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Military and Civilian Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Public Policy Outputs and Outcomes.

Iren Omo-bare
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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Omo-Bare, Iren, Ph.D.

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300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REGIMES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

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Iren Omo-Bare
B.A., University of Delaware, 1983
M.A., University of Delaware, 1985
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Iren Omo-Bare
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

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ABSTRACT

The principal concern of this study is to assess the influence of military and civilian regimes on public policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The key question underlying this research is: Does it make any difference for a country to be governed by a military or civilian government? Some research indicate that regime type does have policy implications, while others suggest that it does not. To determine the linkage (if any) between regime type and public policy four general hypothesis concerning regime effect on public policy are articulated. These are:

H_1 : Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions than in those where they do not.

H_2 : Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite effect.

H_3 : Within any given African country, changes in regime type should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending priorities exhibited by that country.

H_4 : Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under military led regimes that are predisposed to modernization than under regimes headed by civilians who are similarly predisposed.

Three quantitative methods of analysis--the Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS) design, a "pooled" analysis of differences of means and "simple country" analysis--are utilized to evaluate regime performance in several sub-Saharan African countries.

More detailed analysis of the impact of regime type on public policy is provided with case studies of regime performances in Ghana, Liberia

and Nigeria. The Ghana case study deals with the linkage between regime type and agricultural productivity. In Liberia, government policies as they relate to foreign affairs is examined. The case study of Nigeria deals with the impact of regime type on industrial development.

The picture that emerges from this analysis suggests that most military and civilian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are indistinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes. However, there is one category of public expenditure in which there is a clear distinction between the two regime types--defense spending.

INTRODUCTION

Both civilian and military-led regimes can be found in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. However, direct military intervention aimed at supplanting of civilian authority in a sub-Saharan African country can be traced back to November, 1958, when officers led by Gen. Ibrahim Abboud seized control of the Sudanese government. This was followed by a period of stability which lasted until the mid-1960s when, in rapid succession, the governments of Congo-Kinshasa (November, 1965), Dahomey (December, 1965), Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria (January, 1966) and Ghana (February, 1966) all fell victim to coups, thus, making the military coup the most popular method of effecting leadership change in sub-Saharan Africa.

Prior to the mid-1960s there was relatively little scholarly research on the role of the military in African countries. With the increasing incidence of military coups on the continent, a few students of African politics recognized the military as a critical group in shaping the course of nation-building. Thus, the African military became a relevant subject of political inquiry. However, the major emphasis in early research was on describing the political context which precipitates military intervention in national politics. The greater part of the literature was concerned more with coups, countercoups and the collapse of civilian regimes than with the actual functioning of military governments. In time, a few scholars took the significant next step beyond explaining coups. They sought not only to explain military interventions (Nordlinger 1970; Feit 1973; Welch 1974), but also to evaluate the performance of the military as a ruling group (McKinlay and

Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976; Bienen 1987; Joseph 1987). This dissertation is in keeping with this later trend.

When Margaret Thatcher was asked before her first electoral victory what her access to power would change in Britain, she answered in one word: "everything" (von Beyme 1984, 5). It is often with this expectation that things will change, and hopefully for the better, that citizens vote in new leaders to manage the affairs of a country. A military coup in Africa, like an election victory in a Western democracy, installs a new government into office. As is the case with the installation of a new governing party in a Western democracy, direct military intervention in a Third World country is associated with expectations of new policy initiatives.

Some scholars have attempted to discern the impact of party alternation on policy outputs and outcomes in Western societies (Winters 1976; Jennings 1979; Rose 1980; Bunce 1981; Garand 1985). Valerie Bunce has examined the effect of executive succession on public policy in some socialist countries of Eastern Europe. However, no detailed study has attempted to examine the policy implications of military/civilian alternation in power in sub-Saharan African polities. This dissertation is at once an attempt to remedy this situation, and to compare and/or contrast public policy under African civilian and military regimes.

Goals of this Study

The principal concern of this study is to assess the influence of military and civilian regimes on public policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The key question underlying this research is: Does it make any difference for a country to be governed by a military or civilian

government? Given that military intervention in politics is often precipitated by a need to fulfil some specified objectives or solve certain critical problems, how will the policy process be affected by regime change? Does regime change necessarily yield policy change? Are military and civilian regimes associated with different policy priorities, or is the African political and economic environment such that policy outputs and outcomes are not sensitive to regime type. Some observers maintain that regime type does have policy implications, while others suggest that it does not matter. It is the goal of this study to offer some illumination on the issue, as it relates to sub-Saharan Africa.

Another aim of this study is to learn if and why some regime types seem to fare better than others at coping with similar problems (such as, declining productivity, inflation and unemployment). By comparing regime response to similar problems, important lessons may be learned. Some of these lessons may provide guidelines to future leaders on what policy choices to make and which not to make.

Organization of the Study

In the first chapter, the literature on military intervention in Africa is examined in an attempt to explain why military intervention has become the single most popular instrument for bringing about leadership change in Africa. The literature seems to suggest that economic considerations are the most common and perhaps the most important causes of military coup d'etats. Also reviewed in Chapter One are the works of some of the more prominent scholars who have studied regime performance in Third World settings. A preliminary review of the

literature on this subject indicates that considerable disagreement exists among scholars, for example, concerning the policy consequences of civilian vis-á-vis military rule.

In Chapter Two, the hypotheses by which this study will be guided are explicitly stated. Three general hypotheses concerning regime effect on public policy are articulated:

H_1 : Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions than in those where they do not.

Since exceptionally high percentages of defense spending can lead to decreases in the proportion of total public expenditure which is allocated to social and economic sectors, it is also hypothesized that.

H_2 : Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite effect.

From the foregoing hypotheses a general hypothesis regarding regime effect on public policy is articulated, as follows:

H_3 : Within any given African country, changes in regime type should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending priorities exhibited by that country.

Also in this chapter, the two methodologies--quantitative and case study--to be employed to evaluate regime effect on public policies are laid out. Both methodologies are being employed because each makes a distinctive and valuable contribution to this study. For example, the case study approach often does not allow for generalizations, but facilitates detailed analysis of specific subjects. On the other hand, by allowing researchers to study more than a handful of countries at a time, the quantitative approach allows for generalizations, but does not reveal the underlying and particular factors which make for specific

policy outputs and outcomes. Both approaches are employed with the expectation that one approach would check the biases of the other.

In Chapter Three, the quantitative methods of analysis to be employed are specified. They include the Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS) design. The MITS design is employed to evaluate regime performance in the six countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available. In order to evaluate regime performance in all the countries (including those which did not have sufficient data to allow for the use of the MITS design), two additional methods of analysis will be employed. These are "pooled" analysis of differences of means and "simple country" analysis.

Following brief explanations of the methods of analysis and the operationalization of relevant concepts, the quantitative results relating to the impact of regime type on budgetary allocations and regime performance is presented in terms of outcomes in six policy areas (economic growth, agricultural production, industrial production, defense, education and health expenditures). Particular attention is paid to budgetary allocations for defense, education and health, and the contribution of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to the GDP.

More detailed analysis of the impact of regime type on public policy begins in Chapter Four with a case study detailing the performances of alternating civilian and military regimes in Ghana. In order to discern clearly the impact of regime type in Ghana, the performance of successive regimes as it relates to a major sector of the country's economy is evaluated. Since agriculture has always been the principal sector of Ghana's economy, this chapter focuses on agricultural policy

under alternating civilian and military regimes from Nkrumah (1957-1966), to Rawlings (1981-1985).

In Chapter Five an attempt is made to determine whether there is any correlation between regime type and foreign policy behavior. To this end, the following hypothesis is tested: Regime change is more likely to bring about variation in foreign policy than continuous leadership (Rosenau 1971, 111-17; Sang-Seek Park 1980, 138-43). Liberia, a country that underwent a violent regime change in 1980 is chosen to provide the case study to evaluate the impact of regime type and foreign policy behavior. Among other things, the volume and direction of trade, and Liberia's unique relation with the United States, are examined.

The case studies conclude in Chapter Six with an examination of the accomplishments of alternating Nigerian regimes as they relate to the development of the manufacturing industry. Following the approach of earlier case studies, an attempt is made to determine whether it makes a significant difference for a nation to be governed by civilian or military leaders.

In the final chapter, an attempt is made to draw together the findings of the preceding four chapters as they relate to regime performance. Using the four hypothesis which were specified in Chapter Two as guide, the nature of the impact of regime type on public policy is analyzed. More importantly, an attempt is made to provide some explanations for the sensitivity or insensitivity of policy outputs and outcomes to regime type. In the process the impact of environmental constraints (including domestic institutions such as the civil service) on the formulation and implementation of public policies is evaluated.

Among the important constraining characteristics of the civil service in sub-Saharan Africa are the following: routinization, functional specialization, and organizational hierarchy.

Another important constraint which is addressed in Chapter Four is the impact of the international environment on public policy. Thus, the part of the advanced industrial nations, the international marketplace, the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions as they effect the ability of the governments in sub-Saharan African countries to promulgate and implement public policy is examined.

Chapter One

MILITARY COUPS AND REGIME CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction: Independent Africa

In the late 1950s, the African possessions of Britain, France and Belgium, beginning with the Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957 and Guinea in 1958, began to gain their independence. In 1960, no less than sixteen former colonies became independent (see Table 1.1). As colonial rule came to an end, the independence of African countries was proclaimed amid much jubilation and optimism. Expert observers predicted a bright and stable future for the new states on the continent. They portrayed African politics as potentially democratic. Even the military coup in the Sudan in 1958, the attempted overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1960, and the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in 1963 did little to dampen the optimistic predictions and expectations.

At no time or place during the euphoric days of independence were the members of the armed forces portrayed as important players in the political future of Africa. Even James S. Coleman, one of the most respected commentators on African politics, asserted that "except for the Sudan, none of the sub-Saharan African states has an army capable of exerting a political role...." (Coleman 1966, 313-14). This observation was based on some startling facts about the African military of early 1960s. For example, of all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa only the Sudan, where the British had provided military training since 1918, had at the time of independence, a significant proportion of African officers. With its relatively large educated elite, Ghana had only ten

Table 1.1
Dates of Independence of Sub-Saharan African States in Chronological Order of Independence

Sudan	1 January 1956
Ghana (formerly Gold Coast)	6 March 1957
Guinea	2 October 1958
Cameroon	1 January 1960
Togo	27 April 1960
Mali	20 June 1960
Senegal	20 June 1960
Madagascar	26 June 1960
Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo)	30 June 1960
Somalia	1 July 1960
Benin (formerly Dahomey)	1 August 1960
Niger	3 August 1960
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)	5 August 1960
Cote d'Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast)	7 August 1960
Chad	11 August 1960
Central African Republic	13 August 1960
The Congo (People's Republic)	15 August 1960
Gabon	17 August 1960
Nigeria	1 October 1960
Mauritania	28 November 1960
Sierra Leone	27 April 1961
Tanzania (as Tanganyika)	9 December 1961
Rwanda	1 July 1962
Burundi	1 July 1962
Uganda	9 October 1962
Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania)	10 December 1963
Kenya	12 December 1963
Malawi	6 July 1964
Zambia	24 October 1964
The Gambia	18 February 1965
Botswana	30 September 1966
Lesotho	4 October 1966
Mauritius	12 March 1968
Swaziland	6 September 1968
Equatorial Guinea	12 October 1968
Guinea-Bissau	10 September 1974
Mozambique	25 June 1975
Cape Verde	5 July 1975
The Comoros	*6 July 1975
Sao Tome and Principe	12 July 1975
Angola	11 November 1975
Djibouti	25 June 1977
Seychelles	27 June 1977
Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia)	18 April 1980

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, p. 79.
*Date of unilateral declaration of independence.

percent of its officer corps Africanized in 1957, when it became independent. In July 1960, the Force Publique in the Belgium Congo (later called Zaire), did not have a single African officer in a force totalling more than 24,000 men (Gutteridge 1975, 6-7).

While they did not indigenize the officer corps of the African militaries, the British and the French did, make in contrast, some effort to provide their colonies with functioning political institutions before independence. They converted governors' advisory councils into parliaments, manned by duly elected representatives. They also established western-style legal systems with their safeguards for civil rights (Kotecha and Adams 1981, 52). To be sure, the British did much more in this respect than the French.

Consequently, upon achieving their independence, most former British and French colonies inherited or adopted a parliamentary form of government. Heading the governments of these new states were prime ministers responsible to duly-elected parliamentary majorities. Provisions were also made for independent judiciaries, protection of individual rights and other democratic institutions and practices.

The new leaders of Africa were generally anxious to get on with the job of "nation building." Their immediate concern was with the construction of much needed infrastructures, such as roads and railways, along with the provision of essential amenities, including schools, dispensaries, running water and electricity. The new political leaders paid very little attention to the military. After all, the military had played no positive role in the process of decolonization and the achievement of independence. Indeed, in some quarters, they were

perceived as agents of the colonial powers, since, during the colonial era African soldiers had often participated in the suppression of nationalist sentiments. As Gutteridge (1975, 6) observed:

> There had been a legacy of fear and distrust of soldiers in many African countries. Nationalist politicians saw them as agents of imperial rule suppressing political demonstrations and protecting European property. Though they had won glory by serving overseas in the two world wars, their imperial activities caused them to be regarded in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as mercenaries in the service of foreign powers.

These sentiments were reinforced by the presence of a high proportion of European officers in most post-colonial armies (Guinea in 1958 being a notable exception). Partly because of the low esteem in which the military was held, and partly because former colonial powers continued to provide external military support for some of their colonies (e.g., Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal), military matters had a low priority in the agenda of the new rulers of Africa. In fact, some African leaders, including Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika), advocated a policy of "non-militarization" for their countries. However, only Dawda Jawara of the Gambia went beyond such rhetoric and dispensed with a national army altogether. He chose to provide for paramilitary duties by means of an expanded national police force (Liebenow 1986, 242).

The Military Intervenes

The first few years following the achievement of independence were relatively peaceful. Unconstitutional actions by the military were viewed as aberrations that did not reflect the future of Africa.

Furthermore, many of the newly-independent countries achieved some modest economic gains. Some--including Cameroon, the Ivory Coast (now Cote d'Ivoire), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria--had high economic growth rates. But beginning in the mid-1960s, conditions took a turn for the worse, as economic and constitutional order began to break down. Within the space of one four-month period in the mid 1960s, the governments of the Congo (November 25, 1965), Dahomey (December 22, 1965), Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria (January 1966) and Ghana (February 24, 1966) all fell victims to military coups. By the end of the decade, there were ten more coups, bringing the total number of military interventions up to twenty-two in twelve African states. In the 1970s, this trend continued (see Table 1.2). In time, throughout Africa stable civilian oligarchies began to disappear.

Today, parliamentary systems survive in only a handful of sub-Saharan African countries: Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius and Zimbabwe. The remainder are either one-party states or are governed by military juntas. Of the states that gained independence in the 1960s, less than a third have had civilian regimes continuously since independence (Kotecha and Adams 1981, 64). Since 1960, there have been only nine examples of regular constitutional succession in all of sub-Saharan Africa: Gabon (1967), Liberia (1971), Kenya (1978), Botswana (1980), Senegal (1980), Cameroon and Mauritius (1982), Tanzania (1985) and Sierra Leone (1985). Four of these examples occurred at the death of a ruler and another four followed voluntary resignations.

For the majority of African countries, the military coup has become so frequent as to constitute a routine and anticipated means of

Table 1.2
Successful Military Coups in Sub-Saharan African States, 1958-1985

Country	Coup Date	Coup Leader
Benin	Oct. 1963	Col. Christophe Soglo
	Nov. 1965	
	Dec. 1965	Col. Christophe Soglo
	Dec. 1966	Maj. Kouandete
	Dec. 1969	Lt. Col. Kouandete
	Oct. 1972	Maj. Matthieu Kerekou
Burkina Faso	Jan. 1966	Lt.Col. Sangoule Lamizana
	Feb. 1974	Gen. Sangoule Lamizana
	Nov. 1980	Col. Saye Zerbo
	Nov. 1982	Maj. Jean-Baptist Quedraogo
	Aug. 1983	Cpt. Thomas Sankara
Burundi	Nov. 1976	Lt.Col. Jean-Baptist Bagaza
Central African Republic	Jan. 1966	Col. Jean-Bedel Bokassa
	Sept. 1979	
	Sept. 1981	Gen. Andre Kolingba
Chad	April 1975	
	April 1981	
The Congo	Aug. 1968	Cpt. Marien Ngouabi
	Sept. 1968	Cpt. Marien Ngouabi
Equatorial Guinea	Aug. 1979	Lt. Col. Teodoro Mbasogo
Ethiopia	Sept. 1974	Lt. Gen. Aman Michael Anoom
Ghana	Feb. 1966	
	Jan. 1972	Col. Ignatius K. Acheampong
	July 1978	
	June 1979	Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings
	Dec. 1981	Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings
Guinea	April 1984	Col. Lansana Conte
Guinea-Bissau	Nov. 1980	
Liberia	April 1980	Sgt. Samuel K. Doe
Madagascar	May 1972	
	Jan. 1975	
Mali	Nov. 1968	Lt. Moussa Traore

Table 1.2 Cont'd.

Country	Coup Date	Coup Leader
Mauritania	July 1978	Col. Mustapha Salek
	Jan. 1980	Lt. Col. Mohamed Haidalla
	Dec. 1984	Col. Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya
Niger	April 1974	Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche
Nigeria	Jan. 1966	
	July 1966	
	July 1975	
	Dec. 1983	Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari
	Aug. 1985	Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida
Rwanda	July 1973	Maj. Gen. J. Habyarimana
Sierra Leone	March 1967	Brig. David Lansana
Somalia	Oct. 1969	
Sudan	Nov. 1958	Gen. Ibrahim Abboud
	May 1969	Col. Gaafar Nimeiry
	April 1985	Lt. Gen. Swar ad-Dahab
Togo	Jan. 1967	Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema
Uganda	Jan. 1971	Maj. Gen. Idi Amin
	May 1980	
	July 1985	Gen. Basilio Okello
Seychelles	June 1977	
Zaire	Sept. 1960	Col. Mobutu
	Nov. 1965	Col. Mobutu

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1988.

changing top political leadership. Coups in Africa have affected regime change much more frequently than have elections and other forms of constitutionally sanctioned methods of change. Thus, referring to Nigeria, its former president Shehu Shagari proclaimed: "In this country there are, in the end, only two parties, the civilians and the soldiers" (cited in Johnson, Slater and McGowan 1984, 622-40).

At one time or another, over three-quarters of independent African states have experienced attempted or successful military coups. By 1985, only six African states had not witnessed some form of extra-legal armed involvement in national politics by military elites since achieving independence. These states are Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Lesotho[1] (McGowan and Johnson 1984, 633-66).

Although the primary concern of this study is to evaluate regime performance, it will perhaps be appropriate initially to identify some of the factors facilitating military interventions. As Bienen (1978, 4) observed:

> When we understand the reasons for specific military interventions and we explore the links between the military and other political institutions and groups, we can better assess the future evolution of armed forces in society and can better judge the militaries' capacities to deal with specific problems. The factors that explain military intervention also help to reveal the limits of the militaries' political capacities and the constraints on transition from military rule. Even if we have no general theory to explain military intervention, a dissection of the specific components of an intervention may reveal the potentialities of the kind of rule that the intervening military will exert.

Explaining Military Interventions

Many arguments have been put forth to explain the high incidence of military coups in Africa. These arguments indicate that military coups are the result of a complex mix of factors. Among these are political, economic, military, cultural and ethnic differentiation, personal, and foreign influences.

Political Factors Affecting Military Intervention

An examination of the literature on military-led coups in Africa reveals that political factors are strong determinants of them. Among the forces which have been identified as facilitating military intervention in politics are failed civilian leadership, inadequacy and weakness of existing political institutions, and the inability of incumbent existing regime to gain legitimacy.

Failed Civilian Leadership

A number of coups seem to have been undertaken for the express purpose of correcting the failures of the civilian leadership. Where the military establishment perceives the performance of the existing civilian government as inconsistent with the process of nation-building, it may intervene in order to implement what it deems to be necessary changes. For example, when soldiers assumed power in Somalia in 1969, they did so in order to implement basic political changes. And, after they seized power, to a far greater extent than the previous civilian administration, they pursued, a policy of mass-mobilization (Wiking 1983, 30).

Welch (1970) also argued that a regime's performance failures are an important factor in explaining the timing of an intervention. According to Welch (1970, VIII), "Opportunities to intervene occurred in many forms--widespread strikes or demonstrations against the government, severe economic difficulties, the undesired dependence of the government upon the armed forces to maintain control over a rapidly deteriorating situation." Similarly, Liebenow (1986, 247-48) argued that the civilian leadership's use of the military to cope with political situations (riots, strikes), only served to intensify the political role of the military at the expense of civilian authority. Extensive dependence on the military to maintain control not only revealed the weakness of civilian authority but also encouraged the military to believe that its intervention was indispensable for political stability. Coups in a number of African countries--Dahomey (1963), Zaire (1965), Nigeria (1966), Upper Volta (1966)--appear to meet these general criteria.

Inadequacy and Weakness of Existing Political Institutions

Huntington (1968, 4) perceived military intervention as the result of the inability of existing political institutions to keep pace with the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics. When existing political institutions become strained due to the demands placed upon them by newly-mobilized members of the society, the result is often increased political violence. Where normal political channels cannot accommodate citizens' demands, they will express their demands by other means, such as demonstrations, strikes, and as far as the military is concerned, coups.

The Ethiopian coup of 1974 provides an excellent example of how inadequate political institutions can encourage a military coup. The failure of the attempted land reform in 1967-69 made it clear to civilians and military officers who wanted change that this could not be brought about through the existing institutional structures (Schwab 1979, 125-35). Then, in the early 1970s, when drought struck northern Ethiopia, the demands for reform grew stronger. The drought affected the food and water supplies of the armed forces, which were already unhappy over the dangers of the Eritrean campaign (Ethiopian forces had long been involved in a struggle to suppress the Eritrean nationalist movement and to ensure the continued dominion of Ethiopia over Eritrea). The failure of the existing governmental structures to adequately address the problems associated with the drought and to accommodate the grievances of the military brought matters to head.

On January 12, 1974, soldiers in a small garrison in southeast Ethiopia rebelled against their officers over poor food and a shortage of drinking water. The Emperor did nothing, the soldiers were not reprimanded. News of the Emperor's response, or lack of it, quickly reached other regions in the country. Soon enlisted men and NCOs of the Second Division at Asmara began broadcasting their complaints over a radio station. The Emperor hastily changed prime ministers and promised to make the prime minister responsible to parliament. The military responded by forming a secret coordinating committee, later to be known as the Dergue, and military leaders announced that the armed forces would no longer automatically obey the prime minister. While they proclaimed their loyalty to the Emperor, leaders of the coup began to

systematically arrest all those around him. On September 12, with all his close associates already jailed, the Emperor was placed under house arrest, although the Dergue did not formally proclaim the end of the monarchy until March 1975 (Cartwright 1983, 271-72; Ottaway 1978).

For Liebenow (1986), the inherent weakness of African political parties also fosters a climate in which military interventions can occur. With a few notable exceptions, such as National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), formerly the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon and the Action Group (AG) in Nigeria, political parties in postcolonial Africa have lacked organizational strength. Due, in part, to the obstructionist policies and practices of colonial administrators, African civilian politicians failed to acquire the organizational skills needed to create and manage viable political parties (Liebenow 1986, 240-41).

Furthermore, even where strong and potentially viable parties did exist, they tended to be oriented to a specific region or cluster of ethnic groups. In Nigeria, for example, the NCNC was essentially an eastern and Ibo party mechanism, while the AG was of western and Yoruba orientation. Except for a handful of countries, there were no truly national parties in Africa. And as Liebenow (1986, 241) pointed out, civilian leadership has endured only in those few countries (Tanzania, Cameroon, Malawi and Zambia) where broad, cross-cultural political parties have been successfully created.

In the Cameroon, for example, the only national party, the Reassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) [established in 1966 as Union Nationale Camerounaise (UNC)], was the result of a merger

of the governing parties of each of the country's two states (East Cameroon and West Cameroon), and four opposition parties. Consequently, RDPC had representatives from all major groups in Cameroon. The same is true of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM--the revolutionary party of Tanzania) which was the result of a merger between the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar-based Afro-Shirazi party. The CCM has many affiliate organizations from diverse groups in Tanzania (Africa South of the Sahara 1972, 840; 1985, 1004). In Malawi, membership of the country's only political party, the Malawi Congress Party (MPC), is compulsory for all adults. Aside from these countries, there are a few others, which although they lack broad-based political parties, have nonetheless been able to maintain durable civilian regimes. They include Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gabon.

The durability of civilian regimes in Mozambique and Zimbabwe is for the most part due to the fact that the parties assumed a military posture during the anticolonial struggles. But, upon achieving independence, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe took steps to isolate the military wings of their organizations from political affairs. The militaries in these countries have not had occasion to step into the political arena to settle disputes between competing political elites. Furthermore, civilian political leaders in Mozambique and Zimbabwe have relied on their regular police rather than soldiers to maintain internal order.

By contrast, civilian rule has prevailed in the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gabon because of the presence of external military support. The stationing of French troops in these countries has permitted

civilian leaders to remain in control of the state, irrespective of whether the party was broad-based or organizationally strong (Liebenow 1986, 241-42).

Inability of Existing Regime to Gain Legitimacy

Welch and Smith (1974, 26-30), argued that, "the ease with which the armed forces assume political power varies inversely with the legitimacy enjoyed by the existing civilian government." The loss of legitimacy[2] has been used by military elites in several African countries to justify their intervention in politics.

For example, the ouster of President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria in December of 1983 was encouraged by the regime's loss of legitimacy. The last three years of Shagari's administration had witnessed a rapid deterioration of economic conditions in Nigeria. But the military took no action until it became obvious that the administration no longer enjoyed the same level of public support as it did prior to the presumably "rigged" elections of 1983. The elections had been marred by violence and allegations of electoral malpractice.

The electoral victory of Shagari's National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the legitimacy of his newly-formed government were called into question in the face of what Chief Awolowo, leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), who described the process as "vote-rigging of a scale unprecedented in African history."[3] Based on the Nigerian case, the ease with which the military assumed power just four months after the elections seems to lend credence to the proposition that the military is more likely to intervene in politics where the existing regime lacks legitimacy.

Economic Factors Affecting Military Intervention

Of all the factors which encourage military intervention, perhaps none is more significant than the nation's economic condition. Economic difficulties create the opportunity for soldiers to intervene in political system. Most African countries have been and remain economically depressed. In 1983, the U.S. State Department noted that "Africa is the only area in the world where national growth rates are often negative and where per capita food production is declining" (Bureau of Public Affairs 1983, 1). It is therefore not surprising that in nearly all of the countries in which coups have occurred in Africa over the past three decades, coup leaders have pointed to economic problems, such as those cited by the State Department, to justify their decision to intervene.

There is consensus among scholars that the state of a nation's economy affects the probability of a coup occurring within it. In her study of coups in Africa, Nelkin (1967, 231), concluded that "the issues which best account for the ease of military access to power, relate to economic circumstances and their social consequences." Nordlinger (1977, 89), and Welch (1970, 18), have also cited economic decline as a factor that encourages military intervention.

A typical example of a country where economic decline has encouraged military intervention is Benin (which has experienced six coups since achieving independence in 1960). Successive coup leaders in this former French colony of Dahomey have invariably pointed to deteriorating economic conditions to justify their actions. The importance of economic conditions is also reflected in at least two of

the five military coups in Ghana--the first ousted President Nkrumah in 1966 and the second saw the overthrow of Dr. Busia in 1972. Economic considerations were also the primary factors that prompted military interventions in Mali (1968), Congo-Brazaville (August 1968) and Nigeria (July 1975 and December 1983).

The relationship between economic performance and military intervention was empirically evaluated by Staffan Wiking (1974, 74-77). He showed that income, in terms of per capita GNP, in African countries varied significantly with the incidence of coups in these countries. Of the "poorest" fifteen countries on the continent, all but two had had military coups. On the other hand, only six of the "richest" fifteen had experienced military intervention (Wiking 1983, 37).

Military Factors Affecting Military Intervention

Some scholars have argued that factors internal to the African military establishment can encourage or inhibit military coups. The African soldier is particularly sensitive to actions that are not consistent with the military's collective corporate interests. In this regard, reductions in the budgetary allocations to the military, or attempts to limit the military's autonomy, are of particular significance. As several scholars have observed, the likelihood of military intervention increases when the existing government fails to provide adequate funding for the military or interferes excessively in the military's affairs (Nordlinger 1977, 64-76; Liebenow 1986, 240-50; Welch and Smith 1974). For example, the ouster of the Ghanaian prime minister, Dr. Busia in 1972, was, in part, due to the declining living standard of the country's armed forces. Also, the coups in Uganda

(1971) and Liberia (1980), were partly justified on the grounds that the existing government had neglected the material requirements of the military (Wiking 1983, 786-98).

Military coups are also the result of excessive involvement in military affairs by civilian leadership. Once again the Ghana coups of 1966 and 1972 provide excellent examples of the consequences of excessive interference in military affairs by an existing civilian government. These coups may not have occurred or at least may have been delayed, if the civilian regimes of Nkrumah and Busia had not introduced political considerations into matters which were essentially military. According to Robert Price (1971, 399-430), the military's resentment of Nkrumah's removal of the very popular General Ankrah from his position as commander of the army was one of the major factors that precipitated the 1966 coup. The leaders of the 1972 coup not only charged Prime Minister Busia with lowering the living standards of the Army personnel, but also with manipulating promotions within the military (Wiking 1983, 86-87). Uganda, where the personal conflict between Milton Obote and Idi Amin culminated in the ouster of the former in January 1971, provides another instance of military intervention resulting from civilians moving against military personalities (Decalo 1976, 173-230).

Perhaps nothing is more challenging to the military's corporate interest than the creation of independent military or paramilitary organizations. Some African leaders have incurred the wrath of their regular army by creating armies of foreign-trained and well-equipped personal body guards. According to Liebenow (1986, 249), the "creation by Nkrumah of a President's Own Guard Regiment--recruited, trained and

equipped independently of the regular army--was the second professional irritant (the first was the dismissal of General Ankrah) contributing to the 1966 coup in Ghana." Similarly, the attempt to recruit mercenaries from abroad was used by the military to justify the 1966 overthrow of King Ntare V of Burundi.

Military Coups and Cultural Pluralism

Ethnic and regional differentiation constitutes another important reason for military intervention in African politics. Thus Welch and Smith (1974, 26-30) propose that: "The likelihood of military intervention rises as the intensification of conflicts arising from ethnic or class cleavages threatens the status and power of the dominant group or class." While it is often difficult to identify specific instances of military intervention as being prompted solely by ethnic or regional factors, nevertheless, such factors have certainly played a role in quite a few coups. The first short-lived coup in Sierra Leone in March 1967, for instance, was a direct result of reluctance by the Mende tribe to relinquish to another tribe the control it had exercised over the country since independence (de Villiers 1976, 60).

Although soldiers rarely justify their intervention in politics on ethnic or regional grounds, it has been the most important consideration on more than one occasion. In the coups in Somalia (1969), Uganda (1971), and Chad (1975), the coup-makers accused the previous regimes of having pursued a policy of "tribalism," but it was only in Uganda that this accusation was specifically used to justify military intervention (Wiking 1983, 119). Dissatisfaction with the way in which the civilian leadership was handling the regional problems in the Sudan was, in part,

responsible for at least one of the coups in that country. Colonel Gaafar Nimeri and Babaka Awadallah, the two leaders of the 1969 coup in the Sudan, blamed Prime Minister Muhammed Mahgoub and his fellow politicians for their inability to resolve the traditional problem with the southern areas of the country. Ethnic and or regional problems also lay behind the coups in Nigeria (1966), Togo (1967), Dahomey (1972), Rwanda (1973) and Mauretania (1978) (Wiking 1983, 93-119).

Personal Factors Affecting Military Intervention

Although coup leaders often emphasize other factors (economic, organizational, cultural) as the reasons influencing their decision to intervene, the striving for status and the desire to hold and exercise power cannot be ruled out in assessing the motives behind some coups in Africa (Decalo 1976, 15-22, 173-230; de Villiers 1976, 54-66).

According to Decalo (1976), the most important reason for the 1965 coup in the Central African Republic was the personal ambitions of the army chief of staff, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa had manifested his desire to exercise power on numerous previous occasions, including once when he unilaterally assumed the position of minister of war (Decalo 1976, 17).

The personal element in African military coups was perhaps most clearly manifested in the 1971 coup in Uganda. Although Idi Amin cited some of the aforementioned factors as motivations for his decision to intervene, more cogent reasons were Amin's personal fears. As Decalo (1976) pointed out, Amin's decision to intervene preempted President Obote's call for his removal from his position as commander of the army. According to one report, a few hours before the coup, Obote had called

from the Singapore Commonwealth Meeting to have Amin arrested (Decalo 1976, 18). Furthermore, in October of 1970, Amin's powers had already been reduced by the creation of two command positions equal to his own; and he was also the target of at least two inquiries (one into the death of a top army officer and the other into the misuse of defense funds). Finally, there was the personal conflict between Amin and Obote (Decalo 1976, 18-19). All of these considerations coalesced to provide a strong motive for Amin to intervene.

Foreign Factors Affecting Military Intervention

A significant omission in most of the literature on coups is the importance of foreign influence on the military's propensity to intervene in African politics. In the light of available evidence this would appear to be an unjustifiable omission. Although there are difficulties involved in proving foreign influence, there are instances where such influences seem clearly to have been at work. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its sister organization the World Bank, provide excellent examples of how foreign institutions can influence political affairs in African and other countries. One such example is the Sudan, where in 1985, President Nimeri was persuaded to acquiesce to the wishes of the IMF in the removal of food subsidies and the devaluation of the currency. The subsequent increases in the price of food and fuel sparked a general strike by professionals such as lawyers and doctors and demonstrations by students. Public discontent with the regime culminated in the ouster of Nimeri on April 6, 1985 (Clark 1985; Africa South of the Sahara 1988, 949).

Another important foreign factor is reflected in the so-called cases of "contagion" or "demonstration" effect of coups. This idea holds that the threshold of tolerance by the military for an existing regime is drastically lowered when there is an increase in the frequency of successful military coups elsewhere on the continent. Coups, in effect, breed coups! When the continent is viewed as an interacting system it becomes evident that a process of feedback is at work. In this regard, the wave of coups in 1965 and 1966 is very striking. It is perhaps not easy to demonstrate that there were direct connections between events in Algeria (June 1965), and the seven other countries in which coups occurred between October 1965, and February 1966. However, there is no doubt that, by the mid-1960s, African politicians as well military officials were much more in touch with one another and with political life on the continent as a whole, through frequent meetings within the framework of international organizations inside and outside Africa as well as in informal international activities.

For West Africa, in particular, more direct links between coup-makers can be traced. Colonel Lamizana of Upper Volta (now known as Burkina Faso), Colonel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, General Soglo of Dahomey (now Benin), knew one another since they served together in Indochina and, according to Aristide Zolberg (1968, 86), it is likely that the presence of one of them at the helm of his country creates new status aspirations among the others. Helen Kitchen (1963) cites the case of Colonel David Thompson, commanding officer of Liberia's National Guard, who was arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup and is alleged to have said three weeks after the assassination of

President Olympio of Togo: "If only 250 Togolese soldiers could overthrow their government a Liberian army of five thousand could seize power easily" (1963, 9). Another aspect of the phenomenon of contagion is suggested by General Soglo, who explained that his takeover in Dahomey was prompted by the fear that the elections scheduled for early 1966 might crystallize the north-south cleavage and result in disorder similar to that which prevailed among the Yoruba of neighboring Western Nigeria during and after the electoral campaign of October 1965, and about which Dahomians, many of whom are also Yoruba, were well informed (Zolberg 1968, 86).

Conversely, Soglo's successful takeover probably affirmed the resolution of Nigerian officers to topple the civilian regime of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Their success, in turn, may have inspired their Ghanaian counterparts, with whom they shared not only British professional traditions but also an exposure to the disastrous consequences of political disorder gained while serving with the ONUC in the Congo. Furthermore, Zolberg (1969, 179) has argued that, "the phenomenon of contagion contributed to the normalization of military rule as well: its establishment in one country enhanced both the opportunities available to other groups and the legitimacy of stepping in to save the situation. In the light of their shared experiences, military leaders became even less hesitant to establish military rule from the outset."

The most important aspect of contagion is related to the strength of the regime in power. As Welch and Smith (1974) and Feit (1973) observe, coups seem to have occurred mainly in countries whose regimes

are obviously weak. According to Zolberg (1968, 87), "the revelation of this prevalent weakness made even the more firmly established regimes much less formidable. It is as if a spell had been broken..." and "...the army has now seen that the Emperor stands naked." Although it is reasonable to expect "the more firmly established regimes" to be able to resist coup attempts successfully, this has not been the case in Africa. For example, the two most enduring regimes in Africa, the imperial regime in Ethiopia and the one-party dominant civilian regime in Liberia, fell victims of military-led coups in 1974 and 1980 respectively.

No matter what the prevailing conditions may be, the military's ability to topple the government of a country is, to a significant degree, dependent on the acquiescence of the general public. Ultimately the people must first manifest their displeasure over the performance of the existing regime before the military can intervene.

Regime Type and Public Policy: State of the Literature

As the foregoing clearly indicates, a general body of knowledge exists explaining military interventions. What tends to be neglected, however, is the issue of the performance of soldiers after they have assumed control of the government. Do military rulers perform any better or worse than the civilian leaders whom they replace? Or as Claude Welch (1971, 213) puts it, "Can a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?" Are some of the nation's problems susceptible to solution by means congenial to the governing military junta, in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?

Social and political conditions prevailing in contemporary Africa almost preclude any rigorous analysis of this question. For example, available statistics are very uneven, and there are many variables which ideally ought to be investigated in any attempt to answer such questions. Notwithstanding these difficulties, some studies have examined and tried to explain the performance of different regime types in Third World settings. Some scholars have argued that military regimes are more "progressive" than civilian ones; others have contended that military rulers are essentially conservative; and still a third group has maintained that there is little or no difference between military and civilian regimes. The remainder of this chapter will review and analyze these contending perspectives on military regime performance in the Third World.

The Military as a Progressive Force

Some scholars have suggested that the likely consequences of military rule are: economic growth; the modernization of economic and social structures; and more equitable distribution of scarce economic values and opportunities (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962). As sponsors of this kind of change, military governments are depicted as positive forces, whose politization is to be commended. According to the leading exponent of this school of thought, Lucian Pye, the continuing modernization of the military's organization and weaponry has instilled in the officers the belief that their society ought also to be modernized. Said Pye:

> Above all else the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their

> countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies (1962, 280).

Thus the pursuit of social and economic change arises from an awareness of backwardness brought about by improving military technology. Pye cites the overseas experience of the military officers, and "their distance from civilian societies, including attitudes and judgments, that are remote if not completely apart from those of civilian life," as factors that cause the military to "focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world" (1962, 281). The progressive consequences of military rule, it is further argued, stems from the fact that alternative organizations are weak, and that the military, as a major avenue for social mobility, attracts the most talented and confers on its members substantial experience with rational organization and sophisticated modern technology.

Recent studies of regime performance in Latin America (Cohen 1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987), argue that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are more efficient than other regime types at promoting economic development. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are essentially military regimes governing with the tacit approval and collaboration of technocrats and domestic bourgeoisie (O'Donnell 1973). Although the bureaucratic-authoritarian model is a South American phenomenon, these studies can still be instructive in the inquiry into regime performance in Africa. After all, the National Liberation Council in Ghana (1966-69), and the Mohammed-Obansanjo regime in Nigeria (1975-79), exhibited some characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarianism [i.e., the rule of

the military in conjunction with technocrats] (Cammack, Pool and Tordoff 1988, 123).

Using interrupted time-series analysis, Cohen compared the performance of democratic and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. He observed that such regimes have an advantage over democratic ones in effectively implementing the type of policies necessary to facilitate economic growth. However, he noted that economic gains were often made at enormous political costs (e.g., suspension of constitutional rights, censorship of the media, arrests, exiles, and executions).

In their study, Sloan and Tedin (1987) employed a multivariate model and year-by-year data from 1960 to 1980 in twenty Latin American countries to analyze the relationship between regime type, regime age, and public policy. They employed two independent variables (regime type and number of years a specific regime has been in control of government) in an attempt to explain variations in policy outputs. They identified five regime types. These were democratic, bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA), communist, "traditional authoritarian" (TA) and "transitional." According to Sloan and Tedin (1987, 104), TA regimes were either personal dictatorships or "oligarchic democracies." The label transitional regime was used to account for any year in which a country experienced a change in regime control of government.

Having identified the various regime types, Sloan and Tedin then proceeded to evaluate regime effect on five separate policy areas. They were: domestic economic performance, agricultural production, military spending, external debt and domestic social performance. Like Cohen

(1985) they found that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were the most effective in achieving economic growth. However, they compiled poor records when it came to controlling inflation and avoiding external debts. On the other hand, democratic regimes performed adequately and had the second-best record in all five policy areas.

The Military as a Conservative Force

A second view of military regime performance, that of the military as a conservative force, was advanced and gained wide acceptance from the late 1960s onward. A number of scholars have argued that, because military officers belong to the most "organized" institution in developing countries, once they assume power they will be primarily concerned with the attainment and preservation of order. According to advocates of this view, even where social and economic factors are proclaimed as justification for a coup, a military government does not often possess the political and organizational skills to bring about change in the desired direction. As soon as it becomes evident that the goals of economic growth and social change are difficult to achieve, military governors will tend to focus their resources on preserving order (Bienen 1971). Other scholars argue that in addition to maintaining order, military rulers are also very much concerned with the protection of their own interests and those of the middle classes. In this view the military is seen as a conservative force with little or no concern for the promotion of modernizing policies.

Nordlinger (1970) employed statistical analysis of economic change under military regimes to advance the hypothesis that military governments do not really act as agents of modernization. However, he

later modified his hypothesis by stating that, "within a particular social and political context (when there is hardly a middle class to speak of, and when workers and peasants have not been politically mobilized) soldiers in mufti sometimes allow or even encourage economic modernization" (1970, 1134). He maintained, that for the most part, the military in emerging countries assumes power in order to advance its own interests. Under military regimes, the interests of the military are paramount, even when they conflict with the aspirations and interests of larger segments within the society or the nation as a whole (Nordlinger 1970, 1134).

Relying upon the World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, Nordlinger found that in those countries in which there was direct military rule during at least part of the period from 1957 to 1962 (n=18), the average percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) spent on defence was 3.6; but the corresponding figure among those countries in which the military did not serve as governors, but did exert a good deal of political influence (n=20) was 3.4; and in those countries in which the military's activities remained circumscribed within their instrumental role (n=36) it was 1.9 (1970, 1135).[4] Thus it appears that the proportion of GNP devoted to defense is almost twice as large in countries overtly ruled by the military as it is in countries with non-politicized military. The conclusion seems inescapable that when the military accedes to power, its interests become paramount.

Nordlinger also puts forward a proposition regarding the influence of the officers' middle-class interests and identities as these

influence public policy under military regimes. While agreeing with the general hypothesis that the military acts to protect middle-class interests, he advanced a supplementary hypothesis stating that "soldiers in mufti will protect the status quo only where the middle-class interests are seen to be threatened" (1970, 1142-43). From his analysis based on data collected by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1967), Nordlinger inferred that military governments failed to sponsor economic modernization in countries where more than ten percent of the active male population was employed in middle class occupations--i.e., commerce, banking, insurance, technical, professional, managerial, administrative and clerical positions (1970, 1143).

Later works by Edward Feit (1973) and Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith (1974), rely on case studies to develop some useful hypotheses. Feit (1973) argued that the most military governments evolve through three stages. The first stage is characterized by direct control of the polity by military officers. In this stage all principal offices in the country are held by military officials. This stage is usually of a short duration and is followed by a second phase, in which civilian cadres, mostly from the administrative arm, are drawn into the regime, which now claims to be apolitical. At the same time, a cohesion without consensus is built. This cohesion is an alliance of mutually hostile social forces, which are balanced against each other by the military government as means for maintaining power. This coalition holds together only as long as each component believes that its interest will be best served by remaining within it, and that none will profit more than it will itself. Since any serious attempt at social

regeneration will break the coalition, any effort at regeneration is inhibited from the outset. In the end, observed Feit, the hostility of the opposing interests comes to the boil, and the coalition breaks apart, taking the military regime with it.

To avoid this, and to initiate the promised regeneration of society upon which the military's claim to power is based, the regime shifts to a third phase, in which it moves from being presumably apolitical to being avowedly political. In this phase, the leaders seek a mass base as a means of legitimizing the regime and inducing progress. To this end, the military regime creates sets of symbols to which it attempts to condition the masses. The regime also creates mass parties in which the people can be trained to a given political ritual. However, the mass parties are unable to hold the allegiance of the masses, because the coalition essential to maintain the sense of representation, which is a major role of the mass party, cannot be maintained. Eventually the hollowness of the ritual becomes evident, destroying any mass following the military regime may have acquired. The military regime fails because it can neither hold together the disparate and hostile social forces it has had to harness, nor maintain the mass support that it needs to maintain some semblance of legitimacy (Feit 1973, 6-19).

Feit's model reveals that because of the constraints imposed by political and organizational factors which limit their ability to initiate or maintain socioeconomic development, military officers do not make good governors.

In their consideration of military regimes, Welch and Smith (1974) identify four principal types: predatory, reformist, radical and guardian. According to these authors, the great majority of recent military regimes have reflected the propensity of military officers in emerging societies to establish themselves as the unique custodians of the "national interest."

Guardian military regimes place an overwhelming value on political stability and order or on their own corporate interests. Unlike radical and reformist regimes, military guardians consider change to be of secondary importance, and they prefer that change takes place through a gradual and orderly process. They are primarily "law and order" men.

The authors identified four major categories of military guardianship. These are: direct, arbiter, factional, and postcolonial. Of these, the postcolonial variety is the most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The other forms of military guardians apply mainly to Latin America.

In direct guardianship, the military leadership assumes direct responsibility for government by ruling for indefinite periods. In arbiter guardianship, the military tend to act indirectly as custodians of national interest, supporting civilian elites they deem acceptable and setting limits on the policy choices open to government leaders. Factional guardianship is similar to arbiter guardianship. However, in the latter pattern, the armed forces are relatively weak and organizationally fragmented. Consequently, they are unable to effect fundamental changes.

The principal objective of postcolonial guardians is to restore orderly processes to a social order distorted by misgovernment. The authors suggest that, the net effect of this African variety of military guardianship appears to be oriented more to true guardianship. By restoring stability and investor confidence, the military rulers serve the interest of economic development and stimulate the growth of the middle class.

Having described the four principal types of military regimes, Welch and Smith then turned to the case studies of civil-military relations in Thailand, Nigeria, Egypt, Peru and France (France stands apart from the other four countries discussed by the authors). Although the French military were instrumental in bringing down the Fourth Republic, they did not threaten to supplant the civilian government (Welch and Smith 1974, 205-33). The case studies reveal that the scope and character of the political role of the military are conditioned by a large number of interacting institutional and environmental variables. Nevertheless, Welch and Smith still conclude that the outcomes of military intervention and its implications for socioeconomic modernization and political development conform to a pattern which they called the "Garrison-Managerial State." According to this idea, as military institutions throughout the Third World have become more differentiated and specialized, and as officer corps have become more professionalized, the performance in office of military politicians has tended to be more bureaucratic than political in both motivation and effect. Military rule focuses primarily on policies that serve the narrow interests of the armed forces. Secondarily, they seek the

preservation of public order. Thirdly, the military seek the promotion of stable industrial growth; and lastly (if at all), the military advocate policies designed to bring about social and economic reform (1974, 260).

In a study dealing with regime performance in Africa, Berg-Schlosser (1984) identifies four African regime types (polyarchic, socialist, civil authoritarian and military) and evaluates their performance on three main levels. The first level includes achievement of socioeconomic development; the second is the degree of dependence on external economic and political forces; and the third level is the achievement of a good political order (1984, 134).

The results of his analysis contradicts the widely shared view that democracy hinders economic growth in developing countries. Berg-Schlosser finds that polyarchic systems fare quite well both in terms of GNP growth and the improvement of the basic quality of life. They also have the best record when it comes to normative standards, such as the achievement of a good political order (e.g., protecting civil liberties and guaranteeing freedom from political oppression). Military regimes did not fare as well as their civilian counterparts. According to Berg-Schlosser (1984, 121-51) "military regimes clearly show themselves to be no remedy whatsoever for the problems of Africa, either in terms of their economic performance or of their observation of normative standards."

A sort of compromise between these two views (progressive and conservative) on military regime performance, is offered by Huntington

(1968), who suggests that the effect of military rule is dependent on the level of development of the country under consideration:

> As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus paradoxically but understandably, the more backward a society is the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military (1968, 221).

Thus, according to Huntington's argument, both views of military regime performance are essentially accurate. However, the question is how to distinguish between backward and advanced societies. It would appear from his discussion that Huntington was referring to the level of social and economic development. However, no matter what standard of measurement is applied, when compared to nations in other regions of the world, nearly all of those in Africa will be classified as backward. Thus, at least in the present context, Huntington's hypothesis seems consistent with that of Pye. On the other hand, in regions where economic and social development are at a relatively more advanced stage, military regimes will tend to act as conservative forces. This implies that African military governments are likely to constitute a force for economic and social progress, whereas their Latin American counterparts will tend to act as conservative forces inhibiting social and/or economic change. To be sure, there are some Latin American nations (including Bolivia and Peru), which are as backward as many in Africa.

Within Africa itself, there is very little difference from one country to the other in terms of the level of social and economic development. With the notable exception of oil-rich Gabon, and sparsely

populated Seychelles (with average annual per capita GDPs of approximately $700.00 and $500.00, respectively) over the last ten years, the annual average per capita GDP for most of the remaining African states fell some where between $350.00 (for Zambia, Swaziland, Mauritius and Cote de'Ivoire) and $60.00 (for Mali, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia). At these low levels of economic development, Huntington's hypothesis is not likely to be of any meaningful significance. Thus, if they are to illustrate Huntington's theory, African military regimes should act as "progressive" forces, since all societies in Africa are underdeveloped.

Regime Type Makes no Difference

Some studies of regime performance have concluded that there are no significant differences between military and civilian regimes. In a cross-national, aggregate study of all independent, non-Communist countries with a population greater than one million, R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan (1975) find that military rule in the Third World has no discernible economic policy consequences. They conclude that "the occurrence of a military regime does not have a pronounced effect on economic performance when MR (military regime) are compared to CRM (period of civilian rule in countries that have experienced military regimes)" (1975, 20). They also find that military regimes have no significant effect on economic performance when both MR and CRM are compared with CR900 (low income countries which have experienced only civilian rule). With regard to overall regime performance, McKinlay and Cohan conclude that military regimes in the Third World are not a

homogeneous group that can be clearly differentiated from civilian regimes (1975, 1-30).

Another significant contribution in this field of research is the attempt by Robert Jackman (1976) to evaluate the merits of some of the foregoing arguments about military regime performance. Using the Adleman and Morris (1967) data, along with a new set of data covering the period from 1960 to 1970 for seventy-seven Third World countries, Jackman (1976) assesses the validity of various hypotheses about the impact of military rule. He specifies a general model which allows for the evaluation of the arguments of Pye (1962), Huntington (1968) and Nordlinger (1970). His findings do not confirm any one of the competing hypotheses. He concludes:

> In short, military intervention in the politics of the Third World has no unique effects on social change, regardless of either level of economic development or geographic region.... We can conclude that blanket statements portraying military governments in the Third World as either progressive or reactionary are without empirical foundation. This implies that many observers may have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills to the military, whether directed toward progressive or conservative ends. We can also conclude that military regimes do not assume different mantles as countries of the Third World become wealthier. In short, the simple civilian-military government distinction appears to be of little use in the explanation of social change (1976, 1096-97).

Conclusion: Some Critical Observations

The foregoing studies have offered insights into how military officers, and in a few cases civilians, perform upon assuming political control of the state. This review clearly indicates that, in coping with the problems of developing countries, answers to questions regarding regime effectiveness are still inconclusive. With the

exception of three studies (Pye 1962; Cohen 1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987), the proponents of these theories all arrive at the conclusion that military rule has a negative, or at best no, impact upon social and economic change in third world countries. These scholars all arrive at their conclusions by different routes. Nordlinger (1970), McKinlay and Cohan (1975), Jackman (1976), Berg-Schlosser (1984), Cohen (1985), and Sloan and Tedin (1987) do so by employing statistical analysis, while the others use case studies.

The conclusion of several of those scholars who believe that military regimes are positive agents for economic and social modernization seems to be based on several unwarranted assumptions. The first is that the education and training which soldiers receive "socialize" them into professional men, with attributes that make for good governors. Second, there is the assumption that such acquired values or attributes are transferable into situations or occupational roles which are not primarily military. The third assumption is that in the process of governing a civilian society, these military values are transmitted to the rest of society in a way that regulates societal behavior and that, consequently, changes such societies for the better.

A number of studies in professionalization appear to support the first assumption, particularly for the officer corps. Yet, these studies can be applied to African military elites only with considerable caution. The training which produces a top military professional is in general usually of exceptional duration (Moore 1970, 6). The rapid "Africanization" of the officer corps within African nations after independence inevitably produced conditions in which the usual officer

training periods were shortened. For example, in January of 1960, the officer corps of the Nigerian army was only 18 percent Nigerian, but by the end of 1965 it was totally Nigerianized (Welch 1987, 103). Five years was too brief a period to adequately train the number of Nigerians needed to replace expatriate officers. The Nigerian military suffered accordingly, and, in 1976, a major in the Nigerian army, lamenting the decline in the quality of officers in the country's army, observed that "the degree of professional proficiency in the Nigerian Army of today," was significantly inferior to that of the Nigerian pre-civil war soldier (Ogbebor 1976, 12).

Aside from the effect of indigenization, the prosecution of wars (civil wars in Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan) creates the necessity both for rapid and crash training, as well as for quick promotions, because of manpower needs to prosecute such wars. Also, in military-led governments, the movement of senior officers to staff civilian administrative positions brings about premature promotions of junior officers to senior positions. The result is the presence of considerable mediocrity among the professional officers corps within these nations.

Evidence also reveals that members of the military in most African countries do not all live in isolated barracks. The lack of barracks facilities and the size of the army ensure that the education and training of military personnel are conducted in facilities which are not insulated from interference by civilians. Civilians and soldiers mix freely at shops, markets, sporting events and other public places to such an extent that it can be argued that there is considerable

"civilianization" of the military. The absorption of military values and attitudes will be less effective when other social groups can interfere, albeit indirectly, in the educational and training processes of the military. The fact that professional men of quality are in short supply and professional training has been constrained by several factors in independent Africa, necessarily makes it difficult to agree with those scholars (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962) who argue that military officers possess special qualities which make for good governors.

Pye's assertion that possession of modern military equipment and overseas experience of training or duty would make military officers eager to have their own countries modernized seems plausible. However, it should be borne in mind that the influence of training in the west becomes increasingly less important as the date of independence recedes. Many African countries have their own military academies, and it is not uncommon for some countries to have their officers trained in several foreign countries (including the Soviet Union, China and Eastern European countries). Furthermore, the same arguments about the influence of overseas training on military officers could be made for African civilian elites (including politicians). With very few exceptions, African civilian elites receive most of their higher education overseas. Many African politicians spent several decades overseas before returning home to lead their country to independence. They include: Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Hastings Kamuzu Banda who returned to Malawi in 1958 after forty years in Europe and the

United States. Moreover, the link between education or training and political behavior in African polities is one that is difficult to establish. Inferences from military experience or training to military political behavior become less valid to the extent that officers are subject to pressures and expectations from other groups. This is of particular significance in the Third World and especially in Africa. The increasing politicization of the military profession in Africa helps to develop a politicized ethos. Hence it is to be expected that overseas training would become a less valid predicator and influence on the behavior of military rulers. When outside pressures mount and politicization increases, the spectrum of options open to the military and the values attached to each alternative will play a greater role in determining actual behavior.

Nordlinger's (1970) argument that increases in military spending in countries with military regimes leads to a decline in performance of other sectors of the economy may also be based on a faulty analysis. The proper question to ask is: How detrimental to economic development is increases in military spending? It would be necessary to compare defense budgets with allocations for other sectors of the economy. This becomes a matter of evaluating data for individual countries, but this was not provided by Nordlinger. Another factor that Nordlinger did not accommodate is the possible spill-over effect of increases in defense spending. Increases in defense spending have been known to stimulate growth in other sectors of the economy (e.g., the United States experienced tremendous economic growth during and immediately after World War II, for the most part because of increased defense spending).

Thus, it may be that increases in military expenditure under military regimes do not preclude the ability of military governors to act as agents of economic modernization.

The different approaches employed by these observers can impose significant limitations on the validity of their findings. Such is the case, for example, with the studies by Feit (1973) and Welch and Smith (1974), which suffer from a problem common to most case studies. The applicability of their findings tend to be geographically- and temporally-bound. For example, where Feit's model proved useful for explaining the performances of the military regimes that constitute the six case studies in his book (Spain, Argentina, Pakistan, Burma and Egypt), it did not prove to be an adequate model for explaining military regime performance in tropical Africa. Thus, some military regimes in the region (Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Liberia, Togo and Niger) have actually skipped Feit's first stage, going directly to some variation of the second stage. Still other regimes remained at the second stage until they were toppled or voluntarily return to the barracks. Other regimes have gone through the first and second stages without actually reaching the final, "mass-party" stage. However, Mobutu's regime in Zaire seems to have gone through all three stages (Willame 1970, 149; Africa, March 1985). In the West African experience, only the former French colonies of Mali, Benin and Togo have experimented with the formation of political parties by the ruling military. A similar situation exist in the Congo Republic.

Unlike the case study approach, the quantitative approach allows for generalizations, but it rarely permits the critical evaluation of

specific cases. Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative approach is heavily dependent upon the reliability of available data. The difficulty in obtaining accurate and reliable data from Third World countries is a familiar problem in the social sciences (Janowitz 1977, 21). Many factors mitigate against the gathering and storage of such data. These include: political expediency, lack of modern technology, and difficult geographic conditions.

Statistics relating to the military tend to be the most suspect. In military regimes, the "juggling" of statistics is a common practice. Moreover, the affairs of the military tend to be shrouded in secrecy (especially for foreigners) and military rulers are usually very reluctant to give information to researchers.

Furthermore, in some instances, the duration of military or civilian rule has been too brief for a meaningful longitudinal study. For example, Eric Nordlinger's (1970) study, which concluded that military rule was essentially conservative, is based on cross-national data for the period of 1957-1962. A similar study by Robert Jackman (1976), over a longer period of time 1960-1970, produced a different conclusion. These results suggest that statistical data from African countries, and especially those with military governments, should be used with extreme caution. Despite these limitations, investigators who employ statistical analysis in evaluating regime performance in third world countries still perform a very useful task. Among other things, their efforts serve the purpose of directing our attention to some relevant indicators for the evaluation of regime performance. More

importantly, they can serve as foundations upon which future research, using improved data, can be based.

Endnotes

1. After a successful military coup in January 1986, a military government was established in Lesotho.

2. Legitimacy refers to the perception on the part of citizens that a given system of government is just and proper. Where legitimacy exists, it provides a surer basis for regime survival than force alone could ever do. A regime acquires legitimacy only when its actions conform to a generally accepted tradition and/or constitutional and legal order. Max Weber identified three types of legitimate authority on which regimes may be based. They are traditional (where people believe in the sanctity of traditional institutions, e.g., monarchies), charismatic (where citizens accept an individual's right to rule because of a belief that he is endowed with special powers or qualities, e.g., De Gaulle, Stalin, Mao, Nasser, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kenyatta and Toure), and rationality (where citizens accept the legality of established rules and the right to govern of those who come to power in observance of these rules, e.g., the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union). Weber felt that regimes based on rationality are the best (Weber 1947, 324-429).

3. Africa <u>News</u>, 22 August 1983; <u>West Africa</u>, 22 August 1983.

4. Nordlinger's study included 74 countries grouped into four regions: Latin America (N=21); Middle East and North Africa (N=15); Asia (N=15); Tropical Africa (N=23). Of the tropical African countries only the Sudan had a military government during the period 1957-1962.

Chapter Two

REGIME TYPE: PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

The key concern of this study is to determine whether it makes any socioeconomic difference for an African nation to be governed by the military or by civilians. No serious discussion of this question will be complete without at least brief reference to Africa's historical traditions as they relate to regime types.

Precolonial and Colonial Traditions

Historical traditions have had a significant impact on the affairs of contemporary Africa. To be sure, these traditions, colonial ones in particular, have set important limits within which rulers of independent Africa have functioned and continue to function. Of particular significance, at least as far as this study is concerned, is the role of the military in the political system.

The role of the precolonial African soldier varied from one time and place to another. For example in the so-called "stateless societies" (e.g., the Kungs of the Kalahari and the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria) which developed no identifiable form of central government, there was no place for the soldier or warrior. On the other hand, the soldier played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of the various Sahelian empires (Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Kamen-Bornu).

The Sahelian empires were located south of the Sahara. The empire of Ghana which rose and fell between about 500 A.D. and 1250 A.D. was situated in the region between the bend of the Niger at Timbuktu and the middle reaches of the Senegal and Gambia rivers; it occupied most of

present-day Mali, the southeastern regions of contemporary Mauritania and eastern Senegal. The empire of Mali, which flourished from the mid-thirteenth century to the later part of the fourteenth century, occupied all of ancient Ghana. At its height the king of Mali's authority extended form the Gambia and the lower Senegal valleys in the west, to the western region of contemporary Niger to the east, and from the southernmost part of Algeria in the north to the northern regions of Guinea and Burkina Faso in the south. The Songhai empire, which reached its height in the sixteenth century, covered all of ancient Mali and extended further east to occupy most of present-day Niger and northern Nigeria. The empire of Kamen-Bornu evolved over the same time as the Mali and Songhai empires. However, at its height in the early fourteenth century, it was only about half the size of the Songhai empire, extending from north of the River Benue in northeastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon to the south, to all of modern day Chad and eastern Niger to the north.

In Mali and Songhai, the king who appointed the generals was himself the commander-in-chief of the army and personally directed military operations. In each empire the army was divided into several corps assigned to the defense of different provinces. The generals commanding the various units of the army had purely military powers. There was a clear distinction between civilian and military authority (Diop 1987, 53-59, 115-24).

The primary role of the soldier in precolonial Africa was to engage in foreign expeditions. Military expeditions were undertaken either to secure existing borders or to facilitate territorial

expansion. For example, Mansa Musa the most famous king of Mali used his army which was said to be about 100,000 strong, to tighten the grip of the central government on the provinces to ensure peace and order, to conquer new states or reconquer states which may have broken away from the empire (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 28). However, rulers rarely directed their military establishments against their own subjects (Diop 1987, 107).

In spite of the current trend toward authoritarian forms of rule in Africa, the notion that rulers have to be accountable to their subjects is not alien to Africa. In many parts of precolonial Africa, governments were established according to democratic principles. For example, long before European penetration of Africa, traditional rule in Botswana was based on a system of consultation and free discussion on matters of public interest in the assembly known as the "lekgotla." The ruler in the Botswana political system derived his powers from the people. This is expressed in Setswana as, "Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho," meaning the chief is the chief by the will of the people (Magang 1986, 103-108). A similar principle is clearly evident in the Sotho proverb, "A chief is a chief by the people; a people are a people through the chief" (Potholm 1988, 25).

In many societies in precolonial Africa there were effective restraints on governmental power. Although these checks were not often written down and not often formalized, they were no less real (Busia 1951; Magang 1986; Maquet 1971). In precolonial Ghana, for example, the Asantehene (titular monarch) can be "de-stooled" for behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with Asante traditions (Busia 1951). Among

the Swazis, the king was always referred to as the "Ngwenyama-in-council," to signify his reliance on the council to sanction his actions. Among the Sotho peoples, the national "pitso" (assembly) was open to all and its approval was vital for any major policy decision (Potholm 1988).

To be sure, there were also examples of authoritarian systems in precolonial Africa. For example, the Fulani empire which came into being after a holy war (jihad) to reestablish Islam in what is today Northern Nigeria, Chad, and Northern Cameroon, led to the establishment of some of the most highly centralized, conservative and hierarchical political systems in precolonial Africa. Autocratic rule through hereditary emirs was the customary form of leadership. Eligibility for leadership in the emirates was conferred by birth and was viewed as a "gift of Allah" (Coleman 1960, 39; Smith 1955, 93; Theen and Wilson 1986, 514).

A different pattern of authoritarian rule was established among the Nguni peoples of the south east coast of Africa. Traditionally farmers, the Ngunis were transformed into warriors under the command of an absolute ruler, the warrior king. With its military political system, the Zulu kingdom--which reached its pinnacle in the reign of the ruthless King Chaka--has been likened to that of Sparta in ancient Greece (Oliver and Crowder 1981, 86; Magang 1986, 103).

Although they were often deemed to be nonpolitical, in fact, military forces in colonial Africa served the profoundly political purpose of upholding European rule. They were often used along with

colonial police forces to suppress political dissent, such as strikes and demonstrations (Welch 1987, 76-77, 101-103; Gutteridge 1975, 6).

For example, in 1906, the British declared martial law when the Zulus under Bambata refused, among other things, to pay a toll tax. Perhaps the most celebrated use of force by a colonial power in Africa was in the 1950s, when the British army was called upon to suppress the Mau Mau movement in Kenya (Phillips 1984, 59-64). The pattern was the same for other European powers all over the continent. Colonial rule was maintained by the use of force and intimidation (Oliver and Crowder 1981, 166-67).

Since Africa was subject to rule by several colonial powers (British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish, Italian, and German), the colonial legacy has varied from one part of the continent to another. Yet all colonial systems shared a number of characteristics that effectively influenced the course of politics in Africa.

All colonial systems in Africa were imposed or at least maintained by the use of force. The systems of government were essentially authoritarian. In all the colonies, every important decision was made by the colonial administrator and imposed on the citizens of the colonies. The political patterns were overwhelmingly hierarchical, and Africans were systematically excluded from decision-making roles (Schoolman 1988).

Despite the claims made about their virtues, the Westminster and French models of parliamentary democracy where never practiced in any African country throughout the colonial period. Although they had never been developed under colonial rule, these models of democracy were

nevertheless imposed on the colonial peoples at independence (Legum 1986, 175-85; Magang 1986, 103-108). It is no wonder that, in most African countries, the Western system of democracy collapsed almost immediately after independence.

Whereas no direct connection seems to exist between the role of soldiers in precolonial and postcolonial Africa, more direct links can be traced from the role they played in the colonial era and the role they have played since independence. For example, it is not uncommon for soldiers in independent Africa to be called upon to suppress domestic dissent. Like the colonial rulers before them, civilian rulers in postcolonial Africa often make use of the military to maintain control over their citizens. Some observers have argued that the use of soldiers to cope with political challenges to the regime (strikes, demonstrations and riots), encouraged the military to believe that their intervention was necessary for political stability (Liebenow 1986, 247-48). One result is that military systems have become the most common form of government on the African continent.

African Political Systems: A Typology

When attempting to categorize political systems, researchers often look at a variety of system characteristics. Among these are the basis of legitimacy, the party system, the pattern of recruitment of the head of the executive, the formal vertical and horizontal separations of power, the actual power structure, the scope of political control, constitutional provisions and the ideological orientation of the system (Shils 1962; Easton 1965; Apter 1965; Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; Berg-Schlosser 1984).

Because very few African leaders, if any, govern in accordance with the provisions of existing constitutions, it is not worthwhile to use constitutions as the basis for determining African system types. Nevertheless, some useful efforts have been made to construct typologies which may be applied to African regimes (Welch and Smith 1974; Nordlinger 1977; Berg-Schlosser 1984; Ayoade 1986).

For the purpose of this study, I will use a modified version of a typology of African political systems developed by Berg-Schlosser (1984, 121-51). Berg-Schlosser identifies the following four categories of political systems: polyarchic, socialist, authoritarian and military. For this study, I have adopted only three variations of his four categories. These are multiparty (democratic), one-party/dynastic and military.

The category of socialist systems has been excluded from the present classification of system types, because of the difficulty involved in identifying African Marxist-Leninist countries. According to Berg-Schlosser socialist systems are noted for having, "effective single-party organization, a more centralized system of government, and an ideology that pursues a more self-reliant and noncapitalist road to development with the aim of a more egalitarian social order" (1984, 130). Although the leaders of many African countries have espoused what has sometimes been called "African socialism," "developmental socialism," or "communitarian socialism," none of them has been able to put it into practice successfully (Sargent 1987, 205-207).

As a number of African leaders have discovered, proclaiming a country's socialist destiny and either achieving it or making it persist

are not necessarily the same thing. Thus far, so-called socialist revolutions on the continent (e.g., Angola, Burkina-Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Tanzania), have faltered before they even got off the ground. External forces such as the world economy, have produced conditions that make the implementation of socialist goals impossible, even if everything had gone well internally. But as Lyman Sargent observed:

> Internally, all Third World countries face a multitude of problems. Among the worst problems are rampant corruption, extreme differences of wealth, threat of military takeover, and tribal and religious conflict. As a result, no Third World country has been in a position to put developmental socialism into practice even if external factors had been perfect (1987, 207).

A number of African leaders that once advocated socialism have discarded this ideological orientation in favor of pragmatic considerations in determining government policy. For example, in the People's Republic of the Congo, collectivist methods, inspired by Marxism-Leninism, have been discarded in favor of entrepreneurial methods. The minister of agriculture said simply, "Marxism without revenue is Marxism without a future" (Sklar 1986, 135).

Finally, almost every country in sub-Saharan African has what Almond and Verba have called a "parochial" political culture (Almond and Verba 1963). This is a political culture in which citizens are only indistinctly aware of, or not concerned with, the central government. Consequently, the modern political arena in a typical African country will tend to cover a very small proportion of the whole country. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful whether the solid popular base required for an effective socialist party can be built. These are the

principal reasons for excluding a category for so-called "socialist" political systems--a step which should not have any significant impact on this study.

The classification of political system upon which this study will be based, therefore, is derived from three major system characteristics. The first is the executive selection process (i.e., whether the chief executive is elected, inherited the office or installed by coup). The second criterion refers to the autonomy of the chief executive and his cabinet (e.g., whether the assembly, if it exists, can veto executive decisions). The final characteristic refers to the presence of political parties and party competition (how many political parties are there, and whether free competition among parties is allowed).

The characteristics used here are not only sufficient to accommodate all of the system types in Berg-Schlosser's classification, but they also capture major variations in the general form of African regimes. More characteristics could be included, which would possibly yield finer distinctions and a more elaborate typology. However, these three seem to cover the key differentiating features among regimes and for our purposes should produce a useful classification of sub-Saharan African regime types.

The first three of Berg-Schlosser's categories of political systems are associated with civilian regimes. A civilian regime can be said to exist in countries where civilians occupy key government positions and openly determine national policy, goals, and objectives. There are many expressions of civilian regimes. A civilian regime can take the form of a multiparty (democratic) system, a single-party

system, or a monarchy. It may espouse socialism or capitalism. For this study, the various expressions of civilian regimes are classified under two broad categories: multiparty and one-party or dynastic (see Table 2.1).

Multiparty (democratic) systems are competitive systems in which candidates from two or more political parties are able to openly and freely contest election for the purpose of assuming control of government. In Africa, European forms of democratic systems (Westminster and French presidential model) were installed by the colonial powers in many countries at the time of independence. Not many of these have survived (see Table 2.1) and even where the original system has been maintained to a certain extent, it has undergone a number of significant modifications (Sklar 1983, 11-24; Berg-Schlosser 1984, 130). Consequently, some civilian regimes that are less than fully competitive, but clearly not one-party systems have been included under this heading (e.g., Kenya 1963-1981).

One-party systems are characterized by a single dominant party structure, along with strongly centralized and highly personalistic leadership (Berg-Schlosser 1984, 130-31). There are no free and open elections; public opinion is closely controlled. Because of the similarities in their central characteristic (i.e., single-party structure), Berg-Schlosser's socialist and authoritarian categories are merged into this one-party category of civilian regime (see Table 2.1). Also included in this category are the dynastic systems in Swaziland and Ethiopia (until 1974).

Table 2.1
Classification of Political Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1985

COUNTRY	CIVILIAN REGIME Multiparty System (Democratic)	One-Party or Dynastic System	MILITARY REGIME
Benin	1960-65	---	1966-69
	1970-72	1973-85	
Botswana	1966-85	---	---
Burkina Faso	1971-73	1960-65	1966-70;1974-85
Burundi	1962-66	1967-76	1977-85
Cameroon	1960-72	1973-85	---
Central African Republic	---	1960-65;1980-81	1966-79;1982-85
Chad	1960-62	1963-74	1975-85
The Congo	1960-64	1965-68	1969-85
Cote d'Ivoire	---	1960-85	---
Equatorial Guinea	1968-70	1971-79	1980-85
Ethiopia	---	1960-74(mon.)	1975-85
Gambia	1965-85	---	---
Ghana	1960-63	1964-65	1966-69
	1970-71	---	1972-79
	1980-81	---	1982-85
Guinea-Bissau	---	1975-80	1981-85
Kenya	1963-81	1982-85	---
Lesotho	1966-85	---	---
Liberia	---	1960-79	1980-85
Madagascar	1960-71	---	1972-85
Malawi	---	1964-85	---
Mali	---	1960-68	1969-85
Mauritania	1960-64	1965-78	1979-85
Mauritius	1968-85	---	---
Niger	---	1960-73	1974-85
Nigeria	1960-65	---	1966-79
	1980-83	1984-85	
Rwanda	1962-73	---	1974-85
Senegal	1960-66	1967-85	---
Sierra Leone	1961-66	---	1967
	1968-73	1973-85	
Somalia	1960-69	---	1970-85
Sudan	1965-68	1960-64;1969-85	
Swaziland	---	1968-85(mon.)	---
Tanzania	---	1961-85	---
Togo	1960-66	---	1967-85
Uganda	1962-65	1966-70	1971-78;1980
	1979;1981-85		
Zaire	1960-64	---	1965-85
Zambia	1964-72	1972-85	---
Zimbabwe	1980-85	---	---

Sources: Africa South of the Sahara (1988), Berg-Schlosser (1984), Legum (1970-87).

A military regime or system is one in which military officers occupy key government positions and openly dictate national policy; military definitions of national goals prevail, dominating the mass media of communication and both public and private discussion; and military-dictated priorities supersede competing goals and policies (Fidel 1975, 1). Military regimes can also espouse socialism or capitalism, and they might even have dynastic pretensions (e.g., Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Empire). Military regimes are noted for the violent means (coup d'etat) by which they assume and often maintain power (Berg-Schlosser 1984, 130-31). Although there are various expressions of military regimes (Welch and Smith 1974; Nordlinger 1977), all regimes that satisfy the foregoing definition of military system will be so identified.

African Regime Types: Performance Expectations

Good reasons exist to expect one regime type to perform better than another according to certain performance indicators. As already noted, many students of African politics argue that the structural organization of the military, combined with the technological and managerial skills possessed by members of the armed forces, help to orient the military toward the goal of modernization. Furthermore, civilian regimes, particularly those that have a democratic system of government, are viewed by many as a luxury that Third World countries can ill afford (Andreski 1969; Chirot 1977; Hewlett 1980). However, other observers have argued that modernization cannot occur without democratic institutions (Lipset 1959; Coleman 1960; Rostow 1971). For example, in a study of emerging nations of Asia, Africa and the Middle

East, James Coleman (1960, 532-44) concluded that "the major hypothesis that economic development and competitiveness are positively correlated is validated when countries are grouped into major differentiating categories of competitiveness and where mean scores of economic development are employed."

In the following pages, the main arguments regarding regime capabilities will be presented. From these arguments, certain hypotheses will be derived that will guide the study.

Civilian Regime: Multiparty System (Democracy)

The most fundamental characteristic of a democratic system is the notion that citizens should be involved in the making of political decisions, either directly or through elected representatives. Whether directly or indirectly, citizens are encouraged to have some say regarding public policy. This type of system demands constant political activity by the people--debates, the formation of associations, preparations for and participation in elections, and party competition. Many commentators have questioned the usefulness or wisdom of instituting such a demanding system in the newly emerging countries of the Third World. There are positive and negative positions on this issue.

The positive perspective holds that a competitive system will facilitate economic and political development in Third World countries. According to this perspective, the only way to identify obstacles to development is through citizen participation. For it is the average citizen who has to confront the problems of society in his everyday life and who, consequently, is best informed about what needs to be done.

Thus, only a system that makes allowance not only for feedback from the governors to the governed, but also from the governed to the governors, can enable the government to identify and direct resources to sectors where they are most needed. A democratic system, it is further argued, encourages economic growth because it is the only system that is conducive to free competition. And, since free competition rewards initiative and enterprise, this type of system should facilitate maximum increases in productivity.

Furthermore, the positive argument asserts that only a competitive system can guarantee responsive public officials. Public officials who wish to be reelected, or elected in the first place, must convince voters that their term in office will be beneficial to the country. One way of doing this is to be responsive to the changing needs and demands of the society and its population.

Conversely the negative argument views democracy as a system that Third World countries can ill afford. According to this perspective, citizen participation is an impediment to national development. The powers of decision makers are limited; and the command structure is ordered in such a fashion that decision makers are slow to make important decisions, because they are bound by an established legal order. Thus, it often takes too much time for even beneficial programs to be implemented.

Furthermore, in the culturally pluralistic countries of Africa, the adoption of a democratic system could be destabilizing. Because substantial portions of the population still do not accept the legitimacy of the state, democratic procedures, such as elections, could

provoke major political disturbances (de Villiers 1976, 82-83; Powell 1982, 41-43).

For example, a general election in Rwanda in 1961 was preceded by violent clashes between the two major ethnic groups in the country: the Hutu and the Tutsi. In April and May 1972, factional struggles in Rwanda's southern neighbor, Burundi, led to one of the most appalling ethnic slaughters ever recorded in the annals of modern Africa. Following an abortive Hutu-led coup in April, a campaign of repression was carried out by the Tutsi, resulting in an estimated 100,000 Hutu deaths. From 1961 to 1964, ethnic clashes in Rwanda claimed an estimated 20,000 lives (de Villiers 1976, 82-83; Africa South of the Sahara 1988, 305-306, 825-27). Racial antagonisms have also played a significant role in Kenyan politics. The 1961 election in Kenya was marked by racial violence between the Kikuyus and Masais. Further indication of the negative impact of democratic processes on the politics of ethnically differentiated societies include the racial clashes that flared up soon after the 1960 General Election in the former Belgium Congo.

Another problem arising from the cultural diversity of African countries is that it makes democratic compromise difficult, if not impossible. The different groups clamor for scarce resources and for control of government. This leads to what Daniel Chirot (1977, 224), refers to as "democratic paralysis." Even in more advanced democracies conflicts over what Dan Usher calls "assignment" can be especially troublesome. For a democratic political system to survive there must be a prior agreement among citizens on a set of rules or consensus for

allocation of resources (Usher 1981, viii). In such a society it is necessary to have general agreement (what Rousseau called "the general will") concerning certain substantive assumptions underlying the government. Where this is lacking, as is the case in most of sub-Saharan Africa, in practice democracy can in fact be very destabilizing.

Whereas some observers see free competition as a positive aspect of multiparty systems, others maintain that such competition is often accompanied by considerable nonproductive expenses. They suggest that the newly emerging countries need a planned economy if they are to attain a rapid and sustainable level of economic growth. They hold that economic planning is not compatible with a representative form of government. Although a representative assembly can agree on the need for planning, the argument goes, it is not likely that it can work out a production schedule. Such a schedule must have a uniformity and continuity that exclude the compromises typical of democratic institutions (Tingsten 1965, 161). Furthermore, when a representative assembly handles planning, the changes and additions to the program that might result from compacts between different groups in the assembly would tend to introduce disorder and waste into the system and interfere with the application of certain essential parts of the original program. Problems such as these can only serve to maintain the underdevelopment of the newly emerging countries of Africa.

At this juncture it is perhaps proper to note that reputable studies have shown that the greatest advancements, both socially and economically, have generally occurred in the more democratic societies (Lipset 1959; Powell 1982; Berg-Schlosser 1984). Nonetheless, even

defenders of democracy, including this writer, recognize that, to a large extent, democracy is dependent on a disciplined and educated electorate (Tingsten 1965, 112; de Villiers 1976). As experience has shown, this is a rare condition in modern day Africa. Another criterion for democracy--a stable middle class--is also lacking in many African societies. Furthermore, democracy presupposes consideration as well as tolerance. In a true and just democracy, the majority must uphold civil liberties and respect the political rights of the minority. This is rarely the case in Africa, where the majority often uses its position to establish such a concentration of power so as to make certain that the minority cannot assume power.

The basic unity or consensus that is requisite for democracy is absent in Africa. Consequently, for the majority of African nations, at this stage of their political development, the popularly-elected government is not necessarily the best kind of government.

Civilian Regime: One-Party System

Like their democratic counterparts, African one-party systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The major advantage that has been ascribed to one-party systems is that, by mobilizing the country's human resources, the single party can ensure support for the task of national construction and develop stable loyalties to government leaders. Yet, while this may be true of other single-party systems, African one-party regimes are not well equipped to perform these tasks.

Like the political party in African multiparty states, the dominant party in African one-party states is often very weak. Nearly all of the disadvantages of one-party regimes are attributable to this

weakness. First, because of the cultural diversity of African societies, no single party (socialist or otherwise) has been able to command the allegiance of significant segments of the population. Normally, the African political party is ethnically- and geographically-based. Some ethnic groups support it; others are hostile to it or at best indifferent. Thus, a ruling party in an African one-party state, supported equally by all ethnic groups in the country, is an unrealistic expectation.

Houphouet-Boigny's Parti Democratique de Cote de'Ivoire (PDCI) comes closest to this ideal, but even it has not completely eliminated ethnic divisions. Ethnicity remains the basis of its organization (Lewis 1970, 86). In Ghana, Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) government was faced at independence in 1957 by a number of regionally based opposition political parties. But, by 1964, when Ghana officially became a one-party state, Nkrumah had successfully eliminated all effective opposition. Although his one-party state reduced ethnically-based opposition, it only did so to the extent of uniting Ghanaians from all regions against his dictatorial regime (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 151-52). Similarly, Sekou Toure had hoped to use his Parti Democratique de Guinea (PDG), the only political party in Guinea, to eliminate ethnicism in that country. However, his collectivization of agriculture aroused much opposition among the Fula, who became the focus for growing discontent with the PDG dictatorship (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 152).

Second, the governing party in single-party states usually vies with other organizations for control of the society. Notable among these are the armed forces, the bureaucracy, and trade unions. As a

result the efforts of African one-party regimes to suppress dissidence and to prevent organized opposition from forming have seldom been successful (LeVine 1986, 91).

Third, in many one-party states, the single party has proven to be of questionable efficiency in performing governmental functions. The absence of legal opposition within the one-party system make it much harder to identify and address important problems. Although one-party states often have parliaments, more often than not they are merely "rubber-stamp" assemblies in dealing with the actions of the president.

Finally, African one-party regimes are highly unstable. One-party governments can maintain themselves only by building up an extensive secret police which roots out opposition groups before they can do harm to the regime (e.g., the Soviet Union). But in fact no African one-party regime can aspire to this degree of efficiency. For example, Gus Liebenow (1986, 240-42), has attributed the high incidence of military intervention in African politics to the weakness of existing political parties. Writing about African political parties, Henry Bienen (1970, 99-100) observed that:

> ...as the victorious parties formed governments, they lost functional relevance and coherence.... No matter what roles parties have been assigned, almost everywhere in tropical Africa--whether in single party, multiparty, or nonparty states--they perform few.

Civilian Regimes: Dynasties or Monarchies

There are only a handful of dynastic systems in contemporary Africa. The only two countries with such regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are Swaziland and Lesotho. Lesotho has a constitutional monarch (King Moshoeshoe II) with very limited powers. Thus, the only monarch with

absolute power in black Africa today is King Mswati III of Swaziland. As is the case with African single-party systems, absolute monarchs in Africa have to vie for control with other organizations (including the military, the civil service and trade unions). Furthermore, the size of African royal families means that dynastic regimes not only have to compete with external organizations for control but sometimes, also with factions from within the royal family.

The main source of support and consent for dynastic regimes is custom and tradition. In such systems citizens acknowledge that monarchs have ruled in the past and, according to tradition, they should continue to rule. And as long as citizens remain loyal to tradition and are insulated from outside influences, all will be well with monarchies. However, in an increasingly interdependent environment, a monarch's ability to insulate his subjects from new ideas from abroad is very limited. As the population assimilates new and foreign ideas the ability of dynastic regimes to maintain themselves will be undermined.

As the foregoing suggests, the civilian regime in sub-Saharan Africa may not always be the most effective in achieving national developmental objectives. Under civilian leadership, national unity of purpose and method seldom prevails. Civilian political institutions are often incapable of successfully arbitrating the competing demands of various groups within the population. If anything, civilian leaders are often obligated to satisfy the demands of highly specific constituencies whose interests may not only be different from those of larger segments of the population but may be anti-development as well.

Unlike most of their counterparts in the west, none of the African varieties of civilian regimes can claim to have the ability to "authoritatively allocate resources." Ethnic divisions between and within political parties often results in victorious parties forming governments that do not possess effective legitimatized authority. This, in turn, affects the capacity of the state to carry out its public policies forcefully and effectively. Consequently, African civilian regimes are often unable to initiate or execute development schemes (Duigan and Jackson 1986, 27). More importantly, these regimes are rarely able to control state institutions of repression in their respective countries. Even the dictatorial one-party and dynastic regimes cannot always prevent the organization or expression opposition. This fact greatly limits the capacity of African civilian regimes to promote national integration and achieve political stability, which are necessary for development.

Military Regimes

Aside from the regime types already identified, the only other species existing in sub-Saharan Africa is the military regime. As indicated earlier, military regimes are the most prevalent on the continent. They can, of course, assume a variety of forms. We are relying upon the classification by Eric Nordlinger (1977), who identified three types: guardians, moderators and rulers.[1] Yet military rule is essentially authoritarian. Just as is the case with the other regime types, there are of course positive and negative aspects to military rule.

One of the positive aspects of military rule has to do with the fact that, in nearly all the states of sub-Saharan Africa, the military has the advantage of being the most highly organized group. In making decisions they are guided by established standard operating procedures which tend to focus on the most efficient, most effective, and quickest, means for the realization of specific goals. The military is structured hierarchically, where authority flows downward and responsibility upward. Hierarchy is also punitive, based upon the threat of the harshest disciplinary measures, and a normative belief in unquestioning obedience of the state as a result of military training (Levy 1971, 43-45). Because of their preoccupation with order, and their emphasis on hierarchy and chain of command, new military rulers are more likely to insist that existing government institutions function in a similar manner. More emphasis will be placed on adherence to rules and plans. Consequently, the effectiveness of government is likely to increase, making military rule perhaps more effective than civilian leadership (Fidel 1975, 19).

Perhaps the most important positive aspect of military rule is manifested in the absolute or relative advantage of the military vis-á-vis other power centers with regard to the control of resources available for use against adversaries. This fact results in part from character traits that are peculiar to the military. According to Janowitz (1977, 103), "the military establishment--regardless of its societal context--has a unique character because the threat of violence is a permanent reality to its leaders.... The unique character of the military derives from the requirement that its key members be

specialists in the use of violence." The fact that most military regimes in tropical Africa have actually governed without extensive use of violence should not obscure the significance of force as the basis from which they exercise their political power. Within military regimes there are significant variations from one regime to another in the commission of repressive acts. Nevertheless, the threat of the use of force is always present.

It is nearly universally acknowledged that the capacity of the military to govern derives from its control over the instruments of violence (Fidel 1975; Janowitz 1977; Bienen 1978; Macridis 1986). It is this fact that provides military rulers with a positive advantage over their civilian counterparts. As Kenneth Fidel (1975, 9) argues, either competing demands or gross indecision in government policy-making can lead to civil and economic chaos. The military, he suggests, may be the only group in the nation capable of making hard development decisions and imposing these decisions upon other segments of the population. In the absence of other strong forces capable of implementing development programs, through the use or threat of force, the military can impose difficult solutions. For example, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which ruled Ghana for a few months in 1979, vigorously enforced its price control policy. There were instances where soldiers used their guns to threaten market women and other traders to sell their goods at and low controlled prices (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 61).

The arrest of a few citizens and the imposition of limited political oppression can often suffice to suppress or destroy opposition to a military regime or its policies. On the other hand, civilian

rulers tend to be less anxious to offend their various support groups or coalitions by adopting unpopular measures. Thus, comparing operating procedures under civilian and military regimes in Nigeria, one cabinet member of the former western Nigerian government of Brigadier Adebayo said:

> In the military regime there is no constituency whatsoever. Anyone who wants to influence the Governor has no constituency to back him up in anything he wants. During the civilian regime the reverse takes place. The premier would consider the influence of a person in the cabinet but also his influence outside the cabinet.... In the military regime there is no question of being affected in judging cabinet members by how many people vote for them. If it is a civilian regime, the Prime Minister must be alert to losing support of the most influential people (cited in Bienen 1978, 202).

The last positive, and perhaps the most important, quality of military rule is that, in fragmented societies, it may serve as a focus of solidarity. It has been suggested that African military rulers are better equipped than rival groups to deal the problems associated with ethnic fragmentation. According to Dennis Austin (1966, 70-71), military elites have the advantage sometimes of starting with a "clean slate;" they are not committed to a particular group interest and thus are free to make decisions in the national interest. Another scholar has observed that, "African armies tend to be the most detribalized, integrated and cohesive institutions in their respective states" (Lefever 1970, 20).

According to Janowitz (1977, 109) the operational experience of the armies of new nations may contribute to their internal cohesion. Extensive and successful experience contributes to a sense of professional self-esteem and social cohesion. For example, ex-colonial

African armies with experience in World War II include troops from French West Africa (especially Senegalese troops in North Africa) and Nigerian and Ghanaian soldiers (serving in East Africa and Burma). Similarly the military in post-independent Africa have had enough successful experiences to foster their internal cohesion. For example, Rwandan soldiers have had several successful engagements with Tutsi infiltrators from Kiru (Congo) and Uganda (Janowitz 1977, 109). Ethiopian, Nigerian, Ghanaian, Sierra Leonean and other African troops have had effective operational experiences in United Nations operations in the Congo and Lebanon.

The importance of national unity in the crucial stage of postindependence development cannot be overemphasized. Thus, at least on the African context, the corporate solidarity of the military rulers provides them with a significant leadership advantage over the ethnically-factionalized political parties. Because the military lives in a nationalist environment and, both as a function of professional socialization and role performance, are concerned with issues of national survival, military officers from various ethnic background are often willing and able to work together (Fidel 1975).

Although the ethnic divisions found in African societies are sometimes reflected in their military establishments, these divisions are not always as pronounced within the military as they are in other organizations, such as political parties, trade unions, and the civil service. A major reason for this may be the "us-against-them" mentality which has developed over the years within some African armies. The frequent use of African armies by civilian and military rulers (not to

mention former colonial administrators) to suppress domestic dissent and to maintain control over the population have often resulted in situations where soldiers were distrusted and disliked, even by members of there own ethnic group. In recent years, there have been numerous instances in which civilians have attacked soldiers and destroyed their property to protest the actions of military rulers. After a recent series of clashes between civilians and soldiers in Nigeria, for example, the response of the military rulers prompted a Lagos-based national news daily to editorialize as follows: "The picture that emerged was one of a cleavage between the military and civil society as if civil society were an enemy at war with the military. It was a picture of 'them against us.'"[2] Referring to the same sequence of events, Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka noted that "the theme is usually becoming 'we versus them'" (Onanuga 1989, 9).

During the colonial era, some African armies were perceived as agents of imperial rule and, at other times (especially under military regimes), they have been regarded as armies of occupation (Gutteridge 1975, 6; Liebenow 1986, 247-48). The hostility that some Africans exhibit toward their armies is reflected in a statement made by Alao Aka-Bashorun, president of the Nigerian Bar Association, who observed that "in the 1940s and 1950s, anyone who joined the army was regarded as one of a kind and even your parents detested your entry. I thought we now have a new army. I am surprised that kind of army still exists" (Onanuga 1989, 9-10). Aka-Bashorun made the statement in the wake of a court boycott by lawyers to protest the Nigerian military government's continuous disregard for established judicial processes and the

detention without trail of the prominent Nigerian lawyer, Chief Gani Fawehinmi.

When confronted with distrust and hostility by the civilian population, soldiers are apt to seek refuge in the barracks and other military facilities. As a result of their common experiences, notwithstanding the differences in ethnic backgrounds, soldiers have often found solace and security in the company of other soldiers. Within African armies, the friendship and understanding which develops from close and continuous association with soldiers from other ethnic backgrounds can reduce the misconceptions which have so often been the cause of ethnic intolerance in many African societies. Consequently, soldiers may be the best equipped to deal with the issues of ethnic and cultural fragmentation that is at the root of many of the continent's problems.

Yet, there are some significant negative aspects of military rule. A major problem with military rule has to do with the fact that power is usually concentrated in the hands of a few members of the military junta. This situation does not allow for honest expressions of opinion. As Herbert Tingsten (1965, 86-87) wrote, "concentration of power of itself breeds a desire to satisfy those who control the power.... On the one hand, the desire to please--and the fear of displeasing--those who hold power become motivating forces that undermine independent formation of opinion."

Although this condition is not peculiar to military regimes, African military regimes have proven to be much more adept than civilian ones in suppressing opposing opinions. Consequently, the ability of

ordinary citizens to express their views to their rulers is more severely constrained under military regimes. For example, some civilian commissioners in the former Western Nigerian military government of Brigadier Adebayo mentioned how "little people" were afraid to go and see military officers because they had to go past a series of soldiers with guns (Bienen 1978, 206). This results in a unidirectional flow of communication from the top down. Where the flow of information from the common person to the central policy-making body is poor or nonexistent, the capacity of government to address important issues is limited. This can have negative social and economic consequences. Such was the case in Nigeria, for example where the military's ignorance of, and insensitivity to local demands regarding tax collection resulted in widespread rioting in 1968 (Bienen 1978, 204).

Another negative aspect of military rule is the fact that the military lacks leadership skills in bargaining and political communication that are required for sustained political leadership. This limitation is a consequence of the absence of a tradition for dealing with people outside the military (Janowitz 1977, 104). The absence of regular contacts with persons outside the central policy-making bodies means that there is little or no external input into the policy-making process. This lack of input or feedback from the population often results in the mismanagement of available resources. Because military rulers rarely have sufficient knowledge of the needs of the various sectors in the society, resources are often misappropriated. To be sure, there are other reasons why the resources of African states are often misappropriated, including the avariciousness of military and

civilian leaders as well. Thus, the military's ignorance of the needs of the various sector of society often tends to aggravate an already serious condition.

Under military regimes, there is an unhealthy tendency towards tyrannical action. Upon assuming power, the military immediately, and often successfully, eliminates those participatory mechanisms which are characteristics of representative government. They eliminate legislatures, political parties and other forms of organizations which might challenge their authority. The public hardships under military regimes are well known: liberty is suppressed; labor is regimented and exploited; personal choice is severely restricted; and any opposition is often violently suppressed. Mass arrests, seizures of property and death by firing squad are standard procedures for destroying opposition, both real and imagined.

Military regimes are also associated with central planning, which often is also incompatible with political liberty. This means that the state makes most of the decisions regarding what shall be produced and consumed. The government also decides which areas are to have priority (manufacturing or agriculture, defense or education). Here again, lack of knowledge of what needs to be done can hinder the process of economic development. Although central planning may sometimes prove to be necessary to promote development in Africa, there is always the danger of too much control and overregulation. Too much control can inhibit creative initiatives which are also necessary to stimulate development. Furthermore, the creation of regulatory agencies to oversee policy

implementation not only increases the size of an already swollen African bureaucracy but also creates new opportunities for corruption.

Some Consequences of Regime Type on Public Policy

Africa is a vast continent. Considerable variation exists, for example, between East and West Africa (not to speak of North Africa). Consequently, any generalizations derived from a limited segment of the African experience will require further testing under different conditions. Thus, although a number of hypotheses will be advanced, the verification of these hypotheses is not the primary concern of this study. The hypotheses are essentially working hypotheses, to be used to set the parameters within which a comparison of military and civilian regime performance in Africa may be undertaken.

Policy Outputs

It is generally accepted that the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have chosen the goal of socioeconomic development. To this end, African regimes have adopted several strategies which are best manifested in their public policies. Given the different characteristics associated with African military and civilian regimes, some hypotheses regarding regime effect on public policy may be articulated.

In the less developed societies of sub-Saharan Africa, the ability of the state to fund every important project is very limited. Consequently, there must be budgetary "trade-offs" and, in the competition for scarce resources, there is a tendency for rulers to respond first to the needs of their primary constituency before allocating funds to other sectors. Thus it can be hypothesized that:

> H_1: Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions than in those where they do not.

Exceptionally high percentages of defense spending should precipitate low percentages of social and economic expenditure. Consequently it can also be hypothesized that.

> H_2: Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite effect.

From the foregoing hypotheses a general hypothesis regarding regime effect on public policy may be articulated, as follows:

> H_3: Within any given African country, changes in regime type should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending priorities exhibited by that country.

Although the notion of budgetary "trade-offs" is present in every society and under all regime types, in Africa, with its very limited resources, government budgetary decisions can often be a life-and-death issue.

For example, as hundreds of thousands perished from the famine of 1983-1985, the Ethiopian Dergue allocated few resources to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) relative to the efforts they were putting into other concerns of the regime, such as the build-up of the largest army in Africa and the of training "vanguard cadres" in Marxism and Leninism (Legum 1986, 215). Furthermore, in September of 1984, at the height of the drought crisis, the same government spent about $45 million for celebrations marking the occasion of the tenth anniversary of its revolution and the creation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party. All Ethiopian ministries also contributed one-tenth of their annual budgets

toward the costs of preparing for the celebration (Shepherd 1985, 51-54).

Although there are other forces at work, the spending priorities of a regime does have a significant impact on policy outcomes and the socioeconomic development of a country.

Policy Outcomes

Africa is faced with severe social and economic crisis. Among these, one has to include the crisis associated with dependency or "unequal interdependence," such as the servicing of African debt. This has led to the preposterous situation in which financial outflows from Africa have been greater than its inflows. There is the additional problem of the increasing difficulties caused by low commodity prices for countries which are mainly suppliers of raw materials in the world market (Whiteman 1989, 40-42). African societies also have the problems of droughts, food shortages, and population pressures. Often these problems are of such magnitude that even moderate rates of economic growth are not sufficient to satisfy the demands of the rapidly increasing population.

Over the years, different policies have been promulgated in efforts to solve such problems. African regimes have adopted a variety of policy measures in the hope of achieving the desired outcome: a sustainable level of significant economic development. Given the differences in the qualities of African regime types already identified, what regime type is best qualified to improve the prospects for African development?

Some theorists, using a rationalist model, have observed that all politicians seek to manage the economy so as to ensure their reelection. Citizens are also inclined to vote for the benefits of government spending programs, but they are opposed to the taxes necessary to support such programs. These and other premises have been used to explain why civilian regimes (democratic ones in particular) encourage bigger governments, higher deficits, and more inflation (Borcherding 1977; Brittan 1979; Buchanan and Wagner 1977). Thus, it is sometimes suggested that civilian regimes tend to stifle economic development in the newly-emerging nations of Africa. On the other hand, military regimes seem well-qualified to initiate and enforce necessary but unpopular policies. According to Irving Horowitz (1975, 308), there is a strong "functional" correlation between the coercive mechanisms that a state can bring to bear on its citizenry and the ability to produce high economic development. Given this theoretical orientation, it seems reasonable to advance another general hypothesis.

> H4: Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under military led regimes that are predisposed to modernization than under regimes headed by civilians who are similarly predisposed.

Data and Methods

In order to evaluate effectively the performance of the military as governors, it is necessary that their performance be compared to those of civilian administrators who have preceded and succeeded them. Thus, in the chapters that follow, the performance of civilian and military regimes in selected sub-Saharan African countries will be evaluated along a range of major policy dimensions.

Two methodological approaches will be used to evaluate these performances of the two regime types: quantitative and case studies. Both methodologies will be employed because each makes a unique and valuable contribution in our effort to answer the question regarding the impact of regime type on public policy. For example, the case study approach often does not allow for generalizations but tends "to be very sensitive to human agency and social processes in general" (Ragin 1987, 35-51, 70). On the other hand, by allowing researchers to study more than a handful of countries at a time, the quantitative approach allows for generalizations, but it does not reveal the underlying and particular factors which make for specific policy outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative approach is heavily dependent upon the reliability of available data. And, as is well known, data collected in developing nations, especially African states, are often extremely unreliable. For this reason, the validity of some of the quantitative analyses on regime performance has been questioned. For example, the methodology used in large cross-national studies, including those by McKinlay and Cohan (1975) and Jackman (1976) has been criticized for failing to consider important variables, such as a nation's natural resources, infrastructure, size, or geographical location. Instead, these studies often depend almost exclusively on the overall economic and statistical indicators of the countries under investigation (Janowitz, 1977).

On the limitations of quantitative analysis of military regime performance in Africa, Bienen (1978, 15) writes:

> There may be military characteristics, responses, orientations, and patterns of decision making that do not

> show up in cross-national analyses. That is we may be able to capture some elements of military rule in Africa that are consequential, but we may not be able to see these elements in every case of African military rule, and we may not be able to see them via aggregate data such as growth rates, GNP, rate of urbanization, and literacy.

Therefore, in order to overcome such shortcomings, both approaches will be employed. It is expected that one approach should check the biases of the other. As Bunce put it, "by combining these two approaches, we can speak about processes, correlations, and causes, and be more confident in drawing concrete conclusions about the role of succession in generating policy innovation" (1981, 39). Yet it is also recognized that using both methodologies raises the possibility that the results of the two dissimilar approaches may be irreconcilable (Ragin 1987, 70).

To be sure, the present study has a number of limitations. One shortcoming is the reliance upon only two African regime types. In reality of course, there are several species of African military and civilian regimes (Linz 1975; Nordlinger 1977; Bienen 1978). Another possible objection to the approach being employed in this study is that two regime types (and three categories of political systems) utilized are too few to portray African political reality in a satisfactory fashion. For example, within African civilian systems there has been a great deal of variability in the influence of the military. There is the low end of the scale in Gambia--illustrating civilian regimes where the political influence of the military is negligible--to the upper end, where military elites have played major roles in determining the outcomes of political struggles (Kenya).

African military regimes also vary according to the degree of civilian involvement in the making of public policy (Bienen 1978, 11).

Thus to group together as civilian regimes multiparty systems, single party systems and monarchies on the one hand, and such military regimes as Idi Amin's Uganda, Mobutu's Zaire, Gowon's Nigeria and Rawlings' Ghana, on the other hand, distorts political reality. At the same time, if every possible form of African military and civilian regime were considered here, then the variables would become too numerous and confusing to deal with systematically.

Another problem inherent in this study is the use of data that, as has already been observed, in the African setting are sometimes extremely unreliable. Consequently, the validity of the findings produced by the quantitative section may be open to question.

Finally, like most studies of this genre, the present work cannot "prove" that specific policy outputs and outcomes are a direct consequences of a particular regime type. Too many other variables may intervene between regime decision-making and socioeconomic outcomes for this to be possible. For example, irrespective of regime type, the oil crisis of the mid-1970s influenced public policy-making and outcomes in Africa and other regions. Thus we cannot expect regime type alone to explain all of the variance in policy outputs and outcomes.

Nevertheless, by combining these two methodologies, this study will provide evidence that there is some causal relationship between regime type and public policy. Notwithstanding the shortcomings identified above, the study should also make a meaningful contribution to the literature of comparative regime performance and public policy. At least, it should yield some useful insights into the political systems of sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, by ranking regime

effectiveness, we should be able to discern if later military or civilian regimes have learned anything from their predecessors.

However, it may be that measures of regime expenditure priorities and of gross domestic product are not the most useful indicators of military and civilian regime differences. Analysis of aggregate data may show that military and civilian regimes cannot be differentiated by their effects on socioeconomic variables (Mckinlay and Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976). Thus, Bienen (1978), suggests that it may be more fruitful to look for regime differences in the decision-making process. This would entail analyzing patterns of deliberation, representation, and pronouncement in civilian and military regimes. Looking at the decision-making process would also involve looking at how policies are implemented. As Bienen (1978) concluded, observing these processes "should differentiate between military regimes or between some military regimes and some civilian regimes" (Bienen 1978, 195-96). The case studies should provide for this by providing us with insights into the way political decisions are made and enabling us to discern the links between the rulers and the population.

Relevant Countries

By the late 1980s, more than one-half of the nations in sub-Saharan Africa were governed by military regimes. All of them have experienced both civilian and military leadership. For the purposes of this dissertation three sets of nations will be considered. Data for the quantitative section will be derived from the following two groups of 36 and 21 countries respectively:

Group 1

Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, The Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Group 2

Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, The Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Uganda.

The first group of countries encompasses the majority of sub-Saharan African countries that have been independent for at least five years. They include countries that have had only civilian regimes or only military regimes or both. The second group includes only those countries that have experienced significant periods of both civilian and military rule.

For the case study approach, the focus will be centered on three nations: Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia. A primary reason for choosing these nations to provide more detailed information is because of the availability of relevant documentary material, including economic data. Another reason is that, like several other African states, they have all had durable civilian and military regimes. The durability of a regime is an important criterion for inclusion, because a regime in power for only a short time can do little to introduce lasting changes; at the very least, a short lived-regime is unable to put its own policies into effect. Consequently, only countries in which successive military and civilian regimes have lasted for at least four years (the same as the presidential term in the United States) were selected for case studies.

The availability of relevant source materials, including economic data, also made these particular nations attractive subjects of .

This study will concentrate upon a comparison between regimes within the same countries rather than across countries. Thus, the pitfalls associated with neglecting important environmental variables will be avoided (e.g., population, and size).

However, this approach does risk some pitfalls of its own. For example, it suffers from a shortcoming common to a majority of aggregate research of this genre. It does not adequately account for the inclusion of military officers in civilian-led governments, or of civilians in military governments. Even when it does not formally hold the reins of power, for example, the military may have a great deal of influence upon policy formulation and implementation (as in the United States and the Soviet Union). On the other hand, in some Third World states, there are military regimes that do not have much influence outside the capital city and a few towns (Bienen 1983, 2).

Another limitation with the present study is that the quantitative section does not recognize civil wars and international conflicts experienced by the countries under examination. Civil wars and international conflicts obviously affect regime performance in a variety of ways. For example, civil wars in Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia resulted in substantial increases in defense spending and a corresponding decline in the provision of social services in Chad and Ethiopia. Where applicable, the impact of environmental factors on public policy outputs or outcomes will be noted, and the direction of their influence analyzed.

Policy Areas

Almost without exception, military coup leaders in Africa declare that their actions are necessitated by the need to "save" their nation from economic and social catastrophe. Different military-led regimes adopt different policy strategies in their efforts to reverse what they perceive as negative socioeconomic trends and to achieve a sustainable level of development. Leaders of sub-Saharan African countries often define their development goals primarily in economic terms. Specific goals frequently are: an increase in the gross national product, greater exploitation of natural resources (increasing agricultural productivity, oil production, production of hydroelectric power, etc.). In the attempt to promote national development, social issues and needs, such as health and education, are sometimes likely to be subordinated to economic questions. Health and education are often viewed as concomitants of economic development, especially in countries that are plagued by endemic, disabling diseases or where there is a critical shortage of technical personnel. In response to these socioeconomic problems, programs of public health and expanded educational effort are often initiated.

For the quantitative section of this study only policy instruments which can be compared across time and across nations will be utilized. One such instrument is the national budget. Budgetary priorities of alternating civilian and military regimes in each country will be analyzed in an effort to discern changes in policy outputs. The major justification for looking at budgets is that they are the major indicators of governments' plans. As Boulding (1966) indicates, "The

budget seems to be the prime expression of political decisions..." (cited in Bunce 1981, 47). To determine regime performance in terms of the outcomes of the policies it proclaims, five separate areas will be analyzed. The first area is economic growth; the second is agricultural production; the third is industrial production; the fourth is defense expenditure; and the fifth is social welfare (education and health).

In the case study portion of this study, as already noted, three cases will be selected for evaluation. For each of the three countries, an in-depth case study focusing on a public policy issue of major significance for that country will be undertaken. In the case studies section, regime performance will be evaluated, in large part, in accordance with the goals and objectives adopted by the respective civilian and military rulers themselves. This approach will make possible the determination of regime effectiveness, initially in relation to the generalizable criteria (e.g., those that social scientists select as being intrinsically desirable--health, education and welfare), and finally in relation to the regime's ability to achieve its own specified goals (Rothchild 1980, 459-79).

Policy issues to be examined will include those that successive administrations--civilian and military--in each country have had to address. For example, the issue of indigenous control of the Nigerian economy is one that successive Nigerian administrations have grappled with. Different administrations have held different views on how much foreign investment should be allowed, what sectors of the economy should be reserved for indigenous investors, whether or not to nationalize industry, and related questions. In pursuit of its goals, each

administration has adopted special policy strategies. These policies and their outcomes will be the focus of the chapter on economic and industrial policy in Nigeria.

Agriculture is the principle sector of Ghana's economy, accounting for over one-third of GDP and employing over 60 percent of the working population. Over the past two decades agricultural output in Ghana has steadily declined. In the 1980s, this decline was exacerbated by drought, bush fires and smuggling. Consequently, agriculture in time became a major focus of successive Ghanaian administrations since independence, through three military and three civilian regimes. Agriculture will, therefore, be the central concern of the chapter on Ghana.

The only country south of the Sahara not to have been colonized is Liberia. Since its establishment as a settlement for freed slaves Liberia has had very close relations with the United States. This relationship with the United States tends to be at the center of many of activities in which successive Liberian governments have been involved. Thus in the chapter on Liberia, government policies as they relate to foreign affairs will be examined and foreign trade patterns will be evaluated.

Regime Evaluation

"Does it make a difference for a country to be governed by civilians or military officers?" If it does "make a difference" what kind of difference does it make? "Which regime type will be most effective in dealing with the developmental problems of African countries?" The main criterion of "effectiveness" is the ability of

leaders to identify issues of concern and to implement consistent and effective policies in response. Also of importance will be their ability to achieve those goals that they set for themselves at the outset of their stewardship. In addition to the above, measurable improvements or decline in the relevant economic and social indicators--GDP, agricultural and industrial outputs, education and health--will be analyzed to determine differences in regime performance.

Conclusion

In a recent book on comparative public policy research in Europe and America, Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams (1983, 1-2) wrote:

> These everyday comparisons of public policies have one important thing in common with more systematic, academic efforts at comparative policy analysis. Both informal and formal approaches seek a deeper understanding than could be gained by looking at only one thing at a time. By assessing one situation against another, we gain fuller perspective of both options and constraints.... While informal comparisons generally serve some personal end, the academic study of comparative public policy has a broader agenda. One aim of this agenda is to learn why some governments seem to fare better than others at coping with similar problems.

This is precisely the objective of this study. By employing both quantitative and case study approaches it is hoped that we will not only be able to identify the most effective regime type, but also gain, via the case study approach, a deeper understanding of government institutions and political processes in sub-Saharan Africa.

Endnotes

1. According to Nordlinger military regimes can be categorized according to the degree of the army's involvement in politics. Military moderators intervene to settle disputes among civilian political leaders, and exercise a veto power over major public policy decisions, without taking actual control of government themselves. They apply pressure on civilian incumbents with threats of a coup. When moderator actions fail to achieve the desired objectives, then military officers often take control themselves. When this happens, the military officers are said to be Praetorian Guardians. Military guardians are primarily concerned with correcting the malpractices and deficiencies of their civilian predecessors. They usually stay in power for a brief period. Praetorian Rulers represent a third category of military regimes. They take direct control of the government with the express intention of making far-reaching changes that will take a considerable amount of time. They are the most intolerant of opposition (Nordlinger 1977, 21-27).

2. The Guardian, 29 June 1989.

Chapter Three

REGIME PERFORMANCE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

In the comparative study of regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa, two different questions can be asked about the consequences of civilian and military rule. First what are the budgetary priorities of each regime type? Are there, for example, any significant differences between regimes in the way in which they allocate public funds to the various sectors of the society? Second, what are the socioeconomic consequences of the governance of each regime type? Does any regime type exhibit a superior capacity to provide effective leadership for African countries striving for rapid economic development? An attempt to answer these questions is the central task of this and the next three chapters.

The specific purpose of this chapter is to explore variations in the performance of military and civilian rulers in sub-Saharan Africa. Using generalizable standards of measurement, I will compare military and civilian regime performance as it relates to their effectiveness in attaining multiple goals at relatively low cost. The quantitative results relating to the impact of regime type on budgetary allocations and economic performance will be presented in terms of outcomes in six policy areas: economic growth, agricultural production, industrial production, education, health, and defense expenditures. This will be followed by a discussion of the linkages involved.

Attention in this chapter will be focused on 36 sub-Saharan African countries (see Table 2.1). Wherever possible, an effort will be made to include information on as broad a range of countries as

possible, while looking in much greater detail at a few selected countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zaire. The rationale for this selection is based on economic, political and historical factors. The geographic location of the countries and the availability of data were also very important determinants for their inclusion. With regard to policy outputs, particular attention will be paid to budgetary allocations for defense, education and health, and to policy outcomes as they relate to GDP, agriculture and manufacturing.

Methodological Considerations

The methods of analysis employed in this section have been determined by the comparative and longitudinal data available. However, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, although greatly improved over the past few years, available data on African systems still lack the reliability needed to permit the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships with great confidence.

With the caveat concerning the unreliability of available data, I will nevertheless attempt to evaluate regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa. Empirical evaluation of political and economic performance in African countries needs to be conducted by contemporary political scientists. If, for no other reason, such studies can serve as foundations upon which future research, using improved data, can be based. Furthermore, as Sarkensian (1978, 21-22) noted, "the available data are useful, if for no other purpose than to examine current tendencies and notions about African regimes." However, as noted above, the outcome of contemporary empirical research undertakings that employ

these data, including this effort, should be interpreted with particular caution. With the proper caveats, studying these questions is better than not studying them at all!

Research Design

Almost all quantitative studies of comparative regime performance in Africa have employed cross-national data (Nordlinger 1970; McKinlay and Cohan 1975). Cross-national analysis can be very limiting and can distort empirical findings, because it employs data from a variety of countries and therefore examines different situations of regime performance. Cross-national studies thus cannot accommodate important economic, social, historical and geographical constraints unique to sub-Saharan African countries. A useful quantitative study, therefore, must include single-country data that capture trends over time.

The multiple interrupted time-series (MITS) design is an ideal way to evaluate trends within a single country. This is a procedure discussed and developed by Campbell (1969) and Campbell and Cook (1979). It has been employed in comparative policy evaluations by Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980), Bunce (1981), Garand (1985) and Cohen (1985). This method of analysis is particularly useful for this study because it features an alternating independent variable (regime type in this instance) and a continuous dependent variable (budgetary expenditure, and economic growth). Furthermore, as Caporaso (1973, 17-18) observed, interrupted time series analysis:

> is appropriate to data distributed over time...and where there is theoretical reason to believe that some event should cause a change in the behavior of the series. The key question involved in this design is whether the occurrence of the events in question had an effect or

> whether the behavior of the series after the events represents an undisturbed continuation of the series from its previous state.... Two questions are involved. Did a non-random change occur in the vicinity of the experiment? Is this change attributable to the occurrence of the experimental event? (quoted in Bunce 1981, 51).

While the interrupted time series design is an improvement over the usual method of analyzing African regime performance, it is, not by itself, sufficient to rule out any plausible rival hypothesis. The refutation or confirmation of any hypothesis is more likely to be expedited when all relevant and accessible data are employed. This requires the introduction of a control group. According to Donald Campbell and Laurence Ross (1970, 110-25), in a quasi-experimentation (such as this), even a nonequivalent control group is helpful. The control group "provides the only control for history (for those extraneous change agents that would be expected to affect both the experimental and control group), and assists in controlling maturation, testing and instrumentation" (Campbell and Ross 1970, 110-25).

The key point is that changes in outputs associated with regime change could be due to other factors not in the model. One can be more confident in one's findings if: (1) one includes control variables, and the regime change coefficients continue to suggest the same effect; or (2) one includes control nations that did not undergo a regime change. Because control variables are not readily available, I have opted for the second approach.

The control group in this study will be made up of nations which did not undergo regime change. Individual nations from the control group will be matched with individual nations from the experimental group (i.e., nations that have experienced significant periods of

civilian and military rule), and using a "comparative" interrupted time series design, a determination will be made as to the impact of regime type on public policy. The comparative interrupted time series entails the same process as the single interrupted time series analysis, only that in this instance the interruption in a nation in the control group is simulated to resemble the actual interruption in its matching nation in the experimental group. The hypothesis of an impact of regime change on public policy would be supported if there is an effect in the experimental nation and no effect on the control nation.

However, due to the lack of sufficient longitudinal data for most of the nations under examination, this model can be used to evaluate regime performance in only a handful of the countries under study. In order to evaluate regime performance in all the countries, two additional methods of analysis will be employed. These are "simple country" analysis of differences of means and "pooled" analysis.

In the first instance (simple country analysis), the mean changes in the various indicators of policy outputs and outcomes for civilian and military regimes in individual sub-Saharan African countries (for which data is available) will be evaluated. This will be complimented with a pooled analysis, in which the mean changes in the various indicators of policy outputs and outcomes for the two regime types are compared across all sub-Saharan African countries grouped together. A MITS design will then be employed to evaluate regime performance in the six countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available.

Data and Operationalization of Concepts

Data for regime expenditure priorities are available from a variety of reliable sources. However, the public expenditure data for this study are derived from two major sources--UN Statistical Yearbook, and IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. The primary source of data for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data for agricultural and industrial production are derived from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics.

As I have indicated, few nations in Africa have truly reliable data. There are cases were data are not available for several years at a time. A few nations are excluded from this study primarily because they lacked sufficient data to permit a satisfactory analysis of regime performance.

And, as I indicated in the preceding chapter, a slightly modified version of a typology of African political systems developed by Berg-Schlosser will be used to determine regime type (see Table 2.1). Stated briefly, military regimes will include all those political systems in which members of the armed forces occupy key government positions (including that of head of government), and openly dictate national policy. All those systems which are headed by nonmilitary officials and where military-dictated priorities do not dominate national policies will be classified as civilian regimes (included in this group are the dynastic regimes of Swaziland and Ethiopia).

Policy Outputs

In Chapter Two, it was stated that the examination of the national budget is one of the best ways of comparing quantitatively the policy priorities of different regime types. The budgetary priorities of a regime are effective indicators of how much importance the regime attaches to competing government programs.

One way of measuring a regime's budgetary priorities would be to examine the levels of total budgetary expenditure as well as expenditure in each socioeconomic category (e.g., health and education) every year throughout the life of the regime. However, such a measure, although useful for some types of analyses, is not so useful in this case. As I indicated to in the preceding chapter, the process of budgetary allocations involves choices from among competing expenditure claimants as to which is to receive scarce public funds. The concept of priority assumes a rank ordering of alternative actions and the willingness of the decision-maker to select one alternative on the basis of that rank ordering. In a budgetary sense, this involves either shifting relative shares of the budgetary pie for alternative spending areas so that they coincide with the regime's relative priorities. Consequently, this study measures a regime's spending priorities in terms of the relative GDP shares (i.e., as a proportion of GDP at time t) for total spending and for spending on health and education. For example, education priorities are measured by dividing education expenditure by GDP. This method of measuring the budgetary priorities of the different regime types also helps to eliminate the impact of

inflationary pressures on the actual dollar amount (or local currency) spent in the various budgetary categories.

Policy Outcomes

The most commonly used generalizable standard of measuring regime performance is economic productivity. For this study, total output, manufacturing output, and agricultural output are used to evaluate regime performance. In keeping with other studies which have employed interrupted time-series analyses in international political economy (Chase-Dunn, Pallas and Kenter 1982, 341-56; Cohen 1985, 123-336), this study measures total economic productivity as total GDP at constant 1980 prices. Manufacturing output is measured as GDP accounted for by manufacturing activities, while agricultural productivity is measured as the GDP accounted for by agricultural enterprises.

Statistical Model: Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS)

MITS is conceptually equivalent to running separate regressions for each time period separated by the interventions and determining changes in the behavior of the time series caused by specific interventions from one time period to the next. In this instance it is suggested that regime alternations in control of government can be viewed as interventions in the process within which policy is determined. The impact of regime alternation on policy outputs over time (measured by budgetary outlays) can be evaluated by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the following equation for each of three areas of expenditure (education, health and defense)[1]:

$$EXPSHARE_{t,e} = b_0 + b_1\ COUNTER_t + b_2\ DUMMY_{xt} + b_3\ COUNT_{xt} + \dots + b_{n-1}\ DUMMY_{xt} + b_n\ COUNT_{xt} + e_t \qquad [1]$$

where $EXPSHARE_{t,e}$ = the share of total expenditure for spending area e at time t; $COUNTER_t$ = a counter for each year t from 1960 to 1985, coded from 1 (1960) to 26 (1985); $DUMMY_{xt}$ = a dummy variable for regime transition years, coded 0 for observations before intervention year x and 1 thereafter; $COUNT_{xt}$ = a counter variable for regime transition years, coded 0 for observations before intervention year x and 1, 2, 3,...for year x and after; b_0 = the intercept, or the level of the time series prior to the initial regime change; b_1 = the slope of the time series before the initial regime change;[2] b_2, b_3,...b_{n-1}, and b_n = the parameters to be estimated, representing respectively and alternatively the shift in the intercept and the slope of the series associated with regime alternation; e_t = a randomly distributed error term for each year t.

In order to evaluate the impact of regime alternation on the level and/or slope, the parameter estimates of each dummy variable (even-numbered coefficients) and counter variable (odd-numbered coefficients) respectively, will be examined. The value of the coefficients for the dummy variables indicates the difference between the observed intercept term for each post-transition period and the intercept expected given the previous (preshift) pattern of expenditure outlays. Coefficients for the counter variables indicate the change in the slope of the regression brought about by regime change. In order to determine the slope for the post transition period, the parameter estimate for the counter associated with the regime change is added to the sum of all

previous coefficients. If the coefficients for the dummy and/or counter variables are statistically significant (e.g., at the .05 or .10 levels), it can be inferred that regime change does have a significant impact on the height and/or slope of the time series.

Model Estimation

The above model will be estimated separately for each output category, including spending priorities in total and in each spending area (education, health and defense). Using the same procedure, the above equation [1] will be estimated separately for each dependent outcome variable (i.e., industrial production, and agricultural production). For every dependent variable, each of the six countries for which sufficient data is available (at least 15 years) will be analyzed separately.

Using this procedure, if the series between 1960 and 1985 for Nigeria is analyzed and the slope (e.g., industrial production) after 1966 is positive and the same slope after 1980 is negative it can be inferred that the military regimes (1966-1975 and 1975-1979) performed better than their civilian predecessor (1960-1966) and successor (1979-1983). However, making such an inference may not be entirely proper since both regime types were not operating under similar environmental conditions. Of particular significance is the international environment. It has been argued that contractions and expansions in the world market can and does influence the performance of a country's domestic economy (Kaufman 1969, 228-53). If this is so, findings derived from comparisons between civilian and military regimes within a single country would be of questionable validity. More

dependable findings would require the use the aforementioned comparative multiple interrupted time series design.

Candidates for this procedure in sub-Saharan Africa are very few. The best candidates in the region are: (1) Ethiopia and Kenya; (2) Sudan and Zaire; (3) Togo and Malawi; and (4) Uganda and Tanzania. During the period covered by this study, Kenya (civilian), Malawi (civilian), Tanzania (civilian) and Zaire (military) have been governed by one regime type, since there has been no alternation between civilian and military rulers. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis these four countries may be viewed as the "control group." The four pairs of countries provide a useful test for cross-national regime performance since they have relatively homogeneous socioeconomic characteristics but, have often been different in regime characteristics. To be sure, there are socioeconomic differences among these nations, but the differences are less than those of other groups of nations often used in comparative analysis, such as the nations along the west coast of Africa.

As indicated above, for those countries with inadequate data, the mean changes in expenditure patterns from one regime type to another will be evaluated. While the use of these three methods of analysis by no means eliminates the limitations imposed by unreliable data and inadequate controls for some intervening factors, it may encourage some confidence in the findings should they prove consistent over the three methods of analysis.

Table 3.1
Description of Variables

VARIABLE NAME	DESCRIPTION
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDP80	Gross Domestic Product at constant 1980 prices
CGDP80	Percentage of change in GDP80
PSPEND	Total budgetary expenditure as a proportion of GDP
PHEALTH	Expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP
PEDUC	Expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP
PDEFEN	Expenditure on defense as a proportion of GDP
PMAN	Percentage of contribution of manufacturing to GDP
PAGRIC	Percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP

Some Results from "Simple Country" and "Pooled" Analyses

Since the mid-1970s successive governments in many African countries have sought external assistance in their efforts to stimulate economic growth in their respective countries. In order to secure external loans, the governments of these countries have generally been required to adopt IMF and World Bank-recommended structural adjustment programs. A central feature of these programs is the requirement that public spending be severely curtailed. As was suggested in the preceding chapter, through the use of coercion, the military may be better able to execute the kind of austerity that is often demanded by IMF programs (The typical austerity budget often include the removal of subsidies on such important items as food, housing and transportation).

Although some military regimes have sought the support of the mass public to maintain their hold on power (Nasser in Egypt, Rawlings in Ghana and Sankara in Burkina Faso), the primary base of support for most military regimes is the armed forces. Consequently, a military regime may feel no obligation to make allowance in the budget for more than the barest economic essentials. Conversely, because the survival of civilian administrations requires the building of coalitions, and the pacification of various constituent groups, civilian governments, especially in multiparty states, are often reluctant to curb public spending. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that public spending will be above average when civilians are in power and below the average when soldiers are in power. However, a glance at Table 3.2 shows that this argument cannot be sustained.

Table 3.2
Total Budgetary Expenditure as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (PSPEND)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	0.1563	---	---	---
Botswana	---	0.3741	---	---
Burkina Faso	0.1306	0.1438	1.0860	0.2893
Burundi	0.2222	0.2078	-1.7498	0.1236
Cameroon	---	0.1887	---	---
The Congo	0.3034***	0.2153	-3.4111	0.0025
Cote d'Ivoire	---	0.3055	---	---
Ethiopia	0.2532***	0.1317	-6.6501	0.0001
Gambia	---	0.2712	---	---
Ghana	0.1657**	0.2140	2.2081	0.0370
Kenya	---	0.2240	---	---
Lesotho	---	0.3479	---	---
Liberia	0.3686***	0.2223	-5.4388	0.0001
Madagascar	0.2125	---	---	---
Malawi	---	0.2591	---	---
Mauritania	0.3593	0.2452	-1.7825	0.1179
Mauritius	---	0.2396	---	---
Niger	0.1547***	0.1129	-4.4468	0.0004
Nigeria	0.1625	0.1589	-0.1699	0.8667
Senegal	---	0.2107	---	---
Sierra Leone	---	0.2213	---	---
Rwanda	0.1243***	0.0649	-7.8205	0.0001
Sudan	0.2006	0.2085	0.6131	0.5464
Swaziland	---	0.2479	---	---
Tanzania	---	0.2326	---	---
Togo	0.2487**	0.1217	-2.5038	0.0202
Uganda	0.1396	0.1667	1.3677	0.1852
Zaire	0.3604	---	---	---
Zambia	---	0.3280	---	---
Zimbabwe	---	0.3414	---	---
TOTAL (All Nations [30] n=524)	0.2175*	0.2320	1.7368	0.0830

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Civilian or Military only

Table 3.2 shows the mean public expenditure as a proportion of GDP (PSPEND) under military and civilian regimes in those countries (n=13) for which sufficient data are available. As can been seen from this table, there was no consistent pattern for PSPEND under either regime types. Only in seven of the countries were differences in the total spending of regime types statistically significant. In six of the seven countries (Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda and Togo), PSPEND under military administrations is significantly higher than it was under civilian ones. Only in Ghana was civilian rule associated with a significantly higher PSPEND than it was under the military. However, although not statistically significant, PSPEND was also higher for civilian regimes in Burkina Faso, Sudan and Uganda. Furthermore, when PSPEND under each regime type from all sub-Saharan African countries (with sufficient data n=30), are pooled together, the results cast more doubts on the argument that public expenditure is influenced by regime type.

While the results for the simple country analysis appear to suggest that public spending will tend to be higher under military regimes, results of the pooled analysis suggests the opposite to be the case. As can be seen from Table 3.2 total PSPEND was approximately 22 percent under military regimes and 23 percent under civilian ones. This difference is statistically significant at the .10 level.

As I suggested in Chapter Two, the notion of budgetary "trade-offs" can be especially significant in sub-Saharan African countries where resources are very limited. In these countries, exceptionally

high percentages of defense spending should precipitate low percentages of social and economic expenditure. Consequently, I hypothesized that:

> Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite effect.

The results reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are mixed. For example, in the area of education and health services, only in three countries (Ethiopia, Liberia, and Rwanda), were there any significant differences between the budgetary priorities of the regime types. In each case, the proportion of GDP allocated to education (PEDUC) and health (PHEALTH) was significantly more under military rule than it was under civilian rule. PEDUC was also significantly higher for military regimes in Niger and Togo. Can we then conclude that military rule facilitates higher public expenditure on education and health? The results does not allow one to reach such a conclusion. The results show that PEDUC in three countries (Ghana, Sudan and Uganda), and PHEALTH in seven countries (Table 3.3), were higher under civilian rule than they were under military rule. To be sure, the results were not statistically significant.

It is also noteworthy that those countries in which the military spent greater proportions of GDP on health and education, were also the same countries in which military rulers allocated substantially higher proportions of the GDP to public spending. Thus the increases in PHEALTH and PEDUC may simply be the outgrowth of the increases in the overall public expenditure. However, the results of the pooled analysis provided some support for the aforementioned hypothesis. The results show that civilian regimes allocated more of the GDP to health and

Table 3.3
Expenditure on Health as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (PHEALTH)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	0.0147	0.0156	0.3626	0.7223
Botswana	---	0.0203	---	---
Burkina Faso	0.0092	0.0079	-1.6634	0.1135
Burundi	0.0100	0.0136	2.1236	0.1238
Cameroon	---	0.0080	---	---
The Congo	0.0229	---	---	---
Cote d'Ivoire	---	0.0123	---	---
Ethiopia	0.0090***	0.0075	-5.5025	0.0001
Gambia	---	0.0194	---	---
Ghana	0.0116	0.0133	1.0100	0.3226
Kenya	---	0.0156	---	---
Lesotho	---	0.0235	---	---
Liberia	0.0361***	0.0167	-5.9238	0.0001
Madagascar	0.0152	---	---	---
Malawi	---	0.0149	---	---
Mauritania	0.0111	0.0106	-0.3022	0.7823
Mauritius	---	0.0219	---	---
Niger	0.0075	0.0075	0.1591	0.8771
Nigeria	0.0069	0.0078	0.8103	0.4268
Rwanda	0.0066***	0.0046	-5.7754	0.0001
Senegal	---	0.0123	---	---
Sierra Leone	---	0.0130	---	---
Sudan	0.0071	0.0103	1.6135	0.1216
Swaziland	---	0.0172	---	---
Tanzania	---	0.0144	---	---
Togo	0.0132	0.0107	-1.1026	0.2821
Uganda	0.0095	0.0120	1.0359	0.3115
Zaire	0.0168	---	---	---
Zambia	---	0.0223	---	---
Zimbabwe	---	0.0212	---	---
TOTAL (All Nations [30] n=474)	0.0121***	0.0151	4.3288	0.0001

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Civilian or Military only

Table 3.4
Expenditure on Education as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (PEDUC)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	0.0367	0.0299	-1.5951	0.1330
Botswana	---	0.0687	---	---
Burkina Faso	0.0224	0.0218	-0.2724	0.7884
Burundi	0.0442	0.0420	-0.2289	0.8337
Cameroon	---	0.0242	---	---
The Congo	0.0678	---	---	---
Cote d'Ivoire	---	0.0597	---	---
Ethiopia	0.0253***	0.0177	-4.6689	0.0002
Gambia	---	0.0297	---	---
Ghana	0.0328	0.0361	0.8013	0.4308
Kenya	---	0.0379	---	---
Lesotho	---	0.0640	---	---
Liberia	0.0559***	0.0299	-5.7095	0.0001
Madagascar	0.0330	---	---	---
Malawi	---	0.0331	---	---
Mauritania	0.0412	0.0370	-0.4055	0.7123
Mauritius	---	0.0375	---	---
Niger	0.0249***	0.0133	-3.6868	0.0050
Nigeria	0.0226	0.0215	-0.3401	0.7372
Rwanda	0.0261***	0.0160	-4.2727	0.0007
Senegal	---	0.0381	---	---
Sierra Leone	---	0.0330	---	---
Sudan	0.0148	0.0174	1.2211	0.2356
Swaziland	---	0.0496	---	---
Tanzania	---	0.0317	---	---
Togo	0.0358**	0.0186	-2.2990	0.0314
Uganda	0.0230	0.0241	0.3229	0.7498
Zaire	0.535	---	---	---
Zambia	---	0.0478	---	---
Zimbabwe	---	0.0684	---	---
TOTAL (All Nations [30] n=474)	0.0320***	0.0366	2.8258	0.0049

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Civilian or Military only

education than military regimes did, and the difference in both cases are significant.

It has been argued persuasively (Nordlinger 1977, 64-67; Wiking 1883; Liebenow 1986, 240-50), and demonstrated practically (in Ghana, Uganda and Liberia), that reductions in defense spending under civilian regimes is a major cause of military intervention. Consequently, with regard to spending priorities, one would expect the greatest difference between military and civilian regimes to be in the area of defense appropriations. The results reported in Table 3.5 provide moderate support for the hypothesis that defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions than in those where they do not. In six of the ten countries in Table 3.7 (Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo and Uganda), military regimes spent significantly higher proportions of their GDP on defense (PDEFEN) than their civilian counterparts did. The mean difference in budgetary allocations to the defense sector were particularly pronounced in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Nigeria where PDEFEN was more than twice as much for military regimes as they were for civilian ones.

The results of the pooled analysis showed the impact of regime type on PDEFEN to be significant, with all Sub-Saharan African military regimes combined spending an average of 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, while their civilian counterparts combined were spending only 1.9 percent of GDP (see the last row in Table 3.5).

With regard to policy outcomes, no consistent pattern is observed for the sensitivity of all measures of policy outcomes (GDP, manufacturing and agricultural productivity) to regime type. For

Table 3.5
Expenditure on Defense as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (PDEFEN)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	0.0168	---	---	---
Botswana	---	0.0278	---	---
Burkina Faso	0.0221	0.0291	1.3760	0.1904
Burundi	0.0241	0.0243	0.0431	0.9684
Cameroon	---	0.0158	---	---
The Congo	---	0.0354	---	---
Cote d'Ivoire	---	0.0120	---	---
Ethiopia	0.0696***	0.0238	-6.6415	0.0001
Ghana	0.0132	0.0164	1.1282	0.2704
Kenya	---	0.0200	---	---
Lesotho	---	0.0414	---	---
Liberia	0.0349***	0.0101	-7.6943	0.0001
Madagascar	0.0186	---	---	---
Malawi	---	0.0154	---	---
Mauritania	0.1164	0.0634	-0.8583	0.4538
Mauritius	---	0.0056	---	---
Niger	0.0072	---	---	---
Nigeria	0.0357***	0.0121	-4.5103	0.0002
Rwanda	0.0179**	0.0139	-2.5248	0.0233
Senegal	---	0.0227	---	---
Sierra Leone	---	0.0093	---	---
Sudan	0.0276	0.0323	0.8586	0.4004
Swaziland	---	0.0193	---	---
Tanzania	---	0.0364	---	---
Togo	0.0218*	0.0097	-1.8289	0.0810
Uganda	0.0250*	0.0173	-1.9272	0.0670
Zaire	0.0330	---	---	---
Zambia	---	0.0133	---	---
Zimbabwe	---	0.0639	---	---
TOTAL (All Nations [30] n=396)	0.0275***	0.0199	-4.2658	0.0001

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Civilian or Military only

example, in thirteen of the sixteen countries in Table 3.6, PMAN (i.e., contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP) is higher under military regimes than under civilian ones. However, the differences are significant in only six of the countries. The difference in PMAN is also significant in Uganda, where the manufacturing sector contributes nearly twice as much to GDP under civilian rule (10 percent) than under military rule (6.6 percent). In the agricultural sector, the contribution of agriculture to GDP (PAGRIC) is higher during periods of military rule in only six of the same sixteen countries (see Table 3.7). The results of the pooled analysis show that PMAN is higher under civilian rule, whereas PAGRIC is higher under military rule.

Results of the Time Series Analysis

The results of the MITS are reported in Tables 3.8 to 3.13. Like the "simple country" and "pooled" analysis they show no clear pattern of the effect of regime type on public policy. Beginning with PSPEND, the results show that the proportion of GDP going to spending prior to initial intervention ranged from approximately 10 percent for Liberia (see Table 3.8) to 18 percent for Uganda (see Table 3.13). For Sudan, the only country with a military regime at the beginning of the initial time series, the figure was 16.3 percent. There was approximately a 0.8 percent shift per year in the rate of change over the initial time period for the spending trend for the Sudan. With the inauguration of a civilian regime in the Sudan (see Table 3.11) in 1965 the DUMMY66 (intercept) coefficient was 0.0317 reflecting a short-term increase of about three percent in the overall levels of time series after regime change. The coefficient of -0.0207 associated with the slope shift in

Table 3.6
Percentage of Contribution of Manufacturing to Gross Domestic Product (PMAN)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	0.0745	0.0677	-0.7948	0.4371
Botswana	---	0.0826	---	---
Burkina Faso	0.1081	0.1048	-0.3213	0.7517
Burundi	0.0779	0.0754	-0.4802	0.6405
Cameroon	---	0.1208	---	---
The Congo	0.0711	---	---	---
Cote d'Ivoire	---	0.1074	---	---
Equatorial Guinea	---	0.0477	---	---
Ethiopia	0.0951***	0.0778	-3.6204	0.0018
Gambia	---	0.0576	---	---
Ghana	0.0989	0.0894	-0.5361	0.5993
Guinea-Bissau	0.0109	0.0106	-0.3772	0.7190
Kenya	---	0.1175	---	---
Lesotho	---	0.0417	---	---
Liberia	0.0758***	0.0507	-3.0071	0.0070
Madagascar	0.1621***	0.0985	-6.7072	0.0001
Malawi	---	0.1006	---	---
Mauritania	0.0605***	0.0503	-3.3499	0.0085
Mauritius	---	0.1426	---	---
Niger	0.0535	0.0606	0.9439	0.3655
Nigeria	0.0569	0.0523	-1.1630	0.2573
Rwanda	0.1430***	0.0654	-4.8284	0.0002
Senegal	---	0.1823	---	---
Sierra Leone	0.0553	0.0766	1.5155	0.1461
Sudan	0.0874	0.0846	-0.1930	0.8489
Swaziland	---	0.1911	---	---
Tanzania	---	0.0876	---	---
Togo	0.0798*	0.0594	-1.8172	0.0869
Uganda	0.0659***	0.1001	4.5620	0.0005
Zaire	0.1086	---	---	---
Zambia	---	0.1517	---	---
Zimbabwe	---	0.2319	---	---
TOTAL (All Nations [32] n=531)	0.0917	0.0988	1.6096	0.1081

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Civilian or Military only

Table 3.7
Percentage of Contribution of Agriculture to Gross Domestic Product (PAGRIC)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	---	0.4165	2.4277	0.0253
Botswana	---	0.2691	---	---
Burkina Faso	0.4036	0.3976	-0.3125	0.7583
Burundi	0.5339***	0.6123	3.7699	0.0031
Cameroon	---	0.3532	---	---
The Congo	0.1155	---	---	---
Cote d'Ivoire	---	0.3022	---	---
Equatorial Guinea	---	0.5299	---	---
Ethiopia	0.4588***	0.5433	4.1645	0.0005
Gambia	---	0.3771	---	---
Ghana	0.5146	0.5054	-0.2618	0.7968
Guinea-Bissau	0.5815	0.5990	1.5425	0.1739
Kenya	---	0.3125	---	---
Lesotho	---	0.3275	---	---
Liberia	0.1559*	0.2016	1.7323	0.0986
Madagascar	0.3900***	0.3234	-5.2336	0.0001
Malawi	---	0.4756	---	---
Mauritania	0.3509***	0.2641	-3.8479	0.0039
Mauritius	---	0.1939	---	---
Niger	0.4841***	0.5654	3.2122	0.0083
Nigeria	0.3396	0.4278	1.3385	0.1944
Rwanda	0.4504**	0.4020	-2.1905	0.0447
Senegal	---	0.2344	---	---
Sierra Leone	0.3197	0.3467	0.5428	0.5936
Sudan	0.4635*	0.3982	-1.9428	0.0662
Swaziland	---	0.2393	---	---
Tanzania	---	0.4034	---	---
Togo	0.3171***	0.4813	4.1497	0.0007
Uganda	0.5794	0.6061	0.5150	0.6152
Zaire	0.1979	---	---	---
Zambia	---	0.1303	---	---
Zimbabwe	---	0.1174	---	---
TOTAL	0.3864***	0.3463	-3.0829	0.0022

(All Nations [32] n=533)

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Civilian or Military only

1966 (COUNT66) suggest a 1.3 percent (i.e., 0.0077 - 0.0207) decline per year in the proportion of GDP going to public spending (PSPEND) during the life of the civilian regime. When the military intervened again in 1969 the overall level of the series increased by 3.5 percent (DUMMY70 = +0.0352). However, PSPEND under military rule declined at an annual average rate of -0.3 percent (-0.0207 + 0.0077 + 0.0105). In the case of Liberia, the rate of change for the initial period was 0.9 percent. Military intervention in 1980 resulted in a 10 percent increase in the level of the time series. With a coefficient of -0.0170 for COUNT81 indicates an annual decline in PSPEND of about 0.8 percent (i.e., 0.0094 - 0.0170).

The results of the MITS for PSPEND showed that, with the notable exception of Togo where military intervention resulted in an immediate downward shift in the level of the time series, regime change in all the selected countries was associated with short-term increases in the levels of spending. It did not matter whether the change was from civilian to military rule (Sudan 1969, Nigeria 1966, Liberia 1980 and Ethiopia 1975), or from military to civilian rule (Sudan 1965, Nigeria 1979 and Uganda 1981).

Furthermore, there was no observable consistency in the trend of the slopes following the initial shifts in the level of the time series. The sensitivity of long-term trends in PSPEND to regime type is significant on only two occasions after military intervention and in another two following the restoration of civilian rule. Following military intervention in Uganda in 1971, a -0.0166 coefficient associated with the counter (slope) variable suggests a negative -1.5

percent (0.0013 - 0.0166) shift per year in the rate of change over time series for public expenditure (see Table 3.13). However, military intervention in Ethiopia in 1975 corresponded with a significant positive shift in the slope of the trend line for the period of military rule. Positive and negative coefficients for PSPEND in Uganda (COUNT82 = 0.0296) and Nigeria (COUNT80 = -0.0369) reflect the presence of similar inconsistencies in the long-term shifts in the trend lines for PSPEND following the restoration of civilian rule.

When the time series for PSPEND in Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo and Uganda are compared with that for their country pairs in the "control group," no consistent pattern is observable. For example, there was a positive change in the level and slope of the series for PSPEND in Ethiopia after change in regime. However only the change in the slope (COUNT76) was significant. The changes in the level and slope of the simulated series for PSPEND in Kenya (Ethiopia's country pair) were similar to those in Ethiopian series, suggesting that the changes in the Ethiopian series may not have been totally related to change in regime. Similar patterns were observable for the other country pairs. However, changes in the level and slope of the series for the country pair of Uganda and Tanzania are not always in the same direction.

Whereas there is a positive shift in the level of the series after the military intervened in Uganda (DUMMY71), a simulated intervention in Tanzania (DUMMY71) is associated with a negative shift in the level of the series. Although, the changes in the slope (COUNT72) and level (DUMMY82) for PSPEND in Uganda and Tanzania are identical, the changes in Uganda are highly significant while those in Tanzania are not. The

changes in the slopes (COUNT82) for the two series are significant at the .01 level, but while the change in Uganda is positive, the change in Tanzania is negative. The complete MITS results for the selected pairs of countries are reported in Tables 3.10 to 3.13.

Health (PHEALTH) and Education (PEDUC)

The tables also demonstrate that the sensitivity of spending trends for health and education to regime change is not consistent in any discernible direction. For example, Table 3.11 shows that in the Sudan, at the beginning of the time series, 1.2 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP went to health (PHEALTH) and education (PEDUC) respectively. The initial time trend indicated a -0.04 percent and -0.01 percent shift per year in the average rate of change for both PHEALTH and PEDUC. The coefficients of 0.0009 and 0.0097 associated with the 1965 return to civilian rule (DUMMY66) suggest short-term increases of 0.1 percent and 1.0 percent in the overall level of the series for PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively. The annual rate of change over the time series is -0.02 percent (-0.0004 + 0.0002) and -0.26 percent (-0.0001 - 0.0025) for PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively. The coefficients of 0.0014 and 0.0054 associated with the military intervention in 1969 (DUMMY70) reflect short-term increases of 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent in the overall level of the series for PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively. The coefficients of -0.0006 and 0.0020 associated with the shift in slope after 1970 indicate a -0.04 percent and a -0.05 percent annual rate of change in PHEALTH and PEDUC for the time series.

This example shows that the time series for the Sudan begins with a negative slope (indicating a trend toward declining public expenditure

on health and education) from 1960 to 1965 and then undergoes a positive shift in both intercept and slope, although the overall slope for the period from 1960 to 1985 remains negative. However, only the short-term shift in the overall level of the trend line for PEDUC (DUMMY66) is significant. Although the direction of the shifts in the intercepts and slopes of the time series are sometimes different, the results of the MITS analysis for PHEALTH and PEDUC in other countries are not noticeably different from the Sudanese results. In Liberia, the 1980 military coup is associated with positive shifts in the time series for PHEALTH and PEDUC (as manifested in significant intercept shifts), but the slope trends for the period of military rule (1980-1985) are not significantly different from the slope for the preceding period (see Table 3.8). However, Liberia is the only country in which military intervention appeared to have had a significant positive effect on the time series for PHEALTH and PEDUC. The only other case of a significant positive intercept shift is in Nigeria where return to civilian rule (DUMMY80) seems to have occasioned an increase in the proportion of GDP allocated to the health sector (see Table 3.9). On the other hand, military interventions in Ethiopia and Togo are associated with significant negative intercept shifts for PEDUC.

When the results of the MITS analysis for the countries in the "control group" are compared with their pairs, no clear pattern is discernable. For example, there is a negative but insignificant shift in the level of the PHEALTH series following military intervention in Uganda, but a simulated intervention in Tanzania is associated with a positive and significant shift. However, while military intervention in

Table 3.8
MITS Results for Liberia (7)

	b	t	Prob.
PSPEND (OLS)			
Intercept(C)	0.1053***	3.828	0.0012
counter(C)	0.0094***	4.739	0.0002
dummy81(M)	0.1016**	2.215	0.0399
count81(M)	-0.0170	-1.327	0.2010
	R^2 = 0.8163		
PHEALTH (3rd)			
Intercept	0.0079***	5.698	0.0001
counter	0.0007***	6.788	0.0001
dummy81	0.0093**	2.443	0.0274
count81	0.0019	1.631	0.1236
	R^2 = 0.9344		
PEDUC (3rd)			
Intercept	0.1033***	4.579	0.0004
counter	0.0015***	9.272	0.0001
dummy81	0.0203***	3.466	0.0035
count81	-0.0025	-1.430	0.1731
	R^2 = 0.9323		
PDEFEN (1st)			
Intercept	0.0091***	4.287	0.0005
counter	0.0001	0.659	0.5188
dummy81	0.0447***	11.372	0.0001
count81	-0.0059***	-5.329	0.0001
	R^2 = 0.9178		
PMAN (OLS)			
Intercept	0.0015	0.367	0.7177
counter	0.0039***	13.066	0.0001
dummy81	-0.0063	-0.907	0.3762
count81	-0.0052**	-2.661	0.0159
	R^2 = 0.9241		
PAGRIC (1st)			
Intercept	0.3139***	8.221	0.0001
counter	-0.0085***	-3.167	0.0056
dummy81	-0.0384	-1.041	0.3126
count81	0.0235*	1.917	0.0722
	R^2 = 0.7972		

* .05<prob.<.10
** .01<prob.<.05
*** prob.< .01

Table 3.9
MITS Results for Nigeria (24)

	b	t	Prob.
PSPEND (OLS)			
Intercept(C)	0.1193***	4.692	0.0002
counter(C)	-0.0000	-0.009	0.9931
dummy67(M)	0.0275	0.918	0.3713
count67(M)	0.0032	0.531	0.6024
dummy80(C)	0.1222**	2.515	0.0223
count80(C)	-0.0369	-1.726	0.1025
	R^2 = 0.6955		
PHEALTH (2nd)			
Intercept	0.0073***	6.910	0.0001
counter	0.0003	1.438	0.1710
dummy67	0.0031	0.251	0.8052
count67	-0.0010***	-3.939	0.0013
dummy80	0.0055*	1.939	0.0716
count80	-0.0003	-0.251	0.8054
	R^2 = 0.7873		
PEDUC (2nd)			
Intercept	0.0219***	4.144	0.0009
counter	0.0000	0.015	0.9881
dummy67	0.0001	0.013	0.9901
count67	0.0001	0.087	0.9316
dummy80	-0.0142	-0.979	0.3430
count80	0.0052	0.761	0.4584
	R^2 = 0.4140		
PDEFEN (OLS)			
Intercept	0.0037	0.459	0.6519
counter	0.0006	0.335	0.7421
dummy67	0.0270**	2.873	0.0105
count67	-0.0002	-0.106	0.9171
dummy80	-0.0076	-0.498	0.6251
count80	-0.0042	-0.624	0.5408
	R^2 = 0.7545		
PMAN (OLS)			
Intercept	0.0460***	8.386	0.0001
counter	0.0025*	2.068	0.0533
dummy67	0.0041	0.639	0.5309
count67	-0.0048***	-3.660	0.0018
dummy80	0.0082	0.949	0.3554
count80	0.0008	0.274	0.7870
	R^2 = 0.6509		

Table 3.9 Cont'd.

	b	t	Prob.
PAGRIC (1st)			
Intercept	0.6284***	12.677	0.0001
counter	-0.0178*	-1.766	0.0953
dummy67	0.0171	0.376	0.7116
count67	-0.0105	-0.860	0.4019
dummy80	-0.0016	-0.030	0.9761
count80	0.0422*	2.030	0.0583
	R^2 = 0.9591		

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01

Togo was associated with an insignificant negative shift in the level of the PHEALTH series and a significant positive shift in the slope, the simulated intervention in Malawi effected negative and significant shifts in the level and slope of the series.

Defense Spending (PDEFEN)

As expected, there are distinctive differences in the time series for both regime types in the area of defense spending. The advent of military rule in Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda is associated with significant short-term increases in the overall level of the time series for PDEFEN. However, the slopes of the trend lines during military rule are not significantly different from those for preceding or succeeding periods of civilian rule. However, the results for Ethiopia (see Table 3.10), show that the time series after military intervention underwent a significant positive shift in both the intercept and the slope.

In Ethiopia for example, at the beginning of the time series, the proportion of GDP allocated to defense (PDEFEN) is 3.5 percent. There was an average annual shift of -0.1 percent in the slope of the time series. Following military intervention there is a short-term increase of 3.1 percent in the overall level of the time series. The period of military rule witnesses a significant positive annual shift of 0.6 percent in the slope of the time series.

Ethiopia's uniqueness as manifested by the significant shift of 0.53 percent per year in the rate of change in PDEFEN over the period of military rule (1976-1985), is perhaps due to the fact that since it assumed office Ethiopia's military government has been engaged in a costly military campaign against Eritrean and Somali separatist

Table 3.10
MITS Results for Ethiopia and Kenya

	ETHIOPIA (11)			KENYA (15)		
	b	t	Prob.	b	t	Prob.
PSPEND (OLS)				(5th)		
Intercept(C)	0.1086***	9.742	0.0001	0.1874***	20.195	0.0001
counter(C)	0.0026**	2.547	0.0208	0.0011	1.166	0.2598
dummy76(M)	0.0085	0.777	0.4477	0.0019	0.106	0.9171
count76(M)	0.0181***	9.756	0.0001	0.0088***	3.588	0.0023
		R^2=0.9777			R^2=0.8630	
PHEALTH (OLS)				(2nd)		
Intercept	0.0074***	12.855	0.0001	0.0091***	5.665	0.0001
counter	0.0000	0.349	0.7319	0.0004**	2.825	0.0105
dummy76	0.0011	1.744	0.1016	-0.0004	-0.259	0.7979
count76	0.0001	0.523	0.6086	0.0002	0.505	0.6193
		R^2=0.6466			R^2=0.9001	
PEDUC (OLS)				(1st)		
Intercept	0.0068***	2.928	0.0094	0.0231***	2.992	0.0072
counter	0.0011***	5.324	0.0001	0.0014*	1.919	0.0694
dummy76	-0.0049**	-2.137	0.0475	-0.0032	-0.571	0.5741
count76	-0.0001	-0.199	0.8446	-0.0007	-0.392	0.6993
		R^2=0.8111			R^2=0.8664	
PDEFEN (2nd)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.0349***	4.541	0.0004	0.0013	0.386	0.7029
counter	-0.0010	-1.499	0.1546	0.0009**	2.532	0.0190
dummy76	0.0306***	3.945	0.0013	0.0133**	2.418	0.0243
count76	0.0063***	4.882	0.0002	-0.0003	-0.357	0.7246
		R^2=0.9419			R^2=0.7946	
PMAN (2nd)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.0534***	51.365	0.0001	0.0937**	2.309	0.0330
counter	0.0029***	27.707	0.0001	0.0013	0.346	0.7334
dummy76	-0.0111***	-4.908	0.0002	0.0809**	2.111	0.0490
count76	-0.0016***	-3.062	0.0079	-0.0131**	-2.151	0.0453
		R^2=0.9691			R^2=0.2960	
PAGRIC (3rd)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.6505***	105.386	0.0001	0.3613***	18.946	0.0001
counter	-0.0126***	-20.025	0.0001	-0.0035*	-2.032	0.0572
dummy76	0.0137	0.968	0.3496	0.0433**	2.405	0.0272
count76	0.0124***	3.711	0.0023	0.0057*	-1.983	0.0628
		R^2=0.9667			R^2=0.6196	

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01

movements (Wubneh and Abate 1988, 68-74). Although the Eritrean struggle for independence from Ethiopia was in its fifteenth year in 1975 (when the military assumed power), it was not until after the military intervened that the Ethiopian government made a concerted (as yet unsuccessful) effort to overwhelm the liberation movements. Thus the armed forces which numbered 50,800 in 1975 were increased to 229,500 by 1980. Further increases in defense expenditure was also encouraged by the presence of thousands of Cuban soldiers and Warsaw Pact technicians and advisers who served in the Ethiopian forces and operated aircraft and heavy equipment (Legum 1977, B201; 1981, B167-168).

The significant effect of regime type on defense expenditure is confirmed by the results of the time series for Kenya (the "control" country for Ethiopia). The results (see Table 3.10) show that a simulated intervention in 1975 is associated with a significant shift in the overall level of the Kenyan time series (DUMMY76). However, whereas DUMMY76 in Ethiopia was significant at the .01 level, DUMMY76 for Kenya was significant at the less impressive .05 level. A more significant difference is manifested in the slope of the trend lines. Whereas there is a very significant positive shift in the long-term trend of the series for Ethiopia, the long-term trend for Kenya is negative.

There was at least one instance in which military intervention is not associated with positive changes in the time series for PDEFEN. In the case of Togo (see Table 3.12) for example, the proportion of GDP allocated to defense (PDEFEN), over the initial time period is 0.10 percent. Average yearly change in PDEFEN over the initial time series is 0.17 percent. Military intervention (DUMMY68) is associated with a

Table 3.11
MITS Results for Sudan and Zaire

	SUDAN (29)			ZAIRE (34)		
	b	t	Prob.	b	t	Prob.
PSPEND (OLS)				(OLS)		
Intercept(M)	0.1628***	8.321	0.0001	0.5656***	8.317	0.0001
counter(M)	0.0077	1.530	0.1445	9.1940E	---	---
dummy66(C)	0.0317	1.061	0.3037	0.1227	1.142	0.2728
count66(C)	-0.0207*	-1.946	0.0684	-0.1113***	-3.658	0.0026
dummy70(M)	0.0352	1.637	0.1201	0.1129	1.651	0.1211
count70(M)	0.0105	1.105	0.2846	0.1079***	3.511	0.0035
		R^2=0.3640			R^2=0.6642	
PHEALTH (1st)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.0118***	6.127	0.0001	0.0406***	13.090	0.0001
counter	-0.0004	-0.810	0.4299	-1.8735E	---	---
dummy66	0.0009	0.447	0.6608	0.0204***	4.161	0.0011
count66	0.0002	0.235	0.8175	-0.0105***	-7.591	0.0001
dummy70	0.0014	0.829	0.4192	-0.0100***	-3.155	0.0076
count70	-0.0006	-0.816	0.4263	0.0106***	7.542	0.0001
		R^2=0.8875			R^2=0.9613	
PEDUC (5th)				(1st)		
Intercept	0.0149***	3.426	0.0050	0.0380***	3.549	0.0040
counter	-0.0001	-0.111	0.9133	-1.4919E	---	---
dummy66	0.0097**	2.233	0.0454	0.0885***	5.135	0.0002
count66	-0.0025	-1.131	0.2802	-0.0249***	-6.337	0.0001
dummy70	0.0054	1.568	0.1428	0.1511*	1.786	0.0994
count70	0.0020	1.308	0.2154	0.0262***	6.692	0.0001
		R^2=0.6530			R^2=0.7773	
PDEFEN (OLS)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.0120**	2.438	0.0261	0.0555***	5.688	0.0001
counter	0.0024*	1.869	0.0792	-2.6021E	---	---
dummy66	0.0052	0.693	0.4977	-0.0077	-0.500	0.6255
count66	-0.0019	-0.722	0.4801	-0.0089*	-2.050	0.0611
dummy70	0.0147**	2.719	0.0146	0.0312***	3.140	0.0078
count70	-0.0028	-1.184	0.2529	0.0076	1.709	0.1112
		R^2=0.7816			R^2=0.5469	
PMAN (OLS)				(2nd)		
Intercept	0.0427***	6.387	0.0001	0.1358**	4.288	0.0128
counter	0.0014	0.813	0.4284	-1.9948	---	---
dummy66	0.0335***	3.278	0.0047	5.0373	---	---
count66	0.0041	1.125	0.2772	0.0202*	2.250	0.0876
dummy70	0.0013	0.181	0.8590	-0.1312***	-16.359	0.0001
count70	-0.0063*	-1.925	0.0722	-0.0202*	-2.255	0.0872
		R^2=0.9406			R^2=0.9943	

Table 3.11 Cont'd.

	SUDAN (29)			ZAIRE (34)		
	b	t	Prob.	b	t	Prob.
PAGRIC (OLS)						
Intercept	0.6299***	15.773	0.0001	0.3409*	2.617	0.0792
counter	-0.0354	-3.451	0.0033	6.9064	---	---
dummy66	-0.0923	-1.513	0.1497	0	---	---
count66	0.0673***	3.093	0.0070	-0.0373	-1.039	0.3752
dummy70	0.0189	0.424	0.6770	-0.0516	-1.356	0.2682
count70	-0.0368*	-1.885	0.0778	0.0491	1.315	0.2800
		R^2=0.6653			R^2=0.7878	

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Insufficient data

Table 3.12
MITS Results for Togo and Malawi

	TOGO (32)			MALAWI (19)		
	b	t	Prob.	b	t	Prob.
PSPEND (1st)				(OLS)		
Intercept(C)	0.1252	1.476	0.1562	0.1827***	5.991	0.0001
counter(C)	-0.0018	-0.128	0.8994	0.0065	1.076	0.2938
dummy68(M)	-0.0178	-0.344	0.7343	-0.0105	-0.331	0.7434
count68(M)	0.0198	1.203	0.2439	-0.0019	-0.300	0.7666
		R^2=0.8685			R^2=0.4657	
PHEALTH (1st)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.0145***	4.889	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.023	0.9821
counter	-0.0009	-1.720	0.1016	0.0019***	2.940	0.0084
dummy68	-0.0020	-0.909	0.3747	-0.0045**	-2.454	0.0240
count68	0.0018***	3.145	0.0053	-0.0013*	-2.084	0.0509
		R^2=0.8490			R^2=0.7593	
PEDUC (OLS)				(1st)		
Intercept	0.0205***	3.692	0.0014	0.0225***	3.840	0.0010
counter	-0.0004	-0.419	0.6796	0.0014	1.359	0.1885
dummy68	-0.0100**	-2.164	0.0427	0.0014	0.291	0.7739
count68	0.0038***	3.525	0.0021	-0.0016	-1.305	0.2061
		R^2=0.9128			R^2=0.4591	
PDEFEN (1st)				(1st)		
Intercept	0.0010	0.057	0.9550	0.0021	0.088	0.9307
counter	0.0017	0.560	0.5820	0.0006	0.166	0.8700
dummy68	-0.0019	0.150	0.8823	-0.0007	-0.104	0.9183
count68	-0.0006	-0.180	0.8588	0.0005	0.144	0.8869
		R^2=0.4598			R^2=0.7783	
PMAN (OLS)				(OLS)		
Intercept	-0.0366	-1.753	0.1001	0.0838**	2.216	0.0468
counter	0.0174***	5.120	0.0001	-0.0005	-0.089	0.9304
dummy68	0.0030	0.294	0.7729	-0.0040	-0.297	0.7714
count68	-0.0209***	-6.046	0.0001	0.0054	0.920	0.3755
		R^2=0.7870			R^2=0.7374	
PAGRIC (1st)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.6396***	7.865	0.0001	0.5845***	4.957	0.0003
counter	-0.0289**	-2.290	0.0381	-0.0026	-0.147	0.8856
dummy68	0.0069	0.191	0.8512	0.0052	0.125	0.9028
count68	0.0155	1.109	0.2861	-0.0164	-0.901	0.3851
		R^2=0.9138			R^2=0.8345	

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.<.01

short-term decrease of 0.19 percent, and the long-term trend showed a 0.11 percent (i.e., 0.0017 - 0.0006) average yearly shifts in PDEFEN. To be sure, Togo is the only clear case in which military intervention is associated with a decrease in PDEFEN. However, the changes in the time series are not statistically significant.

Manufacturing (PMAN) and Agriculture (PAGRIC)

As can be discerned from the MITS tables (Tables 3.8 to 3.13), the performance of the two major sectors of the economies of all the six countries does not seem to have been overly sensitive to regime alternation in any consistent fashion. For example, the tables show that military interventions in Ethiopia (Table 3.10) and Liberia (Table 3.8), are associated with short-term decreases in the overall level of the respective time series for PMAN. Tables 3.9 and 3.11 show the reverse to be the case in Nigeria and the Sudan. However, in all four countries, irrespective of the direction of the initial shift in the intercept, the overall slope for the periods of military rule are negative. Furthermore, in the Sudan, when military rulers are succeeded by civilians, the trends are reversed. The reinstatement of a civilian administration seems to effect a significant positive shift in the overall level of the time series for PMAN in the Sudan (DUMMY66). Although civilian succession of the military in Nigeria is associated with a positive shift in the intercept for PMAN, the shift is not statistically significant. However, in both countries the slope of the trend lines during periods of civilian rule are not significantly different from the slopes of the preceding periods of military rule.

Table 3.13
MITS Results for Uganda and Tanzania

	UGANDA (33)			TANZANIA (31)		
	b	t	Prob.	b	t	Prob.
PSPEND (OLS)				(2nd)		
Intercept(C)	0.1784***	13.851	0.0001	0.0676***	3.301	0.0049
counter(C)	0.0013	0.735	0.4710	0.0137***	5.596	0.0001
dummy72(M)	0.0118	0.648	0.5246	-0.0102	-0.571	0.5761
count72(M)	-0.0166***	-5.752	0.0001	-0.0046	-1.539	0.1446
dummy82(C)	0.0699**	2.460	0.0231	0.0224	0.658	0.5207
count82(C)	0.0296***	3.067	0.0061	-0.0393***	-3.393	0.0040
		R^2=0.8345			R^2=0.8964	
PHEALTH (OLS)				(OLS)		
Intercept	0.0175***	9.463	0.0001	0.0057**	2.530	0.0216
counter	-0.0001	-0.218	0.8296	0.0006**	2.172	0.0443
dummy72	-0.0042	-1.594	0.1266	0.0041**	2.146	0.0466
count72	-0.0009*	-2.064	0.0523	-0.0004	-1.105	0.2845
dummy82	0.0021	0.515	0.6119	-0.0005	-0.176	0.8624
count82	0.0008	.605	.5521	-0.0018*	-1.919	0.0719
		R^2=0.8049			R^2=0.8049	
PEDUC (OLS)				(2nd)		
Intercept	0.0304***	12.062	0.0001	0.0183***	8.169	0.0001
counter	0.0000	0.011	0.9915	0.0010***	3.782	0.0018
dummy72	0.0042	1.161	0.2593	0.0030	1.540	0.1444
count72	-0.0028***	-4.894	0.0001	-0.0003	-0.995	0.3357
dummy82	0.0069	1.236	0.2308	0.0072*	2.000	0.0640
count82	0.0048**	2.537	0.0196	-0.0076***	-6.035	0.0001
		R^2=0.8136			R^2=0.9183	
PDEFEN (OLS)				(OLS)		
Intercept	-0.0012	-0.326	0.7479	0.0225*	1.886	0.0886
counter	0.0020***	3.902	0.0009	-2.4286	---	---
dummy72	0.0141**	2.599	0.0172	0	---	---
count72	-0.0043***	-5.042	0.0001	0.0026	1.354	0.2055
dummy82	0.0053	0.622	0.5409	-0.0069	-0.274	0.7896
count82	0.0045	1.581	0.1295	-0.0052	-0.647	0.5321
		R^2=0.7305			R^2=0.1639	

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
---Insufficient data

Similar inconsistencies are noticeable in the very important agricultural sector. For example, the return to civilian rule is associated with a short-term decrease in the overall level of the time series for PAGRIC in Nigeria (DUMMY80) and the Sudan (DUMMY66), whereas military intervention in both countries (DUMMY67 and DUMMY70) is associated with the opposite trend. However, military intervention in Liberia (DUMMY81) is associated with a decrease in the overall time series for PAGRIC. Although all the shifts in the overall level of the time series for PAGRIC are not significant, there are significant positive shifts in the slope of the trend lines in Ethiopia (COUNT76), Liberia (COUNT81), Sudan (COUNT66) and Nigeria (COUNT80). Whereas the positive trends in Ethiopia and Liberia are associated with military rule, similar trends in Nigeria and the Sudan are associated with civilian rule. A significant negative shift in the slope of the trend line is also associated with military rule in the Sudan (COUNT70).

Since no clear evidence of policy sensitivity to regime type is present, it is not necessary to analyze the results of the MITS analysis for the countries in the "control group."

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Perhaps the most important indicator of economic performance is the gross domestic product (GDP). Table 3.14 shows the annual percentage change in GDP (1960-1985) for twelve selected countries and Table 3.15 shows the average annual percentage increase in GDP under military and civilian rule. As can been clearly discerned from these tables, the effect of public policy on GDP is not consistent within regime types. The tables show that gains in GDP are registered under

Table 3.14
Annual Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1980 Prices, 1960-1985*

YEAR	BOTSWANA	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	KENYA	LIBERIA	MALAWI	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	TANZANIA	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA
1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	7.1	1.7	6.1	-	-	4.9	4.1	3.3	-2.0	-	5.4	-2.1
1962	7.0	0.6	4.8	-	-	1.5	11.6	5.7	1.3	-	4.3	1.4
1963	4.8	2.7	3.5	-	-	2.1	4.3	8.4	-1.1	-	4.9	2.2
1964	13.6	4.9	2.6	-	-	11.8	-5.9	6.1	-5.1	-	3.9	17.8
1965	-5.4	5.9	1.4	-0.3	1.7	2.1	6.7	2.6	8.9	-	3.4	18.4
1966	6.5	3.9	**0.1**	10.9	19.0	9.9	23.3	**-2.0**	0.4	12.8	**12.1**	13.4
1967	7.0	4.5	**-2.3**	1.2	-0.7	5.6	-3.4	**-20.7**	9.5	4.0	**2.3**	12.8
1968	1.9	3.0	**6.4**	8.6	4.8	-0.2	-7.8	**12.6**	9.3	5.2	**4.3**	7.5
1969	15.1	6.0	**5.8**	5.5	7.3	6.4	-1.6	**26.8**	11.0	1.8	**9.1**	18.7
1970	14.9	3.6	**6.7**	7.4	6.5	1.5	9.3	**29.8**	11.0	5.8	**9.6**	-13.7
1971	17.2	4.5	5.6	6.9	5.0	14.4	-3.4	**18.4**	1.2	4.2	**6.0**	0.1
1972	29.8	4.8	**-2.5**	16.1	3.8	0.2	-7.6	**7.3**	0.2	6.7	**0.1**	9.8
1973	24.8	2.7	**15.3**	-2.3	-2.5	1.6	-10.9	**-5.0**	3.4	3.1	**8.1**	-1.0
1974	24.2	1.4	**3.4**	10.8	7.4	7.4	**6.2**	**12.1**	**0.7**	2.5	**3.1**	6.7
1975	-1.3	**0.1**	**-12.9**	0.8	-15.1	5.5	**20.5**	**-3.0**	**2.0**	5.7	**-5.0**	-2.4
1976	16.5	**2.3**	**-3.5**	3.9	4.0	6.2	**15.3**	**10.9**	**1.8**	20.7	**-5.2**	4.3
1977	2.3	**0.6**	**2.3**	9.4	-0.8	4.3	**2.8**	**8.1**	**5.1**	2.8	**0.8**	-4.3
1978	18.3	**-1.1**	**8.5**	7.2	3.9	8.3	**9.8**	**-7.3**	**9.8**	2.9	**-5.3**	0.6
1979	12.1	**5.3**	**-3.2**	3.9	4.4	3.3	**3.8**	2.5	**9.4**	1.2	**0.3**	-3.1
1980	14.0	**5.5**	0.0	4.8	**-4.7**	-0.4	**2.1**	5.3	**-3.6**	0.8	**2.4**	3.1
1981	8.7	**6.2**	-1.8	3.9	**-4.4**	-5.2	**-6.3**	-8.4	**2.5**	-1.1	**2.9**	6.2
1982	-2.3	**1.9**	**-7.2**	1.7	**-2.1**	2.8	-	-3.2	**4.1**	1.3	**-3.0**	-2.8
1983	24.0	**4.3**	**0.7**	3.7	**-3.3**	3.5	-	-6.3	-	-0.4	**1.3**	-2.0
1984	20.1	-	-	0.4	**-3.0**	4.5	-	-5.2	-	2.5	**2.7**	-1.3
1985	8.0	-	-	3.9	**-0.9**	4.1	-	5.2	-	-0.2	**2.5**	4.4

*Bold type indicates military governmental periods

civilian as well as under military rule. Similarly declines in GDP occur under both regime types. The results in Table 3.15 show that the only statistically significant difference in regime performance occurred in Liberia where the GDP increased by a yearly average of 3.24 percent under civilian rule and decreased by a yearly average of 3.08 percent under the military.

Summary and Conclusion

The picture that emerges from this analysis suggests that most military and civilian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are indistinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes. However, there is one category of public expenditure in which there appears to be a clear distinction between the two regime types. It is clearly evident from the various statistical techniques employed in this study that military regimes in most of the African countries included in this study spent significantly more on defense than their nonmilitary predecessors and successors. But, the results also show that there are a few countries in which the reverse is the case with civilian rulers spending more than their military counterparts on defense. However, in these few exceptional cases PDEFEN under military and civilian administrations are not significantly different.

The results of the MITS analysis also seem to suggest that the difference between military and civilian rulers in the area of defense spending is directly related to the budgetary priorities of each regime type immediately following regime change. The results show that the budgetary allocation to defense tends to undergo a significant increase immediately following a successful military coup. But upon achieving a

Table 3.15
Percentage of Change in Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1980 Prices (CGDP80)

COUNTRY	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
Benin	0.0541	0.0545	0.0065	0.9949
Burkina Faso	0.0277	-0.0167	-1.0764	0.3013
Burundi	0.0409	0.0367	-0.1110	0.9133
Ethiopia	0.0278	0.0359	0.9115	0.3724
Ghana	0.0073	0.0317	0.9782	0.3391
Liberia*	-0.0308	0.0324	2.1316	0.0463
Madagascar	-0.0028	-0.0077	-0.1182	0.9070
Niger	0.0677	-0.0564	-1.2099	0.2404
Nigeria	0.0566	0.0152	-0.8946	0.3803
Rwanda	0.0354	0.0418	0.2904	0.7747
Sierra Leone	0.0400	0.0458	0.1241	0.9026
Uganda	-0.0061	0.0089	0.5605	0.5834
TOTAL (All Nations n=25)	0.0251	0.0378	1.4431	0.1497

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01

new and higher level of spending for defense, the average yearly percentage changes in defense spending under military rule are not evidently dissimilar from average yearly percentage changes under civilian rule. This finding is consistent with Valerie Bunce's (1979, 1980, 1981) contention that changes in political leadership has significant short-run impact on budgetary changes but very little long-run impact. However the results for Ethiopia (see Table 3.10) also show that the time series after military intervention underwent a significant positive shift in both the intercept and the slope.

In Chapter One, three contrasting views on the effect of military rule on economic development were presented. The first of these views suggested that military rulers were progressive forces promoting economic growth and the modernization of the economic and social structures of Third World countries (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Cohen 1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987), while the second view saw military rulers as conservative or even reactionary forces (Nordlinger 1970; Feit 1973; Welch and Smith 1974; Berg-Schlosser 1984). Although the regression results for PDEFEN appear to lend some credence to views espoused by Nordlinger (1970) and Welch and Smith (1974), that military rule focuses primarily on policies that serve the narrow interests of the armed forces, the overall results show that African military rulers and their civilian counterparts cannot be distinguished by their budgetary priorities or by the economic outcomes of their policy initiatives.

By most measures of economic performance, the results clearly fail to show that the performance of one regime type is superior to the

other. The use of GDP in determining a country's economic efficiency remains a standard, albeit imperfect, measure. As demonstrated in Tables 3.14 and 3.15, measures of GDP (at constant 1980 prices), fails to distinguish between the two regime types. Trying to reduce some of the problems associated with using a single indicator of economic performance (GDP) by adding measures of industrial and agricultural production served only to emphasize the suggestion that regime type is not associated with policy outcomes.

Although results from some of the simple country studies seem to suggest otherwise, there is no consistency in the pattern of the association between regime type and policy outcomes. It seems safe therefore, to conclude that the results of the foregoing analysis support the more recent views (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976), which suggests that public policy is not sensitive to changes in regime type. The results suggest that it may be risky to presume, as some studies seem to have done, that either military or civilian regimes act as monolithic bodies whose policy priorities and effect on economic performance can be clearly differentiated from one another. The MITS results for the selected pairs of countries reported in Tables 3.10 to 3.13, lend further credence to this conclusion.

But where do we go from here? An obvious next step is to attempt to find out why there appears to be so little difference between two distinctly dissimilar African regime types. This, as I have already noted, is not a task which easily lends itself to the quantitative method. A more critical analysis of the policy implications of regime type will require an in-depth study of some countries which have had

experience with both military and civilian regimes. It is expected that these case studies will yield a better understanding of the variations in the policy process that are missed by aggregate-data studies.

Endnotes

1. OLS estimates were used for those equations where there were no autocorrelated errors. However, time series regression models often suffer from the problem of autocorrelated error terms, which renders OLS regression inappropriate. Where this problem was evident, each equation was re-estimated to control for autocorrelation of the error variable.

   In order to obtain reliable estimated parameter values for the models used in this analysis, a two-step process was undertaken. First, I examined the plots of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for each model tested. From these plots it was possible--using the criteria suggested by Cook and Campbell (1979) and Hibbs (1974)--to detect the existence of autocorrelation as well as to make an estimate of the order of the autoregressive process.

   In those cases in which there was a significant autocorrelation problem, the model parameter values had to be re-estimated using a standard Cochrane-Orcott procedure found in SAS AUTOREG program. The result is a set of improved parameter estimates that are consistent and undisturbed by autocorrelation. See Hibbs (1974), Ostrom (1978), Cook and Campbell (1979), McDowell, et al. (1981) and Garand (1985).

2. Shifts in the level of the time series reflect the immediated short-term impact of an intervention (in this instance the installation of a new regime). Shifts in the slope of the time series reflect the long-term impact of the intervention.

Chapter Four

REGIME TYPE AND THE ECONOMY: AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN GHANA

The situations under which African states have been governed have been so varied that the continent provides one of the best settings within which to test the assumption that regime type is correlated with public policy. Of all the countries on the African continent, perhaps none is more suitable to test this assumption than Ghana.

Ghana is ideal for investigating the relationship between regime type and public policy because it is one of only seven nations in sub-Saharan Africa to have experienced all three of the systems of government identified in Chapter Two (competitive, one-party, and military). Furthermore, of these seven countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda), Ghana, is the only one for which fairly reliable data are available.

In later pages, the Ghanaian experience since independence in 1957 will be laid out in an effort to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of the last chapter about the consequences of civilian and military rule--what are the budgetary priorities of each regime type and what are the socioeconomic consequences of the governance of each regime type?

Historical Background

Ghana was formed by a merger of the Gold Coast, a former British colony, and the British-administered part of Togoland, a United Nation Trust Territory. The country attained independence on 6 March, 1957, under the premiership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. In the initial years of

independence Ghana maintained its pre-independence political institutions, (Westminster-type parliamentary system that had been instituted a few years before independence). Nkrumah had first become Prime Minister in 1952, after his Convention People's Party (CPP) won the British-administered general elections of 1951. Nkrumah continued in power after the CPP won 71 seats in the 104-seat legislative assembly in another British supervised general election in 1956.

Soon after Ghana became independent, Nkrumah began to take steps to consolidate his power. The CPP government introduced laws which effectively banned opposition political parties (Boahen 1975, 194). Those individuals who continued to be critical of the Nkrumah administration were detained under provisions of the Preventive Detention Act (Boahen 1975, 194; Woronoff 1972, 65-66).[1] Consequently, by 1960 the parliamentary Opposition had become a negligible force.

The CPP consolidated its control over unions, farmers, business, the press, youth and women's organizations. Civil servants were also pressured into becoming members of the CPP. The party reached into every village and directed every aspect of social and political life in the country (Kraus 1971, 59).[2]

On July 1, 1960, Ghana was declared a Republic. The new Constitution provided for an executive President who was elected for life and specified by name: Kwame Nkrumah. The cabinet was responsible to the President who appointed and could dismiss ministers. The Constitution provided for a parliament with powers to debate issues and reject government proposals with which it is dissatisfied. In practice this provision was pointless since the Constitution also empowered the

President to enact legislation by decree in the "national interest" (Woronoff 1972, 67). By the end of 1960, multipartism was, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent in Ghana. However, it was not until February 1964, following a referendum which was widely reported to have been manipulated by the government, that Ghana officially became a one-party state (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 46; Woronoff 1972, 67).

In the early 1960s, a decline in the world cocoa price--cocoa is the mainstay of Ghana's economy--hampered Ghana's economic development. Budget deficits became the norm as increases in expenditures rapidly outpaced revenues. The government introduced an austerity budget in 1961 and borrowed extensively both locally and abroad (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 44; Kraus 1971, 54; Baynham 1988, 206). By the beginning of 1966, the declining state of the economy and Nkrumah's authoritarian rule had coalesced to generate grievances in many sectors of Ghanaian society.

The state of the economy was also cause for concern within the armed forces. Because of declining revenue, the Nkrumah regime was forced to reduce spending on defense. Army officers blamed Nkrumah for Ghana's economic woes and its negative impact on the military. For example, Brigadier A.A. Afrifa noted that:

> because of bad planning, economic mismanagement, and political interference, this army was rendered incapable, ill equipped, and had virtually been reduced to a rabble. By Christmas 1965 a number of our troops were without equipment and clothing, things essential for the pride, morale, and efficiency of the soldier. There was an acute accommodation problem due to a rash military expansion scheme that Kwame Nkrumah had launched. It was shameful to see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, and sometimes without boots during his training period (Afrifa 1966, 104).

By the end of 1965, it was clear that Nkrumah and the CPP had lost the confidence of the Ghanaian people, including the army and police. Thus, on February 24, 1966, a group of army officers, led by Colonel E.K. Kotoka, Police Commissioner J.W.K. Harlley, and A.A. Afrifa, overthrew the Nkrumah regime while Nkrumah was on a visit to China.

The coup was greeted with overwhelming and spontaneous jubilation by Ghanaians. Support for the coup came from all social sectors, and the CPP which had ruled Ghana for fifteen years virtually disintegrated overnight (Baynham 1988, 205). The coup makers established a National Liberation Council (NLC) to administer the affairs of the country. It was headed by General Joseph Ankrah, who had previously been forced into retirement by Nkrumah. The new military leaders suspended the 1960 Constitution and announced their intention to "govern by decrees which shall have the force of law until a new constitution is promulgated." Parliament was dissolved; the CPP was declared illegal; all political parties were banned; and some 900 political prisoners were released (Baynham 1988, 218; Pinkney 1972, 97).

The Ghanaian military in 1966 was clearly ill-equipped to govern. Not only was the officer corps small, but, as a result of rapid expansion and Africanization of the army, virtually all command and staff posts were occupied by officers who were, on the whole, younger, less well-educated and less experienced than should ordinarily have been the case (Baynham 1988, 220). Shortages of appropriately trained personnel made it impossible for the military to govern alone. Consequently, the NLC had to rely heavily upon top civil servants, former opposition politicians, and university lecturers (Kraus 1971, 65).

The popularity of the new military regime was greatly enhanced by an official early announcement that its stay in power would be brief. The NLC promised to hand over power to a democratically-elected government within the shortest possible time. This promise was backed up by the establishment (in September of 1966) of a commission to draft a new constitution. The regime also tried to improve its popular standing by deploying army units for community projects, such as "Operation Yellow Pod" which involved carting hundreds of bags of cocoa from remote rural areas. Another undertaking was "Exercise Abongo-Omo," in which army units performed useful tasks, such as road repairs (Baynham 1988, 219).

In spite of its popularity at home, and massive infusion of economic assistance from the West, the NLC was unable, however, to make any significant improvements in the economy. Unemployment rose as government spending in the productive sectors of the economy, such as industries and agriculture, was drastically reduced (Price 1971b, 370). After three and one-half years of NLC rule, the problems which beset the country at the time of Nkrumah's ouster continued to exist. For example, corruption and economic mismanagement became worse. Early in 1969, having been accused of corruption NLC chairman, General Ankrah, was removed from office and replaced by Brigadier A.A. Afrifa (Kraus 1971, 70; Price 1971b, 377).

A new constitution was promulgated in mid-1969. It established a political system based upon the concept of separation of powers. It provided for a President, elected by an electoral college, and a Prime Minister appointed by the President from the majority party in the

Assembly. On May 1, the ban on political parties was lifted and soon thereafter many political parties were formed. The major parties were: the Progressive Party (PP), headed by Professor Kofi Busia; the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by Komla Gbedemah, the United Nationalist Party (UNP), led by Joe Appiah; and the All People's Republican Party, led by P.K.K. Quaidoo. Then, in the general elections held in August 1969, Busia's Progressive Party won 59 percent of the votes, taking 105 of the 140 National Assembly seats.

The first priority of the new civilian regime was to clean up the economic mess left by the NLC military government. In pursuit of this objective, the Busia administration took a variety of steps. Initially, in order to combat the problem of rising unemployment it enacted the Aliens Compliance Order, which called for the expulsion of all foreigners from Ghana. This was followed by the Ghanaian Business Bill, which prohibited foreign ownership of small retail companies. However, these measures did little to protect Ghana's economy from foreign domination (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 54).

There was also a campaign to eliminate bribery and corruption. The Center for Civic Education was established to instruct Ghanaians about their rights and obligations as citizens. During the anti-corruption campaign, in what has been described as a politically motivated purge, the Busia government summarily dismissed over 500 civil servants (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 55).

Under the PP government, Ghana's economy, in spite of higher world cocoa prices, remained stagnant. After only two years in office, the PP government accumulated debts equal to those compiled by Nkrumah's CPP in

nine years (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56). The fall in world cocoa prices in late 1971 forced the government to devalue the cedi (the Ghanaian unit of currency), and make cuts in public spending, including military spending.

In January 1972, in the wake of increasing economic and political difficulties, the army again seized power. Busia was in London undergoing medical treatment when his government was toppled. The constitution and all political institutions were abolished and replaced by a National Redemption Council (NRC) under the chairmanship of Lt. Col. (later General) Ignatius Acheampong.

The policy objective of the NRC, as presented in the National Redemption Charter, was to bring about, "a complete and systematic transformation of our peoples into a self-reliant nation, unique in its economic, social, cultural, political, technological and all-round development, a united nation with a spirit of its own" (The Charter of the NRC 1973, cited in Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56-57; Rothchild 1980, 467).

In 1975, major governmental changes took place, and ultimate legislative and administrative authority was transferred from the NRC to a Supreme Military Council (SMC), also led by Gen. Acheampong. In 1978, after six years in office, the initiatives of Acheampong's government had failed to produce any significant economic gains for Ghana. To be sure, by its corruption and mismanagement, Acheampong's military regime had created an economic crisis--with severe shortages in foreign exchange and consumer goods, and high inflation rates (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 58). The consequence was massive civilian protest and a palace

coup which removed Acheampong from office, in July of 1978. Acheampong was succeeded by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo, who immediately upon assuming office, declared that the return to a popularly-elected government would take place in July of 1979.

Akuffo adopted stringent economic measures as demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, increases in public expenditure were curtailed and the Ghanaian currency was devalued 58.2 percent (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 59). Yet these measures did not bring about the anticipated improvements in Ghana's economy. Economic decline continued, with inflation reaching 300 percent by October of 1978.

As one of the steps toward the return to civilian rule, local elections were held in November of 1978, and in December, a Constituent Assembly was set up to draw up a new constitution. The six-year ban on party politics was lifted in January of 1979. On June 4, only two weeks before the elections were due to take place, the Akuffo government was toppled in a coup staged by junior officers of the armed forces led by Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by Rawlings, was established as the new government. Rawlings announced that the purpose of the AFRC was limited to "house cleaning," to bringing to justice those former rulers who were responsible for Ghana's socioeconomic woes, and to restoring the reputation of the armed forces (Legum 1981, B496).

Upon assuming power, the AFRC had announced that the elections would be held as scheduled on the 18th of June, but that civilian rule would be delayed by at least three months. Eleven presidential candidates participated in the campaign leading up to the elections.

Seven of the candidates were sponsored by political parties. The People's National Party (PNP), an Nkrumahist party, won 71 of 140 seats in the parliamentary elections held on the 18th of June. On the 9th of July, in a run-off election for the presidency, the PNP candidate, Dr. Hilla Limann, defeated the Popular Front Party's Victor Owusu. Dr. Limann assumed office on September 24, 1979.

The Third Republic fell victim to criticism from the start. The mere transition to civilian rule could not reverse Ghana's desperate economic plight. Ghanaians continued to suffer great hardships. Inflation remained high, and the shortage in foreign exchange caused shortages in almost everything including consumer items such as milk, soap, toilet paper, and spare parts for cars and trucks (Legum 1981, B486).

In addition to economic problems, Limann had to cope with the conflict between the ideologues (or "Nkrumahists") and the pragmatists within the PNP. The President assumed a centrist position, and at the annual party congress in Kumasi in 1980, told the delegates that it was possible to be an Nkrumahist without being an ideologue: "Our present duty is to lay firm foundations for the drive towards full attainment of the goals for which the Osagyefo lived, worked and died in agonizing exile" (Legum 1981, B489).

His appeal for party unity went unanswered, and when Alhaji Imoru Egala, "Father" of the PNP died suddenly of a heart attack, an unpleasant struggle for party leadership ensued. While this was going on, the PNP administration's credibility was severely damaged by a scandal in which serious allegations of financial mismanagement were

made against people close to the President. By the end of 1981, therefore the PNP was fragmented; and with cocoa production at their lowest levels since independence, the economy was on the verge of total collapse. These events did not help the cause of democracy in Ghana.

Assisted by the military, Jerry Rawlings, now retired from the armed forces, seized power for a second time on December 31, 1981. He cited corruption and the continuing economic decline as the reason for his intervention. After the coup, the constitution was abolished, parliament dissolved, and political parties were banned. Widespread pro-Rawlings demonstrations early in January of 1982, indicated the popularity of Rawlings and the coup. A Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), comprising four military personnel and three civilians, was established to manage the affairs of the country. Rawlings assumed the chairmanship of the PNDC.

At the start the new regime was characterized by radical rhetoric, calling for the creation of a new Ghanaian society based on egalitarian values. People's socialism was to be the vehicle for the establishment of this new society. In an effort to get the people involved in the decision-making process several national and local committees were established (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 79).[3]

The PNDC adopted a series of measures that would help improve the economy and eradicate corruption. These measures proved to be ineffective and by May of 1983, university students, initially supporters of the PNDC were demonstrating their resentment against many of the government's policies. As Ghana's economic decline persisted, the PNDC was forced to abandon radical and ideologically based

approaches in favor of more cautious and conventional approaches to economic management. Thus Ghana had to reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in 1983 it embarked on a conventional IMF adjustment program. Among other changes, the PNDC agreed to maintain budgetary restrictions and to devalue the country's currency. Consequently, in October of 1983, the cedi was devalued by almost 100 percent (Bienen 1987, 54).

Towards the end of 1985, there were signs that Ghana's economy was recovering. The growth in the country's average GDP for 1984-1985 was nearly twice as high as the year before and there was a significant decline in inflation. Despite these improvements, Ghana's fundamental economic problems persisted, with major difficulties in the coordination of developmental plans. As 1985 drew to a close, it was not yet clear whether the PNDC would succeed in bringing to an end over a quarter century of economic decline in Ghana.

The forgoing discussion clearly shows that, irrespective of regime type, successive Ghanaian administrations have had no success in dealing with the socioeconomic problems which has plagued Ghana since independence. However, in order to discern clearly the impact of regime type in Ghana, the performance of successive regimes as it relates to a major sector of the country's economy must be evaluated. Agriculture has always been the principal sector of Ghana's economy, accounting for over one-third of GDP and employing almost two-thirds of the working population. Consequently, in the remainder of this chapter, agricultural policy under alternating civilian and military regimes from Nkrumah (1957-1966) to Rawlings (1981-) will be evaluated (the first

Rawlings administration lasted only a few months and will, therefore, receive only brief mention).

Agricultural Policy

Agriculture Under Colonial Rule

For the most part, the policies of British trading companies and the British colonial government were responsible for making agriculture the dominant sector of Ghana's economy. The major trading companies including the United Africa Company (UAC), Cadburys and Holts along with the colonial administration greatly stimulated agricultural activities in Ghana, by setting up agricultural colleges, introducing new and improved varieties of crops and providing the necessary infrastructure of railways, roads and ports. Local branches of British commercial banks were established to supply farmers with credit and agencies were set up to deal with the purchase, grading and shipment of crops (Jones 1976, 233). The emphasis during the colonial era was on cash crop production to meet the European demands for tropical agricultural products.

The success of the efforts of the colonial government and the trading companies was reflected in the record production and export of Ghana's major cash crop, cocoa. Cocoa was first introduced into Ghana towards the end of the nineteenth century, but it was only after the First World War that the country's export trade really became significant. The volume of cocoa exports rose from 80 pounds in 1881 to two million pounds in 1901 and to 88.9 million pounds in 1911. This made Ghana the world's leading producer of cocoa. The export of cocoa

continued to rise until it reached the record figure of 305,000 tons in 1936 (Boahen, Ade-Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 128).

In 1948, the colonial administration established the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) as Ghana's sole buyer, grader, seller and exporter of cocoa. The ostensible purpose was to protect the Ghanaian cocoa farmer from the fluctuations of the world commodities market. The CMB bought all Ghanaian produced cocoa at a controlled and stable price and resold it on the world market at the then current world market price. By setting the domestic price lower than the world price, the colonial administrators hoped to build a reserve fund which could be used to develop the country's economy and to pay local farmers in the event of a shortfall in world prices (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, 40).

Despite the fact that the greater portion of the CMB reserves were diverted to Britain, for use in rebuilding her shattered postwar economy, Ghanaian agriculture was still able to make some impressive contributions to Ghana's economy. For example, CMB reserves were used to build roads, dispensaries, clinics, wells, water-catchment devices, maternity and community centers, and schools (Pedler 1979, 90). At the time of independence in 1957, Nkrumah and his CPP government were able to inherit a buoyant economy, with a per capita national income higher than any in Africa outside of South Africa (Omari 1970, 100). The colonial government also handed down to the CPP government foreign reserves amounting to about 200 million pounds and a foreign debt of only 20 million pounds (Boahen 1975, 192). Nkrumah and the CPP had every reason to be optimistic about the future.

Agricultural Policy Under the Nkrumah Administration (1957-1966)

From his writings and speeches, Nkrumah made it abundantly clear that he was a Marxist who was determined to push through a socialist program of political and economic development (Nkrumah 1957; 1962). In his autobiography published in 1957, Nkrumah had stated that capitalism was too complicated a system for a newly independent nation to adopt (Nkrumah 1957). Moreover, less than a month before independence, on February 25, 1957, Nkrumah told the CPP's National Delegates' Conference that he would construct in Ghana a "socialist pattern of society" (Boahen 1975, 197).

In view of Nkrumah's avowed commitment to socialism, observers were expecting some really revolutionary measures in the economic field. However, contrary to all expectations, Nkrumah's CPP government did not take any decisive step towards adopting a socialist pattern of development. In spite of pressure exerted on the government by the more radical members of the CPP, including C.K.K. Baah, W.A. Wiafe, and J.R. Asiedu, who advocated the indigenization of retail trade and the introduction of restrictions on import-export trade, the CPP government refrained from taking any actions that might curb the dominant position of foreign companies in these fields.

It was only in two fields, the purchasing of cocoa and banking, that any real changes occurred. The Ghana Farmers' Marketing Cooperative established in May of 1957 and the Ghana Cooperative Marketing Association, using licensed indigenous buying agents, soon became the major purchasers of Ghanaian cocoa. This partial indigenization of cocoa purchasing, was welcomed by most of the foreign

companies involved in the cocoa trade. In time, these companies including the UTC, UAC, GBO, SAT, and CFAO, voluntarily withdrew from the domestic cocoa purchasing business (Boahen 1975, 198).

Apart from the fields of cocoa purchasing and banking (the Ghana Bank was established in 1957 as the central bank) the other economic sectors experienced no change whatsoever. Nkrumah continued on the economic path laid down by the former colonial administration. Thus, although Nkrumah desired to institute a program for the rapid industrialization of Ghana and the diversification of the one-crop (cocoa) economy, his government exercised restraint, being guided by pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, considerations.

In the first three years of independence, the economic policies of the CPP government produced some significant gains for the country. Its open door policy attracted some foreign capital for the construction of new industries. During this period, Ghanaians experienced an unprecedented increase in their standard of living (Omari 1972, 100; Boahen 1975, 200). However, the repatriation of profits by foreign cooperations, together with the decline in world cocoa prices, placed a tremendous burden on the country's foreign reserves. To arrest this adverse trend, new policy measures were initiated.

The new policy measures were consistent with Nkrumah's Marxist rhetoric. A socialist type, mixed economy replaced the free market-dominated, mixed economy of the immediate post-independence years. E.N. Omaboe, Chairman of the National Economic Committee has suggested that this change was prompted by Nkrumah's desire to emulate the impressive

economic achievements of the communist countries which he had visited in 1961 (Omari 1972, 102-103).

The new policy priorities of the CPP were included in the Third Development Plan (the Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963-1970) and in the Program of the Convention People's Party for Work and Happiness, which was a comprehensive, detailed document for economic, educational, health, and social development. The new plans laid considerable stress on industrial expansion and the productivity of agriculture. The plan included heavy emphasis on centralized planning and the establishment of state-owned industries and joint ventures between the state and large foreign firms (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 43; Woronoff 1972, 176-91).

In implementing its new, noncapitalist, development policies the Nkrumah government placed its real hopes for Ghana's economic advancement on industrialization. Table 4.1 shows the government's priority for industry and mining. Of the total investment of 25 percent allocated to industry and mining, fully 23 percent, the highest ever, was public investment (Woronoff 1972, 178). Only 14 percent of total public expenditure was allocated to the agricultural sector.

One of the major objectives of the new policy in agriculture was to reduce the dependence on cocoa by diversifying production. Another objective was to raise productivity through improved techniques, the use of irrigation and modern machinery. The CPP government decided that these goals would be best realized through the creation of cooperatives, state farms and Workers' Brigade farms.

Table 4.1
Selected Plan Data: Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963-1970

Investment Allocation (Public and Private)	#m	Percentage
Agriculture	176.6	17.4
Industry	206.4	20.3
Mining	41.7	4.7
Unallocated private	75.2	7.4
Directly Productive	499.9	49.8
Transport equipment	62.9	6.2
Other physical infrastructure	109.4	10.7
Physical Infrastructure	172.3	16.9
Education	61.3	6.1
Health	20.4	22.1
Housing	76.2	7.5
Social services	23.4	2.3
Human and Social Infrastructure	101.3	19.8
Administration	22.8	2.2
Renewal of Fixed Assets	104.2	13.8
TOTAL	1,015.0	100.0

SOURCE: Seven Year Development Plan, 1963-1964 to 1969-1970 (Accra, Ghana, 1964).

The Workers' Brigade and state farms were intended as an instrument to alleviate urban unemployment and rural underdevelopment (Jones 1976, 228-29). In its efforts to promote diversification, government plans directed that these farms should produce palm oil, rubber, sugar cane, cotton and meat (Woronoff 1972, 186). The Soviet government and some East European countries agreed to help manage the state farms. They also supplied machinery, tools, construction materials, fertilizers and chemicals (Smertin 1987, 112).

These farms were supposed to help increase Ghana's cash crop production and produce enough food to satisfy the country's domestic needs. More importantly, they were to become not only financially self-sufficient, but also be able to generate sufficient profits to help facilitate the development of other sectors of the economy. To get them going, the Plan provided a fair share of the agricultural budget, $26 million for state farms and $13 million for the Workers' Brigade farms (Woronoff 1972, 186).

The creation of state and Workers' Brigade farms progressed very rapidly beginning with 26 such farms in 1962, and by 1966, when the CPP government was toppled, there were well over 100 state farms and 34 Workers' Brigade farms (Woronoff 1972, 186; Smertin 1987, 112).

The private farmers did not receive as much government support as their numbers and productive capacity would suggest. While the whole farm population may have benefitted from the million of dollars spent for research and for irrigation, a disproportionately larger share of total government expenditure went to the state farms sector. Furthermore, in addition to reducing the prices paid to the farmers by

the CMB, the CPP government discontinued several significant forms of assistance: the subsidies on insecticides and spraying machines, the grants for replanting areas where diseased cocoa trees had been cut out, the traditional, end-of-season bonus to each farmer, and the practice of providing off-season advances without interest (Esseks 1971, 17; Berg 1971, 209). Furthermore, the Agricultural Development Corporation originally established to provide assistance to private farmers was dissolved (Olajide 1976, 79).

The new institutions, including the United Ghana Farmers' Council (UGFC--that replaced the independent National Farmers Council, which had been opposed to many of the government's agricultural policies), took over the responsibilities of purchasing, grading, storage and transportation of cocoa from the farmers to the dockside (Jones 1976, 232-37). The UGFC, which was also responsible for providing assistance (financial and material) to private farmers, tended to discriminate against those who did not belong to the cooperative movement (Berg 1971, 209; Amonoo 1981, 128-29). The cooperative movement, like the UGFC, the Workers' Brigade and many other government sponsored groups were all auxiliaries of the CPP.

The CPP government's socialist-oriented agricultural policy failed to improve Ghana's economic performance. Most of the state farms failed completely and the Workers Brigades could not even produce enough food to feed themselves, let alone the nation (Boahen 1975, 216). Although the state farming sector got most of the money, it produced very little in the way of output. More than 98 percent of total agricultural output

was produced by the private sector (Smertin 1987, 112-13; Berg 1971, 196).

The CMB, which the colonial administration had established in the 1940s, gave the CPP government easy access to the savings of the country's cocoa producers. The CPP not only maintained the CMB, but also extended its area of operation to include other crops, such as palm oil, coconuts, groundnuts, and bananas. The CMB reserves that were intended to be used to stabilize the price that farmers got for their produce and to promote the development of the country's economy, were diverted into the coffers of the CPP (Munger 1959, iii-56; Jones 1976, 234).

After 1961, things became worse for the farmer when the UGFC intervened between the him and the CMB, and ever greater proportions of the profits were withheld from the farmer. This fact, coupled with the general restrictions on consumer imports, encouraged farmers to smuggle cocoa and other agricultural output to neighboring countries where they fetched higher prices. Between ten and thirty thousand tons of cocoa each year are said to have been smuggled out of Ghana during the period 1960-1965 (Berg 1971, 199).

The ideological motivated relations between the Nkrumah regime and the Soviet-bloc countries caused considerable harm to Ghana's agricultural productivity. Agricultural machinery and other equipments supplied by East European countries were often not suitable for Ghana. For example, one East European country supplied Ghana with several hundred 'agricultural' tractors which turned out to be snowplows (Omari 1972, 108). Even when the proper type of machinery was delivered, spare

parts were often not available, and thus servicing was seriously impaired.

The failure of the state farm sector, the unfavorable treatment of private farmers, and the lack of adequate farm machinery and spare parts all coalesced to bring about a decline in agricultural productivity. There were food shortages and food queues became a common sight in the major towns all across the country (Jones 1976, 254, 258; Woronoff 1972, 188; Boahen 1975, 216).

Perhaps the most unfavorable consequence of the CPP government's agricultural policies was the slump in the cocoa industry. The activities of the CMB and the UGFC did only encourage smuggling of cocoa out of the country, but also led to a decline in the planting of cocoa trees. Furthermore, in order to save funds, the campaign against swollen shoot disease, the cocoa tree's worst enemy, was interrupted and the disease returned. All of these culminated in a decline in cocoa production at a time when the price for cocoa on the world market was also falling. By the time Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, cocoa production which only two years earlier had reached the record level of 580 tons per year had declined to about 380 tons per year (see Table 4.2).

The Nkrumah years saw the gradual disappearance of the substantial reserve fund, which at the time of independence had amounted to some 200 million pounds, and its replacement with a national debt of 349.2 million pounds--more than seventeen times the size of the debt at the time of independence (West Africa 1965, 1123).

Table 4.2
Production of Major Crops (000 tons)

YEAR	RICE	MAIZE	YAMS	CASSAVA	GROUND NUTS	PALM OIL/ KERNELS	COCUA
1948-56*	23	168	482	600	--	--/--	253.3
1957	--	--	--	--	--	--/7	--
1958	30	183	--	1092	--	4/8	259.6
1959	--	--	--	--	--	5/3	254.2
1960	--	--	--	--	--	--/3	307.7
1961	30	--	--	--	--	--/2	416.0
1962	31	--	--	788	57	--/8	428.4
1963	33	183	--	1194	61	25/6	427.7
1964	43	173	1153	122	61	26/10	580.9
1965	33	209	1055	1171	61	37/22	415.7
1966	30	358	748	1171	61	44/22	381.0
1967	52	363	1134	1577	39	56/22	423.5
1968	65	301	1351	1446	62	54/25	327.0
1969	61	304	1305	1320	61	55/34	414.3
1970	69	442	1617	1596	60	60/37	396.2
1971	55	384	909	2388	102	60/37	470.0
1972	47	389	660	2813	89	61/38	415.7
1973	62	438	686	2865	122	61/38	343.0
1974	73	486	--	1770	148	23/33	382.0
1975	71	343	--	1800	110	24/34	396.0
1976	--	--	--	1800	60	30/32	320.0
1977	58	309	--	1800	90	15/30	271.0
1978	60	340	--	2100	80	21/30	265.0
1979	55	380	--	2200	90	21/30	290.0
1980	62	390	--	2250	92	21/30	255.0
1981	79	378	--	1650	100	21/30	247.0
1982	70	285	--	1976	110	23/30	203.0
1983	70	172	--	1729	70	25/30	160.0
1984	66	575	--	4083	90	30/30	173.0
1985	90	411	--	3076	128	42/30	212.0

*average
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations, 1961-1987.

Agricultural Policy Under the NLC (1966-1969)

Whereas the CPP government's economic and social policies were based on detailed plans, the NLC assumed office with no detailed plans for governing the country. As Brigadier A.A. Afrifa (member and later chairman of the NLC), later remarked:

> We knew we would form some kind of revolutionary council. Originally we had planned to set up a small high-powered group of civilians. We were aware that as soldiers we were not cut out to do politics...we thought we could stand in briefly and put things right as quickly as possible. The emphasis was on speed (Legon Observer, quoted in Bebler 1973, 38; Baynham 1988, 220).

However, the NLC did recognize that the economy demanded immediate attention. Thus, on the day of the coup, an economic council, consisting of top civil servants, was formed to advise the new military government. The initial position of the new government was to reverse the economic policies instituted by the Nkrumah regime.

Guided by the recommendations made to the CPP government by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1965, the NLC adopted a policy of austerity. Thus, Nkrumah's ambitious Seven-Year Development Plan was abandoned and work on several prestige projects such as Accra-Tema concrete motorway was stopped (Boahen 1975, 228-29; Chazan 1983, 158-59).

In the agricultural sector, the NLC instituted several changes. The state monopoly on the domestic marketing of cocoa was terminated and Ghanaian private companies and cooperatives were invited to re-enter the field (Esseks 1971, 24). The UGFC was dissolved and its functions were transferred to the Purchasing Department of the CMB (Milburn 1977, 108).

The NLC's Two-Year Development Plan (1968-1970), which dealt with agriculture, fisheries, mining and roads, allocated substantial funds for the construction of agricultural feeder roads. The NLC government also resumed subsidies on insecticides and spraying machines, and reinstated the end-of-season bonuses. In response to farmers' complaints about the price they received for their crops, the price paid to cocoa producers was revised upward. Beginning in 1966, cocoa farmers benefitted from four increases in the producers' price, and in March of 1969 were receiving twice as much for their crops as they did when the NLC first came to power (Esseks 1971, 24; Boahen 1975, 229). The NLC's "Operation Yellow Pod" provided further assistance to the private farmer by deploying army units to help in the transportation of cocoa from remote rural areas.

The new head of state, General Ankrah indicated the NLC's preference for private, rather than public, enterprise. Guided by the IMF recommendations, he tried to limit the number of state enterprises. State involvement was limited to "certain basic key projects especially where private capital might not be available" (Olajide 1976, 85). In pursuit of this new policy, the government cut down the number of state enterprises from 52 to 19; and of the more than 120 state-owned farms, only 39 were retained by the State Farms Corporation and 20 by the Young Farmers League (Bebler 1973, 41-42; Olajide 1976, 85). The rest were sold to private concerns, while others which were not viable were abandoned.

The NLC's efforts to improve agricultural productivity led to increased emphasis on a more traditional, labor-intensive approach to

agriculture. To facilitate the transportation of crops from the rural areas to the ports and inner city markets, over 450 miles of feeder roads were constructed between 1967 to 1969 (Rothchild 1980, 467-68). Despite the overall commitment to agricultural improvement, there was no mistaking the NLC's priorities where public spending was concerned. There were substantial increases in current and capital expenditures on the armed forces and the police.

These increases went to finance improvements in pay and conditions, and the purchase of new equipment for both services. Justifying the increases, Commissioner of Finance Brigadier A.A. Afrifa argued that "owing to the neglect suffered by our armed forces in the past, it has become imperative to re-equip the entire army to make it justify its existence" (Omari 1972, 164; Bayham 1988, 229). Whereas government spending in the non-productive defense sector was greatly increased, budgetary allocations to other sectors, particularly in such productive sectors as industry and agriculture experienced substantial reductions.

Despite higher world prices for cocoa, the Ghanaian economy under the NLC did not achieve the level of agricultural production of the pre-coup period. During the three and one-half years of NLC rule, cocoa production further declined reaching a nadir of 414 tons in 1969 (Chazan 1983, 159). Although the rising prices did permit the NLC to raise the purchasing price paid to farmers, it failed to halt the smuggling of the crop to neighboring countries. According to Robert Dowse (1969, 242), anything up to 20,000 tons was being smuggled to Togo and the Ivory Coast. Furthermore, although NLC policies led to some decline in the

rate of inflation, there was no discernable change in the cost of locally produced goods, since the cost of basic foodstuffs such as plantain and yams remained high (Boahen 1975, 234). At the same time, the country actually got further into debt; there was high unemployment; and the median per capita income declined by an average of twenty dollars in the three years of the military government's tenure in office (Dowse 1969, 243; Chazan 1983, 159).

Agricultural Policy Under the Busia Administration (1969-1971)

Dr. Kofi Busia's Progressive Party (PP) government assumed power with no clearly defined economic policy. Like the NLC before it, the PP affirmed its "support for and confidence in private enterprise" and placed considerable stress on giving Ghanaians a "greater stake in the economy of their own country" (Progressive Party Manifesto 1966, 5-7). There was also, a renewed emphasis on agriculture and rural development. In his first budget speech, J.H. Mensah, the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, summed up the importance of agriculture to the nation's economy, as follows:

> Agriculture remains by far the biggest preoccupation of the government. Once we can be assured of adequate food production, of maintaining our place in the world cocoa market and of a reasonable supply of agricultural raw materials, the economy can be considered to be established on secure foundations. Until then we will continue to live insecurely, at the mercy not only of the weather at home but also of the ever-rising costs and vagaries of outside sources of supply, for the most basic requirements to sustain our lives (cited in Legum 1971, B354-55).

Soon after assuming power, the PP passed the Aliens Expulsion Order, which effected the expulsion from Ghana of some tens of thousands of people from other West African countries who did not possess valid

residence permits. The order was ostensibly motivated by severe unemployment in Ghana, by underemployment in the cocoa growing regions, and by a growing resentment of alien intrusions into the field of petty trading (Chazan 1983, 159; Killick 1978, 312). Although not specifically an agricultural policy initiative, this first major act of the Busia government had a significant impact on the agricultural sector. Naomi Chazan (1983, 160) observed that "the immediate effects of this policy were to somewhat ease the unemployment problem and to create serious resentment among Ghana's neighbors." More importantly however, N.O. Addo (1972, 39), found that the expulsion worsened an already existing shortage of agricultural labor (particularly in the much needed seasonal agricultural sector).

Reconfirming the Busia administration's commitment to agricultural development, J.H. Mensah, in 1970, declared:

> We aim to intensify our support to the agricultural sector and generally to the rural population. This policy should aid our search for greater self-sufficiency in food supplies. It should contribute to our quest for a more even development as between different parts of the country (Rothchild 1980, 468).

In line with this aim, a series of policy initiatives were put into effect. The new agricultural program provided incentives to producers, upgraded rural services, and sought to improve infrastructure in the countryside. Budgetary allocations for rural development and agriculture rose substantially as the government expanded subsidies to such agricultural inputs as fertilizers, seeds and implements.

Funds were also made available to cocoa farmers for use in seasonal advances. Furthermore, payments to cocoa producers rose to a new record in 1969-1970 and were sustained throughout the life of the

Second Republic. Payments to cocoa farmers were slightly above C120m (or 120 million Ghanaian cedis), in two years of the Busia government, as compared with an average of C84m in the three preceding years (Killick 1978, 307, 324n). Apart from cocoa, the Busia administration made significant efforts to promote the cultivation of other crops. Particular emphasis was placed on the cultivation of rice and maize. To encourage farmers in this area, the government provided the Grains Development Board with a substantial budget to assist growers and guarantee them competitive prices for their produce (Legum 1971, B356-58).

To compensate for the increases in public expenditures in rural development and agriculture, significant cuts were made in other areas. For example, while the budgetary allocations for agriculture rose from C20.3m, in 1968-1969 to C27.4m in 1970-1971, those for defense declined from C50.2m to hC42.7m in the same years (Rothchild 1980, 468). The increases were also made possible by the fact that during the first year of the Busia government cocoa fetched a record price on the world market. Whereas in the eight preceding fiscal year government revenue from cocoa export duty had brought an annual average of C39.5m, in 1969-1970 the average was C133.7m (Killick 1978, 324n). When the increases in total government revenue from cocoa is taken into account, then the increases in budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector becomes less impressive than they at first appear.

The two years of the Busia administration was perhaps not enough time to assess its agricultural policies, although it did seem that the stress on rural development was beginning show some dividends. To carry

out its rural development program, the Busia government established the Rural Development Fund in 1970 (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 55). The administration also instituted a National Development levy of up to 5 percent of all incomes above C34 per month to finance the development of the rural areas. The administration's achievements in this area, included the provision of water, electricity, feeder roads and rural health facilities and education. Progress was also being recorded in the production of rice (Killick 1978, 311; Chazan 1983, 160-62).

The most important economic measure for which the PP government is perhaps best remembered was its 82 percent devaluation of the cedi in December of 1971. The devaluation was prompted by the fall in world cocoa prices, a commodity which still accounted for about 65 percent of Ghana's foreign exchange earnings. By the time of the military intervention on January 13, 1972, the Busia regime had accumulated debts equal to those compiled by Nkrumah's CPP government in nine years (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56).

Agricultural Policy Under the NRC/SMC (1972-1979)

Unlike the NLC and PP governments, the new military government under General Acheampong had definite views about the economy and on how it intended to tackle Ghana's economic problems. Thus, immediately following the coup, Acheampong's NRC moved swiftly to implement some short term remedies to the country's problems. The cedi was revalued by over 40 percent, and a number of medium term debts, contracted during the Nkrumah era, were repudiated (Austin 1980, 433).

The long-term policy objectives of the NRC was presented in their January, 1973 Charter of Redemption. According to the charter, the

NRC's policy objectives were aimed toward "a complete and systematic transformation of our peoples into a self-reliant nation, unique in its economic, social, cultural, political, technological and all-round development, a united nation with a spirit of its own" (The Charter of the National Redemption Council 1973; Pellow and Chazan 1986, 57).

A practical step to promote self-reliance was manifested by the launching of Operation Feed Yourself (OFY), a plan for the development of food self-sufficiency. The OFY program sought to increase the production of foodstuffs (rice, maize, cassava, yams, groundnuts, plantain, and millet) for the domestic market. It was hoped that increasing the domestic production of foodstuffs will ensure the availability of Ghana's basic food requirements at reasonable prices and arrest the country's excessive dependence on imports. OFN demonstrated the NRC's commitment to self-reliance by means of agricultural expansion. The new government's commitment to improving agricultural productivity was further demonstrated when it designated the 1972-1974 period as "agricultural years" (Rothchild 1980, 468). A related policy measure, Operation Feed Your Industries (OFYI), was designed to produce raw materials (e.g., cotton, tobacco, oil palm, and sugarcane) for use by Ghanaian industries.

Public expenditure on agriculture rose steadily throughout the NRC's tenure in office. Whereas budgetary allocations to agriculture was C29.2m in the 1971-1972 financial year, it rose to C37m in 1975-1976, C53m in 1976-1977, and C65m in 1977-1978. In addition, significant investments were made in the agricultural sector by both public and private lending agencies. Government loans, at very generous

terms, were extended to farmers. The two major development banks, the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the National Investment Bank (NIB), expanded their activities in the agricultural sector during the Acheampong period. The link between heightened ADB lending and the NRC's OFY program is made clearly apparent by the increase in bank lending from C8,622,441 in 1971 to an unprecedented C28,468.713 in 1972. The NRC years also witnessed increased foreign investment activities in the agricultural sector (Rothchild 1980, 469). The government also subsidized the cost of seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, cutlasses, insecticides and expert agricultural advice. Customs duties on agricultural machinery and spare parts were waived, tax exemptions were placed on income from cocoa and taxes on incomes from farming enterprises in their first five years of operation were abolished (Rothchild 1980, 470-71; Oquaye 1980, 13).

OFY and other associated NRC policies of self-reliance were, at least in the short term, a modest success. The OFY program had acted as an incentive to agricultural production at many levels. Even urban dwellers began to engage in backyard gardening, growing some basic food items and vegetables. For about the first three years of the Acheampong military government, Ghana produced a large proportion of its food requirements and by 1975 there was hardly any food importation into the country (McCaskie 1985, 410).

Within three years of its inception, the enthusiasm for OFY fell noticeably. OFY's declining impetus was reflected in Ghana's poor agricultural performance after 1975. After registering impressive growth rates between 1972 and 1974, agricultural production started on a

downward trend in the mid 1970s. The production of important crops such as cassava, maize, rice, palm oil and palm kernels fell noticeably during this period (see Table 4.2).

Quite obviously declining rainfall in the northern regions of Ghana during the mid 1970s contributed to OFY's declining impetus. Yet in part, at least, it also resulted from government mismanagement and ineffective planning. Moreover, as Rothchild (1980, 471), noted, "government policies, as measured in terms of planned and actual expenditures, did not match the rhetoric of military rulers." For example between 1972 and 1975, public expenditures in agriculture declined from 6 to 5 percent, while those for defense rose from 8 to 9 percent (Rothchild 1980, 472).

Nowhere was government mismanagement more apparent than in the area of rice production. According to the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, by 1975, the country was no longer importing rice (Legum 1976, B586). However, by 1976, the government's reluctance to assist rice growers by providing them with much needed farm equipment resulted in a decline in production. Unavailability of machines to harvest their rice on time was a problem for many farmers. Thousands of acres of rice went up in flames from bush fires as a result of undue delay in harvesting. Furthermore, the refusal of the Acheampong administration to pay farmers a favorable price for their produce encouraged some farmers to hoard their produce and others to smuggle quantities across the borders to neighboring countries where they fetched higher prices (Oquaye 1980, 15-16).

The performance of the dominant cocoa sector during the Acheampong era was particularly unimpressive. Although the government created a Ministry of Cocoa Affairs in 1975, cocoa production steadily declined in the mid 1970s until by the 1978 season, production had fallen to 265 tons, the lowest level in nearly twenty years (see Table 4.2). This meant that Ghana was unable to take advantage high cocoa price prevalent then on the world market. Government's efforts to encourage farmers to produce more by increasing the producer price paid to farmers was of little consequence. New producer price increases were always made meaningless by the soaring inflation rate. Furthermore, because of low producer prices, cocoa farmers were forced to smuggle their produce to neighboring countries where they fetched much more generous prices (Oquaye 1980, 50).

By July of 1978, the deteriorating economic condition was such that the army, anxious to protect its reputation, ousted Acheampong in a palace coup led by his chief of Defense Staff, Lt. Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo. Upon assuming power, the SMC under Akuffo introduced a series of medium-term policy measures aimed at easing Ghana's economic problems. The cedi was devalued by 58.2 percent and the new administration introduced an austerity budget.

The 1978-1979 budget, declaring the agricultural sector to be the government's top priority, increased the budgetary allocation to the sector from C65 million to C76.2 million. Because of devaluation, however, this, in, fact represented a significant decline (51 percent) in allocation to agriculture (Legum 1979, B633). Despite increasing the producer price of cocoa, only a small increase in production (9 percent)

was recorded, while the smuggling of cocoa to neighboring countries persisted as farmers tried to get competitive price for their produce. This was due to the fact that increases in producer prices were negated by high inflation rates (Rimmer 1980, 442).

The policies of the Akuffo administration did not result in any significant improvements in the agricultural sector or in the economy as a whole. The rate of inflation remained high and consumer goods, particularly local foodstuffs, remained scarce (Rothchild 1980a, A141). As the situation continued to deteriorate, Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings and his colleagues toppled the Akuffo regime. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council AFRC) and its chairman, Jerry Rawlings, were in office for only three months before they handed over power to a civilian government. However, in those three months, the AFRC temporarily dissolved the CMB and the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs which had been created by Acheampong. They also increased the producer prices on cocoa and other cash crops. The AFRC was in power for too brief a period for its policies to have had any significant impact on Ghana's agricultural sector.

Despite encouraging rhetoric, the various policies of the military regimes from 1972 to 1979 did not produce a significant increases in agricultural productivity; Ghana was still not self-sufficient in food production. During this period, the growth of agriculture (as part of GDP) was -0.1 percent, and in terms of per capita income, -3.1 percent (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 136). Indeed, the last year of military rule witnessed significant declines in the productivity of all the major crops (see Table 4.2). More importantly, Ghana, which at the beginning

of 1972 when the NRC first assumed power, was the world's leading producer of cocoa (accounting for over 25 percent of total world production), had by 1979 lost it preeminent position, accounting for only 18 percent of world output (see Table 4.2).

Agricultural Policy Under the Limann Administration (1979-1981)

With production in the agricultural and industrial sectors at low levels, consumer goods in short supply, and inflation at over 100 percent, President Hilla Limann's PNP administration assumed office in September 1979 under the most inauspicious of circumstances. Considering the economic crisis confronting Ghana, the new administration wisely eschewed ideology and concentrated instead on what Limann described as realistic solutions to the country's problems (Rothchild 1980a, A142). The first budget of the PNP government called for cuts in government spending and increases in the prices of such items as beer, cigarettes and petroleum products, as well as in a variety of taxes on self-employed persons (Rothchild 1980a, 142).

Since agriculture still accounted for over 40 percent of Ghana's GDP and 70 percent of total export earnings, increasing the productivity of this sector was a major preoccupation of the PNP government. Speaking about his administration's emphasis on agriculture, Limann declared that "agriculture shall be our first priority now, and for the foreseeable future. It is unacceptable that a country which abounds in arable land should import food or else go hungry" (Rothchild 1980a, A142).

Announcing a two-year crash program for agriculture, code-named the "New-Deal," Limann said that his administration was determined to

make Ghana self-sufficient in food production. The government's plan involved efforts to bring down food costs by encouraging the peasant farmer to increase productivity. This was to be achieved by means of price incentives and by the provision of subsidized inputs such as hoes, cutlasses, fertilizers, improved seeds and insecticides. In order that quick results may be attained, the administration placed emphasis on the production of quick-yielding food crops such as plantain, yam, maize, rice, guinea corn, millet, groundnuts, and soya beans (West Africa 1981, 1039; Legum 1981, B493).

The PNP government also affirmed its support for intensive production of important foreign exchange earners such as cocoa and palm oil. The government's plan also envisaged a significant increase in the total area of arable land devoted to agricultural production (West Africa 1981, 1039). To carry out its program, the PNP government, in its 1980 budget, allocated C148 million to the agricultural sector. This was 74 percent more than the budgetary allocation to this sector in the previous year (Legum 1981, B493).

As can be seen from Table 4.2, the agricultural programs of the Limann administration did not result in the expected increases in agricultural productivity. Although there were some modest increases in the production of some crops (rice and maize), production of other crops actually declined during the two years of the Limann administration. More significantly, cocoa production declined still further from 290 tons in 1979 to 255 tons in 1980 and 247 tons in 1981, the lowest since the early 1950s (see Table 4.2). The effects of the decline in agricultural productivity was manifested in the negative trends in major

economic indicators. For example, by the end of 1981 the inflation rate which had dropped to 50 percent in 1980, rose again to 116.5 percent. Furthermore, real GDP declined at an average annual rate of 6 percent during the tenure of the Limann administration (World Bank 1984, 2; Kraus 1985, 165).

Agricultural Policy Under the PNDC

When Rawlings seized power again in late December of 1981, his administration focused attention on two major areas: imposing a new system of justice and restoring the economy. During the first year of PNDC rule, leftist intellectuals and activists were its key supporters and leaders. During this period Ghana's economic policy directions were phrased in radical and catchy rhetoric, most of which alluded to breaking out of dependency relationships with the "imperialist West" (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 81). The first year of PNDC rule witnessed an increase in direct state participation in economic affairs. Harking back to the days of Nkrumah, the PNDC's Programme for Reconstruction and Development, unveiled in December of 1982, mandated state control of the economy.

In the agricultural sphere, where transportation and storage of crops were major problems, a campaign was launched to evacuate the cocoa crop, and pool food production, primarily by using student task forces. To facilitate the transportation of harvested crops, volunteer work groups were deployed to repair roads. Furthermore, in an effort to curb smuggling, black-marketeering, and currency trafficking, the PNDC government, in September of 1982, closed all of Ghana's borders.

However, the borders were reopened in January of 1983, to allow for the re-entry of over a million Ghanaians who had been expelled from Nigeria.

As 1982 came to end it was abundantly clear that the PNDC's policies were not producing the desired improvements in Ghana's economy. Shortages of almost everything grew more severe; manufacturing was almost at a standstill; inflation continued at over 100 percent and cocoa production dropped to 203 thousand metric tons. Conditions were further aggravated by persistent drought condition during the 1982-1983 and 1983-1984 planting seasons. Fires which broke out as a result of the drought destroyed 300,000 acres of cocoa farms and hundred of acres of plantain, yam and cassava crops (Legum 1985, B440).

In March, 1983, the PNDC government launched an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) which included a number of major reform measures designed to improve the country's economy. These included policies to reduce the huge price distortions, restore exports, reduce inflationary budget deficits, increase prices to cocoa farmers, raise interest rates, and rehabilitate key productive sectors. As Jon Kraus (1987, 206), wrote, "these measures were necessary to obtain promised large infusions of capital from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Western donors, without which recovery could not occur."

One of the first, and a major corrective action taken by the Rawlings administration under the ERP was the devaluation of the overvalued Ghanaian currency, the cedi. The cedi was devalued five times between March of 1983 and January of 1986, culminating in a total devaluation of 3,172 percent. The March, 1983 devaluation, along with budget proposals that imposed a severe austerity regimen, was a

precondition for the extension of a $300 million loan from the IMF (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 83). These measures were immediately effective in attracting foreign assistance.

In the agricultural sector, the PNDC government was making efforts to improve productivity. Cocoa, still the mainstay of the economy received special attention. Following the drought and bush fires of 1982-1983 and 1983-1984, the government embarked on a national cocoa replanting program aimed at replanting all burnt farms. Cocoa seedlings were distributed and compensation of C350 per acre was paid to farmers who replanted burnt farms. The program was enthusiastically embraced only by farmers near the borders, where farms were maintained mostly because of the ease of smuggling their produce to the more lucrative markets in the Ivory Coast and Togo (Legum 1987, B43).

The producer prices paid to cocoa farmers were increased by 67 percent in April of 1983, and by a further 50 percent in May of 1984 (Kraus 1985, 168). However, given the soaring inflation rates, increases in producer prices were often inadequate to encourage cocoa farmers to increase productivity. Furthermore, difficulties in cashing government checks paid to cocoa farmers for their crops, was reported to be encouraging a changeover from cocoa to food farming, from which an income was more certain (Africa South of the Sahara 1986, 489). Consequently, cocoa production fell to 160,000 tons in 1983, although it improved to 173,000 tons in 1984 and 212,000 tons in 1985 (see Table 4.2).

Planting of staple crops was high in 1984, and favorable weather conditions, combined with new price incentives, helped to facilitate

bumper food harvests in 1984 and 1985. Although rice production fell from 70,000 tons in 1983 to 66,000 tons in 1984, it increased to an all time high of 90,000 tons in 1985. Maize production rose to 575,000 tons in 1984, although it declined to 411,000 tons in 1985. As can been seen from Table 4.2, cassava output more than doubled between 1983 and 1984, while yams, groundnuts and palm oil showed noticeable improvements in 1984 and 1985. However, the rise in food production was not sufficient to meet the country's food requirements.

As 1985 came to a close, to ensure the continuity of food supplies throughout the year, the PNDC administration was making plans to improve the storage facilities to facilitate the storage of surplus produce. A price-support structure, to combat fluctuating producer prices was introduced in 1985, and moves were under way to sell some of the remaining state farms (Africa South of the Sahara 1986, 490). Impressed by the commitment of the Rawlings government to the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), foreign donors were eager to invest in agricultural improvement projects. For example, the state-owned Food Distribution Corporation (FDC) was able to build a number of silos with financial assistance from Britain and the World Bank. Similarly, the International Development Association (IDA), provided a credit of $40m, to allow the importation of farm inputs, such as fertilizers, spare parts for farm machinery and vehicles (Africa South of the Sahara 1986, 490; Legum 1987, B43).

In spite of the gains made in agricultural productivity in 1984 and 1985, the fear is that this trend may not continue. For as Seung Choi, the World Bank's Accra representative admitted:

Table 4.3
Ghana's Share of World Cocoa Production for Selected Years

YEAR	1958	1961	1964	1967	1970	1973	1976	1979	1982	1985
000 tons										
Ghana	260	416	581	424	396	343	320	290	203	212
Africa	565	830	1190	978	1066	941	890	1011	979	1070
World	920	1140	1530	1366	1461	1354	1387	1621	1711	1963
Percentages										
Africa	46.0	50.1	48.8	43.4	37.2	36.5	36.0	28.7	20.7	19.8
World	28.3	36.5	38.0	31.0	27.1	25.3	23.1	17.9	11.9	10.8

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations, 1961-1987.

> The sort of reforms Ghana is undertaking will succeed only if they can be sustained over time. But there is always a time lag concerning the benefits, which raises the question of the social and political acceptability of this sort of program. Some governments get stuck on some issues and the reforms may not continue (Novicki 1987, 50-51).

The ERP, which was responsible for most of the gains made in the agricultural sector, demanded a considerable amount of sacrifice from Ghanaian citizens. As the period covered by this study came to an end, the trade unions were beginning to clamor for an increase in minimum wage and students were protesting the removal of meal and housing subsidies. Should the Rawlings administration acquiesce to demands to relax the stringent austerity measures dictated by the ERP, the modest gains made in the various sectors of the economy will quickly disappear.

Conclusion

The results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter Three (see results in Tables 3.3 to 3.16), indicate that there was no clear and consistent difference between military and civilian regimes, according to selected generalizable standards of measurements. The results as they relate to Ghana are reproduced in Table 4.4 below. They show that civilian rulers in Ghana allotted a greater proportion of GDP to overall public expenditure (PSPEND) than did their military counterparts. Although the difference between the two regime types was significant in this regard, the results also indicate that there was no significant difference between Ghanaian regimes in the way in which they allocated public funds to the major sectors of the society or in the outcomes of their policy initiatives, as measured by productivity in the

Table 4.4
Results of Simple Country Analysis for Ghana, 1960-1985

VARIABLE	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
PSPEND	0.01657**	0.2140	2.2081	0.0370
PHEALTH	0.0116	0.0133	1.0100	0.3226
PEDUC	0.0328	0.0361	0.8013	0.4308
PDEFEN	0.0132	0.0164	1.1282	0.2704
PMAN	0.0989	0.0894	-0.5361	0.5993
PAGRIC	0.0989	0.0891	-0.5361	0.5993

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.<.01

manufacturing and agricultural sectors. These findings are consistent with the general pattern of regime performance demonstrated in this chapter. This examination showed that, in the formulation of public policy, there were no discernable homogeneous differences between military and civilian regimes in Ghana.

The case study of Ghana has shown that policies of both regime types were guided at various times by capitalist principles and, at other times, by socialist ones. For example, the policies of civilian-led CPP government (from 1963 to 1966) and those the military-led PNDC (from 1981-1983), were based on socialist economic doctrines; by contrast, the economic policies of three of Ghana's military regimes (NLC, NRC/SMC I and SMC II) and those of its civilian successors (PP and PNP) were based on capitalist principles.

Irrespective of their guiding ideology, alternating civilian and military regimes in Ghana acknowledged that agriculture was the mainstay of the economy. Consequently, in their attempts to master the country's tottering economy, agriculture was made the centerpiece of their respective economic policy initiatives. Measured by their objective achievements, their efforts since independence, and especially between 1962 and 1983, were clearly unsuccessful. The performance of Ghana's agricultural sector has been poor since the early 1960s and has deteriorated sharply since the mid-1970s (see Table 4.2).

Although it is still too soon to determine the outcomes of the policies of the Rawlings administration, this study clearly shows that no regime type has been able to develop and sustain an effective economic policy. Furthermore, the study illustrates that although

control of the policy-making process alternated between civilian and military regimes, "the fact remains that the economic outcomes remained by and large persistent, negative, and somewhat mysteriously predictable" (Chazan 1983, 178). The problems which beset the economy at the time of the fall of one regime continued to exist, and some even became worse by the time of the fall of its successor. The decline in agricultural productivity is a case in point.

The ability of respective Ghanaian regimes to bring about sustainable growth in the agricultural sector has been undermined by a variety of factors. As Rothchild (1980, 471) observed, the failure of the NRC's OFY program was a reflection "of a variety of constraints that had long affected Ghanaian agriculture adversely: lack of investment capital, inadequate foreign exchange, mounting domestic and international inflation, poor transportation facilities, smuggling, a shortage of farm laborers, over-centralization, and ineffective planning." Similar constraints could be blamed for the ineffectiveness of the agricultural policies of the other Ghanaian regimes.

Among all the foregoing, factors perhaps the most pertinent constraint was the inability of Ghana's rulers to develop effective plans for the implementation their respective agricultural policy. Had the immediate post-independent governments (CPP & NLC), been able to follow the system of priorities outlined in their respective development plans, there probably would have been no problems with lack of investment capital, inadequate foreign exchange, smuggling, or shortage of farm laborers.

The "Second Development Plan" of the Nkrumah administration provides many indications of the lack of consistency between policy and implementation. For example, the "Plan" allotted almost 20 percent of total planned public investment during the period 1963-1969, to the agricultural sector. However, what actually happened was that the state agricultural sector during the first two years of the plan spent at rate far exceeding its allocation in the plan, and development expenditure in activities affecting private small holders was far below plan allocations (Berg 1971, 196, 208). The failure of government to spend on the private sector its allotted share (50 percent) of total planned agricultural investment had a negative impact on productivity. It encouraged the reallocation of farm labor to the inefficient state farms, which paid better than the traditional farming sector. Consequently, reducing the availability of labor to the more productive private sector.

The series of military and civilian regimes which came after Nkrumah were similarly unable to follow established plans. The tendency to misallocate funds to unproductive sectors of the economy was a major characteristic of all of Ghana's governments since independence (Boahen 1975; Jones 1976; Oquaye 1980; Chazan 1983; Kraus 1982; 1983; Pellow and Chazan 1986). Both military and civilian governments were equally unable to exercise budgetary discipline or impose strong control on public expenditure.

Yet it would be unfair to conclude on a totally negative note. Since Ghana attained independence, there has been a considerable enhancement of the physical infrastructure and of the social amenities.

New roads and buildings, factories and airports, schools and hospitals, and the Volta and Kainji Dams, stand out as substantial accomplishments. Although most of these structures have not been well-maintained, post-independence Ghana contrasts sharply with the colonial Gold Coast, where there was much uncultivated land and little infrastructural development.

Development, however, properly consists of more than tall office blocks and luxury hotels. Unfortunately for Ghana, in the sometimes mistaken urge to build big, and to industrialize at any cost, agriculture (despite such exhortations about "green revolution," "Operation Feed Yourself" campaigns, and the periodic rhetoric of its supposed primacy), has often been ignored.

Endnotes

1. New York _Times_, 5 Oct. 1958.

2. New York _Times_, 17 Oct. 1960.

3. _African Recorder_, Vol. 21 (1982):5844.

Chapter Five

REGIME TYPE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR IN LIBERIA, 1945-1985

Whether it makes a difference for a country to be governed by civilians or military officers cannot be conclusively determined by looking at regime performance in only one or two policy areas. Regime performance in a variety of policy domains needs to be investigated. Any serious discussion of this issue will not be complete without at least a look at the foreign policy behavior of the different regime types. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether there is any correlation between regime type and foreign policy behavior. To this end, the following additional hypothesis will be tested: Regime change is more likely to bring about variation in foreign policy than continuous leadership.

This hypothesis is derived from Rosenau's (1971, 111-17), observation that a change in the incumbent leadership will bring about a change in foreign policy. The plausibility of the hypothesis is further enhanced by Sang-Seek Park's (1980, 138-43) observation that a violent leadership change is more likely to install a new regime whose ideological position is different from that of the incumbent.

The external policy of an administration is reflected in a variety of foreign policy initiatives. For example, formal diplomatic and trade relations are two very important indicators of an administration's foreign policy priority. Since most sub-Saharan African countries are not economically self-sufficient, attempts to secure foreign aid are often a major preoccupation of these national governments.

Consequently, the type of aid sought and received, and the source of aid, are also very important indicators of the foreign policy direction of an administration.

This chapter will focus exclusively on the relationship between changes in regime type and foreign policy behavior in Liberia. Liberia has been chosen as the focus of attention for several reasons. Its long membership in the United Nations (Liberia is one of only two African countries that were original members of the UN), its unique relationship with the United States, and the availability of data make Liberia a good subject for this case study.

Since its creation as an African settlement for freed slaves, the nation of Liberia has had a "special relationship" with the United States. The United States has been the major source of economic and military aid, as well as the major international trading partner of Liberia. A comparison of the status of the relationship between Liberia and the United States, the status of the relation between Liberia and the rest of Africa, and Liberia's trade relations under both civilian and military administrations in Liberia, should provide a useful yardstick for determining whether it makes a difference for a country to be governed by a civilian or military leaders.

Historical Background: Important Domestic Developments

Modern Liberia's history dates from the early nineteenth century when the American Colonization Society was founded in the United States to provide for the welfare of some 200,000 freed slaves. It was decided that the most promising plan was to repatriate the freed slaves to Africa (Strong 1930, 32). Having purchased land from the African

inhabitants of the "Malagueta" or "Grain Coast" the American Colonization Society, with the tacit approval and economic support of the United States government, started shipping freed slaves to Africa. The first settlers landed at the site of present-day Monrovia in 1822.

On July 26, 1847, the settlement was proclaimed the independent republic of Liberia, the first independent republic in Africa. Monrovia, named after President James Monroe, who had been instrumental in convincing Congress to appropriate funds for the new settlement, was chosen as the capital of the new republic (Sisay 1985, 13).

The constitution of the newly independent country was modeled after the constitution of the United States. It contained a declaration of rights, defined legislative and executive powers, and outlined the organization of a judicial branch much in the same fashion as the U.S. Constitution. This 1847 constitution remained, with few amendments, the law of the country until 1980, when the civilian administration of President William Tolbert was overthrown by members of the Liberian military.

No discussion of the Liberian state can get very far without discussing the relationship between the Americo-Liberians (as the freed slaves who founded Liberia called themselves), and the indigenous population. Although Liberia is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that was never a colony, the relationship between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous tribal groups bore a close resemblance to colonialism (Brown 1941, 117, 137; Wrubel 1971, 189-204).

Americo-Liberians were Christian zealots. They spoke the English language and regarded the non-English speaking, non-Christian natives as

"uncivilized." The native people were encouraged to remain in their homelands in the hinterland.[1] Exceptions were made, however, when inexpensive labor was needed on the large estates established by Americo-Liberians (Nelson 1985, xxiv). The two groups remained distinct societies at practically all levels.

The territorial distinction between Americo-Liberians and the native Africans was disrupted when the "scramble for Africa" began at the beginning of the twentieth century, forcing the Liberian government to confront the colonialist ambitions of the European powers. In its efforts to demonstrate effective control of its hinterland, Liberia gradually became an active participant in the scramble for Africa's interior, and was at times, even prepared to accept the "rules of the game" as laid down by the Berlin conference. In 1906, for example, President Arthur Barclay noted "...that several Liberian expeditions have been sent to that section of country, that the Liberian flag has been raised, that Liberian patrols have been stationed there, and that the territory is now occupied in the same manner that interior territory is occupied by European Power" (Gershoni 1985, 33-36).

Subsequently, the hinterland population was brought under the direct control of the central government when citizenship status was extended to "all peoples of Negro descent" in Liberia. The hinterland regions were divided into three provinces, and these were divided into tribes, each of which was governed by clan chiefs, responsible to a district commissioner appointed by the president. None of the provinces was directly represented in government, in contrast to the five coastal counties which were controlled by Americo-Liberians, and whose elected

representatives made up the legislature (Wrubel 1971, 191). This system of indirect rule was copied from neighboring British-ruled Sierra Leone.

This colonial pattern of rule continued until 1943 when William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman was elected president of Liberia. In his inaugural address on January 3, 1944, the new president declared that his administration "shall engage in and strive at the assimilation and unification of our various populations composing the body politic. Liberia must be a place for all Liberians to live alike, all to stand equally privileged, responsible and protected by like administration of the law" (Boley 1983, 64). Tubman's inaugural declaration later became known as the "National Unification Policy."

The National Unification Policy resulted in the initiation of several steps aimed at bringing the indigenous population into the country's political and economic processes. For example, reforms were introduced that brought about universal adult suffrage and extended the principle of direct legislative representation to the hinterland regions. Notwithstanding this and other changes initiated by Tubman, Americo-Liberians remained the dominant force in Liberia. For example, voting rights granted to the indigenous population did not translate into any real political power as Americo-Liberians continued to be over-represented in the legislature (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 62). Furthermore, the True Whig Party (TWP) remained the only political party and the leadership of the party remained concentrated in the hands of a few Americo-Liberian families (Liebenow 1987, 107).

In the economic sphere, the Tubman administration adopted the "Open Door Policy" which had been recommended in 1930 by an

International Commission of Inquiry (Boley 1983, 64). The Open Door Policy was intended "to encourage the investment of foreign capital in the development of the country (Clapham 1989, 591). These policies opened the hinterland to foreign investors searching for mineral resources (including iron ore, diamonds and manganese). Consequently in the early years of Tubman's rule, Liberia witnessed a tremendous growth in its economy. This growth was fueled primarily by foreign investment in mining and agriculture (Clower, et al. 1966; Wilson 1971, 200).

The last years of the Tubman era were marked by economic recession and the government had to implement austerity measures. This, in turn, created discontent among Liberians and increasing, though clandestine opposition political activity. In July of 1971, Tubman's twenty-seven-year rule ended suddenly with his death at an eye clinic in London.

Having served for two decades as vice president to Tubman, William Richard Tolbert became the nineteenth president of Liberia on July 23, 1971. In his first inaugural address, Tolbert asserted that the primary objective of his administration was to make Liberia what he called a "wholesome functioning society." Tolbert declared:

> We seek a wholesome functioning society where merit, not favoritism; productivity not influence and connection; selflessness, not selfish individualism, form the criteria for real distinction.... Especially devoted to discipline and order under the law, the wholesome functioning society must express concrete concern for the poor and underprivileged, and must ensure security and protection for its citizens, and their freedom from fear and intimidation. It must guarantee opportunities for all, with the corresponding responsibility that all must be equally dedicated, as a prerequisite, to enjoyment of the benefits to be derived therefrom...(Boley 1983, 80).

Tolbert's inaugural address raised the hopes of many Liberians. Indigenous Liberians were particularly gratified by Tolbert's promise to

resurrect and expand Tubman's unification program, which had been neglected in the last years of the Tubman era.

Tolbert emphasized the need for self-reliance, decreased dependence on foreign aid, and the Liberianization of the economy. He proposed the organization of a national fund-raising rally for the purpose of raising funds to implement national development objectives (Boley 1983, 82-83; Liebenow 1987, 124).

By the end of his first term in office Tolbert had become the dominant a political figure in Liberia. Despite the call by Former Attorney General Abayomi Cassell for the formation of a second party, no opposition group registered and Tolbert ran unopposed in the October 1975 elections. However, soon after his election victory opposition began to develop. Among the opposition were groups such as the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), formed by professors and students at the University of Liberia; and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) formed by Liberian students in the United States (Boley 1983, 97; Liebenow 1987, 174-78; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 75).

In the late 1970s, in the face of rising energy costs and a decline in the world price of iron ore (Liberia's principal export), the Tolbert administration was forced to introduce austerity measures. In April of 1979, the government's announcement of a 50 percent increase in the price of Liberia's staple food, rice, led to mass public demonstrations. Police attempts to restore order resulted in the deaths of many demonstrators. Alarmed by the intensity of the confrontation, Tolbert called upon President Sekou Toure of Guinea to dispatch Guinean troops to restore order (Liebenow 1987, 172).

On April 12, 1980, almost a year to the date of the "rice riots," as the events of April, 1979 have been labeled, the Tolbert government was toppled in a violent coup, led by an indigenous Liberian, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe. Tolbert and twenty-six other occupants of the Executive Mansion were killed during the coup.

The coup makers established the People's Redemption Council (PRC) to administer the affairs of the country. The PRC was headed by Samuel Doe. As Chairman of the PRC, Doe became the twenty-first Head of State of Liberia. Thus, after 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule, the indigenous Africans, who constituted the vast majority of Liberia's population, finally took power.

Among the first acts of the new military leaders was the suspension of the 1847 Constitution, and the banning of the TWP. Several leaders of the TWP were arrested and charged with various crimes against the Liberian people. After being tried and found guilty by a military tribunal, thirteen of them were executed and the rest sentenced to long prison terms. Although they aroused widespread condemnation abroad, the executions, like the coup itself, were popular in Liberia (Liebenow 1987, 186; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 93).

In his first policy statement after the coup, Doe assured Liberians that the military will initiate "real change" and direct the "building of a new society" in which the injustices endured by the masses will be alleviated (Holloway 1981, 161; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 94). But the objectives of the PRC represented an enormous task for a military government composed of young soldiers lacking in administrative experience and formal education beyond high school level. Candid

recognition of these limitations resulted in the appointment of a cabinet in which key portfolios were given to civilians (Nelson 1985, xxvii).

The Liberian economy was on the verge of collapse at the time of the coup and the Doe regime was obliged to accept an IMF economic stabilization plan, under which the PRC was required to adopt an austerity program. In compliance with the program, a $9 million subsidy on rice prices was lifted, gasoline and income taxes were raised.[2] However, defense spending was not affected by the PRC's austerity program. Consequently the overall spending on national security (defense and cost classified as "public order and safety") more than doubled during the first year of the Doe regime (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 96).

In the political sphere the PRC made preparations for a return to civilian rule by its promulgation of a new constitution in 1984. The constitution bore a strong resemblance to the one that had been in force before the coup. Changes from the old constitution included the abolition of property qualifications for voters and the reduction of the initial presidential term from eight to four years. The ban on political activities was lifted in July of 1984.

Among the many parties that tried to register to participate in the forthcoming elections, only four were allowed to register. They included the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) led by Samuel Doe, the Unity Party (UP) led by Dr. Edward Kesselly, the Liberian Action Party (LAP) led by Jackson Doe (a former TWP politician and no relation to Samuel Doe), and the Liberian Unification Party (LUP) led by

Gabriel Kpollah, a teacher. More serious opponents to Doe's candidacy were not allowed to contest the election (James 1986, 33).

By the time of the election, opposition to Doe's regime was widespread. Opposition groups were harassed and Doe had some of their leaders detained. The election which was held on the 15th of October 1985, was widely believed to have been fraudulent. After a two week delay it was announced that Doe had eked out a 50.9 percent victory in a four-way race for the presidency (Clapham 1987, 593; Liebenow 1987, 293-96). President Doe was formerly inaugurated as the first president of the Second Republic on January 6, 1986.

During Doe's five and one half years as head of the PRC Liberia had struggled with a steadily worsening economy, and by the time of his inauguration the economy was far less viable than it was in 1980.

Liberian Foreign Policy

Historical Background (1847-1944)

In 1848, Great Britain became the first country to recognize the new independent Republic of Liberia. Despite continued economic and military support, it was not until 1862 that the U.S. extended official recognition to the Republic. Despite official recognition, however, American relationship with Liberia remained ambiguous. At a time when Liberia was trying to ward off both European and native African challenges to its territorial claims, the U.S. government remained vague in its expression of support for Liberian cause (Sisay 1985, 15-16).

Uncertain of U.S. commitments to protecting Liberia's sovereignty, the Monrovia government appealed to Britain for security and financial

support. Subsequently, the British government agreed to aid Liberia in reforming its monetary and judicial systems and in establishing a Liberian "frontier force" (LFF) (Gershoni 1985, 42-43). British-Liberian ties were also manifested in the areas of trade and education. Britain became the primary source of Liberia's imports and the British pound became and remained Liberia's official currency until 1943, when it was replaced by the U.S. dollar.

Although Liberia's foreign relations during the early part of the twentieth century were European-oriented, the American connection remained strong. For example, when British involvement in Liberian affairs culminated in a situation in which Britain attempted to transform Liberia into a British colony, Liberia guaranteed its independence by securing United States assistance (Boley 1984, 36-37; Gershoni 1985, 44-45; Liebenow 1987, 17). Army officers from the United States assumed the responsibility for the command and training of the LFF. Their efforts succeeded in providing Monrovia with the means to impose its control over the hinterland population.

In May of 1922, Britain announced the "Stevenson Plan" by which rubber exports from British producing areas will be regulated so as to facilitate an increase in the price of rubber. During this period, Britain effectively controlled 80 percent of the world's production of rubber, while the United States consumed about 70 percent of total production (Boley 1983, 38). In an effort to offset the detrimental impact of the Stevenson Plan on the U.S.-based Firestone Tire Company, its president, Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., decided to establish a rubber plantation in Liberia. Subsequently, a concession agreement was

concluded between Firestone and the Liberian government (Lowenkopf 1976, 38-39).

With the coming of Firestone, the "European period" of Liberia's foreign relations ended. The Firestone plantations quickly became the largest employer, importer, exporter and trainer of human skills in Liberia. Firestone's dominance of the Liberian economy was such that the country became colloquially known as the "Firestone colony" (van der Kraaij 1983, xv).

Rapid changes in Liberia's foreign relations began with World War II. When Japanese activities in southeast Asia began to affect the sources of raw materials to the U.S. and her allies, Liberia's significance to the allies was greatly enhanced (Sisay 1985, 135). Liberia became the principal source of rubber for the allies--a source that needed to be safeguarded. Consequently, in March of 1942, President Roosevelt declared that the defense of Liberia was vital to the defense of the United States. He then proceeded to send a "Special Representative" to Liberia to negotiate the use of Liberian facilities in the war effort. This resulted in the signing, in March of 1942, of a defense agreement between the United States and Liberia. According to the agreement, the Government of Liberia granted to the United States for the duration of the war:

> the right to construct, control, operate and defend at the sole cost and expense of the latter and without charge to the Republic of Liberia, such military and commercial airports in the Republic as in consultation with the government of the Republic of Liberia may mutually be considered necessary; and the right also to assist in the protection and defense of any part of the Republic which might be liable to attack during the present war, said grant to include the right to construct access roads from Monrovia to the airport at Roberts Field on the Farmington River and

> the seaplane facilities at Fisherman Lake in the county of Grand Cape Mount (Dept. of State Bulletin, VII p. 979, cited in Goodrich and Carroll 1944, 600-604).

In July of 1940, in implementing of the agreement, U.S. forces were stationed in Liberia. The United States also agreed to train and equip the Liberian army (Lowenkopf 1976, 40).

Germany protested the U.S.-Liberian agreement, calling it a violation of Liberian neutrality; and Berlin threatened to hold Liberia answerable for every disadvantage and damage suffered by German citizens as a result of the Republic's agreements with the United States (Sisay 1985, 136). Having been assured U.S. protection, Liberia ignored the German protest and, subsequently, ordered the German Consul and his staff to leave Liberia (Goodrich and Carroll 1944, 601). In January of 1943, the U.S. signed a lend-lease agreement with Liberia.

Foreign Policy During the Tubman Era, 1944-1971

The election of Tubman as Liberia's new president in 1943, led to the introduction of policies which effected at least two important changes in Liberia's international relations. The first of Tubman's programs to alter Liberian international posture was the "Open Door Policy," which invited virtually unrestricted foreign investment into Liberia and changed the economic landscape of the country forever. Another change occasioned by Tubman's election was the establishment of Liberia as an important actor in Pan-African politics. Despite these two important changes, the focus of Liberia's external relations remained dominated by its "special relationship" with the United States--a relationship which intensified under the Tubman administration.

Liberian-U.S. Relations During the Tubman Era

On January 27, 1944, three weeks after Tubman's inauguration, Liberia declared war against Germany and Japan. Having thus forcefully demonstrated its commitment to the allied cause and to the United States in particular, in a further display of its affinity with the U.S., Liberia converted its currency from the British pound to the U.S. dollar.

Liberia was subsequently a founding member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In 1960, it became the first African state to be selected to seat on the Security Council. As a member of the UN during the Tubman era, Liberia seldom deviated from the American position when important international issues were discussed. For example, Tubman as well as his successor, Tolbert, provided diplomatic support for the American position with respect to the war in Vietnam. Liberia's commitment to the Western position in general and the U.S. position in particular were so strong that it occasionally led to Liberian equivocations on the major issues in postwar African politics (Dunn 1979). For example, despite Liberia's support for the OAU's advocacy of nonalignment in the cold war, the country remained vigorously anti-communist during the Tubman era.

Throughout the Tubman period Liberia also had no diplomatic relations with a communist country (although diplomatic relations with the USSR were formally established in 1964, they were not actually initiated until 1972 when a Soviet embassy was opened in Monrovia). Although Liberia regularly extended invitations to communist states to attend Tubman's many inaugurations, when these communist states would

reciprocate by inviting Tubman to visit their countries, excuses would be offered for Tubman's inability to accept the invitation. Liberia's negative responses to these invitations were no doubt, influenced by the United States. For example, in 1956, the Liberian ambassador in Washington was told by an official of U.S. State Department to decline a Soviet invitation to Tubman because to accept it "would unfavorably reflect on the prestige of the U.S. government, especially so due to its close ties with the Liberian government" (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 191).

Liberia's international stance during this period was consistent with Tubman's declared policy objective of cultivating "the closest possible friendly relations" with the West and supporting "their general national and international aims" (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 172). It was during the Tubman presidency that an Agreement of Cooperation between Liberia and the United States was signed. The 1959 agreement made Liberia the first--and thus far the only--African state to conclude a mutual defense pact with the United States (Liebenow 1987, 136).

In terms of economic assistance, Article II of the 1959 Agreement stipulated that the United States "will continue to furnish the Government of Liberia such assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States and the Government of Liberia in the effective promotion of its economic development and in the preservation of its national independence and integrity" (Zimmer 1960, 429-30). Thereafter, the U.S. substantially increased its financial and technical assistance to Liberia. In addition to emergency measures, such as the sale of rice in 1966 at low cost under the Food for Peace program, the U.S. provided technical assistance in the fields

of road construction, agriculture, forestry, fish production, public administration and veterinary science. The greatest technical assistance, however, was in the field of education, especially in the form of the Peace Corps volunteers sent to Liberia. Since 1962, two hundred Peace Corps volunteers have served in Liberia each year on two-year contracts (Liebenow 1987, 136).

During the period 1946-1972, U.S. official development assistance to Liberia totaled $195 million ($119 million in grants and $76 million in loans). Among the major projects completed with U.S. grants and loans were: the Free Port of Monrovia, Roberts International Airport, major segments of the interior road systems, a hydroelectric dam at Mt. Coffee near Monrovia, elementary and secondary schools, and the National Medical Center in Monrovia which included the 271-bed John F. Kennedy Hospital and Training Center (U.S. Dept. of State 1973, 3). Additional support for Liberia's development efforts were provided by American business, missionary, and educational organizations, which were very active in the country.

Liberia and the Rest of Africa During the Tubman Era

Until the late 1950s, Liberia's international affairs were limited to relations with the United States and the European colonial powers. The surge toward independence among African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, brought about a pronounced reordering of Liberia's foreign policy priorities. The independence of Ghana in 1957 and of Guinea in 1958 encouraged Liberia to become a more active participant in African affairs. Tubman was concerned about the ideological disposition of the leaders of the two newly independent African states, and their

effect on Africa in general and Liberia in particular. The Monrovia government was especially concerned about the socialist regime of Sekou Toure in Guinea, Liberia's neighbor to the north. Liberia's apprehension regarding its own well-being in an independent Africa was expressed by the Secretary of Defense in his Annual Report for 1960:

> With the attainment of independence of our sister African brothers [sic] contiguous to our borderline, problems which we never thought of are arising and have to be grappled with [with] every degree of efficiency and alertness. Not only are the problems of the crossing into out territories of citizens of other states involved but also the question of national ideologies, some of which are divergent to ours and destined to threaten and uproot the very foundation upon which our democratic institution was founded. To ensure that the situation just referred to will be averted and not permitted to take a foothold in Liberia we have to strengthen and increase our border control units and give more attention to border problems as they arise from day to day (cited in Liebenow 1987, 143).

Dreading isolation on the continent, Liberia aligned itself with the cause of decolonization and self-rule for all of Africa. Tubman became an active champion of Pan-Africanism. However, he was reluctant to go as far as Ghana's Nkrumah who envisaged a political union of all independent African states (Nkrumah 1957; 1963). Tubman was also disturbed by Nkrumah's ambition to assume the leadership role in independent Africa.

In furtherance of his ambition, in April of 1958, Nkrumah had taken the initiative in inviting to Accra the first conference of independent African states. The conference was attended by all of the eight independent African states (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia). However, other than Nkrumah, Tubman was the only head of state and government present. Apparently, the leaders of Arab north African states were not ready to accept Nkrumah's

leadership. Nkrumah was not discouraged, however, and as soon as Guinea attained its independence, Nkrumah began making overtures to its leader, Sekou Toure. Soon after, the two leaders declared that their two countries had united to form the Union of West African States. Other African countries were invited to join.

Although the Ghana-Guinea union amounted to nothing more than a paper union, it was sufficient to cause some concern among Liberian leaders. Tubman was probably disturbed over the possibility of Nkrumah's having access to Liberia's border by way of Guinea. In an effort to contain Nkrumah's radical version of Pan-Africanism, Tubman invited both Nkrumah and Toure to a meeting. The meeting took place in Liberia's remote interior at Sanniquellie in 1959. At the meeting, Tubman put forth an alternative Nkrumah's political union idea. He suggested a loose political federation that would agree in areas of mutual economic and political interests. Tubman succeeded in convincing Toure that his idea of functional cooperation was more practical for the time being. The resulting Sanniquellie Declaration was a victory for Tubman (Holloway 1981, 35-36).

In May of 1961, a conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States took place in Monrovia. This conference signaled the deepening cleavage between the radical socialist-oriented states (called the Casablanca Group) and the more moderate or conservative states (which came to be called the Brazzaville and later the Monrovia Group). The Monrovia conference endorsed Tubman's approach of functional cooperation in such areas as trade, communications, transportation, and the like,

rather than the political union favored by the Casablanca Group (which included Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria).

At the Monrovia meeting, African leaders agreed to hold another summit meeting in Lagos, Nigeria in 1962, in order to develop technical and cultural cooperation and carry forward the "unity of aspirations and actions" of African states. In preparation for the African summit, the Tubman administration prepared a draft charter for a future African organization, as well as a detailed proposal for non-political cooperation. Upon presenting the draft to those present at the Lagos Summit, Tubman pointed out that it "represented the thinking of the Liberian government on the organizational mechanics of African and Malagasy cooperation," intended by no means to be definitive. "It may be accepted, amended, revised or completely rejected", he added (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 185-86). The Liberian draft proposal, after some revisions was accepted and subsequently became on May 25, 1963, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Tubman's moderate imprint on the Charter was clear.

The trend in post-1963 Africa toward economic cooperation represented a significant victory for Tubman's African policy, which had resisted Nkrumahs' bid to lead Africa into some kind of political union. Under Tubman, Liberia collaborated with other African countries to forge functional associations. A 1960 Liberian proposal for West African economic cooperation was the beginning of a collaboration which culminated in the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.

Throughout the Tubman era, relations between Liberia and other African countries (with the notable exception of Ghana), were very cordial. Only after Nkrumah's ouster in 1966 did the two countries resume normal relations. Despite widely divergent ideological outlooks, relations between Tubman and Toure and their two countries were very friendly. Tubman's remarkable political and diplomatic skills enabled him to assume a vigorous stance on southern Africa, while the domestic situation in his own country still bore some resemblance to apartheid. Even more significant was the fact that Tubman vehemently opposed South Africa's apartheid system at a time when Liberia's constitution specified that only "persons of Negro descent" could become citizens, vote or own land thus excluding thousands of Lebanese entrepreneurs long established in Monrovia solely on racial grounds (Adelman 1979, 9-12). Tubman's skills also enabled him to support the OAU's policies on southern African liberation, anti-colonialism, and even nonalignment in the cold war, while maintaining Liberia's "special relationship" with the U.S. To be sure, Liberia's forceful anti-communist stance during the Tubman era compensated for any of Liberia's OAU motivated policies which may have been incompatible with U.S. positions.

Foreign Trade and Economic Policies During the Tubman Era

Before the end of World War II, the only important foreign investor in Liberia was Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, which, in 1926, had obtained a huge concession agreement from the Liberian government. Firestone's contribution to the Liberian treasury (made up of yearly rent payments, rubber export tax, consular fees, and port and harbor dues), represented a major proportion of total government

revenue. After the introduction of the income tax system in 1951, Firestone's income tax payment represented almost half of the total government revenue in that year (van der Kraaij 1983, 60-64).

Firestone contributions to the Liberian economy convinced Tubman that a policy that encouraged more foreign investment would be beneficial to Liberia. Thus, in his first inaugural address in January of 1944, Tubman announced: "We shall encourage the investment of foreign capital in the development of the resources of the country, preferably on a partnership basis, and we shall accord to investors the necessary protection and fairness of treatment." Subsequently, in 1945, the Tubman administration granted Col. Lansdell Christie, a former U.S. Army officer, "exclusive exploration rights in an area of about three million acres and exclusive mining rights in respect of all minerals except gold, diamonds, and platinum" in an area not exceeding 25,000 acres (to be chosen from the exploration area) (van der Kraaij 1983).

In 1947, Tubman signed a statement of understanding with Stettinius Associates-Liberia, Inc., a company owned by former U.S. Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, to establish the Liberian Company. Stettinius' company was granted an 88-year concession "to exploit any line of business, except activities already expressly granted to other concessionaires" (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 177).

It was in the same year, 1947, that the Tubman administration used the term "Open Door Policy" for the first time. After the signing of the agreement with Stettinius, the government issued a press release expressing the hope that "people of all races and nations who have either skills or funds to employ in any specific projects for the

development of Liberian resources will come in.... Liberians will always come first to the extent of their available contributions but the policy of the open door is to be followed...(van der Kraaij 1983, 44). Nine years later, in his third inaugural address, President Tubman reaffirmed his Open Door Policy (Clower, et al. 1966, 118).

In accord with the Open Door Policy, foreign companies were granted tax-free holidays. There were also no restrictions on the repatriation of profits and dividends, and no expropriation of foreign investment. In furtherance of this policy, virtually unlimited control over large areas of land and freedom to exploit Liberia's natural resources was extended to interested foreign companies.

Initially, the Open Door Policy was not very successful. The expected diversification in natural resource exploitation did not occur. Until well into the 1950s, Liberian economic growth was almost exclusively dependent upon export earnings from rubber. Indeed, as late as 1957, rubber was responsible for as much as 77 percent of Liberia's total export earnings (Liebenow 1987, 60). Furthermore, Liberia's excessive dependence on the U.S. and U.S.-based companies remained virtually unchanged in the first few years following the introduction of the Open Door Policy. For example, until 1950, only two major concessions (both U.S. based) were added to Firestone: the Liberian Mining Company, founded by Col. Lansdell Christie and the Liberian Company, founded by Stettinius. Total trade in that year amounted to $38.2 million, and 90 percent of Liberian exports went to the U.S., which also provided 70 percent of the imports (Schulze 1982, 581).

Beginning in 1950, there was a tremendous influx of foreign investors into Liberia. By the end of the decade there were 15 major companies from six different countries (see Table 5.1). The arrival of these companies led to a significant increase in government revenue. The performance of the Liberian economy was so impressive that, in 1961, Tubman unilaterally made further assurances to foreign investors. He asserted that nationalization "will never happen in Liberia" (Sisay 1985, 155). By the time of Tubman's death in 1971, there were more than one hundred foreign companies in Liberia. Although over fifty of these companies were from the U.S., Liberia's dependence on revenues from U.S.-based companies had diminished considerably. For example, total trade in 1971 reached $386.1 million, but only 21.8 percent of Liberia's exports went to the U.S., which now provided only 32 percent of Liberia's imports (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Some diversification of Liberia's trading patterns had thus taken place. European countries, such as Germany, Sweden, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands not only became major sources of foreign investments, they also became important trading partners as well.

Along with the diversification in trading partners came an impressive decline in Liberia's nearly exclusive dependence on one export commodity--rubber. Tubman's Open Door Policy had resulted the signing of a number of concession agreements with foreign companies interested in mining operations. Subsequently, mining became a major industry in Liberia, and by 1961, iron ore had replaced rubber as Liberia's principal export. In 1971, iron ore accounted for over 65 percent of total exports thus replacing rubber to become Liberia's new

Table 5.1
Major Concession Holders in Liberia as of 1960

Concession Holder	Principal Product	Year of Agreement	Development Cost (in millions)	Country
Firestone	natural rubber	1925	$32.0	U.S.
Liberia Mining	iron ore	1946	37.0	U.S.
Liberia Company	rubber	1947	2.0	U.S.
African Fruit	rubber	1952	4.5	Germany
Goodrich	rubber	1954	4.3	U.S.
Delimco	iron ore	1953	100.0	Germany
Lamco	iron ore	1953	215.0	Sweden
Monrovia Breweries	soft drinks, beer	1956	3.5	Switzerland
National Iron Ore	iron ore	1958	30.0	U.S.
Liberia Independent Forest Co.	lumber	1958	.4	Spain
Limpex Palm Oil	palm oil, pineapple	1958	.5	Germany
Munarriz Works	bricks, soap	1952	.2	Spain
Le Tourneau of Liberia	lumber	1952	3.0	U.S.
Maryland Logging	lumber	1960	.5	England
Providence Mining	diamonds	1960	.05	England

Source: Wilson, Charles M. 1971. Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm, p. 202.

monoculture. A significant outgrowth of the decline of rubber as an export commodity was the drop in Firestone's contribution to the Liberian treasury from 35.9 percent of total treasury receipts in 1955 to under 6 percent in 1971.

The Open Door policy also enabled the Liberian government to secure revenue from the registration of foreign ships. Liberia provided certificates of registration to the operators of convenience flag ships at lower fees than other countries. Thus within a short period of time Liberia had a large merchant fleet, comprised of ships owned by companies of many nations but registered in Monrovia (though few of the ships ever went there). By 1970, more ships were registered in Liberia than in any other country (Pedler 1979, 113). This soon became a very important source of revenue for the Liberian government.

The open door strategy proved to be Tubman's most successful economic policy initiative. The influx of foreign investors into the country led to an exceptionally rapid increase in government revenues. For example, in 1944 when Tubman first assumed the presidency, total domestic revenue was only $1.6 million; but ten years later in 1954, it had risen to $12 million; and at the end of the Tubman era in 1971 it had reached the staggering sum of $69.5 million (van der Kraaij 1983, 307, 333).

Foreign Policy Under the Tolbert Administration

While maintaining close links with the West, Tolbert expanded Liberia's relations with the Communist bloc. However, the most significant feature of his foreign policy was the promotion of closer ties with Liberia's neighbors in Africa.

Liberia-U.S. Relations, 1971-1980

Liberia's foreign policy, traditionally pro-Western, was not significantly affected by the change in leadership. However, in his first annual message to the Liberian legislature, President Tolbert observed that there was a need to explore additional sources of aid. Perhaps out of this need to diversify its sources of aid and trading partners or because of Tolbert's wish to play a more significant leadership role in African affairs, Liberia began to display a relatively more independent international posture.

In the first few years of his presidency, some of Tolbert's foreign policy initiatives appeared to be designed to help Liberia shed her image as "America's little brother" (Adelman 1979, 12). For example, Liberia increasingly began to vote with the nonaligned (particularly the African) bloc in the UN. Furthermore, Liberia established diplomatic relations with all East-bloc countries, as well as China and Cuba. In December of 1972, a resident Soviet ambassador arrived in Monrovia. Trade agreements were also negotiated with a number of communist countries. The Liberian government sought and received an increasing number of scholarships for Liberians to study in Europe, Canada and even Soviet-bloc countries (Legum 1973, B647; 1975, B702).

Another indication of Tolbert's bid to move Liberia away from the U.S. and closer to the African position on foreign policy matters was provided when, in November of 1973, Liberia became the 25th African country to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. A few years later in 1976, Tolbert dismissed the Liberian delegate to the UN, Dr.

T.O. Dusumo Johnson, for voting with Israel against a resolution condemning Israeli policy in occupied Arab territory (Legum 1974, B691; 1976, B746).

This pattern of disengagement did not involve any significant shift in Liberia's guiding ideology. Thus, in response to a question on Liberia's relations with communist countries and with the United States, Tolbert noted that:

> In recent times, we have come to observe that political ideologies can be completely differentiated from economic cooperation on the international level. Thus, we have been seeking harmonious relations with all nations, regardless of ideological differences, once they are willing to respect our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to treat us as equals.... Liberia's historical relationship with the United States stems originally from the fact that the country was founded by free blacks from the United States, thereby creating extraordinary links between Liberia and the United States. Because of this historical tie, both Americans and Liberians have always referred to their relationship as special and traditional, without any political domination or patronage. We share a similar system of government, our economies are based upon the free enterprise system, and our legal system draws substantially on the common laws system you have, coupled with our African customary laws.
>
> Since the founding of Liberia, our ties with the United States have been kept vigorously alive through trade, contacts, religious interactions, and other areas and by virtue of similarities in our political systems. Our past relationship is therefore the outgrowth of this historical and cultural fact or phenomenon. In respect to our existing relationship with the United States, it can be described as having matured over the years and is fast evolving from mere historical and cultural ties to bilateral cooperation, in which there is increasing appreciation of our efforts to respond to the basic needs of our two peoples. Thus, our relationship with the United States is very friendly and will remain friendly.[3]

Despite promoting policies which helped to broaden the Liberian perspective beyond its traditional narrow focus upon the United States, Tolbert continued to stress the existence of a "special relationship"

between the two countries. The primary benefit for Liberia from its special relationship with the U.S. was in the form of economic assistance. The Tolbert administration recognized the importance of U.S. assistance to Liberia's economic well being, and thus, even when it strayed from the U.S. position on international matters, it was careful not to offend American sensibilities. For example, on the very important and sensitive issue of the war in Vietnam, the Tolbert government, like Tubman's before it, continued to support the American position.

In 1973, when Tolbert paid an official visit to Washington, President Richard Nixon pledged to continue U.S. economic aid to Liberia. Thus, throughout Tolbert's presidency, the U.S. remained the largest single supplier of aid to Liberia. In return for U.S. aid, Liberia permitted the construction near Monrovia of a Voice of America transmitter powerful enough to cover the entire African continent. This gave the U.S. a considerable advantage in the propaganda war with the USSR (Liebenow 1987, 137). The U.S. linkage was further reinforced through the opening in 1976 of the $7.4 million OMEGA navigation station in Liberia. The system which provides worldwide assistance to shipping in all weather conditions was constructed by the U.S. government but administered and staffed by Liberians. It is one of eight such stations in the world and the tallest manmade structure in Africa (Legum 1977, B629; Liebenow 1987, 137).

The special relationship between Liberia and the U.S. was reaffirmed when President Jimmy Carter visited Monrovia in April of 1978. Liberian relations with the Soviet Union became strained after

Soviet embassy personnel in Monrovia, and Cuban embassy personnel from Sierra Leone were implicated in the "rice riot" of April, 1979. "For the benefit and security of the Republic of Liberia," Tolbert expelled three Soviet diplomats (Hughes 1979, 8; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 192-93).

Liberia and the Rest of Africa During the Tolbert Administration

Tubman's high-profile African policy was continued under the Tolbert administration. Tolbert also vigorously pursued his predecessor's policy of regional economic cooperation within Africa. This was reflected in the signing in October of 1973, of the Mano River Declaration by President Tolbert and President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone. The Declaration established the Mano River Union (MRU) which brought about "closer links in trade and in cultural and economic cooperation" between Liberia and Sierra Leone. All customs procedures, regulations and laws were harmonized and a common external tariff between the two countries was initiated in October of 1977 (Legum 1979, B696).

The MRU was an integral part of the larger Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Tolbert administration played an important role in formulating and defining the objectives of ECOWAS. In January of 1975, Tolbert hosted the founding meeting of ECOWAS, which purpose was to effect the eventual elimination of internal customs duties within the community and the establishment of a common external tariff. In addition, ECOWAS aimed to promote the free movement of labor and capital among all member states and to bring about the adoption of common economic policies (Legum 1978, C196-98). Liberia's strong commitment to ECOWAS was forcefully expressed by President Tolbert when

Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obansanjo, the Nigerian Head of State visited Liberia. Tolbert declared that, if necessary, Liberia was ready to relinquish any privilege arising from its relations with other groups or countries in order that ECOWAS should realize its full potential (Legum 1980, B684).

Under Tolbert, Liberia continued to play a key role in the OAU. Liberia served on many important committees of the OAU. During the Tolbert administration the country was best known for its work on the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. For example, it was the Liberian initiative which ended a long-standing dispute between Guinea and Senegal on the one hand, and Guinea and Ivory Coast on the other (Legum 1979, B697; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 188).

On the issue of southern Africa, Tolbert initially adopted a firmer and more militant attitude than his predecessor. While lending both moral and material support to "liberation movements" in southern Africa, Tolbert repeatedly expressed his opposition to any dialogue with the Pretoria regime. However, in February of 1975, in a spectacular reversal of his position on the issue of dialogue, Tolbert invited the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster to Monrovia. Despite Tolbert's protestations that Vorster was invited only after consultations with other African leaders including SWAPO leaders in Namibia, the meeting was roundly criticized in African circles (Liebenow 1987, 149). The launching of a Liberation Fund for southern Africa to which the Tolbert administration contributed $100,000 and Tolbert's renewed advocacy of a militant stance against the Pretoria government were probably instrumental in Tolbert's return to respectability on this issue.

Throughout Tolbert's presidency Liberia was steadfast in its identification with OAU objectives. Liberia's role in the fostering of greater inter-African cooperation was accorded due recognition when, in 1978, Liberia was selected to host the 1979 OAU Summit Conference. At the conclusion of the conference Tolbert automatically became the presiding chairman of the organization.

Foreign Trade and Economic Policies, 1971-1980

Upon assuming the presidency, Tolbert outlined plans to lessen foreign domination of the Liberian economy, while encouraging more indigenous participation. He called for a more equitable partnership between Liberians and foreign investors (Legum 1973, B609).

Tolbert introduced some measures which were aimed at increasing Liberian participation in the economy. For example, privileges formerly granted only to foreign investors (including tax-free holidays and import restrictions on competing products), were extended to "qualified" Liberians. Some economic activities were made the exclusive preserve of Liberian nationals and major foreign cooperations were ordered to reduce the number of their expatriate employees (Legum 1973, B609; 1974, B649).[4] These measures facilitated a significant increase in the number of Liberian entrepreneurs. For example, whereas nearly 72 percent of the 2,535 businesses registered in Liberia in 1972 were foreign owned and by 1978, less than 60 percent belonged to foreign investors (Legum 1974, B649; 1980, B685).

Tolbert's call for a more equitable partnership between Liberians and foreign investors was given substance when his administration reviewed and renegotiated the country's concession agreements with

Firestone, LAMCO, Bethlehem Steel and other concessionaires. The new agreements called upon concessionaires to give preference to qualified Liberians when employing labor, and further to provide on-the-job-training, operate vocational training facilities, and grant scholarships to qualified Liberian employees to pursue advanced studies abroad (van der Kraaij 1983, 80-83).

Traditionally, foreign enterprises operating under concessions agreements in Liberia were not subject to Liberian laws. Under the new agreements concessionaires became subject to Liberian laws (van der Kraaij 1983, 228-31). However, because of their immense contributions to the Liberian economy, the Tolbert administration, even while renegotiating more advantageous concession agreements, was careful not to include any clauses that might have frightened the foreign investors away.

In fact, the Tolbert administration continued to offer incentives to attract foreign investment. Under a new investment code foreign companies were offered comprehensive guarantees against nationalization and tax-free holidays of up to seven years. There was also the added attraction of the complete absence of foreign exchange control. The result of Tolbert's continued adherence to the Open Door Policy was that over one-third of the country's GDP was generated by foreign firms. It was also clear that the renegotiations of concession agreements did not produce a hostile climate since foreign investors continued to find attractive opportunities in Liberia. Subsequently, foreign investment rose from $23 million in 1966 to $180 million in 1977 (van der Kraaij 1983, 228).

Table 5.2
Principal Trading Partners (Value in Millions)

YEAR	WEST GERMANY		ITALY		NETHERLANDS		U.K.		U.S.A.	
	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
1948	0.0	--	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.6	0.0	1.1	12.6	6.4
1951	0.6	0.8	--	0.1	2.4	0.4	0.0	1.9	48.2	11.1
1952	0.4	1.1	--	0.2	1.3	0.6	0.5	1.7	34.6	12.4
1953	0.4	1.2	--	0.1	3.1	1.0	1.1	2.0	25.6	12.5
1954	0.6	1.5	--	0.2	1.9	1.6	0.8	2.3	22.1	15.3
1955	1.6	2.9	0.1	0.3	2.3	1.8	0.9	2.8	37.2	16.1
1956	2.1	2.6	0.0	--	2.2	1.6	1.3	3.2	35.4	16.7
1957	2.7	4.2	0.0	0.5	3.0	1.8	1.4	3.4	31.5	24.0
1958	9.2	4.4	0.0	--	3.3	1.9	3.0	3.2	35.2	21.3
1959	5.7	4.5	0.8	0.8	9.8	2.3	5.0	5.1	40.9	20.2
1960	6.8	6.0	1.8	1.5	14.2	3.7	11.7	7.6	43.6	37.6
1961	3.9	8.8	3.7	2.9	13.8	5.5	5.5	11.3	28.6	44.5
1963	13.1	17.1	4.7	5.0	8.3	3.7	10.1	11.4	33.4	39.0
1964	26.9	21.8	5.3	1.8	6.8	6.5	14.2	10.7	57.3	44.1
1965	36.2	12.7	12.2	2.7	7.2	3.7	10.0	10.5	50.0	49.5
1966	42.5	--	11.5	1.9	8.5	4.5	12.7	10.6	52.3	50.6
1967	44.6	15.0	17.7	1.6	8.0	4.4	14.1	8.7	47.5	55.0
1968	33.0	10.1	18.5	2.2	23.6	4.5	10.1	11.8	43.9	43.4
1969	--	--	16.9	1.7	37.7	4.3	11.2	9.7	54.2	38.7
1970	38.1	21.7	22.1	3.7	32.6	16.2	14.0	11.1	49.5	46.4
1971	41.3	15.6	28.7	3.4	33.7	13.0	11.7	14.5	48.4	51.9
1972	42.0	20.7	43.8	4.1	35.4	9.6	15.8	16.4	50.2	54.1
1973	55.7	23.9	42.0	4.6	40.6	6.3	55.8	18.4	65.6	53.8
1974	75.9	27.1	49.3	5.9	50.5	10.7	10.4	27.2	94.3	82.0
1975	84.7	32.8	51.0	3.5	38.5	11.7	8.2	31.5	86.5	104.2
1976	126.4	49.6	63.9	11.1	25.7	23.9	11.9	32.8	88.0	119.1
1977	107.2	42.6	58.7	20.3	32.7	39.9	16.0	33.2	94.8	121.9
1978	108.9	52.4	54.9	20.5	28.7	21.7	14.6	41.5	105.5	116.7
1979	137.4	56.5	56.2	16.2	37.7	36.2	21.1	41.1	106.3	120.3
1980	144.0	50.1	61.7	4.3	51.4	39.4	21.7	31.5	124.5	120.2
1981	132.1	48.4	70.3	4.6	27.5	40.2	20.4	23.7	120.6	140.4
1982	149.0	42.9	65.9	3.8	19.8	31.0	19.7	17.3	82.5	117.3
1983	130.9	50.4	75.3	4.0	22.8	40.6	11.9	20.1	76.2	101.3
1984	134.8	49.8	68.8	5.2	28.0	34.8	6.9	22.3	90.9	80.8
1985*	140.7	28.0	68.7	2.9	19.0	18.6	4.6	21.1	83.8	73.9

Sources: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1955-1989; *Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, Europa Publications, 1989.

Under the Tolbert administration, an effort to broaden the range of economic ties with the global community was apparent in the area of international trade. For example, in 1978 alone, trade agreements were negotiated with East Germany, South Korea, China, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Egypt (Legum 1980, B686).

In analyzing Liberia's relationships with its major trading partners during this period, it is clear that despite minor fluctuations there was steady growth in both imports from and exports to the U.S. Imports from the U.S. rose from $51.9 million in 1971 to $120.3 million in 1980. Exports to the U.S. underwent a similar expansion, from $48.4 million in 1971 to $124.5 million in 1980 (see Table 5.2). However, Table 5.3 indicates quite another story with respect to the relative position occupied by the United States in trade with Liberia during the same nine-year period. Although the U.S. continued to be the single most important country in terms of imports into Liberia, its share of total imports into Liberia fell from 32 percent to 22.5 percent. Even more important was the relative reduction in significance of Liberian exports to the U.S., with West Germany actually surpassing the U.S. as the major destination for Liberian exports. As the U.S. share of Liberian exports fell from 21.8 percent in 1971 to 20.9 percent in 1980, that of West Germany went from 18.6 percent to 24.1 percent over the same period (see Table 5.3).

Foreign Policy Under Military Rule

The April,1980 coup, the assassination of Tolbert and the execution of members of Tolbert's cabinet were vigorously denounced by the international community (Holloway 1981, 160). African nations

Table 5.3
Principal Trading Partners (Value as Percentage of World Total)

YEAR	WEST GERMANY		ITALY		NETHERLANDS		U.K.		U.S.A.	
	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
1948	0.0	--	0.0	0.0	17.1	7.1	0.2	12.4	78.6	73.2
1951	1.2	4.6	--	0.4	4.7	2.6	0.0	10.9	92.4	65.0
1953	1.1	6.5	--	0.4	9.9	5.3	3.5	10.6	82.7	67.0
1955	3.6	11.3	0.2	1.3	5.3	7.0	2.0	11.0	86.9	62.0
1956	4.6	9.7	--	--	4.9	5.9	2.9	11.8	79.5	62.2
1957	6.6	11.0	0.1	1.4	7.3	4.8	3.5	8.8	78.0	62.7
1958	17.1	11.5	--	--	6.1	5.0	5.6	8.3	65.6	55.5
1959	8.5	10.5	1.3	1.9	14.7	5.3	7.4	11.8	61.1	47.0
1960	8.2	8.6	2.2	2.2	17.2	5.4	14.1	11.1	52.8	54.4
1961	6.3	9.7	6.0	3.2	22.2	6.0	8.8	12.5	46.2	49.1
1962	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1963	16.1	15.8	5.9	4.6	10.3	3.4	12.6	10.5	41.3	36.0
1964	21.4	19.7	4.2	1.6	5.4	5.9	11.3	9.7	45.6	39.7
1965	26.7	12.1	9.0	2.6	5.3	3.5	7.4	10.1	36.9	47.4
1966	28.3	--	7.7	1.7	5.6	4.0	8.4	9.4	34.8	45.2
1967	28.1	12.0	11.2	1.3	5.0	3.5	8.9	6.9	39.9	43.9
1968	19.7	9.5	11.0	2.1	14.1	4.2	6.1	11.0	26.2	40.6
1969	13.5	14.3	8.7	1.5	19.3	3.8	5.7	8.5	27.7	33.9
1970	17.9	14.5	10.4	2.4	15.3	10.8	6.6	7.4	22.7	31.0
1971	18.6	9.6	12.9	2.1	15.1	8.0	3.3	8.9	21.8	32.0
1972	17.2	11.6	18.0	2.3	14.5	5.4	2.3	9.2	20.6	30.2
1973	17.2	12.4	13.0	2.4	12.5	3.1	3.4	9.5	20.3	27.8
1974	19.0	9.4	12.3	2.0	12.6	3.7	2.6	9.4	23.6	28.4
1975	21.5	9.9	13.0	1.0	9.8	3.5	2.1	9.5	22.0	31.4
1976	27.7	12.4	14.0	2.8	5.6	6.0	2.6	8.2	19.3	29.8
1977	24.0	9.2	13.1	4.4	7.3	8.6	3.6	7.2	21.2	26.3
1978	22.4	10.9	11.3	4.3	5.9	4.6	3.0	9.1	21.7	24.3
1979	25.6	11.2	10.5	3.2	7.0	7.1	3.9	8.1	19.8	23.7
1980	24.1	9.4	10.3	1.0	8.6	7.4	3.6	5.9	20.9	22.5
1981	25.2	10.1	13.4	1.0	5.2	8.4	3.9	5.0	23.0	29.4
1982	31.5	10.0	14.0	1.0	4.2	7.2	4.2	4.0	17.5	27.4
1983	31.0	12.2	17.8	1.0	5.4	9.9	2.8	4.9	18.0	24.6
1984	30.0	11.1	15.3	1.4	6.2	9.6	1.5	6.2	20.2	22.3
1985*	32.3	9.9	15.8	1.0	4.4	6.5	1.1	7.4	19.2	26.0

Sources: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1955-1989; *Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, Europa Publications, 1989.

called for the isolation of the new Liberian government. To African leaders, the assassination of Tolbert was especially disheartening since he was the current chairman of the OAU.

The overthrow of Tolbert was applauded in some quarters. The Soviet Union, which had had some of its diplomats expelled by Tolbert only a few months before the coup, was one of the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the new military government. Other states which expressed immediate support for the government included Ethiopia, Cuba and Libya (Legum 1981, B544). The PRC flirted briefly with Liberia's new friends. Top Liberian government officials visited the capitals of some the "friendly" countries. Gabriel Baccus Matthews the new foreign minister visited Addis Ababa in May of 1980, and again in August when he travelled with Doe's party to Ethiopia and Tanzania. Perry Zulu the finance minister, went to Libya in February of 1981 (Legum 1982, B532). Doe even sent some Liberians to Ethiopia for training in adult literacy and the government accepted a number of Libyan scholarships for Liberian students to go to Tripoli (Legum 1982, B532; Liebenow 1987, 200).

In the first few months of the Doe regime, Liberia's foreign policy seemed to be more closely aligned with those of the East-bloc countries. However, by mid-1981, with the closure of the Libyan People's Bureau and the drastic reduction of the staff of Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, this initial appearance of a reorientation in Liberia's foreign policy had vanished.

Liberia and United States Under Military Rule

Despite the mildly hostile reaction of the United States to the coup, it was to the United States that the new military rulers first turned to for assistance. Almost immediately after the coup, U.S. diplomats were approached by the new leaders for counsel and aid. Doe personally requested the U.S. military adviser in Monrovia, Col. Robert Gosny, for help and advice on how to maintain order after the coup (Legum 1981, B544; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982, 6). The official American response to these initial advances was not encouraging. In fact, because of the executions and the unstable atmosphere of the immediate post-coup period, the U.S. canceled a Pentagon training mission that had been scheduled to go to Monrovia on May 1, 1980 (Sisay 1985, 167).

The U.S. soon reversed its position on this matter and, about one week after the coup, announced America's continued support for Liberia and rescheduled the Pentagon training mission. Furthermore, a commission headed by Congressman William Gray of Pennsylvania was sent to Liberia to review the status of U.S.-Liberian relations. This high-level U.S. mission, which arrived in Monrovia in late May of 1980, included Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 175-76).

At the time of the coup, the Liberian economy was on the brink of collapse. The PRC inherited a large outstanding debt, totaling about $740 million (Culley 1983). The new regime needed immediate international financial assistance, and recognized that it was in its best interest to maintain and even expand on Liberia's special

relationship with the U.S. Members of the Gray commission were sympathetic to the plight of the PRC. Upon their return to Washington, they recommended that the U.S. government increase its level of assistance to Liberia. In his report to President Jimmy Carter, Congressman Gray, made mention of the tremendous popularity of the coup and noted that the new military rulers were committed to the capitalist system (Sisay 1985, 168).

However, in the immediate post-coup period, Libya and other socialist leaning countries were making overtures to the Doe regime. Besides the initial favorable response to these overtures, the PRC tried to use the interests of these countries in Liberia as leverage, in its efforts to secure aid from the West. Thus, Doe warned Liberia's traditional friends that, unless they increased their level of aid, his government would be forced to look elsewhere for help.[5] The U.S. was particularly disturbed by Liberia's new African friends, fearing that the PRC would seek to strengthen relations with Ethiopia and Libya, two of its most persistent suitors. To assure that this did not happen, the U.S. response to subsequent PRC requests for aid was prompt and generous.

U.S. aid from the time of the coup to December, 1980 totaled $18 million. In addition, the U.S. provided the PRC with military equipment and provided funds to help with the construction of houses for the Liberian army (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982). In December of 1980, while announcing an American commitment to providing Liberia with more economic aid in the future, Secretary Moose told Liberia's military rulers that it was not necessary for them to obligate

themselves to Libya out of financial concerns. He described Liberia as a country which has a "very special meaning to the United States." He noted that the U.S. and Liberia have been "valued allies" for many years. "We want that relationship to continue into the future," he added.[6]

To protect American interests (which included the Voice of America transmitter, an OMEGA Navigational System, U.S. bank loans and private investments), and, at the same, to promote the special relationship, U.S aid to Liberia during the period of military rule shattered all previous records. From an annual average of $8 million in the twenty years preceding military rule to an annual average of about $65 million during the five years of military rule (see Table 5.4). By 1985, Liberia had become the world's largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid, with about one-third of the country's budget coming from the U.S.[7]

There were also certain symbolic, yet significant, gestures of friendship between the U.S. and Liberia during this period. For example, in response to a request by Doe, the U.S. government sent 100 U.S. Green Berets and the destroyer Thorn to Liberia. The timing of the visit was significant, coming on the first anniversary of the coup.[8] Doe used the occasion of the anniversary to express his country's gratitude to the U.S. government, which had become Liberia's largest aid donor. A month later the PRC ordered the closure of Libyan People's Bureau and the Soviet Union was ordered to reduce its embassy staff from 15 to six.[9]

Despite some congressional disapproval of the lack of democracy in Liberia, Liberian-American relations during the period of military rule

Table 5.4
U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Liberia, 1946-1985
(in millions)

YEAR	ECONOMIC AID			MILITARY AID			TOTAL AID
	Loans	Grants	Total	Loans	Grants	Total	
1946-48			7.5				7.5
1949-52			2.3				2.3
1953-61			29.2			2.3	31.5
1961-62			11.9			1.5	13.4
1963	31.3	10.4	41.7			.1	41.8
1964	7.4	9.1	16.5			.4	16.9
1965	9.3	9.8	19.1			1.1	20.2
1966	2.2	9.5	11.7			.6	12.3
1967	1.9	8.3	10.2		.8	.8	11.0
1968	1.3	7.2	8.5	--	.7	.7	9.2
1969	5.6	7.4	13.0	--	.5	.5	13.5
1970	.9	7.1	8.0	--	.5	.5	8.5
1971	--	8.0	8.0	--	.7	.7	8.7
1972	8.1	9.2	17.3	2.0	.4	2.4	19.7
1973	12.9	5.7	18.6	--	.2	.2	18.8
1974	--	6.0	6.0	--	.1	.1	6.1
1975	9.0	6.7	15.7	1.8	.1	1.9	17.6
1976	--	5.8	5.8	1.7	.1	1.8	7.6
1977	11.8	9.6	21.4	.5	.1	.6	22.0
1978	--	7.2	7.2	.5	.2	.7	7.9
1979	--	17.6	17.6	1.2	.3	1.5	19.1
1980	10.0	13.5	23.5	2.5	.2	2.7	26.2
1981	15.0	40.2	55.2	4.7	1.6	6.3	61.5
1982	15.0	50.5	65.5	7.0	5.6	12.6	78.1
1983	16.7	46.2	62.9	7.0	5.7	12.7	75.6
1984	15.0	51.0	66.0		12.8	12.8	78.8
1985			75.5			16.2	91.7

Source: Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 1988.

were clearly as strong if not stronger than they were during the preceding twenty years. The Doe regime became more pro-Western that its predecessors. Attacks on Soviet policies and a corresponding adoption of an extremely pro-American attitude was vigorously pursued by the Doe regime. Liberia's voting pattern in the UN became increasingly more consistent with that of the U.S. (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 114).[10] Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the PRC's pro-American foreign policy posture was the 1983 resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel (Liebenow 1987, 252).[11] Furthermore, by the end of the military interregnum, the Doe regime had severed many of the communist contacts established by the Tolbert administration. Diplomatic relations with the USSR were frozen, both countries having withdrawn their personnel from their respective embassies (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 193).

Liberia and the Rest of Africa During Military Rule

The military coup and the assassination of President Tolbert (who was then the incumbent chairman of the OAU) lead to a near rupture of Liberia's relations with her African neighbors. Tolbert had been a very active participant in OAU affairs and had acquired considerable prestige on the continent. Thus, his assassination and the subsequent executions of members of his cabinet aroused the hostility of many African leaders to the coup and to the new military rulers. Perhaps an even more profound cause for concern was the anxiety of African leaders about the vulnerability of their own governments to a similar kind of takeover. Understandably, Nigeria, which had only a few months before restored civilian rule after thirteen years military rule, took a strong lead in condemning the coup and the executions.

Doe's claim to automatic succession as chairman of the OAU was rejected and the OAU appointed President Leopold Senghor of Senegal as interim chairman. However, the first major open display of hostility by African countries toward the Doe regime came at the OAU special economic summit in April of 1980. When Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel Matthews flew into Lagos, Nigeria in an attempt to represent Doe at the meeting, he was compelled to return to Monrovia when his plane was refused permission to land at Murtala Mohammed Airport in Lagos. It was later revealed that, with the exceptions of Libya and Ethiopia, all the other OAU member states had opposed Liberian participation (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 189).

The refusal to grant the Liberian delegation landing rights in Lagos was followed by other decisions denying Liberian participation in other African organizational affairs. For example, no invitation was extended to the new Liberian defense minister to a meeting of defense ministers of ECOWAS in May of 1980. Two weeks later, Sgt. Doe and his delegation were denied participation at the ECOWAS summit meeting in Lome, Togo. The decision greatly embarrassed the Liberian delegation who had already arrived in the Togolese capital and had been accorded a welcome befitting a leader and his delegation. A four-nation committee (Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Togo) was formed by the summit to monitor events in Liberia.

In response to the diplomatic snub by its African neighbors, Liberia recalled her ambassadors from the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, ECOWAS, and the Mano River Union. Nigeria, which had been a leading critic of the Doe regime, was also asked to reduce its Monrovia

embassy staff to two officers like the Liberia embassy in Lagos. In announcing the diplomatic recalls, foreign minister Matthews warned that "the government of Liberia is not disposed to simply assume its responsibilities without exercising its rights in any regional or international organization. Liberia is therefore suspending all its obligations to ECOWAS until its rights are restored...."[12]

The presidents of Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Togo visited Monrovia in June of 1980 and discussed the conditions they felt should be fulfilled before relations will be normalized. These included the release of A.B. Tolbert, son of the late president, the release of other political prisoners and the reinstatement of the French ambassador to Liberia (the PRC had demanded the recall of Louis Dollot, the French ambassador to Liberia, after A.B. Tolbert was discovered taking refuge in his residence). In rejecting all three conditions, the Liberian Minister of Information, Gabriel Nimley, said that "the Liberian government would not be subject to pressures from other African governments to accept standards of human rights that are ignored elsewhere on the continent" (Holloway 1981, 173).

Following the normalization of relations between Liberia and Nigeria in September of 1980, relations between Liberia and the rest of Africa began to improve. Doe attended the 1981 OAU and ECOWAS summit meetings in Nairobi and Freetown. In 1982, the three leaders of the Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea), officially established a customs union.

Despite the noticeable improvements in Liberia's intra-African relations, Sgt. Doe did not become as active as his predecessors in the

determination of continental issues. With the restoration and expansion of the "special relationship" between Liberia and the U.S., foreign policy under the PRC became decidedly pro-Western. This Western orientation also colored Liberia's stands on African matters. For example, Liberia protested the OAU handling of the Western Sahara dispute. It consistently opposed the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the OAU and even threatened to boycott the 1982 OAU summit meeting if the SADR were not excluded. Liberia's position on this issue was consistent with that of Morocco (another strongly pro-American state), which had claims on Western Sahara. Finally, in July of 1985, the Doe regime accorded full diplomatic recognition to the SADR (Legum 1984, B493; 1987, B85).

Another clearly pro-American foreign policy initiative was the PRC's 1983 decision to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. This decision was decidedly inconsistent with the OAU position on the Israeli question. In keeping with OAU policy, twenty-six African countries had severed diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Only Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi had continued to maintain relations with Israel since then. Zaire, another of America's African ally, resumed relations with Israel in 1982.

Foreign Trade and Economic Policies Under the PRC

The success of the Open Door Policy was, for the most part, due to the liberal investment policies upon which it was based. However, the fact that Liberia has had durable civilian regimes, seemingly immune from coups, provided foreign-owned enterprises with another strong incentive to invest in the country. The April, 1980 coup was therefore

not a welcome intervention as far as foreign investors were concerned. After the coup, uncertainties about the future led to a sharp fall in private sector liquidity, from $175.6 million in March of 1980 to $102.6 million in December of 1981, as both local and foreign depositors moved their convertible assets abroad (Clapham 1987, 597).

The actions of the new military rulers during the first few days following the coup (the public executions, a decree limiting the repatriation of earnings, and the military's inability to halt the looting of business premises), seriously alarmed the foreign business community. Shippers were reluctant to come into port during the first days of the coup. Shipowners began to question the advantages of registering their vessels under Liberia's "flag of convenience." Some even threatened to switch their registration to Panama, a move which would have deprived Liberia of a substantial source of revenue (Liebenow 1987, 243).

Managers of foreign-owned enterprises also complained about the uneconomic effects of the curfew which was instituted immediately following the coup. Perhaps the action that caused the most anxiety within the foreign business community, was the announcement by the newly-appointed justice minister, Chea Cheapoo, that twenty managers of foreign corporations were to be placed under house arrest. Although the order was immediately rescinded by Sgt. Doe himself, the signals that Cheapoo's action sent to the business and financial interests were ominous (Liebenow 1987, 243-44).

In an effort to soothe jittery investors and arrest the decline in investor confidence, the PRC gave assurances to foreign investors, to

owners of ships registered under the Liberian flag, to local bankers, and to Lebanese merchants that there would be no major changes in the country's free enterprise system (Legum 1981, B545; 1982, B534; Liebenow 1987, 245). The PRC's concern over the future of foreign investment in Liberia was also reflected in some long-term policy commitments, such as the stated intention to continue the use of the U.S. dollar as official currency; the promise not to make any "structural changes in the near or medium term;" the honoring of all foreign debts; the lifting of a post-coup currency regulations which limited repatriation of earnings; and the commitment to continue the Open Door Policy (Liebenow 1987, 245).

Despite these reassurances, investor confidence was never fully restored, and flight of capital continued. It was estimated that $200 million left the country between 1981 and 1983 (Legum 1985, B479). A proposal in January, 1983, to restrict certain types of business to Liberian citizens was not very well received by foreign investors and was rescinded in May. In the same year, the already liberal foreign investment code was revised to encourage more investment (Clapham 1987, 597).

Given Liberia's post-coup "shrunken" currency base, depressed prices for its principal exports (iron ore and rubber), and high oil import prices, the Doe regime was never able to halt Liberia's economic decline. The depressed economy was further aggravated by the introduction of new Liberian five-dollar coins. Referring to the introduction of the new coins and its impact on investor confidence, the leader of the Unity Party, Edward Kerselly said:

> Foreign investors have no confidence in Doe and until they can have faith in him things are not going to get better. I

> will admit he has been given bad advice, but it was his fault that he took it. The very worst thing he could have done he did, and that was to listen to the people who suggested he mint his own money. We may never get over that blunder (James 1986, 33).

The minting of five-dollar Liberian coins have proved economically disastrous. Although the U.S. dollar remained the official legal currency, it became increasingly hard to come by. Derisively referred to as "Doe dollars" or "little soldiers" the introduction of the seven-cornered five-dollar coin caused many in Liberia to transfer their U.S. dollar holdings abroad or hide them (James 1986, 33; Liebenow 1987, 203, 245). In accordance with Gresham's law, bad money literally drove out good money.

When the Doe regime first assumed power, the preponderance of Liberia's trade relations were with the West. The Doe regime did not try to be innovative and maintained these trade ties, which had proved to be very beneficial for Liberia in the past. Although the relative position occupied by the U.S. and West Germany in their trade with Liberia had improved during the period of military rule, in real terms there was a decline in trade. For example, imports from the U.S. declined from \$120.3 million in 1980 to \$73.8 million in 1985 while exports decline from \$124.5 million to \$83.8 million over the same period. The trend was the same for Liberian/West German trade (see Table 5.2).

The U.S. continued to be the most important country in terms of imports into Liberia, accounting for 26 percent of total imports into the country. This represented an increase of nearly four percent over the period at the time of the coup in 1980. The U.S. also maintained

its position as the second most important destination for Liberia's exports, while West Germany's significance as the leading destination for Liberia's exports remained unchanged. West Germany's share of total Liberian exports actually went up from 24.1 percent in 1980 to 32.3 percent in 1985 (see Table 5.3).

Iron ore (64 percent) and rubber (18 percent) continued to account for most of Liberia's exports and remained major sources of governmental revenue.[13] However, the international market for both commodities was depressed. Thus as Liberia prepared for a return to civilian rule in January of 1986, the judgment on the performance of the Doe regime seemed clear. Capital flight, declining investment, high oil import prices and worsening export markets had virtually ruined the Liberian economy.

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, it is abundantly clear that the very survival of Liberia is inextricably tied to its international relations. For example, in 1985 about 60 percent of total domestic revenue was derived from the activities of foreign enterprises in Liberia (Clapham 1987, 600). Taxes on the profits of these enterprises were responsible for a significant proportion of governmental revenue. Taxes on foreign trade (e.g., customs and excise duty) accounted for just over 25 percent of total governmental income. Thus, when military rule came to an end in 1985, the Liberian government was still as dependent on payments from foreign companies and concessions as it was during the early years of the Tubman era, when Firestone alone provided more than half of total government revenues.

Another characteristic of Liberia's foreign policy that was not significantly changed by the alternation between civilian and military rule was the inordinate importance of the United States for the preservation of Liberia's economic solvency. As was indicated in earlier pages, the overriding importance of the U.S. to Liberia stems from the "special relationship" which has existed between the two countries since the founding of Liberia as settlement for freed slaves. Over the years, the "special relationship" has come to mean a responsibility for the United States to provide Liberia with military, technical, educational, economic and other developmental assistance. In return, Liberia has provided the U.S. with strategic sites for the location of important facilities.

Although the United States has had a mutual defense pact with Liberia since 1959, and U.S. training teams have provided training for the Liberian armed forces, American military aid remained a distant second to economic aid in terms of its impact upon the Liberian society. Economic assistance from Washington made it possible for successive Liberian governments to realize most of their developmental objectives (e.g., the provision of good roads, drinking water, hospitals, schools and colleges).

Given the animosity between Americo-Liberians and indigenous Africans, and the role which the United States played in the establishment and preservation of the Americo-Liberian aristocracy, it was widely speculated that the coup (which instituted indigenous rule in Liberia) will result in the weakening of Liberian-U.S. ties. Despite an initial tilt towards radical and socialist-oriented states (such as

Libya and Ethiopia), the Doe regime did not in any fashion lessen Liberia's ties with the United States. Quite the contrary, a major outcome of the coup was that the long standing special relationship became more intensified during the five years of military rule.

This study does not, therefore, support the hypothesis that a change in the incumbent political leadership will necessarily lead to a change in foreign policy. The evidence also fails to support Sang-Seek Park's (1980, 138-43) observation, that a violent leadership change is more likely to install a new regime whose ideological position is different from that of the incumbent.

This case study clearly shows that practical, rather than ideological, considerations were the most important determinant of public policy under both civilian and military regimes in Liberia. Given the degree to which the Liberian economy was dependent on external forces, Doe's options when he assumed power were limited. He needed the support of the military to stay in power; and pay raises and improved living conditions for the soldiers had to be provided to keep this support. There was also the high expectations of the indigenous population now that one of its own was in power. As one of Doe's cabinet minister put it: "The people expect us to deliver."[14] Thus, Doe had no good reasons to depart from Liberia's pro-western orientation in foreign policy. The survival of Liberia, of the military regime, and of Doe himself demanded that the new military rulers maintain--and even intensify--the special relationship with the U.S. and that they expand, or at least maintain, the Open Door Policy.

To be sure, there were instances when the PRC deviated from the practices of its civilian predecessors. The quantitative results from chapter three provide examples of such instances. For example, total public expenditure as a proportion of GDP (PSPEND) was significantly higher under military rule than it was under civilian rule (see Table 5.5). Similarly government spending on health education and defense was significantly higher during the Doe regime than it was under the administrations of Tubman and Tolbert. However, in large part these increases in governmental spending were made possible by the substantial increase in U.S. economic assistance to Liberia during the period of military rule. By 1985, U.S. aid accounted for nearly 30 percent of the Liberian government's budgetary allocation (see Table 5.4). As can be seen in Table 5.5, despite the increases in public expenditure by the Doe regime, the rate of growth of GDP (CGDP80) was a negative 3 percent annually during the period of military whereas during the preceding period of civilian rule GDP grew at annual average rate of 3.2 percent.

In foreign affairs then, the Liberian military regime did not break with the past. But even while retaining old institutions and practices, it did revitalize some of them (as with Liberian-U.S relations) and maintain others (as with Liberia's relations with the rest of Africa).

Table 5.5
Results of the Simple Country Analysis for Liberia, 1950-1985

VARIABLE	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
PSPEND	0.3686***	0.2223	-5.4388	0.0001
PHEALTH	0.0361***	0.0167	-5.9238	0.0001
PEDUC	0.0559***	0.0299	-5.7095	0.0001
PDEFEN	0.0349***	0.0101	-7.6943	0.0001
PMAN	0.0758***	0.0507	-3.0071	0.0070
PAGRIC	0.1559*	0.2016	1.7323	0.0986
CGDP80	-0.0308*	0.0324	2.1316	0.0463

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.<.01

Endnotes

1. Hinterland was the term used in the Liberian laws to designate interior regions outside of the coastal counties. These regions were inhabited by indigenous Africans who were referred to as "uncivilized" and "aborigines" by Americo-Liberian settlers.

2. Africa Report, Jan./Feb. 1981, p. 28; Nov.-Dec. 1981, p. 27.

3. Antony J. Hughes interview with President William R. Tolbert, Africa Report, July/August 1979, p. 4-8.

4. Africa Report, March/April 1979, p. 25.

5. Africa Report, Nov./Dec., 1980, p. 28.

6. Africa Report, Jan./Feb., 1981, p. 28; West Africa, January 12, 1981, p. 96.

7. Africa Report, Nov./Dec., 1985, p. 39.

8. Africa Report, May/June, 1981; July/Aug., 1981.

9. Africa Report, July/Aug., 1981.

10. Economist 1987, p. 46.

11. Africa Report, Sept./Oct., 1983, p. 31.

12. West Africa, June 9, 1980, p. 1044.

13. International Financial Statistics, p. 668.

14. Committee of Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 1982, p. 3.

Chapter Six

REGIME TYPE AND THE ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA

As is the case with most nations in sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture is of critical importance to the Nigerian economy--as a provider of employment, the production of food and raw materials, and as a source of foreign exchange. Thus, agricultural development has tended to receive high priority on the policy agendas of successive Nigerian regimes. But since Ghana has provided a case study assessing the impact of regime type on agricultural development, this chapter will be concerned with a different, but equally important, policy issue area--the impact of regime type on industrial development.

Like Ghana, Nigeria is ideal for examining the relationship between regime type and public policy because Nigeria has spent more than two-thirds of its life as an independent nation since 1960 under military rule. Both countries have also experienced at least two alternations between military and civilian regimes. Finally, Ghana and Nigeria are two among a handful of sub-Saharan African states for which updated records and reasonably reliable data are available. Thus, for the purpose of the comparative study of regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is a suitable focus of attention.

Nigeria is the biggest nation in Africa, with a population of about 100 million. This means that one out of every five people in Africa is a Nigerian. In terms of size and population, Nigeria offers a market sufficiently large to enable modern industries to develop. Furthermore, the nation has a great variety of agricultural and mineral

resources to sustain these industries. Consequently, successive Nigerian regimes have placed emphasis on the development of the manufacturing sector. Although the manufacturing sector has consistently ranked a distant third to mining (crude oil in particular) and to agriculture in terms of its contribution to gross domestic product (GDP), its importance to the Nigeria economy has increased considerably since the end of the colonial era.

In the following pages, the accomplishments of alternating Nigerian regimes as they relate to the development of the manufacturing industry will be examined. Following the approach of earlier case studies an attempt will be made to determine whether it makes a significant difference for a nation to be governed by civilian or military leaders. In the process, the budgetary priorities and the socioeconomic consequences of the policies of each regime type will be evaluated.

Historical Background

Before the colonial era, the geographical area known as Nigeria was made up of a collection of small independent states with different historical, political and cultural backgrounds. The major cultural groups inhabiting the area at the onset of the colonial period were the Yoruba, Bini and Ibo in the south and the Hausas, Fulani, and Kanuri in the north (Irukwu 1983, 111-12). Early British involvement in the region led to the creation of Lagos Colony and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Nigeria did not become one country until 1914. That was the year when the British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria--including Lagos Colony--were amalgamated to form the

"Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria" (Ostheimer 1973, 14-20; Rinehart 1982, 31).

On October 1, 1960, after half a century of British rule, Nigeria became an independent nation. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was elected Prime Minister in December of 1959 and continued to serve in that position until January of 1966. Nigeria became a republic in 1963. In 1963, the mid-West Region was created, bringing the total number of regions to four (the other three were the North, West and East).[1] Although the Balewa government made some notable improvements in the Nigerian economy, its performance in the political sphere was not very impressive. Nigeria's first six years of independence was marred by incessant and often violent political strife.

The first major political disturbance started in the Western Region, where an ideological rift between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Action Group (AG) political party, and S. L. Akintola, the deputy leader of the party, led to a split within the party, with one faction supporting Awolowo and the other supporting Akintola. The disagreement between the two factions sparked rioting across the region. (Ostheimer 1973, 48-51; Isichei 1983, 468; Adamolekun 1986, 79).

As events in the region took a turn for the worse, the federal government intervened by declaring a state of emergency and suspending the region's constitution and government. Following a judicial enquiry into the affairs of the region, Awolowo and twenty-seven others were arrested and placed on trial for treason. Awolowo was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment (Rinehart 1982, 47; Irukwu 1983, 133). With Awolowo and the other leading party members in jail, the

Action Group ceased to be an effective national opposition party. The removal of the opposition in this fashion marked the end of the effort to conduct the affairs of the federal parliament on the Westminster model (Pedler 1979, 213).

In 1962, another controversy arose over the census figures. As soon as the 1962 census figures were announced it was rejected by northern leaders because it showed a decreased proportion of Nigerians living in the North. The census was canceled and another count took place in 1963. Although political leaders from the southern regions were unhappy with the new figures, the census was used as the official basis for any calculations in which population was a relevant factor (Rinehart 1982, 50; Irukwu 1983, 133-34). Public displeasure with the performance of Nigeria's first civilian rulers was already very high by the time of the 1964 general elections.

The federal elections of 1964 and the 1965 legislative elections in the Western region only served to further undermine public confidence in the ability of Nigeria's political leaders to administer the affairs of the country. Charges of electoral malpractice were widespread. Unable to resolve their differences in the polling booths, political factions fought in the streets. The fighting was especially violent in the Western Region where an estimated 2,000 persons died (Rinehart 1982, 52). On January 14, 1966, with the country on the brink of a major political debacle, the military intervened, bringing an end to Nigeria's First Republic.

The army's Commander in Chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo, assumed the leadership of the country as the head of the

newly formed Federal Military Government (FMG). The FMG suspended the constitution, ordered the dissolution of all legislative bodies and banned all political parties. On July 29, 1966, while on an official visit to the Western Region, Ironsi was assassinated (Rinehart 1982, 54). The Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from a small northern ethnic group (the Angas), assumed the leadership of the FMG.

Gowon received the support of most Nigerians in his efforts to restore order and stability. However, the military governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, an Ibo, refused to acknowledge Gowon as supreme commander and asserted that the new federal government was illegal. However, the Gowon regime was faced with a more serious problem. Thousands of Ibos were killed and their properties looted and destroyed as fighting broke out in the North (Ostheimer 1973, 64). An angry Ojukwu summoned all easterners to return to the East and all non-Easterners (except mid-Western Ibos) to leave the eastern region. Perceiving this and other related actions by Ojukwu to be a prelude to complete secession, Gowon declared a state of emergency.

Using his newly acquired emergency powers, Gowon appointed a government consisting of both military and civilian commissioners, abolished the regions, and divided the country into twelve states. Ojukwu responded to these actions by pulling the Eastern Region out of Nigeria. On May 30, 1967, citing the FMG's inability to protect the lives of easterners and suggesting its culpability in genocide, Ojukwu formerly proclaimed the Eastern Region as the independent Republic of Biafra (Rinehart 1982, 56; Pedler 1979, 223-25). Initially the FMG

initiated a "police action" to end the secession. In July of 1967, the "police action" turned into a full-scale war. During the ensuing war, which lasted for thirty months, there were over a million casualties. The literature on the Nigerian civil war is rich and its ample coverage by other studies renders any detailed discussion of it superfluous here.[2]

Having successfully prosecuted the civil war (or the "war of national unity" as it was labeled by the FMG), and supervised the peaceful assimilation of easterners into the Nigerian society, the Gowon regime had to deal with the task of returning the country to civilian rule. In a broadcast marking the tenth anniversary of Nigerian independence, Gowon declared that it would take his government six years before the country would be readied for a return to civilian rule. The reasons for such a protracted period of preparation for civilian rule were set out in a nine-point program which, according to Gowon, must be completed "before the government of the country can be handed over with a full sense of responsibility" (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 4). The program included the following:

1. The reorganization of the armed forces.
2. The implementation of the National Development Plan and the repair of the damage and neglect of war.
3. Eradication of corruption in Nigeria's national life.
4. Resolution of the issue of the creation of more states.
5. The preparation and adoption of a new constitution.
6. The introduction of a new formula for revenue allocation.
7. Conducting a national population census.

8. Organizing of "genuinely national" political parties.

9. The organization of elections and installing popularly elected governments in all the states and at the center (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 4; Irukwu 1983, 186).

The target date for completing this political program and for restoring the country to civilian rule was 1976.

No assessment of the political performance of the Gowon regime would be complete without at least a brief examination of its handling of its nine-point program. The Second National Development Plan, which got under way in October of 1970, was aimed primarily at the reconstruction of facilities damaged or neglected during the war. By the time the Gowon regime was toppled in 1975, significant progress had been made toward fulfilling the FMG's objective of repairing "the damage and neglect" of the war.

However, the reorganization of the armed forces was another matter. At the end of the civil war, the Nigerian army had grown from a force of about 11,500 in 1966, to over 250,000 (Europa Yearbook 1967, 953; Legum 1973, B693). The substantial cost of maintaining such a large army in peace-time was an enormous financial burden for Nigeria. However, despite the FMG's recognition of the need for extensive demobilization of soldiers, no meaningful reduction in the size of the army took place (Irukwu 1983, 187).

The Gowon regime did not make any significant headway in its attempts to eradicate corruption. In fact, the FMG under Gowon was widely perceived to be tolerant of corruption. Although it issued a decree in 1973 establishing a special anti-corruption police (the X-Squad, whose subsequent investigations revealed that ingenious forms of

extortion and fraud was rampant in government and other sectors of the Nigerian society), the problem of corruption actually got worse during the Gowon regime (Legum 1973, B686-96; Rinehart 1982, 66).

The most politically sensitive part of the nine-point program was undertaken in 1973. During that year the FMG conducted a national population census. Despite the elaborate measures taken to ensure a more accurate count than had been possible in 1963, the 1973 results once again confounded many Nigerians, as well as informed demographers. Not only had the national population apparently risen from 55 million to 79 million in ten years, but the northern states now contained 64 percent of Nigeria's total population, as compared to 53 percent in 1963, which was believed to be an exaggerated figure even then (Rinehart 1982, 65-66). The 1973 census, upon which any future electoral representations and revenue allocations would be based, revived fears of ethnic domination.

The other five points in the nine-point program were not realized during the life of the Gowon regime. For example, the questions concerning the creation of more states and the preparation of a new constitution were ignored; no new formula for revenue allocation was introduced; the ban on political parties remained in force; and the promise to hold elections and return the country to a popularly-elected civilian government in 1976 was abandoned when, in his 1974 independence day broadcast to the nation, Gowon declared:

> Our own assessment of the situation as of now is that it will be utterly irresponsible to leave the nation in the lurch by a precipitate withdrawal which will certainly throw the nation back into confusion. Therefore, the Supreme Military Council, after careful deliberation and full consultation with the hierarchy of the armed forces and

> police, have decided that the target date of 1976 is in the circumstances unrealistic and that it would indeed amount to a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to that target date.[3]

Gowon assured Nigerians that the FMG had not abandoned plans of returning the country to civilian rule. However, he did not indicate when civilian rule will be reinstated. In the face of rising public discontent with Gowon's vacillation on the issue of a return to civilian rule, his regime was toppled in a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975.

Gowon was succeeded by another northerner, Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed. One of the first acts of the new regime was to cancel the 1973 census and replace it with normal population projections from the baseline of the 1963 census. On October 1, 1975, Muhammed announced a five-stage program which he said would culminate in the return to civilian rule. The program was to be accomplished as follows:

1. Appointment of a Constitution Drafting Committee in October, 1975, to work on a preliminary draft.

2. Creation of new states by April 1976; completion of the first draft of the constitution by September, 1976.

3. Election of members of a Constituent Assembly in October, 1977.

4. Ratification of the Draft Constitution by the Constituent Assembly by October 1979, and lifting of the 1966 ban on political parties.

5. States and federal elections by October, 1979 (Irukwu 1983, 201).

Muhammed named October 1, 1979, as the date when the military would hand the control of government to civilians. He promised that his regime did not "intend to stay in office a day longer than is necessary, and certainly not beyond this date."[4]

The Muhammed regime had more success with its stated political objectives than did Gowon's. In October of 1975, a 50-man committee to draft a new constitution was appointed. On February 3, 1976, the FMG announced the creation of seven new states, bringing the total number of states to 19. The FMG's progress toward the realization of its stated political objectives was briefly interrupted when Muhammed was assassinated in a failed coup attempt on February 13, 1976. Muhammed was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, a westerner of Yoruba origin. The change in leadership was accomplished without any noticeable lapse in the progress toward civilian rule. The draft constitution was completed in September of 1976, and in August of 1977, a Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected. The CA completed its task in August of 1978, and a month later a new Constitution, patterned after that of the United States, was promulgated into law as Decree No. 25.

Soon after the ban on politics was lifted in September of 1978, many political parties were established. However, only five of the new parties met the required criteria for registration. The five political parties that were registered by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) to contest the 1979 elections were: the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), and the People's Redemption Party (PRP). The legislative and presidential elections were held in months of July and August respectively. Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN won the presidential race and was installed as the President of Nigeria's Second Republic on October 1, 1979.

During the first two years of the Shagari administration, the affairs of the government progressed very slowly. For the most part, this was because the president's party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), did not have a commanding majority in the National Assembly. Efforts to sustain a working coalition with the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) failed when a shaky alliance between the two parties broke up in July of 1981. The slow progress of government was demonstrated by the fact that, after two years of civilian rule, the National Assembly had passed only 17 bills (Legum 1982, B504).

Furthermore, the Shagari administration had to deal with the hostilities of opposition party members who accused his ruling NPN of political victimization and intimidation. There were also inter-party conflicts in the various states (Legum 1981, B569; 1982, B507; Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 79). Having survived a problematic first term in office, Shagari was re-elected president in the 1983 elections. However, the results of the elections were widely disputed. There were accusations of electoral fraud by defeated candidates.[5] Except for supporters of the victorious NPN, Nigerians were generally critical of the conduct and results of the elections (Falola and Ihonvbere, 220-23). It came as no surprise to most Nigerians when less than four months after the elections the Shagari regime was toppled in a military coup.

The new FMG was headed by Maj. Gen. Muhammed Buhari, the former Commissioner for Petroleum in the last military regime (1975-1979). Upon assuming office, Buhari stated that the elimination of corruption and the restoration of the nation's economy were the principal objectives of the new military rulers. One of the new regime's major

initiative was the introduction of what it called the "War Against Indiscipline" (WAI). WAI was aimed at re-educating Nigerians to refrain from corrupt and non-productive activities.

In an effort to curb the rising incidence of crime, Buhari's regime promulgated several decrees which mandated the death penalty for a number of offenses, including armed robbery, oil smuggling, and drug trafficking.[6] The execution in April, 1985, of three men for cocaine smuggling so appalled the people that they called for a change in policy. However, the new military leaders were not swayed by popular demands for milder sentences.

Another cause of public concern was the promulgation of Decree No. 4 (Protection Against False Accusation) on April 17, 1984. The decree was supposedly intended to protect government officials from "falsehoods and inaccuracies of press reports" (Legum 1985, B550). However, to most Nigerians, it represented an attempt by the Buhari regime to curb the freedom of expression to which they have become accustomed (under both civilian and military rule). The initial popularity which the regime enjoyed soon gave way to fear and disenchantment, as the regime became rigid and uncompromising in its posture. After only twenty months in office, Buhari was ousted by his fellow officers who "could not stay passively and watch a small group of individuals misuse power to the detriment of our national aspirations and interest" (Legum 1985, B545).

Economic Developments

The issue of economic development is one that has loomed quite large in the affairs of successive Nigerian governments. Irrespective of the nature of the regime, successive Nigerian governments have

advanced policies designed to bring about the rapid development of the country's economy. In the settings of such policies, these regimes have tended to place the greatest emphasis on the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Within the industrial sector, two areas have received most attention: petroleum and manufacturing. In later pages, the performance of alternating Nigerian civilian and military regimes will be laid out, in an effort to determine how effective they have been at attaining their objectives. Since the case study of Ghana focused on the agriculture sector, and the petroleum sector was not an important part of the Nigerian economy until the late 1960s, the manufacturing sector has been selected as the focus for a detailed examination of regime performance in Nigeria.

Economic Developments During the Colonial Era

In the wake of the British control of Nigeria came the development of a cash economy based mainly on the production of cocoa, palm oil and kernel, rubber, cotton, and timber, as well as the mining of tin ore and coal. The primary concerns of the colonial administration were to stimulate the production and export of these cash crops and to encourage the consumption and expand the importation of British manufactured goods. The fact that these economic considerations were the major reasons for the colonization of Nigeria is supported by the observation of the first British Governor General of Nigeria, Lord Lugard. According to Lugard, "the partitioning of Africa was, as we all recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the industrialized nations of Europe" (Stavrianos 1981, 278).

Consequently, the colonial administrators encouraged agricultural and mining activities, while giving little or no support to manufacturing activities.

Agriculture

The colonial government established a number of institutions for the general advancement of agricultural production. Schools, plantations and agricultural research stations were established. These institutions greatly enhanced the production of major cash crops: palm oil and kernels, cocoa, groundnut, cotton and rubber. These products made significant contributions to the colonial economy.

Throughout the colonial era, the agricultural sector remained the most important sector of the Nigerian economy. By 1960, the sector accounted for over 75 percent of total export earnings. The colonial administrators encouraged the production of cash crops because this not only met the need for such crops in Britain, but it also provided the Nigerian farmers the income with which they could pay the head tax that was the main financial prop of the colonial government.

Mining

A distant second to the agricultural sector in its contribution to the Nigerian economy was the mining sector. British colonial rule resulted in the extensive exploitation of Nigeria's mineral resources. The exploitation was particularly severe in the case of tin mining. Foreign mining of tin was begun by the Champion (Nigeria) Tin Fields Company around 1909. By the end of 1910, over fifty companies had taken up licenses to prospect for tin in Nigeria. The quantity of tin

exported rose from 737 tons in 1910 to a high of 15,166 in 1945 (Ekundare 1973, 179). Other minerals including columbite, coal and gold also contributed to export earnings.

Manufacturing

The type of manufacturing establishments that were allowed to develop in colonial Nigeria were primarily those involved in first-stage processing of raw materials. Saw-milling, cotton ginning, groundnut shelling and groundnut oil extraction, and palm fruit processing characterized the industrial activity in colonial Nigeria. Because the British used their colonies primarily as a source of raw materials and not as a center for manufacturing, the latter was never given the necessary impetus to develop in Nigeria. During the colonial era, some local industries continued to operate, but at a much reduced capacity. The increasing importation of foreign goods brought with it new tastes for better, and sometimes cheaper, industrial goods from Europe.

A notable feature of colonial rule was the decline in the industrialization of the Nigerian economy. Iron smelting ceased to exist. Salt production declined, surviving only insofar as it catered to local preferences. Local pots were partly displaced by imported enamel ware. The production of soap and local textiles declined (Isichei 1983, 431). This process of industrial decline was facilitated by the policies of the colonial administration. For example, the Caravan Tax of 1902 added to the cost of Hausa textiles, and the abolition in 1904 of tolls on British textiles gave them a competitive advantage over those that were manufactured in Nigeria. Furthermore, in response to the demands of British mining companies, the colonial

government banned the local smelting industry (Isichei 1983, 427-31). Even as late as 1946, the colonial government foiled plans by the United Africa Company (UAC) to open a textile factory in Nigeria. The plans were well advanced when the company was informed that if its projected textile factory resulted "in an appreciable diminution in the yield of import duties on textiles the factory's products would be made liable to an equivalent excise duty" (Pedler 1979, 103).

In the late 1940s and early 1950s the situation began to change as Nigerian nationalists started agitating for more substantial participation in government. This led to a series of political developments that created the conditions under which Nigerians could become more involved in the determination of the nation's economic and political growth. The most important of these developments was the promulgation in June, 1951, of a new constitution, the Macpherson Constitution (named after the incumbent governor, John Macpherson). The new constitution marked the beginning of a period of effective transfer of political authority from British administrators to Nigerians. It allowed for regional autonomy, transforming the regions which had been merely administrative divisions into complete political and governmental systems, with executive councils and legislative assemblies (Ostheimer 1973, 24-25; Rinehart 1982, 41-42). The regional governments were given the responsibility for formulating and implementing policies in several areas, notably agriculture, education and industry.

Another important development began in 1946 when, under the stimulus of the scheme for Nigeria contained in the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, a ten-year plan for development and welfare

was inaugurated. The plan allocated funds for a variety of projects ranging from small community improvements to the construction of major health, educational and research facilities (Ekundare 1973, 230).

Government policies on economic development during the 1950s were aimed at encouraging private investment, particularly in manufacturing and agriculture. In 1952, the initial steps were taken to encourage pioneer industries. Any business venture which satisfied the provisions of the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance (which were, broadly that, that the industry must be favorable to Nigeria and in her interest) might be declared a pioneer industry. Such industries were relieved from payment of company or profit tax during the first two years of their existence. This ordinance was superseded by the Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Ordinance of 1958, which extended the period of guaranteed tax relief and also liberalized the procedure for granting pioneer certificates (Ekundare 1972, 40-41). Although some businesses abused the privileges provided by the ordinance (upon making substantial profits some companies folded up as soon as their pioneer status expired), the ordinance led to the establishment of many manufacturing enterprises in Nigeria (Pedler 1979, 105-107).

Another factor that provided an impetus for the growth of manufacturing industries during the 1950s was the expansion of the Nigerian market and the increase in the purchasing power of the population. During this period the value of imports underwent a tremendous expansion and it soon became apparent to trading companies that the Nigerian market will be able to sustain some types of manufacturing industries. Consequently, the large trading companies

channelled some of their profits, which would ordinarily have been transferred overseas, into establishing some light manufacturing industries in Nigeria (Isichei 1983, 432; Rodney 1974, 171). Thus, the trading companies became pioneers of industrialization, but it was not long before the were joined by others. Because of a lack of indigenous capital most of the new industrial establishments were foreign-owned. For example, the giant UAC (the largest trading company in Nigeria since the advent of colonial rule), founded the Nigerian Breweries, Ltd. and many other light manufacturing enterprises; Portland Cement Company built a cement manufacturing plant; and the makers of Raleigh bicycles and Bedford lorries (trucks) established plants for assembling their products in Nigeria (Isichei 1983, 432).

Colonial Policies and Foreign Investment

The domination of the manufacturing industry by foreign firms became a major concern of the colonial government as Nigeria moved toward independence. Although some colonial policies, such as the Pioneer Industries Ordinance, helped to encourage the development of indigenous manufacturing enterprises, the incentives provided by the ordinance proved to be more of a boon for foreign entrepreneurs than for indigenous ones. The Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Ordinance, which authorized the repayment of part or all of any duty paid on imported materials used in the manufacturing sector, was also more beneficial to foreign-owned enterprises (Ekundare 1972, 41). In 1956, the concern over foreign domination of the Nigerian economy led to the creation of a national committee on Nigerianization of business ventures. Among other proposals, the committee recommended that aliens

be barred from distributive trades. This recommendation was not adopted until well after Nigeria achieved independence (Whitaker 1982, 142). Nevertheless, by the time Nigeria attained independence, the manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly (see Table 6.1) and was beginning to contribute to the overall growth of the economy. During the 1950s, the sector contributed a yearly average of nearly 4.5 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP).

Economic Development During the Balewa Administration (1960-1966)

During the first six years of independence, significant progress was made in the areas of commerce and industry. During the Balewa administration, Nigeria's foreign trade continued the upward trend begun after the Second World War. The value of exports rose from 327 million naira in 1959 to 568 million in 1966, while the value of imports rose from 357 million naira to 512 million naira over the same period. The composition of Nigeria's exports witnessed a significant change during this period. In 1959, agricultural products accounted for over 75 percent of total exports, while crude petroleum accounted for only 1.7 percent. However, by 1965, the contribution of agriculture to Nigeria's exports had declined to 51.6 percent, while that of crude petroleum had risen to 26 percent (Aboyade 1972, 558). The growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP), averaged an impressive 5 percent per year during the live of the Balewa government (1960-1965).[7]

Manufacturing, 1960-1966

Like most African leaders, Nigeria's governing elite were convinced that the manufacturing industry was the basis of the strength

Table 6.1
Increase of Manufacturing Industry in Nigeria, 1950-1960
(at Constant 1957 Prices in Thousands of Pounds)

	1950	1960	% Increase
Bakeries	19.0	316.0	1550
Oil Milling	363.6	2610.0	618
Beer and Soft Drinks	257.9	2800.0	911
Tobacco (Cigarettes)	1395.8	2190.0	57
Textiles	4.5	613.0	1350

SOURCE: Pedler (1979), p. 105.

of Europe and North America, and that its absence was the principal cause of Africa's underdevelopment. Consequently, after Nigeria achieved independence, the Balewa administration devoted a great deal of attention to industrial development.

Under the Balewa administration, all sectors of the economy grew rapidly. Agriculture remained the dominant sector of the economy in terms of its contribution to economic growth. Despite the government's attempts to diversify the economy by emphasizing the development of other sectors (manufacturing in particular), the contribution of the Agricultural sector to GDP amounted to over 50 percent in 1965 (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). As can be seen from Table 6.3, the contribution of the mining sector to GDP increased more than threefold between 1960 and 1965, when as a result of increased production of crude oil, the sector contributed nearly 5 percent to the GDP.

This period also witnessed a significant increase in the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the nation's economy. During the period 1960 to 1965, this sector grew at an average annual rate of over 12 percent. The sector's contribution to the GDP in real terms grew from 107.6 million naira in 1960 to 214.6 million in 1965 (Olaloku 1979, 4-5). The fact that manufacturing was becoming an important contributor to economic growth in Nigeria can be seen in Table 6.3. The table shows that the sector's share of GDP rose from 4.5 percent in 1960 to over 6.4 percent in 1965. Import substituting ventures were undertaken on a wide scale, resulting in a significant decline in the importation of manufactured goods. The number of manufacturing establishments in Nigeria grew from 524 in 1962 to 776 in

Table 6.2
Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Economic Activity, 1960-1985
(in Billion Naira)

YEAR	GDP	AGRICULTURE	MANUFACTURING
1960	2.4	1.41	0.11
1961	2.4	1.45	0.13
1962	2.5	1.62	0.14
1963	2.9	1.67	0.16
1964	3.1	1.67	0.19
1965	3.4	1.69	0.21
1966	3.6	1.84	0.22
1967	2.9	1.53	0.21
1968	2.9	1.41	0.20
1969	3.8	1.71	0.28
1970	5.6	2.49	0.38
1971	7.1	2.97	0.41
1972	7.7	3.00	0.51
1973	10.9	3.10	0.50
1974	18.8	3.46	0.66
1975	21.8	4.05	1.17
1976	27.6	6.12	1.46
1977	32.5	7.31	1.55
1978	35.5	8.05	1.78
1979	43.1	9.10	2.04
1980	49.7	10.08	2.35
1981	52.2	9.86	2.65
1982	55.7	12.41	2.73
1983	55.2	12.16	2.37
1984	56.7		
1985	65.5		

Source: United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main Aggregates (1979-88).

1965, an increase of over 48 percent (Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1966-1968). The most impressive increases occurred in the manufacturing of textiles, beverages, footwear, printing, soap, cement and cigarettes (IBRD 1974, 83; Boahen, Ade Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 167). This growth was in large part due to the changing role of government with respect to manufacturing. Prior to 1950, in its effort to secure and preserve the Nigerian market for British manufactured goods, the colonial government deliberately discouraged the development of certain manufacturing activities. The transfer of governmental authority to Nigerians, who were, in general more anxious to attain rapid economic development, led to the adoption of policies designed to encourage growth in the manufacturing sector.

A number of measures were introduced to attract manufacturing establishments into the country. For instance, legislation was passed that gave income-tax-free holidays to those firms engaged in "pioneer" or favored industries. In the early 1960s, additional fiscal incentives were introduced, such as import duties relief on imported materials, accelerated depreciation allowance on plants and equipment, and tariff protection. A number of non-fiscal incentives such as the provision of industrial estates, with facilities such as roads, drains, water, electricity and accommodation for workers was also a major inducement to manufacturers (Pedler 1979, 106). Industrial and training research organizations were also established, and loan financing was introduced.

In pursuit of the goal of creating and industrial society in the shortest possible time, and, in the absence of sufficient domestic private investment capital, the Balewa administration tried to attract

Table 6.3
Sectoral Composition of the Gross Domestic Product (in Percentages)

YEAR	AGRICULTURE	MANUFACTURING	MINING & OTHER INDUSTRIES	WHOLESALE & RETAIL TRADE	TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATION
1960	58	4.5	2	12	5
1961	61	5.0	2	11	5
1962	64	5.5	3	11	4
1963	57	5.5	2	12	5
1964	53	6.0	2	12	5
1965	50	6.0	5	12	5
1966	51	6.0	5	12	4
1967	52	7.0	4	12	4
1968	49	7.0	3	12	5
1969	44	7.0	8	12	4
1970	44	7.0	10	12	3
1971	42	6.0	15	11	2
1972	39	7.0	16	10	3
1973	28	4.5	18	20	4
1974	18	3.5	33	16	3
1975	19	5.0	22	20	3
1976	22	5.0	25	20	3
1977	22	5.0	24	21	3
1978	23	5.0	24	20	3
1979	21	5.0	28	21	4
1980	20	5.0	32	20	4
1981	19	5.0	27	22	4
1982	22	5.0	24	21	5
1983	22	4.3	22	22	4

Source: United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main Aggregates (New York: United Nations, 1979-88).

foreign investors. However, during this period foreign investors were very cautious and only interested in projects which were guaranteed to be profitable and did not require substantial initial investments. Thus, foreign private investment tended to be concentrated in light manufacturing industries (such as beverages and textiles). In the face of the political pressure for factories at all cost, federal and regional governments were compelled to become entrepreneurs. In a number of cases the governments' ventures into the manufacturing industry turned out to be very costly as they invested in many non-viable projects. For example, in some factories owned by the government of the Eastern Region (including a glass factory, a bottling plant, a brewery, and a ceramic factory), over-staffing, nepotism and other corrupt practices limited their profitability (Schwarz 1968, 290).

The federal government, for its part, entered into a number of questionable joint-venture agreements with foreign investors. Most of the projects were package deals featuring turnkey projects, with little local technological participation. These projects were financed by suppliers' credits or "contractor finance." Under these agreements, irrespective of the viability of a project, the foreign investor made substantial profits by selling the machinery which are used in the projects. If he had a stake at all, his holding was generally so small that any loss was far outweighed by the profit on the selling of the machine. Early in 1965, outstanding Nigerian debts under these arrangements totalled 55.3 million pounds (Schwarz 1969, 290). A senior Nigerian civil servant with experience in this field complained about:

> ...guaranteed riskless investments which involve government guarantees in foreign exchange and in which the government

> has to undertake to meet all obligations falling due if the investment is not viable. In such projects the foreign investor generally contributes five percent of the equity capital; the rest comes from the government. The foreign partner supplies the equipment under suppliers' credit terms. There are known cases where the foreign investor is the consultant who prepared the feasibility study for the project, the financial adviser and the banker who finalized the credit arrangements, the manufacturer who supplied the equipment, the technical partner and management agent who runs the factory under a management agency agreement, with fees and commissions. The economic "Mikado" gets a government guarantee that if the project fails, the government would from its budgetary resources service the loan for the equipment (A. Ayida, quoted in Schwarz 1969, 291).

As the foregoing clearly illustrates, far from serving as a means for the transmission of capital into the Nigerian economy, this form of foreign investment actually resulted in a net drain of capital from the country. Furthermore, the policies of the Balewa administration also assured the continued domination of Nigeria's economy by foreign enterprises.

Government Policy and Foreign Investment, 1960-1965

Aside from its commitment to a policy of industrialization the Balewa administration also expressed a commitment to the "Nigerianization" or indigenization of the economy. Hence, although his administration made sustained efforts to attract foreign capital, it was equally concerned about encouraging foreign domination of the economy. Accordingly, Balewa (1964, 33), noted that while his administration was "anxious to see a large and vigorous private sector developed," it was "also anxious that our own people should take an increasing part in the development of that sector." His administration's concern was expressed in the Nigeria's first National Development Plan (1962-1968), in which

it was stated that the government would adopt policies "to enable Nigerians to participate to an ever increasing extent in the ownership, direction and management of Nigerian industry and trade" (Akinsaya 1983, 166).

Nigeria's level of development in the 1960s made it difficult for the Balewa administration to implement its policies of rapid industrialization and Nigerianization at the same time. The lack of sufficient domestic capital and inadequate technical know-how meant that the government's goal of rapid industrialization could not be realized without substantial foreign participation. Hence, speaking before Parliament in 1964, Balewa expressed his concern about the foreign domination of the country's economy. At the same time he stressed his administration's intent to maintain an open-door policy toward foreign investment:

> It must be obvious that no Nigerian can be content so long as any major sector of the economy is controlled by foreigners. But we are realists and we say that so long as there is a dearth of Nigerian capital, so must there be an opportunity for foreign capital in Nigeria. We do not seek the withdrawal of foreign capital from any area of the economy before Nigerian enterprise is able to replace it. When the time for withdrawal has come, due notice will be given (Proehl 1965, 159).

This official liberalism was expressed in practical terms in the shape of generous incentives for foreign investors. These included liberal income tax and import duty relief, accelerated depreciation allowances and the imposition of protective duties and import quotas. There were no restrictions on the remission of profits and repatriation of private salaries (Schwarz 1969, 286). Aside from these economic inducements, the regulations relating to foreign investments provided

for guarantees of fair compensation in the event of nationalization. The Balewa administration indicated that it had no plans "for nationalizing industry beyond the extent to which public utilities were already nationalized" (Akinsanya 1983, 146). This liberal attitude toward business, and the absence of a strongly established socialist element in the nation's politics, helped to attract more foreign capital into Nigeria. As a result, the foreign domination of the economy in general, and of the manufacturing sector in particular, was maintained throughout the life of Nigeria's first civilian regime.

Economic Development from Gowon to Obasanjo (1966-1979)

Economic policy during the civil war period was directed toward raising sufficient funds to prosecute the war. During this period defense expenditure increased more than ten-fold, as public spending in other areas declined. Expenditures on defense, which accounted for only 11.3 percent and 16.2 percent of total current and capital expenditures in 1965, accounted for 50.5 percent and 65.6 percent, respectively, in 1971. Conversely, current and capital expenditures for economic services declined from 11.6 percent and 55.8 percent to 2.7 percent and 19.7 percent, respectively, over the same period (Nafziger 1983, 127-37).

The devastation caused by the civil war necessitated the implementation of a massive program of physical repair and rehabilitation of the country's infrastructure. The successful execution of the program was made possible by Nigeria's new-found wealth from the exploitation and exportation of crude oil. By the time the war ended in 1971, crude oil had become Nigeria's major export, accounting

for about 60 percent of total exports, as against 26 percent in 1965. The dramatic rise in world oil prices in 1974 (when oil accounted for nearly 92 percent of total exports) resulted in a dramatic increase in Nigeria's export earnings.

Spurred by the increase in oil revenue, the FMG embarked on a spending spree, which included expenditures on a variety of non-productive, grandiose projects. For example, the FMG spent over 140 million naira for the construction of facilities for the international Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC), which was originally scheduled for the end of 1975 (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 12-13). Income from oil revenues was unevenly distributed, as government investment was concentrated in the urban centers, while the rural areas received very little attention. With more public investment going to the cities, labor was attracted away from the less profitable agricultural sector. This led to high urban unemployment, as people leaving the agricultural sector were often unable to secure jobs in the cities. The inflation rate rose considerably during this period, reaching a peak of 43 percent in 1975 (Legum 1975, B750; 1977, B683).

With more attention being paid to the petroleum sector, productivity in the neglected agricultural sector suffered. Agriculture which was, for a long time, the mainstay of Nigeria's economy (accounting for 75 percent of total exports in 1960 and 55 percent in 1965), accounted for only 4.4 percent of total export earnings in 1975 (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 126). Declining agricultural productivity eventually led to food shortages. However, the enormous increase in oil revenue during this period enabled the country to supplement local food

production with imported food products. Subsequently, Nigeria which was once a major exporter of food, became a net importer of food.

After Gowon was overthrown, the new FMG tried to arrest the decline in agricultural productivity. It launched Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) which aimed to promote increased agricultural productivity and make the nation self-sufficient in food output. Despite impressive increases in budgetary allocation to agriculture, the OFN program did not alleviate Nigeria's food problem. Inflation remained a major problem, as food prices continued to escalate at a much faster pace than before (Legum 1979, B753). The FMG was not helped by the world oil glut and the subsequent decline in oil prices after 1977. As the revenue from oil began to decline, the FMG was forced to borrow funds from abroad to carry out its development programs. Consequently, Nigeria's external debt, which stood at only 54 million naira in 1975, rose to 364 million in 1979 (Legum 1981, B580).

Manufacturing, 1966-1979

The Nigerian government has always been a major investor in the manufacturing industry. Thus, the decline in government expenditure on economic services during the civil war led to a decline in manufacturing output. Total manufacturing output declined by over 10 percent between 1966 and 1968. The number of manufacturing establishments declined from 776 in 1965 to 540 in 1968 before rising to 704 in 1970 (National Accounts Statistics, 1978-88; Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1968-74).

After the war was over the Gowon regime turned its attention to economic development. According to the Guideposts for the regime's Second National Development Plan (1966, 2-3), one of the most important

aim of the plan was to promote the rapid industrialization of the economy. Toward this end, the Gowon regime placed more emphasis on the development and expansion of the manufacturing sector. The major objectives of the government's industrial policy included:

1. The promotion of even development and the fair distribution of industries in all parts of the country.

2. Ensuring a rapid expansion and diversification of the industrial sector of the economy.

3. Promoting the establishment of industries which cater for overseas market in order to earn foreign exchange.

4. Raising the proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial investment (Onyejekwe 1981, 158).

By the time the Gowon regime was toppled in 1975, nearly all the manufacturing industries damaged during the war had been reactivated. The growth rate within the sector was about 10 percent between 1970 and 1975. The number of manufacturing enterprises rose from 704 to 1246 over the same period (Legum 1975, B750; Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1972-76; Onyejekwe 1981, 159). Despite the impressive growth rate the industrial sectors' contribution to GDP actually declined during this period, falling from 7 percent of GDP to 5 percent (see Table 6.3).

The Third National Development Plan was launched by Gowon in March of 1975, but it was implemented by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime (1975-1979). The plan was launched under extremely favorable circumstances; Nigeria had become the world's eight largest oil producer; and the 1973 oil crisis which facilitated a substantial increase in oil prices led to an increase in Nigeria's revenue from oil. Consequently, the third plan was much more ambitious than its predecessors and aimed at radically transforming the national economy. Investment in this new plan period

was more than twelve times as much as the investment covered by the second plan (Bailey 1977, 158-59). Although agriculture had the highest allocation in the plan, the largest percentage increase over previous plans was in the allocation to industry. Apart from expenditures connected with the oil industry, the biggest single industrial project in the plan was the establishment of an iron and steel industry (Bailey 1977, 159; Legum 1976, B801-803).

The decline in world demand for oil during the late 1970s, however, adversely affected the implementation of the third development plan. In 1977, due to worsening economic conditions and the drop in the level of Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves, the Obasanjo administration restricted the importation of a variety of goods. Although this measure was designed in part to protect domestic manufacturing industries, it actually led to the collapse of a few businesses. Stricter foreign exchange controls caused delays in the importation of raw materials needed in some manufacturing enterprises. Inadequate supply of raw materials forced others to shut down (Legum 1981, B608-609). Consequently, by 1978 the total number of manufacturing establishments in Nigeria was only 1075, compared to 1246 in 1975 and 1418 in 1977 (Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1976-80). In 1979, on the eve of the return to civilian rule, the sector's contribution to GDP remained relatively low at only 4.7 percent (see Table 6.3).

An important characteristic of the manufacturing sector was unaffected by the policies initiated during the period of military rule. This sector continued to be dominated by light manufacturing enterprises

(food processing, beverages, cigarettes and textiles). Furthermore, the import content of manufactured goods remained very high. On the average, 34 percent of raw materials used in the sector was imported (Jakande 1975, 274-76). Another important characteristic of this sector was the level of government participation. During the thirteen years of military rule (1966-1979), the government's participation in manufacturing enterprises increased substantially. The government invested in a variety of projects, including salt, oil, petrochemical and gas refineries, auto assembly plants, cement, glass and beer factories, textile mills and many more (Ostheimer 1973, 149; Jakande 1975, 276; Olorunsola 1977, 35).

Most of the FMG's activities in manufacturing was in partnerships with foreign companies. The lack of adequate domestic capital meant that the more technologically advanced sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry continued to be dominated by foreign investors. The FMG's concern over the low levels of indigenous participation in manufacturing sector led to the implementation of a number of measures aimed at remedying the situation. Two of these measures was the creation during the Gowon administration of the Nigerian Bank of Commerce and Industry and the Agricultural Credit Bank. It was hoped that these banks would facilitate the development of private indigenous enterprises by extending credit facilities to enterprising Nigerian entrepreneurs (Akinsanya 1983, 160). Another, and perhaps the most significant measure, was the promulgation of decrees which were intended to bring about a reduction in foreign participation in a variety of enterprises in Nigeria.

The Indigenization Decrees of 1972 and 1977

Like its civilian predecessor, the FMG acknowledged the need for foreign capital investment in Nigeria's drive for rapid industrialization. Like its civilian predecessor, the FMG also sought to reassure foreign investors that their investments would be safe in Nigeria. Thus, for example, the Second National Development Plan included the promise that there will be no program of "indiscriminate nationalization" (Ostheimer 1973, 151). The third development plan also sought to encourage foreign private investment by promising "to further open the doors to both indigenous and foreign private investors in most sectors of manufacturing" (Jakande 1979, 305).

While trying to attract foreign investment, the FMG also expressed its concern over the continued foreign domination of the country's economy. Thus, it was stated in the Second National Development Plan that:

> Experience has shown through history, that political independence without economic independence is but an empty shell.... The interest of foreign private investors in the Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide at all times and in every respect with national aspirations...a truly independent nation cannot allow its objectives and priorities to be distorted or frustrated by the manipulations of powerful foreign investors (quoted in Schatz 1981, 22).

In an effort aimed at attaining some degree of economic independence, the FMG promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises and Promotion Decree (Decree No. 4) of 1972. The decree listed 22 selected industrial activities (called Schedule I industries) as the exclusive preserve of Nigerian entrepreneurs. The industries affected included small, labor

intensive manufacturing and local service-related enterprises, many of which were already Nigerian-owned by 1972.

Enterprises exempted on the basis of their size (i.e., those with paid-up capital in excess of 400,000 naira), were required to make available to the Nigerian public up to 40 percent of their total equity. The businesses in this schedule included construction firms, some large import substitution industries, and wholesale and retail distributors. The largest and most important industries (e.g., tobacco and textiles), were completely unaffected by the 1972 decree. The failure to indigenize these enterprises which were among the most profitable in the country, caused many Nigerians to call for an expansion of the number of industries covered by the decree. The government responded with the promulgation of a second indigenization decree in January of 1977.

The second decree added 20 new industries to the list of Schedule I industries which were to be completely Nigerian-owned. Thirty-three new industries were added to Schedule II, and the mandatory sale of shares was raised from 40 to 60 percent. A third schedule was added to the new decree which listed all remaining industries and required that they make available 40 percent of their equity to Nigerians (Biersteker 1983, 190).

The various provisions of the first decree were to have been implemented by the end of 1974, but only about a third of the foreign business affected had completed the process of indigenizing their businesses by mid-1975 (Whitaker 1982, 143). The second decree was similarly only partially effective. Virtually every foreign firm

operating in the country found ways to neutralize the indigenization requirements. The specific strategy or combination of strategies varied from firm to firm; however, they were all designed to ensure a minimal loss of control over operations. Biersteker (1987, 113-225) identified the variety of strategies that foreign firms adopted to circumvent the provisions of the decrees. Thus, although the decrees facilitated some structural changes, they failed to alter significantly the composition of the ownership of businesses in Nigeria.

Economic Development During the Shagari Administration (1979-1983)

Upon return to civilian rule the new government continued with the economic programs of its military predecessor. Monetary and fiscal policies were directed at stimulating domestic production and reducing inflation. Rising oil revenues in 1979 and 1980, as well as the maintenance of the previous military regime's restrictions on imports helped to improve Nigeria's foreign exchange situation (Legum 1981, B579). With the improvements in the country's foreign exchange situation, the Shagari administration was eventually able to relax the restrictions on imports.

The new civilian government promised to make the nation self-sufficient in food production by 1984. Consequently, when the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) was introduced in March of 1981, the highest priority was given to agriculture, which was allocated over 10 percent of total planed expenditure (Legum 1982, B523-24). The administration launched a "Green Revolution" program which emphasized the "revitalization of the small land holders," as well as encouraging the establishment of privately owned large-scale farms.

A major portion of the program of the fourth development plan was to be funded by revenue derived from the exportation of crude oil. Shagari alluded to this fact when the plan was inaugurated:

> The Fourth Plan is being launched at a time when the country's production of crude oil, which is the main source of government revenue and foreign exchange earning, has virtually stabilized. A basic strategy of the Fourth Plan would therefore be the promotion of optional utilization of resources. Oil is a wasting asset. The resources generated from this sector must therefore be used to promote all-round expansion in the productive capacity of the economy so as to ensure self-sustaining growth in the shortest time possible (Shagari 1981).

The estimates for the plan were based on projection of revenues derived from sales of crude oil in 1979 and 1980. The plan envisioned a production rate of 2.19 million barrels per day at $36 per barrel (Bienen 1985, 54). Neither of the projections turned out to be accurate. By August of 1981, oil production fell to 650,000 barrels per day, as world oil prices began to fall. Revenue from oil underwent a dramatic decline, from $23.4 billion in 1980 to $10.1 billion in 1983. As a result of the decline in oil revenues, the Shagari administration was unable to sustain its commitment to programs in the fourth development plan. Therefore, agricultural productivity remained low and the government was compelled to use scarce foreign exchange to import food. The country went heavily into debt. By the time of the coup in December, 1983, the country was on the verge of economic collapse. Between 1981 and 1983, GDP declined by 8.5 percent and consumer prices rose at an annual average rate of over 20 percent (Hackett 1988, 767). Unemployment remained a major problem, particularly among university and polytechnic graduates (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 83-145). However, the

most serious economic problem was the country's external debt, estimated at about $20 billion (Legum 1984, B530-32).

Manufacturing, 1979-1983

When it launched the Fourth National Development Plan in 1981, the Shagari administration indicated that a primary objective of the programs in the plan was the promotion of self-reliance. In addition to agriculture, the plan accorded high priority to increasing industrial productivity (Legum 1981, B583; Olayiwola 1987, 127). The plan promised to encourage "the maximum growth of investment and output so as to ensure a full realization of the country's industrial potential in the shortest possible time." The plan projected a growth rate of 15 percent for the manufacturing industry over the plan period (Legum 1982, B526-27).

The need to reduce the manufacturing sector's dependence on imported raw materials has compelled successive Nigerian governments to include the establishment of an iron and steel industry as an important part of their development plans. Although it was included in the first, second and third development plans, the project never got off the ground (Onyejekwe 1981, 161). Under the Fourth Development Plan, the establishment of an iron and steel industry was again made a priority of government. The government's commitment to the project was demonstrated when a minister of cabinet rank was appointed to be "solely responsible for steel development." Furthermore, the Shagari administration allocated over one billion naira to the project in its 1981 capital budget (Tijjani and Williams 1981, 258-65).

Yet the administration realized part of its planned objectives, when three steel-rolling mills and a steel plant (with the capacity to produce 960,000 tons of steel a year) were opened in 1982. The much larger Ajaokuta steel complex opened its first light section mill in 1983 (Hackett 1988, 771). To be sure, some of these projects were inaugurated during the tenure of the Obasanjo administration.

Another sector that witnessed some growth during the early years of the Second Republic was the automotive industry. The industry continued to expand with Britain, France, Italy, Austria and Germany all involved in joint ventures with national and state governments for vehicle assembly. However, despite the expansion in the domestic automobile manufacturing, local demand remained well above supply (Tijjani and Williams 1981, 268; Hackett 1988, 771).

The expansion in steel and automobile industry, however, was not sustained throughout the tenure of the Shagari administration. As has already been noted, because of the decline in oil revenues the Shagari administration was unable to sustain its commitment to programs in the fourth development plan. The decline in oil revenue after 1981 forced the reduction or stoppage of several planned projects (Hackett 1988, 771). The introduction of austerity measures, including restrictions on imports, resulted in a sharp decline in economic activity. Most manufacturing establishments struggled to operate without essential imported raw materials and spare parts. In 1983, over 100 of these establishments were forced to close for some time as nearly 70 percent of their inputs were imported (Legum 1984, B529).[8]

The manufacturing sector during the Shagari administration continued to be dominated by light manufacturing industries. In 1983, textiles, beverages, cigarette, soaps and detergent accounted for 60 percent of total manufacturing output (Hackett 1988, 771). The contribution of the sector to GDP declined slightly, from 4.7 percent in 1979 to 4.3 percent in 1983 (see Table 6.3). After reaching a record 2342 in 1981, the total number of manufacturing establishments declined to 2112 in 1983 (Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, 407).

Government Policy and Foreign Investment, 1979-1983

In spite of the indigenization decrees, domestic private investment in the manufacturing sector remained relatively small throughout the Second Republic. Investment in the sector continued to be dominated by the government and by foreign firms. Like its predecessors, the Shagari administration expressed a commitment to the Nigerianization of the economy. However, due to deteriorating economic conditions the administration was unable to diligently enforce the provisions of the indigenization decrees. In fact, as part of the plan to increase industrial and agricultural production, the Shagari administration liberalized restrictions on foreign equity ownership in joint ventures in agriculture.

As early as 1980, restrictions on foreign participation in several industries were eased in order to encourage foreign investment. Foreign investors were allowed to have 60 percent participation, against the previous 40 percent, in the production of metal containers, fertilizers and cement (Legum 1981, B587). Legislation was also passed that relaxed investment restrictions, so that a foreign parent company would be able

to keep control of new subsidiary companies in Nigeria. Another action taken by the Shagari administration to attract foreign investors included the establishment of two information centers in the United States, to acquaint prospective investors with available opportunities in Nigeria. The administration also signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Washington, which led to the creation of the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC). The JACC promoted joint ventures and investments by U.S. firms in the establishment of large-scale farms and food processing companies in Nigeria.[9] These efforts by the Shagari administration to attract foreign investment, however, were not very successful. A weak economy and an unstable political climate may have contributed to the reluctance of foreign investors to come to Nigeria.

Economic Development Under the Buhari Regime (1984-1985)

On the economic front, the Buhari regime did not fare much better than its civilian predecessors. In an effort to control inflation and improve the nation's foreign exchange situation, the regime introduced severe austerity measures. Among other things, foreign exchange for new students to study abroad was curtailed, severe restrictions were placed on imports, all imports became subject to import duties, and almost all goods manufactured in Nigeria was covered by excise duty (Legum 1984, B532).[10] Like Shagari's civilian administration, Buhari's military regime gave priority to improving agricultural productivity. In the 1984 and 1985 budgets the sector received 21 percent and 18 percent respectively, of total capital expenditure (Legum 1985, B561).

Despite the regime's efforts, no noticeable improvements were recorded. Even the decision to change the country's currency (a move aimed at foiling the operations of currency smugglers), failed to alleviate the deteriorating economy. The Buhari regime also failed in its attempts to reach a loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the regime met most of the conditions set by the IMF (including imposing import restrictions, reducing of government expenditure, and giving priority to the agricultural sector), it refused to accede to two other important conditions: a 60 percent devaluation of the naira and an end to subsidies on petroleum products (Novicki 1985, 4-9; Legum 1985, B560).

Manufacturing

The FMG under Buhari continued to work within the framework of the Fourth National Development Plan. However, because demand and prices of crude oil continued to sag, a number of projects were abandoned and funding for others were reduced. Although a substantial proportion of government expenditure was devoted to the manufacturing sector (steel development was allocated 523 million naira), a 15 percent reduction in total government expenditure meant that the sector received much less in real terms than it did under earlier administrations (Legum 1984, B532). A rolling mill for the production of steel wire rods was opened at the Ajaokuta steel complex. However, output was sporadic, owing to shortages of imported billets (Hackett 1988, 771).

Private investment in the manufacturing sector was severely hampered by the policies of the Buhari regime. The imposition of import duties, ranging from 5 to 200 percent, on imported raw materials

increased the cost of production for most manufacturing activities. Furthermore, the imposition of excise duty on goods manufactured in Nigeria added more to the price of locally manufactured goods thus, robbing them of any competitive advantage they may have had over their legitimately imported or smuggled competition. Yet another problem was the lack of foreign exchange, which made it difficult for manufacturing establishments to purchase raw materials from abroad. All of these factors combined to produce difficult times in the manufacturing sector during the Buhari regime. There were dramatic declines in productivity in nearly all manufacturing industries. For example, output of all commercial vehicles declined from 30,000 units in 1981 to 10,000 units in 1984 as most automotive assembly plants were operating well below capacity. The only industry that witnessed an increase in output was the brewing industry (Hackett 1988, 771).

Government Policy and Foreign Investment (1984-1985)

The generation of domestic investment capital continued to be a problem during the Buhari regime's brief tenure in office. Thus, during this period, in an effort to encourage foreign private investment in neglected areas, the provisions of the indigenization decrees were selectively relaxed. For example, in his 1984 Budget speech Buhari announced that the FMG was considering "a proposal to amend the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree to enable non-Nigerians to own up to 80 percent of large farm projects" (Olayiwola 1987, 141).

Conclusion

All of Nigeria's leaders (civilian and military) since independence believed that the development of the manufacturing sector was a necessary precondition for the country's economic development. Consequently, they adopted policies which they hoped would lead to the rapid development of Nigeria's manufacturing industry. However, irrespective of the type of regime in power, the outcomes of these policies were negligible.

Throughout the period under review, the manufacturing industry continued to be dominated by light manufacturing enterprises that were technologically simple. The sector remained heavily dependent on imported raw materials. According to the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (MAN), up to 60 percent of all raw materials that local industry used in 1985 were imported. Furthermore, the contribution of this sector to the GDP remained relatively low throughout the period under review. At no time did the sector contribute more than 7 percent to GDP; and in fact the sector's contribution to GDP actually declined during the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 6.3). These tendencies indicated that after twenty-five years of independence, and in spite of the commitment of successive Nigerian regimes to increasing productivity in manufacturing, this sector remained underdeveloped.

Another important concern of successive Nigerian governments was the low level of indigenous participation in the nation's economy. Although the Balewa administration recognized the need to initiate policies which would promote more indigenous participation in manufacturing, it was unable to achieve this goal because of the

shortage of domestic investment capital. It was left to the succeeding military administration to promulgate an indigenization decree. However, contrary to some assertions (Iwayemi 1979, 63), the promulgation of the 1972 and 1977 indigenization decrees had more to do with Nigeria's improving economic status than with the type of regime in power. The massive increase in oil revenue after the 1973 oil crisis meant that the government could embark on its industrial development projects without the aid of much foreign investment. However, as soon as oil revenues began to fall in the 1980s, both the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari and the Military regime of Muhammed Buhari were compelled to relax the provisions of the decrees.

The results of the quantitative analysis from chapter three support the general conclusion that regime type was not a significant determinant of public economic policy in Nigeria. Whatever difference may have existed between the two regime types was negligible. The results of the simple country analysis for Nigeria (which is reproduced in Table 6.4) also indicated that there were no significant differences in the budgetary priorities of both regime types. As might be expected, defense spending was significantly higher under military rule than when civilians were in power. However, budgetary allocations for health and education, as well as output in the agricultural sector, were insensitive to regime type. More importantly, the results show the regime type had no impact on output in the manufacturing sector. The sector contributed an annual average of 5.7 percent (PMAN = 0.0569) to the GDP during periods of military rule and 5.2 percent (PMAN = 0.0523) during periods of civilian rule.

Table 6.4
Results of Simple Country Analysis for Nigeria, 1960-1985

VARIABLE	MILITARY(a)	CIVILIAN(a+b)	t	Sig.
PSPEND	0.1625	0.1589	-0.1699	0.8667
PHEALTH	0.0069	0.0078	0.8103	0.4268
PEDUC	0.0226	0.0215	-0.3401	0.7372
PDEFEN	0.0357***	0.0121	-4.5103	0.0002
PMAN	0.0569	0.0523	-1.1630	0.2573
PAGRIC	0.3396	0.4278	1.3385	0.1944
CGDP80	0.0566	0.0152	-0.8946	0.3803

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01<prob.<.05
***prob.<.01

The lack of any meaningful difference in the performance of civilian and military regimes in Nigeria can be attributed to a variety of factors. Among the most pertinent are: ineffective planning; the reliance of both regime types on the same bureaucratic structures for the implementation of public policies; inefficient and corrupt political institutions and societal cleavages which inhibit the ability government to promulgate universally beneficial policies. Although some of these factors will be discussed at considerable length in the concluding chapter, at this point a brief statement about them is in order.

Perhaps the most important consideration when developing public policy in Nigeria is how it will be perceived by members of the numerous ethnic groups in the country. It was implied in Chapter Two that because of their corporate solidarity military rulers will have a significant advantage over civilian ones in governing ethnically fragmented societies. The Nigerian experience has proved that this is not always the case. For example, a few weeks after the inauguration of the first military regime ethnically motivated rioting broke out in various parts of the country. This was followed a few months later by one of the most violent civil wars in the annals of African history. Military rulers did not only fail to contain ethnic disturbances in the country, but like their civilian counterparts they allowed ethnic considerations to effect the implementation of important developmental programs.

Although successive regimes since independence recognized the need to build an iron and steel complex, and made provisions for the construction of such a complex in their National Development Plans,

nothing came of it until the late 1970s. The primary reason for this delay in the implementation of a project which many observers considered to be of paramount importance to the nations industrial development was the inability of civilian and military leaders to decide on an appropriate site for the project. The major regionally-based, ethnic groups clamored to have the complex built in their region. Not wanting to incur the wrath of any of the major ethnic groups, the nation's leaders deferred the implementation of the project. It was not until late in the life of the Obasanjo administration that a site was finally selected for the project. Ajaokuta, the site selected for the complex was close to the center of Nigeria in a region not dominated by any of the major ethnic groups. The need to please the various groups in Nigeria or at least not to offend any one of them has equally hindered the performance of both civilian and military regimes.

As was the case in Ghana, successive civilian and military regimes in Nigeria were handicapped in their efforts to accomplish their stated objectives because they were not able to develop effective development plans. Plan objectives under both regimes were often designed to accommodate the demands of the various groups in the country. Consequently, these plans were rarely consistent with the government's ability to fund them. Furthermore, development plans in Nigeria were often based upon inaccurate and unrealistic projections of expected revenues. This was the case with the Third National Development Plan which was launched during the Gowon regime and partially implemented during Obasanjo administration (Bailey 1977, 158-59; Legum 1976, B801-803). The Fourth National Development Plan which was launched during

the Shagari administration was also overly ambitious and based on faulty projection of revenues from crude oil sales (Bienen 1985, 54).

Under both civilian and military regimes, the Nigerian bureaucracy played a major role as architect and executor of national development plans. Since the bureaucracy was the only governmental institution that remained relatively unchanged throughout successive periods of civilian and military rule, the tendency therefore, was for public policies to remain relatively constant from one regime type to the other.

The prevalence of corruption in governmental institutions have proved to be a major handicap to regime performance under both civilian and military rule. The amount of money which was discovered in the possession of some Nigerian political leaders after the 1983 coup would have been sufficient to enable the country meet its immediate financial obligations. For example, the minister of transport under the Shagari administration was reported to have misappropriated over six billion dollars, through what was described as a series of "fraudulent practices" (Momoh and Agbabiaka 1985, 1200-1201).[11] Similarly, the Gowon regime in Nigeria was notoriously corrupt. After the regime was toppled in 1975, properties and other assets valued in the billions of dollars, reportedly acquired improperly, were confiscated from former officials of the regime.[12]

When public policies are susceptible to the same procedural and institutional constraints it becomes more likely that policy outputs and outcomes under different regime types will be less clearly differentiated.

Endnotes

1. Regions are the administrative units into which Nigeria was divided by British colonial administrators. The Richards Constitution (1946), established regional legislative bodies to advice colonial administrators on local issues. The Macpherson Constitution (1951), granted autonomy to the regions (Ostheimer 1973, 24-25; Rinehart 1982, 41-42).

2. Excellent accounts of the Nigerian civil war are contained in the following works: J. de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (1972); John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War (1977); and Dan Jacobs, The Brutality of Nations (1987). Useful analysis of the immediate prelude to the conflict can be found in S.K. Panther-Brick, Nigerian Politics and Military Rule and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria (2 vols., 1971).

3. Broadcast by the Nigerian Head of State, October 1, 1974 and quoted in Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 7.

4. Broadcast by Murtala Muhammed, October 1, 1975, quoted in Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 13.

5. Africa News, 15 August 1983; 22 August 1983.

6. West Africa, 30 July 1984.

7. International Financial Statistics, 1986, 520.

8. West Africa, 13 October 1983, 25-38.

9. Africa Report, Jan./Feb. 1982, p. 39.

10. Ugochukwu, 14 May 1984, p. 1009.

11. Africa Report, March/April 1984, p. 15.

12. Nigerian Observer, 18 September 1975.

Chapter Seven

CONCLUSION: CONSTRAINTS ON REGIME PERFORMANCE

To what extent can policy outputs and outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa be explained by the type of regime in power? Does it "make a difference" for a sub-Saharan African state to be governed by civilians or military officers? And which regime type (if any), will be most effective in dealing with the developmental problems of the countries in this region? The preceding four chapters have focused on the performance of civilian and military regimes in a number of sub-Saharan African countries in an effort to provide answers to these questions.

This chapter attempts to draw together the findings of the preceding four chapters as they relate to regime performance. Using the four hypothesis which were specified in Chapter Two as guidelines, the nature of the impact of regime type on public policy will be analyzed. More importantly, an attempt will be made to provide explanations for the correlation of policy outputs and outcomes with regime type. To recapitulate, the four guiding hypotheses are:

H_1: Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions than in those where they do not.

H_2: Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite effect.

H_3: Within any given African country, changes in regime type should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending priorities exhibited by that country.

H_4: Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under military led regimes that are predisposed to

> modernization than under regimes headed by civilians who are similarly predisposed.

Of the four hypotheses, only H1 is supported by the findings in the preceding chapters. Even on occasions when the economic situation called for increases in the budgetary allocations to the more productive sectors of the economy, military regimes never felt compelled to reduce defence spending.

While defense spending was rarely affected by austerity budgets under military regimes, under civilian regimes defense spending was not spared. For example, when declining cocoa revenue forced the Ghanaian civilian regimes of Nkrumah and Busia to introduce austerity budgets, defense spending was one of the major items to be cut (Afrifa 1966, 104; Rothchild 1980, 468). However, when Ghanaian military rulers were confronted with a similar situation, they actually increased the budgetary allocation to defense. For example, between 1972 and 1975, a time when Ghana's economic survival was still uncertain, the Ghanaian military government reduced public expenditure in agriculture from 6 to 5 percent, but increased spending on defense from 8 to 9 percent (Rothchild 1980, 472). Similarly, in 1981, the Liberian military regime, in compliance with an austerity program, removed a $9 million subsidy on rice prices, but instituted a threefold increase in defense spending (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 96).[1]

Surprisingly, however, increases in defence spending under military regimes were seldom associated with decreases in budgetary allocations to economic and social programs. This may be due to the fact that substantial savings were realized when some political institutions are abolished after the military assumes power. The

salaries that are paid to African elected officials (including presidents, prime ministers, ministers, congressmen or members of parliament), as well as the cost of maintaining their residences and places of work (e.g., executive mansions, houses of assembly), often account for considerable portions of government expenditure in sub-saharan African states. In some countries, like Nigeria and the Sudan, the cost of maintaining and staffing regional executive offices and assemblies can be quite substantial. The suspension of these institutions following a coup can result in substantial savings, which may sometimes even be sufficient to offset the increases in defense spending.

It is also noteworthy that defense spending in most African countries is usually for small items, such as uniforms, barracks facilities, wages and small armaments. The governments of most African countries do not need, and cannot make a good case for purchasing, the sort of advanced and expensive weapons systems which are often associated with exorbitant defense spending in the more advanced nations. Not only do African nations not have the kind of adversaries that demand the use of sophisticated weaponry, they also lack qualified personnel to man advanced weapons systems.

Because defense expenditures in African countries are often on small items, it is possible for military regimes to increase defense spending without reducing the budgetary allocations to the social and economic sectors of the economy. This was the case in Liberia where most of the increases in defense expenditure during the period of

military rule went toward the construction of houses for members of the army (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982).

Ghana was the one notable case in which an increase in military spending was associated with a reduction in government spending on other sectors of the economy (mainly agriculture and industry). However, even in this instance the increase in military spending was to make up for the conspicuous neglect of the military by a previous civilian administration. For example, in referring to the past neglect of the armed forces by the Nkrumah administration, Brigadier A.A. Afrifa wrote about Ghanaian soldiers without boots and in "tattered and ragged" uniforms (Afrifa 1966, 104). Thus the increase in defense spending went to finance improvements in pay and conditions (Omari 1972, 164; Bayham 1988, 229). Apart from Ghana, it would seem that military regimes in other sub-Saharan countries have been able to finance the increases in defense spending with the savings accrued from payments which once went to defunct political institutions from the preceding civilian eras.

Another reason why increases in defence spending under military regimes were seldom associated with decreases in budgetary allocations to economic and social programs may be due to the fact that African countries are glaringly underdeveloped. In the types of underdeveloped societies found in Africa, social and economic facilities (such as education, health, transport and communications network) are still at very rudimentary stages of development. It does not require any special talent to recognize the critical need for substantial improvements in these areas. Consequently, no matter what type of regime is in power, African governments have always felt an obligation to allocate

substantial portions of total public expenditure to these important growth sectors. In most African states, the agricultural sector often receives the largest share of budgetary expenditure under both regime types. Most of the funds going to the sector are in form of subsidies. Efforts by the World Bank to get African governments to reduce such subsidies have met with strong resistance from both civilian and military regimes. These regimes recognize that their very survival is dependent upon their ability to provide the basic necessities such as food, shelter, medicine and education. The inability of some African regimes to provide these things has precipitated their unceremonious removal from office. Even the use of guns and other instruments of coercion has not guaranteed the survival of military governments which have failed to provide these basic needs. For example, when the military ruler of the Sudan, Gaafar El Nimeiry, tried to comply with the demands of the World Bank and removed the subsidy on bread, he was promptly overthrown (Clark 1985).

It would appear that at certain stages of development, the type of regime in control of a nation's government may not have any significant effect on the levels of government expenditure. This may suggest why (except for defense spending), there were no significant differences in the budgetary priorities of African civilian and military regimes. Thus, the more important question may be, how successful has a regime been in achieving its stated objectives?

Without exception, the primary goals of African civilian and military regimes has been to formulate and implement policies in an effort to promote accelerated socioeconomic development. Both regime

types have invariably emphasized increased productivity in the agricultural and/or industrial sectors as the path to achieving their primary objective. This fact is borne out by the various National Development Plans. The last hypothesis (H_4) suggests that military regimes should perform better than civilian ones in their respective efforts to attain a sustainable rate of rapid economic development. Theoretically, there are some good reasons (explained more fully in Chapter Two), to expect military rulers to perform better than their civilian counterparts. Yet the material presented in the three case studies (Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria) show that this was clearly not the case.

Many of the planning experiences of both regime types were characterized by a wide gap between aspirations and achievement. The poor overall performance of Ghana's second military regime, as well as the indifferent records of Liberian and Nigerian military rulers, for example, clearly indicate that African military regimes do not have a markedly superior capacity to promote economic development. This observation is consistent with the findings of R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan (1975) and Robert Jackman (1975).

Based on available evidence including the quantitative results in Chapter Three, there is no reason to believe that the conclusion reached thus far would be different for other sub-Saharan African state. The quantitative results in Chapter Three also indicated that no one regime type has a superior ability in attaining its developmental objectives. The results showed that productivity in the two most important sectors of the economies of several African states (agriculture and industry),

were rarely responsive to regime type. Similarly the overall performance of the economies of African states as measured by changes in GDP was not sensitive to regime type.

The overall conclusion, therefore, is that regime types have had no pronounced effect on public policy outcomes in sub-Saharan African countries. The results also demonstrate that military regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are not a homogeneous group which can be clearly differentiated from civilian ones. In fact, under both kinds of regimes, the economies of African countries have continued to deteriorate since the end of colonial rule; and both regime types have been equally unsuccessful in their efforts to reverse this trend. A military coup, then, in the perceptive conclusion of Ruth First (1970, 22), is "a method of change that changes little." There are several reasons for this impasse. The reasons can be grouped under two broad headings: institutional constraints and international constraints.

Institutional Constraints on Regime Performance

Perhaps the major reason for the ineffectiveness of both African regime types is the notable absence of modern political structures and procedures. Both regimes exhibit what Huntington has referred to as "political decay" (Huntington 1968, 1-92).

The post-independent political structures in most sub-Saharan African nations were built around bureaucracies which were established by the colonial powers. Upon attaining independence, successor politicians to the colonial rulers inherited bureaucracies which were, in most cases, largely Africanized. Although the role of the bureaucrat underwent some significant changes after independence, the civilian

political leaders who led African nations into independence continued to rely on them for advice and implementation of public policies (Schaffer 1969, 199; O'Connell 1980, 62). Similarly, in those states where civilian leaders were ousted by military coups, the new military leaders were unable do without the services of established civil servants.

Unlike the other organizations connected with a deposed regime, African bureaucracies tended to emerge from a military coup relatively unscathed. In fact military regimes tended to engender more powerful bureaucracies. African bureaucracies became more politicized as military officers, unschooled in the art of government, brought in top bureaucrats to assist them in efforts to realize the regime's planned objectives (if it had any to begin with). As noted in earlier chapters, there were some instances in which the military had intervened without any clear idea of what it would do upon assuming control of government (Bebler 1973, 38; Baynham 1988, 220). In such instances, the new military leaders relied on the bureaucracy for the formulation, as well as the implementation, of public policies.

Such was the case in Ghana where, following the 1966 overthrow of Nkrumah's civilian regime, the military-led National Liberation Council (NLC), brought in top civil servants to formulate critical economic decisions. According to reports in the Ghanaian press during the early period of military rule, committees consisting primarily of civil servants were "wielding effective executive power in the country" (Dowse 1969, 240). Similarly, in Nigeria following the 1966 coup civil servants were not only involved in the formulation and implementation of public policy, but they also became intimately involved in the

determination of fundamental political questions (such, for example, as the efforts aimed at devising a strategy for maintaining national unity during the civil war period). The power of the Nigerian bureaucrats during periods of military rule was well expressed by Nigeria's former President, Shehu Shagari, who as commissioner for finance during the period of military rule, was well placed to observe their behavior. According to Shagari:

> In a military regime, actually the policies are formulated by the civil servants themselves, not by the military, not by the commissioners. It is the civil servants themselves who formulate policies and execute those policies. That is the position in a military regime.... Under military rule, when a commissioner and his permanent secretary were in disharmony, it was the commissioner who was removed (quoted in Adamolekun 1986, 118).

Accordingly, an important consequence of military rule has been the expansion of bureaucratic power. To be sure, the expansion of the civil service has not been limited to military regimes. Civilian regimes have also encouraged the expansion of the bureaucracy by relying on it for the formulation and implementation of development plans, which became very popular in post-independent Africa. Thus, an important characteristic of sub-Saharan African states is that civil servants acquired primary responsibility for policy advice--and oftentimes policy formulation, as well--and the implementation of settled policies under successive regime types (Adamolekun 1986, 178).

Since both regime types rely on the same institution for the formulation and implementation of public policy, it logically follows that policies under both regimes will be subject to the same environmental constraints associated with the African bureaucratic institution. Because of the characteristic demands of bureaucratic

organizations it became unlikely that strategies adopted to achieve planned national objectives will vary significantly from one regime type to another. Some of the relevant constraining characteristics of the traditional bureaucracy include the following: routinization; functional specialization; and organizational hierarchy.

Routinization means that within a specific bureaucratic organization, particular patterns tend to be reiterated. There are set rules which guide the behavior of its civil servants. For example, past cases are used as precedents to determine present ones. Policy choices tend to be derived from established parameters. Arbitrariness is rarely tolerated. As a consequence of this bureaucratic tendency toward repetition, and aversion for innovation, strategies for the implementation of stated policy objectives tend to be limited. The result is that, within the same country, where the policy objectives of civilian or military regime types are similar, the strategies adopted for pursuing that objective will also tend to be the same. Even when a military regime comes to power with all the instruments of coercion at its disposal, it often finds that bureaucrats are not easily swayed from their set patterns of behavior. For example, NLC members criticized the inefficiency and deliberateness of Ghanaian civil servants in implementing policies. General E.K. Kotoka deplored the lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the bureaucracy and he complained that "things don't go as expected" (Pinkney 1972, 51-52).

Bernard Schaffer (1969, 188-89) has suggested that while the modern bureaucratic style of administration (including the emphasis on functional specialization and on adaptive rather than innovative ways of

attaining policy goals), may be adequate for advanced polities, it serves as a barrier to socioeconomic development in less developed polities. According to Schaffer (1969, 198), "if we consider bureaucracy as a particular kind of solution for the various requirements of administration, we see that it is particularly difficult to afford in less developed societies where rapidly induced change is being sought." He noted that colonial bureaucratic administrations were excusable "in so far as they were providing what has been called good government rather than development" (1969, 199).

To be sure, the modern bureaucratic style of administration,[2] which sub-Saharan African countries inherited from their former colonial masters was partly responsible for the inability of both civilian and military regimes to achieve their policy objectives fully. However, a more significant constraint on African regime performance was perhaps due to the deviation of African bureaucracies from the Weberian precepts of the bureaucratic style. It has been observed that in most developing societies, bureaucratic traditions which were inherited from the period of colonial rule exist alongside new traditions which were developed following the attainment of independence (Eisenstadt 1968, 286-93). Unlike the colonial bureaucracies which were highly apolitical, the "new" civil service in independent Africa was highly politicized. For example, the upper echelons of the civil service in post-independent Ghana were staffed by members of Nkrumah's governing Convention's People's Party (CPP). Even lower level civil servants were pressured into joining the CPP (Kraus 1971, 59). Similarly, the top bureaucrats in the Liberian civil service during Tubman and Tolbert administrations

belonged to the True Whig Party (Liebenow 1987, 107). According to S.N. Eisenstadt (1968, 288-89):

> These party bureaucracies have been oriented more to the political manipulation of groups of population and to the provision of political support and loyalty to the new regime than to the upholding of universalistic legal norms, the development of public services, or the creation of new public administrative service.

Even in a nation such as Nigeria, where no one major political party was able to dominate political affairs at the national level, the politicized civil service also became a feature of the post-independence bureaucratic tradition. In Nigeria, as well as in the many other culturally pluralistic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, the bureaucrat saw himself as fulfilling chiefly partisan functions, either as implementing political goals, or as representing, articulating, and regulating the political interests and activities of different groups and social strata.

Nowhere is the politicization of the African bureaucracy more clearly manifested than in its role as architect and executor of national development plans. Since in most African countries the government is often the dominant economic actor, civil servants have come to exert a great influence on the direction of economic development (Eisenstadt 1968, 286-93). As was observed earlier, the level of such bureaucratic influence is not significantly altered by changes in regime type. Consequently, economic policy initiatives in most sub-Saharan African countries, which have had both civilian and military regimes, have tended to remain the same under alternating regime types. Despite the postindependence changes within the African bureaucracy, the average

civil servant was still predisposed to performing tasks according to predetermined standard operating procedures.

The significant impact of the postindependence bureaucratic style is found, therefore, in the performance of different regime types with regard to achieving planned goals. The politicization of the "new" African bureaucracy necessarily had its chief impact on the ability of the government to achieve major political, social and economic goals. Among the more important consequences of the new orientation of African bureaucracies, the following have been especially noteworthy: (1) the lack of qualified personnel (leading to a decline in technocratic skills); (2) the limited extent of functional specialization, and the consequent overlapping between different echelons and departments; (3) inadequate communication between different levels and departments; (4) over-centralization, poor coordination, inadequate delegation of authority, and lack of autonomy and initiative of junior civil servants; and (5) a high incidence of corruption.

After independence, it became common practice in most African countries for the recruitment of civil servants to be based on ethnic origins, familial connections, political orientation and other non-performance related criteria. This inevitably led to the prevalence of inadequately staffed bureaucracies, with very low technocratic capacities. When civilian and military leaders delegate the responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of development plans to such bureaucracies, the attainment of planned objectives is put out of reach from the very beginning. There is little doubt that the existence of incompetence within the African civil service has been a

major contributing factor leading to the perennial problem of under-implementation of national development plans (O'Connell 1980, 53-71; Adedeji 1980, 72-77).

The emergence of effective African bureaucracies has also been hindered by the lack of adequate departmental specialization. The problem of overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting sets of responsibilities among government departments and agencies have adversely affected several African development plans. Military rulers, coming from organizations where the clear definition of areas of operational responsibility is the norm, are generally very discouraged by this bureaucratic confusion. For example, General A.K. Ocran of NLC blamed the performance failures of the military regime on the disappointing performance of Ghanaian civil servants. He complained that in his ministries, unlike the army, "the line of authority was ill-defined and diffuse, the civil servants often did not know who was responsible for what" (Pinkney 1972, 52).[3]

The lack of appropriate communication among different bureaucratic organs also has often made it difficult for the policy objectives of African regimes to be formulated and implemented constructively. For example, Professor Gordon Idang (1980, 34-52) has suggested that a major deficiency in Nigeria's economic development planning was the inadequate provision for communication and coordination among relevant departments and agencies. The development plans of African regimes is further hindered by the high level of over-centralization of authority. Because responsibility is not sufficiently delegated and independent initiative is often discouraged, some people who may posses the particular talent

or skill to facilitate the realization of planned objective are often under-utilized.

Like most institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, the bureaucracy is beset with corruption. This is a problem which has been openly and officially recognized in most African countries by the appointment of advisory commissions on the suppression of corruption in the civil service. At times, the level of bureaucratic corruption has reached such monumental proportions that some governments now maintain anti-corruption agencies. The problem of bureaucratic corruption extends from the high-ranking civil servants who embezzle millions of dollars in state funds, to those at the lower levels, who extort a "dash" or a bribe for the simplest service.

The relative importance of these constraining factors naturally has varied from one country to another. However, it is also significant that the professional shortcomings of the bureaucracy within individual African states has remained essentially unchanged under successive regime types (Adamolekun 1986, 179). Furthermore, the cumulative effect of these problems were the same across countries and regime types: they resulted in the under-achievement of policy priorities and development plans and, consequently, led to the perpetuation of African underdevelopment.

Evidently, bureaucracies were not the only institutional constraints on regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa. Civilian and military leaders alike were equally to blame for the unimpressive outcomes of their policy initiatives. A great deal of public criticism of African regimes arises because of the considerable gaps between

promise and fulfillment. While bureaucrats who draw up the plans share some of the blame for these discrepancies, the shortcomings are, however, frequently the result of a regime's attempt to please everybody. John Kenneth Galbraith (1964, 73) described the situation thus:

> To be outside the plan is to have a nasty sense of exclusion with practical financial consequences as well. The desire not to be accused of overlooking something is also strong. So there is a tendency for the plan to become not a plan but a list of all the things that should be done, that everyone would like to have done, or that anyone believes ought to be done or which might be a cause of criticism if overlooked. Specification of the things of strategic urgency is lost.

In culturally differentiated African societies, pressures from various sectors of the society have tended to force some government leaders to include far too many projects in their development plans. As the earlier case studies focusing upon Ghana and Nigeria demonstrated, civilian and military regimes were equally subject to these pressures. In both countries, each regime type responded by approving plans that were beyond the reach of available resources.

Although they control the instruments of coercion, African military elites have found that force alone (where they have attempted to use it), is not sufficient to insure success. Such measures as the suspension of the constitution and the banning of political parties have failed to ensure immunity from the same problems which civilian leaders faced. For example, in Ghana the NLC found that it could dismantle only part of the extensive state intervention and welfare systems erected by the CCP. Furthermore, even when individual measures for reprivatization of the state sector and selling unprofitable enterprises to foreign capital seemed the most economically expedient thing to do, the NLC ran

into vehement domestic opposition and had to modify its stand (Bebler 1973, 41).

Perhaps the single most important constraint on regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa is the endemic nature of corruption among both civilian and military leaders of government. All too often, the rulers of sub-Saharan Africa have behaved as if public goods were their private property. Friends, relatives, and clients have received appointments, favors, and high salaries, to the detriment of the common good. The negative impact of corruption on a nation's economic development has been demonstrated in several sub-Saharan African countries, including Ghana and Nigeria where the national treasuries were plundered by the very people in whose custody it was placed.

Corruption among civilian leaders has often been a favorite reason given by soldiers staging a military coup. However, the experience of several African states has shown that, despite such rationalizations, military intervention is not an effective remedy for corruption. Mention has already been made (in Chapter Six) of the corruption existing under civilian and military rulers in Nigeria. Similarly, corruption in Ghana has not been a uniquely civilian phenomenon. Charges of corruption and elitism, which were leveled at Nkrumah, were also leveled at the military regimes that succeeded him. The corruption or "kalabule" of Acheampong's military regime, for example, has stood out as the extreme example of immorality; it ranged from overcharging for goods and services, to "a system whereby top officials issued chits (giving loans or import licenses) to young women who paraded the

corridors of power offering themselves for libidinal pleasures in return for favours" (Oquaye 1980, 17; Jeffries 1982, 314).

The frugality that is (in the Western minds at least) supposedly associated with the military has not been confirmed by the performance of African military rulers. When they are in power, African military rulers have frequently indulged in all sorts of extravagances (sumptuous living quarters, high salaries, lavish receptions, frequent trips abroad, and the like), fully as much as their civilian predecessors and successors. For example, not long after they assumed power in Liberia, Doe and his colleagues began adopting the same style of life formerly identified with the deposed TWP leadership. Doe soon gave up his modest apartment and moved into the executive mansion previously occupied by Tolbert. His wife took over Victoria Tolbert's Mercedes and demanded police escorts for her trips to the supermarket (Liebenow 1987, 201). The corrupt practices and the extravagant lifestyles of some civilian and military rulers have accelerated the depletion of the national treasuries of some African nations.

Another institutional constraint is related to the brief duration of African regimes. The sort of development programs which many African regimes were undertaking stand a much better chance of being realized if they can be sustained over time. Too often the military intervenes before a policy has been given sufficient time to work. When ample time does not exist in which to implement policies, it is not likely that such policies will be effective. Under these circumstances, in which no single regime type has been afforded the opportunity to govern for an

extended period of time, it is not likely that public policies promulgated by either regime type will solve a nation's problems.

Another important institutional constraint is directly related to military rule. In general military rule tends to destroy fledgling democratic institutions in Africa, as elsewhere. Nigeria's First and Second Republics, as well as Ghana's Second and Third Republics, were not given enough time to be properly established. Military rule, contributed to a decline in the political skills of future civilian leaders. Extensive periods of military rule encourages the underutilization and underdevelopment of important political skills (e.g., bargaining skills), which are necessary to insure political stability. This fact may partially explain why, in the few cases where military governments have been succeeded by civilian democracies (Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda), the new civilian rulers were unable to perform up to the expectations of their citizens.

International Constraints on Regime Performance

Domestic institutional factors were by no means the only ones responsible for the failed policies of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. In the modern world, virtually no nation lives in isolation from the world community. Great powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as lesser powers such as China, France, Germany, Great Britain and even Cuba, adopt explicit policies of military and economic aid that can affect the ability of an African regime to promote and implement stated national objectives.

Similarly, the approval (or lack of it) of economic assistance by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can be the

primary determinant of the success or failure of a development plan. Most African development plans rely heavily on foreign aid. For example, successive development plans in Nigeria have relied on foreign sources for substantial portions of planned capital expenditure (Idang 1980, 42). In Liberia, more than 80 percent of total capital investment is financed from abroad, and up to 30 percent of total budgetary expenditure comes from the United States alone (van der Kraaij 1983, 228).[4] The notion of neocolonialism is thus a very important factor in the determination of public policy in sub-Saharan Africa (Stravianos 1981, 665-80).[5]

Another important international constraint is the world market economy. Most African states are dependent on earnings from exports of raw materials (cash crops, such as cocoa, coffee, tea and tobacco), for revenue to fund their budgetary expenditures and development plans. However, cash crops as well as metals and oil which provide most of the foreign exchange for African states, are all commodities susceptible to the vagaries of the international marketplace. The dismal economic record of many African regimes is often due to the fact that their countries' economies are extremely sensitive to changes in world patterns and terms of trade for their major exports and imports. Thus in the mid 1970s, as oil prices rose and the world price for cocoa fell, the Ghanaian economy suffered accordingly.

Ghana's economic fate has been inextricably tied to fluctuations in the international cocoa market (Pellow and Chazan 1986). Attempts to lessen the nation's vulnerability by diversifying the economy through industrialization has thus far proved unsuccessful. Since most of the

raw materials used in the new industrial establishments had to be imported, industrial productivity in Ghana became vulnerable to fluctuations in the market for industrial raw materials (Dowse 1969, 237; Woronoff 1972, 178).

Similarly, the excessive dependence of successive Nigerian regimes on revenues from oil exports to finance their economic policy objectives has proved to be detrimental to the nation's economic development. The sharp drop in world demand for oil during the 1980s led to a complete reappraisal of Nigeria's national development plan. Certainly, it was the special misfortune of the Shagari administration that its tenure coincided in time with a protracted period of oil glut and falling prices. It is most doubtful that a military regime would have fared any better under the same circumstances.

It is widely recognized that international factors have a major impact on the ability of African states to develop (Andreski 1969; Rodney 1974; Amin 1976). However, the impact of international factors on regime performance would be less severe if policy makers took certain necessary precautions. Experience from the three nations examined in this study has demonstrated that failure to realize planned objectives was often the result of the incapacity of the regime in power to make the required adjustments in time and to enforce austerity measures after these have been introduced. For example, African governments contributed to the decline of their economies by a failure to diversify and manage the economy in the wake of wasteful, sometimes willful, dissipation of existing resources. Moreover, the neglect of important sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, has led to a situation in

which most African countries can no longer feed themselves. Consequently, the very survival of large population groups throughout Africa has been put in jeopardy, as the continuing need to import food increases the vulnerability of these nations to the vagaries of the international market economy.

It is clear from the foregoing that both civilian and military regimes in sub-Saharan Africa were equally inefficient and ineffective in their efforts to realize specific socioeconomic objectives. Yet, the similarities between the two regime types does not represent the entire story. A look at the performance of both regime types with respect to intrinsically desirable political objectives will reveal some important differences between African civilian and military regimes.

The performance of military regimes has been even more dismal in the sphere of political development than in the sphere of economic development. Military regimes have tended to accentuate the problems of political development with which their civilian predecessors were initially faced. Upon assuming power, African military rulers severely restrict the free flow of the political process and force civilian politicians into long periods of hibernation, depriving them of the opportunity to acquire much needed political skills, thus perpetuating the chain of political underdevelopment (Maniruzzaman 1987, 12).

Although civilian rulers in Africa have not done much to develop the political institutions of the continent, they have, nonetheless, provided channels for some form of participation by the people. On the other hand, military rulers have often failed to develop legitimate political institutions and to ensure meaningful participation by the

people in the political process. In Nigeria, for instance, the process of political disintegration started after the coup of January 15, 1966, when some junior officers led by Major Nzeogwu launched a ruthless attack on prominent military and political figures in Nigeria. As Talukder Maniruzzaman (1987, 7) rightly observed, periods of military rule is usually a total waste as far as the development of political skills is concerned.

Even more important than their detrimental impact on the development of political institutions, is the military's assault on democracy and abuses of human rights. Having banned political parties, and often lacking the ability to establish new and viable parties, the African military is not well placed to promote democracy. The incompatibility of military rule and the democratic ethic is clearly manifested in the very decision of the soldiers to seize power in situations where institutionalized non-violent procedures exist for changing the rulers.

An important difference between African civilian and military regimes is concerned with the issue of violations of human rights. Although some African civilian leaders are on occasion inclined to resort to the use of force to settle disputes, they are often more likely resort to bargaining. The African military regime, when confronted with a problem promptly resorts to the its specialization--effective utilization of force. As Claude Welch (1971, 226) noted: "Devised to use force in the most efficient manner, armies have a natural proclivity to turn to violence rather than palaver, to repression rather than compromise."

African military regimes, desirous of pursuing their stated socioeconomic objectives in an orderly environment, have often adopted policies of systematic repression, starvation, and mass murder. The continents most reviled tyrants have come from the military. Uganda under Idi Amin (1970-1979), the Central African Republic under Jean Bedel Bokassa (1966-1979), and Liberia under Samuel Doe (1980-1985) were consistently targeted as major violators of human rights. Other military-led regimes were also widely criticized for abuses of human rights: Ethiopia during the "Red Terror" (1977-1978) and Zaire since the mid-1970s (Mazrui 1984; Amnesty International 1986; Young 1988, 537). Based on the level of political brutality and the violent sanctions that they bring to bear against offenders it is clear that, in terms of governance, military regimes are on the average, as Robert Jackman (1986, 228) notes, "more repressive than non-military ones."

It would be hazardous to make a general judgment relating to all African military or civilian regimes, since their effectiveness has not everywhere been the same. In some states the military elites have proved to be much bolder and more imaginative in attacking national problems than in others, where a more conservative approach to national problems has prevailed. Moreover, the particular challenges confronting military and civilian regimes in no two eras or nations are the same. In Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), in recent years, for example, the military saw their major task as essentially one of putting the nation's finances in order. In Benin (formerly Dahomey), it was acting as arbiter among the nation's quarrelsome politicians, each of whom commanded loyalty in a different part of the country. In the Central

African Republic the challenge was mainly saving the nation from the Chinese Communist peril (Du Bois 1969, 9).

Thus in each of these states, the military's justification for exercising governmental power is significantly different. Obviously, in all African societies, the military must contend with common problems, such as the maintenance of public order, the administration of governmental services, and the imposition and collection of taxes.

However, it is important to note that a fundamental question of priorities is involved. If the military accords top priority to solving what is seen as a central problem (such as eliminating corruption) in their country, then these other functions will necessarily receive only secondary, or even no more than incidental, attention. However, as the case studies of Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria have shown, in practice there is a tendency for military and civilian regimes to accord top priority to the same set of socioeconomic tasks.

Whatever a regime's priorities may be, what matters in the end is whether a regime's tenure in power has brought about any positive changes within the society. For example, has a regime performed better than its predecessor, by reversing negative economic trends, such as reducing inflation, unemployment, the national debt or increasing agricultural and industrial productivity? A basic conclusion of this study is that no single regime type in Africa exhibited a consistent ability to achieve its stated objectives, and none appeared to possess a unique capacity for dealing effectively with dominant issues of national concern.

As pointed out in an earlier chapter, available data on African systems lack the reliability needed to permit the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships with great confidence. Consequently, the outcome of contemporary empirical research undertakings that employ these data, including this effort, should be interpreted with particular caution.

Whether the available data are reliable or not, predictions about Africa are much more risky than normal. The rapid pace of change on the continent and great diversity among African states combine to invalidate most generalizations and projections as soon as they are made. Nonetheless, it seems save to predict that the present trends of inept leadership performance by both military and civilian regimes in Africa will continue well into the foreseeable future. The inescapable outcome of recent tendencies is that the increasing frequency of successful and abortive coup attempts to overthrow military and civilian regimes in Africa will result in a shortage of people with good leadership qualities. As early as 1976, for example, Lt. Gen. T.Y. Danjuma noted that the shortage of experienced officers had become an extremely serious problem within the Nigerian army (Legum 1977, B671-72). In some African states the shortage of senior and experienced officers has resulted in situations in which soldiers with little or no executive ability have assumed power after a successful coup. Liberia and Burkina Faso, where a master sergeant and a captain, respectively, became heads of governments, are two recent examples of this phenomenon.

In the future, with the increasing tendency of coup leaders to eliminate potential opposition by executing them, the administration of

African nations by governments headed by incompetent soldiers from the lower ranks of the military will become commonplace. Furthermore, since coups have become the common means of effecting leadership change in Africa, more qualified individuals, cognizant of the high personal cost of failure, will refrain from seeking political office. Under these anticipated circumstances, the similarities in regime performance noted in this study is likely to be more pronounced, as African civilian and military regimes lapse into mediocrity.

In most cases military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa has created a vicious circle that has perpetuated the conditions of economic and political underdevelopment that initially brought about military rule. The consequent decline in the quality and efficiency of government throughout Africa foretells a lamentable future for African nations, irrespective of the regime in power.

Endnotes

1. Africa Report, Nov./Dec. 1981, 27.

2. The term modern bureaucratic style is used here in the technical sense developed by Max Weber. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (1982, 186) summarized Weber's analysis as follows:

    1. Bureaucracy involves a carefully defined division of tasks and operates according to set rules.

    2. Authority is impersonal, vested in the rules which govern official business. Decisions are reached by the methodical application of the rules to particular cases and not on the basis of any private motive.

    3. People are recruited to serve in the bureaucracy on the basis of potential or demonstrated competence.

    4. Officials who perform their duties competently are secure in both salary and employment. Competent officials can expect promotion according to seniority or merit.

    5. The bureaucracy is a disciplined hierarchy in which subordinate officials are subject to the authority of their superiors.

3. Legon Observer, 17 February 1967.

4. Africa Report, Nov./Dec. 1985, 39.

5. In its simplest form the notion of neocolonialism suggest that Europe, through the slave trade and colonialism, imposed upon Africa a framework of unequal exchange. Through its incorporation into the world capitalist economic system, Africa is seen as being drained of its resources. External constraints and influences intrude upon the trade patterns, political process and choice of policy in African states.

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VITA

Iren Omo-Bare

OFFICE ADDRESS: Department of Political Science
Millsaps College
Jackson, Mississippi 39210
(601) 974-1439

HOME ADDRESS: 1595 West Highland Drive, Apt. S-107
Jackson, Mississippi 39204
(601) 373-8622

PERSONAL: Date of Birth: March 15, 1948
Birthplace: Benin, Nigeria
Marital Status: Married, two children

EDUCATION: B.A., 1983, Political Science, University of Delaware, Newark, DE
M.A., 1985, Political Science, University of Delaware, Newark, DE
Ph.D, 1990, Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA

SCHOLASTIC HONORS: Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honorary Society, initiated 1983
Goudeau Memorial Scholarship, Louisiana State University, 1986-88

TEACHING CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS:

Comparative Politics
Subfields: Introduction to Comparative Politics
African Governments and Politics
Politics of Developing Nations
Western European Governments and Politics

American Politics
Subfields: American Political Institutions
Electoral Politics and Behavior

International Relations
Subfields: International Political Economy
Africa's International Relations

PRESENT POSITION:

Assistant Professor, Millsaps College, Fall 1990

PAST POSITIONS:

Assistant Graduate Instructor, Louisiana State University, 1985-89
Graduate Editorial Assistant, Journal of Politics, 1989

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

American Government, International Relations, and Comparative Government--Full Responsibility, Millsaps College, Fall 1990-present
Introduction to Comparative Politics--Full Responsibility, Louisiana State University, 3 semesters

RESEARCH INTERESTS:

Development, Underdevelopment and Dependency
Comparative regime performance
Comparative public policy
Integration (Economic and Political Unions in the Third World)

RESEARCH SKILLS:

Quantitative Methods and Statistics
Statistical Packages: SAS, SPSS

FOREIGN LANGUAGES:

Fluent in Yoruba, Ibo, and Edo
Reading efficiency in Spanish

BOOK REVIEWS:

"Review of Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy." Journal of Politics (Nov., 1988).

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

"Regime Alternation and Public Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa."

"Presidential Vetoes from Eisenhower to Reagan: A Probabilistic Model of Presidential Veto Behavior," coauthored with James C. Garand and Sharon Schierling.

PROGRAM PARTICIPATIONS:

"Presidential Vetoes from Eisenhower to Reagan: A Probabilistic Model of Presidential Veto Behavior," coauthored with James C. Garand and Sharon Schierling, paper presented at the 1986 annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, San Antonio, Texas.

"Regime Alternation and Public Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa." Paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Little Rock, Arkansas.

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS:

American Political Science Association
Southern Political Science Association
Southwestern Political Science Association

REFERENCES

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Professor, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803-5433, (504) 388-2546

E. Ramon Arango, Professor, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803-5433, (504) 388-2542

James C. Garand, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803-5433, (504) 388-2538

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Iren Omo-Bare

Major Field: Political Science

Title of Dissertation: Military and Civilian Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Public Policy Outputs and Outcomes

Approved:

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Paul F. Paskoff

Date of Examination:

October 26, 1990