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## The Religious Impact: Understanding the Influence of Religiosity on Attitudes Toward Policy Issues

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**THE RELIGIOUS IMPACT:  
UNDERSTANDING THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOSITY ON  
ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICY ISSUES**

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by  
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August 2019

“Make good choices.”

“You can do it with a smile on your face or you can do it pouting, either way—it has to get done.”

“Buck up buttercup; it’s called labor for a reason.”

“Do not panic.”

## Acknowledgements

In many ways this has been the most difficult section of my dissertation to write. I do not know how to begin thanking all the people who made this document possible, kept me (partially) sane, and dealt with all the “drama” that surrounds me and a doctoral program. I do not think that anything that I will say will do justice to the people who have helped me get to where I am today. Nevertheless, I will try. My brevity is not due to lack of gratitude but set as a control for the overwhelming appreciation that I feel and would not be appropriate for an acknowledgement portion of a dissertation.

My mind naturally makes lists and categories, so that is what I will do here.

To God: I let go. Thank you.

To Kevin: You always do the right thing and make the hard decisions. Your example has served us well. Thank you.

To Mom and Dad: Enrichment started this. Your enriching support is what keeps me going. This is because of you. All of it. Thank you.

To Jim: You have never given me bad advice. On the first day of class (circa 2008), you asked if anyone considered going to graduate school. Your question started a 10+ year journey. I do not believe that it is possible for someone to be more kind, forgiving, and patient. What’s more—you are an exceptional political scientist. Thank you.

To Joey, Jordyn, Alex: You always knew the right time to check in and the right time to give distance. Thank you.

To Colin: You really know how to challenge me. Thank you.

To PawPaw: You are always there to selfishly listen to me ramble about my current problem, issue, or worry. Thank you.

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## **Abstract**

The purpose of this dissertation is to shed light on the influence of religion on Americans' attitudes toward policy concerns. How do denominational affiliation, religious participation, and religious beliefs influence one's views on social and/or economic policies? I consider the impact of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing—also known as the “3B’s” – on public opinion toward contemporary issues in the United States. In this comprehensive analysis, I discover the importance of including the religious dimensions in models of public policy attitudes. The first part of this project is to outline the current state of the literature and present existing theories concerning the influence of religion in politics. I offer considerations for developing a unified theory that involves (1) the influence of the clergy and religious social groups and (2) religious beliefs as the driving force behind (most) policy opinions. In the second part of this project, I model the effect of the three dimensions of religion on (1) moral policy issues, (2) economic policy issues, and (3) hybrid policy issues. Overall, I find that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing influence moral policy concerns; however, religious beliefs are most useful in explaining economic policy issues. The influence of religion on hybrid policies—or those policies with both value-based and economic components—is largely dependent upon the nature of the hybrid issue. I find that policies regarding humanitarian—arguably value-based—concerns are influenced by all three religious' dimensions; whereas, those issues that have predominately economic components are affected by religious beliefs.

Collectively, I demonstrate that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing are important considerations when studying public opinion on policy concerns. I

suspect that religious organization's standings on moral or value-based issues are well-defined while doctrine on economic issues are generally ambiguous.



# **Chapter 1. Introduction**

## **1.1. Introduction**

The last few decades have brought about much change in the religious landscape of the United States. Trends in public opinion data reveal that denominational affiliation in the United States is declining and there is a growing number of individuals who consider themselves religiously unaffiliated or nonreligious (Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch 2016; Cooperman, Smith, and Richey 2015). According to a 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (thenceforth PRRI) report, roughly 25% of the population is religiously unaffiliated—up from 14% in 2004—and 39% of young adults—up from 23% in 2006—do not claim a religious identity (Jones et al. 2016). Scholarly literature has also addressed these concerns indicating that Americans report “leaving religion” due to factors such as the influence of political preferences, skepticism concerning religion, and life stressors (Vargas 2011). Indeed, this change has brought about divisions among religious and non-religious members of American society, where attitudes concerning moral or values-based policies (e.g., legality of same-sex marriage) have filtered through public discourse often pitting religious and nonreligious identifiers against one another. Those individuals who are more religious are more likely to take conservative views on values-based policies policy positions than their non-religious counterparts who hold more progressive policy opinions (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, and Mattias de Vries 2011; McCarthy and Garand 2017; Lugo et al. 2008).

Contemporary reports may lead to the conclusion that the impacts of religion are lessening in the United States largely due to the decline in formal religious participation or denominational affiliation (Newport 2016). However, careful analyses of survey data reveal a somewhat different and complex story. Recent data demonstrate that while the percent of the religiously unaffiliated

is growing in the United States, this portion of the voting population consisted of approximately 15% in the 2016 election. Thus, most of the electorate reported some ties to religion. Indeed, roughly 75% of Americans reported belonging to either a Christian or non-Christian faith. In addition, 36% of Americans attend religious services weekly and another 33% of American attend services a few times a month/year (Pew 2014; ANES 2016). Scholars have noted that while Americans are less likely to identify with organized religion some of these individuals are not consistently nonreligious (Hout 2017). Many of those individuals who report being nonreligious at one point in time will subsequently identify with an organized religious group at a later date.

Classic studies of the influence of religiosity on political behavior have emphasized social groups and political participation and attitudes (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and McPhee 1954), where religion is considered a transmitter of group norms that differentiate separate political communities (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1998). Marsh and Kaase (1979) connect religious salience or religious importance with political participation and argue that political participation is a function of religiosity which influences the propensity for participation. Layman (2001) argues that the teachings of one's church provide adherents with perspectives on moral judgements that can then be transmitted into political or policy opinions. Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014) argue that religion is not only an important aspect of American politics through political identification and political behavior, but also that religion is evident in all aspects of political life, including preferences for government policies, the interpretation of laws, and attitudes toward the development of government programs.

Previous research about the effects of religion and partisanship produce significant findings, whereby voters with strong and conservative religious preferences largely support the

Republican Party while religious liberals and secularists support the Democratic Party (Smidt and Kellstedt 1991; Miller and Wattenberg 1984; Willcox 1992). Layman (1997) argues that the influence of religion and doctrinal conservatism on partisanship and vote choice has grown over time, where religiously committed individuals increasingly support Republican candidates. Likewise, Kellstedt (1989) demonstrates that conservative Protestants are aligning with the Republican Party, and Miller and Shanks (1996) find that individuals with no religious traditions often vote for liberal candidates. Kellstedt and Green (1993) argue that religious traditions have a substantial influence on overall religious beliefs, and that these opinions contribute to political expressions—i.e. vote choice and policy preferences.

In addition, scholars argue that religious tradition or denominational affiliation and overall religious beliefs hold greater influence on political behavior and vote choice for those individuals that believe that religion is salient or an important part of their life. Hirschl and colleagues (2012) are among several scholars who demonstrate that religious identity influences vote choice and that the relationship between religious identity and voting behavior has increased significantly in the last few decades. This point is exemplified when church involvement is considered, suggesting that those who are more involved in their churches are more influenced by their religious beliefs than those individuals who are less committed to church community participation. In turn, this religious commitment and belief system influences voting behavior, candidate selection, and political preferences (Kellstedt 1989; Kellstedt and Green 1993; Miller and Shanks 1996).

Due to the importance of religion in shaping political preferences, influencing policy opinions, and contributing to voting behavior of many Americans, there is a need to improve our understanding of the relationship between the various dimensions of religion and overall political

preferences. The purpose of this dissertation is to (1) identify and define three dimensions of religion, (2) determine the relationship between these components and policy opinions, and (3) provide support for the “3B” approach to studying the intersection of religion and politics. I argue that it is important to measure the three dimensions of religion—belonging, behaving, and believing—*separately* in empirical analyses to further explore how the various religious dimensions affect a wide spectrum of political policy domains. In doing so, I determine which dimension of religion influences which policy domain.

## **1.2.Problem Statement/Statement of Purpose and Research Question(s)**

There is limited scholarly literature that addresses the impact of religion on a variety of moral or social/values-based issues *and* economic policy issues. In this dissertation, I apply the “3B” classification schema and discuss separately the effects of each dimension (religious *belonging*, religious *behavior*, and religious *belief*) on public opinion relating to various contemporary issues in the United States. Largely, this is a three-part project. The first part addresses the effects of religion on policy attitudes relating to moral/values-based issues. The second part of this project outlines the effects of religion on economic policy preferences. The last part concerns the impact of religion on issues that are considered both moral/values-based *and* economic (i.e. immigration and climate change). In this dissertation, I shed light on the systematic ways the religion dimensions influence policy preferences among policy domains. Scholars have made connections between the three religion dimensions and policy opinions but have largely concentrated on a specific policy domain, e.g. moral policy issues. Likewise, there is a rich line of literature that addresses the influence of religion on a specific policy issue, e.g. same-sex marriage. Scholarly literature is limited insofar as there are few works that address the different dimensions of religion on a variety of policy issues.

The unique contribution of this dissertation to the field is two-fold. First, I use the “3B” approach presented in the literature, but I offer a more comprehensive model to capture the effects of religiosity. Indeed, by incorporating *all three* religious dimensions *separately* (i.e. religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing) in my models, I highlight which religious dimension influence public opinion in different policy domains. My second contribution is the inclusion of *several* policy issues as the dependent variables in my models. The extant literature is limited as scholars typically estimate the effects of religion on only a few issues, and this makes it difficult to make explicit comparisons across issues and highlight the relative effects of the different dimensions of religion.

In this dissertation I am concerned with how religious affiliation, religious participation, and religious belief influence American’s views on moral/social value issues, economic policy issues, and those issues that are considered both social/values-based and economic. Hence, my contribution includes a comprehensive study of not only the three types of major religious dimensions (belonging, behaving, and believing) but also how these religious classifications influence public opinion across a range of issues.

### **1.3. Data and Methodology**

The principal survey used in the analyses is the 2016 American National Election Survey (henceforth ANES). The ANES has a total sample size of 4,271 adults. This dataset is used to provide analyses on the relationship between the three religious dimensions and moral, economic, and hybrid public policy opinions. This rich dataset contains many questions of interest including opinions on same-sex marriage, legality of abortion, spending on the poor, raising minimum wage, increasing immigration, environmental concerns, and foreign policy opinions. There are also several religion-oriented variables including religious tradition, church

attendance, and belief in the Bible. I also use the 2016 General Social Survey (henceforth GSS) and the 2013 Economic Values Survey (henceforth EVS). By using these two additional datasets, I provide supporting evidence to ANES data analysis and explore other policy concerns that are not found using ANES data, e.g. public opinion on pornography laws (GSS) or government responsibility in providing public services (EVS). I use ordered logit and logit to discern the effects of the three dimensions of religion on moral/values, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.

#### **1.4. Definition of Key Terms**

In this section, I address several key terms including religion, the three dimensions of religion—belonging, behaving, and believing—and policy domains—moral, economic, and hybrid.

##### **1.4.1. Religion**

While this dissertation offers a theoretical framework to understanding the influence of religious dimensions in determining individuals' policy preferences, it does not attempt to outline philosophical arguments for the nature or construction of religion or religious ideals. In his seminal work, *The Sacred Canopy*, Berger (1967) offers an excellent explanation and discussion of the formation of religion and the roots of religious belief. Ultimately, he (Berger 1967, 27-28) argues that religion is simply a way for individuals or societies to deal with chaos. Religion is a way for people to answer questions about the unknown. It provides purpose and support in times of despair. The “sacred canopy” acts as a shelter that shields groups in time of distress. Thus, Johnstone (2016,14) defines religion as “a set of beliefs and rituals by which a group of people seeks to understand, explain, and deal with a world of complexity, uncertainty, and mystery, by identifying a sacred canopy of explanation and reassurance under which to live.”

Recent empirical scholarship assumes that religion exists in American society and focuses on religious measurement issues (Steensland et al. 2000). There is consensus—not without debate—about the measurement of religion as religious commitment or belonging, behaving, and believing (see Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009 and Layman 2001 for examples). Thus, I define religion by incorporating Berger (1967) and Johnstone’s (2016) explanation of religion and including measurement components of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing.

*Religious Belonging.* I define religious belonging as the group or religious community with which individuals associate. Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other Christian and non-Christian traditions are the religious groups that I use to measure religious belonging. I also highlight differences among ethnic and racial groups including black Protestants and Hispanic Catholics. In addition, I incorporate a traditional/modernism approach by differentiating between mainline Protestants, black Protestants and evangelical Protestants.

*Religious Behaving.* I define religious behaving as acts of religious participation. Examples of religious behaving include worship or service attendance, religious community contributions, frequency of prayer, religious activity, and participation in religious conversions.

*Religious Believing.* I define religious believing as doctrinal principles, viewpoints, or teachings that influence the way individuals view the world. I measure religious believing as the importance of religion in daily life, religion as a guiding force in daily life, literal interpretations of the bible, perceptions of the image of God, and strength of religious conviction and spirituality. Due largely to data restrictions, this list is not all-inclusive; however, the available data are extensive and provide a foundation for understanding the relationship between religion and public opinion.

In sum, my definition of religion is as follows:

Religion is a social group phenomenon (religious belonging) where individuals can practice (religious behaving) a set of commonly shared beliefs (religious believing)—often involving the recognition of a higher power—in attempts to explain the world around them.

#### 1.4.2. Policy Domains

The next term, moral/value-based issues, is largely rooted in the subfield of morality politics or previously defined as the “politics of sin” (Meier 1999). Tatalovich and Daynes (1998) include a list of policies issues such as abortion, the death penalty, gay rights, and pornography that are considered to be moral policies. As a point of reference, Koopman (2009) included abortion, gay rights, end-of-life issues, gambling, sex education policy, and the death penalty in his discussion of morality politics. For the purposes of this dissertation, I include public opinion on abortion policy, LGBTQ policy, capital punishment, assisted suicide, pornography laws, sex education, and prayer in public places. I use Koopman’s (2009) work as a guideline in classifying moral policy issues. “Morality policies redistribute ‘values,’ whereas redistributive policies redistribute ‘economic’ rewards” (Koopman 2009, 549). Thus, I define economic issues as those directly involving economic or monetary concerns: government funding or services, government spending, deficit reduction, tax policy, economic inequality, and minimum wage. While much attention has been given to the role of religion in moral/value-based issues, there is less consideration of the influence of religion on economic policy attitudes. Thus, this dissertation attempts to shed light on this subject.

Lastly—perhaps the most ambiguous category—are the hybrid issues. These issues are those that have characteristics that can be represented by both value and economic issue categories. For example, immigration reform can be considered a hybrid issue. On one hand,



increasing immigration in the United States or allowing refugees to enter the country can hold very strong moral/value-based components, especially as it relates to humanitarian concerns. On the other hand, immigration attitudes can take on an economic component if questions are geared toward building a government funded border wall with Mexico (for example).

### **1.5. Organization of Dissertation**

This dissertation proceeds as follows.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the current state of the literature regarding the effect of religion on moral or social values-based issues, economic issues, and hybrid issues. In this chapter, I also outline traditional theories of religion and politics and develop a theoretical argument for measuring religion and its influence on policy opinions. Based on the prevailing scholarly literature I develop my own hypotheses.

In Chapter 3, I provide a description of the variables and data and methods used in the overall project. I measure religious belonging as religious traditions, noting differences among the effects of religious traditions on certain contemporary issues. I also include measures to ensure that the effects of within religious tradition differences are accounted for in the models. For example, I separate Protestants into three groups: mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical Protestants. Similarly, I include measures for both Catholics and Hispanic Catholics. Religious behaving is measured using frequency of church attendance, religious contributions, religious activity participation, frequency of prayer, and involvement in religious conversion. Religious believing is measured through the importance of religion in one's life, whether religion provides guidance in daily life, the interpretation of the Bible as the word of God, belief in life after death, belief in God, traditional/progressive religious beliefs, interpretation of Jesus' teachings, and strength of religious commitment and spirituality.

Religious belonging, behaving, and believing are measured separately in the analyses to highlight the differences in the three dimensions of religion. Thus, the independent variables in the models are based on survey questions that capture religious belonging, behaving, or believing, whereas, the dependent variables in the models are measured via survey questions that represent public opinion toward various moral/value, economic, or hybrid issues.

In Chapter 4 I report analyses and results from the first set of policies: moral or values-based issues. Included in this chapter are issues regarding public opinion toward the legality of abortion, LGBTQ issues, capital punishment, vaccines in schools, and the legalization of marijuana. Chapter 5 contains analyses and results from the second set of policies: economic issues. I include analyses of public opinion concerns regarding government funded health care, increase in government services, increase in government spending on a variety of issues, the economy, taxes, inequality, and increasing the minimum wage. Chapter 6 covers public opinion regarding hybrid issues including immigration, the environment, and foreign policy.

In Chapter 7 I offer a conclusion and an outline for future projects. This dissertation is intended to shed light on the relationship between religion and policy opinions. By measuring religion as belonging, behaving, and believing (separately) in the models, and running analyses with many policy issues, I identify which dimensions of religion influence individuals' positions in various policy domains. With this, I hope to help religion and politics scholars develop a more comprehensive theoretical explanation about which religious dimensions influence which policy opinions. The theoretical arguments that I present in this dissertation build on existing theories to help scholars better understanding the impact of religion.

## **Chapter 2. Literature Review, Theory, and Hypotheses**

### **2.1. Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I provide a general outline of the current literature in the field of religion and politics as it relates to the influence of religion on public opinion. Second, I offer a summary of relevant existing theories in the field of religion and politics and present a consolidated theoretical explanation for connections between religiosity and policy attitudes. In this section I discuss the influence of church organizations and their leaders (ministers, clergy, priests) on public opinion and argue that the clergy has considerable influence in informing and fostering public opinion on political matters. In turn, the more exposure to the clergy and the teachings of the religious organization, the more opportunity there is for church-goers to be influenced by their messages. Therefore, I posit that the clergy play a vital role in understanding the causal link between religion and public opinion.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the more religious a person is (the more the person is involved in a congregation or religious activities) the more exposure that person has to their church's teachings on particular policy issues, controlling for other influencers in public opinion such as political identification, political ideology, age, education, income, etc. I argue that the best approach to understanding the causal link between religion and public opinion is to first understand the role of the clergy and churches as a social group and then to breakdown religion into three dimensions: religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Layman 1997; 2001; Green, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth 2007; among others) and measure these dimensions separately in empirical analyses to discern which dimension of religion (belonging, behaving, or

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<sup>1</sup> Although I am interested in the role of the clergy in public opinion formation, I do not directly address the clergy's influence in public opinion in this dissertation. Chiefly, I am concerned with how religion influences public opinion under the assumption that the clergy, religious doctrine, and religious social groups help to develop and shape religious opinions and beliefs. In turn, people apply these religious principles to their attitudes toward policy issues.

believing) influences which policy opinion domain (moral/values, economic, or hybrid).<sup>2</sup> This dissertation is both comprehensive and exploratory in nature, and the theoretical argument presented here serves as a step in the explaining the causal link between religion and policy attitudes.

## **2.2. A Note on Policy Issues**

*Moral-Social Values.*<sup>3</sup> In the last few decades, the importance of social or moral and values/based issues has increasingly become a significant concern in the minds of Americans (Garand and McCarthy 2016). The attention that Americans give to these social issues has important consequences as it shows a change in the religious landscape of the United States. Before the 1970s, religious differences on policy matters were predominately between the different religious affiliations (e.g. Protestants, Catholics, Jews); however, in recent years issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage have led to major differences within religious groups. For example, evangelical Protestants hold mostly conservative views on same-sex marriage and abortion; on the other hand, mainline Protestants take a more liberal stance (than evangelical Protestants) on these issues.

Political parties and political elites capitalize on this divide by structuring their platform on one side of an issue and targeting certain religious groups and individuals (Jelen 2001; Layman 2001; Jelen and Wilcox 2003). While Democrats are predominately pro-choice on the abortion issue, Republican have typically taken the pro-life stance on abortion. According to

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<sup>2</sup> Saroglou (2011) argues that there are four dimensions of religion: belonging, behaving, believing, *and* bonding. The bonding component involves “self-transcendent experiences that bond the individual with what it perceives to be the transcendent ‘reality,’ with others, and/or with the inner-self. Most often, this occurs within a ritualized framework (Saroglou 2011, 1326).” These frameworks include prayer, worship services, religious ceremonies, etc. Ultimately, Saroglou (2011) argues that there are common practices across religions that connect individuals.

<sup>3</sup> I use the terms “moral,” “value-based,” and “social” interchangeably throughout the text. However, there are delineations among components of moral issues. For example, moral issues can be those that are related to sexuality or those issues that are related to values, human rights, and altruism. When appropriate, I make distinctions among these terms.

Adams (1997), the result of this alignment became a new social evolution. Because of this, evangelical Protestants moved into the Republican Party, while mainline Protestants and Catholics moved more toward the center of the ideology scale (Jelen 2009). By the mid-1970s, the presence of these issues led to the rise of the Christian Right (Wilcox, Goldberg, and Jelen 2000). This generated a clear divide among the religious, solidifying the creation of religious liberals and religious conservatives.

Scholars have identified several values-based issues where religion increasingly has an influence. These issues include abortion, LGBTQ rights, capital punishment, and the HHS contraception mandate associated with the Affordable Care Act, among others. As an example, gay rights—including same sex marriage and anti-LGBTQ discrimination policies—have become one of the most prominent and hotly contested social issues. Overall, the public supports equal treatment of homosexuals; however, many religious individuals hold the belief that homosexuality is an immoral act, citing biblical teachings as their reason for disagreeing with what they describe as the homosexual lifestyle (Loftus 2001, Wilcox and Norrande 2002; “Religion, Race, and Same-Sex Marriage” 2012). While tolerance may be on the rise for the majority of Americans, religious individuals are more likely to hold negative views on homosexuality than non-religious individuals (Gallup 2012 ). Tolerance and acceptance may be a result of the coming of age of a new generation, the media’s positive portrayal of same sex couples, and the increasing number of individuals who have contact with homosexuals (Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Jelen 2009).

The literature on the attitudes toward gay rights is quite diverse, but the influence of religion remains a consistent source of opposition (Gaines and Garand 2010). Church attendance and attitudes toward gay rights are directly correlated, with frequent church attenders

considerably less likely to support gay rights. In addition, scholars have found that this applies to particular religious traditions. For example, Roman Catholics are not significantly different than others in their preferences relating to anti-discrimination laws (Wilcox and Norrander 2002); however, evangelical Protestants are largely against same-sex marriage. In sum, the approval of same-sex marriages is increasing overall, but it remains largely unpopular among highly religious individuals and certain religious traditions where church teachings are traditionally conservative. In this project I delve deeper into this relationship. Here I demonstrate the specific differences among religious affiliations, frequent vs. infrequent church attenders, and traditionalist vs. progressive biblical interpretations and opinions on moral issues including same-sex marriage, LGBTQ rights, among others.

*Economic Issues.* What is the role of religion in relation to economic issues and political preferences? While the role of religiosity in shaping Americans' positions on moral/values-based issues is heavily documented, there is considerably less scholarly literature on the relationship between religiosity and attitudes on economic issues. Indeed, the literature is limited to a handful of scholars (e.g. Bartels 2008; McCarthy et al. 2016; and Wilson 2009) who reveal important and significant differences in economic policy opinions among individuals with conservative religious beliefs compared to individuals with progressive religious beliefs.

Wilson (2009) argues that by the middle of 21<sup>st</sup> century mainline Protestants will hold predominately progressive economic attitudes. He finds evidence that black Protestants and mainline Protestants are significantly more supportive of "people on welfare" than evangelical Protestants. In addition, Jews and black Protestants are liberal on many economic and social justice questions, Catholics and mainline Protestants are generally moderate, whereas evangelical Protestants are conservative on economic and social justice questions (Smidt 2001; Wald and

Calhoun-Brown 2007; Wilson 2009). Wilson (2009) also discusses the relationship between faith and economic attitudes among religious groups, arguing that major political movements have been influenced by religious beliefs (Noonan 1998). Indeed, support for economic policies that uplift the poor in society is inspired by Christian teachings and religious beliefs (Trattner 1999; Bartkowski and Regis 2003).

In previous research, my co-authors and I have found that biblical interpretations influence how Americans think about economic or redistributive policies (McCarthy et al. 2016). Those individuals who hold more conservative religious beliefs are less likely to favor increasing taxes on the rich and raising minimum wage. In addition, conservative religious adherents are also less likely to support government redistributive policies. We also find that black Protestants are more likely to express favorability of increasing taxes on the rich and raising minimum wage than other religious denominations.

In sum, scholars have found that religion does play an important role in how individuals evaluate economic policies. However, there are few scholarly works that consider the three dimensions of religion on economic policy concerns. In this dissertation, offer a comprehensive evaluation of the role of religion in shaping economic policy attitudes.

*Hybrid Issues.* Hybrid issues are the most difficult to classify because they have both moral/value-based and economic characteristics. For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider three policy areas hybrid: immigration, climate change, and foreign policy. Because much attention is given to immigration reform, climate change legislation, and foreign policy concerns by the media and political elites and survey data reveal the importance of these issues and divisions in public opinion on approval and policy solutions (Pew 2019; Gallup 2019; PRRI 2018) I include these policy areas in the hybrid policy analyses.

There is (limited) scholarly research that addresses the role of religion in shaping public opinion on immigration policy (Gillis 2003), climate change legislation and regulation (Egan and Mullin 2017; Shao 2017; and Shao and McCarthy 2019), and foreign policy (Guth 2009; Page 2006). Largely, these scholars have found that religion is a factor in how individuals assess these policy issues. Based on their findings and available survey data, I speculate that the three religious dimensions influence hybrid policy issues. This is especially true when I consider the effects of the behaving (worship attendance) and believing (biblical literalism) dimensions of religion.

As an example, I explain why I classify climate change as a hybrid issue and provide an overview of the state of the literature on climate change attitudes. On one hand, support for government funding to reduce climate change is economic in nature in that it involves funding by the federal government. On the other hand, climate change is a moral or value-based concern in that it taps into opinions on bettering society and helping future generations. Scholars have documented differences in environmental concerns among religious traditions (Ecklund et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2016; Shao 2017; Shao and Goidel 2016; Shao and McCarthy 2019) finding evangelical Protestants are among those who are most unconvinced about global warming and its anthropogenic causes (Smith and Leiserowitz 2013; Shao et al. 2014; Shao and McCarthy 2018). While other scholars have noted that there has been a rise in concern about environmental issues among evangelicals (Kearns 1997) and other Christians (Van Dyke et al. 1996; Wilkinson 2010, 2012), contemporary scholarship has reinforced the notion that evangelical Protestants (Ecklund et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2016; Shao 2016; Shao and McCarthy 2018) are least likely to believe that global warming or climate change is happening.



While there has been disagreement in the literature regarding the influence of religious belonging on environmental concerns, there is (somewhat of) a consensus among scholars on the influence of doctrinal beliefs—biblical literalism, end-times theology, conservative eschatology—on opinions about climate change (Guth et al. 1995; Barker and Bearce 2013; Kilburn 2014; Peifer et al. 2016). Barker and Bearce (2013) explain end-times theology as the belief that Jesus will return and that this return will include a battle of good and evil. “Premillennial dispensationalism”—a factor in the end-times theology—is marked by the belief the earth must deteriorate before the Second coming of Jesus. Worldly deterioration includes environmental collapse. Indeed, these scholars conclude that those individuals who believe that the earth has a preordained end-time are less likely to want to preserve the earth for future generations (Barker and Bearce 2013). Those for whom religion is a salient part of their lives are more likely to believe in natural versus manmade causes of global warming—due in part to their beliefs about the Second coming of Jesus and the end-times where religiosity can influence one’s belief about global warming because it may conflict with their belief in divine involvement on Earth (Ecklund et al. 2017). Overall, scholars have found that conservative religious beliefs are negatively associated with environmental concerns due to belief in end-times theology and the belief in the second coming of Jesus (Guth et al. 1995; Barker and Bearce 2013; Shao 2016).

Several scholars have found that there are negligible differences in environmental attitudes among those who are frequent religious service attenders and those who attend religious services infrequently (Guth et al. 1995; Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Clements et al. 2014). Alternatively, some scholars have demonstrated that frequency of service attendance is negatively related to perceptions of environmental factors (Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright

and Dunlap 2011). Likewise, Shao et al. (2014) find that there is a negative relationship between service attendance and beliefs about the severity of global warming.

Scholarly literature is also limited in discerning the relationship between religion and immigration policies. However, there are a few noteworthy works (see Gillis 2009). Knoll (2009) finds that frequent service attenders, and minority religious groups (mainly Jewish adherents) are more likely to support progressive immigration policies. McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle (2010) argue that “Christian nationalism” or a religious interpretation of America’s identity is what influences immigration attitudes, not solely religious affiliation. Nteta and Wallsten (2012) are interested in the role of the clergy in attitudes toward immigration and find that the clergy are essential in relating messages regarding immigration concerns. Overall, when religious leaders portray pro-immigration attitudes, so too do their congregations.

Scholars have also considered the influence of religion on foreign policy concerns. Jelen (1994) argues that religious group membership, i.e. religious denominations, contributes to foreign policy opinions. Catholics are “dovish” whereas evangelical Protestants are “hawkish” in their international attitudes. Later, Guth (2009) concludes that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing all influence foreign policy opinions; however, religious beliefs are especially important contributors in foreign policy concerns. Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) also find that religious beliefs play an important role in shaping foreign policy opinions. In addition, Evangelical Protestants are often in favor of aggressive policy attitudes toward the Middle East and hold negative sentiments toward Muslims and favorable sentiments toward Jews.

Admittedly, this is not a comprehensive list of scholars who discuss the role of religion in shaping environmental concerns, immigration attitudes, and foreign policy opinions. The

purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that attention is given to the effects of religion on these policy issues; however, there is no general consensus in the literature on which religious dimension influences policy opinions. In this dissertation, I offer a better understanding of the influence of religion on hybrid policy concerns.

*Ultimately, I contend that three dimensions of religion (religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing) shape public opinion on three policy (moral, economic, and hybrid) domains.*

### **2.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses**

The theoretical background and hypotheses sections proceed as follows. First, I highlight the major theories in the field of religion and politics. Second, contribute to the existing theoretical arguments in the field and provide several hypotheses regarding religious belonging, behaving, and believing and their effects on the three policy opinion domains. Throughout these sections, I provide specific examples of how religious belonging, behaving, and believing have differing effects on policy opinions.

#### **2.3.1. Theories of Religion in the United States**

I begin this section by providing a brief discussion of existing theories in the field of religion and politics. I also explain the theoretical arguments surrounding the influence of religion on policy opinions. Lastly, I provide an overarching theoretical argument that includes aspects of existing theories, i.e. the 3Bs or religious commitment conceptualization of religion (Layman 2001, 55).

The most thorough account of the various theories in the field of religion and politics is provided by Hertzke, Olson, den Dulk and Fowler (2019). The authors discuss seven major theories and conclude that while each one is useful in discerning particular aspects of the

relationship between religion and politics, no one theory is all-inclusive. The theories presented by Hertzke et al. (2019) include (1) the civil-religion thesis, (2) the unconventional-partners thesis, (3) the culture wars thesis, (4) the secularization thesis, (5) populism, (6) the religious-marketplace thesis, and (7) the culture-shift thesis.

First, proponents of the civil-religion thesis argue that America's "religion" actually consists of a shared group of political ideals or civic creed that is not dependent upon religious denominations. Indeed, all American participate in the civil-religion. Examples of this include "under God" in the pledge of allegiance, and "In God We Trust" on our currency (Hertzke et al. 2019). Second, the unconventional-partners thesis involves the partnership between the government and religious organizations. Religion provides individuals with a code of moral conduct that guide civic engagement and political decisions. Third, advocates of the culture wars thesis (Hunter 1991) argue that the public is largely divided into two camps: conservatives and progressives. Conservative members of society value traditional lifestyles (opposition to same-sex marriage); whereas, progressive encourage the introduction of new ideas and lifestyles. Fourth, scholars such as Norris and Inglehart (2004) posit that as nations industrialize and modernize religious identity decreases in society. Largely, political activism is an attempt to derail the secularization of the United States (Hertzke et al. 2019, 42). Fifth, the populism theory involves religious movements and their ability to enact change in political matters. Most notably, black churches have been instrumental in enacting change in American politics (Smith and Harris 2005; Olson 2009). Sixth, proponents of the religious-marketplace thesis argue that churches compete for members and thus create a "free-market" in which individuals can choose their religious affiliation (Finke and Stark 2005). The churches that can appeal to the broader public will survive, whereas, those churches who cannot compete suffer from declining

membership. Lastly, Inglehart (1990) argues that there has been a shift in culture where individuals are less concerned with organized religion but instead place considerable weight on spirituality.

Each of these theories have a rich line of literature that provides support for their corresponding arguments. However, the enormous breadth of theories has left the field of religion and politics with an ununified theoretical explanation of how religion influences policy opinions. I rely on components of each of these theories when I propose the (working) theoretical arguments in this dissertation.

### 2.3.2. Explanations of Religion and Policy Concerns: The Clergy and Congregations

Scholars have long identified ways in which individuals form their political opinions and how these opinions develop into their understanding of politics, political leaders, and political institutions. Through the process of political socialization, a person learns how to translate their observations of politics into judgements on politics. This process is advanced and developed from childhood to adulthood (Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009). A contributing agent of political socialization (other agents include family life, schools, and social networks) is religious socialization and the influence of churches and religious congregations in one's life. Indeed, scholars have argued that church congregations are among the most far-reaching organization in the United States (Putnam 2000). Congregations are transmitters of doctrinal teachings, group norms, and moral belief judgements. In addition, congregations are largely politically homogeneous where there is large conformity among Jews (Democrats) and evangelical Protestants (Republicans) within their congregation as it relates to political party preferences and ideological beliefs (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007).

Layman (2001) and Weisberg (2005) note differences between religious and non-religious individuals on moral issue opinions such as same-sex marriage and abortion policy. Religious individuals are more likely to hold conservative views on same-sex marriage and abortion policy than non-religious adherents who are more likely to take progressive policy opinions. Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimple (2009) exemplify this point by arguing that religious beliefs and practices also have an influence on policy opinions. Indeed, those individuals with strong religious beliefs and practices often have constrained political attitudes where they reflect the political opinions of their religious congregation. This demonstrates a causal link between religion—denomination, practice, and belief—and public opinion. Particularly, scholars have shown that there is a relationship between religious beliefs and moral or social policy opinions such as same-sex marriage (Layman 2001; Weisberg 2005; Jelen 2009; McCarthy and Garand 2017), economic policy opinion (McCarthy et al. 2016; Wilson 2009), and foreign policy attitudes (Guth, Green, Kellstedt, and Smidt 2005). Religious leaders are tasked with informing and enlightening their congregations not only on religious doctrine and practices but also current societal and political events. Religious leaders are instrumental in relaying the teachings of the church to their congregants and offering solutions—based on biblical teachings and doctrinal traditions—to political issues.

One's religiosity is dependent on the influence and leadership of religious officials, where religious leaders often find themselves in a position where their congregation is in need (or want) of their guidance on contemporary societal issues, including political matters where community issues can shape political attitudes and policy opinions (Jelen 1993; Olson 2009). The influence of the clergy in political matters not only depends on the religious official, but also on a congregation's theological orientations and religious traditions (Olson 2009). For example,

black Protestant pastors are extremely influential in their congregations regarding political matters (Smith and Harris 2005; McDaniel 2011). Djupe (2002) contends that the clergy obtain their political positions by responding to current issues in their environment, and many clerics freely provide their opinions on political issues to their congregations to connect religious principles to current events (Olson 2000).

Olson (2009) and colleagues outline four categories of clergy political action: electoral activities, advocacy, partnership, and gap filling (see Olson 2009; Crawford et al. 2001; Guth et al. 1997; Olson et al. 2005; and Smidt 2004).<sup>4</sup> The clergy's political activities consist of urging congregation members to vote (electoral activities), preaching about political issues (advocacy), forming congregational study groups around salient issues (advocacy), joining a civic organization (partnership) or leading a congregational service activity such as a food pantry or homeless shelter (gap filling). These political activities are influential forming and shaping public opinion. Overall, Jelen (2001) argues that the clergy influences their congregation in four distinct ways: (1) reinforcing preexisting beliefs, (2) linking certain religious beliefs to political views, (3) mobilizing their congregations to act on political beliefs, and (4) changing the views of the congregation.

Based on the preexisting literature, I argue that churches and the clergy are instrumental in forming and reinforcing political attitudes and beliefs on moral and economic political policies. Specifically, religious individuals are more likely than non-religious individuals to be affected by religious congregations and their leaders. Because of this, religion—religious denomination or tradition (religious belonging), religious participation (religious behaving), or

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<sup>4</sup> The list of clergy activities and related citations is found in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*. This description is among the most comprehensive and straightforward description of the influence of the clergy in political activities. For this reason, I have included the “typology” of activities as seen in Olson (2009).

doctrinal beliefs (religious believing)—plays an important role in political policy opinions.

Overall, religious congregations and their leaders play a significant role in influencing public. In the following sections, I build on this (simple) theoretical model by adding three dimensions of religion and policy opinion domains.

### 2.3.3. A (Working) Theory on The Three Religious Dimensions

There is considerable debate among scholars who study the intersection of religion and politics regarding the measurement of religious indicators and the relative importance of different dimensions of religion in shaping political attitudes and behavior. Traditional scholarship has examined religion through various theoretical “lenses” that have led to many conclusions regarding the relationship between religion and policy opinions.

These theories are rooted in sociology, psychology, and political science (albeit- a newer subfield in political science). While scholars have attempted to provide a working theory that connects religion to political attitudes, the field is left with a mix of theoretical understanding and lacks an overarching theory that explains this relationship. Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009) highlight three core theories in the *Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*. These three theories include the ethnoreligious perspective or religious belonging (denominational affiliation), the religious restructuring or traditional-modernism perspective (largely religious beliefs and religious participation), and the “three B’s” perspective (religious belonging, religious behaving, religious believing).

Djupe and Calfano (2014, pg. 21) outline several other theoretical frameworks including religious commitment (the three B’s), psychological approaches (religious identity), and social network approaches. The authors argue that there are large within denominational differences that are often ignored by scholars who incorporate the three B’s in their analyses. I address these



within denominational differences and use the Steensland et al. (2000) classification schema as guidance in the models.<sup>5</sup> I argue that the three B approach is the most comprehensive model to understand the influence of religion on political attitudes. Indeed, this approach which I consider the three dimensions of religion incorporates aspects of many existing theories in the field including the culture-wars thesis, the secularization thesis, populism, the religious market-place, religious identity, and the culture-shift thesis.

Through this dissertation, I demonstrate the empirical fortitude of the three dimensions of religion (belonging, behaving, and believing) and its effect on policy opinions. I provide supporting evidence to the three B approach on certain policy issues by linking the religious dimensions to policy domains. This is unique in that there are few (if any) scholarly works that address all three religious dimensions on a variety of policy issues. Through my analyses, I find that there is considerable significance of religious belonging, behaving, and believing on policy opinions. Religious belonging has the greatest effect on moral or social values issues. Religious behaving and religious believing have a significant influence on both moral and economic policy concerns.

I now more closely explain the three dimensions of religion and offer a theoretical explanation (rooted in current literature) on the influence of religion on policy opinions. The first dimension of religion is belonging (denominational affiliation). The second dimension is behaving (religious participation). The third dimension is believing (doctrinal belief and biblical literalism).

*Belonging.* Coined by scholars as the ethnoreligious perspective, the “belonging” perspective is chiefly interested in religion as a social group that influences political opinions

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<sup>5</sup> A lengthy discussion of this classification schema is in Chapter 3. It accounts for both within and among religious denominational differences.

like other group level variables such as race or region (McTague and Layman 2009).

Ethnoreligious models focus on division among the major religious traditions where religious groups are encased within their own political cultures. These scholars who incorporate this perspective into their models look to religious traditions or key religious groups as a center for public opinion formation, treating religious groups as another mechanism for social interaction. Thus, membership in a certain religious tradition influences political opinion through the interaction that individuals have with their religious community (Green and Guth 1993).

Kleppner (1970) describes this relationship as the “political expression of shared values derived from the voter’s membership in and commitment to, ethnic and religious groups” (cited in Smidt et. al 2009). Scholars who have used the ethnoreligious perspective—most closely associated with religious belonging or religious denominational affiliation—in their analyses conclude that the various religious groups will behave politically different from one another. For example, traditional scholarship noted that Jews and Catholics are distinctly different than (northern) Protestants. Indeed, Protestants are more likely to align with the Republican Party; whereas, Jewish and Catholic adherents are more likely to be a member of the Democratic Party (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954; Green 2007; McTague and Layman 2008).

Scholars have begun to note that ethnoreligious perspective may have ignored important within-traditions differences. Ammerman (1997) argues that as society began to become more mobile, religious traditions that were rooted in “ethnicity, region, and family” began to break down. As a result of this mobility and exposure to new religious cultures, the strict denominational differences that were previously observed began to be influenced by another factor: religious beliefs. Another important theoretical perspective, the traditional-modernism approach, focuses on differences in traditional and progressive religious views. Hunter (1991)

expresses his concern for these differences and the need for scholarship to recognize how these differences influence public opinion in his “Culture Wars” theory in which he argues that religious traditions have become polarized along traditional and progressive lines. In many ways, traditionalist Catholics may have more in common with traditionalist Protestants than they may have with progressive Catholics. Other scholars such as Layman and Green (2005) find that traditionalist beliefs push individuals toward the Republican Party whereas progressive ideals push individuals toward the Democratic party. Consequently, these scholars have noted differences both among and within religious denominations in terms of conservative and progressive theologies (Hunter 1991).

While the ethnoreligious perspective is still useful as religious groups play a large role in shaping opinions and voting behavior (Wuthnow 1989; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman 2001; Guth et al 2006; Green et al. 2007), it is problematic to measure the influence of religion solely based on religious traditions. Within denominational distinctions are needed to address potential differences. I argue that within denominational differences are captured by delineating Protestants into three groups: mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical Protestants. In addition, I separate Catholics into two categories: Catholics and Hispanic Catholics.

According to the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, Mainline Protestants favor the legality of abortion in all/most cases (60%), support same-sex marriage (57%), and believe that stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost (56%). Catholics also hold progressive views on these issues. Catholics are split on their opinions on abortion where 48% believe that abortion should be legal in all or most cases and 47% believe that abortion should be illegal in all or most cases. In addition, 70% of Catholics believe that homosexuality should be accepted and

57% strongly favor/favor same-sex marriage. Fifty-five percent of Catholics believe that stricter environmental laws are worth the cost and 48% argue that government aid to the poor does more good than harm. Jewish adherents favor the legality of abortion in all/most cases (83%), strongly favor/favor homosexuality (77%), and being that stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost (71%). While there is no delineation among Hispanic Catholics and Catholics in the 2015 Religious Landscape Study, there are both Evangelical and Mainline Protestant groups. Evangelical Protestants are generally more conservative in their opinions on abortion (63% illegal in all/most cases), same-sex marriage (64% oppose/strongly oppose), and government aid to the poor (56% believe that it does more harm than good).

Thus, the following hypotheses are rooted in aforementioned theories of religion and politics—especially the ethnoreligious perspective where individuals use social interaction and group associations to influence and contribute to their opinions—and survey reports such as the 2014 Religious Landscape Study.

*I posit that religious belonging—denominational affiliation within and among religious traditions—contributes how individuals assess moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.*

H1: Religious Belonging: Denomination affiliation (among and within religious traditions) effects moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.

H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews hold progressive policy opinions regarding moral, economic, and hybrid issues.

H1b: Evangelical Protestants, and Hispanic Catholics hold conservative policy opinions regarding moral issues.

*Behaving.* Like the process that results in religious belonging or denominational affiliation being converted into policy opinions, the process that results in religious behaving being converted into conservative moral policy opinions and progressive economic policy opinions involves the influence of the clergy and congregations. Those individuals who are more exposed to the church's teachings (by attending services more frequently or participating religious activities) are more exposed to church doctrine and consequently mirror their churches teachings. For example, scholars have found that Catholics who attend church more frequently hold different opinions than those Catholics who are infrequent church attenders (Layman 2001; McTague and Layman 2008). Frequent church attenders hold more conservative views than non-frequent attenders on same-sex marriage policies (Garand and McCarthy 2017). Survey research has also demonstrated that frequent service attenders are less likely to support abortion, same-sex marriage legislation and climate change policy (Pew Research Center, 2015) In a previous article, my coauthors and I have found that religious behaving influences opinions toward economic issues such as support for government spending and healthcare (McCarthy et al. 2016). This component of the three religious dimensions is limited insofar as scholars often couple religious behaving and religious believing into a religiosity index (Putnam and Campbell 2010; McCarthy et al. 2016). Djupe and Calfano (2014,23) consider this a shortcoming of the religious commitment approach where scholars often "blend religious beliefs and behaviors." I argue that religious behaving and believing should be measured separately in analyses to explore differences between the religious dimensions.

Based on the findings in preexisting and survey research literature *I argue that religious behaving contributes to moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.* Those who are more religiously active will reflect the opinions of their religious leaders, congregations, and church's

teachings on policy issues. Therefore, members of traditionally conservative congregations will hold more conservative policy opinions; whereas, members of traditionally progressive congregations will hold more liberal policy opinions. The driving force behind religious behaving is the degree to which individuals participate in religious activity.

Indeed, the 2014 Religious Landscape Survey reveals several noteworthy trends regarding religious participation and political beliefs. First, those who attend service at least once a week believe that abortion should be illegal in all/most cases (63%), that homosexuality should be discouraged (51%), and oppose/strongly oppose same-sex marriage (62%). The findings regarding economic issues are less clear where religiously active and non-active individuals are split in their opinions regarding government aid to the poor. Overall findings suggest that religiously active individuals hold more conservative policy opinions relative to non-church attenders regarding policy concerns. However, and based on the above-mentioned existing scholarly literature, I argue that religiously active individuals hold more progressive economic policy opinions when controlling for the effects of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

H2: Religiously active individuals will generally hold more conservative policy opinions (relative to non-church attenders).

H2a: Religiously active individuals take conservative policy stances on moral issues (due in part to the influence of the clergy and biblical teachings on “pelvic politics” and end of life issues).

H2b: Religiously active individuals take progressive policy stances on economic issues (due in part to the influence of the clergy and biblical teachings on helping the poor in society).

H2c: Religiously active individuals take conservative policy stances on hybrid issues that involve government spending (i.e. environmental protections) but more progressive policy stances on hybrid issues that involve humanitarian concerns (i.e. allowing refugees to enter the country), due to the influence of the clergy and biblical teaching.

*Believing.* Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2007) argue that religious beliefs are the major component in understanding how people behave politically. They argue that there is a great deal of convergence between religious beliefs and policy opinions. Other scholars have also noted differences among those individuals who believe in the literal translation of the Bible as the “word of God.” Biblical literalists are politically more conservative and Republican than other individuals within their own religious traditions (Layman 2001). Biblical literalism is often associated with negative attitudes toward the legality of abortion and same-sex marriage legislation (Gaines and Garand 2010; Garand and McCarthy 2016). In prior research, my co-authors and I have found that biblical literalism is negatively related to economic policy opinions. Those individuals who believe that churches should preserve traditional beliefs rather than adopt new progressive policies that reflect societal changes are less likely to support increasing taxes on the rich and raising minimum wage (McCarthy et al. 2016). Religious beliefs are also connected to hybrid policy opinions, especially as it relates to economic concerns (as previously discussed). There is limited research that incorporate religious believing into empirical analyses. This is largely due to survey limitations and restrictions. Indeed, Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009) argue that there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the influence of religious beliefs on policy opinions.

According to the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, biblical literalists believe that abortion should be illegal in all or most cases (64%), homosexuality should be discouraged

(55%), oppose/strongly oppose same-sex marriage (66%), and that “stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy (48%).” Again, the general findings suggest that biblical literalists are conservative (53%). However, reported economic concerns are limited to government aid to the poor and beliefs on the size of government. I posit that biblical literalists hold more progressive economic views when controlling for socioeconomic and demographic considerations. Therefore, and based on (limited) scholarly research and preliminary analyses, *I posit that religious believing contributes to moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.*

H3: Biblical literalists hold conservative policy opinions (relative to those who do not believe that the bible is the word of God).

H3a: Biblical literalists will be more likely to take conservative policy stances on moral issues (due to the influence of the clergy and church teachings).

H3b: Biblical literalists take progressive policy stances on economic issues.

H3c: Biblical literalists take conservative policy stances on hybrid issues that involve government spending (i.e. environmental protections) but more progressive policy stances on hybrid issues that involve humanitarian concerns (i.e. immigration).

There are several other measures of religious believing included in the models, however, the main variable of interest is biblical literalism. Throughout this dissertation, I discuss these variables and often find that there is variation between believing religion is important and that religion serves as guidance in daily life on policy concerns. This suggests that those who believe that religion is important are influenced by religion differently than those who believe that religion serves as guidance. Thus, my hypotheses regarding the other religious belief variables



are that religious beliefs have an overall effect on policy concerns; however, the direction of the effect is unknown.

## **2.4. Summary and Conclusion**

The point here is that religion matters in influencing public opinion. However, religious traditions, religious participation, or religious beliefs alone do not fully capture the potential effects of religiosity on individuals' policy attitudes. In many cases, there are differences among and within religious denominations as it relates to moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. The proceeding chapters will address these differences and further explore variations among religious dimensions. Thus, the models are influenced by the "3B" classification schema: religious belonging (i.e. traditions), religious behaving (i.e. worship attendance), and religious believing (i.e. biblical literalism and religious importance) (Layman 1997; 2001; Guth, Green, Kellstedt, and Smidt 1999). However, I measure each dimension separately in the models.

Overall, my hypotheses are rooted in the lineage of the ethnoreligious perspective, the traditional-modernist perspective, and the "three Bs" perspective while incorporating the influence of the clergy and religious socialization. I highlight existed theoretical arguments and posit that the religious dimension approach (my delineation of the "three Bs") incorporates aspects of these theories, especially the culture-wars thesis and the populism thesis. My work is unique in that it applies various aspects of these theories and more carefully exposes the variables at work in the "three B" model: belonging, behaving, and believing. By measuring these dimensions separately in the models, I shed light on which dimensions influence which policy domain. Looking at these variables separately in the models paints a clear(er) picture of the relationship between religion and public opinion concerns. On one hand, those individuals who associate positively with belonging, behaving, and believing tend to hold generally more

conservative views that those who do not associate a religious denomination, participate in religious activity, or believe in biblical literalism. On the other hand, those individuals who are “less religious” are more likely to hold progressive views on policy opinions. These findings are important insofar as they suggest the potential for a changing political and religious landscape as more individuals are associating with being non-religious. The proceeding chapters address the nuances of this statement by fleshing out differences in policy opinions contingent upon belonging, behaving, and believing.

## **Chapter 3. Data and Variable Description**

### **3.1. Introduction**

To explore the effects of religion on policy opinions, I rely on several data sources and a wide variety of both religious and policy opinion variables. This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the data used in the analyses in chapters 4 through 6. Second, I define the dependent variables that include moral, economic, and hybrid policy issues. Third, I describe the main independent variables. These variables include religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. Lastly, I conclude the chapter with a snapshot of the variables that are employed in the models.

### **3.2. Data and Methods**

There are three primary data sources that are included in the models: 2016 American National Election Survey, the 2016 General Social Survey, and the 2013 Economic Values Survey. I use ordered logistic and logistic regression in the models included in the empirical chapters. For each model I examine the variance inflation factors (VIF) as a check for multicollinearity, and in no case are the VIFs outside acceptable levels; therefore, there is no evidence of multicollinearity in any of the models.

#### **3.2.1. American National Election Survey**

I use data from the 2016 American National Election Survey to estimate the effects of religious belonging (denominational affiliation), behaving (church attendance and religious contributions), and believing (religious importance, religious guidance in daily life, biblical literalism, and spirituality), on various moral, economic, and hybrid issues. The American National Election Survey (ANES) includes both a pre-election and post-election survey. Respondents were interviewed between September 7 and November 7, 2016 (pre-election) and

November 9, 2016 and January 8, 2017 (post-election). The interviews consisted of both face-to-face interviews and Internet questionnaires. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish. There is a total sample size of 4,271 adults 18 years and older.

I chose to use ANES data in all analyses for several reasons. First, the ANES provides a suitable number of variables, especially as they relate to religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. I considered the use of other datasets for this dissertation; however, each alternative choice is limited in the number of variables relating to religious believing. Second, the ANES has an extensive set of variables relating to moral, economic, and hybrid policy issues; these variables constitute the dependent variables in my analyses. Thus, I can draw conclusions concerning which groups of policy issues (moral, economic, hybrid) are influenced by religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. Lastly, in this dissertation I focus on policy related variables, i.e. “should the government regulate businesses to protect the environment?” rather than public opinion on whether an issue is justifiable, i.e. “is global warming happening?” The ANES provides several policy related variables in each policy opinion category. ANES data are used in all empirical chapters.

### 3.2.2. General Social Survey

The General Social Survey is an annual survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, and the 2016 GSS has a sample of 2,867 adults ages 18 years and older. This dataset is unique in that it includes key religious variables of interest that highlight religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. For example, included in the data are variables representing religious tradition preferences, religious conservatism/liberalism, strength of religious denominational attachment, frequency of prayer, belief in life after death,

beliefs about God, and frequency of religious activity participation. The General Social Survey is used to supplement ANES survey data in Chapter 4 (moral issues).

### 3.2.3. Economic Values Survey

The 2013 Economic Values Survey conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute has a total sample size of 2,002 adults 18 years and older. The survey was conducted between May and June 2013. The uniqueness of this dataset is twofold. First, there are a number of variables that measure religious belonging, religious behavior, and religious belief. This is especially true for the religious belief component of religiosity. Survey questions concerning Jesus' teachings, care for the poor, and views on the image of God allow for a close examination of policy preferences as a function of religious belief. Second, there are many economic policy opinion questions that focus on support for government action and intervention. The Economic Values Survey is used to supplement ANES survey data in Chapter 5.

### **3.3. Moral, Economic, Hybrid Policy Opinions**

The principal data set used in the analyses is the 2016 American National Election Survey. The 2016 General Social Survey and the 2013 Economic Values Survey are used to supplement ANES analyses. In this section, I describe the moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinion variables that are used in the analyses in Chapter 4 (Moral Policy Opinions), Chapter 5 (Economic Policy Opinions), and Chapter 6 (Hybrid Policy Opinions). 2016 ANES data are used in all three empirical chapters. GSS data are used in Chapter 4 (Moral Policy Opinions), while EVS data are used in Chapter 5 (Economic Policy Opinions). This section proceeds as follows: First, I provide descriptions of the moral issues (dependent variables) used in Chapter 4. Second, I highlight the variables of interest in Chapter 5 (dependent variables) for the economic issues

used in the models. Third, I outline the dependent variables used in the hybrid models in Chapter 6.

### 3.3.1. Moral Policy Opinions

Chiefly, the variables that are included in the following section involve “pelvic politics” or those issues that relate to the *morality of sexuality*. “Pelvic politics” was coined by Leege and Kellstedt (1993) and later used by Jelen (2009) and included abortion related issues and gay and lesbian rights. The moral or values-based policies that I include in the models rely on the division of moral policy issues outlined by Leege and Kellstedt (1993) and Jelen (2009). These policy domains include abortion legislation, and a variety of LGBTQ issues. While public opinion toward the pro-life or pro-choice debate has generally remained constant and closely divided in the last two decades (Gallup Poll 2018), there are considerable differences among the religious and religiously unaffiliated (Gallup 2018). Those who attend religious services more frequently often identify with being pro-life; whereas, the non-church attenders and the religiously unaffiliated identify with being pro-choice.

#### *Abortion*

- *ANES*: “ Which one of the opinions...best agrees with your view? (coded 0) By law, abortion should never be permitted, (coded 1) by law, only in the case of rape, incest, or woman’s life in danger, (coded 2) by law, for reasons other than rape, incest, or woman’s life in danger if need established, (coded 3) by law, abortion as a matter of personal choice.

In this dissertation, I examine closely these differences and address the influence of the three religious dimension in support for or opposition to the legality of abortion.

Opinions regarding the legality of same-sex marriage have not been as stable as opinions on the legality of abortion in recent years (Gallup 2018). However, there are also key differences among the religious and religiously unaffiliated. These differences are exemplified when frequency of church attendance is accounted for in the models (Garand and McCarthy 2016).

Frequent service attenders are more likely to not support the legality of same-sex marriage than non-frequent service attenders.

#### *Same-sex marriage*

- *ANES*. “Which comes closest to your view? (Coded 1) Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry. (Coded 0) Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry. (Coded -1) There should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple”
- *GSS*. Do you agree or disagree? Homosexual couples should have the right to marry one another’s relationship.” This variable ranges from “0” strongly disagree to “4” strongly agree.

There are several other LGBTQ issues that have been given considerable attention in recent years. These issues include anti-discrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination, the legality of abortion, required service to same-sex couples by private business owners, and the use of bathrooms by transgender individuals. In this dissertation, I include a full analysis of the influence of religion on these issues. I posit that religious behaving and religious believing will have an influence on how one evaluates LGBTQ issues. Similar to public opinion on same-sex marriage legislation, more religiously active individuals and those who hold more conservative religious beliefs will be less supportive of LGBTQ legislation.

#### *Anti-discrimination laws*

- *ANES*. “Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination? This variable ranges from “0” strongly oppose to “3” strongly favor anti-discrimination laws to protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination.

#### *Gay adoption*

- *ANES*. “Do you think gay or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt children?” This variable is coded “0” if respondent believes that gays and lesbians should not be able to adopt and “1” if gay or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt.

#### *Required service*

- *ANES*. “Do you think business owners who provide wedding-related services should be allowed to refuse services to same-sex couples if same-sex marriage violates their religious beliefs, or do you think business owners should be required to provide services regardless of a couple’s sexual orientation?” This variable ranges from “0”

strongly believes being allowed to refuse services to “5” strongly believes in business owners being required to provide services for gay and lesbian couples.

#### *Transgender bathrooms*

- *ANES*. “Should transgender people—that is, people who identify themselves as the sex or gender different from the one they were born as—have to use the bathrooms of the gender they were born as, or should they be allowed to use the bathrooms of their identified gender? This variable ranges from “0” or respondent very strongly believes that transgender people should use the bathroom of the gender they were born with to “5” or respondent very strongly believes that transgender people should be allowed to use the bathroom of their identified gender.

Sex education, and pornography laws are included in the models dealing with “pelvic politics.” It is reasonable to expect that opinions on sex education and pornography laws are influenced by one’s religiosity. I believe that religious behaving and religious belief will have an effect on these variables where those individuals who are more religiously active and hold conservative religious beliefs are more likely to not support sex education in public schools and more in favor of legislation that restricts pornography. Thus, I have included several variables that I consider “pelvic politics” in the models.

#### *Pornography laws*

- *GSS*. “Which of the following statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws: (coded 0) there should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography, (coded 1) there should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18, (coded 2) there should be laws against the distribution of pornography, whatever the age.”

#### *Sex education*

- *GSS*. “Would you be for (coded 1) or against (coded 0) sex education in the public schools?”

I also include public opinion toward issues that are not related to sexuality. End of life issues including assisted suicide and the death penalty are considered moral/values-based policies in the models because they have values-based or ethical components. These issues deal with the legality of ending a life. In particular, the death penalty involves a governing body



taking a life as ultimate punishment (Koopman 2009). Gallup (2018) trends demonstrate that the public is largely divided on the death penalty for a person convicted of murder, where 56% of the public is in support of the death penalty and 41% is opposed. I suspect that religion has an effect on one's belief assisted suicide and the death penalty because these two issues involve the ending of life.

#### *Assisted suicide*

- GSS. "When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?" This variable is coded "0" if respondent disagrees and "1" if the respondent agrees that doctors should be allowed by law to end a patient's life if requested.

#### *Capital Punishment*

- ANES. "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" This variable ranges from "0" strongly opposes the death penalty to "3" strongly supports the death penalty.
- GSS. "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" The variable is coded a "0" if respondent opposes the death penalty and "1" if the responded favors the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.

Lastly, religion arguably influences opinions on prayer in public places. While the legality of prayer in public schools has been consistently popular among the American public (Green and Guth 1989; Gallup 2014) there are considerable differences among religious traditions. Catholics are less likely to support prayer in public schools (Delfattore 2004) than other religious denominations. However, Jelen (2009) points out one important caveat: school prayer is important for both individuals who believe that religion is important *and* those individuals who believe that religion is not an important part of their daily life.

#### *Prayer in schools*

- GSS. "The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What are your views on this? Do you approve or disapprove of the court ruling?" This

variable is coded “0” if respondent disapproves of the court ruling and “1” if the respondent approves of the court ruling.

In this dissertation, I shed light on policy opinions toward these moral or value- based issues and address the current climate of public opinion through full empirical analyses that capture the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing.

In sum, the following variables are used in the analyses in Chapter 4:

**Table 3.1.** Moral/value-based policy opinion variables

American National Election Survey	Abortion Anti-discrimination laws (same-sex) Gay adoption Required service (same-sex) Transgender bathroom Death penalty
General Social Survey	Gay marriage Assisted suicide Pornography laws Sex education Prayer Death penalty

### 3.3.2. Economic Policy Opinions

Scholars have noted important differences among religious traditions and opinions on economic policy positions (Smidt 2001; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007; Wilson 2009). Overall, the extant scholarly literature demonstrates that Jewish adherents and black Protestant express liberal views on economic policies, Catholics and mainline Protestant hold moderate economic policy opinions and evangelical protestants favor conservative economic policy opinions. In addition to these findings, my coauthors and I have found that religious belief is related to economic policy opinions. Individuals who believe in preserving traditional religious beliefs are more likely to hold progressive economic policy opinions (McCarthy et al. 2016).

I include variables representing three economic policy domains in the models (1) government service, (2) government spending, (3) fiscal or monetary policies . I consider an issue to be economic if it involves monetary compensation by the government or opinions on fiscal policies including the deficit reduction, raising taxes, the government's role in reducing economic inequality, and increasing the minimum wage.

There are fewer scholarly works on the relationship between religion and economic policy opinions than on the relationship between religion and moral policy concerns. However, public opinion on government service and government spending has been long documented by data analytic sources such as Gallup, Pew Research Center, and the Public Religion Research Institute. Overall findings demonstrate that there are significant differences between Democrat and Republican identifiers, where Democrats often hold more liberal economic policy opinions and Republican are more conservative in their economic policy opinions. Thus, I argue that religion influences economic policy opinions where those who hold more conservative religious beliefs (and/or are members of a conservative religious tradition) are more likely to support conservative economic policy. Conversely, those individuals who believe in more progressive religious beliefs (and/or who are members of progressive religious traditions) will be more likely to support liberal economic policies.

Thus, the dependent variables that are included in the economic policy opinion models are as follows:

#### *Government service*

- *ANES*. The *government service* variable is a 7-point scale that ranges from “0” or the government should provide fewer services to “6” or the government should provide more services.
- *EVS*. “It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of themselves?” This variable ranges from “0” or completely disagree to “3” completely agree.

### *Government spending*

- *ANES*. There are several variables that involve public opinion toward government spending included in the models: *spending on social security*, *spending on crime*, *spending on welfare*, and *spending on the poor*. These variables are all coded “1” if the respondent reports favoring increased government spending, “0” if the respondent favors keeping spending the same, and “-1” if the respondent supports decreased spending.
- *ANES*. There are two variables regarding government spending that are coded on a 7-point scale: *healthcare spending* and *defense spending*. Like the other government spending variables, high values denote favorability in increasing government spending and low values denote favorability in decreasing government spending.
- *EVS*. *Spending on social services*. This variable asks respondents if they completely agree (coded 3), mostly agree (coded 2), mostly disagree (coded 1), completely disagree (coded 0) on whether the “government is providing too many social services that should be left to religious groups and private charities.”

### *Deficit reduction*

- *ANES*. “How important is it to reduce the deficit?” This variable is coded “4” if extremely important, “3” if very important, “2” if reducing the deficit is moderately important, “1” if it is a little important to reduce the deficit, and “0” if the respondent believes that it is not important at all to reduce the national deficit.

### *Taxes*

- *ANES*. The variable *tax* is coded “2” if respondent supports increasing taxes on millionaires, “1” if respondent feels neutral about increasing taxes on millionaires, and “0” if the respondent is opposed to increasing taxes on millionaires.
- *EVS*. The variable ranges from “0” strongly oppose to “3” strongly favor “increasing the tax rate on Americans earning more than \$250,000 a year.”

### *Inequality*

- *ANES*. “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government trying to reduce the difference in incomes between the richest and poorest household?” This variable ranges from “0” or strongly opposes government action to reduce inequality to “4” or strongly agrees that the government should reduce inequality.
- *EVS*. “The government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and poor.” This variable ranges from “0” or completely disagree to “3” or completely agree.

### *Minimum Wage*

- *ANES*. The variable *minimum wage* is coded “0” if the respondent believes that the minimum wage should be decreased or eliminated, “1” if the minimum wage should be kept the same, and “2” if the respondent believes that the minimum wage in the United States should be increased.
- *EVS*. The variable ranges from “0” or strongly oppose to “3” or strongly favor “increasing the minimum wage from \$7.25 an hour to \$10.00 an hour.”

In sum, there are two datasets used in the empirical analyses of Chapter 5 (Economic Policy Opinions): 2016 ANES and the 2013 EVS. I explore the effect of the three dimensions of religion on economic policy opinion. I argue that conservative religious beliefs yield general conservative economic policy opinions. In addition, I argue that more progressive religious beliefs yield progressive economic policy opinions. In Table 3.2 , summarize the economic variables used in the analyses in Chapter 5.

**Table 3.2.** Economic policy opinion variables

American National Election Survey	Government service Government spending <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- social security</li> <li>- crime</li> <li>- welfare</li> <li>- poor</li> <li>- healthcare</li> <li>- defense</li> </ul> Deficit reduction Taxes Inequality Minimum wage
Economic Values Survey	Government responsibility Social services spending Taxes Inequality Minimum wage

### 3.3.3. Hybrid Policy Opinions

The last set of policy opinions include those issues that can have both moral and economic components. For example, building a border wall with Mexico has a moral component if related to human rights issues and an economic component if related to government spending. There are three hybrid policy categories that are included in the analyses: immigration, the

environment, and foreign policy. In Chapter 6, I use 2016 ANES data for all analyses. Therefore, the variable description below is exclusive to ANES data.

The first hybrid policy category involves immigration policy opinions. Previous research has highlighted difference among conservative and liberal identifiers in their opinions on immigration where conservatives are more likely to favor immigration restrictions and liberals are more likely to favor increasing immigration (Gallup Poll 2019). I suspect that religion influences immigration policy opinions in several ways. First, if an individual is a member of an ethnic or racial religious minority (Hispanic Catholics), then they will be more likely to want to increase immigration than those individuals of ethnic or racial religious majorities (Catholics). I also expect that those individuals who hold progressive religious beliefs will be more likely to hold progressive beliefs on immigration than those who hold conservative religious beliefs. This is due in part to progressive/conservative religious teaching that include interpretations of Jesus' teaching and biblical literalism.

I include four measures of immigration policy in the models in Chapter 6.

#### *Immigration*

- *Immigration Level.* "What should immigration levels be?" The variable ranges from "0" or immigration to be decreased a lot to "4" or immigration should be increased a lot.
- *Citizenship.* This variable deals with citizenship and ranges from "0" or oppose birthright citizenship to "6" or support for birthright citizenship.
- *Syrian refugees.* This variable ranges from "0" or strongly opposes allowing Syrian refugees in the United States to "6" or strongly supports allowing Syrian refugees in the United States.
- *Border wall.* This variable ranges from "0" or strongly opposes building a border wall with Mexico to "6" or strongly supports building a border wall with Mexico.

The next hybrid policy domain deals with the environmental policy concerns. Scholars have long noted the role of religion in public opinion toward the environment. Most notably, there are differences in the existence of global warming among religious traditions where

evangelical Protestants are less likely to believe that global warming exists than other religious traditions (Shao et al. 2016). For the purposes of this dissertation, I am interested not in the belief of the existence of global warming but environmental policy opinions. Thus, I measure public opinion on environmental policy as environment/job protection and spending on the environment.

#### *Environment*

- *Environment/job protection.* The environment-jobs tradeoff self-placement scale ranges from “0” or “no regulation because it will not work and will cost jobs” to “6” or “regulate business to protect the environment and create jobs.”
- *Spending.* The variable is coded “-1” if the respondent supports decreasing spending on the environment, “0” if spending on the environment should be kept the same, and “1” if the government should increase spending on the environment.

Based on previous research, I argue that religious belonging (denomination), religious behaving (service attendance), and religious believing (doctrinal belief) has an influence on environmental policy positions (Shao and McCarthy, forthcoming).

The last hybrid policy issue that I consider in this dissertation is foreign policy as it relates to free trade and the United States Military. Few scholars have addressed the issue of religion and foreign policy concerns; however, James Guth’s (2009) work on the intersection of religion and foreign policy opinion demonstrates that there are considerable effects of religion on foreign policy opinions accounting for religious tradition, religious behavior, and religious beliefs in the models. In Chapter 6, I highlight which dimension of religion influence foreign policy opinions. I argue that progressive/conservative religious beliefs are associated with progressive/conservative foreign policy opinions.

#### *Foreign Policy*

- *Military.* This variable ranges from “0” or strongly opposes sending troops to fight ISIS to “6” or strongly supports sending troops to fight ISIS.
- *Free trade.* The variable also ranges from “0” or strongly opposes free trade agreements to “6” strongly favors free trade agreements.

In sum, I consider hybrid issues to include those policies that have both moral and economic components. There is limited scholarly research on all three hybrid policy opinions that I examine in this dissertation. Perhaps the most abundant line of literature (still limited) is religion and its effects on public opinion toward the environment. The limited existing research demonstrates that religion plays a significant role in how individuals think about immigration, the environment, and foreign policy. Table 3.3 summarizes the dependent variables in Chapter 6.

**Table 3.3.** Hybrid policy opinion variables

American National Election Survey	<p>Immigration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- immigration level</li> <li>- citizenship policy</li> <li>- refugees</li> <li>- border wall</li> </ul> <p>Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- environment/job protection</li> <li>- spending</li> </ul> <p>Foreign policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- military</li> <li>- free trade</li> </ul>
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### 3.4. Religious Belonging, Religious Behaving, Religious Believing

There are three major components of religiosity that are included in the models in subsequent chapters. The coding classification is influenced on the coding schema presented by Steensland et al. (2000), Layman (2001), Smidt et. al (2009), and Putnam and Campbell (2010). The analyses that I present in this dissertation focus on measuring religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing *separately* to tease out differences among these religious components and discern their effects on overall policy opinions as it relates to several moral, economic, and hybrid policy concerns.



### 3.4.1. Religious Belonging

*ANES*. For the religious belonging variables, I have separated individuals into eight religious denominations or traditions: mainline Protestant, black Protestant, evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Hispanic Catholic, other Christian, Jewish, and other (non-Christian) religion.<sup>6</sup> Those individuals who do not identify with a religious denomination or tradition—i.e. seculars, atheists, agnostics, and the nones—are the excluded or contrast group in the models. Scholars have long noted important differences among these religious groups (Stark and Glock 1968; Sernett 1991; Green et al. 1996; Steensland et al. 2000; among others). Chiefly, Protestantism should be classified to include distinctions among mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical Protestants. There are distinct differences among these religious groups in terms of religious practices (religious behaving) and doctrinal belief (religious belonging) (Hertzke et al. 2019). For example, evangelical Protestants tend to believe in the literal interpretation of the Bible; whereas, mainline Protestants are more likely to interpret the Bible as inspired by God rather than the literal word of God. Black Protestants often hold conservative positions on biblical literalism or theology, believing that the Bible is the word of God, and a progressive interpretation of Jesus' message and teachings in the Bible. Black Protestants interpret God's message as requiring social (or government acts) to uplift the poor in society (Hertzke et al. 2019; McDaniel 2008). In light of these differences, mainline Protestant is coded 1 for those individuals who report being non-black and a member of the mainline Protestant faith and 0 for all other respondents. Black Protestant is coded 1 for black respondents who also identify with being a Protestant and 0 for all other respondents. The evangelical

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<sup>6</sup> I have coded the variables the same for *ANES*, *GSS*, and *EVS* datasets.

variable is coded 1 for those individuals who are non-black evangelical Protestants and 0 for all other respondents.

There are also key distinctions between white and Hispanic Catholics including religious behaving and religious beliefs. For example, Hispanic Catholics tend to hold more conservative views on moral policy issues such as same-sex marriage than white Catholics (Pew Research Center 2017). Hispanic Catholics interpret the Bible and the teaching of the Catholic Church to favor the uplifting of the poor in society through social or government programs (Hertzke et. al 2019); whereas, non-Hispanic Catholics tend to take a more middle of the road position on biblical literalism and social programs. Catholic is coded 1 for individuals who identify as being Catholic and non-Hispanic and 0 for all other respondents. Hispanic Catholic is coded 1 for individuals who identify as both Hispanic and Catholic, and 0 otherwise. Christian is coded 1 for those individuals who report being a member of another Christian group (excluding Mainline Protestant, black Protestant, evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Hispanic Catholic faiths) and 0 for all other respondents. Jewish is coded 1 for individuals who identify with the Jewish faith and 0 otherwise. Other religion includes other non-Christian religious faiths (i.e. Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc.) and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the excluded category in the models is those individuals who do not associate with a religious denomination or tradition. This variable is coded 1 if the respondent is agnostic, atheist, or secular and 0 otherwise.

I also include in the religious denomination category a variable that captures both religious tradition (belonging) and religious ideology (believing). The question asks respondents to classify their religion as fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal. I use this variable in the GSS models. I have coded the variable 2 if respondent reports their religion is fundamentalist, a 1 if the respondent reports that their religion is moderate, and 0 if their religion is liberal. I include

this variable in the religious belonging category because it involves the classification of the respondent's religious traditions into fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal categories. Therefore, I believe that this variable is another measure of religious belonging. However, this variable also taps into religious belief.

*GSS.* In the GSS religious belonging is separated into four major categories: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Other Religion. In addition, I have separated Protestants into three groups: mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and black Protestants. I code mainline Protestants a 1 for those individuals who report being both non-black and Protestant respondents and 0 otherwise. Evangelical Protestants as those individuals who report being both (1) born again and (2) Protestant. Likewise, the black Protestant variable is coded 1 if individuals report being both (1) black and (2) a Protestant. In addition, Catholics are separated between Hispanic and other Catholics. Catholics are coded a 1 for individuals who identify with being non-Hispanic and Catholic and 0 otherwise. Hispanic Catholic is coded a 1 for individuals who report being both Hispanic and Catholic and 0 otherwise. Jewish is coded 1 for individuals who associate with the Jewish tradition and 0 otherwise. Other religious tradition is coded 1 for those members of other religious faiths. The contrast (or excluded) category are those individuals who are religiously unaffiliated. The unaffiliated variable is coded 1 if the respondent reports being unaffiliated or having no religion and 0 otherwise.

*EVS.* The variables in the Economic Values Survey have a similar coding schema to the religious belonging variables in the ANES and the GSS. The variable mainline Protestant is coded 1 for those individuals who are white, non-born-again Protestants and 0 otherwise. Black Protestant is coded 1 for respondents who are both black and Protestant and 0 otherwise. Evangelical Protestant is coded 1 for respondents who are white, born again, and Protestant and

0 for all other respondents. Catholic is coded 1 for all white Catholics and 0 otherwise. Hispanic Catholic is coded 1 for those individuals who report being both Hispanic and Catholic and 0 otherwise. The variable Jewish is coded 1 for all Jewish adherents and 0 otherwise. The variable other religion is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of other religious traditions and 0 otherwise. The excluded (contrast) group is those individuals who are religiously unaffiliated or report belonging to no religious tradition.

I posit that there are among and within denominational differences in policy opinions. I present these differences among the various religious traditions and their influence on policy opinions in my analysis chapters. I argue that race (i.e. black Protestant vs. mainline and evangelical Protestant), ethnicity (Hispanic Catholic vs. Catholic), and culture (fundamentalist, moderate, liberal religious tradition) are among the major contributors to these differences in moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.

### 3.4.2. Behaving

The next component of religion is religious behaving. Traditionally, scholars have included religious behaving in their research in the form of church attendance and frequency of prayer. I use these variables in the models in my analysis chapters. I argue that rote religious behavior is generally related to conservative moral policy opinions and liberal economic policy with a few distinct exceptions that are discussed at length in my analyses chapters.

The American National Election Survey has two variables that are related to religious behaving: *service attendance* and *religious contributions*. *Service attendance* is measured based on how often individuals attend religious services. The categories range from never attending services to attending services more than once per week. The variable *religious contributions* is coded 1 if respondent has contributed to a religious group in the past 12 months and 0 otherwise.

The General Social Survey has several variables relating to religious behaving: service attendance, frequency of religious activity participation, frequency of prayer, and religious conversion. *Religious service attendance* measures the frequency of which an individual attends religious services and ranges from never attending religious services to attending services more than once a week. Frequency of religious activity participation is a variable that measures how often respondents take part in church activities. The variable ranges from 0 or never participating in a religious activity to 10 or once per day. Frequency of prayer encapsulates how often respondents pray and ranges from 0 or never to 6 or several times per day. Lastly, the GSS provides a unique variable labeled religious conversion that asks respondents if they have every tried to encourage someone to believe or accept Jesus Christ. The variable is coded 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. The Economic Values Survey has one religious behaving variable: religious service attendance. Religious service attendance is coded 5 for those individuals who report attending religious services more than once a week to 0 or never attending religious services.

Overall, I argue that religious behaving is positively related to moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. Those individuals who attend religious services more frequently, pray more often, participate in religious activity, financially contribute to religious organizations, and who are involved in religious conversations are more likely to hold conservative moral policy opinion views. The effect of the religious behaving variable on economic and hybrid policy opinions is less clear. On one hand, I argue that those individuals who are members of certain religious denominations (i.e. black Protestants) and participate in religious services and religious activity are more likely to hold liberal economic policy positions due to religious culture and doctrinal teachings. On the other hand, other religious traditions (i.e. Evangelical Protestants) are more likely to hold conservative economic policy positions when they are involved in religious

participation and activity, also due to religious culture and doctrinal teachings. It is important to measure the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing separately in the models to discern differences in public opinion especially as it relates to the less documented policy issues such as gun regulations or immigration reform.

### 3.4.3. Religious Believing

The final component of religion that I use in this dissertation is religious believing. In previous research, my co-authors and I have combined aspects of religious believing to create a religiosity scale that includes religious importance, biblical literalism, and beliefs about relationship with God (McCarthy, Olson, and Garand forthcoming 2019). In this dissertation, I am concerned with how the specific components of religious believing influence moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. Therefore, I include measures of religious importance, religious guidance, biblical literalism, and spirituality in the models using ANES data. In the models using GSS data, I include belief in life after death, biblical literalism, belief about God, strength of religiosity, and strength of spirituality. The Economic Values Survey dataset contains the following religious believing variables: biblical literalism, belief in the image of God, religious importance in daily life, conservative/progressive religious beliefs, and the interpretation of Jesus' teachings.

*ANES.* I begin with the variables from the ANES survey. Religious importance is a binary variable that is coded 1 if religion is an important part of one's daily life and 0 if religion is not an important part of daily life. Religious guidance is measured using a 4-point scale ranging from 0 or no guidance in day-to-day living, 1 some guidance in daily living, 2 quite a bit of guidance, to 3 or a great deal of guidance in daily life. Biblical literalism captures one's belief in whether the Bible is the literal word of God (coded 2), word of God but is not the literal word (coded 1),

or not the word of God (coded 0). Lastly, Spirituality is a dichotomous variable that highlights whether a respondent considers herself spiritual (coded 1) or not spiritual (coded 0).

*GSS.* I have used similar GSS variables. The variable post life measures whether an individual believes in a life after death, coded a 1 when the respondent reported yes and 0 when a respondent did not report believing in life after death. Similar to the biblical literalism variable used in ANES data models, biblical literalism is coded a 0 if the Bible is an ancient book of fables, 1 if the Bible is the inspired word of God but should not be taken literally, and 2 if the Bible is the actual word of God. The variable God ranges from 0 to 5, where respondents range from reporting no belief in God (coded 0) to complete belief in the existence of God (coded 5). The last set of variables, strength of religiosity and strength of spirituality, are consisted of 4-categories that ranges from not religious/not spiritual (coded 0) to very religious/very spiritual (coded 4). The General Social Survey is unique in that it also offers a variable that asks respondents about the fundamentalism or liberalism of the respondent's religion.

*EVS.* Regarding EVS data, biblical literalism is coded 1 if the respondent believes that the Bible is the word of God and 0 if the respondent believes that the Bible is a book written by men and not by God. The image of God variable captures whether respondents believe that God exists and if they can have a personal relationship with God. The variable is coded 2 if the respondent believes that God is a person, 1 if God is an impersonal force, and 0 if there is no God. or there is no God (coded 0). Religious importance ranges from 0 for religion is not important to 3 religion is the most important thing in life. The variable preserve beliefs is coded 0 if respondents believe that religion should adopt modern beliefs, coded 1 if religious beliefs should be adjusted considering new circumstances, and coded 2 if beliefs and practices should be preserved. This variable is particularly important in the analyses because it highlights the degree

to which individuals believe that biblical teaching should remain resistant to changes in society or that religious teachings should change and reflect societal demands. Lastly, the variable care for the poor highlights the interpretation of Jesus' teachings. There are 5 categories that range from 0 (Jesus promoted private charity) to 4 (Jesus promoted a just society in his teachings).

I posit that religious belief will influence moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. In general, conservative religious beliefs are related to more conservative policy opinions. In my analyses chapters I discuss specific nuances in the findings.

In Table 3.4, I provide an overview of the three dimensions of religion: religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing and the variables that are included in proceeding analyses.

In sum, I use ANES, GSS, and EVS survey data in the empirical chapters to shed light on effect of the three major dimensions of religion: religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. Measured separately in the models, these components provide the basic framework for understanding which aspects of religion influence which policy opinion domain. Throughout this project I attempt to retain the coding scheme of the variables so that conclusions can be drawn and compared among sets of analyses.



**Table 3.4.** Religious dimension variables

	<b>Belonging</b>	<b>Behaving</b>	<b>Believing</b>
American National Election Survey	Mainline Protestant Black Protestant Evangelical Protestant Catholic Hispanic Catholic Other Christian Jewish Other non-Christian Unaffiliated (excluded group)	Service attendance Religious contributions	Religious importance Religious guidance Biblical literalism Spirituality
General Social Survey	Mainline Protestant Black Protestant Evangelical Protestant Catholic Hispanic Catholic Jewish Other Religion Religious tradition strength Religious fundamentalism Unaffiliated (excluded group)	Service attendance Religious activity participation Frequency of prayer Religious conversion	Post life Biblical literalism Belief in God Strength of religiosity Strength of spirituality
2013 Economic Development Survey	Mainline Protestant Black Protestant Evangelical Protestant Catholic Hispanic Catholic Jewish Other faith Unaffiliated (excluded group)	Service attendance	Biblical literalism Image of God Religious importance Preserve beliefs Care for the poor

### 3.5. A Note on Political and Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables

I include standard political and socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models.

Overall these variables are coded the same in ANES, GSS, and EVS datasets.

#### 3.5.1. Political Variables

Partisan identification is a 6 point-scale where a 6 represents identification as a strong Republican and 0 represents identification with being a strong Democrat. Likewise, political ideology is a 6-point scale where a 6 represents identification with being a strong conservative

and 0 represents identification with being a strong liberal. I expect partisan identification and political ideology to have a significant effect in the models. Republican and conservatives will hold conservative policy opinions; whereas, Democrats and liberals will hold progressive policy opinions.

### 3.5.2. Socioeconomic/Demographic Variables

Black, Hispanic, and Asian are all (exclusively) coded 1 if the respondent identifies as being black, Hispanic, or Asian and 0 otherwise. Gender is coded 0 if the respondent is a man and 1 if the respondent is a woman. Married is coded 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise. I included married in the models because previous research demonstrates that marital status has an effect on a variety of moral and economic policy opinions. Age is the respondents age in years. Education is the respondent's education on a seven-point scale (6-point scale for GSS data) ranging from 0 or less than 8<sup>th</sup> grade education to 6 or post-graduate education. Lastly, household income ranges from 0 or low income to 27 or high income. Household income ranges from 0 or low income to 6 or high income for GSS and EVS data.

## 3.6. Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the three major datasets that are used in the analyses in Chapter 4 through Chapter 6. There are three major data sources: 2016 ANES, 2016 GSS, and the 2013 EVS. In addition, I highlight the key variables that are used in the empirical chapters. The main independent variables used in the models can be clustered into three groups: religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. Likewise, the dependent variables can be clustered into three policy opinion domains: moral policy opinions, economic policy opinions, and hybrid policy opinions. In the following chapters, I provide supporting evidence for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, I provide analyses to support the hypotheses relating to moral or values-based policy issues. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate the

effect of religion on economic policy opinions. In Chapter 6, I highlight the effects of religion on hybrid policy opinions.

## **Chapter 4. Moral Policy Opinions**

### **4.1. Introduction**

In this chapter, I explore the effects of the three dimensions of religion on moral or values-based policy issues. Using data from the 2016 ANES survey, I estimate the effects of the three dimensions of religion on moral policies relating to LGBTQ rights: (3) same-sex marriage, (5) anti-discrimination laws against same-sex couples, legalized gay adoption, (5) requiring businesses to provide services over their religious objections to same-sex couples, and (6) use of transgender bathrooms. I also present two models that estimate the effect of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on opinions toward (1) abortion policy and (2) the death penalty. Using 2016 GSS data, I present the findings for the effects of religious belonging, religious having, and religious believing on opinions toward (1) same-sex marriage and (2) the death penalty. In addition to the ANES variables, the 2016 GSS is unique in that it provides variables concerning public opinion toward (3) assisted suicide, (4) pornography laws, (4) sex education, and (5) prayer in public schools that serve as dependent variables in the models.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present a series of bivariate analyses of select moral values-based policy opinions. The two issues that I have included in these preliminary analyses are public opinion toward abortion legislation and public opinion regarding the legality of same-sex marriage. I have chosen these two issues because they reflect current and important—and often debated—moral policy issues. There is considerable existing scholarly literature that discusses the effects of religion on opinion toward abortion and same-sex marriage policy opinion; however, these studies are limited in scope because they do not include all three religious dimensions in the models. The first set of preliminary analyses highlight the importance of measuring religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing separately in the

models. Overall, the bivariate results show that there are variations among religious traditions and opinions toward abortion policy and same-sex marriage legislation. The results also reveal within-denominational difference among Protestants. Differences among church attenders and non-church attenders in public opinion toward abortion and same-sex marriage legislation again show the importance of including the religious behaving dimension in the overall models. Lastly, biblical literalists and those individuals who believe that religion is important report different opinions on abortion and same-sex marriage legislation than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God and those who believe that religion is not an important part of their daily lives.

In the second section, I present a series of ordered logistic and logistic regression models that estimate the effects of the independent variables (religious dimensions) and public opinion on moral/values-based policy issues (dependent variables). Overall, the results of these analyses highlight significant differences in the effects of the religious dimensions on public opinion toward moral or values-based issues. In addition, these results show that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing contribute to how individuals think about public policy issues. Lastly, I end this chapter with an overall picture of the influence of the religious dimensions on policy opinions. In the concluding section, I also offer remarks about future projects.

## **4.2. Religious Dimensions**

In this section, I present four sets of bivariate analyses to demonstrate the importance of measuring religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing separately in the full empirical models included later in this chapter. In 4.2.1, I explore the effects of the first dimension of religion—religious belonging. Religious belonging is divided among four groups:

(1) Protestants, (2) Catholics, (3) Jews, and (4) other. In another set of preliminary bivariate models, I separate Protestants into three groups: (1) mainline Protestants, (2) evangelical Protestants, and (3) black Protestants. The division of these groups is based on previous literature and the classification schema provided by scholars in the field of religion and politics (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of measurement). In 4.2.2, I am interested in the second dimension of religion—religious behaving. As an example, I include church service attendance as a measure of religious behaving. The preliminary results expose differences among church attenders and non-attenders on moral policy opinions, highlighting the importance of including religious behaving in models that explore the influence of religion on moral or value-based policy concerns. In 4.2.3, I am concerned with the last dimension of religion—religious believing. Perhaps the most complicated measure of religion, I have chosen two measures of religious believing (biblical literalism and religious importance) to explain differences in public opinion on abortion legislation and same-sex marriage policy opinions.

#### 4.2.1. Religious Belonging

Consistent with previous scholarly research, I have included religious denomination or religious traditions in the belonging dimension of religion. Scholars have exposed differences among religious traditions—i.e., Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other Christian, and non-Christian faiths. In Table 4.1, I highlight the differences in public opinion on abortion regulation and same-sex marriage among four religious traditions: Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and other Christian and non-Christian adherents. The results of the preliminary analyses reveal significant differences among the religious traditions ( $\chi^2 = 83.5431$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Most notably, nearly 80% of those who identify with being Jewish believe that abortion should be legal in all circumstances; whereas, 34% of Protestants, 40% of Catholics and 42% of other religious

identifiers believe that abortion should be legal in all circumstances. In addition, only 3.57% of Jews believe that abortion should never be allowed compared to nearly 17% of Protestants, 13% of Catholics, and 16% of other religious adherents. Regarding same-sex marriage, nearly 84% of Jews reported being in favor of same-sex marriage; whereas, 43% of Protestants, 61% of Catholics and nearly 52% of other religious believers reported supporting same-sex marriage. In addition, there are large differences among religious traditions and those individuals who believe that there should be no legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Specifically, 25% of Protestants, 10% of Catholics, 6% of Jews, and 30% of other religious groups believe that there should be no legal recognition of same-sex marriages. These bivariate results are also statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 178.9776$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ), demonstrating variation among the religious denominations in support for same-sex marriage legislation. These denominational differences are noteworthy insofar as they provide the first step in understanding differences in public opinion as a function of religious belonging and as it relates to certain policy issues.

The distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage reveal that there are noteworthy differences among religious traditions. These results suggest that religious belonging (measured as religious tradition or denominational affiliation) has the potential to greatly influence public policy opinions. Specifically, I find—albeit just a bivariate finding—that Jews hold progressive policy opinions. Without considering within denominational differences, Protestants, Catholics, and other religious groups take a moderate standpoint on policy opinions concerning abortion and a progressive standpoint concerning LGBTQ issues. Protestants, Catholics and other religious groups collectively take a moderate standpoint on certain issues because there is great variation within these religious traditions. For example, when Hispanic Catholics are separated from other Catholics, Catholics in general take a more progressive or

liberal stance on policy issues. Hispanic Catholics are relatively conservative compared to other Catholics. Again, these differences can be explained through the ethnoreligious lens where social group interaction influences opinions. Hispanic Catholic congregations are often more conservative in their viewpoints. In the next section I will discuss these within denominational differences.

**Table 4.1** distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage, 2016 ANES

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other
Abortion				
Never allowed	16.72%	12.72%	3.57%	16.44%
Rape, incest, life of mother	31.88%	32.25%	8.33%	26.97%
Many reasons	17.16%	14.56%	8.33%	14.81%
All circumstances	34.23%	40.45%	79.76%	41.78%
Total	100	100	100	100
N	1,148	927	84	1,168
$\chi^2$	83.5431			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			
Same-sex marriage				
No legal recognition	24.45%	10.41%	5.88%	27.92%
Civil Union	32.23%	28.31%	10.59%	20.19%
Marriage allowed	43.32%	61.28%	83.53%	51.89%
Total	100	100	100	100
N	1,145	922	85	1,164
$\chi^2$	178.9776			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			

While fleshing out denominational differences is useful in understanding the role that religious groups play in shaping public opinion. Indeed, it can be problematic to measure the influence of religions solely based on religious traditions. To exemplify this point, in Table 4.2, I



outline the within denominational differences among Protestants regarding policy attitudes toward abortion ( $\chi^2 = 188.0717$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and same-sex marriage ( $\chi^2 = 133.0976$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). For example, there is large variation in opinion regarding abortion as it relates to whether abortion should be allowed under any circumstances. Evangelical Protestants are the group most against abortion (nearly 27%) followed by black Protestants (nearly 16%) and mainline Protestants (nearly 7%). Conversely, 19% of evangelical Protestants believe that abortion should be allowed in all circumstances, compared to over 43% of mainline Protestants and 52% of black Protestants who believe in unrestricted abortion. Similarly, mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical Protestants hold differing views regarding same-sex marriage. Evangelical Protestants report support for no legal recognition (40%); on the other hand, many mainline Protestants (nearly 60%) and black Protestants (nearly 46%) believe that same-sex marriages should be allowed.

These preliminary results demonstrate that there are noteworthy within-denominational differences and it is important to account for these differences in the overall models. I posit that religious belonging—denominational affiliations within and among religious traditions—contributes to moral policy opinions. Specifically, there are key differences in moral policy opinions among mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants and Non-Hispanic and Hispanic Catholics.

**Table 4.2** distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage among Protestants, 2016 ANES

		<b>Mainline Protestants</b>	<b>Evangelical Protestants</b>	<b>Black Protestants</b>
Abortion	Never allowed	6.59%	26.77%	15.74%
	Rape, incest, life of the mother	26.69%	37.88%	18.30%
	Many reasons	18.37%	16.50%	13.62%
	All circumstances	48.35%	18.86%	52.34%
	Total	100	100	100
	N	557	594	235
	$\chi^2$ Prob( $\chi^2$ )	188.0717 0.000		
Same-sex Marriage	No legal recognition	14.06%	40.07%	37.02%
	Civil Union	26.91%	28.62%	17.45%
	Marriage allowed	59.03%	31.31%	45.53%
	Total	100	100	100
	N	576	594	235
	$\chi^2$ Prob( $\chi^2$ )	133.0976 0.000		

#### 4.2.2. Religious Behaving

I use worship attendance as the key indicator of religious behaving in the models. Other components of religious behaving include (1) religious contributions, (2) religious activity or participation not including worship attendance, (3) frequency of prayer, and (4) participation in a religious conversion. However, worship attendance has been found to be a strong general indicator of religious behaving, so for the sake of brevity I focus attention on this variable. Scholars have demonstrated that those individuals who attend church more frequently often hold

more conservative moral policy opinions. Based on these findings, I argue that religious behaving—measured as religious participation or activity—contributes to moral policy opinions. Those individuals who exhibit greater religious behaving will hold more conservative moral policy opinions.

In Table 4.3, I demonstrate significant differences between church attenders and non-church among the various religious traditions. Indeed, differences among church attenders and non-church attenders exist among all reported religious traditions—Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and other religious adherents—regarding opinions on abortion policy and same-sex marriage. Among church attenders, Protestants, Catholics, Jewish, and other religious adherents report that abortion should be legal in all circumstances less frequently than those non-church attenders. This is especially true for Protestants and Catholic identifiers. In addition, church attenders are less likely to report that same-sex marriage should be allowed than those non-church attenders. Indeed, the number of Protestants, Catholics, and other religious individuals nearly doubled in their approval of same-sex marriage among non-church attenders. The distribution of attitudes toward abortion policy among church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 55.7687$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and non-church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 21.1328$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.012$ ) and the distribution of attitudes toward same-sex marriage among church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 124.9176$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and non-church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 33.5340$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) is statistically significant.

**Table 4.3** distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage among church attenders and non-church attenders, 2016 ANES

		Church attenders				Non-church attenders			
Abortion		Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other
	Never allowed	19.58%	14.91%	4.35%	18.74%	5.86%	7.93%	2.63%	9.73%
	Rape, incest, life of mother	33.88%	36.58%	10.87%	28.74%	24.27%	22.76%	5.26%	21.81%
	Many reasons	16.83%	14.44%	10.87%	14.83%	18.41%	14.83%	5.26%	14.77%
	All circumstances	29.70%	34.07%	73.91%	37.70%	51.46%	54.48%	86.84%	53.69%
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		909	637	46	870	239	290	38	298
$\chi^2$		55.7689				21.1328			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000				0.012			
Same-sex marriage		Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other
	No legal recognition	27.78%	12.66%	8.70%	32.49%	11.76%	5.52%	2.56%	14.72%
	Civil Union	33.85%	32.28%	17.38%	21.39%	26.05%	19.66%	2.56%	16.72%
	Marriage allowed	38.37%	55.06%	73.91%	46.13%	62.18%	74.83%	94.87%	68.56%
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		907	632	46	865	238	290	39	299
$\chi^2$		124.9176				33.5340			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000				0.000			

#### 4.2.3. Religious Believing

The effects of religious beliefs are less documented than the effects of the religious belonging and religious behaving dimensions of religion. However, scholars have noted differences among those individuals who hold traditional or conservative religious beliefs. In Table 4.4, I present bivariate results of religious belief differences including biblical literalism and religious importance in the models.

Biblical literalism is associated with negative attitudes toward abortion ( $\chi^2 = 952.2676$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and sex-sex marriage legislation ( $\chi^2 = 1.0003$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Individuals who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God report approval for abortion in all circumstances (19.88%) significantly less than those individuals who believe that the Bible is not the literal word of God (75%). Similar attitudes are reported for beliefs concerning the legality of same-sex marriage. Twenty-eight percent of people who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God report supporting same-sex marriage; whereas, 83% of individuals who do not believe that the Bible is the literal word of God support same-sex marriage. Overall, biblical literalism plays a significant role in attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage

In addition, individuals who consider religious salient or an important part of their day to day lives are generally unfavorable of abortion in all circumstances or believe that abortion should only be legal in specific circumstances such as rape, incest, or life of the mother ( $\chi^2 = 556.4358$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Religious importance is also related to opinions on same-sex marriage. Those who believe that religion is important report unfavorable opinions on allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry ( $\chi^2 = 515.5731$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Conversely, individuals who do not consider religion an important part of their daily life are more favorable toward the

legality of abortion in all circumstances (nearly 70%) and allowing same-sex couples to marry (nearly 82%).

Based on these preliminary findings, I argue that individuals who have conservative religious beliefs will also have conservative moral or value-based policy opinions.

#### 4.2.4. Summary

The purpose of the bivariate analyses is to demonstrate the core differences among the three religious dimensions and build on my argument regarding the importance of measuring the three dimensions of religion separately in empirical analyses concerning moral or value-based policy opinions. In the following section, I provide additional evidence to support this claim via full statistical models that capture the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on a series of moral policy opinions.

**Table 4.4** distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage by biblical literalism and religious importance, 2016 ANES

	<b>Biblical Literalism</b>			<b>Religious Importance</b>	
	Not the Word of God	Word of God but not Literally	Literal Word of God	Not Important	Important
<b>Abortion</b>					
Never allowed	2.71%	8.14%	29.37%	3.30%	18.09%
Rape, incest, life of mother	8.89%	28.51%	38.85%	13.63%	33.41%
Many reasons	13.04%	17.21%	11.90%	13.83%	15.06%
All circumstances	75.36%	46.14%	19.88%	69.24%	33.44%
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	1,035	1,929	1,201	1,453	2,742
$\chi^2$	952.2676			556.4358	
Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			0.000	
<b>Same-sex marriage</b>					
No legal recognition	4.44%	9.76%	44.14%	5.97%	24.88%
Civil Union	11.96%	26.98%	27.51%	12.22%	29.31%
Marriage allowed	83.61%	63.26%	28.35%	81.81%	45.80%
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	1,037	1,185	1,185	1,457	2,792
$\chi^2$	1.0e+03			515.5731	
Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			0.000	

### **4.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models**

In this section I present empirical results for a series of logit and ordered logit models relating to a range of moral policy preferences. I start with Table 4.5, in which I report the results for the ordered logistic estimates for moral policy opinions concerning LGBTQ issues using 2016 American National Election Survey data: (1) legality of same-sex marriage, (2) gay and lesbian job discrimination, (3) same-sex adoption, (4) service to same-sex couples, and (5) transgender bathrooms. In Table 4.7, I report the results for the ordered logit estimates for moral policy opinions concerning (6) abortion policy and (7) support for the death penalty. In a separate set of analyses, I report the results for ordered logistic and logistic estimates for moral policy opinions using 2016 General Social Survey data (Table 4.9). In the second set of analyses I am concerned with providing an additional set of moral policy opinions: (8) legality of assisted suicide, (9) approval of sex education in public schools, (10) favorability of pornography laws, and (11) approval of prayer in public schools. I also present results from two sets of analyses that serve as supplemental data to the models using 2016 ANES data. I report findings from public opinion on two moral policy issues: (12) legality of same-sex marriage and (13) support for the death penalty. Each model demonstrates public opinion regarding a moral or values-based issue as a function of religious belonging, religious behaving, and/or religious believing. In addition, I include in all models a set of standard political control variables such as partisan identification and political ideology, as well as socioeconomic and demographic control variables such as age, gender, race, marital status, and income.

Because some of my hypotheses about specific coefficients involve directional hypotheses while others involve non-directional hypotheses, I report results from one-tailed and two-tailed hypothesis tests, where appropriate. My overall argument is that religious belonging,



behaving, and believing influence moral policy opinions. I also contend that there are differences among and within the religious denominations and traditions (religious belonging).

#### 4.3.1. Religious Belonging

What is the effect of religious belonging on attitudes towards moral policies? The first set of analyses pertaining to LGBTQ issues is presented in Models 1-5 in Table 4.5. Here I find evidence that religious belonging influences public opinion on LGBTQ policies, controlling for the effects of other religion, political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables. There are several noteworthy findings. First, evangelical Protestants are less likely than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated to favor the legalization of same-sex marriage ( $b = -0.313$ ,  $z = -1.83$ ). Second, Catholics ( $b = 0.302$ ,  $z = 1.86$ ) and Hispanic Catholics ( $b = 0.662$ ,  $z = 2.46$ ) are more likely to favor and support policies allowing gays and lesbians to marry than other religious groups and those who report having no religious affiliation. Third, Hispanic Catholics are also more likely to strongly favor antidiscrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians ( $b = 0.491$ ,  $z = 1.73$ ) Fourth, mainline Protestants and Catholics are significantly more likely to believe that government policies should allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt (Mainline Protestants:  $b = 0.696$ ,  $z = 3.35$ ; Catholics:  $b = 0.576$ ,  $z = 2.88$ ) Fifth, mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jewish adherents are more likely to support required service to gay and lesbian couples (Mainline Protestants  $b = 0.437$ ,  $z = 3.37$ ; Catholics  $b = 0.459$ ,  $z = 3.76$ ; Jewish  $b = 0.486$ ;  $z = 1.82$ ) than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Finally, regarding transgender bathrooms, evangelicals ( $b = -0.484$ ,  $z = -3.34$ ) and Hispanic Catholics ( $b = -0.429$ ,  $z = -1.83$ ) are significantly less likely than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated to believe that transgender persons should be allowed to use their bathroom of choice; whereas, Jewish individuals are more likely to support transgender bathroom of choice ( $b = 0.869$ ,  $z = 2.96$ ). Generally, these findings add support to preexisting research and Hypotheses

1 presented in Chapter 2. All five LGBTQ moral policy issues reveal some significant differences among religious denominations and those who are religiously unaffiliated.

In Table 4.6, I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting same-sex marriage. The predicted probabilities are calculated by setting one religious tradition equal to 1, setting all other religious traditions equal to 0, and setting the other variables equal to their means. For example, the value presented for evangelical Protestants supporting no legal recognition of same-sex marriage is 0.221, when all other religious traditions are equal to 0. In this discussion, I draw attention to the statistically significant coefficients reported in Table 4.5. Among evangelical Protestants, the probability of supporting same-sex marriage is 0.518 and the probability of being religiously unaffiliated and supporting same-sex marriage is 0.571. Thus, there is a difference of .053 among evangelical Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated where evangelicals are less likely to support same-sex marriage than the religiously unaffiliated. Conversely, Catholics (0.621) and Hispanic Catholics (0.678) are more likely to support same-sex marriage than the religiously unaffiliated (0.571). While the differences between the various religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated are not large, the underlying coefficients for these variables are statistically significant.

In the next set of models presented in Table 4.7, I demonstrate the effect of religious belonging on public opinion concerning the legality of abortion (Model 6) and public opinion on capital punishment or the death penalty (Model 7). Like the findings that I present in Table 4.5, there are key differences among religious denominations. First, mainline Protestants are more supportive of abortion rights ( $b = 0.518$ ,  $z = 3.49$ ) than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Next, mainline Protestants ( $b = 0.295$ ,  $z = 2.13$ ) and evangelical Protestants ( $b = 0.330$ ,  $z = 2.15$ ) are more likely to support the death penalty than other religious and nonreligious

groups. Jewish adherents are significantly less likely to support the death penalty ( $b = -0.476$ ,  $z = -1.86$ ).

In Table 4.8, I report the predicted probabilities among the religious traditions and their support for abortion legislation. As one can see, there are little differences among the religious groups regarding abortion. Relying on Model (6) presented in Table 4.7, the coefficient for mainline Protestant ( $b = 0.518$ ,  $z = 3.48$ ) is statistically significant. Thus, among mainline Protestants, the probability of supporting abortion in all circumstances is 0.538 and the probability of being religiously unaffiliated and supporting abortion in all circumstances is 0.450. There is a difference of .088 between mainline Protestant and secular support for abortion policy. There are no other statistically significant coefficient among the religious belonging variables relating to the legality of abortion.

What about the effect of religious belonging on other moral/values-based issues? Using 2016 GSS data, I analyze several moral or values-based issues including public opinion toward sex-education in public schools (Model 8), legality of assisted suicide (Model 9), support for laws that restrict the distribution of pornography (Model 10), and prayer in public schools (Model 11), legality of same-sex marriage (Model 12), and capital punishment (Model 13). Similar to the results presented in Table 4.9, there are a few key differences among the religious denominations. First, Catholics are less likely to support sex education in public schools ( $b = -1.658$ ,  $z = -1.72$ ); whereas, Hispanic Catholics are more likely to favor sex education in public schools ( $b = 2.312$ ;  $z = 2.33$ ) than the religiously unaffiliated. This finding highlights the importance of among and within denominational differences. Second, Catholics ( $b = -0.878$ ,  $z = -1.92$ ) are less likely to support laws against the distribution of pornography in all cases. Third, black Protestants are less likely to approve of court ruling that no government may require the

reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools ( $b = -0.689$ ,  $z = -1.70$ ).<sup>7</sup> Lastly, mainline Protestants ( $b = 0.420$ ,  $z = 1.95$ ) and other religious traditions ( $b = 0.953$ ,  $z = 2.03$ ) are more likely to favor the death penalty for persons who are convicted of murder. The variable *fundamental* represents whether respondents' religious denominations are fundamental, moderate, or liberal. Based on previous research and prior analysis, I argue that those who have a fundamental religious denomination will be more likely to support the death penalty than those who have moderate or liberal religious traditions. This coefficient for this variable is both positive and statistically significant ( $b = 0.181$ ,  $z = 1.74$ ).

Taken together, the results of Models 1 through Model 13 demonstrate key differences between and among religious traditions or denominations and highlights the influence of religious belonging on moral policy opinions. While the coefficients were not (always) in the expected direction—especially as it relates to Hispanic Catholics—these findings are significant in that they demonstrate the importance of considering the effects of religious belonging on Americans moral policy attitudes. Among and within denominational differences remain an important aspect in understanding the influence of religion in American public opinion.

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<sup>7</sup> Note: a high value on the variable "prayer" represents unfavorable sentiments of government required prayer in schools.

**Table 4.5** Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	<b>Model (1)</b> <b>Same-sex Marriage</b>		<b>Model (2)</b> <b>Discrimination</b>		<b>Model (3)</b> <b>Adoption</b>		<b>Model (4)</b> <b>Service</b>		<b>Model (5)</b> <b>Bathrooms</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>										
Mainline	0.265	1.58	0.261	1.64	0.696	3.35***	0.437	3.37***	-0.015	-0.11
B. Protestant	0.074	0.27	0.26	0.97	0.333	1.10	0.216	0.96	-0.124	-0.54
Evangelical	-0.313	-1.83*	-0.029	-0.18	-0.086	-0.42	-0.133	-0.92	-0.484	-3.34***
Catholic	0.302	1.86*	0.18	1.19	0.576	2.88**	0.459	3.76***	-0.032	-0.26
H. Catholic	0.662	2.46**	0.491	1.73*	0.174	0.56	0.129	0.56	-0.429	-1.83*
Other Christian	0.071	0.44	0.119	0.77	0.25	1.28	-0.029	-0.23	-0.168	-1.30
Jewish	0.444	1.07	0.617	1.48	-0.021	-0.05	0.486	1.82*	0.869	2.96**
Other Religion	0.347	1.53	0.355	1.60	0.44	1.62	0.202	1.21	0.18	1.07
<b>Behaving</b>										
Attendance	-0.239	-6.60***	-0.192	-5.18***	-0.213	-5.02***	-0.177	-5.40***	-0.065	-1.94*
Contributions	0.008	0.08	0.122	1.23	0.105	0.89	-0.225	-2.61**	0.004	0.05
<b>Believing</b>										
Importance	0.188	1.06	0.264	1.51	0.38	1.72	0.504	3.47***	0.000	0.00
Guidance	-0.259	-3.90***	0.002	0.03	-0.241	-3.00**	-0.294	-4.92***	-0.073	-1.21
Biblical Literalism	-0.633	-8.31***	-0.391	-5.14***	-0.691	-7.67***	-0.277	-4.23***	-0.485	-7.22***
Spirituality	-0.024	-0.45	0.076	1.52	-0.04	-0.63	-0.030	-0.66	0.028	0.60
<b>Political Variables</b>										
Identification	-0.133	-5.32***	-0.177	-7.13***	-0.104	-3.60***	-0.217	-10.14***	-0.169	-7.82***
Ideology	-0.36	-9.24***	-0.27	-7.03***	-0.367	-7.97***	-0.338	-10.56***	-0.454	-13.89***

Table 4.5 continued

	<b>Model (1)</b>		<b>Model (2)</b>		<b>Model (3)</b>		<b>Model (4)</b>		<b>Model (5)</b>	
	<b>Same-sex Marriage</b>		<b>Discrimination</b>		<b>Adoption</b>		<b>Service</b>		<b>Bathrooms</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>										
Married	-0.161	-1.84	-0.155	-1.79	-0.14	-1.33	-0.122	-1.65	-0.141	-1.87
Black	-0.747	-3.67***	-0.271	-1.33	-0.797	-3.50***	0.158	0.92	-0.422	-2.40*
Hispanic	-0.546	-2.99**	0.076	0.41	-0.504	-2.43*	0.060	0.38	0.095	0.60
Asian	-0.647	-2.76**	-0.169	-0.72	-0.433	-1.51	-0.045	-0.23	-0.488	-2.57**
Gender	0.343	4.24***	0.180	2.24*	0.352	3.63***	0.306	4.44***	0.338	4.85***
Age	-0.015	-6.22***	-0.001	-0.44	-0.016	-5.72***	-0.004	-1.97*	-0.004	-1.78
Education	0.099	3.54***	0.112	4.01***	0.032	0.97	0.014	0.58	0.115	4.76***
Income	0.030	5.16***	0.027	4.66***	0.039	5.49***	0.006	1.24	0.020	3.91***
N		3,285		3,275		3,254		3,266		3,201
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.22		0.101		0.234		0.125		0.139
$\chi^2$		1375.13		636.20		867.16		1300.95		1428.02
Prob $\chi^2$		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000

**Table 4.6.** Predicted probabilities for same-sex marriage associated with religious denominations

Same-sex marriage	No legal recognition	Civil Union	Support
Mainline Protestant	0.154	0.231	0.615
Black Protestant	0.175	0.242	0.583
Evangelical Protestant	0.221	0.261	0.518
Catholic	0.151	0.229	0.621
Hispanic Catholic	0.117	0.205	0.678
Other Christians	0.175	0.242	0.583
Jewish	0.137	0.220	0.664
Other religion	0.146	0.226	0.628
Secular	0.183	0.246	0.571

**Table 4.7.** Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	<b>Model (6)</b>		<b>Model (7)</b>	
	<b>Abortion</b>		<b>Death Penalty</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>				
Mainline	0.518	3.49***	0.295	2.13*
B. Protestant	0.244	0.96	0.140	0.61
Evangelical	-0.118	-0.78	0.330	2.15*
Catholic	-0.141	-1.02	-0.012	-0.10
H. Catholic	0.240	1.01	0.204	0.86
Other Christian	0.041	0.28	0.072	0.53
Jewish	0.526	1.49	-0.476	-1.86*
Other Religion	-0.107	-0.55	-0.138	-0.80
<b>Behaving</b>				
Attendance	-0.227	-6.89***	-0.115	-3.30***
Contributions	-0.167	-1.87*	-0.253	-2.75**
<b>Believing</b>				
Importance	0.085	0.54	0.556	3.55***
Guidance	-0.238	-3.91***	-0.245	-3.84***
Biblical				
Literalism	-0.638	-9.13***	0.159	2.29*
Spirituality	0.246	4.96***	-0.056	-1.12
<b>Political Variables</b>				
Identification	-0.125	-5.58***	0.164	7.33***
Ideology	-0.335	-9.62***	0.316	9.52***
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>				
Married	-0.184	-2.32*	0.144	1.85
Black	0.544	2.76**	-0.298	-1.75
Hispanic	-0.530	-3.21***	-0.465	-2.88**
Asian	-0.137	-0.66	-0.063	-0.33
Gender	0.093	1.27	-0.158	-2.18*
Age	0.010	4.56***	0.003	1.22
Education	0.159	6.27***	-0.195	-7.77***
Income	0.028	5.22***	0.010	1.95
N		3,291		3,260
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.191		0.088
$\chi^2$		1570.70		689.92
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000



**Table 4.8.** Predicted probabilities for abortion attitudes associated with religious denominations

<b>Abortion</b>	<b>No circumstance</b>	<b>Rape, incest, life of mother</b>	<b>Many reasons</b>	<b>All circumstances</b>
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	0.089	0.226	0.147	0.538
<b>Black Protestant</b>	0.110	0.248	0.150	0.492
<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	0.142	0.276	0.152	0.431
<b>Catholic</b>	0.114	0.277	0.152	0.427
<b>Hispanic Catholic</b>	0.110	0.249	0.150	0.491
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.127	0.264	0.152	0.457
<b>Jewish</b>	0.089	0.225	0.147	0.539
<b>Other religion</b>	0.141	0.275	0.152	0.432
<b>Secular</b>	0.131	0.267	0.152	0.450

**Table 4.9** Ordered Logistic and Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions, 2016 GSS data

	<b>Model (8)</b> <b>Sex Education</b>		<b>Model (9)</b> <b>Assisted Suicide</b>		<b>Model (10)</b> <b>Pornography Laws</b>		<b>Model (11)</b> <b>Prayer</b>		<b>Model (12)</b> <b>Same-sex Marriage</b>		<b>Model (13)</b> <b>Death Penalty</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>												
M. Protestant	0.406	0.73	0.391	1.13	-0.106	-0.41	-0.262	-0.98	0.211	0.92	0.42	1.95*
B. Protestant	0.354	0.57	-0.206	-0.51	0.190	0.50	-0.689	-1.70*	-0.142	-0.43	0.069	0.23
Evangelical	-0.075	-0.14	-0.138	-0.43	0.023	0.09	-0.420	-1.40	-0.246	-1.02	0.203	0.90
Catholic	-1.658	-1.72*	0.093	0.16	-0.878	-1.92*	0.165	0.32	0.224	0.59	-0.052	-0.14
H. Catholic	2.312	2.33**	-0.485	-0.86	0.741	1.60	-0.676	-1.33	-0.002	0.00	0.128	0.35
Jewish	-	-	-0.013	-0.02	-0.755	-1.34	0.315	0.50	0.900	1.63	-0.098	-0.24
Other	0.269	0.22	0.224	0.33	-0.312	-0.57	-1.007	-1.59	-0.467	-1.26	0.953	2.03*
Fundamental	0.109	0.51	-0.026	-0.19	-0.116	-0.99	0.117	0.89	-0.086	-0.81	0.181	1.74*
<b>Behaving</b>												
Attendance	-0.069	-1.07	-0.068	-1.78*	0.042	1.18	0.047	1.19	-0.134	-4.40***	-0.08	-2.68**
Activity	-0.068	-1.1	-0.058	-1.47	0.166	4.47***	-0.012	-0.28	-0.008	-0.27	-0.039	-1.31
Prayer	0.071	0.64	-0.030	-0.42	-0.047	-0.81	-0.148	-2.49**	0.036	0.69	-0.063	-1.31
Save soul	-0.114	-0.36	-0.299	-1.56	0.225	1.37	-0.002	-0.01	-0.465	-3.33***	-0.07	-0.51
<b>Believing</b>												
Life after death	-0.173	-0.45	-0.064	-0.25	-0.146	-0.75	-0.035	-0.17	0.421	2.41*	0.121	0.76
Literalism	-0.043	-0.18	-0.513	-3.43***	0.310	2.40**	-0.618	-4.52***	-0.556	-5.04***	0.192	1.81*
God	-0.005	-0.03	0.096	1.07	0.017	0.25	-0.168	-2.40**	-0.096	-1.55	0.062	1.12
Religiosity	0.241	1.42	-0.177	-1.62	0.104	1.09	-0.064	-0.60	-0.001	-0.02	0.025	0.31
Spirituality	-0.152	-0.84	-0.163	-1.45	0.028	0.30	0.033	0.33	0.051	0.64	-0.193	-2.60**
<b>Political Variables</b>												
Identification	-0.273	-3.88***	-0.104	-2.36*	-0.061	-1.56	-0.062	-1.46	-0.16	-4.88***	0.156	4.93***
Ideology	-0.411	-4.16***	-0.167	-2.76**	0.269	4.92***	-0.194	-3.37***	-0.33	-7.05***	0.239	5.48***

Table 4.9, continued

	Model (8)		Model (9)		Model (10)		Model (11)		Model (12) Same-		Model (13)	
	Sex Education		Assisted Suicide		Pornography Laws		Prayer		sex Marriage		Death Penalty	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>												
Married	-0.782	-2.62**	-0.375	-2.09*	0.388	2.59**	0.102	0.63	-0.285	-2.17*	0.024	0.19
Black	-1.069	-1.99*	-0.948	-2.61**	-0.879	-2.63	0.162	0.48	-0.474	-1.68	-0.695	-2.80**
Hispanic	0.576	0.74	-0.289	-0.75	0.203	0.67	0.091	0.25	-0.225	-0.83	-0.16	-0.62
Gender	-0.071	-0.29	-0.352	-2.25*	0.791	5.77***	-0.133	-0.92	0.437	3.69***	-0.335	-3.03**
Age	-0.021	-2.71**	-0.011	-2.19	0.015	3.60***	-0.013	-2.77**	-0.023	-6.40***	-0.002	-0.69
Education	0.602	4.87***	0.090	1.13	-0.112	-1.63	0.403	5.21***	0.188	3.27***	-0.169	-2.98**
Income	0.147	1.66	0.106	1.89	-0.134	-2.77**	0.030	0.58	0.128	2.99**	0.049	1.23
Constant	5.200	4.52	3.973	5.54			0.883	1.47			-0.475	-1.00
N		1,223		1,229		1,285		1,213		1,237		1,815
Pseudo- R <sup>2</sup>		0.229		0.214		0.155		0.224		0.178		0.115
$\chi^2$		152.79		300.77		302.78		376.00		665.83		276.48
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000


#### 4.3.2. Religious Behaving

The second dimension of religion that I am interested exploring is religious behaving. I have measured religious behaving as (1) worship or service attendance, and (2) religious contributions in Models 1-7 using 2016 ANES data. Using 2016 GSS data, I include (1) worship attendance, (2) religious activity other than worship attendance, (3) frequency of prayer, and (4) whether an individual has urged someone to accept Jesus as savior.

Across all 2016 ANES moral policy issues, service attendance has a statistically significant effect on the dependent variables in the models. From Table 4.5 one can see that those who attend religious services more frequently are less likely to support LGBTQ issues across the policy spectrum. Frequent worship attenders are less likely than those who do not attend worship services to believe that gays and lesbians should be allowed to legally marry ( $b = -0.239$ ,  $z = -6.60$ ), less likely to strongly favor anti-discrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians from job discrimination ( $b = -0.192$ ,  $z = -5.18$ ), less likely to believe that gay and lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt children ( $b = -0.213$ ,  $z = -5.02$ ), less likely to believe in requiring business owners to provide services to gay and lesbian couples ( $b = -0.177$ ,  $z = -5.40$ ) and less likely to support transgender people being allowed to use the bathroom of their identified gender rather than the gender that they were born ( $b = -0.065$ ,  $z = -1.94$ ).

In Figure 4.1 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome on the dependent variable, same-sex marriage. The solid lines represented the predicted probability of supporting same-sex marriage, supporting civil unions, or favoring no legal recognition of same-sex marriages. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. Support for same-sex marriage decreases from nearly 72% to approximately 50% as frequency of service attendance increases. Conversely, support for no legal recognition increases from almost 7% to nearly 16%


as the frequency of service attendance increases. In a similar pattern, support for civil unions increases from 22% to nearly 35% as frequency of service attendance increases. This suggests that frequent service attenders are overall less likely to support same-sex marriage than non-frequent attenders. However, frequency of service attendance is also related to an increase in support for civil unions.



**Figure 4.1.** Attitudes toward same-sex marriage by service attendance

Furthermore (Table 4.7), frequent service attenders are less likely to support abortion rights ( $b = -0.227$ ,  $z = -6.89$ ) in all circumstances than non-frequent service attenders and less likely to support capital punishment ( $b = -0.115$ ,  $z = -3.30$ ) for convicted murderers than non-frequent service attenders. In this dataset, regular service attenders express consistent pro-life opinions. I demonstrate these findings in Figure 4.2. Here I report the predicted probabilities

associated with each outcome on the dependent variable, abortion. Support for abortion being legal in all circumstances decreases from nearly 53% to 31% as frequency of service attendance increases. Frequent service attenders are also more likely to support abortion never being legal than non-frequent service attenders. Indeed, the predicted probability increases from nearly 5% to nearly 11% as service attendance increases. Approval for the legality of abortion in cases such as rape, incest, and life of the mother increase as service attendance increase, moving from nearly 22% to nearly 37%. However, there is little change among the frequency of church attendance on abortion being permitted in many circumstances. In sum, frequent service attenders are less likely to support abortion in all circumstances and more likely to support abortion never being legal than non-frequent service attenders. Frequent attenders are also more likely to support abortion policies in cases such as rape, incest, and life of the mother.



**Figure 4.2.** Attitudes toward abortion by service attendance

The religious contributions variable also has a negative effect on public opinion toward requiring service to gay and lesbian couples, abortion, and the death penalty. Those who contribute to religious organizations are less likely to believe in required service to gay and lesbian couples ( $b = -0.225$ ,  $z = -2.61$ ), less likely to believe in the legality of abortion ( $b = -0.167$ ,  $z = -1.87$ ), and less likely to favor the death penalty ( $b = -0.253$ ,  $z = -2.75$ ). Clearly, individuals who are active in attending worship services and in making contributions to religious organizations strongly favor morally conservative public policies.

Using 2016 GSS data, I further explore the effects of religious behaving on a series of social values or moral/based policy issues using worship attendance as well as other measures of religious behaving including religious activity, frequency of prayer and soul conversion. Religious activity is a variable that ranges from 0 to 9 where high values represent frequent participation in church organization activities and low values represent never participating in religious organization activities. Frequency of prayer measures how often individuals pray. High values denote daily prayer and low values denote no prayer. The variable save soul represents whether the respondent has ever tried to encourage someone to believe in or accept Jesus Christ as savior (1 = yes, 0 = no). Similar to the models using 2016 ANES data, I find that there are significant and negative effects of service attendance on public opinion regarding same-sex marriage and the death penalty. Those individuals who attend worship services more frequently are less likely to support assisted suicide ( $b = -0.068$ ,  $z = -1.78$ ), less likely to support the legality of same-sex marriage ( $b = -0.134$ ,  $z = 4.40$ ) and less likely to support the death penalty for convicted murderers ( $b = -0.080$ ,  $z = -2.68$ ). In addition, those who participate in religious activity are more likely to favor pornography laws ( $b = 0.166$ ,  $z = 4.47$ ) than those individuals

who do not participate in religious activity in addition to worship attendance. Frequency of prayer is positively related to government policy on regulation of prayer in public schools. Those who pray more frequently are less likely to support the Supreme Court ruling that no state or local government may require prayer in public schools ( $b = -0.148$ ,  $z = -2.49$ ). Lastly, those individuals who have reported being involved in attempting to save someone's soul by speaking to them about God or Jesus are less likely to support same-sex marriage legislation ( $b = -0.465$ ,  $z = -3.33$ ).

The effect of the religious behaving variables is not consistent across all dependent variables, however, there is some effect of religious behaving on the various dependent variables (except for attitudes toward sex education). In general, those who exhibit greater levels of religious behavior are more likely to hold conservative viewpoints on moral policy issues, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. This point highlights the importance of including the second dimension of religion—religious behaving—in future research.

While the results of the models show that religious behaving influences how one views moral or values-based policy issues, there is some inconsistencies among 2016 ANES and 2016 GSS data. To address this issue, I have conducted a factor analysis of the religious behaving variables and find that these variables load sufficiently on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 2.424; variance explained = 1.750). Based on these factor analysis results, I create a “religious behavior” variable and substitute it into my models using GSS data. Religious behavior includes service attendance, religious activity, frequency of prayer, and talking to someone about Jesus being the savior.



In Table 4.10 I present the results from the models including the religious behavior variable. Overall, the results are similar to the results that I presented in Table 4.9. It is important to note that the effect of the religious behavior variable is statistically significant and in the expected direction for all but one of the dependent variables (prayer). Religiously active individuals are less likely to support sex-education in schools ( $b = -0.389$ ,  $z = -1.88$ ) and less likely to believe in assisted medical suicide ( $b = -0.491$ ,  $z = -3.87$ ) than those individuals who are less religiously active. In addition, an increase in religious behavior yields an increase in public opinion toward government policy that restricts the distribution of pornography ( $b = 0.625$ ,  $z = 5.41$ ), controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Lastly, religiously active individuals are less likely to support same-sex marriage legislation ( $b = -0.558$ ,  $z = -5.48$ ) and capital punishment ( $b = -0.435$ ,  $z = -4.45$ ), than less religiously active individuals. These results are consistent with previous research and demonstrate the importance of including religious behaving when modelling attitudes toward moral or value-based policy opinions.

**Table 4.10** Ordered Logistic and Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions using religious activity score, 2016 GSS data

	<b>Model (8a) Sex Education</b>		<b>Model (9a) Assisted Suicide</b>		<b>Model (10a) Pornography Laws</b>		<b>Model (11a) Prayer</b>		<b>Model (12a) Same-sex Marriage</b>		<b>Model (13a) Death Penalty</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>												
M. Protestant	0.431	0.78	0.396	1.15	-0.131	-0.51	-0.284	-1.07	0.225	0.99	0.403	1.88*
B. Protestant	0.316	0.52	-0.194	-0.48	0.186	0.49	-0.660	-1.64	-0.125	-0.38	0.044	0.15
Evangelical	-0.052	-0.10	-0.156	-0.49	0.022	0.09	-0.411	-1.39	-0.311	-1.30	0.210	0.93
Catholic	-1.560	-1.64	0.125	0.22	-0.950	-2.09*	0.116	0.23	0.185	0.49	-0.095	-0.26
H. Catholic	2.241	2.28**	-0.503	-0.90	0.759	1.64	-0.616	-1.22	0.015	0.04	0.145	0.40
Jewish			0.003	0.00	-0.661	-1.17	0.386	0.62	0.904	1.65	-0.113	-0.28
Other	0.289	0.24	0.218	0.32	-0.320	-0.59	-1.099	-1.71	-0.428	-1.17	0.942	2.01*
Fundamental	0.113	0.53	-0.031	-0.23	-0.118	-1.02	0.126	0.96	-0.091	-0.85	0.181	1.78*
<b>Behaving</b>												
Activity	-0.389	-1.88	-0.491	-	0.625	5.41***	-0.028	-0.22	-0.558	-5.48***	-0.435	-4.45***
<b>Believing</b>												
Life after death	-0.130	-0.34	-0.055	-0.22	-0.189	-0.98	-0.085	-0.41	0.482	2.79**	0.122	0.77
Literalism	-0.044	-0.19	-0.513	-	0.289	2.25*	-0.617	-4.53***	-0.553	-5.03***	0.192	1.82*
God	0.027	0.19	0.098	1.13	-0.025	-0.38	-0.195	-2.85**	-0.078	-1.30	0.062	1.14
Religiosity	0.246	1.47	-0.174	-1.60	0.071	0.76	-0.076	-0.72	-0.004	-0.05	0.021	0.26
Spirituality	-0.112	-0.64	-0.156	-1.42	-0.004	-0.04	-0.029	-0.31	0.084	1.09	-0.194	-2.67**
<b>Political Variables</b>												
Identification	-0.272	-3.88***	-0.106	-2.42*	-0.066	-1.69*	-0.064	-1.52	-0.166	-5.10***	0.155	4.94***
Ideology	-0.412	-4.19***	-0.165	-2.74**	0.265	4.85***	-0.198	-3.44***	-0.328	-7.02***	0.239	5.48***

**Table 4.10**, continued

	Model (8a)		Model (9a)		Model (10a)		Model 11(a)		Model (12a)		Model (13a)	
	Sex Education		Assisted Suicide		Pornography Laws		Prayer		Same-sex Marriage		Death Penalty	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>												
Married	-0.765	-2.58**	-0.374	-2.08	0.400	2.68*	0.094	0.58	-0.298	-2.28*	0.023	0.20
Black	-1.002	-1.89	-0.954	-2.65**	-0.878	-2.65*	0.089	0.26	-0.464	-1.64	-0.679	-2.74**
Hispanic	0.552	0.71	-0.298	-0.77	0.187	0.62	0.136	0.38	-0.223	-0.83	-0.162	-0.63
Gender	-0.042	-0.17	-0.344	-2.20*	0.737	5.47***	-0.176	-1.23	0.454	3.87***	-0.339	-3.09***
Age	-0.020	-2.66**	-0.010	-2.13*	0.014	3.37***	-0.013	-2.98**	-0.022	-6.07***	-0.003	-0.77
Education	0.585	4.80***	0.090	1.15	-0.086	-1.27	0.414	5.43***	0.187	3.27***	-0.169	-3.02***
Income	0.145	1.64	0.105	1.89	-0.133	-2.76**	0.039	0.76	0.129	3.02**	-0.048	1.19
Constant	4.354	4.78	3.538	6.24			1.668	3.55			-0.439	-1.28
N		1,223		1,229		1,285		1,213		1,237		1,815
Pseudo- R <sup>2</sup>		0.227		0.2133		0.149		0.220		0.175		0.1143
$\chi^2$		151.52		300.25		292.41		360.05		654.70		275.63
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000

#### 4.3.3. Religious Believing

The last dimension of religion is religious believing. I have measured religious believing as (1) religious importance, (2) religious guidance, (3) biblical literalism, and (4) spirituality in the models using 2016 ANES data. Using 2016 GSS data, I measure religious believing as (1) belief in life after death, (2) biblical literalism, (3) belief in God, (4) strength of religiosity, and (5) strength of spirituality.<sup>8</sup> The religious believing dimension of religion is perhaps the most complex dimension. Religious individuals may exhibit strong conservative opinions on certain policy issues and strong progressive opinions on other policy issues. One explanation of this is that religious individuals use Jesus' teachings and the interpretation of scripture in formulating their policy opinions, but interpretations of Jesus' teachings and interpretation of scripture will vary across individuals and religious traditions.

I begin with Table 4.5 and the effects of religious importance on the series of LGBTQ issues. Those who believe that religion is important in daily life are more likely to support required services to gay and lesbian couples ( $b = 0.504$ ,  $z = 3.47$ ). Religious guidance in daily life is, as expected, related to conservative opinions on the legality of same-sex marriage ( $b = -0.259$ ,  $z = -3.90$ ), laws that permit gay and lesbians to adopt children ( $b = -0.241$ ,  $z = -3.00$ ), and required service to same-sex couples ( $b = -0.294$ ,  $z = -4.92$ ). Notably biblical literalism has a negative effect on all LGBTQ policy issues. Individuals who believe that the Bible is the literal

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
<sup>8</sup> To remind the reader: *Religious importance* is coded 1 if religion is an important part of one's daily life and 0 if religion is not an important part of daily life. *Religious guidance* is measured using a 4-point scale ranging from 0 or no guidance in day-to-day living, 1 some guidance in daily living, 2 quite a bit of guidance, to 3 or a great deal of guidance in daily life. *Biblical literalism* captures one's belief in whether the Bible is the literal word of God (coded 2), word of God but is not the literal word (coded 1), or not the word of God (coded 0). *Spirituality* is a dichotomous variable coded 1 or spiritual and 0 or not spiritual. The variable *life after death* measures whether an individual believes in a life after death (coded 1) or 0 otherwise. The variable *God* ranges from 0 to 5 where respondents report no belief in God (coded 0), to complete belief in the existence of God (coded 5). *Strength of religiosity* and *strength of spirituality* are 4-category variables that range from not religious/not spiritual (coded 0) to very religious/very spiritual (coded 4).

word of God are less likely to support gay and lesbian couples marrying ( $b = -0.633$ ,  $z = -8.31$ ), less likely to favor laws that protect against discrimination of gay and lesbians ( $b = -0.391$ ,  $z = -5.14$ ), less likely to believe in a law that permits same-sex couples to adopt ( $b = -0.691$ ,  $z = -7.67$ ), less likely to support required service to gay and lesbian couples ( $b = -0.277$ ,  $z = -4.23$ ), and less likely to support transgender persons using the bathroom of their choice ( $b = -0.485$ ,  $z = -7.22$ ). As expected, biblical literalists hold conservative policy opinions; whereas, those who have a more flexible interpretation of the Bible claim more progressive and pro-LGBTQ policy stances.

As an example, in Figure 4.3 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome on the dependent variable, same-sex marriage. Nearly 72% of individuals who believe that the Bible is not the word of God support same-sex marriage; whereas 61% of biblical literalist support same-sex marriage. Support for civil unions and support for no legal recognition of same-sex couples increases as values on the biblical literalism scale changes. In sum, there is general support for the legality of same-sex marriage; however, biblical literalists are less likely to approve of same-sex marriage than those who have more relaxed interpretations of the Bible.

In Table 4.7 I present the results of the effect of religions believing on abortion and capital punishment. Those who believe that religion is an important part of their daily life are more likely to support the death penalty ( $b = 0.556$ ,  $z = 3.55$ ), demonstrating conservative sentiments toward end of life issues. The coefficient for religious guidance is negative and statistically significant in both models. Those individuals who believe that religion provides a great deal of guidance in their daily life are less likely to favor abortion related policies ( $b = -0.238$ ,  $z = -3.91$ ) and less likely to favor capital punishment on convicted murderers ( $b = -0.245$ ,

$z = -3.84$ ). This is consistent with a general pro-life view reflecting both anti-abortion and anti-death penalty sentiments.




**Figure 4.3.** Attitudes toward same-sex marriage by biblical literalism

Biblical literalism is related to conservative abortion policy and capital punishment policies. Respondents who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are less likely to approve of abortion ( $b = -0.638$ ,  $z = -9.13$ ) and more likely to favor capital punishment ( $b = 0.159$ ,  $z = 2.29$ ) than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God.

In Figure 4.4 I show the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome of abortion policy opinions. There is great variation among biblical literalists and those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God. For example, 61% of those who have a more flexible interpretation of the bible support abortion in all circumstances; whereas, 30% of biblical literalists support

abortion in all cases. Interestingly, support for abortion in cases such as rape, incest, and life of the mother increases as opinions on the interpretation of the Bible become stricter. Nearly 18% of those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God support abortion in certain cases; whereas, 37% of biblical literalists support abortion in certain circumstances. This is due in part to the majority of those who have a flexible interpretation of the Bible already supporting abortion in all circumstances.



**Figure 4.4.** Attitudes toward abortion by biblical literalism

Another key finding in Table 4.7 is that spiritual individuals ( $b = 0.246$ ,  $z = 4.96$ ) are more likely to support abortion rights, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. This is consistent with the hypothesis that those who are spiritual will hold more liberal moral policy opinions. Overall, the models using 2016 ANES data show that the religious

believing dimension of religion has a significant (and general consistent) effect on moral policy opinions.

The results of the 2016 GSS models that I present in Table 4.9 demonstrate that there are again effects of religious believing on moral policy opinions, especially as it relates to biblical literalism. Those individuals who believe that there is a life after death are more likely to support same-sex marriage than those individuals who do not believe in life after death ( $b = 0.421$ ,  $z = 2.41$ ), controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. This finding is surprising in that it is the only statistically significant result among the effects of belief in an afterlife on the series of moral/values-based policy positions. In future projects, I will explore the effects of this variable at greater length. There is reason to think that those who believe in a life after death will be more likely to hold conservative policy opinions than those who do not believe in a life after death, contrary to the findings presented in Table 4.9.

Similar to the findings presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.7, biblical literalists generally hold conservative moral or values-based policy opinions. Biblical literalists are less likely to support government laws that allow for medical assisted suicide ( $b = -0.513$ ,  $z = -3.43$ ), more likely to support strict pornography distribution laws ( $b = 0.310$ ,  $z = 2.40$ ), less likely to support laws that do not permit prayer in public schools ( $b = -0.618$ ,  $z = -4.52$ ), less likely to support same-sex marriage ( $b = -0.556$ ,  $z = 5.04$ ). In contrast to previous findings, biblical literalists are more likely to support the death penalty ( $b = 0.192$ ;  $z = 1.81$ ) than those who believe that the Bible is a book of stories written by man. I suspect that this difference can be explained with additional analyses. I maintain my argument that biblical literalists will generally hold more conservative moral policy opinions.



Belief in God is related to negative opinions about laws that do not permit prayer in public schools ( $b = -0.168$ ,  $z = -2.40$ ). Those who believe in God are less likely to support prayer restrictions in public schools than those individuals who do not believe in God. Lastly, spirituality is negatively related to opinions on the death penalty. Spiritual individuals are less likely to support the death penalty ( $b = -0.193$ ,  $z = -2.60$ ) than those individuals who do not consider themselves spiritual. Overall, the models using GSS data add supporting evidence to ANES models. Not only does religious believing influence public opinion on moral/values-based issues, but also biblical literalism is consistently related to conservative moral policy opinions.

#### 4.3.4. A Note on the effects of Control Variables

While the purpose of this chapter is on the influence of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on moral or value-based issues there are significant findings relating to the control variables in the models. As expected, Republicans and conservatives are more likely to hold conservative moral policy opinions than Democrats and liberals, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Republicans and conservatives are less likely to support policies relating to LGBTQ issues and abortion rights policies; whereas Democrats and liberals are more likely to support LGBTQ and abortion rights policies. Republicans and conservatives are more likely to favor the death penalty than Democrats and liberals. A similar pattern emerges in the results using GSS data. Republicans and conservatives are less in favor of sex education in schools, assisted suicide, same-sex marriage than Democrats and liberals.

In addition to the political variables, there is significance among the socioeconomic and demographic variables included in the models. Marital status, race, ethnicity, gender, age, education, and income have an influence on one's assessment of social or value-based policy concerns. Overall, blacks, Hispanics, and older individuals demonstrate little support LGBTQ

rights. Women are more likely to support LGBTQ policies than men. Older individuals are less likely to support LGBTQ policies than younger individuals. Those with higher levels of education are more in favor of policies that yield LGBTQ rights than those with lower levels of education. Income is related to LGBTQ policy concerns. Higher levels of income yield greater support for these issues. Marital status influences support for abortion policies. Those who are married are less likely to support abortion in any or all circumstances than those who are not married. African Americans, younger individuals, those with higher levels of education and income report approval for less restrictive abortion policies. Lastly, Hispanics, older individuals and those with high levels of education are less likely to support the death penalty.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

Throughout this dissertation, I argue that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing influence public opinion on contemporary moral or value-based policy issues. I also argue that it is important to consider these effects separately in the models to flesh out differences within and among the dimensions of religion. Specifically, in this chapter I am concerned with the effects of the three dimensions of religion on how individuals assess moral or social values-based policy issues. Consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, I find that there are differences within the religious belonging dimension. I also find that religious behaving and religious believing greatly affects public opinion on various moral issues. These results demonstrate not only a need to include religious identifiers in models of public opinion but also to include the three dimensions of religion *separately* when conducting empirical analyses. In this conclusion I provide a summary of the major findings presented in this chapter and offer remarks about future research.

*Religious belonging.* The results of the models show that there are among and within denominational differences in public opinion on moral policy issues. For example, mainline

Protestants are progressive in their opinions on gay and lesbian adoption and required service to gay and lesbian couples. Evangelical Protestants are significantly less likely to support same-sex marriage and transgender individuals using the bathroom of their choice than other religious denominations and the religiously unaffiliated. Catholics are more pro-LGBTQ policies than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Hispanic Catholics are also more likely to support same-sex marriage and policies that prohibit gay and lesbian discrimination but are less likely to support transgender bathroom of choice policies than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated or secular. Consistent with the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2, I find that Jewish adherents are more progressive on certain LGBTQ policy concerns, supporting required service to gay and lesbians couples and policies that allow transgenders to use their bathroom of choice. Jews are also less likely to support the death penalty than other religious groups; whereas evangelical and mainline Protestants are more likely to support the death penalty for convicted murders. Using 2016 GSS data, I find consistencies between the models regarding the death penalty. However, in the GSS models I include a variable that measures whether one's religion is fundamental, moderate, or liberal. Those individuals who report fundamental or moderate religious affiliation are more likely to support the death penalty than those individuals who are part of a liberal religious organization, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Interestingly, mainline Protestants are more likely to support pro-abortion legislation than other religious groups and seculars or the religiously unaffiliated. The last finding of note is that Hispanic Catholics are in favor of sex education in public schools and Catholics are not in favor of restrictive pornography laws.

To summarize support for these hypotheses:

Hypothesis	Support	Note
H1: Religious Belonging → moral policy opinions	Partially supported	The effects were not consistent across all moral policies
H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews → progressive policy opinions	Partially supported	Mainline Protestants and Catholics are generally progressive in their moral policy opinions  Few differences between Jewish adherents and the religiously unaffiliated
H1b: Evangelical Protestants, Hispanic Catholics → conservative policy opinions	Partially supported	Evangelicals are conservative regarding LGBTQ concerns and the death penalty  Hispanic Catholics report progressive LGBTQ and sex education policy opinions

What does this tell us about future research? These findings are consistent with the overall hypothesis that religious belonging influences moral policy opinions; however, there are inconsistencies within and among denominations and the classification of conservative, moderate, or progressive support for policies. Ideological differences exist among religious adherents within a particular denomination, thus making it difficult to classify the group as conservative, moderate, or progressive. Future projects can address this issue by more closely examining these within group differences. Overall, the results from these models support the general hypothesis that religious denomination has an influence on assessments of moral policy opinions. Scholars should continue to use religious denominations in their research as predictors of public opinion relating to moral policy issues.

*Religious behaving.* What is the effect of religious behaving or religious activity on public opinion? The influence of religious behaving is clearer than those of the religious

belonging dimension. Specifically, religious worship attendance has a consistent effect on how Americans think about moral policy issues. Religious worship attendance is negatively related to public opinion on all LGBTQ rights policies. Those who attend worship services more frequently are largely against same-sex marriage, gay and lesbian discrimination policies, gay and lesbian adoption, required service to gay and lesbian couples, and legislation that allows transgender people to use the bathroom of their choice. In addition, worship attendance is also related to anti-abortion policies. Those who attend religious services more frequently are considerably less likely to support the death penalty. Interestingly, individuals who report monetary contributions to a religious organization are less likely than those individuals who do not contribute to religious organizations to support required service to gays and lesbians, pro-choice abortion policies, and the death penalty for convicted murders. Using 2016 GSS data, the religious activity score—comprised of worship attendance, religious activity, frequency of prayer, and saving souls—is significantly related to a number of moral policy opinions. Those who are religiously active are less likely to support assisted suicide, more likely to support restrictive pornography laws, less likely to support same-sex marriage policies, and less likely to support the death penalty.

Therefore:

Hypothesis	Support	Note
Religious behaving→ moral policy opinions	Supported	
H2a: Religiously active → conservative opinions	Supported	Supported in all ANES models. Supported in 4/6 GSS models

Where to go from here? Scholars should include a measure of religious behaving in their models of support for moral policies. The results of the models are clear: *religious belonging influences public opinion on social issues*. I speculate that those individuals who regularly attend worship services and who participate regularly in religious activities are more likely to be exposed to church doctrine and clergy teachings than those who are not religiously active. Religiously active individuals are in turn influenced by their (religious) social group and apply their beliefs to moral policies.

*Religious believing.* The last dimension of religion is religious believing. Similar to religious belonging and more so religious behaving, religious believing influences public opinion on moral policy issues. Those who believe religion is an important part of their daily life are more likely to support gay and lesbian adoption and required service to gay and lesbian couples than those who do not believe that religion plays an important role in daily life. Perhaps this is due to the importance one places on Jesus' teachings on how we should treat one another. Additional research is needed to better understand the contradictions among religious importance and the other religious believing variables included in the models. For example, those who use religion as guidance in their daily lives are less likely to support same-sex marriage, gay and lesbian adoption, required service to same-sex couples, transgender bathroom of choice legislation, pro-choice abortion policies, and the death penalty. These findings are consistent with expectations; conservative religious beliefs yield conservative moral policy opinions.

The effect of biblical literalism (or belief that the Bible is the literal word of God) is statistically significant in all models using ANES and GSS data.<sup>9</sup> Overall those individuals who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are more likely to support conservative moral

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<sup>9</sup> There is one exception. There is no effect of biblical literalism on opinion regarding sex education in schools.

policy opinions. Of note, biblical literalists are less likely to support assisted medical suicide but more likely to support the death penalty. Perhaps this reflects opinions concerning just punishment *and* pro-life sentiments that are present throughout the Bible.

I have also included a spiritually variables in the models that ask respondents about whether they are spiritual people. The findings are interesting: those who are spiritual are more likely to support abortion legislation but less likely to support the death penalty! I suspect that these findings reveal a closer association to political stances than constraints of religion or religious doctrine among spiritual individuals. Taken together these results demonstrate that religious beliefs (specifically biblical literalism) play a significant role in influencing public opinion on moral issues.

Therefore:

Hypothesis	Support	Note
Religious believing → moral policy opinions	Supported	
H3a: Biblical literalists→ conservative policy opinions	Supported	Supported in all models (except Model (8):sex education)

In sum, the models that I have presented in this chapter demonstrate that religious belonging, behaving, and believing influence public opinion on moral or value-based policy issues. With this, scholars should continue to include variables representing the three dimensions of religion in their models of moral policy attitudes. Religion not only plays an important role in American politics, but it also influences contemporary politics by shaping and informing policy opinions. In the next chapter, I explore the effects of the three religious dimensions on economic policy concerns including government spending and government responsibility in fiscal issues.

## Chapter 5. Economic Policy Opinions

### 5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I consider the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on economic policy concerns. Using data from the 2016 ANES survey, I estimate the effects of the religious dimensions on a series of government spending topics including spending on (1) social security, (2) crime, (3) welfare, (4) the poor, (5) healthcare, and (6) defense. In another set of models, I estimate the effects of religious belonging, behaving, and believing on attitudes toward (7) increasing government services, (8) reducing the federal deficit, (9) raising taxes, (10) reducing income inequality, and (11) increasing the minimum wage. Using 2013 Economic Values Survey data, I present findings for models that estimate the effects of religion on attitudes toward (1) the government's responsibility in taking care of people, (2) whether the government provides too many services, (3) increasing taxes on the rich, (4) reducing income inequality, and (5) increasing the minimum wage.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present bivariate analyses of the effects of religious variables on two economic policy issues: spending on the poor and spending on social security. I have chosen these two policy issues as examples because they reflect two major areas of economic policy concern: government spending and social welfare programs. These preliminary results demonstrate the importance of considering the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing in the overall models *and* measuring religion variables from these three clusters separately to capture the full effects of the religious dimensions on economic policy opinions. The first section reveals differences among religious traditions and differences within the Protestant faith. In addition, church attenders and non-church attenders vary on public opinion toward spending on the poor and spending on social security. In the final set of preliminary bivariate analyses, I discuss differences among biblical



literalist and religious importance in shaping opinions toward government spending on social welfare issues. In the next section, I present the results of a series of ordered logistic regression models that permit me to estimate the effects of variables representing the three religious dimensions on attitudes toward economic policy concerns. These results demonstrate considerable variation among religious believing measures.

## **5.2. Religious Dimensions**

Similar to the preliminary results that I presented in Chapter 4, in this section I provide preliminary bivariate analyses to demonstrate differences among and within religious traditions, differences between church-attenders and non-attenders, and variation among biblical literalists and (separately) differences between those who view religion as important and those who believe that religion is not important on economic policy opinions. This section serves as a building block for the full models in section 5.3. In section 5.2.1, I demonstrate whether differences exist among and within religious traditions (religious belonging dimension) on spending on the poor and spending on social security. In section 5.2.2, I reveal differences between church attenders and non-church attenders (religious behaving) on economic policy concerns. Lastly and in section 5.2.3., I demonstrate effects of biblical literalism and the importance of religion in daily life (religious believing) on opinions toward government spending.

### **5.2.1 Religious Belonging**

In Table 5.1 I present the distribution of responses among Protestants, Catholics, Jews and other religious traditions on economic policy opinions including increasing (decreasing) spending on the poor and increasing (decreasing) spending on social security. The results of the bivariate analyses show that there are differences in opinions among religious traditions ( $\chi^2 = 82.1326$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2 = 0.000)$ ). Protestants are the religious group is most in favor of decreasing

spending on the poor (23%); whereas, Jews are most in favor if increasing spending on the poor (54%). Regardless of religious denomination, there is general support for increasing spending on social security. However, there are notable differences ( $\chi^2 = 30.5642$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Catholics (62.92%) are most in favor of increasing spending, while Jews are the least in support of increasing spending (47%). In addition, other religious groups have the highest percentage (64%) of respondents wanting to increase social security spending. Overall, the observed differences among religious denominations and opinions toward spending on the poor and social security reveal the importance of including religious affiliation in full statistical models.

Are there within-denomination differences on support for spending on the poor and spending on social security? Table 5.2 shows the distribution of attitudes toward government spending on the poor and social security among mainline, evangelical, and black Protestants. Mainline Protestants (nearly 33%) and evangelical Protestants (33%) are least likely to report wanting to increase spending on the poor; on the other hand, black Protestants are largely in favor of increasing spending on the poor (72%). This reveals significant within-denominational differences ( $\chi^2 = 131.9197$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). All three religious traditions report favoring increase spending on social security; however, black Protestants (76.15%) are the most favorable in increasing spending followed by evangelical Protestants (58.35%) and mainline Protestants (57.49%). Again, there is statistically significant differences among mainline, evangelical, and black Protestants and their support for spending on social security ( $\chi^2 = 29.2793$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ )

**Table 5.1.** distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security spending, 2016 ANES

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other
<b>Spending on the Poor</b>				
Decrease spending	23%	16.58%	11.76%	13.54%
Keep spending the same	44.27%	41.98%	34.12%	37.22%
Increase spending	32.73%	41.44%	54.12%	49.23%
Total	100	100	100	100
N	1,152	929	85	1,174
$\chi^2$	82.1326			
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			
<b>Spending on Social Security</b>				
Decrease spending	6.60%	5.36%	7.06%	5.08%
Keep spending the same	38.66%	31.73%	45.88%	30.91%
Increase spending	54.74%	62.92%	47.06%	64.01%
Total	1,151	933	85	1,181
N	100	100	100	100
$\chi^2$	30.5643			
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			

**Table 5.2.** distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security among Protestants, 2016 ANES

Spending on the Poor		Mainline	Evangelical Protestant	Black Protestant
	Decrease spending	19.34%	22.71%	5.91%
	Keep spending the same	48.19%	44.07%	21.94%
	Increase spending	32.47%	33.22%	72.15%
Total		100	100	100
N		579	590	237
$\chi^2$		131.9197		
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )		0.000		
Spending on Social Security				
	Decrease spending	6.20%	6.75%	2.09%
	Keep spending the same	36.32%	34.91%	21.76%
	Increase spending	57.49%	58.35%	76.15%
Total		100	100	100
N		581	593	239
$\chi^2$		29.2793		
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )		0.000		

In sum, variations among and within the religious belonging dimension of religion warrants the estimation of a full statistical model that demonstrates the effects of religious denomination and religious tradition on economic policy opinions. Based on these preliminary results, I argue that religious denomination can have a significant influence on economic policy opinions. While there are differences in the distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and spending on social security among Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and other religious groups, opinions are

generally in favor of increasing spending. However, within denomination differences exist among Protestants. Indeed, black Protestants report much higher approval of increasing spending on the poor and social security than mainline and evangelical Protestants. Thus, it is imperative to consider both among- and within-denominational differences in estimating the effects of religious belonging on economic policy attitudes.

### 5.2.2. Religious Behaving

In Table 5.3 I outline differences in the distribution of opinions among Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religion church attenders and Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religion non-church attenders regarding increasing spending on the poor and increasing spending on social security. Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other service attenders are generally in favor of spending on the poor. However, there are significant differences among the religious denominations ( $\chi^2 = 61.3706$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). For example, nearly 32% of Protestants support increasing spending on the poor; whereas, nearly 49% of other religious adherents support increasing spending on the poor. A similar pattern emerges regarding attitudes among non-church attenders and support for government spending ( $\chi^2 = 23.4105$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Protestants (nearly 43%) and Catholics (43%) report general approval of keeping spending the same; whereas, Jewish adherents (67%) and other religious groups (50%) favor an increase spending on the poor.

When considering approval for government spending on social security, the preliminary results reveal differences among church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 26.5637$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) but not among non-church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 7.7186$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.259$ ). Overall, in Table 3 it appears that differences exist among the religious traditions and those who attend church services regarding spending on the poor and spending on social security. Based on the preliminary bivariate results,

it appears that non-church attenders hold more progressive economic policy opinions; whereas, church attenders will hold more conservative economic policy opinions. This could be due to the effects of other independent variables that are not accounted for in the bivariate analyses. These results do suggest that it is important to include service attendance in full multivariate models of economic policy attitudes.

### 5.2.3. Religious Believing

The last dimension of religion is religious believing. The two variables that I consider in the preliminary analyses to capture religious believing is biblical literalism and religious importance. Biblical literalism deals with one's belief in the Bible being the literal word of God, the word of God but not literally, or not the word of God. Religious importance is a binary variable that measuring whether religious is or is not important in one's life. In Table 5.4, I show the distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security by biblical literalism and religious importance. While there are seemingly small differences between the distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor ( $\chi^2 = 35.8634$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and spending on social security ( $\chi^2 = 38.1561$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) by biblical literalism opinions, differences do exist. For example, those individuals who believe that the Bible is not the word of God (48.22%) are more in favor of increasing spending on the poor than those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God (43.9%) In addition to these differences, biblical literalists (64.82%) report favoring increasing spending on social security more than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God (52.50%).

**Table 5.3.** distribution of attitudes toward government spending among church attenders and non-church attenders, 2016 ANES

Table 3.5: distribution of attitudes toward government spending among church attenders and non-church attenders, 2010 FAVES									
		Church attenders				Non-church attenders			
		Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other
Spending on the poor	Decrease	23.60%	17.40%	17.39%	14.25%	20.75%	14.78%	5.13%	11.45%
	Keep the same	44.68%	41.38%	39.13%	36.83%	42.74%	43.30%	28.21%	38.38%
	Increase	31.72%	41.22%	43.48%	48.92%	36.51%	41.92%	66.67%	50.17%
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		911	638	46	877	241	291	39	297
$\chi^2$		61.3706				23.4105			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000				0.001			
Spending on social security	Decrease	7.24%	5.45%	10.87%	5.55%	4.17%	5.15%	2.56%	3.69%
	Keep the same	39.41%	33.64%	47.83%	31.30%	35.83%	27.49%	43.59%	30.45%
	Increase	53.35%	60.90%	41.30%	63.42%	60.00%	67.35%	53.85%	65.77%
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		911	642	46	883	240	291	39	298
$\chi^2$		26.5637				7.7186			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000				0.000			

**Table 5.4.** distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security by biblical literalism and religious importance, 2016 ANES

		Biblical literalism			Religious Importance	
		Not the word of God	Word of God but not Literally	Literal Word of God	Not Important	Important
Spending on the poor	Decrease	16.59%	17.44%	17.68%	16.27%	17.70%
	Keep the same	35.20%	44.73%	38.42%	39.95%	40.76%
	Increase	48.22%	37.83%	43.90%	43.79%	41.45%
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	N	1,037	1,927	1,205	1,457	2,753
	$\chi^2$	35.8634			2.6880	
	Prob ( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			0.261	
Spending on social security	Decrease	7.13%	5.53%	6.04%	7.07%	5.57%
	Keep the same	40.37%	35.97%	29.14%	39.19%	32.77%
	Increase	52.50%	58.50%	64.82%	53.74%	61.66%
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	N	1,038	1,935	1,208	1,457	2,765
	$\chi^2$	38.1561			24.9441	
	Prob ( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			0.000	



A similar pattern emerges when considering religious importance, albeit there is no statistical significance between the groups ( $\chi^2 = 2.6880$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.261$ ) regarding attitudes toward spending on the poor. Those who consider religion an important part of daily life (66.66%) support an increase in spending on social security more than those who believe that religion is not an important part of daily life (53.74%). These preliminary findings are significant ( $\chi^2 = 29.9441$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ).

Based on preexisting research and the results of the preliminary analyses, I contend that those biblical literalists will hold more progressive economic policy opinions. As previously discussed, there are differences among the distribution of opinions regarding spending on the poor and spending on social security. In the full empirical models that I present later in this chapter, I will flesh out these differences and shed light on the influence of religious belief on a variety of economic policy opinions.

#### 5.2.4. Summary

The purpose of these bivariate analyses is to show that there are differences among the religious dimensions regarding economic policy concerns. This builds on my overall argument that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing affects economic policy opinions. However, because differences observed in bivariate analyses can disappear in multivariate models with a full range of statistical controls, it is important to account for the possible confounding effects of additional independent variables. In the next section, I provide support for this argument through presenting the results of a series of logistic and ordered logistic regression models that capture the effects of the religious dimensions on economic policy opinions.

### 5.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models

In this section I present the results for a series of ordered logistic regression models that capture the effect of the three dimensions of religion on economic policy opinions. In the first set of models, I present the results for economic policy opinions concerning government spending on a series of issues using 2016 American National Election Survey data. The models include public opinion toward support for increasing (decreasing) spending on (1) social security, (2) crime, (3) welfare, (4) the poor, (5) healthcare, and (6) military defense. In a second set of analyses, I provide the results of five other economic policy opinions. These models include (1) increasing (decreasing) government service, (2) reducing the deficit, (3) increasing taxes on the rich, (4) reducing inequality, and (5) raising the minimum wage. Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey, I present five additional models that serve as supplemental analyses to the findings presented using ANES data. These models include public opinion toward (1) the government's responsibility to help the poor, (2) increasing social services, (3) increasing taxes on the rich, (4) reducing inequality, and (5) increasing the minimum wage. 2013 EVS data is unique in that there are several unique religious believing variables including whether one believes in preserving traditional beliefs and Jesus' message regarding caring for the poor in society. In all models and across the datasets, I have used the standard control variables including partisan identification and political ideology as well as a series of socioeconomic and demographic variables: marital status, race, ethnicity, gender, age, education, and household income.

Based on theory and previous research, I test my hypotheses about the effects of specific variables using one-tailed and two-tailed hypothesis tests, where appropriate. The coefficients for all of the religious belonging variables are tested using two-tailed tests, with the exception of the

coefficient for mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish variables. Based on the preexisting literature, I suggest that these adherents will hold progressive economic policy opinions than individuals of other religious traditions. The coefficients for the variables representing the religious behaving and religious believing dimensions are analyzed using one-tailed tests. I posit that religiously active (religious behaving) individuals are more likely to support progressive economic policies due in part to the influence of their congregations, the clergy, and religious doctrine. Likewise, I argue that religious believing is related to progressive economic policy opinions. Those who hold more progressive or liberal religious beliefs will be more likely to support government spending and hold more progressive or liberal economic policy opinions.

Finally, I use one-tailed hypothesis when analyzing the effects of partisan identification and political ideology. I hypothesize that Republicans and conservatives believe in conservative economic policies; whereas, Democrats and liberals believe in progressive economic policies. Similar to the models that I presented in the previous chapter, I have used two-tailed hypothesis testing for all socioeconomic and demographic variables.

### 5.3.1. Religious Belonging

What is the effect of religious belonging on attitudes toward economic policies? In Table 5.5, I present the results from a series of models regarding government spending. I find evidence that religious belonging influences attitudes on spending. However, the results are generally inconsistent. For example, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants ( $b = 0.323$ ,  $z = 2.09$ ) and Catholics ( $b = 0.481$ ,  $z = 3.53$ ) are more likely to favor an increase in government spending on social security than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Catholics are more likely to support an increase spending on crime ( $b = 0.258$ ,  $z = 1.91$ ) than other religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated. Jewish adherents ( $b = 0.469$ ,  $z = 1.81$ ) and other non-

Christian religious groups are more likely to support government spending on welfare ( $b = 0.659, z = 3.77$ ) than the religiously unaffiliated or seculars. Hispanic Catholics ( $b = 0.536, z = 2.10$ ) and other religions ( $b = 0.545, z = 3.03$ ) are more likely to support spending on the poor than the religious unaffiliated. Lastly, mainline Protestants ( $b = 0.313, z = 2.45$ ), evangelical Protestants ( $b = 0.328, z = 2.29$ ), Catholics ( $b = 0.391, z = 3.16$ ), and other Christians ( $b = 0.360, z = 2.73$ ) are in favor of defense spending.

The results of the 2016 ANES government spending models reveal that religious belonging has an effect on government spending concerns. Nevertheless, there is little consistency across spending areas. Among the various spending areas is at least one significant coefficient, however, different religious denominations support different policy spending areas. For example, mainline Protestants are concerned with social security and defense spending, Evangelical Protestants favor increased spending on social security and defense and Catholics favor spending in these area and spending on crime. Hispanic Catholics are concerned with increasing spending on the poor, other Christians support defense spending, and other non-Christian religious groups prefer increased spending on welfare and the poor.

In Table 5.6 I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting social security spending. The predicted probabilities are calculated by setting all other religious traditions equal to 0. For example, the value presented for evangelical Protestants supporting an increase in social security spending is 0.056, when all other religious traditions are equal to 0. Among evangelical Protestants, the probability of supporting an increase in spending is 0.602 and the probability of being a secular or religiously unaffiliated and supporting increased spending on social security is 0.532. Thus, there is a difference of 0.07. Mainline Protestants (0.584) are more in favor of increased spending on social security than seculars, with a

difference of .05. Catholics (0.636) also favor an increase in social security spending more than the religiously unaffiliated (0.532) with a difference of 0.10 between Catholics and the religiously unaffiliated. While these differences in the predicted probabilities are not large, the underlying coefficients for these variables are significant.

In Table 5.7 I present the predicted probabilities for defense spending attitudes among the religious traditions. Perhaps, this is the most consistent of the spending models regarding differences among the religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated. Indeed, the predicted probability results demonstrate that mainline Protestants (0.116), evangelical Protestants (0.118), Catholics (0.124), and other Christian groups (0.121) are significantly more likely to support an increase in spending on defense than seculars (0.090).

It appears that the various religious groups support increased spending on different policies. Based on results of the ordered logit models, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants and Catholics are more likely to support social security spending than the religiously unaffiliated, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Catholics favor increased government spending on crime. Jews and other non-Christian adherents favor government spending on welfare. Hispanic Catholics and other non-Christian adherents are in favor of spending on the poor. Several religious groups prefer increased spending on defense including mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and other Christian groups. These results highlight the variations among and within religious traditions. Consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, religious denomination has an influence on economic policy concerns.

**Table 5.5.** Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of economic policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	Model (1)		Model (2)		Model (3)		Model (4)		Model (5)		Model (6)			
	Social Security		Crime		Welfare		Poor		Healthcare		Defense			
	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z		
Belonging														
Mainline	0.240	1.69*	-0.145	-1.05	0.134	0.97	0.048	0.36	-0.028	-0.23	0.313	2.45*		
B. Protestant	0.276	1.03	0.143	0.56	0.103	0.45	0.314	1.19	0.087	0.39	-0.029	-0.12		
Evangelical	0.323	2.09*	-0.018	-0.12	-	0.050	-0.32	0.201	1.36	0.077	0.57	0.328	2.29*	
Catholic	0.481	3.53***	0.258	1.91(	0.089	-0.68	0.052	0.41	0.064	0.55	0.391	3.16**		
H. Catholic	-0.146	-0.58	-0.189	-0.75	-0.049	-0.21	0.536	2.10*	-0.021	-0.09	0.075	0.31		
Other Christian	0.220	1.57	-0.068	-0.49	0.026	-0.19	0.176	1.30	0.058	0.47	0.360	2.73**		
Jewish	-0.088	-0.33	-0.225	-0.87	0.469	1.81*	0.186	0.69	0.382	1.56	0.263	1.10		
Other Religion	0.195	1.07	-0.343	-1.94	0.659	3.77***	0.545	3.03**	0.264	1.62	-0.085	-0.50		
Behaving														
Attendance	-0.134	-3.69***	-0.008	-0.22	0.029	0.83	0.006	0.18	-0.034	-1.09	-0.086	-2.56**		
Contributions	-0.075	-0.79	0.038	0.40	-0.125	-1.35	-0.177	-1.97*	-0.067	-0.83	-0.026	-0.30		
Believing														
Importance	0.136	0.84	0.338	2.08*	-0.348	-2.22*	-0.048	-0.31	-0.136	-0.99	0.355	2.39*		
Guidance	0.084	1.25	-0.048	-0.71	0.109	1.69	0.095	1.51	0.096	1.68	-0.001	-0.02		
Biblical					-									
Literalism	0.213	2.91**	0.382	5.25***	0.003	-0.04	0.180	2.61**	0.009	0.14	0.341	5.06***		
Spirituality	0.038	0.80	0.050	1.08	-	0.081	-1.73	-0.034	-0.72	-0.031	-0.67	0.041	-0.88	
Political Variables														
Identification	-0.119	-5.01**	0.023	0.98	-	0.239	-10.53***	-0.206	-9.22***	-0.240	-	11.57***	0.121	5.53***
Ideology	-0.164	-4.68**	0.047	1.36	-	0.439	-12.89***	-0.414	-12.13***	-0.345	-	11.17***	0.374	11.34***

**Table 5.5,** continued

	Model (1)		Model (2)		Model (3)		Model (4)		Model (5)		Model (6)	
	Social Security		Crime		Welfare		Poor		Healthcare		Defense	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>												
Married	0.002	0.02	-0.102	-1.25	0.037	0.48	-0.151	-1.96	-0.150	-2.14*	-0.082	-1.09
Black	0.240	1.20	0.085	0.45	0.376	2.17*	0.478	2.45*	0.331	1.95	0.192	1.00
Hispanic	-0.014	-0.08	0.127	0.76	0.463	2.90**	0.381	2.25*	0.039	0.26	0.011	0.07
Asian	-0.222	-1.08	0.495	2.28*	0.403	1.97	0.165	0.80	0.001	0.01	-0.341	-1.69
Gender	0.183	2.45*	0.142	1.90	0.013	0.18	0.044	0.62	-0.087	-1.35	0.086	1.25
Age	0.020	8.78***	0.016	7.14***	-0.002	-1.14	-0.000	-0.19	0.008	4.30***	-0.018	8.60***
Education	-0.161	-6.18***	-0.087	-3.34***	0.025	0.98	-0.070	-2.83**	0.023	1.03	-0.137	-5.71***
Income	-0.021	-3.85***	0.005	0.91	-	-	-0.023	-4.30***	-0.019	-3.98***	0.005	1.06
N		3,297		3,301		3,296		3,293		3,279		2,884
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.0670		.0447		.1524		.1290		.0756		.0933
$\chi^2$		375.83		251.91		1032.47		880.80		879.70		976.11
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000

**Table 5.6** Predicted probabilities for social security spending attitudes associated with religious denominations

<b>Social Security Spending</b>	<b>Decrease</b>	<b>Keep the same</b>	<b>Increase</b>
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	0.060	0.355	0.584
<b>Black Protestant</b>	0.058	0.350	0.592
<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	0.056	0.342	0.602
<b>Catholic</b>	0.048	0.316	0.636
<b>Hispanic Catholic</b>	0.085	0.416	0.499
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.061	0.359	0.580
<b>Jewish</b>	0.081	0.407	0.512
<b>Other Religion</b>	0.063	0.363	0.575
<b>Secular or unaffiliated</b>	0.075	0.394	0.532

**Table 5.7** Predicted probabilities for defense spending attitudes associated with religious denominations

<b>Defense spending</b>	<b>Decrease</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Increase</b>
<b>M. Protestant</b>	0.045	0.066	0.108	0.278	0.220	0.167	0.116
<b>B. Protestant</b>	0.061	0.083	0.127	0.295	0.206	0.141	0.088
<b>E. Protestant</b>	0.044	0.065	0.107	0.277	0.220	0.169	0.118
<b>Catholic</b>	0.042	0.062	0.103	0.274	0.222	0.173	0.124
<b>H. Catholic</b>	0.055	0.077	0.121	0.290	0.211	0.149	0.096
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.043	0.063	0.105	0.275	0.221	0.171	0.121
<b>Jewish</b>	0.047	0.068	0.110	0.281	0.218	0.164	0.112
<b>Other religion</b>	0.064	0.086	0.130	0.297	0.204	0.137	0.084
<b>Secular</b>	0.059	0.081	0.125	0.294	0.208	0.143	0.090



There are five other models that I present using 2016 ANES data: (7) government services, (8) deficit, (9) taxes, (10) inequality, and (11) minimum wage. Model (7) represents support for an increase in services provided by the government. Model (8) depicts public opinion toward the importance of reducing the deficit. Model (9) involves public opinion on support for increasing taxes on millionaires. Model (10) reveals public opinion on favorability of government action to reduce inequality. Model (11) captures support for increasing minimum wage.

In Table 5.8, I present the results of these models. First, once we control for the effects of other independent variables, there is only limited evidence that religious belonging has an independent effect on economic policy variables. Mainline Protestants ( $b = 0.211$ ,  $z = 1.64$ ) Jews ( $b = 0.726$ ,  $z = 2.91$ ) and “other” religious individuals ( $b = 0.474$ ,  $z = 2.81$ ) are significantly more likely to support increasing services provided by the government. Hispanic Catholics ( $b = -0.902$ ,  $z = -3.33$ ) are less likely to support increasing taxes on millionaires. The coefficients for the remaining religious belonging variables fail to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Clearly, religious denomination has a less consistent effect on economic policy attitudes than moral policy attitudes.

Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey, in Table 5.9 I present the results for five economic policy models. These models include public opinion on (1) the government’s responsibility to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves, (2) government’s spending on social services, (3) increasing taxes on the rich, (4) reducing inequality, and (5) increasing the minimum wage. The results of these models again demonstrate that there is only limited evidence that there are differences among and within religious traditions. I find that Jewish adherents ( $b = 1.872$ ,  $z = 1.99$ ) are more likely to believe that it is the government’s

responsibility to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves. Evangelical Protestants ( $b = 0.635$ ,  $z = 2.08$ ) are more likely to believe that the government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and more likely to support increasing the minimum wage ( $b = 0.382$ ,  $1.74$ ) than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Lastly, Hispanic Catholics ( $b = -1.016$ ,  $z = -2.19$ ) are less likely than the religiously unaffiliated to believe that the government should reduce the gap between the rich and poor. It is important to note that none of the other religious denomination variables have a significant effect on the dependent variables in Table 5.9.

Overall, there is only mixed evidence that religious belonging variables are primary drivers of Americans' economic policy attitudes. However, there are a few findings that are worth mentioning. First, there are some discernible differences among religious adherents in their opinions on government spending. For example, certain religious groups are more likely to favor government spending on social security (mainline Protestants, evangelicals and Catholics), while other groups are more likely to support spending on the poor (Hispanic Catholics and "other" non-Christian religious groups). Future research concerning government spending on social service should include religious belonging identifiers. Secondly, Hispanic Catholics are less likely to support increasing taxes on millionaires, less likely to believe in the government reducing inequality, and more likely to support government spending on the poor. It appears that Hispanic Catholics are conflicted in their economic policy opinions. Future research is needed to flesh out these nuances. Lastly, the effect of the Jewish variable was statistically nonsignificant in all models, with two exception: spending on welfare and their belief in government services and responsibilities. This finding is interesting in that Jewish adherents are more likely to believe

that the government should provide more services and that it is the responsibility of the government to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves.

### 5.3.2. Religious Behaving


What is the effect of religious behaving on economic policy concerns? I argue that religious behaving or worship attendance is related to economic policy opinions. Those individuals who are more religiously active will hold progressive policy stances on economic issues. Indeed, those who are more active in their religious organizations are more likely to support government spending.

Is this speculation on the connection between religious activity and progressive economic policy attitudes supported empirically? First, in Table 5.5 I consider the effect of religious service attendance on government spending. Those who attend religious services more frequently are less likely to support spending on social security ( $b = -0.134$ ,  $z = -3.69$ ) and government spending on military defense ( $b = -0.086$ ,  $z = -2.56$ ). In addition, those who contribute to religious organizations are less likely to support government spending on the poor ( $b = -0.1777$ ,  $z = -1.97$ ).

In Figure 5.1 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome on the dependent variable, social security spending. As the level of service attendance increases, so too do opinions on keeping social security spending the same. In addition, as the frequency of service attendance increases, attitudes on social security spending decreases. Indeed, 64% of those who do not attend religious services favor increased spending on social security compared to 51% of individuals who attend services more than once per week.

In Figure 5.2. I report the predicted probabilities associated with defense spending. These results are interesting in that most individuals support a moderate level of defense spending.


However, as the frequency of service attendance increases, support for spending decreases. Those individuals who attend worship services more frequently are less supported of increasing spending on defense.



**Figure 5.1** Predicted probabilities on attitudes toward social security spending by church attendance

Moving on to Table 5.8, we see that religious worship attendance is also related to reducing the federal deficit. Those individuals who attend worship services more frequently are less likely to believe that it is important to reduce the deficit ( $b = 0.105$ ,  $z = -3.20$ ). Religious contributions are also negatively related to opinions on reducing the gap between the rich and the poor ( $b = -0.253$ ,  $z = -3.08$ ). Finally, in Table 5.9 one can see that none of the religious attendance coefficients achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Hence this variable does not appear to have an effect on economic policy attitudes in the 2013 Economic Values

Survey. Additional analyses may help to explain why religious attendance does not have an influence on economic policy attitudes. However, based on these results religious activity does not have a consistent and systematic effect on economic policy attitudes.



**Figure 5.2** Predicted probabilities on attitudes toward defense spending by church attendance

Overall, religious behaving influences economic policy concerns in some selected instances. However, the effect is limited to a small handful of economic policies: spending on social security, spending on the poor, spending on defense, and opinions on reducing the deficit. Contrary to expectations, in these few instances those who attend religious services more frequently are *less* likely to support government spending and *less* likely to hold progressive economic policy opinions. It is clear that the effects of religious attendance on policy attitudes are largely targeted toward moral policy attitudes and far less so to economic policy concerns.

**Table 5.8.** Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of economic policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	<b>Model (7) Service</b>		<b>Model (8) Deficit</b>		<b>Model (9) Taxes</b>		<b>Model (10) Inequality</b>		<b>Model (11) Minimum Wage</b>	
	<b>b</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>z</b>
<b>Belonging</b>										
Mainline	0.211	1.64*	-0.158	-1.23	-0.123	-0.77	-0.113	-0.90	-0.141	-0.92
B. Protestant	-0.065	-0.26	0.051	0.22	0.006	0.02	0.120	0.53	0.438	1.26
Evangelical	0.226	1.57	0.179	1.26	-0.059	-0.35	-0.022	-0.16	0.137	0.82
Catholic	0.128	1.04	-0.067	-0.55	0.135	0.88	-0.054	-0.45	0.009	0.06
H. Catholic	0.005	0.02	-0.089	-0.39	-0.902	-3.33***	-0.077	-0.35	-0.119	-0.43
Other Christian	0.152	1.16	0.056	0.43	0.062	-0.40	-0.119	-0.96	-0.066	-0.43
Jewish	0.726	2.91**	-0.368	-1.46	-0.375	-1.13	-0.136	-0.56	0.002	0.01
Other Religion	0.474	2.81**	-0.188	-1.10	-0.157	-0.75	0.138	0.84	0.223	1.04
<b>Behaving</b>										
Attendance	-0.057	-1.70	-0.105	-3.20***	0.031	0.83	-0.037	-1.19	-0.062	-1.61
Contributions	-0.110	-1.25	0.104	1.20	-0.078	-0.79	-0.253	-3.08**	-0.047	-0.46
<b>Believing</b>										
Importance	-0.471	-3.18***	-0.110	-0.76	0.067	0.39	-0.345	-2.44*	0.187	1.07
Guidance	0.216	3.57***	0.229	3.84***	-0.029	-0.42	0.213	3.71***	0.084	1.17
Biblical Literalism	0.144	2.13*	0.014	0.22	-0.042	-0.56	0.028	0.45	0.109	1.40
Spirituality	0.015	0.28	-0.019	-0.43	0.092	1.88	-0.060	-1.34	-0.042	-0.75
<b>Political Variables</b>										
Political Variables										
Identification	-0.305	-13.51***	0.185	8.70***	-0.204	-8.11***	-0.247	-12.07***	-0.274	-10.62***
Ideology	-0.449	-13.46***	0.205	6.50***	-0.432	-11.05***	-0.389	-12.55***	-0.377	-9.60***

**Table 5.8,** continued

	Model (7) Service		Model (8) Deficit		Model (9) Taxes		Model (10) Inequality		Model (11) Minimum Wage	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>										
Married	-0.032	-0.43	0.007	0.10	-0.106	-1.22	-0.015	-0.21	-0.028	-0.33
Black	0.656	3.46***	0.038	0.21	-0.474	-2.32*	0.042	0.25	0.465	1.88
Hispanic	0.402	2.52*	0.184	1.18	0.338	1.77	0.182	1.24	0.185	0.98
Asian	0.199	1.01	-0.099	-0.51	-0.201	-0.88	0.497	2.57**	-0.125	-0.55
Gender	0.160	2.34*	-0.002	-0.04	0.111	1.39	0.089	1.36	0.130	1.62
Age	-0.007	-3.38***	0.008	4.17***	0.012	5.23***	-0.011	-5.49***	0.015	6.16***
Education	-0.023	-0.98	-0.050	-2.14*	0.007	0.25	-0.043	-1.92	-0.076	-2.73**
Income	-0.021	-4.12***	-0.009	-1.72	0.013	2.26*	-0.022	-4.44***	-0.009	-1.58
N		2,865		3,298		3,300		3,290		3,290
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.1170		.0654		.1045		.1024		.1368
$\chi^2$		1260.84		526.05		591.52		1064.53		738.50
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000

**Table 5. 9.**Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of economic policy opinions, EVS 2013 data

	Model (1) Responsibility		Model (2) Social Services		Model (3) Taxes		Model (4) Inequality		Model (5) Minimum Wage	
	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
<b>Belonging</b>										
Mainline	0.163	0.57	0.083	0.29	-0.165	-0.81	0.005	0.02	-0.049	-0.24
B. Protestant	0.134	0.27	0.803	1.60	0.429	1.30	0.073	0.15	0.041	0.12
Evangelical	0.156	0.51	0.335	1.09	-0.057	-0.26	0.635	2.08*	0.382	1.74*
Catholic	0.396	1.38	0.299	1.03	-0.195	-0.95	0.386	1.34	0.254	1.24
H. Catholic	-0.007	-0.02	-0.238	-0.53	0.288	0.92	-1.016	-2.19*	-0.379	-1.17
Jewish	1.872	1.99*	-1.212	-1.39	0.711	1.41	0.650	0.72	0.620	1.21
Other	-0.090	-0.30	0.191	0.62	-0.105	-0.48	-0.078	-0.25	-0.190	-0.84
<b>Behaving</b>										
Attendance	0.089	1.42	-0.051	-0.80	-0.026	-0.59	-0.062	-0.98	-0.028	-0.63
<b>Believing</b>										
Biblical Literalism	-0.120	-0.56	0.304	1.44	-0.140	-0.93	-0.323	-1.49	-0.053	-0.34
Image of God	-0.134	-0.88	0.234	1.53	0.155	1.43	0.013	0.08	0.150	1.33
Importance	0.095	0.77	0.115	0.94	0.013	0.15	0.283	2.32*	0.012	0.13
Preserve Beliefs	-0.061	-0.55	0.202	1.83	-0.210	-2.64***	-0.337	-2.98**	-0.273	-3.38***
Care for the poor	0.167	4.02***	-0.174	-4.16***	0.060	2.07*	0.189	4.51***	0.061	2.09**
<b>Political Variables</b>										
Identification	-0.263	-5.01***	0.252	4.90***	-0.344	-9.19***	-0.479	-8.77***	-0.261	-6.88***
Ideology	-0.221	-2.55*	0.438	4.90***	-0.467	-7.35***	-0.330	-3.71***	-0.337	-5.26***

Table 5.9, continued



Socioeconomic/ Demographic	Model (1) Responsibility		Model (2) Social Services		Model (3) Taxes		Model (4) Inequality		Model (5) Minimum Wage	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
Married	-0.067	-0.42	0.088	0.56	0.065	0.58	0.069	0.44	-0.123	-1.09
Black	0.288	0.74	-1.205	-3.09**	-0.325	-1.29	0.241	0.61	1.117	4.03***
Hispanic	-0.241	-0.76	0.265	0.83	-0.405	-1.80	0.435	1.31	0.187	0.78
Asian	0.381	0.70	0.487	0.89	-0.210	-0.54	-0.390	-0.74	0.163	0.42
Gender	-0.130	-0.90	-0.212	-1.47	0.175	1.69	0.300	2.07*	0.463	4.39***
Age	0.002	0.39	0.006	1.50	0.003	0.86	-0.012	-2.80**	-0.010	-3.25***
Educ	0.028	0.64	0.003	0.06	0.020	0.64	-0.137	-3.09**	-0.044	-1.37
Income	-0.076	-1.49	0.020	0.39	-0.137	-3.74***	-0.155	-3.03**	-0.087	-2.38*
<hr/>										
N	737		734		1,410		737		1,407	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0660		.1383		.1021		.1589		.0987	
χ <sup>2</sup>	123.51		276.29		383.58		319.76		354.01	
Prob(χ <sup>2</sup> )	.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000	


### 5.3.3. Religious Believing

What is the influence of religious believing on economic policy issues? I posit that religious believing influences public opinion on economic policy issues and argue that biblical literalism is related to how individuals make assessments on economic policies. While there are competing arguments in the conservative/progressive nature of biblical literalism, I argue that those individuals who believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible are more likely to hold progressive economic policy opinions.

The results that I present in Table 5.5 demonstrate that those individuals who believe that religion plays an important part of their daily lives are more likely to support spending on crime ( $b = 0.338$ ,  $z = 2.08$ ) and defense ( $b = 0.355$ ,  $z = 2.39$ ) and less likely to support spending on welfare policies ( $b = -0.338$ ,  $z = -2.22$ ). Biblical literalists are more likely to support government spending on social security ( $b = 0.213$ ,  $z = 2.91$ ), crime ( $b = 0.382$ ,  $z = 5.25$ ), the poor ( $b = 0.180$ ,  $z = 2.61$ ), and defense ( $b = 0.341$ ,  $z = 5.06$ ). Thus, these results add evidence to support the hypothesis that biblical literalists hold more progressive economic policy concerns (except for favorability in increasing defense spending). Those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are more likely than those who believe that the Bible is the word of man to support government spending. Religious guidance in daily life and spirituality does not have an effect on attitudes toward government spending.

As an example, in Figure 5.3 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome on the dependent variable defense spending by biblical literalism. I find that those who believe that the Bible is the word of God support defense spending (nearly 19%) compared to those individuals who do not believe that the Bible is the literal word of God (12%). In addition,

biblical literalists report extreme support for increased spending on defense (10%) more so than those who believe that the Bible is not the literal word of God (nearly 6%).



**Figure 5.3** Predicted probabilities on attitudes toward defense spending by biblical literalism

Turning to Table 5.8, religious believing influences opinions toward the government's responsibility in providing services, reducing the deficit, and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. Religious importance is related to opinions on government service ( $b = -0.471$ ,  $z = -3.18$ ) and reducing inequality ( $b = -0.345$ ,  $z = -2.44$ ). Individuals who believe that religion is important are less likely to believe that the government should provide more services than those who do not believe that religion is an important part of their daily life. In addition, the importance of religion negatively related to belief in reducing inequality between the rich and the

poor. Those who believe religion is important do not support the government instilling policies to reduce the income inequality. Religious guidance is related to opinions on government service, reducing the deficit, and income inequality. Indeed, individuals who use religion as guidance in their daily lives are more likely to support government services, reducing the federal deficit, and reducing inequality. Lastly, biblical literalism ( $b = 0.144$ ,  $z = 2.13$ ) is related to positive feeling of expanding government services. In sum, I demonstrate that religious believing has a general influence on economic policy opinions. Consistent with the hypotheses, biblical literalism related to more progressive economic policy opinions.

In Table 5.9 I present the results of the models using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey. This dataset is unique in that it provides additional measures of religious believing. Included in these measures are two important variables: (1) preserve beliefs and (2) care for the poor. The first variable, preserve beliefs, is coded 0 if respondent believes that religious should adopt to modern beliefs, 1 if religious beliefs should be adjusted considering new circumstances, coded 2 if beliefs and practices should be preserved. The second variable, care for the poor, involves beliefs in Jesus' teachings. Low values represent the belief that when Jesus talked about caring for the poor he meant through private charity. High values represent the belief that Jesus promoted a just society. When including these variables in the models, the results demonstrate that both preserve belief and care for the poor have significant effects on public opinion toward economic policies. Those who believe that religion should preserve traditional beliefs are less likely to support increasing taxes on the rich ( $b = -0.210$ ,  $z = -2.64$ ), less likely to believe in reducing income inequality ( $b = -0.337$ ,  $z = -2.98$ ), and less likely to support an increase in minimum wage ( $b = -0.273$ ,  $z = -3.38$ ). These findings are unsurprising. Those who hold more conservative religious beliefs also hold more conservative policy opinions

and less likely to support social welfare policies than those individuals who hold progressive religious beliefs. The variable “care for the poor” represents beliefs about Jesus’ teachings. Those who believe that Jesus promoted a just society are more likely to believe that it is the government’s responsibility to provide services to those who cannot help themselves ( $b = 0.167$ ,  $z = 4.02$ ) than those who believe that Jesus’ teaching promoted private acts of charity. Likewise, the “Jesus promotes a just society” believers are less likely to believe that the government provides too many social services ( $b = -0.174$ ,  $z = -4.16$ ). These individuals are also more likely to support increasing taxes on the rich ( $b = 0.060$ ,  $z = 2.07$ ), reducing inequality, ( $b = 0.189$ ,  $z = 4.15$ ), and increasing minimum wage ( $b = 0.061$ ,  $z = 2.0$ ) than those who believe that Jesus’ teachings promoted private acts of charity. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypotheses. Those individuals who hold more conservative religious beliefs are more likely to hold conservative economic policy opinions than those individuals who hold progressive religious beliefs.

#### 5.3.4. A Note on the Effects of Control Variables

Considering the effects of political and socioeconomic and demographic variables across the models, there are a few things to highlight. First, political identification and political ideology had an influence on all government spending economic policy concerns except spending on crime. Republicans and conservatives are less likely than Democrats and liberals to support government spending, regardless of the subject of government spending. Likewise, Republicans and conservatives are less likely to support increasing government services, raising taxes on the rich, reducing inequality, and increasing the minimum wage than Democrats and liberals. Republicans and conservatives are however concerned with reducing the deficit. Looking across models using the 2013 EVS data, I find that Republicans and conservatives are

less likely to support the view that it is the government's responsibility to take care of the poor, increasing taxes on rich, reducing inequality, and increasing minimum wage than Democrats and liberals. Lastly, Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe that the government provides too many services. Overall, these results are consistent with expectations.

In addition to these political variables, there are key differences among the socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models. First, married couples are less likely to support spending on healthcare than unmarried couples. Second, African Americans are in favor of government spending on both welfare and the poor and increasing social services. African Americans are also more likely to support increasing minimum wage; however, they are less likely to support raising taxes on the rich. Third, Hispanics are concerned with increasing spending on welfare and the poor and increasing social services. Fourth, Asians support increased spending on crime and reducing income inequality. Fifth, women are more likely to support spending on social security, increasing social services, reducing inequality, and increasing minimum wage than men. Sixth, older individuals favor spending on social security, crime, healthcare, and military defense. They are also more likely to believe in reducing the deficit and increasing taxes on the rich than younger individuals. However, they are less likely to support an increase in social services and reducing inequality. Seventh, education is negatively related to spending on social security, crime, the poor, healthcare, and military defense. Education is also negatively related to opinions on reducing the deficit, reducing income inequality, and increasing minimum wage. Finally, income is negatively related to government spending on social security, welfare, the poor, and healthcare. Wealthy individuals are also less supportive of increasing social services, reducing inequality, and increasing minimum wage.

## 5. 4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated whether there is an empirical link between religious belonging, religious having, and religious believing and economic policy opinions. Specifically, I am concerned with the effects of these three dimensions of religion on government spending. I am also interested in the influence of religion on a number of other economic policy issues including government services, the federal deficit, taxes on the rich, economic inequality, and minimum wage. I find that there are some among and within denominational differences on economic issues, especially approval of government spending, although, the results are inconsistent across economic policies. I also find that religious behaving is related to attitudes toward government spending where those individuals who attend church more frequently are less likely to support government spending on social security and military defense than infrequent service attenders. Frequent worship attenders are also less likely to support reducing the federal deficit.

Lastly, I find that religious believing is related to economic policy concerns. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that religious importance, religious guidance in daily life, and biblical literalism have the most consistent effects among the models. Likewise, when using 2013 EVS survey data I find that perceptions of Jesus' teachings contributes to how individuals assess government responsibility, social services, taxes on the rich, economic inequality, and raising the minimum wage. The results of the models demonstrate that the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing should be considered in analyses of economic public opinion and that these variables should be measured *separately* when conducting empirical research. In this conclusion, I provide a summary of the findings and offer comments about future research.

*Religious belonging.* The results of the models demonstrate that there are differences among religious denominations on spending on social security, welfare, the poor, and military defense. Indeed, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants and Catholics are more likely to support spending on social security than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. In addition, other non-Christian religious groups are more likely to support spending on welfare. Hispanic Catholics and other non-Christian religious groups are more likely to approve of government spending on the poor. Most notably, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and other Christian religious group are more likely to support government spending on defense than black Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, Jews, other non-Christian adherents, and the religiously unaffiliated. Regarding other economic policy issues, I find that mainline Protestants, Jewish adherents, and other non-Christian religious groups are in favor of increasing government services. Interestingly, I find that Hispanic Catholics are less likely to favor increasing taxes on the rich.

Using 2013 EVS survey data, I find limited denominational differences. Evangelical Protestants are more likely to support reducing inequality; whereas, Hispanic Catholics are less likely support the government's role in reducing inequality between the rich and the poor. In general, the results of the models are consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter, albeit there does not seem to be a systematic effect among the religious belonging variables and attitudes toward economic policy concerns.



Hypothesis	Support	Notes
H1: Religious belonging → economic policy opinions	Generally supported	Inconsistent findings across policy areas
H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews → progressive views	Partially supported	<p>Mainline Protestants support social security and defense spending. Support social services.</p> <p>Catholics support spending on crime, social security spending and defense spending</p> <p>Jews support spending on welfare. Also believe in social services and the government's responsibility in taking care of the poor</p>

*Religious Behaving.* What is the influence of religious behaving on economic policy opinions? The results from Table 5.5 and Table 5.8 demonstrate that service attendance is related to government spending on social security and military defense; however, there is no effect of service attendance among the other government spending variables. Those who attend religious services more frequently are less likely to support government spending in these areas. In addition, frequent service attenders are less concerned with reducing the deficit than non-frequent attenders. Those who contribute to religious organizations are less likely to support government spending on the poor and reducing economic inequality. This suggests that those individuals who are contributing to their churches are more likely to believe in private acts of charity rather than government assistance. Consistent with the hypotheses, I find support that

religious behaving influences economic policy concerns, especially as it relates to spending on social welfare programs.

Therefore,

Hypothesis	Support	Note
Religious behaving → economic policy opinions	Supported	
H2b: Religiously active → progressive opinions	Partially supported	Religiously active individuals hold <b>conservative</b> opinions on social security spending, spending on the poor, and reducing inequality and <b>progressive</b> opinions on defense spending and reducing the deficit

*Religious believing.* Perhaps the most complex of the three dimensions of religion is religious believing. More so than the effects of religious belonging and religious behaving, religious believing influences public opinion on economic policy concerns. In all models—using both 2016 ANES and 2013 EVS data—a component of religious believing influenced government spending opinions and other economic policies. Religious importance is positively related to increased spending on crime and military defense. It is also negatively related to government spending on welfare and increasing social services. Those who turn to religion as guidance in their daily lives are more likely to favor increasing government services, reducing the federal deficit, and reducing inequality than those individuals who do not use their religious beliefs as guidance in day-to-day life. Biblical literalism is significant in nearly all of the government spending variables. Indeed, those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are more likely to support government spending on social security, crime, the poor, and military defense. Biblical literalists are also more likely (than those who believe that the Bible is a book stories) to support government social services. The 2013 EVS dataset provides two

additional variables that I have called “preserve beliefs” and “care for the poor.” Individuals who believe that religion should preserve traditional beliefs rather than adopt to current trends are less likely to support increasing taxes on the rich, reducing inequality, and reducing the minimum wage. Most notably, those individuals who believe that Jesus’ teachings supported a just society in caring for the poor—versus private acts of charity—are more likely to believe in the government’s responsibility in helping the poor, less likely to believing in reducing social series, more likely to support increasing taxes on the rich, more likely to support the reduction of economic inequality, and more likely to support increasing the minimum wage.

Therefore,

Hypothesis	Support	Note
Religious believing → economic policy opinions	Supported	
H3b: Biblical literalists → progressive economic policy opinions	Supported	<p>Biblical literalists support an increase in government spending (variety of issues)</p> <p>Preserve traditional beliefs is related to conservative economic policies.</p> <p>Care for the poor is related to progressive opinions on government responsibility, increasing taxes, reducing economic inequality, and raising the minimum wage</p>

Overall, these findings suggest that those individuals who hold conservative religious beliefs are more likely to support government spending and economic policies. Those individuals who hold progressive religious beliefs are more likely to support governing services and government intervention in economic matters such as reducing inequality and increasing the minimum wage. These findings are generally consistent with expectations.

*Future research.* Two future projects come to mind based on the results of these models. First, the variable “service” is interesting in that it asks respondents about their belief in whether the government should provide fewer or more services. Jews and non-Christian religious groups report support for government services. In addition, those who believe that religion is important in daily life are less likely to support increasing service; however, those who believe that religion provides guidance in day to day life are more likely to support government services. Biblical literalists also favor government services. I would like to explore these findings at greater length. Based on the results presented in this chapter, those who believe that religion is important are less likely to disapprove of government services but when religion provides guidance in daily life respondents are more likely to approve of government services. Religious importance and religious guidance appear to capture two different religious belief sentiments. I suspect that religious importance is related to more conservative religious beliefs; whereas, religious guidance constitutes more progressive religious beliefs.

Secondly (and lastly), the 2013 EVS variable “responsibility” asks respondents about their opinion on the government’s responsibility to take care of people who cannot take care of themselves. The results presented in Table 5.9, Model (1) show that those who believe that Jesus promoted a just society (rather than private acts of charity) are more likely to support the government’s responsibility in taking care of those who cannot help themselves. While this relationship is significant, all other coefficients in the model—with the exception of Jews—are not significant. I would like to further explore these differences. The data suggest that there is little else that influences government’s responsibility than the interpretation of Jesus’ teachings.

In sum, the models that I have presented in this chapter reveal that there is a link between religious belonging, behaving, and believing and economic policy concerns. These three

religious dimensions influence economic public opinion in models of government spending and government responsibility in other fiscal issues. In the next chapter, I explore the effect of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on hybrid policy issues including opinions on immigration, the environment, and free trade agreements.

## Chapter 6. Hybrid Policy Opinions

### 6.1. Introduction

In Chapter 4, I find significant effects of the three dimensions of religion—belonging, behaving, and believing—on Americans’ attitudes on moral policy issues. In Chapter 5, I find that the driving force behind public opinion on economic issues is religious beliefs, with religious belonging and religious behaving having inconsistent effect on economic policy concerns. In this chapter, I am interested in the effect of the three dimensions of religion on hybrid issues including the environment, immigration, and foreign policy. Hybrid policies are those that have both value-based<sup>10</sup> and economic components. For example, immigration is a value issue when considering humanitarian concerns and is an economic issue when considering the government funding of a border wall or government spending on social welfare programs to aid immigrants. Attitudes toward the environment or climate change is another example of an issue that can be considered both moral and economic. Climate change is a moral issue when one places importance on making the Earth safe for future generations. It is also an economic issue when government action, regulation, or spending addresses changing climate. Therefore, I argue that these issues are both moral and economic in nature, and I use the term *hybrid* to designate issues that share both moral and economic features. Since the issues that I discuss in this chapter have both moral and economic components, I am interested in teasing out which aspects of religion influence the various policy domains.

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<sup>10</sup> These value-based issues are different from the moral policy issues that I presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, the moral issues were largely concerned with sexuality or “pelvic politics.” In this chapter, when I use the word moral, I am interested in issues that are value-based or have a sense of fairness or ethical considerations. I consider immigration a moral or values-based issue on the groups of humanitarian rights. The “moral” issues that I present in this chapter focus on human dignity, altruism, and responsibility.

Using data from the 2016 ANES survey, I present a series of models that estimate the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on immigration attitudes toward (1) citizenship of immigrants, (2) Syrian refugees, and (3) support for building a border wall with Mexico. Also using 2016 ANES survey data, I analyze models concerning the environment. Chiefly, I am interested in the influence of the three dimensions of religion on (1) an environment protection versus job protection tradeoff scale, (2) government spending on the environment. Lastly, I consider the effects of religion on two foreign policy issues: (1) military force, and (2) free trade.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I offer a series of bivariate analyses that display the distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration. These two issues are chosen as examples due to their relevancy in contemporary politics. The prevailing scholarly literature on the effects of religion on the environment and immigration is limited. However, previous research has demonstrated that there is a considerable effect of religious denomination (religious belonging) and worship attendance (religious behaving) on global warming opinions (Shao and McCarthy 2019, forthcoming). Evangelical Protestants and frequent service attenders are less likely to believe in global warming than other religious groups and infrequent service attenders. I have included the third dimension of religion (religious believing) in the models to further explore this relationship.

## **6.2. Religious Dimensions**

### **6.2.1. Religious Belonging**

What is the influence of religious belonging on the environment, and immigration? The results presented in Table 6.1 reveal that there are differences among religious denominations and their support for spending on the environment ( $\chi^2 = 111.1125$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and

increasing immigration ( $\chi^2 = 43.5883$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) in the United States. Specifically, most Catholics (53%), Jews (64%), and other religious individuals (56%) report favorable attitudes on increasing spending on the environment; on the other hand, only 41% of Protestants support increased environmental spending, with large minorities of Protestants preferring to keep spending the same (37%) or decrease spending (23%) on the environment. There are also differences among the religious denominations with respect to attitudes toward immigration. For example, many Protestants prefer decreasing (50%) immigration levels in the United States. Conversely, a significant number of Jews (36%) report favorability in increasing immigration.

I also find key within-denominational differences. In Table 6.2, I report the distribution of attitudes toward spending on the environment ( $\chi^2 = 97.0994$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) and increasing immigration levels ( $\chi^2 = 49.6641$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) among Protestants. Black Protestants (70%) are largely in favor of increasing spending on the environment; whereas, evangelical Protestants are largely in favor of either decreasing spending (24%) or keeping spending on the environment the same (39%). Mainline Protestants and black Protestants hold similar opinions on immigration; favoring decreasing immigration (Mainline, 44%; black 38%) or keeping immigration the same (Mainline, 42%; black 46%). Contrary to Mainline and black Protestants, evangelical Protestants are most in favor of decreasing (63%) immigration.

In this chapter, I address these within denominational differences. The distribution of attitudes that I present in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that mainline Protestants and Catholics are more likely to hold moderate to progressive views on the environment and moderate to conservative views on immigration, while Jewish adherents are more likely to hold progressive views on these policy issues. Also, evangelical Protestants take conservative stances on hybrid issues regarding the environment and immigration. My overarching argument in this dissertation



is that religious belonging—within and among religious traditions— effects those hybrid policy issues that involve humanitarian or value components and concerns.

**Table 6.1.** distribution of attitudes toward spending on the environment and immigration, 2016 ANES

		<b>Protestant</b>	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Jewish</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Spending on the environment</b>					
	Decrease	22.66%	12.90%	7.06%	9.44%
	Keep the same	36.59%	34.19%	29.41%	34.52%
	Increase	40.74%	52.90%	63.53%	56.04%
Total		100	100	100	100
N		1,156	930	85	1,176
$\chi^2$		111.1125			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000			
<b>Immigration</b>					
	Decrease	50.05%	45.63%	20.27%	45.99%
	Keep the same	37.31%	40.95%	43.24%	39.59%
	Increase	12.64%	14.32%	36.49%	14.42%
Total		100	100	100	100
N		1,013	789	74	985
$\chi^2$		43.5883			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000			

**Table 6.2.** distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration among Protestants, 2016  
ANES

		<b>Mainline</b>	<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	<b>Black Protestant</b>
<b>Spending on the environment</b>				
	Decrease	13.30%	23.95%	3.38%
	Keep the same	38.34%	38.69%	26.16%
	Increase	48.36%	37.35%	70.46%
Total		100	100	100
N		579	597	237
$\chi^2$		97.0994		
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.010		
<b>Immigration</b>				
	Decrease	44.40%	62.62%	38.69%
	Keep the same	42.44%	30.02%	45.73%
	Increase	13.16%	7.36%	15.58%
Total		100	100	100
N		509	503	199
$\chi^2$		49.6641		
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		0.000		

### 6.2.2. Religious Behaving

In Table 6.3 I focus on differences in attitudes between church attenders and non-church attenders on spending on the environment and immigration. Looking first at opinions on increasing spending on the environment among church attenders, I find that the differences in the distribution of attitudes among Catholics, Jews, and other religious groups are significant ( $\chi^2 = 84.9975$ , Prob( $\chi^2$ ) = 0.000). First, Catholics (50%), Jews (57%), and other religious groups (55%) favor increasing spending on the environment; whereas, fewer (24%) Protestants report

favorability in increasing spending (24%). Among non-church attenders, I find a similar pattern ( $\chi^2 = 22.7490$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.001$ ). Catholics (59%), Jews (72%), and other religious groups (59%) favor increasing spending. Protestants (nearly 50%) are less likely to favor spending on the environment than the other religious groups.

Comparing church attenders and non-church attenders, the distribution of attitudes demonstrates a pattern of support for increasing spending on the environment regardless of religious denomination; for all four religious groups, the level of support for increased spending is higher for non-church attenders than for regular church attenders. Thus, I posit that church attenders are more likely to hold conservative views on the environment than non-church attenders, regardless of religious denomination. However, Jewish adherents and other religious groups are more likely to hold progressive opinions on the environment—regardless of their frequency of service attendance.

Differences among church attenders and non-church attenders exist among religious denominations regarding increasing immigration in the United States. First, I find that among church attenders Protestants (51%) report favorability in decreasing immigration. Many Catholics (49%) and other religious groups (47%) also report favorability in decreasing immigration. Jewish adherents (56%) mostly prefer keeping immigration levels the same. These results of the bivariate analyses are statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 20.2477$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Regarding opinions among non-church attenders ( $\chi^2 = 30.7511$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ), a significant number of Jews (48%) favor increasing immigration. Protestants, Catholics, and other religious groups are split in the opinions on decreasing immigration (Protestants 47%; Catholics 40%; other 43%) or keeping immigration levels the same (Protestants 41%; Catholics 40%; other 42%). I find a progressive trend between the models of church attenders and non-church

attenders. Non-church attenders are more progressive in their views on immigration than church attenders. I speculate that frequent church attenders will hold more conservative opinions on immigration than those who attend religious services less frequently.

Overall, there seems to be (limited) evidence that religious behavior influences immigration attitudes. Indeed, the groups are similar in their immigration preferences, except for Jewish non-service attenders who are more supportive of increased immigration than Jewish service attenders.

### 6.2.3. Religious Belief

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that religious belief influences opinions on both moral and economic policy issues. In Table 6.4, I consider the effects of biblical literalism and religious importance on attitudes toward the environment and immigration. Here I find that there are significant differences ( $\chi^2 = 188.6952$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ) among those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God, the Bible is the word of God but should not be taken literally, and the Bible is the word of God on environment policy concerns. Specifically, those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God favor increasing government spending on the environment; whereas, fewer biblical literalists (44%) believe in increasing spending on the environment.

In another example, religious importance is related to opinions on government spending on the environment ( $\chi^2 = 105.8482$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). In this case, those who believe that religion is important (48%) report less favorable attitudes on increasing spending on the environment than those who do not believe that religion is an important part of their daily lives (64%).

**Table 6.3.** distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration among church attenders and non-church attenders, ANES 2016

	Church attenders				Non-church attenders			
	Protestants	Catholics	Jewish	Other	Protestants	Catholics	Jewish	Other
<b>Environment</b>								
Decrease	23.93%	15.16%	8.70%	10.02%	17.84%	7.93%	5.13%	7.72%
Keep the same	37.70%	34.69%	34.78%	34.97%	32.37%	33.10%	23.08%	33.22%
Increase	38.36%	50.16%	56.52%	55.01%	49.79%	58.97%	71.79%	59.06%
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	915	640	46	878	241	290	39	298
$\chi^2$	84.9975				22.7490			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000				0.001			
<b>Immigration</b>								
	Church attenders				Non-church attenders			
	Protestants	Catholics	Jewish	Other	Protestants	Catholics	Jewish	Other
Decrease	50.75%	48.87%	17.07%	47.15%	47.44%	45.08%	24.24%	42.51%
Keep the same	36.22%	40.18%	56.10%	38.89%	41.40%	39.75%	27.27%	41.70%
Increase	13.03%	13.94%	26.83%	13.96%	11.16%	15.16%	48.48%	15.79%
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	798	545	41	738	215	244	33	247
$\chi^2$	20.2477				30.7511			
Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.003				0.000			

**Table 6.4.** distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration by biblical literalism and religious importance, 2016 ANES

		<b>Biblical Literalism</b>			<b>Religious Importance</b>	
		Not the word of God	Word of God but not literally	Literal Word of God	Not Important	Important
<b>Environment</b>	Decrease	8.38%	12.47%	19.85%	8.22%	16.40%
	Keep the same	21.68%	37.27%	36.15%	28.17%	35.54%
	Increase	69.94%	50.26%	44.00%	63.61%	48.06%
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	N	1,038	1,932	1,209	1,459	2,763
	$\chi^2$	188.6952			105.8482	
	Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			0.000	
<b>Immigration</b>	Decrease	16.10%	23.64%	35.34%	34.79%	48.85%
	Keep the same	42.61%	41.68%	34.23%	42.97%	38.28%
	Increase	9.64%	4.10%	4.40%	22.24%	12.87%
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	N	913	1,658	999	1,259	2,346
	$\chi^2$	195.1880			85.9059	
	Prob( $\chi^2$ )	0.000			0.000	

There are also differences in the distribution of attitudes toward immigration among biblical literalists, those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God, and those who believe that the Bible is the word of God but should not be taken literally ( $\chi^2 = 195.1880$ ,  $\text{Prob}(\chi^2) = 0.000$ ). Biblical literalists are split in their opinions on decreasing (35%) and keeping immigration levels in the United States the same (34%). Those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God largely support keeping immigration the same (42%). Religious importance also plays a role in immigration attitudes; however, the majority of individuals—regardless of religion’s importance in daily life—support either decreasing immigration or keeping immigration levels the same in the United States. Notably, 22% of those who believe that religion is not important support increasing immigration; whereas, only 13% of those who believe that religion is an important party of daily life support increasing immigration.

#### 6.2.4. Summary

These preliminary bivariate analyses expose potential differences among the three dimensions of religion and attitudes toward issues that are considered both moral and economic. These hybrid issues, the environment and immigration, have a mix of both moral and economic components; therefore, I argue that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing influences hybrid policy opinions that are predominately concerned with values and religious believing influences hybrid policy opinions that are predominately concerned with economic considerations.

### 6.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models

In this section I present results for several ordered logistic regression models. In both sets of models, I use data from the 2016 ANES. In Table 6.5, I report the results for environmental policy concerns: (1) environment versus job tradeoff scale and (2) government spending on the environment. In Table 6.7, I report the results for models dealing with support for immigration

policy: (1) increasing/decreasing immigration levels, (2) birthright citizenship, (3) increasing the number of Syrian refugees allowed in the country, and (4) support for building a border wall with Mexico. In Table 6.10, I present results from models concerning (1) the use of military force and (2) free trade agreement opinions. In each model I include religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing variables. In addition, I include partisan identification and political ideology in the models as well as standard socioeconomic and demographic variables. In models concerning immigration and foreign policy, I include two additional variables, (1) foreign born and (2) parents foreign born. These variables capture the effects of whether individuals are foreign born and the number of parents that the respondent has who are foreign born.

My overall argument is that religion influences hybrid issues. However, I include in my models separate sets of variables representing religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing; this permits me to discern which religious dimension influences the hybrid policy domains. I posit that religious believing influences those issues that involve government spending or are more focused on the economic component of the policy dimension, i.e. government spending on the environment or building a border wall with Mexico. I also argue that all three religious dimensions will have an influence on hybrid policies that are predominately values-based or concern humanitarian issues such as allowing Syrian refugees in the country. Overall, since I include a variety of directional and non-directional hypotheses, I report results from both one-tailed and two-tailed hypothesis tests, where appropriate.

#### 6.3.1. Religious Belonging

*Environment.* What is the effect of religious belonging on attitudes toward environmental policy opinions? In Table 6.5, I find that there are limited effects of religious belonging on



environmental policy concerns. In Model (1), the dependent variable is an environment/jobs tradeoff scale, which ranges from 0 (for a preference for “no regulation of the environment because it will not work and will cost jobs” to 6 (for a preference to “regulate business to protect the environment and create jobs”). I find that Catholics are less likely to support government regulation of the environment ( $b = -0.259$ ,  $z = -2.07$ ) than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. However, the coefficients of the other religious belonging variables are not statistically significant in Model (1). It appears that non-Hispanic Catholics are the outliers in their preferences for weaker environmental regulation. In Model (2), I find a similar pattern with regards to the influence of religious belonging on government spending on the environment. Hispanic Catholics ( $b = -0.598$ ,  $z = -2.24$ ) are less likely to support increased spending on the environment than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated.

In Table 6.6, I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting business regulation to protect the environment. In this discussion, I draw attention to the statistically significant coefficients reported in Table 6.5. Among Catholics, the probability of supporting government regulation of businesses to protect the environment is 0.222 and the probability for those who are religiously unaffiliated is 0.261. While the differences between Catholics and the religiously unaffiliated is not large, the underlying coefficients for these variables are statistically significant.

Overall, the results of these models demonstrate that the effects of religious belonging on models of environmental policy concerns are limited at best. I argue that this is due to the economic nature of the variables in the models. Specifically, both models deal with the economic side of environmental concerns: job creation and government spending. Consistent with the

results of the models presented in Chapter 5, religious belonging has a limited effect on economic issues.<sup>11</sup> In the case of this chapter, both environmental policy issues were economic in nature; however, in future projects I will consider dependent variables that capture the other aspects of environmental policy concerns. For example, the 2014 PRRI/AAR Religion, Values & Climate Change Survey contains environmental policy questions involving personal responsibility to protect other species, preventing human suffering, respecting and taking care of the earth, and protecting future generations. I believe that religious denomination will influence opinions on the environment when moral components of climate change are discussed.<sup>12</sup>

*Immigration.* The 2016 ANES included several measures of government regulation or involvement in immigration policy. For the purposes of this dissertation, I include four models dealing with immigration issues: (1) immigration levels, (2) citizenship of immigrants, (3) increasing the number of Syrian refugees allowed in the United States, and (4) building a border wall with Mexico. These variables include both moral and economic components of immigration. The results of the models demonstrate that there are religious belonging effects in all four models; however, there is most variation and statistical significance among the coefficients in models that deal with increasing (decreasing) immigration. Black Protestants (  $b = -0.526$ ,  $z = -2.30$ ) and evangelical Protestants (  $b = -0.439$ ,  $z = -3.16$ ) are less likely to support increasing the number of immigrants allowed in the United States; whereas, Jews are more likely

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<sup>11</sup> There were several environmental variables in the 2016 ANES. Three variables were related to government policy or spending: environment/jobs tradeoff, government spending on the environment, and the government's responsibility on regulating global warming. In addition, there were two variables that were not related to policy but related to opinions on global warming. I did not find significant effects of the religious belonging variables in these models. I did not include these results in the chapter because I am chiefly concerned with policy opinions and not whether global warming is happening or if the respondent believes that global warming is manmade or due to natural causes.

<sup>12</sup> I did not include 2014 PRRI/AAR data in this dissertation because it did not specifically relate to policy issues, rather the questions concerned environmental protection. In future projects I would like to explore religious belonging and attitudes toward environmental conservation.

to support increasing immigration ( $b = 0.507, z = 2.09$ ), controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Jewish adherents ( $b = -0.669, z = -2.82$ ) are also less supportive of birthplace citizenship than the other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. These findings are not surprising—I suspect that Jewish adherents rely on biblical teachings in the Old Testament and religious doctrine when considering immigration citizenship opinions. Evangelical Protestants ( $b = -0.592, z = -4.23$ ), Catholics ( $b = -0.351, z = -2.93$ ), and other Christian religious groups ( $b = -0.307, z = -2.42$ ) are less likely to support allowing Syrian refugees in the United States than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Other non-Christian religious groups are largely in favor of allowing refugees in the United States ( $b = 0.412, z = 2.48$ ). Perhaps these findings demonstrate longstanding religious cultural divides among religious traditions and their feelings toward other religious groups—i.e. Muslims. In the last model that I present in Table 6.6, Model (4), Catholics ( $b = 0.402, z = 3.21$ ) and other Christians ( $b = 0.288, z = 2.19$ ) are more likely to support building a border wall with Mexico than the other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. This is an interesting finding, especially because Mexico is predominately a Catholic country. In future analyses, I will explore at greater length the relationship between Catholics and immigration opinions.

**Table 6.5.** Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of environmental policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	<b>Model (1)</b>		<b>Model (2)</b>	
	<b>Environment/Jobs Tradeoff</b>		<b>Environment Spending</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>				
Mainline Protestants	0.002	0.01	0.136	0.94
Black Protestants	-0.035	-0.14	0.192	0.72
Evangelical Protestants	-0.208	-1.43	-0.037	-0.24
Catholic	-0.259	-2.07*	0.118	0.85
Hispanic Catholic	0.047	0.19	-0.598	-2.24*
Other Christian	-0.049	-0.36	0.048	0.33
Jewish	0.035	0.15	-0.022	-0.07
Other Religion	0.000	0.00	0.009	0.05
<b>Behaving</b>				
Attendance	-0.074	-2.15*	-0.043	-1.25
Contributions	0.036	0.40	0.011	0.12
<b>Believing</b>				
Religious Importance	-0.286	-1.92	-0.143	-0.90
Religious Guidance	0.208	3.37**	0.050	0.78
Biblical Literalism	-0.221	-3.17**	-0.195	-2.71**
Spirituality	-0.000	-0.00	0.024	0.51
<b>Political Variables</b>				
Partisan Identification	-0.213	-9.37***	-0.189	-8.23***
Political Ideology	-0.383	-11.38***	-0.453	-12.48***
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>				
Married	-0.090	-1.18	-0.141	-1.76
Black	0.092	0.49	0.328	1.60
Hispanic	0.346	2.07*	0.860	4.54***
Asian	0.220	1.07	0.508	2.22*
Gender	0.188	2.68**	0.224	3.00**
Age	-0.009	-4.19***	-0.006	-2.55*
Education	0.050	2.03*	-0.008	-0.29
Income	0.002	0.34	-0.008	-1.47
<hr/>				
N		2,769		3,298
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.0892		0.1449
$\chi^2$		907.55		926.48
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000

**Table 6.6.** Predicted probabilities for environment protection attitudes associated with religious denominations

<b>Environment/job tradeoff</b>	<b>No regulation</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Regulate business</b>
<b>M. Protestant</b>	0.044	0.074	0.097	0.183	0.164	0.176	0.261
<b>B. Protestant</b>	0.045	0.076	0.099	0.185	0.164	0.174	0.256
<b>E. Protestant</b>	0.053	0.086	0.108	0.193	0.164	0.168	0.229
<b>Catholic</b>	0.055	0.089	0.110	0.195	0.164	0.166	0.222
<b>Hispanic Catholic</b>	0.042	0.072	0.095	0.181	0.164	0.177	0.269
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.046	0.077	0.100	0.186	0.164	0.174	0.254
<b>Jewish</b>	0.042	0.072	0.096	0.182	0.164	0.177	0.267
<b>Other religion</b>	0.044	0.074	0.097	0.183	0.164	0.176	0.261
<b>Secular</b>	0.044	0.074	0.097	0.183	0.164	0.176	0.261

**Table 6.7.** Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of immigration policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	<b>Model (1) Immigration</b>		<b>Model (2) Citizenship</b>		<b>Model (3) Refugees</b>		<b>Model (4) Border Wall</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>								
Mainline	-0.013	-0.10	-0.031	-0.25	-0.051	-0.41	0.033	0.24
B. Protestant	-0.526	-2.30*	0.142	0.65	-0.439	-1.96	0.164	0.71
Evangelical	-0.439	-3.16***	-0.017	-0.13	-0.592	-4.23***	0.273	1.91
Catholic	-0.221	-1.84	0.101	0.87	-0.351	-2.93**	0.402	3.21***
H. Catholic	0.084	0.38	-0.241	-1.08	-0.123	-0.55	-0.443	-1.79
Other Christian	-0.128	-1.01	-0.124	-1.01	-0.307	-2.42*	0.288	2.19*
Jewish	0.507	2.09*	-0.699	-2.82**	0.034	0.13	0.069	0.24
Other Religion	0.204	1.22	-0.096	-0.59	0.412	2.48*	-0.038	-0.22
<b>Behaving</b>								
Attendance	0.091	2.86**	-0.046	-1.49	0.156	4.83***	-0.096	-2.93**
Contributions	0.084	0.99	-0.031	-0.38	0.182	2.14*	-0.208	-2.38*
<b>Believing</b>								
Importance	-0.281	-1.94	0.293	2.10*	-0.357	-2.48*	0.185	1.25
Guidance	0.099	1.68	-0.145	-2.55*	0.140	2.37*	-0.039	-0.66
Literalism	-0.222	-3.43***	0.023	0.37	-0.205	-3.16**	0.277	4.19***
Spirituality	-0.038	-0.82	0.056	1.33	0.008	0.17	-0.065	-1.46
<b>Political Variables</b>								
Identification	-0.175	-8.31***	0.199	9.78***	-0.300	-14.10***	0.347	15.94***
Ideology	-0.318	-10.02***	0.253	8.35***	-0.472	-14.86***	0.440	13.34***
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>								
Foreign Born	-0.109	-0.68	-0.081	-0.51	-0.152	-0.93	-0.086	-0.49
P. Foreign Born	0.200	2.69**	-0.090	-1.23	0.131	1.74	0.043	0.54
Married	-0.056	-0.77	0.012	0.17	-0.064	-0.87	0.109	1.45
Black	0.365	2.13*	0.061	0.37	-0.208	-1.24	-0.103	-0.58
Hispanic	0.360	2.28*	-0.832	-5.18***	0.200	1.26	-0.932	-5.33***
Asian	0.403	1.94	0.095	0.46	0.104	0.50	0.117	0.53
Gender	-0.164	-2.45*	-0.030	-0.47	-0.046	-0.69	-0.035	-0.51
Age	-0.011	-5.55***	0.009	4.65***	-0.012	-5.84***	0.006	2.83**
Education	0.131	5.64***	-0.032	-1.41	0.169	7.30***	-0.130	-5.42***
Income	0.010	2.09*	-0.003	-0.56	0.010	1.97*	-0.025	-4.87***
N		3,280		3,291		3,281		3,281
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.0925		0.0553		0.1321		0.1474
$\chi^2$		868.87		631.46		1476.45		1557.25
Prob ( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000		.0000		.0000

In Table 6.8 and 6.9, I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting increasing immigration and building a government funded border wall with Mexico. Again, in this discussion I draw attention to the statistically significant coefficients reported in Table 6.7. Black Protestants are significantly less likely to support increasing immigration than seculars, a difference of .023. There is a similar pattern among evangelical Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated concerning opinions on immigration. The probability of supporting a increase in immigration is 0.041; whereas, the probability of being religiously unaffiliated or secular and supporting an increase in immigration is 0.061. Thus, there is a difference of .02 among evangelical Protestants the religiously unaffiliated. Conversely, Jews are more likely to support an increase in immigration (0.094) than the religiously unaffiliated (0.061). While the differences between the various religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated are small, the underlying coefficients for these variables are statistically significant.

**Table 6.8.** Predicted probabilities for immigration attitudes associated with religious denominations

<b>Immigration level</b>	<b>Decreased a lot</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Increased a lot</b>
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	0.222	0.190	0.415	0.113	0.060
<b>Black Protestant</b>	0.307	0.210	0.366	0.079	0.038
<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	0.292	0.207	0.375	0.085	0.041
<b>Catholic</b>	0.255	0.199	0.397	0.099	0.050
<b>Hispanic Catholic</b>	0.207	0.185	0.422	0.121	0.066
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.239	0.195	0.406	0.105	0.054
<b>Jewish</b>	0.152	0.159	0.441	0.154	0.094
<b>Other religion</b>	0.190	0.178	0.429	0.130	0.073
<b>Secular</b>	0.222	0.189	0.416	0.114	0.061

**Table 6.9.** Predicted probabilities for border wall attitudes associated with religious denominations

<b>Border wall</b>	<b>Oppose border wall</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Support border wall</b>
<b>M. Protestant</b>	0.387	0.081	0.021	0.211	0.019	0.094	0.186
<b>B. Protestant</b>	0.366	0.080	0.021	0.213	0.020	0.098	0.202
<b>E. Protestant</b>	0.348	0.079	0.021	0.214	0.020	0.101	0.216
<b>Catholic</b>	0.327	0.078	0.021	0.215	0.021	0.105	0.234
<b>H. Catholic</b>	0.468	0.083	0.021	0.198	0.017	0.079	0.134
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.345	0.079	0.021	0.214	0.020	0.102	0.218
<b>Jewish</b>	0.381	0.081	0.021	0.211	0.019	0.096	0.190
<b>Other religion</b>	0.399	0.082	0.021	0.209	0.019	0.092	0.177
<b>Secular</b>	0.393	0.082	0.021	0.210	0.019	0.093	0.182

In Table 6.9, I report the predicted probabilities associated with the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting the building of a government funded border wall with Mexico. Catholics (0.234) and other Christian religious groups (0.218) are more likely to support a border wall than the religiously unaffiliated (0.182).

What do these models tell us about the role of religious belonging on mass attitudes relating to hybrid policy issues? First, these models demonstrate that there is a relationship between religious belonging and immigration concerns. Chiefly, black Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and Catholics are less likely to favor increasing immigration in the United States. Catholics are also in favor of building a border wall with Mexico. Jewish adherents are more progressive in their opinions on immigration; however, they are not in favor of allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the United States without penalty. Arguably, religious belonging has a significant effect on the models of immigration because the dependent variables in the models concern a moral (relative to economic) component in question phrasing by using “refugees” and “immigrants” rather than “undocumented workers.” In sum, while denominational differences existed among models of immigration, there were limited denominational differences on environmental policy opinions—largely due to the economic nature of the ANES survey questions.



*Foreign policy.* In Table 6.10 I present the results of two models dealing with foreign policy concerns. First, there are generally no differences among religious traditions and opinions on foreign policy—with the exception of one statistically significant coefficient. Jewish ( $b = 0.632$ ,  $z = 2.53$ ) adherents are more likely to support free trade agreements than other religious groups. The non-existent statistical significance on religious belonging variables and foreign policy opinions suggests that religious tradition does not play a role in shaping foreign policy opinions, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. In future projects, I would like to address this issue by including political knowledge and political interest variables in the models. I suspect that those individuals who are more politically aware and who have higher levels of political interest are more likely to have strong foreign policy attitudes.


**Table 6.10.** Ordered Logistic regression estimates for models of foreign policy opinions, 2016 ANES data

	<b>Model (7)</b>		<b>Model (8)</b>	
	<b>Military Force</b>		<b>Free Trade</b>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>
<b>Belonging</b>				
Mainline	0.100	0.77	0.058	0.47
Black Protestant	0.270	1.14	-0.088	-0.40
Evangelical	0.079	0.55	-0.094	-0.69
Catholic	0.201	1.63	0.079	0.66
Hispanic Catholic	0.150	0.64	0.211	0.96
Other Christian	0.232	1.79	0.048	0.38
Jewish	0.203	0.82	0.632	2.53*
Other Religion	-0.144	-0.82	0.166	1.03
<b>Behaving</b>				
Attendance	0.003	0.10	0.011	0.34
Contributions	-0.211	-2.41*	0.068	0.82
<b>Believing</b>				
Importance	0.079	0.54	-0.114	-0.81
Guidance	0.072	1.20	0.029	0.50
Biblical Literalism	0.285	4.24***	-0.101	-1.60
Spirituality	0.045	0.97	0.019	0.46
<b>Political Variables</b>				
Partisan Identification	0.041	1.89	-0.072	-3.50***
Political Ideology	0.149	4.64***	-0.071	-2.32*
<b>Socioeconomic/ Demographic</b>				
Foreign Born	-0.214	-1.25	0.244	1.52
Parents Foreign Born	0.034	0.44	0.002	0.03
Black	-0.032	-0.18	0.194	1.18
Hispanic	-0.292	-1.73	0.231	1.46
Asian	-0.422	-1.84	0.087	0.41
Gender	-0.110	-1.60	-0.194	-2.94**
Age	0.003	1.59	0.006	3.06**
Education	-0.041	-1.73	0.182	7.92***
Income	0.002	0.44	0.011	2.34*
N		3,285		3,266
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.0317		0.0243
$\chi^2$		260.74		260.64
Prob( $\chi^2$ )		.0000		.0000

### 6.3.2. Religious Behaving

*Environment.* What is the influence of religious behaving on Americans' attitudes on environmental policy? In the models presented in Table 6.5, environmental policy opinions, religious worship attendance has a negative effect on the environment/jobs tradeoff. Those individuals who are more frequent service attenders are less likely to believe in regulating businesses to protect the environment than those who attend services less frequently. There are no other significant effects of service attendance or religious contributions in the models regarding environmental concerns. Again, these findings are consistent with my argument that hybrid policy issues that are couched in economic terms will not be influenced by religious behaving in the same ways that behaving factors influence moral issues. The exception in this case is model (1) or the environment/jobs tradeoff. It is possible (and consistent with the bivariate preliminary findings) that church goers in general hold more conservative views on the environment compared to those individuals who are infrequent service attenders.

In Figure 6.1, I report the predicted probabilities of supporting government regulation of business to protect the environment by service attendance. Included in this figure, are the top two and bottom two categories on the environment/jobs tradeoff scale. As one can see, a church attendance increases support for regulation of businesses to protect the environment decreases.




**Figure 6.1.** Predicted probabilities and support for environmental protection by church attendance


*Immigration.* Turning to Table 6.7, immigration policy opinions, I find that there are significant effects of religious attendance and immigration opinions, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. The results demonstrate that religious behaving is related to immigration concerns in three of the four models. Frequent service attenders are more likely to support increasing immigration ( $b = 0.091$ ,  $z = 2.86$ ), and allowing Syrian refugees in the United States ( $b = 0.156$ ,  $z = 4.83$ ) than those who do not attend religious services frequently, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Consistent with these findings, frequent service attenders are less likely to support building a border wall with Mexico ( $b = -0.096$ ,  $z = -2.93$ ) than less religious adherents. Whether one has contributed to a religious organization is also related to immigration opinions. Similar to the findings on the relationship

between service attendance and immigration, the coefficient for religious contributes is positive and statistically significant regarding opinions on allowing Syrian refugees in the United States ( $b = 0.182$ ,  $z = 2.14$ ). In addition, those who contribute to religious organizations are also less likely to support building a border wall with Mexico ( $b = -0.208$ ,  $z = -2.38$ ).

In Figure 6.2, I present the predicted probabilities for support for immigration by church attendance. On one hand, as service attendance increases so too does support for increasing immigration in the United States. On the other hand, as service attendance increases, there is also a slight decrease in approval for increasing immigration. In Figure 6.3, I show the predicted probabilities for support building a border wall. There are significant differences among church attenders and support for the border wall. Indeed, those who are frequent attenders are less likely to support the border wall (11%) than non-frequent attenders (nearly 15%). In addition, those who are frequent service attenders are more likely to oppose a government funded border wall with Mexico (37%) than non-frequent attenders (27%).



**Figure 6.2.** Predicted probabilities and support for immigration by church attendance



**Figure 6.3** Predicted probabilities and support for building a border wall by church attendance

*Foreign policy.* Religious contributions are related to negative opinions concerning using military forces or deploying troops to Iraq ( $b = -0.211$ ,  $z = -2.41$ ). Those who contribute to religious organizations are less likely to favor military intervention. This is consistent with the hypotheses that religiously active individuals will hold more progressive policy stances on issues that involve humanitarian concerns, i.e. war.

These results demonstrate the importance of including the religious behaving dimension of religion when modeling the effects of public opinion on immigration. While the results of the models regarding environmental policy concerns are less clear, I suggest that religious believing influences opinions on the environment when moral or values-based components of the environment are incorporated into survey questions.


### 6.3.3. Religious Believing

Throughout this dissertation, I argue that religious believing is related to both moral and economic policy opinions. In this section, I will demonstrate that religious believing is related to both environmental policies and immigration policies. I measure religious believing as (1) religious importance, (2) religious guidance, (3) biblical literalism, and (4) spirituality. For example, I argue that biblical literalism is negatively related to environmental and immigration policy issues. Those individuals who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are more likely to hold conservative views on the environment and immigration than those who believe that the Bible is the word of man.

In Table 6.5, one can see that religious guidance in daily life is positively related to belief in regulating businesses to protect the environment ( $b = 0.208$ ,  $z = 3.37$ ). Those who use religion as guidance in their daily life support government regulation of business to protect the environment compared to those who do not consider religion as guidance in day-to-day living,

controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Regarding biblical literalism, those who believe that the Bible is the word of God are less likely to support regulation of businesses ( $b = -0.221$ ,  $z = -3.17$ ) and spending on the environment ( $b = -0.195$ ,  $z = -2.71$ ) than those who believe that the Bible is not the literal word of God. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that religious believing is related to both economic and moral policy issues. I have considered these environmental policy issues economic in nature; therefore, the statistical significance of the coefficients is no surprise. I have shown that religious belonging is related to environmental policy concerns, and these results here suggest that scholars analyzing public opinion on environmental issues should also include religious believing measures in their models. In Figure 6.4 I show the predicted probabilities for environmental protection by biblical literalism. The dark lines represent the top two and bottom two categories on the dependent variable, environment/job tradeoff. As one can see, there are considerable differences among biblical literalists and those who do not believe that the Bible is the literal word of God. Indeed, biblical literalists are less supportive of business regulation to protect the environment than those who do not believe in the literal interpretation of the Bible.






**Figure 6.4.** Predicted probabilities and support for the environment by biblical literalism

*Immigration.* The results of the models in Table 6.7 demonstrate that religious believing has an influence on immigration policy opinions. First, religious importance is related to citizenship concerns and Syrian refugee approval. Those who believe that religion is important support birthright citizenship ( $b = 0.293$ ,  $z = 2.10$ ) and they are less likely approve of allowing Syrian refugees in the county ( $b = -0.357$ ,  $z = -2.48$ ) than those who believe that religion is not important. Second, religious guidance also plays a role in shaping opinions on citizenship and Syrian refugees. Those who rely on religion for guidance are more likely less likely birthright citizenship ( $b = -0.145$ ,  $z = -2.55$ ) and more likely to support allowing Syrian refugees in the country ( $b = 0.140$ ,  $z = 2.37$ ). While the direction of the coefficients of these variables seem to contradict one another; perhaps, these findings demonstrate differences between those who believe that religion is important and those who use religion as guidance in day-to-day living and


how these groups apply their religious beliefs and practices. I suspect that those who use religion as guidance in daily living are more prone to expressing their religious beliefs and applying these religious convictions to policy opinions. Third, biblical literalism is related to several immigration policies including opinions on the number of immigrants allowed in the country ( $b = -0.222, z = -3.43$ ), Syrian refugees ( $b = -0.205, z = -3.16$ ), and building a border wall with Mexico ( $b = 0.277, z = 4.19$ ). Biblical literalists are less likely to support increasing immigration in the United States and allowing Syrian refugees in the country and more likely to support building a border wall with Mexico than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God. This finding is consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 and the results presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5: biblical literalists hold more conservative policy opinions than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God. Lastly, it is important to note spirituality does not have an effect on any of the dependent variables in the models. I believe that this is related to large ideological differences among those who are spiritual.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> In figure 6.5 I show the predicted probabilities of supporting an increase(decrease) in immigration by biblical literalism. There are significant differences among biblical literalists/non-literalists. Those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God favor decreasing immigration in the United States. This result is consistent with the hypotheses that biblical literalists are generally more conservative but inconsistent with hypothesis 3c: Biblical literalists take more progressive policy stances on hybrid issues that involve humanitarian concerns.



**Figure 6.5.** Predicted probabilities and support for immigration by biblical literalism



**Figure 6.6.** Predicted probabilities and support for building a border wall by biblical literalism

*Foreign policy.* Consistent with the results of most hybrid policy models, doctrinal beliefs have an effect on support for military force. Biblical literalists are more likely ( $b = 0.285$ ,  $z = 4.24$ ) to support sending troops to Iraq than those who do not believe in the literal interpretation of the Bible. This finding is inconsistent with the hypotheses. I argued that biblical literalists would hold more progressive policy opinions than other individuals and the results demonstrate overall conservative policy opinions regarding military force.

#### 6.3.4. A Note on the effects of Control Variables

In this chapter I concentrate on the influence of religious belonging, behaving, and believing on hybrid policy issues. However, there are significant findings among the political and socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models. There are several findings that are worth pointing out. First, Republicans and conservatives are less likely to support government regulation of businesses to protect the environment and government spending on the environment than Democrats and liberals, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Second, Republicans and conservatives are also less likely to support immigration policies that allow an increasing number of immigrants or refugees in the country and more likely to support policies that restrict immigration such as penalties for undocumented immigrants and a border wall with Mexico. The converse is true for Democrats and liberals who prefer increasing immigration and the number of Syrian refugees allowed in the country and disapprove of building a border wall with Mexico.

In addition to the political variables, there are several noteworthy findings among the socioeconomic and demographic variables. There are two variables that I included in the models relating to immigration: foreign born and parents foreign born. These variables capture whether the respondent is foreign born or if the respondent has parents who are foreign born.

Interestingly, the only model that considers on being foreign born or having parents who are foreign born has an effect is Model (1): Immigration. Those respondents who have more than one parent who are foreign born are more likely to support increasing immigration in the United States than those respondents who have no parents who are foreign born, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Again, the coefficients of these variables are not significant in other immigration models.

Race, gender, age, education, and income have various effects on environmental and immigration policies. Turning to opinions on the environment, Hispanics, Asians, women, younger individuals, and those with higher levels of income hold progressive opinions on government involvement environment regulations, supporting government regulation of businesses or government spending on the environment. Considering the effects of these variables on immigration policies, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to favor increasing immigration in the United States. Hispanics are also less likely to believe that there should be no penalty for undocumented immigrants and less likely to support building a border wall with Mexico. Women are less likely to support increasing immigration compared to men. Age has a significant influence in all models regarding immigration. Those who are older are less likely to support increasing immigration and more likely to support a border wall than younger individuals. Lastly, education and income have an influence on immigration policy opinions. The more education and wealthy are more likely to favor policies that increase the number of immigrants or refugees allowed in the United States than those who have less education and lower levels of income.

In sum, these results are similar to the results presented in previous chapters. Republicans and conservatives hold more conservative policy opinions than Democrats and liberals. Women

are more progressive in their opinions than men. Older individuals are more conservative in their policy opinions than younger individuals. And those who have higher levels of education are more progressive than those with fewer years of education.

#### **6.4. Conclusion**

Overall, the results demonstrate that religious believing is related to policy opinions concerning the environment and immigration. As expected, those issues that have economic or fiscal components are influenced by religious believing. While religious behaving and religious belonging have an influence, the findings are often mixed. Those issues that have moral (in this case humanitarian) characteristics are influenced by all three policy domains. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses presented in the previous chapters. In addition, these findings provide additional support to the notion that the clergy, church social groups, and religious doctrine are clear in their stance on moral or value based policies, whereas, economic issues are more ambiguous. These results demonstrate the importance of including the three dimensions of religion *separately* when modeling public opinion toward these issues and considering whether an issue has moral or economic components. In this conclusion, I provide a basic summary of the findings and I offer closing remarks and future research projects.

*Religious belonging.* I find that religious belonging has a limited influence on environmental policy concerns. Catholics reported negative feelings toward regulating business to protect the environment and create jobs. Hispanic Catholics were not in favor of the government increasing spending on the environment. In previous projects, my coauthor and I found that evangelical Protestants are less likely to believe in the seriousness of global warming (Shao and McCarthy 2019, forthcoming). The results of Model (1) and Model (2) show no significant effects in the relationship between evangelical Protestants and attitudes toward

environmental policies. I suspect that evangelical Protestants do not consider environmental policies important because they are less likely to believe that global warming is a problem.

Religious belonging is also related to immigration opinions. Black Protestants, evangelical Protestants are less in favor of increasing immigration in the United States; whereas, Jewish adherents are in favor of raising immigration levels in the country. When asked about the government policy regarding unauthorized immigrations now living in the United States, Jews report negative attitudes toward birthright citizenship. Evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and other Christians report negative attitudes toward allowing Syrian refugees in the United States; whereas, other non-Christian religious groups are in favor of increasing Syrian immigration. Lastly, Catholics and other-Christian groups are in favor of building a border wall with Mexico, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the model. In future projects I will explore the last of these issues—religion and building a border wall. I suspect that exposure to the media and favorability of President Trump has an influence in border wall opinions.

Overall, the results of these models are (generally) consistent with the hypotheses.

Hypothesis	Support	Note
H1: Religious Belonging → hybrid policy opinions	Partially supported	Moral leaning policies: supported Economic leaning policies: limited effect
H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews → progressive policy opinions	Partially supported	Catholics exhibit more conservative environmental and immigration policy opinions Jews hold progressive policy opinions regarding immigration

*Religious behaving.* Religious behaving influences policy opinions on the environment, and immigration. Specifically, worship attendance influences opinions toward the

environment/job tradeoff scale. Frequent service attenders reported negative feelings toward regulating businesses to protect the environment. They are also more likely to support increasing immigration and allowing Syrian refugees in the United States and less likely to support building a border wall with Mexico than non-frequent service attenders. Consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, I find that religiously active individuals hold progressive policy stances on issues that involve humanitarian concerns. Another component of religious behaving is contributing to religious organizations. Those who contribute are more likely to support allowing refugees in the United States and less supportive of building a border wall with Mexico than those who do not financially contribute to religious organizations. These individuals are also less likely to support using military force.

Therefore,

Hypothesis	Support	Note
Religious behaving → hybrid policy opinions	Supported	Moral leaning policies: supported Economic leaning policies: limited effect
H2: Religiously active → conservative opinions on government funding; progressive opinions on humanitarian concerns	Partially supported	Attendance is related to conservative and progressive opinions—depending on government funding vs humanitarian concerns  Frequent attenders are less likely to support government regulation and environment protections, more likely to support increasing immigration and less likely to support building a border wall.

Due to the exploratory nature of this chapter, I limited analyses to one data source; however, in forthcoming projects I will include data sources that offer a more diverse set of religious behaving variables.



*Religious believing.* The last dimension of religion that I consider in this chapter and dissertation is religious believing. Specifically, I posit that religious importance, religious guidance, and biblical literalism are related to how individuals' assess the environment and immigration.

Most notably, I find that religious importance and religious guidance is related to immigration policy opinions. Religious importance is related to positive immigration policy opinions where those who believe that religion is an important part of their daily life are in favor of allowing unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States without penalty. However, these individuals are also less likely to believe in increasing the number of Syrian refugees allowed in the country. In a similar way, religious guidance is related to both citizenship and refugees. There is one important exception. Religious guidance is negatively related to support for birthright citizenship positively related to allowing Syrian refugees in the United States. Future research is needed to better explain these differences. I suspect that religious importance and religious guidance involves different aspects of religious believing. Those who believe religion is important in daily life are not necessarily the same individuals who believe that religion should provide guidance in daily life. I am interested in further exploring these differences.

I also find that biblical literalism is related to nearly all hybrid policy opinion models. Those who believe that the Bible is the word of God are less likely to support environmental policies, holding conservative views on the environment vs. job tradeoff and government spending on the environment. In addition, biblical literalists are also less likely to support increasing immigration and allowing Syrian refugees in the United States and more likely to support building a border wall with Mexico than those who believe that the Bible is a book

written by man. Lastly, biblical literalists believe in using military force by sending troops to fight ISIS. I am interested in exploring the relationship between biblical literalism and immigration concerns on other issues including public opinion on policies regarding immigrant children, Mexico- U.S. border conditions, and the responsibility of the U.S. government to provide necessities to undocumented migrants.

Overall, these results are consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2:

Hypothesis	Support	Note
Religious believing → hybrid policy opinions	Supported	
H3c: Biblical literalists→ conservative policy opinions on economic leaning policies and progressive policy opinions on humanitarian policies.	Not/partially supported	Biblical literalists hold conservative policy opinions on the environment, immigration, and foreign policy

In this chapter, I have demonstrated a need for including religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing in models regarding policies that have both economic and moral components. In all policy areas, there were significant affects among the religious believing variables and environmental and immigration policies. In the next chapter, I provide an overview of the dissertation and offer future project ideas. I also propose thoughts on developing a theory of religious dimensions that include incorporating religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing in all models of public opinion concerning moral policy issues I also argue that these dimensions should be included and considered separately in future analyses to better understand the effects religion on economic policy concerns. Indeed, biblical literalism plays a significant role in shaping economic policy opinions.

## **Chapter 7. Conclusion**

### **7.1. Introduction**

How does religion influence political opinions? Traditional scholarship treats religion as a social group where individuals are influenced by their religious organizations and consequently adopt political opinions based on their interactions with their religious group (ethnoreligious perspective). Scholars also note key differences within religious denominations in terms of conservative and progressive theologies (traditional-modernism perspective). Contemporary scholars incorporate insights from both the ethnoreligious perspective and the traditional-modernism perspective and measure religion by including three dimensions (also known as the 3B's) of religion in their models: belonging, behaving, and believing. With this knowledge the question now becomes: how do religion variables—i.e., denominational affiliation, religious participation, and religious beliefs influence views on political opinions?

A lack of a unified theory involving the influence of religion and politics plagues the field. In this dissertation, I outlined several existing theories (most coming from the field of sociology) and argued the importance of including the ethnoreligious perspective, the traditional-modernist approach, and “3B” classification of religion and politics in the models. I argue that the social group phenomena of religion is still an influencer in shaping public opinion, however, religious organizations matter for assessments of moral or values-based issues more so than economic concerns. The clergy—and consequently religious doctrine—are clear in assessments regarding moral or values-based issues, whereas, interpretations of economic policies are ambiguous. While I did not directly study the influence of the clergy in this project, I assume their influence based on the works of other scholars (i.e. Olson 2009; Smith and Harris 2005; McDaniel 2011). I incorporate aspects of the traditional-modernist approach by delineating

Protestants among three groups: mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical Protestants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mainline Protestants and black Protestants are more progressive in their policy opinions; whereas, evangelical Protestants are more conservative. I also consider differences between Hispanic Catholics and non-Hispanic Catholics. Traditionally, Hispanic Catholics are more conservative in their religious beliefs than non-Hispanic Catholics.

The final component of this dissertation is the inclusion of the “3B’s” of religion in the models of public opinion. One benefit of the “3B” approach is the natural overlap among the existing theories and how religion is measured. However, I highlight the importance of measuring religious behaving and religious believing separately in the models. I call the “3B’s” the three dimensions of religion because of their unique nature in shaping political attitudes. The first dimension, religious belonging, has a significant effect on moral policy issues. The second dimension, religious behaving, also influences moral policy opinions. The third dimension, religious believing, influences *both* moral and economic policy opinions. Indeed, biblical literalism is an important driver in economic policy assessments. This third dimension of religion that is often coupled with religious behaving proves to be the force behind most policy opinions.

## **7.2. Summary**

In Table 7.1 I demonstrate the overall trends among the religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing dimensions related to moral policy concerns.<sup>14</sup> As you can see, there is some consistency among the religious belonging category. For example, mainline Protestants are more progressive in their attitudes toward moral policies (except for attitudes

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<sup>14</sup> I report (simple) results from ordered logit and logit regression models. I include a “+” or a “-” when the coefficient of the variables was statistically significant in the full models. All summary models in this chapter use 2016 ANES data. I divide the religious dimensions by color: religious belonging is represented by blue cells, religious behaving is represented by orange cells, and religious believing represented by is green cells.

toward the death penalty); whereas evangelical Protestants are more conservative. Catholics are generally supportive of LGBTQ rights; however, Hispanic Catholics hold both conservative (transgender bathroom opinions) and progressive (same-sex marriage and discrimination) moral policy opinions. Lastly, Jews are more progressive in their attitudes. Interestingly and inconsistent with expectations, the coefficient for black Protestants was not statistically significant in the models, suggesting that black Protestant hold similar moral policy opinions to the religiously unaffiliated and secular, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the model.

Moving on to the religious behaving dimensions of religion, the coefficient of service attendance is statistically significant in *all* moral policy opinion models. Frequent service attenders are less likely to support LGBTQ rights than non-frequent attenders. The data also show that frequent attenders are less supportive of abortion and the death penalty than non-frequent service attenders. Thus, service attendance is related to conservative LGBTQ policy views and pro-life opinions. Likewise, those who make religious contributions are also more pro-life in their policy opinions.

The last dimension, religious believing, there are some inconsistencies among the effect of the religious believing variables and moral policy opinions. However, religious guidance and biblical literalism are related to conservative LGBTQ rights opinions. Those who believe that religion serves as guidance in daily life and those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are less likely to support LGBTQ policies. Indeed, the coefficient for biblical literalism is significant in *all* ANES models. Biblical literalists are also against abortion and in favor of the death penalty; whereas, those who use religion as guidance in their daily life hold pro-life sentiments concerning abortion legislation and the death penalty.

What does this tell us about the effect of the three dimensions of religion on moral policies? Overall, I conclude that there are (generally) consistent effects and that scholars should include all three dimensions separately in public opinion analyses relating to moral or value-based policy concerns. Indeed, there is a great deal of consistency among service attendance and biblical literalism on moral policy opinions. In future analyses, I will take a closer look at those individuals who believe that religion is an important part of daily life and those who believe that religion serves as guidance in daily life. In several models, the direction of the coefficients was in opposite directions (and statistically significant). I would like to further address why religious importance is related to progressive policy opinions, yet religious guidance is related to conservative moral policy opinions.

In Table 7.2 I present a simple summary of the effect of the three religious dimensions on economic policy concerns. First, religious belonging has some effect on economic policy opinions where all groups favor an increase in government spending (except for black Protestants) on one or more policy area. For example, mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants favor increased spending on social security and defense, Catholics favor spending on social security, crime, and defense, Hispanic Catholics are concerned with increasing spending on the poor, other Christians favor spending on defense, Jewish adherents prefer government spending on welfare, and other non-Christian religious groups favor spending on welfare and the poor. Considering the other economic issues, there is little affect of religious denomination on economic policy concerns. Mainline Protestants, Jews, and other non-Christian groups are progressive in their opinions on whether the government should offer more services. Hispanic Catholics also conservative in their beliefs about whether taxes should be increased on the rich. In sum, these results demonstrate that religious belonging influences economic policy opinions;

however, the effects are limited to government spending issues. There also is little consistency among the various traditions and spending concerns. For example, mainline Protestants do not prefer increased spending in all areas, they only favor increased spending on social security and defense. Likewise, each religious group has specific preferences on certain government spending areas.

**Table 7.1.** Summary of the three dimensions and moral policy concerns, 2016 ANES data

	Same sex marriage	Same sex discrimination	Same sex Adoption	Same sex service	Transgender bathroom	Abortion	Death penalty
<b>Mainline</b>			+	+		+	+
<b>B. Protestant</b>							
<b>E. Protestant</b>	-				-		+
<b>Catholic</b>	+		+	+			
<b>H. Catholic</b>	+	+			-		
<b>Other Christian</b>							
<b>Jewish</b>				+	+		-
<b>Other religion</b>							-
<b>Attendance</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Contributions</b>				-		-	-
<b>Importance</b>				+			+
<b>Guidance</b>	-		-	-		-	-
<b>Literalism</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
<b>Spirituality</b>						+	

**Table 7.2.** Summary of the three dimensions and economic policy concerns, 2016 ANES data

	Social Security	Crime	Welfare	Poor	Healthcare	Defense	Govt. Service	Deficit	Taxes	Inequality	Minimum wage
Mainline	+					+	+				
B. Protestant											
E. Protestant	+					+					
Catholic	+	+				+					
H. Catholic				+					-		
Other Christian						+					
Jewish			+				+				
Other religion			+	+			+				
Attendance	-					-		-			
Contributions				-						-	
Importance		+	-			+	-			-	
Guidance							+	+		+	
Literalism	+	+		+		+	+				
Spirituality											



The effect of religious behaving is also inconsistent. However, there are a few noteworthy findings. Service attendance is related to conservative opinions on social security spending, defense spending, and reducing the deficit. Religious contributions are related to conservative opinions on spending on the poor and reducing inequality. Overall, those individuals who are more frequent attenders and who contribute to religious services are less likely to favor increased spending, reducing the deficit, or inequality. These findings highlight a general conservative trend among service attenders (albeit a weak trend). In future analyses, I will address why service attenders oppose spending on social security but not spending on welfare and the poor. Perhaps religious beliefs and doctrinal conservatism are influencing these economic policy opinions.

The religious belonging variables have the most consistent effects on economic policies. Specifically, religious importance and biblical literalism have an effect on several policy concerns. For the most part, those who believe that religion is important hold a mix of conservative and progressive economic policy opinions. Indeed, these individuals are more likely to support spending on crime and defense and less likely to support spending on welfare. They also hold conservative opinions on increasing government services and reducing inequality. Biblical literalists hold progressive economic policy opinions on several issues including increasing spending on social security, crime, and the poor. Biblical literalists also favor increasing government services.

In sum, the general trends suggest that religious denomination plays a role in shaping economic opinions; however, the various religious groups support spending on different policy areas. There is a general conservative trend among the religious behaving measures and a progressive trend among religious believing measures. Scholars should continue to include the

three dimensions of religion in their economic policy models—this is especially true for the religious behaving and religious believing dimensions.

The last set of policy issues that I consider in this dissertation is hybrid policies. In Table 7.3 I show the general trend among the religious dimensions and public opinion on the environment, immigration, and foreign policy. First, Hispanic Catholics are the only religious group who are less likely to support business regulation to protect the environment and increased spending on the environment. The other coefficients were not statistically significant in the full models. Based on prior research and literature, I expect that evangelical Protestants hold (much more) conservative views on the environment than other religious groups. Additional analyses are needed to sort out these mixed results. Second, there is a general conservative trend in opinions among Christian religious groups regarding immigration. Black Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and other Christian groups report favorability in decreasing immigration levels in the United States. In addition, evangelical Protestants, and other Christian groups favor a government funded wall with Mexico. Jewish and other religious non-Christian groups support increasing immigration and allowing Syrian refugees in the country. Lastly, Jewish adherents support free trade agreements. Overall, there were some consistency among religious belonging and hybrid policy opinions. Non-Christian adherents are more (generally) progressive in their hybrid policy opinions; whereas Christians are more conservative.

Service attendance is related to conservative environmental policy opinions and progressive immigration and foreign policy concerns. In addition, those who contribute to religious organizations hold progress immigration opinions supporting Syrian refugees in the country and opposing a border wall with Mexico. These individuals are also less likely to support military force in Iraq. Overall, this is consistent with expectation that religiously active

individuals hold progressive policy opinions concerning hybrid issues with humanitarian concerns.

What is the effect of religious belonging on hybrid policy opinions? Similar to the results of the other models, there are differences among individuals who believe that religion is important and those who believe that religion services as guidance in daily life. Those who believe religion is important hold nonservice preferences on immigration; whereas, those who believe that religion serves as guidance in daily life hold progressive immigration policy beliefs. Additional research is needed to flesh out the driving force behind these differences. Notably, biblical literalists hold conservative views on spending on the environment, increasing immigration, building a border wall, and using military force in Iraq. This is consistent with the overall hypothesis that those who believe that the Bible is the word of God are more likely to hold conservative policy opinions than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God.

I suspect that a great deal of variation in support for hybrid policies is related media attention of the issues. For example, concern over allowing Syrian refugees in the country received a lot of media attention, whereas, most individuals know little about birthright citizenship or free trade agreements. In future projects, I will consider media attention and exposure of the issues in the models. I will also consider political knowledge and political interest in future models. I suspect that those religious individuals who are more politically aware will hold stronger hybrid policy opinions.

### **7.3. Concluding remarks**

I argue that it is essential to include all three religious' dimension in models pertaining to moral issues. Economic concerns are often driven by one's interpretation of the bible and the importance (or guidance) of religion in daily life. I also argue for greater consideration of religious beliefs including biblical literalism and interpretations of Jesus' teaching. One's belief that the Bible is the word of God—or not—greatly influences policy assessments. Biblical literalists are more conservative on moral policy opinions and more progressive on economic policy opinions, i.e. government spending. Scholars who study public opinion should consider these findings when modeling political attitudes. Overall, there is an impact of the three religious dimensions on moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.

**Table 7.3.** Summary of the three dimensions and hybrid policy concerns, 2016 ANES data

	Environment /jobs	Environment spending	Immigration	Citizenship	Refugees	Border wall	Military Force	Free trade
<b>Mainline</b>								
<b>B. Protestant</b>			-					
<b>E. Protestant</b>			-		-	+		
<b>Catholic</b>					-			
<b>H. Catholic</b>	-	-						
<b>Other Christian</b>					-	+		
<b>Jewish</b>			+	-				+
<b>Other religion</b>					+			
<b>Attendance</b>	-		+		+	-		
<b>Contributions</b>					+	-	-	
<b>Importance</b>				+	-			
<b>Guidance</b>	+			-	+			
<b>Literalism</b>		-	-		-	+	+	
<b>Spirituality</b>								

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## Appendix. Variable Description

Moral Variables	Description
Abortion (ANES/GSS)	3= legal in all circumstance or matter of personal choice; 2= many reasons; 1= rape, incest, life of mother; 0= never legal
Support for same-sex marriage (ANES)	1= respondent supports same-sex marriage; 0 = respondent supports civil unions but not same-sex marriage; -1 = no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple
Support for same-sex marriage (GSS)	4 = strongly agree homosexual couples should have the right to marry... 0 = strongly disagree
Anti-discrimination laws (ANES)	3 = strongly favor anti-discrimination laws to protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination... 0 = strongly oppose
Gay adoption (ANES)	1 = gay and lesbian couples should be legality permitted to adopt; 0 = gay and lesbian couples should not be able to adopt
Required service (ANES)	5 = strongly believes in business owners being required to provide services for gay and lesbian couples... 0 = strongly believes being allowed to refuse services
Transgender bathrooms (ANES)	5 = strongly believes that transgender people should be allowed to use the bathroom of their identified gender... 0 = very strongly believes that transgender people should use bathroom of the gender they were born with
Pornography laws (GSS)	2 = should be laws against the distribution of pornography, whatever the age; 1 = should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18; 0 = should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography

### **Description of variables, continued**

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<b>Moral Variables</b>	<b>Description</b>
Sex education (GSS)	1 = respondent is for sex education in public schools; 0 = respondent is against sex education in public schools
Assisted suicide (GSS)	1 = respondent agrees that doctors should be allowed by law to end a patient's life if requested; 0 = respondent disagrees
Capital punishment (ANES)	3 = strongly supports the death penalty... 0 = strongly opposes the death penalty for persons convicted of murder
Capital punishment (GSS)	1 = respondent favors the death penalty; 0 = respondent opposes the death penalty for persons convicted of murder
Prayer in schools (GSS)	1 = respondent approves of the court ruling that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools; 0 = respondent disapproves



## Description of variables, continued

Economic Variables	Description
Government service (ANES)	6 = government should provide more services... 0 = government should provide fewer services
Government responsibility (EVS)	3 = completely agree that it is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves... 0 = completely disagree
Government spending (ANES) (social security, crime, welfare, poor)	1 = respondent favors increased spending; 0 = respondent favors keeping spending the same; -1 = respondent supports decreased spending
Government spending (ANES) (healthcare, defense spending)	6 = respondent favors increased spending... 0 = favors decreased spending
Spending on social services (EVS)	3 = completely agree that the government is providing too many social services that should be left to religious groups and private charities; 2 = mostly agree; 1 = mostly disagree; 0 = completely disagree
Deficit reduction (ANES)	4 = extremely important to reduce the deficit... 0 = not important at all to reduce the national deficit
Taxes (ANES)	2 = respondent supports increasing taxes on millionaires; 1 = neutral feelings; 0 = opposed
Taxes (EVS)	3 = strongly favor increasing the tax rate on Americans earning more than \$250,000 a year... 0 = strongly oppose
Inequality (ANES)	4 = strongly agree that the government should reduce income inequality... 0 = strongly opposes government action to reduce inequality

### Description of variables, continued

Economic Variables	Description
Inequality (EVS)	3 = completely agree that the government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor; 0 = completely disagree
Minimum wage (ANES)	2 = respondent believes that the minimum wage should be increased; 1 = minimum wage should be kept the same; 0 = minimum wage should be decreased or eliminated
Minimum wage (EVS)	3 = strongly favor increasing the minimum wage from \$7.25 an hour to \$ 10.00 an hour... 0 = strongly oppose

### Description of variables, continued

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Hybrid Variables	Description
Immigration level (ANES)	4= immigration should be increased a lot... ; 0 = decreased a lot
Citizenship (ANES)	6 = support for birthright citizenship... 0 = oppose birthright citizenship
Refugees (ANES)	6 = strongly supports allowing Syrian refugees in the United States... 0 = strongly oppose
Border wall (ANES)	6 = strongly supports building a border wall with Mexico... 0 = strongly opposes
Environment/job protection (ANES)	6 = regulate business to protect the environment and crease jobs... 0 = no regulation of businesses to protect the environment because it will not work and will cost jobs
Environment spending (ANES)	1 = government should increase spending on the environment; 0 = spending should be kept the same; -1 = decrease spending on the environment
Military (ANES)	6 = strongly supports sending troops to fight ISIS... 0 = strongly opposes
Free trade (ANES)	6 = strongly favors free trade agreements; 0 = strongly opposes free trade agreements

## Description of variables, continued

Religion Variables	Description
Mainline Protestant (ALL)	1 = respondent is mainline Protestant; 0 = otherwise.
Black Protestant (ALL)	1 = respondent is black Protestant; 0 = otherwise
Evangelical Protestant (ALL)	1 = non-black evangelical Protestants; 0 = otherwise
Catholic (ALL)	1 = respondent is Catholic; 0 = otherwise.
Hispanic Catholic (ALL)	1 = respondent is Hispanic and Catholic; 0 = otherwise
Other Christian (ANES)	1 = respondent is of other Christian tradition; 0 = otherwise
Jewish (ALL)	1 = respondent is Jewish; 0 = otherwise
Other non- Christian religion (ANES)	1 = respondent is a member of other non-Christian religious tradition; 0 = otherwise
Other religion (GSS)	1 = respondent is of other Christian and non-Christian faith; 0 = otherwise
Other faith (GSS)	1 = respondent is of other Christian and non-Christian faith; 0 = otherwise
Religiously unaffiliated (ALL)	seculars, atheists, agnostics, “nones”
Religious fundamentalism (GSS)	2 = respondent classifies religion as fundamental; 1 = moderate ; 0 = liberal
Church attendance (ANES)	4 = respondent attends church every week...; 0 = never attends religious services
Church attendance (GSS)	8 = more than once a week... 0 = never attends religious services
Church attendance (EVS)	5 = more than once a week; 0 = never attends services

## Description of variables, continued

Religion Variables	Description
Prayer (GSS)	5 = respondent prays several times a day... 0 = never
Religious contributions (ANES)	1 = respondent has contributed to a religious group in the past 12 months; 0 = otherwise
Religious activity participation (GSS)	9 = respondent participates in the activities and organizations of a church once a day... 0 = never
Religious conversion (GSS)	1 = respondent has tried to encourage someone to believe in Jesus Christ or accept Jesus message; 0 = never
Religious behavior (GSS)	Factor analysis of the religious behaving variables (service attendance, religious activity, frequency of prayer, religious conversion)
Religious importance (ANES)	1= religion is an important part of R's life; 0= not important
Religious importance (EVS)	3 = religion is most important thing... 0 = religious is not important
Religious guidance (ANES)	3= religion provides R a great deal of guidance; ...; 0= religion is not an important part of daily life
Religious participation (GSS)	1 = R has contributed to religious groups in the past 12 months; 0= otherwise
Biblical literalism (ANES)	2= Bible is the literal word of God; 1= word of God but not literally; 0= not the word of God
Biblical literalism (GSS)	2 = Bible is the actual word of God; 1 = Bible is the inspired word of God; 0 = Bible is an ancient book of fables

## Description of variables, continued

Religion Variables	Description
Biblical literalism (EVS)	2 = Bible (or another holy book) should be taken Literally; 1 = not literally but word of God; 0 = not the word of God
Spirituality (ANES)	1 = respondent is spiritual; 0 = otherwise
Post life (GSS)	1 = respondent believes that there is a life after death; 0 = respondent does not believe that there is a life after death
Belief in God (GSS)	5 = respondent knows that God exists and has no doubts... 0 = respondent does not believe in God
Strength of religiosity (GSS)	0 = respondent is not religious... 3 = respondent is very religious... 0 = respondent is not religious
Strength of spirituality (GSS)	3 = respondent is very spiritual... 0 = respondent is not spiritual
Image of God (EVS)	2 = God is a person; 1 = God is an impersonal force; 0 = respondent believes that there is no God
Preserve beliefs (EVS)	2 = R believes that religion should preserve traditional beliefs; 1 = adjust beliefs; 0 = adopt modern beliefs
Care for the poor (EVS)	4 = respondent believes that Jesus' teachings promoted a just society... 0 = Jesus promoted private acts of charity

## Variable description, continued

Partisan/Socioeconomic/ Demographic Variables	Description
Partisan identification	High values = respondent is a strong Republican... 0 = respondent is a strong Democrat.
Political ideology	Political ideology scale: High values= respondent is a strong conservative; . . . ; 0 = respondent is a strong liberal.
Black	1 = respondent is black; 0 = otherwise.
Hispanic	1 = respondent is Hispanic; 0 = otherwise.
Asian	1 = respondent is Asian; 0 = otherwise.
Gender	1 = respondent is a woman; 0 = respondent is a man.
Married	1 = respondent is married; 0 = otherwise.
Age	Age (in years).
Education	Respondent education, High values = post graduate degree... 0 = grade school
Household income	Respondent household income measured as a scale ranging from 0 (low income) to -- (high income).
Parents foreign born (ANES)	2 = two parents born outside of the United States; 1 = one parent born outside the U.S.; 0 = no parents born outside the United States
Foreign born (ANES)	1 = respondent is foreign born; 0 = respondent is not foreign born

## **Curriculum Vitae**

**Angela Farizo McCarthy**

### **Education**

Louisiana State University

Ph.D. *Political Science*, 2019

Fields: American Politics (major), Comparative Politics (minor)

Dissertation: "The Religious Impact: Understanding the Influence of Religiosity on Attitudes Toward Policy Issues"

M.A. *Political Science*, 2018

B.A., *General Studies (Interdisciplinary Studies)*, 2010

Southeastern Louisiana University

M.A. *History*, 2012

Field: American History (major), World History (minor)

Thesis: Women in a Warzone: Participation Precedes Policy

### **Research Interests:**

My research interests include public opinion and policy, political behavior, religiosity and political predispositions, and the politics of gender, race, and ethnicity.

### **Internships, Grants, and Awards**

Research Intern, Public Religion Research Institute (Summer 2016)

LSU Economic Development Assistantship (2013-2017)

Research Assistantship, Louisiana State University (2013)

Research Assistantship, Louisiana State University (2018)

LSU Dissertation Fellowship, Louisiana State University (2018-2019)

### **Professional Service Activities**

#### **Membership in Professional Associations:**

American Political Science Association (APSA)

Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA)

Southern Political Science Association (SPSA)

Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (JSSR)

### **Teaching Experience**

POLI 2051 (Instructor) Introduction to American Government

POLI 4030 (Instructor) Public Opinion and Political Attitudes