June 2019

Political Parties for Protection and Profit: Explaining Opposition Party Competition under Electoral Authoritarianism

Michael David Toje
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, michael.toje@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4936

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
POLITICAL PARTIES FOR PROTECTION AND PROFIT: EXPLAINING OPPOSITION PARTY COMPETITION UNDER ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Michael David Toje
B.A., Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, 2009
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2014
August 2019
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Working on this dissertation has been quite the journey for me, but fortunately, I did not have to travel it alone. First and foremost, my advisor, Len Ray, who worked with me from my first day at Louisiana State University. He pushed me to become a better scholar over the years. I would also like to thank Kate Bratton, Wayne Parent, David Sobek, Harry Mokeba, Joe Clare, Wonik Kim, Bill Clark, Yann Kerevel, and Jim Stoner for their guidance and instruction: through you all,. I would also like to thank Katherine Surek, Lezlie Haynes, and Judy Roberts for being the movers behind the scenes: our department runs on your work, and you have rescued me countless times from the machinery of the bureaucracy.

The many friends I made while completing my graduate studies greatly enriched my time in Louisiana. Nathan Price, Tabatha Cale, Sam Rohrer, and James Gilley took me under their wings and helped me transition into grad life. Friends I made gave me a social circle and a place to share all of our trials and tribulations as well as our moments of joy and accomplishment, so thank you Cory Sukala, Gabi Vitela, Nick Davis, Jacob Ball and Tom Varacalli, Nile Patterson, Trey Bickham, Trent Parker, Mikaela Allen, and Joseph Ducet.

My friends back home, Matt and Trecia Winte, Sam Evans, Elliot Slack, John Myrick, Joel and Stacy Vidakovich, Tyler and Jackie Kabbes, and Jeff Hubbard knew I was destined for great thing in graduate school, and I am thankful for their emotional support even though I was away for most of the year.

My journey to Albuquerque provided a much-needed reset, and to help me center myself and put my time in graduate school in a broader context. I wish to thank Elizabeth Archuleta, Dina Washington, Bradd, Scott and Jahmar for being my companions, even if only for a week.
Our contact with one another may have been brief, but it was exactly what I needed at that time. Good luck to you all, wherever you may be.

Above all else, I wish to thank my parents Matthew and Cindy, my sister Jenny, and my grandfather Clarence, for the immense support and love they have given me, and for always encouraging me to do my best. Finally, I wish to thank Cameron, for coming into my life as a new traveling companion: wherever life may take us, I am thrilled to travel it with you.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................................................. ii

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................................ vii

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 1

2 THEORY .............................................................................................................................................................. 16

3 RESEARCH DESIGN ......................................................................................................................................... 43

4 RESULTS .......................................................................................................................................................... 60

5 AZERBAIJAN ...................................................................................................................................................... 73

6 MOZAMBIQUE .................................................................................................................................................. 87

7 MALAYSIA ....................................................................................................................................................... 103

8 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 118

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................................. 128

APPENDIX

A LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (67%) .............................................................................. 157

B LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (55%) .............................................................................. 158

C LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (75%) .............................................................................. 160

D DATA ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATE MODELS ......................................................................................... 162

VITA .................................................................................................................................................................... 169
LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Conceptualizations and Definitions of Hybrid Regimes........................................13

4.1 OLS Regression Predicting Net FDI and Opposition Party Seat Share..................62

4.2 Case Study Selection..........................................................................................70

5.1 Clans in Azerbaijan............................................................................................85

7.1 Electoral Returns for DAP, Keadilan, and PAS.................................................116

D.1 Descriptive Statistics.........................................................................................162

D.2 Opposition without Lagged Variables...............................................................165

D.3 Opposition with 1-Year Lead.............................................................................166

D.4 Hegemony Threshold Set at 55%......................................................................167

D.5 Hegemony Threshold Set at 75%.................................................................168
**LIST OF FIGURES**

1.1 Conceptual Relationships among Regime Types .........................................................6

2.1 Graphical Depiction of Electoral Authoritarian Political Space .....................................36

2.2 Causal Relationship between FDI and Opposition Party Sustenance ............................38

D.1. Distribution of FDI and Opposition Control of Seats ................................................163

D.2. Histogram of GDP Per Capita PPP ............................................................................164

D.3. Histogram of Population .............................................................................................164
ABSTRACT

Despite the presence of open elections and contestable political offices, opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes face barriers – formal and informal – that prevent them from attaining de facto power. Yet, these parties still decide to spend the time, money, and effort to run candidates in unfair elections. This dissertation seeks to uncover the reasons that opposition parties decide to compete in such an uncompetitive environment, and what sustains opposition parties though cycles of defeat. It proposes that opposition parties compete not for the purposes of unseating the ruling party, but rather for controlling their own local affairs away from interference on the part of an autocratic regime. Opposition parties have a natural affinity with foreign investors, who also wish to do business without dealing with arbitrary government taxes and regulations.

However, while the dissertation does find a relation between foreign direct investment and opposition party strength in the parliament, this relationship runs in the opposite direction than what the theory proposes. Case studies of three countries reveal that opposition parties reflect ethnic divisions within each country and that these ethnic parties serve as mechanisms for distributing patronage goods to their co-ethnics. A transition away from one-party rule did not bring democracy or even a recalcitrant elite reluctantly getting away with as little liberalization as possible while still holding power, but instead, a protracted conflict fought in the electoral arena over limited patronage opportunities, with ethnicity used to form the division between in- and out-groups. The dissertation concludes that one possible way out of ethnic competition is by increasing economic opportunities for the citizenry so that they need not rely on ethnically based political machines to provide for their material security.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 2013, a smartphone app run by the Azeri Central Election Commission listed 72.76% of the vote for the incumbent president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. Aliyev’s victory came as no surprise, as intimidation against political activists and reporters characterized his ten-year period of rule even before this election. What was surprising with the 2013 returns, however, was that the official results were accidentally released the day before the actual election took place. Even though the Central Election Committee claimed the leak was merely a test of the system, but the message received by many Azerbaijanis was that Aliyev’s victory was already a foregone conclusion.

The wave of democratization that swept the world in 1976 through the early 1990s had within it a strong undemocratic undertow, leading some scholars to classify these regimes initially as regimes in transition, or even as “partially” or “imperfectly” democratized regimes. Since then further research has recognized that these regimes are not in fact stuck in a state of transition between full democracy and outright authoritarianism, but rather are the deliberate attempts of elites to retain power in a new geopolitical and ideological environment inimical to outright authoritarianism. Electoral manipulation, violence against challengers, and weak protection of civil liberties became a worryingly common trend for those countries that became stuck. As the years wore on, scholars of democratization and of regime transition recognized that such irregularities were not the birth pangs of a country gradually stumbling its way toward democracy, but were instead deliberate acts of political elites maintaining their rule behind a democratic façade.

Given a political environment in which a dominant party ensures its electoral success against its political rivals through unfair competition, the costs in terms of time, effort, and funds suggest that no opposition member would want to compete against the regime. Indeed, the “true
believers” who find a moral conviction to oppose the regime on matters of principle will always find purpose in competing in elections regardless of the chances of success. Politicians with less conviction in the rightness of their cause, however, should be able to understand the barriers placed before them. Yet still opposition parties convene, campaign, and compete. What drives members of the opposition to participate in contests that offer titular representation in the national legislature? What do the supporters and the sponsors of these parties gain by financing races repeatedly that will not lead to any greater hopes of influencing public policy? When do voters decide to “waste” their votes by choosing the underdog and not the regime?

**Nature of the Problem**

While the phenomenon of nondemocratic regimes using elections to shore up legitimacy is far from new, the practice of allowing open contestation by the regime’s opposition in these nondemocratic elections has only became widespread after the end of the Cold War, a period marked by Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of democracy. Collapse of the Soviet Union discredited other one-party socialist states entirely, and allowed the West to shift its focus from supporting anticommunist regimes regardless of their own lack of democratic credentials to promoting democracy abroad (Levitsky and Way 2010). With the West’s considerable economic influence encouraging transitions to democracy, dictatorship had become passé – if not untenable. Countries wishing to benefit from Western aid and trade had to comply with Western political demands for democratization.

The pervasiveness of these regimes in the post-Cold War world is such that they are now the prevailing form of nondemocratic rule (Reuter and Gandhi 2010; Diamond 2002). Single party states like North Korea and China, military states like Thailand (since the 2014 coup), and

---

1 Though when compared to democracies, electoral authoritarian regimes occur less frequently, thus making the post-Cold War era the first time that democracies comprise the modal category of overall regime type (Schedler 2006, 3; Reuter and Gandhi 2010, 88; Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2013).
traditional monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Brunei now make up a decidedly small percentage of all regime types (Hyde and Marinov 2012, 193). Faced with a growing global consensus toward adopting democratic norms and institutions and the concomitant domestic pressures from their citizens for greater governmental accountability, autocratic leaders have had to adapt their methods of rule to ensure their survival. As such, many leaders have chosen to adopt a form of rule that is neither solidly democratic nor solidly authoritarian but appear to have features of both. These regimes may disguise themselves as democracies, but their costume is a ragged one as the practices of the incumbents rend the fabric of democratic norms that make electoral competition meaningful.

Huntington’s (1996, 137) quip that “the halfway house does not stand” has proven not to be completely true. Cassani (2014, 551) finds that electoral authoritarian regimes are in fact the least likely form of nondemocratic rule to experience regime breakdown. Using my own data, I find that the mean age for electoral authoritarian regimes since 1991 is 11.35 years, while all EA regimes since 1945 show a mean age of 13.38 years. Notably durable electoral authoritarian regimes in Malaysia, Mexico, and Singapore have lasted for decades. Neither do all regime transitions out of electoral authoritarianism move toward democratization; some regimes, like Iran, Syria and Uzbekistan, drift instead into full authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism remains significant as a body of study because of its predominance amongst nondemocratic regimes, its relative newness as a form of rule, and its threats to establishing fully democratic political systems. In addition, several important countries in the world operate under electoral authoritarian regimes, including Russia, Turkey, and (until recently) Malaysia.

Contemporary nondemocratic regimes have held elections much like democracies with increasing frequency, so the classic division of all national governments into democratic/elec-
toral regimes and nondemocratic/non-electoral regimes no longer accurately portrays the world. Carothers (2002, 7) identifies an assumption (among others) in the transition literature following the third wave “that democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages” beginning with rifts forming among regime insiders that then spill over into an incremental liberalization of the political process. This liberalization in turn leads to a complete regime collapse and the first instance of competitive elections, finally culminating in the consolidation of a functioning liberal democracy, much like a dam bursting from too much water pressure.

This assumption regarding democratization was itself theoretically flawed, as Przeworski (2000, 62) demonstrates with his game theoretical model of transitions to democracy. Full democratization only accounts for one equilibrium out of five possible equilibria, the remaining four outcomes resulting in the regime’s retaining some degree of nondemocratic control. Electoral manipulation, violence against challengers, and weak protection of civil liberties became a worryingly common trend for those countries that became stuck. As the years wore on, scholars of democratization and of regime transition recognized that such irregularities were not the birth pangs of a country gradually stumbling its way toward democracy, but were instead deliberate acts by political elites to maintain their rule behind a democratic façade.

**Definition of Terms**

At its most basic, electoral authoritarianism is a form of authoritarian rule masked by democratic features such as open elections and a (relatively) free civil society. Initial conceptualizations of electoral authoritarianism originally classified such regimes as subtypes of democracy (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988; O’Donnell 1994; Zakaria 1997), a perception shaped by an ebullience following the third wave. The problem of identifying electoral authoritarian regimes becomes more acute as the literature makes two major divisions based on a regime’s degree of
competitiveness. The use of the term “electoral authoritarianism” follows from the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991), in which observers noticed that, while many countries did adopt democratic institutions such as multiparty elections, the regimes in place nonetheless seemed unable, or even unwilling, to respect civil liberties and the rule of law.

Rather than classify these regimes as defective democracies, scholars opted to use variations of “authoritarianism with adjectives” (Schedler 2006, 220) to describe these regimes that seem to occupy a classificatory “gray zone” (Carothers 2002, 9) in between liberal democracies and otherwise closed autocracies. However, the above definition still does not distinguish which democratic or authoritarian features are necessary – if any – to determine whether a particular regime counts as electoral authoritarian or not. Nor does this definition indicate how shared institutional features across regime types interact with distinctive institutional features to generate different outcomes.

Contemporary theories of democracy tend to conceive of democracy between minimalist definitions (Przeworski, et al. 2000; Schumpeter 1942) that focus on procedural rules, and maximalist conceptions (Dahl 1971, Lijphart 2012) that include indicators of the political rights and civil liberties that fulfill democratic life. Though the definition of a democracy may differ between minimalist and maximalist definitions, whichever list of attributes one chooses to use for a regime typology will nonetheless divide governments into one of two categories: a category of democracies, and a residual category of nondemocracies.

Nondemocratic regimes, in contrast to democracies, have not had such extensive theorizing on their behalf: they have a negative definition derived from what they lack compared to the democratic model rather than on any unifying method, quality, or theme of their own (Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2013, 19). Indeed, the myriad ways in which a regime can fail to live up to

---

2 A discussion of both definitions will be explored later in Chapter 3.
any one part of the democratic ideal leads to several alternative typologies for nondemocratic regimes (see for example Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012; Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2013). An analogy used by Schedler (2002) regarding the “menu of manipulation” used by nondemocratic rulers is one of multiplication by zero, in which the lack of any one indicator of democracy nullifies the entire democratic credentials of the regime in question. The proliferation after the Cold War of nondemocratic regimes that rely on electoral mechanisms to fill political office blurs the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, while also necessitating a further clarification of the division between “open” forms of nondemocratic rule from other, “closed” forms of authoritarianism.

The term “electoral authoritarianism” used in this study begins with Schedler’s (2006, 8) description of electoral authoritarianism as a political regime that “hold[s] multiparty elections for presidents and legislative assemblies…yet, as they subject these processes to systematic authoritarian controls, they deprive them of their democratic substance.” That is, despite the presence of institutions typically associated with democracies, such as multiple independent parties and competitive elections, electoral authoritarian regimes are nonetheless “plainly authoritarian” in their nature for usurping those very democratic institutions to reinforce authoritarian rule. Schedler (2006) and Kinne and Marinov (2012) maintain that competitive and hegemonic variants belong under the umbrella term of “electoral authoritarianism.”
An instructive first step to clearing any conceptual confusion over electoral authoritarian regimes, therefore, is to define electoral authoritarianism based on its individual institutions (Munck 1996, 5) in order to differentiate it both from democracies and from other, closed forms of authoritarianism. This practice also helps establish shared traits across electoral authoritarian regimes unique to that regime type. Heeding the set of requirements set forth by Cassani (2014) to investigate the micro-level similarities amongst regime types, my list of electoral authoritarian regimes must start with the particular electoral dynamics that differentiate it from other authoritarian regime types with uncompetitive elections on the one hand, and democracies with fair elections on the other. Cassani (2014, 550) identifies four “micro-level” institutional features common to various conceptualizations of electoral authoritarian regimes: institutionalized periodic elections, a multiparty legislature in which the opposition has some representation based on electoral outcomes, few limits to the chief executive’s arbitrary use of power, and frequent violations of the citizen’s political and/or civil rights. The first two components – periodic elections and the formation of a multiparty legislature – comprise the democratic elements while the lack of restraints placed on the chief executive and the violation of political and civil rights make up the authoritarian elements.

Cassani’s requirements explicitly institutionalized periodic elections, a multiparty legislature in which the opposition has some representation based on electoral outcomes, make no mention whether the chief executive is likewise subject to elections. Part of the confusion regarding the various lists of cases results from the degree to which to extend electoral competition to the de facto seat of power. Historically, democratization in Western Europe came in the form of a

---

3 Cassani, along with Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), specifically uses the term “hybrid” to denote a small subset of electoral authoritarian regimes in which electoral competition is unfair, but competitive enough to pose a credible challenge to incumbents, closer to the use of the term “competitive authoritarianism” by Levitsky and Way (2010, 12). Interestingly, Levitsky and Way (2010, 14) opt to use the term “hybrid regime” as the umbrella term for any nondemocratic regime that incorporates democratic features, regardless of the degree of competitiveness.
series of political concessions made to portions of the citizenry (Posada-Carbó 1996). The royal governments of England/Great Britain, the French Second Empire, and Imperial Germany all incorporated democratic features in their institutional arrangements in the form of elected legislatures. However, in each instance, executive power remained vested in a hereditary monarch; not until popularly elected national parliaments asserted their supremacy over their monarchs to make law and shape policy could those countries claim to become full-fledged democracies.

In the present day, non-democratic regimes have added elections in their political institutions in a variety of ways, depending on what function or outcome these leaders want elections to serve (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Hereditary monarchs still exercise executive power alongside elected legislatures in Jordan and Morocco, while Iran’s system of government permits the election of the president and the legislature, but only after the Guardians Council has vetted all candidates for the Islamic credentials. Schedler’s definition does specify elections for the executive, however, due to the resemblance that an executive subject to frequent (unfair) elections in electoral authoritarianism would have to an executive subject to frequent (fair) elections in a democracy. The point of electoral authoritarianism, after all, is to cloak authoritarian rule under the guise of democracy.

Utilizing multiple conceptual dimensions overcomes problems of relying on terms that are neither mutually exclusive nor conceptually exhaustive. The label “nondemocratic,” as mentioned earlier, applies to a heterogeneous collection of regimes, past and present, which differ from one another in their institutional forms, ideological dispositions, procedural norms, and evolutionary origins. Building off Sartori’s (1976) work on political party systems of the world, Gilbert and Mohseni (2011, 280) utilize three regime dimensions for their conceptualization of hybrid regimes. These regime dimensions are 1) contestability, or whether elections are the main
avenue to political office; 2) *competitiveness*, or to what degree elections translate to political selection; and 3) *tutelary influence*, or the presence of an unelected body that can overturn electoral outcomes to maintain the status quo. Notably, Gilbert and Mohseni exclude regimes that may hold multiparty elections but without serious enough competition to threaten the incumbents as belonging to the “hybrid” category. In other words, though many non-democratic regimes may now allow multiparty elections to take place, the lack of any real of competition is insufficient to make these elections meaningful in any way. Thus, a hybrid regime properly understood, is one in which the incumbents must compete electorally, albeit unfairly, in order to win.

Kinne and Marinov (2012, 359) identify two “fundamental properties” of elections to determine regimes’ accountability to electoral outcomes: the degree of pro-incumbent bias in an election and incumbent’s vulnerability to an opposition victory. In democracies, candidates are highly vulnerable and the degree of pro-incumbent bias approaches zero; closed authoritarian regimes, in contrast, effectively eliminate the incumbent’s vulnerability even though the regime’s pro-incumbent bias can range in degree. Echoing Gilbert and Mohseni’s (2011) own conceptualizations of competition and competitiveness respectively, Kinne and Marinov consider “the degree of pro-incumbent bias and the vulnerability of the incumbent to a de facto loss of power following an opposition victory” as the “fundamental properties of electoral institutions.” While Gilbert and Mohseni stress the competitiveness of the multiparty elections as the distinguishing mark of hybrid regimes from other nondemocratic forms of governance, Kinne and Marinov treat all examples of multiparty, nondemocratic regimes as belonging to one of two subtypes, “hegemonic” and “competitive,” based on the degree of electoral competitiveness a given regime exhibits. “Competitive” authoritarian regimes as defined by Kinne and Marinov correspond with the “hybrid” regime conceptualized by Gilbert and Mohseni.
Since elections have become ubiquitous across regime type, the presence of elections alone is no longer the distinguishing mark for determining regime type: advancement through a party, installment by the military, or inheritance via heredity can be the actual mechanism a regime uses to fill political offices. Electoral regimes are simply regimes that institutionalize periodic elections for filling political offices (Cassani 2014, 550). Cassani adds that allowing multiple parties to compete for seats in the legislature is enough to consider a regime sufficiently based on electoral selection to distinguish a hybrid regime from authoritarian regimes, as the regime’s opposition has political representation.

The difference between a fully closed authoritarian regime and an electoral authoritarian regime is a matter of dominance. Even though China does have elections for village-level positions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by law has sole control over the political system, and so it can afford to experiment with methods of attracting new talent without worry that any competition with a rival party will overturn the Party’s monopoly of political power. After all, where else will skilled political leaders go if they want to enter Chinese politics, but through the CCP’s own channels? United Russia, however, has hegemonic control, but not exclusive dominance, and so the party’s leaders must watch for the entry of a successful opposition that can overturn United Russia’s position of preeminence if it proves to be far better at capturing the electoral market.

Such a criterion of allowing opposition parties to take seats in the legislature ignores the fact that, even though elections decide the makeup of the legislature, executive selection relies on some other criterion, such as hereditary succession like in Morocco or the dedazo in Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI). A legislature in which the opposition has some representation is not enough to determine the importance
of elections in a regime: the office of the leader must also be contestable, and thus vulnerable, to regime outsiders (Kinne and Marinov 2012, 362). Electoral vulnerability allows for the possibility of alternation and “concretely impacts the distribution of power in a regime” by introducing a wider set of policy preferences into the political arena (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 285). Contestation forces the incumbents at the very least to heed their opponents’ preferences lest the incumbents alienate too many voters in the next election (Przeworski 2010). Even in electoral non-democratic regimes wherein electoral outcomes count for less than in democracies, the costs of listening are usually always lower than the costs of repressing.

Using elections as the main mechanism of political selection differentiates electoral regimes from non-electoral regimes that insulate incumbents from external scrutiny, influence, or competition. However, not all elections are created equal, as a wide range of electoral quality reveals variation amongst electoral regimes. Not only must elections determine political office and make incumbents vulnerable to the electorate’s decisions, they must translate voter preferences into political representation; that is, elections must be more than a façade for the regime to claim extensive popular support (Kinne and Marinov 2012, 364). Fraud, blackmail, coercion, and other underhanded methods taken from a “menu of manipulation” serve to shift electoral outcomes away from voters’ true preferences toward electoral outcomes favorable to the regime in power (Schedler 2002).

One can draw from the work done by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), Kinne and Marinov (2013), and Cassani (2014) is that incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes willfully submit themselves to frequent and periodic elections that they may potentially lose (to varying non-zero degrees of risk), which differentiates this regime type from other forms of nondemocratic rule. All three authors essentially talk about the same underlying qualities of political rule, though on-
ly Gilbert and Mohseni explicitly identify tutelary influence as a specific dimension. Electoral mechanisms are meaningful in hybrid regimes, as the regime puts itself at risk (albeit not to the same degree as democracies) every time the public goes to vote.

Nondemocratic elites have many reasons for adopting democratic procedures and institutions. Numerous scholars have noted the ways in which parties (Brownlee 2007, Geddes 1999, Smith 2005), legislatures (Gandhi 2008, Wright 2008), and elections (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006) serve to prolong a non-democratic regime’s survival. Elections serve a number of functions in for nondemocratic regimes. Elections can provide non-democratic leaders with information whether of the rivals’ (Ames 1970, Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007) and the public’s preferences (Blaydes 2008, Lust-Okar 2006), or of the loyalty of their peers within the regime (Boix and Svolik 2008). Elections can also provide information about the regime itself by signaling the strength of the ruling coalition to other domestic actors (Magaloni 2006, Malesky and Schuler 2008) or by legitimizing the regime in power (Schedler 2006). Non-democratic elections can also serve to co-opt rivals within the ruling coalition (Magaloni 2006) or from without (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Lust-Okar 2006, Boix and Svolik 2008). Finally, by accepting the presence of electoral competition and partisan identities, non-democratic leaders can use elections to signal to the public that the regime will “abandon ideologies of collective harmony, accept the existence of societal cleavages, and renounce a monopolistic hold on the definition of the common good” (Schedler 2006, 14). In other words, regime incumbents willfully allow regime outsiders to organize for mounting periodic, open challenges to their hold on political power.
Table 1.1. Conceptualizations and Definitions of Hybrid Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competition</strong></td>
<td>“Vulnerability of the incumbent ((\alpha \in [0,1]))”</td>
<td>1. Institutionalization of periodic elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“produces an alternation in rulers and concretely impacts the distribution of power in a regime” (285).</td>
<td>“the probability that electoral victory confers de facto leadership on the opposition” (365)</td>
<td>2. Formation of multiparty legislature in which opposition is represented (550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competitiveness</strong></td>
<td>Degree of pro-incumbent bias ((\beta \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}))</td>
<td>3. Presence of few limits to the arbitrary power of the chief executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“strong enforcement of civil liberties creates a fairer electoral playing field for competing parties … regimes that protect civil liberties provide a broad arena in which citizens can participate and thus have fair competition” (285).</td>
<td>“voters can translate their preferences accurately into political representation” (364).</td>
<td>4. Frequent violations of the citizens’ political and/or civil rights (550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tutelary interference</strong></td>
<td>__</td>
<td>__</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“non-elected institutions … that engage in politics to “constrain the agenda of elected officials or veto their decisions” (286).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democracies are competitive regimes with fair competition whereas authoritarian regimes are uncompetitive regimes with unfair competition. Hybrid regimes occupy the conceptual void of competitive regimes with unfair competition” (280).</td>
<td>Competitive Authoritarianism: “a regime where in elections put the incumbent leader’s job at risk, but the playing field is skewed in favor of the incumbent and against opposition” (364).</td>
<td>“A form of regime that … combines both democratic and autocratic institutions, whose coexistence and interaction profoundly shapes politics” (550).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Democracy | Competitive Authoritarianism |
| \(\alpha = 1, \beta = 0\) | “A form of regime that … combines both democratic and autocratic institutions, whose coexistence and interaction profoundly shapes politics” (550). |
| Com. Auth.: | \(\alpha = 1, \beta > 0\) |
| Heg. Auth.: | \(\alpha = 0, \beta \geq 0\) |
| *Autocracy: | \(\alpha = 0, \beta = 0\) |

---

4 Coding rules for regime type listed on page 366 of their article
5 Kinne and Marinov define competitive authoritarianism as regimes “where elections may be flawed and competition unfair, but leaders nonetheless submit to contested elections and thus give oppositions a chance to win executive power (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010)” (361)
6 Levitsky and Way (2010; 14, 32) mention that “tutelary regimes” are a form of hybrid regime distinct from their definition of “competitive authoritarianism”
7 Kinne and Marinov never specify what the \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) values for a closed authoritarian regime would be, as they investigate electoral regimes only.
Significance of the problem

Overwhelmingly, the literature of electoral authoritarianism has focused on the regime itself, the coalition of elites who control the state for their own benefit. The reasons for scholars’ oversights are simple enough: the regime is the locus of political power in a given country. That is, the regime has the general motivation of securing its power against any encroachments from the public at large and from elites outside of the coalition; and, most importantly for matters of simplifying the interpretation of data, only one regime exists per country. Studying the behavior of opposition parties is much more difficult, as their motivations for challenging the regime party differ not only amongst parties in the same election, but even within parties over time. This study seeks to elucidate the reasons for why parties, facing overwhelming odds against their success, would want to expend the time, effort, and money to compete in elections themselves rigged to ensure the opposition as a whole remains a permanent minority.

Previous studies have investigated party dynamics in electoral authoritarian regimes at the national level. As the following chapter will make clear, the district level is where subsequent studies should focus its attention. Opposition parties generally may legally organize and compete in elections; they may even win some seats in the legislature. What they cannot do is win nationally. Barred from exercising control over the state, opposition parties must instead turn to local affairs to exercise political power. Any district where an opposition party has achieved electoral victory over the regime becomes a sort of stronghold for that opposition party. Where the opposition is no less rapacious than the regime, these electoral strongholds may themselves become authoritarian in their own right, serving as little fiefdoms for a local magnate to derive his rents. Some opposition parties do believe in democratization, and as such, their districts can become liberal oases in an otherwise authoritarian landscape.
The plan of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 surveys previous studies on electoral authoritarianism including the various conceptualizations and definitions of these regimes, critiques offered theories on party dynamics within electoral authoritarianism, and proposes a theory on opposition party behavior in electoral authoritarian political systems. Chapter 3 will contain a discussion of the methods used to test the theory from Chapter 2. The variables and their measurements, and the statistical method used. I will also detail my selection criteria for identifying the case studies I use in subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 will briefly explain the findings of the large-N study without dwelling too long on them; as the theory calls for analysis at the sub-national level and the large-N study makes use of country-year observations, any findings from the regression analysis will be of limited utility on its own. Case studies will provide the bulk of evidence for my argument, and as such, the second half of Chapter 4 will justify my case study selection. Chapters 5 through 7 will illustrate the political histories of Azerbaijan, Mozambique and Malaysia, respectively. These case studies will elucidate the formation and identities of these countries’ respective opposition parties, answering why these parties expend themselves through unfair elections. Chapter 8 will conclude the dissertation, summarizing the study with a discussion of its design limitations, implications for future research, implications for policy, and proffered avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2: THEORY

Theory: A Center-Periphery Conflict

Starting with the regime in power rather than the behavior of opposition parties is necessary in order to describe the political environment in which opposition parties find themselves. The regime structures the political environment in such a way to maintain its dominance from the wider public and from rival elites alike, including resorting to fraud, intimidation, blackmail, coercion, among other underhanded techniques (Darden 2002, Schedler 2002, Ottaway 2003).

Elections in electoral authoritarian regimes do allow the opposition to form political parties and contest elections, but the regime still has ways to ensure that it remains in power. Recruitment from within the party (Malesky and Schuler 2013), careful gerrymandering (Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros), appointment of political loyalists in key governmental positions (Nye and Vasilyeva 2015, Reuter and Robertson 2012), and (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Greene 2007) all serve to disadvantage the opposition from attaining real political power.

Control of the state brings with it control over the state’s assets including but not limited to the police, the bureaucracy, any state-controlled media, political appointments, and the national treasury. These functions of the state become politicized to one degree or another in service of the regime, creating what Greene (2007) calls resource asymmetries, which allows the regime to coopt, coerce, and control any challengers. Nationalization of the oil industry in Mexico under President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938 provided a lucrative source of rents to the ruling PRI, which it then disbursed to politicians and supporters alike essentially to buy their loyalty. Maintaining access to oil rents provided a major motivating factor for politicians to remain loyal to the PRI, and contributed to the party’s hegemony over Mexican politics for the next sixty years. Mexico’s two principal opposition parties, the National Action Party (PAN) and Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) had no comparable sources of party funds, and as such, both parties could not provide any material incentives to politicians or voters to prefer them to the PRI.

Control of the state grants the regime access to resources that its competitors could only dream of having: police, bureaucracy, state media, and most importantly state revenues, all of which grant regime elites the ability to maintain their dominance over their rivals. The state treasury thus serves as a secondary pool of resources available to the regime party. The regime can use public resources as additional campaign funds to increase its vote share (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010) and as patronage to regime supporters (Franz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, Greene 2007). In a democracy, the winners of elections must still respect the barrier between the party’s funds and the state’s funds, even if public funding can be used in partisan ways. In an electoral authoritarian regime, the barrier is much weaker, and plundering the national treasury creates a second set of coffers for the regime, one that has the added benefit of taxpayer subsidies. In other words, every single taxpayer – even those who vote against the regime – indirectly subsidizes the regime’s electoral activities. Research on the effect of campaign spending on electoral outcomes has shown a positive relationship between increased spending and electoral victory (Scarrow 2007, 207). Thus, by accessing public finances for its purposes the regime can vastly outspend its competitors, and do so with help from the public itself in order to ensure its continued hold on power.

The regime can also distribute public resources as patronage goods to its members. Elites create and maintain a system of governance in which those close to the regime can draw from the regime’s resources for their own enrichment (Boix 2003, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Otta-way 2003). Patronage goods attract into the ruling coalition rival elites who would not otherwise have joined under their own volition, but in fact do so for personal material gain. Through the
distribution of patronage goods, the regime creates a governmental pay-for-play scheme, in which the only way to exercise any meaningful political power (and not simply hold office) requires that one join the regime (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Magaloni 2006). Principled politicians can, of course, shun graft and instead campaign for office on their own merits as candidates. However, when compared to a political machine this strategy has a built in limitation of failing to deliver any sort of material profit to less scrupulous individuals. Greed transcends ideological boundaries, and thus less committed members of opposition parties defect to the regime in order to take advantage of the patronage goods offered by the regime.

One electoral beneficial consequence of distributing patronage goods is that the regime can straddle the political center and thus appeal to both left- and right-leaning moderates. According to Down’s (1957) model of electoral competition, two rival parties position themselves on either the political left or right, but would ultimately fight over capturing the greatest number of moderate voters to win the election. Even though the two parties remain ideologically distinct from one another, the nature of electoral competition forces them to moderate their views to become palatable to the political center where the greatest number of voters resides.

However, by its nature electoral authoritarianism does away with the assumption of perfect competition implicit the Downsian model. One party within an electoral authoritarian regime can capture the political center not through espousing an ideological position, but rather by using patronage to bind politicians from the left and the right of any given ideological axis together into a large “catch-all” party (Gelman 2006, 554; Greene 2007). Personal greed, in effect, transcends ideological allegiance. Russia’s centrist, liberal party, Yabloko, should have no problem attracting votes for its pro-civil liberties, pro-democracy, and pro-business platform, but it unfortunately competes for the same political space with the pro-regime United Russia party machine:
United Russia can simply buy off all of Yabloko’s support and render Yabloko as completely harmless to United Russia.

Control of the state means control over the appointment of the state’s functionaries. The regime’s acceptance of elections creates a degree of risk for the regime during each election cycle: the regime may actually fail to win enough votes to retain power. As such, the regime values appointees to subnational offices who can win votes consistently and reliably for the regime (Nye and Vasiliyeva 2015, Malesky and Schuler 2013, Reuter and Robertson 2012). Appointing loyalists comes at the expense of appointing experts and technocrats who can administer the district, region, province, etc. effectively. Loyalists may not have the proficiency to foster economic development in their districts, as their talents focus instead on ensuring the regime’s political survival. Incompetency, corruption, underdevelopment, and even outright neglect worsen the long-term public welfare for a district.

Yet local economic development nevertheless occurs within electoral authoritarian regimes. The amount of foreign investment most readily increases generally under all forms of nondemocratic rule – and within electoral authoritarian regimes specifically – when the state faces constraints on its ability to derive rents from businesses. Since the regime derives its patronage goods from public funds, the regime has an interest in expanding the state into the economy (Greene 2007, 307), which may come at the expense of independent businesses. Nondemocratic regimes are more successful in attracting foreign investors to invest in their countries by tying its hands, either through offering policy concessions to the affected groups via access to the legislature (Escribà-Folch 2008, Hankla and Kuthy 2013, Reuter and Turovsky 2014, Wright 2008). Since foreign investors themselves cannot hold office, the investors work through representatives within government; opposition groups also work to limit the regime’s rapaciousness, and thus
make for natural allies to business interests. Granting concessions come at a price for the regime, however, as further concessions placed on the regime means less opportunities for it to engage in the rent-seeking behavior necessary to maintain the ruling coalition.

Mexico’s electoral history demonstrates the relationship between foreign entrepreneurs and opposition parties. Since its founding in 1929, PRI was able to maintain its dominance over Mexican politics until 2000, when an opposition party won a presidential election for the first time. PRI maintained its electoral supremacy through patronage opportunities, weaponized government transfers to poor districts, and manipulation of electoral law.

PRI developed out of a left-populist tradition, as exemplified by the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas who pursued a populist economic program with heavy state intervention and land redistribution. Through their incorporation, PRI could mobilize vast portions of the population to turn out to the polls in support of the party, while subsidies quite literally bought the loyalty of these groups to continue their support for the party (Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006). After Cárdenas’s death, his successor, President Manuel Ávila Camacho, sought to gain support from the country’s private sector in order to begin Mexico’s industrialization. This “critical juncture” of the state and business marked PRI’s gradual rightward shift (Camp 1989, 21) and marked the beginning of “friendly, fluid relations” between the state and Mexico’s private sector (Mizrahi 2003, 16). This abandonment of its original revolutionary principles for a pragmatic ideological flexibility allowed PRI to appeal to a broad swathe of voters on both the left and the right

---

8 PRI lost control of the legislature for the first time (specifically the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies) in 1997, but scholars typically consider the end of PRI’s dominance in Mexican politics with the loss of the presidency.
9 Cárdenas served his term from 1934-1940, and did so as a politician from Partido de la Revolución Mexicana; PRI is the third incarnation of the Partido de Nacional Revolucionario founded by President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) in 1929 in a move designed to unite Mexico’s regional caudillos in a single political organization (Wuhs 2003, 12).
(Greene 2007), which, when backed up by an extensive patronage machine allowed PRI to dominate Mexico’s political system for decades.

PRI had shored up its electoral hegemony through incorporating key sectors of Mexico’s population into official organizations subsidized by the state: the peasants (Confederación Nacional Campesina, CNC), industrial workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico, CTM) the so-called “popular sector” of government employees and the urban middle class (Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares, CNOP) (Wuhs 2003, 12-13). In 1936 the Cárdenas administration required similar corporate organs for businesses, originally through one organization for the commercial sector (Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, CONCANACO) and another for the industrial sector (Confederación de Cámaras Industriales, CONCAMIN), that were later conglomerated into a single organization (Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio y de la Industria, CONCANACOMIN) (Wuhs 2010, 112).

During the late 1970s, Mexico began experiencing sluggish economic growth, signaling the end of the rapid economic growth of the postwar period, commonly referred to as “the Mexican miracle.” In response, the government opted to liberalize its economy in order to counteract the slowdown. Foreign investment would breathe new life into Mexico’s industries and revitalize the economy, even as this turn away from state-led economic management threatened PRI’s corporatist political machine. The government under President Luis Echeverría placed PEMEX in the center of its revitalization efforts (spurred by the 1973 oil crisis), which – to the government’s credit – did return high growth rates to Mexico’s economy.

An economic crisis beginning in 1982 prompted PRI to liberalize Mexico’s economy, which meant selling off various public industries, eventually reducing the share of the public sec-
tor from 25.4 percent of GDP in 1983 to about 7.5 percent by 1993 (El Financiero 1992, 2).\(^\text{10}\) Liberalization did return the economy onto a path of growth, but reducing the state’s involvement also deprived PRI of many of its resource advantages (Greene 2007, 173). Meanwhile, liberalization opened up the economy to foreign investment: foreign investors, worried about PRI’s expropriative behaviors in past, sought districts that were either under control of the opposition or where the opposition was strong enough to challenge PRI candidates in elections. Sustained and genuine electoral competition in these districts constrained PRI’s predatory actions, which signaled to foreign investors a better business environment than districts where PRI did not face any constraints from the opposition (Stuckatz 2014, 20). PAN’s business-friendly ideology allowed it to attract foreign investments to its districts over districts under control of either PRI or PRD (Timmons and Broid 2013). Foreign investment proved to be a boon for politicians, as the benefits of economic growth for the local economy as not only were PAN politicians building close relationships with wealthy investors into the party, but PAN politicians could also point to a successful record in improving the livelihoods of Mexican voters in its districts through expanded business opportunities.

The crisis of 1982 ended Mexico’s corporatist strategy of development. The government abandoned heavy state involvement in the economy and began the process of liberalizing in order to spur high growth rates. To this end, the government discarded import-substitution industrialization as its primary development strategy, privatized nearly all of its nationalized industries, and – most importantly – opened the economy to foreign investment.

Founded in 1939, the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) served as the main opposition party to PRI. PAN formed in 1939 as a conservative Catholic party opposed to PRI’s anti-clerical policies, as well as the increasing authoritarian nature of PRI. PAN and its

\(^{10}\) Notably, PEMEX avoided privatization, and remains a state-owned enterprise.
left-wing rival PRD had none of PRI’s resource advantages as neither party controlled the state. Both PAN and PRD languished on the ideological margins as niche parties, resigned to the role of political malcontents and ideological extremists. Initially PAN sought a strategy of ideological purity, even if such a stance would drive to the fringes of Mexican politics, which scholar Yemile Mizrahi (2003) likens to a self-inflicted “martyrdom” on the part of PAN party leaders. PAN provided a moral voice in Mexican politics against the venality and self-interest of PRI, while at the same time it allowed business groups opposed to PRI’s corporatist structuring of the economy an outlet for organizing their interests. So long as PAN expected to remain in the political wilderness, the Catholic traditionalists predominated over the pro-business liberals. However, liberalization of Mexico’s economy changed not only the political landscape within Mexico, but it also changed the intra-party dynamics within PAN.

The prospect of actually winning elections against PRI prompted PAN leaders to reconsider the party’s electoral strategy: instead of accepting its fate as perpetually remaining in the opposition (Mizrahi 2003, 18), PAN accepted a new wave of activists dissatisfied with faltering economic conditions in Mexico rather than inspired by PAN’s doctrinaire Catholic platform. An internal clash between PAN’s traditional wing and the new surge of anti-PRI activists

Voter support for PAN came from Mexico’s wealthiest regions (Molinar 1991) and municipalities, especially those municipalities integrated into the global economy (Magaloni 2006; 88-89, 96). Regions of Mexico most likely to vote for opposition candidate against PRI were those regions most integrated into the world economy (Diaz-Cayero, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003), namely Mexico City and State, Baja California, Chihuahua and Sonora (Escobar Gamboa 2013, 5). Entrepreneurs in these states had made their fortunes through the increased flow of foreign investment into Mexico following liberalization rather than through connections and access
to various benefits gained from supporting PRI (Camp 1989, 246). By being less dependent on PRI, these entrepreneurs were less inclined to support PRI in elections.

Nationalization of the banks in 1982 under President José López Portillo “convinced entrepreneurs that even the most pro-business president could betray them” (Mizrahi 1994, 83). Sensing that PRI was no longer advancing their interests, Mexico’s entrepreneurs sought to influence governmental policy by turning to opposition parties, namely PAN. PAN was already inclined toward pro-business policies thanks to its ideological position, especially considering other parties in Mexico at the time were leftwing parties, but PAN never won the support of entrepreneurs until the 1980s when foreign direct investment created a new class of entrepreneur separate from PRI’s patronage machine. These new entrepreneurs recognized that a lack of political transparency could not prevent PRI from appropriating private property if it perceived that its interests were under threat, as nationalizing the banks in 1982 proved. The entrepreneurs decided to constrain PRI by supporting opposition party to defend their interests, namely creating an economic environment in which foreign investors would not fear having their money appropriated by the state.

Most studies on FDI in Mexico focus on the socioeconomic factors of the Mexican states that attract FDI, such as labor openness (Cabral 2013), educational levels and delinquency rates (Escobar Gamboa 2013), and international infrastructure (Mollick, Ramos-Durán, and Silva-Ochoa 2006) rather than political factors, leaving a dearth in the literature about this particular connection. However, a study by Samford and Ortega Gómez (2012) does establish a positive and statistically significant link between partisan control and FDI, according to which states governed by PAN correlate with higher FDI levels compared to states under control of either PRI or
Since the 1990s, states in Mexico have made use of greater political decentralization to experiment with different schemes to attract FDI (Dussel Peters 2009). Entrepreneurs who backed PAN in Chihuahua came from a “new generation” of entrepreneurs who benefitted from the maquiladora program (Mizrahi 1994, 84), which was designed by the Mexican government to attract foreign investment (Stoddard 1991). In contrast, business owners in neighboring Nuevo León remained loyal to PRI because they comprised the state’s “old money” class that had made its fortunes not through foreign investment but through their connections to PRI.

The presence of FDI empowers local party functionaries to ignore or even defy orders from the central government in order to keep the revenue stream intact. Attracting FDI to one’s district brings with it “both physical capital and employment opportunities that may not be available in the host market” (Jensen 2003, 587). Elites within the regime begin to defect on order to capitalize on the FDI, as they no longer need to curry favor with the regime in order to gain access to rents from the state.

In districts firmly under United Russia’s dominance bureaucratic (Reuter and Buckley 2015) and gubernatorial (Reuter and Robertson 2012) appointments reward those who promote economic development, while in regions where United Russia must compete against opposition parties such appointments instead prioritize loyalty to the regime. In United Russia’s competitive districts, the overarching need to ensure the regime’s survival takes precedence, and thus the bureaucrats appointed to these regions are those who can create a reliable political machine that will ensure that such districts will continue voting in United Russia candidates. “Safe” districts can focus instead on delivering goods and services to its public, as the opposition has too weak a

---

11 The authors disaggregate FDI into one of three types: resource, market, and efficiency. The relationship between FDI attraction and states governed by PAN hold true only for efficiency FDI.
showing to upset the regime’s presence. In these districts, merit and competence in fostering development leads to career advancement.

Even while the regime values the ability of party functionaries to deliver satisfactory election results for the regime, the regime must also ensure that it can maintain a minimal level of economic performance lest it provide a cause for dissatisfied regime insiders to defect from the regime (Reuter and Gandhi 2010). Defection of elites from the regime coalition often signals the end of the regime’s rule (Langston 2006, Levitsky and Way 2012, van de Walle 2006) since the elites can no longer rely on the regime to ensure their own political survival. Thus, to make sure the ruling coalition remains intact, the regime has a vested interest in improving the country’s economic environment (or at least not making it any worse) so that it can thus continue supplying the patronage necessary for binding elites to the regime.

Evidence from developing democracies such as India show that increasing electoral competition at the local level in turn increases the level of public funding directed towards economic development. In Argentina, Gervasoni (2010) finds that provinces that derive rents from federal fiscal transfers also tend to engage in autocratic behavior to bolster their own political standing within their province when compared to their more self-sufficient counterparts. Similarly, in fully authoritarian regimes, local cadres willfully disobey central party directives in pursuit of economic policies beneficial to their own provinces, as these benefits strengthen their prestige within the provinces far better than any benefits the central government can provide (Malesky 2008, 101). Studies on electoral authoritarian regimes themselves are few12, but the implications drawn from democracies and closed authoritarian systems alike suggest that an increasing the constraints on politicians decreases the likelihood that they will engage in confiscatory behaviors.

12 Hankla and Kuthy (2013) mention hybrid regimes by name as a distinct subset of authoritarianism rather than imply their existence through a scalar measure of democratic-ness common to many studies on trade.
The transformation of public finance into patronage goods allows the regime to use public finance as a tool for ensuring voter support (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2011; Gonzalez-Ocantoz, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014; Greene 2007; Hidalgo and Nichter 2012; Magaloni 2006). Studies on patronage indicate that the practice has two purposes. The first purpose is to reward partisans for their continued support (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2011; Gonzalez-Ocantoz, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014). Since these are voters who would vote for the regime anyway, patronage towards them do little to swing their vote away from the opposition; rather, the goal of providing such patronage is to encourage those supporters to come out and vote—even to vote in districts in which those supporters are not registered (Hidalgo and Nichter 2012). The second purpose is to entice swing voters away from the opposition. Just as the regime can sway the more unscrupulous politicians to join the regime in exchange for access to rents, so too can the regime buy off voters’ support in exchange for additional public goods. The regime can thus skew voter preferences through its resource advantage via its use of state revenues.

Given the formidable barriers placed before them by the regime, why would the opposition want to compete for political office? By definition some kind of opposition has to exist lest, but even if contenders to the regime make use of the legal openings to run against the regime, why would they bother to do so time and time again? In other words, in the first election any number of opposition parties can run; they will all lose capturing the country’s de facto seat of power, even if they do win some seats in the legislature and maybe even some local contests. Fewer and fewer parties, however, should continue to compete in subsequent elections, as they

---

13 However, Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) find that vote buying has the opposite effect of ensuring voter turnout, as it decreases the trust the public places in elections.
would all learn that they could not dislodge the regime. Yet, opposition parties do exist, and furthermore do compete in multiple elections.

Methods at the regime’s disposal for skewing voters’ electoral preferences include coercion against supporters of rival parties, stuffing ballot boxes, and most insidious of all, the provision and distribution of public goods. Ruling parties benefit from asymmetric resources vis-a-vis opposition parties: rent-seeking behavior by the ruling party allows it to take advantage from a much greater resource pool to outspend its rivals. On top of that, the ruling party can also use these same rents to coax other elites into the ruling coalition, pulling away potential candidates from the opposition. Since the national treasury essentially becomes the ruling party’s treasury, the regime can induce voters to support the ruling party through the select use of public spending. Mexico’s PRI would routinely deny public monies to punish districts that voted against them; in poor districts where public spending was a vital supplement to families’ livelihoods, such a weapon would provide strong incentives for voters to continue supporting PRI.

Nevertheless, some districts would still defect to the opposition despite the ruling party’s attempts to pressure voters into compliance. Voters are not distributed randomly throughout the country. Political preferences tend to cluster together, whether through due to custom, internal migration, economic activity, class dynamics, or charismatic political leadership, among others (Rodden 2010). However, since preferences do cluster in certain districts, those certain districts may show a preference toward one party over another, and in a system of perfect competition, the distribution of parties to votes should map on to one another.

Electoral authoritarianism is not a system of perfect competition (and even established democracies fall short from some Platonic ideal of perfectly free elections), and as mentioned above the regime deliberately biases electoral outcomes through manipulating voters’ prefer-
ences to ensure that it remains in power. Withholding public transfers or other services vital to
the livelihood of opposition voters serves as a powerful disincentive to continue supporting op-
position parties, such as when the PRI would deny poverty-reduction funds to electoral districts
under PAN or PRD control (Timmons and Broid 2013, Magaloni 2006). Nevertheless, even
when taking into account the skewing effects of patronage goods, some districts may still vote
for the opposition over the regime.

The defecting district, now without public funds, would need some way to cover its
budgetary shortfall. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one such revenue source. Debate still ex-
ists within economics about whether foreign investors prefer democracies to nondemocratic re-
gimes. Nondemocratic regimes streamline the decision-making process, stifle workers’ collective
bargaining, and can protect the investor from populist governmental policies (Oneal 1994), while
corrupt politicians can be bribed in the investor’s favor. The argument contends further that de-
mocracies hinder FDI investment through a lack of long-term consistency and their abundance of
veto players (Jensen 2008, 1042). One hallmark of elections in democracies is a turnover of the
politicians (Huntington 1991, 267; Przeworski et al. 2000, 28), and with it a turnover of policy
preferences. Business leaders investing in a democratic country must bear in addition to the costs
of setting up in a host country the additional costs of complying with new regulations and an in-
consistent business environment. Democracies also open up the decision-making process to
many different groups, increasing the number of veto players who can obstruct the passage of
FDI-friendly policies.

On the other hand, nondemocratic regimes may engage in rent-seeking behaviors and na-
tionalization projects that eat away at investors’ profits in the first instance and eliminate them in
the second. For many of the same reasons that some scholars claim that democracies impede
FDI: standing for election increases the audience costs of politicians from overturning popular policies, while the number of veto players compared to nondemocratic regimes can prevent any one group from engaging in illegal behavior. Indeed, recent studies have demonstrated that limiting the ability for nondemocratic leaders to engage in any form of confiscatory behavior creates environments favorable for attracting FDI (Asiedu and Lien 2011, Bastaiaens 2013, Jensen 2008, Madani and Nobakht 2014).

At the local level, increasing electoral competition should bring with it the benefits of democracy, even when the overall political structure falls short. Where the regime faces a strong, credible opposition in a given district, the regime should resort less to manipulative tactics as the chance of an opposition victory and the subsequent exposure of foul play are too great to risk, even if the blame remains a local political affair. The risk of being caught engaging in fraud in competitive districts leads to greater electoral oversight and decision-making transparency overall. Greater transparency in turn allows businesses to assess the political risks better when making decisions of where to invest; districts with less political risks offer better environments for firms to make returns on their investments.

Foreign investors not only make a decision about into which countries to expand, but they also make strategic decision regarding in which region of a country to set up business (Arregle, Miller, and Hitt 2013; Ghemawat 2003; Rugman and Verbeke 2004). Nondemocratic regimes that face some level of constraint on their confiscatory behaviors tend to attract more FDI than nondemocratic regimes that allow their leaders free rein to engage in rent seeking. Aside from the particular resources or capital advantages that a given region may offer, the political makeup of a region also plays a role in affecting investors’ decisions.
The same political institutions that shape foreign investors decisions can be found in miniature within that country’s districts. Foreign capital concentrates itself in localities (at the provincial level, or in select cities) that investors believe will turn them a profit, rather than in an even distribution over the entire country. Districts that have greater transparency and more constraints placed on the governments from confiscatory behavior should attract more FDI than districts that exhibit greater predatory behavior, *ceteris paribus*. At the national level, the regime maintains its hold on power through its resource asymmetries derived through its rent-seeking behavior; districts controlled by the regime should expect the same behavior from the regime’s local offices, namely rent seeking and confiscation of the foreign investors’ assets.

Opposition parties have the incentive to attract FDI into their districts. By doing so, they can compete against the regime on matters of economic performance since they cannot hope to match the sheer resource advantage held by the regime. Foreign investors also have an incentive in investing in districts controlled by opposition parties as such districts curb the regime’s predatory behavior. The benefits of attracting FDI moderates opposition party behavior from creating patronage networks of their own, lest they too should scare off foreign investment and deny themselves one of the few economic resources available to them as opposition parties. If foreign investors fear the predations of the regime, then local opposition groups make for natural allies. Opposition parties form to keep these sites of foreign capital away from the predations of the dominant party. Thus, where one finds greater concentrations of FDI, one should also see opposition candidates show stronger electoral presence than ion locations where FDI remains low or nonexistent. Local leaders with greater ties to the global economy not only have the desire to oppose a rapacious central government, but also the means to finance their defiance in an otherwise uncompetitive political environment.
The presence of FDI empowers local party cadres to ignore or even defy orders from the central government in order to keep the revenue stream intact. Elites within the regime begin to defect in order to capitalize on increasing flows FDI, as they no longer need to curry favor with the regime to gain access to rents from the state. Regions of Mexico most likely to vote for opposition candidate against the PRI were those regions most integrated into the world economy (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). Kazakhstan’s regions developed a level of financial and political autonomy vis-à-vis the central government thanks to local leaders’ use of FDI for local development projects (Jones-Luong 2003). The political monopoly enjoyed by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) excludes that country from this study as a case, but Vietnam’s experience with reforms at the provincial level designed to attract FDI nonetheless offers valuable theoretical insights in the political consequences of newfound economic resources. Malesky’s (2008) findings rely on the fact that the state media routinely condemn subnational leaders who attract FDI to their provinces for acting on their own initiative and for wrestling away policymaking from the central government. Subnational leaders who defy the CPV’s economic directives in favor of policies more appropriate to their own provincial needs find that the economic boons therefrom give them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the Party in favor of greater local autonomy. In electoral authoritarian regimes, which are defined by the fact that they do not prohibit the existence of an opposition (even as they prohibit certain opposition from existing), elites can defect to the opposition and ride voter discontent in order to strengthen their own positions in the political system (Reuter and Gandhi 2010). The presence of an opposition gives elites the opportunity to defect from the regime; FDI gives these same elites their motive to do so.

Foreign capital concentrates itself in localities (at the provincial level, or in select cities) that investors believe will turn them a profit, rather than in an even distribution over the entire
country. Opposition parties take advantage of these sites of foreign capital by keeping it away from the predations of the dominant party. Thus, where one finds greater concentrations of FDI, one should also see opposition candidates show stronger electoral presence than in locations where FDI remains low or nonexistent.

As opposition parties lack access to patronage goods to ensure loyalty the same way that the regime can, they must instead turn to other forms of partisan cohesion. Ideology, sectarian identity, performance, or some combination of these, can serve to mobilize activists and voters. Ideology lays out a society-wide plan, and a blueprint of sorts of how government will achieve such goals, the implementation of which motivates voters to political action. As Gel’man (2006) and Greene (2007) both point out, while adopting an extreme ideological position will garner the opposition a guaranteed set of votes, it also places a natural limit on the number of votes that a party can attract in the first place. While many opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes do in fact adopt extreme ideological positions, forced to the margins by the regime party’s monopolization over the political center, not every opposition party chooses to relegate itself to an inherently small pool of voters from which to draw support. Ideologically driven, programmatic appeals targeted to a select portion of the electorate may guarantee that a party’s base does come out to vote, but such appeals also dissuade newcomers to the party who do not share the same ideological position.

An opposition party based on a sectarian identity (religious, linguistic, ethnic, etc.) can elicit public support if that party makes itself the advocate of a certain community’s interests. Of course, this gambit only works if identity as such has some sort of political salience (de Miguel 2017, Dunning and Harrison 2010, Lipset and Rokkan 1990). Still, parties based on sectarian
identity can become tools for a particular community to pursue its political aspirations as well as participate in the political sphere (Birnir 2007, Lublin 2014, Madrid 2012).

Performance offers opposition parties greater advantage against the regime party, firstly by targeting the innate unfairness of the system, and secondly by adopting a platform that universally shared by voters regardless of ideological disposition. The regime party finds itself in a bind when confronted with opposition parties running on anti-corruption platforms: the regime party benefits from graft and rent seeking, but it must follow the lead of the opposition parties’ campaign rhetoric and adopt an anti-corruption platform of its own lest it gain the reputation of implicitly being the pro-corruption party. Even if a substantive change in government corrupt does not change (Golden 2006), the regime party nonetheless benefits by creating the perception that it is taking steps to curb politicians’ excesses; when opposition parties adopt anti-corruption platforms, the regime party can at least mitigate rhetoric. Of course, the regime party must find the threat from the opposition party credible enough that it would change its behavior. An opposition party too small to challenge the regime party would likely not alter the regime party’s behavior, but an opposition party that could threaten the regime party’s dominance just may.

The most apparent benefit that FDI brings to the opposition is overall democratization, even at the level of a given electoral district. As the opposition becomes increasingly competitive, it forces the regime party to react to the new challenge to its rule (Meguid 2008). An opposition party campaigning on an anti-corruption platform forces the regime to adapt to and adopt anti-corruption policies of its own – as the regime is obviously the target of such campaigns. Madani and Nobakht (2014) find that the overall level of democracy within a country affects the likelihood of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), with more democracy translating into greater investment. The same relationship between local autonomy and FDI attractiveness is true.
for fully authoritarian countries: Vietnamese provinces that attract the most FDI are those where local party leaders willfully disregard central directives from the Communist Party (Malesky 2008). However, such a policy presents a double-edged sword to the regime: reining in insubordinate local party leaders would return overall political control back to the party’s leadership, even as the policies pursued by the local party leaders spearheads Vietnam’s economic growth.

In districts that would have voted for the opposition anyway, the use of revenues derived from FDI replaces the public funds withheld by the regime. FDI allows the district to continue providing public services; meanwhile, the opposition party can take credit for attracting new economic opportunities (Jensen and Malesky 2010). In districts where public funding plays a smaller, but still important, role to the public’s economic well-being, FDI allows opposition parties leverage against the regime party by positioning itself as the party of business, entrepreneurship and economic growth.

Opposition parties, by design, lack the influence to set national economic policy. The regime can generate its own performance legitimacy, and due to its size and influence in the political life of the country, it has many more resources to marshal to its ends. Lucky for opposition parties, though, the regime must wrestle with the inherent tension between maintaining private goods for a select group of regime insiders and providing enough public goods to win the votes of the much larger electorate within the country (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). While generating legitimacy via performance is possible (e.g., Singapore), the relative ease of relying on the provision of private goods to key elites over the provision of public goods to the electorate at large hinders most regimes from capitalizing on such policies designed to increase the people’s general economic well-being. Democratic parties and candidates rely on techniques, (stump speeches, televised debates, neighborhood canvassing, and voter drives, to name a few) all of
which are designed to attract voters in an election in a relatively fair contest against opponents using the same techniques. Electoral authoritarian regimes have even more tools at their disposal, such as ballot stuffing, buying off the opposition, “misplacing” opposition candidates’ registration forms, and outright intimidation, among others – all of which serve to weaken the opposition enough to prevent its threatening the regime’s dominance.

Fig. 2.1. Graphical Depiction of Electoral Authoritarian Political Space

Radnitz’s observations of political contestation against the regimes of Central Asia ultimately rest on the informal structure of social movements: the central government has greater difficulty tracking down and cracking down on leaders since they may change with each new demonstration. In addition, the independent elites within the Central Asian republics have limited goals, in that they simply want the central government out of their own demesnes. The fluid structure and spontaneous growth of social movements fit more with the ends of the independent elites who would prefer to stay out of national politics, and only react to any encroachments on their local influence from the central government.
A party, on the other hand, exists to put individuals into political office. The first decision made by any political party is to decide whether to compete in the first place (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). As an organization, a party directs and coordinates the actions of its members toward shaping politics (Brownlee 2007, 11; Duverger 1954, 1-2; Sartori 1976, 27; Ware 1996, 4-5). As organizations, political parties have a more durable presence in politics than social movements. The organizational structure of a political party allows it to curb its members’ persona ambitions in the pursuit of long-term goals (Brownlee 2007, 13) through its ability to control the disbursement of incentives to its members (Panebianco 1988, 38). These incentives include access to donations and campaign funds.

At the same time, what would normally be a party’s organizational strength such as identifiable leaders and a bureaucracy, turn out to be weaknesses as they lower the costs of targeted repression for the regime party. Opposition parties face the risk of blackmail, imprisonment of their leaders and supporters, vandalism of their offices, among other forms of harassment and dissuasion. On top of all these potential hazards, parties also face the problem of sustaining themselves financially through a series of electoral defeats. At some point, an opposition party’s less-ideological backers would want to see a greater return on their investments, and they could choose to withdraw their funding in favor of the dominant party, or even pull out of politics altogether. In an environment where repression, coercion and intimidation exist to ensure the ruling party remains in power, why would individuals opt for a permanent organization that would face these various constrains to competition?

Studies on electoral dynamics under electoral authoritarianism typically focus on the national level of electoral competition. At the national level, opposition parties should expect to lose elections far more often than they win because they cannot hope to overcome the incum-
bents’ numerous advantages in any one given election. However, the theory described above suggests that opposition parties are not necessarily trying to win nationally, but rather seeking only to wrest control over certain districts away from the regime. Relying on a national level of analysis ignores a crucial distinction that separates electoral authoritarian regimes from other forms of nondemocratic rule: the opposition can, and often enough, do win some district elections against regime candidates. The variables at play in a local setting may differ substantially from the conditions at the national level, and an investigation at those factors that allow for opposition success will elucidate which factors have the greatest effect on sustaining opposition parties through electoral cycles.

A lack of local- or district-level data have hindered studies at the subnational level until recently, but recent research at the effects of local democracy on the provision of the types of publics goods have demonstrated that local elections mater as much as – and perhaps more so – than national elections regarding the crafting of public policy. With better data, the level of analysis for investigating why opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes bother to bear the
costs of competition must shift away from the national level, where they frequently lose elections, to the local-level, where they do have some political representation.

The theory just described is deductive, though with evidence for regime behavior drawn from empirical studies. As such, the major assumptions upholding the entire theoretical argument are the three premises that lead to the problem tackled by the research, and a fourth premise that attempts to explain opposition party behavior under electoral authoritarian regimes. For clarity, the premises are as follows:

- **Premise 1**: the regime plunders the state treasury to sustain its rule through kickbacks and rents
- **Premise 2**: office-seeking politicians join the regime to gain access to rents
- **Premise 3**: politicians remaining are ideologues who are too principled to join the regime and therefore too radical to gain mass public appeal
- **Problem**: not all opposition parties consist of radicals and ideologues
- **Premise 4**: access to outside sources of funding allows otherwise politically moderately politicians to oppose the regime through their own party apparatuses
- **Conclusion**: politicians sustained by outside funding oppose the regime in order to protect that source of outside funding for themselves

Nothing in this theory suggests that opposition candidates are themselves democrats; in fact, because they form political parties to maintain local control from the encroachments of other elites (namely elites with the dominant party), they may act rather undemocratic when asserting their own local control. However, as North and Thomas (1999) noticed with the rise of the business class in England, a liberal economic outlook tends to have spillover effects in increasing political liberalization in the form of designing a regime to protect property rights. Districts un-
der the control of FDI-friendly parties should also exhibit political openness as a result, if for nothing else than to continue attracting additional foreign investments.

**Alternative Theories**

*Alternative Theory 1: Ideological Voting*

One alternative explanation for why opposition parties form and compete against the dominant party is for the expressed benefits of opposing a corrupt and repressive regime on moral principles. Dominant parties enjoy resource advantages over their competitors as they can make use of state funds to supplement party funds (Greene 2010, 2008; Magaloni 2006; Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). In other words, the state treasury becomes an extension of the party treasury. The consequence of this dynamic is that the opposition parties will be more ideologically extreme compared to the dominant party, as they can only rely on their ideological difference vis-à-vis the ruling party in order to attract votes. This ideological-voting model subverts the democratic logic of the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), in that the dominant party establishes itself as a catch-all party and secures the median for itself, capturing a broad swathe of voters and elites of the left and the right by prioritizing access to patronage over adherence to ideology. Opposition parties cannot offer the same levels of patronage goods as the dominant party, so instead they cater to ideological purists of the extreme left and right.

While rent-seeking behavior motivates politicians to join the dominant party, the same behavior does nothing to persuade opposition members motivated by their ideological convictions from giving up their cause; they only gain electoral success when the dominant party loses its ability to dispense rents and therefore its financial advantages over its poorer competitors. The dominant party can attract less ideological individuals from competing parties by offering access to the dominant party’s rents. Thus, the individuals remaining in the competing parties tend to be
more ideologically committed – they oppose the dominant party for some deeply held conviction of how politics ought to operate (Greene 2008, 121-124). In Mexico, the PRD and the PAN compete against the PRI on classic-left-right economic issues, while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood opposes the corruption and pro-Western orientation of the ruling National Democratic Party (Leiken and Brook 2007).

According to Greene’s (2007) theory, opposition parties face no barriers to forming, only in competing, as access to rents binds elites and the public to the dominant party; violence only becomes necessary when economic downturns or privatization shrink the state’s revenues, and thus the dominant party’s source of patronage. In Mexico, the ruling PRI relied on rents derived from the state-owned oil company to maintain a coalition of rightist and leftist politicians. A policy shift in favor of neoliberalism in the 1980s dried up the rents available to keep this electoral coalition viable. Party members defected to opposition parties of similar ideological disposition in the hopes of finding better electoral prospects (Greene 2007, 62). What is tentatively called the center-periphery theory (mentioned above) suggests that funding the party through several losing election cycles is itself a very real barrier to entry, and that many people will simply not be willing to pay the cost in time or money in backing a loser. FDI changes individuals’ calculus by offering a source of revenues that are not only worth protecting from the central government, but also a means to the end of sustaining competition against the dominant party.

*Alternative Theory 2: Cleavage Theory*

Electoral authoritarian regimes tend to exist in countries that possess deep societal fissures within them. Political liberalization provided the impetus for creating a new party system based on the most salient cleavages that emerge after the chaotic sorting process following liber-
alization (Zielinski 2002). Where ethnic, confessional, or regional differences persist, parties are vehicles of identity and advocacy. Dominant parties maintain their dominance to ensure that their group holds a privileged place in society. “Protection pacts” that allowed the rise of strong states in Southeast Asia formed out of a multiethnic coalition of elites to protect themselves from a much larger, hostile underclass (usually consisting of a single ethnic group) (Slater 2010). The divide in these countries is class-based, with a hint of ethnic tension thrown in for good measure, suggesting that regime parties reflect the most salient political issue in that country, at least as understood by the elites themselves.

The idea of using parties as a vehicle for advancing the interests of a particular social group is not new: Western Europe’s party families developed out of the class-based cleavages that formed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) study on the development of political parties from their class-based conflicts over resource allocation provides a theoretical blueprint for analyzing party formation in the present as the outgrowth of societal cleavages manifesting themselves in the political realm. An alternate theory for why opposition parties form and compete against a dominant party despite any strong chance of winning de facto political power is due to the nature of identity politics. The opposition parties form to advance the interests of a particular clan, ethnicity, or religious sect. Parties in electoral authoritarianism thus differ little in their motives from parties found in democratic states. Rather, they only differ in resorting to extralegal avenues of maintaining political power against rival groups.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter details the measurements and the methods used to test the theory of how the presence of FDI supports opposition parties in a biased electoral environment. The ability of the theory herein presented to explain the behavior of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes against competing theories of opposition party behavior lends the theory credence, that it is capturing some real-world phenomenon in a meaningful way.

Measurements

Studies on electoral dynamics under electoral authoritarianism typically focus on political outcomes at the national level. Poor or lacking local- or district-level data have hindered studies at the subnational level until relatively recently, but recent research at the effects that local democracy has on the provision of the types of publics goods have demonstrated that local elections matter as much as – and perhaps more so – than national elections regarding the drafting of public policy. With better data, the level of analysis for investigating why opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes bother to bear the costs of competition must shift away from the national level, where they frequently lose elections, to the local-level, where they do have some political representation.

Even though the theory places the level of interaction among the regime, the opposition parties and foreign investors at the local level, the study makes use of a large-N, cross-national dataset merely to test the theory’s validity. If a large-N study can at least demonstrate correlation between the levels of FDI as a percentage of GDP and shares of seats controlled by the opposition, then it would demonstrate that some relationship exists between FDI and opposition party electoral strength, a relationship that the case studies would examine in greater detail.
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first section will define electoral authoritarianism and my operationalization of the same. The second and third sections will explain the methods used for the large-N and for the case studies, respectively.

**Definition**

Constructing a list of electoral authoritarian cases has spawned a veritable cottage industry within comparative politics, and no shortage of ready-made lists exists for researchers. The lack of consensus comes from the nature of these countries’ regimes themselves: electoral authoritarian regimes deliberately attempt to play up their superficial democratic aspects while also hiding the autocratic behaviors and practices that ultimately keep the regime in power. A working definition that I used in Chapter 1 describes an electoral authoritarian regimes as a regime in which outwardly democratic features like frequent elections open to an independent opposition and a (relatively) free civil society hide a fundamentally authoritarian core. This deliberately duplicitous design makes identifying electoral authoritarian regimes challenging. After all, the perfect authoritarian regime is the one that seamlessly passes as a fully-fledged democracy.

However, some distinction between electoral authoritarian regimes from democracies on one hand and from closed forms of authoritarianism on the other hand, requires a clear set of operationalization criteria. The first step is to distinguish electoral authoritarianism first as a form of non-democratic rule, and that means identifying non-democracies in whole from democracies. Two forms of identifying democracies exist: a “minimalist” definition preferred by Przeworski (1999; 1991) and Schumpeter (1942), and a “maximalist” definition as developed by Dahl (1971), Marshall and Jaggers (2008), and Freedom House. Under a minimalist definition,

---

15 To this effect, Botswana under the Botswana Democratic Party is often cited (Przeworski et al. 2000, 26; Magaloni 2006, 34; Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014, 47-8) as the paradigmatic case of classification uncertainty: though the BDP has controlled Botswana’s government since independence, it does so with no apparent signs of coercion, manipulation, or violence. At the same time, no historical situation has yet occurred to indicate whether the BDP would step down from power if it did, however, lose an election.
democracy is little more than the competition between organized groups of politicians for political office. Przeworski (1999) argues that a minimalist definition is precise in its simplicity because it focuses only on quality of elections. Minimalist definitions benefit from easy conceptualization as it looks only at the integrity of electoral outcomes without worrying about concepts that require greater subjectivity in their measurements. Limiting the number of democracy’s attributes makes causality easier to identify with minimalist definitions by reducing the number of possible causes that could possibly generate some observed outcome.

Maximalist definitions expand democracies beyond their simple electoral facet, and look at the degree of rights and liberties that infuse political life and give democracy much of its value compared to other forms of rule. Principles such as the rule of law, popular sovereignty, and the individual autonomy of the citizen, among others, characterize democracies, but identifying degrees of difference in these traits across regimes is much more subjective, even though adding additional dimensions than just a procedural method of distinguishing a democracy may yield more substantive definitions. Recent qualitative research on non-democracies generally and electoral authoritarianism specifically has tended toward minimalist definitions of democracy likely for their greater analytical clarity.

A related measurement issue revolves around whether to measure regime type on a continuous scale or as a collection of discrete categories, an argument that remains open to debate (Wilson 2014). Differences in selection criteria affect which cases one includes in a given study, which in turn affect the conclusions one reaches about a political phenomenon. Two approaches to classifying regime types are by sorting regimes either according to a scale (Polity and Freedom House), or by coding regime types into discrete categories (Geddes, Wright and Frantz; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland; Hadenius, Toerell, and Wahman).
The oft-used Freedom House (2015) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) datasets measure democracy on a scale, suggesting that all regime types differ only in the degree to which they exhibit democratic norms and practices. Confusion over identifying electoral authoritarian regimes as separate regimes in their own right has resulted from previous conceptions that rank all governments along a continuum, with full authoritarianism on one end and full democracy on the other, such as the Polity IV or Freedom House data. Using a continuous scale to measure regime type is finding appropriate thresholds to differentiate among fully authoritarian, electoral authoritarian and fully democratic regimes. Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman rely on a combined Freedom House and Polity score “to compensate for the weaknesses of both,” scaled on a 0-10 scale with “10” measuring the greatest amount of democracy (2013, 23). From this scale, they use 7.5 as the threshold for determining which regimes are sufficiently democratic, and which regimes fail to be so. The researchers defend their decision to use the 7.5 cutoff as the score used by Freedom House and Polity for their own determinations of where the boundary between democracy and non-democracy lies.

Freedom House and Polity IV contain a number of problems that hinder their ability to classify regime types. First, both hold an implicit normative view that non-democratic regimes differ from democratic regimes only by their deficiency of democracy. Scholars such as Levitsky and Way (2010), Schedler (2002, 2006), Ottaway (2003), and Carothers (2002), among others, have noted the deliberate intent of rulers in electoral authoritarian regimes to stay in power despite any outward democratic appearances their regimes may show. That the democratic ideal has triumphed globally since the end of the Cold War does not mean that every country now yearns to be free. Freedom House’s own data show that the level of freedom in the world has peaked and then largely remained steady since 2006 (Diamond 2015), suggesting that the current
democratic tide may have reached a high water mark. While a significant non-democratic revers-
sal has so far spared the third wave (Diamond 2011, Levitsky and Way 2015), at the same time surviving authoritarian regimes remain stubbornly resistant to democratization.

Another problem with placing regimes on a continuum based on this reasoning conflates state capacity with regime type. A common assumption in the literature is that, since regimes found in the middle of a continuous scale share elements of authoritarianism and democracy, they cannot consistently repress or reward opposition groups. These middle-range regimes must be weak compared to the “purer” types, and must therefore be more susceptible to civil violence. However, state capacity is separate from regime type. The existence of durable electoral authoritarian regimes such as Mexico (1929-2000) or Botswana (1966-present) on the one hand and short-lived authoritarian regimes (Greece 1967-1973 and Thailand 2006-2007) or short-lived democracies (Argentina 1958-1965 and Ghana 1969-1971) on the other hand provide empirical evidence that electoral authoritarian regime are not inherently weaker than fully authoritarian or fully democratic regimes.

Finally, coding regimes on a continuum introduces normative qualities to empirical measurements. Placing regimes on a continuum between fully autocratic and fully democratic endpoints leads to the assumption that regimes found in the middle of the range are somehow “arrested,” “transitory,” or even “imperfect democracies.” Empirically, this reasoning lacks grounding. Authoritarian regimes exist in a wide array of regime types themselves, and make use of institutions to co-opt any opposition into the regime, to maintain a unified ruling coalition, or to subvert democratic norms and institutions to perpetuate authoritarian rule. The intentional misuse of democratic norms and institutions by electoral authoritarian elites runs counter to tele-
ological narratives concerning the advancement of liberal democracy.
Initial Case Selection

The cross-national study uses a list of cases drawn from the dataset on electoral authoritarian regimes involves using Svolik’s (2012) dataset on authoritarian institutions, itself an extension of the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck 2001; hereafter DPI). The NELDA dataset is valuable for its wealth of electoral data, but it does not contain any coding information for non-election years. The original DPI dataset only reaches back to 1975, whereas Svolik’s extension covers the years 1946-2008. Since its original release, the World Bank has updated the DPI to cover 1975-2012, so my data will come full circle by using the updated DPI dataset to cover the four years from 2008 to 2012 that Svolik does not have in his extended dataset of the original DPI data.

Svolik identifies four dimensions of authoritarian rule: method of legislative selection, method of executive selection, and restrictions placed on political party formation, and the degree of military involvement in politics. Of Svolik’s four dimensions of rule, only the degree of military involvement in politics does not factor into the construction of my list of cases. While militaries can and have fulfilled a tutelary function in some regimes by overturning the outcomes of otherwise democratic elections that they deem to be unsatisfactory, Svolik’s dataset includes only authoritarian country-years in its observations in the first place. Thus, factoring in the military’s role in the government is not only outside the scope of this study, but methodologically it also makes considering any military violations of elections effectively a redundant exercise.

I follow Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and Svolik (2012) in excluding country-year observations during which the country in question experiences a breakdown of central authority, transitional rule, or foreign occupation, as these states lack a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within their respective territories (Weber 1946, 78). A regime must first qualify as
a functioning state before I determine its classification (Huntington 1968, 1). Svolik provides data within his dataset that allow researchers to determine when such periods of fragmented state capacity occur, and I exclude these cases accordingly.

Following the coding principles used by as Brownlee (2009) and Higashijima and Kasuya (2016), I distinguish cases of electoral authoritarianism from other forms of authoritarian rule according to three criteria. A regime is electoral authoritarianism if 1) elections legally allow multiple parties to compete, even if one party wins all offices; 2) multiple parties compete, and the largest party wins more than 75% of seats in the legislature; and 3) multiple parties compete, and the largest party wins less than 75% of seats in the legislature. Cases in which 1) no legislature exists, 2) neither the executive nor the legislature are elected, or 3) where elections consist of only one candidate, or multiple candidates belonging to the same party, fail to qualify as observations of electoral authoritarianism.

Finally, I divide my list of electoral authoritarian cases between “competitive authoritarian” and “hegemonic authoritarian” variants, consistent with the two subtypes of electoral authoritarianism identified in the literature (Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002, Schedler 2002). Competitive authoritarianism allows opposition parties greater scope to compete in elections compared to the hegemonic parties, which keep tight control over the electoral arena. As such, one would expect the greater potential gains available in competitive authoritarian regimes to encourage more opposition parties to form. Kinne and Marinov (2013) use a threshold of 55% of seats in the legislature or greater to establish hegemonic control, while Brownlee (2009) uses a threshold of 75%. Kinne and Marinov use the lower limit as the dividing line between competitive and hegemonic subtypes to allow for instances of electoral authoritarianism (usually countries that follow the presidential form of government) in which one party controls the executive

A third alternative comes from Magaloni (2006), who considers ruling parties as being hegemonic when they control 67% or more of seats. This level of control over the legislature not only allows parties to enact legislation and governmental policy without any support from other parties, but it also grants them the ability to amend constitutions unilaterally. While a party obtaining 75% or more of seats in the legislature certainly commands a position of political dominance, I opt for the threshold of 67% consistent with Magaloni’s practice. Appendix A lists the cases included in this study and their years under electoral authoritarianism including the division of cases into competitive and hegemonic subtypes.¹⁷

Two cases prove to be problematic in deciding whether to include them as electoral authoritarian or not, to wit South Africa and Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe). In South Africa, the National Party held a majority of seats during the Apartheid era, but little data exists that it abused its position to shut out other white opposition parties out of power, even though it readily shut out the country’s black majority from participating in politics. White minorities ruled over both South Africa and Rhodesia, and severely disenfranchised the black majority in favor of white minority rule. By severely curtailing citizens’ right of political participation in favor of upholding the dominant minority’s privileges, I count both countries as electoral authoritarian regimes.

¹⁶ Belarus’s parties are weak organizations that have few seats in the legislature, the overwhelming majority of seats belonging to independents. Formally, the regime thus lacks partisan control of the legislature, but President Alexander Lukashenko ensures that the many independent parliamentarians are loyal to him thereby securing legislative compliance (Kulik and Pshizova 2005).

¹⁷ Appendices B and C include the same lists, but with the threshold between competitive and hegemonic subtypes of electoral authoritarianism set at 55% and 75% control of legislative seats, respectively.
Large-N Study

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable *Share* measures the percentage of seats belonging to opposition in the legislature, lagged by one year to make the model more dynamic, and more accurately capture how the present year’s elections reflect to the previous year’s FDI flows rather than measure their relationship within the same year. The variable runs from 0 to 100. In instances where a national legislature has two chambers, I only consider the lower chamber. My observations for *Share* show wide variance, with 78 country-years having no opposition seats, and four observations (Tajikistan 1996-2000) recording the opposition controlling roughly 93% of seats. The mean for *Share*, however, is at 22.7 percent, indicating that the bulk of my country-year observations have the opposition making up only a small fraction of the legislature.\(^{18}\) *Share* is expected to have a positive relationship with my independent variable, *FDI*, *i.e.*, that an increase in FDI as a percentage of GDP leads to an increase in the percentage of seats in the national legislature controlled by opposition parties.

Electoral authoritarian regimes complicate how to count opposition parties, as incumbents may create “official” opposition parties composed of candidates whose only roles are to lose graciously to the incumbent. Furthermore, if electoral tampering is especially heinous, opposition parties may boycott an election, and not run any candidates (Chernykh 2014, Lindberg 2006). Even though these parties still provide the organizational vehicles that allow political actors to attain control of the government (Aldrich 1995, 5; Sartori 1976, 58-9; Schattschneider 1942, 35), they are not participating in that particular election. That is, these parties have made the decision not to bear the costs of electoral participation – or more importantly, the costs of

---

\(^{18}\) My definition of electoral authoritarianism does not explicitly rule out any case in which the regime party fails to control at least half of legislative seats, though these circumstances should be relatively rare compared to instances in which the regime does command at least a bare majority of seats.
electoral defeat. As my dependent variable only codes parties that compete in elections, then my variable by default ignores parties that boycott elections.

*Share* does have its downsides compared to a count variable: for one, a percentage-based variable only considers parties that have won seats in the legislature, and thus it excludes both parties that compete but have not won any seats and parties that only contest presidential elections. Furthermore, electoral authoritarian regimes purposefully bias election results in their favor, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of the variable as an indicator of actual opposition strength, let alone diversity. Using a variable for percentage control of the legislature nevertheless provides some measure of opposition party competitiveness vis-à-vis the regime party.

In addition to the original DPI variable reporting the wrong measure in some instances, I also found some cases where opposition party seats were not reported (Cambodia, Comoros), or instances in which opposition parties were counted even though they had in fact won no seats (Djibouti, Mauritania, Singapore). In the former cases, I turned to data from the International Parliamentary Union’s data on elections, cross-referenced with Dieter Nohlen’s many data handbooks on elections to fill in the lacking or incorrect information on opposition seats.

The DPI dataset only goes as far back as 1975, and Svolik does not have any comparable data on the number of opposition parties within his extension to the DPI dataset. The lack of observations in the years 1970-1975\(^{19}\) forces me to make use of alternative resources to get election data. Two such resources, the Global Elections Database (Brancati 2016) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, extend the dataset used in the survey regarding the number of parties for the years 1946-1974, thereby increasing the overall number of observations. For cases missing from the DPI data, I turn to the Inter Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) PARLINE data.

\(^{19}\) The cutoff point of 1970 is not some arbitrary year I picked: my FDI data only go as far back as 1970 (as indicated below), and so adding any election data from before then would be pointless, as these observations would drop out of the regression models anyway.
PARLINE archives facsimiles of countries’ official ballot returns, using optical character recognition software to create digital copies of official results. Some of these digital facsimiles are of sufficient quality to gain information needed to fill in missing data on opposition seat shares; in others, the software has rendered the original returns to gibberish. I used Nohlen’s election data to fill in these missing observations.

Finally, the original DPI variable was also including independent candidates as opposition parties in their own right, and even then applying this counting rule haphazardly. My study looks at parties specifically, because parties provide an institutional apparatus designed to unite candidates with each other and with voters under a specific political program. Independent candidates eschew parties explicitly (even though they may still decide to vote with particular parties after the election) during their campaigns. Thus, I have made the decision to exclude independent candidates entirely; while I may lose observations, I will take the conservative route and avoid overinflating my data.

*Independent variable*

The theory suggests a relationship between FDI and the number of opposition parties in an electoral authoritarian country. The independent variable in the large-N study is \( FDI \), which measures the net inflow of FDI as a percentage of total GDP in a given country-year. The data on FDI come from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which tracks the flow of FDI for all countries from 1970 to 2014. Given that \( FDI \) measures the net inflow, some values may be negative – an indication of foreign investment fleeing the country.

The UNCTAD data covers the period 1970 to 2014. Iran and nearly all of the Latin American cases fall out of the study due to the lack of FDI data on those countries for that period, while the country-year observations for Malaysia, Mexico, and South Korea become left-
censored at 1970. Out of 976 country-years in my list of electoral authoritarian regimes, exactly
200 observations drop out of the study due to the dependent variable beginning at 1970. Despite
this one setback, however, UNCTAD covers all country-year observations from 1970 onward,
leaving no missing observations in the data for this variable.

Control variables

Controls used in the large-N study will consist of standard demographic indicators in-
cluding a population variable and a variable measuring GDP Purchasing Power Parity to capture
to overall level of wealth in the countries under study. I have taken the log of both variables to
regularize the variance between countries with low and high measures on each respective varia-
ble: the marginal effects of population and wealth are similar. When the population or level of
wealth is small, a single defection from the regime (voter, politician, contribution) has a greater
effect than at higher levels of population or wealth. Taking the log of both variables helps to
make their distribution more normal, while also capturing the non-linear effects of what would
otherwise be linear measures. Further, three variables taken from Alesina et al. (2003) measure
the degree of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, respectively, in the countries in-
cluded in the cross-national analysis. A rich literature on party systems in sub-Saharan Africa
finds that political parties serve as distribution mechanisms to provide material benefits to co-
ethnics (Bates 1981; Berman 1998; Easterly and Levine 1997; Enloe 1980; Francois, Rainer, and
Trebbi 2015; Koter 2013; Lemarchand 1972; Londregan, Bienen, and van de Walle 1995; Posner
2004; Zolberg 1969). Thus, including societal fractionalization measures controls for any influ-
ence that underlying societal cleavages may have on the relationship between FDI and opposi-
tion party strength. I have transformed these three variables because their effects on the depend-
ent variable are so small. Dividing by 100 so that they run between 0 and 1 allows for the coeffi-
cients for the variables to show two significant figures in the regression tables. Transforming my fractionalization variables in this way distinguishes them from all of the other percentage-based variables in my model, which depict values between 0 and 100.

One variable taken from the World Development Index measures the urban population as a percentage of the country’s total population. Urban districts foster the development of opposition parties and become centers of opposition electoral strength due to the greater concentration of regime opponents in one location, which reduces the transaction costs of organizing (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001, 280; Wallace 2013). Cities also supplant traditional societal ties with new relationships (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 409; Lust-Okar 2006), and provide new economic opportunities, thereby reducing the dependence on state transfers for goods and services (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Magaloni 2006) that otherwise bind poor rural voters to the regime. A greater percentage of the population living in urban centers should translate into a higher percentage of opposition seats.

A large part of the theory relies on the regime’s ability to make use of rents from state-owned enterprises as additional resources at its disposal for retaining political power. The aptly named variable Resource measures rents from natural resources (diamonds, petroleum, cash crops, etc.) as a percent of GDP. Another variable, Oil Rents, specifically targets rents derived from the extraction of petroleum, which the literature has found to be a particularly significant determinant of authoritarian rule (Collier and Hoeffler 2005, Jensen and Wantchekon 2002, Ross 2001, Ulfelder 2007, Wantchekon 2000; though Ahmadov 2014, Dunning 2008, and Herb 2005 disagree on the specific effects of oil on democracy). Additionally, rents allow the regime to buy off the support of voters and of opponents, making this variable a crucial addition to the study.
The literature on electoral authoritarianism makes a distinction between “competitive” and “hegemonic” authoritarian regime subtypes. The difference between these two subtypes is that competitive authoritarian regimes face an opposition strong enough to make the regime worry about actually losing an election, whereas under hegemonic authoritarian regimes incumbents remain comfortably insulated from the political risks to their offices posed by holding elections. Yet despite consensus over the presence of these two subtypes, the literature is unsure over where to place the boundary between them. Kinne and Marinov (2013) place the boundary at 55% of seats in the legislature belonging to the party in power, arguing that an outright majority is enough to dwarf the opposition as whole, let alone any one opposition party. Magaloni (2006) instead opts for 67% of seats in the legislature; as such, a supermajority allows the regime to amend the constitution unilaterally. Others such as Brownlee (2009), Donno (2013), Higashijima and Kasuya (2016) and Svolik (2012) use a 75% threshold, indicating clear examples of a regime’s political hegemony.

The case of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) demonstrates why 55% is too low a figure for establishing the boundary between competitive and hegemonic regimes. The CPP has had to rely on coalition partners ever since Cambodia reinstated elections in 1993. In 2008, the CPP was expected to win a two-thirds majority, allowing it to amend the constitution to allow just one party to achieve a simple majority in order to govern, and thus remove the CPP’s need to form a coalition with a rival to maintain power. Alternatively, the 75% threshold ensures that, under that criterion, all of my cases would hold a clear supermajority status, and would consider only those countries whose constitutions require three-fourths support to pass any amendments. Nevertheless, this threshold also has the consequence of omitting cases where “only” two-thirds
is the required supermajority. Its popularity amongst researchers is due primarily to the fact that the widely used DPI dataset codes whether the executive or the legislature wins by 75% or more.

When two-thirds of seats in the legislature belongs to one party, that party gains a super-majority sufficient to pass normal legislation unopposed by the opposition. In some cases at least, depending on each country’s constitutional provisions and parliamentary procedures, a two-third supermajority can also pass constitutional amendments, and if that supermajority belongs to just one party, then clearly that party has hegemonic control of the country’s legislative processes. A limit of 55% favored by Kinne and Marinov is too low, for, while it does mean that the regime has majority support within the legislature, it must also try to gain opposition support for anything that requires a supermajority to pass. A regime that controls a supermajority, on the other hand, can act alone and pass laws over and above the opposition’s protestations.

Magaloni’s arguments for placing the threshold between competitive and hegemonic subtypes provide a better theoretical argument than the 55% threshold or the 75% threshold used in other studies. I built my variable, $heg67$, by dividing the ruling party’s seats by the total seats in the legislature, using the lower house in bicameral systems, in which a value of “1” indicates that the case counts as competitive authoritarian, and a value of “0” when the case counts as hegemonic authoritarian. My dataset includes dummy variables for 55% and 75% control of legislative seats, labeled as $heg55$ and $heg75$, respectively, for the sake of completeness.

A few of my cases do contain country-year observations (33 observations in total) in which the regime’s control of the legislature drops below 50% of seats. In these regimes, the legislature is essentially superfluous, as its control by the opposition still fails to yield any meaningful exercise of political power. Tajikistan is one such example in which the president holds

---

significant decree power to overrule any bills passed by the legislature; whereas in Ecuador, Paraguay and Thailand the military acts in a tutelary capacity, intervening on behalf of the executive to limit democratic or popular demands placed on the regime. The remaining cases consist of regimes that historically are either not fully consolidated upon independence (Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan) or are in transition between regime types (Mexico). I have decided to include these cases in the dataset, as they do still qualify as electoral authoritarian regimes according to my selection criteria, and they account for roughly 4.8 percent of all my observations, which will not be substantial enough to affect my quantitative analysis.

Electoral rules matter in how they structure the incentives for parties to form and compete in elections. Electoral rules that incentivize minor parties to coalesce rather than stand for election separately may override FDI’s capacity to support opposition parties through electoral cycles. Despite all of the FDI that flows into the United States on a yearly basis, its political system nevertheless has only two major parties as a consequence of the electoral rules in place there (Sartori 1997; Taylor et al 2014). Institutional factors controlled for in the study include a dummy variable for electoral rules. Duverger’s (1954) observation that electoral rules shape the number of parties in a given district stands as one of the few “laws” in comparative politics; the variable Plurality codes elections under proportional voting rules as a “0,” and elections under majoritarian voting rules as a “1.” Even in an unfair electoral environment, an opposition party has a conceivably greater chance to win seats under a proportional system than under majoritarian voting rules due to the greater number of seats per district for candidates to contest.

Finally, the variable Federal states as “1” and unitary states as “0.” Federal systems create a separate layer of subnational offices for opposition parties to contest, thus allowing parties with a regional or sectarian base to concentrate on turning out their core constituencies to vote.
Furthermore, subnational units within federal systems tend to have exclusive power over some of their own affairs, allowing any subnational government controlled by an opposition party to exert control over some aspect of the political process. As my theory states that the conflict between the opposition and the regime is won and lost not at the national level but rather in each electoral district, I expect that federal systems will have more opposition parties represented, and thus a greater share of legislative seats than unitary systems.
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

I ran multiple models each with a different set of control variables to test for alternate explanations for the opposition’s control of the legislature in a given year. Regression results indicate a statistically significant relationship between levels of foreign direct investment and opposition party control in the legislature, but this relationship is negative, contrary to what my theory would expect. The regression models themselves are not proof positive of my theory’s validity regarding the relationship between net inflows of FDI and the percentage of seats controlled by the opposition parties in the legislature, especially since my theory indicates that the relationship occurs at the subnational and not the national level, nevertheless the models can demonstrate correlation between these two variables. That is, the regression models’ purpose is to show that the relationship between FDI and opposition party share at the very least exists.

After the Cold War’s end, the mean value for the opposition’s share of seats in the legislature discernably increases compared to the mean value for opposition party share of seats during the Cold War. The mean value during the Cold War is 0.195, while after that period the mean score rises to 0.242. This change in the mean scores between the two periods indicates that opposition parties did gain greater representation in their respective legislatures, commensurate with the observations made by other scholars regarding the rise in political liberalization and multiparty elections with the Cold War’s end (Diamond 2002, Huntington 1991, Levitsky and Way 2010, Schedler 2006). A difference in mean scores between the Cold War era and its aftermath is more readily apparent with FDI. The net amount of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP flowing into electoral authoritarian regimes after the end of the Cold War (4.19) is more than three times greater compared to the amount of FDI flowing into electoral authoritarian regimes prior to the end of the Cold War (1.34).
The first model is a simple bivariate test meant to show that the net level of FDI as a percentage of GDP does have a statistical effect on opposition parties’ share of seats in the legislature. A statistically significant relationship does exist, but it runs in the opposite direction of what my theory proposes. Even if the relationship between FDI and opposition party strength is statistically significant, the real-world effect is relatively weak: every one percent increase of net FDI as a percentage of total GDP reduces the opposition’s share of seats in the legislature by about one-third of a percent. The R-squared also backs up the faint substantive effect by indicating that the bivariate model only captures a mere one percent of the total variance for the dependent variable. Nonetheless, a relationship does exist between FDI and opposition strength. I suspect that foreign entrepreneurs are more likely to accept working with a given regime (however arbitrary it may be) because it is the party in power (Asiedu and Lien 2010, Escribà-Folch 2008, Oneal 1994), rather than try to support opposition parties through rigged elections with little to show for such support.

Model 2 adds socioeconomic controls (logged GDP per capita, logged population, percentage of the urban population and oil rents as a percentage of GDP). This model also includes the dummy variable for the Cold War. FDI maintains its statistical significance, and the coefficient has a greater effect on opposition seats as well, increasing in value from -0.36 in Model 1 to -0.45 in Model 2. Of course, the substantive effect is still negligible. Only two of the control variables achieve statistical significance: percentage of urbanization and the Cold War dummy. However, even with two more statistically significant variables – and one of those showing a substantive effect on the dependent variable – compared to Model 1, the R-squared value still shows the overall lackluster ability of Model 2 to account for the variance in the dependent variable.
Table 4.1. OLS Regression Predicting Net FDI and Opposition Party Seat Share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI, net inflow (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-0.36 ** 0.11</td>
<td>-0.45 ** 0.12</td>
<td>-0.39 ** 0.11</td>
<td>-0.38 ** 0.10</td>
<td>-0.35 ** 0.11</td>
<td>-0.37 ** 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-0.89 * 0.41</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization (% of pop.)</td>
<td>-0.13 ** 0.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.13 ** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.12 ** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>6.16 ** 1.52</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.89 * 0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic frac.</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious frac.</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality voting</td>
<td>-3.98 ** 1.22</td>
<td>-5.19 ** 1.40</td>
<td>-5.09 ** 1.40</td>
<td>-5.09 ** 1.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony (67%)</td>
<td>16.02 ** 1.13</td>
<td>16.94 ** 1.28</td>
<td>16.20 ** 1.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>21.28 * 9.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>23.90 ** 0.73</td>
<td>20.15 ** 8.02</td>
<td>24.19 ** 1.86</td>
<td>17.94 ** 0.99</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>9.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
The positive sign for the Cold War dummy variable provides yet another point of evidence for the geopolitical watershed event that was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, especially as it pertains to the loss of legitimacy (and external support) that fully authoritarian regimes once enjoyed. Unlike FDI’s coefficient, however, its substantive effect does translate into the real world more readily: opposition parties could expect to gain an additional six percent control of the legislature simply by waiting for the end of the Cold War. Non-democratic regimes not only liberalized overall with the end of the Cold War, many of them becoming the electoral authoritarian regimes that one sees today, but even electoral authoritarian regimes themselves felt the global pressure for more electoral accountability with the third wave.

Urbanization is also statistically significant, but its effects lack substantive importance. As a country’s urbanized population increases by one percent, the effect is only to increase the percentage of seats controlled by the opposition by 0.13 percent, or less than a fifth of a percent, which is hardly much of an effect. What is surprising about the urbanization variable, however, is that its sign is negative, suggesting that in my model urban populations are more likely to vote against the opposition, not for it. This particular effect stands in opposition to other findings by Magaloni (2006), Timmons and Broid (2013) and Wallace (2013) that urbanized populations tend to be less dependent on the state for their economic wellbeing.

My third regression model utilizes the ELF variables (Alesina et al. 2003) that measure ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. FDI maintains its statistical significance, while none of the control variables do. This finding (or rather the lack thereof) suggests that a vast literature on the relationship between ethnicity and the number of parties (Bates 1974, Bogaards 2004, Chandra 2004, Posner 2005, Young 1976) may not explain opposition party formation in
electoral authoritarian regimes. Religious fractionalization is also not an explanation for the formation of opposition parties, as this variable also fails to achieve statistical significance. Examples of opposition parties formed along either ethnolinguistic and religious lines do exist (the People’s National Congress and People’s Progressive Party that represent Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese, respectively provide two examples), but within my large-N study these factors are not sufficient to explain the percentage of seats in the legislature held by opposition parties. Perhaps dishearteningly, though it should not come as much of a surprise given the lack of statistical significance, the value of the R-squared for Model 3 is 0.02, falling back to the same lowly level of (poor) accounting as in Model 1.

The variables controlled for in Model 4 look at institutional and political features that would either facilitate or inhibit the proliferation of multiple parties, especially as they pertain to the proliferation of opposition parties. These factors are electoral system, federalism, and the percent of seats in the legislature held by the regime. Model 4 demonstrates a few of the many ways that authoritarian rulers can violate democratic norms in order to engineer electoral victories for themselves (Schedler 2002). In this case, deliberately selecting electoral systems that discourage the formation of small parties (Duverger 1954) provides the regime with a less costly, legal alternative to other forms of electoral fraud such as mobilizing votes or ballot stuffing (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001). Manipulating electoral results beforehand is one way to ensure the continued rule of the regime party, and the propensity of majoritarian electoral systems to favor the largest party adds yet another option for electoral authoritarian rulers to further bias the electoral arena in their favor.

---

The literature is quite clear that in general parties in sub-Saharan Africa form along ethnic lines and function largely as patronage machines to benefit one’s co-ethnics.
Institutions are the framework and the rules that structure society. That is, they set the norms of behavior and the incentives of actors. Institutions are the core actors in comparative politics because of the central role that institutions play in combining and distilling actors’ deeds into political policies. By constraining the range of permissible behaviors, institutions provide incentives and constraints on the actions of individuals and groups. The institution, which is to say the election rules, places limitations on the range of political behaviors within society. For the same reason, institutions create incentives that shape the strategies of political actors (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Electoral authoritarian regimes can make use of these institutional factors to create barriers that hinder the opposition’s ability to contest the regime legally without resorting to extralegal mean of maintaining power. Adopting a single-member voting system alone can reduce the opposition’s share of seats by nearly four percent. Even within a (purposefully) flawed electoral environment, the particular incentives put in place through a majoritarian voting system penalize smaller parties (Duverger 1954); adding various forms of electoral manipulation such as vote buying, intimidation or even outright fraud, should only serve to magnify this effect.

Federalism does not achieve statistical significance, likely because electoral authoritarian regimes tend to keep the locus of political power within the (national) regime, and not share or disperse that power to all provincial governments. If so, then that power goes toward either empowering local magistrates to act as functionaries of the regime, or to attract the support of local potentates and ensure their support for the regime. Another explanation is that my list of cases contains relatively few federal systems, and so the sheer number of country-year observations of unitary states may have drowned out any effect of a federal system in my model.
The literature on electoral authoritarian regimes makes a clear distinction between those regimes in which the incumbents enjoy certain unfair advantages over their opponents but must still work at winning elections (competitive) and those in which the incumbents have such a clear advantage that their elections are virtually devoid of competition (hegemonic). I set the demarcation between competitive and hegemonic subtypes at the 67% level for Model 4, meaning that a country in which the regime controls 67% or more of seats in the legislature I would score as hegemonic; any percentage less than 67 would score that case as competitive. Scoring the variable in this manner means that I can read the coefficient for this variable in a more intuitive fashion, as the greater competitive nature of competitive authoritarian regimes would incentivize opposition parties to form and contest elections. I tested alternative models with different thresholds separating competitive and hegemonic subtypes, and the coefficient remains significant whether the threshold was set at 55%. I have included both models with the different threshold levels in the Appendix as Tables A.4 for the 55% threshold and A.5 for the 75% threshold.

Competitive authoritarian regimes by definition must rely to some degree on their electoral competitiveness to ensure their dominance of the political system, and so the opposition will necessarily have a greater share of seats compared to hegemonic authoritarian regimes. The substantive effect found in Model 4 reflects this fact, as the opposition will statistically control sixteen percent more seats under competitive authoritarian regimes compared to the opposition under hegemonic authoritarianism.

In Model 5, net FDI loses its statistical significance, while the socioeconomic variables retain theirs. The value of the R-squared for Model 5 is 0.29, meaning that this particular model is much better at explaining the variance in the dependent variable; the fact that two of my three control variables are significant further reinforce this model’s explanatory power vis-a-vis my
previous models. Nearly all control variables fail to achieve any level of statistical significance in this model except for the two structural variables (plurality voting and hegemonic party) remain statistically significant, and their effects actually increase compared to their effects in Model 4. The Cold War dummy variable loses its statistical significance in this model, though rents from oil extraction becomes statistically significant. My guess for why the Cold War variable loses significance is because of the explanatory power of the institutional variables. Even though the number and prevalence of electoral authoritarian regimes did increase after the end of the Cold War, outright ignoring electoral competition prior to 1992 was far more permissible, and so electoral authoritarian regimes were more likely to belong to the hegemonic subtype. When the Cold War ended and democracy became the global norm, competition or some facsimile of it became the expected behavior of regimes, the variance that the Cold War dummy variable would capture is being absorbed by the Hegemonic dummy variable.

The variable for rents achieves statistical significance in Model 5, though the coefficient has a small substantive effect. Nevertheless, the relationship is negative meaning that greater reliance on the extraction of natural resources reduces the share of seats in the legislature controlled by the opposition.

The results for my fully specified model are found in Model 6, which differs from Model 5 in that it includes a dummy variable for Africa. This dummy variable codes country-year observations taking place in sub-Saharan Africa as “1” and all other country-year observations as “0”. Some scholars (Basedau 2005, Bogaards 2008, Manning 2005) have noted that electoral authoritarianism is especially prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, where the continent’s one-party states have modernized and liberalized in order to survive under a new, democratic global para-
digm. Nonetheless, this variable proves not to be statistically significant. What I find to be the most interesting about the Africa dummy variable is that it becomes significant when I set the threshold between competitive and hegemonic at 55% and at 75%, yet the 67% threshold somehow fails to achieve this same statistical achievement. I have included both alternative models in the appendix in Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively.

Population achieves statistical significance in model 6, and its effects on opposition party share are negative. Since this variable only has statistical significance when the Africa dummy variable is included, this significance may only be an artifact of the variance introduced by the Africa dummy. Much like in the previous two models, the dummy variables for electoral system and hegemonic control remain significant and with rather strong coefficients. The impact of their coefficients are weaker compared to their coefficients in Models 4 and 5, but nonetheless electoral system and hegemony have substantive effects on the percentage of seats in the legislature controlled by the opposition.

Once again, rents have a statistically significant effect on opposition party representation, at about the same degree as in Model 5. More surprisingly is that fact that ethnic fractionalization becomes statistically significant in Model 6. Its effects have been magnified by a factor of 100, meaning that the substantive effect of ethnic fractionalization is so slight that it is effectively of no impact on the percentage of seats controlled by the legislature. Yet, the variable did achieve statistical significance all the same, so it is worth mentioning at least for that fact.

In all of my regression models, FDI does achieve statistical significance, albeit in the wrong direction. The dummy variables for plurality electoral system and a hegemonic threshold are statistically significant in all models of which they are a part, and their coefficients exert a strong effect on the dependent variable. Surprisingly, the Cold War dummy lost statistical signif-

22 Approximately 45% of my country-year observations come from sub-Saharan Africa.
icance when the variables for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and the institutional features were added. However, as I mentioned in my discussion of Model 5, this fact may be a result of the greater explanatory power of the institutional variables than any contradiction of what other scholars have found about the prevalence of electoral authoritarianism after the end of the Cold War.

One conclusion to draw from the regression models indicate that a link between FDI and opposition party competitiveness does exist, but my theory does not explain that relationship. My theory applies to the subnational level, yet my large-N study uses countries as the unit of analysis, which does cast doubt on the validity of my findings in Table 4.1. The purpose of the large-N study was to establish correlation: that is, as long as the relationship was statistically significant and, more importantly, positive, then I could make use of my case studies to detail that relationship. However, my large-N study found a negative relationship, which complicates the exact relationship between FDI and opposition strength and casts doubt on the relationship proposed by this study.

CASE STUDIES

The theory for how FDI sustains opposition parties through an otherwise hostile electoral environment requires an investigation of the relationship of foreign investors, opposition parties, voters and the regime as political actors at the subnational level. The large-N regression merely serves to show a correlation between FDI and opposition parties. Case studies will explore this relationship in greater depth, and can delve into the subnational factors that sustain opposition parties. Case studies provide an in-depth look at a country’s political particular characteristics, thereby deepening an understanding of that country albeit at the expense of generalizability to other polities.
Table 4.2 Case Study Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High percentage of opposition seats</th>
<th>Low FDI</th>
<th>High FDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (1980-2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low percentage of opposition seats</td>
<td>Mexico (1970-79)</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (1992-95, 2006-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (1970-88, 2001-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My intended criteria for selecting case studies was to choose one case with low FDI inflows and low share of opposition seats in the legislature, one case with high FDI inflows and high share of opposition seats, and possibly one case of high FDI inflows but low share of opposition seats. The first case would show how the lack of FDI has starved any opposition parties from realistically challenging the regime, while the second case with high FDI and high opposition representation would demonstrate how high levels of FDI provide opposition parties with the financial support needed to compete against the regime. My third case would provide an example of a country in which the opposition fails to win a percentage of seats within the legislature despite the predicted values suggested by the model to illustrate how a regime could mitigate the effects of FDI and still constrain the political activities of the opposition. Ideally, most of my observations in the large-N study would have fallen within the range of the two white boxes, which would indicate a positive relationship between FDI and share of seats controlled by the opposition. However, as the quantitative study shows that the relationship actually has the opposite effect than what my theory predicts, I need to determine what the relationship between FDI and opposition party representation actually is.

Table 4.2 shows that the relationship between FDI and opposition party strength in the legislature in my case studies is not static. That is, over time my case studies shift from one box
to another, suggesting that the relationship between my independent and dependent variables is due to some other factor. After all, the quantitative study does suggest a statistically significant correlation between the two variables, but the negative sign on the coefficient and the fluctuating position of my case studies on the two-by-two table rules out that FDI is having a clear causal effect on opposition parties’ ability to win seats in the legislature.

In Models 5 and 6 shown in Table 4.1, rents, plurality voting and whether the regime is sufficiently hegemonic within the political system are significant, while population and ethnic fractionalization reach statistical significance in Model 6. My second alternative theory proposes that political parties reflect societal cleavages, and the coefficients for both variables are both statistically significant and show a relationship in the correct direction. In light of the fact that the quantitative model did not support my own hypothesis, exploring the politics of ethnicity may prove fruitful in explaining why opposition parties compete in rigged elections. The existing literature suggests that ethnicity (at least in sub-Saharan Africa) plays some role in opposition party formation and support in electoral authoritarian regimes (Fearon 1999).

The intent of my dissertation is, ultimately, to explain how opposition parties support themselves repeatedly through unfair elections. Given the statistical significance of ethnic fractionalization in Model 6 and large body of literature on ethnic competition in non-democratic regimes, looking at how opposition parties may exist to promote communal interests may yield insights on the formation and sustenance of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. According to a model based on ethnic competition, each election would serve as an informal census that would measure voting strength as a function of the relative distribution of ethnic groups within the population. As such, opposition parties would only have a minority vote share due to demography. My original theory, that opposition parties have a natural affinity to work
with foreign investors for transparent, and thus democratic, governance, fails based on the unexpected direction of the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Alternative explanations such as institutional barriers, the presence of a rent-generating extractive economy or ethnic fractionalization may provide an alternative explanation for opposition party formation and support.

The cells in Table 4.2 contain names of countries that can serve as possible case studies for demonstrating the relationship between levels of FDI and percentage of seats in the national legislature controlled by opposition parties. My first case study, Azerbaijan, actually occupies two cells, and shows that as FDI increases the opposition generally gains more seats over time, as my hypothesis suggests. Conversely, Mozambique’s political development is more static as it remains confined in a single cell, and actually exists as a disconfirming case to my hypothesis.

Finally, though it is not included in any of the boxes depicted in Table 4.2, my third and final case study will look at party formation in Malaysia. Malaysia’s political environment is distinct from Azerbaijan and Mozambique in that its political parties have obvious ethnic orientations. Thus this case study will not use Malaysia as a study how opposition parties under electoral authoritarianism reflect ethnic cleavages (as that would be selecting on the dependent variable), but rather to demonstrate what an obviously ethnically-divided political system would look like. Further, a case study on Malaysia can show how opposition parties can overcome their ethnic differences in order to promote democratization in their country.
CHAPTER 5: AZERBAIJAN

Of my cases for electoral authoritarian regimes, Azerbaijan combines high-FDI with high opposition party representation in the National Assembly. Though the ruling New Azerbaijan Party controlled less than a majority of the National Assembly after the 2005 parliamentary elections (48%), the country’s party system is completely fractionalized into small opposition parties consisting of little more than one or two candidates. Flows of FDI into Azerbaijan are not the highest of my cases (the greatest level of FDI as a percentage of GDP in any one country-year belongs to Cambodia in 2003), but Azerbaijan’s FDI levels in country-years 1996 to 2004 occupy five of the top twenty positions.

Even though the cross-national test failed to yield any significant findings that would support the main hypothesis, viz. that an increase in the number of opposition parties represented in a given national parliament would correspond with a rise in the levels of FDI to that country. By turning to a cased study of Azerbaijan, I can better understand what factors drive opposition parties to continue competing within an unfair electoral environment.

Historical Background

Azerbaijan’s history as an independent state revolves around the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. The territory lies within Azerbaijan’s legal borders, though currently Armenian separatists have established a de facto independent state in territory captured by the Republic of Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of a territorial and ethnic dispute between the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan that in the late 1980s rather quickly eventually escalated to the point of open warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan and secession of both republics from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
The seeds of the Nagorno-Karabakh War lie in the geopolitical turmoil surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman and Russian empires in the early twentieth century. Armenians suffered large-scale oppression within the Ottoman Empire, especially in the empire’s latter days. World War I gave Turkish nationalists in control of the Ottoman Empire the excuse to engage in wholesale genocide against the Armenians, among other groups (Schaller and Zimmerer 2008). Armenians fled to find refuge in Armenian territories within Russia. The genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks created a distinct sense of nationalism within Armenians all over the Caucasus, and a driving mission for future Armenian states to protect Armenians everywhere.

When the Bolshevik Revolution shattered the Russian Empire in 1917, the various ethnic groups in the Caucasus region seized the opportunity to assert themselves as independent states for the first time (Mammadova 2016, Saparov 2016). Azeri intellectuals helped to form the first Republic of Azerbaijan, which included the Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh region. Almost immediately, Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war over the Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia wanting to include all Armenian-majority lands within its borders, and Azerbaijan wanting to protect its territorial integrity from a hostile foreign power.

In 1920, the Soviet Union reasserted control over the Caucasus and ended the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The Bolsheviks incorporated Armenia and Azerbaijan within the nascent Soviet Union, first as part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic then as separate Soviet republics (Mammadova 2016, Saparov 2016). A special commission was appointed to settle the territorial disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and it awarded Nagorno-Karabakh and the Nakhchivan region to Azerbaijan as autonomous territories without compensating Armenia (Mammadova 2016, Saparov 2016). The Soviet Union’s heavy centralization prevented the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to push for incorporation into the Armenian
SSR, but Gorbachev’s *perestroika* reforms allowed for the political space that allowed the Karabakh Armenians to reopen the ethnic divisions that would eventually lead Azerbaijan and Armenia down the path to war with each other.

The Nagorno-Karabakh War had serious repercussions for Azerbaijan’s political and social development as an independent country. The territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh stemmed from a strong sense of Armenian national identity and a desire to unite all ethnic Armenians into a single homeland (Saparov 2016, 6). Azeri nationalism, in contrast, developed in reaction to Karabakh Armenians’ desires to secede from Azerbaijani territory (Rumyansev 2016). The opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) party formed in reaction to the Karabakh Armenians and managed to join Azerbaijani citizens within an independence movement against the Azerbaijan SSR’s Communist leadership (Kamrava 2001). However, after independence rather than follow the APF’s leaders toward a unified effort to fight the Armenians, various factions within Azerbaijani society resorted to using armed militias recruited by the different clans to pursue their own sectarian interests. The use of clan-based militias instead of a single national army serving the country as a whole later shaped the development of Azerbaijan’s splintered party system after the war.

During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, then-president Mutallibov maintained close ties with the USSR. Mutallibov was a committed member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (AzCP), and, though the political reality of a newly independent Azerbaijan forced him to abandon any ideas of an eventual reintegration into the Soviet Union, he still refused to build a national army to counter Armenian paramilitaries. Dawdling on building this key state institution (especially one so vital to fighting a war) left a vacuum that allowed the clans to form their own militias.\(^{23}\)

---

\(^{23}\) Armenia was also able to capitalize on Mutallibov’s refusal to create an Azerbaijani army by creating a national army of its own that it used to great effect in the later stages of the war against Azerbaijan.
The purpose of these militias was two-fold: 1) to protect Azeri villages in Nagorno-Karabakh against Armenian incursions; and 2) to challenge rival clans’ ambitions within the new republic.

The militias carried out most of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Notably, the Lachin, Fuzuli, and Gubatli militias had such close ties to clan interests that they resembled “extended families” themselves. Within Nagorno-Karabakh, another six militias controlled by criminal organizations operated amidst the chaos of war, fighting against Armenian forces as well as against each other (Bölükbaşı 2011, 188). A militia formed by Heidar Aliyev, the former Communist Party leader of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and future president of the newly independent republic, operated from Aliyev’s home base of the Nakhchivan region. Finally, Azerbaijan’s prime minister at the time, Surat Huseinov, maintained a private militia once hostilities broke out with Armenia, the notorious “Ganja Brigade,” named after the Azeri town where Huseinov’s family originated and where Huseinov allegedly built an illicit fortune as director of the town’s wool combine (Bölükbaşı 2011, 188).

The Aliyev Dynasty

Heydar Aliyev’s political career started in the Azerbaijan People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKVD24) in 1944, where he served with distinction, attaining the post of deputy chair in 1964 and then chair in 1967 while holding the rank of major general (CIA 1983; de Waal 2003, 85). Aliyev’s prominence only continued to rise when in 1969 Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev appointed him as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. As First Secretary, Aliyev routinely promoted other Azeris to high-ranking posts in Azerbaijan (Bölükbaşı 2011, 5; de Waal 2003, 85), a practice that would affect later political development in Azerbaijan upon independence. For his accomplishments, Yuri Andropov promot-

---

24 In 1954, government reforms renamed the NKVD to its more familiar name, the Committee for State Security, or KGB.
ed Aliyev to a full member of the Politburo where he served as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, his first role outside of Azerbaijan’s party-political structure (CIA 1983). Aliyev’s meteoric rise finally came to a halt when Gorbachev accused Aliyev of corruption and forced Aliyev into early retirement in 1987 (Remler 2016, 23). Aliyev then returned to Nakhchivan where he served as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet for Azerbaijan SSR until a political rival, the leader of the Azerbaijan SSR Ayaz Mutallibov, pressured him to resign. However, Aliyev still situated himself to become the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in 1991 (Bölükbaşı 2011, 159).

When independence came to Azerbaijan, Aliyev effectively controlled the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan essentially as a de facto state unto itself. The Nagorno-Karabakh War that broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in a number of early Armenian successes against Azerbaijan. President Mutallibov resigned which created a power vacuum in the country. The Azerbaijan Popular Front, led by Abulfav Echibey, took power in Azerbaijan proper, while Aliyev used the ensuing political chaos to further entrench himself in Nakhchivan, even going so far as to form his own militia. Aliyev used his newfound political stature as the de facto leader of Nakhchivan to stave off a coup attempt supported by Minister of the Interior Isgandar Hamidov in an attempt to reassert control over Nakhchivan, and to broker a cease-fire agreement for Nakhchivan with the Armenian president, Levon Ter-Petrossian.

By May 1993, Elchibey’s presidency faced the prospect of a civil war and even the possible loss of Azerbaijan’s independence at the hands of pro-Russian Colonel Surat Huseynov, his own prime minister. The Russian 104th Guards Airborne Division provided extensive support to Huseynov, even ceding all of its equipment to Huseynov’s militia with its withdrawal from
Azerbaijan. Huseynov and Elchibey alleged each other of treason and abuse of power, and Huseynov began moving toward the capital of Baku.

The Aliyev Petro-Patronage Machine

Azerbaijan sits atop some of the world’s best petroleum deposits outside of the Middle East. After independence, substantial oil revenues supply the Aliyev regime with plentiful rents that it can distribute to loyal politicians. The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP, after its name in Azerbaijani) created by Heidar Aliyev offers up a platform based on broad platitudes and vague statements of Azerbaijani nationalism. What actually binds the YAP’s members is their desire to secure access to oil rents.

Azerbaijan’s petroleum sector has been that country’s leading economic driver for decades starting with the first modern well dug in the mid-1800s. The region of what is now Azerbaijan has long been noted for its petroleum natural gas deposits. Marco Polo writes in his Travels that,

“Near the Georgian border there is a spring from which gushes a stream of oil, in such an abundance that a hundred ships may load there at once. This oil is not good to eat; but it is good for burning… Men come from a long distance to fetch this oil, and in all the neighborhood no other oil is burnt but this” (Polo [1300] 1958, 48).

At the turn of the twentieth century, Russian wells in Azerbaijan were pumping about 50 million barrels annually (Daintith 2010, 157). Oil has since been Azerbaijan’s primary economic driver, whether as part of the USSR or as an independent country, with 86% of Azerbaijan’s exports in 2015 coming from petroleum extraction (Simoes 2017).

Not all FDI is created equal: foreign investments serve the petroleum industry almost exclusively (Guliyev 2009, Mir-Babaev 2004, Radnitz 2012, Rasizade 2004). Oil allows Azerbaijan to curry favor with the West as guardians against any aggression from Armenia or its ally

---

25 The editor asserts that this passage is “doubtless” a reference to Baku, even though Marco Polo never mentions Baku by name in The Travels.
Russia (Kamrava 2001, 224-225). Investments that do not go directly into oil production nevertheless benefit the oil sector by fostering support services to oil extraction such as construction, hotels, and service industries. Thus, while Azerbaijan does receive considerable FDI, a reliance on oil extraction ensures the regime with ready and lucrative rents while also inhibiting the growth of any substantial commercial interests that would find common cause with the opposition.

If FDI does not provide the means for opposition parties to sustain themselves in Azerbaijan, then why do opposition parties continue to compete in rigged elections against the regime? Patronage can buy support, but as the regime can provide greater opportunities than the opposition can for rent seeking through its access to oil profits, members of the opposition may choose to compete for ideological reasons. Greene (2007) notes that the two main opposition parties to Mexico’s ruling PRI occupied the far left and far right of the political spectrum, respectively, and that they relied on their members’ ideological steadfastness to carry the parties through multiple electoral defeats. Perhaps Azerbaijan’s opposition parties also rely on strong ideological ties to motivate party members to stick by the party through each loss.

Furthermore, if Azerbaijan’s opposition parties represented differing ideologies, then Azerbaijan’s political discourse should reflect a wide array of issues and policy positions; even if the YAP dominates the political center, opposition parties could still differentiate themselves ideologically from the dominant party, as well as each other, by adopting the vacated positions on the ideological fringe (Greene 2007). The reality in Azerbaijan, however, is that of a constrained political space wherein each party, regime and opposition alike, adopts a bland nationalistic agenda in its party manifesto that differs little from the regime’s own positions (Guliye

By accepting what March (2003) considers the “pre-political” values as articulated by the regime, Azerbaijan’s opposition fails to present itself as a viable political alternative.

However, Azerbaijan’s opposition presents neither democratic nor an ideological alternative to the Aliyev regime’s “sultanistic semiauthoritarianism” (Guliyev 2005). Rather, the opposition consists largely of rival elites competing against each other for the regime’s favor. While one can find the occasional democrat among the opposition, for the most part it is sadly no less prone to rent seeking as members of the regime, the only difference between members of the opposition and of the regime being whether one is inside or outside the regime’s circle.

**Azerbaijan’s (Limited) Political Opposition**

If Azerbaijan’s opposition parties organize themselves along ideological lines, then they should compete in most districts nationally, as ideology relies only on the transmission of concepts. Granted, certain regions would be electoral strongholds based on a random distribution of classes, ages, preferences and interests. What one does see in Azerbaijan instead are concentrations of opposition parties in specific electoral districts that roughly correlate to the country’s clan and ethnic distribution (Avioutskii 2007). Figure 5.1 displays the districts where Azerbaijan’s four largest opposition parties ran candidates in the 2015 parliamentary elections. One can see how the main opposition parties tend to congregate in certain geographic regions. Most notably, the Popular Front (Whole), a party that splintered from Abulfaz Elchibey’s Azerbaijan Popular Front, competes in Nakhchivan and an east-west line of districts running through the center of the country. Elchibey himself originated from the Ordubad clan from Nakhchivan (Kechichian and Karasik 1998, 8), which, based on where the Popular Front continues to run candidates, evidently continues to support a wing of the original party.
Azerbaijan began agitating for independence from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, engendered by a longstanding territorial dispute with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Solutions from Moscow involving administrative transfers of territory would no longer satisfy the overlapping irredentist claims coming out of Baku, Yerevan, Nakhchivan, or Stepanakert. For some time, Azeri and Armenian politicians stoked the flames of nationalism in order to bolster their own side’s claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, which eventually led both of the Soviet republics to split from the Soviet Union.

Yet, despite having an ethnically homogeneous population buoyed by nationalism founded on hatred towards Armenians, the persistence of clan divisions is a noted feature of Azerbaijan’s politics (Alieva 2006; Avioutskii 2007; Bölükbaşı 2011; de Waal 2003, 2010; Ergun 2010; Guliyev 2012, 2013; Kechichian and Karasik 1995; Remler 2016). This fact about clan identity is important: Azerbaijan’s politics does not fit the otherwise conventional mold of political competition in other countries where ethnic fractionalization and inter-ethnic rivalries hold sway, as demographically Azerbaijani society belongs essentially to a single ethnic group. However, *intra*-ethnic competition plays the same role.

Competition amongst the various Azeri clans provides the Aliyev regime with a divide-and-conquer strategy to ensure the regime’s survival. Loyal clans support the Aliyev regime in exchange for access to oil rents, while the presence of oppositional clans gives the regime leverage against defection by threatening disloyal clans with replacement by oppositional clans that have in turn formed opposition parties to protect their own interests. Even though the populace is overwhelmingly ethnically Azeri (according to the State Statistical Committee 2010, about 91% of the total population identifies as Azeri), clan relations remain a strong form of identity with Azerbaijani society.
Kathleen Collins defines a clan as an “informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds.” Clans are thus different from interest-based patronage networks in that they cohere around inter-subjective conceptions of identity, not just patronage. Yet they too perform the important economic and social function of sharing resources according to the principle of reciprocity (Collins 2004, 231-4). No wonder, then, that opposition parties abound in Azerbaijan’s highly fragmented party system. The Aliyev regime in control of the country draws its support from three clans, the YAP only serving as a vehicle for inter-clan cohesion. Clans outside of the regime, devoid of any rent access of their own from the state-owned petroleum industry, compete against each other for the regime’s favor.

As stated previously, Aliyev in his role as First Secretary of the AzCP introduced the practice of appointing ethnic Azeris to high-ranking posts in Azerbaijan in the Soviet era. He continued this custom when he became president of Azerbaijan by placing many of his former comrades and supporters and ex-Soviet nomenklatura into offices of the new independent government (de Waal 2003, 27; Cheterian 2010, 103). Through his office of the president, Aliyev has been able to construct a patronage network centered on the Aliyev family and, through the first lady’s family, the Pashaevs from Baku. Other important families with ties to the Nakhchivan clan include the Talibov, Mammadov, and Heidarov families, all of whom control Azerbaijani business interests outside of the lucrative petroleum industry (Guliyev 2012).

In addition to Nakhchivan clan associated with the Aliyev family, two other clans dominate Azerbaijan politics. According to Guliyev (2012), these clans are the Yerazi and Kurdish clans, the former comprising ethnic Azeris expelled from Yerevan and the latter consisting of the Kurds living in the south Caucasus (some of these Kurds also originally come from Armenia).
The most prominent clan that fell from political favor in Azerbaijan belongs to the former president Abulfaz Elchibey. Elchibey promoted a strong Azeri nationalism based on its Shiite and Turkic heritage, with a strong eye towards courting Ankara instead of Moscow for foreign support (Bölükbaşı 2011). The Ordubad clan in Nakhchevan near the Iranian border served as Elchibey’s main source of support, where his popularity were such that “armored carriers and dozens of loyal soldiers protected [Elchibey] from potential attacks after his demise from power in June 1993” following Surat Huseinov’s rebellion (Kechichian and Karasik 1995, 8).

Political power in Azerbaijan passed from father to son when Heidar Aliyev nominated his son Ilham as the party’s presidential candidate for the October 2003 elections. Ilham Aliyev easily won the election amid claims of electoral fraud (Guliyev 2005, Sultanova 2014). Since the elder Aliyev’s death in 2003, Ilham Aliyev has been reorganizing the circle of elites. He has been purging some of his father’s ministerial appointees, including firing the founder of the Yerazi clan, Health Minister Ali Insanov (Guliyev 2012, 127). Guliyev (2012) asserts that the firing of the elder Aliyev’s supporters allows the younger Aliyev to sidestep traditional clans and to create a new power center based on business leaders from Baku.

A clan that deserves mention is the Baku clan associated with former president Mutallibov. Mostly members of this clan were intellectuals who were prominent in the late Soviet era. Furthermore, many of the Baku clan also identify as Talysh, an Iranian ethnic group centered in Azerbaijan’s extreme southeast. During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Col. Alikram Hummatov briefly established a “Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic” at the same time as Col. Huseynov’s rebellion against President Elchibey.27

---
27 De Waal (2003, 215) states that Hummadov’s revolt was an attempt to reinstate fellow Talysh the former President Mutallibov, a point that Rubinstein and Smolansky (1995) support, though they acknowledge the republic’s ethnic dimension served as as a cheap tool for legitimizing its existence. Parrott (1995) denies that the Talysh repub-
Conclusion

According to my theory explained in Chapter 2, I predicted that the Azerbaijani opposition, shut out from enjoying rents collected by the state, would have to find alternate sources of funding for their political operations, foreign direct investment being one such source. Foreign entrepreneurs would naturally ally themselves with opposition parties, as they would prefer the transparency that democratic governance brings. Increasing levels FDI would allow the opposition to sustain themselves through unfair elections, and possibly even boost the opposition’s ability to challenge the regime in parliament.

The data, however, do not bear out my theory. A qualitative investigation of Azerbaijan’s politics reveals that its clans, not its parties, structure political life. Social cleavages based on numerous competing clans persisted during Soviet times despite centralized rule from Moscow, with Heidar Aliyev using his position as head of the Azerbaijan SSR’s secret police, then as the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party to distribute goods, offices, and favors to his fellow Nakhchivani clan members. Aliyev continued this practice on a smaller scale in his native Nakhchivan after his falling out of favor with Mikhail Gorbachev. In independent Azerbaijan, the Aliyev regime utilizes oil rents to create a patronage network within the country to cement his rule. Clan politics came to the fore during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, when the sudden power vacuum following Azerbaijan’s independence from the Soviet Union allowed various clans to vie with each other for control over state assets.

Avioutskii (2007) lists the clans both within and outside of the regime, identifying the Nakhchivan, Yerazi and Kurdish clans as the three pillars of support for the Aliyev regime, a c
Table 5.1. Clans in Azerbaijan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nakhchivan</td>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yerazi</td>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordubad</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Popular Front (Classic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talysh/Baku</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharabakh</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Azerbaijan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachin, Fuzuli, and Gubatli</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Independent militias in Nagorno-Karabakh War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>National Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yardymli</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Civic Unity Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


finding found elsewhere in the literature (Bölükbaşlı 2011, Guliyev 2012). More importantly, Avioutskii also lists Azerbaijan’s main clans in opposition (2007, 73). Avioutskii also identifies the political parties associated with each clan, which is unsurprising given the extent to which clans shape political as well as social life in Azerbaijan. Table 5.1 provides a summary of Azerbaijan’s clans and their associated political parties.

The Aliyev regime follows a well-established pattern of building an elite coalition using access to rents (Fearon 1999, Gould and Sickner 2008, Green 2007, Guliyev 2013, Medina and Stokes 2002) to maintain cohesion. The presence of clans outside of the Aliyev circle allows the regime to threaten discontented members of the elite coalition with replacement from members of another clan. This threat is so because the clan structure of Azerbaijan’s society means that many more people depend on rents than just the individual politicians do; politicians are useful for their ability to secure patronage to other members of the same clan. Thus, expelling someone from the regime coalition does more than just send that someone into the political wilderness: it effectively shuts out an entire rival clan from political life.

Azerbaijan receives considerable FDI and it does have a plethora of opposition parties. However, much of the FDI goes to the petroleum sector, and many of Azerbaijan’s “opposition”
parties actually consist of independent candidates running to make names for themselves, thereby gaining access to rents. Azerbaijan’s clan structure perpetuates patron-client structures, where the patriarchs of each clan are the main providers of goods and services to other members of that clan. Those in power can use their access to rents to funnel wealth to their kin; alternatively, regime outsiders attempt to gain access to become important members of their own clans.
CHAPTER 6: MOZAMBIQUE

The case study examined in this chapter, Mozambique, has low foreign direct investment (mean FDI accounts for 4.57 percent of Mozambique’s yearly GDP) and few opposition parties (one major and one minor). Mozambique stands in stark contrast to Azerbaijan, and it would suggest at face value that a country’s level of FDI correlates to the number of opposition parties. However, oppositional politics in Mozambique originate from the wider international situation during the Cold War that then morphed into ethnic competition with the adoption of multiparty elections in 1994.

Historical Background

Mozambique’s history begins with the Portuguese expansion during the age of discovery in the 1540s. The Portuguese selected a few sites near the Zambezi River as stopping points and trading entrepôts on the Indian Ocean. The colony never expanded, and not until British, French, and even German expansion in east Africa did Portugal begin to build up its colony and assert its claim. Even so, the Portuguese granted concessions to foreign investors in Mozambique.

The Estado Novo corporatist dictatorship in Portugal, which lasted from 1933 to 1974, promoted Mozambique as an integral part of a “pluricontinental” Portugal. For the most part, Mozambique’s economy relied on migrant work in mines in Rhodesia and South Africa, and rents derived from transporting goods from the interior to the port city of Beira. Cotton only became significant portion of the Mozambican economy during the Novo Estado period, and even then, inefficient farming and harvesting methods required steady subsidies from Portugal to keep these plantations in operation (Pitcher 1993).

Following the end of World War 2, African demands for independence had grown to a fever pitch, and ideas of independence, anti-colonialism, and black liberation swept through the
continent. By early 1962, several political organizations had formed in Mozambique, each party differing in its views on how best to achieve independence from Portugal. The most important of these parties was the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which waged a guerilla war against the Portuguese until 1974, when a military coup in Portugal replaced that dictatorship with democratic government, which in turn hastily divested itself of all Portuguese colonies in Africa and brokered a peace deal with FRELIMO.

FRELIMO formed from the merger of three pro-independence organizations, the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO) and the Mozambique National Independence Union (UNAMI). FRELIMO’s founding president was Eduardo Mondlane, an assimilado educated in the United States who worked for the United Nations and taught at Syracuse University before returning to Mozambique to campaign on behalf of Mozambican independence (Chilcote and Mondlane 1965). The leadership of FRELIMO reflected Mozambique’s multiethnic elite stratum, while mestiços, assimilados, and Indians made up the party’s lower ranks. Against the white Portuguese, FRELIMO espoused a unified Mozambican nationalism, where ethnic differences mattered little and everyone identified as a Mozambican first (Finnegan 1992; Alpers 1974, 48).

Cold War

The Cold War provided the greatest influence on Mozambique’s politics. FRELIMO formed as an independence movement against Portuguese. Under FRELIMO’s founder and first president, Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO pursued a pragmatic program with no overt ideological cast to it (Reno 2011, 51-7). After Mondlane’s death in 1969, the triumvirate of Marcelino dos Santos, Samora Machel, and Uria Simango pursued a hardline Marxist-Leninist policy.

28 For example, Mondlane visited the United States, the Soviet Union, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in search of diplomatic recognition as well as international support by exerting pressure on Portugal to grant Mozambique independence.
(Simões Reis 2012, Meyns 1981). Soviet influence grew dramatically, and FRELIMO’s general anti-colonial message morphed into a strong anti-West and anti-capitalist program; in territory under FRELIMO’s control, all forms of tradition (spirit healers, bride prices, polygamy) and personal property was abolished (Finnegan 1992, Henriksen 1978).

Once in power, FRELIMO pursued a policy for transforming Mozambican society. All agriculture was collectivized, private property abolished, and religion suppressed. The new constitution proclaimed FRELIMO as the only legal political party in Mozambique, and all civic, labor, and professional organizations must have government approval (Alden 2001, 78). Traditional headmen of Mozambique’s tribes, the régulos, lost all of their privileges maintained under Portuguese rule as part of FRELIMO’s modernization efforts to “emancipate” native Mozambicans “from the ‘tribalist’, ‘obscurantist’, ‘feudal’, ‘colonialist’ values” that remained in the country’s myriad rural villages (Macagna 2008, 224).

The minority governments in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa did not like having an independent black republic on their borders, especially one aligned with the Soviet Union. Rhodesia began funding Mozambican dissidents reportedly as early as 1975 by using Portuguese police files to find likely recruits. Called the Mozambique National Resistance Army (MNRA), these recruits conducted a guerrilla war in the south of the country. Later the MNRA changed its name to the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a name that the organization would carry to the present.

Rhodesia signed an accord with FRELIMO to end support for RENAMO. RENAMO did not have to wait long to find a source of outside support, as South Africa’s military intelligence began meeting secretly with RENAMO in Rhodesia’s absence. South African support collapsed when a Mozambican government raid on a RENAMO base revealed the diaries of Dhlakama’s
adjunct, Francisco Vaz, which detailed extensive technical and material support from South Africa’s intelligence community for the insurgency (Vines 1991, 24). Revelation of the so-called Vaz Diaries prompted South Africa’s government to admit its interfering in Mozambique’s politics. Complicating matters, South Africa could not outright disavow RENAMO, as South Africa was also supporting the anti-communist UNITA in Angola: ending support in Mozambique would weaken South Africa’s credibility with its other allies.

In contrast to FRELIMO’s systematic ideological program, RENAMO originally offered little in the way of a comprehensive platform other than a mealy-mouthed anti-FRELIMO message (Hall 1990, 47-9). Over time, as RENAMO faced the task of administering the territories it liberated, as well as to garner more foreign support, RENAMO began to articulate its ideological program with greater detail to include such platforms as market reforms, multiparty elections, and neo-traditionalism (Vines 1991, 111-119).

**Ethnicity and Mozambican Society**

The previous chapter detailed how Azerbaijan’s clan rivalries structure political life in that country, FDI playing little role in sustaining opposition parties. There, clan affiliation creates important social cleavages and strong interpersonal ties, both of which facilitate the distribution of patronage. More ethnically heterogeneous countries should feature a number of opposition parties roughly commensurate with the number of ethnic groups (Fearon 1999). Like so many other African countries, Mozambique contains a patchwork of different ethnicities. Its borders also cross ethnic regions, separating co-ethnics from one another.

---

29 “Clan” and “ethnicity” both refer to socially relevant groupings of people based on shared notions of kinship or some cultural affinity. Clans happen to be more relevant in Azerbaijan due to the relatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity and identification, both of which result from conflict with Armenians over Nagorno-Karabkah.
Ethnolinguistic regions in Mozambique roughly divide the country along the Zambezi River. North of the Zambezi River live the predominately-matrilineal groups of the Makua-Lomwe, the Yao, and the Makonde. The Makua-Lomwe constitute Mozambique’s largest ethnic group overall, and many practice Islam. The Yao are a small ethnic group and have been heavily Islamized due to their historically acting as intermediaries to Arab slavers. Finally, overlapping Mozambique’s border with Tanzania are the Makonde people (Reno 2011, 56; Hall 1990, 50; Opello 1975, 68). FRELIMO was founded in Tanzania with Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere’s support, and many of its soldiers fighting in the liberation war came from the Makonde. FRELIMO operated out of this border region with Tanzania, and as such, it relied heavily on Makonde support to sustain the liberation war.

However, not all was well between FRELIMO and the Makonde: a continuing source of conflict within FRELIMO originated between the Makonde fighters who served as FRELIMO foot soldiers in the liberation war and the ethnically mixed FRELIMO leadership. Most of the party’s leadership came from the south (especially the capital of Lourenço Marques) and consisted of whites, *assimilados*, *mestiços*, and Indians (Simões Reis 2012, Reno 2011), and were considered by northerners (like the Makonde) to be “aggressive, domineering, and corrupt” (Opello 1975, 69). The Makonde, on the other hand, supported FRELIMO because such an alliance furthered tribal leaders’ goals in creating an independent Makonde homeland (Cahen 1999, 45; Vines 1991, 6). Situated as they are on the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, the Makonde also play a role in Tanzania’s politics and make up some of the leadership of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the ruling party in Tanzania that sponsored FRELIMO in Mozambique. Despite these historic quarrels between FRELIMO and the Makonde traditional leaders, many Makonde today support FRELIMO candidates in elections (Israel 2006) and have
even integrated various FRELIMO propaganda songs into their folk rituals (Israel 2009, West 2005). In the past the Makonde supported FRELIMO during the liberation war against Portugal; now the Makonde support FRELIMO at the ballot box against RENAMO.

The ethnic groups living south of the Zambezi are the mostly patrilineal groups of the Thonga and the Shona. The Thonga are the largest of the southern ethnicities (Opello 1975, 69), and have ties to the cattle-breeding Swazi people of South Africa (Hall 1990, 51). Located along the border with Zimbabwe toward the center of Mozambique are the N’dau, a Shona people who are related to Zimbabwe’s dominant ethnic group, and who provided much of RENAMO’s soldiers in its insurgency against FRELIMO. When RENAMO organized as an insurgency against FRELIMO, it operated close to its patron states of Rhodesia and South Africa: many of its first recruits came from the N’dau, and RENAMO’s leader Afonso Dhlakama is himself a member of the N’dau (Vines 1991, 84).

Mozambique’s capital lies in the extreme south, which is where the great majority of the country’s non-black population lives. White settlers accounted for about one-half a percent of the total population in 1940 (Newitt 1981, 164; Spence 1963, 25). Mestiços, Indians, East Asian and assimilados30 made up another half percent, while the remaining population consisted of native-born Africans. For most of its colonial history, white settlement of Mozambique remained small (Basilson 1980), and only really began accelerating with the Estado Novo’s renewed interest in its colonies (Newitt 1973, 375; Pitcher 1993).

Though Mozambique’s non-black population only accounted for about two percent of the total population at the time of independence (Sumich and Honwana 2007), they almost exclusively contributed Mozambique’s skilled labor and intelligentsia and leaving a “relative absence”

---

30 Assimilados were blacks who had assimilated into Portuguese society and thus enjoyed certain social and economic privileges typically denied to black Mozambicans.
of blacks in political leadership positions (Alden 2001, 15). When the Portuguese left Mozambique following independence, the remaining non-blacks living in Mozambique were unable to provide many of the critical skills needed to run the country (Sumich and Honwana 2007; Finnegang 1992, 244; Meyns 1981). This deficit was especially evident under FRELIMO’s ambitious plans to revolutionize Mozambican society (Simões Reis 2012, Sumich and Honwana 2007, Alden and Simpson 1993, Ottaway 1988, Meyns 1981, Henriksen 1978).

Planters, the main class of white settler in Mozambique, benefitted from a large pool of native workers to work in the plantations. Poor white laborers benefitted from the lower wages given to their black counterparts for the same work, and thus supported racial barriers as a form of economic protection against cheap native labor. Colonial administrators and officials, like Governor-General Joaquim Augusto Mouzinho de Albuquerque, openly admired the British Empire and its attendant racial policies and wished to replicate these policies in Portuguese Africa. They envisioned their presence in the African colonies as part of a larger civilizing mission to replace Africans’ intrinsic “barbarism” with Western values and culture (Newitt 1981, 168).31

The leadership in both FRELIMO and RENAMO faced criticism for ethnic biases within their respective organizations: FRELIMO for southerners despite recruiting Makonde as foot soldiers in their campaign against the Portuguese, and RENAMO for N’dau in its ranks. Yet, this line of criticism overlooks the practical manpower limitations faced by FRELIMO and RENAMO during their guerrilla campaigns, namely that each organization had to recruit from the local populations where it operated.

In the case of FRELIMO, the use of Makonde people as frontline troops is because FRELIMO formed across the border in Tanzania, and its operations took place in the north of Mozambique.

---

31 Even so, talk was cheap: despite having had over 470 years to proselytize, Portuguese missionaries reached less than fifteen percent of Mozambique’s native population by the time of independence (Finnegan 1992, 63).
Mozambique. The Makonde straddle the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, so recruiting Makonde to serve as fighters was simply a matter of convenience. The Makua and northern Muslims avoided supporting FRELIMO, considering it a Makonde organization (Newitt 1981, 227), despite their proximity to where FRELIMO operated. Similarly, the fact that southerners dominated FRELIMO’s leadership has more to do with Mozambique’s capital, Lourenço Marques\(^\text{32}\), being located in the south of the colony. Colonial elites, including *mestiços* and *assimilados*, would have been living in the capital prior to the beginning of the independence movement.

Racial policies in Portugal’s colonies never formally materialized despite demands from the white colonists. The central government in Portugal faced two considerable pressures, one external and the other internal, against instituting openly racist policies in its colonies. First, Portugal’s time as a global power had long passed by the 1800s, and it was no position to protect its colonies from growing British and German ambitions in the region (Newitt 1981, 169). Portugal’s only recourse to British and German military superiority was to challenge these two powers morally, which precluded formally adopting racial policies. Eschewing race laws in the colonies also prevented Mozambican nationalists from using racialism and race discrimination as a mobilizing tool against the colonial state (Newitt 169). Indeed, the demographic category of *assimilado* assumed that any black Mozambican could adopt Portuguese customs and learning, and thus in turn become a full Portuguese citizen (Spence 1963, 31).

According to Vines (1991, 68), splinter groups from RENAMO originated not only due to leadership disputes, but also because of mistrust engendered by RENAMO’s continued support from South Africa. One can assume that these oppositional splinter groups, then, may have

---

\(^{32}\) Lourenço Marques was name for Mozambique’s capital city during its colonial period, named after the Portuguese navigator who explored the area in the 1544. Shortly after independence, FRELIMO renamed the city to Maputo.
had greater reason to organize themselves around ethnic lines: if ethnicity did not play that great a role in FRELIMO (individuals could join the government in a pay-to-play fashion), then a splinter group breaking from RENAMO would have some credible claim as being more “authentically” African in makeup. Further, breaking off from RENAMO would concentrate the ethnic character of that particular faction. RENAMO had a reputation of being dominated by the N’dau (Manning 1998; Vines 1991, 84; Hall 1990), and so a splinter group could advance its own interests independently of another ethnicity’s interests.

Despite espousing a message of national unity (Henriksen 1978), FRELIMO’s early years were rife with factionalism. A number of splinter groups formed because of disputes within FRELIMO (Opello 1975), though none of these splinter groups achieved any political relevance. The need for economic restructuring in light of FRELIMO’s failed policies and RENAMO’s effective targeting of infrastructure exposed rifts within FRELIMO that split along ethnic lines. Hardline and ideological whites, mestiços, and Indians opposed moderate black Mozambicans on the direction and scope of reforms, as well as issues of army conscription and the lack of blacks among the party leadership (Alden 2001, 15).

Just as FRELIMO’s reliance on Makonde resulted from where FRELIMO operated against the Portuguese, one could say the same about RENAMO and its relation to the N’dau: funded by South Africa and Rhodesia, RENAMO formed in Mozambique’s south, which is where the N’dau happen to live. Southern Mozambicans would have been the easiest to recruit, as they were across the border from South Africa and Rhodesia. Indeed, RENAMO did recruit N’dau people as foot soldiers for its insurgency against the one-party state established by FRELIMO and used the N’dau language as a lingua franca (Vines 1991, 84). Much of RENAMO’s membership at all levels were N’dau, leading to a criticism much like that that lev-
eled against FRELIMO that RENAMO had a clear ethnic bias (Alden and Simpson 1993, 45; Finnegan 1992 64-6; Vines 1991, 84-5). Recognizing the criticisms, RENAMO did incorporate other ethnic groups into its leadership ranks, including the Sena, Chope, Lomwe, and even Makonde (Vines 1991, 156). By the mid-1980s, persons from other ethnic groups filled out RENAMO’s upper echelons, though the N’dau still predominated (Newitt 1981, 164). RENAMO and FRELIMO came to be so closely identified with particular ethnic groups, with FRELIMO’s leader Samora Machel himself “regarding the Renamo issue merely as an ethnic dispute between Ndaus and Senas on the one hand, and the Shangaan on the other over which tribe ruled the country” (Cabrita 2000, 208). This quote about FRELIMO’s leader (and thus the president of Mozambique) reflects how interethnic competition, whether in the form of electioneering or open conflict, shapes Mozambique’s political environment.

The N’dau had a reputation for both their martial and magical prowess (Finnegan 1992, 64), the Portuguese seeking out the former trait when recruiting the N’dau for Portugal’s colonial army (Vines 1991, 84), and the latter trait exploited when RENAMO recruited Mozambique’s traditional healers (curandeiros) and mediums (feiticeiros). Service with Portugal’s colonial army created a pool of seasoned veterans trained to fight against FRELIMO, while the social upheaval caused by FRELIMO’s uprooting the traditional village structure provided the impetus for taking up arms against the FRELIMO regime.

**Economic and Political Liberalization in Mozambique**

*Mozambique’s Search for Foreign Investment*

Portugal largely neglected its African colonies until the mid-1800s when the British, French and Germans began pressing their African claims. Even so, not until the Estado Novo took power in 1933 did Mozambique receive any considerable investment in its economy

---

33 In fact, RENAMO’s elite battalion, the “Grupa Limpa,” was a wholly N’dau unit (Vines 85).
()Isaacman and Isaacman 1980, and this was confined to cotton (Pitcher 1993). The liberation war preceding independence already saw the flight of Portuguese capital (Meyns 1981, 47), and FRELIMO’s declaration of a one-party state built along Marxist-Leninist lines did nothing to stem the loss of foreign investment in Mozambique. During this time, Mozambique applied to become a member of Comecon (Vines 1991, 42), further cementing its ties to the Eastern Bloc.  

Years of disastrous economic policies and a destructive civil war forced FRELIMO to abandon scientific socialism in its fifth party congress. Though the Soviet Union remained Mozambique’s military ally in its fight against RENAMO, the government began courting Western economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and African Development Bank (Alden 2001, 90; Alden and Simpson 1993, 116). FRELIMO hoped that with the sudden turn to market economics it could attract foreign capital and revive Mozambique’s moribund economy.

Mozambique’s rejection from Comecon also forced FRELIMO to turn to the West for economic assistance and investments. Simões Reis (2012) in his study of FRELIMO’s ideological evolution from independence to the late 2000s notes that, not only was economic liberalization intended to reinvigorate economy, but it also provided opportunities for party members to line their own pockets from the sale of state assets. This fact corroborates an observation by Alden (2001, 92) and by Buur, Mondlane and Baloi (2011) that those individuals who benefitted the most from privatization happened to be persons with political connections.

Furthermore, the discovery of large natural gas reserves of Mozambique’s coast has led to an “FDI bonanza” (Toews and Vézina 2017) that stimulated additional 70 percent growth in non-extractive sectors. The authors caution that prior to the 2009 discovery of natural gas,

---

34 Mozambique aligned itself closer to Beijing than to Moscow, and Alden and Simpson (1993, 111) note that Mozambique only drew away from China when China covertly assisted South Africa’s 1975 invasion of Angola.
Mozambique had racked up unsustainable levels of debt to foreign creditors, which makes this new-found economic resource vulnerable to a predatory government wanting to free itself from external leverage (Levitsky and Way 2010) and desirous of new patronage sources (Macuane, Buur, and Monjane 2017; Castel-Branco 2014).

Civil war had devastated Mozambique’s infrastructure. RENAMO deliberately targeted bridges and roadways to cripple Mozambique’s economy (Manning 1998, Finnegan 1992). The Beria corridor, which linked Zimbabwe to the port city of Biera, was vital for fortifying Zimbabwe’s own broken economy. The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and FRELIMO had a close relationship with each other (Reno 2011, 91-2), which eventually drew Zimbabwe into FRELIMO’s insurgency against RENAMO (Finnegan 1992, 57-8). Zimbabwean troops occupied the Beira corridor as a deterrent from RENAMO attacks (Finnegan 1992, 96). Ironically, given the geopolitics of southern Africa, the presence of Zimbabwean troops only invited further RENAMO attacks.35

Multiparty Elections Come to Mozambique

The Rome Peace Accords signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992 set a timetable for elections to take place in 1994, the first-ever multiparty elections in Mozambique’s history. FRELIMO expected to win, even as a UN force of 7,000 peacekeepers maintained the ceasefire (Meldrum 1993) and heavy international monitoring watched for dirty electioneering (Turner, Nelson, and Mahling-Clark 1998, 157; Lloyd 1995, 154; Isaacs 1995, 21), because FRELIMO had controlled every aspect of the state for the twenty years prior. Its party cells had penetrated into every village (Manning 2005, 230), and it could reliably count on support in the

35 FRELIMO supported ZANU’s liberation war against Rhodesia’s white minority government from 1976 to 1980. FRELIMO and ZANU both (rightly) considered RENAMO to be an extension of South Africa’s foreign policy of destabilizing the independent black republics.
extreme south near the capital, where much of its leadership originated and operated, and in Mozambique’s north among the Makonde.

In contrast, RENAMO had a weak political wing that was distinctly subordinate to its military hierarchy (Vines 1991 80), and the organization as a whole only controlled the center of the country, especially in N’dau territory. Western funding to RENAMO nevertheless ensured its competitiveness, though it still failed to unseat FRELIMO from power. Initially RENAMO offered no other political program other than taking a broadly anti-FRELIMO stance (Hall 1990). FRELIMO’s policy of revolutionizing the rural villages and stripping the régulos of their customary authority provided RENAMO with recruits in its insurgency against the regime. In return for the régulos’ support and manpower, RENAMO would reverse FRELIMO’s socialist policies and restore the régulos to their role as village headmen: “The traditionalists welcomed Renamo and they were called mulunguissé or those who have come to ‘straighten things up’” (Cabrita 2000, 196).

Magic became an integral part of RENAMO ritual: one story of RENAMO’s first leader, Andre Matsangaissa, relates how he and his men had magical powers that made them invulnerable to bullets as long as they used their powers to (Vines 1991, 74). Another story of Matsangaissa’s supernatural prowess tells how a point-blank shot from an automatic rifle left no mark on him, and how his death from a rocket-propelled grenade cursed Matsangaissa’s killer with madness (Finnegan 1992, 66). Not to be outdone, Afonso Dhlakama, Matsangaissa’s successor and the current leader of RENAMO, frequently called upon spirits before battle to render his soldiers invisible, to cause FRELIMO soldiers to shoot each other, and other such miracles (Finnegan 1992, 64). The peoples living along the Zambezi River expressed societal upheaval through their concept of kupilikula, or counter-sorcery (West 2007). Events such as the coming of the
Portuguese, the introduction of colonial economics, and urbanization and industrialization were all reinterpreted through kupilikula, which allowed the régulos to maintain their social standing amidst changing social circumstances; the establishment of a socialist state by FRELIMO was no less significant an upheaval. A key difference between the period of one-party rule under FRELIMO and past periods of turmoil in Mozambique’s history is that in its drive to force modernization on Mozambican society FRELIMO officials stripped the régulos of their traditional authority, which denied the villages of their coping mechanism for systematic change.

With the end of the insurgency and the introduction of multiparty elections, the régulos have become a key constituency in Mozambique. Much like the casting away of Marxism during its ideological rebranding, FRELIMO has reversed its policies towards traditional life and now courts the régulos for votes, consolidating at the local level what it had lost with the dismantling of the one-party state (West and Kloeck-Jensen 1999). For its part, RENAMO has always relied on the régulos for material and moral support.\(^\text{36}\) Both FRELIMO and RENAMO wish to gain the electoral support from the régulos, as the régulos occupy a key intermediate position in Mozambican society whereby they can turn out voters for either party or help distribute patronage to the various localities (Obarrio 2010, Logan 2009). Thanks to its control over the state and the resources that such control brings, FRELIMO has been peeling away régulo support from RENAMO, leading to an increase in tension starting in 2012 that flared up into the renewal of violence between elements of RENAMO and FRELIMO (Kayuni 2016). RENAMO lacks the organizational strength to challenge FRELIMO at the ballot box, bypassing Mozambique’s formal political institutions and preferring “informal negotiations between its own leadership and

\(^{36}\text{As many Mozambicans still adhered to traditional customs and social structures, RENAMO hoped that restoring the régulos would engender legitimacy in the eyes of the public.}\)
the government” (Manning 2005, 721). For RENAMO, losing the régulos to FRELIMO means losing a valuable resource for RENAMO’s leveraging its share of power from the government.

Conclusion

My original theory predicted that as foreign direct investment increased within a given country, opposition parties would increase in their organizing power as FDI would provide a source of political funding unconnected with the state. A major assumption in my theory was that foreign investors would have a natural affinity for the political opposition over the government.

While the political economy literature on the preferences of investors for a particular regime type remains contentious, the fact that investors prefer transparency and stability is well established. In the case of Mozambique, however, investment has largely remained in the purview of the government: elite capture of key industries (sugar, natural gas, coal) during liberalization ensured that any foreign direct investment into the country would enrich regime insiders, which, given FRELIMO’s strong partisan cohesion, would mean that opposition figures would lose out on economic opportunities.

Partisanship and ethnicity overlap in Mozambique, such that FRELIMO and RENAMO each came to be associated with certain ethnic groups within Mozambique. After the Rome Peace Accords established multiparty elections, FRELIMO and RENAMO would appeal to their ethnic bases for electoral support. FRELIMO abandoned its revolutionary nationalism in favor of a relatively narrower (but still broad overall) alliance between the Makonde in the north and the Maputo-based non-black intelligentsia, while RENAMO relied on its N’dau ethnic core in the center of the country for electoral victory.

As the government controls much of the economy, either directly through state-owned enterprises or indirectly via many privately owned firms belonging to FRELIMO members, elec-
toral victory ensures the winning political party with extensive rents for politicians and patronage
goods to distribute to loyal supporters. Eifurt, Miguel and Posner (2010) have found that ethnic
identity gains increasing saliency closer to elections. Mozambique provides a case of how ethnic
competition, not differing levels of FDI, structures the political landscape in electoral authoritari-
anism.
CHAPTER 7: MALAYSIA

Case studies of Azerbaijan and Mozambique reveal a clan/ethnic substrate to their politics, that is, that communal interests shape contemporary politics in both countries. The same is true for this chapter’s case study, Malaysia. However, in Azerbaijan and Mozambique, when one-party rule gave way to electoral politics, ideologically-motivated parties eventually reverted to tribalism, becoming organizations not for promoting differing principles of government, but rather as vehicles for securing material benefits for a particular ethnic community. Malaysia’s parties, on the other hand, have nakedly represented their respective ethnic constituencies from their very beginnings. Both the New Azerbaijan Party and FRELIMO still espouse a big-tent, broadly nationalist ideology that papers over deeper clan/ethnic cleavages in Azerbaijan and Mozambique, respectively. The ruling coalition *Barisan Nasional* (BN) of Malaysia also promotes a big-tent ideology, but each constituent party advocates narrow, sectarian interests that sometimes clash with the interests of its other coalition allies. This chapter investigates how political parties, ruling and opposition, behave when political competition is consciously ethnic competition.

**Historical Background**

The Malay ethnic group predominates in Malaysia. The Malays were consummate seafarers and traders, and established a number of small kingdoms throughout the Malay Peninsula (properly Malaya) and the East Indies (properly the Malay Islands).\(^{37}\) This area of the world has been a major crossroads for various peoples and civilizations, and Chinese, Indian and Arab traders have plied the waterways for centuries. All of Southeast Asia displays a fusion of these three civilizations with the many native cultures, making for a patchwork of unique societies,

\(^{37}\) Just like the modern country’s name, the very fact that the names for both the peninsula and the archipelago contain “Malay” in them indicates the long history and close ties of the Malay people to these places.
Malaysia being no exception. Indian and Chinese traders came to the Malay Peninsula in the first century CE, and Islam arrived in the early 15th century with the founding of the Malacca Sultanate. The Malacca Sultanate’s literary and missionary efforts effectively formed Malay culture.

Even though significant cultural exchange occurred, very little population change happened in the pre-colonial era; not until the arrival of the British did Malaysia undergo any large-scale demographic shifts. The British imported laborers from southern India, while Chinese merchants flocked to the booming colonial cities. Native Malays grew increasingly marginalized in their own lands, though Malay elites who were tied to the British were still able to enjoy their customary positions in Malay society. Immigration had so altered Malaya’s population profile that the British 1931 census of Malaya records Malays as forming 44.7 percent of the population, Chinese making up 39.0 percent, and Indians as 14.2 percent (Vlieland 1932, 36). British non-interference and indirect rule over the Malay states generally allowed their sultans to retain their social status as titular rulers, though this same policy also meant that the Chinese and Indians had to rely more on the British for economic opportunities and political protection (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, 666). The “divide and rule” approach taken by the British towards the three Malayan ethnic groups would shape that country’s politics for decades after independence.

Japanese occupation during the Second World War would have dramatic consequences for Malaysia’s postwar political development. For one, Japan’s victories against the British in the early stages of the war revealed that Europeans were not invincible, and that the Europeans could be defeated – and by Asians themselves, no less. Secondly, Japan promoted an “Asia for Asians” ideology against Western imperialism, and this idea resonated with many colonized peoples in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, Malay nationalism formed during Japanese occupation: while under

---

38 The Japanese, of course, had their own imperial designs and merely replaced the various Western powers in East and Southeast Asia during World War II, but Japan’s anti-Western message found a ready audience.
British colonialism the Malays were largely apolitical and socially sidelined, under Japanese occupation the Malays were the favored at the expense of the Chinese (Slater 2010).

Eventually the British did come back, and the reorganized its various colonial possessions on the peninsula into a single Crown colony, called the Malayan Union. The terms the British imposed on the native Malay sultans practically stripped them of their political power, threatening the rulers’ approval for the creation of the Malayan Union with trying the rulers for collaborating with the Japanese and dethronement (Omar 1993, 46); but the sun had finally begun setting on their empire. Malay and Chinese intellectuals raised in British schools and familiar with European concepts of governance began appealing for independence; meanwhile, rural Malays began agitating for the creation of a Malay state and against what they perceived to be Chinese dominance of the economy. Governmental officials from the United Kingdom began meeting with these native elites for setting a timetable for Malaysian independence.

When independence came to Malaya in 1957, the new multiethnic state faced the problem of creating a national identity palatable to each of its three, hostile communities. The first general elections took place in 1957 shortly after Malaya declared independence as the Federation of Malaya. Ethnic Chinese constituted roughly half the total population at the time of independence (Kent 2005), and almost the entirety of the middle class. Malaya’s cities were electoral strongholds for the Chinese, and due to their position as merchants and intermediaries during the colonial period, they wielded (or at least were perceived to wield) the country’s economic power. Political power, however, belonged to the Malays: the sultans’ ties to the British and the Malaysian Constitution’s legal recognition of the Malays as a protected class strengthened the hand of the otherwise rural and poor Malays. “[I]n the 1950s and early 1960s, the emphasis in Malaya

39 Though this chapter investigates the ethnic basis for Malaysia’s politics, the name “Malaysia” did not come into use until 1963; as such, I use the name “Malaya” when referring to the polity existing hitherto that year.
was on the consolidation of indigenous political power and the institutionalized guarantees of indigenous ‘special rights’” to compensate for Malays’ lack of economic power (Omar 1993; Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, 672). Each ethnic group founded its own party to contest the first general elections, and each ethnic group sought to position itself as the dominant group.

If the contest between Chinese and Malays in the run-up to independence and the first elections was not enough to hinder Malaysia’s nation-building efforts, a communist insurgency by the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) begun in 1948 erupted from Malaysia’s jungles. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) formed the MNLA as a resistance group against the Japanese occupation, and drew largely from the Chinese population. After the Allies had expelled the Japanese, the MNLA then proceeded to fight a guerrilla war against the United Kingdom, which had by then resumed rule over its former colonies in the region. The “Emergency,” as the conflict was called, provided a dilemma for Malaya’s squabbling ethnic groups: the communist insurgency threatened the property and privileges of the elites from each ethnic group, whether Chinese, Malay or Indian. Rather than fight with each other for a political preeminence that might not mean anything in light of a communist revolution, the ethnic elites unified in an interethnic coalition to maintain their positions of power (Slater 2010). This “protection pact” (Slater 2010, 5) among Malaysia’s ethnic elites became the basis of the “Alliance” electoral coalition that would later rule Malaysia for decades after independence.

The three parties comprising the Alliance electoral coalition were the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), each one representing one of Malaya’s ethnic communities. This multicultural elite compact signaled that Malaya would control ethnic tension and sectarian violence through recognizing the political needs of the Malay’s Chinese and Indian communities (Noora and
Despite the Alliance’s adopting a consociational system (Lijphart 2008; 177; 1969) that has succeeded in managing inter-group conflict, however it has not removed that conflict altogether (Jarrett 2016) – and, in fact, may have only helped to crystalize that conflict.

When the Emergency ended, the urgent threat of a communist revolution dissolved and with it the need for an inter-ethnic coalition to protect elites. UMNO grew in power relative to its coalition partners, and “it became clear that the original conciliatory coalition had been weakened, even though its founding parties remained as members. Non-Malays were not disfranchised, but they lost their ability to affect a great many decisions of the central government, and they increasingly became opposition voters” (Horowitz 2014, 11). The ethnically based electoral system fostered territorialization of the political parties, as the Chinese and Indians lived in the cities, while Malays resided in the country’s rural areas (de Miguel 2017). As such, not only did each member party of the Alliance have its particular ethnic community from which to draw support, but the urban/rural divide fell along ethnic lines, which would help UMNO draw gerrymandered districts to bolster Malay voting power (Horowitz 2014, 10-11).

The Chinese and the Indians feared UMNO’s obvious power move. Communal hardliners in the MCA and UMNO began pressing for their own ethnic concerns: Chinese businesses pressed for greater electoral representation within the Alliance, while Malays refused to increase the proportion of Chinese politicians running for election under the Alliance banner for fear of diluting the Malays’ political dominance (Chandra 1979, 79; Slater 2010, 117). Ethnic relations only worsened when the British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo and the city of Singapore on the mainland joined the Federation of Malaya in 1963 to create the Federation of Malaysia. The population of Sabah and Sarawak consisted of a number of indigenous groups, while Singapore was overwhelmingly Chinese. Though the Bornean populations were
not ethnically Malay, UMNO nevertheless moved to class them as *bumiputra*, (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, 672). This action would add to the UMNO’s voting base relative to the Chinese and Indians and thus give UMNO a clear demographic advantage in future elections. The leading Chinese opposition group, the Singapore-based People’s Action Party (PAP), denounced UMNO for its race baiting and discrimination against the Chinese (Slater 2010, 118). PAP countered UMNO’s *bumiputra* policies with a call for a “Malaysian Malaysia” focused on multiculturalism and civic nationalism rather than ethnic factionalism and Malay nationalism. Tensions rose between UMNO and PAP, and in 1965 Malaysia expelled Singapore from the Federation.

MCA remained with its Alliance partners, but Malaysia’s radical demographic shift and the brazenness of UMNO’s deliberate ethnic politics exacerbated racial animosity between the Malays and the Chinese. Many Indians immigrated to India, attracted on the one hand by that country’s efforts to reverse its diaspora and repulsed by the growing ethnic hostility in Malaysia on the other. A riot broke out in 13 May 1969; the violence was so bad that Malaysia’s constitutional monarch, the *Yang di-Pertuan Agong*, suspended elections, dissolved parliament, and established a caretaker government (the National Operations Council, or NOC) to handle the mass unrest and the threat of ethnic hatred tearing Malaysia apart at its seams.

According to the NOC, the greatest threat to Malaysia’s stability was continued ethnic conflict; the root of this ethnic conflict itself lay in “the identification of race with economic function” (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, 675). Promoting Malay identity would necessarily marginalize Chinese and Indians, who feared that Malay political dominance would result in appropriating middle class Chinese property (Mauzy 2006, Guan 2002). On the other hand, ethnic violence would continue so long as the Malays (rightly) perceived the Chinese as having a disproportionate share of Malaysia’s wealth. Governmental policies designed to narrow the eco-
omic rift between Chinese and Malays would be the key to creating political stability (Balasubramaniam 2014, Siddique and Suryadinata 1981), and the emergency government proposed the New Economic Policy (NEP), an affirmative action program that would privilege Malays in education, government, and the workforce, and thus eliminate the economic disparities between Malays and Chinese.

When normal governmental operations resumed two years after the 13 May riots, the Alliance adopted a number of changes consummate with the changed social and political landscape following the riots. First, it renamed itself the Barisan Nasional, and it allowed other parties from the original three to join the electoral coalition. BN heeded the NOC’s recommendations, and it instituted the NEP. Ostensibly, the NEP was an affirmative action policy designed to move Malays out of rural poverty and make them competitive with skilled Chinese and Indians. However, with the 1959 race riots fresh in Malaysians’ minds the NEP became yet another tool for UMNO’s pro-Malay policies, with Tham (1977) arguing that the NEP was little more than a continuation of Malays’ efforts to maintain their structural relationship vis-à-vis the Chinese.

Under the NEP, the state broke with laissez-faire economic policies in favor of direct government intervention designed to tackle endemic poverty and restructure wealth ownership (Berma 2003). Initially, the NEP’s goal was to increase bumiputra economic ownership of wealth from 2.4% to 30%, and to move Malays out of rural areas and into the cities. Increased state intervention and a proliferation of parastatal corporations expanded the civil sector relevance in Malaysian politics. Civil service became an attractive career choice for Malays, as much

---

40 These junior coalition members include the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Gerakan/PGRM), People’s Progressive Party (myPPP), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), United Sabah People’s Party (PBRS), United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO), United Sabah Party (PBS), Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP), and Parti Rakyat Sarawak (PRS)
of the commercial sector was already in the hands of Chinese and Indians (Puthucheary 1978). Considerable restructuring of private corporations into parastatal enterprises (Doner, Ritchie and Slater 2005, 354), and the creation of outright government monopolies such as Petroleum Nasional Berhad (“PETRONAS” for short) allowed the government to ensure that it could use oil revenues as an additional source reach its redistributive goals. Malaysia’s oil production originally belonged to the constituent states, but with increasing economic centralization the federal government (which is to say, the BN) has appropriated more and more control as an additional revenue source, both for funding Malaysia’s ambitious affirmative action policies as well as for graft.

Oil rents drawn from PETRONAS also tightened the bonds among the BN’s constituent parties. UMNO and MCA already had plenty of private holdings in the media (Gomez 1990; Crouch 1996, 86-7; Wong 2000; Nain 2002) and key industries (Searle 1999, 103; Milne and Mauzy 1999, 60-1; Greene 2007, 272), so minor parties need some inducement to remain in the winning coalition lest they defect to the opposition and threaten BN’s hold on power. These pecuniary incentives came from rent-seeking opportunities made available only by remaining a part of the BN regime (Jomo and Hui 2003); the redistributive logic behind the NEP normalized the distribution of patronage goods as a standard practice (Gomez 2002).

Fueling the NEP’s ambitions was Malaysia’s rapidly growing economy. A switch to state-interventionist policies allowed Malaysia to channel investment into industrial development, and promote manufacturing over natural resource extraction (rubber and tin) (Mahani 2001), though Athukorala and Menon (1999) credit Malaysia’s growth in the 1970s and 1980s to the government’s commitment to trade openness and attracting FDI. Nevertheless, the state never marginalized the private sector, even if the state massively restructured firms to achieve the NEP’s goals, in favor of the public sector.
The NEP did achieve the government’s goal of reducing overall poverty rates among Malays. By the 1990s, Malaysia’s economy had maintained a mean growth rate of 6.5% over twenty years, and urban poverty dropped to around 3% (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2007; 1995), though rural poverty remained largely unaddressed by either program. Rapid and sustained economic growth coupled with a generally pro-market approach would allow Malaysia to pursue its redistributive goals without overly encumbering the Chinese business class (Guan 2000, 26). When the NEP expired in 1990, the government followed with the neoliberal National Development Policy (NDP) and then the National Vision Policy (NVP) in 2001, both of which aimed for the NEP’s original target of 30% Malay ownership of capital, as well as to empower Malay entrepreneurship (Berma 2003, Jomo 2004). Unequal economic endowments and the grievances therefrom faded in importance as the chief marker of ethnic identity, allowing new forms of communal distinctiveness to arise in its place. Furthermore, the state’s close relationship to select firms and its authoritarian character made corruption an increasingly salient political issue. Unable to compete against the incumbent advantages enjoyed by the Alliance/BN, opposition parties would seize upon these new cultural and political fault lines in their bid to unseat the regime from its stranglehold on Malaysia.

Ethnicity and Politics

Much like the Alliance/Barisan Nasional, Malaysia’s opposition parties divide along ethnic lines. Since the 13 May riots, these opposition parties have begun forming electoral coalitions of their own in order to compete against BN. These coalitions are generally short-lived in part because while opposition agree on ending BN rule and preach multiculturalism, the constituent parties nonetheless reflect and remain situated in the communal logic of Malaysian politics (Weiss 2006). This strategy paid off in the 2008 elections, when BN suffered its greatest elec-
toral setback while still retaining overall political control, and again in 2018 when BN lost power for the first time in Malaysia’s history.

The main Malay opposition party is the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS, after its name in Malay). Much of the Malay population professes Islam, and the tension between the secular UMNO and the Islamist PAS has split the Malay vote in recent elections. PAS traces its roots to Islamic political movements formed in the postwar period of 1945-1948, which disbanded when British authorities arrested Muslim leaders at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency. PAS proper formed in 1951 alongside UMNO. Considerable overlap in membership existed between PAS and UMNO, with PAS members highlighting political Islam while UMNO focused on secular Malay nationalism. Both PAS and UMNO campaigned for ethnic Malays, even though their programs differed on the nature of the state.

In 1959, PAS president Abbas Alias stepped down from his position in favor of Burhanuddin al-Helmy. Al-Helmy reoriented PAS toward a radical nationalism. Further, PAS fully distinguished itself from UMNO, preventing members from also registering with UMNO. The PAS was once also a member of the BN, but the tensions between the secular UMNO, MCA and MIC over the PAS’s desire to install an Islamic republic modeled on that of the Iranian Revolution. In 1983, Yusof Rawa attained the party’s presidency. Rawa served as Malaysia’s ambassador to Iran, and his election as the party’s leader represented a dramatic shift toward Islamism (Noor 2014; 2003). He created the office of “First Spiritual Leader of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party” for himself in addition to the party’s office of president. In addition, Rawa elevated members of Malaysia’s ulema to all officer positions in the PAS. Rawa abandoned Malay nationalism, left the BN, instituted the PAS’s to commitment to an “Islamic State,” and advocated for a special “Ulama Assembly” to oversee Parliament (Noor 2003, 208).
PAS was able to capitalize on UMNO’s gradual overtures to Malaysia’s imams. Whereas UMNO paid lip service to Islamic principles (such as making Islam the official, but not state, religion of Malaysia and allowing for sharia courts to operate alongside state courts in matters of family law), doing so only allowed for a fully Islamist party to form that would push for the full Islamization of Malaysia (Liow 2007, 2003). PAS has pushed rolling back Malaysia’s secularism and institute sharia law as the only legal foundation – in short, establish an Islamic state. Policies promoted by PAS demonstrate that party’s hardline fundamentalism. The states of Terengganu and Kelantan are PAS strongholds (Noor 2003, 201), consistently returning PAS candidates to their respective state governments. These state legislatures have had bills submitted by PAS politicians that establish *hudud* punishments for various crimes, including banning the sale of alcohol and pork, and cutting off thieves’ hands (Guan 2000, 11; Liow 2003). Because “Malayness” includes Islam as a critical component, which dates back to the formation of Malay culture during the Malacca Sultanate, Islam’s politicization becomes increasingly relevant and PAS as a viable alternative to UMNO for Malay voters. Appeals to religion had a distinct advantage over ethnic appeals due to its ability to cut across communal cleavages, and PAS eclipsed DAP to become the largest opposition party in Malaysia.

The PAP’s electoral base has always been among the Singaporean Chinese ever since winning the 1959 municipal elections in a landslide, and after Singapore declared independence from Malaysia in August 1965, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) formed in 1968 from its remnants. The DAP hopes to transcend Malaysia’s pervasive ethnic divisions by creating a progressive, secular social democracy. DAP courts the Malaysian educated and middle classes, continuing to use its predecessor’s “Malaysian Malaysia” campaign slogan (Greene 2007, 270). Just to demonstrate the saliency of ethnicity in Malaysia’s politics, the MCA has accused DAP mem-
bers of expressing Chinese “chauvinism,” an ironic charge given that the purpose of the MCA is itself for promoting Chinese interests within the BN coalition. The DAP had relatively strong electoral showings in the 1969 general elections, in which it gained thirteen seats, which, together with another 41 seats from other opposition parties denied the Alliance from controlling two-thirds of Parliament. The election results and the victory parade held by DAP and its partner, Parti Gerakan, precipitated the 13 May riots.

Implicated by the regime as having instigated the 13 May riots, DAP has faced a number of repressive measures designed to undercut any electoral support for the opposition generally and the DAP in particular (Crouch 1992, 24; Crouch 1996, 85; Nain 2002, 128-9). In the 1999 general elections, the DAP helped found the Barisan Alternatif (BA) coalition, along with PAS, the National Justice Party (PKR, or Keadilan) and the Malaysian People’s Party (Chua 2001, 142-143). BA gained seats relative to each party’s share from the 1995 elections (the DAP gained three seats for a total of ten), though the DAP’s two most prominent candidates, Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh, did lose their seats. The coalition split in 2001 due to PAS’s insistence of forming an Islamic state (Kamarudin 2005). The DAP would then form a new coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR) for the 2008 general elections, and once that coalition failed due to PAS’s intransigence, another new coalition in 2015, the Pakatan Harapan (PH).

The multiethnic Keadilan formed in 1999, and since then it has been competing with the DAP as Malaysia’s main multiethnic opposition group. The party formed from a bitter dispute between Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim over the cause of the Asian financial crisis, wherein Ibrahim and his close supporters were expelled

42 These Measures included the Sedition Act, that essentially made illegal any discussion of abolishing bumiputra privileges illegal, and a number of acts designed to control the extent and size of the opposition’s political meetings.
from UMNO. Ibrahim formed the Reformasi movement and led several protests highlighting the corruption in the BN. Spurred by his wife Ibrahim founded Keadilan to contest the 1999 general election as part of the BA coalition (Ufen 2009, 609-610). Keadilan only won five seats, but the public row between its founder and the Prime Minister as well as its opportunity to be a popular outlet to vent frustration with the government meant that the party’s anti-corruption and anti-BN message had resonated with the Malaysian voters. The 2008 general elections would see Ibrahim released from jail and the BN lose its two-third majority, and thus its ability to amend the constitution unilaterally, for the first time in Malaysian history (Slater 2012, 28-89).

Though the party is predominantly Malay, Keadilan professes a multiracial platform based on social justice for all poor Malaysians and not just bumiputra, and a deepening of democracy, in addition to its original anti-corruption stance (Mazna 2008), though Segawa (2013) questions Keadilan’s commitment to multiracialism. Since the 1999 general elections, Keadilan has alternated with the DAP as the leading opposition party (see Table 7.1), which Ufen (2012) states indicates a realignment in Malaysian politics away from protracted ethnic rivalry between Malays and non-Malays (especially the Chinese) and towards a political struggle between cronyism and reform.

In the 2018 general elections, Malaysia experienced its first turnover of power since independence.43 BN no longer holds the reins of power in Malaysia, having only won 79 out of the Parliament’s 222 seats, despite the continued formal and informal advantages enjoyed by that coalition. For the most part, UMNO’s NEP was a success even if it did fall short of achieving 30% wealth transfer to Malays by 1990 (Ho 1992), bringing many Malays into the urban middle class. By succeeding, however, the NEP was also the BN’s undoing: ethnic competition between the politically strong Malays and economically dominant Chinese had been resolved by opening

43 The elections took place on May 9, in the midst of my writing this chapter.
access to Malaysia’s national wealth to the Malays. In addition, the differing birth rates between the Malays and the Chinese eventually ensured that political power would remain firmly within the Malays’ hands. The rise of political Islam gradually eroded Malay support for the secular UMNO, as religious matters began to supplant economic concerns. Finally, more so than the DAP which many voters still considered too closely tied to Chinese interests, the Reformasi movement offered a non-sectarian opposition alternative to the BN’s entrenched cronyism.

**Conclusion**

Ethnic basis for parties and voting can lead to one ethnic group dominating politics, and thus dominating minority groups, simply by demographics. In such situations, as long as the majority can maintain its share of the total population, it can hold onto power forever (Horowitz 2014). Islam continues to be a growing force in Malaysian politics, and was a contributing factor in PAS’s electoral victory. At the same time, Keadilan’s popularity in the 2008 general elections forced DAP and PAS to moderate their messages with the hopes of achieving greater electoral success as a coalition than what each party can achieve alone (Slater 2012, 29). However, by the 2018 general elections, PAS broke from the Keadilan-led PH to join with other Islamist parties.
to form a coalition deliberately aimed at courting Malay Muslim voters. The Malay population exceeds the non-Malay population, so the PAS coalition could still possibly rely on ethnic appeals for votes. Conceivably, PAS could combine its Islamic identity alongside religious appeals for political reform and clean government in order to succeed (Barr and Govindasamy 2010); otherwise, PH’s victory over BN in the 2018 general election suggests that Malaysia is moving towards a new political era based on reconciliation and cooperation rather than mistrust and division.
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION

My original theory for opposition party behavior failed to hold. FDI has a statistically significant effect on the percentage of seats held by opposition parties, but the relationship is negative rather than positive like I hypothesize. Furthermore, the case studies I used in my dissertation indicate that politics in Azerbaijan, Mozambique, and Malaysia revolve around politicians’ rent-seeking behavior, with parties providing the organizational support for accessing these rents. These case studies add more evidence to the already-prodigious body of literature on ethnic politics (Chandra 2004, Chandra 2005, Fearon 1999. To this end, rather than simply stating that my theory fails to explain the data and ending my dissertation without contributing much to political science, I will end my dissertation recommending potential avenues of research that can possibly explain the relationship between FDI and opposition party formation.

My findings reveal a disparity between the quantitative study and the case studies. Foreign direct investment as a percentage of total GDP proved to be statistically significant even if that relationship runs in the opposite direction than what my theory predicts, and actually suggests that increasing FDI inflows weakens, and not strengthens, opposition parties’ abilities to compete in electoral authoritarian systems. At the same time, the case studies suggest that ethnicity is the main driver for opposition party behavior. Additionally, two institutional control variables, electoral system and the threshold of competitiveness, exhibited strong statistical and substantive significance.

One possible explanation for my incongruent findings can be that one of my assumptions about entrepreneurs’ behavior is wrong. That is, foreign businesses will continue to conduct business in a non-democratic regime if they can still make profits; after all, China’s rapid economic development has taken place not due to a regime change but because of an ideological
shift under paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Even though non-democracies do not need the public’s support in order to carry out its goals, compliance nonetheless makes achieving these goals much easier. As such, attracting FDI helps non-democratic regimes buy support from the public. Scholars are divided about whether foreign investors prefer democracies or non-democracies, but a consensus has emerged that non-democratic regimes that face more constraints appear to attract more than their counterparts with fewer constraints (Bastiaens 2013, Hankla and Kuthy 2013), as these regimes with more constraints have less ability to appropriate foreign assets. My findings corroborate the notion that regimes seek to improve their domestic legitimacy by attracting more foreign investment: greater flows of FDI actually hinder opposition parties’ ability to win seats. By attracting FDI and generally improving domestic economic conditions, electoral authoritarian regimes can buy public support for themselves without resorting necessarily to costlier forms of electoral fraud and/or political repression.

The data do not support my argument that foreign entrepreneurs will seek to work with the opposition in favor of promoting policy transparency and political restraint. Rather, foreign entrepreneurs seem to prefer dealing with the regime in power rather than risk siding with the opposition and endangering their investments. After all, the regime has in its control the levers of the state, which includes introducing or withdrawing incentives for entrepreneurs to do business in that country. Even if entrepreneurs have a natural affinity with the opposition, their actions suggest that they will more readily work with an existing albeit flawed regime than hope to work with an opposition party that may never attain power. Further investigation of when foreign entrepreneurs do decide to back the opposition can lead to interesting discoveries of the delicate balancing act facing electoral authoritarian regimes as they attempt to retain power while also providing enticements for foreign investment.
Another way to resolve my quantitative model and my case studies involves understanding that FDI and ethnicity work in tandem with each other in many of my cases. Taking inspiration from Huntington’s (1968, 1) opening statement that a government’s “form” matters less than its “degree,” I have considered the suggestion that many of my cases simply lack the state capacity for effective (i.e., fair) electoral competition (Croissant and Hellmann 2018, van Ham and Seim 2018, Way 2015). “State capacity” in this instance accords more closely with “coercive capacity” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 54-5; Moe 2005; Weber 1918). Coercive capacity details the ability of the state to exert its control over the population. Electoral authoritarian regimes are the result of fully authoritarian states facing institutional failures that prevent their elites from repressing the opposition completely. Many of my cases in my large-N chapter are states that have transitioned away from one-party rule to some form of electoral politics rather than newly emergent states (with a few exceptions), and as such, my evidence of partisan politics in Azerbaijan and Mozambique indicate that weak institutions forced these countries to become “pluralism by default” (Way 2015).

In Malaysia, by contrast, British tutelage made elections and at least a nominal appearance of democracy a precondition of independence, so pluralism was always extant in Malaysia’s political system. Faced at first with a communist insurgency that threatened British, Malay and Chinese elite alike, then with recurring racial riots, Malaysia strove to make a strong state and enforce public order. This strong state simultaneously pursued pro-growth and redistributive policies that eventually reduced ethnic competition over control of the country’s wealth. While politics in Malaysia largely still remains divided along ethnic lines, sustained growth for over three decades and a (relatively) recent turn towards neoliberalism has created opportunities for Malay-

---

44 One could argue that the reconvening of the parliament in 1971 two years after the National Operations Council dissolved the government may count as a transition away from a strict authoritarianism and toward electoral politics.
sians to pursue new interests, and generate new identities that sometimes create cut across exis-
ting sectarian fault lines.

In newly or weakly democratized states, the idea of the state belonging to the public at large instead of a group of elites has not yet caught hold (Chibber 2003, Geddes 1996). Rather than governing on some programmatic basis, the goal for parties operating in that environment is to seek rents. Capturing the state requires a coalition just large enough to outcompete rivals, but not so large as to dilute each member’s share of the spoils (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). This description of elite behavior is the very logic of politics in electoral authoritarianism. Politicians in the ruling coalition treat the state as their property, and elections are the mechanism not for rewarding a “set of actors has control over the state but instead to help incumbent autocratic rul-
ers manage the range of intra-elite and societal pressures that threaten their survival” (Hanson 2018, 18-9). Determining members of the coalition from non-members is essential in order to prevent rents from spreading too thin, and thus an ascriptive form of identity “based on features not easily chosen or changed by individuals” (Fearon 1999, 5; author’s emphasis) provides a hard and fast line between member and non-member.

Two commonalities exist in my case studies. First is that some degree of economic scar-
city exists. Under these conditions, politics becomes less about applying a blueprint for society and more about securing one’s material well-being (Lasswell [1936] 1950). Ethnicity allows for a ready-made social network that facilitates group cooperation onto which parties can later graft themselves (Bowles and Gintis 2004). Chandra (2004) finds that voters in rural India vote in-
strumentally for whichever party can maximize their preferred outcomes, not solely on the basis of ethnicity; ethnic-based parties have the benefit over other parties in lowering the costs of collective action both to reward and to sanction among co-ethnics (Habyarimana et al. 2007).
The break-up of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in Azerbaijan that the Communist Party once provided, while a losing war with Armenia and a concurrent civil war (which was perhaps the more destructive of the two) destroyed political institutions within Azerbaijan: strong-man rule under Heydar Aliev remained the only institution able to govern. Once the country stabilized and the economy recovered, petroleum extraction became Azerbaijan’s primary — virtually the sole — sector. The Aliev regime siphoned oil rents from the state, and, coupled with a loyal security apparatus, graft became the norm for the privileged elites.

Mozambique found itself in much the same situation: centuries of neglect left little in the way of infrastructure or an intrusive state, so when Portugal turned control of the country to FRELIMO, what little capital owned by Portuguese colonists fled overseas. FRELIMO’s Marxist policies hardly made Mozambique attractive for foreign investment or for independent governmental operations of the state: like many one-party states, bureaucratic advancement relied on one’s standing with the ruling party. The RENAMO that operated largely insurgency deliberately targeted hospitals, schools, and party offices with the intention of discrediting FRELIMO. When FRELIMO did finally allow multiparty elections, the state had been so severely weakened (Manning 2005; Vines 1991, 87) by FRELIMO and RENAMO alike that the only way for the public to get basic services was through their ethnic networks. Though FRELIMO officially promoted a unified Mozambican national identity that transcended ethnic affiliation, the reality was that, due to the early years of its insurgency against the Portuguese, the Makonde made up a large proportion of FRELIMO’s membership and continued to support FRELIMO in elections (Israel 2006).

The second commonality among all three of my case studies is that parties organize around clan or ethnic affiliation. Both Chandra (2006) Posner (2007) caution that “ethnicity” is not a single identity that categorizes someone under a single label for all time, but is actually a
series of labels that the bearer can use to varying effect and in different contexts. Thus, as the ambitious nation-building programs of many one-party states collapsed with the end of the Cold War, a single national identity gave way to new forms of identity, including tribal, religious, geographic and familial, among others. Nevertheless, identity of some kind forms the basis for politics in numerous countries non-Western countries.\(^4\) As Fearon (1999) points out, pork-barrel politics and ethnic politics tend to complement one another.

Azerbaijan lost the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Armenian forces occupy the mountainous region to this day. The Azerbaijani elite refused to build a sufficiently strong national army to preserve its territorial integrity, so it should come as no wonder that the state was in no shape to provide even basic public services. Rather than turning to an evidently dysfunctional state for goods (or even for security for some Azerbaijanis), Azerbaijanis turned to their clans as a social safety net. After the cease-fire came into effect, the clans organized political parties for control of the state in order to capture rents, and Azerbaijan’s contemporary opposition parties reflect the clan composition undergirding Azeri society.

Mozambique’s political system evolved out of the Cold War. The ruling FRELIMO party established a one-party communist state after Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal. The white minority governments in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa created and supported RENAMO as an insurgent group within Mozambique, with the purpose of destabilizing the FRELIMO regime. Neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO had an explicit ethnic affiliation, FRELIMO deliberately enacting a policy of subordinating ethnic differences to a new national, Mozambican identity. FRELIMO’s failed economic policies and RENAMO’s effective insurgency forced FRELIMO to agree to multiparty elections in 1994, which FRELIMO won amidst

\(^4\) Arguably, the West is seeing a return of tribalism in the form of ethnonationalism against non-Western immigration (Levitsky and Ziblatt) and regionalism. Bonikowski 2017
close international scrutiny. Since the introduction of multiparty elections, FRELIMO and RENAMO have been orienting themselves around ethnicity to ensure party cohesion, now that neither faces the existential threat of military defeat. Economic growth in Mozambique has been shaky, leaving public goods an important provider for improving Mozambicans’ material well-being, and the state therefore a lucrative source of patronage goods for elections.

Politics in Malaysia explicitly formed around ethnicity. In this way, Malaysia differs from the political situations in Azerbaijan and Mozambique, where ethnic politics either remained hidden in the background (Azerbaijan) or gradually replaced (Mozambique) what was otherwise a competition of differing ideologies. British colonial practices in Malaysia (a model emulated elsewhere in their empire) involved granting native Malay sultans some degree of authority and autonomy over their Malay subjects, largely leaving them to a traditional way of life in the colony’s hinterlands. Meanwhile, the British enacted large-scale immigration of Chinese and Indian laborers to work the plantations, mines and docks; some of the Chinese and Indians later became entrepreneurs in their own right, and created a nascent Malaysian middle-class. Economic function became inextricably tied to ethnicity, reinforcing cultural, linguistic and religious divisions already present. When independence began to emerge, political parties formed with the express purpose of advancing their respective communities above all others. A series of riots between Malays and Chinese threatened the social order, and when an emergency government returned control to parties after a hiatus of two years, the government enacted extensive policy initiatives in order to begin disentangling each ethnicity’s economic niche as an integral part of its identity.

The literature on ethnic-based parties in sub-Saharan Africa is extensive (Bates 1974, Bogaards 2004, Latin 1986, Posner 2005, Young 1976). My research suggests that kinship ties,
whether via clans or ethnicities, may become the foremost organizing principle for political life wherever the state is weak and cannot serve as a neutral arbiter for competing political groups, and especially in countries where privation is the norm.

In all three of my cases, scarcity is the common condition for an ethnic basis to politics, but whereas politics in Mozambique and Azerbaijan is becoming more ethnically centered, in Malaysia the opposition achieved its first electoral victory by overcoming its communal divisions. The NEP and NDP were both largely successful in growing Malaysia’s economy. More importantly, though both policies failed realize their numeric targets for bumiputra ownership of the economy, they did bring urban bumiputra poverty rates down close to the non-bumiputra average. As such, ethnic politics as a struggle for economic control of Malaysia no longer makes as much sense; instead, a steady and growing reform movement was able to capture enough dissatisfaction among the electorate to unseat the long-ruling ruling coalition. Winning one election, however, does not necessarily mean the end of ethnic politics, as Islam forms an integral aspect of Malay identity, and increasing Islamization of Malaysian politics may be indicative of a redefining of ethnic competition that focuses less of economic, and more on cultural, factors.

Malaysia’s political history does offer some hope: as the economy grew, competition among the country’s three ethnic groups diminished. Each ethnic group as a whole became less dependent on its own community for material well-being (Malays especially), and individuals of any race could secure their own livelihoods. Thus, the proverbial economic pie not only grew to grant bigger slices to each ethnicity, but it grew to the point that each Malaysian was able to take a slice. The New Economic Policy mandated capital transfers from the Chinese to the Malays that helped reduce urban poverty among Malays, but liberalization under the National Develop-
ment Policy curtailed wealth transfers in favor of creating a Malay entrepreneurial class. As ethnic competition over scarce resources became less salient in Malaysia, other concerns regarding the governmental corruption and the role of religion took precedence.

Looking forward, my research suggests that many cases of electoral authoritarianism result from a combination of economic scarcity and ethnic salience. The politics of these countries revolve around material security, and ethnicity provides the most efficient way of attaining and distributing these goods by lowering the costs of collective action. Opposition parties will remain in the opposition simply because of demographics. In many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Berman (1998) sees certain legacies of the colonial state (the invention of ethnic groups, an extractive state, and bureaucratic authoritarianism) rooted so deeply into the social fabric that he only offers despair about any attempts for political reform. However, Arriola (2013) finds that economic liberalization (especially de-politicizing access to financial capital) fosters the development of multiethnic opposition coalitions. Arriola’s findings parallel my own findings of the multiethnic Pakatan Harapan’s electoral victory in Malaysia.

Another implication of my study is that the term “electoral authoritarianism” may be too broad a category. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, scholars disagree on the precise definition (and thus also the operationalization) of the term, and lists of cases can differ wildly from one another. The difficulty in determining what regimes count may lie in the fact that, while democracy is a unique combination of values and practices, authoritarianism is simply the failure or absence of any one of those democratic components (Schedler 2002). Thus, non-democratic regimes can have any number of combinations of features, values, and practices that make classification difficult – perhaps why Carothers (2002) considered many of the post-Cold War regimes to lie within a categorical “gray zone,” suggesting the nebulous and indeterminate. That the most

46 To extend the culinary metaphor, the NDP intended for Malays to become their own bakers.
successful electoral authoritarian regimes will be so good at hiding their methods of remaining in power that they would be indistinguishable from true democracies only further compounds the problem.

Scholars commonly make a distinction between two forms of electoral authoritarianism: competitive and hegemonic. My quantitative model does show that this division is more than an academic exercise concerning the percentage of seats that the opposition can hope to win in elections. Even though competitive and hegemonic forms exhibit the same definitional features to categorize both varieties as subtypes of electoral authoritarianism, the underlying logic of rule between both forms may diverge enough that lumping both forms into a single electoral authoritarian “cat-dog” (Sartori 1991) violates the principle of parsimony. Hegemonic authoritarian regimes tolerate an opposition because that opposition has been neutralized to such a degree that it poses no credible threat to the incumbents. In such an environment, FDI should do little to help the opposition, as foreign entrepreneurs would recognize the regime as the only real political player (Bastiaens 2013). Competitive authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, do allow the opposition to exercise some degree of political power, and so, just as the name indicates, political competition between the regime and the opposition may make supporting the opposition a viable strategy for foreign businesses. Non-democratic regimes can deviate from democracies in any number of ways and combinations, and they would therefore differ from one another as many ways as well. Further qualitative work would shed light on whether competitive and hegemonic authoritarianism are subtypes of a broader electoral authoritarianism, or if they are simply academic constructs that obscure dramatic, important differences between the two forms of rule.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and FDI Inflows to Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 57: 175–211.


Pearce, Justin. 2010. “From Rebellion to Opposition: UNITA in ANGOLA and RENAMO in Mozambique.”


### APPENDIX A: LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (67%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Comp/Heg</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Comp/Heg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1995-2005</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1995-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1972-1974</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1991-2004</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1995-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1993-2001</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1975-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1990-1993</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1979-1997</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1983-1989</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1995-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1970-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1995-2004</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1999-2005</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1970-1974</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1994-2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX B: LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (55%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Comp/Heg</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Comp/Heg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-1999 hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-199</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1972-1974</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1998-2004</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1971-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1991-2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1983-1989</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1975-1988</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eq. Guinea</td>
<td>2003-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1995-2000</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1979-2000</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1993-2005</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1993-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>1970-1975</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Comp/Heg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1995-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>1983-1985</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986-2001</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993-2000</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Comp/Heg</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Comp/Heg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1995-2000</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1975-1986</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1987-2004</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1980-2000</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1993-2000</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2001-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1970-1972</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993-2005</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1975-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>1970-1975</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1980-1990</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2001-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1999-2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Comp/Heg</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Comp/Heg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2001-2008</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2003-2008</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1993-2000</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX D. DATA ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATE MODELS

Table D.1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>opp_share</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td>17.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fdi</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>-14.37</td>
<td>50.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loggdp</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>10.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>11.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban_pct</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>43.85</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rents</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>14.77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>52.30</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linguistic</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>50.42</td>
<td>28.94</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>92.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>45.72</td>
<td>26.47</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>86.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plurality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. D.1. Distribution of FDI and Opposition Control of Seats
Fig. D.2. Histogram of GDP Per Capita PPP

Fig. D.3. Histogram of Population
Table D.2. Opposition without Lagged Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>opp_pct</th>
<th>opp_pct</th>
<th>opp_pct</th>
<th>opp_pct</th>
<th>opp_pct</th>
<th>opp_pct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fdi</td>
<td>-0.33**</td>
<td>-0.42**</td>
<td>-0.35**</td>
<td>-0.35**</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loggdp</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.78*</td>
<td>-0.76*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban_pct</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rents</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coldwar</td>
<td>7.56**</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_ethnic</td>
<td>-3.85</td>
<td>9.76**</td>
<td>9.62*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.24)</td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
<td>(3.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_language</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>-2.27</td>
<td>-2.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.58)</td>
<td>(3.08)</td>
<td>(3.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_religion</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-1.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fptp</td>
<td>-2.56*</td>
<td>-3.97**</td>
<td>-3.98**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fednew</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heg67</td>
<td>20.39**</td>
<td>21.29**</td>
<td>21.40**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>africa</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>23.80**</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>23.36**</td>
<td>15.04**</td>
<td>11.51</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(7.97)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(8.58)</td>
<td>(8.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Table D.3. Opposition with 1-Year Lead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>lead1yr</th>
<th>lead1yr</th>
<th>lead1yr</th>
<th>lead1yr</th>
<th>lead1yr</th>
<th>lead1yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fdi</td>
<td>-0.34**</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
<td>-0.35**</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>-0.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loggdpc</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban_pct</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rents</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coldwar</td>
<td>7.87**</td>
<td>2.92*</td>
<td>3.35*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_ethnic</td>
<td>-5.58</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.19)</td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
<td>(4.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_language</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.54)</td>
<td>(3.28)</td>
<td>(3.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_religion</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-1.75</td>
<td>-1.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.54)</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fptp</td>
<td>-3.39**</td>
<td>-4.79**</td>
<td>-4.67**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fednew</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heg67</td>
<td>17.31**</td>
<td>17.06**</td>
<td>16.36**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>23.84**</td>
<td>10.47</td>
<td>24.47**</td>
<td>16.75**</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>15.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(7.88)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(9.09)</td>
<td>(9.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Table D.4. Hegemony Threshold Set at 55%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fdi</td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
<td>-0.45**</td>
<td>-0.39**</td>
<td>-0.38**</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loggdp</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.99*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban_pct</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rents</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coldwar</td>
<td>6.16**</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.76*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_ethnic</td>
<td>-3.94</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.28)</td>
<td>(4.36)</td>
<td>(4.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_language</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.62)</td>
<td>(3.66)</td>
<td>(3.88)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al_religion</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.58)</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fptp</td>
<td>-4.85**</td>
<td>-6.97**</td>
<td>-6.64**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fednew</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heg55</td>
<td>12.01**</td>
<td>12.38**</td>
<td>10.73**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.84**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>23.90**</td>
<td>20.15*</td>
<td>24.19**</td>
<td>22.32**</td>
<td>26.73**</td>
<td>34.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(8.02)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(10.07)</td>
<td>(10.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
### Table D.5. Hegemony Threshold Set at 75%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
<th>share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>fdi</strong></td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
<td>-0.45**</td>
<td>-0.39**</td>
<td>-0.34**</td>
<td>-0.32**</td>
<td>-0.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>loggdp</strong></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>logpop</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-1.01*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>urban_pct</strong></td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>rents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.18**</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>coldwar</strong></td>
<td>6.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>al_ethnic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.94</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.09)</td>
<td>(4.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>al_language</strong></td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.10</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.42)</td>
<td>(3.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>al_religion</strong></td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
<td>(2.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fptp</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.43**</td>
<td>-5.01**</td>
<td>-4.67**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fednew</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>heg75</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.13**</td>
<td>17.43**</td>
<td>16.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-6.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>_cons</strong></td>
<td>23.90**</td>
<td>20.15*</td>
<td>24.19**</td>
<td>15.39**</td>
<td>22.06*</td>
<td>31.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(8.02)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(9.38)</td>
<td>(9.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>732</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
VITA

Michael Toje, a native of Edwardsville, Illinois, received his bachelor’s degree at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville in 2005. He worked for two years in local politics before making the decision to enter graduate school in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University. He received his master’s degree in May 2013 and will earn his doctorate in August 2019.