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Re-Inventing the Public Sphere: Critical Theory, Social Responsibility, Schools, and the Press.

John Pace Konopak
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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Re-inventing the public sphere: Critical theory, social responsibility, schools, and the press

Konopak, John Pace, Ph.D.

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1989

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RE-INVENTING THE PUBLIC SPHERE: CRITICAL THEORY, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, SCHOOLS, AND THE PRESS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Curriculum and Instruction

(Curriculum Theory)

by

John Pace Konopak
B.A., University of New Mexico, 1971
M.J., Louisiana State University, 1984
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the contemporary discourses of journalism and pedagogy from the standpoint of critical theory to assess the impact of technocratic rationality and instrumental logic on the practices of communication and education. It is premised on the observation that, spurred by the imperatives of trans-national capital accumulation, privatization inimical to democratic interests has begun to colonize public education. The study represents an effort to reactivate a concept and rhetoric of "social responsibility" that would animate a project of reclaiming cultural space to be occupied by a "public sphere," in a struggle analogous to that waged against feudalism and monarchical "Divine Right."

The study argues that communication and education, the essential minima of language, are the basic elements of all cultural development. It makes the case that, by deploying artificial antinomies, education and communication technobureaucracy conceals fundamental similarities between the projects of journalism and pedagogy at the levels of both theory and practice—with respect to their complementary roles in enabling citizen participation and appropriating social knowledge in democratic culture—in order to better facilitate reproduction of dominant corporatist ideologies.

Taking as the paradigm case the U.S. Supreme Court's 1988 decision in the matter of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the study applies a Foucauldian analytic to
evaluate both the Court's decision and responses to it in mainstream press editorials, press industry trade and association periodicals, and journalism reviews. It finds mainstream acceptance on the grounds of its representation of "real world" conditions, equivocal "balance" in the trades, and "resistance" themes in the reviews.

The study then thematizes the operation of technobureaucratic rationality in the decline of the bourgeois public sphere, and responds to critics who have disparaged social responsibility theory. Finally, it argues for the relevance of such a theory, and explores its implications as a rationale for educational praxis based on the public sphere as counterpoise to the hegemony of state corporatism. Suggestions for further research on the impact potential of desk-top publishing installed in communities, condominium-style, and prepared for by teaching journalistic praxis for a democratic local press, are proffered.
CHAPTER ONE
PATTERNS AND TEXTURES

The people are the only censors of their governors.... The way to prevent th[eir] irregular interpositions.... is to give them full information of their affairs thro' the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.... [W]ere it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers & be capable of reading them. (Jefferson, 1966, p. 101)

We are reaching the point where some of our most basic beliefs about human life will be tested. We will be forced either to bring our economic institutions into line with the fundamental humanist and democratic values we profess to or openly reject them in favor of the lifeboat ethic. (Barnett, 1985, p. 560)

One of the most hallowed of all American democratic principles is that the collective wisdom of the people is
the best guarantor of responsible, humane governance and the most effective constraint upon the power of their governors. This essential tenet of democracy is based on the capacity of its citizens to recognize their long-term interests and to act in ways that support their democratic convictions and traditions if they are possessed of the necessary and sufficient facts and educated in ways that liberate and enhance their faculties to discern truths from those facts.

Nevertheless, experiences and events occurring worldwide over (at least) the last half-century appear to have raised significant challenges to the tenability of democratic assumptions about the people's collective wisdom and seem to have demonstrated the fallability of political acts founded upon it. The on-going development of state and corporate propagandas and other indoctrination techniques, the uses to which they have been put, and their apparent successes have cast into doubt not only the interpretive capabilities of citizens and their competence to participate in democratic culture, but also the viability of fundamental democratic principles themselves (Ellul, 1973). This study represents an effort to gain an understanding of those techniques, the cultural imperatives of their use, and the agendas of those who employ them, and to propose a means and a rationale for a renewed system of public participation and praxis that could serve as an antidote to the technocratic pollutants of the democratic polity.
Critical Theorizing on the School and the Press

These techniques and their affective consequences have not gone unremarked, however, although they seem to have succeeded in at least diverting and at worst manipulating the attentions of the people, such that citizens may be obstructed or prevented from recognizing their own emancipatory interests. The essentially un- and/or anti-democratic interests inscribed in and concealed by dominant discourses of both technocratic capitalism and bureaucratic socialism have been the subject of important developments in the critical social theory of Jurgen Habermas (1964), Michel Foucault (1972), Stuart Hall (1980) and others, who have pointed to two principal culprits as complicit in the pathological pollution of the people’s attention to, concern for, and interest in the conduct of what is, putatively, their public business.

The Critique of Modernity

The first of these is the growing synergism of the state with the interests of trans-national, corporate capital accumulation; the second is the technocratic rationality by which these essentially un- and possibly anti-, democratic interests have been made to seem to be natural concommittants of certain valorized knowledge codes. Under this rubric, notions of social advancement and technological progress supplant the normative claims of moral and aesthetic reasoning, and citizens are forced to choose among values that are portrayed as being mutually
exclusive --or, rather, between claims of facts versus values, wherein the latter are deprived of legitimacy by the assignment of the label of unreliable, undemonstrable, unscientific subjectivity.

The process of technocratic rationalization has enabled the systematic supravention of even the cumulated basic interests of humanity in maintaining a liveable planet --much less the comparatively minute interests of discrete persons in their individual or local life-worlds. This has been accomplished by two expedients: (a) the elevation of cognitive-instrumental logic of science and technology to the position of sole arbiter among competing value claims, and (b) the denigration and delegitimation of the claims of either moral or aesthetic sensibility to offer convincing alternatives (Habermas, 1971).

**Technocratic Rationality in the Press and the School**

The twin forces represented by the modern technocratic corporate state and its pet philosophy, positivism, assert their hegemony by, in, and through the organization and domination of certain (perhaps all) cultural institutions according to the logic of technocratic rationality. Abetted by state-sponsored and legitimized developments in the knowledge of the mechanisms of individual and social control arising from advances in psychology, marketing, and sociology (e.g., Foucault, 1979), the propaganda of technocratic logic is systematically employed in modern
institutions as the press and the schools—particularly in advertising, public relations, and the definition of school knowledge—to attempt to redefine, reshape, or subvert the subjectivities of its intended consumers to the narrow ends of the manipulators (Hall, 1980).

Two of the most influential as well as the most influenced of these institutions are mass education and mass communication. Both the principle of democratic polity and its potential subversion entail the practices and processes of communication and education at the most fundamental levels of democratic culture. This entailment has affected the existential and rhetorical conditions under which the practices of journalism and pedagogy have developed in the United States, the ways those practices are received, and ends to which they are directed.

However, although much critical attention has been paid to the critique of the influences of positivism in schools (e.g., Apple, 1979; Cherryholmes, 1988; Giroux, 1981; Misgeld, 1985; O'Neil, 1985), and media's (Gitlin, 1978; Habermas, 1974; Hall, 1977, 1982; Hallin, 1985; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972; Marcuse, 1964) roles in reproduction and transmission of the dominant rationality, I am not aware that these two crucial institutions have been examined as parallel influences, or that their complementarity as representations of the relations between communication and education has been widely discussed. In this study, I attempt to rectify that oversight.
A Thesis: The Public Sphere Is a Social Responsibility

This study takes as its basic theme a critique of the conditions in education and communication that have permitted, if not encouraged, a gradual but seemingly inexorable detachment of the American people from the arena of substantive concerns and responsibilities imposed on them by their (at least nominal) participation in both democratic culture and form of government. It is thus my intention to seek among patterns created by certain hitherto seemingly overlooked or neglected relations between journalism and pedagogy -- and their respective practices and theoretical affinities in the general context of the communicative and educational conditions required for the sustenance of democratic culture -- for a counter-hegemonic discourse which could unseat the dominant rationality of technocracy and bureaucracy. I undertake here to examine hermeneutically the fabric of recent discourse about communication and education, generally, and about journalism and pedagogy in particular, to reveal the skeins of thought from what, in the recent past at least, have been considered two discrete domains.

Heretofore, the journalists and teachers have seldom even been mentioned in the same breath, due to a generally accepted but nevertheless (as I show in the next chapter) false antinomy with regard to their apparently unique institutional imperatives. To the contrary, I shall argue
that journalism and pedagogy operate in a similar relation to knowledge, both practically and theoretically, and therefore should themselves be regarded as related enterprises, that is, as cognates of the same process. I seek to join them as complementary, signifying activities by which professionals in their praxis mediate and intercede for learning, judgment, and, ultimately, public actions informed by those former two virtues.

My aim is to recuperate and redefine the concept and rhetoric of social responsibility, and to apply them to the project of reclaiming cultural space for a new version of the public sphere, an institution which was of central importance in the success of the Enlightenment’s century-long struggle against the feudal state and the divine rights of monarchy. In particular, I am concerned to reunite the traditions of practice and preparation for the effective conduct of social and cultural praxis in school and the press: especially the sense of the moral duty and obligation owed by the press and the schools in putatively democratic culture to the establishment, support, and maintenance of conditions that would enable and encourage citizens to appropriate and then to use the cultural space for the re-invention of the public sphere. Both press and schools are vital to this enterprise and should be understood to be related through the similarity of their status and roles in the continuing evolution of democratic culture and society.
However, since early in this century when, influenced by the emergent discipline of scientific management and industrial administration, schools abjured their natural domains in the construction of knowledge (Johnson, 1984), educators have lacked a rationale commensurate with the magnitude of the tasks they have been required to accomplish. This has to do with redefining and extending the ethos of social responsibility as an ethical obligation to practices of schooling/teaching as well as to the press --which has recognized, though by and large resisted (e.g., Altschull, 1984, Merrill, 1974; Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979) it, since it was proposed by the Hutchins Commission in 1946. Because I take it that a central concern of both schools and the press should be to contribute to establishing suitable conditions for the free exercise of democratic freedoms and the assumption of correlative responsibilities, this study inquires whether a concept of social responsibility might fit the need.

Therefore, this study proposes to examine contemporary discourses of journalism and pedagogy from the standpoint of critical theory to examine the impact of technocratic rationality and instrumental logic on the practices of communication and education. It seeks to recover some of the hitherto separately carded and spun threads of discourse about the processes of creating and exchanging social knowledge in modern democratic culture. Through a critical examination and analysis of both the broad discourses of
communication and education, and those material conditions which support current, restrictive, dehumanizing practices imposed by fiat on teachers and journalists, I endeavor to explore the interstitial spaces, the gaps and the overlappings, of this imperfect human construction for clues to a theoretically sufficient rationale for democratically oriented praxis of press and school, how it might be achieved and, if achieved, what might result from it.

As they are rationalized in the contemporary, dominant culture of technological accountability and efficiency, the institutions of the school and the press perform as if they are epistemologically and structurally incapable of engendering or supporting the complex conditions which enable the acquisition and deployment of the critical judgment necessary for socially responsible democratic participation in public affairs. It is on rectifying these conditions that an effective renewal of the phenomenon of the public sphere would depend, and a space commensurate with what in former times was known as "the public sphere" could flourish. I take up this venture in the hope of suggesting a theoretical basis for establishing the social responsibility of the school and the press for two related objectives within the general problematics of democratic social relations: (a) a foundation for establishing an ethics of interpretive, practical competence for the press and the school, and (b) the actualization of conditions
necessary for the reinvention of the public sphere as an arena for informed, responsible action that may enable participatory democratic praxis based on practical judgment in public and social affairs.

I take the audience for these considerations to be primarily located among educators, and particularly teacher and journalism educators and their students. Under the tradition of academic disciplinarity, in which the relations of discourses to one another are atomized and truncated for the purposes of discrete understandings, the connectedness of the projects of communication and education has been lost, and their true interests dispersed. For this reason, I shall attend mainly to the relation of those factors as crucial elements in the recuperation and reconceptualization of a meaningful conception of a public space in which citizens may enact and experience emancipatory praxis. In pursuit of this end, I re-analyze the concept of social responsibility and apply it to both the press (in which context it first appeared) and to the schools (which could usefully appropriate it as a rationale for exceeding the taken-for-granted boundaries of education). In this project, I join critical theorizing on both public communications and journalism in particular, with those recent developments in curriculum theorizing relevant to issues of aesthetics, ethics, and the spiritual dimension of education that in recent years have been advanced and deployed under the rubric of "Reconceptualism."
Theoretical Framework

This project is informed by as well as being situated in three diverse critical/theoretical stances or contexts which frame the possibility of individual social action and communitarian solidarity. The first context is derived from the thought of the German critical social philosopher Jurgen Habermas and his descriptions of the interactions of human social interests, (inter)actions, and knowledge. His project was begun with *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1971), and has led him to what one commentator called the "linguistic" --but which another averred would better be called the "performative"-- turn as a central part in the evolution of virtually all his subsequent work in the area of language use (Forester, 1985) and the work of communicative action (Held, 1980; McCarthy, 1979).

Habermas (e.g., 1984) is particularly valuable for his insight in circumscribing work (understood in the Marxian sense of production) and social interaction within the more general ambit of communicative competence. His formulations of the ideal speech situation and the universal pragmatics of speech are both the necessary and sufficient conditions for emancipatory (undominated, coercion-free) communication. These are communicative acts which challenge and seek to overturn the structural inequalities and disequilibriums on which the dominance of scientism as a tool for the legitimation of knowledge has been built.
Habermas's (e.g., 1973) value to this enterprise lies especially in his revelation of the artificial bifurcation of realms of social theory — where he has described the increasing tendency of technologically dominated society to define practical problems as "merely" technical issues — and knowledge theory, where he has argued that positivism has displaced epistemology by its insistence upon the primacy of instrumental reason. I return to this topic in more detail in Chapters Two and Three; but it is relevant and should be kept in mind as well in the discussion of the general democratic principles which I sketch out in the section below dealing with the tradition of participation in which this project resides.

The second context which frames this work is in an interpretation of French philosopher Michel Foucault's theories of knowledge/power (savoir/pouvoir) relations and their reification as/in discourses (1970; 1972; 1980), as well as his identification of the carceral effects wrought of scientistic-scientific investigations into the nature of humanness which were undertaken in the name of ostensibly non-ideological, value-free pursuit of knowledge in the 18th and 19th centuries (1973; 1975; 1979). I consider that Foucault's value to this investigation consists in the view that his work affords on the aura of seemingly ineluctable determinism with which discursive formations and practices constituted in the very structures of scientific knowledge (and social knowledge created scientifically) confront their
critics, and his insight that this apparent determinism is not specious, but the result of social forces set in motion with a particular end in view. Foucault's ideas are more thoroughly examined in Chapter Four.

The third perspective from which this investigation addresses the knowledge codes, practices and activities of contemporary conceptions of journalism and pedagogy is based on the stance toward the production and reception of cultural phenomena foreshadowed in the discourses of Antonio Gramsci (e.g., Hoare & Smith, 1971), the Italian educator imprisoned by Mussolini, and most recently manifested in the work of the British Cultural Studies school (e.g., Hall, 1977; 1980). The foremost exponent of this stance toward cultural phenomena is Jamaican-born communication scholar Stuart Hall, whose neo-Marxian, cultural studies approach to media phenomena, especially, and their reception as expressions of a larger, ideologically founded and supported source of domination and control. Hall and other scholars at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham (UK) have focused on "lived cultures," particularly the popular press, work, and school experiences of the working class.

The fundamental moment in the CCCS critique of cultural production consists in the recognition of the construction of hegemonic discourses by displaying in cultural texts that version of reality which is isomorphic with the interests
of the elite class. Simultaneously, according to Hall (1982), ruling class elites endorse that version by their appropriations of the symbolizing system which invokes the "preferred reading." Through their effective control of the media, schools, and other institutions in which reality is framed, elites are able cast any competing versions of reality in terms favorable to, and reliant upon, the dominant class's horizons of thought --when they permit them to be exhibited at all. Hall and others have found a kind of evidence-manaque for this approach in their analyses of media presentations which systematically omit certain dysfunctional (to the dominant ideology) views rather than have to bother to reframe or discredit them. This approach to cultural production is important both from the point of view of what Noam Chomsky and Edward Hermann (1989) have called "manufacture of consent" within intra-national social relations, and from the perspective of inter-, trans-, or supra-national compliance with the technical, consumerist agenda which Herbert Schiller (1976) identified as "cultural imperialism." I take up these issues again in Chapter Five.

From this stance, it is possible to show that practices of both the schools and the press, as they are currently realized as social and discursive formations (Foucault, 1972), operate as if more was at stake in perpetuating communicative inequalities (Habermas, 1971), and in encouraging attitudes of alienation and passivity in the publics they serve (Ellul, 1973), than they have in
eliminating them and encouraging a greater rather than a lesser scope for the exercise of truly public discourse. Hence, a part of this study is devoted to describing the ways in which certain institutional structural imperatives in the press and the schools have operated, at least over the last century, to impede the development of students' and citizens' awareness of their capacities for critical and active participation in the democratic process.

My purpose in undertaking the ensuing enquiry, then, is two-fold. First, it is to explore the relations of communication and education, in their specific cultural representations as journalism and pedagogy, both in the construction of social knowledge and in the foundation of successful social praxis grounded upon that knowledge. I wish to show the extent to which these two crucial professions, whose purviews with respect to the formation and dissemination of social knowledge encompass nearly the entire range of practical and political concerns, have been affected by the dominant instrumentalist logic and technical rationality, which is thematized in prevailing attitudes about the school and the press, both popularly and within the institutions themselves. The second is to provoke a reconception of the meaning of professionalism in and for journalism and pedagogy, as cultural resources which can be drawn upon to establish and promote a pervasive sense of the efficacy of practical judgment, and an appropriate cultural
space for its enactment.

The vital cultural resources, embodied in the schools and the press as the expert knowledge and practical judgment of teachers and journalists, are now and have been largely misused and undervalued with respect to the constitution of individual practical judgment and its natural expression in discourse within a public sphere. How they may be recuperated for the project of rescuing the discourse of participatory democratic institutions for the emancipation of individuals and the communities they comprise from the thrall of technocracy is the theme of this work.

Context: A Curse for an Age of Crises

"May you live in interesting times!"

Interesting times are times of interesting choices, and ours is an age, certainly, of interesting --even crucial-- choices. The ancient Chinese malediction has perhaps never seemed more appropriate. It may be we are twice (or more, perhaps even exponentially) cursed: rampant nuclear proliferation, the wholesale destruction of delicate micro-environments and the species which depend upon them, and/or the impending social dislocations and reallocations implied by the yet to be properly understood potential macro-environmental, climatological, and geo-political effects of phenomena such as the greenhouse effect and the erosion of the stratospheric ozone envelope. In these interesting times, democratic polity now confronts oblivion or, worse, irrelevance. The American ideal of democratic sovereignty
--government of, by, and for the people-- faces its most complex, intractable, and subtle challenges. Interesting times and choices, indeed.

The choices seem to be three --all, for a variety of reasons, equally interesting and apparently equally untenable. We may choose instantaneous annihilation in a thermo-nuclear conflagration, or slow extinction through the incremental but inexorable despoliation of the ecoshpere; or we may choose a rational, swift, and wide-ranging alteration of the conditions that imperil not only us, but also the entire planet. For it has become apparent that the deadly multiplicity and the potentially fatal nature of the dilemmas confronting humanity are fundamentally social and cultural, and public in their constitution; that is, they are of human construction, the results of human actions, intentions, and policies. As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967) in their seminal work The Social Construction of Reality and latterly, Jean Gebser (1985) in his recently translated The Ever-Present Origin, have persuasively argued, all knowledge is social knowledge and intends social action, based upon the unavoidably symbolic character of human relations with and within their environment --particularly the constitutive processes by which meaning is created and social order is established through human intension.
That these hazards to the very survival of the planet have been allowed to proliferate, however, is the result of human inactivity and inattention. Hence, the possibility and the necessity of creating satisfactory resolutions to our dilemmas must be sought in the public realm of social endeavor, in just relations among and within human communities, and in the capacity for wise and practical public deliberation by the individuals of whom those communities are composed. This study posits that the central requirement for— as well as the central problem of— ensuring the future viability of democratic American socio-cultural institutions involves the development and perpetuation of conditions that would support and encourage citizens' acquisition and practice of a complex set of competences requisite for necessary public deliberations, and wherein their exercise would be seen to be efficacious.

Democratic Visions, Democratic Outcomes

Democracy is not an easy, not a certainty-inducing, not a particularly efficient, nor always even a popular, system of governance. Yet if there are any issues upon which both apologists for and critics of contemporary American democracy might be able to agree, two suggest themselves. First, the complexity and extent of the changes occurring in the nation and the world, especially since the end of World War II, have cast into doubt and now threaten to overwhelm U.S. society's ability to satisfactorily
address its internal and external challenges; and second, if there is yet any hope of meeting those threats and allaying those doubts, that hope still resides in taking seriously American society's democratic promises and releasing the culture's capacity for democratically creating and implementing solutions.

However, as the foregoing indicates, not only opinions about the proper form and function of a particular democracy, but also interpretations of the conception of what actually constitutes a democracy, have varied and continue to vary across time and circumstance. The scope of human social activities over which a democratic polity might legitimately exercise its dominion has been an issue of considerable contention. Politics, the economy, education, culture, work, knowledge: is it advisable or even possible to draw a line over which democracy may not pass? Do our dilemmas have their root in too little democracy, or too much? Different democratic visions --Lockean versus Rousseauian, or libertarian versus socialistic models-- manifest a variety of important conceptual, ideological, and philosophical differences relative to which groups' specific interests are supported --and whose are suppressed-- in particular renditions of the theme of democratic society.

The present inquiry begins with these problematic conditions in view, granting the contention around the issues thematized above, and recognizing the requirement that it characterize at the start the version of democracy
it embraces. Since this inquiry is not primarily concerned with defining a concept of democracy per se, but with the more limited matter of setting forth a theory for a special set of related actions and actors within a specific context of democratic participation, I limit myself to a sketch of the outlines of the preferred version of democracy in which these actions and actors would operate most effectively.

Following Landon Beyer (1986) and Carole Pateman (1970), this study cleaves to a notion of democracy as a cultural (i.e., value-laden, and necessarily participatory) form. Pateman (1970) particularly, in Participation and Democratic Theory, has persuasively advanced the argument that for their continued viability, participatory democracies require the greatest preponderance of their citizens to be enabled, empowered, and willing to participate --actively, consciously, and responsibly-- across the full range their mutual present and future interests. Such participation implies that citizens in/of a democracy have a certain grasp of matters which affect them in their relations with their fellows. That is, the success of participatory democracy entails for its citizens, at a minimum, three levels of practical knowledge: (a) a realistic understanding of their own situatedness in particular existential circumstances, (b) a sense of how those circumstances have come to be effected, and (c) an appreciation of how they may act to alter those conditions
which thwart the social interests that democracy exists to advance. To this sketch, I append two further presumptions: (a) the basic desirability and the justice of organizing and conducting public affairs according to a conception of democracy as enlightened (as opposed to merely short-term, instrumental) participation, and (b) the necessity of doing so publicly.

What is needed, then, are the means to engender both competent social actors and a forum from which they might speak their practical interests. The actors must be critical, informed, intelligent, reflective, thoughtful, wise, and numerous --capable of participating in a polis which collectively possesses, knows it possesses, and is capable of acting on such competence to expand, promote, and protect democratic interests as its own. The forum from which such actors would speak must be accessible to both speakers and auditors alike; capacious enough to accommodate a wide range and variety of ideas, opinions, and views; independent of narrow interests which would profit from limiting discourse, and public in that whatever speech were spoken be known to impersonally represent a legitimate species of opinion.

Both the press and the school are essential in educating citizens for democratic praxis, and for promoting the conditions which would enable that praxis to have a public forum from which it could mount an effective challenge to --or at least articulate its disaffection for--
the dehumanizing imperatives to which people everywhere have
been subjected. However, it is a central contention of this
study that neither can teachers help but fail to adequately
prepare citizens, nor journalists fail to sufficiently
inform their publics, for responsible democratic
participation. They cannot, that is, if those professionals
whose labor animates the press and the schools are obliged
to operate under the influence of the century-old, techno-
bureaucratic, managerial logic and interests. The last
decade has witnessed, along with a revival of deeply
critical analysis, the recrudescence of rationalities in the
pedagogical and journalistic practice that seem to guide, if
they do not ultimately determine, the goals, purposes, and
the subjectivities of social actors toward an ever-
diminishing sense of efficacy, purposefulness, and
responsibility. In the Chapter Four, therefore, I examine
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the matter of Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier as a paradigm case for this
analysis. As I will demonstrate, the Court did no more than
to naturalize and reify discursive formations which had
obtained de facto from the beginnings of the modern age
conceptions of the form and function of the school and the
press.

From this perspective, it then follows that a critical
understanding of the relations between communication and
education will be central to the establishment and the
enablement of truly public democratic participation. The discourses of communication and education are in a sense the (phylo)generic categories in whose onto(lo)genies --their means/ends relationships-- the histories of publicity and enlightenment respectively may be seen to be reenacted. In the project which follows here, I aim to show that certain conventions and traditions within those two categories --specifically the traditions and conventions two important sub-categories: journalism and teaching-- may usefully be interrogated to reveal the fuller implications of their professional practices for the democratic participation.

Jefferson's Caveat

The concatenation of enlightenment (education) and freedom of the expression (communication) with the general good of democratic society is a deeply entrenched --in the public rhetoric, virtually an inviolable-- tenet in the constellation of principles that comprise the firmament from which coalesced the essential features of American democratic life. Thomas Jefferson, for example, throughout the more than 50 years of his public career advanced the necessities of both an educated populace and unfettered expression as inextricably and reciprocally linked in the maintenance of democratic social institutions. From his writings on the necessity of a free and robust press, as well as his from his lifelong attention to the foundation of a system of public education, it is plain that Jefferson clearly envisioned an educated populace with a guaranteed
access to the means of informing themselves on vital matters as the cornerstones of a truly free and democratic social order. Clearly, he recognized and feared the alternative. "Cherish...the spirit of our people," he wrote from Paris in 1787,

and keep alive to their attention. Do not be too severe upon their errors, but reclaim them by enlightening them. If once they become inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and Congress, and Assemblies, judges and governors shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general nature, in spite of individual exceptions;...that man is the only animal which devours his own kind, for I can apply no milder term to [other] governments...and the general prey of the rich upon the poor. (in Lee, 1988, p. 103)

We have not to listen too hard, nor look too far, to apprehend the modern technocratic lupines lurking by the door: the prevaricating pack of renegade admirals and administrators, colonels and coolies, arms merchants, spooks, and spokespersons, with their literally loose cannons, "off the shelf, off the books" subversions, shredder parties, and "plausible deniability."

The only civil defense against them still, as Jefferson (fore)saw, continues to be the educated, enlightened, intelligent attention of a people to the social knowledge
made available and public by and through the free press responsible to the general public interest. In a subsequent chapter, we shall see that some of the "judges and governors," forgetting or forsaking their responsibilities to enlighten, have acquiesced in abetting the wolves.

Elements of the Study

In the subsequent chapters of this study, I shall argue that journalists and teachers (to paraphrase the poet Dylan Thomas) are --like poets, in their crafts and solemn arts-- capable of and both morally and ethically responsible for creating not merely plausible but true representations of social knowledges. These must be susceptible to practical (versus to merely technical) judgments upon the data and opinions always already inscribed in such language/knowledge.

That, indeed, is the beginning of their social responsibility. But it does not stop there. Journalists and teachers must begin to forge new relationships, based on their two distinctive contributions to the reconstitution of a public sphere wherein, by virtue of their praxis, the citizenry of a truly democratic polity would actively and vigorously exercise their communicative competences to direct their governors toward making moral and just policies. Because they deal in mediated (reported) speech, and inasmuch as it is those mediated representations upon which a version of democratic society would depend which could to adapt to the challenges of the present age, this is the crucial prospect of journalistic and teaching
professions.

Warrant for this claim resides in the ways in which the work engaged in by teachers and journalist is similar in nature and scope, and necessarily entails them in phronesis; that is, in the application of their special knowledge toward "wisdom in determining ends and the means of attaining them" under contingent conditions. Heretofore, they have been misled and misdirected by historically situated and scientifically legitimated technical rationality to conceive their praxis ahistorically, as both incommensurable with, and even antithetical to, the speaking of any but technically prespecified and determinate ends. In contrast, I shall argue that, in the present (desperate, and arguably deteriorating) circumstances, journalists and teachers, those who teach them, and those who learn from them must learn to recognize that they share the same telos, and to understand what that means in terms of what I discuss as the "social responsibility" of creating the conditions which comport with the constitution and the provisioning of an informed citizenry.

In contemporary American life, it is to journalists and teachers perhaps more than to any others that has fallen the obligation and the duty of edifying and informing the polis on matters that bear on the conduct and content of public affairs: in Jefferson's words, "to keep alive [the people's] attention." What follows in subsequent chapters is an
effort to show why it is necessary and how it may be possible to recognize, cultivate, and then to draw upon the set of (renewable!) cultural resources immanent in a reconceived understanding of the crucial roles of the journalism and teaching professions in bringing new vigor to the task of constituting and sustaining the attention and judgment of that polis.

The chapters of this study proffer an investigation and an analysis of certain fundamental conditions in two primary social institutions --the press and the public schools-- as they bear upon and reflect the abilities of citizens to participate cooperatively in meeting the demands of active, informed, and responsible democratic citizenship. In this, the present study analyzes current, dominant conceptions --the operant knowledge codes-- which are employed in hegemonic discourses to define and thereby to delimit both journalistic and educational/pedagogical competence (i.e., the ethical exercise of valued knowledge and skills). I argue that journalism and pedagogy are synergistically related at the nexus of democratic participation and comprise a field of overlapping necessities constituting the woof and weft of the fabric of a just and rational society: (a) gathering and reporting the data of fact and opinion, and (b) critical discrimination among the content and sources of those data as they are transmuted by practical judgment into the stuff of knowledge and employed as a vital cultural resource.
Relations of Communication and Education

In Chapter Two, I trace historically and elaborate the relations between the general categories of education and communication as fundamental elements in the social construction of reality through language. After sketching in the general outline of that relation by following the paths demarcated by the linguistic functions of information and injunction, I describe the Habermasian projects of the ideal speech situation and his universal pragmatics as they instantiate communicative competence. I follow this with a section on the existential similarities and differences between the institutional and existential demands of teachers and journalists, highlighting the rhetorical differences as they imply contradictions in existential similarities. These convergences are then shown to be related to a final section on the problematics of democratic theory. This section explores further the nature of the American ideal of democratic participation, how it is situated historically, and how it may be shown to revolve around two essential, fundamentally complementary nexi of competences: acquiring, and critically discriminating among, different sources of social/political knowledge.

The Public Sphere, Social Responsibility, and Technocratic Rationality

In the third chapter, this study examines more closely the key concepts whose conflicts it is an attempt to
resolve. First, the dimensions of a theory of discourse are discussed, and discourse as a category of human interaction is shown to encompass problems posed for a democratic system of schooling and the press by the continued dominance of technocratic rationality and instrumental logic. Then the historical relations of the school and the press are elaborated from the Reformation through modern times. A section then deals with the rise and fall of the public sphere in its historical setting in early 18th Century Britain, using the disappearance of the critical public sphere as the paradigm of the influence of a perversion of Enlightenment sensibility. Habermas's (1971) critical typologies of interests, the legitimation crisis of late capitalism (1973), and communicative competence (e.g. 1984) are deployed as markers to point toward the possibility of renovating the concept of the public sphere and I discuss the disappearance of the distinctions among the intimate, private, and public in the social geography. I re-examine the concept of social responsibility as it has been applied to the press in order to refurbish its rhetorical and moral impetus for changes required in conceptions of schooling. A criticism of social responsibility theory in the past has been that it has lacked a specific focus or a tangible locus on which its affective power might be brought to bear. I suggest that the newly rejuvenated conception of the public sphere provides precisely such a locus and focus, and could become a powerful rationale for needed change. Finally, I
present the critical theory critique of technocracy.

**Discourse, Discipline, and Hazelwood**

In the next chapter (Chapter Four), this study takes up the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, in January 1988, in the matter of *Hazelwood Independent School District v. Kuhlmeier*. This case is chosen as a paradigm, because it represents the situation wherein the interests of both journalism and pedagogy have been seen to come into conflict with the technocratic rationality of the dominant forces in society. Depending on the part of the opinion to which one attends, the decision upholding a principal’s discretion to expunge a vaguely defined class of materials from a school newspaper and otherwise suppress on technical grounds unpopular or controversial student expression, either "returned to the school officials" their rightful control over the curriculum or justified "brutal censorship."

In any event, I suggest that *Hazelwood* represents the paradigm case of how Foucauldian discursive formations and disciplinary technology operate to undermine the schools' abilities to engage, promote and teach the competences necessary for democratic citizenship. As such, it affords a unique opportunity to examine the significance of journalism within the dominant conception of the curriculum as an example of the spurious claims that instrumental logic and technical rationality exert upon the counterclaims of
competence which arise in the existential conditions of the school.

I support this view with a review and a critical analysis of responses to the decision within the community of journalists "talking to themselves" in the professional association and trade journal discourse about the Hazelwood decision. This literature is shown to be relevant to (a) regarding and understanding the professional socialization of journalists, (b) how transcending elements of that socialization process may be effected, and (c) what that might mean to teachers if their relation to school knowledge is similar to journalism's relation to the knowledge it publicly constructs. Also in this part of the study, I suggest that the rhetorically persuasive, but nevertheless illegitimate, conception of journalism evident in the Hazelwood majority opinion and widely supported by editorial voices in the mainstream U.S. press, demonstrates a fundamental misinterpretation of the ways both the curriculum and journalism should be understood in the context of the "social responsibility" for advancing the ideal of democratic participation by diminishing the possibility of redefining and reconstructing the public sphere.

Inventing the Counter-Public Sphere: The Social Responsibility of Journalism and Pedagogy

In the final chapter, I return to the struggle to reclaim a place in the democratic process for a truly public
discourse. I draw a parallel between the colonization of the New World by technologically advanced Europeans and the colonization of the life-world by technocratic rationality by examining the concept of the marketplace of knowledge and ideas. I then sketch the historical conditions which have influenced contemporary conceptions and the consequences of the place of the press and the school as an emancipatory agent involved in social change. Those consequences are shown to have important implications for the ways in which citizens, already heavily reliant upon journalists' professional competence for a preponderance of the material substance upon which they base their own civic practices, appropriate and utilize knowledge that is constructed journalistically in such a way as to conceal from them their own potential for efficacy in participation in the public sphere.

Conclusions and Implications. These investigations lead me to conclude, in the final parts of this study, that any emancipatory potential of the press and schools must be related to undoing the prevailing conception that their projects are marketing problems: that is, in effect, "selling" the socializing process as "education." I therefore argue that understanding this conception is of central importance to the task of redefining the institutions as agents of social emancipation and empowerment. I tender a description of the intersection of
journalism and pedagogy identified and discussed in earlier chapters as a nexus around which could be formulated a new conception of the journalistic project, conceived as critical, self-reflective praxis, is learned and practiced. I then suggest an outline of a plausible theoretical model for the professional education of both teachers and journalists that is founded upon and situated existentially in those professionals' necessary sensitivity to their roles and responsibilities in contributing to the construction of other peoples' communities of reality. Suggestions are proffered for further research on the potential of installing desk-top publishing and low-power, narrowcast, neighborhood information transmission, prepared for by a curriculum in which journalistic competences are highlighted and equated with social praxis.
Notes: Chapter One

1. It is odd that conspiracy theories are eschewed even by those who, through the employment of critical analysis, have uncovered and described such arrangements and paraphernalia whose only logical explanation lies in the intention for them to be used in just such a way as to suggest a conspiracy. That the enunciation of conspiracy theories is so widely disparaged suggests just how narrowly the limits of dissent are defined, even by, of, and for critical theorists. States recognize and punish certain kinds of conspiracies. Why then is it unscientific to propose that they also engage in them? One is left to suppose that either there are conspiracies afoot to circumvent, corrupt, or subvert rational responses to dominant systems, or that Foucault (1972) is correct, and discourses do assume lives of their own over which humans are able to exert only minimal and insubstantial power to direct. Which reasoning could lead to the conclusion, ultimately, that bacteria evolved into higher forms in order to have an adequate supply of hosts upon which to feed.

2. By "project" I refer to Alfred Schutz's (1962) views of action as a "projection" of present views and past experiences into the future, which stresses the social actor's design and praxis to bring them about. Schutz suggests by this that actions in the present and the past have the grammatical effect of locating the basis for action
in the future perfect tense; that is, social action regards the expectation of what will have been the case.

3 See Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947; Siebert, Petersen & Schramm, 1956, esp. Chapter 3; see also Chapters 2 and 3 of this study.

4 William F. Pinar is widely acknowledged as the preeminent figure in the development of "Reconceptualism" in the field of curricular studies and theorizing. He has written recently and modestly of the enterprise in the past tense, signaling the end, or at least the cessation, of debates which prompted "a group of iconoclastic curricularists.... [who] challenged the dominant tradition of the field [which was] characterized by behavioral activities, planning, and evaluation" (1987, p. 1). While the internal conflicts in the field of curriculum studies, which marked the genesis of Reconceptualism, have largely been ameliorated, still the impact of its contributions to theorizing about the curriculum remains somewhat marginal. Reconceptualism's avowed interest is in conceiving and creating the curriculum as a "space" rather than as a fixed or constant entity or program (Daignault & Gauthier, 1982).

Similarly the viewpoints of many of its adherents and proponents reside in traditions that are often systematically marginalized in the lifeworld of schools. An education bureaucracy influenced (to say the least) by the William Bennett, Diane Ravitch, Chester ("Chucker")
Finns, and Mortimer Adlers would not be inclined to look with much favor upon the Marxist, neo-Marxist, critical and post-critical, aesthetic, religious, and above all humanist leanings of scholars who eschewed the development-management agenda in favor of "the scholarly and disciplined understanding of the educational experience, particularly in its political, cultural, gender, and historical dimensions" (Pinar, 1987, p. 2).

Evidence of the Reconceptualists' impact is far more apparent in the mainstream of academia as represented by scholarly organizations such as the American Education Research Association. At AERA over the last decade, the meetings under the aegis of Division B, the curriculum division, have seen "reconceptualist themes litter the... landscape, in particular political, feminist, post-structuralist, phenomenological, and autobiographical" presentations, symposia, etc. (Pinar, 1987, p. 4).

Scientism, in the sense that it is used here, refers to the tendency of technical interest and instrumental logic to assert a claim of privilege or primacy for a particular, positivistic way of knowing; that is, it is the claim that only phenomena amenable to investigation by and evaluation against prespecified "empirical" criteria may yield true knowledge, and that the only legitimate knowledge is that which is "discovered" in this fashion. (See Popper, 1972; cf. Feyerabend, 1975. For a helpful overview of the whole
conflict between scientism and its critics, see Bernstein, 1983.)

6 Intension here is meant in the phenomenological sense: intending subjects both construct and are simultaneously constructed by their relations with objects whose existence is immanent in their presence as phenomena, but whose meaning is always already symbolic by virtue of the intentional act.

7 Democracy is essentially a liberal political phenomenon in this part of the 20th Century. See Benjamin Barber's (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age for an interesting typology of liberal democratic stances: "anarchist," "realist," and "minimalist." Barber argues against the philosophical tenability of a "thin" conception of democracy, pointing out that the excesses of this century are attributable to too little, rather than too much, democracy in the workplace, the community, the schools, and other institutions wherein normative concerns for praxis are contested.


10 Jefferson's memorable, poetic aphorism that (I paraphrase here) a nation which expects to be ignorant and free, and in
a state of civilization, expects what never was and never will be, elegantly expresses his opinion on the matter of the central place of education in the constitution and maintenance of a democratic society. It became a lifelong enterprise, and the unifying theme of his post-Presidential years, to organize a universal system of education for the American people. See Gordon C. Lee (Ed.), (1966), Crusade Against Ignorance: Thomas Jefferson on Education, especially Chapter 3, for a representative sample of Jefferson's writings on the subject. Lee's introductory essay is also valuable, and cites the extensive body of both private correspondence and public writings in which the topic of popular education figures; the subject was, in Jefferson's own words, "the earliest...[and] the latest of all the public concerns in which I permit myself to take an interest" (Letter to Jos. C. Cabell, January 14, 1818, in Lee, 1966, p. 24, fn. 33).

Robert Pattison (1982) takes rather a more jaundiced view of Jefferson's actual plans for education. Quoting the Jefferson's program for universal education in Virginia, he points out that, while advocating "teaching all the children of the State reading, writing, and common arithmetic," the full course of grammar school was to be reserved for "twenty of the best geniuses...[to be] raked from the rubbish annually, and instructed at public expense" (p. 73).
Henceforth in this document I shall refrain from treating such terms as "phronesis" and "praxis" as foreign or otherwise specialized vocabulary. Both are contained in the most recent Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2nd ed., Unabridged, 1987). Phronesis is used by Aristotle in the Rhetoric to distinguish the practical wisdom and knowledge required for making decisions regarding human matters from theoria, the immutable truth of nature which is for Aristotle the province of science. A similar distinction exists in German thought, between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, or loosely translated, human and natural orders of knowledge. They are important distinctions in the immanent critique of positivist modernism engaged in by critical theorists, distinctions which are displaced in the Anglo-American divisions among natural and social sciences on the one hand, and moral and aesthetic concerns on the other.
CHAPTER TWO
RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

Their world view has remained a common-sense positivism that finds a real world out there, a sincere soul inside all of us, and a prose style that opens a transparent window between the two.

(Lanham, 1986, p. 136)

The arbitrary and speculative mysticism attaching to the traditional interpretation of communication can be called, in a precise sense, idealism, in that it purports to treat the material sign as the mere appearance of an underlying ideal reality.

(Silverman & Torode, 1980, p. 3)

[T]he word is inherently 'dialogical'. [It] is oriented to, and takes account of the use of, words in the utterances to which it is a response. ...[E]ver responsive to the word of others, [it] is subject to incessant modification....[I]t is never spoken without immediately altering or qualifying discourse...

(Sarup, 1984, p. 154)

A great deal that seems to be obvious resides in terms such as communication and education. As categories, each is grossly abstract; taken together they encompass an enormous
range of social actions and practices. Considered separately or jointly, communication and education are dauntingly familiar social phenomena; so readily are they associated with one another that it might be difficult to discriminate one from the other. The actions and practices of which they are composed are of sufficient magnitudes of similarity as to at first appear to render trivial an hypothesis that would rely for its force simply on the demonstration of the connectedness that their coincidence in discourse elicits. In this chapter, I examine the obviousness and the taken-for-grantedness of those relations, first by situating the relation in a historical context of the social functions of language, then by examining the institutional and existential relations, and finally by focusing on the implications of those relations for the American ideal of democratic praxis informed by the technologies of communication and education.

Communication and Education: 'To Inform, to Enjoin'

The history of all culture (that is, of human communities) is, at a fundamental level, a history of the processes of communication and education. Humankind's capacity to create complex social arrangements is a consequence of its ability to inform its members of diverse conditions and to enjoin them in cooperating to meet those conditions (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Gumperz & Hymes, 1972). The processes of informing and enjoining both recapitulate the knowledge of individuality and recognize the social need for
The British linguist Michael Stubbs (1983) has written that, while it is possible to "imagine in principle a community in which language is used only to inform and to enjoin someone to do something," it is impossible to imagine a language which does not both inform and enjoin (p. 8). Occurring at the onset of a book devoted to examining the operations of discourse, the statement captures the sense of the centrality of the two basic uses of language to the activities of human culture: communication ("to inform") and education ("to enjoin"). In modern usage, communication and education comprehend more than the two infinitives imply by themselves; nevertheless, they are fundamental attributes of both of speech and of language. Stubbs's observation links them existentially in mutual relatedness with one another and with the community which they were developed to serve.

The distinctiveness and their relationship is implied in Stubbs's (1983) further observation that it is possible, if not unavoidable, that "utterances typically serve more than one function at the same time" (p. 8). The capacity to inform is a commonsensical sine qua non in any systematic attempt to educate; yet it is not the same thing. One may inform without at the same time necessarily enjoining: jokes or puns or other word games may do that. Simultaneously, to enjoin another is a fundamental element in communication. Yet one may enjoin without at the same time informing:
orders, commands, etc., are examples. Although it may be argued that orders, etc., inform their auditors of the intention of their speaker, they typically do not convey such information as to why the order was issued, for instance, or inform their recipients of the conditions under which they were issued, or when they might be ignored. This aspect may explain the difference between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary speech act described by the ordinary language philosophers John Austin (1962) and John Searle (1975). Statements (constatives) inform and, as Habermas (1984) argues, they typically enjoin agreement, but agreement is the essential element of the Habermasian interpretation of language functions. It does not, perhaps, militate against the existential relation between informing and enjoining, nor does it imply their mutual exclusivity.

The junctures at which the two processes intersect in the community constitute both the process of learning and the production of knowledge (Campbell, 1982). It is for this reason that rhetoric, in which information and injunction are the conjoint project, held a position of such importance in oral cultures (e.g., for in rhetoric the relation of communication and education is formally acknowledged and structured in act of utterance). Because oral speech is ephemeral (or was, prior to the advent of audio and audio-visual recording technology), rhetoric in oral cultures relied on relatively invariant formulas for the construction and transmission of knowledge and for
enactment of learning as a process by its auditors. The effects (and affects) of speech were limited to the range of the speakers' voices and the recognition of the rituals which the formulas and patterns of such speech enacted in the local community of auditors. Information was passed, and action enjoined, as much by the formulas that speakers invoked as by the words that they uttered (e.g., Levi-Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1979). The advent of technology altered these relations.

The Linguistic Turn

Even "merely" writing is after all a technology, both in the instrumental sense by which the word is understood today, as well as in its classical sense of art or artifice. Technology means, literally, words of process and production (techne: making, production; logos: discourse, knowledge). In the word alone, production of knowledge and the process by which it is produced are artificially sundered and rejoined. In that division and reconnection reposes the demise of praliterate orality and the construction of the universes of information and injunction.

Understandably, therefore, the relations comprehended by oral rhetoric underwent a substantial change with the onset of literate technologies (e.g., Pattison, 1982). In consequence of the technical capacity to reproduce it, speech became endowed with a more tangible materiality and more widespread possibilities of affect. Over time, the
discrete disciplines and sciences (of which communication and education are certainly the former, less certainly the latter) began to supplant rhetoric in the cultural space wherein the construction of knowledge and the process of learning occurred. Technology permitted (and, in a sense which will become important in a later chapter, finally required) local observers to "communicate" and to "educate" --rather than merely to inform and to enjoin-- other observers similarly situated but no longer localized insofar as the observer's immediate community was concerned.

With the proliferation (another problem to which I defer responding at this point) of technologies, sciences, and disciplines, and the (apparent) displacement of rhetoric into a mere category of communication and of learning, the distinctively human element of the process of acquiring knowledge was also displaced. The structures of language, which as speech were developed "in face-to-face interaction" (Lyons, in Stubbs, 1983, p. 6), evolved away from their bases in interpresonal interaction, and into a radically self-sufficient domain of reality.

The Two Roads Diverge

At this point the already strained fabric of language's social functions appears to have parted. Technē separated from logos, for all intents and purposes, and scholars and philologists who pursued the matter followed their now divergent threads. The techne thread, which both privileges and problematizes action, raveled off to become a concern
primarily with praxis and production: first as Marxism, then functionalism (e.g., Parsons, 1951a, 1951b), later speech-act theory and finally the critical, linguistic-performative theory of Habermas (1979, 1984), to which I will return in due course. The *logos* thread, which privileges and problematizes discourse, took up the banner of the word. To recall the original distinctions, where *technē* became the praxis of injunction, *logos* instantiated objectified information. I follow this latter skein in the section below.

**The Sapir-Whorf (Boas?) Hypothesis.** In the domain of the word, the social and cultural conditions, to which language itself arose as a response ("to inform" and "to enjoин" to action), were transformed. Experiences which had once seemed generative of the linguistic practices of communities began to be recognized as owing their reality to the language which spoke them and in which they were (now) inscribed. Edward Sapir (noted in an essay first published in 1929 that

The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different
labels. (in Mandelbaum, 1949, p. 162)

Not only was the domain of reality that language spoke different from language to language, but also the inhabitants of each different language were arguably quite unaware of it. Although the anthropologist Franz Boas (1911) had noted in the introduction to *Handbook of American Indian Languages* that "the purely linguistic inquiry is part and parcel of a thorough investigation of the psychology of the people of the world" (p. 63), he overlooked or failed to recognize the epistemological import of his own observation. Rather, Boas had noted the methodological significance of the unconscious regulatory power of language:

> The great advantage that linguistics offer in this respect is the fact that...the categories which are formed remain unconscious, and that for this reason, the processes, which lead to their formation can be followed without misleading and disturbing secondary factors of secondary explanation. (pp. 70-71).

It was the epistemological dimension of the unconscious regulatory authority of language upon which Sapir (1931), and later Benjamin Whorf (1952), fixed upon, and which provides the animating force behind the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Sapir's observation was more elegant and galvanized further, and more immediate, investigation --a fact which perhaps explains why it is not now called the Boas-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Sapir wrote:
Language is not merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items of experience which seem relevant to the individual...but is also a self-contained, creative symbolic organization, which not only refers to experience largely without its help but actually defines experience for us by reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of experience. (in Hoijer, 1974, p. 121).

That Whorf (1952) was influenced by Sapir is evident: Language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and the guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions....We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare [us] in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds --and that means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. (p. 5)

Commenting on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Harry Hoijer (1974) has written that there is admittedly a tradition of European scholarship "particularly in the German-speaking
world," which extends back into the late 18th Century and includes "Herder,...[and] von Humboldt" along with moderns such as "Cassirer.... Levi-Strauss...Piaget...and Wittgenstein" (p. 121). But Hoijer takes it as significant that both Sapir and Whorf "had a major interest in [Native American] languages, idioms far removed from any in the Indo-European family, and so ideally suited for contrastive studies" (p. 121). Those studies, Hoijer says, led Whorf to express the principle of linguistic relativism, in consequence of which

[U]sers of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive at somewhat different points of view. (Whorf, in Hoijer, p. 121)

The basic idea, then, of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is clear. Language is not "merely" a device for recording or reporting experience; it is also, and perhaps more importantly, a way of defining --of actually constructing--experiences for its speakers. Human institutions are human products, hypostatized in language without necessarily turning them into "real things". As such, they may be seen also to condition the experiences of those whose existences are defined by them. From there it was but not many strides to a conception in which language veritably defined the
speakers themselves. The first step was taken (interestingly, once again *einer Deutschen Sache*) by the sociologists of knowledge, whose most recent and arguably best known adherents are Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), in their landmark work *The Social Construction of Reality*.

**Sociology of Knowledge.** The essential tenet of this approach was to attempt a synthesis of epistemology and ontology (both of which are linguistic categories), in a universe in which something like the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis obtained. The difference is that language is not seen as the sole conditioning factor. Rather, diverse social "agglomerations of 'reality' and 'knowledge' pertain to specific social contexts" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 3), and that these relationships have to be accounted for when, as it must, the taken-for-grantedness operating in what counts as knowledge in different social arrangements differs from society to society (Zijderveld, 1971).

According to Berger and Luckmann (1967), individuals' cultural and social environments work upon them as if those environment had a reality which was independent of them. As indeed it does have, as a function of the social and cultural institutions into which individual are born, and through which they are socialized. Through language and (and here sociologists of knowledge add an additional, crucial element) other social behavior, a dialectic process
so externalization, objectification, and internalization is
developed.

The dialectic involves relations of individuals to their natural environments. In language, "the most
important item of socialization" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967,
p. 59), and social relations, individuals construct a
symbolic universe in which meanings and institutions are
"historical and objective facticities" (p. 60) external to
themselves out of "anthropological necessity" (p. 52).
Because the meanings of phenomena are perceived to be
external, meanings are objectified in the phenomena
themselves: a tree is a tree is a tree because it cannot be
anything else, and the same applies to institutions. "The
priority of institutional definitions of situations must be
consistently maintained over individual temptations at
redefinition" (p. 62). Meaning becomes independent of the
individual. The dialectic is then completed in the
subsequent process of internalization, by which the now
objectified universe is finally internalized, "by which the
objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness
in the course of socialization" (p. 81) and becomes part of
the individuals' and their society's personalities.

As part of the experienced universe, an institution by
definition is greater than the individuals who experiences
it because it subsumes them. Albeit the institution is the
product of individuals' activities and their language, it
nevertheless becomes independent of the individuals of which
it is composed. Although it is the results of human praxis, by nature of its very size, scope, and pervasiveness the institution is able to exert control over human activities. In the process (and in the aggregate) institutions also provide individuals with modes of action, speech, feeling, etc. Language, as we saw above, is a crucial, but not the sole, conditioning agent; nevertheless, a person "becomes a cavalryman not only by acquiring the requisite skills, but by becoming capable of understanding this language" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 139).

Importantly, in this scheme, knowledge --especially scientific knowledge, because of its putative objectivity and its supra-institutional character-- is not seen routinely as the product of human praxis, but as external to human being. "[A]n entire legitimating machinery is at work so that laymen will remain laymen...happily" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 89). It is something to be learned, but only it is produced only by those individuals who have earned their ways into the broader institutional context of knowledge production: "[T]he scientific universe of meaning is capable of attaining a good deal of autonomy against its own social base" (p. 86). This applies to social as well as to scientific knowledge, because social knowledge is defined by the institutions which have defined social knowledge as scientific knowledge: "...[A] meaningful totality that explains," perhaps also justifies them (...dreams may be
'explained' by a psychological theory, both 'explained and justified by a theory of metempsychosis, and either theory will be grounded in a much more comprehensive universe --a scientific one" (p. 86).

This attitude of sociologists of knowledge toward institutions finds its apodicton (to coin a phrase) in the analytic applied to it by Michel Foucault (1972, 1973, 1979), for whom institutions represent the material extensions of the operations of power in relation with knowledge. Foucault's work will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. To some extent, however, a critique of the sociology of knowledge actually antedates its enunciation. This is to be found in the work of W. I. Thomas (1967), whose famed theorem (articulated in The Unadjusted Girl, in 1923) offers both an affirmation and a rebuttal to the concept.

It will be recalled that the sociologists of knowledge maintain that, despite their normative and regulative authority, institutions should not be hypostatized. Rather, Berger and Luckmann (1967) insist that they are, after all, human social constructions and therefore to some extent at least imaginary creations. Institutions must be thought of as inautonomous, dependent creations of human consciousness and therefore subject to human control. Thomas's (1967) theorem, however, postulates that (I paraphrase) to the extent that things are perceived to be real, they are real in their consequences. That is, contrary to sociologists of knowledge, institutions do have real --and not merely
arbitrary-- effects on human activities. This is a central point to be recalled in understanding Habermas, whose project I discuss in the next section, because it implicates the act as distinguishable from, although related to, the word in the human construction of reality.

The Banner of the Act

When last we left the other skein of the now thoroughly sundered fabric of techne-logos which, when whole, created the fabric of language/speech as a totality of information/injunction, I had noted that the techne aspect had divided from logos and set its focus on action. Since the consequences of this pursuit comprise a large measure of the next chapter, I will leave aside for now an exhaustive exploration of this project. But there is an important actor in this quest whose work might be introduced in the aspect of it which bears directly on our fable of the fabric.

Jurgen Habermas's (1979, 1984) notions of "universal pragmatics" and communicative competence privilege the injunctive (educational) aspects of the formulation set out earlier in this chapter. His theory of communicative action comprehends both the speech act theory of John Austin (1962) as well as its extensions (e.g., Searle, 1975) and an account of the conditions under which systematic distortions of communication arise. His theory, based on the postulate that all speech is action directed toward arriving at
agreements, is predicated on this relation.

His project was announced in 1965, according to his long-time translator, Thomas McCarthy (1979), in his inaugural lecture upon being appointed to a chair at *Universität Frankfurt*. "What raises us out of nature," McCarthy reports,
is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together (*Mundigkeit*) comprise the only idea we possess a priori in the sense if a philosophical tradition. (p. xvii)

In this declaration it is possible to see, if not the imprint of Sapir-Whorf, at least that the solution to the problems and failures of past efforts to come to grips with the seemingly intractable social problems lay in the direction of the theory of language. Habermas's (1978) first systematic attempt to theorize about the relations of language to its historical unity with, rather than its domination of, the community of speech is to be found in the essay "What is Universal Pragmatics?" In it he articulates the principle which would underlie virtually all his future labors: "[T]o identify and reconstruct the universal conditions of understanding (*Verstandigung*). . . . I prefer to speak of the general presuppositions of communicative action
because I take the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental" (p. 1).

This project lays the struggle to reach agreement at the very foundations of social action, from which other forms of action, "conflict, competition, strategic action in general" (p. 1), ultimately derive. Particularly, he is interested in speech acts, the utterances which comprise everyday communicative experience. His theory, therefore, is actually more in the species of interaction, pragmatic intersubjectivity, and meaning theory.

His analytic begins with the semantic theories which seek to describe speakers' intentions. While he does not share with Sapir-Whorf the nearly absolute determinism with which they describe the influence of language, he does argue that linguistic signs are not isolated elements, but take their meanings from shared systems of signs which are publicly available. As he later puts it, "only those analytic theories of meaning are instructive that start from the structure of linguistic expression" (Habermas, 1984, p. 275).

Although this presentation (and Habermas's prose) tends toward density, his contentions rest on the possibility of reintegrating the communicative functions of informing and enjoining. However, in this reading, every speaker has the authority to enjoin an auditor by virtue of the force of logic and rationality with which the case is made. For
Habermas, all too often (in fact, in almost every situation), speakers avail themselves of illegitimate advantages in order to prevail in the negotiation of meaning. This is what he means by systematically distorted communication, which it is the purpose of his theory to provide the means --or at least the rationale-- to reject.

Speech and communication are moral actions for Habermas, and the only ethical stance for a teacher or other communicator is to attempt to ameliorate systematically distorted communication. The structures of speech acts, their force (locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary, (Austin, 1962), and their intention are the analytic tools by which distortions may be recognized. Habermas intends that his theory should serve and emancipatory interest, not a technical, instrumental one.

This (or rather some) notion of communicative competence has achieved a certain amount of currency in recent years. The term has gained the status, almost, of a buzz-word. However much of it misses the point. For example, in a recent number of Journalism Monographs, Shirley Ramsey (1988) inquired into the "communicative competence for the science interview." Yet her approach is almost exclusively instrumental: "[A] study of communicative competence...should provide insight into the development of science writer/scientist, cognitive/language behaviors...and look at how these...patterns affect communication products" (p. 2).
This approach is far removed from the ways in which Habermas intends his project to be understood. It provides, in fact, a paradigmatic instance of the colonization of discourse by the rationality of technocracy, which is the subject of the third chapter of this study. Rather, it corresponds to the competence agenda in the schools, and resounds with the behavioral objectives that have contributed to turning teachers into managers and students into products. The effects of such practices are addressed in the next section of this study.

The Situation of Communication, Education Professionals

In theory, the press is held to provide the wherewithal from which “inferences” are to be drawn, as well as the forum for robust debate, and to present information that situates the terms of such debate within a set of contextual references for the interpretation of differences of facts and opinions. Similarly, the schools are seen to supply the tools, and the training in their use, for “discriminating” among the different presentations of fact and opinion and, through the curriculum, to situate the context of the cultural and social traditions with reference to which critical social choices are made. Either in the discursive practices which construct them as uniquely influential modes of ensuring popular conformity to technically prespecified ends, or as projects which could create the conditions which foster the capacities of citizens to participate rationally
in the democratic governance of society, the two domains are inextricably linked in the potential possessed by the discursive and social practices of which they are constituted to influence such an outcome.

There is considerable evidence of the pervasiveness and prevalence of the press and the school as influential, material elements in the lives of American citizens. Since 1970 at least, the great majority of Americans have finished high school (Ravitch, 1983). This would mean having spent upwards of six hours per day, 180 days per year for 12 or 13 years of their youth in environs of the school. Then as parents, they may be at least indirectly involved in relations with the school of approximately the same duration, as they see to their children's education.

With regard to the media, recent research (Becker, 1988) has revealed that adult Americans spend over 50 percent of their leisure time in media-related activities. Among young people, the time spent with media is even greater because, along with an estimated average of three-four hours of media use per day at home, students are encountering growing amounts of media in their classrooms as schools incorporate newspapers, periodicals, films, video presentations, etc., into their curricula and instructional methods. However, no current theories of either the press or of the curriculum specifically address this phenomenon or adequately account for the potential conflicts which it may
To the extent that that environment is constructed by mediated presentations, the ability to understand and to recreate mediated representations of reality must figure prominently into the schema of "normal adjustment." Students as well as adults, who take an active, conscious part in the mediation of events, and who understand that their understanding is always and already related to interpretations of events rather than to the events themselves, can then contribute to the construction of environments which better suit their own existential purposes.

Therefore, an examination of the conceptual maps of the contemporary American cultural landscape must include, if it does not in fact begin with, an account of the natures, processes, and effects of two prominent socio-cultural features, the press and the schools, and of the relations between them. The press and the schools are cultural resources which, formally and informally, may conduce both formative and persistent influences on social and political activities, and on individual citizens' understandings of their situatedness as individuals with respect to those activities. As resources, they may be understood to frame the essential contexts in which individuals come to be socialized as citizens for participation in the broader arenas of civic and social institutions. It is in this regard that they are influential in the construction and the
endurance of the informed populace upon which the theory of
American political and social culture resides.

Technical Communication

Such a relation implies at least a system for
recognizing or constituting agreement on basic phenomena:
how else is agreement (learning?) to be acknowledged? By
its very nature, a concept of "communication" at minimum
carries with it a series of relations among implied subjects
and objects: "...from," "...about," "...through," "...to,"
and "...for."

Even the rankest beginning student of communication
could be expected to recognize the foregoing string of
prepositions and know that it represented Harold Lasswell's
(1971) model-turned-taxonomy of communication: **Who says
what to whom along which channels to what effect.** Likewise,
a beginning education student would recognize in this brief
typology a (probably all too) familiar species of pedagogy.
To have a concept of "education" already entails a similar
set of actors and actants. We may simply plug in some more
or less specific entities and interests to the taxonomy to
have a model for education. Such a commonsense model might
look like this:

1. Teachers communicate knowledge to students
   through lectures, books, worksheets, etc., to
   promote learning.

In this case, the commonsense model seems altogether
unproblematic. But is it? One way to understand the issues is to plug in other sets of elements into the taxonomy. For instance:

(2) Society communicates values to children through schools to foster social homogeneity.

Even that formulation seems benign enough and still relatively unproblematical, though the possibility for ambiguation arises with the introduction of such terms as "values" and "homogeneity." For another, less ambiguous example, take the following:

(3) Government communicates myths to citizens through the press to manufacture consensus and suppress criticism about its policies.

In this case, it is seems clear that it is no longer spurious or trivial to claim the importance of examining the conflation of such broad conceptions as education and communication. Yet another example will make the point more forcefully:

(4) Teachers communicate discipline to students through "school knowledge" to subvert critical thinking capacities and please administrators.

Examples such as these illustrate a technical model of communication and of education simultaneously. Even when other variables are introduced such as "noise" (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) to account for imperfect transmission or reception of messages, and "feedback mechanisms" (Wiener, 1961) to relieve the model of its one-way, deterministic
problems, the model exhibits traits of a rationalizing principle which objectifies all its constituent parts. The alienating logic Paolo Freire (1970) decried in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed as banking model of education --the teacher depositing knowledge into the empty cognitive accounts of students-- fits isomorphically over the Lasswell model or its information processing and cybernetic progeny.

Regressive Influences

Although there have been notable advances in the areas of conceptualizing the potency of both communication and education for emancipatory praxis, still there are ideologies in place at fundamental levels of our culture which impede the growth of recognition of the full import of such developments. The divisiveness and parochialism of academic disciplinarity, along with the commodification by the "culture" and "knowledge" industries, have had effects which critical reconsiderations of the fields have neither reconciled nor repaired. In the first instance, scholarly parochialism has exacerbated the fracture of the fields along the same lines as elsewhere the division of labor -- and more recently and perhaps more fundamentally the division of knowledge itself-- deprived work of its coherence and satisfaction. In the second instance, commodification has tended to trivialize and thus to impede the abilities of either to influence the other for the cause of the actualization of a truly democratic society. Both of
these conditions militate against the development and maintenance of informed publics possessed of the capacities to judge critically among the claims made by representatives of interests seeking public approval for policies.

One reason for this is that, as we have seen in the beginning sections of this chapter, education and communication historically have been constructed as categories of "mere" behaviors enacted by beings whose autonomy was irrelevant if not altogether spurious. Latterly psychological behaviorism and industrial management theories have been influential in determining certain fundamental aspects of theorizing upon, and therefore the expectations which might be held out for, both communication and education in general, and for journalism and pedagogy specifically. These will be explored in Chapter 3; in the next part of this chapter, I present evidence of the existential and institutional similarities and the differences between communication and education on the level of their structures and on the lived levels of the people who labor, often at seemingly cross purposes, to construct realities within the two professions which derive such authority as they have from their respective disciplinary structures.

Communication and Education: Likenesses and Differences

As I indicated in Chapter One, the real interests of journalism and pedagogy are existentially related. Thus it
would seem important to examine any perceived tension between the institutional discourses of education and journalism. A persistent ambiguity and ambivalence pervade the relations between the schools and the press in the United States, and not only on the level of press coverage of educational issues and problems. At the technical level of discourse, both are commonly considered to be affective, effective, efficient, essential, powerful, and if sometimes ineffable, nevertheless complementary socializing agents (e.g., Merelman, 1984; cf. Parenti, 1986).

Over the course of this century, traditional "non-political" institutions, such as the family, churches, and peer networks, along with traditional political institutions such as parties and unions, are generally conceded to have declined both in influence on and importance for the process of socialization of citizens: the formation of children's political and social attitudes and preferences (e.g., Chaffee, Tipton & Ward, 1970; Merelman, 1984). Meanwhile, media influence upon the young people, on whom the perseverance of democratic society will inevitably depend, has been shown to have increased dramatically, particularly among older youth (Hollander, 1971; Jennings & Niemi, 1988; Miller & Reese, 1982; Nimmo & Coombs, 1980). Almost by default the press and, though perhaps to a lesser extent, the schools have become the principal institutions to which task has fallen to fulfill the conditions and to meet the requirements which the critical eye of Jefferson detected
and identified 200 years ago as requisite for the success of
democratic government.

Nevertheless, since the 1920s at least, the managers of
the press --publishers and editors-- have steadfastly
resisted recognizing an "educational mission" in which that
term would be understood to have other than an instrumental
meaning. All the while mouthing myriad platitudes about
public service, the press has sought to avoid the
concomitant, uncomfortable issue of the press's potential
social responsibility to readers considered as learners,
students, or publics. Rather, in the cynical rhetoric of
the marketing ethos, a commercial relation is called forth
to supplant a social one.

This is accomplished in a way that suggests that the
institution of the press is aware of the potential
correctness of the implications of the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, and has taken the step of creating individuals' identities in linguistic practices. Readers who might
properly call upon the press to regard them as members of a
colis or, at a minimum, of a public --and thus, if not the
legitimate beneficiaries of the rights and privileges
bestowed by the First Amendment, at least their residual
legatees to whom the press owes a fiduciary responsibility--
instead are themselves interpellated as consumers by the
very institutions which trumpet their records for public
service as at least a partial justification for their
existence. That is, the press-qua-business in effect ignores the readers' and viewers' claims to define their own subjectivities, meanwhile recasting them in the more desirable (for the press, since all that is owed to an audience is a performance) aspect of audiences, consumers, and product. In the process, any legitimate public to which the reader/viewer might belong, as well as the individuals themselves, becomes objectified as a commodity that is actually created for the sole purpose of being sold back to the actual beneficiaries: the advertizers.

The Paradox of Effects: The Svengali Syndrome. In this reading of the press/school relation, the public has ample grounds for fearing that the media --especially, but not exclusively television-- were having deleterious effects on social phenomena ranging from health (cigaret ads/lung cancer), democratic politics (TV debates, and convention coverage/decline of political parties), and youthful violence (TV violence/ rebellious, violent students).

This public concern creates the paradoxical situation mentioned above. The problem is this: Media must be able to present themselves to their clients, their advertizers, as powerful and effective messengers whose services are worth the exorbitant sums they extract for delivering messages. At the same time, they also require some mechanism to provide "plausible deniability" (as Admiral Poindexter put it); that is, it means presenting themselves to their audiences in ways that assuage the common-sense fears of excessive dominance
and influence. Meanwhile, the media are constantly engaged in market research employing the positivist, behavioral techniques of psychology, political science, educational technology, and sociology, and constantly refining those techniques, to devise better ways to overcome buyers' resistance and, thereby, better sell the messages, while using the same information to provide more audience/product to sell back to their advertizers.

In the aftermath of the 1968 Presidential election, there occurred another predictable round of chest-beating. This has consisted of a campaign (self-choreographed, -generated, -promoted, and -serving) within the press itself to constitute the press as pitiful, weak dupes of skilled manipulators, with abilities far beyond those of mortal men and well outside the media's power to control or to resist, and who are possessed of media knowledge superior to that of the practitioners themselves (e.g., Mayer & McManus, 1988).

I refer to this attitude as the Svengali Syndrome. By maintaining this posture, the media assure both their advertizers and their audiences of the predictability of their putative neutrality and effect(ive/less)ness. That is, sponsors are assured that the media are themselves incapable of or unwilling to unmask their participation in the charades acted out to impress the consumer. Meanwhile, the audience is offered the solace that, if they are being duped, the messengers are equally helpless and stupefied, or
at least studiously neutral.

This attitude within the media comports with a paradoxical situation for the media vis a vis their position as a broker in the transactions of information and attention with their clients and publics. The model of the media as brokers differs in significant ways from the simple vending model, the communication typology of Lasswell (1971): "Who says what to whom, through what channels and to what effect." The mass media, in the capitalist model, "sell" at least two products: one is the channel (and sometimes the message, in the case of self-promotion) by which the message is transmitted by the sender; the other is the audience, which is packaged around a given message matrix and sold back to the sender. A given medium brokers both products; it is an active participant, and a beneficiary of, both transactions.

I would argue that, in the brokerage model, we can detect a clear analogy with schooling: The state is the source of the message as well as sponsor/advertizer; the curriculum is the medium; "school knowledge" is the message/product, and students are the audience/product. Meanwhile, socialization researchers in the schools --educators, sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists-- seek newer and better ways to market the message. Students differ from audiences for other mass-directed knowledges in that they are not conceived of as being simultaneously resold. Rather, the completion of the transaction is deferred. It is
finalized after the student has dropped out or graduated; then youth are encouraged to adopt an easy payment plan: to repay the sponsorship of their education with minimal levels of political demands, docility or indifference toward national policies, and at least tacit -- but at most, only nominal--levels of participation.

I would argue now that there is at least the possibility that broker's paradox and the Svengali syndrome could apply, with equal relevance, to schools insofar as they function to socialize in the name of education. You pay your money, you take your chances. This matter may lie at the core of the schools' problems with fundamentalists who fear the contradiction of values instilled at home by the expression and discussion of ideas at school which are seen to conflict with parents' desires that their children cleave to the home orthodoxy.

It may also explain the inability of socialization researchers to locate significant detectable effects of schooling on students' political attitudes and practices. Schooling must be shown to have some effects, in the efficiency-dominated social model, in order to justify the expense; but those effects must not be great enough to frighten the individuals on whom the system relies for support.
Antithetical Enterprises?

Despite these potential and actual similarities, at the level of structure within the respective individual institutions, journalism and education have regarded one another as essentially antithetical enterprises, with antipodal purposes, conflicting goals, and divergent agendas. For example, on one hand, as a matter of tradition, American journalists have at least rhetorically accepted a certain obligation to instruct their readers as well as inform, entertain, or entice them. Simultaneously, however, they—or their managers—have a ready barrage of reasons why this cannot be accomplished (International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, 1935). These rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding, however, where the mantle of such an educational responsibility has been assumed by particular journalists, typically they have been supported neither by a minimally sophisticated understanding of what a praxis of journalistic pedagogy would actually entail, nor by any marked institutional or managerial enthusiasm or sympathy for the task of developing and supporting such an understanding. It does not serve the vested interests of power that the press should be sufficiently educational to problematize the status quo or existing arrangements and perquisites within dominant institutions, or to challenge the established boundaries of permissible dissent (Chomsky & Hermann, 1989; Edelman, 1988; Parenti, 1986).
On the other hand, journalism's popularly accepted, though in reality seldom deserved (Altschull, 1984), reputation for abrasive adversariality and watchdoggery, and its all-too-potent agenda-setting capacities, as well as its connotation of skepticism of authority do not readily comport with or comfortably reside in the atmosphere of the contemporary culture of the school. Indeed, as a subsequent chapter will show in detail, school officialdom frequently has suppressed even the tamest exercises of journalistic enterprise, judging them to be inimical to the interests of good order and discipline within the rigidly bureaucratized environment of the contemporary American school.

By the same token, within the professional community of educational theorists and researchers, "journalistic" is a term of opprobrium, connoting a certain shallowness, a glibness, and a lack of seriousness. Classroom teachers, however, often seem content to rely on the representations of events contained in news publications to authorize and convey to their students a reliable (and testable) version of social situations wherein students locate and recreate their existential realities. For example, in current events units within the social education curriculum, it is relatively and understandably commonplace for those "newspaper in the classroom" exercises and current events quizzes to figure in students' overall grades. Teachers are, by necessity, pragmatists. But it is important what the
practice says about the contents of the news, what it implies about the views that are expressed there and those that are not.

Some Structural Similarities. Despite these apparent differences, even a cursory glance at the two fields reveals substantial, important similarities between the goals, objectives and practices of journalism and education. For example, there is a remarkable parallelism between the interests of journalism and education, taken as institutions. As Jacques Ellul (1973) noted, their projects and machineries are convergent in many ways. Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1974) in their study of the sociology of modernization and consciousness, The Homeless Mind, identify communication and education as "secondary carriers" which function under the aegis of the dominant narratives of bureaucracy and technology (p. 105). In the United States, as in any industrial and postindustrial state where knowledge has been commodified (e.g., Lyotard, 1985), education and mass media --the schools and the press-- are designed to operate primarily as (a) socializing influences on their audiences, (b) authorized conduits for transmission of approved, "official knowledges" to those audiences (Wexler, 1981), and (c) propagandizing agents of the state and other vested interests (Ellul, 1973).

Methodological Likenesses. Also, in terms both of the methodology by which they describe and pursue their aims and of the systems by which knowledge about the institutions has
been gained, the schools and the press resemble one another. In order to justify to their sponsors—advertisers and taxpayers, respectively—the enormous expenses involved in both enterprises, both mass education and mass communication units have felt compelled to adopt the criteria of exchange values. That is, they have been required to demonstrate the efficacy of their interventions.

In an age that is still predominantly influenced by the positivist ethos, both in the school (e.g., Finn, 1985) and the press (Cranberg, 1989), this has meant that some sorts of measurable outcomes have been required. Thus the seemingly endless parade of tests and polls began, spawned originally by consequences of putting the country on wartime footing during the First World War (Gould, 1981). The measurement industry in education and the market research/advertising/public relations industries in communications arose in response to these requirements and, though it is probably a moot point as to which came first, intelligence/aptitude testing and market/opinion research have come to dominate the ways in which the outcomes of the processes of communication and education are appraised and rewarded.

In their professional discourses, apologists for both the press (e.g., Cranberg, 1989; Mencher, 1987) and for the schools (e.g., Adler, 1982; Ravitch, 1985) proclaim value- and/or content-neutrality for their representations of factual content, the scientific "objectivity" of their
methods of 'discovering' and reporting --as opposed to constructing-- reality, and legitimate their appropriations and uses of such scientifically revealed reality under the imprimatur of the authority accruing from their expertise. Either explicitly or tacitly, under the encompassing dictates of "measurement" accountability (Martin, Overholt & Urban, 1976) or managerial efficiency, by these strategems individuals --teachers and journalists-- are deprived of creating and assigning their own meanings to acts of signification in terms of their own ability to comprehend their existential realities.

Affinities for Socialization

For another example of institutional similarities, both the press and the schools pay at least lip service to their roles as informants of and educators for the public weal. During campaign seasons newspapers, television, and even some radio station self-promotions routinely announce their intentions to provide "you, the voter," with the information "you need" to exercise responsibly "your right" to vote. Schools allege that they teach creative, critical thinking and problem-solving, also for the purposes of providing tools for responsible citizens to explore the world that is represented in the media and to thereby responsibly exercise their franchise. School activities such as student elections, newspapers, and various "citizenship enrichment" programs, with educational television broadcasts depicting students involved in community issues, appear to prefigure
adult responsibilities. Press units such as newspapers and magazines are incorporated into the curriculum, and students may be required to watch certain television programs, with the view that even a docu-drama or an info-tainment presented on television is superior to students' not being familiar with the information therein presented.

But it is possible that school and press share only the appearance of investing the citizenry with the capacities for attention and competences for debate to which they proclaim their dedication. Generally, they both share in defining the legitimate telos of their projects: education and information in the cause of suffrage. Yet even rational suffrage does not come near to exhausting the minimum responsibilities required of citizens competent to "cooperate in the government of society." Knowledge of political facts and a concomitant sense of active responsibility for policies have been established by the culture as measures of the success of the journalistic and pedagogical enterprises. Even by their own standards, established within the institutions, the press and the schools in America seem to have failed (Cirino, 1971; Jones, 1980; Picard, 1985; Wasburn, 1986).

Yet even in their failure, the potentiality for an emancipatory praxis in the professions of journalism and teaching (which have been identified as holding central places in the possibility of actual democratic
participation) are routinely denigrated in the popular culture that so sorely needs their professional offices. For example, journalism, according to an anonymous wag, is said to be "the calling of those who have missed their calling." Teaching is similarly disparaged: "Those who can, do; those who can't, teach, and those who can't teach, teach teachers," is a canard of ancient lineage. Journalists and teachers are in the unpleasant and over time untenable position of being the messengers carrying news of the accumulating cultural disaster and being blamed for the unpalatable tidings they bring.

It is possible that deprecation is an understandable response of a public which recognizes the potential authority, influence, and power vested in the practitioners of these most public of arts. It may then be that these rank bromides have a salutary effect, reminding the artists of their fallibility and providing a caveat against hubris. These laudable possibilities exist. There is, however, another, more insidious interpretation that, more or less unbidden, attaches to such slanders. That is, these attacks are a kind of generic argumentum ad hominem, the goal of which is to discredit newspeople and teachers (for such is much of the knowledge that is the common fare in schools: news; certainly no less "new" to most students than the events reported on by the nation's newspapers and television newscasts are to their consumers) and thereby to discredit in advance the achievements of which, under different
conditions, their praxis is capable.

Indeed, George Gerbner (1973) indicates this possibility in his study of the images of teachers as they are characterized in popular media, particularly in books, movies and television. Gerbner states that his examination of the evidence in those media the image projected of teachers, scholars, and schools "helps to explain --and determine-- the ambivalent functions and paradoxical fortunes of the educational enterprise in American society" (p. 265). There is little to wonder at in that, given that teachers (when they are portrayed at all) appear as weak and ineffectual ("They do not get the girl"), or as "mad scientists" (p. 283), or as "alien to the community...and often in conflict with its values" (p. 277).

If teachers have seldom had a favorable or symbolically strong portrayals, journalists' fortunes have risen and fallen: From the gritty, witty Cary Grant character in His Girl Friday, to the William Hurt character in Network News; with stops at Network and other less savory stations along the way, journalists are in the throws of losing whatever stature they once had and are being held up either to public censure or ridicule in the success game. The good reporter in Network News loses his job, the girl, his self-respect (albeit temporarily), and winds up working at a station in Spokane; meanwhile, the bubble-headed, bleach-blonde (unethical) anchorman goes on to fame and fortune.
Individuals in the System

Similarities such as these are largely concealed by the institutional discourses that describe the limitations—the parameters of inclusion and exclusion—of the spheres of knowledge with which the two disciplines are concerned and by which they are defined. But, inasmuch as they are seen as providers of (at least) the information and as sources of the concomitant competences necessary for the populace to make appropriate political, economic, and social decisions, the press and the schools may be seen as principal agents for either socialization or education.

Nevertheless, if it is true, as one pundit has it, that one need only scratch a journalist to find a social activist underneath, often there also bleeds a reformer when a teacher is nicked. Journalists, in the main, at least begin their careers imbued with a desire to seek social justice or to correct social ills. Former Associated Press reporter turned journalism professor J. Herbert Altschull, in one of the rare moments of optimism in Agents of Power, his otherwise somber and rather pessimistic assessment/indictment of contemporary journalism, has remarked that

There is built into journalism the possibility of inducing change and of helping to create a world that is more just and more peaceful; it is this possibility that has fired and continues to fire the imagination of journalists everywhere on earth (1984, p. 273, emphasis in original).
Teachers, too, frequently begin their teaching lives with imaginations fired by the possibilities for effecting change that seems to inhere in their chosen profession. The potential for effecting change locally ("helping kids") and globally ("making the world a better place") are among the major factors in attracting individuals to the teaching profession (Lortie, 1975). A similar sentiment is echoed in the literature of a number of teacher-centered educational reform projects. Among the central understandings motivating the National Writing Project, for instance, is that teachers are uniquely situated to act as change-agents in their schools and have the potential to affect both the teaching practices of their colleagues and the future prospects of their students by means of their own models for pedagogy (Daniels & Zemmelman, 1985).

All too often, however, the high hopes of newly fledged journalists and teachers come acropper on the institutional realities in their respective workplaces. Virtually all former journalists and teachers have stories about the dashing of their expectations on the rocks of institutional managerial intransigence. Altschull (1984), for example, includes in the preface of his book an account of his own disillusionment at the hands of obdurate editors who refused to accept his account the effect of the outcome of the West German elections. Ernest L. Boyer's (1983) High School, an account of the findings of the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching on secondary education in America, and John I. Goodlad’s (1984) *A Place Called School*, both report that a major cause of teacher burnout is the perception that school administrators either undervalue or reject out of hand teachers’ attempts to reclaim their classrooms for education rather than discipline and control.

At the level of the individuals who actually do the work of the press and the schools, the similarities are even more striking. Henry Giroux (1988), for example, has described the conditions which "define teachers merely as technicians." Their working lives are overwhelmingly replete with organization constraints and ideological conditions....Their teaching hours are too long, they are generally isolated in cellular structures, and they have few opportunities to work collectively with their peers. Moreover, they are prevented from exercising their own knowledge with respect to selection [and] organization of...materials.... [E]ven worse, they were asked to teach kids how to take risks, weigh alternatives, and exercise independent judgment while being restricted to ... practices that emphasized rote, mechanical, and technical aspects of learning. (pp. 74-75)

Giroux also reported that "the rhetoric often associated with the public's view of schooling was decidedly at odds with...functions in their jobs" (p. 74).
These are conditions with which editorial staffers on most large and intermediate size dailies newspapers would empathize. Along with low pay (though typically not as low as most teachers receive) and long hours, lower echelon news people routinely accept forms of organizational and ideological constraints, including institutional self-censorship and obeisance to the interests of management and advertizers that limit the topics they may report and approaches, sources, and points of view that are acceptable (MacDougall, 1889). Journalists are typically encouraged to conceive their enterprise as competitive rather than collaborative (Breed, 1955), and are pigeonholed according to the "beat" they cover. These practices may substitute for the "enclosure" within their classrooms that constitute teachers working situations.

Given then that there is a relation between the schools and the press in the United States, educators and others interested in the social and cultural implications of journalism and of the curriculum need to be concerned about the attitudes and competences for which citizens are educated. We have seen, in the context of a dominant vision of American participatory democracy, that both the press and the schools are conceived of, primarily, as playing roles as socializing agents in the continuance of democratic institutions, a point which I shall develop at greater length later.
Communication, Education, and the Dilemmas of Democracy

It was precisely this vision of an informed citizenry which that aristocratic travailleur Alexis de Tocqueville identified in Democracy in America as requisite for the realization of the American experiment in political and social ideals. As he did with many of the nascent American cultural forms he observed, de Tocqueville alluded pointedly to the problematic relation between the expression and the actualization of that ideal.

"When the right of every citizen to cooperate in the government of society is acknowledged," de Tocqueville wrote,

> every citizen must be presumed to possess the power of discriminating between different opinions of their contemporaries, and of appreciating the different facts from which inferences may be drawn. The sovereignty of the people and the liberty of the press must therefore be regarded as correlative... (1845, Vol.1, p. 190, emphasis added).

Volume I of Democracy in America consists primarily of caveats about and criticisms of American democracy, intended for the leaders of the French Republic, rather than for domestic consumption on these shores. Nevertheless, it is typical of de Tocqueville's perspicacity that his representation of the minimum conditions necessary and
sufficient for democratic participation should be as relevant today as it was a century-and-a-half ago, perhaps even more so. In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss certain ramifications of these democratic minima: how and what it may mean that they are problematized; how they are to be realized, and in whose hands that realization resides.

The Social Contrast

The problematic aspect of American republican democracy rests squarely on the presumptive condition that de Tocqueville articulated in the citation quoted above, as well as in a set of observations concerning the effects of equality on the possibility of a public life. These latter comprise the major part of the second volume of Democracy In America, composed some five years after Volume I appeared, and are germane to my concern with reconstituting a public sphere as an arena for which the schools should prepare, and in which the press permit, citizens to participate. I will expand upon the first of these here, and postpone the second until later in Chapter 4.

The first problematic presumption is this: Lacking evidence to support the presumption of the competence of its citizens to comprehend and evaluate the government and its policies, it is doubtful that even an elected government or other normative (much less coercive) social institution would for very long entertain the necessary respect for, or obedience to, the will of its constituents. Thus, the
possibility of actualizing or satisfying the presumption resides in two subjunctions: (a) that there be avenues by which citizens might obtain sufficient knowledge about the "different opinions" and "different facts," and (b) that there be means of engendering the requisite discernment and discrimination which "every citizen must...possess."

In other words, a democratic government --even a limited republican one-- which invites the cooperation of its citizens and then legitimizes its existence by that cooperation requires citizens to evaluate in a meaningful and thoughtful way the actions, claims, and policies of the government in which those citizens are cooperating. But not only must they evaluate those claims, they must also debate them; then, having been exposed to the different opinions and facts, they may agree to cooperate in such policies as may emerge from that process. Their cooperation, in turn, directly entails the citizens with a moral responsibility for their government's actions, policies and claims exactly because those citizens are cooperating in and, in that sense, legitimizing them. Thus citizens of a democracy must have--must demand--access to a veritable cacaphony of voices presenting them with "different" facts and opinions about the activities of their society, their raucous or distractingly dischordant clamor notwithstanding. Indeed, they must participate in that clamor. Equally, they must possess the ability both to judge among those voices, to
consider the possible consequences of actions which those voices advocate, and to bring to bear faculties of critical judgment which enable them to examine their own opinions, along with, and in view of, those of their compatriots.

I take this to be a stronger claim than that contained in the bromide Murray Edelman (1988) poses and effectively rebuts at the onset of his recent investigation of the contribution of the press to the "spectacle" of politics: "(C)itizens who are informed about political developments can more effectively promote their own interests and the public interest" (p.1). He continues:

That response takes for granted a world of facts that have a determinable meaning and a world of people who react rationally to facts they know... (when) neither premise is tenable....Whether events are noticed and what they mean depend upon observers' situations and the language that reflects and interprets those situations....If political developments depended upon factual observation, false meanings would be discredited in time and a consensus of valid ones would emerge.... There is no politics respecting matters that evoke a consensus about the pertinent facts, their meanings, and the rational course of action. (pp. 1-3)

To follow Edelman's argument out further, under conditions of perfect consensus there would be no politics
at all. In effect, there would be no news either, at least no political news; but as Edelman also notes, all news is political in that it fits into the matrices of crisis and solution which political necessity manufactures for the legitimation of policies and as "reinforcements of ideologies (p. 12) and no need for an informed, thoughtful polity. Hence there would also be no need for an education that could engender in citizens a faculty for judgment among rival discourses. In a strange way, that end would seem to be the end towards which dominant conceptions and practices of education are directed: toward consensual silence -- orderly, vast, and authoritarian. That conception echoes Isabelle Noelle-Neumann's (1973, 1974) theory of "the spiral of silence" as an explanation of media's power to limit discourse and to stifle rival voices.

A Fix on the Press and the School

American society is heavily dependent upon the press and other media for the images and pictures it receives of itself and of the internal relations among its various elements. It is still more dependent upon mediated messages for representations of reality it relies upon for the construction of its relations in and with the rest of the world. Schools are implicated in this dependency inasmuch as they have been identified, in a landmark U.S. Supreme Court civil rights decision as a "principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
(sic) for later professional training, and in helping him
(sic) to adjust normally to his (sic) environment."

Hence, de Tocqueville's perspicuous articulation of the
problematic of democracy may be read as caveat, which is
probably how he intended it (Sennett, 1978). The grand
experiment of acknowledging "the right of every citizen to
cooperate in the government of society" cannot succeed
absent the "presumed" competences pertinent both to the
dissemination of and debate over political facts and
opinions and to the reflective interpretation and thoughtful
exercise of action based on citizens' appropriations of
those facts and opinions. If a society takes seriously the
ideal of a cooperative, democratic polity, then that society
may not presume anything about the critical competences
which define and enable it, except that they are necessary.
Such a society must empower, legitimize, and maintain those
social institutions which respond to broadly conceived and
realized notions of civic competence, even though some
disorder or some discord ensue. Vocal and voluble debate
and disagreement and the clamor of widely divergent voices
should not be interpreted as symptoms of failure or of
weakness in a democratic state; rather they are, as de
Tocqueville observed, the signs of its vitality. They must
be encouraged by and in social institutions whose goals and
purposes --whose very raison d'être-- include, if they are
not actually founded upon, incorporating within them space
for such disputes to occur.
The press and the schools are the two primary cultural resources upon which American society has come to depend for creating the proper conditions in which such an enlightened citizenry would evolve. Thus, both the requirement and the problem that de Tocqueville identified clearly entail issues that are important in domains broadly defined as philosophy of communication and philosophy of education, and more particularly curriculum theory and theory of the press. For the former, this involves theorizing about the curriculum in relation to how it should be organized to best foster both an appreciation of the scope of the challenges and the abilities to meet them. A democratic curriculum theory should address how and for what purposes a curriculum is conceived and implemented; whose interests it serves, and what society may expect from students who have been educated under its influence. No less than these, however, it should also regard the communicative competences of those whose charge it will be to put it into practice: teachers. Similarly, a theory of the press responsive to the requirements of participatory democracy should conduce replies to questions about press structures, interests, and effects; and it should contain reference to the journalists, --though not necessarily newspapers or television news organizations-- as exemplars for social competence, both in appreciation of the terrible complexity of the challenges, and in pursuit and support of the democratic ideals by which
those challenges may be met.
NOTES: Chapter Two

1 I am not trying to draw an explicit homology here between communication/information and on the one hand and education/enjunction on the other. That smacks entirely too much of functionalism, for one thing; for another, it places too many limits on both of the primary terms. Neither one necessarily excludes the other. However, it does seem that, in the case of education at least, to claim that its essential Habermasian practical interest ought to be injunction is not proscribe any of the activities that teachers could legitimately practice: to rationally enjoin young and old learners to criticalness and skepticism vis a vis the claims of those whose interests are concealed. And by the same token, communication need not eschew injunction; that would remove from it the rhetorical purview which is a legitimate component of its operation.

2 Except in the sense that W. I. Thomas (1967), implicated in his theorem: Things that are taken to be real are real in their effects.

3 Berger and Luckmann (1967) attribute the genesis of the term sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie) to Max Scheler, who they say coined it in 1925. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that --at a time when a fairly rigid prohibition existed against trans-disciplinarity-- had Boas, Sapir, and Whorf been sociologists and not linguists they
would have participated in the discourse. The difference might be that, where Scheler and others suffered from or sought to prevent the "vertigo of relativity" (Berger & Luckmann, p. 5), Sapir and Whorf embraced it.

4 In a footnote, Berger and Luckmann (1967) attribute this point to Arnold Gehlen. Habermas (1983) provides an extensive critique of the Gehlen, as well as other West German "neoconservative cultural critics" and the American strain of that breed as well.

5 Bowers, (1984), elaborates in great detail and with equal erudition on the direct application of the sociology of knowledge approach to education. He also comes down on the "communication" side. His thesis is that sociology of knowledge explains the world the way it is, is perceived by students, and is rooted in the "primacy of the socialization process" (p. 97).

6 It may be supposed that, in addition to assisting students to come to terms with the vagaries of the "real world," newspaper and newsmagazine publishers promote the use of news publications in the classroom by such devices as "Newspapers in the Schools" programs in an effort to assure a continuing market for their products. This could have the further consequence of providing additional and essentially unchallenged reinforcement both to the commercial nature of the relations between reader and text, and of naturalizing
that relationship, and to the facticity of school knowledge. The very nadir of this relationship is now under way as a pilot program of the Whittle Communications Network in Memphis. Called Channel 1, this enterprise offers free audio-visual equipment to the schools which accept the program on the proviso that it be shown to every child in the school. Costs of the equipment and production are assumed by companies whose advertisements are embedded in the 8-to-10 minute "info-tainment" programs.

The educational role of the press was presented us a rhetorical possibility in the first widely recognized "code" of the profession, the Canons of Journalism, promulgated by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) in 1922. In its preamble, the Canons commit their subscribers to an explicitly educational stance: "[T]o communicate to the human race what its members do, feel, and think" ("The Canons of Journalism," 1935).

An approach more seriously directed to the educational role of the press may be found in the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation's (1934) The Educational Responsibility of the Press. This is a slim but fascinating volume, commissioned by the League of Nations to enquire "whether the Press is actually accomplishing its great educational mission of...the provision of information concerning...the requisite material for the formation of judgment and understanding by its readers" (p. 9).
It contains essays by five leading international journalists of the day: M. de Juvenel, former editor of Matin in Paris; Kinglsey Martin, writer and editor for London's New Statesman and Nation; Paul Scott Mowrer, Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign correspondent of the Chicago Daily News; Sanin Cano, of Nacion in Buenos Aires, and Friedrich Sieburg, Frankfurter Zeitung. Each in his own way responded to the question: "Is the Press able to raise the intellectual level of the people and, if so, how?" (p. 9).

Each in his own way (except de Juvenal, whose dialogue between the reader and the listener is quaintly poetic and Romantic) reluctantly answered in the negative, citing the commercial nature of the press, the low class of many readers, and the political pressures of national governments to see their own positions accepted.

Indeed, as Ellul (1973) notes in Propaganda: The Formation of Men's [sic] Attitudes, his important and seminal study of the history, conditions, operations, and practices of the books eponymous subject, mass communication and education are essential elements of the preconditions which afforded propaganda its entry into the fundamental matrices of the modern state. A certain amount of education and a wide dispersion of communication technology in effect guarantee the success of the propagandistic enterprise. Ellul contends that, paradoxically, the more education the propagandee possesses, the more susceptible that person is
to the blandishments of internal --as opposed to agitation (agit)-- propaganda (p. 102-117).

CHAPTER THREE
THE PUBLIC SPHERE, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND
TECHNOCRATIC RATIONALITY

The faults indispensable to this operation of accountancy consist in the morality of the terms used. According to an old terrorist device (one cannot escape terrorism at will), one judges at the same time one names, and the word, ballasted with prior culpability, quite naturally comes to weigh down on one of the scales.

(Barthes, 1972, p. 81)

[If] learning is translated into quantities of information...anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is not translated in this way will be abandoned...[and] the direction of new research will be directed by the possibility of its being translatable into computer language.

(Lyotard, 1985, p. 4)

The abolition of religion as people's illusory happiness is the demand for their real happiness. The demand to abandon illusion about their condition is the demand to abandon the condition that demands the illusion. (Marx, 1967)
Scholars and students of speech/language/knowledge relations have long recognized, but only much more recently begun to fully develop, the implications of the role that the speech/language relation plays in actually creating social reality. In one way or another, most of those investigating that phenomenon have concluded that social reality may be the only relevant reality there is. Even scientific knowledge of some independent reality is lodged in terms of human origin and meaning. In such a case, investigating the ways in which that reality is created and perpetuated is a central task of those who attempt to understand how and why things come to seem the way they seem. Since practices and processes of communication and education are widely understood to define or at least to delimit the possibilities for democratic culture in the present age, in the previous chapter I suggested that examining the relations between the concepts and practices of education and communication could prove to be a path worth pursuing in the furtherance of such an investigation.

This path was suggested because concepts and practices of communication and education were adduced to be the contemporary representations of two mutually supportive but apparently contradictory imperatives of language in the manufacture of human culture: to inform and to enjoin. If, as I have urged, those infinitives capture the primal level of language activity, and if as I also have urged they can be represented culturally by the processes of communication
and education, then communication and education figure large as aspects of the role language plays in constituting social reality. That being the case, the systems and life-worlds of journalism and pedagogy, upon examination, might yield clues as to the hows and whys of the ways things seem to be.

Thus, in the last chapter, I explored existential and institutional arrangements of journalists and teachers. This analysis showed them to be crucial to actualizing a foundation for democratic political and social culture, while the conditions of journalism and pedagogy showed them to be susceptible to the colonial predations of technocratic rationality. This I discussed in terms of particular institutional discourses and structures that conceal or distort important interactions and interrelations which I argued existed between communication and education on levels of experience sufficiently specific as to support the claim of a parallelism of interest. I indicated that these may have been glossed over, overlooked, or dismissed as suspect on grounds of overgenerality, which resulted in their division by positive science into discrete realms of inquiry.

I argued that this sundering has led to a division between informing and enjoining by which at a fundamental level all human culture is accomplished. I then showed that, in journalism and pedagogy, the breech is more
apparent than real, based on the existential conditions under which journalists and teachers work, and that their functional similarities overwhelm the differences between their projects. I then showed how the competence of citizens to participate in democratic political and social culture depends upon their being accorded the opportunity and afforded the training to exercise practical judgment on the data and opinions that constitute social knowledge.

The network of concepts and practices of commonly understood as communication and education comprises a system of discourse located in a historical framework and about which certain theoretical possibilities may be examined. In the first sections of this chapter, I discuss theories of discourse and sketch the development of communication and education systems which led to the model of the public sphere that animates much of this study and outline those historical conditions.

The discourse of intimate, private, and public spheres, however, has been muddied by what critical theorists have shown to be a systematic interference in the domains they represent. I therefore sketch in the foundations of this argument, before examining the meaning of the public sphere and the social responsibility principle that would support its re-invention. I conclude this chapter with a description of the operations of technocratic rationality and its implications for the emancipatory practice of journalism and pedagogy.
Discursive Formations, Discursive Acts

Conditions supporting the development of institutions and concepts such as the public sphere (e.g., Eagleton, 1984; Habermas, 1971, 1973), social responsibility (e.g., Altschull, 1984; Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947), and technocracy and technocratic rationality (Habermas, 1971; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972), and the problems to which all three are in different ways an attempt to address solutions are united in the problematics of communication and education examined in Chapter Two. These issues revolve around two main foci which are captured, as I have sought to show in the context of the existential relations of the press and the school, in the two infinitives ("to inform" and "to enjoin") by which the communicative and the educative functions or purposes of language are expressed as the constitutive minima of speech.

The infinitives (grammar never perhaps more aptly characterized the real world than in this situation) exist in a dialogical and a dialectical relation that has in recent times been represented by two distinct approaches to the phenomena of language and speech. Each approach, while granting the validity of the other, has sought to privilege its own domain: those who cleave to the primacy of the communicative/informative privilege the word, to the educative/enjunctive the action. While neither would claim exclusively to define the language/speech relation, the
history of modernity (though perhaps not the history of other ages) would seem to indicate that "to inform" has proven so far to be the dominant paradigm. In this chapter, I trace out the reasons for this dominance, suggest its consequences, and examine the claims of the other paradigm, through an exploration in the two cultural formations in which the two infinitives find their most public expression -- the press and the school.

Critical Theory of Discourse

The issues addressed in this chapter have to do with discourse theory, broadly conceived as the essentially political arena wherein all that individuals do, say, and write is shaped by structures of power (Macdonnell, 1986). In this sense, discourse theory may be seen to subsume both the informative and the enjunctive domains under their relations with those structures. A central premise of such theorizing would be that of the politicizing of the differences between communication-dominated discourses and education-dominated ones.

This process of politicization may be understood as follows: As they are expressed in the words, expressions, and forms of knowledge, and in the sources of those knowledges and in their objects in institutions and individuals' daily lives, the tensions in the dialectic/dialogic relations of language and speech are themselves the subject of discourse theory. Common utterances such as conversations and even more formal discourses such as
classroom interactions and news reports, along with any and all formal scholarship and research on such topics, are transformed into an unrecognized (or unadmitted) terrain of political struggle upon which the contest for hegemony is played out (e.g., Silverman & Torode, 1980). Social forces with particular objectives and purposes in view traverse the significations of common utterances, as well as those discourses whose modification or modulation is already presupposed by their location and participation in more or less formal discursive situations, such as the knowledges of academic, scientific, and/or occupational disciplines.

The conflictual nature of these relations is concealed behind commonplaces, the taken-for-granted ideological productions wherein are contained the meanings naturalized by institutions which demarcate the boundaries of the struggle over significance/signification. This struggle has an historical dimension, which may usefully be adduced by following (necessarily briefly) the paths trod by such institutions as communication and education through the periods in which their influence on our present conditions came to be constituted. I undertake this task in the next section of this study, tracing the historical developments of those elements of discourse that I have identified as the word and the act from the time at which they became a realizable element in the day-to-day lives of citizens. For this purpose, I have focused mainly on the institution of
the press, since it has had the more oppositional or confrontational role in these developments.

The Press and the School: Some Historical Relations

It is almost a question of the chicken and the egg, this matter of education and communication. The thirst for knowledge encompasses both. Press historian Michael Stephens (1988) has pointed out that, in pre-literate and non-literate societies, greetings between strangers are likely to be followed immediately by the question “What’s new?” or “What’s the news?” (p. 14). At the same time, education in the sense of “deliberate, systematic, and sustained” efforts to introduce the young to the accepted and acceptable practices of their communities is as old as society itself (e.g., Cremin, 1976). News provides the grist, and education provides the framework --the wheel and the stone, if you will-- for interpreting it. The two are to that extent inseparable and have become even more so since the advent of generally dispersed literacy upon which the modern age has depended. That event that for our purposes can be located fairly precisely.

The Universe of Modern Discourse

The Reformation was announced in 1517 with Luther’s “publication” of the 95 theses nailed to the cathedral door in Würz. Through the medium of publication, his act was known and was a topic of intense interest within “a fortnight in Germany, and within a month throughout the rest of Europe” (Stephens, 1988, p. 87). The Reformation,
therefore, began less than a century after the introduction of Gutenberg's printing press in the West.

Educational historian Erwin Johanningmeier (1980) has noted that schooling in a formal sense began to be made relatively widely available as a result of the Protestant Reformation and the establishment of the "priesthood of believers" (p. 5). Within this community, individuals could be responsible for their own relations with God through private interpretation of sacred texts. Acceptance of the doctrine "within a generation [by] over half of Europe" (p. 5) led to the establishment of schools by and in religious communities.

In consequence, literacy spread rapidly, because, in order for individuals to be able to interpret those texts, they had to be able to read. Yet another significant element in the success of Luther's program must have been the ready availability of relatively cheap printed copies of the Bible --which were made possible by advances in mechanical printing (Lortz, 1964, esp. Chap. 4). The two events led directly to a signal readjustment of the relations of the individual with the "Creator." But they also heralded a realignment of the individuals' relations with their temporal rulers (Johanningmeier, 1980) and, though indirectly to a similar and equally far reaching shift in their relations to the universe they inhabited.
The developments that spawned the Reformation, with its emphasis on interpretation (an activity prior to anything else), seem to have inclined the speech/language relation in the direction of action. And indeed, as Heinz Otto Lortz (1964) has shown, the period virtually seethed. The important developments for this study were in the area of journalism, particularly as it --unlike education for the most part-- strove to liberate itself from the yokes of monarchy with the audience that it was in the process of simultaneously constituting and being constituted by: the middle class.

Once having learned to read, readers become more or less undiscriminating as to what is read. People, if they are able to read at all, will read anything that comes into their hands. Newspapers (that is, printed broadsheets, ballads, corantos, newsbooks, letters, pamphlets, etc.) and secular books soon appeared (Stephens, 1888). By 1533, Thomas More could complain that more than 40 percent of Englishmen could not read, but that meant, as Robert Pattison (1982) points out, that over half could.

Reformation and Regulation.

The power and the threat to power which the burgeoning spread of literacy and the ancient appetite for news and knowledge represented was equally soon seen by those who wielded power and feared for their authority to do so. This fear spawned efforts by authorities to suppress (or at least to regulate) the process (Emery & Emery, 1984). This
presented a problem, however. Monarchs and their ministers
(of both sorts: More was Archbishop of Canterbury as well as
Minister of State) recognized that literacy served vital
political and theological purposes and ends. What was more,
like the contents of Pandora's box, it was already out there
as something to be reckoned with. Churches having pretty
much a monopoly on schooling were or were already in the
process of becoming official arms of civil government
(Anglicanism in Britain, Catholicism in France and Spain,
Presbyterianism in Scotland are examples). Thus the
effective control of interpretation was guaranteed by
effective state control of the schools, as long as these
alliances were maintained, a system which obtained from that
date forward.

Licensing. With the notable exception of Catholic
monarchies where the Inquisition held sway and enforced
proscriptions by eliminating readers, most states recognized
the inefficiency of attempting to control the reading habit
of their citizens. The solution lay in the control of the
presses. This was soon enough effected by the expedient of
official licensing, which ironically borrowed a page from
the Catholic Church. The first official licensing of
presses in England was announced on Christmas Day 1534;
thereafter all legal printed material bore the imprimatur of
the Crown. Queen Elizabeth I took the matter so seriously
that in 1576 she authorized flying squads to make weekly
searches of London printers' shops "to record works in progress, numbers of orders, identity of customers, and wages paid" (Emery & Emery, 1984, p. 8).

Still, this did not suffice to prevent the periodic appearance of polemics for papism, opposed to Protestantism, or other similar threats to the realm. Sterner measures were called for. Thus another Elizabethan innovation, the Star Chamber edicts of 1586, imposed torture and death as punishments for unauthorized, dissenting, or otherwise rebellious political publications, and not a few surreptitious publishers paid with their lives for their temerity. It was not until 1644, three years after their repeal by the Long Parliament, that John Milton would publish his justly famed paean to the free press, the Areopagitica (Stephens, 1988, p. 171).

That tract, influential though it would become a century later, was not widely disseminated at the time, and in any case only articulated the freedoms that rather accidentally came to the English press of the 1640s in the power vacuum created by the struggles of Charles I with the Puritans. With the arrival of Cromwell, the English press again fell on hard times again, and it was not until 1679 that Parliament allowed licensing of 1662 to lapse. At that, the measure was revived from time to time, but by then the power of absolute monarchy was on the wane, politics had become a public matter, and the second, more efficient and less obtrusive method of control and regulation was in
place: economics and patronage. These matters are taken up in the next section, as they bear upon a description of the rise and fall of the bourgeois public sphere in the 18th and 19th centuries.

The Setting for the Rise of Public Sphere

Great Britain (England having united with Scotland in 1707) at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century was still a rising power, not yet having reached the pinnacle it would command (and fall from) within the next 150 years. Despite the rising aspirations and influence of the mercantile middle class, monarchy (when it chose to exert it) still could wield nearly absolute power. The previous century of political strife and the abortive efforts of "The Pretender" (the last Charles Stuart) notwithstanding, Queen Anne sat four-square on her eponymous chairs, and Parliament could threaten and often exacted imprisonment as punishment for publishers of "seditious" libel.

Great Britain, then, was a society in flux. The civil war had at least diminished monarchical authority. Parliament was an equal partner with the monarch, having exerted itself to cast off the papist Stuarts and install the Dutch scions of English royalty. Hitherto unthinkable acts of lese majeste even unto regicide had challenged (though not broken) the royal personage, and their perpetrators had gone unpunished. The Absolute power and the Divine Right of monarchs were no longer quite so
absolute, and even divinity was in an unprecedented amount of durance. The cause of the latter was the second major intellectual revolution in the preceding 200 years, the Enlightenment.

The curiosity of Enlightenment scholars and scientists had opened a new cultural and intellectual space. In it, if not outright criticism, at least a healthy skepticism was growing of long-held dogmas about the relations of man with the universe in which he abode. The changes that the movement already had encompassed were substantial; what it forbode was even greater. By century’s end, little that an Addison, or a Steele, or a Defoe, or even a curmudgeonly Ben Jonson might have recognized in 1710 would remain unchanged.

Consider: Isaac Newton, who had “discovered” gravity, was presiding over the Royal Society. Francis Bacon was even then polishing the academic style of writing which survives to this day. Edmund Halley had already predicted (correctly) the return of a comet last seen in 1658. John Locke was barely six years in his grave. Bishop Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding was even then at the printers (Durant & Durant, 1963). And that was just in Britain. Elsewhere Leibniz, Huyghens, Fahrenheit, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Leeuwenhoek were at work; Racine, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Galileo, were part of the living memory, their works in print and widely circulating, their influence unabated.
These were stirring times in other areas, too. The War of the Spanish Succession raged across much of Europe. Great Britain had an army under the Duke of Marlborough (Winston Churchill's ancestor) in the field in France, another under Prince Eugene in the Netherlands, and were engaged in colonial wars with the French in North America which would end with the British securing Canada and its yet unguessed at but well imagined wealth.

The colonial empires that girdled the globe were the prizes at stake in these interminable conflicts; and in truth if the sun ever set on one of them, it arose in the same moment on another. Commerce within that sphere thrrove, wealth was accumulating with every ship that made landfall at Gravesend (or Antwerp, Brest, Cadiz, or Oporto). The British had consolidated their hold on India and were expanding the influence of their colonies in the New World; the French were active in North Africa, North America, and Southeast Asia; the Dutch, their own trade hampered by the wars ranging back and forth across their countryside, were nevertheless financing everything they could get a line on, and the Spanish were still taking shipsful of gold and silver out of Central and South America while extending their Empire into California.

The Public Sphere: A Place of the Critic

This was truly the beginning of the modern period. In it are visible virtually all the characteristics that occupy so much of our attention today. The Cartesian split of mind
from body was fait accompli. Empiricism was in the ascendant: scientific discourse was beginning to dominate academic, political, and public life, and faith was waning, Berkeley’s Principles of Human Understanding and Newton’s revision of his Principia Mathematica in the second edition notwithstanding (Durant & Durant, 1983).

Criticism became an honorable calling early in the Eighteenth Century. In London in 1709, amid the comfortable round of convenient coffee- (Will’s, or St. James’), chocolate- (White’s) and public houses (The Trumpet, or The Graecian), or accessible commons (Shire Lane), a circle of convivial friends and acquaintances which included Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, Jonathan Swift, Daniel Defoe, Alexander Pope, along with other lights great and small, were accustomed to foregather and to imbibe of one another’s wit and wisdom on all manner of current topics, along with their good Spanish snuff and sundry potables. It was in this Company and their public (as well as publicized and published) institutions that, according to Terry Eagleton (1984), the perimeters of the domains of modern criticism were laid down.

It was here, Jurgen Habermas (1974) has argued, that the concept of the public sphere was born --a category he shows is "central to an understanding of the modern period" (Hohendahl, 1974, p. 45.). Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, Daniel Defoe, and Jonathan Swift (all latterly labeled as
literarists, or journalists, or literary journalists, despite --or because of, as Eagleton (1984) argues-- their shared penchant for social criticism were giving a voice to the newly empowered class as it strove to emancipate itself from absolutist monarchy. The public sphere arose in part at least with journalistic midwives in attendance.

Yet the events of the conflicts between the Stuart kings and the Puritan Parliament, the Civil War, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 were still fresh in memory. Albeit the worst of them were some several decades past, recent events had refreshed the awareness. "Bonny Prince Charlie" had landed in Scotland (and had shortly thereafter returned hastily to France when the Scots had refused to answer his call) only a year prior to the founding of The Tatler. Steele (1965), in one number of The Tatler, had occasion to gently lampoon one of the Company, "Major Matchlock,...who served in the last Civil Wars and has all the Battles by Heart....[E]very night [he] tells us of his having been knock'd off his Horse at the Rising of the London Apprentices for which he is in great Esteem among us" (p. 21). The event referred to occurred in 1647; the little satire on it was published in 1709. Likely the worthy "Major Matchlock" was a figure of imagination, but his presence in the narrative seems to signal at least that some veterans of the wars still survived in garrulous old age, as reminders of perils not forgotten.
Emancipation was a central theme of the Enlightenment, and if political or economic emancipation were one species of that state which was pursued, another was emancipation from ignorance. That was, after all, one of the *raisons d'être* for the pursuit of science: by the various arts available to the learned, to advance the cause of knowledge and to free the ignorant from the oppressions for which their very ignorance was a guarantor. Evidence of the soundness of this interpretation is found in various numbers of both of the papers with which Addison and Steele were associated, *The Tatler* during the period 1709-1711, and *The Spectator*, from 1711 through 1712.

One of numerous examples, written by Steele (1965) in *The Tatler* under his *nom de plume* Isaac Bickerstaff, is dated May 27, 1709, and reproduces with a letter received on the subject of recent witch trials in the city of York. Written by a correspondent identified as "Bickerstaff's" cousin, the letter is an ironic account of what were assuredly three actual witchcraft trials, the last of those not having occurred in Britain until three years later (Grun, 1982). In such a climate, it could be expected that authors might take steps to protect themselves, even though their identities were either known or guessed at. As we have seen, the author/publishers of *The Tatler* were no exception.

The use of fictitiously named or "feigned" authors and correspondents by Addison and Steele was in part a necessary sort of camouflage in that period, and part a ploy to entice
readers. The camouflage was necessary because of the tenor of the times: dueling had not been outlawed, and seditious libel was a real threat. The publishers of the day which essayed to comment critically on the aristocratic class, which both The Tatler and The Spectator did with obvious relish and no little acerbity, still ran a considerable risk. And, in as much as both men served at times in the Whig governments that came and went during the period, they could ill afford to give offense that would attach to themselves.

The Public Sphere: A Space Whose Time Had Come

What has been variously characterized as "public opinion," "the public body," "the body politic" and "the public sphere" arose as the literacy and the political acumen of the earlier period accumulated to reach a critical mass, the bourgeoisie. This institution occupies a space that is between the intimate realm of the home and the formally public sphere of the state with its laws, protocols and authority. "One of its primary goals was to make administrative decisions transparent," Hohendahl (1874) writes. That function has been assumed, however badly, all considered, and certainly incompletely in contemporary American society by the press (though I postpone that discussion for a later section).

In any case, by the middle of the 18th Century, all the elements by which we have come subsequently to identify and
characterize the succeeding ages even unto our own were in place. The schools were for the most part safely ensconced with the churches which were either allied to the state or were fleeing its domains and proscriptions in order to found their own states. The press had fledged itself, and was steadily taking the shape of an adversary to the established autocratic/monarchical relations. The sciences were launched, and directed toward a new legitimation network that was to emancipate all from the yoke of ignorance and superstition. The commerce of the age was reallocating resources away from the Crown and into the pockets of the people. In other words, all was in readiness for the long-awaited golden age. That it never came; that, precisely because of the conditions set entrain at the time, it probably never could have, is what the remainder of this chapter is concerned with.

**Discourse, Social Responsibility and Rationality**

I now return to the themes articulated in the beginning of this chapter, having set up the historical conditions under which they have become of surpassing relevance to the contemporary understanding of the relations that they entail. In the sections that follow, I am providing a further grounding for the concluding chapter of this study by examining certain concepts which bear upon the struggle for knowledge, the conditions of its communication and acquisition, and the *telos* that is implicated therein. I turn first to a concept that describes the struggle.
**Hegemony: The Contest for Authorizing Meaning**

The complexity and extent of the interrelation between communication and education generally, between the press and the schools, and between the journalist and the teacher, becomes interesting when, as Antonio Gramsci recognized in his *Prison Notebooks* (Hoare & Smith, 1971), the commonplace is recognized to conceal sites of hegemonic conflict. Such sites are precisely where the struggle for meaning occurs among the various structures and interests which are always embroiled in contests for legitimizing authority to define the "proper" limits on the construction of knowledge. Gramsci's meaning for the term *hegemony* connotes a constant struggle for the power that authorizes the creation, invocation, and perpetuation of what constitutes the legitimate codes for basic signifying systems of cultural knowledge at a given time. That power is the prize that beckons all social interests to contest on any field where such authority may be gained. At stake in the struggle is not only the ability to influence behavior; it is, even more importantly and fundamentally, the power to approve or disapprove social relations by the subtlest and yet the most direct of means: by definition.

Nor is the importance of the contest lost upon all the contestants. Certainly, it is understood expressly by those who, for the last century at least, have exercised their claim to define and valorize what counts as knowledge.
It is less perfectly and more intuitively grasped by those who struggle to expand or to explode currently legitimated meaning systems to make way for their own hitherto excluded categories; and it is understood imperfectly --if at all-- by those who either have failed to recognize the paramount importance of the stakes involved, or have uncritically accepted the status quo and thus have either acquiesced in their own manipulation by it or relinquished by default their natural claim to contribute to their own definitions.

On Gramsci's analysis, commonplaces about communication and education reveal themselves to be a claims that the conjunctures common both to communication and to education are sufficiently well understood as to obviate the need for, and to cast into doubt the wisdom of, any further examination. However, the great number of discursive and non-discursive practices intuitively inscribed as common to the sets of social phenomena differentiated as communication and education also problematizes their differentiation. Of course, this makes the commonplace no less common; but it does invite an investigation of the common places for evidence of how and why knowledge and social reality are defined in certain ways at a particularly busy nexus of contention concerning the legitimation of knowledge. Such evidence may be found in what I take to be the paradigm cases of those most commonplace disciplines, journalism and pedagogy respectively, and the systems of press and school in which they operate.
The Meaning of Parts

The three topics that are the subjects of this chapter are in that category of discourse which is just outside the commonplace, but still familiar enough to be taken for granted. The public sphere, social responsibility, and technocratic rationality are, in this sense and in others, discursive entities—what Foucault (1972) in the last chapter called discursive formations. Two, the public sphere and social responsibility, share an explicitly public aspect which inclines them at the outset toward an allegiance with action; the third is a methodological construct and an epistemological model which locates it initially under the banner of the word. It remains to be shown the category—either communicative or educative—into which each fits, if indeed they may be so categorized at all.

However, before attempting to test these speculations, it will be necessary to first be necessary to make certain distinctions as to the meanings I intend to be taken with respect to the terms I use to describe the social geography of these issues. Thus in the next section, I will attempt to foreground such notions as public, private, intimate, etc., as they bear on this discussion.

The Social Geography

The distinction between public and private is of ancient lineage. The Romans defined an order of things that
were *res publica* (things altered by relation with *pubes*, or adults); hence, the variant *poplicus*, by which they seem to have meant to distinguish between *poplicus*, things of the people. This was distinguished from, but not perhaps contrasted to *privus*, by which was meant separate or particular and from which derived *privatus*, meaning not of the state. Intimate derives from *intimus*, the superlative of *intus*, meaning within; hence, the most within, or the most essential, as in the "intimate structure of the atom" (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1978).

As historian Richard Sennett (1978) has remarked, the history of the public and the private and the changes they have undergone are "key[s] to the understanding [a] basic shift in the terms of Western culture" (p. 16). Sennett found the first recorded appearances of the word "public" in English (around 1470) to be used to connote "the common good of society" (p. 16) and some 70 years later to have the added dimension of objects or discourses that were "manifest and open to general observation" (p. 16). He records that in the usage of that time, "private" meant "privileged, at a high governmental level" and "that by the end of the 17th Century [there was] an opposition of 'public' and 'private'" (p. 16) which was similar to that by which the distinction is made today: "'Public' meant open to the scrutiny of anyone, whereas 'private' meant a sheltered region of life defined by one's family and friends" (p. 18).

In modernity, the distinctions have become, to an
extent that Sennett (1978) argues is of fundamental
importance, almost meaningless. Sennett argues that the
popular interest in equality has had the politically
paradoxical consequence of undermining the realization of
democracy. He maintains that the confusions surrounding
what is the proper purview of intimacy, privacy, and
publicity has corrupted and rendered irrelevant and useless
the concept of a disinterested discourse on matters of
social consequence in American life.

The importance of any distinction, Foucault (1973,
1975, 1984) has long argued, has disappeared under the
relentless onslaught of modern sciences' investigations of
the mechanics and the psychics of the human organism. In
the service of the discursive interest of the state in a
greater ability to control that organism through the
technologies of discipline, such differences as are today
preserved are purely formal.

For Foucault (1973), there is no paradox. The
discursive formations of science serve precisely the
interests of power. By their legitimation in the apparently
"objective" pursuits of knowledge about humanity, the
scientically demonstrated sameness of individuals is used
in the project of maintaining existing power relations. By
naming as "dysfunctional" (to those who instantiate the
power/knowledge relation and exert the power) those
discursive "pathologies" which question the otherwise
unchallenged exercise of power, power justifies its repression of "deviance" and effectively truncates those discourses which might thwart its ends.

At all events, the terms public, private, and intimate have become problematic behind the transformation and translocation of the meanings that are assigned to the terms which are used to signify (or, if we may believe Sapir-Whorf, actually determine) the existential conditions by which we make sense of the social (life-) world. We now have a substantial (even dominant) discourse that advocates the privatization (by which is meant the industrialization) of the public weal in the name of efficiency. The hitherto intimate sphere is continuously and perpetually invaded (critical theorists say "colonized") by a science that is indentured to the state and to the "private" interests to which the "public" interests of the previously private sphere responded. We have been persuaded by David Riesman (1961) and others that our turning inward constitutes a virtue -- though Christopher Lasch (1964) has recently provided an antidote to, or at least a more complex statement of the consequences of doing so.

The critical theorists' attack on positivism and their intense interest in its concomitant realization in the discourses of technocratic rationality (on which more later), articulate a program that, while not explicitly recognizing Foucault's insights, thematizes these abuses. Habermas's (1974) representation of the theory of the public
sphere identifies an agency which, if reactualized and reinvigorated, might provide a salutary counterpoise to them. Countering the abuses of modernity seems to be the project toward which his universal pragmatics and his description of communicative competence is directed.

Or, if --as Habermas (1974) himself seems to have recognized-- it is no longer possible to recreate the necessary conditions for recuperating the public sphere in the form and substance it took when it first appeared in the bourgeoisie's struggle against absolute monarchy, it might be possible to re-invent such an agency. (This possibility, and a synopsis of what I believe it would require to actualize it, constitute the contents of Chapter Five.) In any case, we are now in a position to turn to the concepts in which that possibility is contextualized, and to discover their discursive affinities, if any.

The Public Sphere. That the nature of the public sphere is that of a discursive formation in this sense is suggested in Habermas's (1974) definition of it as "the realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens" (1974, p. 49). Habermas thus appears to consider the public sphere to be a discursive space situated between the intimate sphere of familial and domestic arrangements and the state constituted as the expression but not the collectivity of the general will.
This sphere is created of the communicative capacity of
the collectivity when "private individuals assemble to form
a public body...[to] confer in an unrestricted fashion...about matters of public interest...Although the state
authority is...the executor of the...public sphere, it is
not part of it" (p. 49). Neither do they overlap, as Peter
Hohendahl (1974), a European interpreter of Habermas's work,
has explained. Just as Habermas's conception of a public is
not be confused with a crowd or the mass which assembles
randomly and without purpose, Habermas means that the public
sphere and the state should confront one another across a
gulf delimited by potential social action or policy.

He is concerned with an institution that (once having
accumulated the rational sense of the public opinion
immanent in the conversations for which it also serves as
the forum) can address the state, independently of coercion,
in the expectation of both being heard and garnering some
response. "To be sure, state authority is usually considered
"public" authority, but it derives this task of caring for
the well-being of all citizens from [its relation with] the
public sphere" (p. 49).

It may be seen from the foregoing remarks, and from the
description of the historical conditions under which the
concept that has been described arose, the initial impulse
to locate the conception of the public sphere in the camp of
enjunction was not misplaced. Albeit it is a discursive
practice, the public sphere entails conversation,
confrontation, and communicative capacity employed to enjoin compliance with an expression of democratically informed public opinion. If I am correct in my supposition that "to enjoin" rational action is the **telos** of education, the public sphere is then an inherently educative medium, or one whose **telos** is enjunctive; concomittantly, if I am correct that "to inform" is the **telos** of communication, then it is also a communicative medium. This relation of the public sphere to an educational praxis is founded in a historical situation which lends further credence to its representation here; I shall return to it later in this chapter. Next, however, I shall take up the issue of social responsibility, which was also hypothesized as being enjunctive.

**Social Responsibility.** For reasons that will also be made clear later in this chapter, the space that Habermas (1974) intends should be occupied by institutions that are representative of the public communion of the voices of the social collectivity are, in the United States and other advanced capitalist societies, instead held to be the private domain of the media, especially the press. Yet it may be that an inkling of the inadequacy of the "private" paradox with which we dealt in one of the previous sections.

Social responsibility emerged as a specific category in the discourse of mass communications ethics in the late 1940s in a document prepared by Robert Maynard Hutchins and
a company of other scholars. Philosopher William Ernest Hocking was generally accorded the authorship. The document was called *A Free and Responsible Press*, and in it were presented some fairly pungent caveats to those who, espousing the libertarian-pluralist model of freedom of the press, nevertheless have advocated a laissez-faire attitude toward the "marketplace" philosophy under the rubric of which the modern press as a social agent has been developed and theorized.

The theory has been troubling, though more honored in the breach, since its emergence more than 40 years ago in American mass media studies, especially in relation to the press. As a theory of the press, and as (I shall argue in more detail in the last chapter) a heuristic for educational practice, social responsibility owes its importance to the (even in 1947 already growing) awareness that, as media sociologist Denis McQuail (1984) explained with customary understatement, in "important respects the free market had failed to fulfill the promise of press freedom and to deliver expected benefits to society" (p. 80).

It can be argued that those are the least of the faults of press freedom constrained by the "free market;" but it is an observation filled with portents, both for the press and, as will later become apparent, for education. For, in its acknowledged failure, the free market theory of media --and theories which embrace literally metaphors of commerce in ideas generally-- presents an example to educators and
others concerned with perpetuating and strengthening the
democratic way of life of the folly of permitting
unrestrained market forces to govern access to, and
distribution of, intangible but nevertheless primary social
goods such as knowledge or its precursor, information.

The theory has had fewer defenders than critics, however. Here is John C. Merrill (1974), one of social responsibility's most persistent critics: "[T]his new theory maintains that the importance of the press in modern society makes it absolutely necessary that an obligation of... responsibility be imposed on the mass media..." (p. 36). He continues: "So we are led to believe that if democracy fails, it is the fault of the American press" (p. 86). To forestall that failure, Merrill has argued, the concept of social responsibility --if it were generally adopted-- would "necessarily imply governmental control" (p. 91), which would be contrary to the very principles of the free press which the concept was developed to promote: "[T]he definition of responsible would be functional in a monolithic way --defined and carried out by government or by some non-journalistic power" (p. 81).

The argument is representative of an assembly of critics of the social responsibility theory who have complained that (a) the theory itself lacks a locus of potential pragmatic effect and a focus with which to assure it of internal consistency (e.g., Altschull, 1984), and that
In any case, the only agency with sufficient authority to impose such a responsibility as implied by the theory is the government; such intrusion on the rights of the press is unconscionable and, if that were not enough, certainly unconstitutional (e.g., Altschull, 1984; Merrill, 1974; Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979; Merrill & Odell, 1983).

While I am in at least partial agreement with the critique that Merrill and other traditionalists have lodged against a certain interpretation of social responsibility, I cannot agree that theirs is the only interpretation. Critics who fear state intervention appear to ignore the ways in which the corporate-state alliance already exerts control over the press. Their faith in the efficacy of their own agency seems to exist without an accompanying recognition that, whatsoever efficacy they possess, it is the product of social and discursive formations which have already been colonized and naturalized by corporate imperatives and the technocratic rationality that is their invariant accessory. These permit an illusion of agency while also limiting it in accordance with tolerable levels of dissent. And even such dissent as is permitted is subtly directed toward issues on which the press's effects are either necessary for or negligible to the discursive system of predetermined objectives.

This may help to explain the fascination of the modern press with strategies: in federal, state, even local elections, in reportage on Congressional business, in the
coverage of wars and revolutions, or reports on domestic issues. The main cast of the majority of these reports is frequently on the intimate details of conflicts among the elites for authority, not to determine ends but rather to specify the particular means by which taken-for-granted ends may be most efficiently accomplished. The press is a mouthpiece for contending points of view, but the contention is over merely the methodological approaches to various issues, rather than over the full range of alternatives. This is the existential flaw in the market-place of ideas ideology which has dominated discourse: the market-place is itself a social formation under the domination of those interests which prosper by controlling and limiting access to acceptable and non-disruptive voices (e.g., Hall, 1980; Hallin, 1985).

The Market-place of Ideas

Whatever else it may be, the marketplace is not conducive to democracy in any way that is commensurate with what political philosophers think about when they use the term (e.g., Habermas, 1984, 1987; Rawls, 1970). The market tends always towards monopoly (Galbraith, Adams & Mueller, 1975; Litman, 1988). In and of itself, the market possesses no inherent claim upon knowledge (Lyotard, 1985). It may only exert its sovereignty over those things that have been given up to as commodities in an exchange-value market. Neither may it oblige, in and of itself, a thing to be
offered or maintained as a commodity once producers and
creators of a thing recognize their own interest in or of
the thing is guaranteed by their acts of creation or
production. Knowledge, then, is only capable of being
commodified when certain social conditions can be induced to
prevail.

An essential condition for the commodification of
knowledge is that its creators cede to capital their
constitutive authority in specifying social meanings. So it
is in the interests of capital markets to dissuade the
individual creators of meaning from appropriating to their
own ends the communicative resources that enable the
creation of knowledge and provide it with a supportive
medium in which it may flourish. In the image of the unseen
hand is disguised the unpallatable knowledge of what it
ultimately must mean to consume everything: extinction. In
that way, then, the market is the true expression of self-
decided, self-dedicated determinism: economic Calvinism.

In that respect, the market may be the quintessential
expression of nihilism: despair in the face of the knowledge
that once begun, the process can never be arrested except by
natural means. Those, ultimately, are extinction. Politics
will never suffice. Once introduced, politics naturally
interferes with any attempt at interrupting the natural
sequence presupposed by the rationality of the marketplace.
Politics is the expression of the individual; education is
the expression of community; communication is the medium of
expression. And we understand at another level of understanding Brooke Shield's declaration: "Nothing comes between me and my Calvins." Emblem, icon, totem, that little girl sensuous face-figure-voice represents the ultimate seduction of community by the market: Calvins-ism. Redeemed by flourishing; flourishing, thus redeemed.

Social responsibility is another explicitly discursive formation. inasmuch as that, when it was first proposed by the Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947), it was intended to apply to an explicitly discursive medium as well as a discursive formation in its own right. Yet, being also lodged in the camp of action, social responsibility is not a topic with unique relevancy only to the press. To the extent that we admit the authority of the school in socializing the young, it is in, of, and toward some notion of social responsibility that educators are directing them. The curriculum, then, is in effect the statement of the principles by which competence to act on information in a socially responsible fashion is to be both fostered and understood.

Technical V. Practical Rationality

It is widely accepted that bureaucracy and technocracy are the two dominant social orientations at large in the contemporary world. What is not widely discussed outside the desmaines of critical theory is the relation of those modern developments to the aspirations of the Enlightenment.
In their treatise, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1972) set out something like this position as the practical agenda of the period: ridding the oppressed of the pain, force, and suffering upon which traditional authority historically relied for its persistence. But they also provide a critique of the Enlightenment in which they assert that, in challenging and eventually overturning one set of despots, the period prepared the stage for another, less material sort of despotism. This is the tyranny of science, of rationalism, of method.

**The Pollution of Cultural Resources**

The cultural resources represented by the press and the schools are the well-springs upon which democratic social order draws for substantial parts of its nourishment. But like fresh air and clean water, the sustaining resources of a democratic polity have become increasingly polluted under conditions similar to those by which essential physical resources have been contaminated by the toxic by-products, effluents, and residues of unrestrained technological development. Ideological detergents, pesticides, and preservatives have been introduced into the discursive environments of communication and education.

The most prevalent of these, the most damaging to the possibility of democratic polity, and the most dangerous by virtue of its almost universal acceptance in the public and political discourses of the age is the ideology of
technocracy. Both by Habermas's account (1971) and by the accounts of the Frankfurt School theorists whose work was influential in Habermas's development as a theorist, the pervasive domination of discourse by instrumental logic and technological rationality marks a crucial watershed in the evolution of social relations. The success of these modes of legitimation to validate only that knowledge derived from a narrowly circumscribed methodology has enabled interests which define the nature of social relations as technical problems amenable to technically defined solutions to subsume concerns for the attainment of practical goals.

These are symptomized by developmental trends which Habermas (1971) describes as having figured prominently in the objectification of the processes of journalism and pedagogy since the burgeoning of advanced industrial capitalism. Of primary importance among these has been permanent regulation of economic processes has become the foremost determinant national policies (Habermas, 1971). This has meant that other legitimate interests of the state have been steadily overtaken by the interests of capital accumulation and management, to the extent that the state has effectively ceded its authority in any sphere to make political decisions which are not in the interests of capital; and the rationalities of economy and efficiency have colonized domains in which such categories as efficient management, cost-benefit analyses, etc., are inappropriate
at best, illegitimate at worst. Emphasis on economy and efficiency privileges the means-ends, accountability-focused relations that obtain and in which the status quo is assumed as a given, reifying inequities and justifying their perpetuation as functional necessities (Held, 1980).

Colonization of the School and the Press

Dieter Misgeld (1985), the German-born Canadian critical education theorist, has noted that this on-going and so far successful "cultural invasion" of the sites of such resources has transformed them "into technically planned courses of action" (p. 77). This is crucially true of schools where, as was shown in the previous chapter, it is symptomatic of and necessary for what Habermas (1981) called colonization of the lifeworld --the systematic, rather than ad hoc, subjugation of ordinary life experiences to "managerial rationality"-- that radical inequities in communication and education are made to seem indisputably natural within a context of unexamined assumptions.

Technocratic Rationality in the School. For some time now, educators have known that, in the words of one science educator, "Knowledge is not (something) which can simply be transferred from those who have it to those who don't....It is not a torch...passed from hand to hand. (It) is something which...individual learner(s) must construct for and by (themselves)" (Lochhead, 1985, p. 4). In other words, to regard education as simply a mechanical or a technical program of pre-determined
objectives,...along with programmed learning and competence-based instruction....[which] refers only to the business of instruction....capable of producing anticipated and planned results...on the appropriate range of diagnostic-evaluative tools (Misgeld, 1985, p. 89),
is at least misleading, arguably mistaken, and ultimately illegitimate. Knowledge is always interpretation (Gadamer, 1975), mediated by social relations (Friere, 1970; Geertz, 1973), ideologies (Althusser, 1986; Wexler, 1981), and/or generalizable human interests (Habermas, 1971).

Yet, despite this, a predominantly technical rationality (e.g., Rice, 1914) has remained the mainspring driving most 20th century administrative (e.g., Cubberly, 1916; Taylor, 1947) and pedagogical (e.g., Bobbitt, 1924, 1941; Tyler, 1949) theories and practices of schooling. It has been at the root, as well, of periodic school reform movements (e.g., National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983; Conant, 1959; Thorndike & Gates, 1929). The model was borrowed from "scientific" industrial management (Johnson, 1964) and has since been adapted to accommodate advances in cybernetics, computer science, and information processing theory. This rationality has assumed two different, though related --and as employed, ultimately reductive-- metaphorical constructions: the mechanism, and the organism (Foster, 1986). However, each --taken
separately, or considered together-- has justified a "means-ends" model for schooling.

The technical rationality model has not been without critics, even among conservative educational philosophers. For example, R.S. Peters (1963) warned about the dangers of narrowly conceiving an educational practice whose goals and objectives are already predetermined, prespecified, and least in principle, quantifiable: (T)his model of adopting means to premeditated ends is one that haunts all our thinking about what is valuable....It is my contention that this model misleads us in the sphere of education" (p. 88). Nevertheless, over time the potential affective consequences of the mechanical, technical model of schooling, either for teachers or for students, were not subjected to close scrutiny.

Recently, however, critical reexaminations of educational practice have supported the view that a means-ends rationality may be an inadequate and inappropriate framework for understanding schooling. Scholars such as Michael Apple, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Henry Giroux, Michael Katz, Joel Spring, and others have denounced that dominant view of schooling and education for school professionals for conceiving school work in the same plane with factory or shop work. In the views of these critics, the dominant conception of professional school work --and thus practitioners' institutional and professional identities --has occasioned the practice of education as an
almost purely technological enterprise. They recognized and articulated the effects of applying to students and teachers the mechanistic model similar to those by which, for example, industrial engineers assess the performance of mills, presses, and stamping plants, and businesses measure profit and loss. Technical rationality permits, even encourages, the construction of student identities—both future clients as well as future professionals—as so much raw material to be fashioned into so many replacement parts. "In this way, schools become more like...factories dominated by concerns for input and output, efficiency, and cost savings" (Beyer & Apple, 1988, p. 4).

This is not to suggest the bulk of past inquiries into the purposes of schooling and into school professionals' roles and practices have been irrelevant, or to diminish the importance of their findings. To the contrary, many such inquiries have brought to light important and significant issues for the education of teachers and other school professionals, the study of their practices and their working environments, and the development of the special competence and knowledges that schooling professions entail. Nevertheless, critical scholars have shown that much prior research and many of the programmatic recommendations arising therefrom have been constrained by the limited, and limiting, technical conception both of the purposes of schooling and of school professionals' roles and
responsibilities *via a via* those purposes within that conception. What has been needed is a an educational model in which professional intercession and mediation in meeting individuals' needs transcend the administrative-technical interests of engineering/management. Such a model would instead establish and implement a viable alternative conception of legitimate professional school practice.

Mediation *is the Message*. It remains to be shown that schooling involves an equally compelling and fundamentally important struggle and that school teachers intercede and mediate in it in ways which both justify and require professional competence. Paradoxically, that struggle is evident in the expectations that hitherto have elicited as a solution the same technical rationality whose usefulness has been shown to be insufficient to the task.

Schooling has been deemed among the most affectively influential experiences in American life. For almost a century, Americans have been encouraged to regard academic education as the key to the good life (Cremin, 1961; Ravitch, 1985; Shor, 1986). During that time, the social institution of education has grown to be perceived as an effective instrument for both individual and societal achievement. For individuals, it is seen as a means of achieving satisfying personal lives, social mobility, and entry into employment hierarchies; for society in general, it has been touted as a means for the amelioration of numerous and frequently desparate social problems.
Accordingly, educational institutions responsible for engendering succeeding cohorts of school professionals have undergone periodic readjustments to their curricula, as a substantial literature indicates. Since the early 1870s, departments, schools, and colleges of Education have retooled a minimum of three times, to accommodate succeeding waves of reform agendas: career education, back-to-basics, and the recent push for "excellence" (Shor, 1986). However, in the last decade, the clamor over the state, stature, and status of U.S. public education has not declined. If anything, it has been exacerbated by the linking of education to the vicissitudes of international economic competitiveness.

**Technocratic Rationality as Effect: Media Research**

Essentially the same process is occurring, and the same rationale is being applied, with regard to the headlong rush of U.S. mega-media companies to concentrate. This has presented more of a problem for the press that might be expected though less than for the schools. I indicated near the end of Chapter Two that the media faced a structurally paradoxical, potentially troubling and possibly devastating contradiction in the presentations of their project to either their advertizers or their audience. This I called the "Svengali Syndrome."

The syndrome is a consequence of media effects research, which has swung through at least two complete
revolutions since Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Lasswell, and the Frankfort schoolmen took up a serious interest in the issue. Until early 1930s, based on a common-sense notion that something so novel and so compelling as the media (i.e., radio, film, comic books, newspapers) must by its very nature have broad and not altogether salutory effects, media researchers posited a "bullet"-like character for messages (e.g., Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott, 1977). That is, the media were credited with a very strong influence, and messages were thought to penetrate their audiences quite unmediatedly, piercing consciousness like a bullet. This theory was supported by the uses to which the media were put by European dictatorships in the years between the wars. McQuail (1984) notes that this evidence "tended to confirm what people were already inclined to believe—that the media could be immensely powerful" (p. 177).

That paradigm was discarded after World War II, in favor of theories that, while still crediting the media with some power, directed attention to the good which could come from responsible use of the media to address and hence ameliorate social problems. After about 10 years, this approach was also abandoned in research on media effects when some critics claimed the field was in danger of "withering" (Berelson, 1959). It gave way to a model of communications influence in which effects were deemed considerably less potent, and mediated beyond recognizable—-or at least, beyond verifiable—limits by the plenitude of
intervening psychological and sociological variables (Gitlin, 1978).

The model of effects which evolved out of the British Cultural Studies group around Stuart Hall in the 1970s swung the pendulum back towards a more potent media conception (e.g., Hall, 1977). This model saw media as once again almost supremely powerful, but a kind of gloved fist veiled behind an ideological support for the status quo in the contest for hegemony. It took as evidence an evidence-manque. That is, it inferred influence in terms of what seemed to be excluded from the most powerful media channels (McQuail, 1984). That model has had a continuing influence and has been elaborated in much of the recent research aimed at redefining the parameters of the study of communication (e.g., "Ferment in the field," 1983).

Media sociologist Herbert Gans (1983) put the problem succinctly: "Because the news media are themselves political institutions, policy-oriented studies inevitably have political and ideological implications which science cannot resolve but which the researcher cannot avoid" (p. 174). Unfortunately, those implications seem studiously to have been ignored by the working press, with consequences that have not yet been felt at their fullest. Those are hinted at (one is not prescient), along with other implications.

*Technne-cratos v. Technne-logos.* It may be objected at this point (if not sooner) that I am in danger of
o'ertipping the carefully crafted series of relations that were employed to attempt to distinguish among social responsibility, the public sphere and the rationality of technocracy.

The distinctions still hold, I believe, if I be permitted to assert the difference between technocracy and technology. Technology, as I have been using the term, implies a dialectic and a dialogue; technocracy contains no such resonances. There is no vital tension in technocracy. Cratos views its appropriation of techne as merely a more efficient means of asserting the power of which it is the symbol than is demos. By definition the ends of techne are systematic and prespecified (techne, for Aristotle, is that species of knowledge which is applied instrumentally toward the production of artifacts, as was shown earlier). But in technology, there exists the counterpoise of the logos, the redeeming indefinicity of the word. Therefore, while technocracy dominates, technology negotiates; it is this human dimension which the former lacks which distinguishes between the two.

The colonization principle is exemplified in much of the discourse surrounding the Hazelwood decision, which will be discussed in the next chapter. School is seen as the arena in which, far from fledging their growing critical awareness, students are restrained by dogmatic, formulaic exercises and forbidden to explore regions where the danger to themselves is miniscule but is rather a threat to the
expertise of their keepers. The decision upheld the rationality of school officials' claims to exercise their expert prerogatives against what critical educators have recognized as the necessary possibility of students' acquiring the communicative competence to define even a small part of the agenda in their own immediate environment on the fundamental grounds of First Amendment rights of speech, expression, and the press.

The schools and the press are among the most visible institutions to have come under the thrall of the rationality that grew along with the new despotism, and hence among the advantageous places to observe its effects and thus to examine its entailed interests. Under the aegis of the dominant rationality that Habermas (1971) and others have described as the least desirable, least elevated, least emancipatory under the rubric of general human interests, the instrumentalist/technocratic view of the purposes of education has been dominant in the discourse of schooling since the earliest days of this century, not excepting even the purest Deweyean version of Progressivism, as Robarts and Bickel (1987) have shown; the dominance of which may have been materially responsible for the very ills that recent school reform proposals have been advertized to address. In the next chapter, I examine a case in point.
NOTES: Chapter Three

1 In Therborn, 1980, p. 357. The author is a dogmatic, doctrinaire Marxist, dismissing the Social Democrats as "revisionist" and the Frankfurt school as "revisionist...[and] anti-scientific" (p. 386). Marcuse fairs a little better, but his reasoning is "[u]nfortunately...inverted in relation to reality" (p. 387).

2 The seditious libel statute, the Alien and Sedition Acts was not struck for the U.S. Code until very recently, when it was declared unconstitutional in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan, (1964). 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d. 686 (1964).

3 "Berkeley in Principles...regretted that Newton had thought of space, time and motion as absolute....[and thus] independent...of divine support....When Newton...agreed to prepare a second edition he tried to appease his critics. He assured Leibniz...that he did not assume a force acting at a distance through empty space....To further meet religious objections he appended to the second edition a general scholium on the role of God in his system..." (Durant & Durant, 1963, p. 542).

4 The attitude is captured in Jefferson's aphorism (cited in Chapter One), about the perils of ignorance to a people who cherish freedom, and there remain traces of this attitude in the bromide which Edelman (1988) debunks in
Chapter 2.

5 *In my Just journalism: Toward an institutional ethics of the press* (Konopak, 1985), I show that information and by extension knowledge that is required for the individual to realistically appraise her own life-chances is a public good that requires being excluded from the market, by virtue of its very publicity.

6 See (e.g.) Forester, 1985. This is an exceptional collection of essays which recapitulate virtually all the Frankfurt School themes and the elaborations and disjunctures that Habermas brought to the study of critical theory. The essays, by the likes of Dieter Misgeld, Trent Schroyer, Ben Agger, and Daniel Hallin, focus on the praxis that is immanent in Habermas's work; the book also includes a chapter by Habermas himself, on the praxis of architecture in the modern and postmodern age.

7 See, (e.g.) Habermas, 1971. *Knowledge and Human Interest* lays out the three domains of human interest in a hierarchy of their human potential: technical, practical, and emancipatory. Held, 1980, discusses these topics and analyzes their import from a valuable perspective.
CHAPTER FOUR
DISCOURSE, DISCIPLINE, AND HAZELWOOD

...On the one hand, there is the re-organisation of right that invests sovereignty, and on the other, the mechanics of coercive forces whose exercise takes a disciplinary form.... [P]ower is exercised simultaneously through this right and these techniques and...these techniques and these discourses, to which the discipline gives rise invade the area of right so that the procedures of normalisation come to be ever more constantly engaged in colonisation of the law. (Foucault, 1982, p. 107)

We ought...to be suspicious of the contention that a man who reads and writes does in fact make an informed choice in the performance of his various social duties. Intentionally or not, the result of mass [mechanical] literacy...has been to train the citizen body only for social efficiency and obedience. (Pattison, 1982, p. 175)

Only on relatively rare occasions do the true interests immanent in the operations of technocratic rationality and instrumental logic become revealed to public view. This occurs when, as they sometimes do, irruptions obtrude at the
margins, intersections, and interstices of the discursive formations and practices by which that rationality is both constituted, maintained, and naturalized. At these moments, contradictions may appear that reveal the shape, substance, and machineries of the iron cage that their hegemonic discourses normally conceal.

In the previous chapters of this study, I have endeavored to examine in terms of theory the ways by which the dimensions of the iron cage could be discerned: how the influence of technocratic rationality is made to appear to be the natural state of affairs, how this influence militates against individuals' recognizing its effects and taking personal responsibility for their perceptions, and how it is maintained in discourse. I have also argued that the pre-eminent position occupied by technocratic rationality and instrumental logic in the structuring of human conditions and life-worlds is nowhere more evident to the critical eye than in the taken-for-granted operations of contemporary institutions of communication and education, the school and the press. Thus, if one were to examine the seems of the cage for evidence of rupture, those at which such evidence could be most visible would be at the points of intersection between the schools and the press. The January, 1980, decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier provides such an instance.

Hazelwood: Facts, Functions and Fallacies

The Hazelwood case and the majority opinion on it
presents a unique opportunity to examine and interrogate the techno-managerial rationality as it operates to ensure its dominance in the hegemonic conflict for the power to define the world. *Hazelwood* offers a glimpse at the normally concealed relations by which the technocratic agenda is simultaneously framed, advanced, and reified in discourses. As will become apparent, the discourses in this case are those of both communication and education.

In the following chapter, I examine and discuss the decision in the matter of *Hazelwood*. First, I present the facts of the case, of which only some were considered by the three courts which ruled on the issue. Then, by way of contextualizing the issue, I review the results of the scholastic press's efforts to assert its rights under the First Amendment, in light of their value to the democratic concerns highlighted in the previous section. This first section describes some basic issues involved in the *Hazelwood* decision. In this section, I employ what Paul Lazarsfeld (1946) cogently termed an "administrative" reading of the contending discourses about censorship in the U.S. student press, whereby the discourse under study is permitted to stipulate the terms upon which it may validly be evaluated. Although this evaluation takes for granted that which the discourse might seek to conceal, it does adumbrate certain suggestive relations.
In the next section, these discourses are related to an interpretation of Michel Foucault's (1972) development of the concept of "discursive formation." The concept is elaborated, and its evolution into a controlling, normalizing power/knowledge (pouvoir/savoir) relation is traced, along with the place of discipline in this conceptual matrix. This section situates the Hazelwood decision in the analytical stance that informs a subsequent re-evaluation of the discourses. This section includes a (necessarily brief) excursus on Foucault's thought, certain insights from which inform much of what I have to say, both in this context and in others in both preceding and succeeding chapters.

There then follows a section in which I examine some examples of discourse about the Hazelwood decision within the professional journalistic community. Through an analysis of responses to the decision by mainstream U.S. newspapers, journalism association and trade (management and employee) house organs, and journalism reviews, I suggest that the decision has important and recognized implications not only for journalism education, but also for the wider spectrum of concerns with issues of civic, educational, and journalistic competences. The chapter concludes by situating these discourses in an overarching rhetoric of technical disciplinarity within the press and the schools.
The Facts of the Case

Students enrolled in the Journalism II course at Hazelwood East High School, a wealthy, conservative St. Louis (MO.) suburb, wrote and edited the school newspaper, The Spectrum, under the tutelage and supervision of the school's journalism teacher/advisor. For an up-coming issue, students on the staff had written articles on, among other things, student pregnancy in their school and on the effects upon students of divorce. Prior to going to press with the issue, the journalism teacher/advisor, following a practice which had been instituted only after articles critical of school system pay practices had appeared in a previous edition of the paper (Visser, 1987), had submitted the page "dummies" for the paper to the principal.

Upon reviewing the paper, the principal objected to the content of the divorce and pregnancy articles and, claiming there was insufficient time for reworking the material he found objectionable, deleted the entire pages upon which those stories appeared from the forthcoming edition. Student journalists on the Spectrum claimed that their First Amendment rights had been violated, and sued the principal, the school, and the school district, seeking injunctive relief, monetary damages, and declaration that First Amendment rights had been violated by censorship. A U.S. District Court upheld the censorship; the students appealed and won a reversal in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The school board then appealed the Circuit Court decision to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted *certiorari* and, on January 13, 1988, announced that it reversed the Appellate Court decision by a vote of 5-3. Written by Justice Byron White, the majority opinion on *Hazelwood* articulated three separate rationales for deferring to the school officials' discretion in suppressing students' expressions:

(1) Schools need not "tolerate speech that is inconsistent with [their] basic educational mission" (at 564);

(2) Unless specifically authorized, a student newspaper published as a curricular exercises "cannot be characterized as a forum for public expression" (at 564), and

(3) As publishers of such newspapers, schools may exercise "editorial control over the style and content of student speech" when their actions are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns" (at 565).

The decision has been deplored and hailed, respectively, either by student press advocates and educators interested in the protection of students' rights and in the furtherance of the pedagogical principle of teaching by example, or by school officials who saw in the decision the legitimation of management concerns over control of the schools. In any case, as will be shown in the following section, the decision only rationalized practices of interference in student
expression which have been on-going for decades.

**Learning Voice Control**

The scope and nature of First Amendment rights of students has long been an area of acrimonious dispute in the courts, in the student press, and in schools (Kristof, 1983). For the student press and its advocates and supporters, the highwater mark arguably was set in 1969. That year, in *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District*, the Court protected students' freedom of expression in school to the extent that "speech" such as wearing a black armband in protest of the Vietnam war was tolerated to the extent that it did not materially interfere with "legitimate educational functions of the school." In a memorable phrase, Justice Fortas ruled that neither public school students nor teachers may be construed to "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." With the *Tinker* standard, the Court established a precedent that authorized students a measure of autonomy from the proscriptive practices in public schools, which Justice Fortas castigated for their potential to become "enclaves of totalitarianism."

Yet even in the face of such a stern admonition, the standard set by *Tinker*, though flawed from the perspective of advocates of students' freedom of expression (Kristof, 1983) manifested a spirit of tolerance which has been honored more in the breech than in the observance. A study
conducted for the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Foundation five years after Tinker still had occasion to report that an unabated program of school censorship "has created a high school press that in most places is nothing more than a house organ" (Nelson, in Gillmor & Barron, 1984, p. 717) for school administrations' interests. Thus, while the vast majority of incidents of censorship do not achieve the notoriety of Hazelwood, and so are not brought into broad public awareness, the practices represented in Hazelwood are neither particularly unique, nor isolated phenomena.

According to the aforementioned report for the Kennedy Foundation in 1974, and Tinker notwithstanding, generations of both subtle and overt interference with the rights of student media have fostered a climate wherein self-censorship, the result of years of unconstitutional administration and faculty censorship, has created passivity among students and made them cynical about the guarantee of free press under the First Amendment. (Nelson, in Gillmor & Barron, 1984, p. 717)

With Hazelwood, the Court essentially legitimated, ex post facto, managerial controls over students' speech that had been in force, or threatened with chilling effect, for many years. A 1981 survey of 500 randomly selected high schools in all 50 states conducted by a researcher at Harvard found that instances, threats, or fears of censorship were reported by more than 70 percent of
respondents (Kristof, 1983). The Student Press Law Center, a privately supported Washington D.C. watchdog group, has reported that it is apprised of between 300-500 cases "of censorship or constitutionally suspect punishment for publication" each year (Gillmor & Barron, 1984, p. 717). 

Hazelwood opened the floodgates. Within the first months after Hazelwood, according to SPLC executive director Mark Goodman (in Fraser, 1988), the Center noted a "significant increase in the number of (reports of) principals demanding to review all copy before going to press" (p. 8).

Practices such as prior review comport with an observation made more than 30 years ago by attorney and freedom-of-speech scholar Thomas I. Emerson. Emerson (in Zuckman & Gaines, 1977) recognized and inveighed against the pernicious nature of unleashing the process of prior restraint by administrative fiat. He warned that the entire process is geared toward suppression and that, once in place, the censor will be impelled to find things to suppress.

While apologists for the decision have argued that the Court merely returned to school officials their natural control over education and restored "a degree of sanity to an area of law that had been threatened by lower court lunacy" (Kilpatrick, 1988, p. A27), others were not so sanguine. According to Nat Hentoff (1988), a noted advocate of freedom of speech and expression, the majority opinion in Hazelwood
accorded administrators (who are not necessarily nor even primarily concerned with education) virtually a free hand in stilling student voices that might discomfit the comfortable management of their institutions. In ruling that school authorities could, without violating students' First Amendment freedoms, control a broad range of students' public expressions --from student newspapers, through yearbooks, student plays, etc.-- as long as they were part of the curriculum, Hentoff observed that "public school principals can now censor just about any student speech, written or oral, that is not officially approved" (p. A27). As we shall see in a subsequent section, it was not only student speech in the curricular context, but indeed a wide variety of speaking "texts" such as textbooks, that would ultimately be subjected to this control.

In any case, with the Hazelwood decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has substantially enlarged the powers of prior restraint which may be exercised by school administrators. In doing so, the majority dealt a serious blow to students' rights of expression, while ignoring the decades-old caveat that Donald Gillmor and Jerome Barron (1964) identified as "the foundational concept in this line of cases," which was articulated in an often cited 1943 decision prohibiting schools from requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance:

That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.  

(West Virginia v. Barnette, 1943)

Yet, writing for the Hazelwood majority, Justice White's text at least tacitly concedes that the potential for "strangled minds" and discounting important principles as platitudes were of less consequence than school officials' discretion in maintaining the authority of the curriculum to proscribe content on technical grounds, or reifying a particular "educational mission of the school."

He saw only two oppositional choices for school officials: either permitting "all student expressions...regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate or personally insulting," or the dissolving of all student speech activities, (at 572, fn.9).

The Dissenters

It was apparently just the danger of institutionalizing cynicism and of teaching students by example to discount important democratic principles, to which Justice William Brennan's ringing dissent seemed to allude. Brennan both opened and closed his dissent with a stinging rebuke of the majority for the quality of the civics lesson that was being taught by the Court when it upheld the principal's right to "brutally" censor students' articles, which the principal
had admitted to a reporter could show his administration in a bad light to the local school board or "tarnish the school's ... reputation" (Visser, 1987, p. 441).

Brennan's dissent is far more fulsomely annotated than that of the majority opinion. Underlying his position, perhaps, seems to be an appreciation that, in narrowing the scope of Tinker to exclude the student press (along with other examples of student public expressions), the Court also was nullifying the impact on students' rights to free expression of a significant body of case and Constitutional law that hitherto had protected students' First Amendment rights. Mindful perhaps of the tendency of dissents to eventually supercede majority opinions (as Justice Hugo Black's dissent in Tinker seems to have done in the case of Hazelwood), Brennan takes pains to insert into his dissent the panoply of Constitutional and case law precedent which the majority either ignored or explicitly deemed irrelevant.

The bulk of those decisions had endeavored to close the regulatory avenues available to school officials who, under pretexts of protecting youthful sensibilities, or the necessity to maintain discipline, sought to constrain student expression by drawing overbroad meanings as to such terms as "disruption," by imposing restrictions on pamphlets, etc., or by other assorted strategems. As Brennan notes, the Hazelwood majority opinion "aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts) can camoflage viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection
of students from sensitive topics" (at 578).

Attorney and curriculum theorist James A. Whitson (1988) has pointed out that there is a flawed logic at work here. It is apparent in "the kind of formalistic, all-or-nothing legal reasoning," which permits "preoccupation with such issues as whether or not student newspapers meet some doctrinal test...as 'public forums'" (p. 248). Whitson shows how this logic simultaneously (a) militates against the development of the necessary competences to ascertain true interests in the discursive construction of social reality and (b) constrains discussion to choices that seem structurally to inhibit or preclude making decisions or taking other actions which could both enhance students' understandings of democracy, and contribute to students' preparations to become active, conscientious, and/or willing contributors to democratic dialogue.

Whitson (1988) has argued that the "special characteristics of the school environment" (Hazelwood, at 567) should militate for an entirely different position by schools, both teachers and administrators, on the gropings of students toward social and cultural competence. They should not be tolerated in their diverse expressions, they should be actively encouraged, both in the culture of the school and in the explicit practices of pedagogy. In his view, education is a process whereby "ideas and expressions are presented to challenge and enlarge students' capacities
for dealing critically and soundly with the full range of ideas" (p. 245). In contrast with other communicative situations, where ideas "are presented for the sake of getting them accepted, the classroom has certain 'special characteristics'...in which students are strategically confronted with a diverse array of conflicting ideas" (p. 245). Therefore, in his view, "for government to act as educator," necessarily entails that structural and existential provisions should be made for a "wide latitude for free expression" (p. 245, emphasis in original). "Far from justifying special limitations" (p. 246), he argues that democratic values of tolerance should be recognized as comprising the special character of schooling, rather than a restrictive interpretation.

These considerations notwithstanding, a restrictive, controlling cast to schoolings' special characteristics, however, is consonant with the view that schools, and other social institutions as well, exist primarily as machineries serving the "functional" requirements of advanced corporatist states. Among these has traditionally been the need to be equipped with a labor force whose capacities to reason critically are truncated. In the next section, this study first discusses and then adopts a Foucauldian approach to the problem of discursive constraints on ways of understanding this logic of control. This approach suggests a way of discerning the relations that are in play in the particular situation represented by Hazelwood, as well as in
which the more general school/press relation may be interpreted in light of the instrumental rationality which holds both institutions in thrall. That rationality is exemplified in the section following the next, in which the discourses of journalists “talking to themselves” in the professional/trade literature is examined.

Discipline, Discourse, and Relations of Power

Foucault’s analytic is especially apt in this context with respect to his views on the work disciplinary technology as an important instrument for maintaining discursive orthodoxy. The analysis suggests that certain of the journalistic texts represent a paradigm of a view of school/life relations that results in the denial and abandonment of certain attitudes about knowledge and power which should be fostered as both journalistic and educational communicative social competences. This analysis will attend to the relations of power portrayed in the rhetoric of “discipline” which characterizes much of the current discourse among discursively “authorized” communicators.

Foucault: Discursive Formations and Practices

The reality we think and talk about exists only in the manner and form by which we think and talk about it. Consequently, because we can talk about reality only in the manner and form by which we do think and talk about it, our discourses define our conceptions of reality. In turn, the
ways in which we think and talk about reality depend upon the overarching *topos* and *logos* of a given age, its *episteme*, which establishes for that age the perimeters around the permissible.

This, I think, is a close approximation of what Foucault (1972) means by the concept "discursive formations" (p. 44). They are, essentially, styles of the organization of knowledge that operate automatically in a culture to define and shape the relations of knowledge and thought. They are "relations," not internal nor external to discourse:

They are, in a sense, at the limit...; they offer (discourse) objects of which it can speak; or..., they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish... These relations characterize... discourse itself as a practice. (p. 46)

Moreover, they are "rules that enable (things) to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions for their historical appearance" (p. 48). While conceding that discourses partake in the general operations of sign relations, Foucault argues that "what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to language (*langue*) and to speech" (p. 49). In other words, such relations are the material forms taken by knowledge and thought.
From Discourse to Power

Initially, according to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983), Foucault was not interested in the pedestrian, the everyday practices by which people go about ordering their lives. Or rather, he was deflected from such concerns by his insight into the pervasive nature of discourse. He became concerned --almost obsessed, so much so that he posited the end of the human subject and its replacement with rule-governed, autonomous discourse (Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 1985)-- with "serious speech acts: what experts say when they are speaking as experts" (p. xxiv). With what illocutionary authority is a speech act imbued when it is spoken by an "expert?"

For Foucault (1972), what experts say is informed by and authorized by their expertise, which is an example of a discursive practice. Expertise implies a delineating, defining discourse in which an expert can have and maintain discursive perquisites. The expert partakes of discourse practices in order to selectively include or exclude knowledge: to "constitute a domain of objects, in relation to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions" (p. 234); that is, the knowledge of which knowledge abides in and by the rules of the discourse. Their expertise, in turn, as well as their ability to be experts, is a function of the increased technologizing of social practices that permit --even require-- the power relations entailed in specialization. It is certainly an oversimplification of
the years and rigors spent in the tracing down of the artifacts of this transition in social relations; but I would hazard, nevertheless, that it was his appreciation of this line of implication which led Foucault to abandon his project of providing a general theory of discursive practices. Or better, this former project became subsumed in favor of his latter-day project of interpretive analytics, "the history of the present" (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 118). In this way, as Foucault's thinking and writing progressed from archeology into genealogy, he came to recognize and to describe the material reality of the forms implicated by the multitude relations of knowledge/power. 

The Voiceless Words of the Insane

Prior to these revelations, however, Foucault (1973) had begun to investigate the social phenomenon of madness, and its place in the evolution of the discourse of discipline. Madness, for him, was a paradigm case of the discursive construction of a category of human action that was comprised in a hitherto unknown domain and realized, for the first time, in the application of the label. Psychiatry, the medicament of the soul, came to represent for Foucault the "tyranny of 'reason' over 'madness'" (Sheridan, 1980, p. 12). The speech of people labeled as mad was automatically discounted in the society in which they dwelt, and it was the very act of this exclusion that made reason voluble.
We shall have reason to return to the topic of madness presently. For now, what is important is that Foucault identified this *malaise* as a condition from which arose a discipline, an expertise, that owed its existence to its ability to thematize an Other whose presence challenged the reason of the Subject. From this recognition grew his conception of power as biotic; that is, as a uniquely energized constituent of all social relations, an inhabitant of all social and political practices "from top down and also from the bottom up" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185). A central feature of this latterly arising project is its focus on the "micropractices" of social orderliness, of organization: the seemingly ineluctable processes by which every(-)thing and every(-)body is socially colonized; that is, characterized, individualized, moralized, normalized, routinized, taxonomized and totalized, according to political and disciplinary technologies, the tools of bio(tic)-power.

**Disciplinary Technology in the Discourses of Hazelwood**

It is largely as a result of this facet of his *œuvre* that a Foucaultian approach is found to be particularly suited to this discussion. Both the discourses of the Court in rendering as well as in dissenting from the *Hazelwood* decision, and the discourses instantiated in the articles and commentaries of the journalists discussing the case are characterized by that crucial expertise. As I will show, these discourses are rooted in a rhetoric of discipline and,
to some extent, domination or, at least, control as it is related to the dis-eased condition of its subject/object.

The Ubiquitous 'They. In a Foucauldian analytic, raw domination is not the motive force in these discourses, however, because domination is not the essence of power. Those who manipulate power, who play games and shuffle for position, who aspire to dominance are, in Foucault's (1979) analysis, the first dominees. The real, but hidden, "political technologies" must take hold, must colonize the the local life-world before they can extend themselves to colonize others. There is no ubiquitous they; rather, the they is it: Power is not an institution and not a structure; neither is it a strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic relationship in a particular society (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187). One of the central attributes of that complex relationship is discipline.

Discipline, Foucault (1979) argues, specifically disciplinary technology, emerged as a major concern synchronically with the rise of the "dubious" (i.e., human or social) sciences, as power began to require productive yet docile bodies as useful forces. Its contemporary manifestations, he claims, could not have been accomplished without the interdictions of those enterprises: their disconstruction of the body as an individual concern and its relocation in the regime of the division of labor, the
mapping of its functions, and the need to perfect its efficient functioning. The process accompanied the discovery of the self as subject. Discipline, with its emphasis on bodies, is then essentially corporeal, but it existentially assumes --paradoxically, given its project to produce docile, even willing, subjects/objects as cannon fodder for the advance of its technological rationality-- the repeal of the Cartesian rift between mind and body.

The Body, the Self. Allen Megill (1985) in Prophets of Extremity, an intense and telescopic examination of the continuum of the phenomena of modernism from Nietzsche and Heidegger, through Foucault and Derrida, notes that Foucault's first appropriation of the body to his discourse occurs in a discussion of Nietzsche, "where he defines it as the 'inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration" (p. 253). This presents us with an account that resounds with echoes of tabula rasa, the Lockean description of the mind. Indeed, by Foucault's (1979) own account, discipline could not have succeeded otherwise. Mind and body had to be disciplined, in order to accommodate the technological ends entailed ipso facto in the burgeoning "order of things" within the regime of the human sciences. The carceral perspective need not be limited to the officially quarantined, sanctioned deviance of the criminal (an artificial category, at best). We need examine
only the rationality of the "national security state" to discover the carceral mentality in extremis, applied to a whole population.

**Discipline and Power**

Discipline, then, is both a function and a prerequisite of power. But it may be instilled only upon subjects who are willing to accede to it. For this to occur, subjects must be persuaded of its rationality. The rationality of discipline resides in developed iatrics and therapeutics of the modern age --here we recall the distinction drawn between reason and un-reason. That is, the promise of therapy, if not of outright cure, for deviance from a putative norm.

Foucault (1979) maintains that this persuasion, too, has been the function of the social sciences, and has found its extension in the public and private institutions whose responsibility discipline has become: the military, prisons, schools, courts, hospitals, etc. In this schema, for example, immaturity may be conceived of as an illness, like madness, of which childhood, like unreason, is a symptom. Children may be cured, but only by willing submission to the system that characterizes them as defective or deficient; that is, by submission to the appropriate disciplinary technologies embedded, in this case not in the asylum, but in the schools.

Looking back, then, to the discourses employed by the contending factions on the *Hazelwood* Court, we now may be in
a position to see that what we are dealing with is a "power" struggle between two divergent disciplinary technologies. Both Justice White and Justice Brennan are in agreement that "discipline" is necessary in order to accomplish the "valid educational purpose" of the school, which we now understand to be the preparation of bodies and minds: for the marketplace (White) or for civil society (Brennan). What they are unable to agree upon is not the relative merits of student press freedom; rather, it is upon the best means to accomplish the ends of power. Thus, it can be seen that it was not in their logic that they disagreed, for the telos underlying their discourses was essentially the same. Both sought to preserve and to propagate order and the submission of "deviants" to the institutional imperatives— that is, the disciplinary and political technology— of the school.

Foucault reminds us that power itself may not be appropriated, only the technologies of discipline and politics. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) explain, "power is not a commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot" (p. 185). Rather, Foucault (1983) defines it as

a mode of action upon the actions of others.... [it is] the total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes more easy or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of
their acting or being capable of action. (p. 220)

Applied to the *Hazelwood* decision, a Foucauldian interpretation might suggest that the Court's disagreement is over the degree to which the disciplinary technology of the schools can be amended and still preserve the power relations that the school embodies. In this light, Brennan's point may be the more cynical: his dissent can be seen to imply that an institution such as the school can tolerate a certain (the extant) amount of student speech, and therefore is far less vulnerable. Student speech may be considered the speech of irrationality; thus it is unthreatening for its very location in that realm. Brennan's discourse masks his agreement with the essential contentions of the majority opinion on the need for discipline and for the perpetuation of order.

Justice White, on this reading, appears to have had appreciably less confidence in the power relations instantiated in the schools. His majority opinion not only reflects that relative lack of confidence, but also illustrates the extent to which his discourse has been colonized by the disciplinary technology upon which power expands. For White, the deviance of students, the "illness" of their immaturity, is contagious; the school -- the instrument of their therapy -- required at the least a device to disclaim its participation in the social manifestations of its failure to "normalize" those entrusted to it for
their cure. Such a disclaimer would surely have sufficed. However, the institution endorsing the power relation -- the Court -- recognized that a disclaimer would threaten the seeming authority claimed by the schools for the cure that the schools, as an instance of disciplinary technology, were responsible for fostering. It decided that the maintenance of power relations required for the school the ability to obviate any possible threat to the appearance that schools were anything less than the best appliances for the administration of normalization procedures to their inmates.

For courts to adjudicate such conflicts in the schools is tantamount to having the foxes deciding when and under what circumstances -- but not whether, as that is presumed -- it is permissible for dogs to invade the hen house. It might appear unseemly. Thus Justice White in effect washed his hands of the matter. He suggested that the proper domain in which such disagreements should be resolved was the local or state political arena. For White (though he does not say so in so many words) and the rest of the majority, the purpose in rendering the decision at all was once and for all to remove the issue from the domain of the courts and to locate any further contention within the realm of the politically accountable control over the claims of technocratic expertise by administrators, grammarians, and other documented experts to determine the proper "educational mission of the schools."
They know not what they do. In this case, I think, we cannot say of White and the others who joined his opinion that, in the way Foucault has characterized much local action within an historical apparatus: they "know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187). In fact, the question of "what what they do does" is the very locus of their disagreement. What they did, in fact, was to further blur the distinctions between the worlds of private and public knowledge which, as I showed in Chapter Three, is one of the central strategies of the domination of discourse by the technocratic ideology.

The Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood, ruling in favor of administrators' and other school officials' authority to censor students' public speech, can be seen to rest partially but importantly on the grounds that such expressions are not the students' own expressions; rather, the expressions in a sense belong to the institution because they arise from curricular activities (student newspapers in the instant case, but also yearbooks, dramatic or musical presentations, etc.). The ostensible dispute in the Hazelwood case was over whether or not students below the college/university level enjoyed First Amendment rights which protected their public expressions from unreasonable interference by school officials. For the Supreme Court, censorship, or more properly prior restraint on expression, was only an issue in so far as the debate involved the issue
of by and for whom, and for what purposes, it was permissible; it was not a question of whether it was allowable. Significantly, the words "censor" and "censorship" do not appear in the majority opinion; the issue is treated euphemistically: "Schools need not tolerate..." In the next section, we will see that much the same situations are present (as well as where the disagreements are) in the rhetoric of the journalistic commentaries on the decision.

"That's Life, Kids": The Press in the "Real" World

The Court in Hazelwood relied upon particular discursive constructions of assumptions and conceptions about the nature both of schools' "basic educational mission" (at 565) and, in this case, of "legal, moral, and ethical restrictions... (of) responsible journalism" (at 568). The following section takes up the latter issue first, as a means to understand how the school's basic educational mission is being imposed upon it by concerns which are fundamentally extrinsic to rational purposes of schooling. In arriving at their decision in Hazelwood, the Court majority relied to a significant extent on the conventions and practices of commercial journalism, especially the presumption of press objectivity and the right of publishers to "exercise editorial control" and limit the expressions of the reporters and editors who work for them.
The decision marks a profound change of direction for student journalists. Just how profound already has been the subject of much comment and speculation. Directly the decision was announced, a spate of articles, columns, and letters-to-the-editor appeared in journalism reviews and "house organs" -- the mainstream association publications -- of the professional journalism community.

They Were Expendable

What they meant to do when, in January, 1988, the juridical Titans on the Court launched the Hazelwood decision onto the stormy seas of the discursive environment of free expression, and whether or not they knew what they did did, is a matter open to interpretation. From one perspective, the decision could be seen as something like setting a sea-anchor to stabilize a single, storm-tossed institution on whose decks certain kinds of expression were loose cannons endangering the welfare of crew and passengers (e.g., Day & Butler, 1988). From another perspective, however, the decision represents a seismic shifting under the whole fluid medium of American custom, discourse, and tradition upon which floats, like a flotilla of cockleshells, the First Amendment and the varieties of expression it guarantees. That shifting and the ensuing waves cast some smaller, but nonetheless vital vessels in the fleet, onto the shoals of technical censorship, overturning some and threatening to swamp still others. Impelled by the surge, waves of affect
even now roil the tidal basin of the immediate circumstances of the case and, battering at the containments of the specific situation, threaten to erode the foundations of a whole edifice of communicative freedoms.

How the decision is judged depends on the rationality in which the facts and effects of the decision are situated. To return to the nautical metaphor, the situation is akin to an Admiralty court upholding a ship's captain's authority to invoke any punishment as a deterrent to mutiny. In the terms of the prevailing managerial/technical rationality, the decision merely returned control of a single vessel—or class of vessels—to the duly constituted authorities and strengthened their hands in dealing with future insurrections. To others, it trod roughly on a series of agreements that had permitted a sometimes clumsy but in the long run beneficial sharing of freedom and responsibility, not only to navigate a particular ship but also to contribute to plotting the course for the whole fleet. In any case, the decision caused a stirring in the never tranquil, often turbulent (though seldom violent), deep but narrow channels, within which an increasingly constrained and fretful American managerial culture seeks to contain the ocean of acceptable communicative events.

These channels are normally patrolled with proprietary interest by private, commercial media which are usually quick to send up flares when they detect the first hints of government intrusions into their domains. However,
incredibly, the Supreme Court action in the case caused barely a ripple of discontent aboard the private yachts and corporate fleets of the American press. Mastheads, which in the past have issued forth with flags flying and editorial guns booming when their own closely watched freedoms had been impinged upon to a far smaller degree, remained moored complacently inside sheltered anchorages. Only the most sensitive of sailors experience mal de mer in the marina.

This is, perhaps, not to be wondered at. For, from among all the possible tenets of journalism that the Court have upheld and out of all the rhetorics of freedom and right that it could have chosen to celebrate, it was the publisher's perquisites that the Court implicitly relied upon: "[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper..." (Hazelwood, at 570). Not surprisingly, it was upon those that the most of the media focused upon in their commentaries. As that most acerbic and insightful commentator/journalist A.J. Liebling (1975) noted with heavy irony some years ago, there is freedom of the press, mainly for those who own one. It is this construction of freedom of the press that is one of the major issues which has to be considered in assessing the impact of the Hazelwood Court's decision. And not only freedom, but also Liebling's particular formulation of it. Indeed, a substantial number of newspaper editorials that praised the decision did so on grounds that echoed both Liebling's ironic critique and
Foucault's (1979) formulation of the pervasive application of disciplinary technology in the service of power. I turn now from the Court's discourse to that of the press to examine the contradictions that the actions of Kathy Kuhlmeier and her colleagues revealed in their efforts to be accorded their First Amendment rights.

**Discipline in Journalistic Discourse**

A rhetoric for discipline and submission characterizes much of the journalistic commentary on *Hazelwood* which appeared in the editorials of the daily, mainstream press on the heels of its announcement. Interestingly, however, in journalism reviews and in mainstream trade journals of the profession, there was considerably less unanimity. For the contrast they provide, I examine samples of both discourses below, with the editorials from the daily press first.

**Capitulation in the Mainstream.** Numerous editorials, particularly in the so-called *elite* press (Merrill & Fischer, 1980), echoed and with some slight qualifications supported the position of the Court, upholding submission both to discipline and the reification of the journalistic discursive formations that naturalize the power relationship of the publisher vis a vis the reporter.

*The Chicago Tribune:*

First Amendment rights to expression without censorship never extended to editor-publisher relationships.... Editors who can't agree with publishers have to find a new job or become
publishers themselves. (in "A correct ruling," 1988, p. 15)

The Detroit News:

It is a decision in favor of editing—a process that goes on in real newspapers in the real world today.... What kind of lesson would (students) have learned? That reporters aren't responsible to their publishers?" (in Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11)

The Eugene (OR) Register-Guard:

Student journalists may feel this demeans them... [but] the First Amendment has never given reporters and editors the legal right to put things in the paper that their publishers did not wish to print. (in Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11)

According to an editorial in the Gary (Ind.) Post-
Tribune, the decision was basically one about "who has the power" (in Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 12). In the U.S., the editorial consensus is that, both in the schools and in the "real world," it is and should be the publisher. This theme is the reification of the power of the publisher, and the need for the schools to predispose students either to knuckle under to its authority or to become, themselves, those same kinds of authorities: "(T)he editorials, in general, seem to say, 'That's life, kids'" (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11).
From the previous discussion of Foucault's formulations of the power/knowledge relation, however, we now can see that the issue may be rewritten as "whom the power has," and have a position from which that reformulation can be interpreted.

From his interpretation of the action of power as action against the action of others, we can see that the decision of the Supreme Court in *Hazelwood*, and newspapers' responses to that decision, comport with Foucault's insight.

In this is an example of how disciplinary technologies are employed toward the necessity of power that its subjects be both docile and productive. Hence, the most common theme reported by editorial writers was that of the "real world": if adult, commercial journalists do not have *carte blanche* for the expression of their opinions, but instead have to submit to the will of their publishers, then there is no reason to that student journalists should expect such freedom, and no reason for authorities to suggest that the power of the publisher is anything but absolute.

Conventional Wisdom. That theme was present in commentaries and feature articles in journalism trade publications, as well. However, it shared the stage, in the case of the major management journals, with the ideology of "balance" and "objectivity." In the publication directed toward newsroom personnel, it was completely overshadowed by outrage. The journals of the major organizations for management-level newswriters -- the American Society of Newspaper Editors' *The Bulletin*, and the American Newspaper
Publishers' *prestige*—as well as the "independent" *Editor & Publisher*, were either equivocal or apparently studiously neutral. The three, among them, reach virtually every newsroom, publisher's office, journalism department and major library in the country, and represent themselves as the voices of "responsible" journalism. I examine *E&P* first because its coverage was the most interesting and, on some levels, the most provocative.

*Independently Speaking*. *E&P*’s editor, George Garneau (1988), wrote the first-week story in approved, paradigmatic "objective" style, citing acceptable spokespersons for both (acceptable, that is, Brennan’s and White’s) points of view. *E&P*’s second-week lead story was also "balanced," a survey of newspaper editorials on the decision. Yet it was possible to discern that the editor’s sympathies lay with the students. In the first week lead story headline, "A 'First Amendment disaster'," for example, the editors employed the rhetorical device of *apophasis*. In her valuable but too often overlooked book on the semiotics of headlines, *The Inverted Pyramid*, Roberta Kevelson (1977) shows that the device is commonly used by newspapers to signify their position by letting it be spoken "from someone else's mouth, someone usually well-known as a visible (or vis-a-vis headlines, a deleted-subject and invisible) authority" (p. 3).
There is additional evidence that E&P’s staff was not in accord with the opinion of the Court in the placement and selection both of the sub-head (“Journalism groups and media attorneys decry this week’s High Court ruling allowing high school officials to censor a student newspaper”), and of the outtake which was featured in, and broke up the page for, Garneau’s (1988) piece: "In effect, it says you can learn about the First Amendment in school but you can’t practice it. You can only practice it when you get out of school," Schmidt said" (p. 11).

It is interesting to recall also the sardonic "That’s life, kids" with which Fitzgerald (1988, p. 11) summarized the attitudes he discovered in a survey of 10 large and medium-sized metropolitan dailies editorials on which he reported in E&P’s second week coverage of the story. Although one may see Garneau’s (1988) apparent lack of sympathy for the decision in its first-week coverage as being balanced in the second week by Fitzgerald’s (1988) piece in which he recorded the almost unanimous support for the opinion among daily newspaper editorials, Fitzgerald undermined the editorial rhetoric with his quip, and Garneau seemed implicitly to side with the students, a fact made apparent from a between-the-lines reading of the compositional elements of the story. Without taking an explicit editorial stand, the magazine seemed to support the decision’s opponents while also appearing to balance its coverage. All things considered, including E&P’s esteemed
position in the journalism community, the treatment was surprising.

Management Journals. Neither the editors' nor the publishers' association publications took an editorial stand; rather, both covered the decision with articles. Their oxen were not gored. The issue, however, was apparently of somewhat greater interest to the ASNE than to the ANPA, if content, play, and placement reflect anything about interest.

ANPA's press time gave its analysis about two-thirds of a page near the back of the book in a regular section devoted to juridical matters ('Supreme Court,' 1988). The story's lead graf merely reported the decision; its second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs suggested the possibility of new business opportunities which might arise from the decision, particularly in the area of publishing student newspapers. In this the coverage mirrored the instrumental logic of corporate technocracy. Coming from the publishers' trade magazine, the attitude implied was not unexpected, but did seem a trifle crass.

On the other hand, The Bulletin of the ASNE devoted the first 10 pages of its February issue to presenting differing views of the importance of the decision. The spread included six major pieces, beginning with a long, signed analysis by two attorneys who had submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the students for the ASNE and three other
associations (Schmidt & Wiggins, 1988).

Of interest as an indicator of the editorial sympathies of the Bulletin staff is the fact that the Schmidt who co-authored the piece is the same one who was quoted in the E&P first week story. These authors deemed the central issues implicated in the decision to be essentially unresolved. These they might have characterized, with Foucault, as questions about "what was done did": whether "the case will have a pronounced detrimental effect on the education experience available to student journalists" (p. 6), and "will the Hazelwood opinion encourage broader school administrator's censorship of student publications?" (p. 7). Neither question is answered directly; but as we shall see in a subsequent section, both have become germane not only to incipient student journalists, but also to all students. When censorship becomes a technical process aligned with the curriculum, no texts are safe from the predations of the guardians.

The ASNE spread followed this with outtakes from Op-Ed and editorial commentaries from the Washington Post, and the New York Times, which generally support the decision. Next were a couple of show-and-tell items by a journalism advisor (Valentine, 1988) and two students --one a journalist-- ("Two students react to the decision," 1988) whose high school newspaper in Auburn, WA, has a policy of consulting with local editors on matters of potential controversy.
The spread also featured a piece by Ivan Gluckman (1988), general counsel for the National Association of Secondary School Principals. In it, he (a) launches veiled *ad hominem* attacks on the "professional civil libertarians and student rights activists" (p. 10, emphasis added) who championed the students' cause, (b) reiterates the "real world" discourse and principal-as-publisher argument, (c) claims that reporters have a greater stake in the dispute than "the general public" (p. 10), and (d) restates the curricular and personal/public speech arguments. He concludes with a paean to the reasonableness of school administrators who, he says, already realize that "student publications...interesting to their intended readers...means that some topics student journalists will want to cover may not be the ones principals would most like to see featured in student publications." He tenders reassurances that principals who, in the "rare case...(do) intervene to assure that (school boards') standards are not violated," will do so for the highest motives, only under duress, and with due journalistic professionalism (p. 11).

This piece was situated fifth among the six major slots in the "Cover Story" hole. The last slot was occupied by a report-cum-opinion piece by one of the students whose stories were censored --but who was not one of the three students who brought the case. Andrea Callow's (1988) is the only major piece in which the notion of submission does not appear. Callow, by then a senior in journalism at
University of Missouri, encourages students to continue fighting by proclaiming with (understandable) youthful hyperbole that "[o]n January 13, 1986, high school journalism was changed -- forever" by the Court's granting school administrators "the deadly power to censor" (p. 12). Hers is the last word, and has some force in that position; inasmuch as she describes herself as a future teacher, she holds out a promise for a continuing struggle.

Some Reviews Take a Stand

The two nationally circulated journalism, university-affiliated reviews, The Columbia Journalism Review (CJR) and Washington Journalism Review (WJR, at University of Maryland), and the organ of the Society of Professional Journalists/ Sigma Delta Chi (SPJ/SDX), The Quill, all devoted some coverage to the Hazelwood decision. The Quill and the CJR seem to have been the more outraged, with SPJ/SDX publication leading the way.

The Quill. The Quill devoted a full-page in February, three full-pages with art in the front of the book, and nearly another full-page in the back in March, a Letters column and a full-page (troglyditic, for balance one supposes) opinion piece in April, and a column by the Society's general counsel in May. With the exception of the opinion piece in April, certainly, there was little that smacked of submission to disciplinary authority in the columns appearing immediately after the decision came down.
The publication offered more than vituperation, though there was a fair quotient of that, too; to some extent, they came proffered some possible solutions. For example, Dan Dorfman (1988), a former Quill editor who until recently presided over a monthly spread of 1-3 pages of media criticism in the magazine, was in print already in the February issue. There he inveighed against both the captive student press --editors at Hazelwood told NBC News the decision would not affect them because "we don't do anything controversial"-- and excoriated the decision's potential for "monstrous perversions of education and serious injustices to principled students" (p. 12). He then offers a modest, constructive proposal:

[I]n every community, media corporations, unions of media workers, and chapters of professional organizations such as SPJ/SPX should establish a fund from which student journalists can draw on short notice to print censored publications. The fund would be administered by a local media lawyer who could review the material for libel and obscenity problems. And the students could then take the independently published material and sell or distribute it at school. This much at least is still protected by the First Amendment: School authorities may not interfere with non-disruptive distribution of independent publications. (p. 12)
Dorfman goes on to rehearse Professor Emerson's admonition about the irresistible attractions of their license to censors:

What is permitted will certainly be practiced by authoritarian school administrators. . . . It is not hard to envision the kinds of cases that will arise. A student drama club...preparing a production of West Side Story will be ordered to bowdlerize it. . . . Members of a school-sponsored marching band will flunk. . . . for playing Where Have All the Flowers Gone in a. . . Veterans' Day parade... Anyone who thinks (this) far-fetched has been out of high school much too long." (p. 12)

Dorfman could not foresee, nor was it within his purview to attend to, the mischief that might ensue from the broad powers that the Court had affirmed for school administrators and school boards: powers which have already been invoked, and upheld on appeal, by a Florida school board to expunge versions of Aristophanes' Lysistrata and Chaucer's The Miller's Tale from a high school humanities class, and by a California principal to confiscate and suppress an entire April Fool's Day edition which he found "offensive and possibly libelous."

CJR. The Columbia Journalism Review ("Open season," 1988) also played the story with a commentary in its first post-decision issue. It led its "Comment" section with a full-page, unsigned opinion/analysis piece that not only
recapitulated the case syllabus, and castigated the prevailing opinion. The piece also reconstructed the precedents which the Hazelwood Court had overlooked or overturned in order to arrive at a decision that rebuked students' claims to more rights than was their due "on more grounds than had occurred to the original censor" (p. 18). The story chided the New York Times and the Washington Post which, it noted, "have been most engaged in past First Amendment cases" (p. 18), for "accept(ing) Justice White's fiction that a newspaper can be merely a classroom exercise" (p. 18). According to the CJR, the case may have started from an administrator's thoughtlessness, but it has now concluded in a new Supreme Court doctrine, very much in tune with recent assumptions that greater control of what students read and say equals a better education. Behind these assumptions lies a fear that student freedoms lead only to recklessness and obscenity. To those who believe this, the best reply lies in a decision rendered in 1977 by a federal district court... but ignored by White and his colleagues: "The state cannot constitutionally restrict anyones' First Amendment rights, including those of students, because of mere apprehension of what they might do with them." (p. 18; emphasis added)
The CJR editorial reveals a sensitivity to issues of pedagogy that is almost totally absent from any of the other journalism industry publications reviewed for this study. As the highlighted portion of the citation above demonstrates, the writer of the piece is attuned to and wary of recent (over the last five years) educational reform proposals and the agendas they support.

WJR. The other of the nationally recognized press reviews, the University of Maryland's Washington Press Review, presents a much more equivocal picture than do either The Quill or CJR. The featured piece, flagged in bold faced type in the table of contents, in the March WJR is a column by Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court correspondent for the Baltimore Sun. Denniston's (1988) story is much more in the fashion of the ANPA/ASNE approach: balanced, "objective," and bland. Denniston notes that a "golden era" of student press freedom has passed, and that "students' only hope (is) recruiting the grown-ups in the regular press as their allies" (p. 12). Unlike Dorfman's column in The Quill, Denniston offers no plan to implement, however. Rather, he is content to recount what the decision means to high school journalists, after a tortuous (but no more so than the instant case) retelling of the waxing and waning of the "golden age."

The piece finishes with a wait-and-see attitude about the case, noting blandly that school officials may either censor or not, but they can, without further fear of
reproach, if they want to. "In one manner of speaking," Denniston (1888) writes,
the court...has simply handed editorial control back to the managers...ultimately the principal and the school board....They could declare a school publication to be an 'open forum'....Or officials may go to the opposite extreme...with freedom limited entirely to what the principal is willing to allow. Kuhlmeier makes it constitutionally easy, and permissible to do the latter. (p. 12)

One waits in vain for the other shoe to drop, for the "but..." to appear, for a caveat addressed to journalists, or for a sense that the writer appreciates the magnitude of the decision or of its potential for abuse to infuse his discourse. This is, after all, (a) a column and therefore under the conventions of journalism a space in which the expression of an opinion is permitted and (b) a column by one of the press's watchdogs, a beat reporter who covers the institution and theoretically should have both special knowledge and authority to speak critically. But he never does. The closest Denniston (1988) comes to a critique is in the second-to-last paragraph:

If school officials opt for the strict-controls approach, the court stressed, the First Amendment will not stand in their way. Thus, censorship may be imposed even if a student publication does not
actually disrupt anything else at the school, breaks no laws or violates no one's rights. Until the Hazlewood ruling, a publication that did none of those things had First Amendment protection.

(p. 12)

More telling of the WJR's position in the debate is a piece on the previous pages of the same issue under the interesting headline "Censor Relaxes at Hazelwood" (Bertelson, 1988). In this signed story, running about a page in toto, free-lancer Christine Bertelson reports, apparently deadpan, that:

1. "The most controversial subject to cross [principal] Reynolds' desk has been whether to allow the yearbook to run a picture of a student apparently baring his derriere." [It was a costume, so the principal let it go.]

2. "'Now that we know where we are there is no guesswork,' [Reynolds] said. '...If I can support my decision with reason, logic and common sense, I will win in the courts every time.'"

3. "For the last few years, the school lunch menus have made more interesting reading than The Spectrum... The paper has been a little dull--no very dull,' says Cheryl Stoller, the journalism teacher....'Maybe because I was looking over their shoulders it had a chilling effect and they steered clear of controversy,' Reynolds muses."

4. The co-editor, who "agrees with the Supreme Court decision...thinks a student newspaper should devote its
coverage to sports, academics, movie reviews and other issues of direct concern to students. "We decided to stay away from the presidential race this year...We are bored of hearing about it."

5. Reynolds "approved" of an editorial cartoon that reads: "Attention, All Students! Please Check All Rights at the Front Office. Thank You."

6. "Reynolds says he does not have a policy of prior review of all articles. He leaves that up to Stoller."

7. "Stoller is not interested in creating controversy...I don't see anything wrong with writing about football and dances. I am here to develop their writing skills. [Having students] writing in complete sentences sounds wonderful to me." (pp. 10-11)

It is difficult to tell from the prose whether there is any irony intended by the presentation of the Bertelson's piece. However, the headline ("Censor Relaxes at Hazelwood High"), along with its context in the moment of its presentation, and the general tone of the piece all suggest it was written straight. It is possible, nonetheless, to read the headline two ways: either that the censor has relaxed his controls, or that he was tense with uncertainty that his high-handedness would be approved but is now vindicated and therefore relaxed enough about it that he can afford a little self-deprecating humor. In either case, the headline (perhaps unintentionally) implies one official's
perception of the state and status for the high school press. That it is not unique, and that it is inherently dangerous to both the aspirations of students and the entire institution of the free press as an agent for democracy are issues I discuss in the next section of this study.

**Hazelwood, the School, and the Press**

Judicial interpretation of the First Amendment has increasingly over the last 75 years acknowledged some limitations on freedom of expression. The press may be held culpable and liable for the malicious reporting of falsehoods, for example, or for violating community standards against obscenity; and there is the standard of the "clear and present danger." The scholastic press, which was the focus of the *Hazelwood* decision, has been held to an even stricter standard, one which by which it was enjoined not to materially disrupt the other activities of the school, in addition to requirements not to violate laws or infringe on others' rights.

**New Tests, Special Circumstances, and Higher Standards: Some Implications**

The *Hazelwood* Court also, however, upheld the authority of administrators and other school officials to censor or suppress student publications and other expressive media even if the publication did none of those things. Justice White's opinion allows (and perhaps might be read even to require) censorship/suppression and punishment of student expression under three additional conditions: if/when school
officials judged either (a) that the content of the public expression was unsuitable for (even only some) students, or (b) that its presentation was technically deficient, or (c) that its effect would be to cast the school in an appearance of endorsing controversial opinions or positions. There is, however, no test adumbrated for the severity of official punishments that might be meted out for violations of these standards. That is left entirely to the discretion of the principal/publisher. In the "real" world, a reporter or an editor who resigns or is dismissed over a disagreement with a publisher has only to pack up and move. That option is not viable for most students, and the scope of the punishments available to the principal/publisher is of potentially far greater impact on a young journalist than on an adult veteran with a good clip file and a way with words.

In a society that bestows its largesse on the basis of credentials, there is little question that the schools already have it within their authority to fundamentally affect the lives of students in damaging ways. Quite clearly, then, the criteria for decisions regarding and suppressing certain student expressions as inappropriate or unsuitable for certain audiences may be irremediably arbitrary and potentially dangerously capricious. When coupled with the implicit power of the schools to summarily punish --with failing grades, denial of credentials, detention, suspension, and/or expulsion-- either
unintentional lapses or purposeful challenges, the carceral and coercive quality of the decision is such that Foucault would recognize it as a further exercise of disciplinary technology in the service of power against action.

Justice Brennan, in his Hazelwood dissent, pointed to the "Orwellian" dimension of school administrations who might come to believe themselves as judicially sanctioned "thought police," empowered to assume the "guardianship of the public mind" (at 576-580). Yet even Brennan's dissent to an extent glorifies the actions of school censors who, as Steven Visser (1987) reported in The Nation some months prior to the announcement of the decision, may undertake their "responsibility" to suppress speech for utterly venal and self-interested reasons having nothing whatever to do with either the curriculum or with the legitimate educational mission of the school.

As for the second test, of technical deficiency in grammar, or research skills, or other presumptively objective criteria, even Justice Brennan concurred in that reasoning, noting that official intervention in the publication of material that was deficient in those regards is justified "because to reward such expression would 'materially disrupt' the newspaper's curricular purpose" (at 578). Surely, candidacy for protection of speech or expression by the First Amendment is illegitimately withheld on grounds of deficiencies in grammar, spelling, or other such technical errors. Yet such is the pervasiveness and the
strength of the technocratic rationality in education, at least, that Justice Brennan's otherwise wise and liberal discourse is seduced by it, and he can advocate just such a course.

However discouraging the rhetoric and recondite the logic of the two prior tests may be, the third test for the permissibility of school censorship is the more frightening, for instantiates and naturalizes the ideology of control under the aegis of "imprimatur." School this reading is a unique social institution to be in the position of having to be held positively responsible for anything it does not explicitly oppose or suppress. Rather, it is constructed that way by those who impute to the institution the authority to approve knowledge. That is the only legitimate reason for then reifying the imprimatur which the school is seen to confer on the knowledge in which it deals. In that case, it makes sense to confer upon the school such a role, for it presupposes the legitimizing function --as well as the delegitimizing authority-- of officials who stipulate what knowledge is valuable, even though value is presumed to be a meaningless category where knowledge is concerned. Such a position makes sense from the point of view of institutions which recognize only exchange-value and devalue use-value, i.e., a market driven institution, and those in which the knowledge and appreciation of human freedoms is either systematically obscured or ignored. Schools may fit in both
of these categories, "real world" or imagined.

Antagonistic Administrators, Ignorant Advisers: The Real World of the Scholastic Press

For the scholastic press, this is the world of conflicting values which find expression at the polls during school bond elections. As creatures much dependent upon such expressions, administrators are concerned primarily that the only images presented by their schools are positive. If this means that the school paper be a newspaper in name only, and in reality be nothing more than the public relations organ of the administration, then that is what it shall be. "Says John Fredrick, co-editor of the Spectrum, 'Reynolds] doesn't want more negative publicity for himself and the district'" (Bertelson, 1988, p. 11; emphasis added).

As noted previously, this situation is not unique to Hazelwood East High. Even prior to the Hazelwood decision, the Student Press Law Center (SPLC) had reported being apprised of 300-500 cases annually of "censorship or constitutionally suspect punishment for publication" (Gillmor & Barron, 1984, p. 717.) Within the first months after Hazelwood, according to SPLC executive director Mark Goodman, the Center had already noted a "significant increase in the number of (reports of) principals demanding to review all copy before going to press" (in Fraser, 1988, p. 12).

Such an increase is consonant with the results of both a recently reported national survey of high school principals and journalism advisers attitudes and knowledge on the
subject of control of the student press (Click & Kopenhaver, 1988), and another of similar scope conducted earlier in the decade (Kristof, 1983). The studies revealed that there already existed a strong predisposition among school officials -- and among a surprising number of school newspaper advisers as well -- to stifle student expression in favor of school discipline. Inasmuch as I have already referred to the 1983 study, I shall here concentrate on the more recent one.

The latter research, conducted by William Click and Lillian Kopenhaver (1988) found that "while most ... principals and newspaper advisers believe in the importance of a free press, they also believe that maintaining discipline is more important" (p. 48). Discipline is maintained, according to from 20 to 30 percent of principals, when "articles critical of the school board, local politicians, teachers, and administrators" are banned from school papers (p. 49). Other "harmful" stories would be prohibited by "more than two-thirds of the principals... even if they are not libelous, obscene or disruptive" (p. 51). A smaller, but still a surprising large, number of advisers were found to be in agreement with principals: 10-22 percent in the first case (p. 48), and "more than one-third" (p. 51) in the second. The researchers hypothesized that "advisers should understand the principles of press freedom and ethics (and) would tend to differ significantly
from principals in defending and ensuring student press freedom" (p. 51). That "the degree of difference between the two is not very strong" they attribute to the fact that "many (advisers) are unqualified or marginally qualified in journalism and are alone in their schools" (p. 51).

The data for this study were collected in 1984-85, well in advance of the Hazelwood decision. But rather than calling the issue into question, this factor indicates the depth and duration of the antipathy with which the project of scholastic journalism is regarded in the schools. Student press rights had, until Hazelwood, been protected under the umbrella of Tinker. Since Tinker, however, school officials have continued to seek, and have since the advent of the Reagan Court been increasingly successful in finding, pretexts for controlling and limiting students' expression. Judging from the reactions of officials to the Hazelwood case, the decision may have been just the prescription administrators had been waiting for ("Civics," 1988; see also Fraser, 1988). The opinion seems to have legitimated the antipathy -- or at least disquiet -- that school officials had long felt toward the student press.

Given that, as Click and Kopenhaver (1988) reported, the quality of school journalism advisers leaves much to be desired and that, as Visser (1987) points out, the precarious position of even the best of them in politically highly charged situations is often inimical to their bucking higher authority, if students cannot look to be supported in
their schools by advisers "unqualified or marginally qualified in journalism," we might suppose at least that students should be able to look for and expect to find support in the professional press communities. As I have indicated above, however, this has not been the case, for reasons which are implicated in the very logics by which the Justices were able to rationalize their decision.

The P.S. 21 Colony. The overall effect and the logic of the Hazelwood decision might be better described and understood at a remove from the school, where the contradictions arising from the contrast of wisdom with expediency is in sharper relief. Consider the following hypothetical case: The Court upholds the authority of a certain class of certifiably expert, Government-employed administrators, managers, and supervisors to interfere at will in the public expressions of a disorganized, albeit transient, nevertheless numerous minority of citizens. Moreover, the opinion permits those experts to suppress, on a myriad of technical grounds --"for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for [certain] audiences" -- the public discussion of ideas, opinions, and thoughts that the experts deem unsuitable for those citizens to consider. The range of expression affected includes artistic, creative, cultural, informational, performative, political, rhetorical, sexual, and social speech made public
in any Government-sponsored forum—including art exhibits, books, broadcasts, newspapers, and the theater—where those citizens are under the supervision of the aforementioned experts. Such suppression may be imposed on the mere suspicion that some unspecified upset might occur, and is not susceptible to any challenge by those whose speech is censored or suppressed.

Posed this way, it is difficult to imagine the opinion to have been issued with respect to otherwise valued citizens in any kind of a democracy. This is an edict for managing a penal colony, some bizarre and treacherous Gulag, perhaps, or Nurse Ratchitt’s ward. It may have been an understanding similar to this one which inspired one high school journalist to remark in the pages of The Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) that “This sounds strikingly similar to the way the Soviet press is set up” (Two students..., 1988, p. 7). Indeed, the Soviet press is arguably no less liberal. In an analysis entitled “Press freedom in the Communist world,” Columbia University Journalism School professor Donald Shanor (1983) makes the following point:

The concept of press freedom in the Communist world is...what the government agrees to grant to citizens in order to achieve certain ends. Despite high-sounding phrases...freedom of the press, of assembly, and of expression are not rights that citizens enjoy but limited privileges
that regimes sometimes permit to further their own goals. (p. 327)

Here we might recall Justice Fortas' admonition to school officials about eschewing the totalitarian potential of the institution, and Nelson's (1974) conclusions in Captive Voices. Shanor's description of the Soviet press far more closely resembles the future for the post-Hazelwood scholastic press in America than it does a press, or even a curricular exercise, in a society which ostensibly honors the values --freedoms of assembly, the press, and expression-- which Shanor implies the "Communist world" alone makes a mockery of, or abrogates in the furtherance of their own goals.

According to Louis Day and John Butler (1988), the majority opinion of Justice White relied upon a particular tradition of assumptions and conceptions which touch the nature both of schools and the press. The schools' "basic educational mission" (at 565), in Day's and Butler's reading of the opinion, is located in the traditional, "cultural transmission" theory of the curriculum. The majority opinion upholding "cultural transmission" as the purpose for the curriculum is an instrumentalist, positivist model, as much at home in bureaucratic socialism as in technocratic capitalism. This model conceives of education and socialization as isomorphic and homologous. It constructs education as a process of socialization which aims at
indoctrinating students to invariant social and moral
terities toward ends that are predetermined and predefined.

Although this curricular dogma frames much of the logic
employed by the Court in arriving at the Hazelwood decision,
William Stanley (1965), in an exhaustive examination of the
traditions of social education curricula, has shown that
there is by no means a consensus among social educators
about the appropriateness of the model. Nevertheless, the
Court's adoption of cultural transmission as the preferred
"mission" of the schools reifies the least democratic
possible vision of schooling. As I shall attempt to show in
the next part of this paper, it has implications for the
press as well.

The Post-Hazelwood Scholastic Press

In the words of Robert Knight (1988), an academic
journalist assaying the possible repercussions of the
decision, the Court simply "returned control of school
publications" (p. 42) to school officials. Justice White
recognized an explicit homology between school officials and
the publishers of non-school publications. However, as
Knight also noted, the opinion presents a danger: future
scholastic journalists may not receive the educational
experiences and preparation necessary to foster in them the
requisite critical consciousness and faculties for the
crucial roles that society demands of the press. And not
only future journalists are likely to be affected: "All
public school students might be deprived of real
understanding of the role of the press in a free society" (p. 42).

Although no particular theory of the press is expressly or affirmatively articulated in the opinion, such a theory is captured in Justice White's approving citation the "lessons to be learned" as they were articulated in the Hazelwood High School Journalism II curriculum guide: emphasizing the "development of journalistic skills under deadline pressure," along with "responsibility and acceptance of criticism for articles of opinion," White equates such attitudes and skills with "legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed on journalists..." (at 569).

The only reference to the First Amendment freedom of the press is in the negative: "...rights of students in the public schools 'are not coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,'..." (at 567). This would appear to be a significant part of the "lessons the activity was designed to impart."

That lesson is at odds with the precedent expressed in Tinker, in which Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, strongly urged

Students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state wishes to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of... sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views. (at 507)

Justice Brennan's sentiments in his dissent from "the obscure tangle of excuses" (at 576) employed by the majority to justify permitting schools more authority in controlling student expression reverberate with apprehension. Even the fact that such expression might be perceived, as in this case, to be school-sponsored expression, Brennan argued that this was in effect a subterfuge that was flimsy grounds for permitting "content discrimination." Sanctioning such content discrimination, he argued, conceals "official censorship designed to shield the audience or dissociate the sponsor from the expression" (Hazelwood at 578). He castigates the purblindness of his colleagues to the possibility the "(c)ensorship so motivated might well serve (although [it] cannot legitimately serve) some other school purpose" (at 578). But it in no way furthers the curricular function of even a school newspaper, "unless one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors" (at 584; emphasis in the original).

Implicitly, the same end is held out as the purpose of journalism as is described for the curriculum. The press is conceived as the private, proprietary instrument of the publisher to be employed in whatever way she deems fit, only
constrained by market forces in the "real world." By its action in the Hazelwood case, the Court has also made, implicitly, the same claim about the commercial press, at least insofar as its future practitioners are concerned. The "chilling effect" certainly will not be lost upon nor misinterpreted by student journalists. It is the lesson of the constant tension between freedom and power.

Summary

As we have seen, the Hazelwood decision affords an opportunity to examine the currently dominant conceptions of the fields of journalism and pedagogy where their parallel discursive formations and social practices, intersect and overlap within the public view. Most often, as we have seen, they maintain a scrupulous public distance while engaging in a kind of covert commensalism. However, in January, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court provided such an instance in the case of Hazelwood: a moment when the intersection of the state's interests in and for two of its principal actors in an hegemonic struggle becomes visible and available for analysis.

In an opinion which well may gravely affect the education of prospective journalists, and not incidentally the education of other students as well, the Court held that scholastic journalists' First Amendment rights had not been violated by the censorship of certain articles in a high school newspaper in effect because, as students, they did
not have those rights to begin with (at 570); and even if they had had them, the schools were entitled to abrogate them in the cause of the technocratic conception of the curriculum.

Justice White, in the majority opinion, deferred to school officials' curricular authority to exercise "editorial control over style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities as long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns" (at 571). The dominant issue, for Justice White, and for Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Stevens who joined him, was that the school newspaper, prior to any other construction of its identity, was part of the curriculum, over which "educators are entitled to exercise greater control...to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity was designed to teach, . . . ." (at 575).

In the articles that were expunged, students were doing no more than expressing their views, on the perils and problems of teen-age pregnancy and on their perceptions of the causes and effects of broken homes. In Hazelwood, the argument of the majority sought to disguise viewpoint discrimination behind a screen of newly fledged "valid reasons." The student journalists were not and will not be the last ones to learn that lesson.

Apparently the "lessons" the majority opinion of the Court thought important had been learned well in advance of the opinion. By accounts such as Dorfman's (1988), and
Bertelson's (1988), Hazelwood East High has been a pretty quiet place of late. NBC News had a crew at the school the day the decision was announced. The Spectrum's current editors placidly told NBC, and NBC told the nation, "we don't do anything controversial" (Dorfman, 1988, p. 12).

As I have shown, in the immediate aftermath of Hazelwood there was evidence of substantial ambivalence among working journalists — or at least in their papers — to the plight of student journalists. Reaction to the decision by journalists working in academe and in the professional press was equivocal, at best (Konopak, 1988). As reported in Editor & Publisher, the weekly periodical widely regarded as the bible of the industry, "High school papers aren't getting a lot of support from their elders in the newspaper industry" (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11). E&P's lead article in the second issue after the decision came down reported the editorial positions of 10 "randomly selected" medium-to-large dailies. Of the 10, only one, the Miami Herald, unequivocally criticized the decision.

There were a number of recurrent themes apparent in newspaper editorials of the period immediately following the announcement of the decision. Primary among them was this: If professional, commercial journalists must submit to the will of their publishers, why should students be held to have more rights than they. This theme was played out in editorials in cities as diverse and divergent as Salem, OR,
Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Buffalo, and Bergen, NJ.
Underlying this theme is the relation of the editorial writer with the publisher, and this, I believe, implicates the professional socialization of journalists from the earliest days of their exposure to their craft directly in the educational context.

The embattled position of the scholastic press has recently been highlighted by publicity and media attention focused on the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hazelwood case, and stands in serious danger of being made officially what it had been long accused of being: house organ for school administrations. This possibility --some (e.g., Dorfman, 1988) would say inevitability-- raises serious and troubling issues for both communications and curriculum theorists: Are schools and the press really benevolent agents in the process of creation and perpetuation of a vital, truly participatory democracy? Or do they function to impose social control for the benefit of the ruling elites (Cook, 1985)? Is the press, under the influence of the relentless “good news” approach of, for example, USA Today, tending toward a purely public relations--some, such as Michael Parenti (1986) would say ideological and propagandistic--approach to news which pacifies rather than stimulates thought? Are the schools?

In a society which, like ours, relies so heavily upon both the press and the schools for the creation of an informed and involved populace for the maintenance of its
democratic institutions, as well as for the creation of the knowledge of the problems and issues that are seen to beset those institutions (Edelman, 1980), these are crucial issues. The way in which the Hazelwood Court's decision can be read as a response to the question of what it is for which we rely upon journalists and the press—even though it was not explicitly stated—suggests a disheartening prospect. But it presents an opportunity for both journalism and curriculum theory to explore and examine the theoretical justifications of the conventional wisdom on the role and place of education in society, the purposes for which the curriculum is constructed, the role of journalism as a social and an educational heuristic, and the relations among those three questions.

It is in response to these issues that an investigation and a critique of the theories of culture and society, education, and communication either relied upon or implicated in the Court's decision, as well as those in the dissenting opinion proffered by Justice Brennan was called for and undertaken in this chapter. Regardless of the substantive First Amendment positions iterated in these opinions, it is clear from their disagreement that there are at least two competing hypotheses relating to the competences required of citizens in interpreting and acting upon the information supplied by the press, and to the very role of the press itself. The one, represented by White's
opinion, expresses a positivist, technicalist, instrumental view. The other, Brennan’s view, although it resides in essentially the same discourse, the same episteme, rebuts some of the suppositions the majority relied upon, but upholds others.

It seems likely that these two discourses do not exhaust the possibilities for theorizing the relation between journalism as social competence, the schools and the curriculum as avenues for the attainment of that competence, and the aim of creating a just, liberal American democracy. This project proposes to counterpoise a conception of education, and to elaborate a conception of the journalistic project, as processes which permit persons to transcend their socialization and to attain civic and societal competence.

The Hazelwood opinion presents a difficult dilemma for educators and journalists alike, one that is linked to the notion of a social responsibility of the press and the curriculum of the schools. Social responsibility is not a topic with unique relevancy only the the press. To the extent that we admit the authority of the school in socializing the young, it is in, of, and toward to some notion of social responsibility that educators are directing them. The curriculum, in effect, is the statement of the principles by which social responsibility is to be both fostered and understood.
In an ethical sense that transcends the limitations of both the discursive and social practices of the technical interests of the dominant paradigm, the exigent social responsibility of both curriculum of the school and the press are at issue in the Hazelwood decision. Rather, they are for the moment no longer at issue. In the sense that Foucault meant in querying whether people under the influence of the episteme of their age really know "what what they do does," we may ask if the Court really knew "what what it said did." I have argued that it did. By its decision, the majority of the Court unambiguously (and rather more ambitiously than was perhaps necessary) in effect ruled that the school --represented by its official authorities; not, importantly, by its teachers or its students but rather by its administrators-- was entitled to suppress certain ideas if those ideas were felt to have the possibility of interfering with the "legitimate educational mission of the school." As the Florida and California cases cited earlier show, that is how the decision is being interpreted, with the consequence that the freedom of all students to read, speak, and learn about important social knowledge is being impeded.

Freedom --for whom it is appropriate, who shall exercise or limit it, who has or lacks it, who shall decide what it means-- is a central concern in the discourses of many of the journalistic commentators. Power for Foucault (1983), however, is not the antithesis of freedom; it is the
necessary pre-condition which makes the exercise of power compelling. The two are tied together in a relation of mutual definition. Power cannot wrest freedom away. Freedom cannot be lost; it must be surrendered. The machineries by which surrender is made attractive are the political and disciplinary technologies. For Foucault, rather, the antipodal modality of freedom is discipline. Thus it has been the relation of submission to discipline in the power/knowledge nexus that was examined here. In the next and final chapter, I pursue the implications of this realization and proffer some suggestions couched in terms of the public sphere and social responsibility as an alternative discourse by which these relations may be better understood.
NOTES: Chapter Four


5. **Ibid.**

6. **Ibid.**


8. For an account of some more of the facts contributing to the situation at Hazelwood High, which for some reason did not get into the court records at any level of the proceedings, see Visser (1987). A commentator on the case, Arval A Morris (1988), pointedly queried "Would the result of this case have been different if all (of Visser's findings) had been proved at trial?" A more serious question, which
bears upon the issue of professionalism in general, as well as on issues of acceptable discourse, is "Why were not these issues brought up at trial?"

8 Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir., 1975)


11 See, for example, Christopher Lasch's (1984) explorations of narcissism, therapy, and the cult of the self, on the distinctly dystopian dimensions of recent psycho-therapeutic interventions, especially Chaps. V and VI.

12 Of 19 editorials reprinted in Editorials on File (1988), for the period Jan. 16-31, seven were unambiguously supportive of the decision, four equally unambiguously opposed it, five supported it with some reservations, one condemned it with reservations and two were mixed in their views; of the 19, 14 saw the issue at least partly framed by the "real world" problem of who owns the news.

13 An express notion in the Hazelwood opinion is the establishment of the principal/school board as publisher (Hazelwood, at 574). Understandably, few publishers would want that authority challenged. Newspaper editorial writers, on the whole, did not get to be editorial writers by challenging the authority of their publishers, so that finding is perhaps unexceptional.
14 See Parenti (1986), esp. Chap. 3, on how pervasive, subtle and coercive that power may be.

15 Fitzgerald (1988) reported on both printed editorials and on conversations with editorial-desk staffers at 10 dailies. In only one did he report substantial disagreement with the Court's decision: The Miami Herald. All nine of the others supported the decision either unqualifiedly (Chicago Sun-Times, Detroit News) or with minor reservations.

16 See Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 677 F.Supp. 1547 [44 Ed.LawRep. 1151] (M.D.Fla. 1988). In this case the judge upheld the authority of the school board to remove from the curriculum a book containing Chaucer's The Miller's Tale, which the board found objectionable on grounds of lewdness.

17 See Leeb v. Delong, 198 Cal.App.3d. 47, 243 Cal.Rptr. 494 [44 Ed.LawRep. 444] (1988). According to Tatel and Mincberg (1989), lower courts have used Hazelwood to uphold these actions by school officials. The California case is especially troubling because the state has a statute which had afforded considerable protection to student journalists' speech, but which the Appeals Court apparently held to be supravened by Hazelwood.

18 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986) confirmed educators' broad discretion to define and punish "lewd or indecent"
speech in public schools, a decision in which Justice Brennan concurred, and which concurrence both he himself and Justice White in the majority opinion cited in *Hazelwood*.

19 *Hazelwood*, 108 S.Ct. at 570. These are precisely the technical grounds on which, the Court ruled, school supervisory personnel, administrators, or even school board members were entitled to suppress students' public speech.

20 See Notes 16 and 17, above.
CHAPTER FIVE

INVENTING THE COUNTER-PUBLIC SPHERE: THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF JOURNALISM AND PEDAGOGY

Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men transform the world. To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it.... But while to say the true word --which is work, which is praxis--is to transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some few men, but the right of every man. (Freire, 1972, p. 72)

Every school child in America has learned about the purchase of Manhattan Island from the Indians by the clever colonists. A piece of property that would, upon the eventual triumph of the colonists over the natives, come to be of inestimable worth, was bought for some bolts of cloth, a few blankets, and some shiny trinkets. Children learn how the clever colonists got what they recognized as some incredibly valuable property at the price of some trifles. They are taught that the transaction typifies much of the future relations between the colonists and the Indians. The transaction was unequal; that is part of its allure for third graders, the age of the children when they are first presented with the story as knowledge to be learned as a
part of their heritage.

**A Lesson in Knowledge and Liberty**

Of course the transaction was unequal. The indigenous population, coming into contact for the first time with a system that placed an unfamiliar value on something the "owners" either did not know they owned or had long taken for granted, gladly ceded away to purchasers their ownership of the island, and walked away happily wrapped in warmth, fingerling their bolts of cloth and laughing at the pretty trinkets. That the Europeans had not offered guns or ploughs or other things that were of real value to them, for which the island would have been a more equal exchange is usefully ignored.

In this story, children are posited as having a natural affinity for, and an identification with the buyers, the clever colonists. It would be a long time (if ever) before those cohorts of third graders might learn to appreciate the consequences of that sale to the sellers, before they would learn that the blankets were infected with diseases against which the natives had no immunities, for example; diseases that would decimate their population within a generation or two. Third graders are innocent of the knowledge that the Indians would not understand what the exchange had meant until they tried to utilize the island in their accustomed way and were prevented from it. They would not know or be expected to understand that the Indians would not learn the
true cost to themselves of transaction until they needed what they had traded away. That is the lesson of the purchase of Manhattan, but school children are not taught the real import of the sale.

Nor would they typically be taught the import of the lesson on their own lives. That lesson is typically left to the school of hard knocks, or perhaps undergraduate courses, depending on the resources available to the individual. And even if they were taught it, if their elementary teacher were creative, or concerned, that lesson might be taught in a manner and a vocabulary that stressed the abstract aspects. But usually, it must be supposed, these concerns would be irrelevant if the students' subjectivities were associated with their noble ancestors, were encouraged to think of themselves as clever colonists, not as Indians.

Roads Taken and Not Taken: Summary and Speculation

This study winds toward its conclusion by beginning with the proposition that has been perhaps implicit in much of what has gone before: In more of our relations than we know, we are individually all Indians with respect to the knowledge we create, the liberties we possess, and the values we hold. Our culture is now engaged in --some, Lyotard (1985) for example, would say it has almost completed-- the transformation of knowledge (and certainly already information; see Schiller, 1987) into commodities, like rice, clothes, cars, and bombs. The unadulterated economic model has postulated that cost-benefit analyses
already dominate our political practices and color our views of our freedoms and their value (Parenti, 1977). We settle for rights, narrowly construed by the tenor of whatever court is called upon to interpret them in relation to laws. Submerged in this calculus, we are in danger of forgetting something important: Rights are what is left over after the commerce in knowledge, liberty, and values has begun.

Rights are also ephemeral things, the products of those who would dominate. They are, so to speak, at best the pretty trinkets -- at worst, the blankets -- from transactions between individuals and the state. The producers in these transactions, individuals, negotiate away their freedom to decide for themselves the constitution of reality, the ability to act upon it, and the power to assess its meaning and, form its meaning, its value. The terms are no longer open, the power to designate which commodities have an exchange value and to decide the value of those commodities having already accrued to the purchaser, the state. This is what Foucault (1970, 1972) meant with respect to the relation of the power of discourse and the knowledge of power (1975, 1979, 1984). This may be illustrated with another example.

The Word and the Act, Revisited. I argued in Chapters Two and Four, that there were relations between the kinds of knowledge expressed in the two infinitive configurations of the constitutive nature of language/speech: "to inform" and
"to enjoin." I suggested that the recognition of this diversity had led to two distinct research programs, and that in consequence, much had been learned about the capacity of language to influence individuals' and groups' perceptions of the reality they inhabited. These developments had begun to take shape in Europe in the late stages of the Enlightenment but had found perhaps their ultimate expression in the (still unproven) Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which was developed during the early decades of this century (Hoijer, 1974).

Now, there seems to be a rough contemporaneity between the resurrection in consciousness of the constitutive agency of language, both with respect to meaning and with respect to action, with the onset of the bulk of First Amendment legal activity -- almost all of which has been directed at defining and prescribing limitations upon permissible language and speech (Gillmor & Barron, 1984). Jurist and legal scholar Alexander Bickel (1975) notes, in one of his later observations on the history and the future of the First Amendment, that increased legal activity around the meaning and limits of the First Amendment began in earnest within the last three-quarters of a century.

That is roughly coincident with the emergence of theories of language which assign a determinative role to the vocabulary and grammar of speech (Hoijer, 1974, Mandelbaum, 1949; Whorf, 1952), and those theories of language that extend to speech the capacities and the
responsibilities of action (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953) which attribute to "speech" the dimensions of action: consequentiality, effect, and intention. That is, during the period when the full import of the range possibilities of implied by evidence of the role of language in formulating existential conditions and the role of speech as action reached the public sphere of discourse, language and speech became public sites of hegemonic struggle in the U.S.

Bickel (1975) avers that "an easy and uncontested freedom of speech and the press prevailed through most of the 19th Century" (p. 64). Oh, a few "abolitionists were sometimes dealt harshly with in the South and in some parts of the North and Border states (p. 64). But there was an overall "consensus and freedom" (p. 65). However, that easy uncontested freedom underwent a fairly abrupt turnaround late in the 19th and in the early decades of the 20th Centuries. Bickel says (p. 65) that a rising tide social unrest provoked by "[t]he movement for industrial justice [which] disturbed the concensus gave rise to" state legislatures' attempts to harness what would, in my scheme, be called enjunctive speech.

Bickel (1975) does not --perhaps cannot-- explain why, if newly tumultuous social conditions made the legal activity necessary, the opinions in the decisions that were rendered enunciated the doctrines that they did. Those, by
and large (an especially early) were rendered on the side of constraining language and restricting speech (e.g., Gillmor & Barron, 1984). The answers reside in the Foucauldian analytic, and the Habermasian one as well -- in the relations of imperatives of power and its instrument technocracy as I have attempted to show in this document. The implications of this revelation of what had hitherto been a private struggle -- or at least, one carried on below the surface of public discourse -- are (or should be) of importance to both communicators and educators concerned with the emancipation of their discourses, their students, their readers.

The Market. Redivivus. The market for knowledge, liberty and such is, then, a priori a buyers’ market, in which the purchaser knows more about the product than the producer. The transaction occurs in a market wherein, by the time that the commerce has begun, a basic inequality has been constructed between the two parties in the negotiation which always favors the purchaser. The relation is classically colonial and is, I believe, what the critical theorists cited in the previous chapter (e.g., Habermas, 1984; Hallin, 1985; Misgeld, 1985) have in mind when they use the term colonization to signify the increasing domination of the every-day forms of living by the imperatives of technocratically driven rationalisms which serve to naturalize the predations of the “private” sphere on both the public and the intimate spheres upon which it feeds in order to survive.
Social Ecology of Technocracy

In fact, the ecological metaphor is apt. Technocratic rationalism advances itself by means of such categories as progress, development, civilization, etc. (Foucault, 1870, 1975). These constructs are amplified by what might be called the myth of specialization, by which human energy and technological prowess is seen as the antidote to excessive exploitation: there is no need for concern about the deterioration, the thing that made us great will come up with the answers to save us now. Don't worry, be happy.

However, by any criteria with which "human science" (Foucault, 1970) would regard or attempt to measure non-human speciation, humans must begin to consider themselves unsuccessful. A biological-scientifically successful animal species in its natural environment consumes its sustenance from a limited segment of the ecology in which it resides. Humans have learned to be all-consuming. An animal species that over-consumes the resources of its sustenance undergoes population control. It breeds fewer replacements, its predators multiply as its resource-full-ness increases. As it diminishes in an environment, the species consumes less; there are fewer consumers, until its own sustaining resources restore themselves. The numbers of its predators therefore diminish, unless the species utterly exhausts its own sustaining resources. Then it extincts.
The most specialized living beings are those which rely on the narrowest range of resources for their sustenance. Because humans are all-consuming, it is therefore not only a self-serving misnomer but also a dangerous misconception to regard them as the most specialized animals. Wild things live as long as a butterfly lives...long enough, as novelist Tom Robbins (1974) put it in his wildly funny, but also prescient and troubling novel, *Another Roadside Attraction*.

Humanity has sought ways to escape this natural imperative. Under the aegis of technocracy, humans have arrogated to themselves the power to declare: Howsoever long that may be, it isn't long enough. We seem so far with apparent impunity to have been the only species that could consciously— that is, un-naturally— desire an extended life-span for its individual members and to accomplish it: could know what could happen before it happened. Humans have harnessed the power to engulf everything, including their natural predators, into the ambit of their sustaining resources. They have also created ways of passing on that power to their offspring.

**Communication and Education. Again**

The primary way is, in both cases, knowledge. Knowledge is the source and the gauge of humanity's historical success. But it is also the fate that abides: knowledge is humanity's inescapable destiny. In the power of knowledge resides the knowledge of power. Humans know, can say it before it happens, what happens to species which
exhaust their resources. Our power reveals its price in the very knowledge they use to harness it. Consuming everything, they have the planetarily unheard of potential to exhaust everything. The species which knows that it extends its own life-span, and does so by learning to be omnivorous, owes itself—though itself least of all—at least the responsibility of the survival of the resources it consumes. This is its social responsibility; this must be the knowledge that informs every educator and every communicator on every occasion of social communication and education.

**Naming of Parts, Redux**

In previous chapters of this study, I have drawn attention to various dimensions of the relations between communication and education generally, and between journalism and pedagogy in particular, in the context of the requirement for active citizen participation in democratic society. These relations were thought to be important in light of three purposes for which this project was undertaken:

1. To recuperate the rhetoric and the morality of journalistic social responsibility theory as the grounds for rerationalizing education as preparation by citizens for participation in an institutional "public sphere,"

2. To historically locate and describe a model from which a heuristically and communicatively
compelling version of that institution could be constructed, and

3. To suggest that journalists and teachers could define their professional praxis in terms of their contributions to the (re)enactment of that model.

To these ends, this study employed five chapters, drawing from the literatures of communication (especially theories of journalism), education (especially curriculum theory), along with history, sociology, and philosophy. I review these efforts here.

Chapter Two. In this chapter, Two, following on sociolinguist Basil Bernstein's (1974) injunction to investigate those matters that appeared to be obvious, I traced out the development of two skeins of thought about the effects, functions, and purposes, of the language/speech relation. I noted that, in essential accordance with Michael Stubbs's observation that languages may inform and enjoin but never do neither nor either exclusively, there were two divergent but not mutually exclusive patterns in the social fabric of which language is, at all events, a fundamental part.

Further on in Chapter Two, this study examined the "obvious" and the taken-for-granted conjunctures where the projects of communication and education both overlapped and diverged in the existential communities of teachers and journalists, showing that they shared more in common than perhaps they realized. I also described the functional and
structural parallelisms that inhabit the discourses by which the two enterprises are defined, and highlighted the places at which their institutional discursive practices diverged from their publicly proclaimed and accepted rhetorics. Following up an assertion I made in Chapter One, I examined the assumptions that undergird the hallowed requirement for an informed and active citizenry, and found it sound though its instantiation in public discourse was threatened.

Chapter Three. One of the key elements for the establishment and maintenance of emancipatory democracy to which I referred with considerable emphasis and frequency in the opening chapter of this study was the necessity of defining such democratic praxis in terms of an enterprise situated and enacted in the public sphere. In Chapter Three I advanced an interpretation of the histories of journalism (in particular) and education and the conditions under which they developed toward modernity. Noting the technological and theological roots of the two processes from the Reformation through the advent of modernity in the Enlightenment, I argued that the conditions which spawned the emancipatory telos of modernity also contained the seeds of its contradiction in technocracy. I grounded the basis for the conception of the public sphere in this period, and examined the recent critical theoretical literature in which the concept figures prominently (e.g., Eagleton, 1984; Forester, 1985; Habermas, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1984, 1987; Hallin, 1985; M İşgeld, 1985). The concept of the public
sphere has been a casualty of the irruption in the past Century of technical rationality and instrumental logic as they have come to dominate public discourse. A symptom of this domination is the fascination with and almost exclusive emphasis in the press as well as in the schools on the strategies and tactics of political arrangements rather than on the effects of policies on individuals, communities and the general public weal (Hallin, 1985).

Then, pursuant to the objects of this project outlined above, I examined the discourse on the subject of social responsibility. In particular, I responded to its critics (e.g., Altschull, 1984; Merrill, 1974), and proposed it as an antidote to the technocratic determinism that I found manifested in the contemporary theories and practices of journalism and pedagogy. I finally recapitulated the critical theorists' discussions of technocratic rationality as it affects the schools and the press.

Chapter Four. In this part of the study, I described Hazelwood decision as an example of that threat. After first reviewing and examining critically the discourse of the case, and outlining the brief tradition of more tolerance for student speech which it rescinded, I briefly introduced the analytic described by Foucault (1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1978) by which he sought to comprehend and to understand the operations of discourses generally, the discourses of human science particularly, and the
fundamental position occupied by those practices and formations in the and the power/ knowledge (pouvoir/savoir) relation.

The discussion of the Hazelwood opinion also served to illuminate how technically circumscribed skills imported from another domain (i.e., the news business) may be used to justify impeding students' (or others') impulses to appropriate and publicly represent certain of their own experiences and knowledges in the context of schooling. To the extent that the Hazelwood decision referred, and thus in an important way deferred, to the professional conventions and practices of commercial journalism, as well as to the cultural-transmission view of the aims, goals, and purposes of education in arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court relied on what Habermas among others has called technocratic consciousness. This view was demonstrated in an extended analysis of a body of documentary evidence which had appeared in the mainstream press, the press professional and trade association publications, and the "respectable" critical literature of the journalism establishment in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the decision.

This documentary analysis supported the Foucauldian interpretation of the decision by showing how technically constituted barriers may be erected to effect anti- and/or counter-democratic, managerial ends of control, discipline, and dominance. Allegations of technical insufficiencies such as grammatical errors, or alleged failures to comply
with or reflect constraints transplanted to the school milieu from outside the school (even the threat to unmask Santa Claus!) served to disguise these strategic moves behind a discourse contrasting a liberty with an alleged functional necessity and finding for the alleged necessity.

In summary, in Chapter Four, I suggested that the aims and goals of American teachers and journalists, while similar insofar as they were cognates of the same process (Chapter Two), seem to be largely constrained by instrumental reason and control-oriented, technocratic rationality. I argued that these discursive formations militate against the democratic interests of empowering citizens either to compete with the hegemonic discourses of established disciplinary technologies or to found counter-hegemonic discourses based on citizens' legitimate interpretations of their own life-experiences.

Social Responsibility for Journalists and Teachers

In previous chapters, I took up a discussion of the decline of the public sphere and the concommitant increase in interest in the intimate (a matter which, though not taken up directly by Foucault, is implicated in his discussions of the rise of the human sciences as instruments of domination in the knowledge/power relation). In this chapter, I bring these themes to a close (as much and/or as little as that may be accomplished). To this point I have attempted to argue that the re-invention of a public sphere,
or at least the conditions in which a public sphere could prosper, is the proper focus and necessary locus for a theory of social responsibility that the theory has hitherto been accused of lacking.

I have also argued that, in the project of engendering those conditions (at a minimum) or in the out-right creation of it, teachers and journalists are natural allies whose affinities lie in their commitment to the language/speech relation as I have thematized it by deploying the informative/enjunctive relation. And I have argued that the natural field for their cooperation is in a re-invented public sphere whose perimeters challenge the invidious blurring, indeed the almost total obliteration, of the distinctions among the intimate, the private and the public, by which technocratic colonization not only of the life-world, but of the life-word goes forward unchecked. It only remains to me to attempt a suggestive path along which those perimeters may be marked.

As this one last excursus into the historical conditions of journalism and education will show, we need not search in the structures institutions themselves for the trail. This involves the interesting but by now perhaps not unexpected congruence and simultaneously a dyssynchrony in the historical development of the American press and the American school, which is an important adjunct to the plethora of contemporary similarities highlighted in Chapter
Two of this study. Their historical congruence involves their debts, contributions, and responses to the tempers of the times. The dyssynchrony involves the interests controlling them.

The Press and the School in America

It may be recalled from the previous chapter that the transition from the Reformation to the Enlightenment found a number of religious sects fleeing from the secularism that their leaders perceived to be attending the arising of the reforms that the Enlightenment signalled. It is common knowledge that by the end of the third decade of the 17th Century, many dissenters had emigrated to the New World. They brought with them their books (Bibles and tracts) and not a few printers, and their almost universal literacy. These were, after all, quintessentially people of the Reformation: they had their schools; they read and interpreted the Word for themselves.

Although they were literate, the first religious colonists seem to have been imbued with a distrust of the worldliness that a thirst for news implied (Stephens, 1968), and they brooked very little in the way of interference with their avowed aim of establishing "the City of God." Schooling was a practical matter — practical meaning learning the Bible and reading tracts by the Mathers, or latterly Jonathan Edwards. In colonial times schools "served an elite group of elite male students...to prepare [them] for...political and religious leadership"
America's first college, Harvard, was established in 1636, 16 years after the founding of the Plymouth Colony, and witness to the seriousness with which the colonials took education. Further evidence is provided by the Massachusetts education, enacted in 1642 and 1647, which scholars have said to be the "foundation stones" of American public education in general (Johanningmeier, 1960). Nevertheless, these schools were held firmly in hand by the churches, their elders, and the religiously attuned communities in which they were situated.

Colonial Papers. Such newspapers as there were at the time (at least those which were permitted to publish regularly and openly), served the same clientele. But it was not until 1704 that "a publication meeting all the qualifications of a true newspaper" (Emery & Emery, 1984, p. 23) first appeared, its editor-publisher was one John Campbell, a "postmaster appointed by the Crown" (p. 21). When Campbell fell from political favor and was replaced, he "refused to relinquish his The News Letter" (p. 39). So his replacement, William Brooker, started his own, The Gazette.

Although by the beginning of the 18th Century the colonies were much advanced above the primitive conditions of the previous 80 or so years, there was still not the cosmopolitanism that prevailed in the cities such as London and Paris. As a result, neither the cosmopolite critics nor the gathering places to support them were part of the
American scene. In addition, if there were a native European culture in the colonies, it was religious. The Puritans in England had closed the theaters, after all, and it was a Puritan culture that obtained in a majority of the colonial cities, such as they were. During this period, both the press and the schools owed much to both the church and the state. The next significant period for the purposes of this study is the Revolution and its immediate aftermath, the Jeffersonian period.

The Revolution. I have already attended to Jefferson's tribute to the free press and to his opinions of the value of education. Newspapers, of course played a major role in popularizing the cause of revolution in Colonial times. Samuel Adams and the Radical Patriots had begun to foment the revolutionary spirit in handbills, broadsides, and in partisan newspapers beginning as early as 1764. Thomas Paine's Crisis papers and his Common Sense were circulated among the rebels as broadsides; Paul Revere's first contributions to the revolt were made in his capacity as an engraver of illustrative--often caustically derisive--plates for the revolutionary press. Within a few days of its promulgation in Philadelphia, the Declaration of Independence was a staple of conversation throughout the Colonies, thanks to its rapid dissemination by the press; its effects were felt as far away as France by the same means (Emery & Emery, 1984).
In the milieu of the late 18th Century, after the ferment of the Revolution to which the press had contributed so much, James Madison and the other architects of the Constitution could be forgiven their confidence (and for some, their trepidation) that there was and would continue to be a need for a robust and contentious press, and that a sufficiently --or a dauntingly and dangerously-- wide variety of different opinions and facts should be brought before the public eye to be assessed and discussed. Many were, themselves, journalists, and all had witnessed the power of the press in instigating and prosecuting the rebellion that had lifted from them the yoke of subjugation to England. Significantly, then, when creating the charter of the Republic, these men included a provision for satisfying the first requirement, for (externally) unimpeded public channels of information. At least on a surface level, the First Amendment seemed to anticipate the first requirement: for adequate channels by which requisite information could reach the presumably discerning and discriminating populace. It guarantees a "negative" freedom of the press, the freedom from the most intrusive forms of governmental intervention: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; . . ."

Common Schools, Common Papers. The next significant period finds the press enjoying its franchise, and the schools coming out from under the wing of the church and into the protective embranc of their local communities. The
rise of the common school movement paralleled more closely the advent of a further journalistic innovation: the "penny press." According to press historian John Tebbel (1976), history of the modern newspaper begins "[o]n a May morning in 1833, when the New York Herald first appeared on the streets" (p. 180). James Gordon Bennett’s enterprise was launched scarcely two years before Horace Mann’s appointment as Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education. Mann’s appointment in 1837 antedates by only four years the Horace Greeley’s founding of the New York Tribune.

Mann’s common school and Greeley’s newspaper for the common people illustrate the (ideal) synonymy of the relation of the press and the school to the interests of the societies they serve. Mann in 1849 would write that "[n]ever will wisdom preside in the halls of legislation...until Common Schools create...a more far-seeing intelligence" (in Cremin, 1961, p. 9) in order to persuade businessmen to support his ideas, while in Lowell, Mass. --"the city of spindles"-- the women in the mills were using their literacy as a means to organize. At the same time Greeley gave regular columns to the doings of Henry Clay and allotted space for Arthur Brisbane --the "American prophet of Fourierism," which was an early critique of capitalism. All this was to change in the aftermath of the Civil War.

A Turning Point. The victory of the North’s technological industrialism over the South’s agrarianism had
ensured that continued industrial expansion would be underwritten and hence directed by the requirements and resources of mercantile/investment capital. The success of industrial capital required the construction and employment of a vast machinery of production, in which the role of labor was redefined from its pre-industrial conception. The land could be worked by slaves: their ability to interfere in production was severely limited by the fact that they were, themselves, the machineries on which production depended, and were subject to direct, coercive/lethal supervision which was implicit in the slave relationship. On the other hand, in a factory the expensive machinery representing significant capital expenditure was in the care of laborers whose relations with management supervisors were more equal --though hardly coequal-- because laborers were not themselves the property of management, subject to any disposition it suited managers to exercise. The term sabotage arises from the practice by disaffected laborers of tossing a wooden shoe (a sabot) into the works and interrupting production.

Modern Schools, Modern Press. Herbert Altschull (1884) has made the point that the press is always going to function as an agent of power; that is equally true of the school. As Foucault (1972) commented, "[e]very educational system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it" (p. 227). In the United States,
though they operate in ostensibly different spheres, they are both institutionally agents of the status quo. When there was a spirit of liberalism at large, both the schools and the press cooperated (indeed were the leading vehicles) in its dispersal through the populace; likewise in more repressive times, both institutions have had leading roles in propogating them.

The common school and the penny press were products of expansive times. But after the Civil War, and particularly in the period of the 1870s-80s, when America first widely experienced the effects of the business cycle to which the government was more and more closely tied, the tide had turned. Greeley's premonitions about the invidious side of capitalism were beginning to materialize (Emery & Emery, 1984). Industrial pollution, political corruption, urban decay in slums for the labor force needed to man the machines, civil strife and riots, violent protests and equally violent reprisals-- all the contradictions implicit in capitalism, but which had been masked while the system was still in its infancy, began to appear, and be felt throughout the system.

Thus, when historians of the American press and the American schools have been able to situate to within a single generation the concatenation of exigent situation and technology that presaged the development of American mass communication and mass education, they have been pointing to
precisely the same sort of sea-change that affected the press alone in the Enlightenment. But there were no such institutions in place in American society --of course, to the extent that American society has always been a bourgeois one, there was no space for the emerging class to contend for, and there was none of the diffusion of wealth among labor when it made its try, in the 1870s, '80s and '90s.

By then the bourgeois were the ruling class, and had appropriated all the mechanisms of the Enlightenment to their own. Significantly it was in this period that the press began to erect its barrier of objectivity, also, though it did not achieve its present status until after World War I, and the onset of the age of press agentry. But by then the schools, and in particular school administrators (who were the first class of experts recognized in the system of schooling; see Johnson, 1984) were also firmly in the grasp of the technocratic, managerial mindset, and were readily and enthusiastically complying with the managerial/industrial agenda (Johnson, 1984; Misgeld, 1985; Schudson, 1978).

Return to Hazelwood: Conclusions

This last point is particularly important in the aftermath of the Hazelwood decision. Restricting the freedom of the scholastic press to express unpopular conditions has implications for the whole fabric of civic and social relations. Teachers and journalists should take whatever opportunity presents itself to discuss it publicly.
with students. The Supreme Court justices who contributed opinions (White for the majority, Brennan dissenting) both hoped the decision would provide a "civics lesson." I have tried to show that the lessons taught to, and --as Bertelson (1988) perhaps unwittingly, and Dorfman (1988) with more outrage, demonstrate -- also the lessons learned by, student journalists and their advisor at Hazelwood East High School had as much to do with the political relations among communication, education, and knowledge, and the roles of business and management in stipulating those relations, as they had with the explicit civics lesson that the Court sought to confer with respect to the responsibilities of civic participation and professional training. Or, rather, students learned that the standards of civic competence upon which the Court would rely for its interpretation of those responsibilities are isomorphic and homologous with those other interests.

Taken as a gauge of a preferred view of relations among schools, the press, knowledge, expression, and the competence necessary for effective citizenship, I have argued that the majority opinion of the Court expresses a rebuke to and a repudiation of a conception of schooling for necessary capacities of democratic action, knowledge, and learning for student journalists, or any student, which transgresses the narrow, technical view of education. By such stratagems, students and other learners are taught important lessons:
(a) that they are not the proprietors of even their own knowledge, and (b) that their ability and capacity to speak that knowledge publicly and with a sense of authority depends on the imprimatur of an institutional voice.

But, of course, it was not the students immediately involved in the dispute at Hazelwood East High who were the objects of the lesson; rather, it was the next cohort, and the next, and the next, for whom the lesson of the Court was intended. In a sense, the object of the lesson was anyone who relies on the press for their information about the world. By stipulating the authority of institutional proprietors to control the flow of news, to decide upon what constitutes the necessary information, and to authorize its dissemination, the Court was contributing to the vitiation, at the basic level of structural integrity, of the plausibility of the claim of journalists or educators to present a version of reality upon which actions could practicably be initiated, and to the ultimate disparagement of public reports of public affairs.

I argued above, in Chapter Three, that we have lost (or been bereft of) the distinctions among intimate, private and public as useful categories of individual experience. Perhaps the sole remaining vestige of a public sphere remains in the public character of the schools. Now the schools themselves are the subjects of an integrated and systematic program instigated by the technocrats to coopt the last vestiges of the public weal into the fold of the
marketplace. The voucher system, for example, may be seen as the first battleground of the young campaign. The schools alone, perhaps, may hold the key to the reconceptualization of the social geography in such a way that individuals may once again assert their own responsibility for public discourse and policy. It is toward this end that schools' assertion of social responsibility as the moral imperative for rebuilding the public sphere must be directed.

This project is probably not possible if it is simply an attempt to modify the existing institutions of society, in this case the press and the schools. For one thing, the colonization of the life-world by technocracy has advanced under a rubric of privatization that both disparages and (covertly) usurps the mediating potential of existing public discursive formations. The press as it is currently configured is an inhospitable domain for truly public relations among citizens. It is part of the order of technocratic rationality which is involved in consuming the state for its own ends. In doing so, it contributes to the perception that the state is "too big" and "too intrusive" and "too powerful" in order to purchase it more cheaply from its rightful owners, citizens of the democracy.

Reformers have frequently trumpeted a particularly obnoxious casuistry: "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem." It is my belief (and I trust I
have shown) that, while the institutions of the school and the press are part of the problem, they are also part of the solution. Another part of the solution is the people who compose (literally, in their practices/words, and literally in their participation) those institutions. It lies with teachers, in elementary, middle and high schools, and in teacher and journalism education programs to implement their parts, and to assume control of the discourses that comprise their disciplines. In that way, they can affect their institutions. The big question is how they might accomplish this, in view of the pervading presence of the dominating power and authority that attend the technocratic system that controls them, often without their even being aware of it.

Implications for Future Action

The answer may reside in the theories of social responsibility to a new conception of the public sphere. In its classical formulation, the public sphere was composed of people (albeit usually, but not always men) who were possessed of certain amounts of leisure time, had common educational experiences, had common institutions available to them, and were inspired by the inequalities which they saw all around them to criticize. While neither teachers nor journalists are usually blessed with the even adequate amounts of leisure, there is as a result of the impetus for credentialling a substantial body of common educational experience in common educational experiences.
Common Educational Experiences. This experiential similarity could be enlarged, both in the classroom (in college and university professional preparation curricular) and out of it. As Click and Kopenhaver (1988) have shown, a large number of teachers are woefully ill-informed on the meaning of freedom of the press. Pre-service teachers should be encouraged to take even a rudimentary journalism course as an elective in their programs. Nor are journalists usually any more familiar with the professional responsibilities the teachers confront; ergo, they should be encouraged to take a basic course in educational foundations or principles and practices of education by their journalism school advisors.

Teachers as Sources. Although their individual press units may be technocratically driven, individual journalists have traditionally firmly upheld their private (or is it intimate) canons of questioning authority, embarrassing the haughty (somebody has to do it), and giving voice to the voiceless. This latter point has even achieved a certain currency in journalism (most frequently journalism ethics and introductory mass media) texts since the social riots that accompanied the Equal Rights movement of the 1960s and many good journalists were caught with their pens down on the real stories in the ghettos (e.g., Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1988; Rivers & Mathews, 1988; Rodman, 1984).

Both journalists and teachers are all too frequently exposed to the seamier sides of life. And it is a truism
that seamy makes good copy. Therefore, teachers might then put themselves in the positions of being sources of news for newspeople. This could have an additional benefit in that, often, journalists and their sources become friendly, and so the relations of an extra-curricular kind might develop especially if the common educational experiences are developed and each is capable of recognizing in the other someone who shares the same concerns while pursuing different careers.

Journalists as Resources. Journalists love to tell war stories. And their jobs give them an almost unlimited opportunity for accumulating material. Teachers should be encouraged to invite journalists to participate in their classrooms. The majority would be flattered beyond words at such an invitation. It could be couched in terms that would avoid the stilted, managing-editor approach, and encourage the visiting journalist to divulge the more arcane lore of the newsroom. For as much as they enjoy war stories, they enjoy (as a rule) telling the news behind the news, and how the news actually gets onto the television, or into the papers. Their perspectives could shed a light on the mechanics of the business, as well as on the day-to-day processes of news-gathering.

Implications for Further Study.

In its tone, I have argued, the Hazelwood opinion maintained the presentation of balancing. Students' actions
were characterized as dysfunctional desires, not as needs, or as requirements for citizens-in-the-making to learn to enact their liberties, merely as desires. Their claim to the right to express and highlight their own existential interpretations of issues of immediate, practical importance was weighed in a calculus which privileged the requirements of the exercise of power. As mere desires, students' wants were seen to be insufficient against the counter-balancing influences of (a) the "basic educational mission of the school", (b) the authority of the curriculum, and (c) the imprimatur of the school. These are technocratic disciplinary technologies which thwart students' preparation to participate in democracy.

The contest for the power to define reality, then, is what is finally at issue in the adjudication of complaints about infringement upon the First Amendment. It will be a significant factor in any effort to re-invent a truly public sphere. Thus the implications of this study take two forms: practical and theoretical. They entail both the the ways we think about and the ways we attempt to enact the purposes of the school and the press.

There are certain beliefs and practices of journalism which, although to some extent necessarily idealized, I believe may have relevance to teaching practice; correspondingly, there is and is still developing a body of belief and practice regarding pedagogy that may have equal pertinence for those journalists seeking to found a praxis
in a pedagogical motif. The things that journalism does best, such as watch-dogging the powerful, embarrassing the haughty, and giving voice to the unempowered are qualities that teachers might well be schooled to impart to the young people who are placed in their charge. Under such conditions, it may therefore be possible to reconceive and ultimately reconstitute both schools and the press as agents for fostering an ethical, communitarian individual subjectivity. This, in turn, would engender active, personal, subjective responsibility for the facts and opinions about corporate and/or governmental activities (they are ever more and more synonymous) with which both institutions are intimately concerned, and likewise the critical faculties to be employed in evaluating and judging those activities.

This problem has implications with respect to the professional competence of both journalists and teachers. The competence entailed in the necessarily adversarial role of the press in a participatory democracy is not only desirable but also essential to the education of teachers, and may thus provide grounds for a pedagogy based an emancipatory vision implicated, but seldom realized, in journalistic theory and praxis. This approach to pedagogy would require a rethinking of the role of the school, the teacher, and journalism's place in the curriculum. These considerations are beyond the scope of the present inquiry,
but I announce them here to foreshadow the implications that
the re-invention of the public sphere under the rationale of
social responsibility might hold.

Teachers and journalists must make a common community
against further depredations. This community might be
comprised of members of all three groups conspiring together
to publish newspapers. The First Amendment was written
during times when the available technology was, though
different in kind from that which exists today, not so much
different in its scope and capabilities. In the 1800s,
almost any mechanic could build a letter press, any jeweler
a box of type. Today there are computers which are
substantially more portable than a letterpress, and the
programs to run them are also used in modern, state-of-the-
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art news departments. Future investigations stemming from
this study could explore the possibilities that are inherent
in the technological (in the sense I used it in Chapter Two)
capabilities of students, teachers, and journalists. I can
see nothing wrong with a nation of reporters raising their
hands to object: "Just a minute, Mr. President."
NOTES: Chapter Five

1 A printer named Benjamin Harris attempted to start a paper in Massachusetts in 1680. It published one edition before it was banned and Harris unceremoniously shipped back to England. Harris had the temerity to publish news of a murder which disturbed the equanimity of the Puritans and caused his stock(s) to fall (Stephens, 1988). In 1689, a report from Rev. Increase Mather was published and widely circulated, but it too ran to only one number, though it did contain news of the good Reverend’s efforts to obtain more aid from the Crown (Emery & Emery, 1984). Little is known about the newspapers in the Virginia; schools there were of little import since children were scarce there, and their value as laborers was greater than their value as future "leaders" (Johanningmeier, 1980).

2 This was nearly 50 years before most of the convivial company, whose the coffee-, chocolate-, and public houses, "literary" newspapers, cultural criticism, and general raconteur"-ism betokened the advent of an identifiable public sphere in Britain, had drawn their first breath, much less sniffed their first snuff or swigged their first brew --practices the Puritans would have found offensive in any case.

3 Simultaneously, then, there was begun the policy (though de facto in this case) of public subsidy of the news. Both men, along with their five subsequent replacements, availed
themselves of their positions to distribute their papers at favorable rates and thus to subdue competition (Emery & Emery, 1984).

4 The Enlightenment influences were felt much more strongly in the South, in Virginia especially, which was the home of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and the other luminaries who are responsible for most of the Enlightenment rhetoric in the documents of the founding of the Republic. Even so, these were for the most part sober, serious men who, if they disported themselves at all, did so at home among the slaves.

5 See Chapter 1 of this study; see also Lee, 1966; Johanningmeier, 1980, esp. Chapter 5, on schooling in and after the Revolution; Cremin, 1976, treats with the matter in a cursory fashion.

6 In the writings of Thomas Jefferson are contained both extremes. His widely cited letter (Lee, 1966; see also this study, Chapter 1) to a friend exhibits his confidence: "...Given the choice between a government without newspapers and newspapers without government, I should gladly chose the latter." However, later, having experienced the vicissitudes of the Presidency under the watchful, even baleful, eye of the press, and having been subjected to its barbs, he laments his earlier "liberalism" with regard to the benefits, and recants his admiration.
A partial list would include the "puppet master" Samuel Adams, who is credited with almost singlehandedly fomenting the Revolution, Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin, future Supreme Court Justice John Jay, Jefferson, and Tom Paine.

There is, however, for a variety of reasons no coeval, coextensive Constitutional provision to satisfy the second condition, for the social dispersion of discernment and discrimination. Over time, however, there also came to be developed a juridical mandate for compulsory, free, and equal public education which would answer the latter matter. Theoretically, the press supplies the wherewithal--facts and opinions--from which "inferences" are to be drawn, while the schools supply the tools, and the training in their use, for "discrimination" among facts and opinions relevant in making the critical political choices. Through the development of this system, a symbiosis was forged between the press and the schools, a synergism that seems simultaneously to be exploited and denied by elements of both parties to the arrangement.

See also Tuchman, 1976, for a valuable study on the facade of objectivity in the press; and (e.g.) Short, 1984, for the consequences of competency training in the schools.

In a time when both schools and press units are firmly under the thrall of business interests in the bottom line.
this situation is likely to deteriorate before (if ever) it gets better. Nevertheless, it is not an insoluble problem, especially if networks are established during professional training programs.

If the issue of finding the non-obvious has not penetrated as deeply as it might in classrooms, it absolutely permeates many newsrooms, adding to the substantial workloads many journalists already labor under.

Since the onset of the Reagan regime, interestingly, the media themselves have offered a low influence model of their influence. In a recent Bill Moyers hour on PBS (October 3, 1988), both Peter Jennings and NBC reporter Leslie Stahl portrayed themselves as unwitting dupes, powerless in the face of the constraints of their medium and the media manipulation wizardry of the likes of Roger Ailes and Michael Deaver to do anything but reproduce (albeit perhaps glumly and dumb-foundedly) the precise images they would have liked to criticize.
REFERENCES


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Torchbooks.


APPENDIX

HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KUHLMEIER

[____U.S.____, 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988)]
HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT,
et al., Petitioners

v.

Cathy KUHLMIEIER et al.

No. 86-836.


Staff members of high school newspaper filed First Amendment action seeking injunctive relief, money damages and declaration that First Amendment rights were violated by censorship of certain articles. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, John F. Nangle, Chief Judge, denied injunctive relief, 596 F.Supp. 1422, and held that students' First Amendment rights were not violated, 607 F.Supp. 1450. Students appealed. The Court of Appeals, Heaney, Circuit Judge, reversed, 795 F.2d 1368. Defendants petitioned for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (1) high school paper that was published by students in journalism class did not qualify as "public forum," so that school officials retained right to impose reasonable restrictions on student speech in paper, and (2) high school principal's decision to excise two pages from student newspaper, on ground that articles unfairly impinged on privacy rights of pregnant students and others, did not violate students' speech rights.

Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed.

Justice Brennan, dissented and filed opinion, in which Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun joined.

1. Constitutional Law *90.1(1.4)

Students in public schools do not shed constitutional rights to freedom of speech.
HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DIST. v. KUHLMEIER
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Cite as 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988)

or expression at schoolhouse gate. U.S.
C.A. Const. Amend. 1.

2. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

School need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though govern-
ment could not censor similar speech out-

3. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

School facility may be deemed "public
forum," for purpose of First Amendment,
only if school authorities have, by policy or
practice, opened facility for indiscriminate
use by general public or by some segment
of public, such as student organizations.

See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

4. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

Schools \(\Rightarrow \) 169

High school newspaper that was pub-
lished by journalism students could not be
characterized as "public forum," so that
school officials retained right to impose
reasonable restrictions on speech that went
into newspaper, where students publishing
newspaper received grades and academic
credit for their performance, and journalism
teacher retained final authority with
respect to almost every aspect of produc-
Amend. 1.

5. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

Educators are entitled to exercise
greater control over school-sponsored stu-
dent speech than over students' personal
speech, in order to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons expressive activity
is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material which
may be inappropriate for their level of matur-
ty, and that views of individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to school.

6. Schools \(\Rightarrow \) 169

School must be able to set high stan-
dards for student speech that is dissemi-nat-ed under its auspice and may refuse to
disseminate speech that does not meet

7. Schools \(\Rightarrow \) 169

School must be able to take into ac-
count the emotional maturity of intended
audience, in deciding whether to dissemi-
nate school-sponsored student speech on
potentially sensitive topics. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 1.

8. Schools \(\Rightarrow \) 169

School may refuse to sponsor student
speech which might reasonably be per-
cieved to advocate conduct inconsistent
with shared values of civilized social order,
or which associates school with any posi-
tion other than neutrality on matters of
Amend. 1.

9. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

Educators do not offend First Amend-
ment by exercising editorial control over
style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities, as
long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns. U.S.C.
A. Const. Amend. 1.

10. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

It is only when decision to censor
school-sponsored publication, theatrical pro-
duction, or other vehicle of student expres-
sion has no valid educational purpose that
judicial intervention is required to protect
students' free speech rights. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 1.

11. Constitutional Law \(\Rightarrow \) 90.1(1.4)

Schools \(\Rightarrow \) 169

High school principal's decision to ex-
cise two pages from student newspaper, on
ground that articles located on pages un-
fairly impinged on privacy rights of preg-
nant students and others, did not impermis-
sibly interfere with students' free speech
rights, where students published paper as
part of high school curriculum, and principal
reasonably believed that articles could
not have been modified in time to permit

Syllabus*

Respondents, former high school students who were staff members of the school's newspaper, filed suit in Federal District Court against petitioners, the school district and school officials, alleging that respondents' First Amendment rights were violated by the deletion from a certain issue of the paper of two pages that included an article describing school students' experiences with pregnancy and another article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school. The newspaper was written and edited by a journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum. Pursuant to the school's practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school's principal who objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named, might be identified from the text, and because he believed that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students. The principal objected to the divorce article because the page proofs he was furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final version) a student who complained of her father's conduct, and the principal believed that the student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to consent to their publication. Believing that there was no time to make necessary changes in the articles if the paper was to be issued before the end of the school year, the principal directed that the pages on which they appeared be withheld from publication even though other, unobjectionable articles were included on such pages. The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed.

*The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

Held: Respondents' First Amendment rights were not violated. Pp. 567-572.

(a) First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school. Pp. 567-568.

(b) The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum for public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by policy or by practice opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations. If the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community. The school officials in this case did not deviate from their policy that the newspaper's production was to be part of the educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity under the journalism teacher's control as to almost every aspect of publication. The officials did not evince any intent to open the paper's pages to indiscriminate use by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally. Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the paper's contents in any reasonable manner. Pp. 567-569.

(c) The standard for determining when a school may punish student expression that happens to occur on school premises is not the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
This case concerns the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum.

I

Petitioners are the Hazelwood School District in St. Louis County, Missouri; various school officials, Robert Eugene Reynolds, the principal of Hazelwood East High School, and Howard Emerson, a teacher in the school district. Respondents are three former Hazelwood East students who were staff members of Spectrum, the school newspaper. They contend that school officials violated their First Amendment rights by deleting two pages of articles from the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum.

Spectrum was written and edited by the Journalism II class at Hazelwood East. The newspaper was published every three weeks or so during the 1982-1983 school year. More than 4,500 copies of the newspaper were distributed during that year to students, school personnel, and members of the community.

The Board of Education allocated funds from its annual budget for the printing of Spectrum. These funds were supplemented by proceeds from sales of the newspaper. The printing expenses during the 1982-1983 school year totaled $4,668.50, revenue from sales was $1,166.84. The other costs associated with the newspaper—such as supplies, textbooks, and a portion of the journalism teacher's salary—were borne entirely by the Board.

The Journalism II course was taught by Robert Stergos for most of the 1982-1983 academic year. Stergos left Hazelwood East to take a job in private industry on April 29, 1983, when the May 13 edition of Spectrum was nearing completion, and petitioner Emerson took his place as newspaper adviser for the remaining weeks of the term.

The practice at Hazelwood East during the spring 1983 semester was for the journalism teacher to submit page proofs of each Spectrum issue to Principal Reynolds for his review prior to publication. On May 10, Emerson delivered the proofs of the May 13 edition to Reynolds, who objected to two of the articles scheduled to appear in that edition. One of the stories described three Hazelwood East students' experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.

Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used false names "to keep the identity of these girls a secret," the pregnant students still might be identifiable from the text. He also believed the article's references to sexual activity
and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the divorce story had complained that her father "wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I" prior to the divorce. "I was always out of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys," and "always argued about everything" with her mother. App to Pet. for Cert. 33. Reynolds believed that the student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to these remarks or to consent to their publication. He was unaware that Emerson had deleted the student's name from the final version of the article.

Reynolds believed that there was no time to make the necessary changes in the stories before the scheduled press run and that the newspaper would not appear before the end of the school year if printing were delayed to any significant extent. He concluded that his only options under the circumstances were to publish a four-page newspaper instead of the planned six-page newspaper, eliminating the two pages on which the offending stories appeared, or to publish no newspaper at all. Accordingly, he directed Emerson to withhold from publication the two pages containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce. He informed his superiors of the decision, and they concurred.

Respondents subsequently commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri seeking a declaration that their First Amendment rights had been violated, injunctive relief, and monetary damages.

After a bench trial, the District Court denied an injunction, holding that no First Amendment violation had occurred. 607 F.Supp., at 1466

The court held that Principal Reynolds' concern that the pregnant students' anonymity would be lost and their privacy invaded was "legitimate and reasonable," given "the small number of pregnant students at Hazelwood East and several identifying characteristics that were disclosed in the article." 607 F.Supp., at 1466. The court held that Reynolds' action was also justified "to avoid the impression that [the school] endorses the sexual norms of the subjects" and to shield younger students from exposure to unsuitable material. Ibid. The deletion of the article on divorce was seen by the court as a reasonable response to the invasion of privacy concerns raised by the named student's remarks. Because the article did not indicate that the student's parents had been offered an opportunity to respond to her allegations, said the court, there was cause for "serious doubt that the article complied with the rules of fairness which are standard in the field of journalism and which were covered in the textbook used in the Journalism II class." Ibid., at 1467. Furthermore, the court concluded that Reynolds was justified in deleting two full pages of the newspaper, instead of deleting only the pregnancy and divorce stories or requiring that those stories be modified to address his concerns, based on his "reasonable belief that he had to make an immediate decision and that there was no time to make modifications to the articles in question." Ibid., at 1466.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 795 F.2d 1368 (1986).

The court held at outset that Spectrum was
not only "a part of the school adopted curriculum," id., at 1373, but also a public forum, because the newspaper was "intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." Id., at 1372. The court then concluded that Spectrum's status as a public forum precluded school officials from censoring its contents except when "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or discipline . . . or the rights of others." Id., at 1374 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)).

The Court of Appeals found "no evidence in the record that the principal could have reasonably forecast that the censored articles or any materials in the censored articles would have materially disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the school." 795 F.2d, at 1375. School officials were entitled to censor the articles on the ground that they invaded the rights of others, according to the court, only if publication of the articles could have resulted in tort liability to the school. The court concluded that no tort action for libel or invasion of privacy could have been maintained against the school by the subjects of the two articles or by their families. Accordingly, the court held that school officials had violated respondents' First Amendment rights by deleting the two pages of the newspaper.

We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 926, 93 L.Ed.2d 978 (1987), and we now reverse.

II

[1] Students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736. They cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school premises—whether "in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours," id., at 512-513, 89 S.Ct., at 739-740—unless school authorities have reason to believe that such expression will "substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students." Id., at 509, 89 S.Ct., at 738.

[2] We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools "are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings," Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), and must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736, cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-343, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743-744, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its "basic educational mission," Fraser, supra, 478 U.S., at ----, 106 S.Ct., at 3166, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school. Accordingly, we held in Fraser that a student could be disciplined for having delivered a speech that was "sexually explicit" but not legally obscene at an official school assembly, because the school was entitled to "disassociate itself from the speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is 'wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education.'" Ibid. We thus recognized that "[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board," id., at ----, 106 S.Ct., at 3165, rather than with the federal courts. It is in this context that respondents' First Amendment claims must be considered.

A

[3] We deal first with the question whether Spectrum may appropriately be characterized as a forum for public expression. The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that "time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 

Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-268, n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 273, n. 5, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Hence, school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have "by policy or by practice" opened those facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public." Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct., 948, 956, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations 

Id., at 46, n. 7, 103 S.Ct., at 955, n. 7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent). If the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, "communicative or otherwise," then no public forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community. 


141 The policy of school officials toward Spectrum was reflected in Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 and the Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide. Board Policy 348.51 provided that "[s]chool sponsored publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular classroom activities." App. 22. The Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide described the Journalism II course as a "laboratory situation in which the students publish the school newspaper applying skills they have learned in Journalism I." 

Id., at 11. The lessons that were to be learned from the Journalism II course, according to the Curriculum Guide, included development of journalistic skills under deadline pressure, "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists within the school community," and "responsibility and acceptance of criticism for articles of opinion." 

Ibid. Journalism II was taught by a faculty member during regular class hours. Students received grades and academic credit for their performance in the course.

School officials did not deviate in practice from their policy that production of Spectrum was to be part of the educational curriculum and a "regular classroom activity."

The District Court found that Robert Stergos, the journalism teacher during most of the 1982-1983 school year, "both had the authority to exercise and in fact exercised a great deal of control over Spectrum." 607 F.Supp., at 1453. For example, Stergos selected the editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates, decided the number of pages for each issue, assigned story ideas to class members, advised students on the development of their stories, reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, selected and edited the letters to the editor, and dealt with the printing company. Many of these decisions were made without consultation with the Journalism II students. The District Court thus found it "clear that Mr. Stergos was the final authority with respect to almost every aspect of the production and publication of Spectrum, including its content." 

Ibid. Moreover, after each Spectrum issue had been finally approved by Stergos or his successor, the issue still had to be reviewed by Principal Reynolds prior to publication. Respondents' assertion that they had believed that they could publish "practically anything" in Spectrum was therefore dismissed by the District Court as simply "not credible." 

Id., at 1456. These factual findings are amply supported by the record, and were not rejected as clearly erroneous by the Court of Appeals.

The evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals in finding Spectrum to be a public forum, see 795 F.2d, at 1372-1373, is equivocal at best. For example, Board Policy 348.51, which stated in part that "[s]chool
sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism," also stated that such publications were "developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications." App. 22. One might reasonably infer from the full text of Policy 348.51 that school officials retained ultimate control over what constituted "responsible journalism" in a school-sponsored newspaper. Although the Statement of Policy published in the September 14, 1982, issue of Spectrum declared that "Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment," this statement, understood in the context of the paper's role in the school's curriculum, suggests at most that the administration will not interfere with the students' exercise of those First Amendment rights that attend the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper. It does not reflect an intent to expand those rights by converting a curricular newspaper into a public forum. Finally, that students were permitted to exercise some authority over the contents of Spectrum was fully consistent with the Curriculum Guide objective of teaching the Journalism II students "leadership responsibilities as issue and page editors." App. 11. A decision to teach leadership skills in the context of a classroom activity hardly implies a decision to relinquish school control over that activity. In sum, the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals fails to demonstrate the "clear intent to create a public forum," Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 802, 105 S.Ct., at 3449-3450, that existed in cases in which we found public forums to have been created. See id., at 802-803, 105 S.Ct., at 3449-3450 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S., at 267, 102 S.Ct., at 273, Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174, n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 421, 426, n. 6, 50 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976), Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)). School officials did not evince either "by policy or by practice," Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S., at 47, 103 S.Ct., at 956, any intent to open the pages of Spectrum to "indiscriminate use," ibid., by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally. Instead, they "reserve[d] the forum for its intended purpose[,]" id., at 46, 103 S.Ct., at 955, as a supervised learning experience for journalism students. Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of Spectrum in any reasonable manner. Ibid. It is this standard, rather than our decision in Tinker, that governs this case.

B

The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school, the news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper. The dissent apparently finds as a fact that the Statement was published annually in Spectrum; however, the District Court was unable to conclude that the Statement appeared on more than one occasion. In any event, even if the Statement says what the dissent believes that it says, the evidence that school officials never intended to designate Spectrum as a public forum remains overwhelming.

2. The Statement also cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), for the proposition that "[o]nly speech that 'materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline' can be found unacceptable and therefore be prohibited." App. 26. This portion of the Statement does not, of course, even accurately reflect our holding in Tinker. Furthermore, the Statement nowhere expressly extended the Tinker standard to
These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.1

3. The distinction that we draw between speech that is sponsored by the school and speech that is not is fully consistent with Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973) (per curiam), which involved an off-campus "underground" newspaper that school officials merely had allowed to be sold on a state university campus.

4. The dissent perceives no difference between the First Amendment analysis applied in Tinker and that applied in Fraser. We disagree. The decision in Fraser rested on the "vulgar," "lewd," and "plainly offensive" character of a speech delivered at an official school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to "materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." 478 U.S., at 3165, or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).

5. We therefore need not decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as precluding school officials from censoring student speech to avoid "invasion of the rights of others," 393 U.S., at 513, 89 S.Ct., at 740, except...
stead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.

This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges. See, e.g., Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 1003, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so "directly and sharply implicated." Ibid., as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights.

III

We also conclude that Principal Reynolds acted reasonably in requiring the deletion from the May 13 issue of Spectrum of the pregnancy article, the divorce article, and the remaining articles that were to appear on the same pages of the newspaper.

The initial paragraph of the pregnancy article declared that "[a]ll names have been changed to keep the identity of these girls a secret." The principal concluded that the students' anonymity was not adequately protected, however, given the other identifying information in the article and the small number of pregnant students at the school. Indeed, a teacher at the school credibly testified that she could positively identify at least one of the girls and possibly all three. It is likely that many students at Hazelwood East would have been at least as successful in identifying the girls. Reynolds therefore could reasonably have feared that the article violated whatever pledge of anonymity had been given to the pregnant students. In addition, he could reasonably have been concerned that the article was not sufficiently sensitive to the privacy interests of the students' boyfriends and parents, who were discussed in the article but who were given no opportunity to consent to its publication or to offer a response. The article did not contain graphic accounts of sexual activity. The girls did comment in the article, however, concerning their sexual histories and their use or nonuse of birth control. It was not unreasonable for the principal to have concluded that such frank talk was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication.

7. A number of lower federal courts have similarly recognized that educators' decisions with regard to the content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other expressive activities are entitled to substantial deference. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board of Education Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (CA9 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (CA5 1981); Trachman v. Anter, 563 F.2d 512 (CA2 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct 1491, 55 L.Ed.2d 519 (1978); Frasco v. Andrews, 463 F.Supp 1043 (EDNY 1979). We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.
Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.\[8\]

[10] This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges. See, e.g., Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1003, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Eperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103, 89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so "directly and sharply implicated," \textit{ibid.}, as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights.\[7\]

III

[11] We also conclude that Principal Reynolds acted reasonably in requiring the deletion from the May 13 issue of Spectrum of the pregnancy article, the divorce article, where that speech could result in tort liability to the school.

6. We reject respondents' suggestion that school officials be permitted to exercise prepublication control over school-sponsored publications only pursuant to specific written regulations. To require such regulations in the context of a curricular activity could unduly constrain the ability of educators to educate. We need not now decide whether such regulations are required before school officials may censor publications not sponsored by the school that students seek to distribute on school grounds. See Baughman \textit{v.} Pluenenmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (CA4 1973); Schenck \textit{v.} Northwestern Independent School Dist., 563 F.2d 512 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 1491, 55 L.Ed.2d 519 (1975); Fre Press v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (EDNY 1970). We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.

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HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DIST. v. KUHLMEIER

When the young men and women of Hazelwood East High School registered for Journalism II, they expected a civics lesson. Spectrum, the newspaper they were to publish, "was not just a class exercise in which students learned to prepare papers and hone writing skills, it was a . . . forum established to give students an opportunity to express their views while gaining an appreciation of their rights and responsibilities under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . ." 795 F.2d 1368, 1373 (C.A.8 1986). "[A]t the beginning of each school year," id., at 1372, the student journalists published a Statement of Policy—tacitly approved each year by school authorities—announcing their expectation that "Spectrum, as a student press publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment. . . . Only speech that 'materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline' can be found unacceptable and therefore prohibited." App. 26 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513, 89 S.Ct. 733, 740, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)).

This case arose when the Hazelwood East administration breached its own promise, dashing its students' expectations. The school principal, without prior consultation or explanation, excised six articles—comprising two full pages—of the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum. He did so not because any of the articles would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline," but simply because he considered two of the six "inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable" for student consumption. 795 F.2d, at 1371.

In my view the principal broke more than just a promise. He violated the First Amendment's prohibitions against censorship of any student expression that neither disrupts classwork nor invades the rights of others, and against any censorship that is not narrowly tailored to serve its purpose.

Public education serves vital national interests in preparing the Nation's youth for life in our increasingly complex society and for the duties of citizenship in our democratic Republic. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). The public school conveys to our young the information and tools required not merely to survive in, but to contribute to, civilized society. It also inculcates in tomorrow's leaders the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system. . . ." Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 77, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 1595, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979). All the while, the public educator nurtures students' social and moral development by transmitting to them an official dogma of "'community values.'" Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2806, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).

The public educator's task is weighty and delicate indeed. It demands particularized and supremely subjective choices among (or anyone else) might expect a passage that applies categorically to "a student press publication," composed almost exclusively of "news and feature articles," to mention those categories expressly. Understandably, neither court below so limited the passage.

1. The Court suggests that the passage quoted in the text did not "extend[d] the Tinker standard to the news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper" because the passage did not expressly mention them. Ante, at 569, n. 2. It is hard to imagine why the Court
diverse curricula, moral values, and political stances to teach or inculcate in students, and among various methodologies for doing so. Accordingly, we have traditionally reserved the "daily operation of school systems" to the States and their local school boards. *Epperson v. Arkansas*, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); see *Board of Education v. Pico*, *supra*, 457 U.S., at 863-864, 102 S.Ct., at 2806. We have not, however, hesitated to intervene where their decisions run afoul of the Constitution. See e.g., *Edwards v. Aguillard*, 482 U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (striking state statute that forbade teaching of evolution in public school unless accompanied by instruction on theory of "creation science"); *Board of Education v. Pico*, *supra* (school board may not remove books from library shelves merely because it disapproves of ideas they express); *Epperson v. Arkansas*, *supra* (striking state-law prohibition against teaching Darwinian theory of evolution in public school); *West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (public school may not compel student to salute flag); *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in public or private schools is unconstitutional).

Free student expression undoubtedly sometimes interferes with the effectiveness of the school's pedagogical functions. Some brands of student expression do so by directly preventing the school from pursuing its pedagogical mission: The young polemic who stands on a soapbox during calculus class to deliver an eloquent political diatribe interferes with the legitimate teaching of calculus. And the student who delivers a lewd endorsement of a student-government candidate might so extremely distract an impressionable high school audience as to interfere with the orderly operation of the school. See *Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser*, 478 U.S. ——, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 649 (1986). Other student speech, however, frustrates the school's legitimate pedagogical purposes merely by expressing a message that conflicts with the school's, without directly interfering with the school's expression of its message. A student who responds to a political science teacher's question with the retort, "Socialism is good," subverts the school's inculcation of the message that capitalism is better. Even the maverick who sits in class passively sporting a symbol of protest against a government policy, cf. *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.*, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), or the gossip who sits in the student commons swapping stories of sexual escapade could readily muddle a clear official message condoning the government policy or condemning teenage sex. Likewise, the student newspaper that, like Spectrum, conveys a moral position at odds with the school's official stance might subvert the administration's legitimate inculcation of its own perception of community values.

If mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message were a constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech, school officials could censor each of the students or student organizations in the foregoing hypotheticals, converting our public schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism," *id.*, at 511, 89 S.Ct., at 739, that "strangle the free mind at its source." *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, *supra*, 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185. The First Amendment permits no such blanket censorship authority. While the "constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings," *Fraser*, *supra*, 478 U.S., at ——, 106 S.Ct., at 3164, students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," *Tinker*, *supra*, 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736. Just as the public on the street corner must, in the interest of fostering "enlightened opinion," *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct.
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900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), tolerate speech that "tempts [the listener] to throw [the speaker] off the street," id., at 309, 60 S.Ct., at 906, public educators must accommodate some student expression even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the school wishes to inculcate.

In Tinker, this Court struck the balance. We held that official censorship of student expression—there the suspension of several students until they removed their armbands protesting the Vietnam War—is unconstitutional unless the speech "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others...." Tinker, 393 U.S., at 513, 89 S.Ct., at 737. The "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint," id., at 509, 89 S.Ct., at 738, or an unsavory subject, Fraser, supra, 478 U.S., at ----, 106 S.Ct., at ---, does not justify official suppression of student speech in the high school.

This Court applied the Tinker test just a Term ago in Fraser, supra, upholding an official decision to discipline a student for delivering a lewd speech in support of a student-governed candidate. The Court today casts no doubt on Tinker's vitality. Instead it erects a taxonomy of school censorship, concluding that Tinker applies to one category and not another. On the one hand is censorship "to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises." Ante, at 569.

On the other hand is censorship of expression that arises in the context of "school-sponsored... expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Ibid.

The Court does not, for it cannot, purport to discern from our precedents the distinction it creates. One could, I suppose, readily characterize the Tinkers' symbolic speech as "personal expression that happens to have occurred on school premises," although Tinker did not even hint that the personal nature of the speech was of any (much less dispositive) relevance. But that same description could not by any stretch of the imagination fit Fraser's speech. He did not just "happen" to deliver his lewd speech to an ad hoc gathering on the playground. As the second paragraph of Fraser evinces, if ever a forum for student expression was "school-sponsored," Fraser's was:

"Fraser... delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office. Approximately 600 high school students... attended the assembly. Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to study hall. The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government." Fraser, 478 U.S., at ----, 106 S.Ct., at 3162 (emphasis added).

Yet, from the first sentence of its analysis, see id., at ----, 106 S.Ct., at ----, Fraser faithfully applied Tinker.

Nor has this Court ever intimated a distinction between personal and school-sponsored speech in any other context. Particularly telling is this Court's heavy reliance on Tinker in two cases of First Amendment infringement on state college campuses. See Papish v. University of Missouri Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671, n. 6, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 1199, n. 6, 35 L.Ed.2d 518 (1973) (per curiam); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 189, and n. 18, 191, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2345, 2350, and n. 18, 2351, 33 L.Ed. 2d 266 (1972). One involved the expulsion of a student for lewd expression in a newspaper that she sold on campus pursuant to university authorization, see Papish, supra, 410 U.S., at 667-668, 93 S.Ct., at 1197-1198, and the other involved the denial of university recognition and concomitant benefits to a political student organization, see Healy, supra, 408 U.S., at 174, 176, 181-182, 92 S.Ct., at 2342, 2343, 2346-2347.
Tracking *Tinker*’s analysis, the Court found each act of suppression unconstitutional. In neither case did this Court suggest the distinction, which the Court today finds dispositive, between school-sponsored and incidental student expression.

II

Even if we were writing on a clean slate, I would reject the Court’s rationale for abandoning *Tinker* in this case. The Court offers no more than an obscure tangle of three excuses to afford educators “greater control” over school-sponsored speech than the *Tinker* test would permit: the public educator’s prerogative to control curriculum; the pedagogical interest in shielding the high school audience from objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics; and the school’s need to dissociate itself from student expression. *Ante*, at 569–570. None of the excuses, once disentangled, supports the distinction that the Court draws. *Tinker* fully addresses the first concern; the second is illegitimate; and the third is readily achievable through less oppressive means.

A

The Court is certainly correct that the First Amendment permits educators “to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach.” *Ante*, at 570. That is, however, the essence of the *Tinker* test, not an excuse to abandon it. Under *Tinker*, school officials may censor only such student speech as would “materially disrupt[]” a legitimate curricular function. Manifestly, student speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular function when it arises in the context of a curricular activity—one that “is designed to teach” something—than when it arises in the context of a noncurricular activity. Thus, under *Tinker*, the school may constitutionally punish the budding political orator if he disrupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria. See *Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n*, 447 U.S. 530, 544–545, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2337, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). That is not because some more stringent standard applies in the curricular context. (After all, this Court applied the same standard whether the Tinkers wore their armbands to the “classroom” or the “cafeteria.” *393 U.S., at 522, 89 S.Ct., at 740.*) It is because student speech in the noncurricular context is less likely to disrupt materially any legitimate pedagogical purpose.

I fully agree with the Court that the First Amendment should afford an educator the prerogative not to sponsor the publication of a newspaper article that is “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,” or that fails short of the “high standards ... student speech that is disseminated under [the school’s] auspices....” *Ante*, at 570. But we need not abandon *Tinker* to reach that conclusion; we need only apply it. The enumerated criteria reflect the skills that the curricular newspaper “is designed to teach.” The educator may, under *Tinker*, constitutionally “censor” poor grammar, writing, or research because to reward such expression would “materially disrupt[]” the newspaper’s curricular purpose.

The same cannot be said of official censorship designed to shield the audience or dissociate the sponsor from the expression. Censorship so motivated might well serve (although, as I demonstrate *infra*, at --- ---, cannot legitimately serve) some other school purpose. But it in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student newspaper, unless one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors. Unsurprisingly, Hazelwood East claims no such pedagogical purpose.

The Court relies on bits of testimony to portray the principal’s conduct as a pedagogical lesson to Journalism II students who “had not sufficiently mastered those
portions of the ... curriculum that pertained to the treatment of controversial issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the privacy of individuals ..., and 'the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists...'

Ante, at 572. In that regard, the Court attempts to justify censorship of the article on teenage pregnancy on the basis of the principal's judgment that (1) "the [pregnant] students' anonymity was not adequately protected," despite the article's use of aliases, and (2) the judgment "that the article was not sufficiently sensitive to the privacy interests of the students' boyfriends and parents...." Ante, at 571. Similarly, the Court finds in the principal's decision to censor the divorce article a journalistic lesson that the author should have given the father of one student an "opportunity to defend himself" against her charge that (in the Court's words) he "chose 'playing cards with the guys' over home and family...." Ante, at 572.

But the principal never consulted the students before censoring their work. "[T]hey learned of the deletions when the paper was released ...." 795 F.2d, at 1371. Further, he explained the deletions only in the broadest of generalities. In one meeting called at the behest of seven protesting Spectrum staff members (presumably a fraction of the full class), he characterized the articles as "too sensitive" for 'our immature audience of readers,'" 607 F.Supp. 1450, 1459 (ED Mo.1985), and in a later meeting he deemed them simply "inappropriate, personal, sensitive and unsuitable for the newspaper," ibid. The Court's supposition that the principal intended (or the protesters understood) those generalities as a lesson on the nuances of journalistic responsibility is utterly incredible. If he did, a fact that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, the lesson was lost on all but the psychic Spectrum staffer.

B

The Court's second excuse for deviating from precedent is the school's interest in shielding an impressionable high school audience from material whose substance is "unsuitable for immature audiences." Ante, at 570 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the majority decrees that we must afford educators authority to shield high school students from exposure to "potentially sensitive topics" (like "the particulars of teenage sexual activity") or unacceptable social viewpoints (like the advocacy of "irresponsible sex[x] or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order'") through school-sponsored student activities. Id., at 570 (citation omitted).

Tinker teaches us that the state educator's undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as "thought police" stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). Otherwise educators could transform students into "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate," Tinker, 393 U.S., at 511, 89 S.Ct., at 739, and cast a perverse and impermissible "pall of orthodoxy over the classroom," Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 683, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). Thus, the State cannot constitutionally prohibit its high school students from recounting in the locker room "the particulars of [their] teenage sexual activity," nor even from advocating "irresponsible sex[x]" or other presumed abominations of "the shared values of a civilized social order." Even in its capacity as educator the State may not assume an Orwellian "guardianship of the public mind," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545, 65 S.Ct. 315, 329, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).

The mere fact of school sponsorship does not, as the Court suggests, license such thought control in the high school, whether
through school suppression of disfavored viewpoints or through official assessment of topic sensitivity. The former would constitute unabashed and unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. at 2813-2814 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), as well as an impermissible infringement of the students' "right to receive information and ideas," id., at 867, 102 S.Ct., at 2808 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted), see First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 763, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). Just as a school board may not purge its state-funded library of all books that "offend[] its social, political and moral tastes," 457 U.S., at 858-859, 102 S.Ct., at 2804 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted), school officials may not, out of like motivation, discriminatorily excise objectionable ideas from a student publication. The State's prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely (or to limit its subject matter) no more entitles it to dictate which viewpoints students may express on its pages, than the State's prerogative to close down the schoolhouse entitles it to prohibit the non-disruptive expression of antiwar sentiment within its gates.

Official censorship of student speech on the ground that it addresses "potentially sensitive topics" is, for related reasons, equally impermissible. I would not begrudge an educator the authority to limit the substantive scope of a school-sponsored publication to a certain, objectively definable topic, such as literary criticism, school sports, or an overview of the school year. Unlike those determinate limitations, "potential topic sensitivity" is a vaporous non-standard—like "public welfare, peacefulness, health, decency, good order, morals, or convenience," "Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), or "general welfare of citizens," "Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322, 78 S.Ct. 277, 282, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958)—that invites manipulation to achieve ends that cannot permissibly be achieved through blatant viewpoint discrimination and chills student speech to which school officials might not object. In part because of those dangers, this Court has consistently condemned any scheme allowing a state official boundless discretion in licensing speech from a particular forum. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, supra, 394 U.S., at 150-151, and n. 2, 89 S.Ct., at 938-939, and n. 2, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 556, 557-558, 85 S.Ct. 893, 18 L.Ed.2d 976 (1965); Staub v. Baxley, supra, 355 U.S., at 322-324, 78 S.Ct. at 282-283.

The case before us aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the "mere" protection of students from sensitive topics. Among the grounds that the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviour," with an acknowledgment of "[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms," id., at 938-939, 89 S.Ct., at 938-939, and n. 2, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 556, 557-558, 85 S.Ct. 893, 18 L.Ed.2d 976 (1965); Staub v. Baxley, supra, 355 U.S., at 322-324, 78 S.Ct. at 282-283.

Petitioners themselves concede that "[c]ontrol over access" to Spectrum is permissible only if "the distinctions drawn . . . are viewpoint neutral." Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3451, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)).
Court advances to uphold the principal's censorship of one of the articles was the potential sensitivity of "teenage sexual activity." *Ante,* at 570. Yet the District Court specifically found that the principal "did not, as a matter of principle, oppose discussion of said topic" in *Spectrum.* 607 F. Supp., at 1467. That much is also clear from the same principal's approval of the "squeal law" article on the same page, dealing forthrightly with "teenage sexuality," "the use of contraceptives by teenagers," and "teenage pregnancy." App. 4-5. If topic sensitivity were the true basis of the principal's decision, the two articles should have been equally objectionable. It is much more likely that the objectionable article was objectionable because of the viewpoint it expressed: It might have been read (as the majority apparently does) to advocate "irresponsible sex." *See ante,* at 570.

C

The sole concomitant of school sponsorship that might conceivably justify the distinction that the Court draws between sponsored and nonsponsored student expression is the risk "that the views of the individual speaker [might be] erroneously attributed to the school." *Ante,* at 570. Of course, the risk of erroneous attribution inheres in any student expression, including "personal expression" that, like the Tinkers' armbands, "happens to occur on the school premises." *Ante,* at 569. Nevertheless, the majority is certainly correct that indicia of school sponsorship increase the likelihood of such attribution, and that state educators may therefore have a legitimate interest in dissociating themselves from student speech.

But "[e]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved" *Keyishian v. Board of Regents,* 385 U.S., at 602, 87 S.Ct., at 683 (quoting *Shelton v. Tucker,* 364 U.S. 479, 468, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960)). Dissociative means short of censorship are available to the school. It could, for example, require the student activity to publish a disclaimer, such as the "Statement of Policy" that *Spectrum* published each school year announcing that "[a]ll ... editorials appearing in this newspaper reflect the opinions of the *Spectrum* staff, which are not necessarily shared by the administrators or faculty of Hazelwood East." App. 26; or it could simply issue its own response clarifying the official position on the matter and explaining why the student position is wrong. Yet, without so much as acknowledging the less oppressive alternatives, the Court approves of brutal censorship.

III

Since the censorship served no legitimate pedagogical purpose, it cannot by any stretch of the imagination have been designed to prevent "material disruption of classwork." *Tinker,* 393 U.S., at 513, 89 S.Ct., at 740. Nor did the censorship fall within the category that *Tinker* described as necessary to prevent student expression from "invad[ing] the rights of others," ibid. If that term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights that are protected by law. "Any yardstick less exacting than [that] could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance," 795 F.2d, at 1376, a prospect that would be completely at odds with this Court's pronouncement that the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough [even in the public-school context] to overcome the right to freedom of expression." *Tinker,* supra, 393 U.S., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737. And, as the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned, whatever journalistic impropriety these articles may have contained, they could not conceivably be tortious, much less criminal. See 795 F.2d, at 1375-1376.

Finally, even if the majority were correct that the principal could constitutionally have censored the objectionable material,
would emphatically object to the brutal manner in which he did so. Where "[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools" Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, 385 U.S., at 602, 87 S.Ct., at 683, the principal used a paper shredder. He objected to some material in two articles, but excised six entire articles. He did not so much as inquire into obvious alternatives, such as precise deletions or additions (one of which had already been made), rearranging the layout, or delaying publication. Such unthinking contempt for individual rights is intolerable from any state official. It is particularly insidious from one to whom the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for the cherished democratic liberties that our Constitution guarantees.

IV

The Court opens its analysis in this case by purporting to reaffirm Tinker’s time-tested proposition that public school students “‘do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate’” ante, at 567 (quoting Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736). That is an ironic introduction to an opinion that denudes high school students of much of the First Amendment protection that Tinker itself prescribed. Instead of “teach[ing] children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the American system,” Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S., at 880, 102 S.Ct., at 2814 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and “that our Constitution is a living reality, not parchment preserved under glass,” Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist. Bexar Cty, Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (CA5 1972), the Court today “teach[es] youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185. The young men and women of Hazelwood East expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today. I dissent.
VITA

John Pace Konopak received his Bachelor of Arts from the University of New Mexico in 1971 [Literature/Philosophy], his Master of Journalism from Louisiana State University in 1985 [Journalism Ethics], and his Doctor of Philosophy from Louisiana State University in 1989 [Major: Curriculum Theory; Minor: Journalism]. Dr. Konopak has an extensive professional background in mass communications, including print journalism, broadcasting, and public relations. He has taught high school philosophy and English, adult basic education, and undergraduate journalism and education courses. His major research interest concerns critical theory in mass communication and education.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: JOHN PACE KONOPAK

Major Field: Education

Title of Dissertation: Re-Inventing the Public Sphere: Critical Theory, Social Responsibility, Schools, and the Press

Approved.  

Major Professor and Chairman
Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE

Date of Examination: 2/14/84