Islam and Political Development: The Tunisian Experience.

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Islam and political development: The Tunisian experience

Handal, Najoua Kefi, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1989
ISLAM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE TUNISIAN EXPERIENCE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
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in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

In
The Department of Political Science

by
Najoua Kefi Nandal
B. A., The University of New Orleans, 1980
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1982
May 1989
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I dedicate my work to my children Sarah Elena Handal and Christopher Louis Handal.

Although I am deeply grateful for all the assistance I received, I acknowledge that all shortcomings are my own.
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ABSTRACT

Contrary to many theories attempting to explain "political development" in the contemporary world, the recent experience of the Middle East indicates that religious values, principles, and institutions have to be taken into account in any adequate understanding of political processes in developing nations.

This dissertation is an attempt to identify and analyze in detail the specific contribution of the Islamic religious tradition in the political development of Sunni Tunisia in comparison and contrast to three selected case studies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. These four nation-states were chosen for examination because they provide evidence illustrating patterns or "models" of mosque-state relations.

The contribution of religion, in this case the Sunni branch of Islam, may be positive or negative and it may take diverse forms. As in Turkey, the religious tradition may be viewed by the political elites as a major obstacle to national development. Alternatively, in Egypt it may lead to parallel development or a symbiosis between spiritual and temporal establishments. In Saudi Arabia the "partnership" model provides the Saudi system with legitimacy. The case of Tunisia presents an "authentic" vision of Islam developed by Habib Bourguiba who sought to purify Islam from excesses and from decadent traditions.

Theories of political development conceiving of modernization solely in secular terms are inadequate or misleading. On the basis of the evidence offered by these case
studies, it is clear that for a number of societies throughout
the Third World any satisfactory theory of political development
must devote considerable attention to the role played by religion
in the evolution and operation of the nation's political system.
Note on Transliteration

The transliteration of Arabic, Turkish, and Persian terms always poses problems in correct and consistent usage in English. It is difficult to follow a uniform usage of certain Arabic words (such as ulama, alternatively ulema; and Koran, alternatively Quran.) An effort has been made in this thesis to follow consistent usage throughout, unless the term is spelled differently in quotations. The transliteration of Arabic terms is based on the Middle East Studies Handbook (MESA) system, 1983.

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INTRODUCTION

Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm's length, it seeks to dehumanize them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture without giving them ours.

--Jean Paul Sartre,
Preface to Franz Fanon, The wretched of the Earth.

From time to time in recent years Middle Eastern thinkers have put the question: What is the result of all Westernization? It is a question which we of the West may well ask ourselves too. It is our complacent habit in the Western world--the more so the further West one goes--to make ourselves the model of virtue and progress. To be like us is to be good; to be unlike us is to be bad. To become more like us is to improve, to become less like us is to deteriorate. It is not necessarily so. When civilizations clash, there is one that prevails, and one that is shattered. Idealists and ideologues may talk glibly of a "marriage of the best elements" from both sides, but the usual result of such an encounter is a cohabitation of the worst.

-- Bernard Lewis,
The Middle East and the West--

The dissertation is concerned with this principal issue: What is the specific form or model of state-mosque relations in Tunisia as distinct from other Sunni Middle Eastern nation states? It is the hypothesis of this dissertation that precise models of state-mosque interactions vary widely within the Middle East. The
"authentic Islamic" model in Tunisia demonstrates that these important differences have significant consequences for the political systems existing in the region.

Throughout history a close relationship has existed between religion and politics. The roots of this relationship can be found, for one example, in the Pharaonic civilization of Egypt during which the rulers asserted that their authority came from the gods. The sun-god Re "was a divine king, and legend said that he has been the first king of Egypt in primordial times." Similarly, Greek political elites asserted they were descendants of Zeus. Indeed, the notion of the "philosopher king" in Greek thought illustrates this point. As Barker explained:

The Greek polis's chief activity will be that of training and sustaining the mature in the way of righteousness. That is why we speak of such a state as really a church: Like Calvin's church it exercises a "holy discipline." Political philosophy, thus becomes a sort of moral theology.

In ancient Israel, the monarchy was grounded in the "apolistic prophecy," since the kings "performed altar services and were charged with the maintenance of the temples." In this context, the king was "another embodiment of the idea that it is god's will that rules on earth." In the same vein, the Christian church played a fundamental role in the political process of Europe for centuries. As Ullman explained, "...the Middle Ages were the ages of faith, in which Christianity played a decisive and
determinative role."\(^5\) Moreover, during the ninth century, when the papacy assumed an important initiative, the symbolism of unction meant that "... because Christ's grace flowed into the king, he hereby became the 'type of Christ' or the 'figure of Christ.'"\(^6\)

The notion of the two cities--separation between state and church--was emphasized during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when "the contemporary nation states of the West evolved out of the Medieval religio-political system of Catholic integrism. The Medieval synthesis was cracked open by the Reformation and Renaissance..."\(^7\)
The three major steps that led toward the secularization of Western society were: the Protestant Reformation in the religious arena, the Renaissance, and then the age of Enlightenment or Reason.\(^8\) Indeed, the Reformation "challenged many traditional dogmas and put an end to the long established authority of the church over people's minds."\(^9\) Thus, the Reformation marked the rise of rationalism, scientific method, and secularism.

The role of religion in modern state political development is an important and relevant question for the student of political development or comparative politics in the contemporary era. Islam and religion in general have been considered obstacles to modernization or retarding forces in the development of modern states. Political development theorists questionably (or arguably) consider
secularization as the crucial step to be established in order to prepare for development.

Islam is, of course, the dominant religious faith of the Middle East. As the second largest religion in the world, Islam has won millions of converts over the last twenty years. Yet it must also be noted that the largest Islamic nations are not geographically located in the Middle East. Indonesia, which consists of approximately 120 million Muslims, is in East Asia. Moreover a substantial number of Muslims lives in non-Islamic states; one-tenth of the inhabitants of India (about twice the population of Egypt) are Muslims. The Soviet Union and China include a large number of Muslims who were converted to Islam during the Omayyad Caliphate.

While Islam is not equivalent to the Arab world, it is, however, uniquely identified with Arab culture. Mohammad the Prophet was an Arab. The Koranic message was in Arabic, and the centers of the hajj (pilgrimage) are Mecca and Medina. The Middle Eastern countries have been chosen as models of state-mosque relations because the problem investigated exists in an especially urgent and influential form in that area.

While Islam is a total creed in the sense that it encompasses every sphere of human life, it, nevertheless, offers different patterns of state-mosque relations. The contemporary movement known as the "Islamic resurgence," for
instance, has worked out differently in individual countries. Thus, generalization is a hazardous enterprise. Moreover, events in the late 1970s early 1980s—in Iran, marking the takeover by religious leaders; in Egypt, Anwar Sadat's assassination by Muslim reformists; in Turkey the recent political upheavals producing uncertainty about the future of Kemal Ataturk's secular reforms; in Saudi Arabia the stability and future of the monarchy; in Tunisia, the increasingly rising Islamic reformist movement; and especially, the "resurgence" or "revival" of Islamic movements throughout the world—call attention to the crucial importance of the relationship between religion and politics in the Middle East.

It is important to note at this juncture that the term "fundamentalist" is used as equivalent to the terms "revivalist" and "reformists." Indeed, the term "fundamentalist" has a Eurocentrist connotation. It was coined by Western thinkers who called "fundamentalists" those who wanted to go back to the concept of umma (Muslim community) as it was used under Mohammad and the muhajirūn (those who fled with him to Medina) in the ideal Pristine Medina. In the eras that followed, the adherents to the reformist or revivalist movements in Middle Eastern politics did not call for a return to the "fundamentalist" concept as that notion was developed in the early days of Islam. As it will be discussed in Chapter VI, the impetus for what
Westerners call "fundamentalist movements" is based on economic deprivation or cultural factors. In this context, the theology provided the impetus for and the justification of these movements.

In modern history, the issue of church-state relations in developing nations has come to a very sharp focus in the Middle East because of several factors. First, since World War II, the region has become strategically important in Soviet-American relations. Second, the nature of the Islamic religious system contributes to the salience of the topic of the dissertation. Islam is a "total system," purporting to regulate every sphere of human experience, including the political and economic realms. Third, the Middle East presents a mosaic of models illustrating numerous forms and variations of state-mosque relations. Fourth, in recent years, there has been a revival of Islamic values and ideas. This has had a profound impact upon political developments in the Middle East.

Another reason for the salience of the issue of state-mosque relations in the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular, is that communist leaders, namely Lenin, have expressed the need to be sensitive to the traditions of "backward" countries in pursuing their goal of promoting communism in underdeveloped societies. Vladimir Lenin, who essentially equated feudalism with religious movements, mentioned several characteristics of "backward nations" that
are "particularly important to bear in mind." In his "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," Lenin alluded to the importance of nationalist issues, which implicitly include tradition and religion:

The more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably lend particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty [sic] bourgeois prejudices, i.e., to national egotism and national narrow-mindedness . . . . It is therefore the duty of the class-conscious communist proletariat to regard with particular caution and attention the survival of nationalist sentiments in the countries and among nations which have been oppressed the longest; it is equally necessary to make certain concessions with a view to more readily overcoming this distrust and these prejudices.

In this passage, Lenin suggested the kind of compromise that should be accepted by communist revolutionary groups. Religion, customs, and traditions that do not threaten the security of the political system should not be opposed or eliminated. Thus, it is clear that communism recognizes the importance of "national sentiments," including religion and traditions.

For perhaps different reasons, the United States and other non-communist nations must also acknowledge the part played by religion in shaping the political identity and future of developing nations. For example, in theories of political development proposed by Western commentators (as we shall see more fully in Chapter I), the crucial role played by religious ideas and establishments has frequently
been neglected. Because they largely ignore religion, few theories present an adequate or satisfactory explanation of political development in Third World countries, especially in Islamic societies.

While the question of Islam and development has been extensively analyzed for other countries, especially Iran, little attention has been devoted to it for Sunni North Africa generally and more specifically for Tunisia. Indeed, since the Islamic "revival" of the 1970s, most research focussed primarily upon the Shi'ite sect of Islam. Tunisia follows the Sunni branch of Islam. Interestingly, it is important to note at this juncture that historically there was a strong Shi'ite tradition in North Africa, and the city of Cairo was founded by Shi'ites from the Maghreb. Tunisia has unique traits totally different from the ones characterizing Shi'ite countries. Moreover, this nation-state has unique features that even differentiate it from other Sunni countries (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey).

It will be important to see how earlier Shi'ite tradition affected Tunisia (if at all). Would it not make the case of Tunisia considerably different for example from Egypt or Saudi Arabia? Are these factors which also differentiate Tunisia from the situation in other North African states -- e.g. Morocco, Algeria, Libya?

Much of the literature about political development
presupposes that there is no role at all for religion in the process. Indeed most political development theory does not assign any role to religion and assumes that development is a secular process. The question is: what does the case of Tunisia and other Sunni models considered in the dissertation offer to the theories of political development when dealing with the role of religion in the process of modernization. After looking at the findings, does the theory of development need revising or perhaps abandoning?

The dissertation will utilize a variety of sources in English, French, and Arabic. Most documents were obtained from Dar al-Hizb, that is, the Destour Party's bureau with the help of Mr. Abdel Majid al-Karoui, Director of Protocoles during Habib Bourguiba's Presidency. Mr. al-Karoui is currently representing Tunisia in the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Washington D.C. The following material is a representative selection of these sources:

1) The series Histoire du Movement National Tunisien edited mainly by Mohammad Sayah who was considered the official historian of Bourguiba's regime. The series comprised fifteen volumes which dealt with the contributions of Bourguiba and those of the Neo-Destour to the nationalist movement up to independence. Interestingly, the series were first published in French then were translated into Arabic in 1979.

2) Habib Bourguiba's speeches in Arabic, French and English published in separate pamphlets. It is important to note that several of these speeches were given in the colloquial Arabic of Tunisia, then they were rewritten in classical (literary) Arabic.

3) Autobiographical lectures by Bourguiba given
to the Institute of Press and Information Sciences (Institut de la Presse et des Sciences d'information) in 1973. These lectures were published in Arabic, French, and English under the title Hayati, Arai, Jihādi, That is Ma Vie, Mes Idées, mon Combat (in French) or My Life, My Ideas, My Struggle (in English). And the official biography published by the Tunisian Ministry of Information entitled Habib Bourguiba: Hayatuhu, Jihāduhu, (Habib Bourguiba: His Life, His Struggle).

4) Interview conducted in person with Dr. Touhami Negra, a prestigious alim in Tunis and North Africa and Director of Koranic studies in the Zaytouna University.

5) Interview with activist members of al-Ittijah al-Islami who were responsible for coordinating the students' revivalist movement in Kairouan.

6) Pamphlets representing al-Ittijah al-Islami's vision of Islam. Note that these pamphlets were distributed secretly.

7) Speeches and Interviews given by the New President Zin al-'Abidin Ben Ali.

The Louisiana State University has an important collection of documentary material concerning Middle Eastern Politics. It has been consulted through computer searches: Religion Index, Index Islamicus, PAIS, Social Science Citation Index, Dissertation Abstracts, and Government Documents, especially the material published by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

French magazines, such as Jeune Afrique, L'Express, Le Figaro, and Le Nouvel Observateur will be used as thought-provoking sources. Moreover, they contain some valuable interviews with leaders in North Africa and the Middle East.

In order to examine the issue of mosque-state relations
in Tunisia systematically and objectively, the inquiry will involve five stages. The first stage (Chapter I) will discuss the role of religion in political development theory. The second stage contains a brief examination of the Islamic faith, with particular emphasis on the relation between religious and political concepts in the Islamic tradition. The third stage (Chapters III, IV, and V) presents detailed case studies or analyses of selected Sunni Islamic nations illustrating different models of state-mosque relations. Nations chosen for analysis are: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Each of these models will be examined according to several criteria: e.g., historical events regarding Islam, constitutional provisions derived from or directly related to Islam, and public policies related to Islam. The inquiry will concentrate upon the role played by religious values and authorities in each of these spheres. In the case studies, the principal question is: What specific forms do mosque-state relations take in each of these Islamic societies, and why?

The fourth stage (Chapters VI, and VII) will explore the Tunisian environment or profile and will focus mainly on the components of Habib Bourguiba's vision of "authentic" Islam, the revivalist movement in Tunisia, and the prospects of the future of Islam in Tunisia under the new President Zin al-Abidin Ben Ali.
The fifth stage, the concluding chapter, will identify common problems, dominant patterns and tendencies, and significant similarities and contrasts in the Tunisian case and in the case studies examined, in order to arrive at generalizations about the patterns and implications of mosque-state relations in Sunni nation states. Finally, suggestions will be offered regarding needed revisions in prevalent concepts and theories of national development.
CHAPTER I

RELIGION IN THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Development has captured the central stage of history. This ambiguous process is often depicted as the crucible through which all societies must pass and, if successful, emerge purified: modern, affluent, and efficient. But such a portrait is misleading: it confuses a part of contemporary history with the larger whole. History is made by the interaction of several broad change processes which touch all spheres of human life. These changes are, in their totality, far more comprehensive than development alone.

--Denis Goulet, Cruel Choice.

Theory of Political Development Defined

This chapter is an attempt to synthesize several studies of political development and explore the research contributions to the relationship between politics and religion, in order to understand mosque-state relations in the Middle East more intelligently.

The origin of the current crisis in the field of comparative politics is by no means new. Its roots are embedded in the search for a paradigm which dominated the discipline for three decades. Indeed, several scholars identified the difficulty in defining the field of comparative politics boundaries. As Howard J. Wiarda succinctly indicated, "there is no longer a single integrating set of theories on which scholars can agree. . . There is a lack of clear focus, and the field itself has become fragmented and disjointed." The most interesting
subdiscipline in this area of political science is the issue of development and underdevelopment.

Among political scientists, concern with the issue of national development began in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the industrial revolution altered the economic and political structures. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, modernization and development meant the establishment of the capitalist order. The concept of national development became even more attractive for research in the aftermath of World War II. During that time, newly independent nations emerged in the world to transform the scope of world politics. Indeed, in the 1960s development became the coordinating theory in comparative politics, since it integrated numerous concepts and provided a central core to research studies.

The concept of political development has subsequently become extremely complex. The literature on the subject encompasses a variety of approaches and perspectives based on different schools of thought within the discipline of political science (e.g. structural functionalism, systems theory, communication theory, Marxism, and dependency theory). Today, development theory is divided between two diverse groups: political scientists and economists. For the purpose of this study, the focus is placed almost exclusively upon theories of political development identified with political science, since the latter are more
directly relevant to our investigation.

At the outset, it is necessary to indicate quite specifically how the concept of "development" is defined by different theorists, and how it is used in the context of this dissertation. There are many diverse-- and often contradictory-- definitions of the development concept. James Coleman interpreted the term to mean the capacity of a political system to institutionalize two types of patterns: first, integrating, regulating, and containing "the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation"; and second, new forms of "participation and resource distribution adequately responsive to the demands generated by the imperatives of equality."

Walt W. Rostow envisioned a linear path through which all countries must pass in order to achieve development. This path comprises six major stages of growth. First, there are traditional societies, where the economic life is characterized by fixed land and traditional political and economic structures. Second, there are the preconditions for "take-off" delineated by improvement of communication, an enhanced sense of nationhood, an increase in the number of political influence, and the emergence of specialized government institutions. Third, "the take-off" occurs; it is brought about by the internal changes in preconditions; and it is characterized by developing industrial sectors. The fourth stage is the drive toward maturity, when the
economy benefits from the improvement of science. The fifth stage consists of high mass consumption, linkages between industries and markets, high growth, and increased investment. The sixth stage is that of high mass consumption in developed societies. In this context, development is viewed "primarily as a matter of 'economic growth', and secondarily as a problem of securing social change necessarily associated with growth." 

Karl Deutsch defined development as the change from poverty to wealth, illiteracy to widespread education, high death rates to lower ones, national weakness to national power, and especially the replacement of an obsolete technology by a modern one.

Lucien Pye identified three major characteristics of political development which are emphasized in most definitions of this concept. He explained that, "the first broadly shared characteristic noted is a general spirit or attitude toward equality." That is, political development entails "mass participation" and the involvement of people in the political processes. Second, development deals with "the capacity of a political system," which concentrates on "all the sheer magnitude, scope, and scale of political and governmental performance." The third theme common to the discussion of political development is the "differentiation and specialization of the political and economic structures," or the emergence of a degree of division of
labor within the realm of government and the economy.\(^7\)

Similarly, after succinctly analyzing several works concerned with political development, Robert Packenham identified the main conditions for achieving it, as commonly stressed by such theorists as Max Weber and John Buge. These conditions are a constitution, a political culture, an administrative capacity, an economic base, and an organized social system.\(^8\)

One of the most interesting definitions of development is presented by Samuel P. Huntington. He emphasized the importance of stability and status quo in the process of development. He also stressed the necessity for constraining new groups in developing societies from entering the political arena. He maintained that the increase in demands in a system in the early stages of development could lead to instability and, consequently, result in growing corruption, violence, and "political decay." Indeed, Huntington's stand on development vis-a-vis other approaches was rather conservative. He stressed the importance of containing change in order to maintain stability, balance, and order. He "leaned toward institutional stability rather than toward the potentially disruptive demands of a participating and mobilizing society."\(^9\) Modernization, in Huntington's view, brings about rapid social changes and an increase in social mobility which ultimately lead to political decay.\(^10\) As
Ronald Chilcote explained, political decay is "a reflection of instability, corruption, authoritarianism, and violence, and is the result of the failure of development." In other words, political decay characterizes a fragmented political system and a disintegrated, corrupt society.

Huntington considers the political party as the key and main vehicle to institution and nation building. The party is depicted in this context as the organizer of legitimacy and the provider of stability. Limiting the number of political parties, Huntington argued, will secure constancy and will prepare the path for sound development.

The interesting aspect about Huntington's conception of development is his recognition of the cruel choices involved in the process. Nation-building does indeed entail restricting some groups from participating in the political process. For instance, the United States underwent racial struggles before it incorporated blacks and minorities in the political system.

In political science, there are more than thirty development theories which, at the risk of some oversimplification, can be classified into three major schools of thought. First, there are what may be called "orthodox" political development theorists, who argue that political development means essentially a high degree of political participation by the members of the society. Among orthodox political theorists, there are
others who maintain that development is a result of establishing an elaborate bureaucratic process to carry out the major task of implementing the plans of modernization. The orthodox school sees the Western political system as the model for developing the Third and Fourth Worlds.

A second group consists of Marxist political development theorists, the majority of whom belongs to the "dependency" school of thought. This approach considers revolution to be the leading factor fostering development. The Marxist approach to development will be explored at a later stage. 13

A third school of thought comprises the skeptics about the basic concept of development. These theorists question the whole ethos of the development process. Brief attention will be paid to each of these approaches.

Orthodox Development Theory: Development as Function of Participation

Among the scholars who argue that development is a function of expanded political participation are: Lucien Pye, Myron Weiner, James Coleman, David Apter, and Allan Kornberg. Most are identified with the Social Science Research Council's attempt to define and analyze the "development crisis" in the 1960s and 1970s. In the literature dealing with development, various meanings are given to the notion of public participation, and this fact results in underlying confusion about the concept.
As an ideal, political participation means a high level of regular involvement by the adult population in the political processes. It includes such specific concepts as universal sufferage, freedom of speech, absence of censorship, voting referenda, and other instances of citizen participation in the political system. Emmanuel Wallerstein identified several criteria to measure the concept of political participation. Among these are: active political parties, election of officials, representation of the public interest in legislation, and especially, "the continual according of legitimacy and support to a state and its government."^14

Pye, for instance, contended that the process of nation building has to entail popular participation, which "involves [primarily] the role of the citizenry and new standards of loyalty and involvement."^15 The dimension of political participation in the West, Pye argued, was intimately linked to the broadening of sufferage and the introduction of public elements into the political arena.\^16 Pye added that the problem posed by modernization in the developing countries emanates from the fact that "participation has not been coupled with an electoral process but has been essentially a new form of mass response to elite manipulation."^17 In other words, the democratization occurred only on paper because the governing elites staged fake elections where the people who
participated where given no choice and were asked to vote for whoever was already picked by those elites. However, Pye asserted that firm rule and efficient administration should not be considered as the opposite of democratic development, but rather the combination of authority and participation are prerequisites for the building of a modern nation state.18

La Palombara has explored the condition that gave birth to political parties in the West, namely, "the crisis of participation" which occurred in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He associated the question of participation with the related issue of legitimacy:

Once a number of subjects cease, for whatever reason, to accept the authority of their rulers, then closed political systems are placed under stress and, except in very rare instances, cannot remain closed. This is true whether the rulers be hereditary monarchs, tribal chieftains, ascriptively selected bureaucrats, or colonial masters.19

Similarly, Coleman indicated that participation which involves the members of a given society in the political and economic processes is one fundamental characteristic of development.20 The interesting aspect of participation analyzed by Coleman is the evolution of the process. He distinguished four principal periods encountered by underdeveloped nations that experienced colonialism. The first stage entails accommodation of developing nations to the new colonial circumstances. The second stage is
characterized by agitation and assertion. During the third period--terminal colonialism--, different competing groups maneuver and struggle for power in the new political order. The last stage entails the adjustment and consolidation in the aftermath of independence. Coleman stressed the fact that not all countries have gone through all these stages; nevertheless, there has been a certain broadening of the political support base.

Development as Function of the Bureaucratic Process

Ralph Braibanti and Howard Wriggins were the two major proponents of the bureaucratic school of political development. In turn, they were heavily influenced by Lasswellean political thought. Bureaucracy refers to the administrative agencies of government, which are responsible to an executive and are usually in charge of administering and implementing laws and policies. The main argument advanced by this school was that the principal task of "developing" countries was to establish and operate an efficient, Western-style bureaucratic system that would replace the pre-colonial administration.

Two major points were emphasized by both Braibanti and Wriggins. On the one hand, Braibanti stressed the innovative aspects of the bureaucratic process. He maintained that the bureaucratic elite must be recruited in a way that takes into account educated individuals.
characterized by "superior technological competence from different sectors and institutions" in the society in order to insure the representation of different and opposing ideas. Indeed, Wriggins maintained that internal tensions and opposing ideas institutionalize innovation, which is a crucial element in the process of development.\textsuperscript{25}

It should be noted that this conception, which might apply to Western nations and some underdeveloped countries, is alien to the Islamic principle of "organic" unity between the political system and the umma (Islamic community). This unity envisions the fusion of temporal and spiritual realms, as symbolized by the image of the human body whose parts function in harmony.

On the other hand, Wriggins accentuated the value of a "national bureaucracy" as an institution that played a vital role in promoting national integration. According to Wriggins, the national bureaucracy should attempt "to establish as nearly uniform practices and procedures throughout the country as it can."\textsuperscript{26} This can be carried out through opening new opportunities to young members of the developing states, through frequent geographic and functional rotation of assignments and a system of promotion based on merit.\textsuperscript{27} Many writers, such as Johnson and Huntington, argue that the massive political involvement of the military elites in developing societies plays Wriggins' role as a national integrative bureaucracy.
Interestingly, Wriggins' discussion of the main functions of the bureaucratic process in developing nations is reminiscent of what happened in France during the Third Republic (1875-1936). During that period of stalemate, a lack of organizational coherence in French political life was moderated by the bureaucracy, which played a crucial role in carrying out the effective functions of the state. Thus in the modern period in developing nations, Wriggins writes:

The bureaucracy may be the main armature that holds the polity together in time of crisis, it helps to sustain public order and constrains overt conflict. It is the framework for essential services—the agency of public safety, the main source of public health and medical care, of transportation and communications and of training for the young. It becomes the instrument for implementing the ruler's policies as far beyond the capital as it can penetrate.

**Marxist Development Theorists**

Another school of development advocates fundamental "structural change" in the political system as the prerequisite for modernization. Two important categories of such may be identified. First, there is the Marxist theory of development, as expounded by Vladimir Lenin and followers. A second approach is the "Dependency" movement, with Raoul Prebisch as its first articulate advocate.

Marx maintained that the socialist revolution could only occur when capitalism ripens and reaches its highest stage, that is, when industrialization accelerates and class
differences become more distinct. As related to national
development, as a practical revolutionary leader, Lenin was
forced to amend Marx's thesis. He explained that the
capitalist world found ways to lessen the misery of its
workers by exporting exploitation to colonies in the Third
World. Therefore, Lenin emphasized, imperialism is the
weakest link of capitalism, and revolution will erupt in
colonies where poverty and underdevelopment are used as
tools to further communism. \(^{29}\) The theory of imperialism
advanced by Lenin is the "most important single step [he]
took in changing Marxism into an ideology that was relevant
to the non-industrialized areas of the world." \(^{30}\)

Lenin's strategy for development became the foundation
of the dependency theory. Nevertheless, it is important to
indicate at this juncture that the Dependency school of
development comprises two branches. On the one hand, there
is a non-Marxist anti-imperialist view, identified with the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
with Prebisch as its major spokesman. Another branch of
non-Marxist Dependency theory is represented by the views of
Celso Furtado, Gonzales Casanova, Manuel Andrade, Osvaldo
Sunkel, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and others. The
proponents of the Marxist trend of Dependency are: Andre
Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and
others.

It was Prebisch who formulated the central thesis of
the dependency school, which contends that countries of the North, occupying the world's industrially developed nucleus—namely the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—are deliberately locking nations of the South (Latin America and others) into a relationship of economic and political subservience. The world's underdeveloped nations provide the North with raw materials and consume its finished products. The only means of altering this dependence is through a structural change in this North-South relationship. As Prebisch viewed it, the real problem is rooted in the structure of the international system. Hence there is a need to reform this edifice, rather than foster individual revolutions in underdeveloped societies.

Dependency theory can be considered the main reaction to orthodox views of political development. It is also an attempt to determine the causes and consequences of underdevelopment. As Richard Fagen explains:

Epistemologically, . . . dependency theory is in reality a conceptual framework, a set of concepts, hypothesized linkages, and above all an optic that attempts to locate and clarify a wide range of problems. . . . It sought to recover for both thought and action the dark exploitative, asymmetrical, and difficult to change elements in the development equation.

Definitions of "dependency" differ profoundly. For the purpose of discussion, and due to the limitations of time and space, it is important to note that this section does not attempt to identify a common core in the dependency
literature or to search for common assertions in dependency linkages. Nevertheless, and as Ronald H. Chilcote explains, both Marxist and non-Marxist trends of dependency theorists, who integrated dependency into their interpretation of political development and underdevelopment, seem to include in their discussions elements that can be summarized by the following definition:34

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development.35

The Dependency researchers' main argument in all the case studies they conducted is that developed capitalist nations (i.e., the United States and Western Europe) penetrated the economies of the underdeveloped nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and transformed parts of the local economy into a modern enclave, such as the fishing or textile industries. As Howard J. Wiarda explained:

By virtue of its historical origins, the basis of the modern sector is export trade, even if subsidiary manufacturing or service sectors grow up to sustain it. Here capital accumulates, skills are learned, and class interests are formed whose innermost needs tie them tightly to foreign concerns. The culture of the modern enclave may be of the Third World, but its economic and political character make it a part of the international system.36
Skeptics About Development

Another school of political scientists consists of "skeptics", who question the whole ethos of political development. Before exploring several theories advanced by the group, it is important to note that implicitly most Western scholars (principally anthropologists) use the term "tradition" in an all-inclusive sense. As they employ it, the term tradition refers to the culture concept which covers every aspect of social life, including religion. This group of skeptics "has always constituted in some respects a heretical minority. Its position centers on qualitative improvement in all groups and individuals within societies". In other words, the emphasis is upon "the non-economic social indicators of development: gains in literacy, schooling, health conditions and services, provision of housing and the like . . ." These qualitative aspects of development refer to the values "that ought to be fostered in the effort to obtain a 'humanly better' life." Proponents of this perspective are mainly concerned with the exploration of such dimensions of national life as tradition, religion, human dignity and the cultural and moral implications of the development process. Development itself in this context becomes "a means to the human ascent."

Denis Goulet, a major proponent of this viewpoint, has introduced moral and philosophical values into his
conception of the development process. He placed a great emphasis on "the ethical demands of the development experience." According to Goulet:

Development covers the entire gamut of changes by which a social system, with optimal regard for the wishes of individuals and sub-systemic components of that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory in some way toward some condition regarded as humanly better.

Development, Goulet stressed, "needs to be redefined, demystified, and thrust into the arena of moral debate." The principal premise advanced by Goulet is that the interests of the people--in both developed and underdeveloped nations--are not primarily of a political, economic or technological nature. The issue at stake is moral or religious; it centers around "the 'good life' and the good society' in a world of mass technology and global interdependence." This means, according to Goulet's point of view, that development is a process more than a systemic combination of efficient technology, abundance, modern bureaucracy, and the like. Development has to be human.

According to this interpretation, the development process is a difficult one. It involves sacrifices and bitterness. For instance, England underwent "proletarian agonies," imperialist expansion, and wars over commerce and other issues before it became a developed nation. Similarly, the United States experienced the sufferings of immigrants, the extermination of native Indians, slavery,
and the Civil War. "Even today, after development has supposedly been won, the nation is prey to widespread social alienation." Development is, therefore, "cruel." Its benefits are "obtained at a great price." The assumption that development makes people "happier" or "freer" is indeed questionable. In brief, development involves profound moral or religious issues--an idea which many theories of development ignore.--

Goulet's basic thesis is summarized in this captivating statement:

Men cannot fashion sound development unless they first engage in disciplined normative reflection and transform ethics into a 'means of the means' transforming other instrumentalities--planning, technical transfers, and efficiency systems--into liberating agencies. Failing this, development's blind forces will make men into their own image: process without goals, power and abundance without freedom.

E. F. Schumacher's views represent another skeptical perspective on prevailing theories of development. As an economist, he applied the theory of "limits to growth," which calls for timely scaling down of the whole global economy. In Small is Beautiful, Schumacher presented an alternative strategy to development, which discards recreating the model of Western societies in underdeveloped countries. "The ruling philosophy of development, he argued, "has been over the last twenty years 'what is best for the rich must be better for the poor'." In his view, the United States, Western Europe, and Russia have to
realize that material problems in developing nations (i.e. lack of natural wealth, lack of capital, and weak infrastructure) are secondary concerns of development. "The primary causes of extreme poverty," according to Schumacher, "are immaterial, they lie in certain deficiencies in education, organization, and discipline. ... Without these three, all resources remain latent, untapped potential." These elements make the process of development a complex one, since without them education and organization could only evolve slowly and gradually. It is important to note at this point that Schumacher does not mention religion per se. Yet as he views it, the process of education is an unseparable element of the cultural process, involving the society's religious and traditional values.

The principal argument propounded by Schumacher is that the global economy can no longer keep expanding, because natural resources are limited. The system of production that man created in modern history "ravishes nature" and produces a type of society that mutilates man." Modern times are characterized by the elusive belief that if there were more wealth and more resources, everything "would fall into place." Schumacher argued that "wealth, education, research, and many other things are needed for any other civilization," but he stressed that the goal of development ought to be a revision of the ends which these means are
meant to serve.\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, Schumacher added:

The new thinking that is required for aid and development will be different from the old because it will take poverty seriously. . . . It will care for people—from a severely practical point of view—because people are the primary and ultimate source of wealth whatsoever. If they are left out, if they are pushed around by self-styled experts and high-handed planners, then nothing can ever yield real fruit.\textsuperscript{51}

In the same vein, Loyd I. Rudolph explored the importance of tradition (including religion implicitly) in relation to modernity, another issue often neglected in development studies. He maintained that modernization could not be achieved when the traditional structures of a particular society are neglected or ignored. There are "modern potentialities" in tradition, Rudolph asserted. For instance, the Indian caste system—which has long been regarded as a barrier to development—contains latent "horizontal solidarities [that] have been used in its structural, functional, and cultural transformation."\textsuperscript{52}

Similarly, the Brahmanic law could be considered as a vehicle of modernization, because "it bore some resemblance to the law of modern professionals; it was available in written texts; although diverse, its cosmopolitanism gave it an air of generality and uniformity parochial, customary law lacked. . . ."\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, Rudolph clarified the issue by explaining that:

The misunderstanding of modern society that excludes its traditional features is paralleled by a misdiagnosis of traditional
society that underestimates its modern potentialities. Those who study new nations comparatively often find only manifest and dominant values, configurations, and structures that fit a model of tradition and miss latent, deviant, or minority ones that may fit a model of modernity.

Eric R. Wolf's perspective is comparable to that of Rudolph. He predicted that attempts to break up traditional (including religious) political institutions would be unsuccessful and would not lead to modernization. He presented six case studies (Mexico, Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba) which illustrate the strength of traditional and religious institutions in the peasantry. "The peasant," Wolf contended, "is an agent of forces larger than himself, forces produced by a disordered past as much as by a disordered present."

In sum, these commentators and others have emphasized the human aspect of development. They have attempted to purge prevailing development literature of its exclusive emphasis on such elements as economic factors, political participation, and bureaucracy as sole determinants of development. Despite such studies, the main body of development studies has concentrated on the functional and structural aspects of political development, such as institutionalization of power, political participation, bureaucracies, and legislative processes.

In recent years, the interest in such key concepts as the role of culture and tradition in the development process...
has been increasing. Two main reasons account for this emphasis. On the one hand, "a greater familiarity and appreciation of non-Western traditional societies have already acted as correctives in lay as well as scholarly circles." On the other hand, the increase in the number of non-Western scholars has helped disabuse development literature of "an overly simple and occidental centered view of the relation between tradition and modernity." Yet the discussion of the contribution of religion in national development remains rather limited. Moreover, it has resulted in little agreement among defenders or opponents of religion's central importance. Some theorists are indifferent toward the issue. Others are hostile toward religion and clearly consider it a barrier to development; therefore, they implicitly or explicitly favor secularism. Still another group of commentators maintains that religion can be used as an essential tool in the development process.

Development theorists and the Concept of Religion

For the sake of clarity, religion in this context refers to Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism and the principal sects associated with them. In other words, animistic religious cults and denominations are not included in the discussion. It is important to note the difficulty in drawing a distinct line between the first two aforementioned attitudes.
toward religion and its relation to politics. For the purpose of discussion, theorists who are indifferent or ignorant toward religion are simply those who do not explore the issue in their works. By contrast, those expressing hostility toward religion consider it dangerous, futile and a promoter of fatalism and backwardness. Therefore, they advocate secularism as one of the major components of national development.

Indifference to Religion:

Most theorists who belong to the Social Science Research Council (such as Pye, La Palombara, Coleman), along with other social scientists (such as Lasswell), attach little importance to the issue of religion and its role in the development processes. In Aspects of Political Development, a classic in the field, Pye was indifferent to religion. He merely referred to the concept of "world culture" which is recognized as "the essence of modern life." This culture is based upon a secular, rather than a sacred, world view. It is characterized by such concepts as rationalism, the scientific approach, technology, industrialization and the humanization of values.58

Indifference to religion suggests that the values and research models of these commentators are entirely derived from secular experiences. Implicit in this omission also is the idea that modernization is exclusively a secular
process. Moreover, this indifference to religion can be traced to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which the the notion of the two cities--separation between state and church--emerged. Indeed, during that time, "the contemporary nation states of the West evolved out of the medieval religio-political system of Catholic integralism. The medieval synthesis was cracked open by the Reformation and Renaissance. . . ." The three major steps that led toward the secularization of Western society were: the Protestant Reformation in the religious arena, the Renaissance, and then the age of Enlightenment or Reason. Most importantly, the Reformation "challenged many traditional dogmas and put an end to the long established authority of the church over people's minds." Thus, the Reformation marked the rise of rational, scientific, and secular tendencies.

**Hostility Toward Religion and Secularization:**

This school can be divided into two subgroups. First, there is the communist--or Marxist--tradition which has traditionally advocated the total elimination of traditional religions. The second approach is secularism, which advocates the strict separation of state from church. Marxist ideology singled out religion as a dangerous and negative factor in the life of any society. Marx believed that religion is the "opiate of the people."
Religious beliefs, according to this approach, mask the reality of human suffering, exploitation, and futility of existence. Ironically, the Marxist promise of salvation sought paradise on earth. As Alfred Meyer pointed out, Leninism provided faith for those who felt that the modern world was out of joint. Thus one can argue that Marxism in not fully scientific as some commentators argue. It is, in a way, a religion that transfers salvation from God to "man's own hands." Marx's faith in human capabilities disregards any belief in supernatural divinities.

The secularist approach will be discussed in more detail in the Chapter Five dealing with Turkey. Meanwhile, it may be emphasized here that the secularist advocates the disengagement of the church from the state, leaving religion as solely a matter of private conscience. This was the course taken by most Western societies after the Reformation. The process of secularism is indeed a multifaceted one; it covers a large variety of spheres. The concept is defined by Eugene Smith as follows:

Secularization involves the separation of the polity from religion; legal and constitutional recognition is given to the fact that the political system does not derive its legitimacy from religion, and the symbols and structures which linked the two are destroyed. Secularization involves the expansion of the polity at the expense of religion as major areas of social life (education, law, economy, and so on) pass from religious regulation to the jurisdiction of the state.

The secularization of politics is considered by many as
one of the major conditions which must be met in order to achieve true development. As explained earlier, the Reformation was the origin of political modernization, during which the state disengaged itself from the church.

The concept of secularism appears constantly in contemporary definitions of development. For instance, Marian P. Irish and Elke Frank defined the term developing nation as: "a people moving toward a modernized (industrial, urban, and secular) society and striving for political socialization."^66

The major argument advanced by secularists is that there is a symbiotic relationship between secularization and political participation. In a sense, secularization means the increase in "awareness of the possibility of controlling the social and economic environment. It means recruiting leaders on the basis of their ability to improve governmental performance."^67

The process of secularization could take several forms in contributing to the process of development. Modern Latin America illustrates this aspect. On the one hand, secularization attempted to free the Indian population of its indigenous beliefs and traditional structures in order to create a homogeneous society. On the other hand, the process sought to achieve the diminution of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church on the political process.^68 The principal example of secularism in the modern Middle East
was the sweeping reforms carried out by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. Ataturk's approach will be examined at a later stage.

Religion as Tool in Development:

Proponents of this concept believe that religious ideas and institutions are far from being rigid or static. They maintain that religion forms and preserves a strong bond among the members of society. This contribution of religion has been stressed by several political leaders of developing nations in recent years. U Nu, former Burmese Prime Minister, expressed a great interest in religion. He maintained that "all activities directed toward the stability of the Union [of Burma] and the perpetuation of independence are steps toward the propagation of the Sasana [religion]." Moreover, U Nu explained that "if we go to the root causes of the present disorders in this country, we will find that not less than eighty percent of them are due to apathy to religion."

Correspondingly, in India, Mohandas Gandhi's "world ascetism" arose out of the interaction between the secular and religious realms. Gandhi has a keen understanding of his people's traditions, yet he had the ability to communicate with the Western world. "For me," Gandhi wrote, "there is no distinction between politics and religion." He further added, "when I say that I prize my own salvation above everything else... it does not mean that my personal
salvation requires a sacrifice of India's political ... salvation. But it implies that the two go together."72

Similarly, Fred R. Von Der Mehden explored the positive impact of religion on the nationalist movement in South-East Asia. He found an important religious revival in Indonesia. The essential reason for this revival in the twentieth century was the strong urge of many Indonesians for a sense of security and community.73 Technological innovations, new educational processes, and the introduction of money economy puzzled people and destroyed the traditional security of village life.74

The influence of the unifying force of religion on the nationalist movement of Indonesia and on the decolonization movements in many other countries was summarized by Mehden as follows:

The presence of single faith as a catalytic agent was particularly significant in areas where there were no other coalescing factors such as language, culture, history or past common territory. When the occupying power was of another faith, the conquered grouped together to protect their religion and halt encroachments by foreign missionaries. . . . Religion was the one unifying factor among the conquered; it divided the ruler from the ruled and in doing so provided an emotional basis for nationalism and a tool for ambitious political leaders.75

Some commentators who consider religion a driving force in national development further contend that extreme secularism and the destruction of religious institutions will ultimately lead to the disruption of the social order
in traditional systems. These theorists further argue that overt opposition to religion and tradition throughout history has entailed "unacceptable political risks and in particular seriously [weakened] the legitimacy of a regime. Whereas many admire Ataturk, few dared to emulate him."  

In sum, among development theorists, three main schools of development may be identified concerning the relationship between religion and development. One group of theorists largely ignores religion altogether as an element of national development. This approach suggests that religion—or church-state relations—is not a key issue in the problem of national development. The second group is essentially hostile to religion and views it as barrier to modernization; advocates of this view naturally consider secularism as an essential step in development. The third group of commentators views religion as a positive tool and force that can be utilized to foster development. As will be seen, most of the cases examined in this thesis fall into the last category, since they involve efforts to make the Islamic religion a positive and constructive force in political development.

**A definition of Political Development**

Throughout this thesis the concept of political development will be interpreted from a broad perspective. Developing countries seek to modernize in order to arrive at
a set of political and economic institutions providing them with the "good life," which can be achieved when most needs in a particular society are met, ranging from physical and biological needs (i.e. adequate food, housing, medical services) to cultural and spiritual ones (i.e. adequate education, art, political freedom, and dignity). The vehicle to accomplish this goal is called "development."

Theorists who stress political participation, bureaucratic process, institutionalization of power, and economic structures are indeed focusing on specific aspects of the issue of national development. Indeed, most of the concepts and case studies presented in this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that the process of development is a holistic one. It covers every aspect of human life, including the spiritual and religious ones.
CHAPTER II

ISLAMIC TRADITION: STATE AND MOSQUE IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy is that while the latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty, the former rests on the principle of popular khalifa [leadership]. In Western democracy, the people are sovereign, in Islam sovereignty is vested in God and the people are his caliphs or representatives. In the former the people make their own laws; in the latter they have to follow and obey the laws given by God through his prophet. In one the government undertakes to fulfill the will of the people; in the other the government and the people who form it have all to fulfill the purpose of God. In brief, Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority which exercises its powers in a free and uncontrolled manner whereas Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of God and within the limits prescribed by him.

--Mawlana Abdul Ala Mawdudi, Islam in Modern History

The current Islamic revival is considered by Western thinkers to be a crisis. It is described in negative terms. Indeed, Islamic "revivalism" or what Western researchers call "fundamentalism" has captured the attention of Middle East students who attempted to interpret and analyze the diverse causes behind the Islamic resurgence. In this context, one cannot talk about the widespread reemergence of Islam in politics. Islam and politics have always been a mixed phenomenon and parts of a comprehensive way of public and private life in Islamic nations. This chapter focuses on the Islamic tradition, that is the rise of Islam, Islam...

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as a total system, the variety of Islamic reforms, and most importantly the relationship between state and mosque in Islamic theology.

**The Rise of Islam**

Mohammad was born in Mecca about 570 A.D. His family belonged to the powerful Quraysh tribe. As a merchant in the commercial center of Mecca, in the service of Khadija, a prominent and wealthy Qurayshi woman--who afterwards became his wife--Mohammad was known as al-amin (the trustworthy). Mohammad's marriage with Khadija gave him a prestigious position among Meccans. The call to prophethood came to Mohammad in the year 610 A.D. 2

According to orthodox Islam, Mohammad was meditating in the Hira cave, a few miles from Mecca, when the Angel Gabriel appeared to him and declared: "O Mohammad! thou are Allah's messenger, and I am Gabriel."3 This and ensuing revelations were the authoritative basis of the Islamic faith.

Mohammad eventually suffered severe oppression from the Quraysh tribe, which forced him to migrate to Medina with his followers. The flight from Mecca to Yethrib is called the hijra which marked the beginning of the Muslim era. Indeed, Mohammad's major goal behind the hijra was "to build up a self-contained community that would hold together and maintain its position despite the force of tradition and a
long history of rivalries and feuds [among tribes].”

The most interesting aspect of Mohammad's accomplishments was the consolidation of military, economic, political, and spiritual leadership in his person. As G. H. Hansen commented:

Muhammad became the head of the community at Medina. He was much more than a prophet. He was a soldier -- he took part personally in some of the early raiding battles... He then became a general; he made war and he made peace; he sent out embassadors and received them; he gathered in a booty, divided it and ran a treasury; he laid down laws and administered them... Muhammad was also a family man.

By 632 A.D., date of Mohammad's death, "the dim light of Islam became a flame." The Islamic community gained dynamic political and military powers. As Moojan Momen indicated:

The Major achievement of Muhammad's ministry was the welding together of a hundred or more disparate and feuding tribes into one nation, a union that overrode the ties of kinship and the enmity of blood... So powerful was the impetus given to this nation by Islam that within one generation it had conquered territory stretching from Tunisia to the borders of India and within few generations this backward and primitive people became the center of Western civilization in the Western world and remained thus for almost four hundred years.

During the early years of the caliphate (632-733 A.D.) Islamic warriors succeeded in conquering Syria, Iraq (Mesopotamia), Egypt, and founded Baghdad and Cairo. Although the Caliphs who succeeded Mohammad lacked his prophetic and spiritual charisma, they nevertheless
maintained the religious, military, economic, and political powers—especially the principle of the merger or fusion of both temporal and spiritual powers which is central to the Islamic tradition.

God's message is known as the Koran. The literal meaning of the term is the "Reading," which is taken from the first revelation to Mohammad; "Read: in the name of thy God who createth." As Alfred Guillaume explained, "a great deal of the Quran [Koran] has been learned by heart, for professional remembrancers who could repeat the whole of a poet's composition had long been recognized as indispensable members of Arabian society." Moreover, before the Prophet's death, all the Surahs (or verses) were recorded in writing on animal skin, stones, and tree leaves and were scattered among the believers who were close to Mohammad. The recognized and authoritative version of the Koran was established during Othman's Caliphate (approximately 650 A.D.), when all the Surahs were collected and organized. The version was mainly based on "Abu Bakr's collection and the testimony of those who had learned the whole Koran by heart. . . . The Koran has thus been carefully preserved."8

The Koran asserted the oneness or unity of God, to whom all souls must submit. Surah CXII declares: "He is God alone, God the Eternal (undivided). He does not beget and he is begotten. There is no one co-equal with him." The
teachings of the Koran are in many respects similar to Biblical conceptions. Yet Islam simplified the Christian religion by "discarding the intricacies of Trinitarianism; the harking back to Docetism, ... the elimination of the idea of original sin, ... [and by including a] more optimistic outlook on human nature as needed of guidance rather than redemption ...." Additionally, there is no claim that Mohammad was a divine figure. He was only a human being chosen to convey the word of God. Therefore, the term "Mohammedianism," is misleading and false because it implies worship of the Prophet Mohammad.

The Koran divides mankind into three categories: (1) the umma (community of the faithful), that is, the universal community of Muslim believers; (2) ahl al-kitāb (people of the book), these are the Jews and Christians who must be treated with respect; and (3) al-mushrikūn (idolaters) and al-kāfirūn (the infidels). Several commentators argue that Judaeo-Christian tradition influenced the Koran, particularly such notions as God being the creator, the final judgment, heaven and hell, the general resurrection, and the eternal life of the soul. The Koranic revelation entailed five beliefs or "pillars" which constitute the essentials of Islam. First, there is the great affirmation (or the shahādah) which has to be recited by every convert initiated to Islam: "There is no God but Allah and Mohammad is the Prophet of Allah." As Grunebaum explained:
There is no period of preparation through which the candidate to the Islamic community membership must go, no examination that he must pass. His unilateral testimonial to the truth of the basic verities of monotheism and revelation through the historical person of Muhammad Ibn 'Abdallah of Mecca, the last and most perfect of the prophets suffices as credential.

Second, there is the zakāt (almsgiving), which comes in two forms: the obligatory type and voluntary contributions. Alms can be given in the form of food, clothes, shelter, money, and even land. Third, Muslims must observe the ṣiyām (fasting) during the month of Ramadan, the holy season during which the Koran was revealed to Mohammad. "This fast can be a very severe strain, because unlike the Jewish and Christian months, which fall at a definite period of the solar year, the months of the Muslim year, which is lunar, may begin at any season over a given period of years." Travelers, sick individuals, and pregnant women are exempt, but they have to fast an equal number of days when their circumstances allow.

Fourth, there is the duty of the ṣalāt (prayers). Purification with clean water is prescribed before each of the five daily prayers: ṣalāt al-fajr (at dawn), ṣalāt al-duhr (afternoon), ṣalāt al-maghrib (sunset), and ṣalāt al-qishā (at night). The whole Muslim congregation prays together in the mosque on Fridays guided by an imām.

Finally, if they can afford it, Muslims should participate in the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) at least once.
in their life time. The hajj occurs on the twelfth month of
the lunar calendar. Guillaume summarized the rituals as
follows:

The pilgrims circumambulate the Kaba seven
times, then run between the two small hills
of Safa and Marwa hard by, and gather
together at the hill of Arafat twelve miles
away; on the way back they sacrifice sheep
and camels at Mina, where the ceremonial
stoning of the devil takes place. One of the
most important acts in the pilgrim ceremonial
is the kissing of the black stone set in a
wall of the Kaba.\footnote{12}

In addition to these five pillars of the Islamic faith,
the Koran prescribes a code of conduct based on moral-
ethical and religious instructions, emphasizing goodness,
respect for parents, tolerance, and honesty. The Koran also
forbids numerous sins such as: adultery, theft, murder,
gambling, wine drinking, worship of idols, and witchcraft.

The secondary source of Islamic teaching is the sunna
which consists of the Prophet's hadith\footnote{3}, that is, his verbal
statements and deeds. Like the Koran, the hadith\footnote{3} were
transmitted orally. The major problem emanates from the
fact that over time, a number of spurious hadith\footnote{3} have
arisen. To counter this, the ulama (learned doctors of
Islamic law) prescribed difficult criteria that had to be
met before an hadith\footnote{3} was recognized as authentic.\footnote{13}

After the prophet's death, Islam split into a multitude
of sects. "The Muslims, like the Christians, have their
puritains, fundamentalists and modernists, and their mystics
and hysterical devotees.\footnote{14} As far as this thesis is
concerned, the discussion will take into account only the two major branches of Islam: the Sunni sect, which has two subgroups, the Wahhabi and the Sufi; and the Shi'ite sect, with emphasis upon the group known as "the Twelvers."

The differences that led to the emergence of these sects were of political and theological origin. Theologically, the central issue was the succession to the Prophet. The Sunnis are "the faithful observers of the sunna of the Muslim community, that is, the customs based on the Koran, the hadith, and the precedents followed by the Prophet and the Rashidun Caliphs." They believe in symbolic descent, which means that the Caliph would be a devout individual who epitomizes the Koranic message. The Shiites, on the other hand, believe in linear succession; they insist upon restoring the Imamate to the family of Ali and his descendants.

Politically, Sunni Muslims are predominant among the Arabs of the Middle East, while the Shiites are identified with Persia (Iran). The Shiites rejected the concept of consensus that binds the Islamic or Mahdi—who is a messianic figure appointed by God. After his "appearance," the Mahdi will reinstate justice and righteousness to humanity. By contrast, for the Sunni, the Caliph performs only the function of administering justice through the Shari'a (Islamic law).

The fundamental difference between Sunni and Shi'ite
paradigms lies in their vision of the way religion functions within the temporal (or political) realm. As Edward Mortimer rightly argued, "In Sunni theory religious activities come within the domain of the state, however imperfect, because there is no alternative authority in sight." That is, Sunni ulama perform several functions in the society as educators, counselors, prayer leaders, and judges under the auspices of the state.

In this context, Sunni ulama promoted a non-active opposition to the leaders of the political order, however corrupt or unjust, in the hope that a reformed political environment will be established at a later stage. By contrast to their Sunni counterparts, the Shi'ites' paradigm emphasized and encouraged opposition to the political order and its representatives who rule illegitimately until the return of the hidden Imam. Thus, Sunni Islam can be considered as "the doctrine of power and achievement," while Shi'ite Islam is "the doctrine of opposition." This aspect can be explained by the fact that Shi'ism emerged as a reaction to the defeat of Ali by the Umayyads. This sect made suffering and martyrdom as the core of its paradigm.

As Mortimer indicated:

The mainstream community of Sunni Muslims has always been willing to accept a great diversity of opinions, drawing the line only at those which appear to deny either the oneness of God or the finality of the revelation to Mohammad. This statement illustrates the Sunni flexibility in
dealing with temporal and spiritual issues. This aspect is maintained by the shura doctrine (consultation) and through the establishment of ahl al-ḥal wa al-saqd (the council of notables). These two principles are central in insuring a system of checks against corruption and injustice. If we wish to state concisely the difference between Sunni and Shia Islam,\textsuperscript{22} Goldziher explained, "we should say that the former is a church founded on the consent of the community, the latter is an authoritarian Church.\textsuperscript{23}

The Sunni sect consists of two important sub-sects. These are the Sūfīs (nickname given to them because they wore clothes made of sūf—or wool), and the Wahhabī (named after Mohammad Abd-al Wahhab, founder of the movement). The Sūfīs do not have a dogmatic belief system: the paths or turuq through which they seek God "are in number as the souls of men" and vary widely, "through a family likeness may be traced in all of them."\textsuperscript{24} The Sufis experience the "gnosis," that is, the mystic knowledge of God, through hypnotic trances.\textsuperscript{25} The beliefs of the Wahhabis, who reacted against the Sufi sect and sought to purify Islam from the veneration of saints associated with Sufi practices, will be discussed more fully in the section dealing with reform movement within Islam and in the chapter dealing with Saudi Arabia.

The most important offshoot of Shi'ism is known as the Twelvers or Ithnā'ashari. This body of Shi'ism has been the
state religion in Iran since the beginning of the sixteenth century (1502). The name "Twelvers" is based on the idea of the twelfth Imam who is regarded as having divine significance. The twelfth Imam was Mohammad Abu-Qasim, who was temporarily removed from the world and (as the "hidden Imam" or "Mahdi") will reappear at the end of the world to bring happiness and prosperity to humanity.

Islam as a Total System

As indicated earlier, the Islamic religion purports to regulate every sphere of human experience: personal relations, eating habits, business transactions, prayer ritual, law and order, criminal punishments, political ideals—literally every human activity. Indeed Islam "is not merely religious but political, economic, and legal as well, . . . not just something Muslims turn to on Friday, their day of prayer". The central focus of this thesis is upon Islam's relation to the political process. In view of Islam's total or comprehensive nature, reference to a "secular" Muslim state is logically contradictory, and according to Islamic tenets, false. Islam "does not separate between duty as a believer and duty as citizen; between what is owing to God and what is owing to society". The Islamic community as a whole is the major expression of spiritual and political sovereignty. Every dimension of human life explored by the Islamic system is
learned from Allah and "attainable in political, social, and economic existence, by men on earth."\(^2^8\) Gustave Von Grunbaum elaborated on this issue when he wrote:

Islam is the community of Allah. He is living truth to which it owes its life. He is the center and the goal of its spiritual experience. But he is also the mundane head of his community which he not only rules but governs.

As mentioned above, "Muhammad set up his followers as a theocracy, a commonwealth in which the political power was held by the Lord, who had it administered by . . . the Prophet Muhammad."\(^3^0\) In other words the Islamic \textit{umma} (community) did not comprehend or accept a separation between spiritual and temporal powers. In this context, "the state was the church in that it safeguarded and expanded the area of the faith and took care of the business of the believers."\(^3^1\) Thus, attempts to distinguish between "feasible, 'secular' criteria of a citizen's accountability . . . and the full free vocation of the true 'religious' Muslim" are considered as un-Islamic.\(^3^2\)

From the early days, Islam began as a politico-religious system. As Cragg explained, Mohammad "founded a state. He did not merely launch a religion. Perhaps even that distinction is unsound. We should perhaps say he launched a religion in founding a state."\(^3^3\) The same system was maintained after Mohammad's death, since the Caliphs protected the \textit{Shari'Ca} (Islamic law) and insured its application in all the spiritual and temporal spheres.
Among the major characteristics of the Islamic state identified by Ziauddin Sardar are the following: (1) The Muslim system is a traditional one. Sardar referred to the "traditions of Islam as embodied in its history and culture"; and he insists that they must not be mistaken for "primitive traditions" that impede development. (2) This system is goal-oriented. It seeks to achieve the will of Allah, which implies the maintenance and stability of the existing system, rather than its replacement by a system with different goals (such as individual happiness or the welfare of the proletariat). Stability in this frame of reference means "the ability to maintain Islam's basic parameters in the face of change—and hence ensure its operational continuity." And (3) The Islamic system stresses "structural cohesiveness"; the Prophet referred to the Islamic community as being comparable to a human body or a living organism. When an organ is not functioning, the whole system or body suffers from the harm. This also conveys the image of structure where every part is dependent on the other to survive.\(^34\) A fourth point could be added to the above: The Islamic system is based on the notion of \textit{ijmā'\textsuperscript{C}}, which is the consensus of the learned and competent individuals to judge in religious matters. Any deviation from \textit{ijmā'\textsuperscript{C}} is considered \textit{kufr}, that is, unbelief.

\textit{In Sum:}

Islam is a total and unified way of life, both religious and secular, it is a set of
beliefs and a way of worship; it is a vast and integrated system of law; it is a culture and a civilization; it is a polity and a method of governance; it is a special sort of society and a way of running a family; it prescribes for inheritance, divorce, dress and etiquette, food and personal hygiene. It is a spiritual and human totality, this-worldly and other-worldly.

The current debate focusing on the issue of the Islamic state raises the question of whether the Muslim state is a theocracy, since religion and politics are inextricably joined. As Cragg explained, when dealing with the Islamic political system or state, "theocracy, then in any feasible sense, must mean divine authority in and through human institutions." Moreover, the term theocracy could also designate "the sovereignty of law divinely revealed. The community stands under God because it stands under God's law." By this criterion, every Muslim state is a theocracy. As a theocracy, the next question becomes: What specific form of government or system of institutions (including the relationship between religious and political authorities) shall an Islamic state assume? As different models of Islamic states, which will be examined later, will demonstrate, the concept of Islamic theocracy takes many forms: e.g., Iran is characterized by militant Islam, and Egypt exemplifies "symbiotic" development. Despite such differences, Islam states which did not follow a secularist path have applied the principles of the Shari'ca and have sought to create some kind of balance between political and
Varieties of Islamic Reforms

The profound crisis experienced by Islam in modern times is by no means new; it started in the eleventh century. Nearly all attempts to reform Islam were responses to periods that witnessed the decline of the Islamic civilization and the disintegration of the faith.  

An influential and creative response of Islam to this crisis occurred through Sufism, which sought to present a new and fuller expression of the faith. In time, the Sufis were considered as the "mystics" of popular Islam; they worked with ordinary believers in the tariqas or paths. They inspired the faithful through more practical and less exalted practices based on the loss of the self in search of God.

Some Sufi orders built their life around zawtayya (monasteries), where they worshipped saints and venerated tombs. However, the Sufis demonstrated "an impressive talent for infusing the faith with new life and endowing it with a broad popular appeal." The Sufis were especially prominent in the eleventh century. During that period, they succeeded in achieving results that could be compared to the great conquests of the first Islamic century. The Sufi movement also sought to democratize Islam by bringing it closer to the common man. As one commentator has explained:
At a time when the [fulama] were concentrating almost entirely on the letter of the law and the quest of orthodoxy, Sufi sheiks, dervishes, post and philosophers triumphantly reasserted the supremacy of the spirit. The mystical poetry of the Sufis, their examples of personal devotion and saintliness, and enthusiasm of their brotherhoods charted new pathways of religious expression just as the older ones were being blocked or narrowed by the [fulama].

Al-Ghazali, the leading philosopher and post of Sufism maintained that since the fulama were mainly concerned with "worldly matters," the "cultivation of the Sufi path is needed to achieve man's salvation." The popular appeal of the Sufis reached tribal regions, villages, guild organizations of artisans, and other groups, which provided the movement with strength and support.

Another Islamic crisis occurred under the Ottoman Empire (1326-1922), when Turkey was referred to as "the sick man of Europe." During that period, the Muslim world "had sunk to the lowest depth of its decrepitude." Life had gone out of the Islamic faith leaving degeneration and superstition behind. The situation was so degraded that could Mohammad "have returned to earth he would unquestionably have anathematized his followers as apostates and idolaters."

The movement known as "Islamic fundamentalism" arose as an attempt to diagnose and correct the disorder that led to Islamic eclipse. Two major manifestations of revivalist reform were especially influential. The first was the
Wahhabi movement, a sect of Sunni Islam that appeared in Saudi Arabia in an effort to purify Islam of extraneous influences. The Wahhabis reacted strongly against Sufi practices. They sought to return to Muslim purity and recapture or revive Islam's early simplicity. The movement was characterized by "harsh, uncompromising legalism." For example, Wahhabism revolted against tombside prayers and against saint worship as practiced by Sufi dervishes. Such practices implied shirk, that is, intervention between man and his God. Abd al-Wahhab explained that the sickness and corruption of contemporary society were caused by the fact that people had become "addicted to Sufism as a kind of opiate which lulled them to sleep and deprived them of vigour and vitality."

Al-Wahhab accepted only the plain text of the Koran and the hadith of the Prophet as basis for the Shari'ah. He rejected the bid'a, or innovations and practices not adopted by the Prophet and his followers, such as visiting saints' tombs and the veneration of objects and trees. "He even went so far as to enforce mosque attendance, something previously unheard of."

Politically, Wahhabism gained power in Saudi Arabia. In 1744 al-Wahhab converted the amir Ibn Saud. They signed a pact which laid down the basis for a Bedouin principality within a canonically constituted theocracy. After World War I, the Saudi tribe defeated the Hashimites and
proclaimed Wahhabism the official religion of Saudi Arabia. A more detailed discussion of Wahhabism and its political impact on Saudi government will be presented in the Fourth Chapter of this dissertation.

The second expression of Islamic revivalism was the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1925 by Hasan al-Banna, who was known as the murshid al-amm (the supreme guide). The Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged in rural Egypt, "was to become the most powerful Islamic organization since the heyday of the Wahhabi movement." Like Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood advocated a return to orthodox puritarian Islam. Moreover, al-Banna believed in the possibility of choosing aspects of Western civilization which are compatible with the Islamic faith. However, he criticized the morality of the West, especially the emancipation of women.

Politically, al-Banna believed firmly in the impossibility of separating temporal from spiritual power. His unwavering ideal was the model of polity under the Prophet Muhammad. It took the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood approximately fourteen years to become a considerable political and religious force in Egypt. The organization launched several social programs, such as the construction of mosques, small industries, schools, and technical institutions. The Brotherhood's political activities in Egypt will be discussed further in Chapter
Both Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood were efforts to resolve the crisis of Islam by returning to the unchanging fundamental principles of the Islamic faith, as delivered by Mohammad. A different approach to the phenomenon was exemplified by certain Islamic "reformers" (sometimes called "Islamic modernizers"). Among these were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) and his disciple, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Al-Afghani was the first Pan-Islamic propagandist. His main argument was the need to revitalize Islamic thinking through the adaptation of "Western rationalism." As a fine orator, al-Afghani traveled up and down the Middle East and Europe. He visited India, Persia, Egypt, Turkey, Great Britain, and Russia. From this wide traveling, al-Afghani concluded that "the Muslim world was threatened by the West as a powerful and dynamic entity. He saw that in comparison with that entity . . . the whole Islamic world was weak." Therefore, al-Afghani is considered the first Muslim reformer "to use the concept 'Islam' versus the 'West' as connoting correlative and of course, antagonistic historical phenomena."57

The major theme stressed by al-Afghani in the weekly journal al-Surwa al-wuthqa ("The unbreakable bond"), founded in Paris in 1884, was that all Muslim countries should unite to eliminate Western imperialism and domination. His main argument was that:
Islam . . . having once been great could be great again if it could resist. The way to resist was to bring about reforms in each Muslim country to make them strong and then to unite them in some sort of loose pan-Islamic federation on confederation.58

Politically, al-Afghani sought to unify all Muslims under an ideal universal Caliphate ruled by a "just king" and where the ġulama have a respected position in the government.59 Furthermore, al-Afghani was an activist who believed firmly that "allah changeth not the condition of a folk unless they (first) change that which is in their selves (hearts)." (Surah XIII.)

Muhammad Abduh belonged to a modest family that lived in the delta of the Nile. He received the degree of ġalim (singular of ġulama) in 1877 from Al-Azhar University. He was Al-Afghani's greatest disciple "but a very different man and a bigger man than his master."60 Throughout his life, Abduh attempted to convince Muslims that the study of Western science and reason is necessary to further Islam and defend it. In this vein he wrote:

If [Islam] was the first religion to address the rational mind, summoning it to look into the whole material universe, giving it free rein to range at will through all its secrets, saving only therein the maintenance of the faith, how is it that Muslims are content with so little and many indeed have closed and barred the door of knowledge altogether, supposing thereby that God is pleased with ignorance and neglect of study of his marvellous handiwork?61

In this context, Abduh attempted unsuccessfully to reform the traditional structures of the educational system
in Al-Azhar. Additionally, he tried to modernize the system of the Shari'a. Many of the reforms carried out in later years in Egypt after Abduh's death were based on his proposals. Although Abduh tried "to bridge the gap between modernism and traditionalism by showing that there were modernist elements in Islam itself," Abduh remained "at heart more traditionalist than modernist." He stressed the role of the 'ulama and favored the rule of a just despot king who would unite the Muslim community. Moreover, Abduh expressed his sympathy toward the orthodox Wahhabi approach to political authority.

Still another Islamic reformer that should be mentioned is Rashid Rida (1865-1935). He was Abduh's biographer and student. As Malcolm H. Kerr rightly noted, "Rida's position under different circumstances changed "from liberal reformer, to radical fundamentalist to orthodox conservative." The major argument proposed by Rida was that Muslims must examine their traditional political institutions and their historical structures of government in order to discover the "true principles of faith," in order to understand the reason why they became corrupt. In sum, Rida's lack of confidence in ijma (consensus) and his belief in a just despot are similar to al-Afghani and Abduh's ideas. The only new concept he introduced was "the Islamic Progressive Party" which he viewed as the "real representative of the umma." The members belonging to this
party, he explained, "could not come from the Muslim nations under foreign rule, nor from the ancient seats of Islamic learning nor from the Westernizers." 66

The fundamental conclusion that stems from this view of the major efforts to reform Islam is that all of them described the problems experienced by Islamic nation states without finding acceptable solutions to these problems. The idea of Pan-Islamism proposed by al-Afghani is indeed unrealistic; it cannot be achieved in a world where nationalism dominates the international scene and remains the foremost issue in development. In other words, al-Afghani's advocacy of national development in order to promote Pan-Islamism is contradictory.

Ralph Braibanti depicted an interesting set of "self-corrective cycles" in the attempt to reform Islam. He explained how "Sufism stimulated a reaction against excessive legalism, Wahhabism was directed against the encrustations of Ottoman practices and excessive Sufi ascetism." 67 In the same vein, Ataturk's secularism was a reaction against al-Afghani's Pan-Islamism and his followers. The common element that unites the Sufis, Wahhabs, al-Afghani, Abduh, and others is that: "they appealed with an earnest sense of concrete purpose and with considerable practical optimism, for the adaptation of legal, political, and social institutions to fit an identifiable Islamic mold." 68
Islam and the State: Continuing Crisis

A brief consideration of the orthodox concept of the state in the Islamic tradition and its relevance for the contemporary political situation is necessary before exploring the contemporary crisis faced by Islam. The state is referred to in classical Islam as the "khilāfa" in the Sunni tradition or the "Imamate" in Shi'ism. The function of this body is to protect every member of the Islamic community in terms of life and property. The Shari'ah prescribes that the Caliph is not only the temporal ruler of the state but also its spiritual guide. The Caliph in this context is responsible for the performance of a number of governmental functions, such as the regulation of the system of taxation, and the protection of justice under Islamic law.

The successive crises facing Islam have had a multitude of sources. The roots emanate principally from threats that exist within Islam itself. These threats intensified under the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, when the Turks "let commercial domination of their empire pass almost by default into the eager hands of its non-Muslim minorities--Greeks, Armenians, Copts, Jews and their European partners." Before this era of economic and political decline, the religious impetus, which drove believers toward the domination of strategic areas of the globe, Islam witnessed an eclipse in the spiritual sphere...
toward the close of the Middle Ages. As Erwin I. J. Rosenthal explained:

The heart of the crisis of Islam, as of religion everywhere, lies in the absence of faith or in a weakened faith due to the challenge of modern, and predominantly political, ideologies. The security of total medieval faith has gone, and the unquestioning allegiance to religion, as to a master demanding and receiving wholehearted obedience, has given way to doubt and uncertainty.

The industrial revolution and the growth of applied sciences contributed to the Islamic crisis, because they served only a small number of European nations and later the United States, leaving the major part of the world in poverty and backwardness. Indeed, "for the Muslim of the nineteenth century it was not simply that the Muslim world was far behind Europe in scientific advance, but that it was an old tutor bettered, indeed humiliated by an early pupil."71

Another major contribution to the crisis of Islam was an outgrowth of the colonial period. During the nineteenth century, the political struggle against European powers was initiated by the advocates of nationalism. These groups diverted and diluted the consciousness of belonging to the umma, the universal Islamic community of believers."72 The concept that dominated the period of struggle for independence was that of al-waṭan (fatherland).

The 1970s witnessed an interesting spiritual "revival" and an extraordinary embracing of tradition in the Muslim
world, as well as in the Christian or Jewish countries. This revival is a new attempt to solve the Islamic crisis. The recent "resurgence" of spiritually guided movements is a natural response to events in the contemporary world. These include "the disorientating political, economic and social impact of Western and Soviet imperialism, the imperatives of 'pressure cooker' economic development, the various struggles for independence, the Arab-Israeli conflict . . . and the ongoing political conflicts within the Arab sphere and in the larger Islamic context."  

Pipes has distinguished three approaches in attempts to solve the problems facing Islamic nation states today. First, he explained, there is "governmental Islam," which legitimizes policies decided by political leaders. For instance, Anwar al-Sadat and several other Islamic governments gave "an Islamic hue" to nearly all their major activities and policies. Sadat declared war against Israel, and restored peace with the same nation, in the name of Islamic religion. Similarly, King Hassan II of Morocco organized the "green march" to the Western Sahara in November 1975 in the name of Islam.  

The second approach identified by Pipes consists of "neo-orthodox movements" (i.e. Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Islamic countries, and Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya). These advocate a return to pure Islam and attempt to make Islam a way of life "by
strengthening its hold over society." The third attempt to solve the crisis of modern Islam consists of the "autonomist movement," whose leaders "try genuinely to make society follow Islamic ways." They direct their efforts mainly where Muslims lack political control and strength to achieve political autonomy.

While Islam is a total creed in the sense that it encompasses every sphere of human life, nevertheless, it offers different patterns of state-mosque relations. The following chapters will focus upon four models of Sunni Islamic governmental systems. The Egyptian model of symbiotic relation between state and mosque, Saudi Arabia's "traditional Islam," the Turkish model of "secularism", and especially the case of Tunisia, the model of "authentic" Islam.
Chapter III
"SYMBIOTIC" OR "PARALLEL" ISLAM IN EGYPT

Modern day Egypt is facing several problems in the economic, social, and political arenas. As Hamied Asari explained, "recent media reports and reasoned articles convey the impression that Egypt is on the brink of a terrible upheaval."¹ This crisis is illustrated by numerous worker's strikes, religious extremists' strife, stalemate peace process with Israel, tension with Arab states, poverty, economic stagnation, and an agitated political climate.²

Nadia Ramsis Farah conducted several interviews with Egyptian intellectuals to determine the elements construed as the cause of the crisis. She concluded that the following four elements contributed to the intensification of religious extremist movements in Egypt. These are, "the emergence of an identity crisis after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the use of Islam by the ruling elites as a legitimation tool; the lack of democracy; and increased economic inequities during the seventies."³

This section of Chapter III is not an attempt to explain the current crisis experienced by the Egyptian nation, but it will explore the parallel model of development that survived in Egypt despite the crises. It is important to note at the outset that the Egyptian model of state-mosque relationship exemplifies the concept of "symbiotic" development. Since the revolution of

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1952, the modernizing political elites of Egypt have not followed a rigid institutional separation between mosque and state, such as the one adopted by Ataturk in Turkey. Instead, Egyptian leaders applied a milder form of secularism, consisting of progressive impinging by the government upon areas traditionally and historically dominated by religious authorities. Gamal Abd al-Nasser and his followers were determined to operate a "dual" system which typified a policy of coexistence with the religious establishment of Egypt. The purpose of this section is to explore this unique relationship between the state and the Islamic authorities in modern Egypt.

The Islamic Tradition in Egypt

The relationship between temporal and spiritual powers in Egypt is by no means new; its roots are embedded in the Pharaonic civilization where the Pharaohs assumed the function of kings and gods. As J. A. Wilson pointed out, during the dynasty of the Pharaohs, "the socio-political essential was the assertion that Egypt was owned and ruled by a god, who assured the land of divine blessings and whose knowledge, power and oversight were complete and absolute."4

The incorporation of Egypt into the Arab Empire and its conversion to Islam began in 641 A.D. During the early years of Arabo-Islamic rule, the political elites adopted a liberal policy towards religious worship. As late as 725
A.D., 98 per cent of the Egyptian population remained Christian. With the migration of the Qais and Kaz tribes from Arabia, the process of Egypt's conversion to the Islamic faith was accelerated.5

Under the Arab rule, Egypt was first controlled by the Omayyad Caliphate (from 661 to 750) and then by the Abbassids (from 750 to 1258).6 The Fatimid rule of Egypt (969-1171) marked the flourishing of Islamic civilization in Egypt "which not only speeded and completed the influence of Islam in Egypt, but rendered the country the most prosperous and illustrious center of Islamic culture."7 Entering Egypt from North Africa, the Fatimids built a new capital in Cairo and founded the mosque of al-Azhar, the oldest Islamic learning center in the world. The Fatimids were Shi'ite Muslims; they followed the Islamic pattern of governmental control. The Caliph ruled as the temporal and spiritual leader. The significant aspect about that period was the lack of an orderly civil structure and the dominance of military institutions. The last Fatimid ruler was Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin), who was appointed in 1169. Saladin restored the Sunni sect of Islam to Egypt, a move highly welcomed by the Egyptian Muslims. Moreover, in the year 1174, Saladin declared Egypt independent from the Abbassids and consolidated his political authority in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt under the banner of the Ayyub Dynasty. It is important to note, however, that Saladin recognized
the spiritual authority of the Abbassid Caliph.

Arab domination was interrupted by the Ottoman (Turkish) Islamic rule, which began the Mameluke period in 1517. Ottoman political authority was exercised by the Mameluke beys, who were largely independent of Constantinople. The significant characteristic of that era was the indifference of the Mameluke government towards the backward condition of the population. As a result, the religious authorities (ulama, judges, and teachers) assumed the functions of social welfare organizations. As Vatikiotis explained, during the Ottoman rule, "the Islamic framework with its religious tradition, orders and institutions, operating on the whole within the limits of the Sacred Law [Shari'a], afforded the [Egyptian] an ordered and relatively contented existence."

The significant characteristic of the Islamic tradition in Egypt, during the rule of successive Arab and Muslim dynasties, was the variety of Islamic beliefs in the Egyptian society. On the one hand, the rural segments of the country, mainly the fellahin who have been, and largely remain, the center of primitive and uneducated (sometimes highly unorthodox) forms of Islamic worship. Traditionally, these expressions of Islam included the veneration of saints, beliefs in supernat®nal spirits (&afarit), and concern about "the evil eye."

By contrast, the urban regions have been the pivot of
more orthodox and educationally sophisticated Islamic beliefs and practices identified with the highly learned class of the ḥulama and the qādīs (judges in the Shari'a courts). The ḥulama regulated the educational establishment and strongly opposed Western ideas.

The common element uniting the urban and rural religious sections of Egyptian society was their common adherence to Sufis practices, namely the turuq (paths), which engaged in several charitable functions (i.e. building schools and hospitals and the organization of voluntary institutions).

The high level of culture and influence achieved by the Fatimids declined under the later rule of the Mamelukes and the Ottomans. French domination of Egypt (1798-1801), followed by the arrival of the British colonizers in 1882, initiated Egypt's colonial dependency upon the West and challenged the Islamic culture. For example, Napoleon's short-lived expedition opened the door to Egypt's interest in Western sciences, technology, medicine, and civilization.

**Nationalist Movement and Islamic Contribution**

The nationalist movement emerged with the creation of the Wafad al-misri ("Egyptian delegation") Party, which was the most influential organization expressing the nationalist aspirations of Egypt. The Wafd, founded by Saad Zaghloul in
1918, sought to achieve Egyptian independence from British rule. The party's ability in political organization and mobilization on a country-wide basis—in carrying out demonstrations and propaganda activities—menaced continued British control of Egypt. The atmosphere of unrest stirred by the Wafdish nationalists led to the dispatch of the "Milner commission" in 1920 to investigate the Wafdist activities. The Milner report referred to the Wafd as a "remarkable organization," which under the popular and charismatic leadership of Saad Zaghloul Pasha has held an increasingly strong anti-British sentiment that has to be considered with careful attention. 10

The Wafd consisted of "an amalgam of nationalist groups,: whose members were inclined to republicanism. Despite its appeal to the masses, the Wafd's leadership "represented an upper class which had taken the place of the former Turkish aristocracy." 11 Saad Zaghloul did not sympathize with popular agitation that sought to achieve social reforms. For example, when urban factory workers demonstrated in 1923 against work conditions, Zaghloul favored repressive measures against the movement. 12

The Wafd's nationalist influence led to the unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence and the promulgation of the constitution of 1923. The national election of January 1924 gave the Wafd party an overwhelming victory of 90 percent of the seats in the parliament and Zaghloul became
Prime Minister. After Zaghloul's death in 1927, the leadership of the Wafd party passed to Mustapha Nahhas Pasha. 13

Before exploring the Wafd's ideological inclinations concerning mosque-state relations, the impact of Islamic religious authorities and ideas upon the Egyptian nationalist movement during the era of British colonialism must be noted. Since the views of the Moslem Brotherhood have already been examined (Chapter II), it is sufficient to emphasize here that the Brotherhood appealed not only to the rural sector, where the organization was born, but also to the educated middle class and to nationally influential political leaders in the 1920s and 1930s. 14

The Brotherhood vehemently opposed the British presence and considered Western penetration as a threat to the Egyptian community and to the essence of Islamic culture. In terms of its ideology and purpose, the nationalism of the Brotherhood was--unlike that of the Wafd--non-Western. To the society's minds, patriotism attained "the status of sacredness." 15 In other words, it was equivalent to the notion of jihâd (holy war), and comparable to a religious duty. As Rudolph Peters pointed out, "the doctrine of jihâd offered the most appropriate ideology for mobilizing people". 16 The jihâd was preached by the ulama in Egypt, as well as by the Brotherhood, who urged the Egyptian population to provide financial support to the army in its
struggle against "the unbelievers." In this context, patriotism denoted an unqualified commitment to defend the "nation" (watan) and struggle on its behalf. Not Egypt as such, but because Egypt is a Muslim land. Patriotism was sacred because it was in the service of the faith, patriotism for Egypt was all the more possible and desirable because of Egypt's historically important relationship with Islam.

Hasan al-Banna distinguished between two principal conceptions of patriotism: wataniyya, that is, one's devotion to his or her country; and qawmiyya, which means devotion to one's people. He maintained that each had diverse qualities, of which some are in accord with, while others conflict with, Islamic principles. As Mitchell explained,

Islam . . . teaches wataniyya but one which is contingent on religion rather than geographical boundaries; its goal is not only, as in Europe, "the promotion of a country's well-being," but also and primarily the spread of the word of God across the face of the earth.

In contrast with the Moslem Brotherhood, in general terms the Wafd party's ideology was inclined towards secularism. Wafdist deputies and members of the parliament sought to extend "the supervision and control of the state over religious institutions through legislation." For instance, by 1926, the Wafdist proposed certain reforms regarding marriage and divorce laws and called for the prohibition of religious practices connected with burial and
with veneration of saints. Moreover, the Wafdist parliament of 1927 pushed through legislation to repeal the 1925 law which had granted several concessions to the ulama; the new law brought religious schools and institutions under the control of the Ministry of Education. Predictably, the ulama of al-Azhar University and the Brotherhood expressed their strong opposition to such measures. In addition, the Wafd was opposed to the palace, especially the administrations of King Fouad and King Farouk, because the monarchy was closely associated with religious authorities. Wafd opposition also stemmed from "an inherent reflex against the power of foreigners in Egypt [the Kedive Ismael Dynasty] and emotionally in direct line with . . . the cry of 'Egypt for Egyptians.'"

Wafdist attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood were highly diverse. The liberal wing of the Wafd regarded the organization as anathema, because it represented in their eyes a potential threat to the modernization of Egypt. For the rightist faction of the Wafd, the Brotherhood represented a useful instrument to be utilized against rival movements, such as communism. Many members of the Wafd considered the Muslim Brotherhood a source of potential political power that could not be ignored because of the services the Brotherhood might render to "the overriding and unabated Wafdist conflict with the palace or for the threat it would pose were the palace to make use of it."
instance, in 1942, Prime Minister Nahas Pasha followed the right-wing faction of the Wafd by forming a temporary alliance with Hasan al-Banna. Nahas Pasha feared that the Brotherhood would oppose and threaten the Allied cause during World War II that he promised to support. In return for Brotherhood support, Nahas Pasha introduced legislation against vice, a major element in the Brotherhood's plan of social reforms.

The year 1945 marked a turning point in the Brotherhood's political strategy, when it reverted to an independent course of action based on the notion of jihad, calling for use of violence and terrorism against the "collaborators" with British colonial rule. The Brotherhood declared its enmity to all Egyptian political parties--including the Wafd--and embarked on a wave of assassinations against nationally influential political figures.

The nationalist era in Egypt, especially the period between 1890 to 1914, was thus marked by a conflict within Egyptian society in its reaction toward Western influence. This found expression in a diversity of religious ideologies. For instance, the group identified with the Pan-Islamist reformer, Mohammad Abduh, struggled with the issue of religious reforms in the political and educational spheres of Egyptian society. As noted in Chapter II, this effort failed to change orthodox Islamic ideas and practices significantly. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand,
sought to return to revivalist Islamic political principles in order to eliminate the British presence. In addition, another organization—consisting mainly of Christian Syrians—advocated a policy of cooperation with the colonizers and the West, in order to lead Egypt along the path of economic and political development. In addition, another organization—consisting mainly of Christian Syrians—advocated a policy of cooperation with the colonizers and the West, in order to lead Egypt along the path of economic and political development. The most influential nationalist efforts—carried out by the Wafd—could be identified as predominantly secular. Indeed, if Saad Zaghloul had become Egypt's leader, he would most likely have followed the symbiotic development model that emerged after 1952. As discussed earlier, the Wafd's members in general attempted to increase the power of the state vis-a-vis the religious institutions. This approach could in some measure be justified by the inter-War era in which the Wafd emerged, which also witnessed Ataturk's secular reforms in Turkey. For the most part, Ataturk's revolution was welcomed by the intellectual elite in Egypt.

Constitutional Provisions Concerning State-Mosque Relations

The Constitution in Egypt, as well as in all Arab and Muslim countries, reflects Western influences. According to one commentator, constitutions, "have no place in the traditions of Arab societies, neither the people nor the politicians appreciate their value or understand their purpose." In other words, they exist primarily because
"they provide the political regimes with the appearances of orderliness, modernity, and perhaps progressiveness." In addition, they give the regimes the impression of being democratic.

The Egyptian constitution was drafted in 1956 and promulgated in 1964. The Charter that preceded the ratification of the document did not reflect extremist and conservative religious ideas and principles. "The revolution [of 1952]," Daniel Crecelius explained, "refused to submit to the vociferous demands by the ulama to have the Charter designate Islam the religion of the state." The only reference to religious matters stated that "the eternal spiritual values derived from religions are capable of guiding man . . . . In their essence all divine messages constituted human revolutions which aimed at the reinstatement of man's dignity and his happiness. It is the prime duty of religious thinkers, then, to preserve for each religion the essence of its divine message." Nasser and the "free officers" abandoned this general principle. The 1964 constitution announced the regime's adherence to the Islamic faith and the adoption of Arabic as the official language.

In the same vein, the 1971 constitution, drafted by Sadat, proclaimed Islam as the official religion of Egypt. This document added three significant clauses to the 1964 document. Article 2 declared that "the principles of the
Islamic sharia are a major source of legislation; and Article 9 explained that the family, which forms the nucleus of society "is built on religion, morals, and patriotism." Article 19 affirmed that "religious education is a primary subject in the general educational curriculum."32

President Sadat announced that the framing of this "permanent constitution: reflected Egypt's traditions and, above all else, the Egyptian people's "mission of faith.""33 Although it received the approval of 99.9 percent of the Egyptian population, the "Islamized document" raised heated debate among intellectuals, and especially among legislators, concerning the role to be played by the Shari'Ca in Egyptian life. Some commentators on the issue argued that "legislators should operate simply according to its spirit," while others maintained that the Shari'Ca must be "rigidly adhered to as the sole material source of legislation."34 Stephen R. Humphreys identified two issues that dominated these constitutional debates:

First, the formal identification of Egypt as a Muslim state, which was of vital importance to men of both Fundamentalist and Modernist tendencies, could not displease Secularist circles in the government. This is not only because these circles would recognize that Islam was an essential element in the cultural identity of most Egyptians, but also because such an identification would justify the state in continuing its long established policy (dating from the 1890s) of an ever closer supervision and control of the Muslim religious establishment. As to the sharia's role in legislation, it is a moot point whether the constitution makers were sincere or hypocritical in the definition they
proposed, but through formulation of Art. 1:2 they clearly did assert that if Egypt was to be an Islamic state, it would also be a modernist one.35

These constitutional provisions express the idea that Islam, although not a determining factor in the official ideology of the Egyptian government, remains a fundamental element in the cultural and socio-political life of Egypt. Furthermore, these provisions justify the path followed by Egyptian modernizing elites: "symbiotic development," which allows religious authorities to function actively, but separately, in building modern Egypt.

Islam and Modernization in Egypt: State-Mosque Relations

The most significant characteristic of state-mosque relationship in Egypt is that "religion has for millenia legitimized the state and virtually every ruler of the country has tried to establish himself firmly within the religious tradition . . . ."36 This tradition has dominated the long history of Egyptian rulers. In fact, the only Pharoah "who abandoned the state religion and in doing so brought a quick end to his dynasty," was Amenophis IV (known as Aknaton).37

In more recent years, the origin of the present state-mosque model in Egypt--"symbiotic" or "parallel" development--goes back to the 1920s and 1930s, the era of modern nationalism, in which the Wafd Party was the most
influential movement. Christian P. Harris identified four rather distinctive viewpoints during that period. First, there were the "ulta-conservatives," consisting of the older generation of the qalama who advocated adherence to reformist and orthodox Islamic doctrines and actively opposed attempts at secularism. The second group, consisting of "modernist reformers," advocated that the Islamic community could adapt itself to the contemporary and scientific age. This group was influenced by the earlier reforms of Mohammad Abduh. It stressed the need to practice the ijtihad—that is, the continual reinterpretation of the Koran—in order for Egypt to become a modern and Westernized state.

The third approach was exemplified by the "Muslim reactionaries"—principally the Muslim Brotherhood—who, as we have seen, rejected modernism and Westernization. The fourth group consisted of "secularists." This group had two branches: radicals, who "repudiated the whole Muslim culture and ethos;" and even more influentially, the supporters of a lay or secular state. This last category of secularists come to the forefront of the Egyptian political arena in the late 1940s. Most of the leaders of the 1952 revolution (such as General Naguib and Gamal abd al-Nasser) embraced this viewpoint. They maintained that religion should be a matter of private conscience, in order for the Egyptian society to follow a "healthy" path of development.
The thought of the Egyptian revolutionaries also owed much to the early example of Mohammad Ali (1805-1849), who forced open Egypt's door towards modernity by "an alien dynasty [Albanian] of Westward looking rulers." This modernizing autocrat destroyed Mameluke political power and brought about the "steady erosion of the Ḥulama's political power and influence." Ali's regime attacked the Ḥulama's influence upon the political processes and deprived religious institutions of their revenues. Furthermore, Ali decreed the elimination of salaries for the Ḥulama, except for those at al-Azhar University. Thus, his reign witnessed a period of decay for religious institutions, especially schools, mosques, and dervish orders. Although Mohammad Ali and the rulers that followed him did not institute a secular political system per se, nevertheless, they took an independent course from Islamic authorities in Egypt, thus laying the basic foundations for "symbiotic development" after 1952.

The model of "parallel" or "symbiotic" relationship between state and mosque was explicitly adopted during and after the revolution of 1952, which was, and remained, fundamentally secular. General Muhammad Naguib, first President of Egypt, emphasized the conviction of the revolutionary leaders when he stated:

While sympathizing with the desire to apply the teachings of Mohammad [the prophet] to modern life, [we are] convinced that to do so blindly would spell disaster. The rebirth of
Egypt, in our opinion, depends on the continued modernization of its social, political, and economic institutions . . . . There is nothing in the Koran that calls for theocratic government; on the contrary, the Prophet was in favor of parliamentary rule . . . . It is thus not permissible but desirable for a cosmopolitan country like Egypt to be governed by means of a secular republic.42

Thus, the revolution of 1952 represented the major and ultimate break in Egypt with the Pharaonic and Ottoman traditions.

Under the government that came into power in 1952, state-mosque relations could be examined in connection with several major areas of the Egyptian government, such as the educational system, the judicial branch, the role of women in the political area, and the like. The focus in this section will be placed on state-mosque relations in connection with the political sphere.

**Political Sphere**

In *The Philosophy of Revolution*, Nasser identified three circles to which the Egyptian nation belongs. He stated:

The first circle in which we must revolve and attempt to move in as much as we possibly can . . . is the Arab circle . . . . [The second circle] is the Continent of Africa . . . .

The third circle now remains the circle that goes beyond continents and oceans and to which I referred as the circle of our brethren in faith who turn with us, whatever part of the world they are in, towards the same kibla, in Mecca, and whose pious lips
whisper reverently the same prayers. 43

By placing the Islamic circle in the last position, Nasser expressed the importance he attached to Pan-Arabism, as distinct from Pan-Islamism. This aspect of Nasserism can be illustrated by Nasser's vigorous reaction towards King Faisal of Saudi Arabia's proposal in 1966 to form an "Islamic conference" in Mecca, consisting of leaders of Muslim nations. Nasser openly declared that this proposal was an attempt to form a conservative coalition which would lead to the isolation of revolutionary regimes like the United Arab Republic (Egypt). 44 In this context of events, Nasser defined the real Islamic unity as

the solidarity of the Islamic peoples struggling against imperialism, not the solidarity between reactionary governments which are imperialist agents exploiting and falsifying Islam; reactionary governments that want to stop the march of history and the march of progress. 45

It must be emphasized here that Nasser's conception of Islam was "modernistic" and "reformist" in the sense that it attempted to "fit Islam to modern life." 46 Indeed, "this Muslim who was in personal touch with God," Jean Lacouture explained, "whom he saw as a kind of arbiter of good and of evil rather than as a divine supervisor, did a great deal to secularize his country." 47

Nasser's policies toward that end included the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, after its attempt to assassinate him; the nationalization of waqf
(religious endowments) property; the closure of many mosques which were placed under government control; and the secularization of the educational system. In addition, Nasser abolished all religious courts in 1955, which were thereafter incorporated into the secular legal system. More importantly, Nasser breached "the last remaining bastion of autonomous clerical (and Islamic) power," al-Azhar University, by reorganizing its educational structure and adding secular subjects to its curriculum. 48

Despite all these efforts, Nasser was unable to go as far in a secular direction as Ataturk in Turkey or Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia. Nasser expressed his admiration for the Tunisian experiment in secularism by saying:

I would like to do what Bourguiba has done. But do not forget that the obstacles which he had to overcome in Tunisia were much less solid than those which I have to confront here, in the heart of Islam, at the very gate of Al-Azhar. 49

Nassar's successor, Anwar Sadat, followed a set of milder policies toward the religious establishment of Egypt. This does not mean that he shared political power with the religious authorities. On the contrary, the earlier model of symbiotic relationship was maintained and functioned as it did under Nasser: that is, religion was an institution regulated by the state. Sadat followed "a strategy of survival" against his opponents' frequent criticisms, which centered upon Islam. 50

Sadat sought "to maximize his legitimacy" more
frequently than Nasser. For instance, relying upon the mass media, he publicized his visits to the mosque every Friday. In order to receive the support of the religious authorities, Sadat increased financial allocations to al-Azhar University. On the policy level, Sadat allowed the Islamic establishment's major spokesman to invest in business subsidized by the government and in financial ventures, "fiefdoms, which under Nasser were reserved for secularly-inclined officers and technocrats." Furthermore, the clauses added to the constitution of 1971 concerning Islam illustrated the less stringent policies adopted by Sadat towards the religious elite. Similarly, the January 1977 food riots led Sadat to make concessions to Coptic and Muslim religious leaders by declaring that "religion must be a basic and compulsory subject in [Egyptian] schools."  

Sadat's policies toward the religious establishment changed somewhat after the Camp David agreements with Israel in 1979, which brought about attacks from most Muslim states, as well as from Muslim Fundamentalists in Egypt. Reminiscent of Ataturk, Sadat replied to these attacks with the call: "no politics in religion and no religion in politics." In addition, Sadat undertook repressive measures against individuals and groups who denounced his peace initiative in the name of religion. Sadat's bitter struggle with such opponents contributed to his assassination in 1981 by the Islamist group al-jihād.
Interestingly, recent studies and articles about Egypt seem to focus on Hosni Mubarak's economic reforms, namely the infitāh policy (open door), which began under the leadership of Sadat. President Mubarak seems to follow the pattern established by the revolution in keeping the religious authorities operating as a parallel establishment to the political system. In his speech to parliament, he pledged fidelity to Sadat's policies. Some commentators, however, argue that Mubarak's style reminds the Egyptian population of Nasser more than Sadat.

Under Mubarak's leadership, the "symbiotic" relationship between the ṣūlama and the government persisted. To protect this order, Mubarak developed and carried out extensive repressive measures against extremist Islamist groups; nevertheless, these measures were selective and cautious. Mubarak released several religious and political opposition leaders, namely those who did not pose a threat to his regime. Mubarak invited these leaders and other opposition groups imprisoned by Sadat to unify in order to confront religious fanaticism, which paralyzed Egypt for years. Thus, Mubarak managed to assert his leadership to cultivate "the illusion that he was on the side of all groups and classes, with the exception of Islamic jama'at (extremist groups)."

One of the interesting developments regarding Islam in
Egypt under the leadership of Mubarak occurred in 1984 when the New Wafd party reconstituted itself and formed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. This strategy sought to gain more votes among the rural immigrants and the urban lower middle class electoral strata. The new Wafd won enough votes to form the opposition in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{57} It is important to note at this juncture that all the participating groups in the 1984 election upheld and committed themselves to the \textit{Shari\textsuperscript{a}}. This socio-political climate indicates the continuity of the "symbiotic" relationship between the temporal and the spiritual in Egypt. Another example illustrative of this reality is the licensing of the religious party, the \textit{umma}, which proclaimed the Sunni \textit{Shari\textsuperscript{a}} as the foundation of its social, political and cultural systems. This non-extremist party supports Mubarek's regime and legitimizes its policies.

\underline{Emerging Patterns of State-Mosque Relations in Egypt}

After a survey of the literature dealing with the relations between the political and religious institutions in Egypt, three tendencies can be identified.\textsuperscript{58} First, the regime supports the religious establishments, and in return it receives (or expects to receive) the "blessing" or legitimacy from the \textit{ulama}. Second, opposition to the government since 1952 has emanated mainly from the revivalist groups, notably the society of Muslim Brothers.
This opposition shows no sign of disappearing. The third significant trend is that as far as can be determined on the basis of available evidence, majority sentiment among the Egyptian population supports the government's approach or model of "parallel" development.

Islam in Egypt is not simply the religion of the state; it is also "faith that permeates the society, and it is faith which government propagates and supports." The two systems of mosques, private and state-owned, are illustrative of "symbiotic" relationships between the government and religious establishment. As one study notes, "much of religious life of Muslims [in Egypt] is still centered around the mosque, and religion as an institution of social control is still centered on government agencies." On the other hand, there are mosques operated by private citizens or organizations, which remain under state inspection.

The government's control over religious institutions in general sought to achieve two major objectives: mobilization of the masses in order for them to accept the revolution's ideology--Arab Socialism; and popular acceptance of the regime's internal and foreign policies. The political elites recognized that "Islam remained the widest and most effective basis for consensus despite all efforts to promote nationalism, patriotism, secularism and socialism."
Islam has been used by the government as a principal agent of legitimization. This was a necessary medium for the charismatic Nasser and for Sadat, because of the lack of institutionalization of political power. Daniel Pipes considered Egypt the prime example of "governmental Islam"; that is, "the use of Islamic symbols and ideology imposed from above by the government, usually to facilitate policy without affecting the nature of that policy."  

Several examples highlight the Egyptian leaders' use of religion in general, and of Islam in particular, to gain the desired legitimacy and popular acceptance for governmental policies and programs. For instance, the subjects of sermons preached in the mosques on Fridays, and in Coptic churches on Sundays, are specified by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which outlines the guidelines of argument to be followed. Topics, such as population control, the Peace Treaty with Israel, the atheistic character of communism, have been included in the sermons along with other religious subjects.  

Attendance at the Friday worship is another common practice of government leaders. For instance, during national crises, on several occasions Nassar delivered the sermons instead of the preacher. Moreover, the government asks the ulama's opinion on legal matters and on a variety of subjects including family planning, land reforms, foreign policy, and many other social issues.
Sadat succeeded in giving an Islamic character to all his policies, especially in the process of making peace with Israel.\textsuperscript{65}

Most of the \textit{culama} are opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, guilds, and other fundamentalist associations, which have served as channels for a minority and potentially dangerous opposition to the Egyptian revolutionary government. From the evidence available, the Brotherhood and even more fundamentalist splinter groups do not have wide popular support.\textsuperscript{66} For instance, unlike the Brotherhood, the \textit{culama} of al-Azhar supported Sadat's peace initiatives and argued that "the Koran permits treaties with infidels if they are concluded from a position of strength... Islam preaches peace to all men of good will."\textsuperscript{67}

The distinctiveness of the Egyptian model vis-a-vis Turkey must be emphasized. According to commentators, the spirit of the 1952 revolution expressed by Nasser and the "Free Officers" was not "secularism," as that concept was exemplified by Ataturkism. Moreover, Berger argued that:

\begin{quote}
The militant regime's denial of political influence to the ulama is not secularism, for (1) this denial extends to every elite or popular body that might reduce the regime's total sway, and (2) the ulama and religious bodies are denied not only political influence but even autonomy in religion itself. Secularism means separation of church and state and the latter's supremacy; it does not call for the state's control of the intimate details of religious teaching or harnessing of religion to the purposes of the government of the day.
\end{quote}
Thus, throughout the modern Egyptian political experience, the state's expansion into domains traditionally and historically regulated by religious institutions has been carried out in the name of religion; in this context, the state has been "the patron and master of religion" in Egypt. It is important to note however that despite the Egyptian government's policies in controlling the religious sphere,

Egypt remains an Islamic state, secular in part, but nevertheless preserving the one vital link that connects state and society to God. Even as it changes the [Shari'ah] in a drastic manner and expands the sources from which legal principles can be drawn, it does not repudiate the theoretical primacy of [the Shari'ah] and continues to argue that [the Shari'ah] principles govern the [umma].

The Egyptian model can be contrasted with the model existing in Saudi Arabia, characterized by Wahhabi control over the Saudi state. The following chapter will be devoted to an examination of the "partnership" pattern of mosque-state relations.
Chapter IV

PARTNERSHIP: MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA

The uniqueness of Saudi Arabia's mosque-state relations stems in large measure from the fact that the country is the cradle and the very birthplace of the Islamic religion. If Egypt exemplifies symbiosis between religion and the state, Saudi Arabia illustrates the model of "fusion" or "partnership" between temporal and spiritual authorities. It is the land of the haji and the site of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest shrines of Islamic faith. Since the early nineteenth century, the house of Saud has had strong ties with the puritanical Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam, which pervasively influences the country's political and religious spheres. This deeply rooted Islamic tradition is exemplified by the shahādah (great affirmation) engraved on the flag and by the two swords symbolizing the role of Saudi Arabia in protecting Islam.

Major Historical States

Down to the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was isolated in the midst of deserts. In 1937, Philip K. Kiti wrote, "of all lands comparable to Arabia in size, . . . no country. . . has received so little consideration and study in modern times as . . . Arabia." The discovery and exploration of oil, in 1933, was followed by an intense and unprecedented
Western interest in the history, culture and political processes of Saudi Arabia.

As emphasized in Chapter II, during Mohammad's lifetime, Mecca and Medina became the centers of the Islamic religion. A highly influential period in Saudi history was the era between 1745 and 1818 when Mohammad Ibn Saud, the prince of Diriya in central Nejd, joined with ibn al-Wahhab (1703-1792), in order to unite the scattered and conflicting tribes. The Wahhabist revivalist movement was based on the conservative Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. An important principle advanced by ibn al-Wahhab was that "all objects of worship other than Allah are false and all those who worship them deserve death." The Wahhabi sect stressed austerity, strict morality, and an undeviating practice of all Islamic pillars. The Wahhabis were, therefore, sometimes called the "puritans of Islam." They referred to themselves as "people of unity."

Wahhabism influenced all spheres of Saudi life: social, economic, and political. As Christine Moss Helms observed, "almost from the beginning, [Wahhabism] was given strongest support from the al-Saud whose political authority was, in turn, given the sanction of religious validity." The two major influential contributions of the Wahhabi religious authorities to the Saudi system in its early development was their explicit approval of the hereditary rule of the Saudi royal family, and especially their
propagation of the Islamic belief that all men are equal within the umma or Islamic community. Ibn al-Wahhab emphasized that "membership in the umma took precedence over any other social bonds." This concept was used as an effective political tool because "it gave credence to the Saudi policy of eliminating tribal particularism and urban rivalries to establish its paramount authority."

Under the spiritual guidance of the Wahhabis, the Saudi family attacked the Iraqi city of Karbala, (Shi'ite Islam's holiest shrine) in 1801 and destroyed the tombs of many Shi'ite Saints. Furthermore the Saudis forced the Sultan of Muscat to pay annual taxes to the Saud family. The eviction of the Ottoman Turks from Mecca and Medina led to the Egyptian occupation of Saudi Arabia in 1818. The rule of the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammad Ali, was harsh and uncompromising. He destroyed Diriya, the capital of the Saudi kingdom and executed ibn Saud, thus putting a stop to Saudi expansionist policies. After the destruction of the Wahhabi power base in Mecca and Medina, the Egyptians withdrew to the Najd region (where Wahhabism was born and nurtured) in 1822.

For a century or more before World War I, Saudi Arabia experienced internal political conflicts among the tribes, and during a part of this period was governed by Ibrahim Pasha, ruler of Egypt. Gradually, however, the House of Saud, became the dominant political force in the Arabian
Peninsula.

In a series of military encounters, the Saudi tribe defeated most of its rivals, such as the Rashids. By World War I, its strongest remaining rival was the Hashimite tribe led by the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, who collaborated with the Allies. The Saudi tribe played no part in the "Arab revolt" against the Turkish Empire during the war. At the end of hostilities, the traditional rivalry between the Saudi and the Hashimites erupted anew. The decade of the 1920s witnessed the discrediting and defeat of the Hashimite dynasty and its expulsion from the Arabian Peninsula by the Saudi family and its tribal allies. Hashimite influence thereafter was confined to Jordon and Iraq.8

Following the defeat of the Hashimites, the Saudi family proceeded to consolidate its rule under its leader Sheikh ibn Saud (1880-1953), who united Nejd and Hijaz and founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Ibn Saud I ruled until his death in 1953. He was followed by his son, King ibn Saud II, who relinquished his powers to Prince Faisal in 1963. King Faisal's rule was marked by social, administrative, and financial reforms within the Islamic framework. Faisal's assassination in 1975 led to the smooth succession of Prince Khalid who died in June 1982. Crown Prince Fahd became the King and is presently in charge of administering the Saudi nation.
Constitutional Provisions Concerning Islam

Although Saudi Arabia has no written constitution per se, the kingdom recognized Islam as the official religion of the state and the basis for all constitutional principles and legislation. There have been several attempts to institutionalize power. An early example was the promulgation in 1926 of the organic instructions for the Kingdom of Hijaz. The former was to be ruled by a "patriarchal system" without any specialization of governmental processes. The latter was to be administered by governmental machinery influenced by the Ottoman (Turkish) principles of government. The 1932 decree marking the foundation of Saudi Arabia proceeded to integrate the Hijaz government into the central administration.  

In 1962, King Faisal expressed the need for a written constitution that would establish a "progressive limited monarchy." He stated:

The time has now come for the promulgation of a Basic Law for the government of the country, drawn from the Koran and the Tradition of His Prophet and the acts of the Orthodox Caliphs, that will set forth explicitly the fundamental principles of government . . . and provide for the basic rights of the citizen, including the right to freely express his opinion within the limits of Islamic belief and public policy.  

The basic laws referred to have not yet been implemented because the Koran and the Sunna (the Prophets' deeds and sayings) are viewed as constituting the basis of the Saudi political system. Therefore, it is difficult to
reconcile the orthodox principles of Wahhabi Islamic jurisprudence with the precepts of a modern, democratic, and Western-oriented constitution.

For many decades, the laws of Saudi Arabia, which guide the king and his advisers, have been derived primarily from the Shari'aa, and secondarily from the customary law and tradition of the Arabian society. Tareq Y. Ismael observed that, due to the customary law's simplicity and explicitness, it is more effective than the Shari'aa because it precludes "the possibility of disagreement about the meaning of the rules and the ways of enforcing them--an inherent element in any complicated written law." Such observation does not account for the Wahhabi influence on the operations of the Saudi government. As explained in earlier sections, the Wahhabis have emphasized the application of orthodox and puritanical Islamic principles deriving from the Koran as a basis for the political system. They conceived the Shari'aa as being the uniting tool that arbitrates between conflicting tribal customs and traditions.

Concerning the issue of succession--an experience that has occurred four times since Saudi Arabia became a nation--the process is not based on the principle of primogeniture, or the practice of choosing the eldest son of the preceding ruler as the new monarch. Instead, the House of Saud has generally and traditionally chosen the most able member of
the royal family for the task of governing the kingdom.12

"Partnership": Islamic Model of Political Development in Saudi Arabia

Various concepts may be used to describe the pattern of state-mosque relations in Saudi Arabia, such as fusion, interaction, integration, partnership, blending, union, and amalgamation. The common element is the idea that the religious authorities and the state are united and in effect influence the process of political decision making on an equal footing. In contrast to Turkey, which followed the secularist path of development, obviously the model of "partnership" or "fusion" between the spiritual and temporal authorities in Saudi Arabia is totally different. Furthermore, as we shall see, the Saudi model also differs from the concept of "parallel" development identified with Egypt, where the political elite has been dominant over the religious establishment since the revolution of 1952. In Saudi Arabia both the political and religious spheres are fused and share equality in operating the political system. In other words, unlike Egypt, where the religious authorities have a minor role compared to the state, Saudi mosque-state model, if compared to a law firm, has no "junior partners," only senior partners.

In order to understand the concept of "partnership" found in Saudi Arabia, it is necessary to reiterate an idea explained earlier, in Chapter 2: the Wahhabi conception of
political power or authority. The Wahhabi movement was pragmatic, revivalist, and dogmatic; it did not develop a specific body of Western-style political theory. As a well-informed commentator on Wahhabism explained, "there is almost nothing in the Wahhabi religious texts concerning questions of temporal authority, such as the office of Imam, statecraft, political theory of the Islamic state or practical issues of government." This is explained by Wahhabs' concern with social and other more immediate problems of a society requiring solutions, such as tax laws, tribal unity, marriage, divorce—especially the purification of Islamic principles from extraneous influences. Moreover, the Wahhabi sect did not initiate a body of political theory because the Koran and the Shari'ah covered every aspect of human experience. Wahhabi viewed Mohammad both as a Prophet of God and a ruler. In other words, he represented the fusion of temporal and spiritual authorities. Thus, Wahhabis expected the ruler's behavior to approximate the person and the deeds of the Prophet and stressed that the ruler's authority ultimately derives from the Koranic message. In this context, the primary responsibility and duty of the king was to create a social, economic, and political order that literally applied orthodox Islamic principles to human behavior. In sum,

Whether as the Imam [guide] of the Muslims, Imam of Islam or Amir of the believers, a Saudi ruler [is] not simply a secular authority, but ostensibly the representative...
of God and his divine law on earth. His position as Imam is therefore given religious validity . . . and the Wahhabi [believed] the Imam to be legitimate only as long as he continued to support the Islamic community. 

The nucleus of the political authority—the majlis or open council held daily by the king—is the most illustrative example of Prophetic tradition that is preserved by the Saudi government. Like the Prophet in the early days of Islam, the king meets with people from all walks of life and solves their problems without the intervention of the bureaucracy or the courts.

The position of the monarch in contemporary Saudi Arabia thus illustrates the fusion of sacred and political powers:

He is simultaneously the leading sheikh within the tribal system, chief imam of the ulama, head of the Saudi clan (numbering more than 3,500 princes in 1979) and, of course, head of state. It is the interrelationship of powers, institutions, customs and traditions which serve as the basis of Saudi political authority.

Supported by the religious establishment, the Saudi government has repeatedly rejected Marxist ideology, which is considered as godless. Furthermore, in the official Saudi view the secularism of Ataturk, the Nasserist pan-Arabist and secularist Baathist ideologies (both in Syria and Iraq) are also objectionable because they did not succeed in bringing about "the accomplishments of the secularizers' own goals, much less give satisfaction to the
religious aspirations of the masses of their citizens."

The legitimacy of the Saudi system emanates and rests upon the Islamic religion. The ruler is the protector of the faith, morality, and justice. Indeed, it was the Wahhabi sect of Islam that allied the scattered and conflicting tribes under the banner of Islamic principles and the Saud family's protection. King Faisal declared his allegiance to the "partnership model," when he stated "the government has adopted and will continue adopting means necessary to strengthen and protect Islam by word and by deed." Similarly, King Khalid stressed that "Islamic law is and will remain our standard, our source of inspiration and our goal." As Thomas Ferris has indicated:

The royal House of Saud realizes the strength of religion as a political weapon and uses it aggressively. They are the self-proclaimed defenders of Islam; their enemies are considered enemies of God. There is no evident opposition. But if Islam is used as a political tool the tool is created out of the Arabians' undeniable faith.

A consensus thus exists between the religious and political realms in Saudi Arabia. The religious elite (ulama) actively participates in the political processes by approving or disapproving political decisions promulgated by the king. The ulama exercise their authority through legal decisions (fatwa). Most members of the ulama come mainly from the Shaykh family (linear descendents of Abd al-Wahhab); for some two centuries, they have intermarried with members of the House of Saud. The ulama define the social
guidelines and regard themselves as the protectors of public morality and Islamic puritanical traditions.  

Few, and relatively minor, instances of conflict between the religious and the governmental establishments in Saudi Arabia's political experiences have occurred since 1932. On occasion, some opposition emanated from the ulama related to the rapid modernization of Saudi society. As Robert McIntyre pointed out, the reaction of the religious leaders to the policies of the royal family is difficult to discern or analyze because "there is little in the way of a coherent organized political opposition." When there appears to be such conflict, the matter is usually resolved in a manner acceptable to both sides. Several examples illustrate this process.

During the 1960s, the Wahhabi establishment expressed its opposition to women's education by arguing that "secular education would destroy a woman's capacity to provide her children with character forming religious values." The government resolved this issue by placing female education under the control of the ulama. Similarly, when the authorities decided to introduce modern telecommunication techniques (radio and television) and the automobile to Saudi Arabia, they had to demonstrate "their utility in spreading the work of God." For instance, the radio was permitted because it could serve as a vehicle for transmitting prayers and for broadcasting religious
After some initial opposition to it, television also proved to be useful and acceptable to the religious elite because it permitted university female students to be educated, since women were not permitted to be taught by males. Radio and television are also used to gain converts for Islam.

An early conflict occurred between King Abd al-Aziz and the ulama when he proposed the codification of the legal principles of the Shari'ca "on the basis of the doctrines in it which conformed rigidly to the [Koran] and the example of the Prophet." The ulama opposed this initiative because it meant that the state "would be arrogating to itself the right to manipulate God's law to suit its needs--a process which once began could not easily be checked." The power of the ulama was demonstrated in 1978 when they demanded the destruction of a modern city built to accommodate the large number of pilgrims coming to Mecca every year. The city, which cost the Saudi government approximately twenty million dollars, was demolished because, according to the ulama, it "desecrated" a holy place.

During the seizure of the sacred mosque in Mecca by Shi'ite insurgents in 1979, the national guard and the army had to receive the ulama's approval before attempting to rescue the mosque. The ulama in this case supported the government against the dissidents, although it meant inflicting physical damage upon the great mosque, Islam's
holiest shrine.

For the most part conflict between religious and political authorities has stemmed mainly from the process of modernization introduced to traditionalist Saudi Arabian society. Wahhabi doctrine--calling for austerity, modesty, and a pious mode of life--did not account for, or easily accommodate, the flow of oil wealth that has brought affluence to the Saudi nation. As Stephen Humphreys explained, "the country's experience [and future developments] will demonstrate whether it is possible to reconcile sudden and immense wealth, rapid technological change and strict adherence to the norms of traditional Islam."29

Future Prospects for the "Partnership" Model

Some commentators contended that the political status of the ġulama in Saudi Arabia is declining. Ahron Layish attributed the erosion to nine causes. Among these, four reasons will be summarized. First, Layish argued that the banishment of the Wahhabi ġulama from the Arabian Peninsula in the aftermath of the defeat of the first Wahhabi state by the Egyptians and of the second by the Rashids decreased the power of the ġulama and their influence in the political arena. Second, the decline is related to the shift of the main power center of the state to the royal house, mainly because of the modernization of the army, especially under
the leadership of Faisal and abd al-Aziz. These leaders opened the Saudi society to Western culture and established a bureaucracy to carry out the modernization process in the administrative, legislative, and judicial areas of government. The third cause of the decline of the 'ulama power advanced by Layish lies in the settling down of the bedouin population, an event that transformed the socio-political base of the kingdom from tribal to nation-state orientation. The fourth cause relates to the expansion of secular education and culture in the process of opening to the West.

It is crucial to note that a similar skeptical forecast originated principally from commentators who questioned the Saudi success if facing social and cultural strains that accompany the flow of sudden wealth and affluence, which usually threaten religious and cultural values. As Fouad Al-Farsey argued:

The true strength of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is Islam; its true wealth is its people. Neither of these will diminish with the oil revenues. This is not mere rhetoric. Long before oil, the foundation of the culture of the Arabian Peninsula was laid in Islam. Unshaken in its faith in Islam, the Kingdom has used its revenues from oil to provide all Saudi Arabian citizens with the fullest opportunities for self-development and thence for making a positive contribution to the development of its own society.

For the present time, the Saudi system seems to have functioned resonably well under the new circumstances created principally by rapid economic development.
Potential problems in mosque-state relations might arise from the "corruption" and "demoralization" among political authorities, as a result of the immense flow of oil revenues. Hypothetically, if a major conflict arises in the future between the state and the ulama, in the end there will probably be an acceptable resolution of the matter involving a new interpretation of the Koranic law. This optimistic assumption is based on the experience of the Saudi state since 1932 and on the fact that the Shari'Ca can meet the needs of a modern state, because of the existence of the fundamental principle of ijtihad (Koranic interpretation). This principle was explained by King Faisal when he described the all-inclusiveness and totality of the Shari'Ca:

> What does a man aspire to? He wants "good". It is there in the Islamic sharia. He wants security. It is there also. Man wants freedom. It is there. He wants remedy. It is there. He wants propagation of science. It is there. Everything is there, inscribed in the Islamic sharia.

Similarly, King Khalid was once asked if Saudi Arabia's development could avoid the destruction of many social and religious traditions. He replied:

> If interpreted in the truthful way, we find that Islam meets all the requirements of society, whether politically, economically or socially. That is why we will not encounter any difficulty in developing our society in accordance with the teachings of Islam and our great Arab traditions. . . . That is why we do not believe that we will encounter any political shocks as long as we keep at heart the welfare of our people and the development
Thus, the evidence demonstrates that the wishes of the ulama (in the partnership model) carry great weight, and governmental decisions are sometimes referred to them. They constitute a conservative force with which the government must always reckon. Indeed, the devices of conflict resolution in the "fusion" model are implicit. Nevertheless the example presented in the previous part demonstrates clearly that the Wahhabi ulama legitimize only the policies which agree with Islam's fundamental principles. The political leaders in Saudi Arabia's policies and decisions are based on those principles. Thus, situations involving severe conflict are unlikely to occur.

Many critics--such as secularist Baathists or followers of Ataturk--may consider the "fusion" pattern of temporal and spiritual authorities existing in Saudi Arabia as unworkable, outdated, and obsolete, in other words, as an anachronism. G. H. Jansen has concluded:

> It is a widespread and well based assumption that the regime of the House of Saud cannot long endure, neither in its present form nor in any improved model; and that the [Iranian Revolution in 1979] has considerably shortened its life expectancy.

The political development of Saudi Arabia during the past half-century has provided little evidence to support Jansen's prediction or contention. The proponents of Wahhabism argue that religion provides the political establishment with theology, justice, and raison d'être.
In return, the royal family supplies the 'ulama with financial subsidies and political leadership where religious values remain supreme. Historical data support the view that, for Saudi society, the "partnership" model has many positive values. As explained earlier, the Wahhabi doctrine's influence on the political sphere has survived the Egyptian occupation, the war with the Rashids, and numerous tribal upheavals. As far as the evidence indicates, the masses in Saudi Arabia accept the concept of fusion of power as a legitimate principle of government based on the fact that Islam is a total system that encompasses all spheres of life. Additional evidence of this phenomenon is provided by the smooth and successful transition in choosing new rulers that Saudi Arabia has experienced since the early 1930s.

Some commentators assume that events in Iran will eventually affect Saudi Arabia, when religious zealots finally bring down the monarchy and create another Islamic order. But the parallel often drawn between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Iran is the center of Shi'ite Islam which differs fundamentally from the Sunni sect, particularly in its impact upon the political sphere. Moreover, "unlike the Shah, a remote and isolated figure, the huge Saudi ruling family with its estimated 5,000 princes, has its roots in the lives of the people." These roots are preserved through marriages with
members from different tribes. In addition, as emphasized earlier, the ulama in Saudi Arabia are closely allied with the political establishment and do not constitute a center of intense opposition, as was the case in Iran. "Comparison with the experience in Iran anger Saudi officials who contend that Saudi Arabia has a different style of monarchy with a tradition of consultation." Indeed, Saudi rulers do not wear a crown or sit on a throne. Several American foreign officials explain that "the strength of the [Saudi system] has been that it has held fast to the fundamentals of Islam, while very gradually encouraging change in some attitudes that owe more to customs that have secured religious sanction than to strict Koranic injunction." Therefore, there is little analogy that exists between Iran and Saudi Arabia or any other Middle Eastern country.
Chapter V

SECULARIZATION MODEL: ATATURK'S REFORMS IN THE BALANCE

Turkey is a unique and radical example of a secularized country in the Middle East. Turkey's secular model was established by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk -- Ataturk -- in 1923. This model broke with the Islamic tradition, which fused the temporal and spiritual authorities, and with the Arab and Middle Eastern convention. Ataturk followed the principle that Westernization and secularization were equivalent to development and modernity. His radical and sweeping reforms still challenged the very identity of other Islamic nations, where Ataturk is often viewed as having been an extremist and uncompromising political leader. Ataturk not only separated political from religious authority in Turkey; he also attempted to abolish the influence of religious values and principles on almost every important aspect of Turkish society, leaving religion a matter of private conscience.

Historical Profile: Introduction of Islam in Turkish Society

The Turks trace their origins to the central Asian (Caucasus) region. During the eleventh century, climatic changes and population explosion led different tribes of central Asia, principally the Seljuks, to migrate westward and penetrate into Persia, the northern part of the Abbasid
Caliphate (749-1258). The Seljuks were converted to Islam and served as soldiers for Muslim rulers. They succeeded in defeating Byzantine forces (1071 A.D.) at the battle of Malazgirt, in the eastern part of present-day Turkey. Simultaneously, they took Anatolia as their chief political center. The Seljuks were defeated by Christian crusaders in 1099, who were on their way to capture Jerusalem from Muslim rulers. In subsequent years, Mongol invaders destroyed the remaining Seljuk settlements, and the Abbasid Caliphate in 1260 A.D.¹

In the thirteenth century, another group of Turkish tribes, called the Ottomans, migrated from central Asia. They were led by the legendary Othman or Osman (1281-1326), the first ruler of the Ottoman Empire. Othman embraced the Islamic faith, a factor which made the Ottoman state the leader of the Muslim world in later years.

In 1453, the Turks conquered the city of Constantinople and destroyed the Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman Empire annexed vast territories during the reign of Selim I (1512-20), who became the caliph, the spiritual and temporal leader of Islam. He destroyed the Mameluke Sultanate in Egypt and Syria, and incorporated them into the empire. Selim I also extended the authority of the Ottoman Empire to the coast of North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria).²

The Ottoman Empire witnessed its apogee during the rule
of Sultan Suleiman I (1520-66), known in Europe as Suleiman the Magnificent. He acquired such European possessions as Belgrade and Hungary. Internally, Suleiman established a highly organized bureaucracy and a prosperous economy. Literature and the arts flourished extensively during this period. Externally, the Ottoman fleet and armies threatened the very existence of Europe. ³

The death of Suleiman the Magnificent marked the beginning of the Ottoman Empire's decay. The degeneration of "the sick man of Europe" was triggered by several internal and external factors. Internally, the sultans who followed Suleiman I ruled in an unjust and incompetent fashion. Corruption in the administration led to the degeneration of tax-collecting procedures. Moreover, the military establishment deteriorated extensively. ⁴

Another factor contributing to the crisis was the behavior of the Janissaries, an elite group recruited by the sultans among the children of Christian subjects in the empire. The Janissaries were converted to the Islamic faith and were taught military tactics under strict discipline. During the declining era of the empire, they gained political influence and acquired effective control over the sultans. Therefore, the discipline which constituted the core of their strength was no longer stressed and the Janissaries became corrupt and inefficient soldiers.

Externally, in the seventeenth century, the West
experienced several revolutionary changes as a result of the
Renaissance and the Reformation, which allowed Turkey's
adversaries to advance rapidly because of forces such as
rationalism, science, technology, international trade, and
centralized political institutions, which accompanied the
Western ferment. Abboushi has distinguished five major
weaknesses that led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire:

(1) failure to keep pace with the West in
techonology; (2) weakness of national
loyalties above and beyond regional,
religious, and ethnic ties; (3) continued
identity of church and state; (4) popular
disinterest in economic pursuits other than
agriculture; and (5) administrative and
political corruption.

These events led to the intervention of Western imperialist
powers, namely Great Britain and France, in the region who
began to play an increasingly active role in the affairs of
the decaying Ottoman state.

Before Ataturk's era, several early attempts were made
to reform the Ottoman political system, especially during
the era of Selim III (1789-1807). Sultan Abdul Majid (1839-
61) introduced the *tanzimat* (reforms), which gave Ottoman
subjects political equality under the law and attempted to
reorganize the economic system. These early attempts at
reorganizing the Ottoman state were carried out by a
Western-educated group of Turkish elite. Selim III
endeavored unsuccessfully to reorganize the bureaucratic
establishment and the military corps. In the domain of
education, the *tanzimat* included introducing foreign
languages and sending students to study in European institutions. It was Abdul Hamid "the damned" who put an end to the era of the *tanzimat*.6

Another crucial era leading to Atatürk's reforms was dominated by the "Young Turks" who organized a secret opposition group called the Committee of Union and Progress, between 1908 and 1914. The Young Turks succeeded in fostering dissatisfaction among Western-oriented political elites against the repressive policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid, who ruled from 1876 to 1909. Abdul Hamid ruled autocratically for the thirty years he spent in office; he suspended the 1876 Constitution in 1909 and sought to unify the diverse groups of the empire under a parliamentary regime. Kemal Atatürk led Young Turks for a short period; then he disassociated himself from the organization because of serious disagreements with Enver Pasa, the Minister of War. Atatürk believed that the military should not have an active role in the administration of government once the revolution was achieved, while Enver advocated a military dictatorship with power concentrated in the hands of army officers.

In sum, the reforms carried out by the Young Turks and the *tanzimat* were unsuccessful in saving the Empire from rapid decay. Such reform attempts were significant, however, "because they were part of the heritage of later reform movements, especially that of Mustapha Kemal."7
World War I was a particularly decisive era in altering the mosque-state relations in Turkey. The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers; Turkey based its strategy on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkanism. The sultan and the highest religious authorities, led by the head of the S"ulama, announced in November 1924, that jihād (holy war) must be raised by all Muslims against the Allies. The sultan's call upon Arab and Muslim states to join him in the jihād was unsuccessful. For instance, Sherif Hussein of Mecca joined in an alliance with the British and French, Turkey's enemies. The war was devastating for Turkey which lost most of its territories. Atatürk appeared in the midst of this vacuum of physical and psychological defeat. He created a secular state based on the principles of étatisme (statism), nationalism, and populism.

During World War II, Turkey declared its neutrality. However, the Russian threats of expansion after the war forced Turkey to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The modern era in Turkey has been increasingly dominated by the military. A climate of political unrest and tension led to the bloodless military coup of 1960 and the establishment of the Second Republic in 1961. The early 1960s witnessed unstable political life and a lack of sense of direction, which brought about the dissolution of Ismet Inonu's government in 1965. The early 1970s witnessed various opposition and dissident movements organized by
extremist groups, religious leaders and students. This political disorder was blamed on a deteriorating Turkish economy and especially on the high level of unemployment. One of the most significant aspects about modern Turkey is the revival of Islamic spirit among the masses, especially in the rural areas of the country. It is against this background that Ataturk emerged as a leader to substantially alter the old pattern of mosque-state relations.

The Islamic Tradition in Turkey

The political institutions of the Ottoman Empire, which Ataturk was determined to alter, took shape in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The sultan was at the apex of various social strata and the hierarchical administrative system. The government headed by the sultan was referred to as the "Sublime Porte." Reflecting the era of Mohammad's life and the golden age of the early Caliphs, the Turkish sultans had authority over the temporal and spiritual spheres of life. In this context, the sultan as head of state was viewed as the protector of the Islamic faith. He held the political, judicial, and religious authorities under several names. In other words, he was the padishah (king), the imam (knowledgeable protector of Islam), amir al-muaminin (supreme guide of the faithful), and khalifat Allah (executor of God's law on earth). As Philips M. Price has explained, "the Ottoman Empire was in

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theory at least ruled by an autocrat, but his powers were in fact, limited by a committee of religious elder statesmen known as the ulama, led by sheikh al-Islam."^{10}

Religious authorities were not the only body assisting the sultan in managing the affairs of the state. There was also the diwan (or divan), a small council of ministers which met regularly every Saturday, Monday, and Tuesday with the sultan. It was under the direction of the Grand Vizir (chief minister), and its task was to confer on formulation of policies and matters of state."^{11}

The treasury was under the control of two main treasurers, who were responsible for the collection of taxes and were in charge of the central government's expenditures. However, it is important to point out that "the Ottoman Empire was greatly decentralized financially; provincial governments collected and spent their own funds . . . ."^{12} That is, the provinces which were under the jurisdiction of the beylerbey (chief governors), were in turn divided into sanjaks (districts) and subdivided into timars (fiefs). The cavalry, led by the sipahi (officers), was responsible for maintaining order in the provinces and especially for collecting taxes.

As noted earlier, the principal element and unique feature about the Islamic tradition in the Ottoman Empire is that the ruling institutions and religious authorities were fused, with the office of the sultan at the top of the
hierarchy. Yet, the Islamic institutions had exclusive control over the educational and judicial branches. In the field of education, all mosques had a primary school where students learned to write Arabic and to read the Koran. The madrasas were advanced colleges which taught logic, metaphysics, astronomy, Shari'a, and the fundamental aspects of Islamic history. From these medressehs came the ulama strata or religious leaders. They received two sources of financial support: religious endowments, from private individuals; and especially important, gifts from the sultan and his administration. Religious endowments (the waqf) were usually established to build hospitals, hotels, and other charitable institutions around mosques.  

The judicial branch was also regulated by religious authorities. The primary source of all laws was the Shari'a that is the Koran and the sunna (the Prophet's deeds and sayings). "Sultans, judges, and lawyers were bound by Sacred Law, and to ignore it invited disaster."  

The second branch of Ottoman jurisprudence consisted of the Kanuns (decrees published by the sultan), which constitute a supplement to the Shari'a. These decrees dealt mainly with administrative matters, such as police regulations, tax systems, military rules, and some aspects of criminal law. Customary law or cadet could be considered as another province of the judiciary. Since the cadet differed from one district to another, it was usually amended by the kanuns.
A significant fact about the Ottoman judiciary was that the great institutions of the state, established either by Sacred Law or Kanuns, were accepted as emanating from God or from the sultan's will; in no sense were they considered to flow from the desires of the people.

In sum, all Islamic institutions established by the Ottoman Empire, "from shaykh al-Islam and the sultan's personal hoja (teacher) to the lowliest naib (village judge) and teacher in a mosque primary school, welded the empire together under one type of education and one body of law."16 Although the Ottoman Empire's institutions were based on Islamic foundations, there was a differentiation among the various ethnic groups and religious creeds not based on language, color or social background. On the one hand, there were Muslims; and on the other hand, there were the millets (non-Muslim Greeks, Jews, and Armenians). The latter groups were granted a certain degree of autonomy. For example, they had schools, and they followed their own customary laws.

Islam and the Nationalist Movement in Turkey

Preceding Ataturk's secular regime, the Turkish nationalist movement did not achieve major results until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, after World War I. Three major trends characterized Turkish nationalism: Islamism, Westernism, and Turkism. The first trend is often referred to as the guideline of the traditionalist; it had as major
spokesman Ziya Pasa and Namik Kemal. Both argued that the decline of the Ottoman Empire was a reflection of the neglect of the Shari'a (Islamic Law), which provided the umma (Islamic community) with social justice and political stability. They attacked the tanzimat (reforms), a law based on western legal codes contrary to the shari'a. The nationalism of Pasa and Namik has often been described as "a blend of Ottoman patriotism and Islamic fervor."\(^{17}\) The Islamists sought to restore might to the empire, to spread justice, and to create sound political institutions, not through the introduction of alien European models, but through reliance upon orthodox Islamic principles.

Namik Kemal attempted to demonstrate that there is no contradiction between the original Islamic and legal norms, the political institutions of the old Ottoman Empire, and those aspects of progress associated with Western civilization. According to his point of view, Islam could provide the moral and legal foundations for the new society. "The Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multi-national and multi-religious cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman (not Turkish) state."\(^{18}\) Western civilization furnished material and technical methods that made these components compatible with the modern world. Thus, the Islamist group was mainly interested in the Ottoman, not the Turkish, culture.
The second trend of Turkish nationalism consisted of what Ziya Gokalp called "the zealots of Europeanism." These were the leaders of the earlier tranzimat reforms who advocated the imitation of Western nations in the fields of economy, technology, and sciences. They also sought to base Ottoman political institutions and laws on European patterns and codes. These Western-oriented thinkers were under the illusion of "civilizational fictions," such as the idea that the Ottoman community comprised a single nation. This group was closer to Ataturk's secular ideology than the Islamists, because Gokalp insisted that Turkish culture and Western values will play equally important revitalizing roles in Turkey's development.

The third strand of Turkish nationalism was supplied by the Turkists, a small intellectual elite educated in the West. Mustapha Kemal Ataturk was the major representative of his group. He and his followers rejected Islam because it was associated with Arab cultural imperialism and with Ottoman decay and corruption. They called for the integration of Turkey within Western civilization. Ataturk's aim was to erase the cultural imprint of the Islamic faith and Arabic culture, which has been intimately associated with the Ottoman Empire. He wanted to restore Turkey to its pre-Islamic status. Led by Ataturk, the Republican People's party carried out the war of Turkish independence and established Western institutions as
guidelines for governmental policies.

The First Republic: Mosque-State Relations

The treaty of Lausanne in 1923 recognized the present-day territory of Turkey, with the exception of the Mosul area (assigned to Turkey by the League of Nations in 1926), and the Syrian region of Alexandretta (added to Turkey in 1939). On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly proclaimed Turkey as a Republic, with Ataturk as its President, and Ankara as its capital. This marked the birth of the modern state of Turkey.

As the first President, Ataturk embarked on a rapid series of radical and sweeping reforms of the nation's social, political, and economic life. His goal was to transform Turkey into a Westernized nation and to cut every link with the Arab and Muslim traditions embodied in the Ottoman Empire, which he regarded as debilitating and anachronistic. Ataturk was a man of science, a secularist, and a reforming modernizer. He was a Turk and not an Arab.19

Before surveying Ataturk's sweeping and comprehensive reforms, it is important to identify the trend of secularization followed by Turkey under his regime. Donald Eugene Smith has identified four types of secularism in the modern world. The first entails a simple "separation" of the polity from "religious ideologies and ecclesiastical
structures." The second pattern of secularism consists of "the expansion of the polity to perform regulatory functions in the socio-economic sphere which were formerly performed by religious structures."

The third type is a mere "transvaluation of the political culture to emphasize non-transcendent temporal goals and rational, pragmatic means, that is, secular political values." The last type in purely religious sphere, in order to destroy or radically alter religion." The last form--or what can be called "radical secularization" -- is the kind associated with the revolution in Turkey under Ataturk. His secularization sought the destruction of religious political and spiritual powers, and the sweeping transformation of the population's value system. Thus, "Ataturk's reforms did not involve a separation of church and state as in the West, but rather a government takeover of religious institutions and an attempt to reduce drastically the influence of religion on the minds of the people." Ataturk's secularization campaign began in 1922. In the ensuing period, until his death in 1938, these reforms included the abolition of the Caliphate (1924) and the exclusion of the Ottoman family from Turkish soil. Subsequently, the National Assembly eliminated the authority of the shari'a and religious courts in civil matters (1926). The ministry of Pious Foundations and the 'ulama's schools
were dissolved. The dervish orders were outlawed and their monastaries were closed (1924). By 1926, all the Ottoman religious and civil laws were discarded. New civil laws were based on the Swiss code; the new penal Turkish code was based on the Italian mode; and the field of commerce and laws of the land adopted the German model. In 1928, the state was officially declared secular, thereby deleting the constitutional provision that established Islam as the official religion during the Ottoman rule.

Included among Atatürk's symbolic reforms were the abandonment of the Arabic script as detrimental to the Turkish language, and the introduction of the Western Gregorian Calendar. Men were forbidden to wear the fez and the wearing of the veil by women was banned. Sunday was declared to be the day of rest (instead of Friday, the Muslim holy day). The new capital at Ankara, which replaced Istanbul, the old seat of the caliphs, assumed a modern outlook and no mosques were built in its newer sections. The Islamic call to the salat (prayers) and reading of the Koran were required to be done in the Turkish language, rather than in Arabic.22

The second major point in Atatürk's development program was populism. Class privileges were abolished and equality under the law was established. Article 60 of the millet system, which had granted special privileges to foreigners and to religious minorities under the Ottoman rule.
expression of populism was the establishment of free and universal education in government-supervised schools. This allowed millions of Turks to learn how to read and write. By the early 1940's the illiteracy rate had been reduced from 80 percent to approximately 50 percent.

The third aspect of Atatürk's strategy was the development of nationalism, which was based on common citizenship and devotion to the national ideal not on religion, race, or ethnic affiliation. This involved the condemnation of Pan-Arabism as a retrogressive and nefarious movement. Pan-Turkanism, which consisted of supporting irredentist tendencies among Turkish speaking Moslems in the Soviet Union and in other parts of the world, was also discarded. In this perspective, Atatürk "was a fiery Turkish patriot, proud of being a Turk . . . . He set out in his program to make all Turks proud of their race and heritage." In Atatürk's eyes, the world seemed to be divided into two groups: those who are Turks and those who wish to be Turks!

To fortify this nationalist ideal, Atatürk sought to develop Turkey's own resources and industries behind protective tariffs. He adopted the concept of étatisme as the economic policy for modern Turkey, that is, the constructive intervention of the state "in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the
nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible."\textsuperscript{24}

In his strategy of national development, Ataturk was rightly labeled a dictator: "he determined high policy, selected high officials of state, and forced his will upon the party and nation."\textsuperscript{25} However, Ataturk was a benevolent dictator because his legitimacy emanated from his forceful charismatic strength, which was extremely popular.

It is significant that the individual who carried out the most far-reaching secularization program in a Middle Eastern society was a Turk and not an Arab. Other modern political leaders in the Middle East, such as Gamal abd-Al Nasser in Egypt and Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, admired Ataturk's courage and policies but did not dare to emulate him.

\textbf{Ataturk's Reforms in the Balance}

After some fifty-eight years of Ataturk's secular tradition, the question whether his reforms will endure in this key Muslim country--where Islamic fundamentalism became increasingly active--remains unanswered. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, large groups of the Turkish population began to advocate a return to traditional religious practices as the basis for social cohesion and morality.\textsuperscript{26} Several examples illustrate the revival of Islamic sentiments. In 1949, religious instruction was reintroduced
in the curriculum, first as an elective then as a requirement. By the early 1960s, some 15,000 new mosques were built to accommodate the increasing attendance of the Turkish people. By 1982, Turkey became the third in the Islamic world in pilgrimage attendance to Mecca. Islamic voluntary associations that support religious social programs (i.e. Koranic instruction) grew from 237 in 1951 to 2,510 in 1967. The imams training institutes increased from 7 in 1951 to 506 by 1980.27

The decrease in religious restrictions resulted in an increase of religious groups' involvement in the political sphere. The Democratic Party was able to defeat the Kemalist RPP in 1950 due to its religious appeal to the masses. The party went further to forge an alliance with Said Nursi's "Followers of Light" Sunni Islamic group. This alliance marks a crucial step toward a sort of Kemalist secular principles' erosion, especially that this group called for "the re-establishment of an Islamic state based upon the Shariah and guided by the 'ulama."28

The formation of the Alawi Shi'ite National Salvation Party in 1972 by Necmeddin Esbakan is another illustrative example of Islamic revival in Turkey.29 Indeed, the NSP was the junior partner in three coalition governments between 1974 and 1977. This party called for a greater role of religion in all the spheres of Turkish life and for a closer identification with Muslim rather than Western nations.
Recent events are indicative of a dilemma experienced by the Turkish military rulers in Turkey. These leaders are caught between a desire to implement Ataturk's secular ideals and between responding to the religious sentiments and needs of the population. For instance, in the summer of 1980, Suleyman Demiral's government opened part of the Dysantine monument Hagia Sophia—which was converted to a museum by Ataturk—for Muslim worship. In 1981, however, the military government, which seized power in 1980 instituted a ban on headscarves worn by females and ordered male students to go to school with their head uncovered. The dispute reached the Consultative Assembly, established in 1981 to restore democracy in Turkey. The heated debate unveiled the ongoing struggle between the secularists and the Islamicists. Mehmet Pamak's statement in this meeting reveals the peoples longing for Islamic values:

The state can be secular, the republic can be secular, but you cannot expect an individual or a religion to be secular. According to our religion, it is obligatory to cover the heads, and it is God's order.

The description of Turkey by Melmet Akif, the Islamist intellectual, reveals the popular opposition toward Ataturk's secularism:

People of a nation whose religion is imitation, whose world is imitation, whose customs are imitation, whose dress is imitation, whose greetings and language is imitation, in short, whose everything is imitation are clearly themselves mere imitation human beings and can on no account make up a social group and hence can not
Some commentators rightly argue that Ataturk's attempt to convert Turkey into a secular state has failed, partly because he apparently did not understand the need of the more conservative and traditional elements of the population, especially the peasantry, for spiritual foundations. Ataturk's secular policies provided them with material security, through the development of the economy, but it deprived them of emotional and religious security which constitutes their cultural heritage. As G. H. Jansen explained:

The sad fact about Kemal Ataturk is not merely that he was a very shallow reformer, but that he has proven an unsuccessful reformer. The main reason for his failure is that he did not know his people. He refused to acknowledge that the Turks always have been and for the foreseeable future will remain very devout Muslims. . . . The opponents of Ataturk's dismantling of the Islamic structure argued that what was happening was not secularism, which meant the separation of politics and religion and the neutrality of the state, but the persecution of Islam and the erection of secularism into a sacred and untouchable principle.

The lesson learned from the Turkish secularist model leads one to reflect upon the fact that any nation involved in the process of re-shaping its political structure and social environment has to deal with the cultural and traditional values at the core of its people's life, namely the religious principles. Ataturk wanted to build a democratic nation based on Western ideals and principles.
He overlooked the fact that a truly democratic system must allow for the expression of the sentiment of a substantial segment of its population. In Turkey's case this sentiment was Islamic values and principles.
CHAPTER VI
THE TUNISIAN ENVIRONMENT

If I were to choose a single image to represent Tunisia. . . I would choose one of the veiled women of Tunis. Morocco is a land of harsh, castellated mountains guarded by a race of warriors. Algeria is a no-nonsense country of farms, mines, and banks; your average Algerian is a businessman or farmer who can become a guerrilla when pressed. Tunisia by contrast is feminine: the landscape horizontal with gradual transitions and soft, swelling shores, the climate mild and slightly enervating, the blue green sea, the pervasive scent of jasmine and orange blossoms, the husky plaintive voice of an Andalusian song. The temperament of the people is gay, evanescent, tender -- not fierce like that of Moroccans, nor stolid like Algerians. Tunisians have what the Arabs call 'light blood'. . . But Tunisia can also be dangerous: magic and witchcraft are prevalent, precautions must be taken against the evil eye, murders are committed for enigmatic reasons of jealousy, honour, or revenge.

John Anthony, Tunisia: A personal View of a Timeless Land

In order to understand the issue of state and mosque in Tunisia, it is initially necessary to take account of the principal historical and economic factors that have affected modern Tunisia. This chapter supplies a profile of Tunisia emphasizing its physical and human settings. This will be followed by a review of the main historical phases of the country which will provide a sense of the Tunisian evolution through time.

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Geographical Setting:

Tunisia occupies the eastern part of North Africa. The area occupied by the country is relatively small, consisting of 63,378 square miles (a little larger than the State of Georgia in the U.S. and about twice the size of Austria in Europe). Tunisia is bounded by the Mediterranean and Libya in the East, the Sahara as point of contact between Algeria and Libya in the South, and Algeria in the West. The country holds an important geo-strategic position, since it is separated from Europe only by narrow passages of water no wider than ninety miles. The position of Tunisia on the Mediterranean "has to a large extent been responsible for its history, by making it an area of transit and a battle ground, as well as a means of access to the African continent which the Middle Ages knew as 'the Barbary Coast.'"1

Tunisia can be divided into three major topographical regions: the Mediterranean region, called the Tell, is the most fertile and prosperous area of the country. It provides the major part of agricultural products, such as cereals, olives, citrus fruits, grapes, and garden vegetables. The Medjerda river which crosses the region from the gulf of Tunis to the Algerian frontier is the principal factor responsible for the richness of this farming area. As Boularès writes:

The Tell, highly populated and extremely lively formed the take off point of Tunisian
One will find there towns which have been famous over the ages, such as Tunis, Carthage, Bizerte, Tabarka, and Nabeul, and others whose ruins bear witness to the prominence they once enjoyed: Dougga and Bulla Regia, Utica and Kerkouan.

The Steppe region, located in the center of Tunisia, consists of semiarid land of alfalfa grass pastures suitable for livestock. This area is characterized by dry-farming that produces mainly olives and fruit.

The Sahara occupies the southern part of the country; it lacks sufficient amounts of rainfall. The main geographical feature of this region is the salt marshes, which are situated below sea level and referred to as Chotts in Arabic. The oasis settlements, where date palms are cultivated, give the Sahara its distinctive attractiveness.

One important feature of Tunisia's geography is its coastline, called Sahel which extends over 750 miles. This area comprises the most developed cities of the country which are located on or near the sea. It is this coastline that has made Tunisia a crossroad of civilization.

**Economic base**

The Tunisian economy is based on agriculture which occupies 32% of the labor force. The workable agricultural area consists of arable land (about 20%); prairies and pastures, orchard regions producing citrus, olives, and grapes; and forest land. In 1959, the government launched a land reform program by nationalizing the babus land.
belonging to religious institutions and by purchasing properties owned by foreign settlers. The two main agricultural products are cereals and olives. Tunisian agriculture meets only 40% of domestic consumption. Soil erosion, low prices, overgrazing, poor irrigation, rural depopulation, and especially desertification have contributed to the weakening of this sector.

The lack of energy resources impedes the acceleration of industrial growth. The industrial sector employs 21% of the labor force (1981 data). There are two major types of industries in Tunisia. First, there is the agricultural or food industry which includes the production of olive oil, wine, tomato paste, sugar, and meat. Second, there is the metal industry which relies heavily on the extraction of lead, iron, and zinc ores. Additionally, Tunisia has large phosphate deposits in the regions of Metlaoui, Djebel Medilla, and Kalaat Djerda. The country ranks sixth in the world in the production of phosphate.

Industries are concentrated in the area around Tunis. Sfax is the center of superphosphate production. Sousse produces olive oil. Ksar Hlal is the center of the textile industry, and Kairouan is the center of the tobacco industry. The lack of industrial sites in the interior regions of Tunisia is explained by the underdeveloped infrastructure, chiefly, railways and ports, and by the shortage of skilled labor.
Three major internal problems plague the Tunisian economy: foreign debt (4.8 billion dollars in 1985), a fast growing population at an annual rate of 2.6%, and an increasing unemployment rate of 15 to 20%. Moreover, several external phenomena have contributed to the current economic crisis in Tunisia: the decrease in the production of oil and its prices, the decline in tourism revenues due to the religious revivalism and the rise of anti-Western sentiments in North Africa and the Middle East, the rise of European Economic Community restrictions on Tunisian export products (i.e. wine, olive oil, and citrus fruits), and the recurrent drought in the principal agricultural regions.

Social and Ethnic Composition

The Tunisian population, which numbers 7.32 millions and earns an estimated per capita income of 1250 dinars (approximately 2300 dollars) annually, is demarcated by ethnic and linguistic homogeneity. About 98 per cent of the population is composed of a mixture of Arab and Berber stock. The Berbers are the indigenous inhabitants of Tunisia. As Dwight L. Ling explained, "the term Berbers probably was an insulting one from the Greek Barbaroi, Latin Barbari and Arabic Barbar, names used by these people to designate those who talked a different language." The origin of the Tunisian Berbers is historically unknown, due to the absence of written documents in Berber. Moreover,
there are no archeological sites left from the Berber civilization which was chiefly nomadic. The Tunisian historian Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406) claimed that "the first Berbers of the Masmouda family entered Morocco from the area known as the Spanish Sahara."10

In contrast to such other North African countries as Morocco and Algeria, where Berber tribes still constitute strong and distinct ethnic minorities, the Tunisian Berbers converted to Islam and learned Arabic during the seventh and eleventh centuries A. D. Indeed, Tunisians who still identify themselves as Berbers make up a very small minority of the population. As Zartman explains:

Within the Arab-Berber population of North Africa, the Tunisians are practically a separate nation. Paradoxically, they are more homogeneous than even the Somalis, who are a distinct ethnic group. . . Tunisian ethnic unity has been recast out of a host of contributing invaders - Phoenicians, Romans, Arabs, Berbers, even French and Italians (through cultural, if not personal, intermingling). This unity is being solidified in modern society.

Only one-half of the small Berber community, which constitutes less than 2% percent of the total Tunisian population, still uses the Berber language. Berbers are found mainly on the island of Djerba, off the coast, and in the oases of the Sahara, where they still live as nomadic tribes.

The succeeding waves of European settlers, primarily French and Italians, had social and economic effects, but
this foreign influence did not alter the ethnic homogeneity of the country. Similarly, the Jewish community was also influential during the colonization period. At independence in 1956, 58,000 Jews lived in Tunisia; most Tunisian Jews emigrated to Europe and Israel after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967, when anti-Jewish feelings surfaced in Tunisia. Remnants of the Jewish community still live on the island of Djerba. They speak Arabic and engage in business and trade.12

Tribal and clan groupings, based on blood relationships and on land ownership, were the main units of social structure in Tunisia for both Arabs and Berbers.13 In contrast to other North African countries, however, Tunisia witnessed the weakening and gradual disappearance of tribal organization. Indeed, it was mainly foreign invasions that made Tunisians a cosmopolitan people.14

During the Turkish rule and the French colonial era, four principal social groups existed. At the top of the hierarchy was the urban aristocracy referred to as the baldi; all other city dwellers were called the tunsi. During the colonial era, the rich baldi families were closely associated with the ġulama, and constituted the political elite which formed the Old-Destour Party (Constitution Party). The ġarabi were the mainly nomadic inhabitants of the interior parts of the country, especially the semiarid regions and the Sahara. The sedentary
villagers were referred to as the afaki. Today, the
distinction among classes is increasingly disappearing; only
the distinction between baldi and arabi is still
significant. The interesting aspect of this distinction is
that the arabi speak a different dialect of Arabic, dress
differently, and have distinct customs and life styles.
Unfortunately, they are usually looked down on by the city
dwellers (the baldi).¹⁵

New groups are replacing the old social classes.
First, there is a new Western-educated elite, comprised of
administrators, school teachers, university graduates, and
businessmen, who are committed to the development and
modernization of the country following Western patterns.
Second, there is a new middle class, formed chiefly of
farmers of the Sahel and urban self-employed individuals and
shopkeepers. The third category includes unskilled and
often unemployed urban people huddled in the extremely poor
residential areas called gourbi-villes, found in the
industrial centers and particularly in Tunis. Since
independence, the gap between urban and rural groups has
been widening due to the problem of migration from the poor
and underdeveloped interior and non-industrial regions of
the country to the cities.
Pre-Islamic Historical evolution

Tunisia's position on the Mediterranean exposed it to several conquests and civilizations. Pautard depicted the cultural and historical wealth of the country when he wrote:

Tunisia is a horn land doing sentry for a continent; the slender arch of a bridge over the Mediterranean sea; the vanguard of a refined Islam... Africa and Europe, Islam and Christianity, East and West, have had remarkable encounters here, with history reverberates still, and whose trace is imprinted forever on the country side: the marine ruins at Amilcar, still murmuring after the great clash between the armies of Rome and Carthage; channels, now silted up, where formerly the heavy Punic ships put into port; temples, amphitheatres, columns and pediments where the passage of centuries and the breath of winds have deposited in time- worn cavities unusual and untidy garlands.

Indeed, the long span of Tunisian history is difficult to summarize and capture in a brief space. An effort will be made to highlight the major stages of the country's development.

In the first millinium B.C., Phoenecians established many settlements in the Mediterranean, the most important of which were the cities of Carthage and Utica. The Carthagian civilization attained its peak in the fourth century B.C. The bloody Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome, fought from 262 B.C. to 146 B.C., put an end to this civilization. Romans conquered and destroyed Carthage annexing it to the Roman empire.

Africa Romana (Carthage, today Tunisia) became the Roman Empire's chief provider of food, primarily olive oil.
and grains. The province enjoyed a 400-year period of prosperity and peace under a common legal system and a Roman identity. As Kenneth J. Perkins explained:

The incorporation of modern Tunisia into the Roman sphere reinforced linkages to the Mediterranean world that had begun to form in the Carthaginian era. Under Rome's aegis, people and ideas from Mediterranean Europe, often the source of forces that would shape critical developments in later Tunisian history, exerted great influence for the first time. As Roman interests threatened to relegate many Berbers to a marginal position, tensions between the nomadic and sedentary populations increased, finding expression in a variety of ways including religion. Few of rural Africans who converted to Christianity ever completely abandoned pre-Roman traditions and practices. The Donatist schism gave the Christian peasantry an opportunity to distinguish itself from urban-based socio-economic classes with which it had little in common.

In 428, the Germanic tribe of Vandals migrated from Spain and conquered Tunisia. They ruled until 533. The Vandal kings refused to act as the federated allies of the Roman Empire, now in Constantinople. They established their independent sovereignty through strength and aggressiveness. The Vandal aristocracy confiscated the land from the indigenous population and developed a prosperous and stable agricultural economy. The Vandals were Arians and segregated themselves from all their subjects. They persecuted the hapless Christians in the area, but unlike the Romans, the Vandals did not develop strong military defenses against Berber attacks. This failure plus the lack of "... cultural baggage to devise the mechanisms of a

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permanent, viable state" contributed to the collapse of Vandal rule in North Africa.

The Byzantines' arrival in North Africa ended Vandal rule in 533. Byzantine authorities concentrated their cities and farms in the northern and coastal regions of Tunisia to avoid Berber attacks. The Byzantines focused their effort on economic development in the hope of bringing back the prosperity of the earlier Roman civilization. Their efforts were not only hindered by repeated Berber raids, led mainly by the feared chief Antalas, but were also plagued by religious dissent from the indigenous population that refused to adhere to the Monophyte doctrine upheld by the Christian Emperor Justinian. The weakness of the Byzantines and their failure to provide sound leadership prepared Africa for the arrival of the Arabs who invaded the region in 647.22

**Islamic Conquest**

The commander of the Arab armies, Okba Ibn Nafaa, founded the city of Kairouan (Al-Qayrawan) in 670 A.D. for strategic reasons. The city was built in the middle of a plain away from Byzantine-held Carthage in the North and the Berber-held Numidia mountains in the south. Okba set out from Kairouan to conquer the Maghreb. He advanced as far as Morocco but was killed by Kusaila, the Berber leader in 683.23
The Umayyad Caliphate revived Arab-Muslim interest in Ifriqiya (North Africa). In 691, the Arab Hassan ibn Numan defeated the Berber warrior-woman al-Kahina. Kairouan once again became the center from which expeditions departed to conquer the rest of the Maghreb. Under the Sunni Umayyad rule, the Berbers were converted to Islam but were denied equal rights with the Arabs. The Muslim Umayyads considered the Berbers to be racially and socially inferior and subjected them to higher taxation. It is important to note at this juncture that the Berbers' conversion to Islam preceded the process of their Arabization. Indeed, the Umayyad's elitist attitudes and their segregationist policies prevented the Berbers' exposure to the Arabic language and brought about antagonism and bitterness among the Berbers. It was these anti-Umayyad sentiments that attracted the Berbers to Shi'ism.

Interestingly, it was the concepts of social justice and political equality and not concepts of religion that attracted the Berber tribes to the Shi'ite branch of Islam. Indeed, the Shi'ites maintained that every pious Muslim could become the Caliph of the Islamic umma. This crucial aspect of Tunisian history marks the evolution of the relationship between mosque and state. Indeed, the Berber rebellion against the Sunni Umayyads and the Berber espousal of Shi'ite doctrine were not based on philosophical or theological reasons but were primarily reactions to a social
phenomenon, the racist attitudes of the Umayyads. Indeed, despite rigorous attempts of the Abbasid governors—who replaced the Umayyads in 750—to counteract Shi'ite sentiments, the Berbers remained faithful to Shi'ism. The link among the social, economic, and religio-political spheres in Tunisian society will be developed further in Chapter Seven.

In 800, the Abbasid Caliph, Haroun al-Rashid, appointed Ibrahim Ibn al-Aghlab as Emir to rule Ifriquia. The Aghlabid Dynasty, the first established dynasty in Tunisia, marked the "golden age" of the region and saw the development of a unique Islamic identity. Kairouan became the uncontested Sunni religious, cultural, and intellectual capital of North Africa. The reputation of Kairouan in Islamic tradition grew tremendously, and the city became, according to custom, the third holy city of the Islamic world.  

It was the Fatimids (descendants of the Prophet Mohammad's daughter Fatima) who founded the Shi'ite dynasty in North Africa. The Sunni _ulama_ and followers of their branches of Islam were persecuted. Ubaidallah, the Fatimid leader, changed the capital from Kairouan to Mahdiyya—the city of _mahdi_—on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. The Berbers, chiefly the warrior tribes of Ketama and Sanhaja, were the main supporters of the Fatimids.

By 969, the Fatimids moved to the newly established
The Berber Zirid Emir, al-Moizz ibn Badis, broke off with the Fatimids and declared himself independent of Cairo. For the sake of political control, he renounced Shi'ism and embraced the Sunni doctrine in order to gain the support of the Sunni-Maliki șulama of Kairouan and dissipate the anti-Shi'ism expressed by his non-Berber subjects. The Fatimid al-Mustansir took revenge on ibn-Badis by sending the tribes of Beni Hilal (the Hilalians) and Beni Sulaim from the Upper Egypt Valley into North Africa. These tribes ruined Kairouan and held the inhabitants of other cities to ransom. They burned libraries, destroyed buildings, and laid waste every thing before them. The destructive actions of the Hilalians, described in detail by the historian ibn-Khaldun (1332-1406), had one positive effect that played a central place in Tunisian history, that is, the total Arabization of the Berbers.

The Sunni rule of Almohad Berbers was established throughout North Africa, and particularly in Tunisia, between 1145 and 1227. For the first time in history the Almohad Berbers were able to unite the Maghrib under a single rule, stretching from Agadir in Morocco to Tripoli in

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Libya. Almohad rule in Tunisia lasted until 1227; whereupon, it was replaced by the Hafsid dynasty. After the emergence of the Hafsid as the dynastic power in Tunisia, Arab, as opposed to Berber, culture became dominant despite the fact that the Hafsid family originated from Berber tribes. Tunis, the capital, became the center of a flourishing culture as well as an important center of trade in North Africa. The Hafsid kingdom lasted in Tunisia for more than three hundred years until it was ended by the arrival of the Turks in 1574.

Ottoman Hegemony

During the sixteenth century, Turkish pirates dominated the eastern Mediterranean. In 1574, the Barbarossa brothers, Aruj and Khair Addin, the corsairs most feared by Europeans and Muslims, seized Tunis and made it a province of the Ottoman empire. Hussein bin-Ali founded the Bey dynasty in Tunisia. This monarchy ruled the country for many generations. Pierre Rossi explained that "it is believed to have ended in 1881, but in fact it went on beyond that. For it was only by the treaty of Sevres, signed in 1920, that Constantinople officially waived its rights over Tunisia." By the year 1610, Tunisia was completely under Ottoman Beylical rule. In the late 17th and early 18th century, the country underwent economic
development especially in irrigated agriculture, market gardening, commerce, silk industry, and shashia (fez) production. This development was essentially the contribution of the Moriscos who had been expelled from Spain in the 16th Century and migrated to North Africa.

Hussein ben-Ali, a janissary of Greek origin, founded the Bey dynasty in Tunisia. Beys held both legislative and executive powers of the state, limited only by the religious law (Shari'a). They were responsible for the selection of religious leaders, who handled judicial matters. The caids, agents appointed by the monarch, governed the rural areas with the Shaykhs who were the leaders of the villages and tribes. Ottoman rule had a lasting impact on Tunisia. The era was characterized by prosperous agriculture and foreign trade. Tunis became a thriving city. The Beys laid the foundation of the Tunisian educational system and built madrasas (traditional schools) and mosques to propagate Islamic teachings and principles. Unfortunately, Ottoman rule was politically corrupt and the administration imposed high taxes on an impoverished population and permitted a crippling level of foreign debt, particularly to the French. Failure to pay this debt led to the establishment of French colonial rule.
Colonial Period

It is impossible in a brief discussion to summarize the colonial period adequately, nor is it necessary for our purpose. France first entered Tunisia in 1888 and finally granted the country independence on March 20, 1956. During this seventy-five year period, Tunisia was a part of the French empire and was ruled by a series of colonial administrators. For our purposes, the significant characteristics of French colonialism were: the relation between mosque and French colonial administration, the process of modernization, and the educational system.

Bishop Charles Allemand Lavigerie's mission was to convert Tunisia and the rest of North Africa to Christianity for the glory of France. He established schools and hospitals among which were the Société des Missions d'AFrique and the Soeurs Missionnaires de Notre Dame d'Afrique. Bishop Lavigerie declared:

. . . The flag and name of France are engaged in such an enterprise. . . . Praise to God that this triumph of France grant the final victory of the Christian civilization in the barbarian countries.

The Tunisian 'ulama's initial reaction to the French occupation was somewhat passive, in the sense that they were not militant in their opposition to French rule. Indeed, they even went further to point out that al-jihad (holy war against infidels) would be ineffective at that time. Some religious leaders used their influence "to persuade the
population to submit peacefully, although in most cases such
[sheiks] were probably motivated by a desire to avoid
bloodshed rather than by a desire to curry the invaders'
favor. Arnold Green explained that "the hostility of the
Tunisian ulama was expressed, however, but in more subtle
ways--e.g. social insularity and obstructionism. This
latter tactic . . . became the tool of the ulama for
attempting to counter French reformist initiatives."  

Converting Muslims to Christianity was indeed a
difficult task to accomplish. Lavigerie was compelled to
change his tactics in later years. "He shifted from his
eyearl hope of a wave of conversions to assimilation through
schools and charity to a warning to his missionaries not to
expect any definite results for at least one thousand
years." Moreover, Lavigerie declared that it would be a
crime or an act of madness "to overexite, by acts of an
unwise proselytism, the fanaticism of . . . Muslim
populations."  

The French protectorate in Tunisia also planted the
seeds for the country's modern economy. This foundation
"played a vital role in conditioning the Tunisian mentality
to modernism." The flow of French and European immigrants
into Tunisia brought about demands for facilities such as
schools, hospitals, roads, and banks to provide a Western
environment for Europeans in Tunisia.  

The impact of French colonialism was particularly felt
in agriculture. Before the establishment of the protectorate, 40 percent of the arable land was **habous** (called **waqf** in other Muslim countries), that is, property held by religious institutions as endowments for the maintenance of mosques and the support of religious education. By 1892, French settlers owned more than one-fifth of the best land in Tunisia, and large-scale farming companies held great competitive advantage over the small-scale agriculture on Tunisian-owned land.\(^4^4\)

In the industrial area, the French concentrated their efforts upon development of mining, especially after the discovery of phosphates in the 1850s in the South.\(^4^5\) The French invested in shipping, banking, and began to mechanize agricultural production. Foreign trade increased to approximately 100 billion old francs by 1955. As Rossi explains, "no one attempts to deny these figures. No one denies either that this wealth was in the hands of non-Tunisians."\(^4^6\)

A traditional educational system was already developed in Tunisia before the arrival of the French. The Zaytouna mosque, for example, was the center of higher education and of classical Islamic studies. In addition, there were approximately 20,000 **Kuttabs** scattered around the country. In the **Kuttabs**, children learned the Koran by heart and the Arabic alphabet. In 1875, before the French colonization, the **Sadiqi** College was established by Kayr al-din al-Tunisi
in "an attempt to marry Western technique to the Arabo-Islamic heritage." There were even some pre-Protectorate private schools that educated primarily Catholics.

The European community instituted a dual school system. One system taught all subjects in French, with standards similar to those in France. The other system offered instruction in both French and Arabic, with the inclusion of the instruction of North Africa's history and geography. All schools were open to different races and religious groups, but as Micaud explained, "it was often easy to turn away the Tunisian Muslim because he was not sufficiently prepared, did not know French well enough, or was too old."

Although some commentators question the value of French contributions to the Tunisian educational system, the advantage of the French rule in this respect, according to the author's first-hand knowledge and experience, was the foundation in Tunisia of the basis of a sound and modern educational system, which is serving the country constructively at the present time.

The major effects of the French Protectorate on Tunisian society, which prepared for the rise of nationalism, can be summarized in the following passage by Clement Moore:

*Within fifty years of the establishment of the Protectorate, modern society had been created, centered on the colons; yet a traditional society, in part disrupted,*
existed alongside, unassimilated to the new order. . . . New classes were emerging that were alienated in a double sense, in both societies; the educated counter-elite, the students, and an industrial proletariat, a clerical class, and even a rural proletariat of agricultural workers on colon farms. Furthermore, in Tunisia the settlers would be sufficiently strong to undercut all French Government efforts at reform, thus ensuring the political tension necessary for the unfolding of the colonial dialectic. 

**Rise of Nationalism and Struggle for Independence**

The Pan-Islamic movement, which emerged in the latter half of the 19th century, formed the essential background for Arab nationalism. Most of the early leaders of the Tunisian nationalist movement came from the Sadiqi College Society and from the "intelligentsia of the Grand Mosque Zitouna in Tunis." They attempted to establish a Tunisian identity and demanded social reforms from the colon (French settlers and their families). Among these early nationalists were Bechir Sfar, a graduate from the Sadiki College and administrator of the habous, and Ali Bash Hamba, founder of the nationalist newspaper *Le Tunisien*.

After World War I, Tunisian nationalism received a new impetus. In 1920 the Young Tunisians founded the Destour Party (Constitution Party), composed mainly of the educated elite. The party lacked formal structure and was based on a "loose coalition" of a number of elements with differing and at times irreconcilable opinions. As Charles A. Mecaud explained:
Its internal contradictions were legion: It was a radical group in the demands it made on the French, including independence, yet it was socially and politically conservative. In spite of these limitations, the Party attracted many sympathizers between 1920 and 1922 and became the only political apparatus of that era.

In 1933 the Destour party split and gave birth to the Neo-Destour party. Habib Bourguiba emerged on the political scene as one of the most active and revolutionary leaders of the newly formed party. Most students of North African political development generally attribute the concepts of traditionalism, inflexibility, religious "fundamentalism", and social reactionism to the old Destour. On the other hand, they describe the Neo-Destour as being secular, revolutionary, progressive, flexible, and western-oriented.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the ideological background of the leaders of both parties was very similar. Indeed, the members were educated in the Sadiqi college or in the Zitouna University. They were not identified with Islam or with radical socialism as separate entities. "Both groups evolved within an Arabic-Islamic framework and reacted to the stimuli of intruding westernism." The only difference is that the Neo-Destour was the one that carried out the struggle against the French; it called for action and was able to mobilize the lower strata of Tunisian society.

Bourguiba's strategy was to make the world aware of the
Tunisian question. Because the French colonial authorities considered Bourguiba an agitator and restricted his freedom of movement, he left the country secretly and visited Arab nations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States, and Europe. In time, the Neo-Destour received the support of the Labor Union L'Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), founded in 1946 by Ferhat Hached. By the time Tunisia achieved independence in 1956, the nationalist movement, led primarily by the Neo-Destour had acquired three distinct advantages: unchallenged leadership, a well-organized party, and a long background of constructive conflict with the colonial power."
CHAPTER VII

BOURGUIBA'S VISION OF ISLAM

As far as we are concerned, we think that Islam is a force capable of becoming positive once again and it only depends on us to make it so. We are convinced that the decadence and backwardness from which the Moslem people suffer are due to historical and social phenomena quite unrelated to religion.

Habib Bourguiba

... From the beginning of the State's existence, we have paid special attention to religious matters. We have gone back to the pure and authentic traditions of Islam so as to make religion a source of energy and an instrument of progress to lift the nation out of the decadence in which centuries of social stagnation and intellectual torpor had submerged it.

Habib Bourguiba

This chapter focuses on the components of Habib Bourguiba's vision of Islam what might be called "the authentic version of Islam." It also includes a discussion of Bourguiba's goals for Tunisia.

At the outset, it is important to present a brief biographical sketch of Bourguiba, including a discussion of the influences upon his attitude toward Islam. "The Supreme Combattant," as Bourguiba was honorably called by the people, was born on August, 3 1903, in Monastir, which was then a small port on the Mediterranean in the Sahel region

*The term authentic has been devised by the author in contrast to other versions that can be identified in the contemporary Middle East, such as "parallel model in Egypt," "secular model in Turkey," and "traditional Islam" in Saudi Arabia.
inhabited by fishermen, olive tree growers, and shopkeepers. (At present Monastir is a thriving modern metropolis).

Several commentators, including Bourguiba himself, questioned the date of this official biography. This is explained by the imprecise nature of registering births, deaths, and marriages at that time. Bourguiba maintained that his family was poor but nevertheless honorable. His father earned the title "Shaykh of the District of the Tripolitans" and was a member of the Municipal Council of Monastir during the Protectorate.

Bourguiba was the youngest of eight children. His first name Habib means "the beloved" in Arabic. Bourguiba was cared for by everyone in the family. He referred frequently to his childhood and especially to the impact that his mother, grandmother, and sisters had on his views of liberating and emancipating Tunisian women. He recalled:

Benjamin [youngest child] of a large family, I spent most of my time at home, that is to say, in the company of women. People, they always advised me against this so that I would not be marked by 'feminine manners'; 'feminine manners'? I confess I have never understood the thing.

At the age of five, Bourguiba moved to Tunis to live with his brother and go to Sadiqi College. As explained in the previous chapter, Khayr al-Din founded this bilingual college to provide Arabo-Islamic studies combined with modern Western education in French. In this school, Bourguiba learned Islamic teachings, Arabic grammar, and
classical Arabic from shaykhs of the Great Mosque and from professors of the Zaytouna University. Moreover, he was exposed to French, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and the art of translation. From his accounts of his training at the Sadiki, one can easily detect the imprint that the French language had on him. He wrote:

I remember especially Mr. Collieres to whom the merit is due for our perfect initiation into the French language. I can affirm that neither at the Lycee Carnot nor at the University later on did I need to acquire new knowledge in order to better master this language. . . . He [Collieres] really instilled in us the art of French composition. His pedagogical methods were remarkable. If I learned to compose articles whose perfect transitions and harmonious equilibrium excite admiration, it is certainly to him that I owe it.

What he remembered from his shaykh teachers was their "stocky size", the way they were "booed heartily, and the manner in which they were subjected to practical jokes." He recalled how

The pupils had put sticky paper on [shaykh Hamida Neifer's] chair. Being exceptionally corpulent, the sheikh left the classroom with the chair stuck to his bottom, without noticing it. It wasn't until he passed through the door at the exit of the school that the door keeper alerted him to the seat he was carrying along.

Such accounts reflect the influence of the French educational background on Bourguiba's ease and fluent manipulation of that language. Indeed, the series Histoire du Mouvement National Tunisien, discussed earlier in the introduction, were first written in French then translated.

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in 1979 into Arabic. Western commentators argue that the choice of the French language indicated Bourguiba's leaning toward the West. Irrespective of whatever attraction or leaning he had to the West, Bourguiba simply felt more at ease expressing himself in French than he did in Arabic.

Bouguiba indicated that major events shaped the formation of his personality during his early school years. First, there were the troubles at Jallaz in 1911, when the Protectorate sought to transform the Islamic cemetery of the Jallaz into municipal land. Second, there was the banishment of the staff of Le Tunisien in 1912. This staff was made up of both young and educated Tunisians many of whom had created the reform movement. The third event was the execution of Jarjar in the public square of Bab Saadoon after he had actively participated in the disturbance at Jallaz. "These events "made the greatest impression upon [him]. . . and caused tragic reverberation in [his] personality." Indeed, they symbolized the unjust order of the Protectorate to which his country was subjugated. 6

After completing his primary school certificate, Bourguiba obtained his baccalaureat from the Lycee Carnot and left for France to continue his advanced studies in law in 1924. He explained that his primary goal at that period was "to get intellectually ready to fight against the French colonial system." 7 It is most significant that Bourguiba's stay in France allowed him to experience Western
civilization and political democracy at first hand. It was during this time that he set out "to discover the secrets of the antagonistic power [France],... to penetrate the mechanism of the French civilization, ... and to find out why this country is so strong while [his] Tunisia was powerless under colonial domination." In terms of philosophy, Bouguiba was especially influenced by Auguste Comte's self-sacrificial ideals. He recalled:

One day as I was walking by, I bent down in front of the bust of [Auguste Compte's] effigy and discovered with excitement one of this great thinker's thought 'vivre pour autrui' (live for others). This was a true reflection of my own aim and the goal I set out to achieve.

Bourguiba's inspiration by the French culture and system led some commentators to call him "le fils de la France." (France's son). Camille Begue described Bourguiba as "the stubborn apostle of the Arabo-Muslim personality" and at the same time as "an alive example of perfect assimilation to the West."

One can draw a parallel between Bourguiba's formation in the West with that of Ataturk who had undertaken the task of building a secular, modern, Western-oriented Turkey. Like Ataturk, Bourguiba was a major representative of the small intellectual elite educated in Europe. The crucial difference lies in the fact that Bourguiba was an Arab-Muslim who, unlike Ataturk, did not reject Islam but considered it to be an integral part of Tunisian identity.
Bourguiba's vision of Islam will be discussed in two stages. The first focuses upon his views of Islam during the colonial period, and the second examines these views after Tunisia became independent. As we shall see, Bourguiba's conception of Islam changed fundamentally between the first and second stages.

A. Bourguiba's Islamic Views and Colonialism

Among the first steps undertaken by Bourguiba in his struggle against the Protectorate was the definition and establishment of the "Personnalite Tunisienne" by preserving its symbols no matter how traditional or decadent they might be. These included the veil, the visit to Saints' tombs, and the wearing of traditional clothes. The incident involving a Tunisian woman, during a public debate about the veil, is illustrative of this strategy. Madame Menchari took off her veil and threw it on the floor, a gesture of revolt against the condition of Arabo-Muslim women. Muslim participants in that debate were shocked and engaged in a long discussion invoking Koranic legislation regarding this issue and questioned if the veil should come down to the ankle or cover the face. When Bourguiba took the floor, he said:

Let us put aside the various opinions on the jilbab [veil]. We well admit that [it] is part of the Tunisian personality although it is no way aesthetic. In our present time, it is obvious that the colonial power is doing anything in its power to annihilate our
personality by imposing French ways of life. We are not strong, we have no power, but we should do everything to preserve even some decadent symbols of our personality. This is the only way to preserve our entity. We will discuss this problem when its elimination is no longer a threat to our national personality as was the case for the use of western clothes.¹³

Indeed, this example is reflects Bourguiba's political acumen since he later called for the elimination of the veil as a step towards the liberation of Tunisian women in the aftermath of independence. Bourguiba's move is reminiscent of Ataturk abolition of the fez and the wearing of the veil by women. The significant difference between both leaders was that Ataturk's policies in this area were forceful and much more far reaching than those carried out by Bourguiba. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that Bourguiba considered Islam as the fundamental component of Tunisian identity. He repeatedly stressed that the goal of the liberation movement he led aimed at "saving the country from assimilation... by affirming Tunisia's Arabo-Muslim personality."¹⁴

The events of the Eucharist convention held in Tunisia in 1930 provided the impetus for the Tunisian nationalist movement and the Neo-Destour's ideology. This convention attempted to convert North Africa to Christianity. Bourguiba recalled how this convention "was nothing short of a catastrophe for the country." He described how the streets were crowded with ecclesiastics and children wearing
clothes reminiscent of the Eighth Crusade led by Saint-Louis, King of France, who halted at the shores of Carthage where he died of cholera."\textsuperscript{15}

Another major event that threatened the Tunisian personality was the decree of Nationalization issued in 1932 allowing Tunisians to acquire French nationality. The Protectorate went further to ask Shaykh al-Islam and the Bach Mufti to issue a \textit{fatwa} (Islamic law) permitting naturalized Tunisians to remain Muslims as long as they fulfilled their religious duties.\textsuperscript{16} This decree would also allow naturalized Tunisians to be buried in Muslim cemeteries.

Bourguiba capitalized on this event. He understood the degree to which Tunisians were sensitive about their Islamic beliefs. He thus led several demonstrations against the burial of naturalized Tunisians in Muslim Cemeteries, even though the demonstrations did not put a stop to such burials. He noted that:

\begin{quote}
The leader of this group of nationalized French was a man from the upper middle class, \ldots whose father held a high religious office. His wife died at that time and, although it pained me to do so, I started a campaign against her being buried in a [Muslim] cemetery. In this campaign I was defending an ideal and my country.
\end{quote}

All these examples illustrate Bourguiba's strategy and campaign in forming the Tunisian Personality, which was an integral part of the struggle that led to independence.
B. Bourguiba's Unique Vision of Islam

After independence, Bourguiba's vision of Islam crystallized. One can distinguish five dimensions or components of his conception of Islam: political, rational reformist, economic, and social-judicial.

The first component of Bourguiba's vision of Islam was political. He maintained that Islam is a total system which covers all the spheres of human life. Thus, the leader of a nation can interpret the teachings of Islam is ways that enhance the march toward progress and prosperity. He stated:

Islam is a whole from which neither the temporal nor the spiritual may be dissociated. They are both within the competence of Heads of State. The teachings handed down to us by prophetic tradition and by the action of the first Caliphs clearly show that the imam, or supreme chief, is alone competent to give a ruling on the major points of policy on which depend the invulnerability of the State and the destiny of Islam as a political and social regime.

Thus, Bourguiba explained that the issues relating to Islam and to the life of Muslim leaders are "not exclusively within the competence of the [ulama]," because in Islam "there is no church separate from the political authority."\(^{19}\)

In contrast to Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarek, Bourguiba did not rely on the ulama elite to legitimize his decisions. Their support was not as crucial as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This unique characteristic is due to
Bourguiba's "charisma" and energy in conveying his policies and decisions directly to the masses. It is important at this juncture to discuss the nature of Bourguiba's "charisma." He has often been cited as one of the more "charismatic" leaders within the Third World. Many definitions and models of charisma are available. In Max Weber's views the term "charisma" referred to "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, ... powers or qualities." By contrast another view seems more directly related to Bourguiba's case. In Bourguiba's own words:

> It is rare that the events that make up the landmarks in the life of one man are integrated into the history of a people to such an extent that the man seems to incarnate his whole people. If this transposition has been brought about, it is because the man was able to be the sincere and disinterested spokesman of the nation's conscience, and because he fought so much and so well for the people's cause that the movements in the life of each were brought to merge with one another."

Indeed, the title *si Labbib* (your majesty the president, in colloquial Arabic) indicates Bourguiba's inspirational leadership, which many commentators call "charisma".

Bourguiba's legitimacy had sufficiently been resolved before independence." His charismatic influence allowed him to transmit his ideas in a persuasive manner to the masses. Moreover, Bourguiba's charisma was based on a strong paternalist dimension. Bourguiba was called the
father of the people (abu ashā'ab) by Tunisians. The basic keys to Bourguiba's charisma were: his communicative capability which is evident in his numerous and somewhat repetitious speeches; his detailed and patient explanation of his vision for a modern Tunisia in those speeches; and his ability to electrify the masses. Such unique characteristics explain why Bourguiba's modernist approach was not challenged by the people.

The second component of Bourguiba's vision of Islam was rational and reformist. He maintained that there is an instant need for ḥijārah, that is, the interpretation of the Koran and Sunna according to the needs of a modern society and changing social and economic conditions. The ḥijārah is possible because Islam is primarily based upon reason. He stated:

It happened that in my previous speeches I insisted on the role of reason vis-à-vis religion and I showed the necessity of continuous efforts of research and reflection in the spiritual and temporal domains, in order to give our life a constant impetus toward progress and prosperity and to preserve our religion from stagnation, which will make it powerless, and to answer the needs of our contemporary society and [meet] the demands of our time. Didn't they rightly say that Islam is made for every time and every place?

This unique component of Bourguiba's vision of Islam differentiates him from other leaders in the Muslim world. Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarek created a parallel between mosque and state, where the former had the primary leadership in
spiritual matters. In return, the mosque legitimized and interpreted Islamic principle to guide the policies undertaken in the political sphere. In this context, the concept of legitimacy derives purely from Islamic principles. In Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi Ulema define political leadership and legitimize the temporal order.

Bourguiba went a step further to interpret Islam in a supple and modernist fashion to help lead toward political and economic development. Unlike other Muslim leaders, Bourguiba sought to identify l'esprit, that is the essence or soul of Islam. "Today like yesterday," he maintained, "we need religion but from a completely different perspective oriented toward creative effort and progress. We need to understand the essence of religion."24 The essence of religion consists of stepping away from orthodoxy and traditional conceptions to a moderate and authentic version of Islam.

The third component of Bourguiba's vision of Islam was educational. He attempted to educate the masses who were attached to a purely ritualistic dimension of Islam. In his speeches, he emphasized the importance of an Islamic code of ethics and morality. He sought to replace the popular conception of Islam based on the worship of saints, cults and superstitions by an enlightened Islam adapted to the modern needs of a developing Tunisian society. In his viewpoint one can be modern and a good Muslim at the same
time, once Islam is purified from excesses and decadent traditions which encrusted its core. The means to accomplish this task lie in educating the masses. In this context Bourguiba explained:

The practice of preparing a platter of couscous* by way of a pious act to get the good grace of Sidi Bel Hassen [a saint] does not allow one to have a raison d'être . . . . It is preferable in this case to put the cost of the couscous platter in the works of 'national solidarity' whose mission is precisely to help the needy. It is in this intelligent manner that we should interpret religious precepts and adapt them to the needs of the modern world, which is better organized and more structured than that which existed at the Dawn of Islam.23

In the same vein, Bourguiba tried to educate the masses to remove themselves from the fatalist tradition that colored their beliefs. He called for rejection of resignation to divine will which marked the era of decadence when it was accepted that the individual couldn't do anything to counteract the pre-established destiny [and when] every fight for life was in vain since everyone's fate is decided in advance by God.26 Bourguiba was referring to people's submission and lack of action to change their economic and social situations. In this context of his program of family planning, he always gave the example of

*Couscous is the traditional national dish in Tunisia. It is a rice-like, semolina-based grain prepared with meat, poultry, or fish along with vegetables. The ritual of taking couscous to Saints' tombs, after the fulfillment of a wish, still exists.
the father who keeps on having children, believing that God will provide for them ignoring the fact that God gave his people the ability to reason. Reasoning would tell a man that continuing to reproduce in poverty is unfair to both the children and parents.

The fourth component of Bourguiba's vision of Islam was directed toward economic development. He discouraged, although unsuccessfully, religious practices that tended to hinder this process. For instance in his speech on January 25, 1973, Bourguiba called for temporary abandonment of the tradition of lamb slaughtering in observance of aid al-Idha, that is, the yearly reenactment of God's order to Ibrahim to sacrifice his son Isaac. Bourguiba explained that eliminating this tradition "would allow us to rebuild our livestock and would allow us to avoid a hemorrhage of currency spent on importing cattle."27

Similarly, Bourguiba exhorted the Tunisian people to abandon fasting during Ramadan. He maintained:

Unfortunately, the period of fasting every year looks like a real catastrophe for the state. It is the fault of those who disguised the real vocation of this month of penitence and mortification. During the decadence period, from which we inherited bad habits, Ramadan was the occasion of an "orgy of swills."28

Bourguiba did not exaggerate when he used the expression "orgy of swills". Indeed, the month of Ramadan in Tunisia and in other Islamic nations was reduced to a season of lavish expenditures on food. Families either save
or go into debt in order to be able to spend well during this month. Fasting usually starts at dawn. During the day, fasting Muslims are not allowed to eat, drink, smoke, or even take medicine. The breaking of the fast occurs at sunset. An average dinner during the Ramadan season includes soup with vegetables and meat; brique (a pastry-like dough filled with meat, eggs, cheese, and potatoes fried in olive oil); a main dish (usually couscous or pasta with lamb or chicken); and fruits for dessert. During the sahra (time between dinner and sleep when the family watches television) the typical Tunisian family serves pastries or custards along with tea or coffee. Those who are fasting in the family are awakened an hour before dawn by the tabbal (drummer) to eat once again.

In the previous quotation, Bourguiba was referring to the increased demand during Ramadan for products such as meat, poultry, fish, vegetables, fruits, semolina, sugar, milk, rice, and olive oil. Such demands tend to use any surplus in the economy and sometimes call for increased importation of foreign goods. Bourguiba was also referring to the interference of fasting with productivity, since total abstinence from eating or drinking water can be unbearable, especially when Ramadan falls in the summer months.

When Bourguiba advocated the breaking of the fast, he referred to the sunna to justify his recommendations and to
legitimize them. He described the struggle for economic progress in Tunisia in terms of a holy war (jihād) against underdevelopment. He said:

Do you remember the Prophet's proclamation to the Muslim army that was marching toward Mecca during the month of Ramadan: 'I want you to carry out the victory,' He said, 'when you arrive to Mecca, you must not be exhausted by fasting. Break the fast so that you will be able to achieve victory.'

Once again one can argue that there is no parallel in the Muslim world to such expression of opinions. Tunisian people continued to observe all practices of Islam, but the important issue in this case is that Bourguiba took a risk in his extremely modernist interpretation of Islam. There a parallel between Ataturk and Bourguiba in terms of their psychological make-up. Each had the courage to defy the established order and the courage to express his ideas regardless of what the traditionalists in his country in other Islamic nations might think. This is what led Nasser of Egypt to say:

I would like to do what Bourguiba has done but do not forget that the obstacles which he had to overcome in Tunisia were much less solid than those which I have to confront here, in the heart of Islam, at the very gate of al-Azhar.

There were also some crucial differences contrasting Tunisia to Turkey. Turkey underwent the process of secularization, while Tunisia passed through the process of "desacralization." While these terms are somewhat close, they have essentially different meanings. The concept of
desacralization implies" the removal of traditional taboos from core areas of social behavior, and by extension it suggests the promotion of humanism based on the individual functioning within desacralized society."  Indeed, the Tunisian constitution recognizes Arabic as the language of the country and Islam as its religion. Ataturk, by contrast, decreed a legal secularism for his nation that denied Islam and the Arabic language and institutionalized a purely Western oriented political system.

"One of the most effective means of promoting desacralization in Tunisia," Charles Gallagher argued, "has been the way in which the appeal of traditional religion is being transmitted onto the plane of rational ethics through moral exhortation."

Bourguiba was careful in differentiating himself from Ataturk. He stated that "the founding of the Republic in Turkey has taken ... the aspect of a catastrophe for the Moslem world." He even went further to add:

Ataturk passed for being crazy about modernism. His sources of inspiration were to be found essentially secular. Now, we all know that the Turks are Moslems and profoundly attached to their religion, their faith sometimes even bordering upon fanaticism. Overnight, not even one religious institution existed any longer. He wanted to shape his country to the image of France. But he had forgotten that the Catholic religion was propagated and served in secular France by a whole ecclesiastical hierarchy headed up by the Pope. The secularization caused ravages in the ranks of the Moslems. They experienced such decadence that they returned to the practices of the Moslem world."
whirling dervishes. Additionally, Bourguiba indicated that Ataturk followed the purely Western-oriented path because he was not an Arab:

Research was done to attempt to determine the origin of the Turkish race. It has been pointed out that the Turks were of Indo-European origin and that they had nothing in common with the Semites, the ethnological group of the Arabs and the Jews. To clearly mark Turkey's belonging to the European camp, family names were radically changed. Latin characters were substituted for the Arabic characters. For a long time the resigned people were kept under the iron rule of military men who, from generation to generation, claimed to be the agents of the message of Ataturk.

The fifth component of Bourguiba's vision was social. It consisted of stressing the principles of equality and social justice. Bourguiba expressed the idea that the most valuable pillars of Islam are justice and fraternity:

This [Tunisian] personality has a Berber basis. It was successively Romanized, Byzantinized, and Arabized. Its conversion to Islam marked it profoundly. The egalitarianism of Islam led it to adopt the Arabic culture as its national culture.

By way of comparison, the concept of Islamic justice and equality have been used extensively by Muslim leaders, Sunni and Shi'ites alike. It is also referred to as the goal of the ideal society. Bourguiba added the concept of human progress to the dimensions of justice and equality. He argued that "the Islamic religion seeks essentially to elevate the moral level of man." Bourguiba utilized the concepts of equality and justice in his campaign to liberate...
Tunisian women and in his efforts to provide all Tunisians with a sound education in the primary, secondary, and college levels.

In sum, Bourguiba's authentic vision represented an Islam purified of excesses. The political, rational, reformist, economic, and social-judicial dimensions of this vision sought to utilize the pure elements of Islam and apply them in a way that took into account Tunisia's changing socio-economic and political conditions.

It is important to indicate at this point that the majority of the ulama accepted and supported Bourguiba's and the Neo-Destour's "authentic" vision of Islam. This was conveyed clearly in the views expressed by Touhami Negra, a prestigious calim and Director of Koranic Studies at the Zaytouna University. Negra's judgement can be construed as typical and representative of the Tunisian ulama. In replying to the question: How do you define the components of Bourguiba's vision of Islam in Tunisia? Negra explained the Bourguiba made of Islam a positive force when he opened the country to progress and eliminated the excesses of fanatism, mysticism, taboos, and superstitious bonds. Negra maintained that Bourguiba applied the core of Islam to the mission of developing Tunisia. In the nuclear and space ages, Negra stressed, there is a need to use ijtihad and reasoning to achieve spiritual and material progress. Bourguiba was able to foster this new spirit in Tunisia.
The consensus among the religious and political elites in Tunisia during Bourguiba's Presidency was primarily based on the fact that the former was subordinate to the latter. Indeed, the process of appointments to the Zaytouna University and the selection of Imams for mosques were government controlled. The "Direction de Culte," the religious bureau in Tunisia, was attached to the Prime Minister's Office that subsidized the religious establishment with administrative and financial support. In return, the religious elite legitimized the authority of Bourguiba and that of the Neo-Destour. Those who opposed Bourguiba's modernist objectives were usually removed from their official positions. For instance, when El-Aziz Djait, Shaykh al-Islam, refused to deliver a fatwa authorizing people to break the fast temporarily and allowing them to carry out their religious duties when they are on vacation or retired, he was removed from his position.

Bourguiba's vision of Islam encountered opposition mainly from other Arab leaders, namely from Nasser who accused Bourguiba of being "one of the last agents of imperialism in the Arab world." As Jacques Baulin explained:

Bourguiba - the Arab and Moslem - never felt at ease in the Arab world. The three years he spent in Egypt from 1946 to 1949 [propagating the Tunisian cause while exiled] left him disillusioned. Where he could find brothers in language and religion, he found men with very different preoccupations from his own. He was convinced that the Egyptians
had not been able to take advantage of their independence. [Bourguiba stressed that] "it will be different in Tunisia." Bourguiba was hostile to Nasser's Pan-Arabist ideals because they were considered to be extremist. He declared that "Cairo's fever and hysteria will calm down, so that the conditions for cooperation, respect for the independence and interests of each Arab country may prevail." Indeed, such circumstances explain the reason why Tunisia did not join the Arab League until September, 1958, that is, two and one-half years after independence.

Bourguiba's Policies regarding Islam

Bourguiba's most revolutionary policies regarding Islam addressed primarily the Tunisia socio-political structure. The reforms in the judicial area included the integration of the Sha'ria courts into Tunisia's modern legal system. The secondary educational system of the Zaytouna was integrated in the general secondary secular curriculum. Moreover, the Zaytouna University became simply a department annexed to the University of Tunis. The suppression of the habus turned over to the government 150,000 hectares of land that had financed the mosques and religious charitable institutions. This reform allowed the transfer of religious activities to direct state control.

The most significant reform was the promulgation of the Code of Personal Statute, ratified in August, 1956. The
Code sought to modify the root of the social structure: the family. It abolished polygamy; it made marriage a voluntary contract between two people instead of an alliance between two families; it set a minimum age for marriage; it outlawed the mahr custom (men paying large sums of money to the bride); and it declared illegal the husband's right to arbitrarily divorce his wife. Such policies made Bourguiba the great emancipator of Tunisian women.

Moreover, Bourguiba went further to attack the symbols of the traditional social order, namely the wearing of the veil by women, as if the female were "a disgraceful thing". He argued:

If we understand that middle-aged women are reticent about abandoning an old habit, we can only deplore the stubbornness of parents who continue to oblige their children to wear a veil in school. We even see civil servants going to work in that odious rag... It has nothing to do with religion.

Bourguiba obtained the support of the ulama elite for these policies, mainly from Tahar Ben Achour, Rector of the Zaytouna and influential Maliki shaykh. To boost this support, Bourguiba appointed Chadly Ennifer, whose family dominated the Maliki circle of ulama, to the constitutional Assembly. Such tactics bestowed an aura of religious legitimacy on the government's modernist policies.

Western commentators argued that Bourguiba used a firm hand to institutionalize his socio-political program and vision for development. They referred to the system as a
democratic autocracy. In formulating his strategy for
development, Bourguiba understood the sacrifices needed to
foster the process. He sought to educate the people before
establishing a full democracy and a multi-party electoral
structure. He realized the need to prepare the minds of the
masses for responsible citizenship. He maintained that
democracy "demands civic and moral conscience." 46
Democracy, he maintained, "must be formed progressively
without rush nor demagogy because democracy implies
responsibility, if not it could engender abuse and [could
become] a source of regression." 47

In the same vein, Bourguiba cautioned against the
dangers of democracy by saying: "We must be careful that
Democracy will not engender chaos in our country as it has
done in other countries that were not sufficiently
prepared." 48 In order to prepare Tunisians, Bourguiba
embarked on his education campaign. One-third of the budget
was dedicated to the educational system. By 1966, literacy
climbed from 15% to about 38%. The percentage of children
attending school grew from 25 to 65. The proportion of
girls attending school rose from about 30% to more than 40%.

The Neo-Destour played a major role in this campaign.
The party machine sought to raise the masses' awareness by
recruiting members at the local level and by creating
auxiliary organizations, such as the National Union of
Tunisian Students at the University level and the National
Union of Tunisian Women. In the light of such accomplishments at the socio-political level, it is surprising to the observer to see an increase in the religious "revivalist" sentiments within Tunisia. How can this intriguing fact be explained? The following segment is an attempt to demonstrate that this movement has an economic impetus and that Islamic theology and ideals provided it with the ideological background. How can this intriguing fact be explained? This section includes a discussion of the tenets, characteristics, and the supporters of the movement. It is also an attempt to investigate whether the movement poses a threat to the "authentic" vision of Islam as a model of political development in Sunni Tunisia.

Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in Tunisia

The origins of the revivalist movement al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement or MTI) can be traced to the Koranic Preservation Society founded by the Zaytouna University in 1970. The government allowed the creation of this society for two reasons: first, to appease the left-wing criticism that became heated after the failure of Ahmad Ben Salah's socialist program, and second, to offset the University student unrest that emanated from worsening economic conditions.

The MTI gained strength and militant characteristics in
the period following the riots and strikes organized by the labor union (UGTT) in January, 1977, events which resulted in the death of one hundred people and the injury of many others. The MTI organized local and regional structures. It attracted primarily students from the Zaytouna University, secularly-educated young people from the University of Tunis, elements from the petite-bourgeoisie in the rural area, lawyers, school teachers, economists, technicians, and engineers.

At the beginning of its evolution, the MTI used the mosques for the propagation of its cause where it held its organizational _balaq_ (circles or seminars) after Friday sermons. After the 1981 press conference at which the organization outlined its platform and asked to be accepted as a political party, the government put a stop to their activity at the mosques following religious services. As a consequence, members of the organization had to restrict their activities to the University. Indeed, "the students have frequently served as field lieutenants in the MTI, but the movement's political bureaus have been supplied by non-students." The principal leaders of the movement were Rashid al-Ghannouchi (55 years old) and Abd al-Fatih Mourou (45 years old).

The most important MTI demands consisted of returning the right of self-government to the masses, distributing national wealth according to the Islamic principle "each
according to his effort, to each according to his need," allowing more than one political party to exist, reviving Islamic personality in Tunisia, reviving the mosque as a center of mobilization.  

The MTI gained a great impetus after the "bread riots" in January, 1984, when the government increased the price of bread. The MTI capitalized on the event to gain the support of a large number of people from the lower economic strata of the population that had experienced deprivation and frustration resulting from unmet economic expectations. Based on the organization's secret publications, one can conclude that the leading factor in the MTI's success and appeal was primarily based on economic issues. The call for a return to Islamic principles based on the Sha'ria was just the ideological veil that legitimized the cause. The booklet "For the Sake of Freedom; for the Sake of Human Rights," distributed in June, 1984, declared that the causes of the riots were related to worsening economic situation caused by unemployment, inadequate housing, population explosion, increasing poverty, and especially the worsening gap between the rich elite allied to the government and the majority of the population living in poverty and deprivation. Such conditions, MTI members argued, were caused by the government's failure to keep its promises of providing economic prosperity and social justice.

The Tunisian economy faced the problem of accommodating
the rising number of university graduates since the 1970s. Tunisian youth became disillusioned and convinced that "education or not, a future there is not." ^54 From interviews with activist members within MTI it was apparent that the economic situation provided the primary impetus to the revivalist movement. The activist members expressed their preoccupation with low salaries, the rise in the cost of living, and unemployment. They also indicated that the ruling elite was getting richer on the backs of poor masses.

Some Western commentators contended that the rise of Islamic revivalism in Tunisia is also attributed to political and psycho-social theses. On the political level, they argued that the 1970s witnessed a blockage of participatory political structure that deprived a large part of the population from "access to political fora." ^55 Indeed this blockage was occurring in a society not noted for its pluralism. The single refuge that provided an alternative political expression was the mosque. ^56

The psycho-social explanation of the rise of revivalism in Tunisia focused primarily on the feeling of malaise experienced by Tunisian youth who felt rejected in every sphere of their society. Indeed, as Abdelkader Zghal indicated:

Economically, they have been told their skills are not needed; . . . culturally, they have observed that success was measured in how unlike themselves and their parents, the is, how Westernized they could become. . . . Ideologically Tunisian youth of the 1960s and
1970s generations faced an ineffective choice. On one hand, they were offered the Destourian tradition, which in the years since independence had shown itself incapable of rectifying the social injustices and inequities by which they were threatened. On the other hand, while the radical left could lay out social and political reforms, by denying the worth of the country's cultural heritage—and Islam in particular—it, too, was unsatisfactory.

Thus, the MTI offered a fresh alternative that addressed both the economic and socio-psychological dimensions of the malaise of the Tunisian population in general and the youth in particular. One can argue that several aspects led to the rise of and growth of the revivalist movement. Nevertheless, the economic aspect is the salient one.

Bourguiba's administration and the Neo-Destour responded harshly to the MTI militant initiatives. The military was called every time riots and demonstrations broke out. The leaders of the movement were imprisoned and tortured. Bourguiba indicated that the revivalist movement was a fanatic and extremist ideology imported from Khomeini's Iran and Ghaddafi's Libya to destroy Tunisia's accomplishments; therefore, it should be repressed with firmness.

Zin Al-Abidin Ben Ali, a former General in the Tunisian Army, was called in to put a stop to internal unrest. Ben Ali was aware of the gravity of the situation. He carried out a bloodless military coup and took power on January 7,
1988. Ben Ali explained that he had to interfere and take over the administration of his country because Bourguiba was too ill and senile to govern Tunisia. Ben Ali explained that when he intervened the State was totally cut off from society, intrigue replaced political principles, the University became crippled, the administration was ineffective, opposition parties were intimidated, and human rights were violated.58

Ben Ali expressed that Islam will no longer be used as a tool in the political game. He emphasized that Islam is an integral part of the personality, people's identity, social make-up, and cultural heritage of Tunisia and that the government's responsibility is to protect it and safeguard it from outside influences. Most importantly, Ben Ali expressed his rejection of any form of religious extremism or fanaticism.59 Ben Ali was able to open a dialogue with the MTI leaders by offering several programs to enhance the value of Islam in Tunisia. Among these programs were the creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to oversee all aspects of religious life in Tunisia, the founding of the Institute for Islamic Studies in Kairouan, and making the Zaytouna independent of the secular educational establishment.60

Ben Ali carried out a dialogue with the MTI on the condition that they change their name, because the Ittijāh al-İslāmī meant that the rest of the Tunisian population did
not follow the Islamic path. Abdelfattah Mourou indicated that the movement will call itself Hezb al-Nahda (the Renaissance Party). Moreover, Mourou indicated that the next step in the Islamist agenda would be to legalize the Party and allow it to publish a newspaper. Mourou stressed that his organization was willing to support and legitimize the new government. He explained:

Our Party does not seek to change the present political equilibrium. We will be happy to obtain ten to fifteen seats in the National Assembly in the upcoming three legislatures. . . . Our Party is needed for the stability of the country. It would be useless and dangerous to try to create an erroneous party with Islamic inspiration to counter Hizb al-Nahda.

Future prospects of mosque-state relations in Tunisia remain to be seen. Since the events of November 7, 1988, which ended Bourguiiba's thirty-two year rule, Tunisia seems to be stable. The economic issues need to be addressed by the new administration. The relative newness of Ben Ali's regime does not give sufficient time in which to evaluate it. Insufficient evidence about the nature of the new regime imposes barriers to investigation. At this stage, the researcher cannot be overly confident about many of the specific details concerning mosque-state relations in Tunisia, since it has not yet evolved into its final shape.

In retrospect, one might ask the following questions: How can Bourguiiba's contribution to the development of Tunisia be evaluated? Did his vision of "authentic Islam"
fail? Did this vision accomplish development, since Bourguiba's regime lasted for thirty-three years? The specific importance of the Tunisian case, Charles A. Micaud argued, "is that the pattern of development there helps clarify the entire process of modernization." Micaud emphasized, "A modern society cannot be defined only in terms of its technology or its social and political structures if the definition is to capture all aspects of the achievements for which the new countries are striving." The Tunisian experience under Bourguiba's leadership presents a broader hypothesis that is probably applicable and relevant to most developing nations. Indeed, the socio-political development has been accomplished in Tunisia. For a thirty-three year period Tunisia witnessed stability based on a one-party system that was the vehicle of the modernization task. If Bourguiba's vision of "authentic Islam" was unsuccessful, the system could not have lasted for so long. Two major elements brought about the disruption of the system. The first was Bourguiba's age and illness; and second, a difficult economic situation plagued primarily by the lack of natural resources to accommodate the educated and culturally emancipated human resources.

Proponents of development as function of participation, discussed in Chapter I, might argue that the problem posed by Tunisia stemmed from the fact that participation occurred
only on paper since it was not coupled with an electoral process that gave the participating electorate a choice. As explained earlier in the chapter, Bourguiba maintained that the first step in development consists of educating the people to be responsible citizens and to carry out their duties in a democratic environment with awareness.

This aspect of Bourguiba's view of development fits into Samuel P. Huntington's definition of development, that is, the necessity temporarily to constrain new groups in developing societies from participation in the political process in the early stages of nation-building in order to avoid violence, corruption, and political decay. Limiting the number of political parties in the first stages of development, Huntington argued, would secure constancy and stability. In this context, the Neo-Destour Party functioned as the organizer of legitimacy and the provider of stability.

It was Bourguiba's "authentic" vision of Islam that awakened Tunisians and freed them from superstitious beliefs and decadent traditions. The task of Ben Ali is to energize the economy and find a solution to the problems facing the new generations.

In conclusion, one can argue that Tunisia, according to Walt W. Rostow's theory of development, is at the "take-off" stage (the third) of development. Bourguiba's modernist and desacralized views led the country to this stage. It remains to be seen if the new administration will be able to
accomplish "maturity" through the development of sciences and technology.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined a variety of specific Sunni models of state-mosque relations in the Middle East. The countries chosen for analysis were Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and especially Tunisia.

Three fundamental similarities characterize these nation-states. First, all of them have to face and resolve the question of the role of religion (namely, Sunni Islam) in the operation of their respective political systems. Political elites in these countries (except Turkey) are convinced they can discover a pattern or formula that somehow combines their cherished Islamic heritage and the principals of modern political development. The same challenge, of course, faces other developing states, both inside and outside the Islamic community.

The second similarity that can be identified among these Sunni countries is that all are engaged in the process of national development. The third characteristic is the salience of the concept of "legitimacy" grounded in religious sources or values on which the stability of these systems ultimately depends.

The principal generalization resulting from this analysis is that each of the models exemplified by the four cases examined presented different answers to these questions. To recapitulate: after the essentials of the Islamic faith were identified, the study began by focusing
on the case of Egypt, illustrating the model of "parallel" or "symbiotic" relationship of state and mosque. The revolution of 1952 was and remained secular in orientation. The secularist pattern adopted by Egypt was, however, milder in form than in Turkey; it consisted of gradual encroachment of the state upon spheres traditionally operated by the Ulama. Indeed, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak had a "modernist" (but not a secularist) view of the role of Islam in the political arena to fit the requirements of a modernizing state. Political opposition in Egypt has emanated principally from religious revivalists--most conspicuously the Muslim Brotherhood--who have impaired the political stability of Egypt for years. To date, the opposition has not succeeded in displacing the regime.

The second case examined was Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of the Islamic religion, illustrates the model of "partnership" or "fusion" of temporal and spiritual realms--a fundamental tenet of the Islamic religion. The traditional alliance between the royal House of Saud and the puritanical Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam provided the Saudi nation with a unique model of state-mosque relations, where the religious authorities play a primary role in promulgating policies and in implementing them.

The third case was that of secularized Turkey. Since World War I, Turkey has been at the forefront of development in the Middle East. The outstanding fact about
Turkey's secular model is Ataturk's sweeping and radical reforms that sought to transform Turkey into a Westernized nation and to break all ties with the Arabo-Islamic culture. Ataturk eliminated religious influence on the political process, leaving religious a matter of private conscience. His scheme did not involve a separation between state and mosque but rather a government takeover of all domains traditionally regulated by religion. Yet it is crucial to remember that in his endeavors, Ataturk was a Turk and not an Arab. He was admired by Arabo-Muslim political elites, but no other Middle Eastern nation in the modern period has dared to emulate him. Recent events in Turkey, principally the religious revivalist movements, have called into serious question the future of Ataturk's secular policies.

The case of Sunni Tunisia presents a unique model of mosque-state relations: "authentic Islam developed by Bourguiba. In Chapter VII, the analysis focused upon the components of Bourguiba's vision which called primarily for an Islam purified of excesses and superstitions. Bourguiba maintained that one can be both modern and a good Muslim. The Tunisian model proved for a thirty-three-year period that a nation can adapt the essentials of Islam to the process of development. Moreover, the case of Sunni Tunisia indicates the importance of favorable economic conditions to the success of any political program.

The major major differences among the Islamic countries

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examined in this dissertation relate to the role of the ulama or recognized religious authorities in the political sphere. In this context, the religious establishment legitimized the political system.

As was emphasized in the introductory chapter, in the literature dealing with political development, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of religious systems and values in the process of political development. As explained earlier, among development theorists, three main schools of thought on the question may be identified. Some development theorists largely ignore religion altogether as an element in the development process. This fact strongly suggests that their model of "development" is derived from western experience. They view development as an inherently secular process.

A second group is essentially hostile to religion and views it as a barrier to development. Within this category, two important subgroups may be identified: the communists, advocating the elimination of religion altogether; and non-Marxist secularists, who call for strict disengagement or separation of church and state, leaving religion a matter of private conscience. It is important to point out that Lenin, a major spokesman for the Marxist tradition, recognized the potency of religion in underdeveloped third-world countries and cautioned against the neglect of traditional aspects in these societies.
The third group of commentators regards religion and tradition as a positive tool that has to be taken into account in any satisfactory theory of political development. As the evidence presented in this study suggests, the first two schools of development theory, identifying secularism with development, are not applicable to an influential group of Islamic states. By most criteria, the Saudi political system or Egyptian pattern of parallel development are reasonably successful in the sense that their regimes are legitimate and have the support of both spiritual and temporal authorities. In these two countries, the religious and political elites are cooperating to create better conditions for the citizens, and by some standards at least, these efforts have succeeded.

In Turkey, the recent Islamic revival suggests that some kind of religiously conferred legitimacy is still needed for the military regime or civilian leaders to achieve genuine stability.

The dissertation thesis finds "its happiest home" in the third school of development theory. Its basic premise is that religion not infrequently has a crucial impact on the process of modernization. The case studies were chosen with this hypothesis in mind, and the evidence presented in them confirms this assumption. It is the overall conclusion of the enquiry is that religion does indeed play a highly influential part in the development process of Islamic
nations. The question whether religion is a negative or positive force in the development process remains to be answered authoritatively. The evidence presented in the case studies is clearly mixed. Egypt and Saudi Arabia indicate that religion has played a positive role in the development process according to the criterion of legitimacy, which is a fundamental prerequisite for stability.

In order to understand the future of social and political forces in the developing Islamic countries, it is crucial to realize that the regions that make up the Islamic world remain distinct from one another. The only element perhaps that is common to them is that they are members of the Islamic community. That is, Islam played a significant part in shaping their identity. However, the impact of the Islamic faith was but one of many forces affecting the history and traditions of these nations long before the advent of Islam and even after the Islamic period began.

It is beyond the scope of this study to redefine the concept of "national development." However, the implications of the case studies examined here call into question the traditional conceptions and definitions of development, especially those equating secularism with modernization. It is clear that at least for one group of third-world countries a defensible theory of political development must accommodate the existence of deeply held religious values.
that will influence directly the political processes and institutions of a modern state.
Footnotes

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58 Ibid.
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69 Beer, Modern Political Development, p. 87.
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33 Ibid.
35 Jansen, *Militant Islam*, p. 17 [Italics in the original].
37 Ibid.
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Chapter V

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Chapter VI


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Chapter VII


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28 Bourguiba's speech on November 2, 1970 in Carthage. Translation mine from French.


32 Ibid.

33 Bourguiba, My Life, p. 68.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., p. 69.

36 Bourguiba's speech on March 18, 1974. Translation mine from French.

37 Ibid. Translation mine from French.

38 Interview with Touhami Negra conducted in Person on June 7, 1987. Negra is the author of Realty of Islam and the Threats of the New Age [Al-Wakiu Al-Islami wa Tahaddiyat Al-Asr] (Tunis: Bureau of Economic and Social Research, n.d.); and Human Rights Between the Reality of Practice and
the Recommendations of Religion [Huquq al-Insan Bayna Ouakii al-Mudarasah wa Taalim al-Adyan] (Tunis: Bureau of Economic and Social Research, n.d.). Negra presented many lectures where he compared Christianity to Islam, stressing the need for communication among all religions to address the issues posed by modern-day developments.


40 Ibid., p. 123.

41 Bourguiba quoted in Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 124

43 Bourguiba, Speech on October 1, 1957.

44 Bourguiba, Speech on December 5, 1957.


46 Bourguiba, Speech on April 26, 1966. Translation mine from French.


51 Ibid., p. 656.


53 "Min Aj1 al-Hurriat; min Aj1 Huquq al-Insan," Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, pp. 40-48. This pamphlet among others was distributed only to members and sympathizers of the MTI organization. The author acquired
them through connections within the movement.

54 Slogan shouted by Lycee (high school) students during demonstrations, quoted in Susan Waltz, "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia," p. 661.

55 Ibid., p. 663.

56 Ibid.


59 "Wafa Li Asalatina Al-Arabia Al-Islamia," ("Our Faithfulness to our Arabic and Islamic roots"), a pamphlet published by Ben Ali's administration outlining his vision of Islam for Tunisia. Translation mine from Arabic.

60 Al horria, December 18, 1988. Translation mine from Arabic.

61 Interview with Abdellatif Mourou, published in Realites (from 1-27-89 to 2-2-89), pp. 4-6.


63 Ibid.
Bourguiba, Habib. Speeches:

October 1, 1957.
December 5, 1957.
April 28, 1963, in Gabes.
December 28, 1963, in Monastir.
October 21, 1964, in Bizerte.
October 25, 1964, in Gafsa.
November 20, 1964, in Tunis.
February 21, 1965, in Cairo.
October 29, 1965, in Le Bardo.
August 13, 1965, in Monastir.
April 26, 1966, in Carthage.
June 22, 1966, in Carthage.
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October 27, 1966, Le Bardo.
October 31, 1966, Beni Khedeche.
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October 2, 1967, in Carthage.
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March 22, 1969, in Carthage.
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October 11, 1971, in Monastir.
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June 15, 1972, in Rabat.
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