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Wade Hampton and the rhetoric of race: A study of the speaking of Wade Hampton on the race issue in South Carolina, 1865–1878

Jones, DeWitt Grant, Ph.D.
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WADE HAMPTON AND THE RHETORIC OF RACE:
A STUDY OF THE SPEAKING OF WADE HAMPTON ON
THE RACE ISSUE IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865-1878

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
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requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech Communication,
Theatre, and Communication Disorders

by

DeWitt Grant Jones
B.A., Bob Jones University, 1965
M.A., Bob Jones University, 1967
May 1988
To my wife
Kathryn
and our children
Kathryn
Kristen
Kevin
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ABSTRACT

This study examined the racial rhetoric of Wade Hampton with particular attention to claims that he was a moderate and sought to solve the racial problems of the period through rhetorical means. The study investigated: (1) the extent to which his speeches addressed the racial issue, (2) the consistency of his position, and (3) the nature and appropriateness of his appeals. State newspapers were examined to locate his speeches, which were categorized by period and subject. Examination of the data revealed four specific racial exigencies to which Hampton responded: (1) the loss of black labor (1865-66), (2) black suffrage (1867-68), (3) black political domination (1876), and (4) proscription of black political participation (1877-78). His gubernatorial campaign of 1876 and representative responses to each exigence were critiqued using the methodology of the rhetorical situation. The speeches were analyzed in terms of exigence, audience, constraints, and appropriateness.

The following conclusions were drawn: (1) over ninety percent of Hampton's reported speeches 1865-1878 addressed the racial exigence. (2) His speeches were remarkably consistent with one another and with his private
correspondence. (3) Hampton envisioned a white controlled society with blacks performing most of the labor while enjoying legal equality, educational opportunity, and possibilities for political office. To achieve that end he asked whites to recognize the new political realities, treat the blacks with kindness and fairness, and grant them legal and political rights and privileges. To the blacks, he appealed to their sense of identification as southern men and contended that economically they were inextricably linked to the fate of the native whites. To audiences black and white his ethos was his most dominant appeal. Throughout the period he sought rhetorical rather than violent means for modifying the exigencies. His speeches reveal an approach to the racial issue that was pragmatic and moderate.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem and Justification

C. Vann Woodward in Origins of the New South: 1877-1913 labels Wade Hampton as "one of the foremost spokesmen of the South during the post Civil War period."\(^1\) Huber Ellingsworth in his study of "Southern Reconciliation Orators in the North, 1868-1899," identifies Wade Hampton as one of the four most prominent southerners to speak in the North on the reconciliation theme.\(^2\) These observations logically raised the question of the actual nature and extent of Hampton's speaking in the South, and most especially in his native state, South Carolina. Preliminary investigations indicated that while historians of the Reconstruction era in South Carolina concurred in the significance of his role, referred to his persuasive campaigns, and quoted from his speeches, no one had done a study of Hampton's speaking in South Carolina. In fact, the


\(^2\)Huber Ellingsworth, "Southern Reconciliation Orators in the North, 1868-1899" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1955), 103.
only study of any of Hampton's speaking was Ellingsworth's which was limited to three speeches delivered in the North.

While the whole of Wade Hampton's speaking career could profitably be studied, the racial issue was of such critical importance in the period and so dominant in his rhetoric that it deserved to be isolated and studied apart from his other speeches. Hampton's involvement with the racial-political conflict in South Carolina is noted by all who study Reconstruction in South Carolina, but Hampton Jarrell is the only historian to concentrate exclusively on that involvement. In *Wade Hampton and the Negro* he identifies Hampton with the policies of Lincoln, Johnson, and L. Q. C. Lamar, and argues that Hampton sought a middle road in race relations between black dominance on the one hand and proscription on the other. This claim toward moderation in his racial position gains significance in light of Ellingsworth's claim that Hampton was attempting through his rhetoric to bring reconciliation between North and South. Jarrell further observes that he chose to focus his study of race relations "around the personality of Wade Hampton because throughout the period he was at the center of the conflict." Thus, it seems profitable to focus this study of Wade Hampton's speaking on the issue on which he was at

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4 Ibid., xi.
"the center of the conflict," and which he claimed to be attempting to solve through persuasion rather than coercion.

As early as 1865-67 Wade Hampton spoke to both white and black audiences in an attempt to influence race relations. In the 1876 gubernatorial campaign he publicly disavowed violence and advocated free speech. Judge T. J. Mackey, a converted radical, said there were

three methods of dealing with the Negro voters--three methods: one is to kill him. . . . The next method is to defraud the Negro of his vote. . . . The last is the persuasive method. . . . This is the Hampton method, and by it thousands of Negroes have been induced to . . . vote the Democratic ticket.5

Ben Tillman, Hampton's opponent in the 1890's, derided Hampton for his naive belief in the power of persuasion:

He [Hampton] blundered egregiously in urging the policy of persuasion; and of convincing the Negroes by argument to vote with us. He always maintained that sixteen thousand Negroes voted for him in 1876; but every active worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully mistaken. . . . Gary preached the only effective doctrine for the times: that "one ounce of fear was worth a pound of persuasion," and was prepared and did ride roughshod over the Negroes.6

Thus, the study of Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric clearly offers the rhetorical critic the opportunity to study the attempt of a man who by his own testimony as well as that of his contemporaries sought a rhetorical solution to one of the most volatile continuing problems in American history.

5Greenville Enterprise and Mountaineer, 21 April 1880.

This study will examine the racial rhetoric of Wade Hampton in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878. The lower date was chosen since it represented the beginning of a new relationship between the races in the South, and the upper date since it marked Hampton's accession to the United States Senate and the end of his significant involvement in the race issue. The study will attempt to answer the following questions: (1) to what extent were Hampton's speeches in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878 concerned with the race issue; (2) what arguments and strategies did he employ to deal with the racial situation; (3) did his position and strategies remain consistent throughout the period; (4) to what extent did Hampton practice and encourage rhetorical means for solving the race problem as opposed to more coercive methods; (5) to what extent did Hampton's speeches offer a constructive solution to the problem of race relations in South Carolina; and (6) what was the apparent impact of Hampton's racial rhetoric.

Material and Methods

The concept of the "rhetorical situation" as developed by Lloyd Bitzer seemed to offer the best methodology for analyzing Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric. Bitzer defines rhetorical situation as a "complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so
constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence."\textsuperscript{7} In his detailed explication and extension of the theory, John Patton notes the importance of the role of perception in the situational theory and concludes that "the situational theory offers a way to explain and evaluate perceptions in terms of the accuracy and clarity with which they reflect observable, historical features of situations and the constructive potential of the responses to which they may lead for the solution of genuine problems."\textsuperscript{8}

Prior to the Civil War Wade Hampton had been only modestly involved in politics and had acquired no reputation as a speaker. After the war, however, Hampton spoke before audiences black and white in an effort to influence racial relations in South Carolina. The application of the methodology of the rhetorical situation allows the critic to see Hampton's speeches after the war as a response to an exigence, and to evaluate his perception of the exigence as well as the nature and quality of his response.

The first step in executing the study was to acquire an understanding of the historiographical problems surrounding the Reconstruction era. Second was the reading


\textsuperscript{8}John H. Patton, "Causation and Creativity in Rhetorical Situations: Distinctions and Implications," Quarterly Journal of Speech 65 (February 1979): 54-55.
of general sources on the South, from after the Civil War until the turn of the century, and on Reconstruction in South Carolina. In addition to the comprehensive *South Carolina During Reconstruction* by Francis Simkins and Robert Woody, the following works were of value to the study: Hampton Jarrell's *Wade Hampton and the Negro*; William Cooper, Jr.'s *The Conservative Regime: South Carolina 1877-1890*; George Tindall's *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900*; Thomas Holt's *Black over White: Negro Political Leadership in South Carolina During Reconstruction*; and Joel Williamson's *After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-1877*. Most of the Hampton biographies were eulogistic in nature and of little value. All references in the secondary sources to speeches by Hampton were noted for further research in the newspapers.

From the *Charleston News and Courier* (1865-1878), the *Columbia Daily Phoenix* (1866-1875) and the *Columbia Daily Register* (1875-1878) references to speeches and speech texts were obtained. Hampton's papers were consulted for any additional references to speeches, comments about his speeches, and expressions of his attitude and strategies toward the racial problem. The speeches were then classified according to date, location, occasion, racial mix of the audience, and subject. To develop the nature of the exigence and the attitudes of the audience, manuscript collections of key individuals, convention proceedings,
diaries, government investigations into the Ku Klux outrages and the 1876 election, newspapers, and published accounts of events by participants were consulted.

Once the nature of the exigence and the attitude of the audience were established, a decision had to be made whether to analyze a single representative response to the exigence or a synthesis of all of his responses to the situation. A combination of the two procedures was employed. On the economic exigence in 1865 and the suffrage issue in 1867, single speeches existed that clearly and fully represented his response to the problem. In the defense of his policies in 1878, two speeches were so frequently cited by the press and historians as key responses by Hampton that both were deemed necessary to adequately represent his views, especially since they were delivered to different audiences in divergent sections of the state. For the campaign of 1876 there was no one speech that stood above the others as the embodiment of all his appeals; thus, the campaign was analyzed as a whole with an emphasis on those speeches for which reasonably verbatim texts were available, and which were given in different parts of the state. Once the selection process was completed, the various appeals were analyzed and evaluated in terms of the appropriateness of Hampton's response to the exigence. Responses across the period were then compared for consistency.
Organization

The reporting of the investigation is organized around the four exigencies of the racial problem to which Wade Hampton responded.

Chapter II places the racial speaking of Hampton into perspective and reveals the extent to which his addresses were devoted to the racial issue. It attempts to trace the movement and speaking of Hampton in general terms throughout the period 1865-1878.

Chapter III identifies the first racial exigence as economic and analyzes his response in the Richland Fork address.

Chapter IV focuses on the issue of unrestricted suffrage for the blacks and examines his freedmen's address to an audience of blacks in Columbia, South Carolina in 1867.

Chapter V examines the campaign of 1876 as a response to black domination of the state. Hampton's canvass is evaluated with particular concern for the claims made by some members of his party that the election had been won, not through persuasion, but by violence and intimidation.

Chapter VI isolates Hampton's response to the attack upon his racial policies by some elements of the Democratic party. His Blackville and Greenville addresses are analyzed as two of his most direct and forceful replies.

Chapter VII provides a summary of the chapters and a general conclusion for the study.
CHAPTER II
THE RHETOR

The purpose of this chapter is not to develop a short biography of Wade Hampton nor to consider his education in rhetoric nor the development of his rhetorical skills. The chapter seeks rather to answer the question of the extent to which Hampton incorporated the race issue into his rhetoric from immediately after the Civil War until his election to the United States Senate in December of 1878. Since each of the analytical chapters focuses rather narrowly on specific speeches in response to the immediate exigence, this chapter will attempt to provide a broader perspective on his movement and speaking during the period.

1865-1875

Wade Hampton's speaking from after the war until his nomination for governor in August of 1876 divides nicely into two distinct phases: The politically active period from 1865 to 1869, and the more personal period from 1869 to 1876.

From 1865 until 1869, Hampton took an active, visible role in South Carolina politics. He was elected to the constitutional convention called by Governor Perry in
September of 1865, though he was notified of his election too late to attend.\(^1\) In the October gubernatorial election, despite repeated statements that he did not want to be governor, Hampton came within 743 votes of defeating James L. Orr.\(^2\) Hampton's desire to stay out of office and attend to personal affairs is indicated by the voting of his home district of Richland County; not only did they vote Orr for governor by more than a ten to one margin,\(^3\) they also did not elect Hampton to represent them in the new legislature.\(^4\)

Though he held no office, he was active in expressing his views in speeches and published letters. In July 1866 he was elected as one of four vice presidents at the state convention of the National Union Convention, but he was not selected to go to Philadelphia as a delegate to the national gathering.\(^5\)

With his address in March of 1867 to the freedmen in Columbia, Hampton began a period of active influence that continued through 1868 and was not to be matched until his campaign for governor in 1876. From March until August he

\(^1\)Columbia Daily Phoenix, 15, 27 September 1865.

\(^2\)Charleston Daily Courier, 18 October 1865; Columbia Daily Phoenix, 24 November 1865.

\(^3\)Columbia Daily Phoenix, 29 November 1865.

\(^4\)John Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, 1865-1877 (Columbia: The State, 1905), 21-22.

\(^5\)Columbia Daily Phoenix, 1 August 1866.
actively worked to gain control of the black vote.\textsuperscript{6} His efforts were a total failure, and in November he was elected vice president of a convention of conservatives which met in Columbia to protest the political power put into the hands of the blacks by the Reconstruction Acts.\textsuperscript{7}

Unable to control the black vote he turned his efforts to ousting the radicals and putting a friendly Democratic administration into power in Washington. In April of 1868 he was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the state Democratic party, and in June made a delegate to the national convention.\textsuperscript{8} He was a prominent figure at the convention\textsuperscript{9} and his role on the platform committee became a source of continuing controversy when he claimed shortly after the convention: "I then added the clause which you will find embodied in the platform: 'and we declare that the Reconstruction Acts are unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void.' That is my plank in the platform."\textsuperscript{10}

Judging from newspaper reports, Hampton's most active period of speaking during the ten years between the end of the war and his campaign for governor took place from July


\textsuperscript{7}\textit{Columbia Daily Phoenix}, 7, 8 November 1868.

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{Charleston Daily Courier}, 10 June 1868.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid, 7, 11 July 1868.

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Columbia Daily Phoenix}, 26 July 1868.
through October of 1868. During these months Hampton spoke at Democratic rallies throughout the state. The Columbia Phoenix mentioned speeches by Wade Hampton in Charleston, Columbia, Greenville, Anderson, Marion, Sumter, and Walhalla. The fall election and the rout of the Democratic party by the radicals ended the early period of Hampton's active political involvement.

Hampton Jarrell notes:

After 1868, Wade Hampton retired from active involvement in South Carolina politics, except some activity in 1870 in a fusion campaign headed by M. C. Butler. Though he was in and out of the state during the eight years 1868-1876, most of his time was spent with his plantation in Mississippi.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that, because he was out of the state much of the time and not openly involved in political affairs, he was not involved at all. His letters to Armistead Burt, John Mullaly and James Conner were filled with political advice and strategy.

From 1869 until 1876 his energies were spent in an effort to restore the health of his wife and his fortune. Prior to the war he was the head of one of the wealthiest families in the South and perhaps the nation. At the time

11Ibid, 26 July; 15, 21 August; 9 September; 10, 11 October 1868.

12Jarrell, 34-35.

of his death in 1835 Wade Hampton I was reported to be the wealthiest man in the 22 United States."\textsuperscript{14} Under Wade Hampton II, Millwood, the family home outside of Columbia, and one of three Hampton plantations, was the "mecca for South Carolina's aristocracy, as well as for politicians. . . . The mansion's guest wings always were filled when the legislature was in session, and it was at Millwood's dinner table that most of the governors were chosen."\textsuperscript{15} At the outbreak of the war Wade Hampton had approximately nine hundred slaves at his personal plantation in Mississippi and together the family had at least three thousand.\textsuperscript{16} After Sherman's passage through Columbia two lonely corinthian columns were all that remained of the once magnificent Millwood. In May of 1866, Hampton wrote, "My reputation is the only thing that I have left and I am jealous of its preservation."\textsuperscript{17} On December 4, 1868, he filed voluntary bankruptcy proceedings in Jackson, Mississippi, listing liabilities of one million dollars and assets of entirely mortgaged properties. Ten months later two remaining Hampton residences in Columbia, Diamond Hill and Southern


\textsuperscript{15}Ibid, 174.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid, 211.

\textsuperscript{17}Wade Hampton to Chancellor Carver, 25 May 1866, Wade Hampton Papers.
Cross, were sold at public auction. Hampton was the sole bidder for Southern Cross, purchasing it for one hundred dollars.\(^{18}\) In a letter to James Conner in April of 1869, he clearly indicated his concern about his financial matters. "You will be glad to hear," he wrote, "that I have been able to put matters in such shape as to give me reasonable ground to hope that I may in time pay off my debts. The hope of my life is to do this and I shall devote all my energies to its accomplishment."\(^{19}\)

To increase his chances for paying off his debts, in the fall of 1871, he accepted a position as vice president in the insurance company of J. W. Davis.\(^{20}\) Because of his new position, Hampton indicated in the same letter that he intended to move his family to Baltimore for the winter. It is difficult to pinpoint Hampton's exact location and activities over the next few years. Various pieces of correspondence show him dwelling at different times in Baltimore, Wildwoods, and Columbia, with most of his time apparently divided between Wildwoods and Baltimore. From the spring of 1873, until her death in March of 1874, much of his time was spent caring for his sick wife in Charlottesville, Virginia.

\(^{18}\)Meynard, 255-56.

\(^{19}\)Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade Hampton Papers.

During this period there is no record of Hampton delivering a single political address, though he did deliver a number of ceremonial speeches. In 1871, he addressed the Society of Confederate Soldiers and Sailors on the "Life and Character of General Robert E. Lee." Notices in 1873 in the Wilmington (North Carolina) Star and the Augusta Constitutionalist advertised that General Hampton would be speaking in each city on General Lee and that proceeds from the speeches would go into the Lee Memorial Fund. Though the evidence is not conclusive, it seems highly probable that Hampton delivered this address numerous times throughout the South on behalf of the fund. The only speech during this period that has relevance for this study is his 1869 address at the Macon (Georgia) Fair in which he dealt at length with the new role of black labor.

During the politically active years from 1865 through 1868, it is possible to identify fifteen occasions on which Hampton was the major speaker. Of these fifteen, texts are available for eight. The seven for which no texts are available are all campaign speeches given at Democratic rallies during the late summer and fall of 1868. About these campaign speeches, two assumptions seem reasonable:


22Wilmington Star in Charleston Daily Courier, 20 February 1873; and Augusta Constitutionalist in Charleston Daily Courier, 22 January 1873.
(1) he delivered more than the seven reported in the papers; and (2) they dealt in part at least with the racial question, since that was the predominant issue at the time. Of the eight for which texts are available, one was given to a predominantly black audience (1867 freedmen's address), one was given to a racially mixed audience (1865 Richland Fork address), and one to a northern audience (1868 Union Square address). The others were delivered to predominantly southern white audiences. In five of the eight speeches Hampton made at least one reference to the race issue. In his commencement address at Washington College, his speech to the citizens of Charleston after his return from the Democratic convention, and his address to the Richland County Democratic club, there were no references to race. Among the five that contained racial references the most extensive development of the subject occurred in the freedmen's address and the Richland Fork speech. While the other three contained significant references to race, it was clearly not the dominant theme.

From 1869 until his campaign for governor in 1876, there was only one reference to a speech by Hampton dealing with race, the 1869 address to the Georgia State Fair at Macon. His other speeches were ceremonial and contained no mention of race.
1876-1878

In June of 1876 Hampton returned to South Carolina from Mississippi to attend the Centennial Celebration at Fort Moultrie. Martin Gary had also been in Charleston that weekend to advocate a straightout Democratic ticket for the fall election. By accident Hampton and Gary departed Charleston on the same train, and while traveling together discussed the political situation in South Carolina. Recognizing in Hampton a man who could unite the various factions of the party, Gary persuaded Wade Hampton to accept the nomination for governor on a straightout ticket. Following the conversation Hampton went to his mountain home in Cashiers, North Carolina and remained there until the state convention in August.

Beginning with the convention and continuing through the election of 1878, Hampton engaged in the most extensive speaking on the racial issue of his entire career. During the 1876 canvass, which started on September 2 and concluded November 6, Hampton, by his own testimony, spoke twice in every county in the state with the exception of Lexington, for a total of approximately fifty-seven speeches at large

23Congress, House, Select Committee on the Recent Election in South Carolina, Testimony on the Recent Election in South Carolina, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1877, 331.


25Recent Election in South Carolina, 331.
meetings. The major theme of these addresses was the racial issue. In his December inaugural address he devoted a significant portion to reiterating his racial position and acknowledging his debt to the blacks for their support.

Since the first three months of 1877 were occupied with the political maneuvering between Wade Hampton and Daniel Chamberlain for recognition as the rightful governor of the state, it is not surprising that there is no evidence of any major speeches being delivered by Hampton. When he returned in April from his Washington conference with President Hayes, he delivered a short but important speech, assuring the people that he would be their governor and renewing his commitment to an equitable racial policy. Other major addresses within the state were given later in April at Charleston and at the Darlington County Fair in November. In all of these speeches his racial policy was the prominent theme.

During the summer and fall, Hampton traveled extensively outside of South Carolina. From the middle of June until the middle of July, he traveled to New York state. From the middle of August until early September, he was in Virginia and Washington, and for two weeks in the middle of


27 Charleston News and Courier, 14 December 1876.

28 Ibid, 19 April; 5 November 1877.
September, he was on an excursion to Illinois. On the New York trip, he was the featured speaker for the celebration in Auburn of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Shields Guard, a New York National Guard Company. General Shields was his good friend from before the war. In his speech, Hampton made direct reference to the recent election and his approach to the blacks. The July trip included a major address at Greenbriar, West Virginia, to a gathering of troops from both Virginias. The focus of the speech was upon national reconciliation, and it included only a passing reference to the battle in South Carolina for "the equal rights of all under the constitution."

The September trip to Illinois involved more speeches than either of the previous two excursions. The main occasion was an address to the Winnebago County Fair in Rockford, Illinois. He did not develop the racial issue, but spoke again on the broad themes of national reconciliation. On his return trip he joined President Hayes' traveling party and delivered addresses in Louisville, Kentucky; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Atlanta, Georgia. The ones in Louisville and Chattanooga had no references to race and were basically praise for Hayes' policies. The Atlanta

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29 Ibid, 21, 25 June 1877; for analysis of the speech see Ellingsworth, 104-29.

30 Charleston News and Courier, 20 August 1877.

31 Ibid, 17 September 1877; for a detailed analysis of the speech see Ellingsworth, 104-29.
speech occurred after he had separated from President Hayes, and was an unscheduled affair. He had planned only to spend the night and travel on to Columbia, but Georgia officials successfully prevailed upon him to stay over and deliver an address to the people of Atlanta. The speech focused on two related themes: (1) the recent campaign in South Carolina, with an emphasis on his approach to the blacks, and (2) the statesmanlike conduct of President Hayes.\footnote{Ibid, 24 September 1877.} In addition to these three extended excursions, Hampton also took a short trip in mid-October to Raleigh, North Carolina, to speak at the State Fair. He did not deal with the race issue.\footnote{Ibid, 20 October 1877.} Of these seven major addresses delivered outside the state the race issue was only developed in two of them, probably because he chose to deal with broad national reconciliation themes, rather than the narrower issue of the race problem in South Carolina.

In sharp contrast to 1877, most of Hampton's speaking in 1878 was within the state and on the racial issue. Out of twenty-eight speeches for which at least a summary is available, the platform of 1876 and his policies toward blacks were mentioned in all but two. The two exceptions were a Washington's birthday address to the Washington Light Infantry reunion in which he limited himself to war themes, and a speech in Pickens which dealt with what was a critical
problem for them at that moment, the revenue issue. In the instance of the Washington's birthday speech, Hampton did address the racial issue later the same day. At a reception for the occasion, he strongly appealed for adherence to his racial policies.  

In the spring of 1878 Hampton reaffirmed to the Democratic congressional caucus his commitment to the platform of 1876 and the pledges he had made to the blacks. Shortly thereafter he took that commitment on a speaking tour through the up-state with speeches in Anderson, Newberry, Abbeville, and numerous short impromptu speeches at locations between. In late April and June, he delivered ceremonial addresses at the Old Fort celebration in Ninety-Six, the Aiken Schuetzenfest, and at the commencement exercises of all black Claflin University. Though he adapted to the occasion in each instance he still incorporated his commitment to moderate racial policies into each one.

His two strongest racial speeches, in which he clearly enunciated his views and denounced the racial extremists in the Democratic party, were given during the summer and early fall at Blackville in the lower part of South Carolina,

34 Ibid, 25 February; 23 September 1878.
36 Ibid, 27, 29 March; 1, 11 April 1878.
37 Columbia Daily Register, 26 April, 16, 19 June 1878.
and at Greenville, in the upper portion of the state. The election canvass began in Edgefield, shortly after the state Democratic convention, and then moved to Spartanburg. At that point Hampton became ill and had to retire to his mountain retreat for about a month of recuperation. In mid-September, he returned to the canvass with his Greenville address as well as a few others in the upper and middle sections of the state.38 He closed the canvass with an unusually strong effort in the predominantly black counties in the lower part of the state.39 The year ended with an overwhelming victory for Wade Hampton and the Democratic party,40 his election to the United States Senate, and a tragic hunting accident that cost him a leg and left him incapacitated for several months.41

When Wade Hampton went to the United States Senate in 1879, he left behind him in South Carolina the racial conflict in which he had so long been engaged. His policies were in place and men of his choosing in power. In 1880 he used his power to squelch the gubernatorial bid of his political nemesis Martin Gary, and thus William Cooper, Jr.,

38Ibid., 13 August, 21, 24, 28 September 1878; and Charleston News and Courier, 19 August; 20, 23 September; 1 October 1878.

39Columbia Daily Register, 6 October 1878; and Charleston News and Courier, 3, 4, 12, 22, 29, 31 October 1878.

40Simkins and Woody, 548.

41Jarrell, 151-52.
concludes, "with both party and state safe, Hampton no longer felt called upon to take an active role in state affairs." He remained in the Senate until ousted by Ben Tillman in 1890. With the exception of a speech on black emigration in 1890, he ceased speaking on the racial issue once he went to the Senate.

Throughout the period of a little more than thirteen years, three dominant themes emerged in his speaking. The Lost Cause theme recurred in his many ceremonial addresses, particularly those given to various veteran's gatherings. The theme of national reconciliation and harmony appeared strongly in speeches outside of the state and to a lesser degree in those within South Carolina. Because of the three political campaigns of 1868, 1876, and 1878, in which he was totally involved, and in which race was the major issue, this theme became by far the dominant one in his speaking from 1865 through 1878.

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CHAPTER III

RICHLAND FORK ADDRESS AS RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC EXIGENCE

Exigence

Lloyd F. Bitzer in his article, "Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective," defines exigence as "an imperfection marked by some degree of urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something to be corrected. It is necessarily related to interests and valuations."¹ The exigence is rhetorical when it is "capable of positive modification and where such modification requires or invites messages that engage audiences who can modify those exigencies through their mediating thought, judgment or action."² What then was the urgent imperfection that Wade Hampton sought to modify through rhetoric, and was the perceived imperfection capable of positive modification through discourse?

Unquestionably the dominant exigence in the southern mind during the immediate post Civil War years and perhaps,


²Ibid., 27.
arguably, until the present was the new relationship that existed between whites and blacks. With the end of the war came the end of a way of life. During the spring and summer of 1865 some 400,000 pieces of property in South Carolina suddenly became free men and women.³ While the overriding exigence was the new role of the blacks, urgency was expressed through a variety of concerns that generally revolved around economic and political issues.

The first shockwave from the emancipation of the slaves was economic. The slaves had a market value of $200 million⁴ which was, of course, instantly lost when they were freed. While the loss of the slaves without compensation represented an exigence that, as four years of fighting had proved, was not rhetorical, the new amorphous condition between planter and laborer presented a compelling exigence that threatened the economic survival of the planter and cried out for messages capable of adjusting and harmonizing the desires and needs of the blacks with those of the planters.

The best study of the new economic relationship that developed between ex-slaves and planters in the early years after the war is Joel Williamson's After Slavery.⁵ His

³Simkins and Woody, 12.

⁴Ibid.

analysis will be used extensively in establishing the conditions of the period.

"Contrary to tradition," writes Williamson, the typical slave upon hearing of emancipation did not shout with delight, throw his hat into the air, gather the few possessions he claimed, and run pellmell for Charleston. The great majority received the news quietly and began to make deliberate preparation to terminate their slavery definitely by some overt act.6 Williamson goes on to point out that "desertion was a common means by which the ex-slave asserted his freedom."7 Henry Ravenel, a distinguished scholar and planter in the Edgefield district recorded in his diary for June 14, 1865:

The negroes are very foolishly leaving their former masters. Nearly every family in Aiken has lost some. . . . They all want to go to the cities, either Charleston or Augusta. The fields have no attraction, mine are still with me that have been living here.8

A memorial to President Johnson in July sounded a similar theme:

The able bodied men and women have, in many instances, abandoned the farms upon which they were employed, leaving behind them the children and the old to be supported by the proprietors. . . . Those who remain upon the farms are generally indisposed to labor as they had previously done . . . and many are loitering idly and mischievously through the country.9

While the evidence seems compelling that many slaves

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6Ibid., 33.
7Ibid., 34.
deserted their former masters shortly after the war, Williamson convincingly argues that there were important differences in the nature and timing of the desertions.

Generally, freedmen who as slaves had labored as domestics, mechanics, and in the extractive industries departed at the first reasonable convenient opportunity. In doing so, they typically exhibited some degree of malice toward their recent owners. On the other hand, those who had labored in the fields generally finished the year in their accustomed places, and when they left seldom departed with expressions of ill will toward their late masters.\(^{10}\)

The limited early departure of field workers was brought about primarily through "the insistence of the occupation forces and the Freedmen's Bureau that plantation owners and laborers contract to harvest and divide the 1865 crop before parting."\(^{11}\) As early as May, Chief Justice Salmon Chase was warning the blacks against indolence, and encouraging them to find steady employment:

> They say that you will be disorderly, shiftless, lazy; that you will starve rather than work; that wages cannot tempt you to work. . . . show that you will be honest, temperate, industrious, and faithful in your employments; that you are ready to do honest work for honest wages."\(^{12}\)

The definition of "honest work and honest wages" was to be settled upon through the contract system developed earlier on the Sea Islands by General Saxton. The contracts specified in substantial detail the work to be done by the

\(^{10}\)Williamson, 34.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., 38.

\(^{12}\)Charleston Daily Courier, 13 May 1865.
laborer and the remuneration to be given. To be reasonably certain that the contracts were equitable, "Saxton. . . . ordered his agents to visit each plantation upon which private parties employed Negroes, to read the contract to the laborers, to adjust any differences then and there, and to note carefully on the contract itself the assent of each worker."13 In instances where the workers were dissatisfied with the contracts, they were encouraged to finish the agricultural season, and then seek new employers. Gen. Charles Van Wyck, addressing a mass meeting of freedmen on August 11, urged that "those who were dissatisfied with their present homes and employers, must be patient and enduring and wait until January and if they could better themselves to do so, but now to remain close at home and work."14

Apparently as the new year approached many felt they could improve their contracts or at least felt the need to assert their freedom by some overt act. After examining numerous letters, diaries, and journals of planters throughout the state, Williamson concludes that

Christmas Day, 1865, saw many South Carolina plantations entirely deserted by their negro populations. . . . In Spartanburg District, David Golightly Harris recorded in his journal that all of his "negroes leave today, to hunt themselves a new home, while we will be left to wait upon ourselves."15

13Williamson, 68.
14Columbia Daily Phoenix, 15 August 1865.
15Williamson, 68.
Thus, while the immediate exigence of keeping laborers in the fields for the 1865 agricultural season was satisfied to some extent, the future of that supply was by no means certain.

In addition to their concern about the constancy of the labor supply, many planters were dissatisfied with the quality and amount of work performed by the blacks under the new arrangement. In a letter to a northern journal, a Camden planter wrote "they are as indolent and regardless of their contracts as was to be expected." He went on to say that in the past large numbers of blacks were kept on poor land, but that it was not economical under the new conditions. By the middle of October, a correspondent for the Chicago Times was describing the contract system as a total failure:

> They have made fair trial of negro labor, and they all say it is a complete and total failure. It has been fairly demonstrated that the negro, left to himself and allowed to work at his own volition, will not work in such a manner as to make his labor profitable, either to himself or his employer. The people of the South have been brought to the verge of starvation this fall, solely on account of the bad conduct of the negroes between the months of April and September. There was abundance of time during that period to have raised crops that would have far exceeded the wants of the whole population of the South. But owing to the desertion of the plantations by the negroes after they had made engagements to work, and the inability of the planters to procure other laborers the crops have been almost entirely lost."

16 *Columbia Daily Phoenix*, 11 October 1865.

17 Ibid., 10 October 1865.
Concerned about the constancy and the quality of black labor under the new system, the planters quickly looked for ways to control, stabilize, and guarantee the labor supply. In June 1865 the citizens of St. Matthews adopted resolutions to control the movement of the blacks on and off the plantations and to hold back enough food for the coming year before making any divisions, thus guarding against the chance that the black would squander his wages without making provision for the following year, and then expect the planter to feed him.\textsuperscript{18} The ultimate, however, in the effort to control black labor occurred in the late autumn of 1865, with the passage of the Black Codes.

The Black Codes, drafted by Armistead Burt and David Wardlaw and passed at the first regular session of the South Carolina legislature following the war, granted certain rights to the blacks, but at the same time severely restricted their behavior:

Colored persons were to be allowed to acquire property, sue and be sued, receive the protection of the law in person and property, testify in cases in which they were involved, and enter into marriage contracts. . . . Provision was made for the care of indigent colored persons. On the other hand, a series of restrictions attempted to assign colored persons to the position of an inferior caste. . . . Unless licensed to do so no colored person was to be allowed to follow any employment—on his own account—except that of farmer or servant. . . . Colored persons were not to sell farm produce without a written permit. . . . Judicial officers were authorized to hire to farmers colored vagrants or those engaged in a variety of undesirable employments. On the farms the servants must work from

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 20 June 1865.
sun to sun with reasonable intervals for meals, be quiet at night, and not leave the premises or receive visitors without express permission. They could be discharged for cause and have their wages forfeited when departing from the service of their masters. The masters were given the right to whip "moderately" servants under eighteen. Others were to be whipped on authority of judicial officers. These officers were given authority to return runaway servants to their masters. The servants, on the other hand, were given certain rights. Their wages and periods of service must be specified in writing, and they were protected against "unreasonable" tasks, Sunday and night work, unauthorized attacks on their persons, and inadequate food.¹⁹

Some writers see the Black Codes as a misguided effort on the part of southern whites to satisfy the northern demand for legislation protecting the blacks, and the resulting furor as a misperception of the meaning of "protect." To the southerner protecting the black was to protect him against his own vices and handicaps, much as one might protect a small child, while to the northern mind protection meant investing the black with all the rights possessed by other citizens.²⁰ Regardless of whether or not the codes were designed to palliate the North and gain readmission to the Union, they were prima facie efforts to stabilize and control black labor, and thereby satisfy a pressing economic exigence.

While the planters sought a permanent, controlled labor supply, the blacks wanted their freedom recognized,

¹⁹Simkins and Woody, 48-50.

²⁰John P. Hollis, The Early Period of Reconstruction in South Carolina (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1905), 47; Williamson, 72-73.
equitable remuneration for their labor, and land ownership. The black reaction to the regulation of their lives by the Black Codes was swift, vocal, and strong. In late November a convention of blacks assembled in Zion Presbyterian Church of Charleston to protest to the state and the Congress the passage of the codes. The delegates asked in a memorial to Congress that

the strong arm of law and order be placed alike over the entire people of this State; that life and property be secured, and the laborer as free to sell his labor as the merchant his goods. . . . We protest against any code of black laws the Legislature of this State may enact, and pray to be governed by the same laws that control other men.21

On the issue of land ownership Williamson observes:

The strongest and most enduring reason why Negroes refused to contract during the three year period of military occupation was their hope for a land division and the common impression among them that any negotiations with their late masters might jeopardize their chances for success. This obstacle was most formidable during the fall of 1865 and the following winter.22

Finally, by the fall of 1866 the third concern, equitable remuneration, was being loudly voiced. On November 17 of that year a meeting was held in Sumter to discuss wage problems. The freedmen complained that one

21Proceedings of the Colored People's Convention of the State of South Carolina, held in Zion Church, Charleston, November, 1865. Together with the Declaration of rights and wrongs; an address to the people; a petition to the legislature, and a memorial to Congress (Charleston: n.p., 1865), 30-31.

22Williamson, 89.
third of the crop was not enough since most of them had almost nothing.

During the four hours of this great gathering of freedmen, not a word was said about political rights, negro suffrage, or negro equality. The first and last vote of the occasion was on the same chord, a fair and remunerative return of the services of the laborers.23

As blacks deserted the plantations and their former masters in search of freedom, land, and general economic improvement, the white planters were faced with the economic crisis of securing dependable, cheap labor to till their fields. The Black Codes speak clearly of the urgency and seriousness with which the planters perceived the problems and reflect the dominant belief that only coercive measures could secure the labor of the blacks. It is this problem of how to secure the permanent labor of the black that Hampton addressed at Richland Fork.

Audience

The second essential element of a rhetorical situation is an audience capable of modifying the exigence.24 Before examining the constraints Hampton used in his effort to alter the conditions, it is necessary to examine (1) the ability of his audience to modify the exigence and (2) the attitudes and interests of the audience that might facilitate or inhibit exigence modification.

23Charleston Daily Courier, 24 November 1866.

The audience addressed by Hampton on the morning of November 22, 1865, was made up of both planters and freedmen of the Richland District. Richland District is located in the center of the state, and is the district in which the state capital, Columbia, is located. It is also the district Hampton represented in the state legislature prior to the war. Speaking to his neighbors, constituents, comrades in arms, freedmen, and perhaps even some of his former slaves, he was addressing an audience known well to him, and he to them.

Was this audience of planters and freedmen capable of modifying the exigence? The answer is an unqualified yes. Certainly the North limited the options available to the planters. They could not remand the blacks to slavery, the coercion of the Black Codes would soon be set aside, and any contracts with the blacks were subject to approval by the army. Within these broad guidelines, however, the whites and the blacks were left to work out the labor problem.

The crucial fact in the economic history of South Carolina during Reconstruction is that, ultimately, both whites and Negroes adjusted their demands to the requirements imposed by the North and to the needs of each other. In view of their traditional relations this was accomplished with a rapidity that was amazing. In retrospect, it is easy to see that some adjustment was virtually inevitable. The white man needed the labor of the Negro to make his capital productive; the Negro needed the white man's capital to earn a subsistence. Yet, the prejudices, the bitterness and suspicion that filled the minds of both whites and Negroes complicated an already difficult problem. In this context, possibly

25 Columbia Phoenix, 21 January 1866.
the political dictation of the North was actually salutary in that it forced each group to cut through the fantastical problem of race so that all might deal with the real and pressing problems of economic necessity. Under these circumstances, the economically dominant whites were forced to concede much to the Negro worker which would have come—if at all—only later and with more difficulty.... From the Northern point of view, probably in no area was Reconstruction more completely successful.26

Thus, in Williamson's estimation, the only barriers to good economic relations between planter and laborer were prejudice, bitterness, and suspicion, barriers which were certainly within the capacity of Hampton's audience to remove.

While it is impossible to know the exact mix of attitudes represented in Hampton's audience, it is possible to determine attitudes of planters and blacks in general and reasonable to assume a cross section of these attitudes present in his audience. Since the Black Codes were passed by the South Carolina legislature in the same month that Hampton gave his speech, they can function as a guide to white, planter attitudes. The codes with their restrictions on the work and behavior of the blacks expressed the sentiments of the vast majority of planters.

The debate on the Black Codes revealed three distinct groups of whites: (1) those who opposed the measure as too severe, (2) those who thought they were too lenient, and (3) the supporters.

26Williamson, 121.
Those who opposed the codes as being too severe did so, not primarily out of concern for the blacks, but a realistic assessment of the political reaction in the North. "'Unless you want to bring the North down on us,' James Chestnut had warned the state senator from Kershaw District as he departed for Columbia, 'repeal all laws enacted for Negroes and leave the emancipated Negro and the white man on the same footing before the law.'"\(^{27}\) James Hemphill, an influential member of the state senate, wrote his brother:

My impression is that our Northern brethren, \[emphasis in original\] who hold our fate in their hands, and who are par excellence the Negro's friends, will consider it too much a white man's law, and that it does not sufficiently protect the freedmen against their former masters. It is a most difficult problem to solve, and I do not believe that the great body of our people do yet appreciate the great change that has taken place in the relations between the races.\(^{28}\)

A month later, Hemphill restated his concern about northern reaction to the codes.

The U.S. Congress will take the whole affair of the freedmen under their special charge, and make laws which shall give them protection which their Northern friends may deem necessary. The Code will be regarded by them as too much of a white man's law. Many of its provisions are scarcely compatible with a state of freedom, and it will be hard to persuade the freedom shriekers that the American citizens of African descent are obtaining their rights.\(^{29}\)

Other prominent whites who shared the sentiments of

\(^{27}\)Mary Boykin Chestnut MS Diary, notes written in 1879, in Williamson, 76.

\(^{28}\)James Hemphill to W. R. Hemphill, 7 November 1865, Hemphill Papers, Duke University Library, Durham.

\(^{29}\)Ibid., 1 December 1865.
Chestnut and Hemphill were Gov. James L. Orr and Francis W. Pickens. Governor Orr supported the action of Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles when by proclamation of January 1, 1866, the general declared the codes null and void. In September of 1866 Orr called a special session of the legislature to modify the codes. In addition to his official acts, his public statements and private correspondence manifested a liberal spirit toward the blacks.

In a Christmas Day proclamation in 1865, Governor Orr urged "kindness, humanity and justice" upon the whites in their relations with the freedmen. Several weeks later, in a letter to Francis W. Pickens, he gave a practical suggestion for the application of his advice when he recommended that planters, themselves, should voluntarily divide their lands into forty and fifty acre plots upon which individual negro families would live and work. Pickens, a planter with large land holdings, approved, but added the more generous thought that one-hundred-acre plots might be necessary to provide each with the water, wood, and other resources required to operate a farm efficiently.

Those who supported the codes were not necessarily anti-black. Many were simply seeking to show the North that they were providing for the protection and welfare of the former slaves. The problem was in the interpretation of terms. In the northern view protecting the rights of the blacks meant securing equal treatment before the law for both white and black. To the southerner, however, it meant

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30 Simkins and Woody, 57.
31 Reynolds, 31.
32 Williamson, 122.
protecting him from himself, as one might protect a child.33

A description of the Negro by John DeForest, a Union officer with the Freedman's Bureau in Greenville, indicates that this perception of the ex-slave was not held exclusively by southerners:

> On the other hand, the black was not the vicious and totally irrational creature described in reactionary journals. He was very ignorant, somewhat improvident, not yet aware of the necessity of persistent industry, and in short, a grown up child.34

John Hollis saw the codes as the result not of vengeance, but benign paternalism:

> The sentiment displayed toward the emancipated slaves does not seem from the published account to have been prompted by any spirit of revenge on the part of the whites. Indeed it may be said that to some extent the white population felt a responsibility for the protection of the freedmen in their ignorance and destitution.35

To substantiate his point Hollis cites a portion of Governor B. F. Perry's first message to the legislature:

> The negro has lost the protection of his master and he must now be protected by the law. This is expected of you by the President and Federal Congress and will remove all pretense for military rule in the State, as well as facilitate your speedy restoration to the Union and self government.36

H. R. Ravenel, a planter and scholar, is an excellent

33Ibid., 73.


35Hollis, 47.

36Ibid.
example of one who felt the need for a system of compulsory labor while at the same time evincing sympathy and concern over the treatment of the blacks. In June of 1865 he wrote to A. L. Taveau, "we are in a transition to something better or worse, and I fear the latter very much, unless some system of labor is organized by which the negroes are compelled to work." 37 Two days later he recorded in his diary:

I find some difficulty in "arranging terms" with my negroes, but strange to say, the difficulty lies in the opposite direction from what they most usually do. . . . The condition is so new to both of us, that we find it awkward to arrange. I have told them to consider it over and let me know what they will be willing to take. [He saw the solution in] some discreet and wise agent who could aid and advise both Negroes and employers. 38

A little less than a year later, he commended the steady work of the Negroes on his farm and bemoaned the poor return they would get for their labor because of the condition of the soil, as well as their treatment by poor whites:

That the low and ignorant classes of our white population should feel vindictively inclined toward them, may be expected. They will taunt and maltreat the negro simply because he belongs to the proscribed race and was once a slave. Even if we felt inclined to indulge a revengeful feeling at the loss of property in their emancipation, we should recollect that it was through no act of theirs, that emancipation was effected. . . . Let us have the magnanimity to be just, if we have not the Christian principles of forgiveness. 39


38 Ravenel, 247-48.

39 Ibid., 278.
The third group of whites was composed of "those who did not think the Code was severe enough. This element represented planters and leaders of the heavily Negro populated districts and the persisting proslavery party."40 Prior to the convening of the constitutional convention, F. W. Pickens expressed his concern to Governor Perry over the strength of the proslavery sentiment in the Edgefield District. When the vote was taken, however, only eight voted against abolishing slavery.41 Edmund Rhett realized that slavery in its past form was dead, but nevertheless in a letter to A. L. Burt, a co-author of the codes, urged "that he [the Negro] should be kept as near to the condition of slavery as is practicable."42 Immediately prior to the vote on the codes James Hemphill observed that "every individual member almost can find some ground of objection," and that, "many think it too indulgent of the negro."43

As indicated in the earlier analysis of the exigence, the blacks wanted their freedom recognized, a fair remuneration for their work, and land. Though many of the field hands pressured by the North continued on the farms through the summer, their condition was still too similar to slavery

40Williamson, 74.
41Ibid., 71-72.
43James Hemphill to W. R. Hemphill, 7 November 1865, Hemphill Papers.
to fulfill their need to experience freedom. There was a
general feeling of distrust, but not vengeance, toward the
planter, an anxiety reinforced by the Black Codes, which the
blacks interpreted to mean that the whites wanted to strip
them of freedom and return them as much as possible to a
position of servitude. 44

This distrust of the whites manifested itself in a

concern for fair wages:

Even when the terms of labor were fairly and carefully
determined by a conscientious employer, Negro workers
remained suspicious of the white man. In Spartanburg
District, David Golightly Harris. . . . noted "they are
no judges, and fear to trade for fear they will [be]
cheated and have no confidence in themselves or in the
white man." 45

The black frequently could not understand how his portion of
the crop had disappeared in the advances made to him earlier
in the season. He simply concluded that the planter was
cheating him. 46

Finally, the belief that the federal government was
going to give them land significantly influenced black
attitudes toward making contracts with the planters. "There

44 Alrutheus A. Taylor, The Negro in South Carolina
During The Reconstruction (n.p.: Association for the Study
of Negro Life and History, 1924; repr., New York: Russell
and Russell, 1969), 36-37; Sidney Andrews, The South Since
the War: As Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and Observa-
tion in Georgia and the Carolinas (Boston: Ticknor and
Fields, 1866; repr., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971),
96-97.

45 Williamson, 100.

46 Croushore and Potter, 73.
is among the plantation negroes a widely spread idea that land is to be given them by the government and this idea is at the bottom of much idleness and discontent. \( ^47 \) Williamson concurs that the expectation of a division of the land was a major reason why blacks refused to contract at the end of 1865. \( ^48 \) Of course, considering the confiscated plantations and Sherman's order setting aside land for the blacks, their expectation was not without some foundation.

Thus, at Richland Fork that morning, there were perhaps a few who shared the perspective of James Hemphill and James Orr, that the Black Codes were politically inexpedient, and that a greater recognition of black rights was needed. The great majority, however, saw the codes as necessary to stabilize labor and protect the indolent black from himself. While the extremely harsh views toward blacks were centered more in the lower portion of the state, it is more than probable that some of these attitudes were represented as well. The blacks standing on the periphery of the crowd were apprehensive, generally fearful that the whites would take advantage of them and eventually return them to a status only slightly above slavery.

**Constraints**

"Every rhetorical situation," according to Lloyd

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\( ^47 \) Andrews, 98.

\( ^48 \) Williamson, 89.
Bitzer, "contains a set of constraints made up of persons, events, objects, and relations which . . . have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence." Bitzer divides constraints into the attitudes, motives, and beliefs of the audience which the speaker must harness, and the personal and logical proofs brought to the occasion by the speaker. This section will examine the personal and logical proofs brought to the situation by Wade Hampton, and his attempt to harness the motives of his audience.

Personal Appeals

Unquestionably his personal ethos was a powerful persuasive appeal for Wade Hampton. As developed earlier, his reputation as wealthy planter and Civil War hero was well established not only in South Carolina but throughout the South. The extent of his popularity was amply illustrated by his near victory in the 1865 gubernatorial election despite his attempt to dissuade people from voting for him.

At Richland Fork Hampton was speaking to neighbors who had elected him in earlier days to represent them in the South Carolina legislature, had fought under him in the war, and now had invited him to address them on how to respond to

50 Ibid.
the new situation facing them.

Hampton was not content, however, to rest his ethos strictly upon prior reputation but explicitly reminded his audience of their relationship. Early in the address he reminded them that "years ago, without any agency on my part, you called me from my private life to represent you in the Legislature, and at each succeeding election I had but renewed evidence of your regard and confidence."\(^{51}\) In addition to the mutual regard for each other as representative and constituent, there was the far deeper bond as warriors for the Lost Cause. "It was my good fortune to lead many of the sons of Richland forth to battle. . . . I have seen them, on many a bloody battlefield, bearing aloft the banner of our state as far into the fight and as nobly as did any others."

Did Hampton need these explicit reminders to solidify his ethos with this audience? In one sense, no; his reputation was well established among these men of Richland County. But in another sense a failure to acknowledge their past relationship would have been a severe violation of the amenities of the occasion resulting perhaps in some loss of ethos. So in one sense the reminders were necessary to preserve the esteem in which he was held. What also made these opening remarks significant was the stress placed upon

\(^{51}\)Columbia Daily Phoenix, 21 January 1866. All further references to the text of the address are from this source.
their respective roles in the past. In both the political and the military, he had been the leader, they the followers. The implication was clear, as they had followed his advice and commands in the past, so they should accede to his advice in the present. In a later address on much the same theme in Macon, Georgia, Hampton made the link between past and present authority more direct:

I beg to offer a few words of counsel, for I feel that I can speak to you with authority; not that authority with which accident once invested me, but that given by affection. In by-gone years you never refused to hear me; I never called on you in vain, I never appealed to you that you did not respond, and I would fain hope that my words will not now fall unheeded on your ears.\(^{52}\)

In addition to his audience of white planters and former soldiers, Hampton was also facing a large contingent of blacks, who of course had quite different conceptions of his ethos. To them Hampton portrayed himself as a man of truth and good will:

If they [blacks] will ask my people who have lived with me for years, not one man, woman or child on my place will say that I ever deceived them, or told them what was not true. In what I shall say to you, then today, I shall speak only what I believe to be true, and I shall advise you honestly.

Later, he sought to establish good will when he told them, "I have always tried to treat my negroes well, and I intend to do all in my power for them now. I have offered them good wages, and I tell them if they can do better elsewhere to go there." The proof that he had treated the blacks

\(^{52}\)Ibid., 23 November 1869.
fairly was offered in his next statement. "Most of them are going to remain with me."

Though there is little direct evidence on the question, Hampton apparently did have a reasonably good reputation among the blacks. As will be discussed in later chapters, he was one of the few whites to whom the blacks would give an audience even when they disagreed with his position.

From his white audience Hampton commanded a deep respect born out of a commonality of interests and his record of leadership in small measure in pre-war politics and in large measure on the battlefield. Thus, there was no need to build ethos, only to make acknowledgements and reminders necessary to fulfill the amenities of the occasion. With the blacks, however, he made a definite attempt to establish credibility and good will by citing his past dealings with his slaves.

Logical Appeals

The structure of Hampton's argument was a straightforward problem-solution development. The problem was how to get the fields cultivated. The solution, according to Hampton, was to induce by fair treatment the Negroes back to the fields. The argument was expressed in a series of enthymemes and a final cause-effect analysis.

Hampton began by establishing a premise that didn't fit into the logical structure of the speech until later,
but because of its overriding importance in the mind of his audience had to be established at the outset. The premise was that "the freedom of the Negroes is a fixed and irrevocable fact, and the sooner we recognize and act upon this fact, the better it will be for all parties." Simply put, slavery was dead. He established the premise with three supporting arguments. (1) The South had accepted the terms of surrender and thus was "bound by . . . self respect . . . honor . . . [and] true manhood" to keep the terms of the agreement. The terms included the abolition of slavery, thus the code of a gentleman demanded the acceptance of the end of slavery. While making this argument he adroitly dissociated himself from the correctness of accepting the terms in the first place, and argued it as a fait accompli. "I do not propose to discuss these terms; nor will I say that it was the true policy of the South to accept them. I only state the fact that our people accepted them." For those not willing to be bound by honor he argued (2) that the South Carolina convention had recognized that slavery was dead, and (3) the South Carolina legislature had "ratified the amendment of the Constitution of the United States abolishing slavery." Thus, they were bound both by honor and law, approved and accepted by their peers to accept the freedom of the Negro.

With the question of slavery settled, Hampton began a chain of reasoning with the first of several enthymemes:
"our fields must be tilled." The major premise of this hypothetical syllogism was in the next statement: "Unless this is done and done speedily famine will destroy what little has escaped fire and sword." The complete syllogism would then be:

Major premise: If we wish to eat, the fields must be tilled

Minor premise (understood): We do wish to eat

Therefore: The fields must be tilled

He did not seek to establish the relationship between the likelihood of famine and the tilling of the fields. He left the proof to the experience of his audience.

Hampton then moved to the second link in his argument, the question of who would cultivate the fields. His answer was

the same labor that reclaimed them from the savage wilderness and made them rich with the food of man. . . . The same trained laborers who produced these golden harvests are amongst us, and I believe that their services can still be made available.

The argument was a simple categorical syllogism:

Major Premise: Those who worked the fields in the past are the best for the present and future

Minor Premise: The Negro worked them in the past

Therefore: The Negro is best for the present and future

In his Macon speech, four years later, Hampton advanced much the same argument, but added further support to his contention that the Negro was the best labor for the
fields:

The Negro is undoubtedly better fitted, from his long training, his physical configuration and his adaptability to all the diversities of our climate, to make a more efficient laborer than any other. Especially is this true when the labor is to be performed in the more malarial portions of our country.53

Thus, while at Macon he asserted specifics as to why the Negro was the best laborer for the fields, at Richland Fork the argument was purely circumstantial and drew upon the experience of the audience for its support: what worked in the past would work in the present. In one sense, even though he provided more specifics at Macon, the argument still rested upon the past observations of his audience, since he never developed what there was about the black's configuration that made him better suited for the fields or about his make-up that made him more adaptable to the climate.

If the fields had to be tilled, and the black was the best one to do it, and slavery was dead, how then could his services best be procured? This question constituted the final link in Hampton's chain of argument. The answer was provided through causal analysis. The goal would be achieved "but in one way, and that will be by dealing with the negro fairly, frankly and equitably. Let him see that we not only recognize his newly acquired rights, but that we will protect him in the enjoyment of these rights."

53Ibid., 21 November 1869.
Necessity would force the black to seek work and when he did, the planters should meet him kindly; encourage him when he is disposed to do well; offer fair terms to him, and whilst you demand from him a strict observance of his obligation, carry out honestly and fairly your agreement with him. Show him that the white man of the South is his best friend.

The crux of Hampton's argument lay in the dilemma that was put to the planter. He needed to have his fields tilled and the Negro was best suited for doing it, but the black's services could only be obtained through slavery or fair treatment that induced voluntary labor. Slavery, as he established in his first argument, was dead; the only alternative available was to adopt a program of kind treatment. As the problem with most disjunctive syllogisms lies in the failure to consider the ground between the two extremes, so it did here. Nowhere did he address the use of threats, intimidation, and especially legal coercion as in the Black Codes as means of securing the black's labor.

The omission of any direct reference to the Black Codes is particularly significant, since they were a prime topic of conversation when the speech was given. There were perhaps two oblique references to the codes. One was his reference to protecting the Negro in his enjoyment of his rights. An argument used to gain passage of the codes was that they were protecting the Negro both from those who would seek to take advantage of him and from himself. The other reference was in a remark made directly to the blacks
in the audience that "laws will be made by which every man, white and black, in the country will have to show that he is making an honest support for himself or he will be taken up and put at hard work." The only possible laws that Hampton could have had in mind were the Black Codes. To the extent that the Black Codes could compel the blacks to make contracts with the planters, the need to use fair, kind treatment as the only way to obtain their services was certainly reduced.

Perhaps because he realized the vulnerability of his own argument, he added two additional advantages that could be accrued only through the application of fair treatment: (1) the frustration of the Yankees and (2) the maintenance of the class structure by keeping the peasants happy. "You will speedily eradicate the foul, the false, the pernicious doctrine instilled in his [the Negro] heart by the abolitionists of the North . . . and again have in the South a happy, contented and laborious peasantry." Though it was inadequately developed, this argument was the key to his approach. While other means could be utilized for obtaining black labor, at least temporarily, only kind, fair treatment could neutralize the attempts of the abolitionists to gain control of the blacks and with it radically alter the social structure.

A year later, speaking to the Soldiers Association at Walhalla, South Carolina, Hampton briefly suggested the same
approach toward the Negroes. Dealing with him "frankly, justly, kindly," would cause him to cling to his old home, his own country, and his former masters. If you wish to see him contented, industrious, useful, aid him in his effort to elevate himself in the scale of civilization, and thus fit him not only to enjoy the blessings of freedom, but to appreciate its duties.54

Thus he again argued that the best way to achieve a continuing labor class was by kind treatment of the Negro.

In his Macon address in 1869 he again made the same argument but in more detail than Richland Fork or Walhalla.

Our object, then should be to develop to the utmost his capacity as a laborer. To do this time is required, and we shall have to exercise great forbearance, constant prudence, and steady kindness. We must make him feel that his interests are indissolubly bound up with ours; that high prices for our products insure high wages for him. . . . Let us be scrupulously just in our dealings with him. Let us assist him in his aspirations for knowledge and aid him in its acquisition. . . . In a word, convince him that we are his best, if not his only, friends, and when we shall have done this, we shall not only have placed our labor on a sound footing, but we shall have gained in the laborer a strong and zealous ally.55

While at Richland Fork and Walhalla he simply asserted the causal connection between kind treatment and a contented labor supply, at Macon he supported it with his own experience:

I speak not from theory but experience—an experience which has taught me that the kindest relations can exist between the planter and his former slaves, resulting in mutual advantage to both parties. My old slaves are cultivating the land on which they have lived for years,

54Charleston Daily Courier, 10 October 1866.

55Columbia Daily Phoenix, 21 November 1869.
and there has been a constant and marked improvement in their industry in each year since their emancipation. . . . I have promised to put up for them a schoolhouse and church, and to pay a portion of the salaries of their teachers. . . . That kind treatment, just dealing and sincere efforts to improve their conditions are not without effect upon them, is proved by the fact, gratifying to myself, that I am now on my way to Mississippi, by the request of hundreds of Negroes, besides my own laborers, to advise them what course to pursue in the approaching election there.56

Consistently, then, Hampton advanced the same causal argument introduced at Richland Fork for solving the labor problems. The best way to secure the labor and the control of the black was through kind, just treatment. At Richland Fork his auditors had to accept the statement simply on the authority of the speaker, for no evidence was offered to support the truth of the assertion. By 1869 he was able to offer the limited proof of his own experience to support the causal relation.

In addition to his arguments to the whites in his audience, Hampton also addressed arguments specifically to the blacks at Richland Fork. His arguments consisted of two major contentions. The first, which received the more extensive development, was that the blacks would have to work. The second was that the best place to get work was from the white planter.

The first contention that they would have to work he supported with three reasons: (1) duty demanded it, (2) laws would enforce it, and (3) survival required it.

56Ibid.
"Freedom," Hampton argued, "has its duties as well as pleasures. And the first duty of every free man is to support himself and his family. . . . and to do this you will have to work." For those blacks who might not be impressed with the call to duty, he moved briefly to the level of coercion: "Laws will be made by which every man, white and black, in the country will have to show that he is making an honest support for himself, or he will be taken up and put at hard work." Here, as mentioned earlier, he must have had the Black Codes in mind. While the only backing for the first two reasons was his word, the third reason was supported with evidence. "But if you do not work," he told them, "you will surely starve." This truth was illustrated by the example of the Indian.

They would not work, and though they were a larger and a stronger race than yours, they were driven off by the white man, as the wind drives the chaff before it. This will be your fate, if you will not work, but choose to live like the Indians, in idleness and drunkenness.

Anticipating that some in his audience might reject his argument on the belief that the Yankees would take care of them and keep them from starving, he engaged in refutation. "The Yankees don't care for you, and they would be perfectly willing to see you all die off, so that room would be made here for their poor people." He had no evidence to support such an extreme statement, but he made an attempt by quoting at length from a speech made to the blacks in Florida by the presidentially appointed governor of that state. The
governor noted that he was a Yankee by birth and education but a southerner by residence for some thirty years. He then concluded that he knew well both the Yankee and the southerner and "'I tell you today as your friend, that the Southern white man with whom you were raised, and who is acquainted with your habits and customs, is the best friend you have got.'" The governor concluded by telling them "'the President will not give you one foot of land, nor a mule, nor hog, nor cow, nor even a knife and fork or spoon. He has given you your freedom and that is everything he intends to give you.'" While the testimony of the governor did not support Hampton's extreme statement, it did give credence to the general notion that the North would not support black indolence.

What is perplexing about Hampton's choice of reasons used to support the contention that the blacks must work is the relationship between his second reason and the other two. Reasons one and three presupposed choice, while two was clearly coercive. If laws were going to compel everyone to have a job, it was rather meaningless to argue that blacks ought to choose to work to fulfill the duties of freedom or to keep from starving. The choice was not whether to work, but where to work. Hampton either did not see the Black Codes as an enduring solution and therefore stressed the voluntary aspects of work, or he did not perceive the contradiction in his arguments.
Hampton's second contention was that the best place for the black to get work was from the planter. "Now, how can you support yourselves and your families best? I say by hiring your labor to the white people. We want labor to cultivate our fields, and we would rather hire you than strangers, who know nothing about planting." He offered no support for his claims. As in so many of his arguments, the proof rested either in his authority or the audience's knowledge.

To his white audience Hampton argued that they needed labor, that the blacks offered the best way to fulfill that need, and that kind treatment provided the best avenue for securing their labor. To the blacks he argued their need to find employment and that the best place to do so was with the white planters.

Motive Appeals

Hampton, in calling upon the whites to extend fair and just treatment to the blacks, was not doing so out of any noble, altruistic concern for the welfare of the blacks or moral obligation of the whites. The appeal was strictly to the self interest of the white planters. Their economic and social world had been turned upside down by recent events, and, while the world of the 1850's could not be restored, it was not necessary to plow under all vestiges of it.

Hampton's rhetorical vision was of contented blacks laboring on large farms and plantations for prosperous,
benevolent white masters. The economic arrangements would remain intact. The acquisition of a "happy, contented, and laborious peasantry" would be to Hampton and his white audience "happy results." To achieve this pre-war vision in a post-war environment required only a change of means. Whereas slavery had achieved the desired goal in the past, a kind, just, benevolent paternalism would be needed to achieve it in the present. His appeal was strictly that the end justified the means: "the ends you seek not only justify, but demand the exercise of these virtues to their greatest extent."

Lest their self interests were not sufficient to justify the necessary exercise of "forbearance" and "patience" Hampton appealed to them in the name of patriotism:

You seek to restore the prosperity of your country--to rebuild her cities--to reclaim her desolated fields--to reanimate her with new hope. These are the objects nearest to a patriotic heart and to obtain them no sacrifice would be too great, no labor too arduous.

Thus, using kindness and fairness as a means of securing the labor of the black was characterized as a patriot's sacrifice for his country.

While Hampton's interests and those of his white audience were at one and he could appeal to them on the basis of a common self interest with a touch of patriotism tossed in, he was certainly not at one with the interests of the black members of his audience. His vision of a black
peasant laborer had little appeal for those who had only recently left the bonds of slavery and were now enamored with thoughts of freedom and land. Consequently, his appeal to them was at a more basic level—fear. If they would not work, they would be taken up and put at hard labor, or they would starve, or like the Indians they would be driven off. He made no effort to show the blacks how hiring their labor to the white planters would improve their position in life or bring to fruition any of their new aspirations. The best that he offered was the freedom to make the best contract they could. Their field labor was not a first affirmative step on the road of freedom and opportunity, but an avoidance mechanism to escape the bad things that would happen if they didn't work.

Fitness of Response

The immediate exigence was the economic problem caused by the emancipation of the blacks. Hampton accurately perceived the threat to the survival of the planter and the state's agricultural economy in general, and in his first major speech after the war sought to modify the exigence through the application of rhetoric.

His approach at Richland Fork was the first indication of what became a grand, overall, pragmatic, consistent strategy for dealing with the larger exigence of black-white relations, of which the economic difficulties were only one dimension. Hampton advocated new means to achieve old ends.
He accepted the end of slavery but not of a way of life. To
the white planter he presented the appealing vision of a
social and economic order as much like the pre-war structure
as possible. While most of the white South Carolina leader­
ship shared that idealistic vision, Hampton was one of the
few who possessed enough realism to recognize that it would
not be attained through force, coercion and intimidation.
The advocacy of fair and just treatment toward the black had
little to do with moral or legal obligations and everything
to do with the realistic need to counter the "pernicious
doctrines" of the abolitionists and gain control over the
blacks.

In an 1867 letter to James Conner, Hampton revealed
the extent of his commitment to realistic pragmatism:

> Every good man who can go to the Convention, even if
> sent by negroes and with negroes, should go. We can
> control and direct the negroes if we act discreetly, and
> in my judgment the highest duty of every Southern man is
> to secure the good will and confidence of the negro.
> . . . Like you, I am only solicitous about our State
government, and if we can protect that from destruction,
> I am willing to send negroes to Congress.\textsuperscript{57}

Hampton's writings do not reveal whether or not by November
of 1865 he had foreseen the issues that would be created by
black emancipation and had created a grand strategy for
dealing with them. It is significant, however, that his
strategy for coping with the economic problems by kind
treatment that would secure the confidence of the blacks

\textsuperscript{57}Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
remained essentially unchanged. This strategy was probably the only one that could have come close to achieving the southern vision.

While in some ways Hampton was offering a realistic strategy, his realism did not go far enough. The speech failed on two counts: (1) he did not accurately assess the need of the blacks to assert their freedom, and (2) he offered the planters no reason why kind treatment was the best means for securing black labor. As indicated in the earlier analysis of the audience, one of the strong desires among the blacks was the desire for some land of their own as a means of asserting their freedom. Hampton totally ignored this concern. Considering that his strategy relied upon the voluntary actions of both blacks and whites, there was remarkably little incentive for the blacks. The choices were to make contracts with the planters, starve, or be put at forced labor. There were no positive advantages from working for the planters—no prospect of future land acquisition, no hope of significant financial gain, no avenues for practical expression of their new freedom. Hampton's vision of a white planter class with a black peasant labor class was too much deja vu and nightmare to hold any appeal for the blacks. While Hampton ignored the black's desire for land, E. B. Heyward, who spoke to the same audience at the conclusion of Hampton's speech, fully recognized the desire, gave a rather extensive treatment to
it, and advocated the planters leave to the black laborers a portion of ground for raising their own crops, but which would be forfeited if the worker violated his contract.\footnote{Columbia Daily Phoenix, 21 January 1866.} 

Heyward's analysis is clear evidence of the subject's relevance and importance to that audience, and Hampton's total ignoring of this interest is inexplicable.

Not only did Hampton inadequately respond to the interests of the blacks, he provided no reasons, other than his opinion, why the whites should take a conciliatory attitude toward the blacks. He offered no evidence that such an approach would produce the desired result or that such an approach was even necessary. In fact the events of recent days and his own remarks to the blacks contradicted the need to adopt his position. The recently passed Black Codes were an attempt to deal with the very problem he was addressing. To the extent the Black Codes were enforceable, his approach was unnecessary. Nowhere did he attempt to show that the Black Codes were unworkable, undesirable, or that they would not endure. In fact, to the contrary, he argued in his remarks to the blacks that laws would force them to work, thereby contradicting his earlier appeal to the whites.

At Richland Fork Hampton correctly dealt with the exigence of the economic crisis presented by the new relationship between blacks and whites. He developed a
strategy for solving the problem, but failed to provide adequate constraints for the whites to adopt his position, and failed to analyze his black audience's perception of the exigence as a need for land as an expression of freedom, and not simply survival.
CHAPTER IV
FREEDMEN'S ADDRESS AS RESPONSE TO THE BLACK SUFFRAGE EXIGENCE

Exigence

The second major exigence to emerge with emancipation concerned the political relationship between black and white. It is certainly not surprising that difficulties arose as former masters and ex-slaves, rebels and Yankee conquerors, Democrats and Republicans, native sons and carpetbaggers all sought to define the new relationship. While there were many dimensions to the problem, they all ultimately were reduced to one overriding consideration, suffrage for the blacks. Because of the scope and significance of this issue the analysis will focus only on this one area.

On May 12, 1865, while many up-state blacks were still unaware of their emancipation, a meeting of freedmen was taking place at Zion church in Charleston. Chief Justice Salmon Chase, Maj. Gen. Rufus Saxton, Maj. Martin R. Delany and Reuben Tomlinson, Superintendent of Education for the Freedmen's Bureau, addressed the meeting and urged the blacks to petition President Johnson and Congress for the right to vote. "I wish to leave nothing undone to secure
you that right—the right to vote," said General Saxton, "the right to hold the elective franchise. It is the inalienable right of all men, the right of the colored as well as the white man."\(^1\) Thus the call for black suffrage in South Carolina began almost simultaneously with the end of slavery.

Under President Johnson's plan of reconstruction only those qualified to vote in 1860 were eligible to vote for delegates to South Carolina's constitutional convention in September, 1865. Blacks, therefore, were ineligible to vote for those who would set future qualifications for voters. As white voters went to the polls, blacks assembled in Charleston and St. Helena to petition the convention to grant them suffrage on the same basis as the white population. Significantly, they were perfectly willing to accept a suffrage with educational or property restrictions, as long as the restrictions were applied equally to both blacks and whites.\(^2\) Such, however, was not to be.

Governor Perry presaged the action of the convention by stating in his opening address that "this is a white man's government and intended for white men only." In his view, "to extend this universal suffrage to the freedmen in their present ignorant and degraded condition would be

\(^1\)Charleston Daily Courier, 13 May 1865.

little less than folly and madness." Perry later questioned the wisdom of his approach:

I thought as a matter of policy and justice, that the intelligent property holders amongst the freedmen should be allowed to vote, and so stated in the original draft of my first message to the convention. But my friends advised me to leave out this recommendation as it would only produce a division in the convention, and there was no probability of its being adopted. I did so, and ever since regretted it, for if a qualified suffrage had been extended to the colored people we might have avoided the second reconstruction and the Constitutional Amendment imposed by Congress.

Dr. Alexander Wylie, a delegate to the convention, testified during the Ku Klux hearings that many delegates favored a qualified suffrage but like Perry were hesitant to speak for it:

I . . . favored giving the negroes all civil rights. I voted with only three men . . . to give all civil rights to negroes, not mentioning color, and proposed that we should present some qualifications in regard to education and property. I am satisfied that a large proportion of the older men were in favor of that proposition, but they looked to their constituents and hesitated. They expressed themselves so . . . they had not discussed the matter with the people and were afraid.

Sidney Andrews, a northern reporter, found no sympathy for black suffrage:

I did hope . . . that I should find half a dozen men at least in favor of giving suffrage to some negroes, as many more in favor of abolishing the barbaric color

3Charleston Daily Courier, 16 September 1865.

4Benjamin F. Perry, Reminiscences of Public Men, with Speeches and Addresses, 2d Series (Greenville: Shannon & Co., 1889), 275.

5Congress, Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, The Ku-Klux Conspiracy, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1872, 560-61.
qualification, and still as many more ready to admit that suffrage would be the right of the negro as soon as he is able to use it understandingly. Vain hope! If there are six men who so much as admit that it will probably be right or politic to give suffrage to any negro of their State within ten years, four of them must be among the thirty or thirty-five whose views I have not personally learned.6

The talk, according to Andrews, was all of a "white-man's government."7

While some members of the convention might have had reservations about the tactical wisdom of totally excluding the black from the state's political structure, the fact is that no other policy was seriously considered. The convention ignored the petition from the blacks and granted suffrage only to white males. In fact the convention refused even to count the blacks in establishing a basis for representation in the lower house.8

On November 25, 1865, forty-six black delegates from nine districts throughout the state met in Charleston to protest the treatment of the blacks by the constitutional convention and the recent session of the legislature. The protests were primarily directed at the economic restrictions of the Black Codes and the failure of the constitutional convention to grant equal suffrage. The delegates adopted appeals to the people of South Carolina, the state

6Andrews, 89.
7Ibid., 88.
8Simkins and Woody, 40-41.
legislature, and the Congress. In all of these appeals they asked that suffrage be granted them on an equal basis with the whites.9

Not surprisingly the appeals were ignored by the white power structure of the state, a structure that through its own intransigence was about to lose its power to shape the destiny of the state, for while they were deaf to the appeals of the blacks, such was not the case with the Republican controlled Congress. In December the Congress turned away the state's elected representatives; in January Gen. Daniel Sickles declared the Black Codes null and void. A month later the Congress guaranteed basic equality of rights to the blacks with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Shortly thereafter Congress sent to the states for ratification the Fourteenth Amendment.10

The political relationship between blacks and whites in South Carolina remained unchanged until March 1867 when Congress repudiated the president's plan of reconstruction and substituted its own. Under the congressional plan South Carolina was placed under the control of the United States military. Congress further specified a new constitutional convention with delegates elected by all citizens except those disfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment. The new constitution would have to grant suffrage to all male

10Holt, 23.
citizens, be ratified by the voters, and approved by Congress. The new legislature elected under this constitution would have to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.  

Suddenly, as Thomas Holt puts it, "a revolutionary change in black-white relations, 'a new order,' was in the making." For the first time the black majority in South Carolina would have a direct say in the shaping of the state government. The revolutionary nature of the change was underscored by the almost two to one majority of potential black voters over whites. The new registration of voters completed in October of 1867 showed 46,346 whites and 78,982 blacks.

The exigence was clear and urgent. If the native whites did not in some way gain control of these new black voters, the white power structure would be swept away and control of the state pass to blacks, scalawags, and carpetbaggers. For many their worst fear was on the verge of reality. The strategy for coping with the crisis had been suggested in an unsigned editorial in the Charleston Daily Courier in the fall of 1866. Observing the growing power of the radicals in Congress, the writer advocated the calling of a constitutional convention which would grant suffrage to anyone who "[is] twenty-one years of age, has resided ___

11Simkins and Woody, 64.
12Holt, 28.
13Reynolds, 73,
months in the state, can read and write, and is possessed of
__ hundred dollars worth of real or personal property." The
action was needed, in the writer's view, to preempt more
drastic action by the Congress:

The present Congress will not adjourn and leave the
South a free agent in this matter; now is the time for
her to anticipate the Radical party. . . . Such an
amendment would give us greater strength in Congress,
and instead of running to universal suffrage would
produce exactly the opposite result.14

Audience

As the political context changed so did the nature of
Hampton's audience. Hampton Jarrell observes:

During 1866 Hampton had appealed primarily to the white
men of the state for kind treatment of the Negro; but
. . . by March of 1867 the General realized that the
power of decision in the state as to harmony or strife
between the races had passed to the Negro. . . . [and]
he sought with all his influence to persuade the blacks
to join the white men of the state in shaping its
political structure.15

Immediately following Hampton's address to the freed-
men in Columbia, Beverly Nash, a black organizer of the
meeting, spoke to the crowd. Nash endorsed the sentiments
of Hampton and stressed the bond of friendship that had
existed between the southern whites and blacks: "We
recognize the Southern white man as the true friend of the
black man." He acknowledged the economic need for coopera-
tion: "The white man has land, the black man has labor, and

14Charleston Daily Courier, 29 November 1866.
15Jarrell, 16.
labor is worth nothing without capital. We must help to create that capital by restoring confidence, and we can only restore confidence by electing proper men to fill our public offices." While Nash reinforced cooperation between the two groups he completely rejected the idea of a limited suffrage: "My doctrine is, that every man, whether ignorant or not, who is compelled to pay taxes, is entitled to vote."16

While Nash was in Columbia urging cooperation with the white southern leadership, another meeting of blacks with an entirely different perspective was taking place in Charleston. The meeting was called to ratify a platform for the formation of a Union Republican party in South Carolina. In addressing the group, F. L. Cardozo and B. F. Randolf, both blacks, warned the audience to beware of false claims of friendship and kindness by the southern whites who were seeking only to beguile them and take away their rights. Their true friends were not the former slave owners but the men of the Republican party who had "shown their friendship by the sacrifice of their lives and their treasure." Wade Hampton was specifically mentioned as one who was trying to swallow them through flattery, and Nash was denounced as a traitor. While the reporter indicated that these impressions were enthusiastically supported by the audience, Cardozo prefaced his remarks as if he anticipated some

16 Charleston Daily Courier, 23 March 1867.
contrary views in the audience:

What then, may be asked is the danger? I answer, it lies in the intention of the Southern whites to cheat us, if possible, out of these great advantages, by the false pretension of would-be friends. And here I know I begin to tread on delicate ground; I shall, however, endeavor to go on fearlessly and without any vindictive feeling to any individual. Personally I have been treated with the greatest personal kindness by many Southern gentlemen. I have received from them individual favors and acts of kindness. But this is no question of individual or personal consideration.17

While Nash differed with Cardozo and Randolf on the question of cooperation with southern whites, there was no difference on the issue of suffrage. The sentiment of the Charleston meeting was best expressed by E.J. Adams:

A perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings of liberty cannot be secured without universal suffrage. It is the only means of defense for the illiterate and the poor.18

Six weeks later at a party organizational meeting in Columbia a resolution calling for universal suffrage was adopted.19 And yet, there were some slight reservations. B. F. Randolf was so concerned about providing motivation for education that at the constitutional convention he had inserted in committee a provision that those not able to read and write after 1875 would not have the right to vote. The convention strongly opposed the restriction and voted it down 107 to 2, with even Mr. Randolf voting with the

17Ibid., 27 March 1867.
18Ibid.
19Columbia Daily Phoenix, 2 May 1867.
majority. Thus, the black leadership and a substantial number of followers had a commitment to universal suffrage that would be difficult, if not impossible, for any of the southern whites to overcome.

The blacks, though, were still not a united group. A correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune reported in late May his concern over the poor political organization among the blacks:

There is absolutely none [political organization] deserving the name, outside of Charleston and the islands and adjacent coast towns. The Union League... has made little headway here. The only open Republican movement is that represented by the convention which has just adjourned, and that had representation from only nine out of thirty districts.21

He concluded that the blacks' feelings were with the Republicans, but the ignorance, poverty, and habit of submission prevalent among them threatened the success of the radical movement.22

In addition to the lack of organization there were social differences among the blacks which threatened their unity. F. L. Cardozo alluded to these differences in his speech at the organizational meeting in Charleston:

I would . . . warn you of another danger . . . that is peculiar to ourselves. From the unhappy state of things

20 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of South Carolina held at Charleston, South Carolina, beginning January 14th and ending March 17th, 1868 (Charleston: Denny & Perry, 1868), 824, 830-35.

21 New York Daily Tribune, 23 May 1867.

22 Ibid.
which has existed here in the enjoyment of this new privilege the colored people find themselves divided and disunited by a variety of sentiments and feelings. Whatever may be a man's social status, whatever may be his religious views, whatever may be the state of his knowledge, if he will come with you and vote for the platform, unite with him, if it be Satan himself. Let no cause of dissension, no feeling of animosity, no objection to social condition, prevent you from securing to yourselves and your children the liberty that has been committed to you.23

Thomas Holt provides considerable insight into the possible nature of their division. He delineates three groups of blacks: the freeborn mulattoes, the urban slaves, and the field slaves, with the greatest distinction existing between the mulattoes and the others. While he concurs with other scholars that the problem was not as great as the white press made it out to be and that the major issues "were those dividing black and white, not those between black and mulatto," Holt still contends "divisions and conflicts did exist, and they did have political consequences."24 After noting the religious, social, and economic differences of the two groups he concludes that

a politically mobilized black constituency was essential to the advancement of the brown bourgeoisie. Thus one might speculate that the political conservatism of this element of the South Carolina group was restrained by their dependence on a mainly black, slave-born constituency. Consequently, the freeborn mulatto, bourgeois legislators by and large, reached across the "chasm" to embrace—sometimes belatedly and haltingly, often with vacillation and quibbling at crucial moments—the

23Charleston Daily Courier, 22 March 1867.

24Holt, 59.
political and economic agenda of the black peasantry.25

The blacks, then, that Hampton was seeking to influence were as yet politically unorganized but with sympathies strongly inclined toward the radical movement. They were largely ignorant and concerned with securing land and food. It was an audience with an undercurrent of social and economic factions and some difference of opinion on the appropriate relationship with southern whites, but rather solidly behind the issue that was of utmost importance to Hampton--universal suffrage.

**Constraints**

**Personal Appeals**

As in the speech at Richland Fork, Wade Hampton was a well known figure to his audience of freedmen. His identity and his relationship with blacks both past and present were clear, and needed no amplification. What he spent almost one-third of the speech developing was the trustworthiness dimension of ethos. This dimension was critical to his success for two reasons: (1) any appeal from the old white power structure to the newly enfranchised black majority would have to be viewed with a great deal of skepticism, and (2) his ultimate appeal would call for the blacks to trust the whites. He sought to establish this trustworthiness by showing his friendship with the blacks, a friendship which

25Ibid., 68.
he argued was both sincere and deep.

He sought to establish the sincerity of his friendship by arguing the consistency of his messages and the absence of any personal motives. In the opening of the address Hampton noted that he was speaking to "the colored people of this district, amongst whom my life has been passed." In the past the blacks had treated him with kindness and respect and there had been no change in this attitude since the end of the war. From these two pieces of data he moved to the conclusion that "I am, therefore, justified in calling you my friends." He then expressed the hope that "as my conduct to you has made you look upon me as your friend [as evidenced by the invitation to speak to them] so my advice and actions in the future will but confirm you in that belief." Once he had established the basis of friendship he moved to defend the sincerity of it: "I mention these things to you . . . to give you the assurance, if you need any, of my sincerity in all the advice I shall offer to you today." The "things mentioned" were (1) that he "was the first Southern man who addressed a colored audience after the close of the war," and that the advice given in that speech at Richland Fork was the same he would be giving in this one; and (2) that the advice given to whites in his Pickens address in the fall of 1866 was consistent with what

26Charleston Daily Courier, 23 March 1867. All other references to this speech in this section are from this source.
he would be giving to them. To substantiate his point he quoted from what he had told his audience in Pickens regarding their treatment of the blacks. From this evidence he concluded "I have held one language in reference to your people since your freedom."

The evidence seems to justify his conclusion. There are no inconsistencies between statements made to whites as opposed to black audiences or between those made in this address with those spoken one and two years earlier. In all of these instances he was advocating fair, kind, treatment and good will between the races, with the whites, of course, always occupying the superior position.

In addition to proving his sincerity by the consistency of his messages, he also argued the absence of any personal motives:

No personal motives can possibly sway me for I am no longer a citizen of the United States or of the Confederate States. The Bill which gives the right of suffrage to you, disenfranchises me. I have not even a home here, for my home, and the homes of all who love my name, have been laid in ashes. I have no political rights. I have nothing to bind me to the ruined land, but the memories of the past, the appreciation I cherish for its people, and the graves of my kindred. These ties, however, are strong enough to keep alive in my heart, a warm interest in my state, and they are sufficient to make one strive always to promote her welfare. This motive, alone, brought me here today, for it was not until the chairman of your committee urged me to come, upon the ground, that I could thus "do good to my own people, and to them," that I consented to address you.

While there is no reason to doubt Hampton's dedication to the welfare of his state, and in fact many reasons for
accepting it, the reasons presented here border on misrepresentation. While Millwood, the magnificent plantation of the Hampton family going back to his grandfather, had indeed been converted to cinders by Sherman, Diamond Hill and Southern Cross, both of which were in Columbia and belonged to the Hampton family, were in fine condition. Political control of the state would have a dramatic impact upon the economy, and Hampton, tottering on the brink of bankruptcy, certainly had a vital interest in the economy. While in truth he had been disfranchised and was without political rights, he was not without political influence, and certainly fully expected within a short period of time to regain his rights. Even granting minimum personal motivation, he was still motivated by his vision of a society controlled by white aristocrats. The impression which he sought to create that he was speaking to them purely from an altruistic concern for their welfare was definitely not an accurate one.

Secondly, Hampton argued that he was trustworthy because of his deep affection for the blacks. This affection was based on their past attitudes and actions toward him:

Looking at your action [inviting him to speak] in an aspect purely personal, I cannot but be greatly gratified at the confidence you have reposed in me. It is but another evidence of that life-long kindliness shown by your people to myself; a kindliness which I gladly reciprocate. From many of you I have met not only kindness, but affection. I cannot forget how faithfully some of your people clung to me through all the perils
and privations of the war. I cannot forget that it was one of you, who was always amongst the first at my side when I was wounded, and the last to leave me. Such affection is not often met with, nor is it easily forgotten, and while I have a crust of bread it shall be shared with this well-tried, this true, this trusty friend.

There is little reason to doubt the genuineness and depth of his feeling toward the blacks. What is important is that this feeling had been expressed within very clear societal boundaries. The relationship was not between equals but rather between master and slave. "The freedmen of Columbia," wrote Harper's Weekly, "probably understand Mr. Wade Hampton quite as well as he understands them. They certainly did not believe him to be their chief friend when he was in arms for the glorious right of enslaving them hopelessly forever."27

Motive Appeals

In a New York Daily Tribune editorial a few days before Hampton's address, Horace Greeley wrote:

The Union having triumphed by Emancipation, it was the manifest policy, the clear interest, of the Southerners, to turn at once to the Blacks and say, "we upheld Slavery so long as we could, because we believed it best for us and for you. But slavery is dead and you are free: now we will show you that we were honest in our devotion to slavery by treating you justly and kindly as freemen. Choose your wisest and best men for consultation with us; let them tell us what guarantees you require for your rights, and they shall be freely accorded. We are of different races and must remain so; but we are all Americans and Southerners; and, if we do

27Harper's Weekly, 16 April 1867.
not henceforth live in harmony, it shall not be our fault."\(^{28}\)

White southerners in 1865 had not followed the steps outlined by Greeley, though Hampton had consistently advocated kind treatment. By 1867 Hampton's thinking was much more along the line of Greeley's. The key was to establish a sense of unity and identity. Greeley's line, "we are all Americans and Southerners" was mirrored by Hampton's "are you not Southern men, as we are." The strategy of appealing to identification was clear to minds both North and South.

As indicated earlier, Hampton's whole strategy for dealing with the exigence was to gain control over the black vote, and the means for doing that was identification. Not only in this speech but throughout the spring and summer of 1867 and the summer and early fall of 1868, Hampton sought by verbal and nonverbal means to achieve with the blacks what Kenneth Burke labels as consubstantiation.

Nonverbally, Hampton sought consubstantiation by participating in meetings with the blacks. In his address at Columbia he was a guest speaker, sharing the platform on an equal basis with black orators. Simkins and Woody describe the overall strategy and the manner in which it was executed during the spring and summer of 1867:

To promote this sort of cooperation, public meetings were held at which Negroes were invited to listen to

\(^{28}\)New York Daily Tribune, 14 March 1867.
speakers of both races. To make the gatherings attractive to the Negroes, they were allowed to march in procession to the place of assemblage, members of their race were appointed as a special police force to supplement the regular white force, and a free barbecue was provided. . . . When these gatherings broke, after sturdy repasts of barbecued lamb and kid had been enjoyed everyone was in the best of spirits and it seemed as if kindly cooperation were going to heal scars left by the war. 29

While Hampton and others of the white power structure sought with banquets and processions to identify themselves with the blacks, they were unable to go far enough to make it work:

Why should they follow leaders who demanded that they speak first and eat their barbecue at a separate table? Better far the Negroes agreed, to follow leaders who would give the race some of the offices and banquet cheek by jowl with them. 30

Verbally, Hampton sought identification through his language, arguments, and illustrations. Thirteen times in the address he used "friends" and eight times "kindness." The invitation to address them indicated they looked upon the whites as friends, "friends with whom you wish to act and from whom you are willing to seek counsel." The blacks were to test the proffered friendship of northerners and southerners and discover their true friends. Finally, he identified as a "well-tried," "true," and "trusty friend" the servant who was first to aid him when he was wounded in battle. The blacks, Hampton observed, had always treated

29Simkins and Woody, 85.
30Ibid.
him with "kindness." The black orator of the day had "spoken wisely and kindly." He urged the whites to treat the blacks "kindly." On the one hand Hampton had promised the whites that the blacks would reciprocate any kindness shown to them, and on the other hand he was gladly reciprocating the kindness the blacks had shown to him. In other words, Hampton tried to create the oneness of long-time friends bound with ties of mutual expressions of kindness.

Hampton's arguments are analyzed later in this chapter and will not be duplicated here. Simply put, he argued blacks and whites were linked as one. They shared the same sun, the same soil and they would share the same suffering or the same success. Thus, they were one in environment and circumstance.

Two illustrations from his past experience were used to exemplify the mutual bonds of kindness and respect between black and white. In the one he described an incident that had occurred several years earlier in the North when a ticket agent told him his two servants could not ride with him in the same car. "I told him that I had paid their fare; that I thought them good enough to ride with me, and therefore quite good enough to ride with his fellow-citizens, and that they should go into my car. So I brought them in and kept them there." In a second example Hampton remembered "how faithfully some of your people clung to me through all the perils and privations of the war. I
cannot forget that it was one of you, who was always amongst
the first at my side when I was wounded, and the last to
leave me." The two examples established an almost familial
relationship between Hampton and the blacks with Hampton
being the instigator in one instance and the beneficiary in
the other.

Through nonverbal means of picnics, barbecues, and
joint speaking engagements, Hampton tried to appeal to the
black sense of oneness and identification with the state and
its white leaders. Verbally the same appeal was made by
employing terms that characterize a good and close rela-
tionship, and by pointing to past examples of good feeling.
Unfortunately for Hampton, the chasm was too wide for his
appeals to span.

Logical Appeals

Hampton's argumentative structure rested on one
independent, overriding contention and two conditional
arguments. His first and most crucial argument was that the
fate and prosperity of the blacks was inevitably linked to
the welfare of the southern whites. After establishing this
point, he considered two possibilities and the ensuing
consequences: (1) that the military bill would be declared
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court and the
blacks would have the vote; and (2) that the bill would be
declared unconstitutional and the whites would remain in
power. This section will analyze each of these arguments.
His argument linking the welfare of southern whites and blacks was critical not only to the success of this speech but to his overall strategy of dealing with the black question. In a letter written two weeks after his speech to John Mullaly, a northern newspaper editor, Hampton clearly enunciated his strategy: "If we cannot direct these votes, it will overwhelm us. Now how shall we do this? Simply by making the negro a Southern man, and if you will a democrat, anything but a radical."31 Six days after the speech he wrote to James Conner, "the highest duty of every Southern man is to receive the good will and confidence of the negro."32 While he had earlier urged fair treatment toward the blacks and argued that it was in the whites best interest to treat them kindly, he had told the blacks in his Richland Fork address that "we can get along without you better than you can without us."33

In making his argument, Hampton first established the obvious, that by geography and environment the blacks were southern men:

Are you not Southern men, as we are? Is this not your home as well as ours? Does not that glorious Southern sun above us shine alike for both of us? Did not this soil give birth to all of us? And will we not all alike, ... sleep in that selfsame soil?

31Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade Hampton Papers.

32Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, James Conner Papers.

33Columbia Phoenix, 21 January 1866.
Undoubtedly, very few South Carolina blacks thought of themselves as southern men. While they had been born and were living within the geographic region, it was through no choice of their own. They were in the South because they had been unable to go anywhere else. Further, to suggest that one is a southern man or a northern man carries the connotation that he is in sympathy with the social and political views of that region. It is inconceivable that these blacks, two years out of slavery, were then or had ever been in harmony with a system that had kept them bound in chains. To argue that they should identify with the white power structure because they too were southern men by birth was a hollow appeal.

His second argument linking them to the interests of the South was at least more substantive if not more persuasive:

Your welfare is inseparably linked with that of the whites of the South. If we are unjustly taxed, you will have to pay your share; if we are oppressed, you will suffer; if we are ruined, you will be destroyed. Your prosperity depends entirely on that of your country, and whatever fate awaits the white people of the South will be yours.

He made no attempt to prove the truth of his assertion that the fate of white and black was linked together, rather, he argued the consequences of the condition. Hampton was utilizing Aristotle's topic of the greater and lesser. If the "greater," the white land owners, were adversely affected by taxes or other economic measures, the "lesser,"
the poor blacks, would feel the impact as well. Normally, the argument would carry, but in this instance the blacks had almost nothing to lose. The disparity of their relative economic conditions was forcefully set forth by A. L. Burt in a protest to the Congress over the new state constitution. "'At this moment the taxable property is held by one race, and under that Constitution the political power is vested exclusively in the other.'"34 In a speech to the 1868 constitutional convention R. H. Cain in arguing for an appeal for federal money further described the plight of the blacks:

This is a measure of relief to those thousands of freed people who now have no lands of their own. . . . I believe it is a fact . . . that over three hundred thousand men, women and children are homeless, landless. The abolition of slavery has thrown these people upon their own resources.35

Thus, Hampton's argument was valid only for the small percentage of blacks who had an economic investment in the state. Significantly, Cain in his address to the convention argued the same point that Hampton was trying to make, but correctly noted that for the blacks to have any interest in the economy of the state, they had to be landowners: "If they possess lands they have an interest in the soil, in the State, in its commerce, its agriculture and in everything

34Respectful Remonstrance on behalf of the White People of South Carolina against the Constitution of the late Convention of that State, now submitted to Congress for Ratification (Columbia: n.p., 1868).

35Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 379.
pertaining to the wealth and welfare of the State."

To substantiate his view that blacks and whites were linked in economic interest, Hampton developed an example of unjust taxation:

I have said that if an unjust tax is laid upon the South, you will have to pay your share of it. Let me prove this to you. Many of you are laborers on plantations, working for a portion of the crop. Well, suppose you get one, or two, or three bales of cotton, as your year's wages. Now, before you can sell this cotton, for which you have worked hard, a whole year, you have to pay a tax of twelve dollars a bale, for every bale you have made. There is a case, in which unjust taxation falls as hard, or harder on you, than it does on us.

The example did indeed support his generalization, but certainly did not prove it. Any tax upon goods and services would affect, as Hampton claimed, both white and black. The fallacy, of course, is that he was trying to prove a generalization with only one example. Significantly he avoided mentioning the tax that was uppermost in the minds of the planters--the property tax--because it blatantly contradicted his assertion. The impact of the property tax would fall almost exclusively upon the white landowners. The vast majority of blacks would not only escape the burden of the tax, but would stand to gain as planters were forced to sell some of their land. A. L. Burt in his protest to Congress saw the consequences of heavy property taxes:

Now what must be the consequences? Property under forms of law, in the guise of taxation will be transferred from the hands of those who now possess it to others.

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36 Ibid., 380.
It is inevitable. The holders of taxable property in South Carolina cannot today, and will not hereafter, be able to pay the taxes imposed upon them.\textsuperscript{37}

By 1874 the taxpayer's convention was petitioning Congress and citing unjust taxes that confiscated their property:

It has been openly avowed by prominent members of the Legislature that the taxes should be increased to a point which will compel the sale of the great body of the land, and take it away from the former owners. The fruit of this policy is shown in the fact stated by the Comptroller-General in his official report, that for default in the payment of taxes for the year 1872 alone, 268,523 acres of land were forfeited to the State.\textsuperscript{38}

Not only would the blacks not be hurt along with the whites by taxes, as Hampton stated, they would be significantly helped.

Following his attempt to establish a general link between the economic well being of the two classes, Hampton moved to specific arguments dealing with their new right to vote. He observed at the outset that the bill giving blacks the franchise was being challenged before the Supreme Court and that "a great many persons, amongst whom is the President of the United States, think that this Bill is unconstitutional." With that observation he then considered two contingencies: (1) the bill was constitutional and the blacks would have the right to vote, and (2) the bill was

\textsuperscript{37}Respectful Remonstrance, 16.

\textsuperscript{38}Proceedings of the Taxpayer's Convention of South Carolina, held at Columbia, beginning February 17, and ending February 20, 1874 (Charleston, n.p., 1874), 51.
unconstitutional and the present government would remain in power.

The possibility that the first contingency might be true forced Hampton to make a crucial direct appeal for the black vote. Hampton provided three groups of men from whom the voters would select those who would "make your laws," and "frame your government." They could choose (1) "men who are ignorant of all law--all science of Government," or (2) "strangers who have flocked here to plunder what little is left to us," or (3) "the men among whom you have lived heretofore--amongst whom you must always live," and whose interest it was "to make the blacks enlightened, prosperous and contented." From the available choices, Hampton concluded, "it seems to me this latter course would be the wisest." Essentially, he was employing the method of residues: three choices were available and two were prima facie bad, thus the only viable choice was the remaining alternative. The fallacy in his analysis was the unsupported generalization that he asked his audience to accept. As with much of his speaking, he offered no specific evidence to support his claims. Nowhere did he attempt to prove that all the native blacks were "ignorant of all law." He totally ignored the substantial number of well educated free blacks who had been free for years and were well established in business and the professions. He had to ignore men such as W. B. Nash, the moderator of the
meeting to which he was speaking and whose sound judgment and advice he had earlier praised. Nowhere did he attempt to prove that all the strangers were there "to plunder" them; nor did he attempt to show that the whites had a genuine interest in the welfare of the blacks.

The proof for his claims was to be found in actions not words and significantly, future actions, not those of the past:

I do not tell you to trust to professions of friendship alone, whether they come from the Southern man or the Northern. But what I ask you to do, what I have the right to ask of you is, that as we profess to be your friends, you will give us the opportunity of showing by our actions whether we are sincere or not. If we deceive you, then turn to the North, and see if you can find better friends there.

The attractiveness of the argument was that it was a no risk proposition, since the new constitution would have to be submitted to the people for approval:

Should the new Constitution, then, not give equal protection and rights to all, it can be rejected. Another convention can be called, and another constitution submitted to the people. You have it, therefore, in your power to test the good will and honesty of purpose of the whites without any danger of inquiry [sic] to yourselves.

Hampton's argument was correct; the blacks could allow the whites to write the new constitution and then reject it if it were not satisfactory. The problem with the argument lay in his having to appeal to what the whites would do in the future rather than pointing to what they had done in the past. The whites had been in control of the government since the end of the war. They had revised the constitution
and passed new legislation to meet the changed conditions. The constitutional convention had not given the blacks the right to vote, they had not even allowed them to be counted as a basis for representation in the legislature, but instead had echoed and re-echoed the sentiments of Governor Perry in his opening address that "this is a white man's government." The legislature had shown its concern for the welfare of the blacks by passing the severely restrictive Black Codes. Instead of trying to explain or in any way justify these past acts, Hampton simply ignored them and argued that "not only does humanity dictate kind treatment, honest dealing, just laws for the colored population, but self-interest demands from us the same course." While the humanitarian appeal was new, the self-interest argument was the same cause-effect analysis that he had employed at Richland Fork. The problem was that while Hampton might have believed that humanity and self-interest demanded fair treatment, the evidence from the past two years indicated that at best the whites had varying definitions for "fair" treatment and at worst no concern about it. The evidence indicated that the actions of the whites were determined more by the radical controlled Congress than by humanitarianism.

The argument that the blacks could test the sincerity of the whites without risk was equally applicable to the other alternatives. In fact it is logically more persuasive
when applied to them. The whites had for two years had the opportunity to produce laws favorable to the blacks and had not done so. Since the native blacks and "strangers" had professed at least an equal interest in the welfare of the blacks and had not had an opportunity to prove it through legislation, reason would favor giving them the opportunity, especially since the product of their labor would still have to be approved at the polls.

In his first contingency Hampton dealt with the possibility of the bill being declared constitutional and the blacks retaining the right to vote. The second possibility he considered was that the bill would be declared unconstitutional and the present government continue. This state of affairs would then provide an opportunity for the whites "to prove that our professions of friendship were not idle." He then set forth the case for a restricted suffrage. Significantly, in contrast to his earlier tendency toward sweeping generalizations, he carefully noted that he was not speaking for anyone but himself, a qualification which certainly robbed the proposal of much of its force:

While I cannot speak for others, I tell you what I am willing to see done. I am willing to give the right of suffrage to all who can read and who pay a certain amount of taxes, and I agree that all, white as well as black, who do not possess these qualifications shall be excluded. I would not take this right from any who have heretofore exercised it, but I wish to see an educational and property qualification for voters adopted in the future.

To support his contention he argued that (1) advantages
would come from his proposal, and (2) universal suffrage did not exist.

The advantages of qualified suffrage, in Hampton's estimation were two:

It will be a strong inducement to all to seek education and to obtain for themselves a real and tangible interest in the State. It will . . . contribute not only to the material prosperity of the State, but to the increase of virtue and education among her people.

These advantages were presented as self evident truths and no support was offered. It is possible to accept as reasonable his conclusion that a qualified suffrage would serve as some inducement toward education and property acquisition, though it is not clear to what extent a person not motivated by personal gain to acquire property and education would be motivated by the prospect of voting. Despite the lack of verification this motivation was generally accepted by both black and white. The same position was argued at length in the 1868 constitutional convention where qualified suffrage was rejected not because it wouldn't motivate but because it would place the state back in the control of the white southerners. While reasonable to infer that some, regardless of how few, would be motivated to acquire property and education, one cannot make the leap from the desire to the realization as Hampton did in the second half of his statement. Not only must there be a desire, but also the means of attainment. Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Daily Tribune, generally favored a
qualified suffrage, but opposed it in the South because the means of attainment were not readily available. In the constitutional convention, F. L. Cardozo argued that Charleston was the only place in the state with a system of common schools and that it would take ten years to establish an adequate system.\footnote{Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 825.}

In fairness to Hampton, he did advocate aiding the blacks in their quest for knowledge. Speaking to white Georgia planters in 1869 he urged:

Let us assist him in his aspirations for knowledge and aid him in its acquisition. . . . I do believe that in proportion as you make all labor, other than compulsory, intelligent, you render it profitable. If this is true, we should educate the mind, the heart and the soul of the Negro, looking at the question only in its material aspect and leaving out of consideration altogether those higher and nobler motives which should prompt us to do so.\footnote{Columbia Daily Phoenix, 21, 23 November 1869.}

The system for accomplishing the goal called for the planters to put up a school house on their land and help pay the cost of the teacher.\footnote{Ibid.} It was a system unlikely to lift, in the near future, the bulk of illiterate blacks to a level acceptable for voting. In this address to the freedmen, however, Hampton gave no suggestion as to how blacks would acquire either education or property.

\footnote{New York Daily Tribune, 6 February 1867 in Charleston Daily Courier, 13 February 1867.}
While evidence showing that qualified suffrage would indeed provide greater material prosperity and an increased level of education in the state was absent from the speech and under the existing system logically unsupportable, a third unmentioned advantage was absolutely clear. With black illiteracy estimated at eight-five percent of the population, the unquestionable consequence of qualified suffrage would have been the virtual elimination of the blacks from the ballot box.

Hampton's second main argument for qualified suffrage was that universal suffrage did not exist:

No one under twenty-one years of age is allowed to vote, nor can foreigners do so until they have been in this country some years. . . . Thus, you see that there is no such thing as universal suffrage, nor do I think it desirable, that there should be.

Essentially, he was arguing a straw man. For the most part, those supporting black suffrage were not contending that the state did not have the right to set requirements for voting, only that the requirements should not exclude the black from casting a ballot. Since there was no such thing as universal suffrage, Hampton concluded, "you would have no right to complain of a law which would put within your reach and that of your children, any privilege, enjoyed by any class of citizens." Thus, any limitation upon the right to vote should be acceptable as long as it was applied equally to all involved. Obviously, saying that some qualifications

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43Williamson, 236.
for suffrage are justified is not the same as saying all qualifications are justified. The issue was not the general one of whether there should be universal suffrage, but the specific one of whether blacks should vote.

Hampton's logical appeals simply cannot sustain careful analysis. Throughout the speech he employed sweeping unsupported generalizations linking the fate of white and black and asserting the benefits of a qualified suffrage. He engaged in no refutation or counter-argumentation. It was as if no arguments existed that were counter to his own. Not only did he ignore possible counter arguments, but, in what was probably his greatest logical failure, he ignored the record of the past. To argue the good faith of the whites toward the blacks and omit all reference to the past represented massive misjudgment. The record was not good, but somehow he had to deal with it. With every avowal by Hampton of what the whites would do in the future, his audience had to be asking why the whites had not done it in the past. The issue was too large to ignore as Hampton chose to do.

**Fitness of Response**

The best assessment of Hampton's address is that it was an appropriate but inadequate response to the exigence. It was appropriate in that he both recognized the critical issues and dealt with them in a positive manner. It was inadequate in that while he sought accommodation with the
blacks, what he was offering was too little, too late.

Unquestionably the most pressing issue in South Carolina from the spring of 1867 through the national elections in the fall of 1868 was the political power of the blacks, and specifically their right to vote. Immediately after passage of the Reconstruction Acts, which granted suffrage to the blacks, Hampton spoke to the issue. Whereas in 1865 the thrust of his Richland Fork address was on the need for black labor and economic cooperation, in the freedmen's address the ground had shifted to suffrage and political cooperation.

Hampton's response was also appropriate in that he approached the exigence in a positive manner. Earlier at Richland Fork and at Walhalla he had been positive in urging the whites to deal kindly with the blacks because it was in their best interest to do so. His approach to the blacks, however, had been more negative in tone, warning them of dire consequences if they did not return to the fields. In the freedmen's address, however, there were no threats or warnings, but rather a recognition of their political equality with the whites and a high level appeal for them to put the interest of South Carolina above other motivations. An editorial in Harper's Weekly commended Hampton's approach to the situation:

The meetings of the Freedmen in South Carolina, and especially that at Columbia which was addressed by Mr. Wade Hampton . . . are significant. They show the utmost good sense upon the part of the orators. They
are, of course, attempts to gain the control of the colored vote; but that is a legitimate purpose and they are exactly the results which we have always anticipated from the wise Radical policy of Congress. . . . It is the most healthy sign we have seen in the Southern States. . . . It is a practical acceptance of the situation.44

While doubting his ability to persuade the blacks, the editorial specifically congratulated Mr. Hampton upon his conduct. It is that of a citizen who thoroughly comprehends the situation, and of a soldier who concedes that his cause is lost. Such a man will either leave the country, or if he remains, will adapt himself to its changed conditions when he perceives that they are changed.45

The Richmond Times saw Hampton's response as indicative of "a sagacious, practical statesman and one that should be 'universally imitated.'"46 The New York Times praised Hampton's position and expressed the view that if the South would adopt such a view it would "contribute very largely to the harmony of sentiment between the two sections."47 W. B. Nash, the black leader who spoke on the same occasion with Hampton, later wrote in a letter to the Columbia Daily Phoenix that "when I heard the noble sentiments expressed there by him . . . I threw down the hatchet and called on my people to do the same, and to meet our

44Harper's Weekly, 6 April 1867.
45Ibid.
46Richmond Times in Columbia Daily Phoenix, 26 March 1867.
white citizens half way in a Christian-like spirit." As Harper's Weekly had observed, it was no mystery to anyone that Hampton was trying to gain control of the black vote, but he was trying to do it by recognizing a changed political condition and responding to it in a realistic, pragmatic fashion.

While Hampton's response was appropriate, it was inadequate. Horace Greeley in the New York Daily Tribune saw the position of Hampton and the blacks as being irreconcilable through compromise:

We take Wade Hampton of the well-disposed ex-rebels who are sincerely desirous of the welfare of the freedmen, but wish to control their action; we take the Charleston meeting as the representative of the freedmen throughout the South. . . . There is a radical difference in the conviction of these two, to be adjusted by no compromise. . . . Practically, it is a question of voting. It is whether the negroes shall go over to Wade Hampton, or whether he shall go to the negroes. March 19, he gave them the ultimatum of the Southern whites—"thus far we can go to please you; come over the rest of the way to us." March 22, the negroes gave their answer—"malice toward none, charity to all, but—we vote with the Republican party."49

Hampton was genuinely willing to compromise, as he had indicated in his correspondence with James Conner; not only was he willing to grant a qualified suffrage but also to allow the blacks to take the congressional seats as long as the whites kept control of the state. The problem was that Hampton could not go far enough in his compromise, and there

48Columbia Daily Phoenix, 3 April 1867.
was no need for the blacks to compromise. Hampton offered a qualified suffrage which was unacceptable even to Beverly Nash, the black organizer of the joint meeting who was urging the blacks to support the state's established leaders. In fact Hampton had to carefully qualify his offer of limited suffrage to show that he was only speaking for himself and not the white leadership in general. Thus, the blacks faced a choice between an uncertain, qualified suffrage at the hands of those who had only recently given them the Black Codes, and a reasonably certain unqualified suffrage from those who had been working for their right to vote. It was not a difficult choice.

50Charleston Daily Courier, 23 March 1867.
CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1876 AS RESPONSE
TO THE BLACK DOMINATION EXIGENCE

Exigence

The exigencies of 1867-68 and 1876 were essentially the same in that both concerned which race would control the government of South Carolina. In 1867, however, black dominance was only a threat, whereas by 1876 the black majority had been in power for eight years with all its real and imagined abuses of government. Part of the frustration of the whites came from being one of only three states still under reconstruction government, and knowing that Mississippi in 1875 had overthrown its black majority and returned the state to the control of the native whites. The consensus of white opinion toward black supremacy was expressed in an 1888 article by Wade Hampton, in which he concluded that "it would involve total and absolute ruin to the south and infinite and irreparable loss to the whole country."\(^1\)

The exigence of black control remained constant, but the urgency to modify it increased as the years passed, and various efforts by the whites to bring about change failed.

Unjust taxation and corrupt administration were the two strongest perceptions lending urgency to the need to modify the situation.

In 1871 and 1874 members of the white establishment called taxpayer conventions to publicize the policies of the government and to petition Congress for relief. The 1871 convention was called "to investigate the accounts of the comptroller and the financial agent and to determine the amount of the public debt with a view to seek further action as might be necessary for the protection of public creditors and taxpayers."\(^2\) According to Simkins and Woody the machinations of Gov. Robert Scott, Att. Gen. Daniel Chamberlain, and financial agent H. H. Kempton successfully prevented the convention from uncovering the truth.\(^3\)

The 1874 convention was not as much an investigation of a specific issue as a proclamation of the various fiscal ills of the radical government. In a memorial to Congress drafted by Armistead Burt, he argued that it was the policy of the administration to tax land "to a point which will compel the sale of the great body of the land and take it away from the former owners." He showed that "for the year 1872 alone 268,523 acres of land were forfeited to the State."\(^4\) Additionally Burt cited the extravagance of the

\(^2\)Simkins and Woody, 156.

\(^3\)Ibid., 158-59.

\(^4\)Proceedings of the Taxpayers' Convention, 156.
Republican governments by comparing expenses of leading items for 1865-66 with those for 1873. The contrast was $260,000 to almost $2 million. He attacked particularly the printing expenses, showing that the $331,945 spent for printing in 1873 was $60,765 more than the total spent on printing from 1800-1859.5

By way of rebuttal the Republican administration sent a response to the United States Congress. The incumbents correctly showed that 1865-66 was atypical and then tried to justify the increased cost over more typical years. Significantly, the Republicans did not refute the charge that their tax policies were leading to the confiscation of land, but claimed that the goal was socially desirable in order to achieve a more egalitarian society.6

While the Taxpayer's Convention identified and publicized the increased cost of government, the confiscatory tax policy, and the strong possibility of corruption in the government printing operation, it brought no change in conditions. President Grant received the committee bearing the appeal and responded that it was not a matter for the federal government but for South Carolina, and laid the blame for the problem on the views of the white

5Ibid., 52.

6Reply of the Central Committee of the Republican Party of South Carolina to the Memorial of the Taxpayer's Convention in Reynolds, 253-61.
establishment. Congress likewise claimed the issues were beyond their power and refused to get involved.\(^7\)

Along with the exigence of heavy taxation was that of corruption of Republican politicians. It is not the point of this study to argue the degree of corruption or the culpability of individuals, since that ground is adequately discussed by numerous historians. The two facts of importance for this study are (1) corruption did exist to a significant degree, and (2) the conservatives perceived the corruption as massive and destructive.

Historians of the period, redeemer and revisionist alike, recognize that corruption was prevalent in the radical regimes. Reynolds along with Simkins and Woody paint the fraud and corruption in vivid colors with a broad brush, while more contemporary historians such as Holt, Williamson, and Bleser use delicate bristles and subtle hues. Holt accepts the fact that bribery was widespread, but argues that it usually dealt only with financial matters and concludes that it did not significantly alter the voting patterns of individual legislators. "Clearly, corrupt inducements were simply one of several factors that must be weighed by a lawmaker in arriving at a political decision."\(^8\) Carol Bleser in his excellent study of the land commission

\(^7\)\textit{Charleston News and Courier}, 30 March; 3, 18 April 1874.

\(^8\)Holt, 148.
observes, "although the land experiment was humanitarian in concept, in practice it was sabotaged by internal dissen­sion, riddled with corruption, and harassed by the criticism from the Conservatives." Bleser documents several frauds by the land commission and then cites Gov. Robert K. Scott as "one of the worst corrupters of the Land Commission Act." Williamson specifically details the corruption prevalent in the "Bond Ring" and the "Railroad Ring" and estimates that during the period some twelve to fifteen key figures managed to steal "from scores of thousands to several hundred thousand dollars each."

The significance of the corruption issue is that both Republicans and Democrats recognized and publicly denounced the corruption. Attorney General Daniel Chamberlain wrote in a published letter to W. T. Trenholm that "incompetency, dishonesty, corruption in all its forms, have 'advanced their miscreated fronts,' have put to flight the small remnant that opposed them, and now rules the party which rules the state." Robert Elliott, a black member of the South Carolina legislature and speaker of the house during the Chamberlain administration, attracted great attention

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10Ibid., 54.

11Williamson, 390.

12Ku Klux Conspiracy, 1251.
during 1874 with his bold calls for reform.\textsuperscript{13} The central issue in the gubernatorial campaigns of 1870, 1872, and 1874 was corruption in government. The issue, though, is greatly complicated by the difficulty in distinguishing the corruptionists from the reformers. According to Lamson:

There was of course nothing exceptional in the 1870's, about public servants who advocated reform on the one hand while systematically defrauding the public on the other. Men like Moses, Naegle, Patterson, Tomlinson, Cardozo, Whipper, Smalls, and even on occasion Robert Brown Elliott, to mention only a few, . . . all talked a noble game while often playing an ignoble one.\textsuperscript{14}

Daniel Chamberlain is an excellent example of the problem. Lamson clearly sees him as a hypocrite: "Although he set himself apart as an honest man and a reformer, there is ample evidence that he was a member of the infamous Bond and Railroad rings."\textsuperscript{15} In confidential letters to F. W. Dawson, however, Chamberlain confessed poor judgment but denied culpability for any wrong. "That I hoped to make money--dreamed of thousands--there is no doubt, but I never knew of or consented to any transaction even in this connection, which involved any injury to the State as I then understood it."\textsuperscript{16} Whatever his past experience had been


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 155.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

there is no question but that he was sincere and effective in his reform efforts after 1874. In his biography of F. W. Dawson, E. Culpepper Clark writes:

It has been as difficult for historians as for contemporaries, to resolve the enigma of Chamberlain's close contact with the corruptionists and his apparent good character. The best explanation is found in Robert Means Davis's notebook, "Campaign of 1876," ... Davis a contemporary observed that as attorney general Chamberlain knew about some of the frauds but refused to reveal them, even though he did not profit personally. 17

In spite of the difficulties in discerning between corrupters and reformers the point seems clear that corruption was widespread and available as an issue for both Republicans and Democrats.

From after the 1868 election until 1876 the conservatives felt it was pointless to offer Democratic candidates in state elections. Realizing the futility of direct confrontation, the native whites sought at least to get their foot in the statehouse door through a program of fusion with more conservative Republicans of both races. True fusion campaigns were run in 1870 and 1874 while in 1872 some of the whites supported bolters in the Republican party. 18 The strategy called for a nonpartisan campaign based upon honest reform without regard to party or race. 19

17E. Culpepper Clark, Francis Warrington Dawson and the Politics of Restoration: South Carolina, 1874-1899 (University, Ala: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 47.

18Simkins and Woody, 444-73.

19Charleston Daily Courier, 4 May 1870.
In 1870 the Union Reform party was created and nominated white Republican Richard B. Carpenter for governor and white Democrat M. C. Butler for lieutenant-governor. Despite an active campaign and endorsements by several leading northern Republican newspapers, the Union Reform party failed by more than thirty thousand votes.\footnote{Ibid., 20 February, 16 May 1870; and Simkins and Woody, 449-53.}

The 1874 fusionist effort was by far the most encouraging of all efforts of the conservative whites:

The Independents . . . came within 12,000 votes of defeating the regulars in the gubernatorial contest, and they won Charleston county with its bulging twenty legislative seats. Independent Republicans and Democrats held a total of fifty-four seats in the House, while in the Senate there were eight Independents and seven Democrats for a combined strength of fifteen.\footnote{Holt, 178.}

Had the promise of exerting a conservative control over the legislature been realized the events of 1876 would no doubt have taken a different course.

To understand the situation in 1876 it is necessary to look at the political alignments that developed between 1874 and 1876.

The 1874 campaign was one for reform. Not only was this the battle cry of the bolters but of the regular Republicans as well. "In the spring of 1874, virtually every Republican leader in the state was talking reform, and
a strong minority was moving energetically to achieve it."22 Republican newspapers North and South as well as the Grant administration demanded reform. In fact there are indications that the Grant administration toyed with the idea of supporting a conservative candidate for governor, but in the end stayed with the regular Republicans.23 Whatever the intentions of the other party leaders, Governor Chamberlain's calls for reform were apparently sincere. Williamson lists the reforms initiated by Chamberlain and indicates that by mid-1875 he was drawing support and praise from conservatives who had denounced him in 1874. Strangely enough a strong alliance developed between Chamberlain and F. W. Dawson, editor and part owner of the Charleston Daily Courier and one of Chamberlain's harshest critics in 1874.24 At the same time the governor was developing support among the white conservatives, he was creating division within his own party. "Relations between the governor and the Negro Republican leadership had deteriorated considerably, especially those between Chamberlain and House Speaker Robert B. Elliott."25 Elliott saw Chamberlain's actions as a threat to the dominant political power of the blacks. If,

22Williamson, 399.

23Holt, 177; and Williamson, 400.

24Holt, 183; and Williamson, 401-02.

25Holt, 185; for detailed analysis of the relationship between Chamberlain and Elliott see Lamson, 195-234.
from Elliott's perspective, Chamberlain succeeded in holding together a coalition of white conservatives, reform-minded white Republicans, and upper class blacks who were being hurt by corruption, then the poor blacks would be the losers; thus Elliott worked strenuously to unite the black legislative vote to oppose many of the initiatives of Chamberlain.26

The most significant confrontation between Chamberlain and the black leadership occurred over the election to judgeships of W. J. Whipper and Franklin J. Moses, Jr. Whipper, a northern black, was nominated to a judgeship in the First Circuit, which included Charleston, and former Governor Moses for a judgeship in the Third Circuit. Both Chamberlain and the conservatives denounced the men as corrupt and unfit to serve as judges. The corruption of Moses is generally accepted while the case of Whipper is not quite as clear. Holt observes that the nominee had been twice court-martialed while in the army, but Lamson notes that he

was certainly not a stupid man, nor was he essentially a bad man . . . . he was not one of the "friends" referred to in the Woodruff diary; and except for his admittedly dubious dealings with the sinking fund commission, he was not cited in any other connection in the Report on Public Lands.27

Whether the opposition to him was to his color or his

26Holt, 186-96.

27Holt, 185; and Lamson, 209.
character is not particularly germane. The important issue is that Chamberlain and the conservatives portrayed Whipper and Moses as the personifications of corruption, and a vote for their election was a vote for corrupt government. Elliott, on the other hand, saw their election as a party power move against Chamberlain. "Practically every speaker supporting these nominations invoked the necessity for strict party unity. At the caucus Speaker Elliott had declared that he would measure each member's Republicanism by his vote on this issue."28 In a strategic ploy the vote was taken while Chamberlain was out of town and the men elected. While Chamberlain with a legally questionable tactic prevented the men from taking their seats by refusing to sign their commissions, his victory was pyrrhic. The damage had been done. For the white conservatives the evidence was obvious, the commitment to corruption by the Republican party was so deep that no one could control or reform it.29 Immediately after he learned of their election Chamberlain responded, "'One immediate effect will obviously be the reorganization of the Democratic party within the state as the only means left for opposing . . . the terrible crevasse of misgovernment and public debauchery.'"30 One day after Chamberlain's statement the

28Holt, 186.

29Lamson, 225; Simkins and Woody, 479; and Holt, 187.

30Charleston News and Courier, 20 December 1875.
News and Courier in an editorial called for the reorganization of the Democratic party and on January 1 the Columbia Daily Register published a call for a meeting of the state Democratic Executive Committee, and the Democratic party was reborn in South Carolina.31

Through eight years and three elections the native whites had failed in their efforts to undermine the power of the Republican party and its black majority. The exigence of black domination had not changed throughout the period, but two factors provided a sense of urgency at the beginning of 1876: (1) the election of Whipper and Moses seemed to indicate conclusively the futility, even with a reformer governor, of looking to the Republicans for relief; and (2) the recent overthrow of radicals with their black majority in Mississippi gave hope that it could be done in South Carolina, even as it increased the frustration of being one of the last southern states still under radical control.

Audience

While numerous factions and groups made up the South Carolina political scene in 1876, Hampton primarily directed his attention to two broad categories that were necessary to modify the exigence: apathetic and disillusioned conservative whites, and blacks.

31Charleston News and Courier, 21 December 1875; and Columbia Daily Register, 1 January 1876.
Blacks

The black audience was the key to any hope of success for the Democratic party. The 1875 census of voting age males showed 110,744 blacks to 74,199 whites. With a 35,000 vote majority, the blacks had the power to control any election.

The black vote, however, was not a single, unified, monolithic political force. Holt's analysis of black political leadership documents that in the Republican party divisions existed both between blacks and whites and among the blacks themselves:

Prominent mulattoes from the freeborn class sometimes allied themselves with the conservatives in local and state elections. . . . Furthermore the statistical correlation of voting behavior with socio-economic background evident in earlier legislatures suggests an underlying class schism among negro legislators.33

The lack of adequate data prevented Holt from applying a statistical measure to the 1874-75 legislature, but he was able to detect an apparent tendency on the part of upper class blacks to break with the party stance and vote with the conservative whites on several key issues.34

In addition to the splits along class lines in voting behavior, there were also divisions over the reform

32Congress, Senate, South Carolina in 1876. Testimony as to the Denial of the Elective Franchise in South Carolina at the Election of 1875 and 1876, 44th Cong., 2d sess., 1877, 568.

33Holt, 188-89.

34Ibid., 189-94.
movements of 1870, 1872, and 1874. In each instance the majority of blacks voted with the party and defeated the reformers. Regardless of the outcome, the evidence demonstrates among the black leadership and the rank and file a willingness to break with the regular party leaders in an effort to obtain better government.

The Union Reform party of 1870 was a movement outside the Republican party that represented a coalition of Democrats and both white and black Republicans. M. C. Butler, a Democrat and one of the advocates of the straightout campaign of 1876, was the nominee for lieutenant-governor with Republican Richard B. Carpenter for governor. Approximately one-fifth of the convention delegates were black, and many of them were nominated for county offices. While the effort failed massively, it did mark the first coming together of white Democrats and black Republicans as political equals in a reform movement.35

The 1872 and 1874 splits occurred within the Republican party, and though both were unsuccessful, the 1874 campaign significantly narrowed the margin of defeat from thirty thousand in the earlier campaign to only twelve thousand. The voting results indicate that large numbers of black Republicans and white Democrats supported the reform ticket which had as its candidate for lieutenant-governor

35Simkins and Woody, 447-56; and Taylor, 194-98.
Martin R. Delany, a black.36

The division among black Republicans reached its zenith toward the end of the Chamberlain administration. From the perspective of Robert B. Elliott, black speaker of the house, Chamberlain was on a course that was diametrically opposed to the interests of blacks.37 Holt observes that "the governor's program did spark divisions within the party and among negro legislators in particular."38 The extent and intensity of the division are exemplified by the Republican conventions in April and September of 1876. At the April convention the floor became a battleground where Elliott sought to discredit Chamberlain by denying him a place as a delegate to the Republican National Convention. The charges and countercharges of corruption became so acrimonious that at one point guns were drawn, tables overturned, and the convention turned into an uproar. Chamberlain won the skirmish and gained a seat on the delegation but only after he delivered, at four in the morning, a powerful defense of his Republicanism and his reform policies.39 Though the skirmish and the control of

36Simkins and Woody, 472-73.


38Holt, 182.

39Charleston News and Courier, 11, 12, 14 April 1876; see also Holt, 198-99; and Walter Allen, Governor Chamberlain's Administration in South Carolina: A Chapter of Reconstruction in the Southern States (New York: Putnam, 1888), 258-70.
the party were Chamberlain's, the victory was by no means decisive.

Chamberlain's opposition showed its strength at the state nominating convention five months later. Though Chamberlain was able to retain the nomination for governor he was forced to run on a ticket with two of his bitterest enemies. In a letter to William Lloyd Garrison written two months after he relinquished his claim upon the office of governor and left the state, he described how close he came to forcing the convention into a showdown vote between himself and R. B. Elliott:

I made a grave mistake in that I did not refuse to run on a ticket with R. B. Elliott. . . . Elliott's base presence on the ticket justly gave offence to some honest men of both races. . . . I took the resolution unknown to any friends, to walk into the convention and throw up my nomination and avow that I did it because I would not run on a ticket with Elliott. I knew it would result in putting him off the ticket. I had actually risen in my office . . . for this purpose, when I was met at the door by a dozen or more of my most devoted colored supporters who came to congratulate me on the surrender of Elliott in seeking to stand on a ticket with me! [emphasis in original] I was disarmed of my purpose and relinquished it. It was a mistake.40

While social class and the need for reform were working to split the blacks, white violence and protection of their rights were concerns that pushed them together in the Republican party. Taylor notes the effect of the Ku Klux outrage of the early 1870's:

The failure of the liberal Democrats to rebuke the

40Daniel Chamberlain to William Lloyd Garrison, 11 June 1877 in Allen, 505.
lawlessness of their party associates and the refusal of Democratic officials to convict partisans of crime committed against Negroes and radical whites prevented any considerable cleavage between the mass of Negroes and the Republican party. Indeed, so far from accomplishing their purpose, the action of the Democrats compelled the continued allegiance of the Negroes to the Republican party. This was the logical course for the Negroes since the Republicans had afforded them such protection as they had received.41

It is not germane to this analysis to explore the nature and causes of the Ku Klux violence. Specific cases are amply documented in the testimony before a joint committee of Congress.42 What is important here is that it was violence by conservative whites against black Republicans and white radicals for political reasons, and that blacks throughout the state knew of it.

For the blacks that Hampton sought to reach in the autumn of 1876, violence was not only a memory, it was a present reality. The most significant and widely publicized of all the violent racial encounters of 1875-76 was the Hamburg riot in July of 1876. In the conflict between a band of white men and the black militia, one white man and six blacks were killed and numbers wounded. Five of the blacks were killed in cold blood.43 The response by the blacks came at political gatherings in Charleston and Columbia. In Charleston on July 17 they met to denounce

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41Taylor, 203.

42Ku Klux Conspiracy.

43Holt, 199-200; see also extensive testimony in Recent Election in South Carolina; and South Carolina in 1876.
the violence:

We enter our outrages. We protest against these men and their aides and abettors, and . . . we demand that Governor Chamberlain shall . . . invoke all the powers of the state to bring M. C. Butler and his clan to justice.

They furthermore issued a resolution "that the massacre of colored citizens at Hamburg, S. C. is unworthy of any civilized community and deserves the censure and condemnation of the civilized world."44 Similar sentiments were expressed three days later at a Columbia meeting called by R. B. Elliott. At this meeting the blacks published their grievances in an "Address to the People of the United States."45

A final important perception of the blacks was that their political freedom and social advancement were directly linked to the Republican party. The right to an unqualified suffrage had come not from the Democrats but the Republicans. Under the Republican banner over 250 of their race had been members of the legislature between 1868 and 1876, and numerous others held local and county offices.46 Not only were they serving as local officers of the law and members of the state militia, but they were sitting with

44Charleston News and Courier, 18 July 1876.


46Holt, 228-40.
whites as jurors and taking instructions from black judges. Black controlled legislatures had provided free common schools, admission to the state university on a non racial basis, and a land commission to help the poor obtain property. While fraud and mismanagement had prevented the realization of much of the new legislation, it nevertheless had been undertaken under the aegis of the Republican party.\textsuperscript{47}

The black voters that Hampton sought to reach in the fall of 1876 were far from a simple undifferentiated mass. They were separated by class, education, and morality, and concepts toward the nature and function of government, but they were pulled together by heritage, and fear for the preservation of their personal safety and political rights.

Whites

Hampton's white audience, while far more sympathetic to his views, was also not without its differences. On the one hand there were large numbers who were politically discouraged, disillusioned, and generally apathetic toward efforts to overturn the black majority; on the other hand among the politically active there were strong differences regarding the approach to be taken by the campaign.

According to Williamson,

\begin{quotation}
after the fiasco of 1868 and until 1876, most native whites virtually surrendered the state to
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{47}Holt, 152-70; and Taylor, 153-88.
Republicanism. . . . Most whites simply withdrew from active politics, concentrated upon improving their economic situation, and gave up hope of regaining political power.\textsuperscript{48}

Hampton himself is a good example of this attitude. After the 1868 campaign he withdrew from active politics in the state and devoted his efforts to ameliorating his economic distress. It was not until 1876 that he actively took part again in South Carolina politics. James L. Orr, one time Democratic stalwart, saw the twenty-five thousand vote Republican majority as insurmountable, and joined the Republican party as the only practical way to effect good government.\textsuperscript{49} Others looked at the numbers and quit. "In every election in which the fusionists participated, possibly more eligible white voters stayed home than went to the polls."\textsuperscript{50} From the fall of 1868 until December 1875 the Democratic party was essentially non-existent in South Carolina. In Taylor's words, "the machine all but went to pieces between 1868 and 1876."\textsuperscript{51}

Among the politically active there were several topics of division. There was early division over whether the Democratic ticket should be straightout, or a compromise

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Williamson}, 353.


\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Williamson}, 354.

\textsuperscript{51}Taylor, 188; see also Simkins and Woody, 180.
with better elements of the Republican party. Within the straightout group were significant differences over the strategy and tactics to be used during a campaign.

The division between the compromise and straightout factions was prominent between January and August 1876. The straightout faction, led by Martin Gary of Edgefield County, demanded that only Democrats be nominated for state and federal offices. In his testimony before the Senate investigating committee, A. C. Haskell, Democratic campaign chairman, explained why the party rejected cooperation for a straightout approach:

A large portion of the people of the state were willing to put Mr. Chamberlain on our ticket, notwithstanding past prejudices . . . on the ground that he had shown indications of a desire to reform . . . . But the public opinion overcame that upon the ground, both that the record of the past was very strongly against him, and that the experiment had been tried but had repeatedly failed . . . it was thought to be a hopeless effort. If we took Mr. Chamberlain, he would at once lose all control over his own party.

Though sentiment for the straightout campaign was probably strongest in Edgefield County, there was support from throughout the state. As early as August 1875 The Columbia Daily Register issued a clear call for a straightout campaign. A year later the Pickens Sentinel, Camden Journal, Abbeville Medium, Charleston Journal of

52"Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia.

53South Carolina in 1876, 791-92.

54Columbia Daily Register, 11 August 1875.
Commerce, Keowee Courier, and the Abbeville Press and Banner were all calling for the party to go straightout.55 In Richland County, nominees for delegates to the August state convention were asked to state their position on a straight-out campaign. All of the elected delegates including Wade Hampton supported the straightout position.56

At the May convention of the party, the delegates went into secret session to discuss strategy for winning with a straightout ticket. The reporter for the Columbia Daily Register noted the absence of strong fusion sentiments at the convention. The fusionists, however, were strong enough to defeat a resolution by Martin Gary calling for a straightout campaign, and delay any commitment to a campaign strategy until the convention reconvened in August.57

In contrast to the straightouts, F. W. Dawson, editor of the most influential newspaper in the state, the Charleston News and Courier, felt the only way to overcome the black majority was not to nominate a candidate for governor and allow Daniel Chamberlain to be reelected. Chamberlain's reform measures had won him a substantial amount of acceptance and praise among Democrats. In a series of articles in July 1876 the Charleston News and Courier set forth in detail the praiseworthy reform record

55Ibid., 3 June 1876.
56Ibid., 8 August 1876.
57Ibid., 6, 7 May 1876.
of the governor.\textsuperscript{58} For whatever motives, Chamberlain shortly after his election in 1874 "consciously sought to destroy the existing Republican alliances and to create a new coalition with elements of the former Democratic regime."\textsuperscript{59} Frequently, upon the advice of his good friend F. W. Dawson, he appointed Democrats rather than Republicans to state and local offices.\textsuperscript{60} It is thus Chamberlain who best summarizes the rationale for the cooperationists:

They knew and recognized the fact that the republican party embraced a majority of at least twenty-five thousand of the voters of the state. They knew and recognized the fact that the colored race, who constitute the larger part of the republican voters were attached to that party by ... the profound conviction, whether mistaken or not, that the great boons so recently conferred on them—freedom and suffrage—were safe only ... under the protection of the party which had conferred them. They believed upon evidence too clear to leave room for doubt that for this cause no number of these voters, sufficient to change the relations of our parties, could be detached from the republican party by argument or legitimate persuasion or other lawful methods of influencing their political action.\textsuperscript{61}

Much the same idea was expressed by F. W. Dawson in a July 13 editorial when he argued that the only way a straightout ticket could win would be by "fraud and force."\textsuperscript{62} Rather significantly, A. C. Haskell in a letter to the editor in

\textsuperscript{58}Charleston News and Courier, 5-18 July 1876.

\textsuperscript{59}Holt, 179.

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., 183.

\textsuperscript{61}Recent Election in South Carolina, 356-57.

\textsuperscript{62}Charleston News and Courier, 13 July 1876.
the Charleston Daily Register attacked Dawson for malicious reporting but did not respond to the substance of Dawson's argument.63

The division between the two factions of Democrats remained sharp until one event in the middle of the summer obliterated the dividing line. Chamberlain's handling of the Hamburg riot not only alienated him from many of his Democratic supporters but also drove a wedge between him and his most powerful ally, the Charleston News and Courier. After having published only two weeks earlier an endorsement of Chamberlain, the paper broke with him on July 20: "We have supported Governor Chamberlain's reform measures, and we have frankly expressed our opinion of the Hamburg riot, but we must protest against any move that wears the appearance of taking advantage of a local disturbance to prop up the waning fortunes of South Carolina Republicanism."64

James B. Kershaw, a cooperationist, noted:

I think the unhappy affair at Hamburg will be made such use of in the canvass that no alternative would probably have been left us than to take it straight. At all events it is a luxury once more to be able to put forward the men we like best."65

Ben Tillman, looking back at the events, put the matter rather succinctly, "If there had been no Hamburg riot, it is extremely doubtful whether there would have been any

63Columbia Daily Register, 15 July 1876.
64Charleston News and Courier, 20 July 1876.
65Ibid., 28 July 1876.
straightout campaign in 1876." At the August convention, the straightout supporters were in control. After a lengthy secret session, Wade Hampton emerged as the unanimous choice to head the ticket, with a full slate of Democratic candidates for state offices joining him. "With a Straightout Democrat heading the ticket, the white population for the first time in eight years united in a definite, fixed purpose."67

The party was united in the fixed purpose of overthrowing the radical regime and replacing it with white native Democrats, but below the surface there were still differences as to how that should be done. While for many the concept of a straightout campaign was synonymous with fraud and violence, there was definitely a continuum that ranged from murder at one end to non violent demonstrations of strength and authority at the other. At the one end, argument and persuasion as a means for reaching the blacks was disowned and ridiculed, while at the other they were embraced as viable tools. Martin Gary and Wade Hampton, respectively, represented the two ends of the continuum.68

The audience that Hampton faced as he began the campaign was composed of blacks, large numbers of whom, as

66Tillman, 29.
67Simkins and Woody, 495-96.
68Tillman, 28-29; and Williams, 82-83.
Chamberlain had observed, were convinced they owed their freedom and suffrage to the continuance of Republican administration, but who also were divided over class, philosophy, and personalities. The politically active Democrats were aroused and outwardly united behind a man and a cause, while below the surface strong differences in philosophy, manner, and method seethed. The politically inactive and discouraged were there to be informed and rallied.

**Constraints**

Rather than analyze a single campaign speech, this section will look at Hampton's campaign speeches as a whole and place them within the total campaign strategy. The analysis will cover speeches given from the time of his nomination on August 16 to his final campaign address on November 4 in Columbia. During this period he spoke at fifty-seven large meetings, and in all but one county.  

**Campaign Strategy**

One of the major factors influencing the direction of South Carolina Democrats in 1876 was the overthrow of the radical government with its large black majority in Mississippi. In November of 1875 the Columbia Daily Register quoted an article from the Augusta Chronicle and

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69 Recent Election in South Carolina, 305; and Williams, 161, 357.
Sentinel calling for the people of South Carolina to learn from Mississippi:

The Democratic victory in Mississippi was the most sweeping political revolution since the war. . . . It only now remains to rout the Radicals from South Carolina and Louisiana. . . . Let the white people of those states learn a lesson of wisdom from Mississippi.70

A few months earlier the Register had quoted the New York World praising the work of Mississippi Democrats and setting them forth as an example for other states with black majorities.71 Martin Gary took the advice and turned to Mississippi for guidance in overthrowing South Carolina's black majority. In a letter to Major T. L. Barker of Charleston, General S. W. Ferguson of Greenville, Mississippi described how the whites of Washington County overcame a black majority of five thousand. According to Ferguson, the keys to success were letting the white radical leaders know their lives were forfeit if there were any disturbances, showing up at all radical meetings to contradict the speakers to their faces, and monitoring the polling places. All of the above with considerable elaboration appeared in a thirty-three plank plan for the campaign of 1876 drafted by Martin Gary. Gary even included one recommendation verbatim: "never threaten a man individually, if he deserves to be threatened, the necessities of the times require that

70 Columbia Daily Register, 11 November 1875.
71 Ibid., 22 July 1875.
he should die."  

Gary's plan was specifically for Edgefield County, but certainly clearly revealed a plan that could be used in any county with a black majority.

The heart of the plan was the Democratic rifle clubs that were to be established in each township. They were to be uniformed with red shirts, armed with pistols and rifles, arrayed under military command, and ready to ride to any place in the county at a moment's notice. They were to be present in force at all radical meetings to verbally assault the speakers and confront them with their "lies." In general they were to intimidate the Republican white leaders and impress the blacks with the Democrats' power and determination. Additionally, each man was responsible to use any means necessary to insure that one black man did not vote the radical ticket.  

In a revision of the original plan, Gary gave more specific instructions on intimidating the blacks at the polling places on election day and stuffing the ballot boxes. In no case would there be any rational appeals made to the blacks; they were to be told that the Democrats were going to win with or without them, and they could join the winning side if they wanted. They were to be told that many blacks had already joined the Democrats, but names could not be released because of fear

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72 S. W. Ferguson to T. L. Barker, 7 January 1876, Martin Gary Papers; and "Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers.

73 "Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers.
of Republican reprisals. To tighten the link to the Mississippi plan, General S. W. Ferguson was present at the August Democratic convention and following its close, spoke at a rousing celebration of the work of the convention.

The practical outworking of the plan was described by Ben Tillman and Governor Chamberlain. According to Tillman, "Gary's doctrine of voting early and often changed the republican majority of 2,300 in Edgefield to a democratic majority of 3,900 thus giving Hampton a claim to the office of governor." Tillman further claimed that the Hamburg Riot exemplified the policy of intimidation:

Butler, Gary, and George Tillman had to my personal knowledge agreed on the policy of terrorizing the negroes at the first opportunity, by letting them provoke trouble and then having the whites demonstrate their superiority by killing as many of them as was justifiable.

In his Senate testimony Governor Chamberlain described his experience with Democrats showing up at Republican meetings and demanding a division of time. In early August he went to speak at a Republican meeting in Edgefield:

The public meeting was practically broken up and prevented. There was nothing like free speech allowed by the democrats who were assembled there. The demonstration was so overawing and threatening in size

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74"Plan of the Campaign." There are several versions of this document in the Gary Papers.

75Charleston News and Courier, 17 August 1876.

76Tillman, 29.

77Ibid., 28.
and so brutal and determined in its character as to make it a practical denial of free speech; and although . . . the meeting was called by republicans and no invitations extended to any other party to take any part in it, yet the white people, led by General Gary and General Butler, did take possession of it and did practically deny free speech. . . . They came upon the platform, and they practically enforced their demand of equal rights with us . . . and General Butler and General Gary both addressed the audience before the republicans, who had called the meeting, were at all recognized; and General Gary announced that they had come there to be heard, and they were going to be heard; if there was any trouble in consequence of the enforcement of the demand to be heard, that he wanted it to be understood that the responsibility would be with the republicans and the republican leaders, intimating that if there should be trouble and bloodshed, the leaders would be killed or injured first. . . . I yielded to them simply because I was not willing to take the responsibility of a massacre.  

The governor went on to describe similar episodes within a few days of each other at Newberry, Abbeville, Midway, and Lancaster.

A. C. Haskell, Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee, repeatedly denied that the campaign strategy involved violence, intimidation, or fraud. Haskell in his testimony before both the House and Senate investigating committees outlined the instructions given to the county chairmen at the beginning of the campaign:

The general plan of the campaign was impressed upon them, at the base of which was, that there was to be no force, no demonstration of military force or physical force, other than consisted in mere assemblages of numbers, and that there was to be no actual violence whatsoever in the state; that the campaign was to be conducted on the clearest and broadest principles of equal rights to all men, and full consideration to the colored race, and that we were to win them by argument

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78 South Carolina in 1876, 7-9.
Ten days before the election he again called together the county chairmen and impressed upon every chairman that he was to go back to his county with this understanding, that not only should they not use force at the election, but there must be no demonstration of force; there must be nothing to intimidate, awe, frighten or otherwise deter the colored people from going to the polls.

Regarding the practice of dividing time, Haskell testified:

My instructions always were to go to the meetings and to remain perfectly quiet, but ask for a division of the time and if it was rejected to remain perfectly quiet; to keep order, listen to the speakers, and use any means at their command, by the ordinary rules of mass meetings, to indicate their pleasure or displeasure--to hiss or applaud as they pleased--but by no means to make any demonstration or threaten force or use it.

Wade Hampton avowed that the principles upon which I conducted the canvass were the same as those I had announced in my acceptance of the nomination. I not only declared my disapprobation of any intimidation, but I said there should be none; that if there were any attempts made looking in that direction anywhere in the state, I should withdraw from the canvass.

Throughout the campaign he contended there was no violence or intimidation at any of his meetings except Beaufort, where a black audience refused to hear some of the speakers who were traveling with him. At all of his meetings he offered any Republican the opportunity of dividing time, and

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79Recent Election in South Carolina, 341.
80Ibid., 342.
81South Carolina in 1876, 831.
82Ibid., 984.
specifically instructed the executive committee that Democrats were to request and not demand a division of time at Republican meetings. In his view, the plan of the campaign was to "endeavor to call out the colored people to listen to us, to show them that their interests were our interests . . . to appeal to them by argument, and to reach their heads through their hearts." Later in the same testimony Hampton revealed his confidence in appealing to the blacks:

I believed that it could be carried by an appeal to the best element of the colored people; that they were suffering, as we were, by the stagnation of trade and the ruin of the industrial interests of the state, and I felt satisfied that an appeal to them would enlist enough of them to carry the election.

What then was the plan for the campaign, violence or persuasion, Hampton or Gary? The best conclusion seems to be that both were employed. In essence as the Senate majority report concluded, there was both a high road and a low road: "Legitimate methods of political conversion constituted the canvass. Illegitimate methods constituted the campaign," and

General Hampton . . . took no open part in the campaign. . . . General Hampton was not permitted to hear anyone urge violence, nor did he ever see any armed men, nor did he personally [emphasis in original] know of any physical violence or unlawful intimidation."

In light of his emphasis upon persuasion in 1865 and 1868,

83 Recent Election in South Carolina, 306.
84 Ibid., 311.
85 South Carolina in 1876, 157-58.
his control over the Red Shirts during the dual governorship and his eventual total break with Martin Gary it is not hard to accept as genuine his belief that he could persuade enough blacks to join him to give the Democrats the election. He was also practical enough to know that violence would bring federal troops and that was the last thing the Democrats wanted.

While he may not have condoned the tactics of intimidation, he at least had to know what was taking place. He had been in Mississippi during that election, he was at the August convention during the five hour secret session, he heard the address of General Ferguson, and he surely had to know of the campaign documents of Gary. Hampton may have believed that Gary's tactics were a necessary end to be tolerated for the greater good of ridding the state of the radicals. In any case it is doubtful that he had the political clout to control certain elements of the party. The zealots had been laying the groundwork for the campaign for almost a year prior to Hampton's involvement. Hampton was not the master strategist behind the campaign, but rather was selected by the Butler-Gary faction because of his ability to unify the party and inspire the Democrats with zeal, confidence, and determination.

The testimony of A. C. Haskell was considerably less sincere than that of Hampton. While he professed that the party policy regarding dividing time was to be done in a
quiet, peaceful manner, and only upon the voluntary consent of the Republican leaders, his own testimony of his experiences in going to Republican meetings contradicted his claim. In all of the occasions he cited as peaceful there were disturbances, threats, and guns, and in one instance the overt promise to kill the leaders if violence broke out over their putting forward a black Democratic speaker. In every instance the meeting ceased to be under the control of those who had convened it. While disavowing knowledge of the Mississippi plan he executed it to perfection.

James Conner, a Charleston lawyer, former chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee, former cooperationist, and candidate for attorney general, was a good friend of Hampton and traveled with him through a substantial part of the canvass. In a letter to his wife at the end of October, Conner observed, "our chance to carry the negro was not by argument or reason but by letting him see that we were the stronger, to impress him with a sense of our power and determination--hence the demonstrations we made."\(^{86}\) In another letter shortly after the election he described the inability of the whites to buy the votes of blacks on election day, even though ample money was available.\(^ {87}\)

In summary, while there were two overall strategies at

\(^{86}\)James Conner to his wife, 24 October 1876, James Conner Papers.

\(^{87}\)Ibid., 11 November 1876.
work in the campaign, by far the most pervasive appears to be the Mississippi plan with its fraud and intimidation, rather than the persuasive approach of Hampton. The Mississippi plan with variations in intensity was applied from the mountains to the coast. While Hampton may have believed in his ability to persuade the blacks, there is little evidence to support a widespread belief in the ability to win the blacks through rational argument.

Hampton's Speeches

Personal Appeals

Wade Hampton was one of a very few men in the state who had the respect of both black and white. "There was no other person in South Carolina better fitted than this nominee for the role of arousing white sentiment and of convincing Northern opinion of the liberal intentions of his party." In a letter to the editor in which he recommended Wade Hampton as the party's nominee, M. C. Butler called him "one of our most prominent, patriotic and popular country-men" and saw him as the best man to "reconcile whatever discordant elements there may be in the Democratic party of S.C." In addition to being seen as a man who could arouse the whites, appease the North, and reconcile the party, he was, perhaps most importantly, perceived as the best man to

88 Francis Simkins, "The Election of 1876 in South Carolina," South Atlantic Quarterly 21 (July 1922): 239.
89 Columbia Daily Register, 8 July 1876.
bridge the racial gap. A. C. Haskell testified:

He was nominated as a representative of the interests of both races. He has always been recognized in this state as a conservative man. . . . After the war he was the first man who was looked to by the colored people here in Columbia as their friend and representative and so he acted. We did not nominate him as an extreme democrat, but as a reform man, who was eminently conservative, and who would be able to unite the two races better than anyone else we could select in the state.90

For the native whites, Hampton was more than a pragmatic choice. As the highest ranking South Carolina officer in the Confederacy he was the embodiment of the Lost Cause. Many of the men in the state had fought under his command. In the interim since the war he had addressed numerous reunions of confederate veterans. Williamson expresses well this relationship between Hampton and the state:

When South Carolina found Hampton in 1876, it was if she had re-found herself. Indeed, she had. Hampton was, above all, the creature of the society that had reared him. He was the personification of its ideal, carrying in his human form the inflexible rectitude, the sober courage which all South Carolinians idealized but few possessed. . . . In turning to Hampton in 1876, white Carolinians were listening again to their consciences.91

For the whites Hampton's reputation was so well established that it was unnecessary for him to attempt to build ethos through his speeches. While there were a few references to his devotion to duty and the Lost Cause, they were minimal

90South Carolina in 1876, 792.

91Williamson, 407.
and relatively insignificant. He was telling his white audiences what they wanted to hear and he didn't need to build his ethos to do that. Even in Edgefield where his instructions were direct, forceful, and counter to what Gary was advocating, he included no reminder of his past military authority.92

The stress on building ethos had to be directed toward the black voters. The critical element of ethos was trustworthiness. He was asking the blacks to set aside their history of slavery and black codes and trust him with their newly gained civil and political rights. It was critical to his argument that he establish himself as a trustworthy individual.

Hampton employed three techniques to establish his trustworthiness: (1) To establish the intensity of his commitment he promised drastic future action if there were any attempt to violate his promises, and he gave both past and present examples of his standing up to whites on behalf of blacks; (2) to demonstrate his consistency on the issue of suffrage he pointed to his past position; and (3) through testimony and example he tried to portray the mutual respect and confidence existing between him and the blacks. All of these appeals did not appear in any one speech, but one or more of them appeared in most of the speeches, and some of

92 Charleston News and Courier, 21 October 1876.
them were published in a campaign booklet.\textsuperscript{93}

In establishing the intensity of his commitment, he repeatedly promised to resign his office if the legislature tried to tamper with the rights of the blacks:

I declare to Heaven that if there should be elected a Legislature that attempted to do away with one single right or privilege now enjoyed by the colored people, that, so help me God, I would resign if I could not defeat them.\textsuperscript{94}

He gave impact to this commitment by citing two examples of his standing up to whites to guarantee rights to a black person. Both were reprinted in the pamphlet distributed throughout the state. In one instance in Mississippi a slave who did not belong to Hampton was about to be lynched for murder. Hampton heard of it, went to the owner and told him:

"If you will get two more men, and give us all double-barreled guns, I will take him out of the hands of those men, put him back in jail, and give my life before he shall be subjected to lynch-law." They told me if I opposed the intention of those men they would lynch me. I said let them do it, but I would go and tell them if that man is lynched at their hands, they would be guilty of murder. I did so, and I would risk my life to sustain the laws of South Carolina, and to protect the lives of her citizens.\textsuperscript{95}

The other example occurred in Walhalla at the beginning of the campaign. At the Democratic meeting Hampton asked if

\textsuperscript{93}Wade Hampton, \textit{The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton, Democratic Candidate for Governor, to the Colored People of South Carolina, 1865-1876} (n.p.: n.p.).

\textsuperscript{94}Charleston News and Courier, 31 October 1876.

\textsuperscript{95}The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton, 6-7.
there were any Republicans present who wanted to speak. When a black man stood and declared he was a Republican, the crowd became boisterous and unruly. Hampton quieted the crowd and allowed the man to speak in peace.96

The second proof of his trustworthiness and the one most frequently used was the claim that he was the first man in the South to advocate suffrage for the blacks, usually pointing out that it was before Congress had acted and while Gov. Oliver Morton of Indiana and Gov. John Andrew of Massachusetts were still opposing suffrage for the blacks.97 There is inconsistency among the various texts as to exactly what Hampton claimed. In some speeches he was reported to have taken his position in 1865, while in others it was 1867. In some instances he was the "first man" and in others the "first man in the South" to advocate black suffrage.98 In fact he was referring to the position he adopted in 1867.99 Whether he was the first man in the South to take that position is unclear, but he was one of the earliest southern advocates. In testifying before the Senate investigating committee he observed that he was well in advance of the rest of the South Carolina whites at that

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96Ibid., 7.

97Charleston News and Courier, 10 October 1876.

98See addresses delivered at Sumter and Yorkville in Charleston News and Courier, 10, 16 October 1876.

99South Carolina in 1876, 991.
time. In some of his speeches he tried to use this earlier division as further proof of his own sincerity in advocating voting rights for blacks, and the fact of his nomination as an indication that South Carolina whites had adopted his position.

His final appeal for trustworthiness was established by examples of his past dealings with blacks, particularly those who had once served him as slaves. At Abbeville he quoted a letter from a former slave who said, "You were always good and kind to me when your slave, and knowing that you are a good and kind man—a man who will do what he promises—I write to say that I will vote for you, and get all the black men I can to do the same." In the same speech he went on to describe his good relations with his former slaves at his Mississippi plantation:

These colored people, hundreds of them, with their ancestors, have lived on my estate in Mississippi for over two hundred years, and they are living there still. They have never left me; they live all around me, and since the war, such confidence have I in them that I have not even a lock on my house. There is no protection except those colored people who have grown up from childhood with me. . . . These colored people, when they want help, come to me for it.

He then told of one of his former slaves, who, as he lay

100Ibid.

101Charleston News and Courier, 31 October 1876.

102Ibid., 20 September 1876.

103Ibid.
dying, called for Hampton and

turned over all his property into my hands, asking me to
sell his cotton and take care of the money for his wife
and children, and to protect them. . . . I tell you
this, my colored friends, to show you that those colored
men who know me trust me.104

There is no evidence to suggest that any of these
appeals were illegitimate or inappropriate. To the con­
trary, the evidence indicates that he was consistent in his
advocacy of fair and kind treatment of the blacks and
recognition of their political rights. Generally blacks
indicated a respect for him by attending his meetings and
listening to him when they would not hear other white
men.105 As indicated at the beginning of this discussion,
the whites also perceived him as a man who was respected and
trusted by the blacks. The only flaw in his appeal was in
his discussion of his early position favoring black
suffrage. His black audience knew that he advocated their
suffrage only after it was apparent they were going to get
it anyway, and that while the North was offering full voting
rights, Hampton offered a suffrage with educational and
property restrictions. Overall, though, his claim for
trustworthiness was reasonable and supportable.

Motive Appeals

Hampton employed four basic motive appeals during his

104 Ibid.
105 South Carolina in 1876. 986, 994.
canvass: (1) the use of spectacle to inspire whites with élan and confidence, and to awe the blacks with the whites' power and authority; (2) the appeal to economic survival by showing the threat from radical corruption; (3) the call to patriotism to join as one in saving the state; and (4) the creation both verbally and nonverbally of a bandwagon effect.

A. B. Williams, a young reporter for the Charleston Journal of Commerce, traveled with the canvass and provided a description of the speaking occasions. Williams was heavily biased for Hampton and thus one must allow for some exaggeration, but even with allowances, the demonstrations and processions still appear impressive. At the opening of the canvass in Anderson "the crowd was estimated at 6,000 and 1,600 mounted men, organized in rifle and other clubs, rode in the procession, while a long line of Democratic clubs on foot marched and yelled--the 'Rebel yell.'"\textsuperscript{106} At Greenville he was met with a crowd of 5,000 to 6,000 and 1,500 mounted men, while in Spartanburg there was an equal number of mounted men and the firing of artillery. By the time the entourage reached Newberry, the procession included 4,000 mounted men, "and the first appearance of the regularly uniformed mounted Red Shirts."\textsuperscript{107} At every campaign rally there was much firing of cannon, marching,

\textsuperscript{106}Williams, 161.

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 167, 181, 200.
riding of men uniformed in red shirts, and moving in military order.

While making no direct link to the mounted Red Shirts and the firing of artillery, Hampton in his testimony before the House investigating committee agreed that blacks were easily influenced by "a display of force." James Conner, writing to his wife, gave a clear statement of purpose for all the display. "Our chance to carry the negro was ... to impress him with a sense of our power and determination—hence the demonstrations we made; for the darkey is impres-sible [sic] and the spectacular takes him." The only problem with this approach was as Conner continued, "Chamberlain brought in the troops and showed to the negro that there was a power stronger than ours and the negro ceased to come to us. The same influence or motive that brought him in the one case kept him away in the other."109

The economic appeal was essentially the same one he had been making since the war: the blacks and whites were linked together economically, and if the whites failed the blacks would be on the bottom of the destruction:

If you allow the white people of South Carolina to go down this time, you will go down so deep that no plummet can ever reach you. If we, the white people of South Carolina were to leave you the State, and give you everything,—land, houses, churches, banks—you could not live without them. The only way to bring about

108Recent Election in South Carolina, 330.
109James Conner to his wife, 24 October 1876, James Conner Papers.
prosperity in this state is to bring the two races in friendly relation together.\textsuperscript{110}

Later in the speech he linked the prosperity to good government and then cited Georgia as an example of prosperity for the blacks under a white Democratic government. While Hampton did not go into any specifics regarding corruption and its economic impact, Gen. Robert Toombs of Georgia who spoke immediately after Hampton, gave details on the fraud and stealing of the radicals and how it directly affected the economic well being of the blacks.\textsuperscript{111} At Edgefield he used a comparison he had employed years earlier and threatened the blacks with the fate of the Indians unless they helped restore economic prosperity to the state. Along with the negative, however, he did again cite the economic advantages that had come to the blacks in Georgia since the radicals had been thrown out.\textsuperscript{112} In Charleston, the appeal had a slightly different tone when he contended:

\begin{quote}
I tell the colored man he will never have any protection for his life or property under this corrupt carpetbag government. Why? Because they have not the power to protect you. And they never will have the power until they are supported by the capital and intelligence of the Democratic party.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

He did not clarify what he meant by protection, but it certainly could have been interpreted by his hearers as an

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Charleston News and Courier}, 20 September 1876.

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 21 October 1876.

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., 31 October 1876.
oblique reference to proscription.

Earlier that month there had appeared in the News and Courier a series of one-liners, interspersed among news items, encouraging Democrats to do business with other Democrats: "If you want a porter, employ a democrat; If you want a driver, employ a democrat." More than twenty such appeals appeared with each giving a different service or occupation. The News and Courier also carried a series of resolutions adopted by the Sixth Ward Democratic Club of Charleston. Proscription was one of the subjects addressed:

In our opinion the interest of the democratic party will be promoted if, in purchasing supplies, employing laborers, and so forth, those cooperating with that party will give the preference to persons who intend to join us in this struggle for an honest government.

Hampton denied before the House investigating committee that he had said anything in his speeches specifically about proscription, but had argued only that the economic interests of the two races were linked. Furthermore, after the election he had sent out a directive specifically forbidding proscription. The closest he came to the subject was in his September speech at Marion:

I have told the colored people that the men who own the land, the men who pay the taxes, the men who have the title-deeds from the Almighty, will take you by the hand as their friends if you come with them and help them to redeem the State. But they say, on the other hand, if

114 Ibid., 2 October 1876.
115 Ibid., 21 September 1876.
116 Recent Election in South Carolina, 330-31.
you do not come with them, and rather go with the corrupt crew who have, for eight years, ruled and ruined the State, then you will have to look to them for your living and protection. We offer to the colored people the right hand of fellowship; we hold out to them the olive-branch of peace, but you cannot expect us, when you allow your state to be dragged down to infamous ruin by alien adventurers, to help you who have been the cause of all the suffering which will assuredly follow. We give you your choice now, either to come with your white friends, who never have deceived you, or to go with the carpet-baggers, who have deceived and plundered you for eight years. If you think your carpet-bag friends are right, then, when your trouble comes, go to them for the help and protection you will assuredly need.117

He illustrated the interpretation that should be given his remarks by citing what a Greenville man had told his workers. If the Republicans returned to power he would not be able to afford hiring any of them for the next year, but if the Democrats took control he was confident the economy would improve so that he could give them a $3.00 raise. "He didn't say that if they voted the democratic ticket he would pay them higher wages, but simply if that party got into power he would do so, showing how certain he was that under home rule the prosperity of the state would be insured."118

As in past instances, the appeal to the economic motives of the blacks was more negative than positive. There was some positive ground, as in his promise that money designated for schools would be spent for education and not siphoned off by fraud, and in the citing of the improved

117Charleston News and Courier, 2 October 1876.

118Ibid., 20 September 1876.
condition of blacks in Georgia. Fear, however, certainly predominated. Return of Republican rule would mean economic collapse for the whites and, employing Aristotle's topic of the greater and lesser, far beneath the rubble would be the blacks, or like the Indian, they would be scattered to oblivion. Even if he did not directly endorse proscription there was no mistaking the message that their jobs were threatened if they helped the Republicans to victory.

The appeal to patriotism called from Hampton his most emotional language. He called for black and white to forsake party and to stand together to rescue the state from destruction by the radicals:

I can only implore our people, white and black, to come together and sustain this cause. It is not the cause of a party. It is not the cause of a clique. It is not a struggle for party supremacy. It is a struggle for this grand old home of ours. It is a struggle to save South Carolina from foreign adventurers and thieves. It is a struggle that white and black can struggle shoulder to shoulder, to sustain. This dear old land belongs to us, and, if we are true to ourselves, if we are true to our fathers, if we are true to our children and to our God, we cannot fail to transmit it free and prosperous to our children. . . . Nothing on the face of this great earth would have induced me to enter this contest, but the sole hope that I might save South Carolina. And I tell you that there is not a man in this State who is making a greater sacrifice than I am. And now I ask you all, white and black, in the name of Carolina, in the name of our children, and in the name of your God to stand by and sustain this great cause to the last.119

In Charleston black and white lost their separate identities and became one as patriotic Carolinians:

I came then to speak to you, my friends, not as a party

119Ibid.
man. I do not come to speak to my white friends or my colored friends, but I speak to Carolinians, and I speak as one pleading for a cause as noble as ever stirred the heart of a patriot; for it is the cause of our native land. . . . It is not a party fight. . . . But it is simply an issue of patriotism. It is an issue of life and death to the State of South Carolina.120

Hampton called upon the men of Aiken to sacrifice their lives for the dear old state. Chamberlain had received federal troops to maintain order in the state. Hampton was afraid there would be some provocation that would set off a collision between the whites and the troops. Such an event could place the state under martial law and obviate the ballot. To forestall such a scenario, he pleaded with the men of Aiken to remain passive, seek redress of their rights in the courts, and die rather than offer resistance:

If, by the inexorable law of military authority, they are even ordered to fire upon you, say to them, "we have no war against the United States government; we recognize the flag which waves from the Golden Gate of California to the Granite Hills of New Hampshire. It is ours. If you fire on us, we know that in our deaths American liberty will live." I see beside me today men who offered their lives on many a battlefield. I say to them, offer them again; you could not die in a nobler cause.121

In the name of patriotism, then, blacks and whites were consubstantiated into Carolinians, and the cause ennobled by being lifted above a mere political campaign and placed on the level of protection of family, heritage, and

120Ibid., 31 October 1876.
121Ibid., 23 October 1876.
soil that had been given them as a birthright from God. This appeal would seem particularly appropriate for the whites, many of whom had gone off to war to defend their homeland and their way of life. The merits of the appeal for the blacks is not as apparent, and certainly not as strong as for whites. Many of them did see themselves as native Carolinians and loved the soil of their birth, but for the majority who under the Democrats had never had a chance to own so much as a shovel full of that red clay and sand the appeal to patriotism seems particularly weak.

The bandwagon appeal was both verbal and nonverbal. The nonverbal aspect was in the design of the canvass itself. It started at Anderson in the extreme northwest corner of the state, where white Democrats were in the majority and progressed slowly and systematically through the middle counties to the coast, where the blacks were in control. This progression from the mountains to the coast, from Democratic to Republican, and white to black control, allowed time for the up-state enthusiasm to spread to the low-country. Anderson had been one of the first counties to enthusiastically call for a straightout campaign. Many of the down-state counties who had been inactive and discouraged because of large Republican majorities suddenly caught fire when they heard what was happening in the upper counties. After seeing the initial outpouring of enthusiasm and determination demonstrated by the whites at these early
meetings, H. V. Redfield, a Republican correspondent, wrote that the Democrats were going to carry the state.\textsuperscript{122}

Verbally, the bandwagon effect was created as time and again in the low-country Hampton announced the election won or almost won and invited his audience to join with the victors. In Marion, he declared, "I have seen brave men enough on my march to assure you that victory is secure."\textsuperscript{123}

In Edgefield he announced:

We have already won the battle. I have already seen enough people enrolled in our Democratic clubs to ensure our election, and not only that, but by a much larger majority than we could have hoped. The only thing to be done now is to secure the fruits of victory.\textsuperscript{124}

At Aiken, a few days later, it was much the same thing:

"I bring you the news of the great battle waging throughout the State, of a battle already won. . . . we already have colored men in our Democratic clubs sufficient to carry the election alone."\textsuperscript{125} And in Charleston at the end of October he proclaimed, "I can tell you here that there are already enough colored men enrolled to bear it to victory. We have won the fight."\textsuperscript{126}

Again and again he announced that they had the election won and the only danger was in being cheated out of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Williams}, 161, 162, 167, 168, 179. \\
\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Charleston News and Courier}, 2 October 1876. \\
\textsuperscript{124}\textit{Ibid.}, 21 October 1876. \\
\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Ibid.}, 23 October 1876. \\
\textsuperscript{126}\textit{Ibid.}, 31 October 1876.
\end{footnotes}
the fruits of victory. Of course there was no way he could make such a statement with any degree of accuracy. It was simply designed to impress the blacks with the size and strength of the Democratic movement and to encourage whites, particularly those in heavily black counties.

Finally, Hampton employed ridicule to make Chamberlain and the Republican ticket appear weak and incompetent. Throughout his canvass, Hampton repeatedly chided Chamberlain for not dealing with whatever unrest existed in the state rather than turning to Washington, and for not dividing time with him at the Democratic rallies. At Yorkville he charged: "He who should perform the functions of Governor for the whole people; he who, when there comes a riot . . . instead of being there to see that the laws are enforced and that life, liberty and property are protected flies to the United States government for troops."\(^{127}\) In Marion he made direct reference to the Combahee riots:

> These outraged colored men . . . had written again and again to Governor Chamberlain to protect them and he turns to them a deaf ear. He does not go there and runs to Washington. I say here that if governor Chamberlain will call on me and give me the authority for three days, I pledge myself to go among those Combahee rioters not armed with even a pen knife, and I further pledge myself that they will listen to me and order will be restored in twenty-four hours.\(^{128}\)

His most forceful ridicule occurred at Abbeville:

> Now fellowcitizens is not this a nice condition of

\(^{127}\)Ibid., 16 October 1876.

\(^{128}\)Ibid., 2 October 1876.
affairs when the Governor of a state, the so-called Governor of a state, cannot protect himself or protect his people. Look at the riots that have recently occurred in South Carolina. What does the Governor do? He packs up his carpet-bag, puts off for Washington and cries for United States troops. . . . Think of the time when George McDuffie was your governor, and try and imagine him in the event of a riot calling on United States troops instead of appealing to the hearts of his people . . . if you place me in the chair once honored by him, if I cannot suppress a riot, if I can not go to the people of Carolina white and black, and say to them these are the laws and you must uphold and enforce them— if I cannot appeal to Carolina's sons to support me in the laws that I am sworn to maintain, then cast me out with scorn from the office that I dishonor.129

Not only was Chamberlain inept and cowardly in his handling of the riots, he was also afraid to meet Hampton on the stump. At Yorkville, Hampton indicated that the governor had agreed to meet him there in a joint discussion, but had apparently backed out:

After declining first, he, when pressed, accepts, and the first place appointed for the meeting was here. But where is he to-day? Where is your Governor, who ought to be present to represent you? I can tell you why he is absent. He has libelled the fair name of the people of South Carolina, and he does not meet men who will prove to his face that he is a liar.130

Two weeks later at Charleston, Hampton again mentioned his invitation to Chamberlain to meet him face to face:

But, he will not come out and meet the people of South Carolina, because he knows that if he does he will see flashing from indignant eyes reprobation of his conduct. He will see, in the stern faces of white men and black men, contempt of the man who has been a traitor to the

129Ibid., 20 October 1876.
130Ibid., 16 October 1876.
white and black man alike, a traitor to his position and to his trust.\textsuperscript{131}

In the middle of September at Abbeville he told the crowd he had sent a telegram to the governor offering joint meetings and promising that the white men of the state would protect him.\textsuperscript{132}

The problem with Hampton reproaching Chamberlain for not appearing at the meetings is that no agreement was ever concluded between the two parties for joint sessions. Hampton did telegraph an invitation to Chamberlain for joint discussion. The governor responded that it was a matter that needed to be handled by the executive committees of the respective parties and referred the request to Robert Elliott, the chairman of the Republican committee. Correspondence between A. C. Haskell, the Democratic chairman, and R. B. Elliott indicates a reasonable readiness by the Republicans for joint discussions but a total lack of flexibility by the Democrats. The Republicans were willing to accommodate the Democratic schedule for six of a proposed eight engagements, but the insistence by the Democrats that all of the sessions had to meet their schedule forced negotiations to be broken off on October 18.\textsuperscript{133}

The evidence indicates that Hampton had no reason to

\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., 31 October 1876.
\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., 20 September 1876.
\textsuperscript{133}Copies of correspondence of both parties appear in Allen, 392-97.
expect Chamberlain to appear at Yorkville or at any of the other Democratic meetings. Haskell proposed that joint meetings begin at Yorkville but that proposal was never adopted by both sides. Thus, Hampton's ridicule of Chamberlain for not meeting him face to face seems totally unfounded and inappropriate. The inflexibility of the Democrats is also puzzling. It was part of their campaign design to confront the radicals face to face wherever possible and to attract as large an audience of blacks as possible; joint discussions would have achieved both objectives. Yet, their total intransigence in the negotiations precluded the realization of those goals.

While Hampton was wrong in reproaching Chamberlain for not fulfilling an agreement he never made, he was correct that Chamberlain feared to openly campaign throughout the state. His experiences with the Red Shirts at Newberry, Edgefield, and Midway during the summer and prior to the nominating convention were so devastating and intimidating that the Republicans did not attempt any type of canvass at all until the middle of October, and Chamberlain did not give any speeches from the time of his nomination to the election:

The exceedingly violent tone of the men who were chiefly responsible for inaugurating the straight-out policy was one cause of fear . . . and the result was that from the time of my nomination until the 14th of October, no general canvass of the state was made. Between the 14th of October and the day of election we managed to hold one general political meeting in each county. But the local leaders in the counties, in some instances, in the
upper part of the state were afraid to go out in the
country to attend the local meetings, for fear of their
lives. . . . I did not speak at all to the people from
the time I was nominated until the election, simply
because it was not considered safe; it was regarded by
my friends as an unnecessary exposure of my life. . . .
I was very anxious to do it for some personal reasons,
but I finally consented not to do so, because it was not
considered personally safe.134

He also indicated in his testimony the desire for an agree­
ment with the Democrats for joint discussions since he felt
they would have been protected under such an agreement, but
the rigid demands of the Democrats cancelled that possi­
bility.135

In the perception of whites, the blacks were easily
impressed and intimidated by a show of force and strength.
They were for the most part vulnerable economically and
largely dependent upon white planters and merchants for
economic survival, and most though reared in slavery were
natives of the state. Hampton sought in his appeals, both
verbal and nonverbal, to address all of these motives. In
the spectacle of mounted, organized, uniformed whites there
was strength and power that contrasted sharply with a
governor who would not respond to the taunts of the oppo­
sition and personally go forth to quell the riots and
confront his accusers. Repeatedly blacks were made to fear
the disastrous economic consequences if the Republicans
stayed in power. Along with the heavy dose of fear was the

134South Carolina in 1876, 24.
135Ibid.
uplifting appeal to do one's duty for God, family, and country, and redeem the state from the corrupters. For the whites the need was to inspire confidence and create zeal; and this he did through the spectacular parades and demonstrations, the perpetual proclamations of success, and the call to give all for the grand old state.

**Logical Appeals**

A large part of Hampton's arguments consisted of refuting the belief held by many blacks that the Democrats would take away their rights if they regained power. To refute this major concern, he used three basic arguments: (1) the interest of the whites, (2) the integrity of his word, and (3) the numerical superiority of the blacks. His constructive arguments were also three: (1) the Republican candidates were corrupt and therefore unfit; (2) the whites needed to maintain discipline; and (3) the rights of the blacks were secure.

His first argument to refute the belief that blacks might lose their right to vote under the Democrats was an enthymeme built upon another enthymeme. The underlying enthymeme was a maxim that people will do what is in their self interest. Hampton argued that black suffrage gave South Carolina a greater voice in Congress because it enlarged the base for determining the number of representatives, thus it was in the self interest of the whites to leave black voting rights alone. His understood major
premise was that having a greater voice in Congress was in the self interest of the whites:

By the votes of the colored man the South has more votes in Congress, the South has more votes in the Electoral College, the South has more influence in the Union, and, therefore, we of the South would be fools, politically, if we tried to cut away the 800,000 colored votes that give that power and influence.\textsuperscript{136}

On the surface the analysis appears valid. The black vote did in fact give a greater voice to the South, and it was in the South's interest to have greater influence in Congress. The flaw in the argument, however, is in the unstated major premise that it was in their interest to have a stronger vote in Congress. It was true as long as the whites could control the votes at home. If the black vote posed a threat to white control of the state then influence in Congress would quickly be sacrificed to maintain power at home. Hampton clearly indicated this position in 1867 when he was willing to compromise with the blacks and give them Congress if the whites could have the state.\textsuperscript{137} In the 1876 campaign he made it clear that the state was more important than the national election and encouraged blacks to vote Republican nationally if they felt the need, but to vote Democratic in the state.\textsuperscript{138} Thus the major premise was true only so long as the black vote represented no threat to

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{136}]\textit{Charleston News and Courier}, 31 October 1876.
\item[\textsuperscript{137}]Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, James Conner Papers.
\item[\textsuperscript{138}]\textit{Charleston News and Courier}, 31 October 1876.
\end{itemize}
state control by the whites.

His second line of refutation was his personal pledge that a Democratic administration would not tamper with the rights of the blacks. As proof he offered his personal integrity and examples of his past relations with the blacks. Since his argument from ethos is discussed above, it will not be repeated here, except to say that it was one of his strongest arguments.

His third refutative argument was one he had used in 1867. Essentially he was offering them a no lose situation: "If you trust the white people of South Carolina once, and then if you find any of your rights impaired, you are strong enough in the state to turn them out of office. We cannot be elected without the aid of the colored people."¹³⁹ He amplified the argument by observing that the whites had joined with the Republicans on three occasions to support reform candidates, but without success. They had tried one approach to reform and it hadn't worked, now it was time to try another, and it was without risk because they had the majority. The problem was that the Democrats had had a chance and had done all they could to keep the blacks as close to slavery as possible. Patrick Henry had claimed there was no way of judging the future but by the past and unfortunately for the Democrats there was little in their past actions that boded well for the black. As subsequent

¹³⁹Ibid., 20 September 1876.
history proved there were numerous mechanisms by which the will of a majority could be circumvented.

The argument that gave Hampton the greatest delight, judging by the frequency of use and vividness of phrasing, was his attack on the fitness of the two leading Republican candidates, Robert Elliott and Daniel Chamberlain. He quoted the charges Elliott and Chamberlain had made against each other in the bitterly contested Republican convention.

Chamberlain says Elliott is the most corrupt man in South Carolina, and Elliott goes into the convention, before Chamberlain has received the nomination, and draws from his pocket a paper and reads a part of it, and says: "If I was [sic] to read all that I have in my possession I would destroy Governor Chamberlain . . . I could convict Governor Chamberlain of larceny and consign him to the penitentiary."\(^{140}\)

Hampton then carried his conclusion to the absurd by pointing out that if Elliott and Chamberlain were elected the first duty of Elliott would be to prosecute the governor and put him in the penitentiary. At this point in the argument he suggested that if he could be certain Elliott would faithfully fulfill his oath of office, he would withdraw from the race just so he could see Chamberlain placed in jail.\(^{141}\) Hampton's enthymeme was:

\begin{align*}
\text{Major Premise:} & \quad \text{A party with corrupt candidates cannot reform government} \\
\text{Minor Premise:} & \quad \text{The Republican party has corrupt candidates}
\end{align*}

\(^{140}\)Ibid., 31 October 1876.

\(^{141}\)Ibid.
Therefore: The Republican party cannot reform the government

While Elliott's and Chamberlain's charges against each other made up the heart of his support for the minor premise and was always used, on occasion he strengthened the support by citing the comments of two other candidates about each other: "Take the two next men on the Republican ticket. Cardozo says Dunn is a thief. Dunn says Cardozo is a thief and a liar. That is what they say about themselves. Very likely they are both telling the truth." Hampton then showed the inconsistency of Chamberlain's call for reform two years earlier, when now "the very men whom he denounced as the most corrupt men in South Carolina are on the same ticket with him."142

The Republican party was certainly vulnerable on the corruption issue, and Hampton capitalized on it. The statements by Elliott and Chamberlain were public knowledge. Chamberlain fully realized the inconsistency of his presence on the ticket with Elliott143 and it was entirely possible that Elliott had some damaging documents relating to Chamberlain's past. In any case the argument was a telling one, and put the Republicans in an embarrassing situation. Even Chamberlain's law partner, Samuel Melton, could not support the whole ticket. In a letter to James Conner,

142Ibid.

143See pp. 114-15 above.
Melton expressed his dilemma: "There is a certain sort of propriety in my adhering to the ticket with which he [Chamberlain] has associated himself, and which, aside from political consideration, is unworthy of support, as a whole." Melton expressed extreme displeasure at the selection of Robert Elliott for attorney-general and therefore his intention to vote for Conner.

One argument that was addressed exclusively to the white members of his audience was that they needed to avoid disturbances if they did not wish to lose the election. The argument was one of direct causality. Disturbances, or any civil unrest would give Chamberlain an excuse to call for federal troops and possibly impose martial law; and either would cost the Democrats the election. It was unnecessary for Hampton to establish the link between unrest and federal troops. Immediately after the Hamburg riot, Chamberlain had consulted with President Grant over the possible need for troops. The action was well known by the whites, and as discussed earlier was the breaking point between Chamberlain and his Democratic supporters. On October 17, after the Ellenton riots, the president granted Chamberlain's request for additional federal troops. Thus, when Hampton spoke at Edgefield on the eighteenth and at Aiken on the twentieth, his audience knew that more federal forces were on their way.

144Samuel Melton to James Conner, 26 September, James Conner Papers.
to the state. Additionally, the region had already experienced the presence of federal infantry during the Ellenton riot in late September.

Hampton went beyond arguing that violence would bring the troops to contending that the radicals were hoping for and even encouraging outrages to justify federal soldiers:

They [Republicans] have but one hope, and that is they may be able to goad this people into armed resistance. That conspiracy has already been hatched. . . . They hope now, by scattering troops throughout the state, to bring about a collision. And give a pretext to bring more troops to see that the board of canvassers will count us out and make us lose the victory.145

At Aiken and at Marion he referred to a letter from Gov. Adelbert Ames of Mississippi in which Ames told the radical leaders

that it would be a good thing for their cause if twenty or thirty negroes were killed, as it would furnish grist for the outrage mill. . . . and that if they could raise the cry of the bloody shirt before the North, the success of the party in Louisiana was ensured.146

Another part of the radical strategy, according to Hampton, was to send to their campaign meetings "only those engaged in the national contest, so that if we should break up the meetings or any riot should occur they can appeal to the United States bayonets, and then they can put the state under martial law."147

The conclusion was clear. At all costs the whites had

145Charleston News and Courier, 21 October 1876.
146Ibid., 2, 23 October 1876.
147Ibid., 23 October 1876.
to avoid any provocation: "It is of the utmost importance that the canvass should be peaceable. All bloodshed must be avoided." He stressed the urgency of his conclusion by reminding the old soldiers present of the necessity for strict discipline and adherence to command in the military. He then made the analogy to the campaign with himself and the executive committee in command. They had the best information; therefore, it was imperative that their instructions be obeyed, and their instructions were to keep the peace. Those at Aiken he entreated to not only avoid collision with the federal troops but to receive them as friends: "These men who met us in war, when we laid down our arms, and recognized the supremacy of the old flag and the perpetuity of the Union, were no longer our enemies, but are the best friends we have North. Treat them kindly." At Edgefield he added a commendation for the way they had already greeted the troops. It is significant that he presented the argument in its most developed form at Aiken and Edgefield. Aiken County had already experienced the Hamburg and Ellenton riots which were the prime cause for Chamberlain's request for federal aid. Edgefield County, the home of Martin Gary and the Mississippi plan, was adjacent to Aiken, and many of the men from Edgefield had

148Ibid., 2 October 1876.
149Ibid., 23 October 1876.
150Ibid., 21 October 1876.
been involved at Hamburg and Ellenton.

Beyond the argument in his speeches, the controversy over the purpose and need for federal troops was vigorously pursued in the press, letters, addresses to the people of the United States, and eventually in testimony before both House and Senate committees investigating the election. The Democrats produced testimony that generally throughout the state peace prevailed, and there had been no interference with the courts and the process of law enforcement, and whatever problems there were could be handled by forces within the state. Chamberlain on the other hand flatly denied any political motive in requesting troops and produced testimony that the Democratic rifle clubs consisted of thirteen thousand armed and trained white men in a nonlegal paramilitary organization and that in Aiken and Edgefield counties they had intimidated the law enforcement authorities and were terrorizing and killing blacks.\textsuperscript{151}

It is beyond the scope of this study, if not impossible, to unravel the accuracy of these competing claims. Probability, however, would seem to rest with Chamberlain. Gary, in his plan for the campaign, expressly endorsed riding roughshod over the blacks and even killing if necessary to ensure the election. Since he advocated such measures, and since such measures were claimed to have

\textsuperscript{151}Reynolds, 381-90; Allen, 365-427; Recent Election in South Carolina; and South Carolina in 1876.
occurred, it is not difficult to believe that they in fact
did occur. It is also not difficult to believe that
Chamberlain, based on his personal experiences at Edgefield
and Newberry, was ready to believe the reports of whites
acting in a lawless manner. It is quite reasonable that
Chamberlain, afraid even to venture forth to make campaign
speeches, acted sincerely when he called for federal troops
and not as part of a political conspiracy to defraud the
Democrats.

Hampton and the Democrats did not want the soldiers
for as James Conner indicated, it upset the strategy of
impressing the blacks with their strength. By arguing that
civil unrest and violence would work to the advantage of the
Republicans, Hampton sought to stifle the violent tendencies
of the Gary faction of the party and bring it more under the
authority of the executive committee.

In a campaign marked by violence and intimidation,
Hampton sought throughout the canvass to employ rational
appeals to reach both blacks and whites. He used both
enthymemes and causal analysis, and supported key conten­
tions with sufficient evidence to make them convincing. His
attack on Elliott and Chamberlain was more entertaining and
reinforcing than probative since the data was readily
available, and most of the audience had already made up
their minds on the issue. The appeal to certain whites for
discipline and control was necessary and, in spite of the
wrongfully assigned motives, causally valid to the extent that a direct collision with the federal troops would have harmed any chance they had of winning. There is no evidence however that the argument had any significant impact upon the behavior of whites in those counties. His most extensive argumentation was in an effort to convince blacks that their rights were secure with the Democrats. He approached them from the perspective of the three principal participants in the scene, the whites, himself, and the blacks, and tried to show them that their rights were secure with a three fold lock. The whites wouldn't tamper with their rights because it would hurt their power in Congress; he wouldn't tamper with them because he was a man of his word; and the blacks had the votes to stop any tampering. Thus, there were three independent checks upon any tampering with their rights. He produced evidence to support premises in all three enthymemes, but only in the argument from his character could he point to past example.

**Fitness of Response**

On their face the election returns of 1876 showed Hampton elected by a majority of 1,134. The returns, however, of Edgefield and Laurens counties were thrown out by the Republicans. In Edgefield the total vote exceeded the number of eligible voters by more than 2,000, and the

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^152 South Carolina in 1876, 988.
votes for Hampton went beyond the eligible white population by approximately 3,500.\(^{153}\) With those two counties out Chamberlain won the election by about 3,000 votes.\(^{154}\) Both sides claimed victory, and for five months political chaos reigned with two governors, two legislatures, and a statehouse guarded by federal troops. Finally on April 11, 1877, one day after federal troops were removed by President Hayes, Chamberlain turned over the office of governor to Wade Hampton, and the Democratic victory was complete.\(^{155}\)

The exigence had been removed, but had victory been achieved through rhetorical means or through violence, coercion, fraud, and intimidation? The weight of evidence seems to indicate the latter. A. B. Williams, who traveled with Hampton as a reporter, concluded:

> Nobody ever will know how the state would have gone with a fair and free election. The Democrats cheated and intimidated and bribed and bulldozed and repeated where they could and the Republicans did likewise. It was war and revolution, a battle for life, and force and cunning were applied and the law was disregarded by both sides. . . . In the upcountry Red Shirts rode about in troops from poll to poll voting in each and hindering and scattering negroes who were trying to do likewise.\(^{156}\)

Even Hampton Jarrell, a strong apologist for Wade Hampton, concedes there was no way to explain the vote in Edgefield:

\(^{153}\)Ibid., 568.

\(^{154}\)Simkins and Woody, 514.

\(^{155}\)For detailed accounts of this period see Simkins and Woody, 514-41; Reynolds, 393-462; and Allen, 428-87.

\(^{156}\)Williams, 365.
There was fraud, no doubt, in Edgefield, but probably not to the extent alleged. Most later stories of fraud and intimidation stem from Edgefield, the home of both Gary and Tillman; but this county was the exception, not the rule, as to the campaign in the state at large.\textsuperscript{157}

However, one must add to Jarrell's restricted view of fraud the testimony of James Conner, who was certainly not allied with the Gary faction, that they tried to buy votes in Charleston but failed.\textsuperscript{158} Even if Edgefield were atypical, without its incredibly bloated majority for Hampton, he would have lost. Typical or not, the Edgefield vote was critical to the outcome.

There is likewise no way to determine how many blacks voted for Hampton. Estimates ranged from a low of three thousand by Chamberlain\textsuperscript{159} to a high of seventeen thousand by Hampton.\textsuperscript{160} A. C. Haskell put the figure at about fifteen thousand.\textsuperscript{161} Haskell based his estimate upon an analysis of voting in the twenty-four counties where separate black and white poll lists were kept. By deducting Chamberlain's vote from the total black votes cast he was able to determine that at least 8,191 black votes had been cast for Hampton. By projecting the same ratio of black

\textsuperscript{157}Jarrell, 98, 99.

\textsuperscript{158}James Conner to his wife, 11 November 1876, James Conner Papers.

\textsuperscript{159}South Carolina in 1876, 40.

\textsuperscript{160}Recent Election in South Carolina, 333.

\textsuperscript{161}Ibid., 823.
votes for Hampton to the eight counties that had not reported poll lists by race, he arrived at a minimum of 14,237 blacks who voted for Hampton. The determination of the eight thousand minimum in the twenty-four counties seems reasonably accurate. If one uses the 8,191 to determine the percentage of total votes cast in those twenty-four counties that were black votes for Hampton it is slightly over seven percent. Applying the seven percent figure to the total votes cast in the election would reveal a black vote for Hampton of just over thirteen thousand. The best estimate for the black vote for Hampton would seem to be from twelve thousand to sixteen thousand. James Conner did not give any estimate of numbers but did indicate the black vote for Hampton was less than what he had expected: "They fooled us to death. Thousands who had promised us to vote Hayes and Hampton voted the straight Republican ticket." Ben Tillman, a devotee of Martin
Gary, claimed Hampton

blundered egregiously in urging the policy of persuasion; and of convincing the negroes by argument to vote with us. He always maintained that sixteen thousand negroes voted for him in 1876; but every active worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully mistaken."

On the other hand, one of the key elements of the Gary

162 South Carolina in 1876, 568-71.
163 James Conner to his wife, 11 November 1876, James Conner Papers.
strategy was to keep blacks away from the polls, but as the returns indicate, this effort was an obvious failure since blacks voted in record numbers:

We submit that if the charges generally made against us, of intimidation, were true, the evidence of 105,366 colored votes having been cast is a denial stronger on its face than any personal testimony can be. Admitting, for the argument . . . that there may have been threats made for the purpose of intimidation yet, if they were made, they were entire failures, because the colored vote is within 5,000 of a declared census. . . . It is larger by thousands than any colored vote hitherto cast in this State.165

Jarrell argues that the claims and boasts of intimidation and fraud were exaggerated by certain elements of the Democratic party in order to justify their approach toward the blacks:

The matter [vote count] is significant because the divergent policies of Hampton and Gary (and, later Tillman) towards the negro were largely justified by their contradictory claims as to how the election had been won. . . . Gary was to insist that the election was won only by intimidation and fraud and that any other course with the negro was treason to Straightout Democracy.166

Out of all the claims and counter claims a few conclusions regarding the results of the election seem possible. First, no one, not even the staunchest Democratic apologists, can deny that cheating and intimidation occurred in Edgefield. Second, the evidence seems clear that Hampton received at least in excess of eight thousand black votes and probably in the range of twelve thousand to fifteen

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165South Carolina in 1876, 72.
166Jarrell, 102.
thousand. Third, without the fraudulent votes of Edgefield and the black votes cast for Hampton, there would have been no Hampton victory. Fourth, there is no way of determining how many of the black votes cast for Hampton were the result of bribery and intimidation and how many of free choice. Thus the claim of victory was the product of both coercion and persuasion.

The key concern for this study is not so much the success or failure of the campaign as the appropriateness of the approach Hampton took in trying to modify the exigence. Martin Gary and his faction of the party saw the exigence as nonrhetorical, one that could not be modified by the application of rhetoric. They believed the blacks were incapable of responding to rational persuasive appeals and therefore fashioned a campaign of fraud and intimidation. On the other hand, every piece of evidence indicates that Hampton did not concur in that view, but rather saw the exigence as rhetorical and tried to modify it through persuasive appeals. Repeatedly Hampton asserted his commitment to persuasion:

The canvass opened . . . in Anderson, and I there took the ground . . . that we would endeavor to call out the colored people to listen to us, to show them that their interests were our interests, and to tell them that of course, they had a right to vote as they pleased, but to endeavor, as I used the expression at one time, to appeal to them by argument, and to reach their heads through their hearts. That was the ground upon which the campaign was organized, and most of each speech of
Hampton believed he was nominated because he could appeal to the blacks: "The two reasons [for his nomination] were that I would bring out all the white vote, and that I would bring to my support a large number of colored people with whom my relations had always been friendly." His speeches were completely consistent with his claim. From his acceptance speech before the all white Democratic nominating convention in Columbia to a practically all black Republican audience in Beaufort, from Pickens in the up-state to Charleston in the low-country he advocated and employed the use of persuasion and denounced all use of violence and intimidation. In the congressional hearings none of the testimony linked Hampton to any occasion involving violence or intimidation. In the period immediately after the election when five thousand Red Shirts descended upon Columbia, he counseled peace and confidence in legal measures, and dispersed the crowd. Gary and his supporters did not perceive Hampton as supportive of their tactics. A letter to the editor in the *Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel* accused Hampton of ignoring the straightouts when he selected the state executive committee and of adopting a "milk and cider,

167 *Recent Election in South Carolina*, 305-6.
168 *South Carolina in 1876*, 991.
169 Williams, 418.
peace and prosperity, conciliation of Radicals and flattery of negroes policy, instead of the bold and aggressive policy inaugurated by the straightout leaders.¹¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, according to Haskell, Gary was asked to modify his use of violent language in his speeches:

> It was always heard with great regret, and was directly contrary to the spirit of our party and to our whole campaign . . . His speeches were not approved in that respect. It is a great peculiarity of the man that he uses violent language very often, and he was asked to modify it.¹¹⁷¹

Hampton knew of Gary's plan for the campaign, and while he did approve a show of strength to impress the blacks, it seems clear that he rejected the spirit of Gary's campaign of violence, and instead sought a solution through rhetoric.

His appeals were well adapted to his audience and the occasion, and many were the same ones he had used in 1865 and 1867: the economic mutual interests of black and white and the comparison of the fate of the blacks to that of the Indian had been used in 1865; his character, patriotic love of the state, and the numerical majority of the blacks were all employed in 1867. The appeals still had the same problems they had encountered earlier. With the exception of his character, he had no present or past examples to demonstrate the good faith of the Democrats toward the blacks. At times, as in the attack on Chamberlain for

¹¹⁷⁰*Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel*, 10 January 1877.

¹¹⁷¹*South Carolina in 1876*, 833.
failing to appear and the conspiracy by the Republicans to create outrages, he tended to adjust the facts to suit his argument, but not to an extent that exceeded the propriety of most political rhetoric. He was able to speak to large numbers of blacks and convinced a substantial number to vote the Democratic ticket in the state. On the whole, his, and not Gary's, was the appropriate response to the situation.
CHAPTER VI

ADDRESSES AT BLACKVILLE AND GREENVILLE
AS RESPONSE TO THE BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION EXIGENCE

Exigence

Precisely at noon on April 11, 1877, the personal secretaries of Daniel Chamberlain and Wade Hampton met at the office of the governor of South Carolina. A few words were spoken, keys were passed from one representative to the other, and for the first time in eight years the seal of the state of South Carolina was again in Democratic hands.1 But to insure control of the state, the Democrats also needed the legislature. By the end of April, the Democrats had increased their majority in the House from six to forty, and by the end of the special session in June they had obtained a majority in the Senate.2 Consequently, when the regular session of the legislature convened in the fall of 1877 the Republican party had been thoroughly routed, and Democrats were in complete control of state government.

Once the exigence of black domination had been overcome, at least temporarily, the issue turned to the means for maintaining the dominant position. During the campaign

1Charleston News and Courier, 12 April 1877.
2Cooper, Jr., 24-25.
Hampton had pledged that race would not be an issue in his administration, but that all men regardless of color would be treated equally under the law. The exigence that Governor Hampton faced in 1877-78 was a challenge from within the Democratic party to abandon his pledges and defeat the Republicans at the next election by fraud. His speaking on the race issue during his term as governor was to reassure the blacks of his policy, remind the whites of the good faith of the blacks, and resist that element of the party that was attacking his policy.

Shortly after his election, Hampton made it clear that he intended to keep his pledges and pursue a moderate course toward the blacks. One of his first acts, according to his testimony before the House investigating committee, "was to publish a card advising that there should be no proscription for political opinion in the State." He did this to reduce the potential for confrontation between blacks and whites, prevent harm to the economy, and above all honor "the pledges that I had given through the canvass that we would endeavor to bring about a union of the races here, in peace and harmony; and I thought it would be a most advisable step to take to show that we were not disposed now to look back after the election, but to go forward and redeem the pledges we had made."3 In his inaugural address, a month later, he reaffirmed his commitment and praised the blacks for their

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3Recent Election in South Carolina, 331, 333.
role in helping to elect him. After enumerating the specific pledges of the campaign he added:

To the faithful observance of these pledges we stand committed; and I, as the representative of the Conservative party, hold myself bound by every dictate of honor and of good faith to use every effort to have these pledges redeemed fully and honestly. It is due not only to ourselves but to the colored people of the State, that wise, just, and liberal measures should prevail in our legislation. We owe much of our late success to those colored voters who were brave enough to rise above the prejudices of race and honest enough to throw off the shackles of party, in their determination to save the State. To those who, misled by their fears, their ignorance or by evil counsellors, turned a deaf ear to our appeals, we should be not vindictive but magnanimous. Let us show to all of them that the true interests of both races can but be secured by cultivating peace and promoting prosperity among all classes of our fellow citizens.4

In April, when Hampton returned from Washington with the news that federal troops would be withdrawn from the state, he again announced that he would "know no race, no party, no man, in the administration of the law." He then appealed to the blacks to trust his administration, and to throw all of them out at the next election if they did not fulfill their promises.5 In his first message to the legislature he called upon them to improve the system of free education so as to place the means of education within the reach of all classes in the State. . . . We are bound alike by every consideration of true statesmanship and of good faith, to keep up in the State such a system of free schools as will place within the reach of every child--the poorest as well as the richest, black as well as white--the

4Charleston News and Courier, 14 December 1876.
5Ibid., 7 April 1877.
means of acquiring an honest and honorable education.⁶ Historians of the period generally agree that Hampton was sincere in his pronouncements and made every effort to fulfill both their spirit and letter. George Tindall documents at least eighty-six black Hampton appointees among which were trial justices, jury commissioners, and at least one commissioner on a county election board.⁷ Tindall cites specific instances of Hampton's appointments of blacks as well as testimonials from prominent black leaders of their pleasure at his performance.⁸ Holt concurs with Tindall on Hampton's appointments but faults them for being to minor offices. Cooper cites additional testimony from black and white Republicans supporting Hampton's racial policies and concludes, "most observers—contemporary and subsequent—have found Hampton sincere in his concern for the Negro."⁹ Jarrell in his detailed study of Hampton's racial position contends that

the dominant theme of the two years of his administration . . . is his struggle to end discord in the state—between parties, between the two races, and between the North and South—and to redeem his pledges

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⁶Wade Hampton, Message No. 1 of His Excellency Wade Hampton, Governor of South Carolina (Columbia: State of South Carolina, Executive Department, 1877), 7.

⁷George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), 22.

⁸Ibid., 23-26.

⁹Holt, 211; Cooper, Jr., 93.
in a political atmosphere that made such redemption extremely difficult, if not impossible.\textsuperscript{10}

This difficulty in redeeming his pledges came in large part in the form of Martin Gary of Edgefield and his coterie of followers. In Jarrell's words,

from the first, he [Gary] had seen the political problem of the state as one, not of parties, but of races. He had viewed with utmost scorn all preceding efforts at conciliation or fusion, and he did not shrink from any degree of violence necessary to eliminate the negro majority from the political life of the state.\textsuperscript{11}

An early objection to the racial policies of the governor was Gary's opposition to an annual two mills property tax for schools. The primary problem for Gary was that whites would be taxed to provide schools for blacks. "Nine-tenths of this tax would be paid by white people and three-fourths of it would be spent in educating pickaninnies. . . . He was unalterably opposed to taxing whites to supply the teachers for blacks."\textsuperscript{12} Hampton's views prevailed so that during his administration funding for education increased from $189,000 to $316,000 with blacks receiving about $20,000 more than the whites but the per capita amounts being essentially equal.\textsuperscript{13}

At the Edgefield County Democratic convention in June and at an Edgefield political rally in August, Gary stressed

\textsuperscript{10}Jarrell, 122.
\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, 57.
\textsuperscript{12}Sheppard, 216.
\textsuperscript{13}Tindall, 214.
that the issue in South Carolina was race, not politics. Later in August, Gary was scheduled to review the militia and deliver an address in Greenville. The speech was designed to be a strong straightout speech, but when Gary saw blacks marching with whites, he was incensed and turned the speech into one of his strongest attacks on Hampton's racial policies. Captain J. W. Gray, the white commander of the militia, was so antagonized by the remarks that he issued a response:

The true expression of the feelings of the State volunteer troops—and I take it, of the Democracy of the State—toward the colored race is to be found in an invitation extended by myself as commander of the Fourteenth Brigade, after consultation with other officers, inviting the Mountain City Guards, a colored company belonging to the National Guard, to parade and be reviewed in line with my brigade. This is the first instance where colored troops have ever marched in line with the white citizen soldiery of South Carolina. The event is a moral result of the "Hampton Democracy," and who does not say "Hurrah for Hampton!"

Gary responded the next day:

I do not suppose that anyone will dispute, or care to share with General Gray the honor of having brought about by his invitation "the first instance where colored troops have marched in line with white citizen soldiery of South Carolina." He claims that the event is a natural result of "Hampton Democracy." I suppose that we will next hear of "dining" or dancing with the colored brothers and sisters as . . . the natural result of "Hampton Democracy."

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14Charleston News and Courier, 4 June; 15 August 1878.
15Ibid., 22 August 1878; Sheppard, 263-64.
16Charleston News and Courier, 26 August 1878.
17Ibid., 29 August 1878.
His reference to "dining" was more than a careless exaggeration. When Hampton and Superintendent of Education Hugh Thompson visited the president of Claflin University, a black school, they found themselves obliged to eat with two black dinner guests. Gary knew of the incident and wanted to use it against Hampton, going so far as to include it in an article attacking him for his pro-black sentiments. Upon the advice of a trusted political advisor, however, Gary did not publish the article. In a letter to Gary, Ellis Graydon, a political colleague, observed that he had been "blowing the nigger dining on Hampton, and it meets with universal condemnation."

In Edgefield County Gary led the successful movement to prevent the participation of any blacks in the Democratic primary. At the state convention Gary was instrumental in adding to the platform a resolution to "repudiate all fusion or coalition with the Republican Party." It was not enough for Gary to have the state under the control of the Democrats; he wanted the blacks eliminated from politics. The proper pattern for achieving his objective was Edgefield which not only had no blacks voting in the Democratic

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18 Cooper, Jr., 91.
19 Ellis Graydon to Martin Gary, 19 August 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
20 Charleston News and Courier, 4 June; 25 September 1878.
21 Ibid., 2 August 1878; Sheppard, 258.
primary but had no delegation attending the Republican
convention.22 This sentiment was expressly stated in the
Augusta Chronicle and Constitutionalist:

Republican and race majorities can be overcome every­
where as they were overcome two years ago in Edgefield,
Abbeville, Aiken, and Barnwell. But the fight must be
made as it was made in those counties. The straightout
policy must be adopted, and a bold and aggressive
campaign inaugurated. If this is done, the Republican
vote in the present Legislature can be wholly eliminated
from the next General Assembly.23

M. C. Butler thought it preposterous that anyone would even
consider fusion with the Republicans. "I cannot think that
Hampton or any other sane man would advise a fusion with the
Radical party now that we have control of the state. Did
they give us representation when they were in power?"24

Gary's position was so strongly contrary to Hampton's
that the governor refused to speak from the same platform
with him. Gary volunteered his services for the campaign to
the executive committee and specifically asked to be used in
the low-country; Gary, however, was assigned to speak only
at Aiken. In an interview with a reporter from the Columbia
Register the chairman of the executive committee said, "It
was not deemed politic . . . to send him . . . to the
'eastern and southern counties.'" Additionally, he

22Charleston News and Courier, 22 July 1878; Columbia
Daily Register, 8 August 1878.

23Augusta Chronicle and Constitutionalist in Columbia
Daily Register, 18 April 1878.

24M. C. Butler to Martin Gary, 3 April 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
explained Hampton's refusal to speak on the same platform with Gary: "Governor Hampton was dissatisfied with his [Gary's] speech at Greenville, and also at his sneer of what he termed the 'Hampton Democracy,' and that under the circumstances, it would be unpleasant for him to speak at the same time, with one who differed with him so widely upon the issues of the day." Even Gary's friends thought he was going too far in some of his statements, and urged him to tone them down:

I think I would not come down too heavy on the race issue. . . . I think the old Bald Eagle had better tone down his speeches just a little--or rather I should say omit some parts which too roughly proclaim the inferiority of the negro."

For Hampton the exigence was clear. His policies and his pledges toward the blacks were under attack by the Gary faction of the party. At times the attack was frontal as in Gary's opposition to the education tax, the Edgefield resolution, and his remarks at Greenville, but Gary's strategy included oblique assaults as well:

General Butler's speech at Center Spring, killed their movement and the resolution of Buist [at the Democratic Convention] made it impossible for them to go before the people. We stopped them there, they now can't make fusion speeches, and they stultify themselves if they make straight out speeches."

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25Columbia Daily Register, 22 October 1878.

26J. H. Hudson to Martin Gary, 7 September 1878, Martin Gary Papers.

27Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 25 August 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
In other correspondence with political confidant Hugh Farley he outlined the plan of praising Hampton but attacking other members of his administration. "I made a speech on the 17th in which I came out for Hampton for Governor, but at the same time have given my reasons for differing with him. I have thrown the responsibility of his mistakes upon the lawyers of his administration."\(^{28}\) The attack would also be made under cover of correspondents:

The policy to be pursued is not to make a personal fight against the present state ticket, except under cover of correspondents. Henry said he would write you a letter criticising them. In your editorial I would take the broad ground of a fair and impartial division of the offices amongst the Democracy of the State.\(^{29}\)

Gary seemed convinced that if he could change Hampton's advisors he could significantly alter the direction of his policies. "If we do not surround Hampton with good advisors we are gone. The present state officers have not got spirit enough to oppose Hampton when they know he is wrong."\(^{30}\) Thus the battle lines were clearly drawn. Through public opinion, convention maneuvering, and purging of his advisors, Gary sought to diminish the influence of Hampton and to alter his policy of moderation toward the blacks.

**Audience**

Though Hampton's audience in 1878 was composed of many

\(^{28}\)Ibid., 20 April 1878, Martin Gary Papers.

\(^{29}\)Ibid., 20 May 1878.

\(^{30}\)Ibid., 8 April 1878.
of the same people he had addressed a year and a half earlier, there was a totally different attitudinal framework. The whites who had in their perception been fighting for their existence had won and were in total control of the machinery of state government. On the other hand the blacks had had a year to test the promises and experience life under the "new" Democratic party.

Among the blacks there existed two predominant attitudes, which were not mutually exclusive: (1) demoralization and (2) satisfaction with the policies of Hampton. Holt concludes that blacks and radical leaders were demoralized by the defeat in 1876: "The apathy, fear, and defeatism engendered by that campaign and President Hayes's betrayal were still pervasive in the Republican Party." 31 County organizations were without leadership, and in Colleton County, William Driffle, a former Republican representative and "one of the early organizers among Republicans in Colleton, declared that the party had died in 1876 and he was there to help bury it." 32 At the state convention in August, the Republicans did not nominate a ticket for state offices, but concentrated on county offices and the legislature. 33

Not only did the Republican state convention not put

31 Holt, 213.
32 Ibid., 215.
33 Columbia Daily Register, 9 August 1878.
up any opposition to the state offices, but also it only narrowly defeated a resolution endorsing Governor Hampton. This attempted endorsement was not atypical of the general response of blacks and even white Republicans toward Hampton. In April of 1878, E. P. Clark, managing editor of the Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, visited the state and wrote a lengthy appraisal of conditions in South Carolina after one year of the Hampton administration. The writer claimed to have spoken with white and black, Republican and Democrat, up-country and low-country citizens in his effort to discern attitudes. He concluded: "The concurrent testimony of all these Republicans, white and black, is the most sweeping commendation of Governor Hampton's course and the most implicit confidence in the man." He then quoted Dr. Benjamin Boseman, the black postmaster of Charleston "'as expressing absolute confidence in Governor Hampton and entire satisfaction with his course. We have no complaint whatever to make. He has kept all his pledges.'" The postmaster of Columbia, also a black, expressed similar sentiments. In an interview in the Washington Post Republican ex-Governor R. K. Scott offered his endorsement of the Hampton government and gave his opinion that the blacks were "satisfied with their treatment under Hampton. I am quite sure they would rally to his

34Columbia Daily Register, 8 August 1878.
35Ibid., 19 April 1878.
support and elect him over any man whom the Republicans might nominate." In Barnwell County a mass meeting of blacks at Great Cypress Township unanimously adopted resolutions praising Hampton's administration and calling upon other blacks throughout the state to do likewise. While there was no doubt some dissatisfaction among blacks with the Hampton regime, the preponderance of evidence clearly indicates a generally positive attitude toward the governor. Even J. J. Wright, a black justice of the state Supreme Court whom the Democratic legislature had forced to resign, came out in support of Hampton:

He has kept every pledge he has made, and on the seventh of next November he will be reelected Governor almost unanimously. He will get nine-tenths of the colored vote. I speak advisedly on that point. There is not a decent negro in the state will vote against him.

In analyzing the attitudes of the white audience of 1877-1878, it must be remembered that Hampton and Gary represented opposite poles of the political spectrum within the Democratic party. J. H. Hudson in his letter to Gary suggesting that he tone down his racial language warned Gary that his position was "a little in advance of the Straight-outers, and far [emphasis his] in advance of the fusionist

36Washington Post in Columbia Daily Register, 9 May 1878.
37Columbia Daily Register, 7 September 1878.
38Philadelphia Times in Columbia Daily Register, 21 August 1878; and Tindall, 17, 18.
and policy men." In his testimony before the Senate investigating committee, Hampton admitted that when he advocated a qualified suffrage for the blacks in 1868 he was in advance of the rest of the whites and that "it did not meet with general concurrence throughout the State." The question then is where along that continuum was Hampton's audience.

E. P. Clark in his evaluation of the political milieu was keenly aware of the division within the Democratic party, and sought to determine the sympathies of most of the whites. Clark indicated he had "investigated this point with considerable care" by asking "a good number of people" whether Democrats would support any other man in carrying out the policies promoted by Hampton. Some believed "not one in ten," but a consensus felt it was something less than a majority. The writer concluded:

The policy which he has carried out the past year is not the policy of the old Democratic party of South Carolina; it is not the policy which those old leaders meant to enforce when they got control of the State. Popular enthusiasm for the man has finally suppressed all open opposition to his course, but there is a large element of the party which at least does not like Hampton's liberal course.

A good example of this dichotomy between loyalty to the man and support for his policies came in Hampton's initial test

39J. H. Hudson to Martin Gary, 7 September 1878, Martin Gary Papers.

40South Carolina in 1876, 991.

41Columbia Daily Register, 19 April 1878.
in the legislature. One of the first jobs of the legislature after Chamberlain had departed was to fill the office of chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court since the former chief justice had died in early April. Hampton's choice for the post was Associate Justice A. J. Willard, a carpetbagger from New York who had decided for Hampton in the 1876 election dispute. A substantial portion of the legislature supported Samuel McGowan, a native white from Abbeville. The political battle was fought on May 14 in a Democratic party caucus that lasted from 8:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. at which time Willard finally received the last vote needed to give him a majority. Afterward, according to Sheppard, those who voted for Willard claimed, "Hampton did it. The Governor told us to do it. We wanted to vote right; but we couldn't help it when the governor said otherwise."42

At the Democratic convention in Fairfield County general resolutions were offered supporting the governor and his administration; before voting, though, Thomas W. Woodward wanted to explain his vote. He began by announcing his shock and consternation at Hampton's support for Willard, appointment of R. H. Gleaves, and support for the seating of the Mackey House and Prince Martin in particular. He concluded:

But, sir, despite all this, and more than can be

42Sheppard, 198-214.
alleged, I favor and love this man. I know, personally, that he possesses those magnetic attributes of head and heart which will endear him to this people, and which will keep the honor of the old Palmetto State and the welfare of its citizens uppermost in his mind. Having said this much, which consistency required that I should say, I shall vote for the resolutions, and shall stand prepared to go forth at any moment in the new campaign, as of old, in obedience to orders from headquarters.43

Martin R. Delany, a black trial justice in Charleston, remarked upon losing his job, "I lost as soon as they got rid of him [Hampton] by sending him to the U.S. Senate, as he was too liberal for the rank and file of the party leaders."44 George Tindall concludes that Hampton's policies were "opposed by the majority of the whites and upheld only by the immense prestige of Hampton."45

On the other hand, as Cooper points out, Gary was never able to muster widespread support for his position. He lost every legislative fight to Hampton.46 He wanted the United States Senate seat that was available when the Democrats took power, but because of Hampton's influence it went to M. C. Butler. His speeches and private correspondence reveal four main objectives for the election in 1878: (1) keep blacks out of the Democratic party and out of office, (2) convince the Democrats of the need to keep Hampton in the governor's office for the next two years, (3)

43Columbia Daily Register, 5 April 1878.
44Martin R. Delany to William Coppinger in Tindall, 38.
45Tindall, 39.
46Cooper, Jr., 53-64.
change the personnel surrounding the governor, and (4) get
himself elected to the United States Senate.

His first objective was made clear by his statements
and actions at the Edgefield convention. The barring of
blacks from any participation was the pattern to be adopted
in all the counties. The press and the county organiza-
tions, however, were generally not sympathetic. The
Charleston News and Courier denounced the resolutions and
later excoriated Gary for his "intolerance" and "abuse of
the colored people." The Columbia Register welcomed black
voters to the ranks of the Democracy and rejected extreme
men who were trying to drive them away. In the county
conventions resolutions were adopted encouraging black
participation in the party. In Sumter a committee was
formed to solicit black participation, and in Orangeburg it
was determined that a proportional division of offices
should be made with the blacks. Thus, outside of Edge-
field, Gary's attempt to totally proscribe the black from
political participation failed.

For Gary to have a chance at the United States Senate

47 Charleston News and Courier, 4 June 1878.
48 Ibid., 4 June; 25 September 1878.
49 Columbia Daily Register, 6 September 1878.
50 Charleston News and Courier, 7, 10, 13 June; 12
August 1878.
51 Ibid., 7 June; 12 August 1878.
seat in 1878, he had to keep Hampton from getting it. In a letter to his close ally Hugh Farley he revealed his strategy: "I wish you to show that he is the only man that can keep the blacks and whites harmonious for the next two years." A series of letters to the Columbia Daily Register signed Cato argued strongly the point urged by Gary. Again, Gary was unsuccessful.

In his letters to Hugh Farley in April and May 1878, Gary made clear the need to change the state ticket and surround Hampton with better advisers. Yet at the state convention the entire ticket was unanimously renominated.

In his quest for the Senate, Gary received encouraging news from friends throughout the state. Ellis Graydon wrote, "I am glad to see that your stock is rising considerably in this county. They pick you against Hampton. . . . You can beat any man in the state for the U. S. Senate if left to the vote of Abbeville." But on December 10, 1878, Gary himself, along with 150 others, Democrats and Republicans, cast his vote to send Hampton to the United

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52 Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 25 August 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
53 Columbia Daily Register, 21, 23, 28, 30 November; 10 December 1878.
54 Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 6, 20 April; 20 May 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
55 Charleston News and Courier, 2 August 1878.
56 Ellis Graydon to Martin Gary, 19 August 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
States Senate. Gary's name was not even placed in nomination.57

The best conclusion on the attitudes of the whites is offered by Cooper: "Most white South Carolinians were not so sincere as Hampton in their determination to accord the negro equal treatment with the white; but, on the other hand, most did not accept the harsh, bitter attitude of Martin Gary."58 Hampton's audience, then, was clearly in the center between the two extremes and open to persuasion.

Constraints

Since many of the same arguments from 1876 reappear in 1878 there is not great merit in repeating the analysis. The best way to gauge his response to the 1878 exigence is to look closely at two speeches that were delivered shortly after there were direct challenges to his racial policy. In June, Edgefield County barred blacks from participating in the Democratic primary and passed resolutions that the real issue in the state was race and not party.59 Apparently there was some sentiment in Barnwell County to follow Edgefield's lead.60 Thus, at Blackville in Barnwell County

57 For a detailed account of Gary's Senate attempt see Cooper, Jr., 53-59; Sheppard, 268-78, gives a detailed but biased view of events surrounding the senatorial elections.

58 Cooper, Jr., 93-94.

59 Charleston News and Courier, 4 June 1878.

60 New York Herald in Columbia Daily Register, 11 July 1878.
at a fourth of July reunion of Hart's Battery, Hampton delivered a forceful denunciation of the Edgefield policy. James Conner was the main speaker, and Hampton was not on the program, but at the conclusion of Conner's address the crowd called for Hampton and he took the opportunity. Because of the nature of the occasion the speech was short, but the substance was wholly devoted to the pressing exigence.

The other speech that represents a direct response to an immediate, frontal attack occurred in Greenville. Here as described earlier, Gary made a speech directly attacking the governor's policy toward the blacks.61 In a letter to James Conner, Hampton indicated his intention to use his forthcoming speech at Greenville as a direct reply to Gary. He explained to Conner why he did not directly attack Gary and the Edgefield resolutions in an earlier speech at Edgefield, and then continued:

Gary had then given me no ostensible ground to attack him, but he has done so since in his card replying to Gray of Greenville. The people of this county have asked me to go and do away with the harm he wrought by his foolish speech, and I shall then pay my respects to him. I do not intend to enter in a controversy with him, but I shall denounce his allusion to the results of Hampton democracy as a piece of impertinence. I am tired of his pretended support and his covert insolence.62

61See p. 179 above.
62Wade Hampton to James Conner, 5 September 1878, Wade Hampton Papers.
The Greenville speech provides an excellent opportunity to analyze his direct response to Gary.

Blackville Address

Motive Appeals

The predominant tone of the speech was moralistic. The theme was boldly declared three fourths of the way through when he asked rhetorically, "Is it not better to fail in doing right than to succeed by doing wrong?" In a clear two-valued orientation his policies were on the side of right and those of Martin Gary, though he did not name him, were aligned with evil.

On the side opposed to Hampton were "demagogues," "men who subordinate everything to office, to wealth, to place and to power." They were "extreme men" and men who made promises with no intention of keeping them. They were the promoters of fraud as the avenue of victory. On this side were those who did "wrong," served "mammon," and who would have as their fruits of victory only a "worthless bauble."

Hampton's side, however, was the side of "duty," "honor," "right," and "God." With him were men of character who "would cut off their right arms before they would violate their pledges," and "would die before they would perjure themselves by placing men wrongfully in office."

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63Columbia Daily Register, 7 July 1878. All further references to the Blackville speech in this section are from this source.
The fruits of his policy would produce benefits to be "enjoyed by our children and children's children for generations to come."

He further appealed to their own self respect. If they countenanced fraud as he had heard some men advocating, then "before many years pass over your heads you will not be worth saving, and will not be worthy of the state you live in." If after going to the blacks and securing their help for the victory of 1876, they said, "'Now we have no use for you. You shall not vote even at the primary election.' If this be the policy of South Carolina, then am I sadly mistaken in the people of South Carolina." Thus, to engage in fraud was degrading, and to break their promises indicated a lack of character.

While the perfect dichotomy between good and evil was a bit overstated, his casting the issues in moral terms seems perfectly appropriate. To exclude blacks from any voice in the Democratic party as had been done in Edgefield was a complete abrogation of the commitments Hampton and most of the party had made in 1876. To willfully violate explicit pledges made to the blacks and to practice fraud, since with the control of the election machinery they were in a position to do so, were clear moral issues, and Hampton approached them as such.

Personal Appeals

The general high esteem in which Hampton was held by
audiences throughout the state has already been established, and will not be repeated here. What is noteworthy is how he employed that esteem in his argument at Blackville.

The key strategy of the argument was to impress upon the audience that he and his policy toward the blacks were one. The participation of blacks in the political process was not a peripheral matter that could be discussed, bartered, or altered, but was an integral part of his own commitment to certain values. In other words, if they wanted him they also had to accept his racial policies. After describing the approach of appealing to the blacks and then excluding them, he flatly declared, "I can carry out no such policy." He reviewed his canvass and the commitment he had made to black and white from the mountains to the coast and then put himself among those who "would cut off their right arms before they would violate their pledges." He warned them that "I can only assist you by standing upon that platform of '76." Finally, for the fourth time in the short speech he stated his unavailability if they changed the platform:

If you are to go back upon all pledges that I have made to the people—if you are to say that the colored men that have sustained us are no longer to be citizens of South Carolina . . . then, my friends, much as I would do for you and for South Carolina, earnestly as I would desire to spend or be spent in her service, willing as I am to give even my life for my State, I should have to decline. I would give my life for South Carolina, but I cannot sacrifice my honor, not even for her.
In the challenge to his policies he saw his own character at stake.

During the 1876 campaign the key element of ethos which he had stressed had been trustworthiness. Now it was this element that was threatened. Thus in one sense he was appealing to them not to damage his ethos by destroying his trustworthiness and was relying on their great respect for his character to achieve his objective.

**Logical Appeals**

The speech was typically Hampton. There was an absence of evidence, little detail, and no closely reasoned arguments. In addition to his proclivity for such development, the moralistic tone encouraged the broad lines of analysis. Large portions of his arguments were already in the heads of his listeners. His basic premise was that it was wrong for the Democratic party to proscribe the participation of blacks. He developed the argument in a two fold manner: (1) it was wrong in principle; and (2) it was wrong pragmatically.

The argument from principle was simple and straightforward. Some whites believed that any means that eliminated the threat of black political domination was legitimate. Here, Hampton flatly contradicted that idea. He tried to separate the action from its object and to force a moral judgment on the intrinsic merits of the behavior. To pledge one's word and then deliberately break it and to
engage in fraud were morally wrong and should be avoided regardless of the goal. The argument was conclusionary in nature and assumed that the audience shared his values.

In addition to being wrong in principle, the behavior would prove counter productive:

If you listen to those men, then I say you may as well at once relinquish the fight, for South Carolina will soon pass again under the rule and to the ruin from which she has just emerged, and in the great Presidential contest of 1880 we shall not only lose our own election but we, the people of South Carolina, will be the cause of breaking down the national Democracy.

The argument was causal but the links were missing. In no way did he attempt to show how excluding blacks from the Democratic party would put them back under radical rule and cause the loss of the national election in 1880. The link in Hampton's mind might have been the power of the blacks to regroup and vote out the Democrats, much as he had advised them to do if the Democrats did not treat them fairly.

He also applied the counter productive analysis to the use of fraud. First, it would not produce the desired result because the chosen sons of South Carolina form the returning board now. The men that you have placed there as representing the truth and honor of South Carolina would die before they would perjure themselves by placing men wrongfully in office.

Here at least he provided the causal link, but it was simply an assertion that had to find its validity in the audience's willingness to accept his generalization at face value, and in their own knowledge of the character of the men to whom he was referring. His statement did not prove to be very
accurate since Jarrell argues that probably more fraud occurred in 1878 than in 1876, and Hampton, himself, conceded afterwards that there had no doubt been a good deal of fraud in the election. In addition to not producing the desired result, fraud would also degrade them and make them unworthy individuals.

His most extensive causal argument was the claim that they could be successful in 1878 by appealing to the blacks to join with them. He supported the link by looking at what had happened in Barnwell County in 1876:

You carried your election by an overwhelming majority because you came before the people, white and black, recognizing the right of every citizen and saying, "you shall all be equal under the law." You went to the colored people and told them that their rights would be protected. . . . You appealed to them to come and help you work out the redemption of the State. They came by hundreds and did help you.

Through experience they had seen the one policy work in the past and, therefore, should continue its use in the future. But, what policy had actually been used in 1876 to secure a majority for Hampton? Since Barnwell was one of the three counties whose returns were contested in 1876, there is at least a basis for solid suspicion that Hampton was overly idealistic in describing the approach they had used. To the extent the majority vote had been obtained by fraud and intimidation his argument lost impact.

64Jarrell, 149; Charleston News and Courier, 20 January 1879.

65Simkins and Woody, 517.
His final causal argument was direct and simple. If they altered the platform of 1876 to in any way proscribe the black, then he would not be a candidate in 1878. The link as developed above was that his personal integrity was involved, and it was more important than the state. The position was repeatedly stated, and there was no reason for the audience to believe he was anything less than sincere.

Hampton correctly perceived the issue of racial proscription as having strong moral dimensions and correctly took the high ground. His appeals to his audience's moral integrity and to his own character were the strongest of the address, with those based upon his ethos having the greatest potential for impact. His pragmatic causal arguments were not particularly convincing, since the critical link between the act and its consequences was frequently unsupported or open to other interpretations.

Greenville Address

In the introduction to his report on Hampton's Greenville address, the correspondent for the Charleston News and Courier remarked that the speech "was the most impressive I have ever heard him deliver." His assessment was a good one. It was not the speech of a politician plying his skills to get himself and his party reelected, but rather

66Charleston News and Courier, 20 September 1878. All further references to the Greenville speech in this section are from this source.
that of a statesman seeking an enduring solution to a profound and perplexing problem. The speech was not so much an attempt to persuade his audience as it was a setting forth of his position on the right policy to pursue toward the blacks.

**Personal Appeals**

There was little conscious attempt to build ethos, and yet the entire speech revolved around the character of the man. He assumed, correctly, that he had their respect and set out to show them the path that should be taken by the man of character.

In the introductory portion he reflected on the campaign of 1876 and used it as an opportunity to remind them of his good judgment. He described going to the mountains after his nomination to ponder the plan for the campaign, and then starting the canvass in the Piedmont and moving to the coast:

> It was no accident that arranged that part of my programme. Communing alone with nature in those grand solitudes I had considered what would be the plan of operation, and I determined to go first to the men of the mountain. . . . I knew that the fires of patriotism kindled here would be reflected throughout the State, and I was right.

While he complimented the men of the up-country for their patriotic zeal, he also demonstrated the correctness of his judgment. While not vital to the speech's outcome, he was going to be pronouncing a judgment on right and wrong policies and it didn't hurt to plant at the beginning a
reminder of his past good judgment.

In his conclusion he drew attention to the quality of his judgment. It was not for personal or party gain or for any monetary advantage:

I am not now—God forbid that I should be—advocating a policy simply for momentary triumph or personal qualification. No, I have been looking far beyond that present day—for it has seemed to me that I have been able sometimes to catch transient glimpses of the future through the veil that hides it from us—and I have thought that in that far future, in the day when you and I and all of us shall have been gathered to our God, I could see a great and happy State and people.

His policies thus represented the judgment of a man of vision and altruism. He further strengthened his altruistic motives when he said, "It would be the highest reward that could come to me if in the hearts of those descendants of ours yet unborn they could say that I worked for South Carolina."

He developed his character attributes when he showed himself as a man who would not move on a matter of principle. He and the Democratic party had given pledges in 1876 and reaffirmed them at the 1878 convention, and he was unalterably opposed to any deviation from them. The statement almost had the ring of a Martin Luther's "Here I stand, I can do no other." Hampton wanted there to be no misunderstanding of the position of your standard-bearers in the fight. I intend that there shall be no misunderstanding of mine, for I propose to stand where the Democratic party placed me in 1876. . . . I cannot deviate from that policy. I believed it was the true one then, and I know that it is now.

Finally, he defended his character from the personal
attack of Martin Gary. Gary had earlier referred to "the Hampton Democracy" and its attitude toward blacks. Hampton's response was twofold. He deprecated the linking of his name to a form of democracy: "I have never assumed to myself the honor of founding or attempting to found a school of Democracy." He was but a follower of Jefferson and other founding fathers and "content to follow where they have led, without indulging for a moment in the presumption of trying to engraft one article of faith on the creed promulgated by the fathers." He also denounced any insinuation "that the proud banner of our party has been lowered in my hands," and labeled as "unfounded" and "impertinent" any attempt "to reflect upon myself personally or officially." In essence Hampton put down the attack without ever answering the specifics. It was his character against the charges of Gary, and there was no contest. With the recent Claflin University incident fresh in his mind, it was wise to dismiss rather than dignify Gary's claims.

**Motive Appeals**

His motive appeals were similar to those at Blackville, but not as well developed. He undergirded his position with two basic values: (1) that which was morally right and honorable; and (2) a deep patriotism that desired what was best for South Carolina and her citizens for generations to come.

His direct appeal to discard policies that were
intrinsically wrong was short, succinct, and forceful:

In the name of our civilization and of all that has been honorable in South Carolina, in the name of our State and of our God, I protest against any resort to violence, or wrong, or any adoption of the "shot-gun policy!" We cannot do evil that good may come of it.

The last statement was very close to what he had said at Blackville, "Is it not better to fail in doing right than to succeed by doing wrong." In both instances he rejected the casuistry of the end justifying the means and appealed to higher values.

His patriotic appeal was not a trite, maudlin attempt to cover over bad policy by having the band play Dixie and recalling the glory of the Confederacy. In fact the remarkable aspect of the appeal was that it asked his audience to look forward and not back, and to consider the long term consequences of policies on the quality of their society.

"We must be united and move together," he urged, "for on that depends now the very life of the State, not the mere supremacy of one or another party for an hour. Your children for generations to come will be influenced by your action." He then described his vision of the future:

I have thought that in that far future . . . I could see a great and happy State and people. Our children's children . . . shall build up a new and great country. They will lift up South Carolina and place her where God intended her to stand--with a united, free and happy people, walking on the great road to national prosperity and peace. I have seen that future, and I have worked for it; I have prayed for it.

His vision was the broad vision that went beyond party ascendancy and state domination to national prosperity. His
view encompassed harmony and reconciliation both within the
state and throughout the country. From the perspective of
Richard Weaver's noble rhetorician, he was trying to lift
his audience to a better and higher vision of themselves.

**Logical Appeals**

The primary emphasis of the speech was the development
of four major arguments: (1) he established the commitment
of the party to the platform and principles of 1876; (2) he
refuted Martin Gary's position; (3) he set forth a con­
structive approach for dealing with the racial problem; and
(4) he warned his audience of dangers that threatened the
party.

Hampton supported his generalization that the South
Carolina Democratic party was committed to the principles of
the 1876 election by offering five examples of actions by
the 1878 convention. The convention had endorsed the same
men for state office in 1878 as had run in 1876. The only
exception was James Conner, who resigned in order to return
to his private practice. To send forth the same ticket a
second time constituted, in Hampton's view, a clear mandate
for his policies. The convention had adopted the same
platform from 1876, which he saw as broad, liberal, and
capable of being supported by both races. Third, the
convention had "reiterated unanimously the principles which
gave life, and strength, and victory to that struggle."
Fourth, the convention had appealed to all citizens of the
state for their support, which would include the blacks. Finally, the convention "when it placed its candidates in the field, told them to go forth and declare to the people that the great party which had won success in the last canvass intended faithfully, honestly and truly to keep all those pledges of the past, and not forget in the future the promises made when defeat was overshadowing us."

He further strengthened his argument of commitment by looking at the national party. "The Democratic Party of the United States countenances no proscription on account of birth, race, or color." Furthermore, the national convention had "declared its acceptance in perfect good faith of the recent amendments to the Constitution of the United States." The state convention had not ignored or simply acquiesced in the decision, but had "accepted, ratified and endorsed in most emphatic terms the action of the national party." Because of the actions of both state and national organizations, Hampton concluded, "we are thus doubly pledged to carry out in good faith the policy to which the great Democratic party of the country is unalterably and solemnly committed."

Hampton offered no proof or documentation for the actions of the convention, but relied on his audience's knowledge for that support. He also carefully indicated that the commitment was not just to the principles of 1876 but to his interpretation of those principles. It was a
commitment to a broad, liberal policy of appealing to blacks and practicing no proscription. It was a strong argument with very clear support from the record.

His refutation of Gary consisted of two parts, an extensive response to Gary's "shot-gun policy" and a brief retort to his remarks about a "Hampton Democracy." In refuting Gary's policy, Hampton employed three lines of analysis: (1) Gary's views were not consistent with the Democratic Party; (2) Gary's policy did not produce success in 1876; and (3) Gary's policy was not the Mississippi plan. After extensively developing the position to which the party was committed, he entered his "emphatic dissent to the views expressed by Gen. Gary at the recent meeting here and in his card in reply to Gen. Gray." Those views, he contended, were "inconsistent with the true policy of the Democratic party." He supported the charge of inconsistency by showing that Gary's views did "not represent the opinion of your standardbearer, nor of the Democratic party of South Carolina, and that he was not authorized to speak for your nominee." Thus Hampton succeeded in divorcing Gary's views from the Democratic party. There was clear inconsistency between the position of the party as developed by Hampton and the position of Gary. The only other link to the party would have been if Gary had been speaking in some official capacity, but Hampton denied this. In fact, the evidence is clear that the executive committee did not want Gary out
speaking for the party.\textsuperscript{67} The argument could probably have been strengthened by analyzing specific passages from Gary's speech, but Hampton chose instead to refute the perceptions from the address rather than the actual language itself.

Hampton next contended that it was not Gary's policy which was successful in 1876, but his.

I believe that it was the conservative character of the last campaign, as contradistinguished from what he calls an "aggressive" one, that enabled us to carry the State. I believe that the appeals made to the colored citizens by men in whom they had confidence brought thousands to our support.

He offered no election statistics to back his claim but relied on argument from authority. He claimed as evidence for his contention

the fact that many more thousands will go with us in the coming election. They realize that they have been honestly dealt with. They recognize that all their rights have been unimpaired, and they appreciate the blessings of peace and increased prosperity which have followed the inauguration of Democratic rule.

While as it turned out he was correct in that he received widespread support from the blacks, one can't claim events yet future as evidence. Another fallacy was that satisfaction with the Democratic administration did not prove which means got them into office. Even if elected by fraud they still could have carried out a policy that pleased the black constituency. To prove that he had been elected by the help of the blacks he needed, preferably, statistical data or at least authoritative testimony to bolster his

\textsuperscript{67}See pp. 181-82 above.
assertion. His statement of the positive attitude of the blacks that would cause them to vote Democratic in the next election not only didn't relate to how he had been elected in the past but was again an unsupported generalization. There was ample data available to indicate the satisfaction of many blacks with his policies, but he chose to ignore it, choosing rather to rely upon his ethos. While the logic was flawed and the support weak, it is highly probable that the only perturbation belongs to the critic and not his audience.

The longest part of his refutation focused on the Mississippi plan. In what was substantially an argument of definition, Hampton contended that it was slanderous to refer to the Mississippi plan as a "shot-gun policy." He compared the Mississippi canvass to the one in South Carolina:

In one sense their canvass was aggressive as ours was. They met the plunderers of their State at every point to denounce their corruption before the people. They devoted themselves, as did our people, heart and mind to the great work of saving their State, and they appealed to all honest voters to aid them in their patriotic undertaking.

He then provided the example of General Chalmers to support this contention. Chalmers had won election to the United States House of Representatives in a district with a large black majority by appealing to them. Hampton had recently seen an interview in which the question was asked: What he [Chalmers] would do if the Republicans sent speakers into his
district to oppose his election? He did not threaten to Ku-Klux them or to intimidate them; he did not say that he would resort to the "shot-gun policy," but he said that he would give those visitors a cordial welcome; that he would offer them every facility to meet his constituents and that he would have them met everywhere by colored Democratic speakers.

Hampton then concluded, "This is the best commentary on the Mississippi Plan, and that plan I am willing to adopt."

The purpose of the argument was to further isolate Gary and deprive his views of any legitimacy. Earlier he had isolated Gary from the Democratic party of South Carolina, now he prevented him from claiming the same policy as was used in a sister state. Hampton had also tacitly endorsed the Mississippi plan and it was important to distinguish what he had endorsed from what Gary advocated. The example of Chalmers was a good illustration of Hampton's interpretation of the Mississippi plan, but was far from proving that in fact it was the policy carried out in Mississippi. The letter from General Ferguson outlining the Mississippi plan would strongly suggest otherwise. While he could not prove that Gary's use of the term was illegitimate, except again by his own authority, he did succeed in establishing the meaning he attached to the term.

He concluded this attack on Gary's misapplication of the Mississippi plan with the causal argument that had the policy of violence been followed, the election would have been lost: "Had we been so short-sighted as to have

68See p. 126 above.
endeavored to carry the State at the last election by force or violence, martial law would have been proclaimed, and we should now be under the hateful rule of our oppressors." Again, Hampton offered no proof other than his word, but he could reasonably count on his audience's knowledge that federal troops had been brought into the state as a direct result of specific violence against blacks; thus, he extended the analysis to conclude that had the violence been widespread the entire state would have been placed under martial law. It was not an unreasonable extension of argument.

Hampton's second line of refutation was against what he considered personal attacks by Gary. In his response to Gray, Gary had said, "He [Gray] claims that the event [black and white militia marching together] is a natural result of 'Hampton Democracy.' I suppose that we will next hear of 'dining' or dancing with the colored brothers and sisters as . . . the natural result of 'Hampton Democracy.'" Yet as discussed above, Hampton did not want to get into the substance of the attack because of the Claflin incident. His reply, which focused on the phrase "Hampton Democracy," totally missed the issue. "Hampton Democracy" had not been coined by Gary but by Gray in his defense of Hampton's policies. So the phrase entered the dispute in a positive, not a derogatory, way and from a friend, not a foe. Yet

69 Charleston News and Courier, 29 August 1878.
Hampton took umbrage at Gary's use of the term, and argued that he was not the founder of a school of democracy. Thus Hampton's attack on Gary for use of the phrase was unfounded since Gary was merely repeating Gray; moreover, Hampton ignored the substance of the argument which dealt with the direction his policies were taking.

The constructive policy which Hampton developed for dealing with the blacks constituted one of the most complete statements on the subject in any of his speeches. Before making his proposals, he identified the problem and described some of its characteristics.

The problem was the "adjustment of the relation of two distinct nations living on the same soil." It was one which was not temporary. "It is not a question of a day nor of a generation, but for all time to come, and we have to meet it now." His perspective was not a narrow one that looked exclusively at immediate political gain, but a broad one that considered the difficulties of two distinct groups of people living and working together over a long period of time. It was the correct perspective for viewing the problem.

The problem, he contended, was not created by the white southerners but the northerners who brought the slaves to the South, sold them, and then to mollify their conscience set them free at no cost to themselves. But rather than spend time vilifying the Yankees, he accepted the
present condition as a burden placed upon the southerner by an act of Providence: "We cannot tell what great object Providence had in view in allowing these things to be done by which these people have been brought here and liberated in our midst." Providence, then, had also placed upon the whites the responsibility of caring for the blacks: "He has brought them here, relieved them of their shackles and left them here untutored in mind, with all the prejudices a century of slavery has engrafted on them, and we are to be their guardians and protectors." The only flaw with this relationship was that others had come between the native white southerners and the blacks, and taught them that "we [whites] are natural enemies, politically at least, of the colored men," and "that if the Democratic party got into power he would be put back into slavery." In spite of that teaching, in all matters except voting, the blacks still felt a strong pull toward their old masters: "Personally they have had kindly feelings for their old masters. Let one of them but get into difficulties, and in nine cases out of ten he will go to his old master for assistance, and not to one of his Republican leaders." There was, therefore, a role or an obligation for the whites to fulfill toward the blacks, and the natural ties from the past would enable him to carry out that role in all areas except the political, where the black had been deceived by northern adventurers. Now, he argued, under his policies the claims of the
Republicans were exposed as lies, and there was no reason for the blacks not to trust the white Democrats:

They have been at last dispossessed of the great error into which they were led by their designing leaders, and have found that they are protected in all their rights, and are as free now as they were in '76. . . . They see now that they were misled and are now willing in many instances to trust those whom they were taught to distrust.

His support for the changed attitude was "that while thousands voted the Democratic ticket at the last election, thousands more will support it at the next one."

The ideal relationship ordained by Providence was a benevolent paternalism of whites toward blacks. This proposition was strictly an assertion by Hampton, but one that he was safe in making. The tendency of blacks to seek aid from former masters was also unsupported, but Hampton in his 1876 campaign had frequently referred to his own experiences with former slaves to support that contention, and the argument was not likely to be challenged by his audience. The causal factor preventing the ideal relationship was the political distrust of the blacks. His administration had eliminated the mistrust, thus they were now in a position for the ideal relationship to be realized.

A new opportunity was before the Democrats, and Hampton moved into the means by which this new relationship could be permanently secured and maintained. The whites should: (1) recognize the political equality of the races; (2) protect them in the exercise of all their rights; (3)
manifest a kind disposition toward them; (4) provide facilities for their education; (5) encourage them to join the Democratic party and if they did, allow them to vote in the Democratic primaries; and (6) show them through justice, generosity, and magnanimity that the whites were their best friends. At the same time, blacks would not be given any preference because of race. Each man would have to stand upon his own merits, and positions would be filled by the most qualified men without regard to race. Most of these duties were not developed and had to be accepted on the authority of Hampton. The exception was education, which he developed extensively.

He first established the importance of education for a nation: "The greatest statesman and philosopher of England has said that education is the chief defence of a nation, and no philosophical remark was ever made with greater truth." Realizing how sensitive this subject could prove for his up-country audience, he carefully qualified what he meant by education. "I am not one of those who believe [sic] that because a man can read and write he is necessarily a better man than his fellow." As an example to prove his point, he recalled that during the war the northern men were better educated, but the southern men were better soldiers. Education, he concluded, was "not only intellectual education, but education of the heart and soul—to lift our people up and teach them that the only
true knowledge is the knowledge of God." He then turned to ancient Greece to argue "that the best educated people the world has ever seen could neither read nor write." In addition to the educated Athenians who could neither read nor write were men of South Carolina in past generations. They were well versed in governmental and political theory, but they received it from "their great men who came frequently through the country and discussed before them the great questions of the day." Once he had qualified his definition of education, he could then argue for both kinds:

I want not only that education, but the diffusion of a general education—that the rudiments at least should be placed in the reach of every man, and the colored people allowed the opportunity of bettering their condition. I want them to be made good citizens, and I believe it can best be done by giving to their children education. Education would help them learn the "rights, duties and responsibilities of citizenship." The results would be beneficial to both white and black because "they will be happier, and will make us happier."

His initial argument for education was a broad enthymeme that whatever was in the best interest of a nation was good; education was vital to the interest of a nation, therefore, education was good and by implication should be pursued. The minor premise was expressed as a quotation from a respected British source. The major premise and the conclusion were both unexpressed. His second argument was a more narrowly developed causal analysis. Education for the blacks would give them a better
understanding of their role as a citizen which would in turn make for a better relationship between the races. The weakest link in the analysis was that a better informed black citizenry would work to the benefit of the whites. Idealistically he was probably correct, but one could also argue that as education for the blacks increased so would their desire for more influence in the government and that definitely would not have made a lot of whites happy.

In his fourth major area of argumentation, Hampton addressed the issue of dangers to the party. He identified two concerns: (1) independents who acted apart from the spirit and letter of the platform, and (2) an overconfidence that tolerated political heresies. Though Gary's name was not mentioned in this section, both threats were indirect attacks upon him.

The greatest threat endangering the party was "that of an Independent movement." He carefully defined an independent as one "who sets up his own individual judgment as a rule of action, and refuses to act in full and perfect accord with our platform, in spirit as well as in letter." The crisis of the times, presumably the threat of blacks and carpetbaggers regaining control of the government, demanded unity above all else:

Our party must be kept fully organized, perfectly compact, and thoroughly disciplined. Every member of it must yield implicit obedience to its dictates, sacrificing, if need be, his private judgment to its expressed policy, and subordinating all personal ambition to the public welfare.
Anyone who did not act in this manner should be considered an "enemy," and a "radical," for "an open enemy is far less dangerous than a pretended friend."

On the surface it was a general argument for Democratic unity, which was supported by Democrats across the state, including Gary. Below the surface, however, Gary was the intended target. In the early part of the speech, he had shown that Gary was acting in a manner that was totally inconsistent with the "spirit" and "letter" of the party platform. It was common knowledge Gary was pursuing his ambition for a seat in the United States Senate and apparent as well that Gary was putting his personal judgments on the race issue above the expression of the party. An editorial in the Charleston News and Courier attacked Gary for being out of step with the Democratic platform. "So long, however, as he approves of and stands by the Fourth Article of the Edgefield platform, he is not in accord with, and stands in opposition to, the assembled Democracy of the State." 70 Finally, the "pretended friend" reference was almost directly from Hampton's letter to James Conner in which he disparaged Gary's "pretended support." 71

The second danger was even more obviously aimed at Gary. The threat was an overconfidence that tolerated

70Ibid., 25 September 1878.

71Wade Hampton to James Conner, 5 September 1878, Wade Hampton Papers.
deviation from the successful path of 1876:

The Democratic party thinks it is invincible, and it is so when thoroughly disciplined and properly led, but if we have divisions and dissensions, and if we allow ourselves or any men to set up false gods or indoctrinate us with political heresies and lead us from the straight road which led to victory in '76 . . . that party will be scattered as these leaves now shimmering above us will soon be scattered by the blasts of October.

The political heresies that would lead them astray were no doubt the ones he had been attacking throughout the speech. The audience had two choices: they could either follow the policies of Hampton which would lead to victory, or "political heresies" that created division and ultimately produced disaster. The choice was not a difficult one. The argument was nothing more than a restatement in general terms of the more specific argument employed earlier that the "shot-gun policy" would have led to martial law and carpetbag rule whereas his policy of moderation had been successful.

Hampton's position and his analysis were clear and reasonably well developed. More so than in most of his speeches, he provided support for his claims. He provided multiple documentation to support the commitment of the Democratic party, which was foundational to everything else he would argue. With regard to Gary, he provided a three-fold analysis to prove Gary's inconsistency. With his constructive policy for blacks and analysis of dangers to the party, his line of argument was clear but resting
primarily upon his authority and the knowledge in the heads of his audience.

Fitness of Response

Hampton's response to Martin Gary's challenge of his moderate racial policies was direct, aggressive, bold, and most appropriate. He perceived the exigence correctly as a rhetorical one in which the blacks had to be convinced that the Democrats would keep their pledges and allow black participation in party affairs, and whites persuaded that the promises were commitments that needed to be met. From the spring of 1878 until the election in November he spoke to both black and white audiences in all parts of the state. Whether the occasion was a political meeting or a festive one such as the Aiken Schutzenfest he consistently incorporated into his speeches a call for kind, fair treatment of the blacks as demonstrated by his administration. The blacks were not going to rule the state again, but they should be fairly represented.

Many of the themes were old ones such as the destinies of the two races being linked, and that which was in the best interest of the whites, but there was some remarkable new ground as well. Though he had been speaking on the subject since 1865 the utterances of this period marked his highest level of appeal. Repeatedly he framed the issue to his white audience in moral terms. The Gary policy of violence was wrong. Denying blacks who had voted with the
Democrats a voice in the primaries was wrong. Abandoning promises made in good faith was wrong, and the moral principle was more important than the pragmatic gain, for it was better to fail doing right than to succeed doing wrong. Along with this new moral appeal was also a new dimension of statesmanship. He had consistently argued from a perspective of long term race relations, but during this period he placed more stress upon establishing policies that would solve the problems for generations to come. There were fewer negative statements regarding the blacks and more emphasis upon education, political participation, and economic improvement.

The appropriateness of Hampton's response, particularly the policies enumerated in the Greenville speech, is the subject of considerable difference of opinion among historians. Joel Williamson argues generally that Hampton was not "more willing than any of his followers to give the Negro political justice." To the contrary, "Hampton actually offered Negroes only the privilege of voting for himself and his followers, and he was in perfect harmony with those native whites who steadfastly refused to recognize the Negro's political equality by joining with him in any political partnership."^72 Thomas Holt, looking specifically at the Greenville speech concludes:

Wade Hampton seemed more interested in creating the

^72Williamson, 406.
image [emphasis in original] of liberality than its substance. . . . In essence, he described a policy based on the illusion of color-blindness. He promised blacks a fair procedure [emphasis in original] in the selection of offices, not actual representation [emphasis in original] of their constituents in government operations.\textsuperscript{73}

Holt then illustrates his point with the example of the special election of the Charleston state delegation in 1877. He cites the view of the Charleston News and Courier that blacks should be given proportional representation on the ticket, but when they received fewer than their proper proportion
the editor dismissed this discrepancy as being of little practical effect after all. "Upon the fair number of colored candidates we do not lay so much stress because every one of the seventeen members from Charleston will represent the colored people." Thus while great care should be taken to represent lawyers, doctors, and Germans, anyone could be counted on to represent blacks.\textsuperscript{74}

In contrast to Holt and Williamson, George Tindall concludes that "under a regime of white supremacy Wade Hampton saw room for the talented and trained Negro and left open the door of advancement for the whole race." According to Tindall, Hampton "gave not only lip service to the pledges of 1876, but also active effort in carrying them out." Tindall further points out that "during his administration Hampton carried out the announced policy of naming the 'best men' to office without regard to race by appointing a number

\textsuperscript{73}Holt, 212.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid.
of negroes to minor offices." Tindall then proceeds to document those appointments and the Hampton policy in general. The question then is whether Hampton's response was one of substance or appearance.

Williamson's statement seems so far off the mark that it is difficult to understand how he reached his conclusion. The whole Gary-Hampton controversy that has been documented above clearly shows that Hampton was most certainly not "in perfect harmony" with those who refused to recognize the political equality of the blacks. In Sumter he commended the county Democrats for putting up Westberry, a black man, for a seat in the state legislature. Throughout the state, Hampton encouraged counties with large black populations to divide the offices between them. Orangeburg County Democrats asked the black members of the party to select a proportionate number of their race to be on the ticket. While the offices and the number of blacks selected may not have been as great as Williamson desired, it was Hampton's leadership that was preventing the proscription of blacks and providing in large measure support for the offices they received.

Holt's criticism is unrealistic and slightly

75Tindall, 21-26.
76Columbia Daily Register, 24 September 1878.
77Tindall, 23-24.
78Charleston News and Courier, 12 August 1878.
inaccurate. In his illustration of the Charleston special election as representative of the Hampton policy, he misses the point entirely. He quotes the opinion of the editor of the Charleston News and Courier. In a list of grievances against Hampton, Martin Gary revealed that the governor opposed the unseating of the original Charleston delegation. Not only did he oppose the original action, but also he sent a message by James Conner encouraging the Charleston white Democrats to select a proportionate number of blacks. Thus, by his opposition to the unseating and his direct plea for proportional representation, he certainly seems to be consistent with the principles enunciated at Greenville. It is also difficult to understand how Holt can fault Hampton for offering "a fair procedure" rather than guaranteeing "actual representation." It is not at all clear how Hampton could have guaranteed actual representation to any group. What does seem clear is that within his socio-political milieu he exercised to the degree possible both his authority to appoint blacks and the force of his persuasion to encourage an expanded role for the blacks.

Both Holt and Williamson appear to be judging Hampton with a twentieth century standard rather than measuring his

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79 Message "To His Excellency Wade Hampton, Governor of South Carolina," Martin Gary Papers.

80 Charleston News and Courier, 20 June 1877.
responses by the attitudes of his day. They are obviously bothered by the concepts of white supremacy and paternalism which were unquestionably part of Hampton's vision of good race relations. It is Tindall who is able to look at Hampton's actions and beliefs and evaluate them within their context:

The liberal nature of the Hampton program, however, should not be exaggerated, nor on the other hand, should it be condemned in the light of contemporary programs for Negro advancement. It was . . . basically a program of white supremacy. But there was in the Hampton view no necessary correlation between white supremacy and black proscription. His program did not carry the connotation that latterday white supremacists included of the complete elimination of Negroes from public life.

Tindall then concludes: "Given the situation in which he found himself and the dominant spirit of the times, with both northern and southern white opinion accepting as axiomatic the innate inferiority of the Negro race, the Hampton program marks him as a generous and constructive statesman with regard to race relations."81 Considered thus within its context, his response was not image creation, but a substantive, appropriate response to a challenging exigence.

81Tindall, 20-22.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This investigation of Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric in South Carolina 1865-1878 was prompted by studies showing him as a prominent reconciliation speaker in the North, a major spokesman for the South, and a moderate on the race issue. Since no investigation of his speaking in South Carolina existed, this study attempted to assess his speaking in the state on the race issue. The dates represent the period of his active involvement in the controversy. The major newspapers of the state were examined to locate his speeches, which were then categorized by period and subject. Those that contained racial passages were grouped for further study. These speeches were then critiqued employing the methodology of the rhetorical situation. This approach seemed most appropriate since it allowed the critic to view Hampton's speeches as a response to an urgent problem, which in fact they were, and to analyze the appropriateness of his response.

The plotting of his speeches revealed four periods of active speaking on the racial theme, with a different emphasis in each period. In 1865-66 he focused on the lost
supply of laborers and the need through fairness and kind
treatment to induce the former slaves to return to the
fields, lest both white and black go down to economic ruin.
In 1867-68 he directed his attention to the suffrage issue
and sought to gain control of the black vote by offering a
qualified suffrage. Personal matters took him out of active
involvement in the affairs of the state until the campaign
of 1876. In his campaign for governor, he went to the
blacks seeking their assistance in redeeming the state from
thieves and carpetbaggers. In the last period, 1877-78, he
fought attempts from within the Democratic party to break
his promises of 1876 and proscribe blacks from party
participation.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the study a number of questions
were posed. It is now possible to look back over the
preceding chapters and posit answers to those questions.

(1) To what extent were Hampton's speeches in South
Carolina from 1865 until 1879 concerned with the race issue?

Three general themes emerge in Wade Hampton's
speaking: the Lost Cause, North-South reconciliation, and
race. The race question overwhelmingly dominates the other
two. The Lost Cause theme was frequently employed in
ceremonial addresses to various veterans' groups, both in
and out of the state. Even on these occasions, however,
Hampton would at times inject the racial theme as he did in
his 1866 Walhalla address and the 1878 speech at the reception for the Washington Light Infantry. The reconciliation theme was used more at engagements outside of the state than within it.

Of his thirteen known speaking occasions within the state during 1865-68, all but two were concerned to some extent with the racial issue. In all probability the actual number is higher since the number of speeches reported for the 1867-68 suffrage campaign does not seem to match the level of his involvement.

From 1869 until 1876 there is no evidence of a single speech delivered by him within the state on the racial issue. The only evidence of his addressing the issue at all during this period is his 1869 speech at the Macon, Georgia fair. He was out of the state for most of the period attending to personal and business matters. His speeches were ceremonial and centered around the Lost Cause theme.

Both the amount of his speaking and the proportion devoted to the racial issue increased enormously beginning with his 1876 gubernatorial campaign and lasting through his election to the United States Senate at the end of 1878. In the 1876 campaign there were at least fifty-seven major addresses plus his acceptance of the nomination and his inaugural. Thus, during the five month period from August through December there were at least fifty-nine major addresses that focused on the racial issue. His pace
changed dramatically in 1877 with only three speeches delivered in the state, but all three dealt with the racial theme. He returned to a more active schedule in the state in 1878, delivering twenty-seven major addresses of which twenty-five incorporated the racial element. Not included in this number are short impromptu speeches delivered en route to campaign engagements. The number is smaller than it would have been had he not become ill and cancelled several of his campaign addresses.

Over the span of thirteen and one-half years from after the Civil War until his election to the United States Senate in 1878, it is possible to document 102 speeches delivered by Wade Hampton in South Carolina. Of those speeches ninety-eight dealt at least in part with the racial issue. Overwhelmingly, the dominant theme of his speaking in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878 was race.

(2) What arguments and strategies did he employ to deal with the racial situation?

There is no evidence of a clearly developed strategy by Hampton for dealing with the racial problem prior to the spring of 1867, yet his speeches during 1865 and 1866 were all consistent with the later plan of action. In letters to John Mullaly and James Conner in the spring of 1867 he clearly outlined his plan for dealing with the racial issue. His objectives were the obvious one of preventing the blacks from "overwhelming" the white minority and the less expected
one of making a record for history. The only expression of
the latter goal was in his letter to John Mullaly:

We are appealing to the enlightened sense and the
justice of mankind. We come forward and say we accept
the decision rendered against us. We acknowledge the
freedom of the negro and we are willing to have one law
for him and for us. We are making up our record for
posterity and we wish no blot or stain to be found
there.¹

Though this letter provides the only reference to the motive
of a record for posterity in the approach to the blacks, his
later affiliation with the Southern Historical Society
suggests that he was concerned with how subsequent gener­
ations would view his actions. To James Conner he wrote in
1869:

There is another matter on foot in New Orleans which
promises immense good—the formation of a grand
Historical Society with branches all over the south. I
have promised to assist in this scheme. . . . We wish to
put on record in an enduring form, the truths regarding
our struggle for freedom, and thus preserve untarnished
our glorious position and our heroic deeds. If we let
the Yankees manufacture a history, as they do wooden
nut-megs, we shall have of the former about as good an
article as they gave us of the latter, and as much like
the genuine.²

A key ingredient in achieving his objectives was to
realistically assess the situation and adjust his plans
accordingly. Prior to the war he had been a Union man
opposed to secession, but when South Carolina withdrew from
the Union he adjusted his stance and wholeheartedly

¹Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.

²Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade
Hampton Papers.
supported the southern cause. After the war he repeatedly counseled frank recognition of what had happened and the need to accept new realities. On the need to face the realities of the racial issue he wrote to John Mullaly,

I advocate a warm protest from the South against all this legislation of Congress, but protests can do us no good. We must meet it as a fact, one we have to deal with, and on the solution of which depends the very existence of our country.3

To Conner, he wrote in 1869,

It is criminal to say that because we do not recognize the present State Offices as constitutional, we refuse to take any part in the administration. We cannot be extricated from our deplorable condition by any help from abroad, we must work out our own political salvation and work it out with such instruments as we find at hand.4

A realistic approach to the new conditions called for a strategy of controlling the black vote by saying "to the negroes, we are your friends . . . we are willing to let the educated and tax paying among them vote."5 To Mullaly, he indicated it meant "making the negro a Southern man and if you will a democrat, anything but a radical."6 The critical element in the strategy was a kind, benevolent attitude

3Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade Hampton Papers.

4Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade Hampton Papers.

5Ibid., 24 March 1867.

6Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade Hampton Papers.
toward the blacks by the whites:

As it is of the last consequence to maintain the same amicable relations which have heretofore existed between the whites and the blacks, I cannot too strongly reiterate my counsel, that all classes should cultivate harmony and exercise forbearance. Let our people remember that the negroes have as a general rule, behaved admirably, and that they are in no manner responsible for the present conditions of affairs. Should they, in the future, be mislead by wicked or designing men, let us consider how ignorant they necessarily are, and let us only the more, try to convince them that we are their best friends. Deal with them with perfect justice, and thus show that you wish to promote their advancement and enlightenment.7

This realistic, pragmatic strategy even meant concessions to and compromises with the blacks. The qualified suffrage was an effort to divide the blacks along class lines and draw to themselves the educated, propertied class of blacks whose interest in sound government and economic responsibility would most likely be parallel to their own. It even meant giving some offices to the blacks:

Like you, I am only solicitous about our state government, and if we can protect that from destruction, I am willing to send negroes to Congress. They will be better than any one who can take the oath and I should rather trust them than renegades or Yankees.8

A few weeks later he was even more direct, "We had better endeavor to compromise with the negroes, allowing them to go to Congress if they will let us have the State."9

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8Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, Wade Hampton Papers.

9Ibid., 9 April 1867.
His strategy, then, came from a realistic, pragmatic assessment of conditions. It was an attempt to direct the black vote. An exercise of kindness and good will would reaffirm former ties of loyalty and friendship between masters and slaves and thus draw to them many of their previous slaves. The qualified suffrage and compromise on offices would split the blacks along class lines disfranchising the majority of blacks while drawing to them the upper strata of blacks. Of course, after 1868 the qualified suffrage aspect of the strategy had to be abandoned, but the rest remained intact. Finally, they were to appeal to the blacks in terms of mutual self interests and southern heritage. In essence the strategy was almost exactly what Horace Greeley had suggested would have been the appropriate policy for the South to have pursued immediately after the war.

Aristotle said that the appeal from a man's character is probably stronger than either emotional or logical appeals. An analysis of Hampton's speeches revealed the prominent role of ethos in his arguments. Aristotle placed the emphasis upon ethos developed within the speech rather than that which preceded the speaker to the occasion. In Hampton's case, however, he drew heavily upon antecedent ethos as well as that developed in the speech. With his white audiences his reputation as successful planter and military hero was well established. Primarily because of
the war, the admiration for the man was not divided by class or sectional lines. He was as popular in the up-country as in the low and with the merchants and small dirt farmers as with the aristocracy. Thus, there was little need to develop ethos among the whites. The only time he developed the ethos argument in speaking to whites was in 1878 when he linked his policies and his character and argued that to talk of going back on the pledges of 1876 was a direct threat to his integrity.

To his black audiences he developed at length the elements of trustworthiness, sincerity, and good will. In Richland Fork he was a man of truth and good will, who had the best interests of the blacks at heart. In the freedmen's address over one-third of the speech was spent establishing his trustworthiness, and a similar portion was used to build sincerity by showing the consistency of his approach since the war. The same was true in the 1876 campaign when in almost every speech he argued the good relationship that had existed in the past between himself and his former slaves. Repeatedly he gave illustrations and examples of the respect and trust exhibited toward him by blacks. In 1878 he pointed to the fulfilling of his pledges as past evidence of his trustworthiness.

Hampton accurately recognized the pivotal role his character played in any appeal to blacks and correctly stressed those appeals. In order to achieve any degree of
success he had to convince them that he and the other whites could be trusted with their political future. In 1867 Hampton could point to past examples of his good relations with blacks as justification for trusting him; however, the record of the white power structure since the war indicated they were not a safe repository for black rights. While the blacks might trust Hampton, he was in no position to make guarantees or speak in any official capacity. In 1876 the same appeals had greater impact since as candidate for governor, he spoke for the party and with the power to carry out his pledges.

Hampton's motive appeals were both positive and negative, and demonstrated some progression in his approach during the period. Self interest, particularly in terms of economic survival, was one of his most consistent appeals. In 1865 he told the whites it was in their self interest to treat the blacks kindly and fairly because it was the best way to keep laborers for their farms. To the blacks he contended in 1865, 1867, and 1876 that their economic interest was intrinsically bound up with that of the whites. Instead of showing, however, the economic benefits that were possible if the whites thrived, the application was primarily negative, stressing how far down in the rubble heap the blacks would be if they let the whites go under. In 1865 and 1867 he strengthened the fear dimension by adding reminders of what had happened to the Indians. He
was correct in his assessment that the self interest of both blacks and whites required a working together but the emphasis was misdirected. When one has been on the lowest possible rung of the economic ladder, the threat of collapse is not terribly intimidating; a more compelling appeal would have been to hold out possible gains for them through mutual cooperation.

A second major appeal involved two dimensions: patriotism and identification. To the whites the appeal was to work and sacrifice for the good of South Carolina. For the blacks, however, before he could appeal to them for the good of the state, he had to get them to see themselves as Carolinians and southerners, thus the two pronged approach. In 1867 and 1876 he tried to transcend the racial and class differences and have the blacks view themselves as one with the whites in their heritage; he could then appeal to them as patriots. While the appeal was ideally suited to his white audience, it was painfully obvious to the blacks that they were not and had not been one with the native sons. The South Carolina of the blacks was a totally different state from the one celebrated by the whites.

The progression in his thinking is seen in his speaking in 1878, and particularly in the Greenville address. The appeal was not to immediate self interest or economic survival but to a true patriotism that looked toward the long term solution of a profound sociological
problem. The emphasis was positive in providing education and opportunity for the blacks. Finally, he placed his appeal on a new level, that of morality. Certain actions and approaches to the racial problem were wrong and his appeal was to do what was right.

In his argumentation Hampton utilized both constructive and refutative approaches, and employed enthymemes, causal analysis, and generalizations. His arguments tended to be broad and sweeping in nature and frequently lacked adequate support. Rarely in any of the speeches did he engage in counter argumentation; it was almost as if his were the only conclusions possible. One conceivable explanation for his reliance upon his authority rather than evidence and his failure to engage in counter argumentation may rest with his background. As a wealthy planter, who managed several plantations, and a high ranking confederate officer, he was more accustomed to having his statements accepted at face value than having to support them with detailed analysis and evidence.

In 1865 he argued that the best way to keep crops in production and achieve a happy, contented, and laborious peasantry was through kind treatment. The only proof was his authority. In 1867 he contended that the interests of the blacks were bound up with those of the native whites and that the native whites were the best ones to have political control of the state. While he used valid lines of
argument, his evidence did not adequately support his premises or his conclusions. In 1876 his emphasis shifted from constructive to refutative arguments. He had to refute the belief that the whites, once they got in power, would take away the rights of the blacks. The case here was one of the best constructed in all of his speeches. The analysis showing the threefold guarantee of rights by the whites, himself, and the blacks was brilliant, but at the same time the argument was flawed because the truth of two of his propositions was certainly susceptible to doubt, even though he supported them with evidence. His two constructive arguments consisted of an enthymeme indicting the integrity of the radical office seekers and a causal argument dissuading the whites from violent tactics.

The Greenville speech in 1878 was probably his best use of argumentation; it was certainly his most extensive and well developed attempt at analysis. Two of his best constructive arguments dealt with the commitment of the party to the platform of 1876 and the need to provide education for the blacks. The former was a generalization which was well supported with examples, and the latter was an enthymeme with premises supported by historical example and authority. He advanced a detailed refutation of Gary's position but it did not match his other arguments. The analysis was valid, but his support was not adequate to prove his contentions.
Overall, Hampton's analysis was generally valid, and his arguments pertinent to the question. His great weakness was a tendency to rely too heavily upon his audience to provide proof for his propositions or to trust his authority. Here one must realize that in some cases he was trying to establish a point for which all of the existing evidence was contrary to his thesis. In trying to prove in 1867 and 1876 that the whites would preserve and protect black rights, the only direct evidence was the refusal of the whites to grant a qualified suffrage in 1865 and the passage of the harsh, restrictive Black Codes. Thus, Hampton was faced with the challenge of advancing an argument with all of the evidence against him. It must also be remembered that while many of his arguments were not sufficient to meet the rigorous demands of the critic, Hampton's authority and the premises drawn from his audience's own experience were sufficient to secure the point.

(3) Did his position and strategies remain consistent throughout the period?

One of the rather surprising findings of this study is the consistency of Hampton's position. Only a little more than six months after the war, Hampton addressed an audience of blacks and whites at Richland Fork and made his initial statement on the approach to be adopted in the new racial climate. From that day until his departure for the Senate
in 1879 his position did not change. His private correspondence with political confidants elaborated upon and clarified his position but was internally consistent throughout the period and consonant with his public utterances. The same policies were advocated before white audiences that were argued before black ones. His position in the up-country was no different in the low. In short, Hampton may be faulted for many things, but not for being inconsistent in his racial views. Apparently early on, he had a view of the new social, economic, and political relations in the post-war society and the means to achieve that goal. While the society about him underwent revolutionary change, his vision and the means for achieving it remained essentially unaltered.

(4) To what extent did Hampton practice and encourage rhetorical means for solving the race problem as opposed to more coercive ones?

There is no direct evidence that Hampton ever practiced or encouraged anything but rhetorical means for solving the racial problem, and considerable evidence to establish his active opposition to violence, intimidation, coercion, and fraud as means of dealing with the blacks. The only reason to raise the question is because of some of the tactics employed in the 1876 campaign. Outside of this campaign there isn't even a shadow of tolerance for anything but persuasive means. There is no question but that
coercive methods were practiced in the campaign. Importantly, however, no one actually accused Hampton of being present where any violence or intimidation occurred. The Senate investigating committee concluded that Hampton was totally removed from all of the violent aspects of the campaign.\textsuperscript{10} Apparently there were two roads for the campaign, the high road of persuasion taken by Hampton, and the low road of violence and intimidation traveled by Martin Gary. The question is whether Hampton knew of the violence and gave tacit approval by ignoring it. There is no direct evidence on the question, so the answer is based strictly on inference. Considering the contacts he had and his prominence in the campaign it seems almost impossible that he would not have known about the violence and intimidation that were taking place. Secondly, those who pursued the policy of violence perceived Hampton's approach as inimical to their own, and in 1878 he directly challenged Gary and his policies. The best conclusion seems to be that Hampton knew, at least in part, of some of the acts of violence and intimidation, and that he did not approve of the activities, but lacked the political clout to stop it. Not until his position was secure in 1878 could he move directly against the intemperate forces of Gary, and even then he was still unable to totally control the actions of his party. Hampton repeatedly avowed a commitment to persuasion as the means

\textsuperscript{10}South Carolina in 1876, 138.
for gaining black support, and his actions appear to affirm the sincerity of his commitment.

(5) To what extent did Hampton's speeches offer a constructive solution to the problem of race relations in South Carolina?

In the conclusion of his Greenville address, Wade Hampton spoke eloquently of his vision for the state.

I have been looking far beyond the present day—for it has seemed to me that I have been able sometimes to catch transient glimpses of the future through the veil that hides it from us—and I have thought that in that far future, in the day when you and I and all of us shall have been gathered to our God, I could see a great and happy State and people. Our children's children—wise by the errors we have committed, chastened by sorrows we vicariously have borne for them, instructed by the experiences we have gained—shall build up a new and great country. They will lift up South Carolina and place her where God intended her to stand—with a united, free and happy people, walking on the great road to National prosperity and peace. I have seen that future, and I have worked for it; I have prayed for it.11

Hampton had a vision of an ideal social order for a prosperous South Carolina, and toward this vision he worked and prayed. Before evaluating the vision one must first determine the character of his society.

The first tenet upon which Hampton's society was constructed was white supremacy. In an 1888 article he clearly and forthrightly stated and defended his position:

The question has been asked in some quarters, "What would be the effect upon the South, morally, socially, and commercially of the political supremacy of the negro?" Every one in the South who had the misfortune

to experience that baleful supremacy while it existed would answer, without hesitation, that it would involve total and absolute ruin to the South, and infinite and irreparable loss to the whole country. But a large class at the North, mainly honest and conscientious men, but knowing nothing of the condition of affairs at the South, and profoundly ignorant of the characteristics of the negro, think that he should, of right, rule, wherever his race is in the majority. To this class I shall address myself, and I shall endeavor to prove, by facts cited from the recent history of South Carolina, while under negro rule, how erroneous are their opinions, and how sound are those of the southern people who have had direful experiences of negro supremacy.12

At the conclusion of the article he quoted Abraham Lincoln to show that the Great Emancipator held similar views on the equality of the races, yet Lincoln "was equally emphatic in expressing the utmost kindness for the negro. No one can doubt that he was a sincere friend of the colored race."13 Repeatedly in his speeches in 1878 he reminded blacks that while their rights would be protected and they could participate in government, never again would they control the state.

The second tenet was that the primary role for the black was as a laborer on large farms and plantations. At Richland Fork he had argued that kind treatment of the blacks would bring about "a happy contented and laborious peasantry." The blacks, however, were to be given the opportunity to acquire education and better prepare themselves for the responsibilities of citizenship. Those that

13 Ibid., 14.
were qualified by education and experience would have an equal opportunity to compete with whites for positions in government. Ideally he would have had only the educated and property holders voting, but that was taken out of his hands. Blacks should be encouraged to join the Democratic party and all black members should have full voting rights in party matters and primaries.

His vision has received a variety of labels from historians. Holt and Cooper see it, at least partially, as an expression of noblesse oblige. Williamson describes it as "paternal politics as they had given him paternal slavery." Tindall characterizes it as noblesse oblige, paternalism and white supremacy. They are all correct; it was all of those, but because those terms carry a strong negative connotation in late twentieth century society one cannot deprecate out of hand the application of those concepts in the latter portion of the nineteenth century. One must consider the context and the alternatives. Hampton's program was a significant improvement over the Black Codes of 1865 and the later violence and proscription of Gary and Tillman. It also represented a realistic assessment of what could be done. The program had to be within the latitude of acceptance of the whites or it would

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14 Holt, 212; Cooper, Jr., 19.

15 Williamson, 406.

16 Tindall, 21.
have gone nowhere. As it was, Hampton was operating on the very fringe of acceptability as he sought to expand the area of acceptance. As discussed earlier he was significantly ahead of other whites in 1867 when he called for a qualified suffrage, and though his program was being implemented from 1876 to 1878 it was not without a struggle. His program was positive and constructive in that it offered the best attainable balance between a totally unacceptable black supremacy—on the one hand and proscription on the other and sought to establish persuasion, accommodation, respect, and equality of rights as means for solving for generations to come the complex problem of "two distinct nations living on the same soil."

(6) What was the apparent impact of Hampton's racial rhetoric?

From 1865 through 1868 Hampton's rhetorical efforts were apparent failures with no favorable results. In 1865 the farmers preferred the Black Codes as a means of keeping their labor over Hampton's proposal for kind treatment and just compensation. In 1867-68 blacks rejected his plea to trust the native whites and qualify their suffrage. It was not all failure, however, since he established a wide reputation as a racial moderate. The New York Times, New York Herald, Harper's Weekly, and the New York Daily Tribune all commended his moderate views and his persuasive efforts toward the blacks. The Richmond Times indicated pleasant
surprise at Hampton's speech to the freedmen:

Light upon the intricate problems of "how to deal with the freedman" [emphasis in original] has broken in upon us from a most unexpected quarter. Wade Hampton of South Carolina . . . is destined to become as distinguished as a sagacious, practical statesman, as he was a hero.17

By the time of the 1876 gubernatorial campaign he was clearly identified as a moderate on the racial issue, and one of the strengths in his appeal to the blacks was that he could point to a consistent position that went back ten years.

While Hampton's figure of seventeen thousand blacks voting with him in 1876 may be somewhat exaggerated, and while the precise number cannot be documented, blacks across the state in substantial numbers did listen to him, and several thousands of them voted for him. Hampton, uniquely, possessed the personal appeal that allowed him to bridge the gulf between the races. He was able to both rally and restrain the whites and persuade the blacks. Without his judicious application of rhetoric to the situation, it is highly doubtful that the whites would have carried the 1876 election.

In 1878 his rhetorical efforts were directed at reaffirming and redeeming the pledges made two years earlier. In many counties with large black populations the problem was how to deal with the new influx of blacks and

17Richmond Times in Columbia Daily Phoenix, 26 March 1867.
particularly their role in the candidate selection process. One cannot establish a direct causal link between Hampton's persuasive efforts and actual policies adopted in the counties, but significantly, the counties, with few exceptions, and the state convention adopted Hampton's position.

One certainly cannot discount the multiple factors that were at work during the period influencing racial attitudes and decisions, but clearly the rhetoric of Wade Hampton played a major part in helping define and shape the new black-white relationships in the post-war period.

In 1865 the world turned over for southerners. Not only had they lost the war, but with emancipation of the slaves their whole social order had been thrown into chaos. The attempt to restore order and define the proper relationship between the races presented a problem of such complexity and controversy that over a hundred years later it is still one of society's most pressing issues. The study of Wade Hampton provides insight into the efforts of one man, in one state, during one brief period to cope with the problem. He perceived the issues in terms of economic and political exigencies which could be modified through the application of rhetoric. His efforts demonstrate for the rhetorical critic the power and significance of a rhetor's personal character and the comparative roles of rhetoric and coercion as they were applied to the same objective. The substance of his solution to the exigence was not such as
would be appropriate in our day, but was in his, and at least provided a direction which if followed in succeeding generations might have removed the exigence from ours.
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VITA

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He entered Bob Jones University in the fall of 1961 and graduated from that institution in the spring of 1965 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Interpretative Speech and a minor in English. During this period he was elected to various student offices, was an active member of Classic Players, the university's Shakespearean repertoire group, and won commencement honors in public speaking. In 1965 he received a graduate assistantship to pursue an M.A. degree in speech at Bob Jones University.

After completing his M.A. in 1967, he joined the speech faculty at Bob Jones University. During the summer of 1968 he did further graduate work at Ohio State University. In 1977 he began work toward the Ph.D. degree in Rhetoric and Public Address at Louisiana State University, where he held a graduate assistantship in forensics.

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Title of Dissertation: Wade Hampton and the Rhetoric of Race: A Study of the Speaking of Wade Hampton on The Race Issue in South Carolina, 1865-1878

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EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

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Date of Examination:

April 13, 1988