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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, 1939-1945. (VOLUMES I AND II)

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col. Ph.D. 1984

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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, 1939-1945
VOLUME I

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

Jerry Purvis Sanson
B.A., Louisiana College, 1974
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1975
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of Louisiana's political, social, and economic development during World War II. Louisiana in 1939 was a rural, agricultural, poorly-educated, racially segregated, one-party, southern state. By 1945, however, many aspects of life in Louisiana had changed.

Louisiana's political development during the war years was marked by the temporary displacement of the Longite faction of the Democratic party by the reform faction of the party. Even though reformers Sam Jones and James H. Davis captured control of the executive branch of the state government, Longites remained strong in the legislature and in minor state offices. The Longite holdovers retained enough political clout to prevent full implementation of the reform program and preserved their faction's political base.

Both teachers and students left their schools in order to participate in the war effort. In addition, schools took on the task of educating their students and the general public for the new wartime demands.

The state's economy was marked by increased industrialization during the early 1940s. Demand for implements of war stimulated industrial production throughout the country, and Louisiana was no exception. Despite large war plants constructed in the state, however, Louisiana remained predominately rural. Increased income caused by the demand for agricultural products raised the living standard of Louisiana farmers from the low levels of the 1930s.
Louisianians living on the homefront had to adjust to many changes. Consumer goods virtually disappeared "for the duration"; family members and friends disappeared in the vast American war effort; holidays lost many traditional trappings; and two groups whose social and economic equality had long been suppressed made claims for their share of recognition. Blacks and women used the scarcity of traditional laborers to move into jobs formerly dominated by white males. Even though their gains proved to be temporary, their emergence from the economic shadows established the foundation upon which later economic and social improvements were made. Louisiana was transformed between 1939 and 1945. The old state, however, was still visible underneath the layers of change.
INTRODUCTION

Louisiana politics in 1939 was still dominated by the heirs of Huey P. Long, whose organization had retained control of the state's political system following Long's assassination in 1935 and which continued to overshadow the weak anti-Long opposition. In 1939, Governor Richard W. Leche could survey a state he controlled. The upcoming gubernatorial campaign to elect Leche's successor promised to be relatively uneventful. Leche's own 1936 landslide victory over the anti-Longite faction of the Democratic party seemed to indicate that the Longites would have little trouble in the foreseeable future maintaining their control of the state. No candidate powerful enough had emerged from the political opposition during Leche's term to challenge the Longites, and even if such a candidate had emerged, the Longites remained firmly entrenched and widely popular.

Unpredicted developments during 1939, however, affected all aspects of life in this rural, agricultural, poorly-educated, racially segregated, unsophisticated, Southern, one-party state. The "Louisiana Scandals," exposed to public attention in June toppled the Long machine, while the beginning of the European conflagration in September eventually brought new people with new ideas, millions of federal dollars, and accelerated urbanization and industrialization to Louisiana.

Louisiana in 1939, therefore, stood on the threshold of unprecedented political, social, and economic change. The criminal behavior of individual Longites seriously undermined the organization, while American support of massive national defense efforts and military
involvement in the war itself greatly altered the state's economy and
society from the outside. Louisianians on the homefront elected to
live under two anti-Longite administrations between 1940 and 1945,
learned much about European and Asian geography, took jobs in industry,
made higher wages than ever before, moved from one location to another,
and worried about family members or friends in the United States armed
forces. Changes wrought by events set in motion during 1939 left
Louisiana in 1945 far different from what it had been before.

The Longite organization's defeat in the 1939-40 election initi­
ated major changes in political policies and performance during the
war years. The venality of several Longites and their temporary
banishment from the center of power produced an effective bifactional
political system in which both Longite and anti-Longite Democratic
candidates became viable contenders for public office.

This study, therefore, begins with a summary of Huey Long's suc­
cessful appeal to the ordinary Louisianian's desire for a share in the
state's politics and economic opportunities, controlled for decades
by New Orleans machine politicians and rural parish aristocrats.
Long's sudden and unexpected death left his organization leaderless.
By 1936, a coalition of top Longites had seized control of their fac­
tion. But without Long to supervise them, his heirs committed ex­
cesses which so weakened Longism's hold on Louisiana's government that
the anti-Longite opposition was given its first meaningful opportunity
in twelve years for a return to power.

When "reform" anti-Longite Governor Sam H. Jones took the oath of
office in the spring of 1940, France was about to be overrun by
Hitler's Wehrmacht. Events both at home and abroad were thus con­verging upon Louisiana, to produce unforeseen problems, responses, and results.
CHAPTER I

LOUISIANA IN 1939: THE LEGACY OF HUEY LONG AND HIS ASSOCIATES

The new year, 1939, dawned fair and mild in Louisiana. In New Orleans the temperature on Sunday, January 1, 1939, reached into the 60s during the afternoon before falling to a low in the mid-40s. Monday, January 2, again was mild; gentle easterly winds blew across the city where the temperature at halftime of the Sugar Bowl football game was 65 degrees and reached a high of 73 degrees later in the afternoon. Louisianans struggled back to work Tuesday morning, many exhausted by the three-day holiday week-end.

Overall, the New Year's holiday in 1939 seemed deceptively normal. It was the last year of a trying decade which had witnessed the near collapse of the American economic system. Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, each in his own way, had struggled to cure the system's ills after its 1929 debacle which ended the giddy 1920s. Before the fateful year of 1939 ended, however, the world and Louisiana were transformed, and never again would the old patterns, attitudes, or relationships precisely fit the circumstances of the new order.

Germany plunged the world into the horror of global war for the second time in the twentieth century with Chancellor Adolph Hitler's dawn invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The great European democracies, Britain and France, belatedly realized the uselessness of their accommodating policy toward Hitler's expansionist demands and declared war on Germany. Many Americans hoped that the new conflict would be contained on the European continent and that the United States would remain uninvolved. These hopes proved unfounded. President Roosevelt...
in 1939 began revisions of the Neutrality Acts passed during the 1930s to prevent American involvement in armed conflict. In direct conflict with President Woodrow Wilson's pleas to the American people for neutrality at the beginning of World War I, Roosevelt said that "I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought. . ." Throughout 1940 and 1941, the President followed the dual course of helping the Allies (Britain and France) as much as possible and girding the United States to defend itself in case the country was attacked. Despite Roosevelt's aid to the Allies in the European war, direct United States involvement in the conflict did not begin until December, 1941, when negotiations with the Japanese over conflicting interests in the Pacific failed to achieve results, and the Japanese launched their surprise attack on United States military and naval installations in Hawaii.

Full United States participation in the war led to permanent changes in Louisiana: its depression-ravaged economy improved because of the influx of federal money into army camps, payrolls, and numerous war industries; while Louisiana's people adjusted themselves to life in a modern age of grave threats to national security. The most significant change in Louisiana politics during the war years, however, came about not because of the war but because of the venality of the state's elected officials who had grown fat and careless in office. In 1939, that carelessness led to the temporary downfall of the established order in state politics, the "Longite" faction of the Democratic party headed by Huey P. Long from 1928 until his death in 1935, and thereafter by his heirs. From the 1939 "Scandals" arose a new political order — effective bifactionalism, in which both Longite and anti-
Longite Democrats became mutually competitive in statewide elections. Louisiana's ruling political organization from 1928 until 1939 was the creation of one man, Huey P. Long, who wrenched control from the previous aristocratic ruling class and shaped it to meet his own goals. His virtual dictatorship of the state re-shaped both the form and substance of Louisiana politics, and the events of 1939, along with their subsequent repercussions, cannot be understood without assessing Long's background and political career.

Huey Long based his organization directly on the votes of Louisiana's ordinary people, who had become discontented with the control, corruption, and neglect of their interests and needs by the previous ruling faction dominated by the Regular Democratic Organization of New Orleans. The RDO, "Old Regulars," or "Ring," as the association was variously called, together with upstate cotton planters, constituted a tight oligarchy which had kept Louisiana under the control of business, industrial and planter elements from the 1880s until 1928. T. Harry Williams best described this "government by gentlemen" as "conservative in make-up and outlook, devoted to the past and satisfied with the present, dedicated to the preservation of privilege, and staidly corrupt." Before 1928, successful gubernatorial candidates generally obtained victory by winning the support of the Old Regular/upcountry alliance. Huey Long, however, spoke directly to the people of Louisiana, often over the opposition of the "Ring's" local political boss and in so doing attracted large blocs of votes for himself, his candidates, and his programs. Williams also credits Long with possessing a political charisma which enabled him to attract popular support on the basis of his personal appeal. That quality, added to his
forceful speaking style honed by his experience as a successful traveling salesman, created Long's solid base of support on which he rose from an obscure Winn parish boyhood to the Railroad Commission, the governor's office, and ultimately to the United States Senate.¹

Huey Long's family background provided him with a keen appreciation of the ordinary citizen's needs. Long was born August 30, 1893, in a log house on the farm of his father Huey P. Long, Sr., near the small, north-central Louisiana town of Winnfield, seat of Winn parish. Arthur Schlesinger described Louisiana to be "as natural a breeding place for radicalism as its swamps were for fevers."² During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Winn parish inhabitants, "row crop" cotton farmers (not planters), subsistence farmers, or small-scale stockmen, eagerly embraced radical political reforms designed to alleviate the hard lot of the ordinary people. During the 1890s the parish became strongly Populist, providing the Populist candidate for governor in 1892. Following a visit by Socialist presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs in 1908 Winn voters elected Socialists to their school board and policy jury, and in 1912 gave Debs more votes than they gave Republican presidential candidate William Howard Taft.³


This heritage of radical protest, added to the individual personality of Huey P. Long, ultimately produced a revolution in Louisiana politics. Huey's brother Earl commented that as a boy Huey was "nervous" and curious—always wanting to know how things operated. Earl also observed that even though a reputation for physical cowardice dogged Huey, he had no fear of standing up politically for something he believed right. By 1918 Huey had concluded that the old oligarchy had worked too long with larger national corporations to exploit Louisiana's resources and cheat her citizens. This conclusion convinced him to run for the Third (North Louisiana) District seat on the Louisiana Railroad Commission. The Louisiana Railroad Commission (soon to be renamed the Public Service Commission) then regulated pipelines and utilities as well as railroad rates and practices. Long realized that while the commission appeared to be an almost moribund board manned by political hacks, it offered a platform from which an ambitious young politician could launch a successful career. Besides, the Louisiana Constitution stipulated no minimum age for Railroad Commission members and Long was only twenty-four years old.\(^4\)

Huey Long, with Earl's assistance, campaigned vigorously for the Railroad Commission seat against the overconfident incumbent, Burk A. Bridges, who ran a low-key, colorless campaign. As a result of their combined efforts, Huey was nominated in the second Democratic primary

by a slim 635-vote margin. Democratic nomination then was tantamount to election because the impotent state Republican party rarely entered candidates in general elections. In this first of his campaigns, Huey Long discovered the usefulness of his ability to change his mood or his subject to bring forth maximum response from his listeners. He began to emerge as the newly-released voice of the Louisiana "redneck," pент up too long under oligarch rules.

Huey Long did not forget his constituents after his election. Many of his critics expected him to be merely another southern demagogue who had promised much, would deliver little, and eventually stumble into cursing blacks and Yankees in order to hoodwink the voters into electing him to office again. While on the Railroad/Public Service Commission, Long championed the interests of the ordinary people, successfully forced the public utilities and railroads on the defensive and actually brought some rates down. As Long told Forrest Davis, fulfillment of his campaign promises created an important distinction between him and other Louisiana politicians: "I would describe a demagogue as a politician who don't (sic) keep his promises. On that basis, I'm the first man to have power in Loozyanna (sic) who ain't (sic) a


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Moreover, he could not afford to forget the voters. He had plans for a higher office; and he needed their continuing support.

Long reached for the top in his first try for the governorship in 1924, conducting a vigorous campaign against Old Regular candidate Henry L. Fuqua and Lieutenant-Governor Hewitt Bouanchaud, but finished third in the first Democratic primary. Even though he lost, Long had become well known statewide, and began the groundwork for the next gubernatorial election immediately after his 1924 defeat.

In the 1928 campaign Long again faced two opponents: incumbent governor Oramel H. Simpson who had become governor upon Fuqua's death in 1926, and Congressman Riley J. Wilson. The main issues of the campaign were Huey Long and his proposals to improve the conditions of the common people of Louisiana: toll-free bridges, state-owned "free" school textbooks, more road construction, improved state social services, and opposition to Old Regular and corporate rule. Conversely, Wilson, a self-made man and ardent spokesman for conservative beliefs, called for restricted, economical government, and low taxes. Simpson recognized the need for an increasingly activist state government, but his statements indicate that his reform streak ran shallow: he favored free textbooks only if the money needed to buy them could be raised.

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7 Williams, Huey Long, pp. 191-213. Long formally announced his 1928 candidacy on October 16, 1926, more than two years before the election. New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 17, 1926.
without increasing taxes. Faced with the rising tide of Longism, Wilson and Simpson finally attempted to persuade Louisiana voters that Long represented an attempt by communism to take over the state. Neither Wilson nor Simpson found the political strength to overcome Long's appeal. Long finished first in the first Democratic primary with 126,842 votes to Wilson's 81,747 and Simpson's 80,326. Because Wilson and the Old Regulars chose not to continue the struggle into the second primary, Long won by default.  

Long's administration continued Louisiana's lengthy tradition of powerful governors who aggregated power through actual practice as well as through constitutional provision. Once in office, he fully developed the powers inherent in the Louisiana governorship's control of budget formulation, selection of legislative officers, patronage, and the letting of state contracts. Despite efforts by the old political establishment to absorb and thus neutralize him immediately after his election, Long turned his attention to organizing the legislature so that his adherents held the positions of power. The pliant president of the senate and speaker of the house yielded the historic duty of their offices to appoint committee members and allowed the governor to dictate assignments. He obtained control of patronage with which

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to reward loyal followers when he appointed his friends as chairmen of the Highway Commission, the Board of Health, and the Conservation Commission. In the legislature, Long often became his own floor leader, rallying his troops and issuing orders on key bills. To the consternation of the conservative opposition, he passed a bond issue for hard-surfaced roads which the state badly needed, but which horrified the conservatives whose political upbringing led them to recoil from public indebtedness. He financed the new "free" schoolbooks program with increased severance taxes.

With these measures, Huey Long began moving Louisiana into the twentieth century. His obsession with time, however, along with the strength of his opposition, caused him to move more ruthlessly and swiftly than previous governors. Long hoped to establish his programs while his opponents were still in disarray. The opposition's residual strength became fully evident in a special session of the legislature which met in March, 1929, to consider a tax that Long proposed to place on the refining of oil in Louisiana. Long's opponents instead gathered enough support in the House of Representatives to impeach him.

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11 Williams, Huey Long, p. 298; Russell Long, "Remarks," War and Politics Symposium, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, April 27, 1979, typescript copy author's collection; Russell Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast January 9, 1984; R. Norman Bauer interviewed by T. Harry Williams, May 4-5, 1962, Williams Collection. Bauer, a reformer and ally of Sam Jones, maintained that Long moved quickly "not because he loved Louisiana or wanted to help people, but because he wanted to put Huey Long up."
on a wide array of charges. He managed to thwart this threat with a whirlwind campaign of circulars, speeches, and promises, but became confident of success only when fifteen senators (one more than enough to block the two-thirds vote necessary to convict him) signed a "round robin" pledge that they would not vote to convict the governor because they believed that the charges against him were invalid. Even though Long had defeated his opponents and remained in office, the impeachment scare increased his determination to gain complete control of Louisiana. He spent the remainder of his life acquiring enough power to prevent further challenges to his position and his program.

While still consolidating his position in Louisiana, Long ran for the United States Senate, to which he was elected in 1930, and in which he assumed his seat in 1932. The Senate did not easily accept the new junior member from Louisiana, and Long did not especially care for the Senate. Except for progressives George W. Norris and Burton K. Wheeler, Long thought that the Senators constituted a collection of


14 The two year delay resulted from Long's refusal to resign the governorship and leave Louisiana in the hands of lieutenant-governor Paul Cyr who had become his political enemy. Long claimed the Senate seat only after Cyr had himself sworn in as governor to replace Long. Cyr maintained that Long could not be both governor and senator, and that Long's Senate term began with the new session of Congress, even though Long had not claimed his seat. This move allowed Huey to have Cyr removed from office, thereby allowing state senate president Alvin O. King, a Longite, to become governor until the 1932 election when Huey engineered the election of the pliant Oscar K. Allen, one of his boyhood friends from Winn parish.
stuffed shirts. The Senate, in turn, at first looked upon Long only as another southern demagogue and considered his frequent absences and his repudiation of his committee assignments as an attempt to avoid the hard work of the Senate. Even when he appeared on the Senate floor more frequently during late 1934 and 1935, many of Long's colleagues regarded his vituperative personal attacks and prolonged filibusters as grandstand plays designed to further advertise his ideas on a national stage.\textsuperscript{15} Huey and the Senate never came to terms because they found that neither could dominate the other as they wished.

Following the United States Senate race in 1930, Long consolidated his hold on Louisiana. The Old Regulars began defecting to him when New Orleans business and political leaders recognized his strength in the city and realized that they would have to cooperate with Long in order to maintain state funding for the city's needs. In 1934, after he had moved to the Senate and managed the election of acquiescent Oscar K. Allen as governor of Louisiana, Long dominated a series of special sessions of the legislature which in undue haste considered and passed laws giving the governor unprecedented power and stripping the opposition of virtually all its few remaining sources of support.\textsuperscript{16}

By 1935, Huey Long stood unquestionably at the helm of Louisiana


\textsuperscript{16}Williams, Huey Long, pp. 481, 738-740; Billington, The Political South in the 20th Century, pp. 73-74.
and also had become a national political figure through his Share Our Wealth movement. His greatest failure was his inability to come to terms with President Franklin Roosevelt. He had supported Roosevelt's quest for the presidency in 1932, but broke with him when Long became convinced that Roosevelt's New Deal did not go far enough in its efforts to ease the people's suffering. Long subsequently launched his Share Our Wealth movement in 1934 and continued battling Roosevelt, both on the national stage and for control of federal patronage in Louisiana until his death. Speculation about a possible Long run for the presidency in 1936 ended abruptly when he was shot in Baton Rouge on September 8, 1935, while managing yet another special session of the legislature in the new skyscraper capitol he had built to symbolize Louisiana's dedication to, and confidence in, the future. Long died two days later. His assassin was a young Baton Rouge physician, Carl A. Weiss, who evidently committed the murder because Long was attempting to gerrymander out of office Weiss's father-in-law, state judge Benjamin Pavy.


18 Williams, Huey Long, pp. 859-876; Luthin, American Demagogues, p.
Long's body lay in state in his capitol, and his funeral attracted a crowd estimated at 125,000. He had not forgotten the people of the hills and hollows while in office and they did not forget him. "Huey's Preacher," Gerald L. K. Smith, provided a forceful eulogy. Governor Allen, State Senate President-pro-tempore James A. Noe, State Speaker of the House Allen J. Ellender, State Supreme Court Justice John B. Fournet, Long followers Robert Maestri, Seymour Weiss, and Abraham Shushan slowly carried Long's body down the capitol steps and to a nearby grave in the capitol gardens. Long's beloved LSU band led by "his" bandmaster, Castro Carazo, played his theme song "Every Man A King" transposed into a minor key.\(^{19}\)

Long left behind a powerful but leaderless political organization, and an almost mystical memory on which the organization could perpetuate itself. A sizeable bloc of his hill country people virtually canonized him and formed the foundation of continued Long machine rule. As late as the mid-1970s, long after bifactionalism had ended in Louisiana, campaign portraits of Huey Long still hung in places of honor in the homes of elderly Louisianians.

A contemporary news magazine surveyed Long's political heirs


shortly after his death and divided them into two groups: "insiders" working behind the scenes to keep the machine running smoothly, and "outsiders" — the vote-getting political front of the machine. These two groups included "insiders" Seymour Weiss, who had handled the Long organization money and tax payments, and Robert Maestri, Conservation Commissioner. "Outsiders" included Public Service Commissioner Wade O. Martin, Sr., Senator James A. Noe, and Representative Allen Ellender, but no one man in either group had an undisputed claim to Long's mantle. Instead, the Long machine pledged the day after Long died to follow Governor Allen's lead when he called a caucus later to agree upon the slate of candidates for the next year's campaign.

However, the machine soon began to fall apart. Too many men with strong egos and ambitions had campaigned in Huey's shadow too long. Some observers considered Gerald Smith's eulogy to be a political speech in which Smith attempted to establish himself as Long's political heir. Approximately ten days after Long's death, however, Smith persuaded Noe to run for the governorship. Even though it suffered from a lack of focal leadership, the Long organization in late 1935 still retained numerous political assets, among them the governorship and its attendant array of powers, as well as the memory of Huey Long with which to appeal for the votes of the people now enjoying the increased state services Long had provided.


Just as significant for Louisiana's political future, the organization controlled an environment ripe with opportunities for abuse of power and public trust. Long had almost completely obliterated the checks and balances of the democratic process with his concentration of powers in the office of the governor, his domination of the legislature, and his discrediting of the state's newspapers. Hamilton Basso observed Long's heirs and accurately predicted what would soon unfold: "From now on the boys who own the cow get the cream, every ounce of it, and the skimmed milk as well." Huey Long also had recognized the opportunities for graft created by his machine's tight control of the state, and doubted his associates' ability to withstand the temptation. As he accurately remarked, "If those fellows ever try to use the powers I've given them without me to hold them down, they'll all land in the penitentiary."

This organization settled on a ticket for the 1936 campaign headed by New Orleans Appeals Court Judge Richard Webster Leche for governor and Earl Kemp Long for lieutenant-governor. The Leche-Long slate handily defeated that of opposition candidate Cleveland Dear of Alexandria by drawing sixty-seven per cent of the vote in an election Perry Howard has described as "the peak of the Long surge that had scattered the Bourbon Democrats into disarray."

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The new administration established itself as the true heir of Huey Long by visibly continuing programs of public works and public assistance. Longites in high position also began to steal money from the state at every opportunity, the top leaders clothing themselves in the trappings of an aristocracy. They dressed expensively and built lavish homes. They flashed rolls of $1,000 bills as an essential accouterment of a well-groomed gentleman. For three years the members of the Leche administration surveyed a state they controlled. They made peace with Franklin Roosevelt — something Huey had never done — and thus added more federal patronage to available state jobs. In 1939, however, a disgruntled former member of this ruling circle, James A. Noe, began final action that toppled the state administration and sent shock waves all the way to Washington.

Noe broke with the organization because it failed to nominate him for governor in 1936. In 1937 he began collecting affidavits certifying thefts in state government, but found himself unable to interest the United States Justice Department because he lacked substantial proof of his allegations. Noe turned to the federal justice system because he had no faith in state courts and prosecutors subservient to the Long organization. Noe also distrusted the state's major newspapers, "lyingnewspapers," as Huey had dubbed them, because

the Scandals period accurately observed that "Huey liked money but loved power; 'Governor Dick' [Leche], on the other hand, liked power but loved money." Davy Brooks, "A Turn of Events: Earl Long and The Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940 and 1948," The Southern Historian, Spring, 1984, p. 38.

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many Louisianians would dismiss any corruption story as merely another biased charge of the anti-Long newspapers' ongoing campaign against the organization. Noe decided, therefore, that he needed photographic or other valid proof of his affidavits in order to prove their validity. Subsequently, he added photographers to his staff of researchers. At first, their pictures proved useless because no photographs actually showed a theft of property that could be unquestionably identified as property of the state.  

On June 7, 1939, however, Noe’s luck changed. The telephone in his Monroe home rang before daylight that morning, and Hicks Batts of the Louisiana State University construction department informed him that a truck loaded with window frames was leaving a workshop at LSU bound for the construction site of a house in Metairie owned by James McLachlan, a colonel on Governor Leche's staff. Noe quickly relayed this information to the city editor of the New Orleans States, his friend F. Edward Hebert. Hebert assigned reporter Meigs O. Frost and photographer Wilfred D'Aquin to meet Noe's WNOE radio station manager Ray Hufft who could guide them to the Metairie construction site where they were to take clear photographs of the truck unloading its cargo.

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on private property. They found the truck on the highway and followed it to the McLachlan house. There they drove around a street corner and parked their car. Frost remained in the car to keep the motor running in case they needed to escape quickly, while D'Aquin and Hufft crawled through a vacant lot and took the photographs from the cover of high weeds. D'Aquin had to crawl partially from the cover provided by the weeds in order to use his bulky Graflex camera properly. A horse pastured in a vacant lot watched them intently, causing Hufft to fear they would be detected. The workers continued unloading the materials. The truck bore no identifying marks, and the rear license plate was smeared with mud, but photographs of the front of the truck revealed the license number which States researchers traced to LSU through records in the secretary of state's office. The States staff meticulously checked every angle of the story. They traced the license numbers of several automobiles parked at the construction site and found that their owners worked for George Caldwell, LSU superintendent of construction. Additional contacts with the men's relatives revealed that they were in New Orleans "on a job." Jefferson Parish assessment records revealed that the construction site belonged to Mrs. James McLachlan. Finally, neighbors in the Metairie suburb confirmed that the McLachlans were indeed building the house.

Hebert delayed the story for two days while his staff re-checked the facts, and then published a page-one article which carefully detailed the episode and caused a sensation throughout the state. Leche attempted to explain away the apparent wrongdoing. He declared that the sale of LSU products to individuals was not unusual, citing the public sale of LSU dairy products as an example. Other state officials clearly contradicted each other as they desperately attempted to cover themselves. Leche maintained that the McLachlans purchased the window frame materials at a commercial lumber yard, that university workers constructed the window frames while otherwise unemployed, and that the McLachlans used their private funds to pay them for their work.

George Caldwell, when asked whether he could verify the governor's statements, replied that "My (record) books were open once, but they're closed now." LSU President Dr. James Monroe Smith later stated in a news conference that the McLachlan work done in the LSU carpentry shop was not in accordance with LSU policy, a contradiction of Leche's statement made six days earlier. Smith also commented that Caldwell must have been "befuddled" about the record books.²⁷

In addition to Noe's private investigation which led to the States revelation, United States Treasury Department officials also had kept a watchful eye on Longite state officials since the 1937 settlement of income tax claims against them. In 1938, Rufus W. Fontenot, collector of Internal Revenue at New Orleans, convinced...

Elmer Irey of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Washington to resume an active investigation of Louisiana's politicos. By mid-1939 special agent James M. Cooner found that Dr. Smith had spent sums of money far in excess of his salary. Subsequent investigations revealed that Smith had obtained sizeable sums of public money for his personal use: he had sold $130,000 worth of stock in 1938; he purchased 2,000,000 bushels of wheat and pledged as collateral $500,000 in mostly unauthorized and unsold (occasionally completely forged) LSU bonds. Smith's salary at this time totaled $10,000 per year.  

Irregularities at LSU proved to be only the tip of a system of statewide corruption unequaled in Louisiana history. Even Louisianians, long used to venality in their state officials, had had enough. J. J. Fournet, president of the Louisiana Police Jury Association, observed even before the States revelation that "... due to the weakness of human flesh and the great pleasures and the many luxuries that money does buy, men in public life, in too many instances, are unable to resist successfully always the evil influences of a money-mad age, and are selling our people down the river." Following the first revelations, the Board of Directors of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce called on President Roosevelt, Congress, and the Attorney General of the United States to conduct a thorough investigation for the purpose of "bringing to light ... every misdeed affecting the good State of Louisiana." Other Louisianians expressed their disgust in diverse

ways. A correspondent using the pseudonym "John Gauthier" wrote to Hammond attorney James H. Morrison, "They have stole (sic) even the stink from the pole cat." The Scandals also inspired at least one Louisiana poet to compose the following doggerel verses on the subject:

Sing a song of monkey money  
Pocket full of swag  
Four and twenty blackguards  
Caught in a bag  
And when the bag was opened  
They all began to moan  
'Headed for Atlanta (the nearest federal prison)  
But not there alone."29

The federal government quickly responded to the developing situation in Louisiana with a full investigation headed by O. John Rogge, chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, who commanded a force of seventeen treasury agents. Together with postal inspectors and other federal investigators, Rogge came to Louisiana with the intention of prosecuting errant state officials on charges of income tax evasion. When he began his investigation, however, he found that most machine leaders had been painstakingly honest in reporting their incomes, from whatever sources, just to prevent the kind of indictments Rogge envisioned. As Rufus Fontenot informed Elmer Irey: "All we did (in the 1937 tax evasion cases) was to teach 'em (sic) to cut

Uncle Sam in on their graft."30

State officials had been less careful with state money. The new business manager at LSU, Troy H. Middleton, found in late June, 1939, that "We didn't know whom we owed, if we owed anyone." University officials had placed all income into one fund from which they made all expenditures without bids, purchase orders, or full knowledge of the status of the budget. Rogge discovered, however, that some state officials had made mistakes which would enable him to prosecute them for violation of federal mail fraud laws. He prosecuted James Monroe Smith, Seymour Weiss, and three others on this charge because the check for $75,000 they had received in a fraudulent deal (the Bien­ville Hotel case in which the University paid twice for the building's furniture) was mailed from a bank in New Orleans to a bank in Baton Rouge after being cashed. The court held that the use of the mails in this way was a direct result of the cashing of the check by one of the defendants, and all were convicted.31

The details of the Bienville Hotel case revealed the intricate maneuverings by which private individuals profited from public office and political connections. The case stemmed from the sale of the Bien­ville Hotel, "lock, stock, and barrel, ready for immediate occupancy,"


to LSU for use as a dormitory for student nurses studying at the LSU Medical Center in New Orleans. The state subsequently purchased the hotel’s furnishings a second time. Prosecutors charged that on or about October 20, 1936, Smith drew a check for $75,000 on LSU funds deposited in City National Bank in Baton Rouge, ostensibly to pay for the furniture of the Bienville Hotel, which the state had already bought. He made the check payable to the National Equipment Company and gave it to Monte E. Hart, former co-owner of the Bienville, at an undetermined location in East Baton Rouge Parish. Hart brought the check with him to New Orleans and cashed it at the City Branch of the Whitney National Bank where he received $25,000 in cash and deposited $50,000 to the credit of the National Equipment Company. He then gave the $25,000 cash to J. Emory Adams (Mrs. Smith’s nephew) in New Orleans. Adams divided the money with Smith in an unspecified location, Smith receiving $14,000 while Adams kept the rest. Meanwhile, Hart drew a $25,000 check on the National Equipment Company funds made payable to Louis C. LeStage, a Standard Oil Company lobbyist, who subsequently gave $16,000 to Seymour Weiss, former Bienville co-owner along with Hart, at the Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans. After the investigators had exposed these questionable dealings, Smith and the others were charged with a bill of information in Orleans Parish where Hart cashed the check. The defendants protested that jurisdiction was improper, that the alleged crime had occurred in East Baton Rouge Parish where Smith had given Hart the check, and that the trial should be moved there (where the defendants had a more friendly district judge). The trial judge overruled their motion, but the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that LSU lost the funds when City National Bank paid the check.
in Baton Rouge, and that Smith was responsible for the funds in Baton Rouge where they had been entrusted to him. The trial was ordered moved to Baton Rouge. Nevertheless, all defendants were convicted. 32

The investigations and subsequent indictments continued throughout the summer and fall of 1939. The splashiest of the Scandals trials occurred in June, 1940, when Governor Richard Leche himself went to court. Leche was charged with participating in several illegal deals, including irregularities in the construction of Leche Hall, an administration building at Louisiana Technological Institute at Ruston. His trial, however, focused on a kick-back scheme with an Alexandria automobile dealer named George Younger. Younger had sold 138 trucks in 1937 for a profit of $57,931.06. In 1938 he sold only 95 trucks, some to the state, for a profit of $53,349.50. In addition, he received a $5,000 "refund" on state sales tax payments. (Rogge commented that Louisiana must have "tax-paying in reverse."). Younger testified that he paid James Thomas, a lobbyist and friend of the late Huey Long, a $53,000 "commission" on the sales. Thomas then stated that he gave $31,000 of the money to Leche and distributed the rest among legislators. Leche in his testimony fatally damaged his own defense. He denied receiving the $31,000 from the Younger truck deal, but admitted under Rogge's relentless questioning that he had received $67,000 in an oil deal with Seymour Weiss, and that his $75,000 St. Tammany parish home had cost him personally only $10,000. Leche also

32 Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 336-337; State of Louisiana v. James Monroe Smith, Et. Als., No. 35,603 Supreme Court of Louisiana, John B. Fournet Papers, Troy H. Middleton Library, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
admitted that he had received an $11,000 yacht bought with Conservation
Department funds and presented to him as a gift from "friends," and
that the sale of Huey Long's old newspaper, The Progress, had made him
$215,000 profit.33

Despite his protestations of innocence, Leche was convicted and
sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He entered the Atlanta Federal
Penitentiary on December 31, 1941.34 Following a disbarment trial at
which Leche again denied any involvement in the Younger deal, and at
which Mrs. Leche testified that at the time of the alleged deal in
1938 she and her husband were out of state, the Louisiana State Bar
Association struck Leche's name from the roll of practicing attorneys.
The Bar in its petition stated that Leche had been convicted of a
felony in a United States District Court, was serving his sentence,
and that his name should therefore be removed from the roll. The
petition, however, did not cite any of the specific facts upon which
the conclusion could be drawn that Leche was guilty of misconduct.
The Bar Association instead relied on the general contention that a
convicted felon should not be a practicing attorney. The Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bar Association, but Justice John
B. Fournet, a Long stalwart, produced a dissenting opinion which
stated that the Bar Association should present evidence of each act
which had resulted in Leche's imprisonment so that Leche could

33Irey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, p. 111; Kane, Louisiana Hayride,
p. 333; Times-Picayune, June 12, 1940.

34Times-Picayune, June 12, 1940; Shreveport Journal, November 14, 1941;
Town Talk, December 30, 1941, March 17, 1943.
adequately prepare his defense. 35

Leche remained in prison until June 27, 1945, when he was re-
leased from the federal penitentiary in Texarkana, Texas, following
three and one-half years' incarceration. At the time of his release,
the United States Attorney in New Orleans, Herbert W. Christenberry,
announced that the government had dropped two of its remaining charges
against him (one involved a questionable LSU landscaping deal in which
an original bid of $45,855.68 mysteriously escalated to $122,000; the
other involved "Ruth," the 40-foot yacht he received from "friends").
But the justice department did not drop charges that Leche had con-
spired to violate the Connally "Hot Oil" Act. Leche, Seymour Weiss,
and Freeman W. Burford had allegedly produced through the Pelican Oil
and Gas Company 488,000 barrels of illegal oil above the allowable
production from thirteen wells in the Rodessa field in northwest
Louisiana. Leche's share evidently amounted to 10 cents per barrel
of oil and a share of the pipeline profits, a total of $67,000. Leche,
however, was never tried on these charges and eventually received a
full pardon in 1953 from President Harry S. Truman. 36

35 Louisiana State Bar Association v. Richard W. Leche, Supreme Court
of Louisiana No. 36,352, Fournet Papers.

36 Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 29, 1945; States, May 23, June
28-29, 1945; Town Talk, June 28, 1945; Times-Picayune, January 24,
1953; Field, "Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," p. 403. Tru-
man's pardon of Leche led some observers to recall Truman's own politi-
cal beginnings associated with the corrupt Pendergast machine in
Kansas City, Missouri.
Leche maintained throughout his ordeal that he was a martyr suffering at the hands of the conservatives who were never able to defeat Huey Long. He tried repeatedly to portray the investigators and newspapers uncovering the Scandals as villains attacking him because he was a friend of Huey and the poor people. The newspapers, he said, "ignore completely the true facts of which they were aware, and publish instead a story containing cheap and untrue insinuations . . ." Just before he entered federal prison, he quite accurately remarked:

> It was no easy task to succeed an unusual individual like Huey Long. Nor, was it easier to placate, to the great advantage of the state, the enemies he accumulated. It was by no mean achievement to bring peace to a state torn by eight years of bitter political strife and to restore amity to our relations with the national government.\(^\text{37}\)

Leche received support from his friends in organized labor. A pro-Leche booklet circulated in 1941 asked, "Why is Labor's Best Friend Being Crucified in Louisiana?" and answered, "The Demagogues Want Him Incarcerated. Ten Years Imprisonment on a Technicality. Political Vengeance Was Satisfied." Many more Louisianians, however, agreed with a poem in the *Louisiana Bumble Bee* which caustically commented

\(^{37}\)Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 126; Town Talk, December 30, 1941.
Tokens here and shakedowns there
Has (sic) made Brother Dick a millionaire. 38

The major newspapers also felt no hesitation at probing further into the state's sordid affairs. As each day brought forth a new scandal, journalists kept the state's attention riveted on the document. Their attitude is best summarized in a Times-Picayune editorial:

By misuse of his sweeping powers, Governor Leche made himself largely responsible for the scandalous record compiled during and under his administration. He set an evil example which wrought great mischief and might have had disastrous consequences but for the timely exposures and punishments of those who aided in its setting.

... in the case of the governor who profited financially from the scandalous practices that flourished under his administration and then strove so desperately to avoid sharing the consequences with other convicted offenders, comment upon the vindication of justice seems a public duty. 39

Dr. James Monroe Smith became Louisiana's other most celebrated felon besides Leche. Smith's imprisonment included both state and federal incarcerations. He entered the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola on November 18, 1939, attired in a regulation denim suit


39Simmons, "Crusading Newspapers in Louisiana," pp. 325-333; Times-Picayune, December 30, 1941.
with three-inch-wide black and white stripes. The former status of
the new prisoner failed to impress Warden L. A. Jones, who announced
that Smith would cut sugar cane for harvest and that he "will be
given the same treatment as any other prisoner, no better and no
worse." On November 14, 1944, the pardon board recommended a commu-
nication of Smith's sentence, and Angola warden D. D. Bayer announced
that he would recommend a "double good time" early release. These
actions reduced Smith's original eight to twenty-four year sentence to
twelve years and made him eligible for parole in thirty days. Governor
Jimmie Davis announced on April 3, 1945, that he had released Smith on
recommendation of the state pardon board and commuted his sentence to
time already served. Nevertheless, Smith still faced a detainer from
the federal government to serve a 30-month sentence on conviction for
income tax evasion. He left Angola on April 5, 1945, and went im-
mediately to federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia. He received a parole
from the United States Parole Board in Washington, D.C., on January
10, 1946, and left Atlanta on February 5. Following his release,
Smith returned to Angola as director of rehabilitation and worked
there until his death in June, 1949. Smith applied his long training
in education to reforming the prison's work policies, attempting to
institute a careful screening program to direct prisoners into jobs
which would prepare them for legitimate occupations upon release.
Lack of state support limited the success of his work, however. 40

40Mark T. Carleton, Politics and Punishment The History of the Louisi-
ana State Penal System (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Louisiana State Univer-
sity Press, 1971), pp. 135, 148-149; New Orleans Item, November 20,
1939, April 4, November 5, 1945, January 17, February 21, 1946; Morning
Advocate, November 15, 1944, April 4, 6, 1945, January 18, 1946. While
at the federal prison in Atlanta, Smith taught correspondence courses
In his statement issued just before entering prison, Richard Leche had remarked that "I am happy that . . . the vast improvements attained during my administration will long outlast the ten years I am about to serve for an offense which I never committed." Investigation of the record, however, reveals that Leche's administration achieved only a mixed success in "vast improvements." It did continue traditional Longite construction and state service programs. Typically, while members of the administration enriched themselves at state expense, they neglected to provide adequate facilities or services for many of the most unfortunate of Louisiana's citizens -- inmates of the state mental hospitals and prisons. A thorough investigation of Central Louisiana State Hospital at Pineville and the East Louisiana State Hospital at Jackson, both treatment centers for mental patients, conducted by State Supervisor of Public Funds Jerome Hayes in 1941, revealed that at Central between December 1938, and November, 1940 some "employees" carried on the payroll performed no work; that purchases totaling $117,706.10 were made without public bids; and that over $10,000 was due the state from non-indigent patients. During that same period, athletic contests for the patients were dropped, the poultry farm abandoned, and patients housed in old firetraps equipped with improperly-maintained fire extinguishers. Trash blocked fire escapes, and helpless and elderly patients were assigned to third-floor rooms. Hayes' investigation found patient care as inadequate as the physical facilities at both hospitals. As one recent study stated: "Wade Long's administration at Jackson was, simply
stated, an abomination." Agricultural land became weedlots, the orchards lay abandoned, fields were rented out and equipment sold. Recreation for patients was discontinued. The tennis courts became unplayable. Even the simple recreation provided by reading rooms and organized walks was dropped. Moving pictures were no longer shown after Long argued with the Jackson citizen who owned the projector and promptly reclaimed it. As at Central, fire fighting equipment was not in good repair and no practice fire drills were conducted.  

Unfortunately, the reformers did not immediately correct conditions in the state's mental hospitals. In September 1940, four months after Sam Jones became governor, expenditures for food at East Louisiana State Hospital fell to 10.6¢ per day per patient. Cooking equipment included only six steam-jacketed boilers, so that only boiled food could be prepared. Beef stew and greens sometimes were served for thirty days at a time. By August 1941, however, Jones' administration had raised the number of acres in cultivation at Jackson from 40 to 1200 and had let contracts for over $100,000 in new equipment and physical improvements. The focus, however, continued to be on profit. The state made $622.23 in May 1941; $1,942.49 in June; and $2,366.95 in July.  

Just as Louisiana's mental patients were mistreated, so were its convicts. Huey Long set the tone for his machine's penal administration when he hired Robert L. "Tighty" Himes as general manager of the


42 Morning Advocate, September 18, 1940; Town Talk, August 26, 1941.
Louisiana State Penitentiary in 1931. He praised Himes for "the close manner in which he has guarded every fund and every property of (Louisiana State) University . . . that is the kind of man we need at the penitentiary." Long endeavored to maintain the prison as cheaply as possible at whatever cost in prisoner labor or treatment. His successors continued his policy. By 1940 their goals for the prison included keeping the prisoners securely behind bars and making the prison "as light a burden on the tax-payers as possible." They gave no mention to reform or rehabilitation. Concentration on discipline and control led to beatings administered by guards to prisoners during Longite control as a result of which about forty died. 43

Even though the Long machine often presented itself as the friend of the common people of Louisiana, obviously certain groups were excluded from this friendship, quite probably for practical political reasons. The mental patients and prisoners did not vote, and relatively few of the general voting population ever witnessed conditions which existed in the mental hospitals or the prison. Money spent on highways and public buildings was much more visible and thus worth more politically.

During the summer and fall of 1939 these shortcomings were overshadowed by the Scandals which were the top news story and topic of conversation in Louisiana. The Scandals had broken just as Louisiana began the 1939-1940 gubernatorial campaign. Louisiana politics is

43Carleton, Politics and Punishment, pp. 126-134; States, June 25, 1941.
seldom dull, but the revelation of the Scandals added to the normal factional stridency. In addition, the vibrant campaign style of such 1940 candidates as Earl Long and James H. Morrison, produced a rowdy campaign even by Louisiana standards.
CHAPTER II

THE 1939-1940 LOUISIANA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

The Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of 1939-1940 was a major point of departure in the state's political history. Before Sam Jones' victory over incumbent Governor Earl Long in February, 1940, anti-Long Democrats had been merely an impotent minority protesting political and fiscal abuses within state government. While Huey Long's election to the governorship in 1928 spawned a sharply polarized political system in which recognizable "pro-Long" and "anti-Long" factions within the Democratic party vied for control, it was Jones' election that proved that the Long political machine was not invincible; that reformers within the state Democratic party could at last carry the anti-Long banner in Louisiana and win a state-wide election. The 1940 contest ushered in two decades of competitive bifactionalism. During the next five hard-fought state campaigns, both factions were viable contenders for capturing control of the state government, although the only one to elect two successive governors during the next twenty years was the anti-Long reform group, which elected James H. Davis to follow Jones in 1944. The Longs recaptured the state government in 1948, lost to the reformers in 1952, but returned to power in 1956. The 1939-1940 campaign and election, therefore, initiated an evolution of modern Louisiana one-party Democratic politics into a close approximation of the traditional American two-party system.

The major issue of the 1939-1940 campaign was unquestionably the Louisiana Scandals which unfolded just as the campaign began. Other issues arose before the first Democratic primary in January 1940 --
the beginning of World War II abroad, military records of the candi-
dates during World War I, continued apparent corruption in Earl Long's
short administration, and eventually the race issue — but the pri-
mary issue remained the Long machine's systematic looting of state re-
sources while Richard Leche had been governor.

The gubernatorial candidate most damaged by the corruption issue
was Huey's younger brother, Earl Long. Machine leaders had selected
Earl to run for lieutenant-governor in the 1936 election because of
his name and his close kinship to the martyred Huey. In 1939 they
chose him as their gubernatorial candidate largely by default.

Earl Long was born August 26, 1895, in a log house other than the
one in which Huey had been born. (Huey Long, Sr.'s family lived in
three log houses before he built his two-story frame home in Winnfield.)

Earl recalled in later years that they were closer than any other two
members of the family. While in school, Huey proved to be the better
student. He had a fondness for learning that Earl lacked, even though
the younger Long was capable of learning much about a subject if it
interested him. Earl was also more inclined toward physical violence
than was Huey. ¹

Earl became involved in Huey's political career from the begin-
ning. In the 1918 contest for a seat on the Railroad Commission and

¹Earl Long, "Last of the Red-Hot Poppas," (phonograph recording)
(Baton Rouge, News Records, Inc., 1961); Richard B. McCaughan, Socks
on a Rooster Louisiana's Earl K. Long (Baton Rouge, Claitor's Book
Store, 1967), pp. 8, 14-15, 19-20; G. Dupre Litton, The Wizard of Winn-
field (New York, Carlton Press, Inc., 1982), p. 12; Morgan D. Peoples,
"Earl Kemp Long: The Man From Pea Patch Farm," Louisiana History, Fall
1976, p. 385; Parker Long, Sr., and Harley Bozeman interviewed by Joe
Tullier, July 21, 1966, Oral History Collection, Louisiana State Uni-
versity at Alexandria.
in the 1924 gubernatorial race, Earl performed yeoman work tacking up
signs, distributing posters and leaflets, and learning the fundamental
rules and tactics of politics. Following study at Loyola University,
Earl was admitted to the Louisiana bar, even though he had not ac­
quired a law degree. In 1928, following Huey's gubernatorial election,
Earl became attorney for the state inheritance tax collector in New
Orleans, a political "plum" because even though Earl received over
$14,000 yearly salary, the duties of the job were so light that he
spent most of his time in Baton Rouge performing political odd jobs
for Huey.²

Despite the closeness of their boyhood years and their early
years together, the two brothers found themselves publicly at odds
in 1932. In 1931 Earl decided the time had come for him to run for
public office, and he asked Huey to support his gubernatorial candi­
dacy. Huey refused, and also refused to support Earl in a campaign
for the lieutenant-governor's post. Huey maintained later that he was
being criticized enough for trying to create a personal dictatorship
in Louisiana, and therefore he could not support his brother for a
state office. Also, Huey was already committed to Oscar K. Allen's
candidacy for the governorship, and he was too shrewd a politician
to place two men from the same parish at the head of his ticket.
Nevertheless, Earl ran a futile independent campaign for lieutenant-

²McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, p. 14; Litton, The Wizard of Winn­
field, p. 15; Margaret Dixon, "Governor Earl K. Long," Baton Rouge
Morning Advocate Magazine Section, May 9, 1948, p. 7; T. Harry
governor against Huey's candidate, state senator John B. Fournet. 3

The bitter feelings caused by the 1931-1932 campaign surfaced during United States Senate investigations into alleged improprieties in the 1932 election of John H. Overton of Alexandria, Huey's candidate for Edwin S. Broussard's Senate seat. The Senate eventually decided to seat Overton, but the hearings provided a public forum in which Huey and Earl each attempted to blacken the reputation of the other. Earl testified that Huey had stolen votes during a 1930 election and that he gave and took bribes. Huey often shouted during Earl's testimony, "That's a damn lie!", to which Earl replied sharply, "I stood with you as long as I could, but you run (sic) wild!" After his break with Huey, Earl was no longer attorney for the inheritance tax collector, but in 1932 became Louisiana counsel for a New Deal agency, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. By 1934 the brothers had reconciled, and both helped elect Fournet to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Earl also returned to a state job as counsel to the State Tax Commission. They continued on amicable terms until Huey's death in 1935. When he heard that his brother had been shot, Earl rushed from Winnfield to Baton Rouge where he visited Huey on his deathbed. 4


Following his return to favor, Earl could not be ignored by the Long machine leaders who met to choose a ticket for the 1936 election. Some of them were uneasy with his forceful personality and refused him the gubernatorial nomination, choosing instead the more polished and urbane Richard Leche, but offered Earl the second spot on the ticket.\footnote{McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 57-58; Litton, The Wizard of Winnfield, p. 15; Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride: The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship 1928-1940 (New York, William Morrow & Company, 1941; reprint ed., Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Company, 1971), p. 154.}

Earl Long served a relatively uneventful term as lieutenant-governor from his inauguration in May 1936 until June 1939. He remained in the background while the dapper Leche and his associates ran the state and filled their bank accounts. The question of Earl's involvement in any of the Scandals remains unresolved. If he was not involved in the corruption, why did he not report it or move more forcefully against it in 1939? Allan Sindler answers this question by maintaining that Earl hoped to be elected governor in 1940 and feared that Leche might not endorse him. Earl knew that he could not win the governorship without the support of either Leche or the state machine headed by Robert Maestri. Because he did not wish to lose either of these potential sources of support, Earl kept quiet about whatever he knew of corruption. The fact that Earl himself was a top member of the administration should not be overlooked. It would have been difficult and politically unwise for him to expose his associates.

Earl Long was not convicted for any offense arising from the Scandals, but he was indicted along with four other officials for allegedly ordering that ten people employed by the New Orleans dock
board just before the second Democratic primary in 1940 be paid whether or not they appeared for work. The indictment was later quashed because it was improperly worded, and the case was not revived. Nevertheless, Long had to defend himself for the rest of his political life from charges that he had profited at state expense during his lieutenant-governorship. During the 1939-1940 campaign, for example, Andrew P. Tugwell charged that Long had "supplied LSU, the Normal College, the Pineville Asylum, and possibly other institutions with a large part of their pork and beef requirements." James Domengeaux charged during the 1948 gubernatorial campaign that Earl Long had absconded with $500,000 during the Scandals period but had escaped prosecution because the federal government was too involved in more important cases in Louisiana and because the war also brought an end to the investigations. The effect on the voters caused by the aura of corruption surrounding Earl Long is graphically illustrated by a letter Mrs. Mary Flogel wrote to James H. Morrison in 1939: "Its (sic) a lots (sic) of voters around here (Tunica) certainly dont (sic) want Earl long (sic) for Governor becaus (sic) he was with the crowed (sic) when they were doing the Stealing (sic) & wouldnt (sic) open his mouth untile (sic) they were caught ..."6 Despite his apparent innocence,

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6Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics 1920-1952 (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 145; New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 30, 1939, July 24, 26, August 8, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 28, 1940; Morning Advocate, October 3, December 12, 1940; "New Light on Earl's Record," Radio Address by Congressman James Domengeaux, typescript copy, William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection); Mrs. Mary Flogel to James H. Morrison, December 10, 1939, James H. Morrison Collection, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Morrison Collection).
Earl Long bore a large measure of the public blame for the Scandals.

Just after the McLachlan window frame story broke and the investigation into Dr. James Monroe Smith's personal finances surfaced, rumors that Governor Richard Leche planned to resign from office began to surface on June 22, 1939, around both Baton Rouge and Washington, D.C. Leche maintained that his health no longer permitted him to remain in office. Many people in Louisiana, however, suspected that Leche hoped to fade quietly into the background without further involvement in the Scandals.

After he decided to resign, Leche set state administration lawyers to work researching the correct procedure for resigning the Louisiana governorship. Only one Louisiana governor had resigned before 1939 — Thomas Boling Robertson, elected in 1820, resigned in 1822 — but records of how he technically completed the action had been lost. Following discussion of several harebrained schemes, Leche decided that he would merely resign by issuing a proclamation.

7Leche apparently did have health problems with chronic arthritis. In letters he received early in 1939, months before any hint of the Scandals, his correspondents either mentioned his poor health or sent hopes that he was feeling better. Also, Leche told an interviewer in February, 1939, that he suffered "a million shooting pains" in his legs and had recently been bedridden because of them. Governor Albert B. (Happy) Chandler to Leche, January 18, 1939; W. W. Cunningham to Leche, January 29, 1939; Earle Christenberry to Leche, February 14, 1939; D. M. Ellison to Charles M. Colvin, February 23, 1939; E. A. Conway, Sr. to Leche, March 9, 1939; New York Journal and American, February 25, 1939, Richard W. Leche Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
that he was no longer governor. \(^8\) (He was upstaged in his resignation, however, by the surprise resignation of LSU president Dr. James Monroe Smith who had no such technicalities of resignation to worry about.) Nevertheless, Leche signed his formal resignation and issued his declaration that he was no longer governor on June 26, 1939. Leche's resignation led to Earl Long's inauguration to the first of his three terms as governor. Leche undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief as he commented "It's all yours now, Earl." The new governor in his first official statement characteristically captured the mood of the Louisiana public and announced that his new administration would take as its motto a text from the book of Proverbs: "Better a little with righteousness than great riches without right." "That's a significant statement," an anonymous observer remarked.\(^9\)

Even though Earl Long quickly settled into the governor's office, he did not immediately receive the full endorsement of all the Longite allies. Through much of September, 1939, some of the New Orleans Old Regulars expressed displeasure at the prospect of automatically endorsing him. One faction thought the New Orleans component of the Long machine was becoming increasingly subordinate to the state organization and suggested that the city and state groups should settle on

\(^8\)One rejected scheme called for Leche to leave the state and have then-acting-governor Earl Long appoint him a justice of the peace so that when he took the oath for that office he would vacate the governor's chair. Another scheme, still bizarre, but not quite so circuitous as the first, called for the attorney general to appoint Leche as his assistant so that again Leche would vacate the governor's office when he accepted another state job.

a compromise candidate. An even more extreme group favored the Old Regulars splitting with the Long machine entirely and supporting an independent candidate. Concurrently, "some of the North Louisiana boys" announced that a permanent alliance with the Old Regulars might not have been in the best interest of the state machine. Long's position was affirmed, however, on September 21, when a caucus of state administration leaders endorsed him as their candidate for governor. Old Regular leaders present at the meeting interpreted a separate endorsement of New Orleans city attorney Francis Burns for attorney general as a compromise in their favor. 10

Although his chances appeared to be improving, Governor Long recognized that the linchpin in any agreement between the Old Regulars and the Louisiana Democratic Association would be New Orleans mayor and LDA president Robert Maestri. (One New Orleans magazine remarked that Maestri was "the man [Long] probably admires most in the state.") Long announced on September 4, probably with more hope than concrete assurance, that none of his opponents could bring "power enough on earth" to keep Maestri from supporting him. The night after the state association caucus had endorsed him, Long traveled to New Orleans to confer with Old Regular leaders. 11 During late night meetings with Maestri and other leaders from St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes, Long discussed a possible special session of the legislature to repeal one of Huey's state laws depriving sheriffs of control over hiring and firing their deputies, a law which the local political

10 New Orleans Item, September 3, 5, 17, 20, 22, 1939.

11 Ibid., September 5, 23, 1939; The Punch, July 1939, p. 7.
leaders disliked. The Old Regulars, though, extracted even further concessions in exchange for their support. The deal eventually struck between the two sides obliged the Old Regulars to support Long in the 1939-1940 governor's race in exchange for Long's promise of a special legislative session to repeal a number of state laws offensive to local interests which had been enacted during Huey's, Allen's, and Leche's administrations — and Long's promise to support Old Regular candidates in the 1942 New Orleans city campaign. 12

Despite their seeming agreement, Earl Long worked feverishly until almost mid-October keeping Old Regular support. On October 10 he held an all-night conference with Old Regular ward leaders at Maestri's Roosevelt Hotel suite. He met with each ward leader individually because he feared that an open caucus would permit those opposed to his candidacy to convince those still wavering to withdraw their support. A majority of the Old Regular leaders reportedly assured him that they could carry their wards for him, but a small group scattered throughout the city told him that they considered him a negative candidate. Nevertheless, they agreed to support Long because of a previous agreement with Leche, Maestri, and Allen Ellender to support state association candidates in 1939-1940 in exchange for state support for the Old Regulars in the 1942 campaign. As a result of this series of meetings, and in order to smooth over any remaining problems, the two sides created a steering committee composed of Dr. Joseph A. O'Hara of the state board of health, Edmund Burke, first ward representative

12 Item, September 24, October 11, 1939.
from the LDA, Old Regular vice-chairman James Reilly, Commissioner of Public Property Joseph J. Skelly, and James Comisky, the third ward Old Regular Leader. Long met with Skelly and Comisky the next day at his Jung Hotel suite in an attempt to keep them from endorsing one of three anti-administration candidates reportedly seeking their help. When asked whether the Old Regulars would support him, Long replied, "I don't know." The next day, however, the Old Regulars and the Old Regular women's organization endorsed Long, the women's organization pointedly noting in its resolution that "through all of the storms of scandal that have rocked the state (he) remains untouched and his honesty unquestioned."13

Harmony had apparently been restored between the LDA and the Old Regulars by late October. A joint Old Regular-LDA rally on October 26 packed New Orleans Municipal Auditorium with thousands of spectators as Long opened the New Orleans phase of his campaign. James L. Reilly, then acting chairman of the Old Regular caucus, joined him on stage. But problems between Long's followers and Old Regulars persisted throughout the campaign. The next threatened break occurred early in November when Robert J. Silva, leader of the Eighth Ward Democratic Club, announced that he had resigned his job as an inspector for the state board of health as a gesture of support for twenty of his followers who had been dismissed from their jobs with the New Orleans Dock Board. Silva recalled commitments from Huey that every precinct captain would have a job, and sharply commented: "We thought his

13 New Orleans States, October 11-14, 1939; Item, October 13-14, 1939.
successors would stand by us, but it looks as though we have been
double-crossed." Silva's protests lasted four days until his fol­
lowers were returned to their jobs. An anonymous Old Regular leader
commented sadly of the episode: "It's just another example of what
we are going to have to put up with as a result of our support of
Earl Long . . . his men are causing breaks in our already thin ranks,
and we can't afford to have these things get out."

This feeling of resignation, of having to "put up with" Earl Long
and his followers persisted in Old Regular ranks throughout the cam­
paign. The New Orleans States commiserated with the dissident Old
Regulars who felt ill at ease with Earl Long. An October 12 editorial
compared (with some overstatement) the Old Regulars with the state ad­
ministration:

The Old Regulars have been guilty of many sins.
Their record is far from white. But in all their
years of political activities, you never saw
their leaders rising from rags to riches. You
never saw them engage in wholesale thefts. You
never saw them stealing from the poor, the maimed
and the crippled. You never saw them growing fat
over hospital contracts . . . the Old Regulars
didn't steal from this class of people.

An anonymous Old Regular leader, observing the campaign near the end,
sadly commented:

I wonder what Martin Behrman and some of the real
Old Regulars would say about conditions today.
Here we are forced to endorse Earl Long without
even holding a caucus. We don't want Earl Long,
the people don't want Earl Long, nobody but Bob

\[14\] Item, October 26, November 4, 6, 1939; States, November 8, 1939.
Maestri wants Earl Long. 15

Despite their differences, leaders of both the LDA and the Old Regulars had no choice other than to endorse Earl Long for governor. As William P. Dillion, LDA fourteenth Ward Leader, told a New Orleans rally:

We've got to win this election. If we don't — well it's your meal ticket. We don't want any unemployment in the 14th ward. If the other gang gets in, you'll be out. So think it over and talk to your neighbors. 16

The marriage between Earl Long supporters and the Old Regulars may not have been convenient, but it was one of necessity. Long without Old Regular support stood little chance of election; the Old Regulars without Long faced the possibility of four years in the political wilderness without allies. Political realism dominated consideration of events on both sides and forced their cooperation. 17 Despite his problems with the threatened Old Regular defection and his embarrass-

15 States, October 12, 1939, January 25, 1940.

16 Ibid., November 10, 1939.

ment by the unfolding Scandals, Earl Long remained the candidate to beat in the 1939-1940 campaign.

The eventual victor who overcame the Long machine was Lake Charles attorney Sam Houston Jones. Jones was born to Robert and Susan Jones on July 15, 1897, in a two-room log house on his grandfather Moses Frazar's farm near the small town of Merryville, in rural Beauregard parish in southwest Louisiana. The physical surroundings of Jones' boyhood in Beauregard parish were not too different from those of Huey and Earl Long in Winn parish at about the same time. One recent study of Louisiana's political culture categorizes Beauregard as the most southwesterly of "North Louisiana" parishes. As Jones said:

Beauregard's economy was based largely on timber, then secondarily on livestock, such as cattle and sheep; with small piney woods farms growing upland cotton, and other such crops as corn, Irish and sweet potatoes, and vegetables of various kinds, but largely subsistence type farms.18

This description could just as easily have applied to Winn parish in the 1890s.

Sam Jones' earliest political training came from his father who abandoned farming and sold insurance, managed a store, taught school, and finally became a minor public official. When Jones was three his

18 Denny Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor's Mansion" (senior thesis, Louisiana State University, 1970), pp. 16-17; Sam Jones to Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection); David M. Landry and Joseph B. Parker, "The Louisiana Political Culture," in Louisiana Politics Festival in a Labyrinth, ed. by James Bolner (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 3; Bob Angers, Jr., "Sam Houston Jones Reform Governor," Acadiana Profile, October/November 1971, p. 6.
father moved the family to the small town of DeRidder in north central Beauregard parish where he served on the town's Board of Councilmen and as mayor from 1908 until 1912. During World War I the elder Jones served on the local draft board and board of health, and capped his political career with twelve years as Beauregard parish clerk of court (1916-1928). His antipathy to Old Regular control of Louisiana and his political independence influenced his son's political viewpoint. When Huey Long arose to challenge the Old Regulars, the elder Jones could not resist his appeal and supported him. After Long began building his own powerful control of Louisiana, however, Robert Jones looked upon his initial support of Huey as a great mistake. 19

Sam Jones later recalled that he was "practically born in a courthouse." He began his public career during World War I as clerk of the draft board of Beauregard parish. Army service from 1917 until 1919 interrupted his career, but in 1920 he became his father's deputy clerk of court, and in 1921 was the youngest delegate to the Louisiana constitutional convention, where he served on the Suffrage and Elections and the Conservation committees. On April 3, 1922 Jones became a lawyer after passing the state bar examination without finishing college — he attended Louisiana State University from 1915 to 1917 -- and less than one year later received an appointment from Governor John M. Parker to fill an unexpired term as city judge of DeRidder. In 1924 a new district attorney for the five parishes of southwest Louisiana offered him an appointment as assistant district attorney,


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and Jones accepted, even though the new job required him to leave his native Beauregard parish and move to Lake Charles in neighboring Calcasieu parish.  

Jones left political life after the 1928 election, believing that active opposition to the powerful Long machine was useless unless some unforeseen problem greatly weakened its hold on Louisiana politics.  

The unfolding Louisiana Scandals in 1939 propelled Jones back into the political arena. When the Scandals broke, Jones was a successful Lake Charles lawyer, bound by commitments to his wife and his partners to stay out of politics, even though he still occasionally toyed with political involvement. (He had supported Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith in 1928 and was to head Franklin Roosevelt's re-election effort in Louisiana's seventh Congressional District in 1936 to counter the efforts of the incumbent Congressman who was  

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boosting Huey Long, but Long's death in late 1935 made Jones' effort unnecessary.\textsuperscript{22}

In early August, 1939, a committee of prominent Louisianians headed by Prescott Foster, son of former Governor Murphy J. Foster, visited Jones ("they came to me in desperation," Jones later remembered) to persuade him to run for governor. Many anti-Longites thought that at last the time had come for a reformer to turn the Long machine out of office, and they thought that Sam Jones was the man most likely to complete the task. Jones' lack of political experience was no mark against him in their opinion. As Jones recalled later, by 1939 the anti-Longs had been out of office in Louisiana since 1928 and the faction had no candidate with both major elective experience and a chance to win the governorship. Fortunately, Jones had joined the American Legion following his release from the army, and as he rose through various offices until he became state commander in 1930, he made a network of personal contacts and acquaintances all across the state, thus laying the foundation for an effective campaign. In addition, his American Legion service allowed Jones to polish his stage presence as he spoke in all 64 Louisiana parishes.\textsuperscript{23}

Jones initially rejected the entreaties that he enter the governor's race but gave his permission when Foster asked whether they could

\textsuperscript{22}Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor's Mansion," pp. 23-24.

talk to Jones' law partners. His partners and his wife, Louise Gambrel Jones (to whom the reformers also talked), added their encouragement to the suggestion that he make the race. Jones was visibly warming to the idea, and consulted with his old friend, Vance Plauche, who told him, "There are times when we have to risk everything for the right. This is one of them." Even though he received much encouragement to run for governor throughout August, Jones waited until at least one of the Longites had been sentenced to prison before he made a final commitment. The completion of the Bienville Hotel case in September, 1939, fulfilled this requirement, and Jones tossed his hat into the ring the day following the successful prosecution. He did not declare for the governorship lightly and made advance preparations to move to Houston, Texas, to continue his law practice there if he lost the election.24

In the final analysis, the reform streak in Jones' personality had much to do with his final decision. Moreover, he was the father of two small children, Carolyn and the infant Robert Jones, and stepfather of William and James Boyer. In a letter to James B. Aswell, Jr., Jones revealed the influence his fatherhood had on his decision:

*I do not want my children to grow up believing it is all right for the rich and powerful to steal from the poor. Neither do I want them to be taught, by the force of public example, that the road to success lies through schemes*

for making easy money and disregard for the Ten Commandments.25

Or, as he said more succinctly during one of his campaign addresses, "We are fighting for honesty and decency against dishonesty and degradation."26 After he overcame his initial reluctance, Jones waged a vigorous and ultimately successful campaign centered around his pledge to restore much-needed "Common Honesty" (his campaign slogan) to Louisiana government, for, as he cogently reminded the voters, "We are seeing the result of the lack of it in Louisiana affairs today."27

Besides Sam Jones and Earl Long, three other candidates competed for the governorship in the first Democratic primary. Most prominent among them was former governor James Albert Noe. Noe, a native of West Point, Kentucky, was born December 21, 1893, and began his political career as a follower of Huey Long. He was elected to the state senate in 1932 from his adopted home of Ouachita Parish in northeast Louisiana, and was serving as president-pro-tempore of the senate when Governor Oscar K. Allen died in office. Lieutenant-governor John Fournet had already been elected to the state Supreme Court, and Noe became governor of Louisiana. Noe's short term as governor lasted approximately four months (January 28 to May 12, 1936) before Richard

25Sam Jones to James B. Aswell, Jr., November 15, 1939, James B. Aswell, Jr. and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Aswell Collection); "The Jones Family," Acadiana Profile, October/November, 1971, p. 12.

26Sam Jones campaign address (n.d., 1940), Jones Collection.

27Item, September 21, 1939.
Leche was inaugurated as a result of the 1936 election, but the feel of the office suited him. Noe was convinced that he had been cheated out of the 1936 gubernatorial nomination, and he was determined to show the state a model administration beginning in 1940, when he planned to assume the governorship. While briefly in office, Noe opened the governor's mansion to Huey's country people and further gained their favor by naming Huey's widow to complete Long's unexpired United States Senate term. When Noe's short term was over, he reluctantly left office and became a staunch critic of the new administration, collecting the affidavits which eventually led to its downfall. 28

After 1936, Noe devoted himself to his personal businesses — oil and gas leases, real estate, and radio station WNOE in New Orleans — and to his personal vendetta against "Dick" Leche. By 1939, the wealthy Noe was again serving in the state senate and launched his gubernatorial campaign from that post. Noe's political career both inside and outside the Long camp undoubtedly contributed to his poor showing in the first Democratic primary. He had broken with the machine and could expect no help from it, but neither was he accepted by the anti-Long voters because of his previous close ties to the machine. Noe was thus neither fish nor fowl. The Louisiana Association for Clean Government's statement that "The people of Louisiana

want to destroy the machine. Jimmy Noe wants to take it over and run it for himself," accurately characterized the reform element's assessment of him. Noe centered his campaign appeals on the old Huey Long voter who was disgusted with the corruption of the post-Huey Long machine. Longites attacked Noe for supposed irregularities in the amassing of his wealth. Earl Long, for example, declared on numerous occasions during the campaign that Noe since the 1920s had been on the "Crooks to Look Out For" list of the United States Post Office. 29 Despite his paradoxical political stance, anti-Long but not fully a reformer, Noe ran a strong third in the first primary and had a decisive voice in the selection of the new governor in the second primary.

The fourth candidate in the first primary race with thirty-two-year-old James Hobson Morrison, a graduate of Tulane University and lawyer from Hammond. Morrison's legal career had included work for various groups of strawberry farmers in the Florida parishes, and he hoped to capitalize on his "friend of the small farmer" image in the campaign. Morrison later recalled that he really did not have much chance to win the governorship in 1940, but the campaign allowed him to express his contempt for the corruption rampant in public office: "No matter how strong a political machine gets, some people will stand up and they will inspire others to follow for election reform ... (the election) gave me a chance to show what I had — the courage of my convictions." 30

29 Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 431; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 269.

Morrison’s campaign may easily be classified as the flashiest conducted by any candidate in the contest, outstripping even the usually flamboyant Earl Long. The centerpiece of Morrison’s appeal was his fiery stage presence: on some occasions he called Earl Long a "slimy little stooge" and shared the stage with a monkey named "Earl Long" until the beast went mad, but his most colorful innovation was "Jimmy Morrison’s Convict Parade," a group of his farmer friends who volunteered to dress as convicts and appear on floats portraying state officials dressed in convict garb in the act of looting the state. Morrison recalled years later his appreciation for his friends who volunteered their time and trucks, and he remembered that costuming his characters proved to be something of a problem — his farmers could not afford to buy white pants or to paint black stripes on their "Sunday white shirt," so they used only the cheapest clothing to construct costumes of traditional prison attire. 31

Despite his shoestring budget which forced him to use the money collected at each rally to move the "convict parade" to the next stop, Morrison’s sideshow proved to be a popular adjunct to his campaign. Its appearance on Canal Street drew a crowd estimated to be larger than even the Rex Mardi Gras parade. A correspondent from Winnfield wrote Morrison, "When you visit this section, we certainly expect your parade". Another correspondent wrote that his family enjoyed the parade "even better than (the) 'Gang Busters' (radio) program." With the convict parade, Morrison in one stroke solved a classic problem in politics: that of a minor candidate attracting potential supporters

31Morrison interviewed by Sanson, May 13, 1982.
to notice him. His answer included the surface fun-and-games of the parade — as he said "If you didn't make a flamboyant campaign, you might as well stay home" — but after the entertainment attracted a crowd, Morrison strove to persuade his listeners to support him rather than the other candidates. Moreover, the "convict parade" was undoubtedly a graphic reinforcement of the Scandal stories appearing each day. The parade's effect on a poorly educated Louisiana electorate should not be diminished, but despite his entertaining campaign, Morrison finished a distant fourth in the first primary and refused to endorse either Earl Long or Sam Jones in the second primary.32

The fifth and very minor candidate in the first primary was Vincent Moseley, an Opelousas lawyer. Moseley's campaign can be accurately described as fiercely independent ("not supported by any coterie or any close corporation of capitalistic capons") and passionately anti-Long. Moseley often appeared to be running as much against Huey as against Earl Long:

I for one can never defend Huey Long. I do not believe that either you or I can ever condone his methods or elect a candidate who does, a candidate who announced 'Huey Long was betrayed' when he well knew that his was the master mind, and he the master evil.33


33Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 142.
The administration considered Moseley a minor nuisance. He was pictured in Progress cartoons as a barely visible pipsqueak of a man. The other candidates generally ignored him unless he made a direct personal attack on one of them that they felt compelled to refute. Otherwise, outside the urban press, Moseley's campaign received scant attention.

Other politicians throughout the state announced their intentions to run for the governorship, but dropped out of the race before the first primary. Among them were mayor Sam Caldwell of Shreveport, State Treasurer Andrew P. "Pat" Tugwell, and former public service commissioner and perennially irrepressible "Cajun" politician Dudley LeBlanc. The 1939-1940 campaign for the Louisiana governorship therefore, focused upon the personalities, records, and promises of Long, Jones, and Noe. 34

When Richard Leche suddenly thrust the governorship on Earl Long in June, 1939, Sam Jones had not yet announced his candidacy. Noe was in the field already, but the new governor's most vocal critic during the early weeks of the campaign was Andrew P. Tugwell. Tugwell attacked Long first about the "de-duct" money taken involuntarily by the state machine from state employees' paychecks. He began his investigation with a letter to John M. Push, assistant to the general manager of the New Orleans dock board, asking whether it was true that

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34 New Orleans Item-Tribune, September 10, 1939; Vincent Moseley to W. Scott Heywood, August 11, 1941, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection); Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 428-429.
New Orleans mayor Robert S. Maestri had custody of the funds derived from the payroll deductions: "It is my understanding that you are merely one of the state collectors and that the Honorable Mayor Maestri is recognized custodian of all the funds collected," wrote Tugwell. Fush replied that Maestri had "nothing whatsoever" to do with the deduction funds. The next day Tugwell quoted from a speech former governor Leche made on May 24, 1938, in which Leche disclaimed handling any money from the deductions: "Dr. O'Hara (Joseph A. O'Hara, president of the state board of health) is president of it (the Louisiana Democratic Association, political front for the deduction money), Mayor Maestri and Mr. Fush are treasurers of it." Tugwell commented that in view of Leche's speech, "Mayor Maestri's denial regarding the shakedown fund is far from satisfactory."

Even though he remained unable to connect Maestri with the deduct fund, Tugwell's persistent investigation brought LDA finances under increased public scrutiny. On July 10, 1939, Dr. O'Hara and Fush revealed that they were indeed the custodians of the deduct fund collected by the LDA. Fush, though, declared that he was "too busy" to show Tugwell any of the organization's records, but they would be open for his inspection if Dr. O'Hara approved. O'Hara refused to permit anyone to see the LDA records and emerged as a staunch defender of the deduct system, commenting that the funds "are just like the dues of almost any other organization of its kind," without explaining which other states, parties, or factions had an "organization of its kind."

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35 *Times-Picayune*, July 6-7, 1939.
He also admitted that the LDA funds were indeed the deduct dollars from state paychecks, thus establishing the connection between the two sets of funds. When asked if Governor Long had made any move to change the financing of the LDA, O'Hara replied, "No, not that I've heard of."  

O'Hara was correct. Upon taking office, Earl Long began tidying up the sloppy payroll procedures of the Leche administration by halting the practice of carrying employees on the payroll of one department even though they worked in another department. He did not, however, move against the deducts, even though Noe made public the sworn affidavit of James S. Allain (former clerk in the Louisiana State Automobile License Bureau office in New Orleans) which revealed that Hubert Haydell, chief clerk in his office, had cashed his $100 payroll check each month and returned $95 to him without mentioning where the other $5 had gone. Furthermore, Frank S. Perilloux, eighth ward leader for the LDA in New Orleans and chief inspector for the dock board, stated that contributions equal to five per cent of their salary were expected of state employees, and added that he collected an additional one percent for the ward organization because the local units received none of the "five per cent" money. Even though Governor Long intimated that the deduct would be discontinued, the LDA continued to take money from state employees.  

While they continued to collect the deducts, administration

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36 Ibid., July 11, 1939.

37 Ibid., June 29, July 14, 21, 24, 1939.
officials realized that the public mood demanded that their methods of collecting the "deducts" had to be streamlined. State employees reported in early August, 1939, that "sources which experience has taught them to respect" assured them that no more deductions would be taken from their salaries in the immediate future. One employee, however, added "we have been told to save our money because, when things quiet down, they will expect us to pay in a lump sum the equivalent of deductions not taken out of our pay." Governor Long announced on August 9 that no further deductions would be taken from state employees after July 31, but responded angrily to reports that employees had been ordered to save their money. "Anybody who says I told them that is a damned liar," he declared.38

The system LDA leaders devised to replace the straight deduct was a "voluntary contribution" plan. Workers at the Charity Hospital in New Orleans were the first to report the new system. They would be "permitted to contribute" to Long's campaign, but hospital officials had assured them that no one would lose their jobs if they refused to do so. Several workers reported a further refinement of the old system: the "voluntary contributions" would be accepted from them after they cashed their paychecks, not before, and in a building set aside from the main hospital. Even though Governor Long steadfastly maintained that contributions "will never be collected on a fixed percent while I am governor" and that if any state workers was unable or unwilling to contribute, or had suffered a recent family illness "he or

38 Bill Attel to "Gentlemen," August 7, 1939, Morrison Collection; Times-Picayune, August 8-9, 1939.
she won't be allowed to contribute," Charity Hospital workers in New Orleans found special brown envelopes marked for their "voluntary contribution" included in their mid-November pay envelopes. State police and highway department workers in Baton Rouge also received strong hints to make the "voluntary contributions." Employees of the State Employment Service Perdido Street office in New Orleans received in December a form letter addressed to Governor Long with which they were to send their contribution "in recognition of your integrity and outstanding record of accomplishments and to aid you in some small measure in your great fight to secure for Louisiana four more years of the good government that you inaugurated when you became governor." 39

Reform elements in Louisiana were particularly incensed by the state employee assessments to help pay for Long's campaign. Tugwell, Jones, Noe, and Morrison repeatedly referred to the practice when reciting their litany of abuses practiced by the Long regime. Their attitude is best typified in two editorials which appeared in the New Orleans States. The first portrayed a Long machine composed of politicians who treated the poor with callous disregard "unless the poor bow down and worship them and give up in many instances part of their pay by means of the nefarious deduct system." More directly, the States reminded its readers that given the past record of the administration, every state employee who received one of the "voluntary

contribution" envelopes and failed to respond "would soon be regarded as inefficient, defiant or not possessing the requisite qualities to hold a job."^40

Tugwell created a permanent campaign issue with his investigations into the deduct system and next focused his attention on the suspicious activities of the Louisiana Conservation Department. He first questioned the arrangement by which the Longwood Oil and Gas Company received a permit to produce an extraordinarily high amount of gas from two wells in the Cotton Valley oil and gas field in Webster parish. The permit was ostensibly for the purpose of conducting an experiment on recycling distillate gas in the field, but Tugwell charged that the extra gas was not recycled once it was pumped from the ground. He compared the Longwood permit to one issued to the Ohio Oil Company for a similar experiment in the same field. The Ohio permit was limited to a period of thirty days while the Longwood permit was issued for an unlimited period.\(^41\)

Tugwell also discovered other irregularities in the Conservation Department. The department had received $350,000 from the previous legislature to fund construction of a geology building on the campus of Louisiana State University, but LSU records showed only $275,000 received. Governor Long held a hasty conference with university officials and Conservation Commission William O. Rankin, and shortly

\(^{40}\) States, November 9, 17, 1939.

afterwards LSU received the rest of its money. Tugwell next charged that many Louisiana companies dealing in oil well supplies and equipment were compelled to obtain merchandise through the Maxwell Supply Company, which kept ten per cent of the total amount of the order even though it provided no service other than writing the bill for each order. Other firms transported, stored, and delivered the equipment. Tugwell identified C. A. Morvant of Thibodaux as the registered agent of the Maxwell Company in Louisiana. Morvant also happened to be chief attorney for the Department of Conservation. Morvant admitted that he was the company's agent but maintained that no one was compelled to order through the Maxwell firm.42

Governor Long initially declined to make any personnel changes in the Conservation Department, but he eventually removed Commissioner Rankin as the political attacks mounted and appointed state senator Ernest S. Clements as commissioner. Clements knew little about the oil business in Louisiana and freely admitted so but pledged to obtain the best advice possible from experts in the field. Some Louisiana oil men looked hopefully to his pledge to run the department without political favors.43

Earl Long and other members of the Long ticket were not the only

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42Times-Picayune, July 14, 19, 25, 28, 30, 1939.

43Ibid., July 25, 1939; W. Scott Heywood to Mr. and Mrs. Gene Heywood, August 2, 1939, Jennings-Heywood Collection; Banta, "The Regulation and Conservation of Petroleum Resources in Louisiana," p. 459; Rankin was eventually jailed for using Conservation Department funds to purchase the yacht for Governor Leche, then was sentenced to an additional 5 years for his participation in the Longwood deal.
candidates involved in the campaign who were forced to defend themselves against corruption charges in the conservation area. Erstwhile reformer James A. Noe also ran into criticism for his oil and gas dealings. On August 23, 1939, the Ouachita Parish grand jury returned indictments against W. D. Dark and L. J. Melton, respectively manager and field agent of the Louisiana Conservation Department in northeast Louisiana, charging them with bribery in connection with the flow of gas wells in the area. Dark and Melton admitted their guilt but maintained that the principal beneficiaries of the deal were the people who had bribed them. The indictments stated that the men received $2,250 from the J. and H. Gas Company to permit it to acidize twelve well and thus increase their production. James A. Noe was listed as president and general manager of J. and H. and incorporation papers for the company listed Noe and Harold Wood as joint stockholders. Noe quickly explained that, "Since the beginning of the Dick Leche-Earl Long administration, the independent oil and gas operators in this area have had to pay tribute to the indicted representatives of this vicious political machine," and he added that the grand jury had examined all the evidence and had not indicted him. Governor Long, however, lost no opportunity to turn the glare of investigation away from the machine and onto Noe. He charged that "Noe used to run the conservation department" in Monroe, and that if Noe had nothing to hide, he should have reported the shakedowns instead of unlawfully paying them. L. J. Melton added that acidization of Noe's wells was a direct violation of a 1936 agreement among oil men in the region that they would refrain from using acid in their wells because continued use of acid caused an intrusion of salt water into the field,
thus ruining it for further production. Melton also stated that Noe had not yet explained why he paid the two agents $666.66 in 1937 not to report him for producing excess gas from two of his wells by not having it properly metered. The money Noe called a "shakedown" to pay conservation department employees in order to operate his business, the Long machine maintained, was in fact a "bribe" paid by him to needy department officials who in turn allowed him to operate his wells illegally. The Progress, the administration newspaper, thereafter often pictured Noe in cartoons as the mother of two children, plump, well-dressed "Shakedown" for whom Noe provided the best care, and skinny, bedraggled "Bribe" whom Noe sought to disown.  

Administration officials correctly considered Noe and Sam Jones to be their most formidable opponents in the campaign and concentrated

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44 Times-Picayune, August 24-25, 1939; Item, September 17, 1939; Progress, various issues, August 1939-January 1940; Banta, "The Regulation and Conservation of Petroleum Resources in Louisiana," pp. 455-458. Noe's side of the argument is lent some credence by the fact that Dark and Melton were also indicted for accepting $1,000 from George D. Pipes ostensibly in exchange for protecting Pipes and Barlow Inabet from prosecution for violation of Louisiana conservation laws. They were never tried on this charge, however. See Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 35,665, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection); the Leche administration conservation department certainly was not above shady deals. W. Scott Heywood reported in 1939 that William Burton had appealed to Leche about the field agents in the Jennings field and Leche subsequently ordered Rankin to allow Burton to produce "around 5,000 barrels" of oil per day per well, more than the other wells in the field. Heywood also maintained that Earl Long and Clements stopped that extra allowable. See Heywood to Mr. and Mrs. Gene Heywood, August 2, 1939, Heywood to Frank A. Smith, January 14, 1940, Jennings-Heywood Collection. The Item commented with much accuracy about the semantics of the episode that the logic in the "Bribery-Shakedown" incident "is more lengthy than convincing." See Item, September 12, 1939.
most of their attacks on them. The anti-Noe campaign focused on convincing the public that he had not earned his considerable wealth honestly and that he had somehow betrayed Huey Long when he broke with the machine following the 1936 nomination. Earl Long, for example, in one speech told his audience, "This Jimmie Noe has made plenty of money out of oil and gas when he was governor, taking it away from the school children of this state..."  

The anti-Jones phase of their campaign sought to portray Jones as something of a "Bourbon" — a conservative corporation lawyer who would turn back the clock by taking away all the state facilities and services that Huey Long and his heirs provided for the people. The Progress exclaimed that "Stuck-up Sam Jones, the High Sassity (sic) Kid, of Lake Charles is to receive $100,000 for himself to run for governor of Louisiana as the candidate of the corporate interests." Long charged that Jones represented fifty corporations in his legal practice, a number which the Progress reduced to forty-three. The governor warned Jones that "The people are not ready to turn this government over to the corporate interests." 

Later during the heated campaign, Earl Long coined the famous phrase "High Hat Sam Jones, the High Society Kid, the High-Kicking, High and Mighty Snide Sam, the guy that (sic) pumps perfume under his arms" that haunted Jones throughout his political life. United States Senator Allen J. Ellender, speaking in behalf of Earl Long, told his 

45 Times-Picayune, September 5, 1939. 

46 Ibid., September 21, 1939; Progress, September 15, October 7, 1939.
audience that "the opposition" wanted to turn the state back over to the "big boys who haven't forgotten that the present regime made them turn over $8,000,000 in severance taxes, $3,500,000 in year in corporation franchise taxes, and $5,500,000 per year in income tax." Presumably the "big boys" were now out for revenge.  

Jones, of course, did not allow these charges to appear unchallenged. He repeatedly stressed his humble beginnings in rural Beauregard Parish in his stump speeches and reminded voters that even though his law firm did handle corporation clients, he accepted only "honest" cases, corporate or otherwise, and moreover, he had been a member of the same law firm as former governor Alvin O. King, whom Huey Long had made governor in his fight with Paul Cyr. If Huey had approved a governor whose legal firm handled corporate clients, why could not he (Jones) represent corporations? In addition, Jones reminded his listeners that he had recently won a large judgement for some southwestern Louisiana rice farmers who had sued a milling corporation.  

In Gueydan, Jones warned his audience that the administration would try to tell them he was against free school books, homestead exemptions, the free right to vote, and old-age pensions, but he cited an article printed in the DeRidder Enterprise in 1920, in which Jones himself had advocated these measures. Speaking to a carpenter's union, Jones advocated Labor's right to organize, strike, and picket.

47 Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 434-435; Item, November 17, 1939.

48 Times-Picayune, October 1, 3, 5, 26, 1939. For a list of King's considerable corporate connections, see Sobel and Raimo, Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States Volume II, pp. 583-584.
His most pungent rebuttal to the "High Hat" charge, though, remained his "My pappy was for Huey" phrase, repeated endlessly on the campaign trail. But Jones failed to mention his father's eventual disillusionment with Huey Long. 49

The charges and countercharges of both sides were briefly pushed from the front pages of state newspapers during early September, 1939. The European situation had steadily worsened since Adolph Hitler's rise to power as German chancellor in 1933. War finally erupted when Hitler ordered his armored columns to invade Poland during the early hours of September 1. England and France subsequently launched a futile effort to save Poland, and World War II spread across the European continent. The mood across the Atlantic, both in the United States and in Louisiana, was at first one of reluctance to envision any possibility of American involvement in the spreading war. 50

The outbreak of World War II immediately made the candidates' World War I army records primary campaign topics as they sought to prove their patriotism. The only major candidate without a war record was Earl Long. Noe hastened to attack Long as a "slacker":

49 Times-Picayune, October 15-16, 1939.

I want to ask him where he was 21 years ago today (Armistice Day). There never has been a greater slacker and draft dodger. I say Earl K. Long was in Texas dodging the draft. When the armistice was signed, a warrant was out for Earl Long's arrest as a draft dodger.\textsuperscript{51}

Noe also sought to parallel the Long machine in Louisiana with Nazi Germany, characterizing the incumbent administration as "a political machine as evil and debauched as Adolph Hitler, Europe's madman."

James H. Morrison joined the fray when he charged that the Louisiana administration even provided aid to Hitler by producing oil in excess of the allowable under the Connolly "Hot Oil" Act and selling the "hot" oil to Nazi Germany to be refined into airplane fuel. Pressing the same idea still further, Sam Jones declared that the Long machine had attempted to "Hitlerize" the school children of the state by having State Superintendent of Education T. H. Harris suggest to school principals that if they could only afford one newspaper for their school, that paper should be the Progress.\textsuperscript{52}

Earl Long felt pressed to defend himself and his administration against any charge of disloyalty. He explained that he was living in Brownsville, Texas, during World War I, selling baking powder for $100 per month plus expenses. With that money, he had helped to support one sister in Colorado suffering from tuberculosis and another widowed sister who was studying at the State Normal College at Natchitoches in order to support her children as a teacher. Long had sent the

\textsuperscript{51}Times-Picayune, November 12, 1939.

\textsuperscript{52}Times-Picayune, September 10, November 4, December 19, 1939; States, December 19, 1939.
Colorado sister $60 per month, the widowed sister $40 per month, and lived on the expense account. After investigation, his local draft board placed him in Class II. Class II of the 1917 Selective Service Act provided only temporary exemptions until the local board's supply of Class I registrants was exhausted. Earl could be placed in this classification only by a strained interpretation of its first provision, which provided exemptions for registrants with both wife and children, or who were the father of motherless children, where the family was not solely dependent upon the registrant's labor for support because "reasonably certain sources of support" (Huey?) were available. Actually, Earl's situation could have more easily placed him in Class III, under Section A, providing exemption for a registrant who was the main support of children not his own issue, or Section C, a registrant with a helpless brother or sister, regardless of age, mainly dependent on his labor for support. Huey eventually offered to support their sisters, and Earl had reported promptly for induction. The draft board, however, told him that an armistice was on the verge of being signed and that if he had a job, he need not enlist.

Long's explanation did nothing to defuse the opposition attacks. Noe remarked that he did not understand "how Earl Long ... can stand between the American flags and ask the people of Louisiana to elect


54 Times-Picayune, November 13, 1939.
him governor," and that Long moved to Texas during the war not to pursue his career but to escape the Winn Parish draft board. The States taunted the governor with a series of editorial cartoons deriding his supposed draft dodging, and then culminated its attack with a forceful editorial:

Sam Jones wore the uniform of his country during the World War. So did Jimmy Noe . . .

But Earl Long wasn't there. He managed to keep himself out of khaki. He managed to keep a few jumps ahead of the draft board's 'greetings' peddling shoe polish along the way. When the draft board finally ran him down, he was at Brownsville, Texas, just across the border from Mexico. Earl Long did not fight for anything in 1917-18, except for a few dollars in commissions.55

Long attempted to deflect criticism of his lack of army service by belittling Sam Jones' army experience. Noe had served overseas in the American Expeditionary Force, so he escaped this salvo, but Jones spent his World War I army days at Camp Beauregard north of Alexandria, Louisiana. Jones was initially a clerk of the Beauregard draft board because of his schooling at LSU and his familiarity with government forms, but he took the job only with the understanding that he would join the army reserves and be subject to call at any time. He was soon called into the army and applied for admission to the Army Artillery Officers Training School, but the armistice became effective before Jones received his appointment. Though Jones was never closer to Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany during the war than Alexandria, Louisiana,

55 Item, October 9, 1939; New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, November 12, 1939; States, February 9, 13, 17, 1940.
still he had served in uniform for seventeen months (September 29, 1917 to February 28, 1919) during the conflict, eventually reaching the rank of sergeant, and he often reminded his audiences of his service to his country during the gubernatorial campaign.56

The Long forces made much of Jones' paltry war record, claiming that his war duties consisted of tending livestock at Camp Beauregard. The Progress later dubbed him "Mule Nurse Sam."57 Undaunted, Jones throughout the 1939-40 campaign clung to the image of a fighting protector of American liberty provided by his stateside service.

James A. Noe campaigned hardest for the support of World War I veterans vote. He attempted to convey the message that his overseas service gave him a special rapport with them. His campaign included veterans' organizations throughout the state, including the "Jackson Brigade" charged with keeping the New Orleans vote count honest. Following his defeat in the first Democratic primary, he directed their efforts toward protecting fellow veteran Sam Jones' interests in the city.

Despite the sudden timeliness of the candidates' World War I army records — or in Long's case, the absence of one — the dominant issue of the campaign remained the corruption of the incumbent administration. Long attempted to dissociate himself from the Scandals, reminding voters that federal investigators had not indicted him. His

56 Sam Jones to Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection; Maj. Gen. E. S. Adams to Allen J. Ellender, February 3, 1940, Ellender Collection; Angers, "Sam Houston Jones Reform Governor," pp. 6, 12; States, January 15, 1945.

57 Progress, February 16, 1940.
opponents, however, charged that Long had either been a part of the systematic looting (despite his denials), or that if he had not actually known what was occurring, he was too stupid to be governor.

Jones stressed the "common honesty" theme of his campaign, charging that even "If Earl Long was deaf, dumb, and blind . . . he should have known that something was rotten in Louisiana," and stating that, "Everybody in the state — even the big majority of the job-holders," now wanted to clean up Louisiana, and the organized reformers had only to see that the public sentiment was accurately counted at the polls. In a particularly vitriolic radio speech broadcast over WDSU, Jones said that, "The ancient Huns of the Old World were not so barbarous in their treatment of their enemies as these people have been in the treatment of those who elected and trusted them."58

Former Senator Joseph Ransdell, whom Huey had retired from politics, endorsed Jones because "the state needs someone to lead it out of immorality, degradation, and dishonor into which it has fallen."

The state's major newspapers endorsed Jones, and angry citizens joined groups with such names as the Fearless Democrats, the Citizens' Voluntary Committee of Louisiana, the Louisiana Association For Clean Government, and the People's League (chaired by young New Orleans attorney T. Hale Boggs), all designed to elect a reform governor of Louisiana. The Catholic church establishment joined in the general revulsion at the rampant corruption, but carefully avoided any appearance of factional alliance. In February, 1940, Archbishop Francis

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58 Item, September 21, October 5, 16, 20, 1939.
Rummel called on citizens to correct and atone

for all the public scandal, ugly crimes, flagrant injustices, slanders . . . disturbing agitators which have during the past eight months poisoned our atmosphere, shocked the sensibilities and wounded the pride of honorable citizens, humiliating our state before the nation, and threatening to undermine its credit.\textsuperscript{59}

The New Orleans Catholic newspaper added its hopes that "the shock of the recent revelations of scandals instill(s) a firm resolution in the people to cherish the franchise of freedom before it is too late" and defended Rummel's foray into politics: "Those of the priesthood should counsel and encourage the people to the performance of their duty, to an honest use of their American birthright, the Ballot (sic) . . ."\textsuperscript{60}

A minor adaptation of the general appeal of reformism developed in New Orleans, where Sam Jones and his supporters likened their crusade to that of the White Leaguers who had worked to end what many New Orleanians considered the dictatorship of Reconstruction. Jones spoke at the Liberty Monument at the foot of Canal Street, and the States editorially asked the people to "Vote as They (the White Leaguers) Would Vote" — for liberation and against tyranny. James Morrison charged that each of Earl Long's rallies cost the state $4,000 and maintained that a vote for Earl Long would be cast only

\textsuperscript{59} Times-Picayune, November 24, 1939; Shreveport Times, January 7, 1940; Item, November 29, 1939, January 3, February 19, 1940; Howell, Louisiana Sugar Plantations, Mardi Gras, and Huey Long, p. 169.

\textsuperscript{60} New Orleans The Catholic Herald, February 15, 1940.
"by one who has no respect for America or Louisiana." 61

Earl Long and his allies countered this barrage of criticism with the political means at their disposal, legal, illegal, and questionable. The governor was an effective stump speaker, amply able to conduct his own defense, but even he called upon the eloquent Gerald L. K. Smith to join him on the stage to deliver a fervent appeal to the voters not to let Huey down by repudiating the machine: "If you want to know who to be against, find out who the devil is for." Earl also called upon Huey's widow, Rose, to join in a few rallies and simply ask the audience to vote for him. Illegally, state trucks and employees continued distributing the Progress. Questionably, Dr. E. L. Sanderson, Superintendent of the Shreveport Charity Hospital sent a form letter to the parents of student nurses studying at the facility, asking them to support Long: "If you have no special reason for supporting someone else for governor, we shall consider it a great help to this institution if you will help us to elect him." State workers also glued Earl Long posters to the Orleans civil court building on Royal Street while city officials refused permission to Jones and Morrison workers to place their political posters on public buildings already bearing Long posters. Civil Sheriff Louis Knopf refused to allow Noe workers to photocopy Orleans parish poll lists so they could carefully check their accuracy. 62

61 Item, October 18, November 29, 1939.

62 Times-Picayune, January 4, February 8, 1940; Progress, February 16, 1940; Item, November 16, December 20, 1939; States, November 6, December 4-5, 21, 1939; Earl Long circular, January 14, 1940, Ellender Collection.
The effect of the Scandals and the continued anti-Long effort to focus the campaign on them was revealed in December, 1939, when a new campaign device burst upon the Louisiana political scene. On December 17, Dr. George Gallup began releasing the results of a public opinion poll his American Institute of Public Opinion had conducted in Louisiana earlier in the month. A sample of 2,500 Louisianians revealed that Long and Jones were running even in public support with thirty-four percent of the straw vote, Noe was in second place with twenty per cent, Morrison third with ten per cent, and Moseley fourth with two per cent. These findings indicated that voter support of the Long machine had severely eroded since Leche's rout of Cleveland Dear in 1936. Even more ominous for the Longites were predictions that a Jones-Long second primary would result in Jones receiving fifty-eight per cent of the vote and Long forty-two per cent.63

The pollsters also asked other questions which revealed the lack of confidence in state government felt by Louisianians in 1939. When asked, "Do you think elections in Louisiana in recent years have been honestly conducted?" Louisiana voters responded: Honest - twenty-five per cent, Dishonest - sixty percent, No opinion - fifteen per cent. Asked "Do you think that if the present state administration is returned to office next year it will 'clean house' in the state government?", those polled responded: Yes - thirty percent, No - fifty-one percent, No opinion - nineteen per cent. Asked "Do you think that

state courts are honest?" they responded: Yes - thirty-six per cent, No - forty per cent, No opinion - twenty-four per cent. Despite the opinion revealed in these questions, a fourth question substantiated the enduring legend of the man who had set the stage for the political situation which many Louisianians had come to deplore. Asked "Taking everything into consideration, do you think that Huey P. Long was a bad or good influence in Louisiana? Louisianians responded: Good - fifty-five per cent, Bad - twenty-two percent, Both - fourteen per cent, No opinion - nine per cent.64

Even beyond these numbers, however, the Gallup pollsters made a chilling empirical assessment of Louisiana's political culture: "The Institute has never found, in any state, on any question, such widespread reluctance to speak and such guardedness in replies." The pollsters found fear of expressing an opinion more common in the poorer sections of the state, and more common in men than in women, though some women interviewed alone commented that "My husband has told me not to talk to anybody about state politics." Overall, one person in five indicated their reluctance to talk for fear of political or personal reprisals. Their fears were not unjustified. When told that some respondents thought Huey Long had been a bad influence on the state, one man replied:

64Gallup and Rae, The Pulse of Democracy, pp. 156-158; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 440; Item, December 20, 22, 1939; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 115-116 includes a revealing further breakdown of the statewide figures on the last question showing that Longism had made heavy inroads into the middle class which should normally abhor a perversion of democracy. Sindler attributes this anomaly to the voters' disgust with Louisiana's political system before Huey Long.
I wish you'd show me the ones that says (sic) he was a bad influence! I'll report 'em (sic) tomorrow and they'll sure lose their jobs fast. You are probably a Long man, and you'll probably report them before I can, but I sure wish you'd let me do it. 65

Reaction to the results of the poll were understandably mixed. Long thought the poll "ridiculous." The Progress charged that the Gallup organization came to Louisiana solely to rig the election, and in an attempt to discredit the results made the racial slur that the Gallup team included "a Harlem nigger (sic) in a double-breasted suit." Noe and Moseley had no comment; Morrison instructed his listeners to "pay no attention to this poll." Jones' forces, however, used the results to their advantage. In a circular repeating the results, Jones rhetorically told Long that "it may not be that you are beaten — but you are at least found out." 66

The political threat to the machine revealed in the Gallup poll results led to the revival of a practice rarely used by Longites: raising the race issue when forced into a political corner. The Long machine threaded racist attacks throughout the campaign. When Dudley LeBlanc withdrew as a candidate on October 23, 1939, all sides hoped to inherit his sizeable Cajun support. LeBlanc endorsed Jones on October 25 and thus inspired a racist attack on the Jones camp. The

65 Sunday Item-Tribune, December 17, 1939.

66 Sam Jones Circular, December 20, 1939, Aswell Collection; F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans" The Life and Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1976), p. 145.
Progress printed a picture of two black children holding Jones signs and literature. In an attempt to blunt the impetus given Jones' campaign by LeBlanc's endorsement, the newspaper noted that black support had come to Jones along with LeBlanc. Obviously, the Long machine wished to persuade its white supporters where sympathy for blacks lay, and that a vote for Longism was a vote against presumed "nigger lovers" -- Jones and his followers.

As the campaign neared the first Democratic primary, United States Senator Allen J. Ellender made several speeches in an attempt to help Earl Long win the election. Speaking at the governor's final New Orleans rally, Ellender charged that federal prosecutor O. John Rogge came to Louisiana charged by the Justice Department with establishing the right of properly qualified blacks to vote in the election and dared Rogge to perform his duty. Ellender soon expanded on the same charge. The day after his initial comments, he declared from the stump that, "If you people don't watch out, in 10 or 15 years the federal government will be in charge of all your elections and the darkies will be voting." He held out hope, though, taking comfort in the fact that there were "too many good white citizens in Louisiana who remember the carpetbag days, when Negroes voted and held office,

\[67\] Progress, December 22, 1939; Item, October 26, 1939; Floyd Martin Clay, Coozan Dudley LeBlanc From Huey Long to Hadacol (Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 132-133; Trent Angers, "The Three Faces of Dudley LeBlanc," Acadiana Profile, Second Quarter, 1977, pp. 47-48, 58. Louisiana political folk wisdom held that LeBlanc strongly controlled 5,000 to 6,000 "Cajun" votes, a sizeable number in a close election. C. A. Shaw to David C. Pipes, October 2, 1940, Pipes to R. H. Chadwick, September 26, 1940, David C. Pipes Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

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to permit any federal interference in state affairs." Earl Long did not join in this blast. During Ellender's attack, he satisfied himself with calling the opposition candidates "filth chunkers and brow-beaters" and declaring that "I have been carrying on like Huey P. Long, Oscar Allen, Jesus Christ, and God Almighty would have me do." (His campaign stationery bore the motto: "Carrying On the Work of Huey and O.K.").

Despite the Long machine's efforts, Earl Long was not successful in this campaign. The Governor garnered more votes than any other candidate in the first Democratic primary, 226,385 to Jones' 154,936; Noe's 116,564; Morrison's 48,243; or Moseley's 7,595, but he carried only nine parishes and failed to win the nomination outright as he had often boasted he would do. As the campaign wound into the second primary, the Progress descended into a blatantly racist appeal for votes. In its last edition published before the second primary, the newspaper reprinted facsimiles of the February 10, 1940, issues of the Louisiana Weekly, which it called "the largest Negro newspaper in the South," and the Sepia Socialite, so-called "No. 2 Negro newspaper in New Orleans." The sole purpose of these reprints was to appeal to the racism of white voters. A passage quoted from the Louisiana Weekly showed the Long machine as a staunch defender of white supremacy:

Feeble attempts were made during the day (the

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68 Times-Picayune, January 14-15, 1940; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 446-447; Earl K. Long to W. Scott Heywood, December 11, 1939, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
first primary) at various polls throughout the city (New Orleans), by courageous Negroes, to call the bluff of the domastic Mr. Ellender . . . but to no avail. The Long machine crashed their hopes. The Negro was told that 'this is a white man's primary.' Commissioners for both Mr. Jones and Mr. Noe argued that the Negro was entitled to vote, but the Old Regulars thought differently, and their thoughts were conclusive.

Slyly attacking the opposition's war record, the Progress further quoted that:

Another advantage that the Negro who fought in World War No. 1 has is the comradeship of Mr. Jones and Senator Noe. The sterling qualities possessed by these gentlemen will permeate down throughout the past system giving impetus to . . . the birth of enfranchisement.

The Progress's editorial comment about the black newspapers' endorsement of Jones went even further in racist rhetoric:

Sam sure is making gains with the coons. He charms them with some kind of sex appeal. Look what this nigger (sic) newspaper say about Sam. This Negro 'society newspaper' attacks Governor Long for not letting the Negroes vote in the Democratic primaries and praises Sam Jones for the battle he is making in behalf of the coons. 'We are against Earl Long because he takes the stand that the Democratic primary is a white man's election' says this Sam Jones Negro newspaper. The Sepia Socialite says that 'Sam Jones is the white hope of the black man.'

Even though Jones and Noe ignored the attacks, many reform elements

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69 Progress, February 16, 1940; Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections 1920-1949 (University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1950), p. 70.
in Louisiana condemned the Long machine for this ugly phase of the campaign. The *Item* editorialized that "we can't recall in 35 years any political faction that has departed so far from decency to raise the race-issue (sic) among Democrats, or even so-called Democrats, in this state," while the *States* commented that "The Maestri-Long-Leche machine has stooped to foul means of any sorts (sic) in the effort to win this election, but the most venal and contemptible plot it has yet engineered was its clumsy attempt to promote race animosity and class strife."70

The statement of James E. Wilkins, president of the New Orleans branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, raised a pertinent question about the entire episode: why did the Long machine choose this time to raise the race issue?

The local branch of the NAACP resents the injection of the Negro into the Democratic primary campaign after every known scheme has been used to prevent this minority group of American citizens from voting . . . In our present voiceless state whoever emerges victorious on February 20, 1940 (the second Democratic primary) is of little concern to us.

Louisiana voting rolls in 1939 reflected approximately four decades of systematic disfranchisement. After all, it was not until 1944 that the first blacks since disfranchisement in the early 1900s registered to vote in Rapides parish, and Assistant Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa parish, Merle S. Weigel, wrote to her soldier-husband in

70 *Item*, February 14, 1940; *States*, February 27, 1940.
1944 that no blacks had registered yet in that parish. No "black threat" existed in Louisiana in 1939 comparable to that which existed during the 1890s and before by which unscrupulous Democratic politicians safely kept white voters in line. The votes necessary to create this "threat" simply did not exist in the black communities. In 1940, only 886 black voters were registered in the entire state. They constituted .1 per cent of the total registration. Nevertheless, and in desperation, the Long machine had used the threat of a fictitious black vote to capitalize on the ingrained fears and prejudices of the white community.

A full account of the Louisiana Weekly and Sepia Socialite articles reveals a trail of greed and misplaced zeal. The Louisiana Weekly editor, C. C. Dejoie, Jr., stated in an affidavit executed before notary public T. Hale Boggs that the articles he published were brought in to his office by James B. LaFourche, who paid for their insertion. He identified LaFourche as a black man who performed odd jobs for the police department and also for "a lawyer known to support the administration." LaFourche subsequently issued his own affidavit in which he stated that he wrote and inserted articles in the two newspapers in an effort to make money. He had heard that the Long

71 Item, February 16, 1940; Alexandria Daily Town Talk (hereinafter cited as Town Talk), August 8, 1944; Merle S. Weigel to H. S. Weigel, August 11, 1944, H. S. Weigel and Family Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

72 Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 422; Riley E. Baker, "Negro Voter Registration in Louisiana, 1879-1964," Louisiana Studies, Winter, 1965, pp. 335, 336. It was not until 1964 that every parish in Louisiana had some blacks registered to vote.
machine had sought to buy 450,000 copies of a black newspaper carrying an article asking O. John Rogge to help blacks get the vote and suggesting that Jones and Noe were willing to aid such a move. Keeping an eye on the main chance, LaFourche arranged with one of the papers to receive two cents royalty on the sale of each copy above the normal circulation. The Long machine subsequently purchased extra copies of the newspaper issues carrying LaFourche's articles, but when he heard them misrepresented in a radio address, he went to Jones headquarters and agreed not to write any more of them, commenting "... my only idea was to agitate for civil rights of Negroes with an increased circulation of the papers out of which I would realize a profit." Even though crass commercial greed lay behind the publication of the articles, the Long machine bears sole responsibility for injecting the race issue into the campaign.

The major event of the second Democratic primary occurred when Noe endorsed Jones "1000 per cent" and actively campaigned for his election. Even though Jones' hopes for election brightened considerably as he finished second in the first primary, he welcomed Noe's support. The Progress detected a political deal in the Jones-Noe arrangement. Articles in the newspaper charged that Noe received $150,000 for his endorsement, and cartoons appearing in the paper showed Noe clutching a money bag labeled "$150,000" and dressed in a "Mark Hanna" suit covered with dollar signs. In fact, Jones and Noe reached an agreement, but not exclusively for money. Instead,

73 Item, February 14, 16, 1940.
their "deal" included the stipulation that the Jones organization would pay Noe's campaign expenses and ironically, that fifty per cent of the state patronage jobs would be reserved for Noe's supporters after the election, even though Jones had promised to create an effective Civil Service. Morrison refused to endorse either Long or Jones and announced that he was "going fishing" on election day, though Jones claimed that thousands of Morrison supporters were flocking to his campaign. Moseley also did not participate in the second primary. 74

The second primary combination of Jones and Noe proved too powerful for Earl Long to overcome. Even the threat of massed troops could not sway voters for Long. On the eve of the second Democratic primary, Governor Long ordered the Louisiana National Guard to be ready to move in case of disorders at the polls. In nineteen cities throughout the state, 3,500 men were on call during election day. To counter this threat and also any attempted vote-stealing in the election, Noe enlisted more volunteers in his "Jackson Brigade." 75

Earl Long lost the Democratic nomination for governor when the voters in the second primary gave him 261,790 votes (48.2 per cent) compared to Jones' 282,470 (51.8 per cent), but Long was not yet ready to retire to his Winnfield farm. The Governor attempted to continue


75 Times-Picayune, February 13, 20, 1940; Item, February 9, 1940; States, February 9, 1940.
in a lesser state office after the death of incumbent Secretary of State E. A. Conway on February 18, 1940. Conway had won renomination over reform candidate James Gremillion, but died just before the second primary. Long appointed E. A. Conway, Jr. to fill the remainder of his father's term. Meanwhile, several possible candidates emerged for the four year term to be filled in the general election. The leading contenders for the post were Long and Conway, Jr.  

The Long-dominated Democratic State Central Committee elected in 1936 selected Long as the new Democratic nominee, but reform members of the "new" Democratic State Central Committee elected in 1940 objected to the selection and maintained that their committee should select the nominee. Sam Jones reached a settlement with Wade O. Martin, Sr., chairman of the "old" (1936) committee, in which Martin agreed to call his committee into session again to replace Long with a nominee more compatible with the governor-elect. The 1936 committee on March 2, 1940, rescinded its earlier nomination and nominated Gremillion, and the 1940 committee meeting the same day reaffirmed that action.

Earl Long immediately appealed to East Baton Rouge District Court Judge James D. Womack for a court order blocking Gremillion's certification as the legal candidate in the general election, but Jones'  

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76 Times-Picayune, February 23, 1940; Item, February 19, 1940; Heard and Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections, p. 71.

77 Times-Picayune, February 23, 25, 28, March 3, 1940; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 1, 1940.
forces blocked this maneuver by filing a petition for application of writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court asking that Womack be relieved of all jurisdiction in the struggle. The high court agreed that district courts did not have jurisdiction in such cases and later dismissed Long's suit, stating that he had no legal basis for contesting Gremillion's nomination. The Supreme Court ruling was the end of Long's dream of retaining office in 1940.

The campaign of 1939-1940 was at last over. Jones still faced token opposition in the general election from Republican William Tuttle of New Orleans but did not bother to campaign against him. The miniscule Louisiana Republican party was split into two warring factions, and the Democratic nomination was then tantamount to election. The general election results were: Jones 225,841 and Tuttle 1,367. The April general election merely lent a final stamp of authority to the vigorous reform movement now ready to do battle with the Long machine at every turn. That running battle lasted twenty-four years until a brief reappearance of the race issue following civil rights developments in the 1950s, and the unique homogenizing campaign of John McKeithen for the governorship in 1964 obliterated the last

78 Times-Picayune, March 3, 1940; Ibid., March 8, 1940; Ibid., March 9, 13, 1940. One casualty of Long's fight was Angola Warden Louie A. Jones. Long discharged him because Jones gave his proxy to the opposition side in the nominating struggle in the "old" committee. Jones was subsequently appointed Angola farm superintendent by Angola general manager Theophile S. Landry who had also given his proxy to the opponents, but was protected from Long's wrath because his job required Senate confirmation. See Times-Picayune, March 14, 1940, Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 17, 1940.
vestiges of the classic bifactionalism in Louisiana.79

Reform-minded commentators throughout the state and nation hailed Jones' victory as a triumph also for the democratic principles of government. Jones, however, saw his election not as a final triumph, but only as a beginning. He commented in an interview after the second Democratic primary that, "We have got to restore decent, democratic government and enact legislation that will prevent the recurrence of debauchery, corruption and dictatorship that has characterized Louisiana in recent years," and he reminded the people of Louisiana in his inaugural address that, "Once again yours is the dictatorship, the dictatorship of the whole people over the men who serve them, the only kind of dictatorship that a Democracy can abide."80

Even though he acknowledged his debt to Noe and to the reformers who had helped him from the beginning of the campaign, Jones also


acknowledged the importance of the help he had received from Louisiana's women voters: "It can safely be said that a good many thousands of wives of state and city officials voted against their own husbands who drew their pay from the political payrolls." With the secret ballot, of course, his estimate is unverifiable, but it does echo the sentiments of organized reform women's groups and of Mrs. James A. Noe who took to the stump to urge women to vote for her husband in the first primary and then Jones in the second primary.  

While the reformers exulted in their victory, the Longites consoled each other and tried to put together what had gone wrong. T. H. Harris, defeated candidate for re-election as State Superintendent of Education on the Long ticket, stated simply that the Long slate lost because the votes of the candidates who had been eliminated in the first primary went to their opponents in the second primary. Jennings oil man W. Scott Heywood, who had campaigned for Long in the first primary, concluded that Long lost because he was "double-crossed by the school teachers, the bus drivers, and the truck owners;" and because Jones had promised a $3 fee for automobile licenses, a fifty per cent reduction in the fee for truck licenses, and twelve months pay for school teachers, even though Long had maintained that the state could not afford such favors. Long himself provided the most fitting epitaph for his 1939-1940 troubles when he wrote eight years later: "They charged me with being politically and personally dishonest, and there was no way on earth, at that time, for me to prove

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that their contemptible accusations were untrue."\(^{82}\)

As Long's ally, United States Senator Allen Ellender surveyed the political situation in the early spring of 1940, he took comfort in the fact that "We put up a good fight, but the odds were against us." Ellender looked forward to a friendlier political climate in the future: "Right now sentiment is swinging the Jones way, but I predict that the people will soon wake up and realize their mistake."\(^{83}\) The Long machine and its allies lay in wait for Sam Jones. Its articulate spokesmen still sat in the national and state Houses of Representatives and Senate, and in parish courthouses and city halls throughout the state. Jones began his administration in a state filled with expectation. The reformers expected a vigorous assault on the abuses of the previous administrations, the Longites expected Jones to turn back the clock to a pre-Huey Long time, obliterate state services and thus lose his thin margin of support.

Sam Jones' victory in the 1939-1940 gubernatorial campaign, while important because it established effective bifactionalism in Louisiana, was incomplete. He had no sweeping mandate from the voters. Indeed, even with the help given his campaign by the revelation of the Scandals, he received only fifty-two per cent of the second primary


\(^{83}\) Allen J. Ellender to Donald A. Draughon, March 5, 1940, Ellender Collection.
vote compared to Earl Long's forty-eight per cent. 84

Brief analysis of the 1940 second Democratic primary results, the election which most clearly revealed the Long/anti-Long cleavage in that year, reveals that Longism remained strong in its traditional home base in the north Louisiana hills. Earl Long carried fourteen of the twenty-seven north Louisiana parishes. Moreover, eleven of those parishes gave him at least 53.3 per cent of their vote. Southwest Louisiana, Sam Jones' home territory, also voted heavily Longite. Allen parish gave Long 57.4 per cent of its vote, compared to 42.6 per cent for Jones; Cameron parish went 55.7 per cent for Long and 44.3 per cent for Jones. In addition, Jones' native Beauregard parish split almost evenly (50.9 per cent Long, 49.1 per cent Jones). Only in his adopted Calcasieu parish (55.9 percent to 44.1 per cent) and neighboring Jefferson Davis (60.3 per cent to 39.7 per cent) did Jones do well in his native area.

The reformers found much more support in south Louisiana. Jones swept the twenty-four south Louisiana parishes with the exception of four. Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes voted for Long as a result of alliances between the Longites and Old Regulars in Orleans and Leander Perez in St. Bernard and Plaquemines. Long carried the fourth "Longite" south Louisiana parish, St. James, by only five votes. In addition, south Louisiana contained six of the sixteen parishes statewide giving Long the lowest percentage of their vote.

84 Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 264.
The Florida parishes remained a center of anti-Longism in this election, with Long carrying only Washington parish. The two bastions of reform sentiment in this region were East Feliciana, which voted for Jones 61.1 per cent to 38.9 per cent, and East Baton Rouge, 65.9 per cent for Jones, 34.1 per cent for Long.

A survey of the 1940 Longite vote also reveals that the faction continued to obtain stronger support in the rural areas of the state than in the urban area. Louisiana then contained six parishes which either were urban or contained one of the state's largest cities. Earl Long carried only one of these: boss-controlled Orleans, by 55.3 per cent to Jones' 44.7 per cent. Jones carried the other five: East Baton Rouge and Calcasieu by the totals noted above; Rapides by 57.6 per cent to 42.4 per cent; Ouachita by 62.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent; and Caddo by 66.9 per cent to 33.1 per cent. Moreover, Jones also carried the nascent "bedroom suburbs" of Jefferson parish (56.8 per cent to 43.2 per cent) and St. Tammany (53.0 per cent to 47.0 per cent).

Despite the large number of parishes he carried, however, Jones still won only a narrow victory, carrying eight of his forty-one parishes by a five per cent or less margin of victory. Moreover, he failed to carry all the members of his ticket into state office: reformers won in the races for Attorney General, Superintendent of Public Education, and Secretary of State, while independent reformer A. P. Tugwell retained the State Treasurer's office, and Longite holdovers remained as Registrar of State Lands and Commissioner of Agriculture.

More importantly, Jones' supporters did not win a majority of
MAP 2-1
ANTI-LONGITE VOTE, SECOND DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY, 1940

Parishes Carried By Sam Jones

Parishes Carried By Earl Long
seats in the legislature. One estimate divided the House of Represent-atives into sixty-one or sixty-two "independent" members to thirty-eight or thirty-nine Longites, and divided the Senate into twenty-four Jones supporters compared to fifteen for Long.85 This estimate appears to have been generous. Other observers found much less Jones support in the legislature, as few as seven Senators and fourteen Representatives prominently aligned with him.86 Jones later claimed at most thirty-five supporters in the House and fifteen in the Senate.87

Jones, therefore, was not able to act independently and tear the Long machine "leaf from twig" as he had promised during the campaign. Because of his partial victory, he was forced to compromise on some of his measures in order to establish any of his reform program. His compromises disillusioned some of his followers who expected a pristine reform unsullied by any hint of "politics as usual," but Jones cannot be realistically faulted for agreeing to compromise. His bed-rock supporters, ardent but politically inexperienced, were not numerous enough to pass his legislation by themselves. Jones counted his political ability as the prime reason he was able to hold together and enlarge his legislative following enough to pass his program.88

85 Morning Advocate, February 22, 1940.
86 States, May 13, 1940.
87 Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1940, Daugherty Collection.
appraisal should be considered accurate. He had no reliable legislative majority for his proposals, and the residual strength of the Longite organization, discredited but not destroyed, became apparent during the 1940 and 1942 legislative sessions and in a series of law suits challenging Jones' program when passed. His election indicated a temporary popularity of reformism in Louisiana, but in its narrowness it bore the seeds of an uneasy tenure in office.
Following his victory in the February second Democratic primary, Sam Jones left for Tucson, Arizona, and a vacation at the home of his wife's parents. During his lame duck period between the February primary and Jones' inauguration in May, however, Earl Long sought to maintain Longite influence in state government. In one move, Wade J. Garnier of Amite resigned from the Louisiana Milk Commission in April rather than continue serving until August when his term would expire (thus giving Jones an appointment). Long then appointed State Representative R. C. Hathorn to replace Garnier for the four remaining months and appointed Garnier to fill a new six-year term. He also appointed L. H. Bowden to fill a vacant term expiring in 1942. Henry Vernon, the other commissioner, had served only two years of his original eight-year appointment and thus had six years remaining on the board.

Long also attempted to help five New Orleans men convicted of attacking Jones supporters at the polls during the recent primaries. The five men were all political henchmen of Longite leader Philip "Nina" Patorno, who lived next door to the polling place of Orleans Parish's Ward 5, Precinct 1 on Dumaine Street. Judge Frank T. Echezabal sentenced each of the five to a six-month term in prison.

1 New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 29, March 4, 29, 1940.
2 Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 19, 1940 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk).
Long granted each man a reprieve so he could ask for clemency before a special meeting of the State Board of Pardons. Long's maneuver proved ineffective when the pardon board denied all five requests. 3

Even though Long still sat in the governor's chair and occasionally used his official power to the machine's advantage, the state's attention focused on the incoming Jones administration. Jones announced that his inauguration would be held in Louisiana State University's horseshoe-shaped football stadium. His planning committee hoped to seat 60,000 people in the stands and crowd the rest of the expected 125,000 people in the end zones and on the field. They also planned a huge barbeque of at least 800 cattle and 250,000 hams to be washed down with 300 barrels of lemonade. In an attempt to discredit the "High Hat" label put on him during the campaign by Earl Long, Jones announced that the inauguration would be run "in the most democratic way possible" and promised, "We'll find room for as many as appear." Jones also sought to dispel the corporation lawyer image Long had attached to him by making his first speech as governor-elect to the Louisiana State Federation of Labor convention in Shreveport. In this speech Jones promised to appoint a "real labor man" as labor commissioner; recommended that labor leaders continue their work to improve the economic condition of their members ("I have no respect for any organization that does not"); but also warned that labor's

3 Times-Picayune, April 26, May 4, 1940. Patorno eluded justice by committing suicide May 8, 1940, the day of his delayed sentencing. Times-Picayune, May 9, 1940.
Inauguration day, May 14, 1940, was a busy time for Jones. The festivities began at 9:00 in the morning with a parade from his Heidelberg Hotel headquarters in downtown Baton Rouge to the LSU campus, followed by a song festival in the LSU stadium at 11:30 (which included old favorites such as "Hail, Hail, The Gang's All Here," "Home on the Range," and "God Bless America," as well as a new composition entitled "How Do You Do Sam Jones?"). The swearing-in ceremony began at 12:00 noon as Louisiana Chief Justice Charles P. O'Neill administered the oath of office. In his inaugural address, Jones paid homage to the investigators who uncovered the Louisiana Scandals ("... I take my high hat off to the unflagging courage of our press ... "); cautioned his followers not to expect a free disbursement of public jobs ("do not make my administration," he said, "... an obscene scramble for places at the public trough"); promised that the state police would no longer be used as political instruments of the state administration (they "will cease to be a political gestapo, modeled on Hitler's best efforts"); promised to destroy completely all vestiges of the Long machine and repair its damage to political democracy in Louisiana; and compared the hopelessness of the European situation with the hopeful developments in Louisiana ("With the lights out in Europe, with democracy dead and dying ... it is as inspiring a task as we could set ourselves — the restoration of thriving, unshakable democracy here in one great state of this Union."). The new

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4New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 31, 1940; Town Talk, April 4, 1940.
governor's audience interrupted his speech with cheers and applause, and as he concluded with "God Bless Louisiana," they gave him a standing ovation.5

Afternoon inaugural festivities included the barbeque at 1:00 and block dances before the LSU Memorial Tower, on the old and new capitol grounds, and in Victory Park, at which visitors could buy souvenir top hats and perfume bottles. The final official events of the day were informal dances held at the LSU Gymnasium and Field House and at the American Legion Community Club. The new governor and Mrs. Jones retired to the executive mansion on North Boulevard to host a buffet supper for close friends and relatives in the mansion's east room.6

Sam Jones became Louisiana's chief executive at a threatening time in European affairs. On the day of his inauguration, the German armies broke through the French lines at Sedan, while the Netherlands surrendered to the Germans later the same evening. In Washington, President Franklin D. Roosevelt worked with his aides on a message to Congress requesting extraordinary defense funds which reliable sources estimated could reach $500,000,000. Antwerp, Belgium, fell to the

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5Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, May 14-15, 1940; New Orleans States, May 14, 1940; Sam Jones Inaugural Address, May 14, 1940, James B. Aswell, Jr. and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Aswell Collection).

6Morning Advocate, May 15, 1940. Outgoing governor Earl Long declined to attend Jones' inauguration. His first public appearance after leaving office occurred May 16 when he appeared at a Bossier City cattle auction dressed in khaki pants, red checkered shirt, and white panama hat. He was there, he said, to sell some cattle from his Winnfield farm.
German onslaught on May 17 and on May 20 residents of the English coast at Dover first reported hearing the sounds of airplanes coming toward the English Channel. The Allied debacle at Dunkirk occurred on May 30. Italy entered the war against France and England on June 9, and Paris fell on June 13.  

The events of the unfolding war in Europe caused some concern in Louisiana, but most attention continued to focus on events in Baton Rouge. Sam Jones began his first day in office by driving himself to the capitol in his personal car. His first visitor was Vance Plauche, head of the State Civil Service Commission. Other prominent politicians followed, including James A. Noe, who came to the governor's office for the first time since leaving it at the end of his short term in 1936. Jones spent the rest of the day politicking: he shook hands with ordinary citizens who wanted to congratulate him, held his first gubernatorial press conference, appointed F. Edward Hebert as his personal representative in Washington, D.C., and Steve Alford as the new superintendent of state police. He signed Executive Order No. 1 which forbade state department heads from collecting "deducts" from employees' salaries and ordered any employee approached for a deduct to report the incident promptly. This order was important in fact,

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8 This Civil Service Commission was a sham created by Huey Long in the Second Extraordinary Session of the Legislature in 1934, which, in reality, provided no Civil Service protection, but instead helped the Longite machine seize control of local personnel. L. Vaughn Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," *Tulane Studies in Political Science* (New Orleans, Tulane University, 1956), p. 46.
for it specifically forbade a particularly glaring political abuse
perpetuated by the Longite machine, but it was also important as a
symbolic act — the reformer sweeping aside the vestiges of corrup-
tion. Finally, Governor Jones began laying the foundation for a
successful legislative session by hosting an afternoon reception at
the mansion for legislators and then worked past midnight with his
followers outlining administration bills.  

Jones' attempt to establish a solid relationship with the in-
coming legislature was well advised. Because he had achieved election
with only fifty-two per cent of the vote, Jones had no overwhelming
mandate with which to persuade legislators, while a sizeable bloc of
the legislature was elected on the Long slate.  

Despite his lack of overwhelming support, Jones was successful
in securing the important legislative leadership posts for his

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9 Morning Advocate, May 14, 1940; Times-Picayune, May 16, 1940; F.
Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans" The Life and
Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisi-
a, Center for Louisiana Studies, The University of Southwestern
Louisiana, 1976), p. 153; Roman Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law: Louisi-
a State Police (Topeka, Kansas, Josten's Publications, 1980), pp. 50-51. 
Jones thought that the Louisiana Congressional delegation would
not adequately represent his interest because it was anti-Jones. More-
over, the Louisiana governor's office already maintained a representa-
tive in Washington, Earle Christenberry, Huey Long's former secretary,
whom Hebert briefly replaced in the $10,000 per year job before he ran
for Congress. Alford, meanwhile, immediately began purging the state
police of Longite supporters. On May 15 he fired 17 troopers including
Joe Messina, Huey Long's former bodyguard.

10 Morning Advocate, February 22, 1940; States, May 13, 1940; Sam Jones
interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape recording, Dennis
M. Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisi-
a (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection).
followers or his allies. Norman S. Bauer of St. Mary parish, elected on the Jones ticket and the governor's choice for Speaker of the House, was chosen for the position following a briefly confused situation which led to several candidates announcing for the post after Jones announced that he would take no direct part in organizing the legislature because he was hesitant to appear to be following in Huey's dictatorial footsteps. Frank T. Ellis of Covington, also elected on the Jones ticket, became President-Pro-Tempore of the Senate. Similarly, Jones carried the day in selection of committee chairmen: Joe T. Cawthorn, a Noe associate, became chairman of the Senate Finance Committee; pro-Jones Senators James Bailey, W. D. Cotton, and Grove Stafford became Senate Judiciary Committee chairmen; and Lionel Ott, a Jones man from New Orleans, secured the chairmanship of the Affairs of New Orleans Committee. In the House, important chairmanships also went to Jones men: Rules (A. C. Petitjean), Ways and Means (H. H. Huckabay), Judiciary (Arthur C. Watson and Lester Bordelon; Old Regular Frank Stitch received the third Judiciary chairmanship).  

The new governor in his first address to the legislature called on members to help him carry out his pledges to reform Louisiana. Jones won two early tests of strength on his anti-corruption pledges,
though one victory came through default. On May 21, 1940, Representative DeLesseps S. Morrison of New Orleans introduced a resolution declaring vacant the seat of Representative Chester Wooten of Plaquemines Parish because Wooten had served as Plaquemines registrar of voters until September 22, 1939, and the constitution clearly stated that no parish registrar could be elected or appointed to any office until twelve months after vacating the registrar's office. "It is purely a constitutional question," Morrison said, "The question is merely abstract and not personal. I am speaking for the principle alone." Wooten, however, represented the baliwick of the pro-Long political boss Leander H. Perez. The Wooten expulsion resolution deadlocked the Committee on Elections with a 3-3 vote, but Wooten resigned rather than face possible expulsion. Jones thus indirectly gained his objective. He was more clearly successful in ousting State Bank Examiner Jasper S. Brock, who also kept the payroll records of the infamous Louisiana Debt Moratorium Commission which the Longites had used to reward friendly legislators. The final vote to oust Brock passed 79-17 in the house and 31-6 in the senate. The New Orleans delegation provided fourteen of the house votes and five of the Senate votes against ouster.  

Jones' success in these early victories and in his subsequent passage of bills implementing a large part of his campaign platform has been credited to several factors. Allan Sindler traces much of

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12 *Times-Picayune*, May 21-23, 28-29, 1940. Jones' new bank examiner found that legislators had collected $296,987 in debt moratorium commission salaries during the past four years.
Jones' success to a working arrangement reached by Jones and Robert Maestri shortly after the second Democratic primary. Maestri recognized that New Orleans needed continued state fiscal assistance, and that in large part his domination of New Orleans resulted from state legislation which could be undone in Baton Rouge. In return for favors from the state government, the Old Regular delegation agreed to support many of Jones' key reform bills. Ever the political realists, the Old Regulars recognized the direction of the political wind and accommodated themselves to it, pledging to support the governor "in every constructive move he made for the benefit and welfare of our beloved state and its people." As noted above, however, the Old Regulars remained unreliable allies at best.  

Jones later maintained that he had been successful in the 1940 legislative session because the general public's anti-Long, anti-corruption sentiment was so strong that few legislators chose to vote against it. More perceptively, he also maintained that some of the Longites voted with him in hopes of placating him and obtaining some of the patronage jobs for their followers.  

In reality, all three of these considerations influenced decision-making in the 1940 legislative session. Robert Maestri and Sam Jones

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14 Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection; Sam H. Jones interviewed by James M. Godfrey, February, 1977, typescript copy, LSU Oral History Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; *Times-Picayune*, August 8, 1940.
were shrewd politicians who realized that both would benefit from a political compromise, and designed a temporary truce that both could accept. Old Regular representatives met with Jones representatives in Baton Rouge just before the 1940 regular session opened. Norman Bauer assured the Old Regulars that "nobody will be punished for the way he voted in the election" and that they would receive a fair share of committee memberships. Following this meeting, twenty-one of the twenty-eight member New Orleans legislative delegation met informally at the Choctaw Club headquarters and voted to support the Jones program "as far as may be possible." Jones, however, always maintained that there was a limit to how far he could compromise: "The important thing," he said later, "is getting your program through without sacrificing your principles."\(^{15}\) Moreover, the importance of the anti-corruption sentiment resulting from the Louisiana Scandals cannot be underestimated. No other single reason adequately explains the presence of such anti-Jones stalwarts as Representative William J. Dodd on the Jones side of several of the reform measures.

American legislative bodies seldom hold tidy, smooth-running sessions. Their function is not only to enact bills into law, but also to hear alternatives, consider complaints, and forge compromises of issues they choose to consider. The 1940 Louisiana legislative session was no exception to this rule. Sam Jones had pledged himself to a thoroughgoing reformation of Louisiana and was eager to embark on his task. He had to deal, however, with a legislature in which many

\(^{15}\) Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection; New Orleans Item, May 8, 10, 1940.
of his slim cadre of supporters were, like Jones himself, political
neophytes equally eager to do a good job of reforming the state, but
who were also inexperienced in the procedure and unfamiliar with the
political log-rolling necessary to accomplish their objectives. In
addition, Jones was bound by his idealism and his campaign statements
to leave the legislature unbossed. The result of this situation was
the introduction of 1,430 bills, only 481 of which became law,\textsuperscript{16} be­
cause of the inexperience and excessive optimism of administration
leaders in both branches of government.

Nevertheless, Jones managed at the outset of his administration
to piece together a partial fulfillment of his platform. The heart
of Jones' effort consisted of his pledges to dismantle the centrali­
zation of power and resulting opportunities for corruption in the
state government left from the previous administration, and to re­
organize the state government into a more business-like, manageable
system. His record of accomplishment in these areas is mixed. Some
of his reforms were successful, while others proved temporary and
ineffective.

Much of Sam Jones' lasting success lay in his fight to repeal
numerous laws, some dating back to Huey Long's administration, which
allowed the state government to dominate parish and local units.
These centralization measures hampered the effective operation of
local governments, and both the Louisiana Police Jury Association and

\textsuperscript{16} Tom Dutton, "Sam Houston Jones: Louisiana's Liberator," \textit{Christian
Science Monitor}, April 27, 1940; James Bugea, Carlos Lazarus, and
William T. Pegues, "The Louisiana Legislation of 1940," \textit{Louisiana
the Louisiana Municipal Association eagerly sought their repeal.

Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell noted at the 1940 LMA convention that the absence of home rule in municipal governments led to morale and control problems. If an employee knew that his job was a state appointment, Caldwell asked, how were municipal officials to influence him not to neglect his work? 17

The major legislation concerning local revenue passed at the 1940 regular session was Act 70, which repealed Act 10 of the 1934 Extraordinary Session and restored full authority to municipalities and parishes to impose taxes, license fees and taxes without seeking legislative approval. Jones had little trouble with repeal, which originated in the Senate where it passed with a 30-6 vote. The measure passed the House unanimously. 18


Local municipalities of 12,500 or more persons also received authorization to install and operate parking meters on their streets, provided that they called an election after a three-month trial period to decide whether the meters should remain permanently. Alexandria, which was soon swamped by vehicles from nearby army camps, was one of the first major Louisiana cities to experiment with parking meters, not so much for revenue as for some effort to control traffic itself in the increasingly congested downtown area. The legislature also authorized local governing bodies in Louisiana to participate in the federal government's national defense program by authorizing them to donate or otherwise transfer land to the United States for national defense purposes, especially for the maintenance or construction of waterways.  

Jones also sought legislative authorization to pursue wrongdoers who had stolen the state's property or money through creation of a State Crime Commission to consist of the governor, the executive counsel to the governor, and the attorney general. The agency was set to remain in existence for four years with a $1,000,000 appropriation for its operation. With this $1,000,000, Jones hoped to recover $4,000,000 which had been illegally taken from the state. His bill was introduced in the House on June 3, and after an unsuccessful attempt by Representative James E. Bolin to reduce its appropriations to $250,000, and opposition from Representative Lloyd Hendrick who preferred a legislative investigating commission, the bill passed the

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19 Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 392, 441; Town Talk, August 16, 1941, January 22, 1942.
House on June 19 on an 87–7 vote, with most of the nay votes cast by rural north Louisiana Longites. The bill passed the Senate on July 4, by a 32–4 vote, with opposition from a combination of north and south Louisiana Senators. Jones thus obtained in Act 13 his Crime Commission with wide-ranging authority "to investigate and inquire into the affairs of the State, to investigate the functions, transactions, contracts, purchases, sales and expenditures of the State to the extent it may deem necessary or desirable," and the authority to institute civil proceedings to recover "any money, property or thing of value" it found fraudulently acquired from the state.

Despite the ease with which former legislatures had granted extraordinary powers to the governor during the years of Longite control, some Longite legislators feared that the Crime Commission (the "Hitleristic, dictatorial, tyrannical crime commission" as Senator Boucher called it) gave too much power to the governor. On the other hand, the reformers applauded the new authority. The Longites, however, chose not to criticize the purpose of the Crime Commission, but instead attacked the legality of its appropriations.


20 Proceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 1055–1057; House Calendar, 1940, p. 251; Proceedings of the Senate, 1940, pp. 403–404; Senate Calendar, 1940, pp. 1779–1780; Times-Picayune, June 3, 13, 1940; States, June 3, 1940.

21 Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 73.

22 Morning Advocate, September 9, 1940.
v. Sam Houston Jones, Governor, Member of Commission Created by Act 13 of 1940, filed in the 19th Judicial District Court presided over by Judge James D. Womack in Baton Rouge. In this and other cases brought before him, Judge Womack proved to be a thoroughgoing Longite, whose court district in East Baton Rouge Parish normally heard cases which questioned the constitutionality of state government actions. Womack issued a preliminary injunction against the Crime Commission on June 21, 1941, in which he prohibited it from expending any funds made available to it because he found that the Commission had no legal source of funds. The original legislation provided appropriations to it from state funds not otherwise appropriated, at a time when all funds were in fact earmarked.\footnote{"Louisiana Crime Commission Report to the Legislature," May 11, 1942; Harold G. Falkenstein, Et. Als. v. Sam Houston Jones, Governor, Member of Commission Created by Act 13 of 1940, Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. 36,416 (hereinafter cited as Falkenstein v. Jones); John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).} Womack then began hearings into the legality of the funding plan.

These hearings led to a heated conflict between Jones and Womack over the limits of executive privilege of the Louisiana governor. Womack wanted to call Jones into his courtroom to testify about the Crime Commission bill and issued a subpoena to require his attendance. Jones, in turn, asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to issue a writ prohibiting Womack from forcing the governor's appearance in his courtroom, surrounded himself with 30 state troopers, and announced that he did not intend to be taken from his duties by "frivolous efforts of a few demagogues and enemies of good government." In his
opposition to Jones' plea to the Supreme Court, Womack sarcastically remarked that "this court had hoped that the governor would refrain from his speechmaking activities and . . . come into court and testify in the case and thus . . . assist respondent judge in arriving at an intelligent decision . . . ." Histrionics aside, the Supreme Court five days later declined to dissolve Womack's restraining order which paralyzed the Crime Commission and also denied Jones' request that he not be forced to appear in Womack's court.24

Jones, however, had no intention of honoring the subpoena. He cited as precedent Thomas Jefferson's refusal to appear before a court during his years as President of the United States. If he were to appear in every political suit brought against the state, Jones maintained, he would have no time to attend to his duties as governor. Besides, he added, the Attorney General had issued an opinion that "I am not amenable to subpoenas." Womack, however, was neither ready to recognize Jones' claim nor to establish the precedent of executive immunity in Louisiana and declined to reissue a subpoena for Jones, thus never forcing the issue to a conclusion. Judge Womack did, however, issue a ringing statement in which he reiterated his belief in judicial supremacy over the executive:

I grant that he has defied my authority and I have tolerated it, but he has not by any means intimidated this court and I want to say at this time that in the event I signed an order compelling his attendance and it became . . . my personal duty to serve that order, I would

24Morning Advocate, July 3, 8, 1941.
bring him into court regardless of the consequences.25

Womack closed his Crime Commission hearings on July 10, and on July 14 ruled that the appropriation plan was defective and issued an injunction to replace his temporary restraining order paralyzing the Commission. The Louisiana Supreme Court lent its final stamp of authority to the case when it upheld Womack's ruling in an appeal by the state, and in addition, in its later ruling on the Elmer Stewart, Et. Al. v. Eugene Stanley, Attorney General, Et. Al. case, held that the Commission's right to institute suits was also unconstitutional.26 As a result of these court decisions, Sam Jones' Crime Commission perished.

Jones similarly lost his bid to reorganize the bewildering conglomeration of 179 state departments into a more manageable 20 departments. He began studying the problem of government reorganization before his inauguration, and on April 31, 1940, announced that he had hired the "nationally known firm of Griffenhagen & Associates of Washington, Chicago, New York, Boston, and Milwaukee" to survey Louisiana's state government and design a more efficient arrangement.

25 Ibid., July 11, 1941; Sam Jones to J. D. Womack, June 28, 1941, William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.

The resulting "Griffenhagen Report" produced a reorganization plan modeled on arrangements already in effect in Virginia, Illinois, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Minnesota. The report and the subsequent reorganization bill in the legislature called for consolidation of the state government into 20 departments: Revenue, Treasury, Finance, State, Education, Occupational Standards, State Lands, Agriculture, Labor, Banking, Public Service, Public Welfare, Institutions, Public Safety, Highways, Public Works, Conservation, Minerals, Military Affairs, and Independent Establishments. The plan also created an executive cabinet (consisting of the department heads, the governor, and his executive counsel and special assistants) which was to meet each week to coordinate governmental affairs. The key to the reorganization plan was to be the new Finance Department, divided into bureaus for the budget, accounts and control, purchases and property control, buildings, local governments, and administrative services. In addition, a new fiscal code proposed in a separate bill further buttressed the Finance Department's enhanced importance. The fiscal code provided that the Finance Department would construct preliminary budgets for all other state departments, supervise all expenditures, and make all purchases, while the Treasurer continued as custodian of all state funds, the disbursing officer and supervisor of state investments. The State Auditor examined all state accounts and reported any

Unauthorized or illegal transactions to the legislature. In addition, the fiscal code provided a new Board of Finance consisting of three members appointed by the governor for overlapping 9-year terms to represent the public, approve all rules in the Finance Department, approve depositories of state monies, approve the borrowing of funds, and make any investigations deemed necessary.\(^{28}\)

Introduction of the companion reorganization and fiscal code bills engendered a storm of protest from the Longites. Representative Wilbur T. McCain of Grant Parish complained that the bills were too long (the reorganization bill alone ran to more than 100 pages), and legislators were asked to vote without sufficient time to consider them. Representative C. O. Webb of Red River Parish added that "I have read [these bills] twice and all I could get was a headache. I defy any member of this House to say truthfully that he knows what these bills mean." Other legislators, however, thought that they knew exactly what the bills meant — Teutonic dictatorship on the Nazi model. Senator Ernest Clements asserted on the Senate floor that "it is not necessary to go all the way to Chicago and bring the firm of Griffenhagen to Louisiana to tell us how to write our laws and how we shall live." Griffenhagen, he said, was "an emissary of Adolph Hitler." Moreover, Griffenhagen had devised "an attempt in a most dictatorial manner through the governor to take charge of our state."

Clements emerged as the most vituperative critic of the reorganization plan. In floor debate on a bill to appropriate $100,000 to fund

preliminary investigation of state departments, he charged again that the proposed law was the "most high-handed and dictatorial ever known in the state," and again in an absurd statement drew the Griffenhagen/Hitler parallel:

Why should Griffenhagen want to reorganize the government of Louisiana? Hitler trampled down the bloodstained poppies of Flanders Field and overran the hallowed soil of France. In the cafe the other day, I saw one of Griffenhagen's associates and he had the map of Germany written all over his face.

If the reorganization passed, Clements worried, "We will have a combination of Fascism, Naziism and Bolshevism that will be known as the Jones Four Year Plan."  

Senator Frank Ellis defended the reorganization plan by reminding Clements that "It is as necessary for the government to adjust itself to progress and social change as for individuals to become adjusted," and pointedly asked the Senators "Are you statesmen or are you politicians?" Jones in a radio address also defended reorganization ("the heart and core of reformation in Louisiana") and attempted to allay any fears of dictatorship by reminding the voters that "the administration is not 30 days old yet, but we have seen the restoration of democracy and abolition of dictatorship."  

Despite vocal opposition, the reorganization bill (Act 47) passed the House with an 89-2 vote and the Senate with a 35-3 vote (Clements

29_\textit{Times-Picayune}, June 11, 24, 28, 1940.

30_\textit{States}, June 13, 18, 1940.
persuaded two others to vote with him). The companion fiscal code bill (Act 48) passed by similar margins: 87-1 in the House and 36-1 (Clements voted nay) in the Senate.  

The reorganization bill passed the legislature as a constitutional amendment and thus required ratification in the November, 1940, general election. Earl Long and other Longites waged a strenuous campaign against the amendment, but the voters approved it 140,543 to 113,876. Jones proceeded to establish the new governmental order in Louisiana, but his efforts ultimately came to nothing. The reorganization and fiscal code acts faced the same gauntlet as the Crime Commission: the 19th judicial district courtroom of Judge J. D. Womack.

A group of six Louisiana taxpayers filed suit in Womack's court in late December, 1940 (Earl R. Graham, Et. Als., v. Sam H. Jones, Et. Als., later amended to Earl R. Graham, Et. Als. v. A. P. Tugwell, Et. Als.). Graham and the other plaintiffs in the case contended that the Reorganization Act was unconstitutional on three grounds: 1. it violated the fundamental principles of the republican form of government guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, "because it is arbitrary, undemocratic, and denies and limits petitioners' voice in the election of public officials directly responsible to the electorate and places unlimited; centralized power in the Governor of

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31 Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 220-228; Proceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 1242-1251; House Calendar, 1940, pp. 248, 258-259; Proceedings of the Senate, 1940, pp. 1604-1605; Senate Calendar, pp. 400, 410; Times-Picayune, July 3, 1940.

32 Times-Picayune, August 16, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 3, 14, 1940.
Louisiana without due process of law"; 2. the legislature had failed to designate the specific election at which the amendment was to be submitted to the voters as required in Article 21, Section 1 of the state constitution; 3. the statute as presented to the voters also violated the requirement in Article 21, Section 1 of the state constitution which provided that "when more than one amendment has been submitted at the same election, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately."

Judge Womack in his decision and the Louisiana Supreme Court in its subsequent review of his decision both dismissed the plaintiffs' first contention, the Supreme Court noting that American legal precedent had established that enforcement of the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government was a political question over which the courts have no jurisdiction. Both courts agreed, however, that the statute was invalid because of sloppy procedure. The legislature had failed to specify the date of the election when the voters were to vote on the amendment as provided by the amending procedure of the 1921 Constitution. Womack also ruled that the reorganization act was too broad: it amended laws covering various functions of the state government which were too divergent to be covered with one amendment, thereby failing to fulfill the constitutional requirement that voters be allowed to vote on each amendment separately. The amendment as presented to the voters provided only one choice: reorganization of the entire state government. The plaintiffs contended that a voter may want to approve the reorganization of one department of state government but not approve reorganization of another department, and could not do so under the amendment as it appeared on the ballot.
Womack on March 18, 1941, therefore, ruled the entire reorganization amendment unconstitutional. 33

The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed Womack's decision on appeal by the state, and by a 5–2 vote upheld his ruling. The complex supreme court decision left Jones in an odd situation: his state government now had no clear lines of authority or organization. The court invalidated the enactment of the amendment on two points—the legislature failed to specify the date the amendment was to be submitted to the voters, and the act should have been submitted as at least two separate amendments (a practice dating from the 1879 Constitution and its stipulation that acts of the legislature must deal with one subject only). In the murky majority opinion written by Justice Wynne G. Rogers, the high court appeared to rule that while the enactment of the reorganization was completed improperly and was thus unconstitutional, the enabling acts relating to the reorganization and the fiscal codes were not unconstitutional. 34 The original suit had not attacked any possibly dangerous centralization of power, and the supreme court apparently saw none.

State attorneys argued that loss of the reorganization amendment would not cause the collapse of the entire new governmental structure; that the reorganization and the attendant fiscal code would be intact except in those areas where it specifically conflicted with the 1921

33 James D. Womack, The Griffenhagen–Jones Reorganization Amendment: The Decision Rendered by a Competent, Honest and Courageous Judge Holding the Scheme Flagrantly Unconstitutional (n.p., n.d., 1941?) pp. 2–23; Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941; States, July 1, 1941.

34 Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941; States, July 1, 1941.
Constitution, which contained a vague authorization for consolidation of departments. Opposition attorneys maintained, however, that loss of the amendment resulted in loss of the entire reorganization. Governor Jones questioned the court's authority to declare an amendment unconstitutional: "Its effect is to declare the constitution unconstitutional . . . The decision says that [the people] don't have [the] right to change their own constitution." He also admitted that the state had no alternative plan for the reorganization, but reaffirmed his determination to bring it about. The Supreme Court anticipated Jones' question, and in its opinion cited the American and English Encyclopedia of Law: "The courts have full power to declare that an amendment to the constitution has not been properly adopted, even though it has been so declared by the political department of the state," and the Miller v. Johnson decision cited in the Lawyers' Reports Annotated, which declared that "the question of lawful adoption of an amendment to the constitution is a judicial question."35

Jones began a strenuous public campaign to restore state reorganization. He portrayed the decision as an assumption of judicial power unprecedented in Louisiana: "Never . . . have the people of Louisiana been denied the right to say what their constitution may contain . . . every amendment adopted since 1921 can be declared null and void."

Earl Long and Ernest Clements announced that they would follow Jones everywhere he spoke and counter his arguments. The state asked the Supreme Court to rehear the case, or, failing that, to issue a clarification of its incomprehensible ruling. Otherwise, state officials

35Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941.
will be confronted with a presumptively valid administrative organization under a presumptively valid act of the legislature, but under which no operations may possibly be had because of the impossibility of determination of exactly what the court means by its decree. 36

As the state awaited the outcome of its request, House Speaker Norman Bauer hinted that if the court denied the rehearing, Jones might call the legislature back into a special session either to re-pass the reorganization or to call a constitutional convention to write the reorganization into the organic law of the state. In the end, neither happened. In 1942 the supreme court also invalidated the reorganization acts themselves in the case of O. Dolan Ricks v. Martin Close, on the basis "of inseparability of those provisions depending on constitutional change from the other provisions." Jones salvaged some of his reorganization plan when the 1942 legislature by statute reinstituted the Departments of Public Works, Finance, and Occupational Standards, but generally the state government reverted to its inefficient pre-1940 organization. Careless drafting of legislation on the part of the reformers thus made their attempts to reorganize the state administration vulnerable to nullification. 37

Jones was more successful in his efforts to establish a Classified State Civil Service System to replace the old order in which state employees had been subject to dismissal at the whim of their super-

36 Ibid., July 16-17, 1941.

visors, and had been compelled to provide "deducts" from their pay-
checks to finance Longite machine campaigns. To eliminate these
abuses and protect state employees, Jones appointed prominent New
Orleans attorney Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., who had worked for institu-
tion of the merit system since Governor John M. Parker's administra-
tion in 1920, to head a committee to draft proposed Civil Service
bills for the state and for the city of New Orleans. Dunbar's com-
mittee responded with two separate bills modeled after the Civil Ser-
vice laws of the federal government and other states. 38

The two bills were introduced in 1940 as administration bills
with Jones' full backing. The proposed Civil Service laws were
further strengthened by a proposed constitutional amendment which
provided that they could not be amended or repealed by any subsequent
legislature except by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Therefore,
while the Civil Service bills did not face the November hurdle of
popular ratification, their protecting amendment did. The bills origi-
nated in the House, where they passed by wide margins following sur-
prisingly mild debate and passed the Senate after the defeat of
several proposed diluting amendments, thus becoming Act 171 (New
Orleans) and Act 172 (state) of the 1940 regular session of the
legislature. 39

38 Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 75-76.
39 Hyneman, "Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legisla-
ture," pp. 15-16; Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana,"
pp. 75-76; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 687-729; Pro-
cedings of the House, 1940, pp. 833-834, 2071-2072; House Calendar,
1940, pp. 220-223; Times-Picayune, June 12, 15, July 5, 1940; States,
June 14, 1940.
The Louisiana Civil Service bill provided for a State Civil Service Commission consisting of five members appointed by the governor for staggered 6 year terms from lists provided by the presidents of five Louisiana colleges: LSU (public), Tulane University (independent private), Loyola University (Catholic), Centenary College (Methodist), and Louisiana College (Baptist). Dunbar and his associates assumed that future governors could be hostile to Civil Service and therefore designed several safeguards into their system. If the governor failed to appoint a member to a vacancy on the Commission within six months of its occurrence, for example, the person whose name appeared first on the list prepared by the college president who had recommended the member whose seat became vacant automatically became a full member of the Commission. The bill also provided for a state director of personnel whom the Commission was to appoint from a list prepared by a special examining committee consisting of three persons skilled in personnel management. The act brought into the classified Civil Service most of the employees of all the executive departments and agencies except the offices of the governor, the attorney general, and the Crime Commission. Entrance into the Civil Service was to be by "truly competitive" examinations. The Louisiana Civil Service law faced the problem of how to start the system. It rejected the procedures used in other states which called for state employees to take competitive examinations along with prospective employees in order to keep their jobs, or freezing all state employees on their job without any test at all. Instead, current Louisiana employees had to pass special "noncompetitive" examinations proving their minimum competence.
to hold their job, after which they were "blanketed in" under Civil Service protection. The act forbade the use of political pressure for employment or promotion and also forbade employees to pay "any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political organization or purpose..." a direct response to the Long machine's "deducts" and forced Progress subscriptions. The law was not to become effective until July 1, 1942 (the legislature later delayed the effective date to January 1, 1943), thus allowing time for the Commission and the personnel director to be appointed and the tests designed. 40

The other administration-sponsored Civil Service bill applied only to cities with a population in excess of 100,000, i.e., New Orleans. That measure differed from the state law only in establishing a separate commission and providing that all current city employees would be blanketed in on July 1, 1942, without any examinations at all, a concession to Mayor Maestri and members of the New Orleans legislative delegation who threatened to oppose Civil Service if the test requirement was not dropped. The reformers thought that Civil Service could not be enacted without their support and so agreed to this major concession, which, in effect, made meaningful implementation of Civil Service in New Orleans a matter of employee attrition. 41

40 Acts of the Legislature (1940), p. 687; Hyneman, "Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legislature," pp. 16-22; Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 77-79; Willard E. Parker, Report Department of State Civil Service 1943-1944 (Baton Rouge, 1945), pp. 18-20. Of the 9,531 state employees judged eligible to take the original non-competitive exam, only 86 failed to qualify.

The voters approved the Civil Service protection amendment by more than 9,000 votes in the November, 1940, election, and six days later Jones appointed his Civil Service Commission, which began its search for a personnel director. Jones' Commission survived a taxpayer suit brought against it when District Judge Charles A. Holcombe in December, 1941, ruled that plaintiff O. Dolan Ricks (a Longite former deputy fire marshal) was not directly affected by the provisions of the act and could therefore properly contest only the constitutionality of the act and not the expenditure of general revenue funds to pay for its operation. 42

But Civil Service in Louisiana, as enacted by the Jones administration, proved to be short lived. Newly-elected governor Earl Long mustered a two-thirds vote in the 1948 regular legislative session to emasculate Civil Service and then mustered a two-thirds vote in the 1948 extraordinary session which destroyed Civil Service except for employees of the social security agencies (where the federal government


42 Item, November 8, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 14, 1940; Times-Picayune, December 9, 1941; States, March 30, 1942; O. Dolan Hicks v. Department of State Civil Service, Et. Als., Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 36,529, Fournet Collection. A third Civil Service act passed in the 1940 legislature provided protection to municipal firemen and policemen in cities with populations in excess of 16,000 persons. This bill did not have administrative backing, and Jones vetoed it when it reached his desk. He created a minor legal flap when he later reconsidered and signed it into law. The court ruling in State v. Junkin (1907), he said, provided that as long as the bill remained in the governor's possession, it was subject to consideration, and he had never filed his veto with the Secretary of State. His action was subsequently not questioned. See Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 81-83 and Bugea, Et. Als., "The Louisiana Legislation
required it). Permanent, fully protected Civil Service did not arrive in Louisiana until Governor Robert Kennon's administration wrote Civil Service into the constitution at the beginning of his administration in 1952.43

Governor Jones' efforts to reform Louisiana's electoral procedures survived judicial and political challenges. The legislature passed administration bills prohibiting any state office from "padding the payrolls" of any department by increasing the number of employees in the six months preceding a gubernatorial election; prohibiting any person from allowing his or her name to be carried on a state, parish, or municipal payroll for services not actually rendered; prohibiting political advertisements on public property; prohibiting any employee of the state or any of its political subdivisions making $200 or less per month to contribute to political campaigns for primary or general elections, either directly or indirectly; providing that illiterate voters could obtain help from poll commissioners only if they produced an affidavit certifying their inability to read; and providing that parish registrars of voters must have their poll records available for public inspection for part of each day.44


44 Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 14, 377, 832, 1141, 1197; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 155-156; States, May 30, June 4, 1940; Times-Picayune, May 17, June 12, 14, 19, 28, July 10, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 7, 1940.
Another electoral reform that caused a great legal and political storm was Act 84 which authorized the use of voting machines in primary and general elections, and made their use mandatory in all municipalities with populations in excess of 150,000 (New Orleans). Even though the measure passed the legislature with little difficulty, it faced both judicial challenges in new "taxpayer suits" and official resistance on the part of New Orleans officials reluctant to implement the reform, which would make manipulation of the city vote more difficult. Nevertheless, Jones pushed ahead with his reform. In June, 1941, the state let a contract by which the Shoup Voting Machine Corporation of Philadelphia was to supply 435 machines at a cost of $1,136 each, or a total of $464,160 with a two per cent discount for paying cash. The state paid the total bill and the city of New Orleans was to reimburse the state treasury $25,000 immediately, $100,000 the next fiscal year, and the rest of its one-half share of the machines' cost over the next several years. The funding scheme was quickly challenged in a suit instituted by O. Dolan Ricks (the same O. Dolan Ricks who challenged the Civil Service act), represented by attorney Charles Rivet of New Orleans, special assistant attorney general and revenue department attorney in former Longite administrations. In his suit, Ricks alleged that the legislatively-created board in charge of the voting machine purchase had no power to bind the state to pay the $464,160 debt and asked that the purchase be prevented. Judge J. D. Womack again struck down an administration measure when he agreed that the voting machine purchase board had indeed far exceeded its authority in contracting the debt, and issued a temporary order restraining the
state treasurer from spending any money on the purchase of the machines. In addition, the voting machine act faced other suits. In August, 1941, Adam J. Falkenstein (brother of Harold G. Falkenstein who had challenged the state Crime Commission) filed a separate suit seeking to restrain State Treasurer Andrew P. Tugwell from withholding funds for purchasing the machines from money due New Orleans for homestead exemptions. The homestead exemption provided that homes up to a certain value were exempt from property taxes. Falkenstein's suit was dismissed, however, because he had received his full homestead exemption on his New Orleans property in 1941 and had thus paid no taxes.

The third suit brought against the voting machine act was filed by Lafayette policeman Alphonse Peck, who challenged the law because it required the state to pay one-half the cost of New Orleans voting machines but did not provide state help for any other municipality choosing to use them. Judge Womack again struck at the reformers by deciding that the entire Act 84 was invalid, "a striking and glaring example of loosely written, hastily prepared and ill-considered legislation," and prohibiting the state and the city from buying, leasing, or renting the machines. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, overruled Womack in the Peck case and found Act 84 to be legal and correct in all sections, neither too broad nor dealing with more than one subject.45

Local resistance to the implementation of the voting machine law

45 Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 406; States, May 21, 1940; Morning Advocate, June 11, 22, July 9, August 14, 1941; Times-Picayune, June 13, 1940; August 15, September 26, December 2, 23, 1941; Town Talk, September 23, 1941; Item, December 1, 1941.
surfaced in the New Orleans Commission Council headed by Mayor Robert Maestri, who informed the governor that it would be impossible for New Orleans to pay its share of the cost because the money had not been provided in the city's 1941 budget. Jones, however, noted that the Commission Council had amended city budgets before to pay for unforeseen expenses. Meanwhile, a groundswell of reform opinion in favor of installing the machines swept the city. The Citizens' Voluntary Committee of Louisiana offered to arrange a loan to the city to provide its half of the voting machine money although city attorney Francis P. Burns quickly ruled this move illegal. Five organizations— the Optimist Club, the Woman Citizen's Union, the People's League, the Citizens' Voluntary Committee, and the Louisiana League of War Veterans— joined the New Orleans Junior Chamber of Commerce's offer to support a subscription drive to raise the money. In addition, the Woman Citizen's Union formed a picket line in front of City Hall to remind the administration that the citizens demanded voting machines. (Mayor Maestri warily eyed the pickets as he passed by on his way to his office, but said only "Keep up the good work.") At last the Commission Council in September voted to set aside money in the 1942 budget (to be adopted in December 1941) to pay for the voting machines.46

Other measures passed by the 1940 legislature dealt with the more mundane aspects of governing the state: taxes, education, and housing.

Jones had campaigned in 1939-40 on a platform including a pledge to repeal the Louisiana sales tax, a revenue device of Longite Governor Richard Leche. In fulfillment of that promise, Representatives DeLesseps S. Morrison and Welborn Jack introduced in the House a sales tax bill which specified no termination date for the tax because the authors expected the Ways and Means Committee to fit the repeal into a general tax reorganization and not leave the state without sufficient revenue to meet its expenses. Senator Joe Cawthorn simultaneously introduced a Senate bill for repeal, but his bill provided a specific termination date of October 1, 1940, after which the sales tax would no longer be collected. The Ways and Means Committee decided on December 31, 1940, as the termination date to be inserted in the House bill.  

Jones' entire new tax package, introduced to the legislature in early June, included increases in the tax rates on liquor and tobacco products, income, gasoline, extension of the severance tax, and imposition of a distribution tax on natural gas. The new liquor taxes provided for increases ranging from 10 cents per gallon (on still wines of 15 per cent or less alcohol) to 50 cents per gallon (still wines of 25 per cent or more alcohol), while the tax on liquor and sparkling wines was increased a flat 50 cents per gallon. (Beer escaped the upward revision completely.) In addition, the cost of selling liquor also increased; a sliding scale of $200 for saloon permits and $100

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for package house permits in cities of 5,000 or more and $100 for saloon permits and $50 for package house permits in cities with less than 5,000 replaced the old standard $5 permit fee for all dealers in alcoholic beverages. Wine-only package house permits cost $50 regardless of location. Jones’ tobacco tax raised the rate from $10 to $20 per thousand cheap cigars (15 cents to 20 cents) and from $13 to $27 per thousand on more expensive cigars (21 cents-up), while the cigarette tax increased from one-fifth to one-fourth cent per cigarette.

One-third of the increase in tobacco tax revenue was earmarked for the General Fund while two-thirds went to the Public School Fund.  

Readjustments to the severance tax included extension to tax pulpwood at the rate of 6 cents per standard cord and to tax distillate, casing head gasoline, and natural gasoline at the rate of 11 cents per barrel, while tax rates on previously-taxed oil increased.

The tax package also included a one-half cent per thousand cubic feet tax on the gathering of natural gas, a temporary measure, the administration said, to help liquidate the huge public debt left by Longite spendthrift programs, meet the state’s emergency financial needs caused by the repeal of other taxes, and carry on state public assistance programs.

Surprisingly for an administration which its enemies attempted to
portray as a friend of the rich and the corporations, Jones' tax package also raised income taxes and tightened loopholes in the gift tax. The new rates taxed incomes at the rate of two per cent on the first $4,000 of income in excess of credits, four per cent on the next $4,000, and six per cent on all income above $8,000. The old Longite rates had been two per cent on the first $1,000; four per cent on the next $40,000; and six per cent on all above $50,000. In addition, the tax on corporate incomes increased from four per cent to six per cent and applied to all taxable net income without the $3,000 exemption allowed by the Longites. Also, individuals and corporations faced a five per cent surtax on net income in excess of $5,000 resulting from sales of unimproved land, sale of mineral rights or oil royalties, or lease of land for oil exploration. The gift tax provision closed the loophole by which an individual could save taxes by spreading large cash gifts over several years. Under the new tax, the amount paid would be the same whether the gift was made in one year or in several years.  

While the governor's sales tax repeal successfully passed the legislature, the income tax increases, which had to be framed as a constitutional amendment because prevailing rates were written into that document, failed to gain approval in the November election. This failure left Jones a dire problem with which he wrestled until 1942: how to fund a $154,002,641.58 biennial budget without a major source.

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50 Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; Dakin, "Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940," pp. 55-60.
of revenue he had expected to receive.\footnote{\textit{Times-Picayune}, June 18, 1940; \textit{Morning Advocate}, November 3, 1940. The sales tax repeal also brought another problem: what to do with the left-over sales tax tokens the government had produced in the millions (6,806,400 one-mill pieces and 1,599,750 five-mill pieces remained in storage and another 53,709,860 one-mill and 7,812,564 five-mill pieces remained in circulation). Louisiana tried to sell them to Mississippi, which had a shortage because of curtailed war production, but state law prevented Mississippi from accepting another state's tokens in payment of its tax.}

Education bills passed by the 1940 legislature provided improved benefits for the state's teachers and public school funding at unprecedented levels. Teachers received ten days per school year leave of absence for illness or other emergency without loss of pay, sabbatical leaves in all parishes, and the establishment of a Teacher's Retirement System. The legislature, with Jones' urging, dedicated the severance tax to public education to provide a maximum $20 per educable child, and also reserved a portion of the tobacco tax revenue for education. Teachers also received slight pay increases: the average white teacher's salary rose to $1,331.88, while the average black teacher's salary was less than half that -- $558.81. The state also tightened its requirements for certification, and for the first time required a minimum bachelor's degree rather than the sketchy college training course required before. The main criticism of the 1940 education legislation was that it did not go far enough. Representative William J. Dodd, an Allen parish teacher and president of the Louisiana Teacher's Association, pointed out that even with the pay raise, the average Louisiana teacher received $83 per month after taxes and also publicly scored Jones and Superintendent of Education John E. Coxe because they failed to back a bill to extend Louisiana's...
school requirements from eleven to twelve years for high school graduation. 52

On the whole, Jones was well pleased with his first legislative session. It was, he said, a legislature that "cannot be bought, bulldozed or browbeaten." He reported to the people that he had worked with the legislature, but pointedly reminded them that he "never appeared on the floor of either House and . . . never appeared before any committee." Perhaps if he had, more of his legislation might have fared better. He strove to dispel the old Longite image of him as an unfeeling corporation lawyer. In addition, he said, the people had been freed from political dictatorship. 53 The subsequent taxpayer suits, of course, dampened his optimism.

Not all members of the legislature shared Jones' positive opinion of the session. While Senator Joe Cawthorn remarked that "I am happy that the vicious deduct system, dual jobholding and graft, that was fought so hard by my close personal friend, former Governor James A. Noe, have been successfully eliminated from the political system of


53 Times-Picayune, June 13, July 12, 1940.
Representative Charlie Webb of Red River parish, a "self-admitted Earl Long member of the House," called the legislative session "a disappointment," and further remarked that "The [employment] of Yankees from Chicago to throw aside a form of government we have been using for 100 years and substituting a plan that no one understands is an unnecessary experiment. The crime commission will probably be used to persecute and intimidate those connected with the past administration..."  

Following the legislative session, Jones faced the problem of maintaining much of his reform program as the entrenched remnants of Longism filed taxpayer suits against it. He and his followers also had to grasp and learn to manipulate better the levers of power in the state government. Jones found that even the best good government intentions did not protect him from problems with patronage. In many cases, he appointed businessmen to government positions: sugar planter W. Prescott Foster of St. Mary parish became chairman of the Highway Commission, while Alexandria produce merchant Martin L. Close, and Franklin parish planter and businessman W. E. Gilbert became members of the same body. New Orleans engineer Frank Grevemberg became business manager of executive buildings; independent oil operator B. A. Hardy of Shreveport became Conservation Commissioner; while another Shreveport oil man, Charlton H. Lyons, became president of the board...
of supervisors of elections for Caddo parish.\(^{55}\) Jones had relatively little trouble with these appointments, but the agreement by which Jones' camp agreed to share state patronage 50-50 with James A. Noe's supporters slowly came unraveled, and as it did, Jones gained a foe as implacably anti-Jones as he had been anti-Long. Moreover, he took many of his vocal supporters into the anti-Jones camp.

Governor Jones shrewdly did not begin a serious turnover of state jobs until the legislative session neared adjournment. He therefore retained the leverage provided by a promise or even a hint of a state job for a legislator's favored supporter. He and Noe, however, held several preliminary meetings in Baton Rouge in which they discussed patronage. Noe denied rumors that he and Jones had failed to reach an early agreement: "I'm 100 per cent behind whomever Governor Jones wants to appoint."\(^{56}\)

After the legislative session, however, the serious competition for state jobs began as rumors raced across the state that "Long men" were to be purged from state payrolls and replaced by men loyal to Sam Jones. Hundreds of people —  hopeful Jones supporters, legislators, and James A. Noe — converged on the state capitol and the executive mansion during late July, 1940, for a series of patronage

\(^{55}\) Town Talk, May 4, 1940; "Major Hardey Looks Ahead At the 'Golden Age of Louisiana,'" Louisiana Conservation Review, Spring, 1940, p. 7; Sam Jones to Charlton H. Lyons, Sr., October 16, 1942, Charlton Havard Lyons, Sr. Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

\(^{56}\) Morning Advocate, May 17-18, 1940.
meetings.  

Jones' eventual plan for the distribution of state patronage was typical of him — business-like and multi-layered. All job changes under his original plan were to be made under recommendation of parish political units of the Jones administration. He also planned for a "district representative" in each Congressional district to smooth over problems which arose. The district representatives, in turn, were to forward recommendations for jobs to the department with the opening. In his public announcement, Jones reiterated his plan that the men appointed must be qualified to fill their posts and perform their job. He planned a major turnover in state jobs to begin August 1, when the state composed its new payrolls. Several legislators complained that the plan had no place for them except for having a final veto over job offers in their districts. That meant, they said, that when someone received a job he or she would feel indebted to the Jones organization, but when someone failed to receive a job he or she would damn the legislator.  

Jockeying for control of patronage brought strange bedfellows together: Old Regular Assessor James E. Comisky and Property Commissioner Joseph P. Skelley met in Baton Rouge with Jones and Noe to arrange for Old Regular input into selection of state workers in New Orleans, in exchange for Old Regular support for Jones-Noe candidates in city elections. Remnants of the Leche-Long administration, mean-

57 Times-Picayune, July 26, 1940.

58 Times-Picayune, July 26-27, 1940; Item, July 17, 1940.
while, announced formation of the American Democratic Association led by George W. Flynn, who had worked in Earl Long's campaign headquarters in the recent gubernatorial election, to seek votes from voters who lost jobs, failed to get jobs, or generally opposed the Jones-Noe-Old Regular alliance. 59

Despite his careful planning, Jones' guidelines to distribute patronage through the district representative system failed as Noe's forces protested their lack of influence in the selection process. Noe, however, remained loyal ("everything is lovely"), and Jones' forces formulated a new plan which allowed Noe to establish his own parish committees to be consulted on the patronage distribution at the local level. Jones also announced a new "high command" composed of Vance Plauche of Lake Charles, Francis Whitehead of Port Allen (both former members of his campaign team) and Charles E. McKenzie of Monroe, Noe's first Democratic primary campaign manager, to handle all requests for patronage. 60

Jones' hope, however, was not fulfilled. Three months after their organizations promulgated the second patronage plan, Jones and Noe met again, and neither was satisfied with the outcome of their conference. Noe remarked in a restrained understatement that "We haven't been so very well pleased with what we've been getting," but added that "we hope things will get better." He adamantly rejected a suggestion to solve the problem by merging their two organizations:

59 Times-Picayune, July 30-31, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States July 28, 1940.

60 Times-Picayune, July 31-August 2, 1940.
"As long as Jimmy Noe is able and Mrs. Noe is by his side . . . we'll never leave our organization." Jones ruefully remarked, "I guess this will be going on up to 1944." Following this meeting, Jones leaders unveiled yet a third patronage plan to replace the old system. Now, Jones and Noe would each appoint three members to a special patronage committee. A Jones member and a Noe member from the committee would then contact state department heads and discuss patronage with them.61

The new arrangement also failed to satisfy Noe. Ill tempers flared again at patronage conferences in the spring of 1941, and the conflict fueled rumors of an impending Jones-Noe split. Noe termed their April 7, 1941, meeting "highly unsatisfactory." Noe's organization then began to crack apart. Five New Orleans ward leaders announced that they did not attend a meeting of his city organization because they felt that total amalgamation of the Noe and Jones organizations was the essential requirement for full participation in the patronage. They also wondered if perhaps Noe's determination to hold his organization together showed his dedication to political ideals, or his "ambitions for personal political advancement," a pointed reference to his publicly announced intention to run for the United States Senate seat held by Allen J. Ellénder. Noe delayed for two days before replying that he would continue to fight for the complete independence of the Noe organization as the best guarantee of good government in Louisiana, but that he still continued to back "every

61 Morning Advocate, December 17, 22, 1940.

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constructive move" Jones made.  

On April 17, however, Noe left Baton Rouge, saying that the governor had been too busy to hear his request to meet with New Orleans Noe leaders to reassure them about patronage. That same day Noe's organization continued to deteriorate as three Noe leaders in New Orleans became co-leaders of their wards in the Jones organization. Noe hurriedly sought and received Jones' assurances that the defecting leaders would have no effect on the Noe followers who had received state jobs, yet remained loyal to Noe. He reiterated, though, that "we haven't been treated right, either in the country or the city," and threatened to devise his own plan to divide the jobs.  

Noe rapidly became disillusioned with his perceived slights in the patronage controversy, and angrily charged that even though he favored Civil Service, he wondered whether the Jones camp was attempting to install its followers in all the state jobs to blanket them in when the Civil Service became effective. The final break between the erstwhile allies occurred after Noe charged on May 14, 1941 that Jones was merely erecting a new dictatorship in Louisiana. Jones planted spies in the Noe organization meetings, Noe charged, and then fired from state jobs Noe supporters who would not join his organization, or who spoke against him. "This is nothing more than dictatorship dressed up in silk stockings and under a new name ..." Noe  

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62 Ibid., April 8-9, 1941.

63 Ibid., April 17-18, 1941.
The alliance of convenience forged between Jones and Noe seemed almost destined to disintegrate. They were, after all, unlikely allies, one the idealistic reformer, the other a consummate politician schooled by the master, Huey Long. Jones' need for Noe's help was most acute during the second primary campaign in 1940, and thus he may have agreed to provide more patronage than reality later allowed him to supply to Noe's supporters.

Not all Jones' time during his first two gubernatorial years was occupied by formulating or defending his reform plans or in attempting to pacify James A. Noe. The unfolding European war caused a boom in defense industries throughout the United States, and Jones traveled to Washington, D.C., to plead with President Roosevelt "for anything and everything that will help Louisiana." New defense stations, he said,

64 Morning Advocate, May 15, 1941. Even though the bitter split with Noe cost Jones some of the support with which he established his reform program at the beginning of his administration, it was not as costly as it may appear at first glance because Noe's days as an asset were numbered. In late 1940 he was indicted by a federal grand jury for alleged income tax evasion committed in 1935 by the Win or Lose Oil Corporation, in which Noe (who served as president), Seymour Weiss, Oscar K. Allen, and Huey Long (Allen and Long secretly) shared the profits. Noe was acquitted on all counts following a tearful court appearance, but his statewide political influence was on the wane. He threatened on several later occasions to run for either governor or United States Senator, but his only campaign for an important state post, his ill-fated 1959-1960 gubernatorial candidacy in Earl Long's bizarre attempt to retain political power, ended in a crushing defeat. See (for Noe's trial) Morning Advocate, June 12, August 17, 1941, April 12, 1942; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, April 12, 1942; (for Noe's subsequent career) Glen S. Jeansonne, Race, Religion and Politics: The Louisiana Gubernatorial Elections of 1959-60 (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), pp. 31-32.
expansion of present army, navy, and marine organizations, opening of airplane factories, anything that would bring money into Louisiana would be considered: "If there are any federal funds to be got, I am going to do my darndest to get them." 65

Shortly after his trip to Washington, Jones attended the Southern Governor's Conference and proposed a study of all states to determine what each had to contribute to the national defense and preparedness program, and called for a Southern Defense Council, composed of one representative appointed by each southern governor. He was not ready, however, to gear Louisiana's economy solely on defense. He announced that Louisiana would join in the "Balanced Prosperity" program, a ten-year effort to bring a more balanced economy to the south, sponsored by the Southern Governor's Conference, and warned a Lake Charles audience that Louisiana would enjoy only a "false prosperity" based only on defense spending. "There will be better times, much better times," he said, but "there will be a repercussion when that [defense] spending stops." 66

As Jones worked tirelessly to attract United States dollars to Louisiana, he also established himself as a staunch advocate of improved United States relations with Latin America, a pet project of President Franklin Roosevelt. Jones' efforts in improving these relations, however, resulted from his pragmatic attempts to reestablish New Orleans as the premier port connecting the Upper Mississippi

65 Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940.
66 Times-Picayune, June 3, 4, 11, 19; September 24, 1940; Morning Advocate, February 16, May 9, 1941.
Valley and outside world, especially Latin America. He also envisioned New Orleans as the new "air hub of America" connecting the great Mississippi valley and South America, and pledged his administration to fostering better understandings and relations among all the Americas. Jones proposed increased study of Spanish and Portuguese at LSU to ease communication problems. He also proposed an exchange student program, and encouraged nationals of all American countries to visit other countries so that nonrepresentative nationals in a foreign land would not discredit the entire citizenship of their country. He set an example himself by vacationing in several Caribbean countries to unwind after his grueling campaign to win approval of his constitutional amendments in the fall, 1940 general election. He chaired the five-member committee formed by the Southern Governor's Conference to promote trade, defense preparedness, and friendship with Latin American countries.

Perhaps Jones' most flamboyant effort toward establishing his personal diplomacy toward Latin America occurred during the summer of 1941 when the "Greater Louisiana Special Train" brought a group of prominent Louisianians to Mexico City for a good will visit from July 12 until July 24 to promote Louisiana-Mexico trade. Jones planned to lead the "special," but legal challenges to his reform plan kept him

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67 Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 4, 1940; Times-Picayune, August 7, 1940; Monroe Morning World, September 17, 1904; Morning Advocate, November 23, 1940; Town Talk, December 11, 1940; A. E. Pradillo, "Louisiana's Governor 'Sells' Middle West," New Orleans Port Record, October, 1943, pp. 9-10; Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press, 1959), pp. 52-66; Gary Arnold Bolding, "Efforts to Develop New Orleans as a World Trade Center, 1910-1960" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1966), pp. 62-64.
in Baton Rouge to help plan strategy. In his stead, Mrs. Jones and Agriculture Commissioner Harry D. Wilson led the delegation.\textsuperscript{68}

Victory, joy, challenge, frustration, defeat — Governor Sam Jones experienced all these emotions during his first two years in office. He established his reform laws for Louisiana but saw some of his efforts washed away in court battles. Little did he know, as he struggled to save his reformation and bring more industry to Louisiana, that even greater challenges lay ahead. His break with Noe and his lack of a strong political base in the legislature, however, led to even further defeat in the 1942 regular session.

\textsuperscript{68}Morning Advocate, July 10, 1941; Greater Louisiana Special Train (n.p., n.d.); Justin E. Wilson to W. Scott Heywood, June 28, 1941, Heywood to Harry D. Wilson, June 30, 1941, Heywood to Sam Jones, June 30, 1941, Jones to Heywood, July 2, 1941, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONTINUING BATTLE FOR REFORM (1942-1944)

Louisiana politics in 1942 began with the Democratic primary for the New Orleans mayor's race. Early speculation suggested freshman United States Representative F. Edward Hebert as a possible reform candidate. Hebert, however, had no interest in the office, so some reformers initially chose as their candidate former Old Regular Congressman Paul H. Maloney, whom T. Hale Boggs had defeated in 1940. Governor Sam Jones briefly considered lending his support to Maloney, but purists among the Governor's supporters dissuaded him from doing so. The Old Regulars, meanwhile, promised to support Maloney for Congress again in the 1942 fall election in exchange for his withdrawal from the January mayoral primary, a deal which Maloney accepted. The reformers then turned to 38-year-old attorney Herve Racivitch, a veteran politician from the Jones campaign. The Old Regulars backed incumbent Mayor Robert Sidney Maestri in his election bid. Two minor candidates, Shirley G. Wimberly and John T. Knoop, entered the race as independent Democrats who attacked Maestri as the close ally of the "thieving" Long machine and Racivitch as the candidate of a new reform machine.¹


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Maestri and the Old Regulars campaigned as a "complete the work" ticket, citing improvements in New Orleans finances made since 1936. Sam Jones did not enthusiastically support Racivitch, evidently because Jones hope to continue the working relationship with Maestri which had allowed at least some of his legislative proposals to pass the 1940 legislature. Governor Jones did, however, accompany Racivitch to a New Orleans dinner commemorating the transfer of Louisiana from France to the United States, and in his speech that night remarked that during the war in which the United States found itself currently embroiled, "Derelictions and backgrounds which in times of peace might be overlooked are now reason enough for instantaneous repudiation of any man in high office," a direct allusion to Maestri. Again in New Orleans for services commemorating the 127th anniversary of peace between the United States and Great Britain following the Battle of New Orleans, he reminded voters that any appeals to the old "don't-change-horses-in-the-middle-of-the-stream" slogan, "[are] now as ludicrous as [they were] always fallacious . . . if your horse can no longer make progress under its own power because of riding so long on a machine -- then

Orleans Item, July 31, 1941; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, August 1-2, 1941; New Orleans States, December 18, 1941. Maestri had become mayor in the aftermath of Huey Long's political war with New Orleans which led to mayor T. Semms Walmsley's resignation in 1936. Governor-elect Richard Leche, Conservation Commissioner Maestri, and New Orleans Dock Board president Seymour Weiss agreed that Maestri should be appointed to replace Walmsley. Maestri's one opponent in the primary election called in 1936 to fill Walmsley's unexpired term withdrew from the campaign and the Republicans did not enter a candidate in the general election. Maestri thus became mayor without facing the voters. The Longites then pushed through the legislature a constitutional amendment which cancelled the regular 1938 mayoralty race. Therefore, in 1942 Maestri had been mayor for 6 years, but was conducting his first campaign for the office.
you'd better change horses . . ."²

Jones' former ally, James A. Noe, felt no reluctance at campaigning in the New Orleans election. Noe had already announced his intention to run for either Allen J. Ellender's United States Senate seat in 1942, or for the governorship in 1944, and planned to use the 1942 mayor's race to forge political alliances for use in his later campaigns. Noe the reformer thus mended his political fences with the machine and endorsed Maestri and the Old Regular ticket: "[they] have my blessings and my best wishes . . ." Maestri replied that he was "happy" to accept the endorsement.³

Noe, however, unwittingly created a split within his New Orleans organization. A small group of twelve ward leaders who had originally backed Noe in the 1940 gubernatorial primary sought to oppose the Maestri endorsement. Their spokesman, Harry Cabral, one of Noe's earliest supporters in the city, asserted that they stood by the original intent of the Noe organization "to bring an end to the Maestri-Leche-Long dictatorship . . ." James D. McNeill, chairman of the Noe city caucus sought to discredit the dissidents by charging that they had accepted state jobs in exchange for their disavowal of the Noe organization. The Jones-Noe failure to fulfill their patronage agreement in 1941 thus surfaced to harry Jones' reform effort. Noe, however, retained control of his organization. "I am still Kingfish of

²Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 21, 1941; Times-Picayune, September 22, 1941, January 9, 30, 1942.

³Morning Advocate, October 5, 1940, July 16, 1941, January 17, 1942; Times-Picayune, January 3, 1942.
the Noe lodge . . ." and announced that "we are 100 per cent with Bob Maestri in this fight."\(^4\)

The reformers' campaign centered on Maestri's ties to the Long machine and its attendant corruption, while the Old Regular-Noe alli‐
ance attacked Jones for his efforts to help Racivitch. Rumors of a renewal of the infamous deduct system to finance Maestri's campaign caused a brief flurry of excitement and a quick response from the mayor: "I have given no orders to make any 'deducts.'" Reformers thought they had uncovered a new sophistication of the deduct scheme when they discovered that city employees were buying tickets to a "lotto party" to benefit Maestri's campaign, but the sponsoring Old Regular ward leaders innocently explained that instead, the proceeds "are to be used for baskets for poor families and for no other pur­pose." Telephone calls made on the night of the supposed party to the address shown on the tickets, however, failed to ascertain whether the lotto games were in progress.\(^5\)

Charges of corruption, past or present, failed to bring the reformers victory in New Orleans. Maestri received 76,008 votes to Racivitch's 49,762, Wimberley's 11,029, and Knoop's 788. Sam Jones attempted to put the best possible face on the returns, noting that the Old Regulars carried 3,000 less votes for Maestri than they carried for Earl Long in the governor's race two years previously, but the reformers could take little comfort in the election returns as

\(^4\) Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 4, 1942; Morning Advocate, January 17, 1942; Times-Picayune, January 6, 8, 16, 21, 23, 28-29, 1942.

\(^5\) Times-Picayune, September 20-21, October 10, 12, 1942.
Maestri remained safely in power. The governor on March 30 cancelled the general election as state law required if the Democratic candidates had been unopposed and the deadline for qualifying had passed with no other party candidates in contention.\(^6\)

The 1942 mayoralty campaign proved to be only the preliminary bout to the major political battles of the year: the regular and subsequent extraordinary sessions of the legislature. Governor Jones' primary problem stemmed in part from the voters' failure to approve the constitutional amendment providing for increased income taxes designed to replace some of the revenue lost with the sales tax repeal in the 1940 legislative session. Jones dealt with the problem immediately after the income tax amendment failed, receiving authority from the State Board of Liquidation to poll the legislature for permission to borrow up to $5,000,000 in case of a possible shortfall to tide the state over until Jones could call a special legislative session to deal with the situation. Prompt action became necessary because State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell announced on November 29, 1940, that as a result of the new tax structure, the state could run out of money by March or April, 1941, and by then also have an $8,000,000 deficit. Jones subsequently polled the legislature and received permission to make the loan. Despite Jones' attempts at establishing more efficient public administration, by the end of 1940 the state faced a biennial

\(^6\)Ibid., January 28-29, February 1, March 31, 1942; Morning Advocate, May 16, 1942. Maestri thus served as New Orleans mayor for 10 years (1936-1946) and placed his record on the line only twice, this successful 1942 campaign and the 1946 contest which he lost to the young war hero-reformer DeLesseps Morrison. After the 1942 election, Jones compensated Racivitch by appointing him attorney to collect delinquent taxes in Orleans parish.
deficit of $14,000,000, chiefly caused by public largesse distributed by the 1940 legislature, continued state borrowing, and Jones' inability to implement his administrative and fiscal controls because the Longites had successfully challenged him. Also, the Governor's split with Noe caused Noe's fiery young protege, State Senator Joe T. Cawthorn of DeSoto parish, to become one of Jones' most ardent and vocal critics. The state's dire fiscal condition became apparent in early 1941, when the New Orleans Charity Hospital closed its two uppermost floors, thus eliminating 497 patient beds, a move that presaged later developments.  

During early 1942, Jones attempted to impress upon his department heads the gravity of the situation and also to persuade them to save as much money as possible by issuing guidelines to adapt the state government to the war effort. These guidelines included returning to the state treasury as much of their current appropriations "as humanly possible," not replacing personnel taken for military service, eliminating desirable but non-essential services, and cultivating all available state land for food and fuel requirements of state agencies. Jones' attempted economies, however, were not sufficient to obliterate the deficit. State financial officers in 1942 estimated that the 1940 legislature had increased state expenditures for schools, hospitals, and relief by about $8,000,000 per year, while state income had

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increased by only about $5,000,000. The state would require at least $3,000,000 to relieve the existing deficit; an additional $4,000,000 for each of the next two years to prevent a recurring deficit; and about $3,000,000 more to fund built-in increases in salaries, materials, and other expenses. Jones blamed the failure of the 1940 income tax amendment and the state's bonded indebtedness leftover from the Long-Allen-Leche administrations for the state's fiscal problems, but Senator Cawthorn, Jones' most persistent critic, charged instead that "waste and inefficiency" since 1940 had led to the current situation: "The governor was not satisfied with the help and advice he could get from the elected officials . . . He had to go up to Chicago and get a Mr. Griffenhagen . . ."8

Problems concerning both Louisiana's role in the war and the state's fiscal condition dominated the 1942 regular session which opened in May. Reform elements in the state hoped that the legislature would "[avoid] all kinds of petty legislation introduced in the name of the war effort which has no real purpose . . ." and propose only measures to "provide for the orderly conduct of state business." Their hopeful attitude found some basis in the Old Regular announcement that they would not oppose Norman Bauer for re-election as Speaker of the House. The reformer's hopes, however, were short lived. The first skirmish of the new session occurred in the vote to replace the late J. Martin Hamley as Secretary of the Senate. The administration first supported William Gladney of New Orleans for the post but, in an

8Shreveport Times, January 10, February 11, 1942; States, March 21, 1942; Morning Advocate, April 9, 29, 1942; Item, May 14, 1942.
effort to find a more popular candidate, switched to Robert A. Gilbert of Napoleonville, brother of the late Senator Philip Gilbert, formerly aligned with Huey Long's regime. The staunch anti-Jones group of senators headed by Cawthorn nominated former Acadia parish representative N. Smith Hoffpauir, but when they realized that the administration commanded enough votes to block Hoffpauir's selection, they agreed to a compromise of Gilbert for secretary and Hoffpauir for assistant secretary. The potential deadlock created by the virtually equal support of each side in the Senate was revealed when Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton ruled that the two appointments were separate and had to be considered separately. Cawthorn retorted that the Senate could make its own rules, and a 20-19 vote sustained him. The Senate then elected Gilbert and Hoffpauir by the same 20-19 vote. The Senate secretary vote also revealed an additional problem Jones faced. His ally from the 1940 session, President-Pro-Tempore Frank B. Ellis, voted against the administration. Ellis maintained that he had not broken with the administration, but instead merely exercised his right to make independent decisions. Jones' enemies, however, had counted Ellis as one of their own, or at least expected him to vote with them more than against them. (Jones later maintained that Ellis had "sold out to Maestri.")

Governor Jones, in his opening address to the legislature, called for enactment of measures to provide for Louisiana's role in the war effort, to solve problems created by invalidation of some of his 1940

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9States, May 7, 11, 1942; Morning Advocate, May 8, 10, 12, 1942; Item, May 12, 1942; Sam Jones interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
reforms, and to finance necessary and desirable governmental activities for the next biennium. His proposed war measures included mundane proposals regulating blackouts, penalizing anyone trespassing in or attempting to sabotage a war industry, as well as election reforms guaranteeing the right of servicemen to register and vote absentee, providing leaves of absence to servicemen in state employ, and permitting servicemen to run for public office absentee by a simple notification procedure instead of the regular formalities and fees required by law. His principal proposals to solve the reorganization problem included legislative recognition of the departments of state government not invalidated by the adverse decision on the constitutional amendments, especially certain provisions of the fiscal code. Administration fiscal proposals strangely provided no detailed plan to raise necessary additional revenue. Jones had already stated that it was the Legislature's role to provide the money necessary to fund the state government, and thus confined himself to general platitudes about reduction of appropriations and unnamed additional revenue sources needed to balance the budget.10

Reactions to Jones' speech were mixed, understandably along factional lines. Cawthorn accused him of "attempting to hide the failure of his administration behind the war." Senator Brooks Oliver of Bastrop stated that "I think it was a bunch of hooey. All of us believe in defense and co-operation," and asked pointedly, "Why didn't he cooperate with us during the past two years?" Earl Long, however,

10 Morning Advocate, May 13, 1942; States, May 13, 1942; Shreveport Journal, May 13, 1942.
probably best typified a widespread feeling in Longite ranks. He attended the opening of the legislative session, and when asked his opinion of Jones' speech, he replied, "I didn't hear it. I wouldn't waste time that way." Nine Longite Senators apparently agreed with Long's assessment when they followed Senator Ernest Clements' lead in voting not to recess the Senate to hear Jones' address. (The Senate voted 29-10 in favor of recess.) They did, however, attend the joint legislative session which Jones addressed. Jones' supporters described the speech as "excellent and most timely," and "wonderful."11

Jones' troubles with the legislature, however, had only begun. Robert Maestri rented Longite Registrar of State Lands Lucille May Grace's house in Baton Rouge to serve as a convenient political and entertainment headquarters for Longite members of the legislature. Jones' allies failed in attempts both to pass resolutions asking Maestri to leave the city and quit attempting to influence legislators, and also to pass bills stripping the New Orleans mayor's office of extraordinary powers granted to it at the expense of the city council during Leche's administration.12

Governor Jones and the reform forces were most successful in passing the measures he called for in his opening speech to facilitate Louisiana's participation in the war effort. The legislature provided authorization (Act 6) for "forces of Louisiana" other than the National Guard to serve outside the boundaries of the state, to pursue enemies

11 Morning Advocate, May 13, 1942; Item, May 13, May 22, 1942; States, May 13-14, 1942.

12 Morning Advocate, May 15, 19-20, 1942; Item, May 19-20, June 2, 16, 1942; States, May 19-20, 1942.
of the state into other states with reciprocity agreements, and also
authorized other states' military forces to pursue their enemies into
Louisiana. They also authorized the Governor (Act 7) to provide pro-
tection from air raids by ordering practice blackouts, radio silences,
and other precautionary measures. In order to protect vital war in-
dustries located in the state, the legislature made trespassing il-
legal on any premises engaged in defense activities (Act 22); estab-
lished the crime of sabotage and provided prison terms of one to ten
years at hard labor for those convicted of tampering with or inten-
tionally damaging public or private property engaged in war production,
or intentionally producing faulty articles destined for war or defense
of the United States (Acts 24, 25, 26). To protect harbors, ships,
and navigable waters, Act 117 provided that anyone on any of them or
on land within 200 feet of a navigable stream must have a valid
identification and approval by the Coast Guard. Moreover, Act 242 made
it unlawful to encourage violence, sabotage, or disloyalty to the
United States or Louisiana, or to give information on military se-
crets, operations, or plans of defense, and Act 290 prohibited employ-
ment of known enemy aliens or conscientious objectors. The Louisiana
Commission of Labor received extraordinary authorization to dispense
with lessor labor laws for six month periods for businesses producing
goods under army or navy contracts (Act 41), while the Director of
Highways could close, partially close, or restrict the civilian use of
any public or private highway or street used in the American war ef-
fort, or in troop movements. To help conserve gasoline and tires,
the legislature decreed (Act 228) that service stations be closed be-
tween midnight Saturday and midnight Sunday, except for five per cent
of the stations (chosen by lot every three months), which would remain open as emergency stations. The legislators authorized the Governor to grant leaves of absence (Act 33) to appointed officials and Notaries Public (Act 9) who joined or were drafted into the armed services. To allow full participation in the United States Government's War Bond Program, the legislature allowed (Act 12) businesses chartered under state law to act as issuing agents for United States Government obligations. The legislature also authorized the state (Act 28), Police Juries (Act 29), School Boards (Act 30), and municipalities (Acts 39 and 150) to invest surplus funds in "E," "F," and "G" war bonds, and allowed state and parish employees to dedicate a portion of their paycheck to the purchase of series "E" bonds.13

Despite occasional agreement on the necessity of war measures, not all of them enjoyed bifactional support. Sam Jones' plan for a "state guard," composed of volunteers between 18 and 64 years of age, for example, drew heavy Longite fire. Representative DeLesseps Morrison introduced the bill in the House, and the original draft included provisions for drafting men into the guard if not enough volunteers emerged to fill the ranks. Representative William J. Dodd of Allen

13 Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana At the Regular Session 1942 (hereinafter cited as Acts of the Legislature, 1942 Regular Session), pp. 52, 59, 61, 64, 71, 106, 11-112, 117-119, 121, 123, 129, 133, 378, 516-517, 801, 824, 968. The new easements of labor laws reflected some of the requests of United States Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that the exemptions be limited to war industries and retention of certain aspects of labor laws passed to protect women workers. Frances Perkins to Sam Jones, June 13, 1942, William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection).
Parish rose to announce that while he was in favor of creating the guard, he was against creating a "buzzard roost" of deadheads on the state payroll. Why not, he asked, rely strictly on volunteers? The governor considered the bill to be in such grave danger that he made a rare appearance before a legislative committee along with Adjutant General Raymond H. Fleming of the Louisiana National Guard, testifying in behalf of the guard bill.  

Most war measures passed the legislature easily. The bill allowing pursuit of "enemies of the state," for example, passed the House of Representatives with an 83-6 vote. Three of the "nays" saw fit to include a rare "Explanation of Vote" in the House Journal. Beatrice Moore, W. O. Noble, and T. C. Brister opposed the bill, not because it was an administration bill, they said, but instead because they felt that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies could better handle interstate troubles. The state guard bill also passed by a wide margin, 85-5, but Noble again gave an explanation of his "nay": he believed the draft clause "an insult to the patriotism of the male citizens of Louisiana." (Representative Dodd did not

14 Item, May 21, June 4-5, 19, 1942; States, June 2, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 5, 1942; Town Talk, July 18, 1942; W. Scott Heywood to Neal Whisenhunt, July 6, 1942, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection). General Fleming understandably felt some initial reluctance to help establish the State Guard because he feared that it might infringe on his own National Guard. After passage of the law, however, he helped to supply arms and uniforms to the State Guard and helped to establish standards for examining officer candidates. Major General Raymond H. Fleming to Sam Jones, September 15, 18, 22, 25, 1942, Jones Collection.
overcome his objections, and also voted against the bill.)

The governor was also successful in his attempts to push through the legislature new laws to salvage part of his state government reorganization struck down by the state Supreme Court in a ruling issued May 25, 1942, while the legislature was in session. The Jones administration quickly created a new package of bills, each of which created and provided for the continued operation of one state department (Public Welfare, Occupational Standards, Labor, Public Safety, Institutions, Highway, and Finance), each headed by a director appointed by the governor. While all of the reorganization package faced opposition, the proposed fiscal code drew the strongest Longite ire. The fiscal code passed the Senate by a slim 20-18 vote, with Senator Cawthorn in strong opposition.

While the reorganization faced stiff challenges, but eventually succeeded, Longite and reformers reached a stalemate on Jones' Civil Service program. Representative Moseman Simoneaux of New Orleans, a Maestri ally, on May 31 introduced a resolution providing for the suspension of New Orleans Civil Service until after the 1944 regular session of the legislature (at which time the Longites hoped to

15Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana at the Eleventh Regular Session of the Legislature Under the Adoption of the constitution of 1921, pp. 495-496. Unfortunately, the Senate Journal for this session is virtually inaccessible because the complete Senate Calendar was never published. The fragmentary Calendar only covers the first four weeks of the session and is incomplete even for that short period. Some House bills which the Senate considered then are not listed in the fragment.

16States, May 25, June 3, July 13, 1942; Item, June 3, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 13, 1942. Jones later vetoed the bills creating the Public Welfare and Labor departments, claiming that they were sufficiently established by laws already on the books.
control the governorship again). Meanwhile, a coalition of rural legislators (Horace Wilkinson of West Baton Rouge, C. O. Webb of Red River, and A. D. Flowers of LaSalle) introduced a similar resolution to delay implementation of the state Civil Service. The Longites sought to achieve the desired delay by resolution in an attempt to circumvent the governor's veto power.17

Reformers again rallied to the Civil Service banner. They interpreted the move to delay the acts as pure politics: "[The Longites] want political jobs they can pass out, and they want office holders under their control . . ." The New Orleans Ministerial Union tied Civil Service to the war effort: If we are going to ask soldiers to give their lives and our people to give their money for national survival, they asked, "why does this community tolerate the defiance of law and the diversion of millions of dollars from constructive use into the coffers of greedy, immoral ghouls?"18

While reformers in the House beat back an attempt by Representative Flowers to cramp Civil Service by reducing its appropriation about $83,000 in its first year, and $71,000 in its second year, the Civil Service League and the governor eventually agreed to delay implementation of New Orleans Civil Service — ostensibly because the administrative apparatus was not yet in place — and also agreed to postpone implementation of state Civil Service in order to avoid further factional animosity and suspicion. The delay, however,

17 Morning Advocate, June 1, 1942; States, June 5, 1942.
18 Morning Advocate, June 4, 1942; Item, June 9, 1942.
was not as long as the Longites originally desired. Civil Service implementation was now delayed from July 1, 1942 (original implementation date) to January 1, 1943, instead of July 1, 1944, as the Longites wished. 19

The primary battle (and the most important stalemate) between the two factions occurred over Jones' budget and tax proposals. He submitted two budget bills for legislative consideration, an "A" budget maintaining approximately the current spending levels, and a "B" budget with reduced appropriations. The "A" budget called for the state spending $152,654,467.15 over the next biennium (fiscal 1942-43 and 1943-44) with a state sales tax enacted to generate $8,500,000, and a natural gas gathering tax enacted to generate $1,600,000 in needed additional revenue. The "B" budget provided for spending $133,178,365.29 over the biennium without the sales tax. But as Budget Director James I. Smith explained to the legislature, the reduction in funding would require the removal of approximately 4,000 patients from state hospitals, dropping approximately 2,400 students from state colleges and 700 from trade schools, removing approximately 19,000 recipients from the welfare rolls, closing an unspecified number of health units, and losing countless dollars in federal matching funds. The governor reiterated his belief that it was the legislature's proper task to determine budget appropriations but warned that

19 Morning Advocate, June 7, 1942; States, June 25, July 1, 1942; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 172. Sam Jones maintained that after the regular session adjourned, emissaries from Leander Perez offered him a deal by which the Longites would drop their opposition to the sales tax in a special session if Jones would agree to dismantle the Civil Service. Maestri and Perez both hotly denied offering such a deal. See Morning Advocate, July 15, 1942; States, July 15, 1942.
he felt duty-bound to veto all appropriations for which sufficient revenue was not provided. 20

Moreover, the governor warned the legislature of impending major deficits in state expenditures: $9,647,462.86 by the end of the 1942-43 fiscal year, and $9,989,831.27 by the close of the 1943-44 fiscal year, unless the provided additional funding for "the present services of our state agencies which have been authorized by you." The House and then the Senate, however, approved a budget of $175,000,000 for the biennium. 21

While the eventual legislative budget was approximately $25,000,000 above Jones' most optimistic proposals, the legislature would have seemed less irresponsible had it provided sufficient revenue to fund its appropriation. Early in the session, however, leaders of the "country group" of Longites announced their opposition to increased taxation. Nevertheless, Representative Paul F. Stinson of Jackson parish, a Jones ally, introduced a two per cent state sales tax bill on wholesalers expected to generate $11,000,000 to $15,000,000. Opposition to Stinson's bill surfaced immediately from Longites, reformers, and business groups. The States called the wholesale tax only a "camouflaged sales tax" and called on the administration to present its case of need, ask for a statewide sales tax, "and try to fool no one." State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell endorsed a general sales tax. A sizeable delegation of merchants under the leadership of

20 Times-Picayune, May 19, 1942; Item, May 19, 1942; States, May 21, 1942.

21 States, May 26, June 22, 29, 1942.
the New Orleans Association of Commerce and Young Man's Business Club (friendly to Jones since 1939), called the proposal "unfair, impracticable, and unworkable," primarily because the bill provided no mandatory clause that retailers pass along the increased cost of the tax to their customers. The businessmen thus thought that the federal wartime agency, the Office of Price Administration, would object to increased retail prices resulting from the wholesale tax. Subsequent to this storm of protest, the House Ways and Means Committee dropped the wholesale sales tax in favor of a retail sales tax to be reported in the form of an amendment to a bill which had been introduced by title only by Representative H. H. Huckabay of Caddo parish. The new bill provided a one per cent sales tax on all retail purchases from thirteen cents to sixty-two cents and two per cent on sales above sixty-two cents, but exempted gasoline and natural gas purchases, as well as taxes under other laws, and purchases of water flowing through pipes in its natural state. The Ways and Means Committee attempted to make the increased tax rate more acceptable by titling the sales tax a "War Emergency Tax" to provide additional funds made necessary by the war effort, limiting its term to two years, and expressly forbidding a return to the tokens of the Long sales tax program.22

Battle lines between the two factions appeared almost immediately. James A. Noe, James H. Morrison, and Senators Cawthorn and Clements all appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee, and each recalled that Jones had promised that the state would have no sales tax

22*States, May 12, 28, June 5-6, 9, 1942; Item, June 1, 4-5, 9, 1942.
during his term of office. Jones, in a public response to a request for advice from 24 legislators, replied that even though he was not an advocate of sales taxes, in this case it had become a necessary evil: "I would rather defend my support of the sales tax than explain closed hospitals and hungry old people, and bankrupt local governments, and unbalanced budgets, and underpaid teachers, and impassable roads . . . [and] I am confronted with these alternatives." Superintendent of Education John E. Coxe sent letters to school board members, parish superintendents and supervisors, and school principals asking their support for the sales tax and its proposed $2,135,000 increase in school funds. As a result, 40 parish superintendents endorsed the tax. 23

House floor debate on the sales tax lasted a stormy four hours. Representative Theo Cangelosi (East Baton Rouge) warned that the people were in favor of retrenchment, not excessive taxation. Representative James E. Bolin of Webster parish appeared in his army lieutenant's uniform to plead for defeat of the tax, telling fellow legislators that they should "leave as much money with the people as we can to pay federal war taxes and to buy war bonds and stamps." Speaker Norman Bauer and other pro-Jones representatives repeatedly referred to benefits of the tax: $20 per educable child for public schools, regular equalization fund payments, regular contributions to the teacher retirement fund, additional old-age pension funds, and added revenue for hospitals. The House at last passed the Jones sales

23 Morning Advocate, June 12, 16, 1942; States, June 13, 16, 1942; Item, June 17, 1942.
tax on June 17, 1942, by a vote of 51 yea and 43 nays.24

The thin margin by which the sales tax passed the House, where it had a friendly presiding officer, did not augur well for the bill in the Senate. Jones attempted to lobby the Senators as he had the Representatives: ". . . if I were a member of the Senate, I should most assuredly vote for the proposed sales tax. It is a grim necessity. The war has tak[en] huge slices of our tax revenues; oil and gas products, which supply us with sixty per cent of our revenues, will yield smaller and smaller sums as the rubber shortage grows more severe . . ." Despite Jones' pleas, the Senate voted on June 24 to kill the sales tax in a complex bit of parliamentary maneuvering. The Senate first voted 21-17 to indefinitely postpone (and thus kill) the bill. Senator Grove Stafford, a Jones floor leader from Rapides Parish who voted against the indefinite postponement, then announced that he wished to switch his vote to the prevailing side so he could give notice of reconsideration and bring the bill back before the Senate the next day. Senator Cawthorn maintained that Stafford was out of order, but Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton ruled that a Senator could indeed change his vote and give notice of reconsideration. Cawthorn and Senator Dudley LeBlanc objected to Mouton's ruling, and Cawthorn moved a suspension of the rules to revert to the bill in order to move that it be laid on the table (again effectively killing it). Mouton denied Cawthorn's suspension of the rules motion, but Cawthorn asked for a Senate vote and carried his motion by 20 yea to
18 nays. With the rules thus suspended, Cawthorn made his final motion to table the entire bill and carried it, thereby killing the sales tax for the 1942 regular session.25

Jones' supporters were outraged by the Senate action. Senator Lloyd Hendrick of Shreveport called the Byzantine maneuvering "one of the most cowardly, contemptible, most reprehensible things I have ever heard of." Much of the reformers' rage was directed toward Robert Maestri, whom they saw as the mastermind who "sits down on the highland road (sic) and sends his delegation up here" to thwart the will of the people. Jones blamed "three millionaires" -- Maestri, oilman William Helis, and political boss of Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes Leander Perez -- for defeat of his tax proposal. The Alexandria Daily Town Talk warned its readers to expect a barrage from the "Jones smearing crew" whom it expected to appear shortly in north and central Louisiana to attack the governor. They will say, the newspaper predicted, that "we told you so. We knew Sam Jones would not help the poor people, the lame, the halt, and the blind. Where is all the money he was going to use to help feed you, and send your sons to school, give medical attention to your sick and aid for your old and feeble?"26

Rhetoric aside, Louisiana still faced the problem of its looming deficits. The House passed new revenue bills adjusting income tax rates, and the Senate talked of reviving the wholesale sales tax, but

25 Morning Advocate, June 21, 1942; States, June 24, 1942.

26 States, June 24, 1942; Item, June 24, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 28, 1942; Town Talk, July 1, 1942.
the only major piece of revenue legislation passed by both houses was the gas-gathering tax, estimated to raise about $1,500,000 per year. Jones announced that he had made one last appeal to the Regular Democratic Organization for fiscal sanity but had failed to win their support, so his war-time tax program was indeed dead. The governor did not totally despair, however. He still had one possible, though unpleasant, option: "The only thing left for me to do is to veto sufficient items to balance the budget." An independent citizen's committee investigating state finances reported that the 1942 legislature had appropriated $8,000,000 to $11,000,000 in excess of estimated revenue for 1942-43, and between $7,000,000 and $9,000,000 excess for 1943-44. The governor clearly had a difficult task.

The performance of the rebellious 1942 legislature reveals the fiscal irresponsibility of Jones' opponents. They assumed the mantle of "fiscal integrity" and reiterated their compassion for the "common man" by defeating the tax increases proposed by the reformers. At the same time, however, they expected their own lavish programs to be financed, apparently out of thin air. When the legislature adjourned, therefore, it left the governor as the scapegoat who had to reduce state expenditures to balance state income by eliminating desirable programs.

Jones' Longite opponents were pleased as the legislature adjourned...
"sine die" on July 9, 1942. They had not completely obliterated Civil Service, but they had beaten back attempts to curb their leader, Robert Maestri's, power, had forced Sam Jones to endorse a distasteful sales tax in violation of his campaign pledge, and had then brought him to his knees by failing to pass it, and had custom-tailored a campaign issue to use against the reformers in 1944 (Where is your health care? Where are you schools?). The Longites, however, had underestimated the governor's resilience and his willingness to take a political gamble to obtain his balanced budget.28

Jones' gamble involved vetoing enough necessary or popular programs to at once balance the budget and also create enough public pressure on legislators that they would vote to provide the revenue needed to continue state services with a balanced budget. (The Louisiana governor had no power to reduce appropriations made by the legislature. He could only approve or veto them.) Jones' vetoes resulted in approximately 11,000 families leaving the relief rolls; a $342,000 reduction in LSU's appropriations; loss of a $2,000,000 appropriation to aid unemployables not covered by federal programs; loss of $1,000,000 for the teachers' retirement system, among others. Jones' biggest gamble, however, was his veto of the $6,500,000 biennial maintenance appropriation for the New Orleans Charity Hospital.29

The governor attempted to place blame for the Charity Hospital's problems squarely on the Old Regulars. "Your political party [sic]


29 Morning Advocate, July 11, 13, 1942; States, July 11, 1942.

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is primarily responsible . . ." he wrote to Old Regular caucus chairman George Montgomery. "When the sick are turned away from your hospitals, it will be your fault." Montgomery shot back that, "As an organization we feel that it would be undemocratic to attempt to dictate to [the New Orleans delegation] as to how they must vote." Mrs. Helen N. Farris in an open letter to Jones and the legislature placed the blame on both factions for their shortsightedness: "... what are you thinking about," she asked, "when you close the door of health of thousands of people?" The premier Longite, former governor Earl Long, blamed Sam Jones solely for the hospital's problems. "I don't understand why it is that Gov. Jones had to pick on the hospitals and welfare when in the same appropriation bill was an appropriation of over a million dollars for a civil service bureau that is not necessary." 30

The New Orleans Charity Hospital had fallen on lean times even before it was caught in the bifactional conflict. By June 23, 1942, it had lost eighty resident physicians, ninety-three nurses, thirty-eight junior interns, and forty-nine members of the visiting staff to the armed services. Hospital officials feared that in case of an air raid or other serious emergency, the remaining staff would be unable to provide adequate medical service. 31

The Longites resorted to their familiar tactic of filing a lawsuit to overturn Jones' veto. In this case, New Orleans attorney

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30 States, July 1-2, 8, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 18, 1942.

31 States, June 23, 27, 1942.
Alfred O. Danziger, represented by attorneys Leander Perez, George M. Wallace, and Wade O. Martin, Jr., filed suit in Judge J. D. Womack's court seeking to block Jones' veto on the grounds that it prevented payment on the state's $800,000 bonded indebtedness for the hospital, of which Danziger himself held two bonds. The administration filed writs in the Louisiana Supreme Court asking that the suit be dismissed because Womack's court lacked jurisdiction in the case. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ. Womack declared Jones' veto unconstitutional on two grounds: it cancelled the obligation of contract (the state, he reasoned, had entered into a contract with its bondholders and was obligated to complete payment), and he also declared that Jones should have returned the veto to the legislature for action prior to adjournment. The state then filed a suspensive appeal with the State Supreme Court seeking to overturn Womack's injunction ordering the state to meet the Charity Hospital obligations. Danziger, through Perez, maintained that if the court granted the suspensive appeal, he would be denied protection of the law and divested of his rights without due process of law. The Supreme Court, however, granted the state's suspensive appeal and made it returnable on September 4, when both sides were to submit briefs and a date was to be set for hearing the injunction. This action effectively nullified Womack's decision, because the court on the same day announced its summer recess, meaning that the case could not be heard until October, weeks after the September closing date set for the Charity Hospital unless it received more money.  

[32] Morning Advocate, July 28, 1942; States, July 31, August 1, 6, 10, 12, 14-15, 1942; Item, August 15, 1942.

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The obvious answer to the state's fiscal problem appeared to lie in a special legislative session. Rumors of a special session surfaced after the Senate voted down the sales tax during the regular session. The governor, however, was reluctant to cause the state additional expense unless he obtained reasonable assurance of success: "It would be a waste of the state's money to have a special session that would result in a cat and dog fight." Requests for a special session, however, came from various sources. Sixteen Senators on July 26 urged Jones to call a special session empowered to raise money for all the curtailed state services. The vacillating Senator Ellis called for a session to provide funds for the Charity Hospital but remained opposed to the sales tax, and proposed a transfer scheme by which a surplus in the Confederate pension fund could be used as the foundation of a bond issue to pay for programs for the aged and needy, thus freeing money set aside for them in the general fund which could then be used for the hospital. The Young Men's Business Club of New Orleans appealed to the governor for relief for the hospital.33

The governor continued to seek assurances that a special session would be worth the money it cost. During mid-August, he informed Mayor Maestri that he was contemplating issuing a call for an extraordinary session and asked Maestri to meet with him to discuss ways of raising enough revenue to keep Charity Hospital open and other state services functioning. Maestri, when asked by newspaper reporters, testily denied receiving Jones' telegraphed invitation, declaring that

33 States, July 7, 27, August 10, 14, 1942; Item, August 13, 1942.
he did "not propose to be dictated to by his excellency" and maintain­ing that he had no more to do with the legislature than did any other mayor. (He also noted, however, that "several of my friends" had confided that they would vote for any tax necessary to raise reve­
nue except a sales tax).  

While Maestri maintained his refusal to meet with Jones, Old Regular floor leaders Representative Frank Stitch and Senator J. Aubry Gaiennie met with the governor and announced that they opposed "anything in the form of a sales tax" but would consider other taxes. The participants in this meeting declined to announce the exact proposals discussed, but political observers reported that the primary topic of discussion was a one and one-half per cent sales tax and an alternate one per cent sales tax with increased additional taxes. Stitch and Gaiennie favored the latter proposal. The Longites, however, continued to question the need for a special session before the September Congressional primaries. Ex-governor Earl Long declared that Jones only wanted to use the session to help his "stoogey" Congress­ional candidates. Maestri's representatives reportedly offered support for a sales tax in exchange for a delayed session. The extra­ordinary session, however, met August 20, 1942, in response to the governor's call, which did not limit it to consider a sales tax only but instead authorized consideration of various revenue measures that the legislators wished to propose.  

34 States, August 16, 18, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 17, 1942; Item, August 18, 1942.  
35 States, August 18-20, 1942; Item, August 18-20, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 20, 1942.
The legislators responded to Jones' wide authorization by introducing a number of proposals. Senator Ernest Clements, for example, urged a widening of the call to include revision of the appropriations, in order to eliminate funds for state Civil Service, "the greatest army of high-salaried, super-colossal, streamline 18-karat deadheads" the state had even known. The governor, however, recommended the one and one-half per cent retail sales tax, and Representatives Bonnie Baker of East Baton Rouge Parish and H. H. Huckabay of Caddo Parish introduced the bill in the House. The major Longite alternative to the sales tax was framed in bills introduced by Representative W. O. Noble of Richland parish and Senator Joe Cawthorn. These bills would have funded the Charity Hospital completely by cutting all other state expenditures by thirty per cent. Administration leaders, of course, immediately saw this move as the political ploy it was intended to be: though the Charity Hospital would remain open, Longites could campaign over the rest of the state against Sam Jones, telling audiences that he had mishandled the state's funds so badly that it had to reduce its benefits to them. 36

The House passed the one and one-half per cent sales tax by 51-33 vote, and then only after adding an amendment providing that if the people approved a proposed increased income tax amendment in the November election, the sales tax would expire. In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee also ruled unfavorably on six revenue bills (1 cent soft drink tax, increased common carrier tax, increased gas

36 Morning Advocate, August 21, 24, 1942; States, August 21-22, 24, 1942.
gathering tax, among others) introduced by anti-Jones members as substitutes for the sales tax.\footnote{States, August 24–26, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 25, 1942; Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the Extraordinary Session 1942, p. 6, 28.}

While House debate on the unpopular tax proceeded normally, debate in the Senate broke into open warfare. The melee began when Senator Dudley LeBlanc took the floor and roundly attacked the governor. Representative Fred J. Heintz of St. Tammany parish, who was standing nearby, began exchanging words with LeBlanc and invited him outside the Senate chamber to continue the exchange. Instead, LeBlanc removed his glasses, and both men began swinging their fists. Other Senators immediately joined the fracas. Representatives present in the chamber vaulted the low railing onto the floor. Calls arose to "call the police" and Lieutenant-Governor Mouton repeatedly pled for order: "This is just a trivial matter. Please return to your seats, gentlemen." Mouton's gentle admonition went unheeded as one legislator grabbed a brass cuspidor and bandied it about before he was disarmed. The members eventually returned to order. Even though anger continued to seethe within the chamber, the adjournment was generally peaceful, with only fistfights between spectators, but not legislators. Senator Cawthorn and Louisiana State Police Superintendent Steve Alford began a fight in the corridor just outside the governor's office, but their friends quickly separated them. Earlier on the day of the melee, however, former governor James A. Noe signaled a break in Longite opposition to the sales tax when he testified to the Senate
Finance Committee that he favored the tax only as a last resort to keep the hospitals open and to provide state services to the poor, sick, blind, and insane. (Noe also told the Senators that he would remove the sales tax after he was elected governor in 1944.)

Despite Maestri's protests earlier that he had no extraordinary influence in the legislature, final negotiations to break the sales tax deadlock occurred in his Heidelberg Hotel room at a meeting of Old Regulars, the New Orleans legislative delegation, and non-city Longites. One last-minute hitch developed on the Senate floor when Senator Grove Stafford of Rapides parish objected to dedicating $1,750,000 of the proposed revenue to parish police juries. Nevertheless, the Senate passed an amended version of the House sales tax (the Senate voted a one per cent levy) on a close 20-15 vote following a complex session filled with legal and parliamentary points of order. The House the next day concurred in the Senate amendment, thus giving Jones a source of revenue expected to yield about $6,000,000 per biennium.

Predictably, neither Jones nor Maestri could resist attempting

38 Morning Advocate, August 26, 1942; States, August 26, 1942. The States commented that many of the legislators were "young enough to hurl bombs at Hitler and Hirohito" and added that if their performance in the fight was any indication "many of them should make good commandos."

to make political mileage out of the results of the special session. Jones exulted that the opposition "has taken a political shellacking and they know it," and hoped that after the Congressional primary "we can all settle down and give the people a breathing spell from partisan politics." Maestri, on the other hand, reminded the people that Jones had originally proposed a two per cent sales tax "which he claimed was absolutely necessary . . ." but "the resistance of the city delegation and their country friends resulted in reducing this tax to 1 per cent . . ." with a proportionate saving to the voters.  

Even though the new sales tax began generating revenue at midnight, August 31 (the legislature gave its final approval only on August 29), Charity Hospital's troubles did not suddenly end. Hospital Superintendent Dr. Oliver P. Daly, announced that while the infusion of revenue would allow an expansion of the hospital's capacity from 1,600 to 2,200 or 2,300 patients and would reopen the seventh floor, it would not be possible to use all 3,300 beds until after the war because of the shortage of doctors, nurses, and other staff members.  

The records of the 1942 legislative sessions reveal that despite national and state calls for setting politics aside for the duration of the war, combative bifactionalism continued in Louisiana. If Sam Jones was correct in his later assessment that in 1940 the Longites were convinced that they had the votes to do as they pleased, but

40Morning Advocate, August 30, 1942.

41States, August 31, 1942; Item, August 31, 1942.
decided to cooperate with him in hopes of a share of the patronage, then by 1942 that hope was gone. Moreover, the "country Longite" group held out even longer against rapprochement with Jones than did the Old Regulars. Senator Clements of Allen parish, for example, was one of the fifteen Senators who voted against the resuscitated sales tax in the extraordinary session, even after Senator Cawthorn had abandoned his opposition to the tax. Clements also held true to his principles and cast the lone dissenting vote against creating the War Emergency Revenue Fund, which channeled the sales tax receipts into the hospital, welfare, and school funds. Both sides went through the motions of appealing for unity, but neither was willing to set aside their differences. Each looked forward hopefully to the 1944 state campaign and attempted to establish a strong foundation for its appeal to the voters.

Even with Louisiana's fiscal problems solved more or less to his satisfaction, Sam Jones still faced one more major challenge to his control of the state — the infamous "little war of 1943." This challenge surfaced when Plaquemines Parish Sheriff L. D. Dauterive died on June 1, 1943. Jones and Attorney General Eugene Stanley contended that the constitution provided that in such instances in which the late official had less than one year left to serve, the governor could appoint a successor to fill the office until the next regular election. The next election following June 1, 1943, was the state-wide general election to be held April 18, 1944, thirty days after which (May 19, 1944) the governor could issue a commission to the newly-elected official. Therefore, Jones and Stanley automatically assumed that the governor should appoint Dauterive's successor.
Attorney Leander Perez, a Longite since Huey's day, staunch anti-Jones man, and undisputed boss of the parish, thought otherwise. Dauterive, he held, had not filed his oath of office until June 14, 1940, so his term lasted until June 14, 1944, clearly more than one year past his death. Therefore, he concluded, the constitution did not authorize Jones to appoint Dauterive's successor but instead provided that he call a special election to fill the parish vacancy. In fact, Perez's convoluted interpretation sprang from his fear that Jones planned to appoint an anti-Perez sheriff. (It was also in direct contradiction of the terms of Perez's original appointment to public office as district judge in 1919 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court had established the legality of the less-than-a-year appointment procedure.)

Each side held firm to its convictions. Perez had Plaquemines Coroner Dr. Benjamin R. Slater sworn in as acting sheriff on June 2. According to the state constitution, however, Slater could only assume an incapacitated sheriff's tax collection duties. Jones, after a frantic search for an anti-Perez man willing to challenge the boss, appointed Walter Blaize as sheriff. Blaize, a Buras automobile repair shop owner, former police juror, and chairman of the Grand Prairie levee board, was a recognized staunch anti-Perez man who possessed the courage to run repeatedly on an anti-Perez platform and to suffer

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defeat after defeat. Dr. Slater refused to relinquish the office to Blaize, and Perez installed approximately twenty parish deputies in the sheriff's office and barricaded the court house at Point a la Hache. 43

Jones, meanwhile, gathered a force of State Guardsmen in Baton Rouge, evidently hoping to frighten Perez into submission with an implied threat of invasion, but dismissed the State Guard after only a roll call and a brief drill on the grounds of the Old State Capitol. Instead of being frightened, however, the pugnacious Perez gathered his own army. Using one of the wartime measures passed by the legislature which authorized local officials to call upon local citizens to quell a public emergency, he created the Plaquemines Wartime Emergency Patrol, ostensibly to guard the parish's coast from German submarine attack, but in reality to keep Walter Blaize and the State Guard away from the courthouse. 44

Confrontation seemed likely as the protagonists drew their armies around them, but the first clash occurred in court. The "little war" caused a number of court cases filed in various state and federal courts. Jones initially filed a friendly suit against the supervisor of public funds and the collector of revenue, claiming that they

43 Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 128-129; Conaway, Judge, p. 66; Morning Advocate, June 12, 1943; Times-Picayune, June 12, 1943.

44 Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 130; Conaway, Judge, pp. 66-67; Times-Picayune, 9-11, 1943. Perez had opposed the legislature's passage of the State Guard bill, fearing that Jones would use it against local governments, but Longites were not concerned. Senator Cawthorn commented that "Jones doesn't know how to use power so he won't abuse power. That fellow Jones could go into a Boy Scout camp with a cannon and come out without his pants." See Item, June 19, 1942.
refused to yield their roles as temporary Plaquemines tax collectors to Blaize. This move allowed the administration to establish the legality of the governor's action in a district court other than the Plaquemines-St. Bernard district court which Perez dominated. Despite Perez's argument that the Plaquemines deputy tax collector (his nephew, Wilson Dauterive) had never surrendered the tax records to the state officials, the Baton Rouge district court on June 18 ruled that Blaize's appointment was indeed valid. In order to lend a further stamp of authority to the decision, the defendants appealed the district court decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court which on July 13 upheld the lower court's ruling.45

Blaize's legal right to the Plaquemines sheriff's office proved to be easier to obtain than physical possession of the office. His initial foray to Pointe a la Hache ended at the northern parish line where he saw a group of deputies stopping cars at Braithwaite and checking the occupants' identification before allowing them to enter the parish. Perez had the Pointe a la Hache highway blocked in front of his house and traffic diverted through his yard where he stationed his guards to detain undesirables. Blaize announced that he would not attempt to force his possession of the sheriff's office. "We're

45Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 131-132; Morning Advocate, July 15, 17, 1943; Walter J. Blaize v. Jerome A. Hayes, Supervisor of Public Funds, Et. Al., Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37190, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Jones' hand was strengthened in the East Baton Rouge district court when Judge Womack lost a 1942 re-election bid.
working on something else," he said.  

Blaize and Jones eventually had to resort to outright invasion to place the new sheriff in office. On October 8, 1943, the State Supreme Court reiterated their decision that Blaize legally possessed the office by refusing Perez's application for a rehearing of their June 13 decision upholding the appointment. On October 9, Jones declared martial law in Plaquemines parish and ordered State Guard commander Brigadier General Thomas F. Porter to install Blaize in office. Perez obtained a restraining order from "his" District Judge Albert Estopinal, Jr., stopping the State Guard from attempting to install Blaize in office, but it proved useless. The State Guard gathered at Camp Pontchartrain in Orleans Parish, and Perez made his last minute preparations for invasion. One Plaquemines deputy reported that the courthouse was "bristling with machine guns" but also added significantly that "we don't have the men to shoot them if the going gets tough."  

The State Guard rolled into Plaquemines parish early on the morning of October 9, 1943, on 31 trucks, with two command cars and an ambulance. They met resistance only three times: three deputies met them at Braithwaite and attempted to serve Estopinal's court order, but they were arrested and the court order torn up; the main highway before Perez's home was blocked by oil field equipment which had to be removed; and burning oyster shells blocked the highway at the

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46 Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 133-134; Morning Advocate, June 12, July 15, 1943.

47 Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 134; Morning Advocate, October 8-9, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 8-9, 1943.
outskirts of Pointe a la Hache. As the State Guard approached the parish seat, Perez and his followers abandoned their stand inside the courthouse after looting the sheriff's office, and fled on the Pointe a la Hache ferry to the middle of the Mississippi River. Slater refused to leave his office and had to be carried from the building before Blaize could be installed in the wrecked room. One Slater deputy remarked that the lack of office equipment really did not matter because "I give Blaize two weeks in office. Then he will have to call the State Guard again."\(^4\)

Threats of continued violence proved groundless. Blaize, the State Guard, and newspaper reporters who accompanied them had to cope with harassment from local citizens who spoke, whistled, sang into, or turned the crank of their old-fashioned telephones, thus disrupting contact with the outside world. Also, a mysterious blackout left the courthouse without electricity while nearby residential customers continued receiving power. The only physical combat, however, was aimed against the swarms of delta mosquitoes.\(^4\)

The quietness of the situation led Jones and Porter to remove all but one hundred of the State Guardsmen within three days. The contingent was soon reduced to about seventeen, then to a symbolic two men and one officer. Even though a surface quiet prevailed, Blaize was still not the effective sheriff of the parish. He soon located

\(^4\)Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 135-136; Conaway, Judge, pp. 72-76; Morning Advocate, October 10, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, October 10, 1943.

\(^4\)Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 137-138; Morning Advocate, October 11-12, 16, 1943.
missing tax records left behind in a locked courthouse safe, but desultory efforts to collect taxes met with failure. Meanwhile, Perez continued his propaganda and legal battle against the state administration, filing as many as fifteen lawsuits at one time. The administration, in turn, fought back with lawsuits of its own, filing impeachment proceedings against Perez and Estopinal and filing a murder conspiracy suit against Perez, among others.  

Louisiana's "little war" occurred against the backdrop of the 1943 statewide primary election campaign. In Plaquemines parish, both Dr. Slater and Blaize qualified to run for sheriff, but not surprisingly, Slater with Perez's help defeated Blaize by an approximately four to one margin. Slater's election, however, did not end the controversy. In April, 1944, Judge R. R. Reeves of the Catahoula-Concordia parishes district, who had been installed to replace Estopinal until the impeachment charges against him could be heard, ruled that Jones had acted illegally when he declared martial law in Plaquemines Parish. Jones maintained that he was merely enforcing the judgment of the Supreme Court. Almost a year after the fact, the Supreme Court on October 4, 1944, laid to rest the last of the Plaquemines cases before it, dismissing charges of conspiracy to commit murder brought against

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50 Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 137-140; Morning Advocate, October 16, November 6, 18, 1943; Benjamin R. Slater v. Walter J. Blaize, Et. Al., Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37,237; Benjamin R. Slater v. Walter J. Blaize, Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37,341, Fournet Collection. Perez's propaganda barrage included a speech entitled "The Truth About the Plaquemines Situation" which detailed his side of the conflict. He delivered the speech on WNOE, and Representative F. Edward Hebert also inserted the text into the Congressional Record. See Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 78th Congress First Session Appendix, Volume 89 Part 12 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. A4598-A4600.
Jones and Stanley, fraud charges against Stanley, and the impeachment proceedings against Perez and Estopinal. Most of these charges were dropped because of lack of evidence or because the points of law they were based on were by then moot, because Jones, Stanley, and Blaize were out of office. This ruling did not end litigation in the case, however. On October 9, 1944, former Plaquemines deputy sheriff Joseph Cappielo sued Jones, Stanley, and eight others for injuries he allegedly suffered at the hands of the State Guard during the invasion. The final decision in the "little war" cases occurred on February 7, 1945, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans upheld Federal District Court Judge Adrian J. Caillouet's dismissal of the damage suit for lack of jurisdiction.51

The Plaquemines "little war" can be seen as merely a reprehensible waste of precious fuel and manpower during wartime, but it should also be seen in the context of its part in the larger theme of continued bifactionalism, another opportunity for Longites to harry Sam Jones and ridicule his reforms. (Perez did not split with Earl Long until the race issue surfaced in the 1950s.) The thread of continued bitter bifactionalism ran through Jones' administration, especially from 1942 until the end. The unnamed "oppositionist" Senator who said during the 1942 regular session that, "We don't expect to get bills we really want... We're just concentrating on keeping Jones from getting what he wants," accurately summarized the situation. The reluctance of the 1942 regular session to pass the sales tax while increasing state

51 Morning Advocate, October 10, 1944, February 8, 1945.
expenditures stemmed in part from Longite desire to put Jones in an uncomfortable position, as well as from their philosophical opposition to a regressive sales tax (many of them, however, had approved Leche's sales tax in 1936). The bitter last-ditch stand by "country" Longites against the sales tax in the 1942 extraordinary session likewise revealed a continued bifactionalism even though Jones cagily split the opposition by retaining appropriations for state charity hospitals outside New Orleans in part because much of his support came from these areas, while establishing much political pressure on the New Orleans legislative delegation by withholding the funds for the city charity hospital. The Morning Advocate editorially saw the "little war" as only a continuation of the Jones opposition and sadly commented that "folks -- especially in Louisiana -- have to accept such shenanigans as more or less to be expected . . ." Expected or not, however, the little war exploded across the news reports of the state as a major challenge to Sam Jones, a challenge in which he ultimately failed.

He won the battle; he installed Walter Blaize as sheriff; but he lost the war. Leander Perez reestablished an iron control over Plaquemines parish that was never again successfully challenged until his death in 1969.52

As his administration drew to a close in late 1943 and early 1944, Sam Jones judged that his efforts had met with a great deal of success. He had fulfilled, he said, 43 of 45 campaign promises made

52 Item, June 26, 1942; Morning Advocate, October 16, 1943; Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 141; Kane, Deep Delta Country, p. 213; Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South, p. 17.
in 1939, and his failure to eliminate the sale tax and provide old age pensions at the level he anticipated were due to Longite obstructionism, not to failures on his part. In fact, however, Jones left a mixed legacy to both his supporters and his critics. As Allan Sindler observes, many of the pure reformers, expecting a renewal of John M. Parker's holy war against machine politics, stood by aghast as Jones made the necessary deals with Noe and Maestri to implement his administration's reform program. Jones simultaneously disappointed Longites by not mindlessly attempting to reduce Longism's social services, as they had expected he would, thus demonstrating that Jones was no political naif. Comparison of Jones' and Earl Long's 1939 platforms reveals, indeed, striking similarities: they both had promised increased aid to education, free school books, a school lunch program, increased old age assistance, and homestead exemptions.53

Jones, in fact, fully realized by 1940 that it was no longer possible in Louisiana politics for an anti-Long gubernatorial candidate to campaign openly and sincerely against public services (as did Old Regular candidate Hewitt Bouanchaud in 1928) and still seriously expect to be elected. This practical realization marked a new maturity and political realism in anti-Long ranks. "My pappy was for Huey," Jones reminded the voters, but it was not until Jones' administration that the anti-Long, anti-machine reform group had a chance to prove the state's ability to provide many of Huey's services

53 Shreveport Times, December 11, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 11, 14, 1943; Sam Jones Report to the People, December, 1943; Barney Krebs to "Mr. Healy," n.d. (1948?), DeLesseps Story Morrison Papers, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
without the concurrent corruption and semi-dictatorial political apparatus.

Perhaps it took the shock of Huey Long to focus conservative Louisiana's attention on poor people's problems, but Jones aptly demonstrated that by 1940-1944, conservative Louisiana had learned its lesson. No longer would it retreat so far into fiscal conservatism that it would rip apart Long's social program. Even so, the reformers were still not as comfortable as the Longites in spending large sums on many of Long's favorite programs.

Sam Jones, the amateur politician, learned much about political reality during his four years in the governor's office — the necessity of forming alliances with people not normally considered as allies, the demands for patronage, the frustration of being unable to save a legislative program from defeat in the legislature or in the courts, and the desertion of friends. Jones remarked on Jimmie Davis' inauguration day: "One thing I found out in my four years as governor is that all of the saints were not in my political faction, and all of the sinners were not in the opposing faction." Despite his problems, however, Jones provided not the hidebound conservatism of the past past but a "progressive conservatism" which Sindler accurately maintains "became impressed upon large numbers of voters ... as a reasonable alternative to the buccaneering liberalism of the Longs."54

Louisiana's Constitutions since 1898 forbade the governor from succeeding himself for a second term. Therefore, as Jones prepared

54 Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 177-180; Shreveport Times, May 10, 1944.
to leave office and return to his Lake Charles law practice, the 1943-44 gubernatorial campaign, while quieter than the 1939-40 contest, brought politics back into focus as the reformers sought a candidate to take up the reform banner, while the Longites regrouped for a strong attempt to regain control of all state offices.  

This departure was not the end of Jones' public career. He ran for governor again in 1948 and suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Earl Long. During the 1960s, Governor John McKeithen appointed Jones to head a committee studying reorganization of the state government. Jones died on February 8, 1978, two years after his son, Robert, received his own drubbing in a campaign for the governorship against Edwin W. Edwards.
CHAPTER V

THE EMERGENCE OF JIMMIE DAVIS (1943-1944)

The Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of 1943-44 commanded much attention, even though many people continued to be preoccupied with war news. Speculation centered on two questions: Would the reformers be able to retain the state government offices they had won in 1940, or would the Longites sweep back into full control? Would the United States involvement in World War II have any effect on the campaign? These questions were answered as the campaign unfolded.

Governor Sam Jones, curiously, did not openly endorse a potential successor to carry on his reform efforts in the state government. Instead he broadcast a series of ten radio addresses in December, 1943, the scripts of which were collected into a pamphlet and distributed throughout the state. In this pamphlet, Jones underscored the benefits provided by his own reform administration. Even though he wanted a reformer to follow him into office, Jones felt constrained by his political principles not to use his power as governor to help sway the election. He thought that such activity would contribute to the appearance of his building a state administration political machine, an image that he, archfoe of Huey Long's political machine, did not want to project.¹

Even though Jones did not publicly involve himself in the cam-

¹Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 10, 1944; Sam H. Jones to Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection); Sam Jones Report to the People, 1943.
campaign, it was an open secret throughout Louisiana that he desired Public Service Commissioner James Houston (Jimmie) Davis of Shreveport to follow him into office, even though Jones had doubts about Davis' ability to govern the state. He was "not a good candidate" Jones later recalled of Davis, "but he was a good campaigner."  

The reform faction had to locate a new candidate because the 1921 Louisiana Constitution prohibited governors from succeeding themselves, thus eliminating any possibility of Jones running for re-election. Jones sent two emissaries, Prescott Foster and Louisiana Highway Department Director D. Y. Smith, to Shreveport to discuss a possible candidacy with Davis, but Davis refused to see them because he was not yet interested in aspiring to higher office. Soon afterward, however, Davis attended a Public Service Commission meeting in Baton Rouge. While he was in the city, Lee Laycock, Clerk of the Louisiana House of Representatives, persuaded Davis to meet with the governor. Davis' agreement led to an informal meeting between him and Jones along the shore of Lake Bruin, near the small town of St. Joseph in Tensas parish, where Jones was visiting. Jones told Davis that some of the reformers had mentioned him as a possible gubernatorial candidate and that he favored Davis' candidacy. Davis, however, remained reluctant to run for governor, fearing the potential for scandal associated with the oil business in Louisiana and the unpopularity of superceding local officials to prosecute gamblers in the state. He feared that he had

\[ ^2 \text{Sam Jones interviewed by James Godfrey, February, 1977, LSU Oral History Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.} \]
too little experience with the oil business to understand its complexities and could thus enmesh himself unwittingly in improper agreements. He also realized the popularity of gambling, especially in the southern part of the state, and did not wish to appear dictatorial in enforcing the state's anti-gambling laws. Jones reassured Davis that the Mineral Board insulated the governor from the oil business, and as for gambling, "I guess the best thing on that subject is just to let [the local officials] handle their own business."3

The reason behind Jones' lack of public support for Davis remains unclear. Gus Weill maintains (based on Davis' recollections) that Davis told the reformers at a meeting at the governor's mansion that he would not accept their offers to campaign for him because "I don't believe the people will go for the show of a lot of power."4 Jones, however, maintained that he refrained from campaigning because he had no plans to construct a state machine.5 The important specter overhanging both interpretations is that of the Longite machine and its Louisiana Scandals of 1939. The deep impression made by the Scandals on Louisiana politics is amply illustrated by the attempts by both Jones and Davis to disavow any hint of connection to a powerful...

3Gus Weill, You Are My Sunshine The Jimmie Davis Story (Waco, Texas, Word Books, 1977), pp. 61-63. Weill's book is useful because he records Davis' thoughts and memories in sometimes quite lengthy statements. Interpretations included in the book, though, must be carefully scrutinized. It is, after all, a self-proclaimed "affectionate" (uncritical) biography.

4Ibid., pp. 63-64.

5Ibid., p. 64; Morning Advocate, March 10, 1944; Jones to Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
political organization. The anti-Longites, of course, had long been opponents of political machines -- their own lack of an effective organization had prevented their winning elections prior to 1939 -- but the Scandals made it imperative that the reformers avoid machine tactics in the 1943-44 contest. In addition, Jones' failure to endorse Davis, as Allan Sindler maintained, allowed Davis to attract a cross-factional support that may not have been possible had he publicly enjoyed strong support from Jones.  

In Jimmie Davis, the reformers selected the most popular candidate willing to carry the reform banner in the election. Davis was born in an autumn, sometime around the beginning of the twentieth century, one of the eleven children of Sam Jones Davis and Sara Elizabeth Works Davis. The elder Davis worked as a tenant on the farm of W. R. Guess located in the tiny Beech Springs community near the small town of Quitman in rural Jackson parish. Jackson parish and its neighbor immediately to the south, Winn parish, shared many traits. They were both populated by a heavily Anglo-Saxon Protestant population wrestling a living from the poor, hill soil. "We were the same kind of people as those at Winnfield," Davis later wrote, "My Dad

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7 Davis' precise birthday is unknown. Robert Sobel and John Raimo in Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States Volume II (Iowa-Missouri) (Meckler Books, Westport, Connecticut, 1978), p. 588, list September 11, 1902 as the date, but they also have Davis' father's name wrong. Davis' birth was not recorded, a practice which continued well into the twentieth century in rural Louisiana, so his exact birthday is impossible to determine.
Jimmie Davis began his education at the small elementary school at Beech Springs, graduated from Beech Springs High School in 1920, and entered Louisiana College, a small Baptist college in Pineville, in the freshman class of 1920. There he worked in the college kitchen and found additional odd jobs to help finance his education. He graduated from Louisiana College in 1924, then returned to Beech Springs High as a teacher and coach. He remained there two years before entering Louisiana State University from which he received a Master of Education degree in 1927. 

Following his LSU graduation, Davis taught social studies at Dodd College, a Baptist girl's college in Shreveport, and also began his professional music career, writing "country" songs and performing on radio station KWKH in Shreveport. Davis came from a musical family. He wrote in 1969 that "Grandma Davis ... was the only one in the family who never tried to hit a note, or play a guitar, or anything," and the few recreational opportunities in rural Beech Springs — the


9 Weill, *You Are My Sunshine*, pp. 35-36; *Shreveport Times*, May 9, 1944; Morgan Peoples, "The Sunshine Governor From Jackson Parish," paper presented to the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March 25, 1983; *The Pine Knot 1924*, Keatchie-Mt. Lebanon Collection, Richard W. Norton Memorial Library, Louisiana College, Pineville, Louisiana; Jimmie Davis interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, April 9, 1984. Davis in his very brief master's thesis observed that "among the negroes [sic] themselves there are certain individuals who are capable of taking on that type of training which will qualify them for leadership in the betterment of their race," and advocated early recognition of those individuals by a test battery so that "the most intelligent negro [sic] children" would receive "the advantage of better training," but also concluded that black intelligence is raised in proportion to the amount of Caucasian inheritance of an individual. James Houston Davis, "Comparative Intelligence of Whites, Blacks, and
Baptist church and Saturday night or Sunday afternoon sing-alongs — provided ample practice. The future governor had supplemented his college income by singing on the streetcorners of Alexandria and later Baton Rouge, but his first regular check from his singing was the $5 per week he received from KWKH. His regional success led to recording contracts with nationally-known labels. Davis' early hits included "Nobody's Darling But Mine," recorded in 1934, but his biggest hit was unquestionably "You Are My Sunshine," recorded in 1939, which became his campaign theme song.

In addition to his teaching and singing careers, Davis entered politics in 1929, when he became clerk of the Shreveport city court. In 1938 he defeated two opponents (one backed by Richard Leche and the Long machine) to become Shreveport Public Safety Commissioner. Davis in this local campaign learned the effectiveness of using his band to attract a crowd to his rallies, a tactic he used to good advantage in the 1943-44 governor's race. Davis also used his singing


10 Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 47-49; Davis, "Country Music is Part of the People," pp. 16-17; Peoples, "The Sunshine Governor From Jackson Parish;" S. A. Wilkins, "Dodd College: A Brief History," North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Summer, 1980, pp. 29-30; Alexandria Daily Town Talk, May 22, 1983 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk); Jimmie Davis interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, April 16, 1984. "You Are My Sunshine" was eventually recorded by more than 350 artists. A 1983 survey found that it is the third most widely-known song in the English language (preceded by "Happy Birthday" and "White Christmas"). Davis mused in 1983 that "You can go anywhere in the world and they'll sing it with you." I argue no brief in the current disagreement in country music history circles about whether Davis actually wrote "You Are My Sunshine." His recording of and association with the song (he holds the copyright) made him famous, and that fame helped propel him into statewide politics.
ability to "sell" Shreveport on public safety: his talks on traffic safety to school children, for example, included his rendition of several ballads.11

The years between 1938 and 1942 brought Davis both increased fame as an entertainer and growing political ambition. In 1942, he began a movie career in the musical "Strictly in the Groove," which led to other roles, usually as the leading man's best friend and sidekick. Also in 1942, he defeated Longite John S. Patton for Louisiana's Public Service Commission Third District seat. By 1943, therefore, when the reformers cast about for a gubernatorial candidate, they found that Jimmie Davis was widely known through his entertaining, was electable (moreover, he had defeated two Longites), and that his pleasant personality and soothing campaign style had left him with few political scars.12

11 Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 49, 54-55; Morning Advocate, September 12, 1943; Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1941, p. 61.

12 Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 57-60; Times-Picayune, April 8, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 28, 1943. "Strictly in the Groove," also featured Ozzie Nelson and Shemp Howard, among others. According to advertisements, the story centered on "a group of jumpin' [sic], jivin' [sic], jitterbugs, who, by some mistake, provide the right answers to their college exams and graduate." Davis' other films were almost exclusively westerns. Hollywood columnist Hedda Hopper, for example, reported that he held up shooting a scene of "Cyclone Prairie Rangers" while he answered a long-distance telephone call from friends in Louisiana asking him to run for governor. Shreveport Times, July 30, 1943. Davis' singing career introduced him to Louisianians in non-traditional ways. Merle Weigel asked her soldier-husband "What do you think about Jimmie Davis for our Governor?" and added, "The first time I ever heard him was on a 'Juke Box' at Felders." Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, March 3, 1944, H. S. Weigel Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
Davis received numerous delegations of reformers asking him to enter the race, but he postponed an official announcement of his gubernatorial candidacy until September 11, 1943. He delayed, he said, until he was sure that

the people of our state were interested in a candidate who they believe can amalgamate the forces of our state so that after the war, we will be able to give our returning soldiers and sailors the opportunity of making a decent living and returning to a normal civilian life with the least friction and resistance.

Davis' prepared statement reveals that he planned to run a harmonizing, soothing campaign. He called for retention of

all constructive legislation of all past administrations, including an adequate system of old age pensions and social welfare, free school books, the civil service system . . . homestead exemptions, adequate funds [for road construction], hospital privileges, and proper accounting in state financing.

Davis efforts to be non-controversial and his pleasant personality, however, should not be confused with neutrality. He recalled in 1983 that the strength of Huey Long's dictatorship and the Louisiana Scandals convinced him that Sam Jones' reforms required four more years to cleanse the state. Davis, however, hoped to transcend faction: "We had a lot of dissension," he said in 1983, "I wanted to get those people together. I said I didn't care if they were Long or anti-

13 Morning Advocate, August 29, September 12, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, September 12, 1943; Shreveport Times, September 12, 1943.
Long . . . I wanted them to be a Davis man," or, as he said in 1943, "I shall do all in my power to bury the hates and distrusts of the past and raise the curtain that will let in the sunshine of Louisiana's future greatness."^14

While Jimmie Davis hoped to bring all Democratic factions in Louisiana together under his banner, the Longites experienced an unprecedented disunity. The Longites easily agreed that the primary goal of the campaign was to defeat the reformers, but they were unable to agree on a candidate to lead their fight. James A. Noe announced in January, 1943, that he planned to run for governor, but his campaign failed to attract adequate support. Noe subsequently withdrew from the race "as a first step toward uniting Louisiana and promoting harmony and eliminating political disunity . . ."^15

The major split within Longite ranks, however, occurred between the New Orleans Old Regulars and the "country" Longites from North Louisiana. To combat the Old Regular political organization, the upcountry Longites created the Louisiana Democratic Organization at a conference held at the Hotel Bentley in Alexandria during February, 1943. The LDO was also strongly anti-Sam Jones. Longite state Senator A. A. Fredericks of Natchitoches remarked in the statewide radio speech launching the LDO campaign that "the strategy of the Jones administration should be well understood. It is like the one used by

^14 Morning Advocate, September 12, 1943; Town Talk, May 22, 1983.

^15 Morning Advocate, January 14, September 19, 1943; Town Talk, September 18, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 19, 1943.
The LDO, however, appears to have been primarily a political front for Earl Long's quest for the gubernatorial nomination.

Even though the 1921 constitutional prohibition against two successive gubernatorial terms prevented a direct Sam Jones-Earl Long confrontation, Long was eager to unseat the reform faction which had turned him out of office in 1940. He spoke at LDO meetings throughout the state, and LDO leaders negotiated with Robert Maestri and the Old Regulars about the gubernatorial nomination. LDO leader A. L. Kilpatrick of Monroe reported on July 29, 1943, following such a meeting, that neither the LDO nor the Old Regulars had selected a candidate yet, but "It was unanimously decided that we continue our efforts as strictly opposing the Sam Jones administration or any candidate that he might suggest or offer." The LDO, however, maintained that the Longite candidate should come from outside New Orleans. Alexandria businessman, J. A. "Brother" Blackman, LDO chairman for the Eighth Congressional District, remarked on August 22, that the organization had to find a way to choose, as the Longite gubernatorial candidate, either James A. Noe, Earl Long, or Senator Ernest Clements.

All three candidates, however, failed to develop a strong enough base of support to claim the nomination. Long enjoyed support from old-line Longite state administration employees thrown out of office

16. Morning Advocate, April 6, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 29, 1943; Town Talk, August 23, 1943.

17. Morning Advocate, June 14, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 29, 1943; Town Talk, August 23, 1943. It was not until the 1948 gubernatorial campaign that Earl Long obtained his revenge in his stunning defeat of Sam Jones which ended Jones' elective political career.
by the reformers, and from the rural areas of the state. Clements re-
mainecl the choice of labor leaders of Louisiana. Maestri and the Old
Regulars thus held a key bloc of Longite support which each contender
hoped to add to his following. 18

Maestri, however, kept his own counsel as delegation after dele-
gation of up-country Longites visited him seeking some sign of Old
Regular preference in the struggle. Earl Long, meanwhile, in early
September, received the LDO endorsement to run for governor after
agreeing to support the organization's anti-Jones platform, which
included planks calling for abolishing all unnecessary state depart-
ments (especially the Finance Department), a twelve-month pay plan for
schoolteachers, a retirement system for teachers after thirty years'
service, an increase in old-age pensions to $30 per month, lowering
the voting age in state elections to eighteen years and calling a con-
stitutional convention "to remedy ills and defects in our present
system of laws." Many of these planks, including the education and
voting age reforms, are remarkably similar to planks in the platform
Earl Long promulgated when he announced his candidacy six months be-
fore in March, 1943. 19

Long gratefully accepted the LDO endorsement in his opening
statewide radio address originating from WDSU in New Orleans. Long,
in his speech, sought to reassure the businessman who might be tempted
to vote for the reformers, noting that his experience as a lawyer,

18 Town Talk, August 24, 1943.

19 Morning Advocate, March 28, 1943; Town Talk, August 24, September 6,
1943.
farmer, and livestock producer qualified him to understand the businessman’s point of view. He also sought to quell immediately any doubts about his honesty still lingering in the minds of the voters: "I stand before you tonight as one man in our state at least who has been investigated from top to bottom, from morning until night, from cradle to the present time and I have yet to find any man who could point the finger of suspicion at me for breach of the public trust."

He also dismissed Sam Jones’ administration as "one of the saddest failures in the history of Louisiana . . . [a failure] no longer necessary to discuss," but also branded Jimmie Davis as "The Sam Jones candidate for governor," who would "turn this state government back to Sam Jones and his henchmen for the next four years," and called Davis a "banjo-picking song and dance man."20

20 Morning Advocate, September 15, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 15, 1943; States, September 15, 1943. Earl Long’s most damning comment about Jimmie Davis occurred after the campaign: "Jimmie Davis," he said, "loves money like a hog loves slop."

The statewide radio broadcast was a standard fixture of Louisiana politics during the 1940s, and the evidence suggests that a politician utilizing it could reach a large audience. One survey of Louisiana’s radio use in 1940 revealed that 307,883 of the 577,965 households in the state (53.3 per cent) contained a radio. The study also revealed, however, that 72.6 per cent of Louisiana urban dwellings were furnished with a radio. Moreover, 70.1 per cent of radio owners reported the radio as their primary news source, while only 18.1 per cent of them relied on newspapers as their primary news source. A politician making a radio speech, therefore, could expect to reach many potential voters. Edgar A. Schuler, Survey of Radio Listeners in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, General Extension Division, Louisiana State University, 1943), pp. 9, 62, 67. Reaching those voters and convincing them to vote for a particular candidate, however, were not always the same. Frank T. Lewis, Jr. found no correlation between the amount of radio time used and the number of votes received by the candidates in the 1948 gubernatorial campaign. Frank T. Lewis, Jr., "The Political Use of Radio in the Louisiana Gubernatorial Campaign of 1947-1948" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1952), pp. 73-76.
Longite ranks became further confused when United States Senator Allen J. Ellender announced on September 15, 1943, that he was "seriously considering" running for governor at the behest of individuals and groups who considered him to be the only candidate capable of uniting all factions within the Longite camp. Ellender's considerations, however, included two unalterable conditions: all other Longite candidates would have to withdraw from the race so he could conduct a strictly anti-Jones campaign, and he would not trade his Senate seat for support from the Jones faction.21

The Old Regulars welcomed a possible Ellender candidacy. Rumors circulating in New Orleans held that the Ring had decided to support Ellender for governor and Ernest Clements for lieutenant governor. But the Ellender candidacy encountered trouble on two fronts: the other Longites refused to withdraw from the race, and, more seriously, William L. Donnels, editor of the Federationist, the state labor newspaper, announced at a New Orleans labor rally that organized labor was "unalterably opposed" to Ellender. "If the Old Regulars endorse Ellender," he said, "we will work for his defeat. If he runs for governor, we'll snow him under . . ." Donnels also presented labor's opposition to Ellender at an Old Regular caucus ("labor here and now expresses its unqualified opposition to Senator Ellender's gubernatorial aspirations"), and, in addition, presented a resolution passed at a New Orleans labor rally calling on Ellender to "stay in Washington and carry out the campaign pledges he made." Ellender's estrangement from

21 Morning Advocate, September 16, 22, 1943; States, September 21, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 21, 1943; Town Talk, September 21, 1943.
organized labor apparently stemmed from his personal dislike of Congress of Industrial Organizations president John L. Lewis in particular and other labor union heads he considered dictatorial. Moreover, in June, 1943, Ellender also voted for the Smith-Connally (War Labor Disputes) Act, which authorized presidential seizure of war plants on strike, and thus further incurred the wrath of labor unions.\(^{22}\)

The collapse of the Ellender boomlet left Earl Long as the strongest Longite candidate in the field. The Old Regulars had not dismissed Long, but negotiations among Old Regular leaders, Long and LDO president, state Representative T. C. Brister of Pineville, had left unresolved differences. Moreover, in 1943, Earl Long was not the proven commodity he later became in Louisiana politics. He was, in fact, a two-time loser — once for lieutenant governor and once for governor — and the Old Regulars were "anxious to be with a winner," as one Ring leader remarked.\(^{23}\)

Despite their lack of confidence in him, Earl Long was too strong for the Old Regulars to ignore completely. On September 20, rumors

\(^{22}\)\textit{States}, September 29, October 1, 1943; \textit{Times-Picayune}, October 1, 1943; Thomas Becnel, \textit{Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment} (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp. 24-27.

\(^{23}\)\textit{States}, September 16, 21, 1943; \textit{Morning Advocate}, September 21, 1943. As George Briwar wrote to James H. Morrison: "... looks like Earl Long wants to make another try, but the City Hall boys don't think he can make it. [T]hey seem to think the name 'Long' will hurt ..." George Briwar to James H. Morrison, April 3, 1943, James H. Morrison Papers, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana.
in New Orleans hinted that a newly-concluded political agreement between them created a virtual "co-governorship." The terms of the agreement included provisions that Long would abandon his gubernatorial candidacy in exchange for Old Regular endorsement for lieutenant-governor on a ticket headed by Lewis Morgan of St. Tammany parish, and in return receive control of all state jobs and state government activities in Louisiana north of Alexandria.24

The final Longite ticket for the campaign was not completed until October 25: Morgan for Governor, Long for Lieutenant Governor, Wade O. Martin, Jr. for Secretary of State, Joe T. Cawthorn for Attorney General, E. J. Bourg (treasurer of the Louisiana Federation of Labor) for State Auditor, John B. Daigle for State Treasurer, Lucille May Grace for Registrar of State Lands, and Harry D. Wilson for Commissioner of Agriculture. The Old Regulars endorsed this ticket on October 27, and added Lether Frazar for Superintendent of Education.25

The new nominal leader of the Longites, Lewis Morgan, was a sixty-seven year old St. Tammany parish native who had graduated from Tulane University in 1901, served on the St. Tammany Parish School Board from 1904 to 1908, served briefly in the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1908 before resigning to accept a post as district attorney for the 22nd District (St. Tammany and Washington parishes), where he remained until 1912. He served as Louisiana's Sixth District United States Representative from 1912 until 1917, when he retired to

24 States, September 21, 1943.

25 States, October 23, 1943; Morning Advocate, October 26, 28, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 28, 1943.
private law practice. He returned to state government in 1929 as Counsel for the Highway Commission and was also one of the attorneys representing LSU during the 1939 Scandals investigation. Morgan originally announced that he would run for Attorney General in the 1943-44 campaign, but political observers speculated as early as August, 1943, that he would make a strong gubernatorial candidate.26

Despite the apparent unity in October, 1943, when the Longite ticket was formed, the intra-factional dissension continued throughout the campaign. Morgan's age and health problems (heart trouble) branded him as a weak, ineffective leader in the eyes of many potential Longites. In addition, some of Earl Long's up-country Longites voted for their hero for lieutenant governor, but deserted Morgan in the governor's race. Long later maintained that the Longite ticket would have been successful at the polls if only he had been tapped to run for governor instead of the second spot.

While Morgan and Davis were the major candidates in the gubernatorial campaign, other candidates joined the fray. James H. Morrison, by then Louisiana's Sixth District United States Representative, announced his candidacy in August, 1943. This campaign was not as colorful as his 1939-40 effort. There was no "Convict Parade" this time, but Morrison offered in its place "Jimmy Morrison's Victory Parade," a pale copy that lacked the vitality and timeliness of the original, and also included in his entourage a band similar to that

26 Town Talk, August 27, 1943; Morning Advocate, August 28, October 17, 26, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, October 17, 1943; States, October 23-24, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 28, 1943.
of Jimmie Davis. Morrison's rhetoric, however, was as sharp as ever:

Just as the American people have shown that they will not obey or bow to the will of any dictator, the people of Louisiana feel likewise. No man [who seeks] to be crammed down their throats by Tojo, Mussolini, Hitler, Sam Jones, or any other dictator, foreign or domestic, can expect anything but defeat.

Louisianians, Morrison thought, wanted no part of either a continuation of Jones' brand of reform or a return to Longite control, but instead wanted "new blood, youth, aggressiveness, and ability to get the job done." Morrison campaigned against both the Jones and Longite factions, but after his elimination in the first primary, he endorsed Morgan in the second primary.27

Shreveport Mayor Sam S. Caldwell also ran for governor in the 1943-44 campaign. Caldwell, a fifty-year-old native of Mooringsport then serving his third term as Shreveport mayor, centered his campaign on his promises to "return home rule to every parish and to every city in the state," freeing them "from domination from Baton Rouge," just as "our state must be freed from fundamental control from Washington." Caldwell also maintained that he wanted to bring all political factions together, even though Earl Long called him a "trial balloon for Sam Jones." (Caldwell's reply: "I have no time to waste on dead politicians nor ammunition to waste on chattering sparrows.") Caldwell eventually formed a ticket with state Senator Frank B. Ellis, who

27 Morning Advocate, April 29, August 15, December 7, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, October 22, 1943; James H. Morrison interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, May 18, 1982.
had originally announced to run for governor, but withdrew to join Caldwell's ticket as the candidate for lieutenant governor.  

In addition to Morgan, Davis, Morrison, and Caldwell, four other gubernatorial candidates appeared on the ballot in the first Democratic primary in January, 1944: state Senators Ernest Clements and Dudley LeBlanc, Opelousas lawyer Vincent Moseley, and editor of the Amite News Digest, Lee Lanier. The minor candidates spent most of their time attempting to convince the Louisiana electorate that they were serious candidates. Lanier, LeBlanc, and Moseley campaigned against both Davis and Morgan as independent reformers. As Moseley asked in a speech to the women of Louisiana, "Must you swoon to a 'Sinatra' hillbilly [singer], or, in the alternative, be taken over by the 'Wheelchair' Morgan crowd?" Moseley promised an administration "that will end factionalism and vindictiveness . . ." but his most novel political idea in this campaign was endorsement of Lewis Morgan and Davis' candidate for lieutenant governor, J. Emile Verret in the second primary. Moseley encouraged voters to "split the two machine tickets wide open and let Earl Long die a natural political death." 

The actual campaigning for governor did not begin until October,

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28 Shreveport Times, July 29, August 1, October 26, 1943; Morning Advocate, July 29-30, August 1, 1943; States, October 25, 1943.

1943. Sam Caldwell began his campaign on September 30 with a speech in which he promised a strong state system of public health, state aid to farmers, state aid to provide education and employment to returning servicemen, conservation of Louisiana's water resources, and twelve-month pay for the state's public school teachers.  

Jimmie Davis opened his campaign two weeks later, October 13, with a state-wide radio address in which he said that "Until the [world] war is won, there can be no other vital issue," but he also outlined his plans for the future of Louisiana. Davis proposed a new state project to bring Louisiana's marginal farmland into food production but also called for increased industrialization to ease Louisiana's economic dependence on agriculture. "We must," he said, "hold the war-built industries. But we must not be content with these alone. We must stop the flow of our raw materials and learn to convert them to the finished product here at home." Davis also in this speech reiterated his independence ("I am running on the ticket of Jimmie Davis strictly and Jimmie Davis alone . . ."), promised to conduct a "positive" campaign without saying anything derogatory about his opponents, and closed his speech with a rendition of "You Are My Sunshine," a practice which became a standard feature of Davis' campaign appearances. 

Davis also broadened the appeal of his campaign during October when he and Sam Jones persuaded Iberia parish insurance agent J. Emile

30 Morning Advocate, October 1, 1943.

31 Town Talk, October 15, 1943; Shreveport Times, October 15, 1943; Morning Advocate, October 15, 1943.
Verret to join his ticket as the candidate for lieutenant governor. Davis, recognizing the weakness of his appeal as an unabashed North Louisiana Protestant in Catholic South Louisiana, sought a running mate from South Louisiana. Verret undoubtedly increased Davis' South Louisiana popularity. He was born on a farm at Loreauville, fifteen miles north of New Iberia on September 13, 1886, and graduated from Southwestern Louisiana Institute (now the University of Southwestern Louisiana) in 1905. He worked as an assistant overseer and store clerk on Morbihan Plantation, invested in sugar cane land and a sugar mill, and in 1927 entered the insurance business. He gained his political experience on the Iberia Parish School Board to which he was elected in 1912. He became president of the parish school board in 1914 and held the post until 1944. In addition, he was president of the Louisiana School Boards Association in 1942, and thus had a network of political contacts throughout the state.

32 "Speech Delivered by Governor James H. Davis, Rotary Banquet Held June 6, 1945," transcript; "Address" (n.d., 1943), transcript copy; "Biography of J. Emile Verret, Candidate for Lieutenant-Governor on the Sam Jones Ticket," (n.d., 1948), J. Emile Verret Papers, Archives and Manuscripts Collection, Dupre Library, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Verret Collection). Davis in this instance followed the example of Governor Sam Jones. Even though Jones was a native of Beauregard parish, which is geographically but not culturally in South Louisiana, he chose Lafayette physician Marc Mouton as his running mate in 1939 to bolster his campaign in the French areas of the state, then retained Verret in the same role in his unsuccessful 1948 campaign.

33 "Biography of J. Emile Verret, Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana, 1944-1948," typescript copy, Verret Collection; Shreveport Times, October 30, 1943; Times-Picayune, January 26, 1944.
Following the completion of his bob-tailed ticket in late October, Davis spent November spreading his "You Are My Sunshine" philosophy in a campaign that was part political rally and part North Louisiana tent revival. He called for less state government interference with local governments and pledged a comprehensive program to conserve the state's exhaustible natural resources (especially natural gas). This program was a favorite of Sam Jones, who envisioned a vast industrial boom in post-war Louisiana, fueled by cheap natural gas. Davis also promised to provide college programs or trade school training to returning war veterans, wholeheartedly endorsed Civil Service (it "should not be tampered with"), and adopted Sam Jones' calls to develop Louisiana as the "air terminal of the two Americas."

In his role as peacemaker, Davis acknowledged that Louisianians appreciated improvements in the state, whether they were in the form of clean government or of increased benefits from the state government, no matter whose administration had instituted the benefits. He therefore incorporated some of the old Longite measures into his campaign: more adequate old age pensions, increased services for the poor and dependent, and construction of a preventive medicine program. He couched the last suggestion in terms of saving the state money. It cost the state less, he said, to keep a poor person well than to treat

34 The four original members of Davis' ticket were Davis, Verret, Fred LeBlanc of Baton Rouge for Attorney General, and James Gremillion of Crowley for Secretary of State. In the second primary campaign, Davis added incumbents John E. Coxe for Superintendent of Education, and A. P. Tugwell for State Treasurer.

35 Times-Picayune, November 3, 15, 18, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 16, 18, 28, 1943; Town Talk, November 17, 1943.
an illness. Even as he promised state benefits, however, he acknowledged that scarcity of goods and manpower caused by the war necessarily limited the services he expected his administration to provide. I could "promise you the moon with a fence around it," he told a Sunset audience, but "I wouldn't do that . . . because my policy on promises has always been 'if you can't fulfill them, don't make them.'"36

Davis also cast his campaign as a crusade. He wanted, he said, to make the governor and the citizens of the state into "good friends."

When asked why his band appeared with him on the political stage, Davis replied: "We always found [at Beech Springs] that people who liked to gather around the organ or music box and sing [were good friends] and that's what the people of Louisiana want to be with their governor -- good friends." He repeated many times that "Our meetings are friendly and happy. We are trying to spread sunshine and good will as we go along . . ." Davis reached the height of the religious overtones in his campaign in a speech at St. Martinville:

I think we should have more music and song and less fighting. When people are singing they are not fighting. I take this attitude about my so-called 'corn fed' music -- down this life's pathway, which way I'll go but once -- if somewhere down the road we can make someone's burden a little lighter and scatter some sunshine along the way, I'm only glad I've had the opportunity to do so.37

36 Town Talk, November 17, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 19, 29, 1943.

37 Morning Advocate, November 20, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 10, 1943.
While Jimmie Davis administered his soothing homilies to the voters, Lewis Morgan spent November combatting rumors about his ill health and attempting to heal the bitterness caused by the bruising fight for the Longite nomination. He opened the Longite campaign on November 3 with a Baton Rouge speech in which he promised a "sane and economical" administration, no use of state power to harass individuals, and freedom of parishes from state control. Morgan was almost immediately removed from active campaigning, however, by serious injuries incurred when a gas heater exploded in his Covington home.

In his stead, the Longite ticket embarked on a campaign tour of the state.\(^\text{38}\)

At early rallies on this tour, Earl Long tackled the question uppermost in the minds of many Longites: why had he abandoned his quest for the governorship? Long answered that he agreed to run on the Morgan ticket in the interest of "harmony and unity" and added, "I would run for dog catcher on any ticket that would end the regime of Sam Jones and his crowd."\(^\text{39}\)

James A. Noe's appearance at Longite campaign rallies in Monroe and West Monroe sparked a revival of reform interest in the Scandal era. The New Orleans States editorially recounted the charges and countercharges hurled between Earl Long and Noe during the 1939–40 campaign, and asked, "If Earl Long is what Jimmy Noe said he was, why does Mr. Noe support him? If Mr. Noe is the kind of character Earl

\(^{38}\)Morning Advocate, November 4, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 8, 1943.

\(^{39}\)Times-Picayune, November 8, 1943.
said he was, why does he accept his support?" An even more relevant question, the States mused, is "Why Mr. Morgan as head of the Maestri ticket accepts the support of either of them."  

United States Senator John Overton partially answered this last question early in 1944 when he charged that he had been "stabbed in the back" by his Longite friends. According to Overton, Noe had abandoned his 1943-44 gubernatorial candidacy and agreed to support the Morgan-Long ticket in exchange for his protege, Joe Cawthon's, place on the ticket and promises by Long and the Old Regulars to unseat Overton and support Noe in the fall, 1944, United States Senate race. The breach between Overton and the other Longites was healed before the second Democratic primary and caused only a minor stir in the campaign, but it revealed the most probable cause for Noe's withdrawal of his candidacy.

Rumor about Lewis Morgan's ill health caused concern among some Longites, and Morgan sought to allay those fears. He returned to active campaigning on November 11, declaring that his health was good, that he was able to serve "every single moment of a four year term," and that he was not merely a "stalking horse" for Earl Long: he had no intention of resigning the governorship and turning the office over to anyone else. Any attempt to do so, he said, would be

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40 States, November 9, 1943.

41 Morning Advocate, January 6, February 16, 1944. The Shreveport Times (January 6, 1944) commented that "If greater infamy could be added to such stabbing in the back, it would be added by the further fact that the Win or Lose Oil Company Jimmie Noe was to be the beneficiary."
"infamous." He reiterated his theme in a speech broadcast on both WNOE and WDSU radio stations:

Knowledge, experience, and sound judgment are qualities which can be acquired only through the passing of years.

Where youth brings to a cause fire and enthusiasm, maturity brings wisdom and courage . . .

Two days later, he asked in another radio speech, "Since when must a man defend his ability to continue to serve the people of his state because he is in his sixties? When, before, has maturity . . . been a matter which one must attempt to excuse, to vindicate, to live down?"

Morgan unveiled his platform on November 27 in a New Orleans speech. He made an obligatory attack on Sam Jones: "Sound economy means that no state administration . . . should neglect roads, schools or hospitals to glorify a surplus . . ." and revealed an ambitious, typically Longite platform of public services. Morgan's program included (for health care) well-equipped trailers to provide free dental care, free ambulance service in each parish, traveling tuberculosis X-ray clinics, and an improved system of charity hospitals; (for education) additional work scholarships for students, a trade school in every parish, and increased pay for school bus drivers and teachers; (for roads) rebuilding of farm to market roads, and widening existing main highways; (and in general) hiring Louisiana people for

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42 Shreveport Times, November 12, 1943; States, November 12, 1943.
43 States, November 26, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 28, 1943.
state jobs, lending every effort toward winning the war, reclaiming waste land, replenishing streams regularly with fish, teaching reforestation in high schools and colleges, "favoring" Civil Service, and providing $30 monthly old age pension checks.\footnote{Times-Picayune, November 28, 1943.}

Sam Caldwell opened his campaign in his Shreveport stronghold and called for adoption of a "Louisiana Charter," based loosely on the Atlantic Charter. The Louisiana Charter, he said, would include "Freedom from graft and corruption, political bosses, from those who could exploit our state for selfish gain, from inefficiency, waste, extravagance, punitive and vindictive legislation, bigotry, intolerance, bureaucrats, and dictators or control from whatever source it may come."\footnote{Shreveport Times, November 5, 1943; States, November 5, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 5, 1943.} Caldwell also received several important endorsements during November: the Shreveport Times and both Monroe newspapers, the Monroe Morning World and the Monroe News-Star, endorsed him, as did the American Democratic Association (despite its name, it was a state organization), which rescinded its original endorsement of Jimmie Davis because of his supposed involvement with Prescott Foster.\footnote{Shreveport Times, November 7, 28, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 11, 1943; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 183-184.}

James H. Morrison's early campaign focused on two themes: establishing himself as the only true "Huey Long man" in the race, and protecting himself from charges that he misused his Congressional office in his campaign for governor. Morrison declared that Lewis...
Morgan was really seventy-one years old instead of sixty-seven, as Morgan and the Old Regulars claimed, and that "I [Morrison] used to help him on all his harder court cases. Whenever he made a 15 minute speech, he had to go home and go to bed the next day." Morrison told an Abbeville audience that "You can't fight the Sam Jones faction with Davis [because of his ties to it], or with Morgan [because he is too infirm], but you can do it if you elect me." Morrison continued to draw the Morrison/Long parallel: "The only way you can get something for the people is to fight for it, just like Huey Long fought to get you roads, free school books, school busses, homestead exemption, and free hospitals." Elect me, he said, because "It is my hope to fight the battle for the people, just as Huey did ..."47

Morrison had to fight charges of his own political impropriety because of a series of letters he inserted in the Congressional Record, then mailed to Louisiana voters using his Congressional frank. The series included two general letters, one concerning the military situation ("I have supported President Roosevelt and the armed forces on every war measure"), the other recounting the "thousands" of mistakes in family allotment checks received from servicemen, mistakes he helped to correct and also cases in which he tried to help worried family members locate a missing or wounded serviceman. He also inserted letters directed to "Dear Fellow Elected Officials," and "Dear School Bus Driver," as well as his response to a letter of inquiry (obviously contrived) from Alfred Bateman, Manager of the Ascension

47 Morning Advocate, November 20, 1943; States, November 22, 1943; Shreveport Times, November 28, 1943.
Farmers' Cooperative Association, in which Morrison detailed forty ways in which he had helped his district or the state. United States Postal officials investigated whether Morrison's action could be considered improper and announced before the first primary that he was entirely within his rights as a Congressman to insert material in the Congressional Record and then frank it to his state. Morrison, they added, used his own funds to pay the duplication costs for the copies mailed to Louisiana. Even though he was cleared of any improper behavior in the episode, the investigation provided an aura of questionable ethics which Morrison's opponents exploited.

State Senator Ernest S. Clements was the only other candidate to draw statewide attention in the opening phase of the campaign. Clements attempted to establish himself as the only truly independent candidate in the race. Morgan and Davis, he said, were both "hand picked" candidates. "Elect me governor of Louisiana," he told a hometown Oberlin audience, "and show the Maestri and Jones gangs in New Orleans that the people in the country don't want them to hand-pick

48 Congressional Record, 78 Congress 2 Session Appendix, Volume 90 Part 10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. A3267, A3348-A3349, A3598; Times-Picayune, November 18, 1943. Morrison did help a number of servicemen's dependents who had trouble either receiving their allotment check or hearing from their loved one. His papers still contain copies of hundreds, if not thousands, of letters he wrote to federal government agencies on behalf of his constituents who experienced these problems during the war years. Just prior to the first Democratic primary, Morrison admitted using his frank to mail the letters and commented that instead of condemning him, the federal investigators congratulated him on keeping "the folks back home" informed on current events. Times-Picayune, January 18, 1944.

49 States, December 31, 1943; James H. Morrison interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, May 13, 1982.
candidates and cram them down your throats." Clements also reminded
Louisianians that he had stood alone in his fight against the Crime
Commission, Reorganization Act, and the sales tax. He unveiled a
decidedly rural Longite platform calling for extensions of mail and
school bus routes, restocking lakes and woods with wildlife, protec­
tion of trappers and fishermen, as well as old age pensions and
"rehabilitation" of needy World War II veterans. 50

The candidates continued their campaigns during December, 1943.
Sam Caldwell and Frank Ellis spent the month attempting to convince
voters that they were the only independent candidates in the race. On
December 1, Caldwell's most influential backer, the Shreveport Times,
blasted both the Prescott Foster-Jimmie Davis and Maestri-Morgan-Earl
Long political machines for a recent "whispering campaign" which held
that "Sam Caldwell is the best candidate in the governor's race, but
he can't be elected without a machine." Instead, the Shreveport Times
maintained, Caldwell will be elected because he has no political
machine behind him. 51

Caldwell repeatedly returned to this theme during the month.
"The day of the political bosses in Louisiana is at an end," he said
on December 3, "whether the machine that supports a candidate be in
New Orleans or Baton Rouge, the voters of the state . . . resent this
organized attempt to force a candidate down their throats." Or, as
he said more simply in a later speech stressing his own independence:

50 States, November 15, 25, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 15, 1943.
51 Shreveport Times, December 1, 1943.
"I have no strings tied to me."  

Caldwell also charged that Prescott Foster had first attempted to run State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell for governor. The Tugwell candidacy, however, disintegrated when Tugwell's questionable association with businessman William T. Burton was revealed at Burton's tax evasion trial. Foster then endorsed Davis, Caldwell said, "whom he had guffawed at before."  

In a series of North Louisiana speeches during the first half of December, Caldwell also attacked Jimmie Davis because Davis' singing career added nothing to his political experience: "Do the people of Louisiana want to become the laughing stock of other states?" he asked a Lake Providence audience. "If so, all they must do is to elect a crooner of sweet nothings to the highest and most dignified office within their gift." Or, as he said more pointedly in an Oak Ridge speech, "If we must have an entertainer to lead us in these [perilous times], then let's send to Hollywood and get a good one. I

52 Ibid., December 9, 11-12, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 4, 1943.  

53 Shreveport Times, December 12, 1943. Tugwell testified during Burton's trial that Burton had given him $5,000 in 1936 to speed up payment due Burton for shells, dredging, towing, barge rentals, and other services he provided the Louisiana Highway Commission because Burton was afraid that incoming governor Richard Leche thought that a recent $15,000 business payment from Burton to James A. Noe was a political contribution and would therefore withhold or delay the $84,000 payment in retaliation. While Tugwell's acceptance of the $5,000 payment may not have been technically illegal (he provided, after all, only his normal service in paying the legitimate $84,000 debt), it was unethical, and it ended his brief boomlet for governor in 1943. Shreveport Times, July 21, 1943.
believe Mickey Rooney is available."

Jimmie Davis began December pleasantly with the endorsement of the Times-Picayune-New Orleans States in an editorial that recounted the fight for reform four years earlier, as a result of which "we have had clean, efficient, scandal-free government," and urged Davis' election "because we are convinced he will give Louisiana the honorable, constructive administration every good citizen wants . . through the four years ahead."

Davis maintained his relaxed campaign style developed during the previous month. An appearance in his hometown of Shreveport, for example, included his brief recapitulation of his life, general suggestions for various improvements needed in the state, a comment that if the constantly warring peoples of Europe would "gather 'round (sic) the organ, take the old fiddle down from the fireplace and sing a while, there would be less trouble in the world," followed by a music program during which Davis interspersed political comment between songs. He sang "Live and Let Live" ("Live and let live. Don't break may heart . . .") and remarked that the attitude suggested by the lyrics "would be a good policy for any governor."

Jimmie Davis and Emile Verret also further defined the reform

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54 Shreveport Times, December 9, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 11, 1943.

55 Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 5, 1943. The other major New Orleans newspapers also endorsed Davis, the States on December 24, 1943 in an action separate from the Times-Picayune New Orleans States endorsement, and the Item on January 8, 1944.

56 Shreveport Times, December 15, 1943.

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platform during December. Davis in a speech at Clarks publicly endorsed a $30 minimum old-age pension, vocational education, and increased services for the poor. Verret, meanwhile, reiterated the general provisions of the platform: ridding the state of bifactional hate and preserving the positive achievements of past administrations. Both candidates promised continued economic development in Louisiana after the war. Davis told an Alexandria audience that servicemen from all forty-eight states had received military training in Louisiana, and he hoped that many would return after the war to become permanent residents. Verret noted that "with our reserve of resources, we can attain as great a prosperity in time of peace as we attained during the war... built upon firm, enduring foundations not subject to curtailment of any Armistice day." Davis in a Mangham speech stressed his belief that Louisiana should reduce its exports of natural gas in order to conserve its natural resources for an attempt to become one of the great industrial centers of the south following the war.  

Davis' campaign received a small boost during the last days of December when Theodore Hotard, president of the Orleans parish school board, and Samuel J. Boylan, tax assessor for the fifth municipal district (Algiers), both members of the Old Regular faction, bolted from the Morgan-Long ticket ("a set of candidates who were repudiated at the polls four years ago," they termed the Longites) in order to

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57 Morning Advocate, December 17, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 19, 1943; Times-Picayune, December 23, 1943; Verret Address (n.d., 1943?), Verret Address (December 3, 1943), Verret Collection.
support Davis. The *Times-Picayune* editorially applauded Hotard and Boylan for their farsightedness. The newspaper also took full advantage of the opportunity to remind the voters of the Scandals and called the Old Regular endorsement of Morgan and Long "a flat defiance of the public will and the public interest."^58^  

Jimmie Davis also suffered sharp criticism during December. The *Shreveport Times* attacked "Absentee Ace" Davis for his excessive absence from Shreveport city commission council meetings when he was Commissioner of Public Safety: ". . . he didn't have much time at home those days," the newspaper noted, "what with going east to make juke box records, eyeing Hollywood, and keeping the old hill-billy band tuned up for 'come election time.'"^59^  

The sharpest criticism of Davis, however, came from Sam Caldwell, who charged that the speeches attributed to Davis in newspapers were "but figments of the imagination of his roving press agent." Caldwell commented that one of his friends attended a Davis rally during which Davis acted as master of ceremonies, sang, and mumbled a few "inaudible" words. Caldwell's friend was surprised to read in the next day's newspapers that Davis had "discussed reforestation and the lumber industry in the manner of an expert."^60^  

Caldwell's ally, the *Shreveport Times*, immediately took up his theme. The newspaper on December 17 editorially charged that Davis'
press agents filed reports that Davis made wide-ranging erudite speeches on various subjects, when, in fact, he had not done so. The Shreveport Times also revealed that the situation had arisen because of the wartime shortages of gasoline, tires, and manpower. Major newspapers which normally assigned a reporter to travel with each major candidate in a gubernatorial campaign and file reports did not do so this time because of the shortages, but instead relied on reports wired in from each candidate. Later in the month, the Shreveport Times reported that because of its revelation of the fraudulent speeches, the Associated Press would no longer quote Davis directly in its dispatches, but instead only noted that his press agent quoted him as saying something.  

In fact, the charges that Davis or his agents reported more complete and meaty speeches than he actually made appears to have been more than mere campaign rhetoric. During the 1947-48 gubernatorial campaign, for example, Dave McGuire reported to candidate Sam Jones that the Times-Picayune refused to take road quotes from candidates "because they were badly burned by phony reporting during the 1944 Davis campaign . . .".  

The Lewis Morgan/Earl Long ticket exhibited a rare unity during December. Morgan in a speech at Olla on December 1 pledged to rebuild the state highway system, provide $30 per month old age pensions to  

61 Shreveport Times, December 17, 29, 1943.  

62 Dave McGuire to Sam Jones, October 22, 1947, DeLesseps Story Morrison Papers, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as D. Morrison Collection).
every needy person above sixty years of age, and admission to charitable health institutions by presenting a certificate of medical need from a practicing physician. Then on December 6, he also pledged full support to both New Orleans and state Civil Service systems.  

Morgan also attacked the reformers by attacking Sam Jones. In a speech at Columbia, he attacked the surplus generated by the sales tax but not used — "... no administration ... should neglect our roads, our schools, our hospitals to glorify a surplus and to cast upon the succeeding administration the burden not only of its current expenses but the additional burden of repairing and replacing the normal wear and tear which occurred during the proceeding four years." Morgan and his running mate also charged that the reformers were using the state governmental apparatus to coerce voters by ordering state officials to "put Davis over if you want to hold your jobs."  

Earl Long appeared with Morgan at various political rallies throughout the month and joined his attacks on the reformers: he asked the voters to defeat the "Jones-Davis do-nothing ticket" and return liberal government to the state; he charged that Davis in fact had a contract which provided that he would appear in Hollywood several months of each year and called on Davis to tell the people if they would have a full-time or a part-time governor if they voted him into office; he joined in the charges that Davis did not deliver the speeches attributed to him and added that, moreover, Sam Jones’

63 Morning Advocate, December 2, 7, 12, 1943.

64 Ibid., December 11, 1943; Shreveport Times, December 12, 1943.
publicity agents wrote Davis' speeches. 65

New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri joined the Longite campaign against Davis by speaking at Morgan-Long rallies in New Orleans and Algiers, where he commanded some political support and would not stir up resentment from angry rural voters. Maestri reminded his audiences that some of the legislation the reformers claimed was in fact passed with the help of legislators supported and elected by the Old Regulars. 66

The other candidates and their allies, meanwhile, struck at Morgan. Jimmie Morrison stressed that Morgan, "a fine old gentleman," was nevertheless "71 years old with a weak heart and in bad health." The Shreveport Times charged that Morgan's pledge to build a vocational school in every parish was merely a ploy to provide building contracts to his friends. The Times-Picayune, however, struck hardest at Morgan in an editorial intimating that even though "so far as we know, he was not personally involved" in the Louisiana Scandals, Morgan had served in the Longite administrations guilty of looting the state, and was thus guilty by association: "he continued to occupy a luxurious rumble seat on the state machine until Louisiana voters junked it . . ." 67

65 Morning Advocate, December 2, 5, 11, 12, 1943; Shreveport Times, December 12, 22, 1943.

66 Item, December 13, 1943; States, December 23, 1943. Even though he confined his campaign appearances to his New Orleans base, Maestri had to defend himself against charges that he was attempting to establish himself as dictator by endorsing Morgan. See Times-Picayune, January 13, 1944.

67 Shreveport Times, December 15, 17, 1943; Times-Picayune, December 18, 1943.
The candidates continued their campaigns until the date of the first Democratic primary, in January of 1944, on the same issues. Jimmie Davis maintained his "sunshine" campaign: "we must elect to office men who have no hatred in their hearts and whose records prove that they have the interests of the masses of the people at heart," and stressed his independence ("the man doesn't live who will tell me what to do in politics"). Earl Long, however, harbored no doubts about Davis' supposed independence. As he told an audience at Rayne, "Any one with a thimble full of sense would know that Jimmie Davis has the full blessing of the Jones group . . ." Long also attempted to throw Huey's mantle over the Morgan-Long ticket: "Don't lose all the benefits that my brother Huey worked his life out to give you."68

The lack of substantive issues in the 1943-44 gubernatorial campaign is revealed in a minor smear attempt which developed after Shirley Wimberly, president of the American Democratic Association in New Orleans, called on Jimmie Davis to defend himself against whispered rumors that he had written and recorded songs with serial numbers 60836AB and 60837AB on the Decca Records label, namely "Bed Bug Blues" and "High Geared Mama." "To say that these songs are suggestive, indecent, and vile," Wimberly judged, "would be a decided understatement. They were obviously designed for the entertainment of the denizens of the lowest dives and dens of inequity." The East Baton Rouge Morgan Committee added that not only had Davis recorded those two songs, he had also written and performed other equally

questionable tunes entitled "High Geared Daddy," Honkey-Tonk Blues," "Mama's Getting Hot," "Papa's Getting Cold," and "Shirt Tail Blues." A political advertisement the committee placed in the Morning Advocate maintained that the words to these songs were "unprintable, but suffice it to say that they glorify the 'Bottom' or red light district in Shreveport which ran wide open while Jimmie Davis was Commissioner of Public Safety."69

Jimmie Morrison joined in the attack on Davis, who, he said, "has no political record that can be seen [but does have] several obscene records that no decent people would like to hear." Both Morrison and the Longites, however, found it difficult to label as "obscene" a man who had so successfully cultivated the image of "sunshine, peace, and harmony" as had Jimmie Davis. When they attempted to stigmatize Davis as crude and indecent, Morrison and Long were themselves forcefully rebuffed. When Morrison, for example, played "Red Nightgown Blues," another of Davis' risque records, at a Shreveport rally, the audience began dancing! Morrison became enraged, broke the record, and exclaimed "Elect him if you want him." Earl Long, faring no better, played "Bed Bug Blues" for a group of ministers, expecting to hear comments of shock and outrage, but instead, heard a thankful expression that even though Davis "used to be on the wrong side of the fence ... now he's seen the light! Thank the Lord!"70

69 Morning Advocate, January 16, 1944; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 68-69; Gary Mills and Grady McWhiney, "Jimmie Davis As A Figure of Continuity in Country Music," paper presented to the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March 25, 1983.

70 Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 68-69.
Despite these charges, the Jones administration swung more openly behind Davis' candidacy during the week before the first Democratic primary. On January 11, Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton announced from his sickbed that he realized that he was fighting a losing battle for his life and that he therefore had nothing to lose by speaking out on the race. He recalled the "days of political plunder and shame and disgrace," and pled with voters to elect Jimmie Davis in order to keep Louisiana from returning to those bad days.  

Sam Jones, in his election-eve broadcast, still declined to endorse Davis by name, but he also reminded his audience of Louisiana's sordid political past:

> It is easy to forget some of the things of the past. It is easy to forget the fraud, the corruption, the abuses, the crimes, and the suicides. The wholesale thievery and the rest are easily forgotten, but let me remind you that a man you once honored as governor of this state paid his visit to the Atlanta penitentiary.

Despite Jones' refusal to endorse Davis, his remarks clearly indicated that he preferred a reformer to follow him: "... every single gain you the people have made over these years can be wiped out in a period of five months after the next governor takes office," he advised his audience, "and I tell you that at least some of the candidates for the office would like to do that very thing."  

71 Times-Picayune, January 12, 1944; Morning Advocate, January 12, 1944. Mouton died on August 21, 1944.

72 Times-Picayune, January 18, 1944; Shreveport Times, January 18, 1944.
Perry H. Howard maintains that the 1943-44 election was the first of a "new competitive Louisiana politics" in which first Democratic primaries became "sorting out contests as increasingly more candidates . . . vied for a position in the runoff." While Howard's observation is accurate, the 1943-44 election, even though it marked a new evolution of Louisiana politics, also remained firmly in the bifactional tradition of recent Louisiana politics. The two leading candidates in the first primary were Jimmie Davis (34.9 per cent of the vote), and Lewis Morgan (27.5 per cent). The Longites and the established reformers left both the independent Longites and the independent reformers in the dust. Davis received 167,343 votes and scored a plurality in 34 parishes, while Morgan received 131,682 votes and achieved a plurality in 11 parishes.

Even though the reformers took comfort in Davis' lead over Morgan, the first primary returns revealed that they also had cause for concern. The combined "Longite" votes (Morgan+Morrison+Clements+LeBlanc) was 56.1 per cent of the total, while the combined "reform" vote (Davis+Caldwell+Lanier+Moseley) was only 43.9 per cent of the total. Moreover, reformers had trailed badly in several of the races for lesser state offices. Verret trailed Long in the lieutenant-governor's race by 128,232 votes to Long's 194,155; Gremillion trailed Martin in the secretary of state race; LeBlanc trailed Cawthorn in the attorney general race; Coxe trailed Frazar in the superintendent

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74 Ibid., p. 270; Item, January 26, 1944.
of education race; and Registrar of State Lands Lucille May Grace and Commissioner of Agriculture Harry D. Wilson won re-election to their offices. These results showed that the taxpayer suits and legislative opposition to Sam Jones' program had not been the dying gasp of a beaten faction. Instead, Longism, discredited and battered four years before, had bounded back marvelously. Reform forces still faced a stiff battle to preserve their control of the government.

The two candidates remaining in the gubernatorial race after the first primary immediately began collecting endorsements for their second primary efforts. Ernest Clements endorsed Lewis Morgan on January 20, as did Lee Lanier on January 25, Vincent Moseley on January 30 (Moseley announced his endorsement of a split ticket of Morgan and Emile Verret for lieutenant-governor), and Jimmie Morrison on February 18. Sam Caldwell congratulated both Morgan and Davis for their success in the first Democratic primary but announced his neutrality in the second primary, as did the Ewing newspapers in North Louisiana (the Shreveport Times, the Monroe Morning World, and Monroe News-Star), which had formed his bedrock support. Jimmie Davis received the endorsement only of Dudley LeBlanc among the unsuccessful gubernatorial aspirants.

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75 Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 270; Item, January 26, 1944.

76 Times-Picayune, January 21, 26, 31, 1944; Item, February 19, 1944; Morning Advocate, February 19, 1944.

77 Shreveport Times, January 22, 1944; Morning Advocate, January 22, 1944.

78 Item, January 29, 1944; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 30, 1944.
In addition to the scramble for support from unsuccessful gubernatorial candidates, Morgan and Davis also sought help from candidates for lesser state offices. On January 26, James A. Gremillion, the incumbent secretary of state for whom the reformers had fought so hard against Earl Long's backdoor attempt to stay in public office in 1940, withdrew from his second primary re-election campaign, leaving his Longite opponent, Wade O. Martin, Jr., as the Democratic nominee.\(^79\) Attorney General candidate Joe Cawthorn reaffirmed his steadfast support for the entire Morgan-Long ticket, and the Long machine promised its continued support of him.\(^80\) Jimmie Davis, meanwhile, received endorsements from incumbent Superintendent of Education John E. Coxe, and incumbent Treasurer Andrew P. Tugwell, and added them to his ticket.\(^81\)

No new issues emerged in the second primary campaign. Morgan continued to attack the reform administration of Sam Jones: "Never will you find Lewis Morgan using the power of his office to oppress people by threatening to close the largest state hospital in Louisiana as a means of gaining political legislation, such as was done by the present administration in 1942." Morgan also charged that Jones was

\(^{79}\) Times-Picayune, January 27, 1944; Item, January 27, 1944. In response to Gremillion's defection, Davis' campaign manager, W. H. Talbot, referred vaguely to "a huge slush fund" the Longites were exploiting to regain control of the state and its natural resources.

\(^{80}\) Morning Advocate, January 29, 1944; Henry D. Larcade, Jr. to Joseph T. Cawthorn, December 27, 1943, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).

\(^{81}\) Morning Advocate, January 29, 1944; Times-Picayune, February 4, 1944.
attempting to coerce Civil Service employees into supporting Davis. In addition to his offensive, Morgan also attempted to draw Huey's mantle even more tightly around himself: "[I]f you want the kind of government originated by Huey Long in 1928," he told a Coushatta audience, "then go to the polls and vote for Lewis Morgan." The next day at Homer, he called Huey "That sandy-haired boy who came from Winn parish in 1928," and declared that "he was the most affectionate and beloved friend I ever had." 

The reform faction continued its drumbeat of denunciation of Longite corruption. The Times-Picayune New Orleans States commented that "... very few will vote deliberately for Louisiana's betrayal and forced retreat to the scandalous deals that stained Louisiana's good name and wasted her funds and resources during the previous Maestri-Leche-Long dictatorship." Davis, in a state-wide radio speech (we know he delivered this one!), asked whether the voters thought that "the city ring [can] bring harmony to you? So long as one part of the state tries to dominate the other, this can never be. All the great fights in Louisiana politics came about because of this attempted domination." Even though Davis' speech reveals an incomplete understanding of Louisiana politics, the sentiment is clear. It was a surprisingly strident presentation for Davis.

Easily the most explosive event of the second primary was the

82 Morning Advocate, January 30, February 17, 25, 1944.
83 Ibid., February 17-18, 1944.
84 Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 23, 1944; Morning Advocate, February 18, 1944.
threatened disintegration of the Longite faction. The trouble stemmed from a quirky provision of the 1921 Constitution which provided that if there was no second primary for governor, either because a candidate was nominated in the first primary or because one of the candidates selected for the second primary withdrew from that race, then there would be no second primary for any other state office, and the candidate with the highest number of votes in each of the lesser statewide races would automatically be declared the Democratic nominee. Immediately after the results of the first primary became apparent the Longites realized that if Lewis Morgan withdrew from the second primary they would obviously lose the governorship again but would gain control of powerful, though lesser, state offices. Despite this realization, the Old Regulars on January 20 announced that they would continue the fight through the second primary. 85

Other Longites, however, apparently harbored reservations about the wisdom of continuing the contest. Lewis Morgan announced on January 21 that he intended to stay in the race, even though current rumors suggested that he would withdraw. Scarcely a week later, however, Morgan announced that "a political friend" was negotiating with Jimmie Davis forces to bring the campaign to a quick end. On February 1, after a speech in Lafayette, Morgan replied "Yes, that's right" when asked whether Earl Long was the "political friend" negotiating with Davis. 86

85 Shreveport Times, January 21, 1944.
86 Times-Picayune, January 22, February 1-2, 1944; Morning Advocate, February 2, 1944.
Morgan's announcement split Longite ranks. Lucille May Grace and Wade O. Martin, Jr. announced that they would "stick by Lewis Morgan" through his "darkest hour" filled with "terrific sabotage." Earl Long, however, denied any knowledge of Morgan's charge: "You can tell 'em (sic) I expressed utter surprise," he told a Times-Picayune reporter. W. H. Talbot announced that he knew of no contacts between the Davis and Long forces. Maestri declined to comment on the charge. 87

Former Judge James D. Womack dropped a bombshell into Longite ranks during an address broadcast over WNOE and WDSU radio on February 4, in which he revealed the alleged details of the Davis-Long deal. Womack claimed that he had attended a Longite conference at the Montejoine Hotel in New Orleans on January 25 at which Earl Long announced that John Fred Odom, E. A. Stephens, and Wade Garnier of the reform camp, had requested a meeting with him. Long obtained Maestri's permission for the meeting, and then heard the reformers' proposition: Morgan would be "prevented" from contesting the second primary, thus electing Davis and the high man in each of the other races. In exchange for Longite derailment of Morgan's campaign, Davis would leave the state six months following his inauguration to make movies in Hollywood, leaving Earl Long in charge as acting governor. Davis would also resign his office eight months before the 1948 primary, thus giving Long the additional perquisites of the incumbancy to use in his campaign for the governorship. In addition, Womack said, Long

87 Times-Picayune, February 2-3, 1944.
reported that both Davis and Sam Jones promised to support his 1948 bid for the governorship. 88

The principals named in Womack's speech immediately issued hot denials. Davis -- "I have never had a political conference with Earl Long in my life;" Stephens -- "unqualifiedly untrue;" Odom -- "preposterous and untrue;" Long -- "nonsense." (Long also paid Davis an uncharacteristic compliment during the episode. Davis, he said, told "the absolute truth" when he denied the alleged negotiations.) 89

The accuracy of Womack's fantastic charges cannot be determined. The absurdity ("giddiest absurdity" the Item characterized it) 90 of the political shenanigans he outlined, however, undermines his credibility. It is difficult to imagine the reformers willingly yielding control of the state to Earl Long six months after Davis' inauguration. It is virtually impossible to imagine Sam Jones agreeing to support Earl Long for governor in 1948. It is possible, however, that Womack's charge did stem from knowledge of a meeting that had taken place. Earl Long admitted that he had, in fact, met with a group of men whom he "presumed to represent Davis," but that they only sought to establish the basis for a smooth administration in case he and Davis were elected to office. 91

88 Times-Picayune, February 5, 1944; Item, February 5, 1944; Morning Advocate, February 6, 1944. When he repeated these charges during a speech broadcast over WJBO in Baton Rouge the night following his New Orleans broadcast, Womack changed the site of the political meeting he attended on January 25 from the Monteleone to the Roosevelt Hotel.

89 Times-Picayune, February 5, 1944; Item, February 7, 1944.

90 Item, February 7, 1944.

91 Morning Advocate, February 7, 1944; Town Talk, February 7, 1944.
Even though the breach in Longite ranks was healed by the Old Regular announcement that they would endorse the same ticket in the second primary that they had backed in the first primary (i.e., Morgan-Long with no exceptions), the rifts were only papered over. Morgan in a Winnsboro speech on February 19, asked his audience to vote for "every solitary man" on his ticket — the first time he had asked for support for the entire ticket since the disagreement with Long. Joe Cawthorn in Gonzales on February 20 announced that "we've all joined hands . . . There is no more confusion in our ranks. We'll never split again." But Morgan and Long did not appear together until their closing New Orleans rally at Municipal Auditorium.  

The results of the second primary revealed that even though the Longites had shown a surprising strength in the campaign, they were not strong enough to overcome the reformers. Jimmie Davis was elected governor with 251,228 votes (54 per cent of the total) to Morgan's 217,915. Moreover, reform candidates swept into all the contested state offices: Verret for lieutenant governor, LeBlanc for attorney general, Tugwell for treasurer, and Coxe for superintendent of education.  

92 Morning Advocate, February 20–21, 28, 1944.  

93 Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 271; Morning Advocate, March 8, 1944. Davis carried 44 parishes and 7 of Louisiana's 8 Congressional Districts, losing only the First District, which consisted of lower Orleans parish, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes. Davis remembered this loss, and during an appearance at Port Sulphur in Plaquemines parish in 1945, dedicated a song to its residents, then burst into a chorus of "It Makes No Difference Now." Item, August 1, 1945. The race issue which became important in Louisiana politics during the late 1950s and early 1960s caused several new and strange (by previous standards) alliances within the state, one of which was Leander Perez and Jimmie Davis. See Glen Jeansonne, Race, Religion, and Politics The Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1959–60.
Observation of the 1944 second Democratic primary results shows that while Davis added to the number of parishes voting anti-Long in north Louisiana compared to the 1940 results, he lost some of the southern and Florida parishes Sam Jones had carried. Davis' native Jackson parish, East and West Carroll, Franklin, and Concordia parishes joined the ranks of the reformers in 1944, while Grant and Caldwell left the reformers and voted for Lewis Morgan. Beauregard joined Calcasieu and Jefferson Davis parishes in southwest Louisiana in voting for Davis, but Allen and Cameron parishes remained Longite. Acadia and St. Martin parishes in south Louisiana voted for Morgan by comfortable margins, 52.6 per cent to 47.4 per cent in Acadia and 55.6 per cent to 44.4 per cent in St. Martin, but Davis carried St. Bernard, which had voted for Earl Long in 1940. Morgan's lifelong association with the Florida parishes allowed him to erode anti-Long strength in this region. St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Livingston parishes all voted for the Longite in 1944.

Nevertheless, with the continued exception of Orleans, Davis held on to the urban areas of the state. East Baton Rouge parish preferred him 66.8 per cent to 33.2 per cent for Morgan; Calcasieu by 52.8 per cent to 47.2 per cent; Rapides by 58.3 per cent to 41.7 per cent; Ouachita by 64.1 per cent to 35.9 per cent; and Caddo by 75.4 per cent to 24.6 per cent.

The reformers, of course, were well pleased with the second primary results. Sam Jones remarked that Davis' election demonstrated

(Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), p. 112; and Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 257-260.
that his own election four years before had not been merely a "flash in the pan." The 1940 campaign, he said, "was won by the flame of spontaneous revolt against shocking scandal." The 1944 reform victory, in contrast, "was brought about by the unspectacular but deliberate determination of the people to continue clean, independent government." Former reform United States Representative T. Hale Boggs wrote to Emile Verret congratulating him on his victory over Earl Long: "In defeating him you have earned the everlasting gratitude of the people of Louisiana." State Representative DeLesseps Morrison, a thoroughgoing reformer then on army duty overseas, wrote to his mother that "[It] looks like . . . a prolonged era of good government is in for Louisiana . . . Thank God, we are through with Joe Cawthorn, Earl Long, and the like. Here's hoping [the reformers] don't start making deals with the Old Regulars . . . as long as you play with dogs, you're bound to catch fleas."94

The Longites, meanwhile, were gracious in their defeat. Robert Maestri said that "Because I have always been of the democratic opinion that the rule of the majority prevails, [!] I congratulate Mr. Davis on his election . . ." Lewis Morgan extended his "sincere and hearty" congratulations to Davis, and hoped "that his administration will be one to which the people may point with some satisfaction at its close . . ."95

94 Morning Advocate, March 1, April 29, 1944; DeLesseps S. Morrison to Anita O. Morrison, March 12, 1944, D. Morrison Collection; Hale Boggs to Emile Verret, March 6, 1944, Verret Collection.

95 Morning Advocate, March 2, 1944.
In contrast to the 1939-40 campaign, the 1943-44 contest had been tame. Even the war, which dominated so much of American life, failed to dominate Louisiana's political agenda. Gas rationing caused the candidates some minor transportation problems, even though the Office of Price Administration in Washington, D.C., empowered local ration boards in Louisiana to issue special gasoline rations to the candidates.96

The war issue entered the campaign only in two minor themes. First, calls came from various sources to conduct a serious campaign without the ballyhoo, innuendo, distortion, and lies usually present in Louisiana campaigns (admonitions that went unheeded). The second war theme which entered the campaign was the pledges made by both Jimmie Davis and Lewis Morgan to provide "rehabilitation" and jobs for the returning servicemen and servicewomen.97 Neither of these war-related issues achieved major importance in the campaign.

Jimmie Davis' election to Louisiana's highest office in 1944 allowed reform elements in Louisiana another four years in which to

96 Times-Picayune, September 16, 1943; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, p. 66; W. Scott Heywood to Prentiss M. Brown, October 4, 1943, Jennings-Heywood Collection. J. E. Brumfield, district director of the OPA said in Shreveport that all properly qualified candidates would receive enough gas coupons to carry on their campaign, but would not receive coupons for transportation of bands, sound trucks, or campaign workers.

97 Morning Advocate, August 19, 21, 1943; "Address," (n.d., 1943), Verret Collection. The concerns about providing "rehabilitation" to returning combat servicemen after the end of the war were shared by people throughout the United States who wanted their loved ones back from the battlefields, but realized that the veteran would not be the same person as the recruit they had sent away to war. As the war wound to its conclusion, a real concern developed that battle-hardened and scarred veterans might wreak havoc in the country, either because of psychological disorders or by turning their military training to criminal uses. See Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years 1945-1950 (New York, Antheneum, 1976), pp. 37-51, the chapter entitled "Preparing for Ulysses."
govern the state. Relations between the outgoing and incoming adminis-
trations remained cordial. Governor and Mrs. Jones invited the
Davises to move into the governor's mansion with them on May 1, to
allow them to become accustomed to their new quarters and also to
simplify some of the confusion of inauguration day. Jimmie Davis,
however, served notice to the reformers that even though he would
preserve those aspects of their program he considered useful, he was
not Sam Jones. When asked whether he endorsed all of Jones' reform
program, Davis replied, "I never take stock in anybody's politics ex-
cept my own." 98

Even though some of the reformers never fully accepted a profes-
sional country singer as the champion of good government in Louisi-
99 ana, Jimmie Davis in 1944 began establishing his own very different
leadership of the state.

Shortly after winning the second Democratic primary in February,
1944, which ensured his election as Louisiana's sixty-eighth governor,
Davis made two announcements. He believed he would be too busy to
make more films or record any songs for a while, and also rejected an
offer to star in a special movie, "The Singing Governor," based
loosely on his life, planned by Columbia Studios in Hollywood. 100

98 Morning Advocate, April 16, 25, 1944.
100 Morning Advocate, March 5, 17, 1944; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp.
79-80. The eventual movie based on Davis' life, "Louisiana," was not
made until 1947 by Monogram Pictures. Davis' prediction that he would
neglect his entertainment career was wrong. He spent 44 days out of
state in fiscal 1944-45, and 68 days in fiscal 1945-46. See Sindler,
Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 190. Davis later excused his action by main-
taining that many of these days were on week-ends when he flew to re-
cording sessions in Nashville or New York. Nevertheless, he twice ex-
hausted the contingency fund which pays the lieutenant governor the
Davis was officially elected governor of Louisiana in the general election on April 18, 1944. He was unopposed and the voter turnout was typically low.

Davis' inauguration was much simpler than Sam Jones' extravaganza held four years before. Gasoline and tire rationing reduced the crowd to an estimated 10,000 people, compared to the approximately 100,000 who had crowded into Baton Rouge to witness Jones' inauguration. The simple inaugural ceremony was held on the capitol steps, rather than in the Louisiana State University football stadium, and there were no inaugural balls. Following the inaugural speech, Governor and Mrs. Davis held an open house at the governor's mansion. 101

Jimmie Davis worked even before his inauguration to translate his "peace and harmony" campaign style into administrative reality. He endorsed incumbent House Speaker Norman Bauer of St. Mary parish for re-election to that post, and reformer Grove Stafford of Rapides parish as President-Pro-Tempore of the Senate. He also announced, however, that in issuing these endorsements, he was not attempting to downgrade the qualifications of any other candidates for the posts. Davis also met with legislators from around the state, including those from the First and Second Congressional districts (in and around New Orleans) who possessed slightly more than one-fifth of the votes in the legislature. He revealed in the meeting with the Orleans delega-

governor's salary when the subordinate official must substitute for the chief executive.

101 Morning Advocate, April 19, May 7, 10, 1944; Item, May 9, 1944; Shreveport Times, May 10, 1944. The inaugural crowd included Davis' mother, but his father was too ill to attend the ceremony and died on February 6, 1945.
tion that he had no "must" legislation, but that he expected wide-
spread support for his "non-political" program which included renewal
of the sales tax, re-enactment of the gas-gathering tax, and separa-
tion of the Conservation Department into two agencies — one for wild-
life and one for minerals. The initial success of his effort to estab-
lish "peace and harmony" was revealed in a public letter from Longite
Secretary of State Wade O. Martin, Jr. to Davis pledging "my . . .
active support, co-operation, and assistance in every matter which
shall have for its purpose the advancement and improvement of the
state of Louisiana."102

The dove of peace had apparently settled over the legislature
by the time it convened on May 8, 1944. Old Regular leaders told
the members of their delegation to the legislature that they would
"play ball" with Davis, and entered no candidates in the races for
House Speaker or Senate President-Pro-Tempore. Some reform elements
in the state hoped that the new legislative mood signaled an improved
political climate in Louisiana: the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate
commented, "Politically speaking, there is today more unity and good
will among the people of Louisiana than has been seen in a long while
... [We] believe that, in a manner of speaking, the sun will shine
in Louisiana for the next four years."103

The legislature met in joint session on May 15 to hear the new
governor's plans for the state. Davis, however, revealed no specific

102Morning Advocate, May 2, 6, 1944; States, May 4, 1944; Item, May 6, 1944.

103Morning Advocate, May 8, 1944; Item, May 8, 1944.
recommendations in his address. He spoke in general terms about the need for improved flood control, highways, hospitals, and penal institutions, but reminded the legislators that "many of these improvements involve construction and the use of materials and supplies. These needs must continue to yield to the greater needs of war."

Davis called the legislators to endure a period of austerity until "the greater needs of war [are] lessened" and the victory won. "... it behooves all of us here," he said, "to do everything that is humanly possible to accomplish this one common desire that is felt in the heart of every real American."

Despite his pleas for austerity and careful husbanding of the state's resources, Davis presented the legislators with a budget calling for expenditures of $197,768,787.26 for the 1944-45 biennium ($15,540,292.55 above Sam Jones' 1942-43 budget). State fiscal officers anticipated income for the biennium covered by the new budget to be approximately $42,000,000 less than the proposed expenditures. The original estimates of the deficit, however, did not include approximately $16,000,000 in revenue to be realized if the legislature re-enacted the sales tax, and approximately $3,500,000 additional revenue from Davis' proposed re-enactment of the gas-gathering tax. It also did not include the possibility of reducing the deficit by using part of the $12,500,000 surplus left in the state treasury by

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104 Address by Governor Jimmie H. Davis Before the Joint Session of the Legislature -- May 15, 1944 (Baton Rouge, House of Representatives, 1944), pp. 2, 6; Shreveport Times, May 16, 1944.
Governor Jones described the executive budget (actually prepared by the executive department before he took office) "considerably out of balance" and called upon legislators to cut appropriations "where necessary to provide an economical and balanced budget . . ." The state's expenditures, he said, "must be kept within the means of the state to pay." 

In addition, Davis favored renewal of the two taxes which could generate enough income to lessen the deficit considerably, the gas-gathering tax and the sales tax. Renewal of the sales tax met with less opposition than did renewal of the gas-gathering tax. Davis appeared before a House caucus on May 29 and pleaded for renewal of the one-cent sales tax. "It was not a campaign pledge," he said, "but after study from every angle, I believe it is necessary." The House then approved the measure on a 94-0 vote with no debate. The Senate similarly passed the sales tax, and Davis signed it into law.

Renewal of the gas-gathering tax, however, roused the ire of both large and small natural gas producers throughout the state. They maintained that they had accepted the original gas gathering tax in 1940 and agreed not to subject it to litigation only because Sam

105 Item, May 16, 1944; Morning Advocate, May 16, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 191. Sindler maintains that "The administration's budgetary miscalculations were so gross as to warrant a judgment of intentional deceit . . . ."

106 Item, May 23, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 5, 1944.

Jones assured them that it would be in effect for only two years, and that he desperately needed it to pay the state debt left behind by the Longites. Then in 1942, the producers maintained, they agreed to a two-year extension of the tax in order to help ease the state's financial crunch, and, in exchange, received a distinct pledge from the Jones administration that the tax would positively not extend beyond 1944. Davis' spokesmen, however, maintained that he could not be held responsible for a pledge made by the previous administration, and that it was just as important for him to achieve a balanced budget as it had been for Sam Jones. Despite the protests from the natural gas spokesmen, the legislature renewed the gas-gathering tax.

The "peace and harmony" facade of the legislative session disappeared on June 12. The first bill to create division was the administration proposal to remove the Education Department from politics by providing for an appointed rather than an elected Superintendent of Education. The bill caused a sharp debate between legislators who thought it a reasonable reform and those who saw it as a dangerous concentration of power in the governor's hands. The latter group drew enough support to dispose of the measure. Davis also lost when he endorsed a proposal to "freeze" $10,000,000 of the $12,000,000 treasury surplus by investing it in war bonds. ($2,000,000 of the surplus was earmarked for salary increases for teachers but was

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108 Item, May 16, 1944.

entangled in a lawsuit against the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt and was not included in the "freeze" proposal.) The legislators, however, preferred to keep the surplus liquid, even though the war-time scarcity of construction materials limited its use.¹¹⁰

Davis received his sharpest rebuff from the legislature when he attempted to institute an additional one cent state retail sales tax. Davis and the other major supporters of the proposal — Executive Counsel to the Governor, James I. Smith; State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell; Highway Director D. Y. Smith; and Public Works Administrator DeWitt Pyburn — urged the legislature to pass the additional tax to help veterans after the war. They recognized the pent-up need for state projects including construction or repair of roads, hospitals, and mental institutions, as well as other state projects which would demand large amounts of money as soon as the end of the war made construction materials plentiful. At just that time, the supporters reasoned, the Louisiana economy would also enter a slump because of the sharp reductions in military and industrial spending expected at the end of the war. James I. Smith explained to the legislators that the state could raise money it needed for post-war projects (which would incidentally create jobs for returning servicemen) in either of two ways: it could wait until the end of the war and issue state bonds, or it could impose the additional one cent sales tax in 1944, while the Louisiana economy was booming and save the revenue generated

¹¹⁰ Item, June 13, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 191.
by the tax for postwar projects. 111

Despite Davis' assertion that "... since it is for the soldiers, I think we can all agree to be for it," the additional sales tax drew a storm of protest. E. H. "Lige" Williams, president of the Louisiana Federation of Labor, called the appeal to patriotism in remarks supporting the tax, a "transparent mockery." The New Orleans legislative delegation opposed the measure because they thought that residents of the city already paid a high sales tax (two cents city tax and one cent state tax) and the additional one cent would push sales taxes in the city to an unacceptable level. Opposition also arose from reformers, some of whom thought the additional levy unnecessary because of the large surplus generated by the state sales tax instituted in 1942. 112

Despite the strong opposition, the additional sales tax passed the House Ways and Means Committee, but only on a close 8-6 vote. Floor debate on the proposal was sharp. Speaker Norman Bauer pled for passage, but the opposition to the tax overwhelmed him. Representative J. Duff Smith of Union parish charged that Tugwell had threatened that if Smith did not vote for the bill, "I couldn't get the things we need in Union parish." Representative Sidney Sylvester of St. Landry parish warned darkly that the additional tax would created a "slush fund to perpetuate a political machine." 113

111 Item, June 15, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 192.

112 Item, June 15, 22, 1944; States, June 26, 1944.

113 Item, June 15, 28, 1944.
After a prolonged debate before packed galleries, the House voted against the additional sales tax 48-47. Governor Davis announced that he was disappointed that the state would not be collecting the additional revenue from the money then circulating in Louisiana but, typically, also announced that he was not bitter about the defeat. He had thought that the proposal was useful and necessary, but a majority of the House members had thought differently, "and that was their privilege."^114

As the legislative session unfolded, the reformers found that Jimmie Davis was indeed not another Sam Jones. While Jones' belief in an "unbossed" legislature led him to refrain from appearing in behalf of administration bills, sometimes to the detriment of his program, he worked behind the scenes to build coalitions in support of his program. Davis, however, provided little legislative leadership, overt or otherwise. Without direction from the governor, the legislative sessions quickly disintegrated into a welter of confused efforts and cross purposes within the reform faction.

The administration's position on many issues became so unclear that Davis held a series of caucuses with legislators to emphasize which bills had administration support. But these sessions did not stop the flow of criticism directed at the governor. Representative R. Brownell of Morgan City, a staunch reform supporter, on a point of personal privilege, remarked that there was a vast difference between an independent legislature and a disorganized legislature.

^114 Ibid., June 28, 1944; Shreveport Times, June 29, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 29, 1944.
Legislators not invited to the early caucuses became incensed at being omitted. As Representative A. R. deNux remarked, his constituents in Avoyelles parish felt that "You're not representing us if you're not called in to decide on what's going to be done in the legislature."115

Criticism of Davis' lackadaisical legislative leadership spilled over into other reform elements in the state. The Item entitled its June 19, 1944, editorial "The Lack . . Leadership," and remarked that

When legislators go about in circles saying they don't know what measures are favored or opposed by the Governor . . . the situation has got to a sad pass.

. . . the idea of bringing the Governor into 'secret caucusses' to inform [the Legislature] of his views is bizarre. The only right way to do that is to have the Governor express himself to the Assembly in messages or personal addresses . . . The leadership and incentive have to come from the Governor and none other.116

In addition, veteran New Orleans political journalist Hermann B. Deutsch analyzed the legislature and reached an equally dismal conclusion:

In the House of Representatives, there is no one to call signals, and when anyone gets hold of the ball, he carries it as his individual fancy dictates . . . [and] apparently no one is authorized to make decisions. All the players are independent, and quite proud of that fact, as well

115 States, June 9, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 16, 19-20, 1944; Shreveport Times, June 20, 1944; Item, June 20, 1944.

116 Item, June 19, 1944.
they might be. But they are not merely in-
dependent, they are unorganized. And between
those two terms yawns a tremendous difference. 117

The *States* noted as the legislative session ended, that the
"State Pays Price for Peace, Harmony." The "price" cited in this
editorial included broken pledges, a dissipated $10,000,000 surplus,
no postwar legislation of any consequence, and no "great constructive
legislation . . . for the benefit of the people or the returning sol-
diers." 118

Whatever their cost, peace and harmony prevailed at the closing
meeting of the legislature. Governor Davis attended the House ses-
sion, harmonized with the representatives on several songs, and ren-
dered a solo performance of "It Makes No Difference Now." Represen-
tative Leonard Santos of Orleans parish released two pigeons labeled
"Peace" and "Harmony" in the House chamber. 119

The legislature left the governor a seriously imbalanced budget,
but Davis vetoed $15,000,000 of appropriations, thus bringing expendi-
ture into line. His two major vetoes eliminated $5,000,000 each for
state drainage programs and for highway construction to be paid from
the general appropriations fund. His other vetoes were for lesser
amounts: $1,280,000 payment to police juries for parish roadwork;
$75,000 for construction of an agricultural experiment station in

117 Ibid.

118 *States*, July 6, 1944.

119 Ibid.; *Morning Advocate*, July 7, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisi-
ana, pp. 196-197.
Washington Parish and $100,000 for a similar project in Red River Parish among others. By July 12, State Treasurer Tugwell announced that with Davis' vetoes, he projected a $1,000,000 budget surplus for the next biennium.120

Projections of a budget surplus kept Davis from calling a special legislative session to reconsider imposition of the additional one cent state retail sales tax that the regular session had failed to pass. Speculation about the extraordinary session began when the regular session rejected the additional sales tax, and as the legislators considered the idea after the regular session, some of them decided that the administration proposal to "stockpile" revenue with the additional tax had merit, after all. Representative Drayton Boucher of Spring Hill announced that he had found that "my people and the other members of the Legislature from my district are in favor of the bill." By early September, however, the administration had abandoned all thoughts of the special session. A "high unnamed administration source" gave no official reason for abandoning the idea, but the Item pointed out that during the first two months of the new fiscal year (July and August, 1944), Treasurer Tugwell's records showed that the state received $12,021,761.98 total revenue, compared to $10,375,318.71 during the same two months of the previous fiscal year, and that the previous year had produced the $12,000,000

120 Morning Advocate, July 8, 11-12, 1944.
surplus. Administration leaders thus felt great reluctance at the prospect of attempting to "sell" increased taxes when the state expected a healthy surplus from available revenues. Davis on February 14, 1945, announced that he would call no special session "until the end of the European war was in sight."

During the months between the end of the first regular session of the legislature in July, 1944, and the end of World War II in September, 1945, Davis remained involved with governing the state and participating in the war effort. He met with President Franklin Roosevelt, and following Roosevelt's death, with President Harry Truman, "talking politics" and also asking them to retain Louisiana's war production plants and military training camps during the post-war years. He attempted to halt "floggings or other mistreatment" of prisoners at the state penitentiary by executive order. Sam Jones had issued a similar order, but prison officials had ignored it. Davis' order met a similar fate and flogging of state prisoners continued into the 1950s. He and his band made public appearances at war bond sales rallies, and made an eight-state "postwar business tour" of the south attempting to persuade businessmen to build commercial establishments in Louisiana after the war. Davis also did not forget his entertainment career. He and cowboy singer Tex

121 States, August 17, 1944; Item, September 7, 1944. Louisiana remained in a healthy economic condition for the remainder of Davis' term. The 1945 special session appropriated $16,500,000 for highway and drainage construction, and yet the budget surplus in 1946 was still $19,000,000. See Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 192.

122 States, February 7, 15, 1945.
Ritter completed the score for a musical comedy entitled "Start Cheering." 123

Following the 1944 regular session, the legislature met only once more to deal with war issues — in the postwar extraordinary session Davis promised to call immediately after the end of the war. This short session quickly passed bills providing for expenditure of $16,500,000 — $7,500,000 to match federal funds for construction of highways and bridges, $4,000,000 to the State Department of Highways for the construction or improvement of roads and bridges not included in the state highway system and not included in the federal aid system, and $5,000,000 to the Department of Public Works for draining and reclaiming undrained or partially drained marsh, swamp, and overflow lands. 124

The war years proved to be the most peaceful and harmonious of Davis' administration. He became embroiled in the attempts to restrict organized labor's powers in the 1946 regular session when he vetoed the "right to work" bill the legislature passed outlawing the union shop, calling it "an interference with the right of collective bargaining." In 1946 and again in 1947, Davis' (and Sam Jones') "conservationist" policy of restricting exports of natural gas from Louisiana came under heavy fire from legislators ready to exploit the...


124 Morning Advocate, October 12-13, 1945; Acts Passed By the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the Extraordinary Session, 1945, pp. 5-7.
state's resources for short-term gain. 125

Despite these setbacks, Jimmie Davis' administration, as Allan Sindler correctly maintains, was more than the "do-nothing" void in Louisiana politics that the Longites (on purpose) and Sam Jones (unwittingly) branded it. 126 Davis was partially successful in his efforts to establish "peace and harmony" in Louisiana, but bifactionalism did not disappear. Davis' lack of legislative leadership allowed new coalitions of Longites and reformers to form around specific proposals. Moreover, the facade of harmonious relations was also nurtured by the plentiful supply of money in the state treasury. This surplus, along with the dearth of construction materials caused by the war, necessarily limited the conflict over state funding for the legislators' pet projects. In addition, the two most visible factional symbols in the state, Sam Jones and Earl Long, either of whom could enrage the opposing faction merely by the mention of his name, were both out of office during Davis' administration. Their reappearance in the 1948 gubernatorial election caused a rerun of the 1939-40 contest, a bitter struggle that ended in Long's sweeping victory.

Davis' administration, therefore, was only a continuation of the reform interlude in Louisiana politics between the era of unbroken Longite control (1928-1940) and the renewed success of the Long machine under Earl Long's leadership in the late 1940s and 1950s. Davis' initial retirement from politics lasted from 1948 until 1960,

125 Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 195-196; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 75-77.
126 Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 196-199.
when he was elected to a second gubernatorial term. His third try for
the governorship ended in failure in 1972, and he retired permanently
to his entertainment interests, by then consisting almost exclusively
of performing and recording gospel music — and he was deservedly
elected to the Country Music Hall of Fame.

While Davis' second gubernatorial term would be marred by discord
and violence arising from court-ordered school desegregation, and by
two costly projects of questionable worth, his first term generated no
equally disruptive controversy. Instead, the first Davis administra-
tion provided a friendly atmosphere for continued reform, even though
Davis himself was not an ardent or aggressive reformer. As Allan
Sindler correctly maintains, Davis' reputation suffered from Sam
Jones' campaign tactics in the 1948 gubernatorial campaign, when Jones
focused on the 1939 Scandals and his own gubernatorial term, and thus
acquiesced in Earl Long's contention that Davis had presided over a
"do-nothing" administration. "Good government" has always been
the underdog in Louisiana politics, and the surprise in the state's
political history during the 1940s was not that Earl Long devastated
reformism's white knight, Sam Jones, in 1948, but rather that Jimmie
Davis had been able to defeat a Longite resurgence in 1944.

127 Ibid., pp. 190-191.
A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, 1939-1945
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A Dissertation
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CHAPTER VI
LOUISIANA AND NATIONAL POLITICS, 1940-1944

Louisiana's participation in national politics, together with voter behavior in federal elections, reflected the state's ongoing bifactionalism during World War II. "Longite" and "reform" candidates contested for seats in Congress as well as for local and state offices. Political unity in Louisiana came nearer to realization in the two wartime presidential elections, but even then President Franklin D. Roosevelt's successful quest in 1940 for an unprecedented third term, combined with his choice of the unpopular Henry A. Wallace for vice president, met with opposition and caused some defections from state Democratic ranks. While Louisiana did not abandon the party in either 1940 or 1944, the two wartime presidential campaigns revealed increasing discontent with Roosevelt's "Grand Coalition" which included organized labor, intellectuals, and blacks — a discontent Louisiana shared with the rest of the South — and which blossomed into full rebellion in the first post-war presidential election in 1948.1

An essay written by Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture Tom Linder, to Louisiana Commissioner of Agriculture Harry D. Wilson, revealed emerging southern restiveness. Linder wrote that the historic Democratic party was no more, and that "the nefarious practices begun by Abraham Lincoln are now being carried to completion by Roosevelt

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and the New Deal party." Linder even suggested that the South boycott the national Democratic convention and nominate its own presidential candidate, who would then hold the balance of power between the "New Deal and the Republicans."²

Beyond Southern concern with "liberal" tendencies within the national Democratic party, two other issues dominated the 1940 presidential election: should Franklin Roosevelt be granted a third term as president, and how realistic were the President's plans to defend the country in a world at war?³ The third-term issue split the national Democratic party as Vice President John Nance Garner, Postmaster General (and Democratic national chairman) James A. Farley, and conservative United States Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland attempted to wrest the Democratic presidential nomination from Roosevelt, who nevertheless won an easy renomination on the first ballot at the Democratic national convention at Chicago.⁴

²Tom Linder to Harry D. Wilson (n.d., 1940), William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collection Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection).


⁴Burke, "Election of 1940," pp. 369-373; Geoffrey Perret, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph (New York, Coward, McCann and Geogahan, 1973), pp. 48-50. This was the convention in which the famous "voice from the sewer," Chicago's Superintendent of Sewers Tom Garry, chanted over the public address system in the convention hall that "Illinois," "America," and "the world" wanted Roosevelt as the Democratic nominee. The contrived demonstration he led following Senator Alben Barkley's speech announcing Roosevelt's professed reluctance to run again for president last more than one hour. The continued demonstration allowed Roosevelt to note coyly in his acceptance speech that even though he did not want to run for a third term, the overseas war emergency made it imperative that he "not reject the call of the party to run"
Roosevelt's muted pursuit of a third nomination upset some Louisi­
anians, just as it did many other Americans. Anti-third-term senti­
ment in Louisiana was best expressed in a front-page editorial pub­
lished in the New Orleans Item in July, 1940, just before the Demo­
ocratic convention opened. The Item recounted its support of Roosevelt in both the 1932 and 1936 elections. The newspaper also claimed that it had supported "most of his [Congressional] measures." It further promised to "[continue] to support him in all steps for the national welfare, so long as he remains President." But the newspaper also stated that "The Item believes that a President who has served two terms should retire." The Item, a strong reform voice in Sam Jones' recent victory over the Longites in the 1939-1940 gubernatorial cam­
paign, feared the potential danger in establishing the precedent of a three-term president:

In our state we have had a terrible example of the abuse of democratic government by officeholders for officeholders, and for their associated plunderers. We have no feeling that there is any such intent as this in the 'draft Roosevelt' movement. But our interpre­
tation of democracy in our own country makes us believe that the two-term tradition in the presidency, established by Washington and per­petuated by Jefferson and Jackson, is a safe anchor to which to tie in this time of world­wide storm.

That Louisiana would in fact support Roosevelt in the 1940

and if elected, "the call of the country to serve." Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 Volume, War — And Aid to Democracies (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 293-303.

5 New Orleans Item, July 9, 1940.
presidential election was not clearly evident earlier in the year. In April, Governor Jones met with Postmaster General Farley at Shreveport, as Farley awaited a train connection to Jackson, Mississippi. Jones, however, disclaimed any endorsement of Farley: "I am absolutely uncommitted to any candidate for presidential nomination. It is not the province of the governor to dictate to the people whom to nominate for president."

The intrusion of Louisiana's bifactional division into national politics was clearly revealed during the Louisiana State Democratic Convention held in the Louisiana State University Gymnasium to choose Louisiana's delegates to the Democratic National Convention. The state meeting became uncontrollable when United States Senator Allen J. Ellender walked to the podium to move that Louisiana's delegates to the national convention be instructed to vote for a third nomination for Franklin Roosevelt. The state convention delegates, dominated by the reform faction, had booed Ellender as he entered the building, and as he attempted to address the convention, a chorus of boos again greeted him.

"I thought Louisiana had returned to a democracy," Ellender commented as the rising volume of noise made it evident that he would not be heard. "It has," several delegates rejoined from the floor. Despite his reception, Ellender gamely attempted to deliver his proposal. He described his visit to the White House the day before to

6 New Orleans Times-Picayune, April 5, 1940.

7 Ibid., June 5, 1940; New Orleans States, June 5, 1940.
inform Roosevelt that he planned to submit a resolution to the state convention calling for Roosevelt's renomination. More boos rang out from the delegates. "The president asked me to deliver to you his sincere wishes for a successful convention," Ellender said. "Then why don't you sit down?" a delegate shouted back. In an apparent attempt to placate the delegates with small talk, Ellender said, "The president expressed his sincere desire to come back to Louisiana and partake of our fishing and perhaps duck shooting." Ellender must have instantly regretted his choice of words. Upon his mention of the word "duck," a delegate shouted "de-duct!", and the crowd began chanting, "What about the de-ducts?" Ellender became livid and asked convention chairman Vance Plauche to restore order, but the crowd would not be silent. Plauche and then James A. Noe asked for quiet so that Ellender could be heard, but cries of "No! No!" drove Ellender from the stage.\footnote{\textit{Times-Picayune}, June 5, 1940.}

While the delegates were eager to vent their resentment at the Long machine by humiliating its most visible public spokesman, they did not want the President to believe that their repudiation of Ellender was also a repudiation of Roosevelt. After Ellender resumed his seat on the floor of the convention as a delegate from Terrebonne parish, Hewitt Bouanchaud, a delegate of Pointe Coupee Parish, offered a resolution that the convention action not be construed in any way as a reflection upon Roosevelt. Bouanchaud's resolution
passed unanimously.\textsuperscript{9}

It must be remembered that the rank and file of the Louisiana Democratic party had no opportunity to express its feelings during the years of Longite control. The 1940 meeting was the first state Democratic party convention since 1924. It must also be remembered that Ellender had played an integral part in the recent 1939-40 gubernatorial campaign, raising the race issue in his futile attempt to help Earl Long defeat Sam Jones, and that a majority of state convention delegates were Jones partisans.

The delegates declined to instruct Louisiana's delegates to the national convention to vote for Roosevelt. Instead, they left the delegation uninstructed except for an admonition to keep the state's votes together as a unit.\textsuperscript{10} That none of the state's delegates to the 1936 national convention were selected to attend the 1940 convention clearly revealed reform domination of the official state party apparatus.\textsuperscript{11}

Ellender maintained later that the humiliating incident at the state convention was an attack on him and not on Roosevelt. He suspected beforehand that he would not be allowed to speak, he said, because the "powers that be," whom he identified as "a few disgruntled sugar planters, cotton exchange brokers, and bond dealers," had de-


\textsuperscript{10}Times-Picayune, June 5, 1940; States, June 5, 1940.

\textsuperscript{11}Shreveport Journal, July 3, 1940.
cided that he should not speak.  

When asked how he would cast his vote for the presidential nomination at the Democratic national convention, Governor Jones replied "I don't know." Asked who his favorite was among the Democratic contenders for the nomination, Jones facetiously replied, "O. John Rogge." Jones also reiterated that he would not dictate the Louisiana delegation's vote on the nomination.

The Louisiana delegation to the Chicago convention, however, caucused and agreed to support Rogge on the first ballot for the presidential nomination with a tacit understanding that they would switch to Roosevelt on later ballots. The proposal to vote for Rogge resulted partially from the reformers' wish to honor the man who had successfully exposed the corruption of their political opponents, and partially from the delegates' efforts to apply a bit of political pressure to Roosevelt to accept a Louisiana-proposed plank in the Democratic platform calling for strong protection of the American sugar industry. Rogge immediately dispatched a telegram asking the delegation not to support him any longer. He notified them that he "cleaned up the state through a desire for justice" and not for

12 Joseph P. McCormick to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 6, 1940; Allen J. Ellender to T. E. Bird, June 25, 1940, Ellender Collection. Roosevelt had been careful to avoid any entanglement in the infighting in the Louisiana Democratic party. When asked, "Is there anything in the Louisiana situation that you would like to comment on?" Roosevelt carefully replied, "I don't know a thing about it except that they have a runoff primary. That is all I know." Complete Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt Volume 15 1940 (New York, DaCapo Press, 1972), p. 103.

13 Times-Picayune, July 15, 1940; Item, July 15, 1940.
political acclaim.\textsuperscript{14}

The support for Rogge, however, at least partially achieved the delegates' objective — consideration of Louisiana's goal of protection for American (i.e., Louisiana) sugar producers. Roosevelt's emissaries, including Harry Hopkins, well-known in New Orleans because of his flood relief work there with the Red Cross following World War I, met with Louisiana's delegates and produced a compromise agricultural plank which induced the Louisiana delegates to abandon Rogge and vote as a unit for Roosevelt's nomination on the first ballot.\textsuperscript{15}

The Louisiana delegation was concerned about reform of American sugar policy because of unrest felt among Louisiana sugar planters who were displeased with New Deal agricultural policies which limited their crop and thus limited their income. The New Deal sugar policy was embodied in the Sugar Act of 1934 (the Jones-Costigan Act) and the subsequent Sugar Act of 1937. The Sugar Act of 1934 established a sugar quota system guaranteeing to each producing area a portion of the estimated United States sugar requirements during a calendar year. The act thus regulated mainland production and limited imports. In addition, mainland producers received Federal payments for compliance with various requirements of the act, including limitation of crop acreage, payment of minimum wages to sugar workers, and soil conservation practices. Money to pay for the provisions of this act came from a processing tax of one-half cent per pound of raw sugar placed on the

\textsuperscript{14} New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.

\textsuperscript{15} New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.
manufacture and importation of sugar. The Sugar Act of 1937 primarily retained the same objective of sugar acreage reduction but adopted funding methods which circumvented the United States Supreme Court's 1936 ruling which invalidated the processing taxes and contractual method of controlling production. The year 1937 also saw completion of a new international sugar agreement in which the sugar exporting countries of the world won a concession from the importing countries which also produced part of their domestic demand (including the United States) by which the exporters could continue their substantial output. Therefore, Louisiana sugar producers felt that their production at home was being curtailed and that they had little hope of expanding their market overseas.

While Franklin Roosevelt neatly sidestepped the ire of the sugar interests in his bid for a third nomination, his handpicked vice presidential candidate was not so fortunate. Great disappointment settled over the 1940 Democratic convention when Roosevelt announced soon after his own nomination for president that he was endorsing Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace as his vice presidential running mate. Wallace had few friends on the convention floor, and had only recently converted from his original Republicanism to the Democratic party.

Wallace won the vice presidential nomination on the first ballot, but only by the close vote of 628 to 459 ballots cast for various other rivals for the nomination. ¹⁷

Roosevelt, in choosing Wallace, chose the bete noir of Louisiana sugar interests. J. Y. Sanders, Jr., a member of the Louisiana delegation and a member of the resolutions committee, tried to persuade the committee to adopt a strong plank for the party platform in favor of domestic sugar production. Sanders' proposed resolution included assertions that American farmers were entitled to priority and preferences in the home market; that farmers producing a non-surplus crop should be encouraged to increase production; that essential foods should be produced within the United States as part of the defense program; that continental producers, who supplied less than 30 percent of United States consumption of sugar, should be permitted to increase their production to their physical limits in order to safeguard against shortages; and that the sugar policy of the United States should be based on adequate tariffs and quotas against foreign countries to allow expansion of the domestic sugar industry. ¹⁸ Sanders understandably marshalled support for his resolution among delegates from sugar beet producing states and Florida, but ran into opposition from Wallace and his supporters. The Wallace partisans pointed out in committee hearings that Sanders' proposals, if adopted, would threaten


¹⁸*Itera*, July 16, 1940.
the agreements that the United States had signed with other countries setting the level of sugar production. Wallace himself told Sanders that the proposed plank might "upset our foreign policy regarding Cuba, and seriously affect the economic life of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico." Sanders cared little about the international implications of United States sugar policy in peacetime. Instead, he replied to his critics that one-third of Louisiana was directly affected by the sugar policy ("It's more important for us not to upset the domestic economy of the United States"), and moreover, that normal peacetime agreements may no longer be valid in a world at war. Now is the time, Sanders told the committee, to produce all necessary food in increased volume.  

Despite Sanders' valiant efforts, the Democratic platform contained only a weak, general agricultural plank with no specific mention of sugar. The Democratic party pledged "To safeguard the farmer's foreign market and expand his domestic market for all domestic crops." While this generously-worded plank pledged nothing specifically for protection of sugar farmers, its protectionist cast allowed some of them to support Roosevelt in good faith.

Wallace's opposition to Sanders' sugar plank led the Louisiana delegation to endorse Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson for the vice presidential nomination. Johnson had been a University of Virginia classmate of Prescott Foster, and an American Legion friend of Sam Jones. Governor Jones, in fact, led the opposition to Wallace

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19 States, July 18, 1940; Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.

20 Item, July 18, 1940.
within the Louisiana delegation. He informed Roosevelt's convention leaders Harry Hopkins and Senators James F. Byrnes of South Carolina and Pat Harrison of Mississippi, that Wallace's nomination would "split the party wide open in the state." The Louisiana delegation agreed to stay with Johnson as long as he remained in the race, and if he withdrew, switch to Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas or Speaker of the House William B. Bankhead of Alabama.  

Louisiana's Democratic delegation headed home from Chicago displeased with Wallace's first ballot nomination. Governor Jones announced that he was against Wallace "1000 per cent." One irate Louisiana delegate, storming out of the convention, demanded of Washington columnist George Allen, "Name me one, just one, man [who wanted Wallace]." Allen replied, "Brother, that I can do -- and that one man was Roosevelt."  

Some Louisiana delegates reported after they returned to Louisiana that they had been displeased with more than the Wallace nomination. John Caffery, a south Louisiana sugar planter, revealed that he had planned to speak in favor of an anti-third term plank, but when delegates debated the plank, convention chairman Alben Barkley refused to recognize those delegates wishing to support it. Caffery maintained that anti-third term sentiment remained strong in the Louisiana delegation until it became apparent that Roosevelt commanded enough support to ensure his nomination. They climbed on the Roosevelt band-

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**21** States, July 18, 1940.

**22** Alexandria Daily Town Talk, July 18, 1940 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk); Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, pp. 177-178.
wagon "in the best interests of Louisiana." While most of the Louisi-
ana delegates believed that the state would close ranks, soft-pedal
the third-term issue, and support the president, Caffery announced
that he planned to support Republican candidate Wendell Willkie, and
predicted the largest Republican vote in Louisiana's Third Congres-
sional District (heart of the sugar-growing area) since Reconstruc-
tion. 23

Caffery was correct in his predictions of a drift away from
Roosevelt and toward Willkie in south Louisiana. Charles A. Farwell,
chairman of the education committee of the American Sugar Cane League
in New Orleans, called Wallace "the worst enemy Louisiana sugar ever
had," and announced that "I'm voting for Willkie." Farwell recited
a litany of complaints the sugar interest had against the Democrats:
Roosevelt in 1932 promised not to lower United States tariff rates
when a reduction would hurt a domestic crop, and then lowered the
tariff on Cuban sugar from two dollars to ninety cents per ton; in
1936, the administration promised production of all the sugar the mar-
et could absorb plus creation of a reserve supply, then in 1937,
promulgated the new sugar act with continued sugar quotas; Wallace,
while he was Secretary of Agriculture, had made a speech during 1934
in Ruston, Louisiana, in which he called sugar "an inefficient indus-
try," and commented that "I would not kill it outright ... But I

23 Item, July 19, 1940; States, July 19, 1940.
would expose it gradually."\textsuperscript{24}

Prescott Foster announced upon his return from Chicago that he would wait a while before deciding for whom to vote in the presidential election, but that "I imagine the sugar planters will get together . . . and confer on the whole question."\textsuperscript{25} The sugar planters did indeed "confer on the whole question," and some of them reached the conclusion that they must support the Republicans. Allen Ramsey Wurtele, a New Roads sugar planter and businessman, announced his plans to run as a Republican for Louisiana's Sixth District House seat. "Democracy is escaping from the United States under the Roosevelt dictatorship," Wurtele said, "Unless the Republicans take over this country immediately, democracy is ended for us."\textsuperscript{26}

Louisiana Republicans welcomed the defecting Democrats. Louisiana's delegation to the Republican national convention that summer in Philadelphia had not originally voted as a unit, preferring instead for each delegate to vote individually, and they had split into two groups: those who supported New York District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, and those who supported Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft. The amateur attempt to nominate utilities president Wendell Willkie of New York and Indiana stampeded the Philadelphia convention, however. Louisiana delegates supported Taft after Dewey withdrew following the

\textsuperscript{24} *States*, July 20, 1940. Farwell also recalled that John E. Dalton, United States Department of Agriculture Sugar Administrator, told them after passage of the 1937 Sugar Act that "Unless you do as you're told, we will throw the doors open and let the gales of tropical competition blast you from the face of the earth."

\textsuperscript{25} *Item*, July 20, 1940

\textsuperscript{26} *Ibid.*, July 22, 1940. Republicans also entered the First, Second,
fourth ballot, and climbed on the Willkie bandwagon when Ohio governor John W. Bricker called for a unanimous nomination after Willkie had won a majority of the delegates. Nevertheless, Louisiana Republicans were comfortable with Willkie and worked for his election.

New Orleans attorney John E. Jackson joined Willkie's advisory council in Washington, D.C., and local Republicans created political associations to attract disgruntled Democrats to Wendell Willkie. These organizations, called the Jeffersonian Democratic Clubs, were part of Willkie's effort throughout the South to attract Democratic support without demanding that life-long Democrats abandon the prejudices of their youth and join a Republican organization. They party also created the Louisiana Young Republican Club, a New Orleans-based organization courting the "dyed in the wool Republicans and disgruntled Democrats." The Republicans had to attract Democrats if Willkie was to have any hope of success in Louisiana. The state in October, 1940, recorded a total of 702,545 voters — 700,727 Democrats, 1,573 Republicans, 242 Independents, and 3 Socialists.

and Third District races. Only David Pipes in the Third District remained in the campaign. John P. Conway withdrew from the First District race, Joseph O. Schwartz withdrew from the Second District race, and Wurtele withdrew from the Sixth District race.


Many prominent Louisiana Democrats, even those opposed to Wallace, however, did not join in the Willkie boom in the state. Governor Jones announced on August 4, that "I am a Democrat. We fight out our fights in the family," and gave the Roosevelt-Wallace ticket his "complete endorsement." Louisiana Democratic Central Committee Chairman, Frank J. Looney of Shreveport, announced that any Democrat who bolted the party to join the Jeffersonian Democratic clubs and boost Willkie's candidacy would forfeit the right to vote in all future Democratic primaries.  

The Roosevelt administration assisted loyal Democrats in Louisiana by supplying statistics to refute the sugar interest's claim that New Deal farm policy had hurt the domestic sugar industry. Undersecretary of Agriculture Paul Appleby wrote to Sam Jones that Secretary Wallace had, in fact, helped to increase mainland sugar area base quotas in the 1937 Sugar Act from 160,000 tons to 420,000 tons, and had also helped to free conditional payments to Louisiana farmers who violated the child employment provisions of the 1937 act. In addition, Appleby said that Wallace had never ordered Louisiana sugar farmers to plow up any of their crop, as had been done in other New

29States, August 5, 1940; Town Talk, August 13, 1940. Asking for votes for a Republican candidate in the South in 1940 was a ticklish job. While it is true that it was the twilight of the Solid (Democratic) South, many southerners still "voted the way they (or their father, or their grandfather) shot" in the Civil War. Looney on another occasion urged Louisiana Democrats to "Be faithful to the traditions of the tried and true; of [Robert E.] Lee, of [P. T. G.] Beauregard, of [Francis T.] Nicholls."

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Deal crop reduction programs.  

Governor Jones again endorsed Roosevelt's candidacy in a speech which attacked the Republicans in terms strangely reminiscent of the Longite attacks on him: "If the Republicans get into power, you'll see more destitution, hunger, and starvation than you've ever seen in your lives."  

Jones' later assessment of the 1940 presidential campaign, however, reveals that he may have been less than sincere in his endorsement of Roosevelt. Instead of being won over because of New Deal agricultural policy, or vague promises of increased opportunities for agriculture, Jones thought that Roosevelt's experience would help him guide the country successfully through the perilous war-torn years which lay ahead.

By the time of the American political conventions during the summer of 1940, Hitler's armies had swept through the Low Countries and into Paris — a dark and scary time for Western democracies. The 1940 presidential election in the United States turned more on the "experience" issue than on any other. Indeed, Roosevelt expressed his wish to the Democratic convention to retire to his home at Hyde Park, New York, but held open the possibility that if the delegates wanted a candidate with his experience, he would be amenable to a

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30 Paul Appleby to Sam Jones, September 19, 1940, Jones Collection. Appleby's information was incorrect. The USDA ordered Louisiana sugar farmers to plow up portions of the 1939 crop. See Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, p. 74.

31 Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 19, 1940.
draft. Willkie, a political novice, had no comparable record in foreign policy. Or as Jones phrased it, "If your house catches on fire, you want a fireman who knows what he's doing." 32

Jones reiterated this same theme in another speech he delivered defending Roosevelt from Republican charges that Roosevelt was trying to establish a dictatorship with the third term:

The issue, which might carry weight in an election conducted down the sunny lanes of peace and world security, shrinks to mere obstructionism, to a strained quibbling and peevish yapping now that the earth has become over much of its surface, a cockpit of fighting ships and men and planes.

Now that each day's fearful developments brings us teetering nearer and nearer the act of seizing the sword to defend all that we have in this hemisphere, I cannot worry too much about whether Mr. Roosevelt will serve eight years or twelve. 33

In spite of his public pronouncements favoring Roosevelt in 1940, Jones also later recalled that the Democrat's victory in Louisiana was not automatic: "With three speeches, Willkie could have carried

32 Sam Jones interviewed by Denny Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape recording, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection).

the state." The considerable disaffection among Democratic sugar
planters in south Louisiana was not the only criticism Roosevelt
suffered. His liberal experiments in New Deal social programs and
his strengthening alliance with urban and labor groups at the ex-
 pense of agricultural interests had left many southern Democrats dis-
 illusioned. W. Scott Heywood wrote to his son in 1940 that Willkie
was "just as good a democrat and probably more of a democrat than
Roosevelt." In addition, Heywood objected to Roosevelt's support of
"Ma Perkins" (Frances Perkins) as Secretary of Labor. Furthermore,
Heywood objected to Roosevelt "allowing his wife [Eleanor] to be
popping off the way she has been doing ...".

The Willkie boomlet in Louisiana proved to have less support
than the sugar planters and the traditional Republicans hoped. A
Gallup poll published on November 4, 1940, revealed that Roosevelt
still commanded much support in Louisiana — 82 per cent for Roosevelt,

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34 Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
Jones himself followed a political path from the old-line Democracy to
Republicanism. He told Daugherty that he started voting against the
Regular Democrats after Roosevelt's third term. He voted for Dixie-
crat Strom Thurmond in 1948, and then left that halfway house and
voted for Republican presidential candidates. Like many other Louisi-
anians, however, he remained a registered Democrat.

35 Hubert H. Humphrey, The Political Philosophy of the New Deal (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 23-29; Robert A.
Rutland, The Democrats From Jefferson to Carter (Baton Rouge, Louisi-
ania State University Press, 1979), p. 197. Humphrey catalogs the dis-
parate elements that constituted the support of the New Deal. Rutland
adds that during the New Deal, "the city-dwelling organized laborer in
a sense had replaced the farmer as the yeoman Democrat."

36 W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Heywood, August 14, 1940, Jennings-He-
wood Oil Syndicate Records, Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
(hereinafter cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection).
18 per cent for Willkie. Roosevelt's support in Louisiana was less than that found in Mississippi, equal to his support in Arkansas, and more than his support in Texas. In Mississippi, Roosevelt had 94 per cent support compared to Willkie's 6 per cent; in Arkansas, the president commanded the support of 82 per cent of the respondents to Willkie's 18 per cent; and Texas respondents supported the president by seventy-nine per cent to Willkie's twenty-one per cent. The sugar planters, the Republicans, the businessmen in Louisiana may have been disillusioned with Roosevelt, but the president still commanded the allegiance of the people.

Roosevelt's supporters also turned out to vote on election day. The president carried Louisiana by a margin of 267,510 votes, receiving 319,751 ballots compared to Wendell Willkie's 52,241. Obviously, if Willkie could have carried Louisiana "with three speeches," as Sam Jones later maintained, then those speeches would have had to have been blockbusters. Even the sugar areas of Louisiana voted for Roosevelt. The South Louisiana Bayou voter type voted 84 per cent for Roosevelt, while the South Louisiana Planter vote type voted 83 per cent for the president.

37 Item, November 4, 1940.

38 Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, p. 189. Moscow also notes that Roosevelt did well in the south because the regional economy was then still based on cotton exports to Europe, and thus southerners felt at ease with Roosevelt's internationalist foreign policy.

39 Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed., 1971), p. 299. The two voter types include Louisiana's major sugar parishes. Many sugar growers returned to Roosevelt after the Democratic Senate in 1940 suspended domestic sugar quotas with Senate Joint Resolution 225, which provided that a grower could harvest all of his domestic quota plus

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The Congressional elections held in Louisiana during the fall of 1940, in conjunction with the presidential election, maintained Louisiana's reputation for spirited politics, except for the Seventh District race. (In that district, Sam Jones' friend Vance Plauche ran unopposed.) Governor Jones hoped that his reform forces could ride the crest of his success in the spring gubernatorial election and turn all the incumbent Longite Congressmen out of office in the fall elections. The Longites, he thought, no longer represented the will of the people of Louisiana. Subsequently, Jones endorsed reform candidates in most Congressional races and campaigned for his "reform slate" of candidates. In a radio speech broadcast in late August, he attempted to persuade Louisiana voters to complete the sweep of Longites out of office they had begun in February:

Every vote you cast for this discredited group is a vote against good government. It is a vote to revive hopes in the hardened hearts of the corruptionists, the grafters, the crooks, and the despoilers of democratic institutions.

After many years of administration of rottenness and corruption, the task of restoring democracy and public confidence is herculean. Remember, this is a task that cannot be accomplished without the continued support and twenty-five additional acres without losing benefit payments. See Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, pp. 74-75. The President's popularity in Louisiana was not seriously threatened by the sugar planters' disillusionment. The comment of Harold H. Young, the political strategist who headed Roosevelt's campaign in the Dallas-Ft. Worth, Texas area, "Nobody's for FDR except small voices -- the people," was also true in Louisiana. Quoted in Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson The Path to Power (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 581.

Town Talk, July 2, 1940.
enthusiasm of the people of Louisiana.\footnote{Ibid., August 28, 1940.}

The reform effort to unseat all incumbent Congressman, however, was not successful. Representatives Overton Brooks (Fourth District), Newt Mills (Fifth District), and A. Leonard Allen (Eighth District congressman and brother of former governor Oscar Allen) were all re-elected.\footnote{Ibid., September 1, 1940; \textit{Morning Advocate}, September 14-15, October 16, 1940.}

The most bitter campaigns for Louisiana's Congressional seats during 1940 occurred in the First and Second Districts (in and around New Orleans). The campaign opened when First District Representative Joachim O. Fernandez and Second District Representative Paul H. Maloney, both Longite allies, qualified to run for re-election. Reformers in the city quickly fielded their own candidates: New Orleans attorneys Herve Racivitch in the First District and T. Hale Boggs in the Second District.\footnote{\textit{Times-Picayune}, July 12, 15, 1940.} Both Racivitch and Boggs had been active in Jones' gubernatorial campaign. The clearest bifactional competition emerged in the Second District race where Boggs flatly stated that

\begin{quote}
The incumbent Congressman represented a vicious dictatorship foreign to everything in America rather than the people of Louisiana. That dictatorship has now been thoroughly repudiated. And its representatives can be of no service
\end{quote}
to our people.  

The clear bifactionalism in the First District race was clouded by New Orleans States city editor, F. Edward Hebert, who entered the campaign on July 15. Hebert's friend James A. Noe attempted to persuade him to run for mayor of New Orleans in 1942, an office which Hebert did not want, so Hebert attempted to placate Noe by agreeing to run for Congress in 1940. 

Hebert built a strong coalition of support through his association with Noe. Jones, Noe, and Old Regular leader George Montgomery reached an agreement which divided the offices in the New Orleans area: the Jones-Noe reform forces agreed not to oppose incumbent judges seeking re-election in the area, and not to interfere directly in the 1942 New Orleans mayor's race, and in exchange, the Old Regulars agreed to support Jones-Noe candidates in the 1940 First and Second Congressional Districts, the First and Second Public Service Commission Districts, the Orleans Parish School Board, and Orleans Parish Juvenile Court. This agreement, however, did not take into

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44 Ibid., July 15, 1940. Boggs had organized the People's League to support Jones' gubernatorial candidacy, and had served on Jones' campaign Speakers, Legal, and Finance Committees.

45 F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "last of the Titans" The Life and Times of Congressman F: Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1976), pp. 152-153. Hebert also realized that even if he served only one term in the House, the lifetime access to the House floor accorded former Congressmen would provide him a priceless news source when he returned to journalism.

46 Times-Picayune, July 16, 18, 1940; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans", pp. 153-154. Hebert adds that Maestri agreed to support Jones-Noe candidates in hope that his new alliance with the reformers would blunt the ongoing federal investigation of his political faction.
consideration the ambition of the incumbent Congressman.

Nevertheless, the Old Regulars and the reformers continued their loose alliance through the campaign. New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri announced to an Old Regular caucus on August 22 that "we are all Jones boys now," and instructed Old Regular leaders to "get out in [your] wards and work hard" for the Jones-Noe candidates. In return, several reform candidates for the Civil District Court withdrew from their campaigns. Harry A. Cabral withdrew from the Division B race "at the request of both Senator Noe and Governor Jones," ostensibly to devote full time to the reformers' efforts to "instruct the electorate on the value of passage of the [constitutional] amendments" which embodied much of Jones' reform program.47

Jones' association with Maestri, however, did not please all the reformers. George Piazza, an independent candidate in the District A Civil District Court race, refused to withdraw. "You cannot have honest courts," he announced, "when you allow political organizations to name your judges . . . A judge who is elected by a political machine becomes part and parcel of that political machine . . . He becomes a politician like the ward leader or the precinct captain."48

Despite its unpopularity among some reformers, Jones' agreement with Maestri ensured F. Edward Hebert's election in the First District race. Any candidate with support from Jones, Noe, and Maestri had little to fear, even from an incumbent Congressman. Fernandez received

47 Times-Picayune, August 13, 1940.

48 Ibid.
support from organized labor groups, but the principal endorsements in New Orleans went to his opponent.

Both Hebert and Fernandez virtually ignored Racivitch and campaigned primarily against each other. Hebert called for an American two-ocean navy, an adequate army, a "first-rate air force," federal aid for Louisiana to stimulate industry, and new outlet from New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico to facilitate movement of wartime supplies and commerce. Hebert also tied Fernandez inextricably to the Longite machine: "I believe that the incumbent . . . represents that which has been repudiated by the people of Louisiana . . ." And on another occasion commented that "[Fernandez is one of] the diehards who can't understand the writing on the wall. They can't believe that after twelve years of plunderbund they have been counted out by the free and independent people of the state." 51

Fernandez, in return, characterized Hebert as an enemy of labor, and called Hebert's platform "pure, simple, unadulterated political fakery." He also read aloud letters of support from United States House Speaker William B. Bankhead and House Democratic Leader Sam Rayburn, and cited his memberships on the important House Appropriations Committee and its Naval Appropriations Subcommittee as reasons

50 Ibid., p. 158; New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 4, 1940.

51 Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 159; Times-Picayune, August 13, 1940.
why Louisiana needed to return him to Congress.\footnote{Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," pp. 157-161; Times-Picayune, August 15, 1940; Congressional Record 76th Congress Third Session Appendix Volume 86 Part 17 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 5526.}

While the Jones-Noe-Maestri understanding aligned the city's dominant powers behind the reform candidate who then stood toe-to-toe with the incumbent, who was stripped of his power base, it threw the Second District race somewhat into disarray. Political stances in the Second District had been unclear from the beginning of the campaign. Some reformers, remembering that incumbent Congressman Paul H. Maloney had occasionally supported reform movements in the past, originally wanted to maintain Maloney in Congress in order to improve their relations with the Old Regulars.\footnote{Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 154. Maloney's entire political career was marked by the indecisiveness he exhibited during the 1940 campaign. He began his political life as an Old Regular member of the New Orleans Commission Council, on which he served from 1920 until 1925. He bolted from the Old Regulars in 1925, ran for mayor against Martin Behrman, and was defeated. In 1928, he again opposed the Old Regulars when he supported Oramel Simpson for governor instead of Riley Wilson, the Old Regular candidate. Maloney announced his support of Huey Long in the second primary before Wilson withdrew, and as a reward, was elected to Congress in 1930 with Huey Long's help. Thereafter, he remained identified with the Longites. It is therefore not surprising that the Old Regulars were willing to dump Maloney in 1940. See Times-Picayune, August 9, 1940, and Martin Behrman of New Orleans Memoirs of a City Boss, ed. by John R. Kemp (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1977), pp. 335-341. During their 1925 mayoralty campaign, Behrman called Maloney "a champion of mediocrity."} The wishes of the reformers, however, ran into the political ambitions of New Orleans attorney T. Hale Boggs. While the administration hoped that Boggs would run for the Public Service Commission, Boggs preferred to run for Congress, and George
Montgomery's indication of Old Regular willingness to drop Maloney opened the way for a Boggs candidacy in 1940, even though some reformers remained reluctant to endorse him.  

Maloney, after he realized the strength of his opposition, declared that he would withdraw from the Second District race. Any loss of Old Regular support, he said, "would in effect strip my candidacy . . . of election machinery," and bitterly added that

The imperfections and uncertainties of politics under the guise of political expediency deny the people of my district the advantages that would unquestionably be forthcoming from the position of prominence and influence that I have reached in the United States Congress after almost 10 years of honorable, efficient, and attentive service.  

Almost immediately after he made his announcement, however, Maloney announced that he had decided to remain in the race. An organization named the "Friends of Honest, Efficient Government," in a newspaper advertisement called upon Second District voters to "send back to Congress an efficient and experienced Congressman . . . We believe we are not asking too much when we seek to elect our Congressional representative without interference from any political machine."  

Even though the United States Senate quickly confirmed Maloney as

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55Times-Picayune, July 20, 1940.

56Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 21, 1940; Times-Picayune, July 25, 1940.
Collector of Internal Revenue for the New Orleans District when President Roosevelt nominated him on August 8 (a tempting offer provided by Senators John Overton and Allen Ellender who recommended Maloney to Roosevelt), Maloney chose to remain in the Second District race:

> If the voters of this district return me to office in spite of the coalition of the reform administration with the very ones they promised to strip 'branch from stem and leaf from twig' I shall be the proudest man in Louisiana."57

Hale Boggs, however, registered the last word on Maloney's vacillation:

> "No man can be a serious candidate if he cannot make up his mind whether or not he is in the race."58

Boggs firmly aligned himself with the new tide of reform sweeping through Louisiana, and Maloney retained support from many Longites in the city. Boggs attacked Maloney for his past ties to the Longite machine. In one campaign address, he noted the dangerous world situation in which the United States found itself, and asked his audience, "Isn't it a dangerous thing to have representing us as our Congressman a man who has expressed so much sympathy, tolerance, and understanding of Dictatorship?" In an address following Governor Jones' endorsement of him, Boggs commented that "If your governor, whom you elected . . . over a scandal-ridden machine of which Paul Maloney was part and par- cal, has faith and confidence in Hale Boggs, I believe you . . . can

57 *Times-Picayune*, August 9, 13-15, 1940.

58 Ibid., August 17, 1940.
well follow his recommendation."59

Maloney struck back with a scurrilous attack on Boggs for alleged leftist activities during Boggs' days as a student at Tulane University. "T. Hale Boggs Exposed!" screamed one Maloney leaflet which contained the charge that Boggs had joined the American Student Union in 1937 while studying at Tulane. The American Student Union, according to the leaflet, promoted the pacifist "Oxford Pledge" by which Union members promised not to fight for the United States either in a defensive or an offensive war.

Think of an organization that tells red-blooded American men that you shall not fight in defense of the United States of America — demanding that if this country should be invaded by brutal forces of a cruel and consciousless dictator that you must stand cowardly by while your wives, mothers, sweethearts, and sisters fall helpless prey to the wild desires of human beasts.

Another Maloney leaflet was more to the point: "Shall It Be Americanism and Maloney or Communism and Boggs?" This leaflet added the "information" that the Dies Committee (The House Unamerican Activities Committee) had labeled the American Student Union "one of the eleven Border Patrols of the Communist Party," and called Boggs "a disciple

of the bristle-moustached Stalin."^60

Boggs fought off Maloney's charges by outright denial:

I have never been a member of the American Student Union; [but] I was chairman of the student union building committee at the University ... I have ever been ready and willing and am now ready and willing to take up arms to defend the United States of America. 61

Boggs also issued statements by Rufus Harris, president of Tulane, and Paul Brosman, dean of the Tulane Law School, affirming that he had never been involved in any "subversive movements while at Tulane."^62

Both candidates sought to buttress their appeals to the voters by supporting strong national defense. Maloney issued statements from members of Congress urging his re-election. The statement of Representative Pat Boland of Pennsylvania was typical: "We are going through a period of important history-making, and these are most important times in the nation's capital ... This is the time that we need the sound counsel that comes from experience."^63

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^60 "T. Hale Boggs Exposed!" (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection; "Shall It Be Americanism and Maloney or Communism and Boggs?" (n.d., 1940), Ellender Collection. It must be remembered that the 1940 election occurred while Russian Premier Joseph Stalin was in alliance with Adolph Hitler by the terms of the Russo-German Pact signed in August, 1939. Stalin was thus "bristle-moustached." His rehabilitation into a vaguely affable "Uncle Joe" Stalin did not occur in the United States press until after Hitler turned on Russia with a vengeance in June, 1941.


Boggs, meanwhile, also capitalized on the national defense emergency issue in his campaign. After the fall of France to the Nazi onslaught in June, 1940, which sent a sudden chill through the United States, Boggs delivered a speech in which he belittled Maloney's claim to governmental experience: "For years France left her destiny in the hands of old men who were re-elected year after year, and where is France today but under the dictator's yoke." Again in a later speech, Boggs noted that the United States had failed to fortify the Gulf of Mexico coastline, an oversight which "will be remedied when Hale Boggs goes to Washington as your Congressman."  

Boggs also did not fail to reiterate that coastal protection would incidentally provide jobs as well: "money and pay rolls to Jefferson parish and New Orleans," he remarked in one speech. In other speeches, he urged New Orleanians to make a strong bid for their fair share of the money spent on the United States rearmament program.  

Boggs, with his combined reform/Old Regular support, swept into office in the Democratic primary in September, 1940. He received 33,636 votes to Maloney's 25,590. 

The spirited contest for the Third District seat occurred not in the Democratic primary, but in the general election. James Domengeaux, who had Governor Jones' endorsement, defeated incumbent Congressman Robert L. Mouton in the Democratic primary in September, but faced David W. Pipes, a Democrat-turned-Republican because of Henry A.  

64 Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.  
65 Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection; Times-Picayune, August 13, 1940
Wallace, in the general election. The Third District, a wedge-shaped area surrounding Lafayette in south central Louisiana, contained much sugar country, and some sugar planters had not forgotten their antipathy to Wallace after his nomination on the Democratic ticket. James Domengeaux, in fact, found himself in legal trouble after he publicly admitted slapping Dudley LeBlanc's face following a radio address in which LeBlanc compared Domengeaux to Wallace:

"Henry A. Wallace . . . is not a friend of the farmer and Jimmy Domengeaux is not a friend of the farmer and the poor people." Domengeaux paid a $25 fine, but stated that he was willing to pay the cost of the satisfaction he received from physically assaulting a man who compared him to Wallace.

Pipes had telegraphed Prescott Foster at the Chicago Democratic convention asking that Foster exert all possible efforts to secure...
administration support for the sugar industry: "Your support of this request is the only action which will discourage entry of Republican candidates [in the Third District race] with formidable support from sugar industry and in addition from many loyal Jones supporters."69

Pipes' supporters included people with sugar interests who were disillusioned not only with Henry A. Wallace in particular, but who were also disillusioned with the leftward drift of the Democratic party. U. S. G. Pettycrew wrote to Pipes that "I saw in the news that you was (sic) a real Democrat and not a New Dealer." Jules Godchaux wrote more perceptively that "... I think it is in the best interest of the sugar industry that we show the Democratic party our dissatisfaction of the way they have been treating us, a vote for the Republican candidates is the most effective way to register our protest."70

Pipes indicated the depth of his protest when he switched his political allegiance from Democrat to Republican on July 17 and announced his intention to run for the Third District seat.71

Pipes waged his Congressional campaign more against Henry A. Wallace than against James Domengeaux. He opened his campaign on September 15 with the following remarks:

I say to you here and now that the Louisiana sugar industry has withstood and conquered plagues of plant disease and insects, the

69 David W. Pipes to Prescott Foster, July 13, 1940; Pipes to C. J. Bourg, September 26, 1940; C. J. Martin to Pipes, n.d., 1940, Pipes Collection.

70 U. S. G. Pettycrew to David W. Pipes, October 3, 1940; Jules Godchaux to Pierre Chastant, August 2, 1940, Pipes Collection.

71 Times-Picayune, July 30, 1940.
ravages of frost and flood and drouth, [but] can better face all these than the prospect of four more years of Henry Wallace ... 

[The] curtailment of production means idle people and empty main streets in South Louisiana — and this is the treatment accorded us by the New Deal Democratic party and Henry Wallace. This is the Democratic party's appreciation of the 'Solid South.'

Again, six days later, Pipes reiterated that "Up till (sic) now, the Democrats took us for granted and the Republicans did nothing for us because we were Democrats." He also struck directly at Wallace: "I believe ... that as long as Henry A. Wallace has a position of importance in the councils of government, agriculture will be in a straitjacket of ruin."

Domengeaux and his supporters struck back at Pipes, not with a defense of Wallace, but instead with appeals to the Third District voters to remain loyal to the Democratic party in spite of Wallace. Sam Jones in a speech delivered at Abbeville in support of Domengeaux, urged voters to "Do as I'm going to do on November 5 — stamp the [Democratic] rooster from tip of beak to end of claws." The large French population in the Third District led to a bilingual campaign for Domengeaux. Lieutenant-governor Marc Mouton urged Third District voters "allons faire le vieux coq crier" ("Let's make the old rooster

72 Morning Advocate, September 16, 1940.

73 Ibid., September 22, 1940.

74 The rooster, not the donkey, is the symbol of the Louisiana Democratic party.
Domengeaux attacked Pipes as merely a spokesman for the sugar establishment, an associate of "big shots," and charged that Pipes worked laborers on his sugar lands long hours at the low wages of eighty cents a day. Domengeaux also promised that he would "never vote for a declaration of war which would mean sending American boys overseas," a reflection of the public wish to remain out of the European war, just as Domengeaux's eventual vote for the declaration of war reflected the profound change in public opinion by December 8, 1941.

Pipes waged a spirited campaign and attracted attention from both the national Republican party and the national press, but he failed to defeat Domengeaux. Third District voters instead chose the Democrat to represent them in Congress.

Compared to the spirited contests for the First, Second, and Third District seats, the campaigns in the Fourth and Fifth Districts were relatively tame. The Fourth District race drew five contestants

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75 Morning Advocate, October 31, 1940; Town Talk, November 4, 1940.

76 Morning Advocate, October 31, 1940.


78 Now that we are used to political campaigns for inconsequential offices costing many thousands of dollars, it is striking to note that Pipes reported spending only $2,955.02 on his Congressional campaign. "Statement of Income and Expenses From Pipes Campaign to be Filed In the House of Representatives," November 5, 1940, Pipes Collection.
incumbent T. Overton Brooks, Shreveport insurance agent Henry O'Neal, Caddo Parish District Attorney James U. Galloway, former Webster Parish Registrar of Voters and State Representative J. Frank Colbert, and Shreveport attorney and Caddo Parish State Representative Wellborn Jack. O'Neal, Galloway, and Jack had all supported Sam Jones' gubernatorial candidacy, and the Governor remained neutral in the first Democratic primary but endorsed O'Neal in his second Democratic primary battle with Brooks, citing O'Neal's "ability, honor, and integrity," as well as his personal friendship with the new Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn, who had replaced William Bankhead upon Bankhead's death.

In the face of his challenge from four opponents, Overton Brooks stressed the importance of his Congressional experience and the importance of national defense during the deteriorating world situation. While he did not advocate active American involvement in the shooting war, Brooks' stance accurately reflected public opinion in northwest Louisiana, which was somewhat stronger than opinion in the rest of the state in accepting possible American intervention in the war.

79 Shreveport Journal, May 31, June 5, 24, August 6, 16, 1940; Shreveport Times, August 6, 1940.

80 Morning Advocate, September 8, October 3, 1940. Rayburn became Speaker on September 16, 1940, after Speaker Bankhead died of a stomach hemorrhage. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson The Path to Power, pp. 593-594 chronicles this transfer of power.

81 Brooks inserted into the Congressional Record statements from both individual constituents and various civic organization in northwest Louisiana stressing the need for strong American defense, and even one resolution which proposed United States defense of the entire Western Hemisphere. Congressional Record 76 Congress 3d Session Appendix Volume 86 Part 16 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1940).
Brooks repeatedly allied himself with northwest Louisiana's conservative attitude. He scored the Roosevelt administration for its failure to prepare the nation's defense for any eventuality during the past eight years: "stuffing money into our national defense system will not revitalize it overnight." In his formal statement of his candidacy, Brooks pledged continued support for the nation's preparedness program, support for the "Dies Americanism Committee," adequate federal old-age pensions, and assistance "for the farmers and workingmen of Louisiana." Brooks' campaign slogan was "Defense to the Utmost," and a letter to his constituents reflected his concern in the following sentence with confused syntax, but clear meaning: "If you endorse the program of national defense to the utmost, 100 per cent Americanism, and to rid the country of all spies, traitors, and 'fifth columnists,' I claim your active support." 82

Fourth District voters apparently agreed with Brooks' supporters who pled with them to return a man of experience to Congress. (Fred Wilson of Coushatta wrote that experienced men "should not be swapped in the middle of this ocean of hell.") Brooks' campaign advertisements stressed that Brooks was "At His Post of Duty," and pleaded "Don't swap in a crisis." 83 Despite the reformers' efforts to elect Henry

Office, 1940), pp. 4062, 4211-4212, 4622-4623.


83 Congressional Record 76 Congress 3 Session Appendix Volume 86 Part 16, p. 4483; The Mansfield Enterprise, September 5, 1940.
O'Neal in his stead, Fourth District voters returned Brooks to Congress. 84

While the Fourth District campaign stirred little emotion ("Defense to the Utmost" is not, after all, a stirring call to arms), the Fifth District race stirred even less. Even though his five opponents included Lincoln Parish District Attorney Truett L. Scarborough, and State Senators Edward Gladney and D. Y. Smith, incumbent Congressman Newt V. Mills received more votes than any other single candidate in the first primary, and then defeated Gladney in the second primary. 85

The campaign for Louisiana's Sixth District seat in 1940 centered not on national defense but on Sam Jones and the reformers' efforts to overhaul the state. The Sixth District race originally drew four candidates, incumbent Dr. John K. Griffith; attorney Jared Young Sanders, Jr., son of former Governor Sanders; former Louisiana State University football player Sidney Bowman from Hammond; and New Roads sugar businessmen Allen Ramsey Wurtele, a Republican. 86

84 Morning Advocate, October 16, 1940. Brooks' friends evidently could not resist a bit of highjinks following his victory. On the morning after their victory parade in downtown Shreveport, groundskeepers at the Caddo parish courthouse found a stuffed effigy bearing the name "Sam Jones" hanging from a tree on the courthouse square. Overton Brooks remained in Congress until his death in 1961, when his seat was filled by Joe D. Waggonner in a special election. Congressional Directory 88th Congress 1st Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 65.

85 Times-Picayune, July 23, 1940; Monroe Morning World, September 11, 15, October 16, 1940.

86 Morning Advocate, August 20, 1940; Congressional Directory 77th Congress 1st Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 43. Wurtele is an interesting character. In addition to his New Roads sugar interests, he owned a factory in Minneapolis, Minnesota, had invented a process to turn white sugar...
scion of a family whose anti-Longism had included the elder Sanders' celebrated fisticuffs with Huey Long in the lobby of the Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans during late 1927, had campaigned for Sam Jones in the 1939-40 gubernatorial campaign, and allied himself firmly with Jones and the reformers in this Congressional campaign. Griffith and Bowman both attacked Jones and the reformers, while Wurtele conducted an anti-New Deal campaign.

Sanders received widespread support from Jones leaders throughout the Sixth District, and Jones in his written endorsement cited the advantages of Sanders' prior service in Congress, as well as "his

into synthetic rubber, and had designed a mechanical cane harvester. He had also attempted to dabble in international politics. When Adolph Hitler demanded the city of Danzig and the Polish Corridor in 1938, Wurtele posted $5,000 as a start toward collecting $70,000,000 to buy the area and turn it over to Hitler in order to avoid spending "5,000,000 human lives and $100,000,000."

Wurtele remarked when he announced his Congressional candidacy that the plan "sounded silly when it really was an extremely sane solution to the crisis at the time."

87 T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 271-272; Hammond Vindicator, July 5, 1940. The younger Sanders had served in Congress from 1934 until 1936, when, he claimed, Richard Leche and the Longites counted him out of office. Congressional Directory 77th Congress 1 Session, p. 43. Sanders' 1934 election revealed the strength with which good government forces had to fight the Longite machine. Incumbent Sixth District Congressman Boliver Kemp died in 1933. Huey Long and Governor Oscar Allen preferred to appoint a Longite as Kemp's successor, but a group of Sixth District residents led by former United States Senator E. J. Gay demanded an election, and threatened to hold one with or without Allen's approval. Allen subsequently called an election to be held five days later, in which Mrs. Boliver Kemp was elected. The citizens' committee held its own election twenty-two days later, in which Sanders was elected. The House refused to seat either Mrs. Kemp or Sanders, so Allen called another election, and the Longite machine backed Agriculture Commissioner Harry D. Wilson. Sanders was elected again, and this time the House accepted the legitimacy of his election. J. Y. Sanders, Sr. commented of the Sixth District that it was "the only one Huey Long has never been able to dominate." Item, September 1, 1939.
intimate knowledge of the strawberry and dairy problems" as reasons for his support. The Hammond Democratic Club endorsed Sanders because "we are all desirous of carrying on the work of reconstruction begun by the recent gubernatorial election of the Hon. Sam Jones," and "[you have] carried the banner of decency and honest government shoulder to shoulder with us in our recent fight for the restoration of democracy in Louisiana."  

Sanders gratefully accepted the proffered support of the reformers. He expressed his sympathy with Jones' reform program and told a Sixth District Sam Jones rally in Baton Rouge that the main choice in the race was "between the two schools of thought in Louisiana, those who believe in the graft and corruption of the past 12 years, and those who are for honesty and decency in government."  

Sanders opened his campaign in Franklinton with a speech in which he declared that democracy was indeed on trial "right here in the United States." He commented, "Not only were these people who stole public funds at fault, but the system in the state of Louisiana which allowed such stealing and grafting to take place was also at fault." Sanders touched on the national defense issue in a speech at Mandeville in which he warned of the need for the United States to be armed and trained now that only the British fleet stood between the New World and the Nazis, but he concentrated his attack on the "Maestri-Long- 

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88 Hammond Vindicator, August 9, 16, 1940; Times-Picayune, August 14, 1940.

89 Town Talk, August 6, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, August 9, 16, 1940.
Leche machine" which had supported Griffith in 1936 and 1938.\(^{90}\)

Representative Griffith began his campaign in absentia, with a political advertisement in which he maintained that "world conditions are such that it is necessary for Congress to remain in session and this prevents my returning home at this time to conduct a personal campaign" and stressed the importance of his membership on a "major committee" (Naval Affairs). "Local Democratic Friends" paid for another advertisement which asked voters to "Return John K. Griffith to Congress" because "This is no time to play petty politics in National Affairs and there should be no change made in our Congressmen or Senators in Washington that would delay the preparedness program."\(^{91}\)

Griffith also launched virulent attacks on both Sanders and Jones. He charged that Jones "is attempting to drive the people like cattle and to tell them how to vote" with his endorsement of Sanders and remarked that "there has never been in Louisiana's political history a dictator so oppressive in his domination, a governor so arrogant and vindictive as the present occupant of the executive mansion in Baton Rouge. He holds that any man who raises his voice against him is unfit for public office." Griffith also attacked Sanders ("It is not safe to send such a man to Congress in perilous times.") for alleged exces-

\(^{90}\)Morning Advocate, August 18, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, August 30, 1940.

\(^{91}\)Hammond Vindicator, August 23, 30, 1940.
sive absence during his previous Congressional term.  

Sidney Bowman, the third candidate in the Sixth District race, also waged an anti-Jones and anti-Sanders campaign. Bowman also attacked Sanders' absence on crucial Congressional roll call votes and charged that Sanders had been only a minor figure in Jones' gubernatorial campaign and "only blossom[ed] forth after this administration went into power, and then he and they went haywire promising jobs." Furthermore, Bowman attacked Governor Jones, who, he said, "has replaced dictatorship with autocracy." He also remarked that the Jones reorganization amendment, which was also on the ballot in the 1940 fall election, "does to the government of Louisiana what Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini did to their countries." Bowman asked rhetorically "who do you imagine they found to do the job of reorganizing Louisiana?" and answered his own question: "It was Griffenhagen & Co., a good old German firm with a good old German background." Nevertheless, Sanders profited from his association with the reformers and defeated both his opponents in the first Democratic primary.

The Louisiana Seventh District campaign was no contest. Incumbent Congressman Rene L. DeRouen announced that he would not run for re-election because of poor health. The only candidate who qualified to run for DeRouen's seat was Vance Plauche, a Lake Charles attorney who

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92 Morning Advocate, September 4, 9, 1940. Griffith also attacked the younger Sanders for the senior Sanders' absences during his own Congressional career. Griffith maintained that the elder Sanders missed every roll call during December, 1919, and January, 1920, while he was in Louisiana campaigning for gubernatorial candidate John M. Parker.

93 Ibid., August 31, September 1, 9, 1940.
was also Sam Jones' friend, campaign co-manager, and Jones' first head of Civil Service. Jones enthusiastically endorsed Plauche's candidacy. Plauche ran unopposed in both the Democratic primaries and the general election.\(^4\)

The Eighth District race, in contrast, featured a thoroughgoing Longite, a thoroughgoing reformer, and a genuine Long. Incumbent Longite Congressman A. Leonard Allen was an educator in rural Grant and Winn Parishes before entering the legal profession in Winnfield in 1922. Allen was first elected to Congress in 1936.\(^5\) The Long family member in the race was Dr. George Shannon Long, Huey and Earl's older brother who had been a dentist and state representative in Oklahoma before moving back to Louisiana in 1934, originally to Monroe, and then to the small community of Dry Prong in rural Grant parish. George Long, unlike his brothers, was a World War I veteran and thus avoided the cowardice charges which had dogged Huey and Earl.\(^6\)

James B. Aswell, Jr., ably represented the reformers in the Eighth District race. Aswell was the son of former State Superintendent of Education (1904-08) and Eighth District Congressman (1913-31) James B. Aswell, who, along with Governor Newton Crain Blanchard, had

\(^4\) Town Talk, July 18, 1940; Times-Picayune, July 19, 1940; Congressional Directory 77 Congress 1 Session, p. 43. John B. Fournet to Rene L. DeRouen, July 22, 1940, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).

\(^5\) Town Talk, September 6, 1940; Congressional Directory 77 Congress 1 Session, p. 43.

established a modern education system in the state. The younger Aswell had a promising national literary career during the 1920s and 1930s. Short stories he wrote appeared in major magazines of those decades, including Collier's, and became a mainstay of College Humor. Aswell by 1927 had also begun a newspaper column, "My New York," and by 1931 became Broadway correspondent for the Central Press Association. Increasing difficulty in selling his material during the late 1930s, however, led to Aswell's deep disillusionment with the American literary establishment and prompted his return to Natchitoches Parish in September, 1938, to become a "Farmer-Writer," as he described himself. Aswell hitched his wagon to the Sam Jones star in 1939 as a Jones campaign leader in the Eighth District and became State Director of Publicity following Jones' election.

Aswell was displeased with Congressman Allen's representation of

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97 Rodney Cline, Builders of Louisiana Education (Baton Rouge, Bureau of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, Louisiana State University, 1963), pp. 14-16; Merritt Hubbard to Ann Watkins, October 28, 1929; Polly Hightower to James B. Aswell, Jr., December 12, 1927; H. N. Swanson to Aswell, December 9, 1929; Swanson to Carol Hill, January 13, 1930; Anne L. Young to Aswell, November 11, 1929; Mark Hellinger to Aswell, March, 1931, Aswell Collection.

98 James B. Aswell, Jr. to Ann Watkins, January 15, 1935; Watkins to Aswell, January 8, 1935; H. N. Swanson to Aswell, July 31, 1933; rejection slips from Ladies Home Journal, April 4, 1930, Cosmopolitan, June 2, 1930; Aswell 1938 Voter Registration Certificate, Aswell Collection; Morning Advocate, June 23, 1942. Aswell's deepening bitterness is clearly evident in his papers. On July 29, 1933, he wrote to Swanson that "I am interested in telling stories and this columning business is getting in my hair... I'm sick of it and sick of New York. I want new stimuli, new surroundings, new color, new friends." By 1939, however, he was much more blunt: "To hell with the whole God damned bunch of pink old ladies who run the three or four magazines which can make or break a writer's career. I'll devote myself to another career which leads to a point where I can make or break them." Aswell to Sydney A. Sanders, July 3, 1939, Aswell Collection.
the Eighth District. He remarked early in 1940 that "the people might as well send a postcard up there [Washington] as to depend upon the incumbent's efforts." This perception of Allen, plus Aswell's determination to help rid the state of all vestiges of Longism, led him to announce his candidacy for the Eighth District post.  

Aswell waged a campaign at once anti-Long and pro-preparedness. In his opening campaign speech, a radio broadcast from Alexandria, the major city of the Eighth District, Aswell recalled that Allen "defended the regime of graft and corruption from every stump he could get hold of" in the recent gubernatorial campaign. He later dubbed Allen "the zero Congressman of the United States" because no bill he introduced had ever passed both houses of Congress, and called him "a little machine congressman."  

Aswell also stressed his support for United States preparedness, referring often to the fall of the French republic to the Nazi juggernaut: "as Marshall Petain said, France fell because the citizens had become soft and divided and self-indulgent. [Teachers] must toughen and steel the young people in their care for the greatest crisis this country has ever faced." His Fourth of July address brimmed with patriotic fervor:  

"From here on out we must be tough; we must be  

99Town Talk, April 26, 1940; Aswell to Mrs. J. W. Smith, July 30, 1939, Aswell Collection. Aswell wrote to Mrs. Smith that "I love this country and the people in it. They do not deserve to be governed by thieves and incompetents, and if enough of us yell 'Thief!' maybe a majority of them will be caught and jilded. I'm going to keep on yelling."  

100Town Talk, July 18, August 27, 30, 1940.
tough in our determination to keep this island of democracy free in a world where chains clank and the marching feet of aggressors sound louder and louder ... Our Maginot line consists in (sic) the steel resolution of our own characters. If that line holds, America is safe from any foe on earth.

Aswell also linked Allen with the tired old politicians who had lost France: "France had too many Leonard Allens in office and we have too many in Washington." 101

Aswell did not wage only a negative campaign. He outlined his plans for conservation, reforestation, industrialization, and vocational education, including a proposal to gear vocational training to actual industrial need, but centered most of his campaign on attacking Allen. 102

The established reformers joined in his effort to unseat Allen. Precinct captains, co-captains, and campaign workers of the Jones organization in Alexandria endorsed Aswell. Jones-Noe alliance forces throughout the Eighth District met in Alexandria and unconditionally endorsed Aswell. Governor Jones formally endorsed him on August 12, calling him "the only one of the candidates who supported the present administration and is able, courageous, and fearless." 103

Aswell also relied on a network of "Junior Jim Aswell Clubs," organizations of young voters dedicated to electing a young man (Aswell

101 Ibid., June 26, July 5, August 27, 1940.

102 Ibid., July 18, August 27, 1940.

103 Ibid., August 2, 5, 13, 1940.
was born in 1908, Allen in 1891, Long in 1883) to represent them. As club director Cecil Roberts remarked, "Since we are the ones to have to live under future governments, we want a young man who understands our needs to lay a strong foundation for that government." Following the failure to defeat Allen in 1940, Aswell wrote to Roberts, "Do your best to keep the Jim Aswell clubs alive during the next two years and we will hand Allen a defeat next time." 104

In the face of the reformers allied against him, Congressman Allen drew the mantle of his incumbency tightly around himself. "To discharge an experienced representative at this critical time is like discharging a skilled surgeon in the midst of a major operation," he wrote. Allen's secretary, D. M. Riddle, announced, however, that the Congressman was too busy in Washington to campaign full-time in the district. 105

Allen also identified himself as "a consistent foe of un-Americanism, [who has] supported every move in Congress to stamp out un-American 'isms' and has always championed Congressman Dies," and noted

104 Ibid., July 17, 1940; James B. Aswell to Cecil Roberts, September 12, 1940, Aswell Collection; Congressional Directory 77 Congress 1 Session, p. 43; Congressional Directory 83 Congress 1 Session, p. 53. Allen retained his Eighth District seat until 1952, when George Long was elected. Long, in turn, served until 1958, when he was defeated by Harold McSween. Congressional Directory 86 Congress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 60.

105 Town Talk, July 15, 1940. A Leonard Allen to Dr. Joseph Bath, July 27, 1940, Aswell Collection. Aswell thought Allen's absence from the district was only a coy deception. He recalled Allen's two trips to Louisiana to campaign for Earl Long only a few months previously and remarked that Allen seemed to be willing "to go 2,000 miles . . . to defend graft and corruption anywhere it cropped up." Town Talk, July 18, 1940.
that he had authored a bill to deport American Communist Party leader Harry Bridges. While he defended his support of preparedness ("Mr. Allen has long supported adequate national defense . . . and time has proven the wisdom of his position"), he continued to oppose active American intervention in the shooting war ("We must not sentence the flower of American manhood to die on the battlefields of Europe . . . The mothers and fathers know that he can be depended upon to continue his fight to keep our boys out of Europe").

Allen eventually campaigned personally in the district, but he also utilized a new refinement of Huey Long's old practice of using sound equipment mounted on trucks. Sound trucks became staples of Huey Long's campaign caravans. By 1940, however, new improvements in the quality of sound recording made the live politician unnecessary. Allen utilized two sound trucks equipped with tape recordings of his speeches and the amplifiers necessary to broadcast them. Unfortu-

106 Town Talk, July 16, 1940. Allen's patriotic stance led Major General O. R. Gellette, Adjutant General of the Order of the Stars and Bars, to call upon all Confederate veterans, and widows, children, and friends of Confederate veterans to vote for Allen because of "his fight against the sinister forces of foreign 'isms' which are now seeking to undermine and destroy our great nation." Town Talk, August 1, 1940. Apparently, no one thought it strange for a Confederate veteran to speak out against "forces . . . which are now seeking to undermine and destroy" the United States just as he had once done.

107 Ibid., August 31, 1940. The Town Talk, however, immediately realized the long-range implications of this campaign device and commented that "if television could be hooked up to the new type broadcast trucks, a politician could 'visit' in person and carry on a campaign throughout his district or state and remain comfortable in his office all at the same time." The later widespread use of television receivers, of course, made it possible for politicians to wage their campaigns without bothering with the sound trucks. Louisiana had received its first look at television on September 11, 1939, when RCA set up special broadcasting and receiving equipment at the D. H. Holmes department store in New Orleans. The demonstration broadcast included statements by Robert Lienhard, president of Holmes, Leo Hirsch, president of
nately, no extant records reveal how many potential voters were willing to attend a political rally in which they looked at a truck and listened to a taped political speech.

Despite his largely absentee campaign, Allen was renominated in the first Democratic primary, but by only a slim 503 vote margin over the combined votes of his opponents. Allen received 21,835 votes to Aswell's 17,013 and Long's 4,219.108

Overall, Governor Jones was pleased with the result of the 1940 election. Even though the reformers failed to make a clean sweep of the Congressional seats, reformers now sat in five of them. Moreover, the three incumbent Congressmen, sensing the depth of reform sentiment, promised to cooperate with the state administration "toward the upbuilding of a better and greater state and the securing of national recognition."109

The 1942 midterm Congressional elections in Louisiana were, as most midterm elections are, much less exciting than the elections which coincide with presidential elections. The 1942 political season was a relatively quiet interlude between the major campaigns of 1940 and 1944. The 1942 contests are notable, however, for the Old Regular switch from their temporary alliance with the reformers supporting Hale

108 Town Talk, September 11, 1940.

109 Morning Advocate, November 7, 1940.
Boggs in the Second District, J. Y. Sanders' loss to James H. Morrison in the Sixth District, and Longite Allen J. Ellender's re-election to the United States Senate even though reformer E. A. Stephens attempted to unseat him.

Early speculation that former Governor James A. Noe would run for Ellender's Senate seat faded away in 1942 as federal investigators closed in on Noe in the Win or Lose Oil Company tax evasion case.\textsuperscript{110} By 1942, moreover, Noe and Sam Jones had reached the end of their temporary alliance. Therefore, New Orleans businessman and former President of the New Orleans Dock Board, E. A. Stephens, a reformer who had worked in Jones' gubernatorial campaign, took up the reform banner in the Senate campaign.

Stephens cast his campaign as an attempt to stop "dictatorship [that] is again attempting to raise its ugly head in this state with a carefully worked out and well-financed plan." Stephens portrayed Ellender as an integral component of the Longite machine who was serving as a point man in an attempted Longite resurgence with which the machine hoped to place Robert Maestri in the governor's chair in 1944.\textsuperscript{111}

Ellender and his allies struck back at the reformers. They had considered Stephens a suspicious character since Jones appointed him

\textsuperscript{110} Noe received a gold pen from the audience at a testimonial dinner in his honor held at Farmerville in April, 1940. The Master of Ceremonies told him that they hoped he would sign committee reports with it "When you go to Washington to serve in that great body [the Senate]." Robert M. McGehee to Allen J. Ellender, April 19, 1940, Ellender Collection.

\textsuperscript{111} Morning Advocate, June 16, July 9, 14, 1942.
to the Dock Board. The *Farmer’s Friend*, newspaper of the Farmers' Protective Union and mouthpiece of James H. Morrison, attacked Stephens as a "pal and cohort of Hitler's No. 1 U. S. Agent Baron von Spiegel." (Edgar von Spiegel was the German consul in New Orleans until he was expelled along with other German diplomats by President Roosevelt in June, 1941.) Stephens replied that while he served as president of the Dock Board, he was coolly civil to the German consul but had not developed a warm friendship with him.

Ellender also attempted to build a consensus of all Louisianians by playing on the war issue. "This is no time for factional or personal politics," he said in his formal statement of his candidacy. "I do not believe that anyone should turn their thoughts to personal political matters, but that we should all pull together." This belief, however, did not prevent Ellender from launching a personal attack on Stephens for his supposed "foreign" birth (Stephens was a native of Virginia).

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112 The *Farmer's Friend*, a newspaper not noted for its objectivity, also remarked that "This latest obnoxious appointment made by stupid Sam Jones will give the Nazis an inside track into the biggest and most important utility in the State of Louisiana." *Farmer’s Friend*, (n.d.), Fournet Collection.

113 In fact, the reformers themselves had been suspicious of von Spiegel. Governor Jones requested Secretary of State Cordell Hull to investigate the German's activities as early as the summer of 1940. *Times-Picayune*, June 18, 1940; *States*, June 16, 1941.

114 *Morning Advocate* July 22, August 19, 1942. Dr. George Long, in his statement endorsing Stephens, remarked of Ellender that "I know the friends of Huey Long. I know the Huey Long program inside out, and I also know a hypocrite when I see one." Stephens wondered whether Maestri and Ellender, had they been alive in 1815, would have rushed to the Chalmette Battlefield and shouted to Andrew Jackson, "Stop! You can't save our city and our nation! You are a foreigner from Tennessee!"
The striking feature of the 1942 Senate race in Louisiana is its aura of "politics as usual." The war became a poor second best issue as the factions battled for the Senate seat. Ellender retained the seat, and that, as a matter of fact, signaled something of a Longite resurgence, just as the reformers feared.

The Congressional races in 1942 were generally lackluster. Vance Plauche chose not to run for re-election from the Seventh District, leaving that race wide open. State Representative William J. Dodd considered a campaign for the office, but the Army draft called him into service, and he chose not to ask for a deferment to run for Congress. Opelousas insurance man Henry D. Larcade was subsequently elected to the post over J. L. McHugh, who had Governor Jones' active support. 115

Among Congressional races, however, the Sixth District proved to be the most rousing because of James H. Morrison's entry in the campaign. J. Y. Sanders opened his campaign in July with a ringing announcement of his support for President Roosevelt's conduct of the war. Morrison, however, questioned Sanders' participation in the conduct of that war. "While our beloved people were beset with worries that their sons in the armed forces be given adequate equipment," Morrison fumed, what was this Sam Jones rubber stamp doing?" He then answered his own question: ". . . little J. Y. Sanders was helping to author, support, and vote for a pension bill for himself . . . , was securing for him-

self an X [unlimited gasoline] rationing card, and playing petty politics at the request and dictates of Gov. Jones.\textsuperscript{116}

Morrison's platform was a mixture of planks pledging "to do everything possible to win the war as soon as possible," as well as "to support President Roosevelt's war policy 100%," and also planks promising jobs and benefits for the Sixth District: army camps along with the civilian jobs they provided, more federal funds for old age pension and welfare rolls, and "100% cooperation with all labor organizations." Sanders objected to Morrison promising to support the war in Congress when he had not supported it by serving in the armed forces. "By his own actions and utterances," Sanders said, "he has branded himself an Isolationist, and Obstructionist, an Objector to Military Service in time of war, an advocate of the America First Committee, and the German Bund, and a sympathizer of [Burton K.] Wheeler, [Hamilton] Fish, and [Charles] Lindbergh.\textsuperscript{117}

Despite Sanders' plea with Sixth District voters not to vote "a draft exemption to 'allergic-to-khaki' Morrison," he lost the election by the slim margin of 27,990 votes to 29,078 for Morrison.

While the 1942 off-year elections stirred little interest in Louisiana, the 1944 presidential election year attracted a great deal of attention within the state. President Franklin Roosevelt during his unprecedented four elections to the presidency created deep

\textsuperscript{116}Morning Advocate, July 8, 12, 1942. Sanders maintained that he had not voted for a $4,000 pension for himself, and that statements to the contrary were "either malicious fabrications of a perverted intellect or they are the delusions of a diseased imagination."

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., October 2, 4, 15, 1942.
divisions within the Democratic party as it adopted a more liberal agenda to attract the allegiance of the increasingly urban American population. This shift left the conservative rural South behind. Its frustration led to overt attempts to wrest control of the party from the liberal forces which had increasingly controlled its agenda since Roosevelt's election in 1932.

Governor Jones reflected the frustration felt by both Louisiana and the South in his article "Will Dixie Bolt the New Deal?" published in the March 6, 1943, issue of the Saturday Evening Post. Jones argued that Roosevelt, despite his lengthy residence at his "Little White House" at Warm Springs, Georgia, knew little about the South, and that New Deal economic policies "continued to kick an already prostrate South in the face." The national administration had denied the South its due share of public investments, and had continued the railroad freight-rate disparity between North and South which worked to the detriment of the South. Moreover, Roosevelt had shown sympathy for the stirrings of the black struggle for civil rights. Therefore, Jones suggested, it was time for the Solid South to abandon its blind allegiance to the Democratic party. 118

Jones did not come suddenly to his conclusions. In late December 1942, he had remarked:

I can't see why we should continue to give adherence to a party which has treated us worse than the Republican party has ever treated us.

118 Sam H. Jones, "Will Dixie Bolt the New Deal?" Saturday Evening Post, March 6, 1943, pp. 20-21, 42, 45; Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, p. 95.
on these issues [allocation of war contracts]. I can't see why we should adhere to the Democ­
tratic party if we are going to be a step­
child. I don't see why we shouldn't form our
own Democratic party and join with the people
of the Middle West.119

The Morning Advocate editorially endorsed Jones' proposals. The
governor's concerns, the newspaper remarked, "highlights a growing re­
volt by Southern leaders against what they consider unfair legislation
and economic discrimination." Furthermore, "What we have had in
Washington for ten years is of all things, not the Democratic party
the South knows." The answer to the problem appeared obvious to the
editorial writers: "We should not be chased out of the home of our
fathers. Rather, we should throw out those who have usurped the party
raiment and its name."120

Not all Louisianians shared these feelings. Roosevelt still re­
tained a strong and loyal following within the state. J. F. McDougall
wrote a letter to the editor of the New Orleans States in May, 1942,
full of glowing praise for the president:

From George Washington, down through the years to
the present time, He [God] has never failed us.
At this time when the whole world is at war, when
if this nation ever needed a man of great wisdom
and understanding, God has proved that He loves
us and the things we are fighting for, humanity,
peace, and honor, by giving us a great leader, our

119 Morning Advocate. December 3, 1942.

120 Ibid., December 10, 1942.
beloved President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Senator Allen Ellender urged the United States Senate to designate Roosevelt as "supreme leader" of the Allied war effort during the summer of 1942. In April, 1944, the Louisiana State Federation of Labor urged Roosevelt to accept the Democratic party nomination for an unprecedented fourth term as president. New Orleans industrialist Andrew Jackson Higgins in a national radio speech in May, 1943, said that if the war lasted until 1944, Roosevelt should be returned to office because "This war is not time for discord." Higgins by then also realized the economic benefit Louisiana reaped from the war. He alone employed some 20,000 people at seven plants producing war goods in New Orleans.

As usual, the main bout in Louisiana during the 1944 presidential election concerned the Democratic party. Louisiana's delegation to the Republican National Convention in Chicago unanimously voted to nominate the eventual Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey of New York, and Louisiana Republican National Committeeman John E. Jackson of New Orleans issued a statement that "The people of Louisiana, as well as the rest of the South, are tired of the New Deal, and I believe [they]

121 States, May 5, 1942; Shreveport Journal, June 25, 1942; Morning Advocate, April 9, 1943, April 5, 1944; Town Talk, May 17, 1943; Jack B. McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics," Louisiana History, Summer, 1974, pp. 274-275. Despite the State Federation of Labor endorsement, however, not all of Louisiana's working class favored Roosevelt. Federal Marshals shot and wounded Cylton Moses of Rapides Parish when they arrested him in December, 1943, for "making threatening remarks against the bodily welfare of the president of the United States." In addition, Frank Joseph Daulong, a railroad telegraph operator from Ruston, pled "not guilty" in April, 1945, to charges that he had threatened Roosevelt's life. Witnesses, however, claimed that he said, "If someone does not kill him soon, I have a notion of doing it myself," on one occasion, and "I hope someone gets him tonight. If
will go along with the Republican ticket." Republican politics in Louisiana, however, remained the sideshow while the Democrats dominated the midway.

The Democrats felt rumblings of discontent throughout 1943. Governor Jones joined with Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia at the 1943 Southern Governor's Conference and called for an end of the Democratic Solid South so that both parties would have to solicit the South's electoral votes. The Democratic National Committee called for campaign funds, and Francis J. Whitehead, Assistant Secretary of the Louisiana Democratic Central Committee, replied that requests of funds would probably go unheeded "unless the Democrats soon straighten out their politics respecting the South ..." Louisiana Senator John Overton denounced a fourth term for Roosevelt: "I opposed a third term and I will even more strongly oppose a fourth term, war or no war. The precedent established when our government was formed should not be broken. We will be plagued in years to come for our present actions." The election year of 1944 brought no end to the incipient Southern rebellion in Louisiana. Forty Democratic leaders from South Carolina

they don't, I'll go do it myself," on another. Morning Advocate, December 24, 1943, April 4, 1945.

122 Shreveport Times, June 26, 1944; States, June 29, 1944. Political contributions to the DNC from the South were an especially important lever because Southern Congressional elections were almost invariably settled in the Democratic primaries. This meant that the Southern contributions could be channeled into Northern Congressional races in which Democrats faced strong Republican challengers, and thus needed extra money. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, p. 97.

123 Town Talk, March 26, June 17, 19, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 9, 1943.
Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida met in Shreveport about one month before the Democratic National Convention in June. The disgruntled delegates agreed "to drive the New Deal, the CIO Communists and negroes' (sic) out of control of the Democratic party and restore state's rights." The delegates hoped to put together a one-hundred vote block of delegates to the national convention who were opposed to Roosevelt's nomination. 124

Insurgent Louisiana Democrats threatened further action. Democratic State Chairman Frank Looney announced on July 4, that resolutions to declare the Louisiana electors "free agents with the right to cast their vote for a Democrat for president and vice president other than the nominee of the party" would be introduced at the Committee's next meeting in September. In addition, the Committee elected Representative Henry Clay Sevier of Tallulah as the new national committee-man to replace House Speaker Norman Bauer, who resigned to devote more time to his personal and House business. Sevier was an avowed foe of Roosevelt and the New Deal. 125

Franklin Roosevelt announced during July that he would accept a fourth nomination. As the Democratic delegates gathered in Chicago for the national convention, Sam Jones met with the Louisiana delegates and announced that his informal poll of the delegation had revealed a great deal of support for conservative Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia

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124 Shreveport Times, June 10, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 10, 1944. The Democrats had abandoned the "two-thirds rule" only in 1932 (partly at the insistence of Huey Long), when Roosevelt's supporters attracted enough votes at the national convention to overturn it.

125 Shreveport Times, July 5, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 5, 1944.
for president, and that "we will join with other Southern states in opposing the nomination of Mr. Wallace for vice-president." Old Regular delegates, however, were not so sure that Louisiana should abandon the president. Typically, the Old Regulars held that Roosevelt's nomination was certain, even with the threatened Southern revolt, and that Louisiana should protect its interests by staying with the winner.  

When the Louisiana delegation met in caucus to decide which candidate to support for president, the insurgents carried the day. Democratic Committeeman Sevier moved that Louisiana endorse Harry Byrd. Before Sevier's motion came to a vote, however, Old Regular James Comisky of New Orleans made a substitute motion to endorse Roosevelt. Comisky's motion came to a vote first, and lost by a 14-6 margin. Sevier's original motion then carried on a 16-4 vote. Under the unit rule, therefore, all 22 of Louisiana's votes (two delegates were absent from the caucus) went to Senator Byrd. The caucus also approved by a voice vote ("a unanimous roar") a resolution presented by visitor Wright Morrow of Texas which included opposition "with all vigor" to any platform plank favoring social equality between the races, favoring anti-poll tax legislation, and advocating the right of all states to manage their domestic affairs without restraint from the federal government.

126 *States, July 18, 1944.*

127 *Item, July 19, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 19, 1944.*

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Even though he suffered defections on the Southern front, Roosevelt easily garnered his fourth nomination as president. He received 1,176 votes on the first ballot, compared to eighty-nine votes for Byrd (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia), and one vote for James A. Farley. Louisiana's standard, however, did not join the exuberant victory demonstration on the convention floor. One of the anti-Roosevelt delegates tied it tightly in place with a handkerchief to keep an enthusiast from unauthorized use of it during the demonstration. (The Mississippi and Texas standards were similarly tied in place.)

Following Roosevelt's nomination, attention turned to the vice-presidential nomination. The South was still opposed to Vice-president Henry Wallace, and this time Roosevelt was not disposed to save him. He still personally supported Wallace but bowed to the wishes of leading urban party bosses who believed that Wallace had no chance of nomination because of opposition from the Southern states and turned to United States Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri.

Sam Jones had to dampen a vice-presidential boomlet in his favor. Walter Sillers, chairman of the Mississippi delegation, George Butler of the Texas delegation, and Louisiana's John Fred Odom attempted to

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128 Item, July 21, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 21, 1944.

start a stampede toward Jones for vice-president, but Jones thought that the Southern delegates should not "scatter their shots" on the vice-presidential ballot, and instead hold their votes together in an attempt to defeat Wallace. Jones received promises of support from five other states, but told a caucus of those states to focus their support on a man who could obtain more national support than he could count on. The Louisiana delegation subsequently voted unanimously to support Truman to the bitter end in order to defeat Wallace. Truman received the vice-presidential nomination on the second ballot.130

Truman's nomination removed some of the bluster from the Southern rebellion. Sam Jones, interviewed late in the convention by Major James E. Crown, remarked that "The defeat of the radical Easterners" was the major accomplishment of the convention. And the South, Jones said, had led "[a] bold, courageous and determined fight . . . to protect the traditions and principles the South holds dear." Had it not been for the South, "the Democratic nominee for vice president would not have been Senator Truman, but would have been a man who brazenly flouted the traditions of the South." Southerners felt comfortable with Harry Truman, grandson of slaveholders, because of his background in a border state. Their desperate attempt to nominate "anybody but Wallace" however, caused them to overlook Truman's support of the New Deal, and his exposure to the problems of urban minority groups as an associate of the Pendergast organization in Kansas City. Truman, while not an ardent liberal, was more moderate than most of the South. Southerners

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would, therefore, feel betrayed when he supported liberal causes during his own presidency, especially his order to desegregate the armed forces and his attempt to renew the Fair Employment Practices Commission.131

Not all Louisianians swung to Roosevelt's support in 1944, even with Truman nominated as his running mate. Irving L. Lyons wrote to the States editor that he was planning to vote for Thomas Dewey:

"... I am enough of an optimist to believe that this country has not degenerated to the point where we have only one leader measuring up to the demands of the times, critical though they may be ..." The "Southern Anti-New Deal Association," headquartered in Shreveport, attacked Sidney Hillman, one of the founders of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and its National Political Action Committee and a Roosevelt advisor: "today we have the foreign-born Hillman pulling the strings in the campaign to re-elect Roosevelt and the New Deal ..." J. T. Powell, a New Orleans attorney, formed a "Democratic Committee in Favor of Dewey," which instructed Democrats how to split their ballots and vote for Dewey for President and Democratic candidates for local offices.132

The gravest challenge to the Roosevelt-Truman candidacy in Louisiana occurred when some of the state's Democratic electors

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131 States, July 22, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 22, 1944; Miller, Plain Speaking, pp. 79-80; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 41-56; Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth," Journal of American History, March, 1970, pp. 859-867. Jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence (New York, Lippincott, 1950), p. 234 maintains that "Truman was nominated by men ... who knew what they wanted, but did not know what they were getting."

132 States, July 25, 1944; Town Talk, October 18, November 4, 1944.
refused to sign a pledge to vote for Roosevelt and Truman, as re-
quested by the Democratic State Central Committee. Most members of
the state committee, except for a few Southern zealots, accepted the
Democratic ticket with the addition of Truman. The zealots, however,
caused the main fireworks in the campaign. The State Central Commit-
tee replaced seven electors in October because four resigned rather
than sign the pledge, and an additional three electors refused to sign
but hoped to retain their posts. These three, E. Wales Brown of
Shreveport, Bronier Thibault of Donaldsonville, and George Billeaud
of Broussard, filed suit seeking to overturn the Committee's action
dismissing them, but the Nineteenth Judicial District Court and the
First Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the Committee's action, citing
the Louisiana Supreme Court ruling in the 1940 Earl K. Long v. Wade
O. Martin, Sr. case, which upheld the State Central Committee's right
to determine Democratic nominees. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused
to hear the case of the dissident electors. 133

Senator Truman personally brought the Democratic campaign into
Louisiana with a campaign trip to New Orleans in mid-October. He
toured the New Orleans waterfront and addressed the Mississippi Valley
Flood Control Association. When asked about Democratic changes in the
election, Truman confidently replied that the South would remain Demo-
cratic: "All a Southerner has to do is read the speeches of Dewey
and they will be all right." Furthermore, the continuation of the war
provided a strong attraction to the incumbent president: "I don't

133 Morning Advocate, September 28, October 14-15, 1944; States,
October 7, 17, 1944; Town Talk, October 8, 1944.
think people interested in winning the war will take the chance of upsetting the cordial relations with our Allies and losing any more of our young men."134

Truman's expectations for Democratic success were well founded in Louisiana. The Democratic ticket carried the state, and all ten of Louisiana's electors cast their votes for Roosevelt when they met in December.135 Moreover, the old threat of the summer before to withhold Louisiana contributions from Democratic coffers did not materialize. A Congressional committee examining campaign expenditures in April, 1945, found that Louisianans contributed $40,000 to Roosevelt's campaign. One-half the amount, however, came from New Orleans industrialist Andrew J. Higgins, recipient of millions of dollars worth of war contracts, and his family.136

The 1944 Congressional elections resulted in the re-election of all Louisiana's incumbent Congressmen. The only spirited campaign occurred in the Sixth District. Incumbent Congressman James H. Morrison drew several opponents, the most prominent of whom were East Baton Rouge State Senator H. Alva Brumfield, and Tangipahoa Parish District

134 States, October 14-15, 1944. Truman later recalled of the 1944 campaign that "I found little evidence of any inclination to change leaders during the war." He also remarked that people "just never did trust" Dewey: "He had a moustache, for one thing, and since in those days, during the war, people were aware of Hitler, that moustache didn't do him any good." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman One Year of Decisions (Garden City, New Jersey, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 193; Miller, Plain Speaking, p. 188.

135 Morning Advocate, December 19, 1944.

136 Ibid., May 1, 1945; McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics," pp. 174-175.
Attorney Boliver E. Kemp, Jr. Morrison required a second primary to defeat Brumfield. 137

United States Senator John Holmes Overton also faced a challenge for his Senate seat when his term expired in 1944. Overton at first threw the race wide open when he announced in March, 1944, that he intended to retire from politics and return to his Alexandria home. (He was then sixty-nine years old.) During Overton's absence from the race, several other candidates emerged. Former Governor Noe announced his intention to run for Overton's seat but withdrew when his campaign again failed to draw adequate support. Former Governor Earl Long announced that if Overton did not carry the Longite banner in the Senate campaign, then he would become a candidate. E. A. Stephens also announced his candidacy. Sam Jones, however, announced that he would stick to his pledge to return to private life after his gubernatorial term, but "if the time should come when other vital issues are at stake, I shall not hesitate to once again answer the call as I did in 1939." Overton, however, changed his mind at the behest of "Democratic colleagues in Washington," and "insistent demands from all political factions in the state" and announced his candidacy for re-election. 139

Overton based his campaign on both his record of support for the

137Morning Advocate, December 19, 1944.

138Ibid., May 12, July 23, September 21, 1944.

139Ibid., May 18, 24, July 6, 9, 1944; Item, May 24, 1944; Town Talk, June 29, July 8, 1944; States, July 8, 1944; John H. Overton to W. Scott Heywood, April 1, 1944, Heywood to Sam Jones, May 6, 1944, Jones to Heywood, May 12, 1944, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
United States war effort and his efforts which provided "several
hundred million dollars" worth of flood control, navigation, irriga-
tion, and reclamation projects to Louisiana. He also revealed an un-
easiness with the growth of the federal government. The war, he said,
cau sed "a very appreciable amount of regimentation," but

I wish to assure you . . . that as soon as the
battle flags are furled I shall do all in my
power to abolish the mushroom agencies that have
grown overnight as adjunct to the prosecution
of the war and that I will undertake to drive
bureaucrats out of our federal government and
return to the basic principles of American
democracy.140

Senator Overton, despite his announcement during 1943 that he
had been "stabbed in the back" by the Old Regulars who planned to
support James A. Noe in the 1944 Senatorial campaign, received support
from the Old Regulars and also from Senator Allen J. Ellender, who
asked Louisianians to "leave the team of Overton and Ellender intact
to carry the ball for Louisiana." Overton also received support from
some North Louisiana interests not normally associated with Longites.
The Shreveport Times revealed the reason for its support in its edi-
torial endorsing Overton: if Overton left the Senate, then both Louisi-
ana Senators would be from South Louisiana. His defeat would leave
North and Central Louisiana without the one Senate seat they normally
held by Louisiana political custom.141

140 Morning Advocate, July 7, 25, August 9, 1944.

141 Ibid., July 27, August 16, 1944; Shreveport Times, July 30, 1944.

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Harry Truman's nomination as the Democratic vice-presidential candidate permitted Overton to utilize the Missouri Senator's support. Several of Overton's campaign advertisements featured quotes from Senator Truman praising Overton's defense preparedness record. A typical quote read, "we have need of you in the Congress, especially in the furtherance of the war effort and in handling the very complicated problems following the war." It is impossible to imagine a Senatorial candidate in Louisiana using Henry Wallace's endorsement in a similar manner. Indeed, the candidate's opponent would have reaped much more benefit than the candidate Wallace endorsed.

Overton's principal opponent in the 1944 Senate race was Stephens, a veteran of the Sam Jones and Jimmie Davis gubernatorial campaigns, and loser to Ellender in 1942. Stephens flailed away at Overton, attacking his age ("the country and this state need strongmen in the U. S. Senate who are both mentally and physically able to help win this peace"); his Longite alliance ("The issue is clear. It is to turn over the important post of United States Senator to [Robert] Maestri . . . through the medium of my opponent and thus give Maestri a toe hold to take over the state a few years from now . . . "); his opposition to Roosevelt's successful attempts to change the arms embargo at the beginning of World War II in order to ship arms to Britain and France (Overton "joined hands with Senator [Gerald P.] Nye of North Dakota, an avowed champion of Hitler, before Pearl Harbor").

142 Town Talk, August 30, 1944; Item, September 12, 1944.

143 Morning Advocate, July 28, August 11, 1944; States August 11, 1944.
Overton overcame his challengers in the first Democratic primary. He defeated Stephens as well as his other two challengers in the race, Fourteenth Judicial District Attorney Griffen T. Hawkins of Lake Charles, and New Orleans real estate liquidator Charles S. Gerth. The New Orleans Item, in a post-mortem editorial on Stephens' candidacy, found three reasons why he had lost: Sam Jones and Jimmie Davis chose not to support him openly; many reformers chose to support Overton; and late in the campaign, Stephens attempted to swing toward a more liberal stance by endorsing the New Deal, thus causing some voters to consider him indecisive and insincere. 144

The 1944 Presidential and Congressional races terminated federal elections in Louisiana during the World War II years. Contests for the federal offices had several times reflected the bifactional division in the state. Despite the agreements between reformers and Longites in some districts in the 1940 Congressional election, and the reformers' decision not to endorse John Overton's opponent in 1944, federal elections in Louisiana during the war years were contested along bifactional lines. The two factions may have temporarily united in support of a given candidate, but the rival political organizations did not disappear. When a temporary alliance unraveled, as did the Old Regular/reformer alliance created in 1940, for example, the two factions remained intact and ready to oppose each other.

The victory of the reformers in the 1940 Congressional elections, following closely Sam Jones' displacement of the Longites on the state

144. Morning Advocate, September 21, 1944; Item, September 14, 1944.
level, was the zenith of success for the anti-Long faction in federal elections during the war years. Voter displeasure with the Longites contributed to reform success in five districts that year, but the reformers failed to hold their gains as the excesses of the Louisiana Scandals became only a memory. Moreover, the reform faction could not dislodge Longite control of both Louisiana's Senate seats. Therefore, while reformers enjoyed their success in several races during the war, the Longite faction remained strong and fully capable of reasserting its control of the state as it did in Earl Long's triumphant return as governor in 1948.

Just as some Longites remained in power on the state level, other members of the faction retained federal office. After 1940, however, their domination of Louisiana's Congressional delegation was not assured. The 1940 state elections proved that Longites could be dislodged from state office and the 1940 federal elections proved that they could be dislodged from Congressional office. As the 1940s progressed, however, and the Longite faction recovered its strength and regained its voter appeal, that possibility became increasingly remote.

The war years also sowed the seeds of major discord in national politics which burst forth during the later days of peace. The Democratic party in 1940 and 1944 beat back full-fledged Southern revolts because of the political power, record of leadership, and overpowering personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt. By 1948, however, the South's anger at the Democratic party — by then well on its way to becoming even more urban, liberal, and northern and thus less rural, conservative, and Southern — could no longer be contained by President Harry S. Truman, and the party split apart. Louisiana's role in the post-
war era, however, lies beyond the scope of this study.
CHAPTER VII

LOUISIANA OPINION AND THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II

As war spread across the European continent after the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, public reaction in the United States was divided, but generally supported the British and French in their military opposition to German aggression. Robert Dallek's study of American reaction reveals that 80 per cent of the American public in early September favored the Allies, and that from 50 per cent to 60 per cent specifically favored American aid to Britain and France. Even with their pronounced preference for the Allies, however, a majority of Americans unequivocally wished to keep the United States out of the war, although the South tended to be more pro-British and to support a more interventionist foreign policy than did other sections of the country.

According to Leila Sussman, United States public opinion during

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1940 was divided into three distinct groups: an isolationist wing, a pro-Ally wing, and a middle group sympathetic to the Allies, but anxious to stay out of war. Sussman also found that the last group was larger than the other two.4

Sources reflecting public opinion in Louisiana during the months between German invasion of Poland in 1939 and United States entry into the war in December, 1941, reveal that public reaction in Louisiana was also divided, and that Sussman’s three divisions of opinion conform with sentiment in Louisiana as well as in the United States. No major Louisiana newspaper immediately called for United States entry into the war on either side, and no major Louisiana newspaper was pro-Axis. Most Louisiana editorial opinion clearly fell into Sussman’s third category: sympathetic to the Allies but wary of United States involvement in the war. In some newspapers, however, this wariness was so pronounced that it bordered on outright isolationism.5

The outbreak of war did not catch Louisiana newspapermen completely by surprise. They had reported Adolph Hitler's early threats to the safety of Europe, and as conflict neared, they focused on the attempts to settle the crisis peacefully.

As the attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement failed, the major Louisiana newspapers hoped that the United States would remain aloof from the conflict. For example, the New Orleans States on

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5 Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Louisiana Public Opinion and the Beginning of World War II," paper presented to the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March 26, 1983.
September 1, 1939, maintained that the United States "must keep out of this conflict . . . If European nations want to fight, let them spill their own blood and provide their own materials, munitions, and money." The New Orleans Item, meanwhile, was just as strongly committed to keeping the United States out of war. Citing a popular isolationist contention that American participation in World War I had come to nothing, the Item reminded its readers on September 2 that the unhappy nations of Europe, having slaughtered each other at frequent intervals for 2000 years, are not amenable to suasion by us, [and] that our effort to help compose their age-old quarrels for them and advance civilization as a whole, by intervening in their latest and greatest war, [World War I] was frightfully injurious to ourselves without doing them or civilization any proportional good . . . their wars are no longer any of our business.6

The strongest proponent in North Louisiana of strict American neutrality in the new war was the Monroe Morning World. It warned on the eve of war that "Europe is an unhappy, stricken land and nothing is to be gained by casting our lot with hers . . . We will be worse than foolish if we travel three thousand miles to throw ourselves once again into the seething cauldron." The specter of World War I loomed large before the Morning World: "We have not forgotten that thousands of American lives and untold billions in American wealth and resources were sacrificed. Only history will reveal what good, if any, came

6New Orleans States, September 1, 1939, New Orleans Item, September 2, 1939.
Isolationism, however, was not the unanimous reaction in North Louisiana to the outbreak of war. The Monroe afternoon daily newspaper, the News-Star, suggested that the new war began in part because the United States had remained too aloof from world affairs following World War I. "Now we shall find that World affairs are going to bother us." In addition, the major North Louisiana daily newspaper, the Shreveport Times, emerged in the early days of the war as a firm supporter of Britain and France. While the Morning World reminded its readers that "many of our people came here to escape [Europe's hatreds]," and the States regretted "that humanity is being shamefully violated in Europe, that the blood of innocents is being shed. But there's nothing we can do about it . . .," the Shreveport Times asserted that the United States would only help Germany if it withheld aid from Britain and France. If the United States retained the ban on munitions sales, the Times maintained, "we give encouragement to further aggression . . ." The Times also did not believe that the American people were either disillusioned with the outcome of World War I, or at least did not believe that the American people were so disillusioned that they would abandon the democracies to a Nazi future: "Any attempt to do so, under the guise of safety and pacifism, would be an injury to the conscience of the nation." Even though it had no hesitation about accepting American material intervention in the war, the Times was not immediately ready to commit American soldiers

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Monroe Morning World, August 30, 1939, September 20, 1939.
to the fight. Instead, the Times hoped that the supplies would take
the place of American soldiers: "Repeal of the [arms] embargo would
in reality be a sensible compromise, giving the democracies helpful
assistance but withholding from them the active military support of
the United States."8

In south Louisiana this sentiment in favor of supplying American
material aid to the Allies emerged in the editorial pages of the
Times-Picayune, which also considered judicious revision of national
neutrality policy a necessary American reaction to the war. The
Times-Picayune recognized at once that the United States could not
allow a German victory. It noted on the eve of the war that the
United States was "not prepared to let the present [neutrality] law
work its crippling effect on France and Britain as it did on Loyalist
Spain," and soon after the invasion of Poland the paper recognized
that "A vast American majority feels that upon [Hitler's] decisive
defeat, with its demonstration that might does not make right, may
depend survival of institutions, principles, and humane philosophies
prized by all civilized men and women." The Times-Picayune, however,
also wanted American aid to go no further than equipment and supplies.9

The question of whether the United States should revise its
neutrality laws became an important issue after President Franklin
Roosevelt on September 13, 1939, called a special session of Congress
to meet on September 21 to consider a revision of the regulations in

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8 Monroe News-Star, September 23, 1939; Morning World, August 30, 1939;
States, September 4, 1939; Shreveport Times, September 9, 22, October
23, 1939.

9 New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 31, September 4, 1939.
order to allow supply sales to the Allies on a "cash and carry" basis.  

Roosevelt's move toward providing material aid to the Allies caused a strong reaction in Louisiana public opinion. The Item reported that Louisianians were divided "about 50-50" on the question, but, unfortunately, it did not provide the results of any scientific polling by which it reached its conclusion. Its perception of the split in Louisiana, however, matches the split that newspaper columnist Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., found in his travels throughout the South and which he reported to Roosevelt.  

The north Louisiana newspapers split on this first important issue of the new war into factions which lasted until June, 1940. The Shreveport Times accepted Roosevelt's reasons for the amendments:

... if we retain the ban on munitions sales, we merely help Germany by injuring her enemies. That is, we say to Britain and France that despite the sea supremacy which they have won at heavy cost, they are barred from buying munitions in the United States, even though they pay cash and carry the munitions on their own ships.

A silent acceptance of the need for Allied victory is implied in this paragraph, and is given greater emphasis in the next paragraph of the same editorial:

Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 200.

Item, September 21, 1939; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 200.

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At a time when Germany is gathering fresh reserves of munitions and supplies through her conquest of Poland, we give encouragement to further aggression by depriving the two great democracies of access to normal peacetime sources of supply.\textsuperscript{12}

Even more strongly, the \textit{Shreveport Times} stated ten days later:

This law, which effectively aligns the United States with the dictatorships by depriving Britain and France . . . of an important source of war supplies, should be torn down. That is the least this country can do, in a time of peril abroad, to show that it opposes domination of the world by stark, merciless force.\textsuperscript{13}

The \textit{Shreveport Times} offered two reasons for maintaining its viewpoint of the neutrality amendments. It first held that

. . . under any neutrality program, our own belief is that an embargo system which chokes off the sales of goods to belligerents, thus causing unemployment and deepening the depression, would promote the war spirit far more quickly than would sale of munitions to all comers.\textsuperscript{14}

It is important to remember that World War II broke out as the Great Depression began to diminish, though none of the editorial writers perceived at the time that economic conditions were improving steadily, if slowly. This explains why the \textit{Shreveport Times} considered economic reasons early in its policy formulation. The United States had just survived ten years of misery and knew of the latent violence

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Shreveport Times}, September 9, 1939.

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, September 19, 1939.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, September 13, 1939.
among unemployed men. However fragile Roosevelt's recovery program, the Times desired to "keep . . . business on an even keel, avoiding either a slump or a war boom." It had experienced enough of the former, and was unprepared for the unimagined horrors of the latter.

The Times' second reason for accepting changes in the neutrality law was more idealistic:

It is not in the mood of the American people to withhold all aid from Great Britain and France in the crucial struggle which they face. Any attempt to do so, under the guise of safety and pacifism, would be an injury to the conscience of the nation, and would in the end, generate the war spirit which all hope now to curb.  

Nevertheless, the Times could not completely abandon its pragmatic reasons for supporting the amendments:

Repeal of the embargo would in reality be a sensible compromise, giving the democracies helpful assistance but withholding from them the active military support of the United States — support which might require sending American soldiers to fight on Europe's soil.

Even though the Times' rhetoric was not jingoistic interventionism, the results of the policy it advocated proved to be a step toward sending American soldiers to fight on European soil, even though by then in a conflict generally regarded as the United States' war, also.

The Morning World, meanwhile, maintained in its Armistice Day

15 Ibid., September 22, 1939.

16 Ibid., October 23, 1939.
editorial that "Our business is here. We may be about all that is left of a civilization where individual initiative has a fair chance."\(^{17}\) The United States, it thought, was in continual danger, and it called upon Congress for "a strong neutrality law which would be foolproof and serve to discourage Europe from attempting to lure us into its endless and cruel disputes."\(^{18}\)

This idealization created an anomalous picture of the United States. One \textit{Morning World} editorial portrayed the United States as the surviving hope for individual freedom and creativity in the world gone mad, while analysis of another editorial reveals a shoddy, hard-hearted, calculating Uncle Sam:

\begin{quote}
News of air atrocities by Hitler's forces will continue to come over the cables, and every American deplores such barbarism.

But sympathy does not bring involvement in war in this the Twentieth century. Not a combatant in Europe today is in the war because of sympathy for some other nation. The law of self-preservation has brought about the present line-up. The law of self-preservation will keep this nation out of it.\(^{19}\)
\end{quote}

The \textit{Morning World} continued to follow its noninterventionist line during December, 1939, when it held that the United States would actually harm the Allied cause if it joined in the fight:

\(^{17}\textit{Morning World}, \text{November 11, 1939.}\)

\(^{18}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{September 6, 1939.}\)

\(^{19}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{September 5, 1939.}\)
The messier this whole affair becomes, the more evident it should be to the United States that the biggest contribution we can make toward better world conditions is to remain aloof. Our whole democratic spirit may revolt at the strangulation of helpless neutrals elsewhere . . . But we could do nothing more than complicate things further by throwing ourselves into the international riot.20

The Morning World thought that the United States must concentrate on itself with increased efforts toward self-purification and self-preservation, an outlook not unlike its acceptance of other puritanical ideas for the country:

We must concern ourselves with unemployment, with security, with national economy. We must try to set up a sound agricultural program and to improve housing conditions. We must do all these things while, at the same time, we keep out of Europe's struggle, except insofar as we can help in establishing peace.21

The Morning World, like the Shreveport Times, feared anything that promised to cause economic disruption, even though they disagreed on how the United States should prevent that disruption. The Morning World was much more disillusioned by the outcome of World War I and thought that war-time experience sufficient reason for keeping the country out of the new war:

We have not forgotten the World war. It sowed the seeds for the years of social discontent and depression that followed. We have not forgotten that thousands of American lives and untold

20 Ibid., December 29, 1939.

21 Ibid., December 31, 1939.
billions in American wealth and resources were sacrificed. Only history will reveal what good, if any, came from that war.22

The editorial writers of the Monroe News-Star remembered World War I, also, but used the experience to stand the Morning World's reason for staying out of the new war on its head. The News-Star thought that the United States would indeed be involved in the new war because they were not sufficiently involved in the last one:

Had we done our duty by the cause of world peace and civilization, this war would have never got going. The fact is that we Americans welshed after the world war was won . . . when we had the job half completed, we quit . . .

Had we been an active member of the League of Nations from its inception, the entire world picture today would be different . . .

But we in the United States simply did not wish to be bothered by world affairs. Now we shall find that world affairs are going to bother us.23

The Shrevepor Journal recognized early that Britain and France were waging a war for civilization as they knew it, a concept that the Morning World did not recognize until later, but even so, the Journal did not call for early American intervention in the struggle:

The sympathies of America, naturally, are with the British and French and Polish peoples — three nations which are at war to preserve civilization from attack by forces directed by a maniac.

22 Ibid., September 20, 1939.

23 News-Star, September 23, 1939.
[But] until there is some overt act aimed squarely at the rights of the American people, it is their duty to remain calm, do nothing that would provoke criticism, make no wild assertions or threats.24

A local battle for arms embargo revision occurred in the "Letters to the Editor" column of the New Orleans States. Joseph William Flynn began the controversy with a letter published on September 13, in which he maintained that the "cash and carry clause will eventually lead us into war. England will control the seas as she did in the last war; we will then be aiding England. Germany will then find some way of retaliating and we will be drawn into the conflict."25

Flynn soon received support from other New Orleanians who were also opposed to neutrality revision. T. M. Heidelburg wrote that "the forces of war, of intervention and of internationalism are again at work in America, determined, if possible, to break down the remaining barriers that separate our country from the perpetual infernos of death which sweep Europe every few years." Dr. J. C. Hary also warned New Orleanians not to be brainwashed by the film "Nurse Edith Cavell" then showing at the Orpheum Theater. Hary thought that the film about the World War I nurse executed by Germans for alleged spying was "pure British propaganda," and pled, "if you are opposed to propaganda, discourage this form and try to keep our people out of Europe's bloodshed. We were fools once; let history not repeat itself."26

24 Shreveport Journal, September 2, 4, 1939.

25 States, September 19, 1939.

26 Ibid., September 27-28, 1939.
The pro-Allied side, meanwhile, was busy with its own letter-writing campaign. These writers generally recognized that Britain and France were fighting not only for their survival but for the survival of the United States, as well. An individual using the pseudonym "A Reader" noted that opponents of revision frequently stated that Germany could not possibly invade the United States, but asked "in the event that France and England are defeated in the present struggle, what could stop Hitler, say in 10 or 15 years from now, from making an attempt to conquer the United States?" "A Reader" was not yet ready to send American troops to Europe but urged revision to allow the Allies any war materiel they required from the United States.  

R. B. Pitkin best stated the deep-seated commitment to the European democracies felt by pro-Allied New Orleanians: "If Germany chooses to force a war on France and Great Britain, I, an American, feel that it is the duty of all freedom-loving Americans to see that the right side wins. To me the right side is and will always be the Allies."  

The Times-Picayune added its editorial influence to the pro-Allied sentiment in New Orleans. As Congress debated Roosevelt’s proposed adjustments, the Times-Picayune lamented "all our unfortunate adventures with neutrality laws over the last four years," and applauded a

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27 Ibid., September 28, 1939. Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York, The Free Press, 1947), p. 271, notes the fallacy behind the pro-neutrality argument: people who thought the United States safe as long as Europe bled itself white missed the fact that victorious nations gain resources with each victory. Thus, as Germany continued to triumph, Hitler's regime would grow materially and strategically stronger.

28 States, October 2, 1939.
coalition of Democratic and Republican leaders who supported the president in his attempt to "allow this country to return to the rules of international law and again consent to the sales of arms ...."

Congress responded to Roosevelt's request for more flexibility in American "neutrality" by passing the Fourth Neutrality Law, which allowed the "cash and carry" sales of armaments he wanted in late October, 1939.

The event that awakened the United States from its reluctance to consider possible involvement in the European war was the fall of France in June, 1940, and its attendant threat to England, the country then considered the last citadel of civilization in Europe. France was to Louisiana, and especially to south Louisiana, a shining symbol of freedom and its most immediate connection to the Old World. The sentimental attachment to France, however, did not overshadow the hard realization that with France gone, only Britain stood between civilization and barbarism. By June 7, any hesitation about the United States supplying material aid to the Allies felt by some Louisianians during the previous autumn was gone. The States on that day recognized that "If Britain and France both go down ... it will dawn on us that, alone, deprived of the armies and fleets ... we

29 Times-Picayune, September 23-24, 1939.

must face a victorious world superpower marching on in furious revolution and destructive conquest." In addition, the faculty of Centenary College told Fourth District Representative Overton Brooks that "(we believe) that it is vital to the interest of the United States that England not be defeated; that the President and Congress should ... give immediate and effective aid to England in the form of implements of war, munitions, and credits."\(^{31}\)

The Monroe Morning World also altered its opinion about American aid to the Allies. Between September, 1939, and June, 1940, the Morning World evolved from a strong proponent of isolation to a warm proponent of American aid to ensure an Allied victory. By mid-June, 1940, it stopped just short of calling for armed American intervention:

If this war were between two nations of the same kind ... we could well afford to take an absolutely neutral stand and say it was none of our business ... But ... it is a war to the finish against reincarnated barbarism — against the unleashed forces of evil ... Just how it is possible for a nation with the ideals of the United States not to throw its influence against Germany in this struggle ... is beyond comprehension ... Only through the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini, or by an armed state that will awe them, can the United States be reasonably certain that it will be spared the horrors that now beset France.\(^{32}\)

The Shreveport Times recognized early the importance of French


\(^{32}\text{Morning World, June 16, 18, 1940.}\)
contributions to Western European civilization, and lamented its passing to German puppet control:

It was freedom that made Paris great. Men and women were free to utilize their full talents without restraints...

If the German armies march into Paris, all this will be plunged into the dustbin of history. The event will send dour echoes down through the future, influencing the course of human thought and action.33

The fall of Verdun reminded the Shreveport Times of a firebell warning the United States of the spreading danger. Contrasting stubborn French defense of Verdun in 1915 with virtual abandonment in 1940, it said: "It serves stern warning that the new way of war practiced by the Nazis is deadly for the old ways of defense."34 No amount of American aid would be too much in this new combat, and the Shreveport Times thought that aid must be delivered to France, even if American merchant ships had to carry it, a strong veer toward American intervention in the war: "What the French ask for, they should be given, at top speed... If there is a shortage of trans-Atlantic shipping space, then arrangements should be made to transfer merchants to registry allowing their use."35

The Shreveport Times eclipsed even this belligerent attitude later in the month in an editorial that all but acknowledged that the

33 Shreveport Times, June 14, 1940.

34 Ibid., June 16, 1940.

35 Ibid., June 12, 1940.
United States was at war and needed to create a war economy and society. In support of a military draft bill introduced in Congress, the Shreveport Times recalled the 1917-1918 draft:

... the broad result of the draft system was good. It taught the nation discipline. Too, when one saw the whole country moving forward under a co-ordinated plan for summoning its manpower, one could sense the might of democracy. The draft system produced confidence which was an important factor in winning the war.36

The fall of France also welded the sentiments of two of the smaller north Louisiana dailies to the Allied cause. The Shreveport Journal wrote:

That the people of the United States regard Italy's decision to fight on the side of the dictator as a distinct threat to the peace of the whole world, including the American continents, is the generally accepted view ... Congress should put on 'full speed ahead' in the enactment of whatever legislation is necessary and in the providing of funds, regardless of the cost.

... there is no alternative for the United States save preparation to meet any emergency which may be forced by the German maniac and his Italian partner. For this work of preparedness the American people are ready to give their money unstintedly and of their lives if necessary, lest this great democracy of the western hemisphere suffer the fate that has befallen its friends across the Atlantic.37

The Monroe News-Star recognized that the European fight was being waged for the existence of the United States, also, but was selfishly

36 Ibid., June 24, 1940.

37 Shreveport Journal, June 11, 15, 1940.
jubilant that this country was not yet involved in the struggle:

If our boys were over there fighting this war, we would send them everything they need which we have or could get. Then why should we not do all in our power to help the boys over there, who are fighting our fight over there, and thank God that the war is not over here and that those boys are not our boys?38

The Louisiana/France connection was also poignantly revealed in the sentiments felt by the Marianite Sisters of Holy Cross College in New Orleans. Their Mother House in LeMans, France was now in Nazi-occupied territory. The Our Lady of Holy Cross Chronicles reported:

Our hearts are torn with anguish at the thought of the anxiety and suffering of our dear Reverend Mother and her Sisters. Many times a day our prayers rise heavenward, begging God to protect them in this hour of dire need and peril. May our dear Mother of Sorrows be their solace in this great affliction.39

The Allied military setbacks of 1940 were a severe shock to the American people. In Louisiana these events, especially the fall of France, led to increasingly widespread acceptance of the possibility that American troops might eventually be needed overseas, and that at the least Britain needed more supplies than it could buy with cash in order to continue the struggle against Nazi Germany. By November, 1940, several major Louisiana newspapers began advocating loans or

38 —News-Star, June 5, 1940.

outright gifts to keep Britain supplied and American boys at home.  

One Louisiana public official, United States Senator Allen J. Ellender, however, warned at the end of 1940 that continued drift of public opinion toward providing loans to England, President Roosevelt's so-called "Lend-Lease" proposals, might well lead to war. "Should we determine to change existing laws so as to further aid England, we might as well make up our minds to go the whole way and do some fighting." Ellender's comments, however, failed to stop the continued drift of public opinion toward acceptance of possible United States involvement.

By the beginning of 1941, many Louisianians believed that perhaps the United States was no longer in control of its own destiny. The editor of the Lafayette Daily Advertiser recognized that the question of peace or war was not wholly for the United States to decide and remarked that keeping the country out of the war was an excellent idea "if we can only find the way to do it . . . [but] events may take the decision out of the hands of Americans." Or, as the Morning Advocate said even more directly: "Should the United States ever enter this war . . . it will be because the logic of events shall have gradually

40 *Times-Picayune*, March 15, 1940; *Morning Advocate*, November 27, 1940; *Alexandria Daily Town Talk*, April 27, November 27, December 26, 1940.

41 *Morning Advocate*, December 25, 1940. Ellender's position closely reflected that of his Senate colleague, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, an isolationist. See Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse*, p. 282. Ellender also wrote to a constituent that "You may be sure that I am wholeheartedly in favor of the United States maintaining its neutrality in the present European conflict and I am absolutely opposed to sending our soldiers to fight the battles of other countries." Allen J. Ellender to J. C. Curry, April 26, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
drawn us into the position . . . in which the likely results of not fighting is [sic] less tolerable than all the horror of war itself."
The Baton Rouge Kiwanis Club also passed a resolution on May 1, 1941, which recognized "that no nation or people anywhere on the globe can hope to remain neutral except on terms and conditions specified by [the Axis] and to end in becoming their tool and vassal" and "that the vital interests and perhaps the very survival of our American democracy are at stake in this World War."^42

President Roosevelt decided in July, 1941, that the safety of the United States and the North Atlantic shipping lanes to England required that he dispatch American soldiers to protect Iceland from threatened German subjugation after the fall of Denmark. This move met with widespread approval in Louisiana. The Shreveport Times wrote:

There can be no question in Hitler's mind now that this nation really means business.

Either we [keep the Atlantic shipping lanes open] or everything that has been done and everything that has been said of what we are willing to do to defeat Hitler must be classed as empty phraseology and idle gesture.^43

While the Morning World also supported the president's action, it also soberly reflected on its possible outcome:


the war is entering upon an intensified stage, and the United States is drawing ever nearer to hostilities as the nation's defense effort is providing more and more of the sinews of war.44

North Louisiana press attitude toward the American move into Iceland was best summarized in a thoughtful editorial in the Shreveport Journal:

That President Roosevelt acted upon his own initiative and then informed Congress, is . . . worthy or note — and of commendation . . . here is one instance, at last, where a Democratic government has taken decisive action before it was 'eternally too late' . . . the friendly move into Iceland . . . means that Hitler can not under any possible set of circumstances use it as a base from which to launch an attack against this country or against ships in service between the United States and Great Britain. It was a very wise and timely action.45

In south Louisiana, the New Orleans States commented of the United States move into Iceland that "It is encouraging to see one of the great democracies moving boldly with foresight." The Morning Advocate added that "The occupation of Iceland by American air and land forces is the only logical step under the circumstances . . . What would it avail us to make goods for Britain if the Nazis had control of the strategic post in the North Atlantic?"46

Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has maintained that

44Morning World, July 11, 1941.

45Shreveport Journal, July 10, 1941.

46States, July 8, 1941; Morning Advocate, July 9, 1941.
Roosevelt's movement of United States troops into Iceland by executive agreement constituted a major assumption of power by the president at the expense of Congress. This consideration mattered little to many Louisianians. The States commented that "It is well that he acted without first submitting the enterprise to Congress for debate that would have run on interminably and likely resulted in the imposition of silly restrictions or conditions." Other newspapers confidently commented that if Roosevelt arrogated some powers not normally held by the presidency, the wartime situation demanded and legitimized such action. Furthermore, other wartime presidents, notably Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson, had exercised unprecedented wartime powers, but with the coming of peace, the executive branch had relinquished those powers. Roosevelt, they thought, would do the same.

The event that unquestionably led to almost unanimous support in Louisiana for direct American military intervention in the horror of World War II was the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The immediate American reaction was to shatter nearly all isolationist opposition to the war and to weld together temporarily a strong base of domestic support for


48 States, July 8, 1941.

49 Shreveport Times, June 8, November 8, 1941; Morning World, June 17, 1941.
American intervention. Again, Louisiana public opinion closely reflected American public opinion. The Shreveport Times echoed the popular idea that "By her vicious assault, the Far Eastern imperialists have eradicated ... all the inner dissensions which have hampered American rearmament in recent months ... the nation [now] takes up arms against an enemy who made the fatal error of initiating aggressive action." The Shreveport Journal called for "Prosecution of the war to definite and overwhelming victory."

After the Pearl Harbor attack, the Monroe Morning World came fully about face from its earlier non-interventionist position. On December 11, 1941, the Morning World remarked that "the urgent task is to smite the Japs so hard that they will never be able to take the offensive in the war." The Monroe News-Star echoed the same sentiment: "We shall not sheathe [our sword] until the world power of Japan is broken, finally and forever."

The New Orleans newspapers also abandoned completely their previous non-interventionist sentiment. The Item on December 8, 1941, called for "the prosecution of the war against our aggressor enemies ... with all our strength and resources." The States commented more.


51 Shreveport Times, December 8, 1941; Shreveport Journal, December 8, 1941.

52 Morning World, December 11, 1941; News-Star, December 15, 1941.
bluntly that "Japan must be blasted off the face of the earth." 53

In summary, Louisiana public opinion about World War II from September, 1939, until December, 1941, generally followed American public opinion closely. The outbreak of war in September, 1939, competed with the breaking story of the Louisiana Scandals and the gubernatorial election for Louisiana's attention and indeed, many opinion-makers in Louisiana compared the Longite machine and the dictatorial Nazi government in Germany. As Louisiana considered the military situation, however, a general revulsion at the possibility of American involvement in another "European" war gradually gave way to the realization that the United States was necessarily going to be involved in the war on the side of the Allies. The fall of France in June, 1940, greatly accelerated that realization, but it was only after the Pearl Harbor attack that the United States and Louisiana had at last to accept the fact that the United States had become, though perhaps unavoidably, a major belligerent.

53 Item, December 8, 1941; States, December 8, 1941.
CHAPTER VIII
THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II UPON EDUCATION IN LOUISIANA

World War II caused unprecedented problems within the Louisiana education system, and led to the assumption of new responsibilities and the placement of greater emphasis on certain portions of the traditional curriculum. As the conflict began, and as the United States responded with expanded national defense programs which included training thousands of soldiers in Louisiana army camps, local school systems designed to accommodate the local population found themselves suddenly overrun by children of soldiers who had moved their families south. The central Louisiana area including Camps Beauregard, Livingston, and Claiborne suffered especially from such overcrowding. State Superintendent of Education John E. Coxe announced on January 7, 1941, that the Rapides Parish School System had experienced an increase of approximately 600 students over the previous year's enrollment. Moreover, the system expected about 500 additional students by February 15. Small Pollock High School in neighboring Grant Parish had a one-hundred student increase over the previous year, and expected an additional one hundred students within a few weeks. Nevertheless, Coxe promised that Louisiana would provide educational facilities for all children of army men stationed in the state. Massive federal aid programs which might have facilitated the absorption of the new students did not then exist. The major federal aid program for Louisiana schools in 1939 was the Works Progress Administration program, co-sponsored by the State Department of Education, to provide nutritious lunches to
underprivileged children.  

Following the initial increase, however, Louisiana schools experienced declining enrollments.  

Table 1 illustrates the steady reduction in numbers of both white and black students which began in the 

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>298,028</td>
<td>173,300</td>
<td>471,328</td>
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<td>1938-40</td>
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<td>277,338</td>
<td>171,743</td>
<td>449,081</td>
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<td>1945-46</td>
<td>264,770</td>
<td>165,229</td>
<td>429,999</td>
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1Alexandria Daily Town Talk, January 7, 1941 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk); Jerry W. Valentin, "The WPA and Louisiana Education," Louisiana History, Fall, 1968, pp. 391-395.

2The composition of the student body also underwent a change. By the 1943-44 school year, only in West Feliciana Parish did boys outnumber girls enrolled in school. Louisiana Department of Education Bulletin No. 543 Ninety-fifth Annual Report for School Year 1943, 1944, pp. 186-187; Louisiana Department of Education Bulletin No. 548 Official Proceedings of the State Board of Education January 8, 1945; James Adair Mackey, "A History of the Louisiana State University Laboratory School, 1915-1965" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971), pp. 90, 92. The Department of Education Bulletins will hereinafter be cited as Bulletin with the appropriate number and/or subtitle.
1941-42 school year and continued through the 1945-46 school year, with white enrollment continuing to decline until 1946 and black enrollment increasing only slightly from 1944 to 1946.

Regardless of the number of students enrolled in Louisiana schools during any wartime year, the state experienced problems providing the education Coxe had promised in 1941. The massive army training exercises known as the "Louisiana Maneuvers" conducted during 1941 and again in 1942 caused a delay in opening the school year in the maneuver area because of the "considerable danger" the State Department of Education found for school children riding buses on roads crowded with military vehicles. Delays in opening schools in these parishes created an accounting problem. The school boards preferred beginning teacher pay periods on the first day of classes, thus retaining control of payroll funds for an additional time period, while the teachers themselves and the Louisiana Teachers' Association requested that pay periods begin on the day school would have normally begun.  

Wartime gasoline rationing also caused problems within the education transportation system. The State Department of Education in 1943 directed all parish superintendents to prepare maps for the routes of each school bus so that an adequate supply of war-rationed

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gasoline could be obtained. 4

The school system also suffered from personnel shortages during the war years. Teachers and other school employees left their posts to enter the armed forces or to accept higher-paying jobs in defense or war-related industries. As a result of this exodus, the State Department of Education issued more than 1,000 temporary teaching certificates during the twelve months between March, 1941, and March, 1942. The Louisiana Teachers' Association worried that the temporarily-certified teachers would be unqualified, that scholastic achievement in the state would drop, and that "the schools will be subjected to harsh and unjust criticism..." 5

Despite these dislocations and annoyances, Louisiana schools were still obliged to assume additional functions in the war-time society. Teachers, already under stress because of larger classes than normal, were expected to provide time for implementing the rationing program by enrolling people on ration lists, and distributing ration books or commodities. Teachers also had to encourage students to buy war stamps


or bonds to aid the war effort.  

The Louisiana education system, along with other state systems, had to inculcate both a strong awareness of the national defense needs of the United States and a vigorous patriotism in students. The New Orleans Times-Picayune remarked in August, 1941, that "National defense will be an underlying theme of classes from kindergarten through college." The Times-Picayune predicted that awareness of national defense needs would result in increased interest in military training, and in the introduction of more home nursing, nutrition, physical fitness, and skilled trades in the schools.

A movement toward requiring Louisiana schools to teach the dangers of the world emergency and to place increased emphasis on patriotism began during the summer of 1940 when representatives from the American Legion of Louisiana and the United Veterans Defense Council appeared before the State Board of Education. The American Legion requested that the Board "include as a part of the Educational system of this state, and to be included in its curricula, a course on flag etiquette." In addition, the United Veterans Defense Council petitioned the Board to direct that one hour each week be set aside to educate "Americans ... in the public schools of the State ... that a national crisis now exists." The Board approved the petitions, and directed an

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7 New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 26, 1941.
enthusiastic State Department of Education to implement the program, Superintendent Coxe having already reflected much the same sentiment: the world crisis, he said, "should make us sensitive to the virtue of democracy and appreciative of our government, as well as deeply aware of our responsibility to provide training and practice in citizenship for the boys and girls in our schools."  

The Department prepared a circular explaining the objectives of this "intelligent patriotism" program, explaining that

What we need most is a generation trained with a devotion to [the] principles which will serve as a guarantee to our freedom against the enemies of democracy who refuse to value the lives of the people who constitute the state -- a devotion so strong that we will be willing to fight for them, and if necessary, die for them.

The circular included a number of specific goals. Depending on grade level, students would learn to understand and appreciate the meaning of the flag; to sing the national anthem and other patriotic songs; understand "what our national heroes stood for from the time our government was founded"; understand "wherein our government is superior to a state ruled by a dictator"; learn how to condemn dishonesty, corruption, graft, and inefficiency in government; how to discover and use

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facts against "insidious propaganda"; how to read patriotic stories and biographies; hold a mock Constitutional Convention and learn that they could not do so under a dictator; and study the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights.  

The State Board of Education also passed a resolution in June, 1941, reiterating its approval of the teaching of patriotism, saluting the flag, and the Pledge of Allegiance, and commending the local school authorities for their help in carrying out these goals.  

The combined themes of defense and patriotism were greatly emphasized in school activities throughout Louisiana. Teachers at Ruston High School, for example, developed and taught a unit on national defense during the fall semester of 1941. Students learned about the Army and Navy, defense bases, diplomatic policy, the role of industry, and other aspects of the subject (including one that could have been most interesting — "Defense and the Public Pocketbook").  

Forty years after the war, Bessie Lawrence, a third grade teacher at Buckeye High School in rural Rapides Parish during the 1940s remembered the patriotic flavor of school life during the early 1940s. The school day began with the Pledge of Allegiance and salute to the flag. School assemblies often were held around the flagpole in front of the school. The students sang patriotic songs, a faculty member,  

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10 Bulletin No. 453 Minutes of the Meeting of the State Board of Education May 5 and 6, 1941, pp. 26-27.  
or occasionally a soldier, spoke on a patriotic theme, stressing the virtue of democracy symbolized by the United States flag. "We taught them that's what men were fighting for. As long as it flew, we would be free, but if someone else took us, we would not be free."\textsuperscript{13}

Dean E. B. Robert of the Louisiana State University College of Education told high school graduating classes in 1941, "Every public school-house in this republic should be a holy temple of democracy, every public-school teacher a high priest daily administering at its altar . . . Preparation through education for its duties and obligations is the ordained means for its preservation."\textsuperscript{14}

In New Orleans, teachers at the Henry W. Allen Elementary School used the sudden popularity of things military and patriotic to encourage their students to read more energetically. They devised a system of military ranks in which students received promotions for reading certain books. Reading any ten approved books made a student a "second lieutenant" in the army or an "ensign" in the navy; two historical novels read promoted one to the rank of "second lieutenant" or "lieutenant j.g." The ranks went all the way to the top — Tales From Shakespeare, King Arthur and His Knights of the Round Table, and Rip Van Winkle carried one upward to "lieutenant commander" or "major," while twenty-four poems by Sidney Lanier, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,

\textsuperscript{13}Bessie Lawrence interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, September 10, 1983.

James Russell Lowell, and Edgar A. Guest brought the rank of "commander" or "lieutenant colonel." A student could complete the program by reading three "outstanding" plays and become an "admiral" or "general."¹⁵

Requirement of patriotic observances in the public schools caused some disagreement regarding the constitutional relationship between church and state. The controversy arose when A. J. Smith, principal of Evergreen High School in Avoyelles parish, required members of the Jehovah's Witnesses attending his school to pledge allegiance to the flag during classroom exercises. The Jehovah's Witnesses objected because such a pledge conflicted with their religious beliefs, and Reverend Victor Blackwell of the Jehovah's Witnesses and Richard Cadwallader, a representative of the Louisiana League for the Preservation of Constitutional Rights, protested Smith's requirement to the State Board of Education. Louisiana Attorney General Eugene Stanley advised the Board that because they had passed a resolution requiring the observance, he could find no reason why they could not enforce it. Board members themselves were split on the issue. Most stated their belief that all students should salute the flag, while other suggested a compromise by which the Board should specifically exempt Jehovah's Witnesses from the requirement. The Board decided to defer action on the question indefinitely and declined to issue a ruling on the question during the war years, presumably leaving parish superintendent or

¹⁵ New Orleans Times-Picayune, New Orleans States, November 23, 1941.
school principals to wrestle with the problem themselves.  

In addition to inculcating patriotism in school children, the State Department of Education also developed plans for the schools to educate adults about the national emergency. The Department formulated this plan in response to a nationwide call by President Franklin Roosevelt and United States Commissioner of Education John W. Studebaker for development of public education and discussion forums focused on the national emergency. The Louisiana plan called for community meetings to be held in school buildings. Programs included the singing of patriotic songs, group recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance, and discussion of pertinent topics. Suggested topics included "The Local Community's Part in the Present Emergency," "Public Health and the War," "The Farm Family's Part in the Present Emergency," "Inter-American Friendship," and "The Bill of Rights." World War II also initiated a debate concerning the utility of education during wartime. Governor Jones called on Louisiana educators to make education more practical:

We ought to scrap or radically revise our educational system and start all over again . . . We need to teach our children agriculture, how to farm, and mechanics . . . You can't face the problems of life by studying Shakespeare.  

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16 Bulletin No. 453 Minutes, May 5 and 6, 1941, pp. 31-33; Town Talk, January 8, 1941; Morning Advocate, April 9, May 7, 1941.  


18 Morning Advocate, August 12, 1941.
"The plain fact is that our boys and girls are not learning in sufficient numbers how to earn a living in their own baliwicks," the Governor reiterated. "Somehow, I can't escape from the notion that it is more important for a young man in the coastal parishes to know how to build a boat than to know Latin." While the Governor may have overstated his case in order to be emphatic, he clearly and sincerely desired that Louisiana train its students for jobs in the traditional farming, fishing, and trapping occupations, as well as positions in the newer oil recovery and chemical industries.

Not everyone in Louisiana agreed that public education in America should abandon its responsibilities for teaching the history and legacies of Western civilization and developing well-rounded intellects just to impart timely technical knowledge. John Edward Hardy, writing in *Louisiana Schools* remarked:

> . . . the purpose of education is not to be defined with a cancellation clause effective in the event of war. If the purpose of educational activity is well considered and seriously defined at its inception and is consistently understood during the building of the tradition of an educational system, it is not subject to capricious change with a view only to the exigencies of the moment.

> All that the new war-time studies can provide is a knowledge of technique. The necessary development of the intellect must be accomplished by other means . . . If [we give the students] only these techniques and deprive a whole generation of that knowledge . . . which alone can make them just and not blind users of the power instru-

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19 *Times-Picayune*, October 21, 1941.

ments, we are defeated though we conquer those nations which have appeared as the immediate incarnation of the forces of evil.\(^{21}\)

While Governor Jones called for an ambitious program of vocational education to provide students with practical knowledge they could apply on the farm or in one of Louisiana's emerging industries, the increased vocational emphasis during the war years themselves focused on training more efficient workers for jobs serving the needs of America's defense effort. Therefore, both public schools and trade schools in Louisiana adjusted their curricula to incorporate programs requested by the federal government. These programs were of two categories: those designed to improve industrial performance, and others designed to increase agricultural production.

The schools provided additional industrial training under three plans. Plan I (Trade and Industrial) included pre-employment refresher courses for people drawn from Louisiana State Employment Office and Works Progress Administration rolls. These courses included thirty to forty hours of class time each week. In addition, the schools provided refresher courses for people already employed, which included ten to twelve hours of class time each week. Plan I provided refresher courses in welding (both electric and oxy-acetylene), machine shop, electricity, sheet metal, automobile mechanics, and radio repair. The Plan I curriculum did not interfere with regular courses because it was presented at odd hours when school facilities were not in use. By the end of the 1939-40 school year, 4,938 people

\(^{21}\)John Edward Hardy, "War-Time Proposals for High School Curricula Changes," Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1943, pp. 27, 42,
were enrolled in courses offered under Plan I.  

Plan II (Vocational Education for Defense Workers for Rural and Non-Rural Youth) provided courses specifically for persons just entering the industrial work force. Potential enrollees had to be between seventeen and twenty-five years of age. This program drew students from the Civilian Conservation Corps and NYA rolls as well as from the general population. Plan II was subdivided into "Programs." Program A, titled "General Pre-Employment Courses," provided training in the operation, care, and repair of tractors, trucks, and automobiles (both gasoline and Diesel engines); metal work, including simple welds, tempering, drilling and shaping; woodworking; and elementary electricity, including care and repair of electrical equipment. Program B, titled "Specific Pre-Employment Preparatory Courses," provided more intensive training in motor mechanics, welding, machine shop, lathe operation, drill press operation, shaper operation, electrical work, sheet metal work, and radio repair. By the end of the 1939-40 school year, approximately 10,000 Louisianians were enrolled in the 400 courses offered in Program A, and 1,200 were enrolled in the 70 courses in Program B.

Plan III, entitled "Youth Engaged on NYA Work Projects," offered courses in three areas: agriculture, trade and industry, and home

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economics. These courses provided intensive training supplementary
to work experience provided by the NYA, and supposedly eased the ad-
justment from NYA jobs to permanent employment. In addition, Plan III
included programs designed "to enlarge the civic or vocational intel-
ligence of young people employed on NYA work projects." Approximately
4,000 of the 5,000 NYA workers in Louisiana at the end of the 1939-40
school year were enrolled in some phase of Plan III.24

The home economics courses taught in Plan III included instruction
in health and nutrition, home care of the ill, first aid, clothing,
housing, consumer buying, and personal living. Students enrolled in
the Trade and Industry section of the plan also received training in
federal, state, or local government offices in bookkeeping, filing,
typewriting, manual and machine record keeping, and preparing statisti-
cal data.25

While the programs summarized above dealt primarily with individu-
als outside the mainstream of Louisiana secondary education, the war
also altered the state's high school curriculum. These modifications
occurred primarily in two areas: implementation of the "High School
Victory Corps" program, and improvement in the Vocational Agriculture
program to improve agricultural education.

The High School Victory Corps caused an extensive expansion in
educational programs. It required both new emphasis on traditional
subjects and introduction of subjects not normally taught in high

24Ibid., pp. 36, 42.

schools. The High School Victory Corps was originally intended for high schools desiring an ROTC, but not previously having the facilities to implement such a program. The United States Army provided a training curriculum approved by the State Department of Education; ROTC departments in colleges and universities throughout the state provided training sessions for instructors, and also became "sponsoring agencies." This assistance from the military helped high schools implement the program and maintain acceptable quality. The object of the High School Victory Corps was to familiarize boys with army life and training, and thus shorten the basic training period required for recruits.27

Courses studied in the High School Victory Corps included (during the first year of study) military courtesy and customs of the armed services, infantry drill regulations, military sanitation and first aid, military history and policy, military organization, and rifle marksmanship. The second year of study included map reading, techniques of rifle fire, tactical training of the individual soldier (as scout, observer, sentinel, listener, sniper, or messenger), automatic rifle and machine gun fire, combat training, and infantry drill.28 In addition, the High School Victory Corps curriculum included studies of the opposing philosophies of the Axis and the Allied powers, patriotic attitudes, progress of the war, recognition of propaganda, global geography, and the wartime economy. Community


28 Ibid., pp. 3-5.
services included school participation in civilian defense, scrap
drives, war stamp and bond drives, and conservation of community
resources.  

In addition to training future soldiers, Louisiana schools also
helped to train future army clerks by providing training in army pro­
cedure and forms. The State Department of Education suggested that
this course be ranked as a second semester senior course worth one-half credit toward graduation, but warned that it could not be sub­
stituted for regular business courses.  

The State Board of Education, at the request of the War Depart­
ment, also recommended, but did not require, that high school prin­
cipals include one or more general pre-induction courses in the funda­
mentals of electricity, radio, machines and tools, shop work, and
automobile mechanics. The War Department had found that inductees
from throughout the United States needed additional training in these
areas in order to shorten their post-induction training period.  

Not all Louisianians initially favored this headlong rush to
turn the state's educational system into prep schools for boot camp.
A coalition of Parent-Teachers' Associations defeated a bill requiring
compulsory military training for high school and college students
introduced in the 1940 legislative session.  

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29 Bulletin No. 496 Wartime Education Curriculum Changes (Implementing the High School Victory Corps), pp. 14, 37, 40-57.
32 New Orleans Item, June 5, 1940.
just as Louisiana experienced the shock resulting from the fall of France. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, cast military training in a different light and led to a more receptive attitude toward the teaching of military subjects in Louisiana schools. Even then, however, the High School Victory Corps remained a voluntary program.

Louisiana also adjusted its Vocational Agricultural Education program to meet the needs of the wartime emergency by providing instruction in producing specific crops deemed vitally essential by the Secretary of Agriculture. The new Vocational Education program trained high school youths, out-of-school rural youths, and adult farmers. The schools provided evening classes for the out-of-school youth and adults, while high school students participated in Vocational Agriculture training during the regular school day. 33

The Vocational Agriculture program shared with the general industrial programs an emphasis on care and repair of farm machinery, welding, metalworking, woodworking, and elementary electricity. In addition, training in Vocational Agriculture included instruction on how to increase production of milk, poultry, eggs, pork, beef, mutton, lamb, wool, soybeans, peanuts, and vegetables. 34 Agriculture teachers


34 Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisiana," p. 202; Bulletin No. 490 Louisiana State Plan for Vocational Education to Carry Out the Provisions of Public Law No. 647, 77th Congress, Chapter 475, 2nd Session, Authorizing a Vocational Program of
also participated in scrap drives; taught how to preserve and can food; helped to develop cooperative school-community facilities for food preservation; and — because of the increased mechanization of agriculture caused by the agricultural labor shortage — stressed farm machinery care and repair in their farm shop facilities. 35

In addition to training rural workers, the State Department of Education also created Emergency Farm Workers' Schools to solve the agricultural labor shortage. These schools prepared persons 14 years of age or older for farm work. The students were drawn from those who either had no farm experience, or who needed additional training. The program accepted both in-school and out-of-school students of both sexes. 36

The principal school organization for students of agriculture, the Future Farmers of America, also suffered from declining enrollment in the overall school system. Many vocational agriculture teachers entered the armed services, and some departments closed for lack of qualified replacements. (Membership in the LSU chapter of FFA dropped from 125 in 1939–40 to none from 1942 until the end of the war in 1945.) 37 The other school-related organization for agricultural

Instruction Essential to the War Production Training Program to be Given for Out-of-School Rural and Non-rural Persons Subdivision (3), p. 32


37 Frederick W. Williamson, Origin and Development of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana 1860–1948 How It Opened the Road for Progress in Better Farming and Rural Living (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Division of Agricultural
students, the 4-H Club, continued operations during the war years, even though it experienced the same problems as the FFA: declining student population and shortage of sponsoring agents. Louisiana 4-H students, nevertheless, participated in numerous war-related scrap collection and bond sale drives.  

Modernization of the state educational system began during the war years because of reform movements within the state and not only as a response to national defense requirements. The major internal change which occurred was the addition of a required twelfth year for high school graduation. The additional year of school had been a goal of the Louisiana Teachers' Association for several years. Representative William J. Dodd, who was also state LTA president, had criticized Superintendent Coxe and Governor Jones for not lobbying the requirement through the 1940 legislature, and the measure was enacted in 1944.  

A problem arose, however, when the state had to decide whether the extra grade required reclassification of other grades. In other words, would the addition of grade twelve mean a difference in the number of grades classified as grammar school grades or junior high school grades? Should the ninth grade be included in junior high school, or high school? Dr. Clark Barrow, East Baton Rouge Superinten-

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dent of Education, ordered a halt to all school construction in the parish until the State Board of Education resolved the matter. The Board's ruling, he said, would determine how school buildings were to be constructed and which facilities should be included, depending on whether the institution was to be a junior high school or a high school.  

The State Department of Education experienced reorganization on two levels simultaneously during the war years — by Governor Jones, and by newly-elected Education Superintendent John Coxe, who took office in 1940. While the governor's reorganization was only temporary because the courts ruled it unconstitutional, Coxe's revision survived longer. Former Superintendent T. H. Harris had preferred a system of general area supervisors. (Coxe, himself, had served as Head State Supervisor of High Schools until Harris dismissed him early in 1939.) Elected to replace his former boss, Coxe instituted a system of subject area supervisors. He also organized the State Department of Education into three major divisions: Administration and Finance, headed by John M. Foote; Instruction and Supervision, headed by R. R. Ewerz; and Higher Education, headed by Joe Farrar.

A profound change in Louisiana's traditional methods of instruc-

40 Bulletin No. 533 Official Proceedings June 26, 1944; Morning Advocate, November 3, 1944.

tion occurred during the war years as a result of the increased availability of visual media, primarily films. The armed services first discovered that films were useful aids in training and educating large numbers of people. While visual aids had been a peripheral part of Louisiana education for some time, the war years brought them into far more classrooms. Indeed, by 1945 the State Department of Education had six film depositories throughout the state from which schools could obtain films. Money to purchase the films was scarce, but agencies of the federal government, especially the Agriculture Department and the War Department, donated approximately one hundred films to Louisiana schools prior to 1945, primarily on war-related subjects. The State Department of Education reported in 1943 that it owned 330 prints of 205 film titles. The Agricultural Extension Service, another source of films, reported in 1944 that the most requested film in its library was "Soldiers of the Soil." The new importance of educational media also caused a change in the curriculum of teacher training programs. The LSU College of Education added a new short course, Education 152, taught during the summers of 1941 and 1943, which covered the functions and use of audio-visual aids.  

Louisiana's colleges and universities were affected by many of the same problems within the public school system during the war years. War-related jobs or the armed services took many students, especially males, away from their studies -- so many, in fact, that Southern University President J. S. Clark wrote in June, 1943, that "our campus

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has almost developed the appearance of a female school. Less than 50 boys are here in college now." Enrollment at Louisiana State University dropped from 5,682 to 4,233 between June and December, 1942. Southeastern Louisiana College (now Southeastern Louisiana University) at Hammond enrolled 612 students in September, 1940, its largest enrollment up to that time. By the beginning of the 1944 school year, however, only 331 students were on campus. Enrollment at Xavier University fell from 1,012 in 1939-40 to 510 in 1944-45. Other Louisiana institutions of higher learning, both public and private, shared the experience of declining enrollments.

Louisiana's colleges, of course, needed students to justify their existence; they therefore sought to replace regular students lost to the war effort with army recruits who needed specialized training. The State Board of Education in April, 1943, authorized colleges under its control to negotiate training contracts with the United States Army and Navy. As a result of this authorization, state colleges commenced a spirited competition among themselves to secure training.

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programs for their campuses. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute (now Louisiana Polytechnic University), Southwestern Louisiana Institute (now the University of Southwestern Louisiana), and Louisiana State Normal College (now Northwestern State University), all launched Army or Navy training programs. In addition, Southeastern Louisiana College acquired a Civilian Aeronautics Authority training program, Southwestern and Southern Universities offered agricultural refresher courses, and two of Louisiana's private colleges, Centenary College and Louisiana College, acquired small Army Air Force programs.

Female colleges contributed to the war effort in other ways. The Sisters of the Academy of Holy Angels (later Our Lady of Holy Cross College) in New Orleans, for example, conducted air raid drills, sold Defense Stamps, and participated in Red Cross activities. Academy students constructed 326 garments of various kinds for Red Cross

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distribution to soldiers.  

Louisiana college students adjusted to the grim realities of war in various ways. Some became apathetic, others adjusted well to the new spirit of patriotism, while still others saw in the threat to their country a reason to do well in their studies. Many enrolled in mathematics and science courses, enrolled in extracurricular first aid courses, or became air raid wardens.  

Major General Campbell B. Hodges, President of LSU, told students in February, 1942, that "Every man student at the University, down to and including every freshman man, will see service before this war is over..." Hodges therefore instituted compulsory physical education for every male undergraduate.  

While several other schools instituted compulsory physical education and emphasized intramural sports to improve the physical condition of male students, the State Board of Education voted on January 11, 1943, to discontinue all intercollegiate athletic contests involving the colleges under its control. The Morning Advocate applauded the

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49 Morning Advocate, February 24, 1942. Hodges, a former commandant of cadets at West Point and military aide to President Herbert Hoover, became LSU president on July 1, 1941, when he replaced Law School Dean Paul M. Hebert, who had been acting president since James Monroe Smith abruptly resigned and fled the country in June, 1939, in his futile attempt to escape punishment for his embezzlement of LSU funds.

Board's action, noting that "to continued these sports and maintain their schedules in the face of transportation shortage, and rapidly dwindling enrollments of eligible students is obviously impossible."^51

The Board's ban on intercollegiate athletics lasted only nine months, however. In October, 1943, the Board authorized resumption of the contests because it had found that the Navy training program it had authorized in March (and which several colleges had now obtained) required that enrollees have the opportunity to participate in college athletics. The guidelines for the reinstituted program, however, required that the number of events be held to "a reasonable minimum," that students could not be absent from campus more than forty-eight hours for an athletic event, and that "no means of transportation requiring the use of rubber or gasoline shall be used for out-of-town trips by athletic teams, contestants, or spectators connected with any college unless OPA [the Office of Price Administration] approves in advance."^52

^51 Morning Advocate, January 14, 1943; Hardy, A Brief History of the University of Southwestern Louisiana, p. 93, reports that Southwestern lost 7 of its leading football players, 6 of its 9-man basketball team, and all the sprinters on its track team by 1943. Lowrey, 150 Centenary College of Louisiana, p. 23 reports that the advent of World War II and soaring costs ended Centenary's intercollegiate football programs.

^52 Bulletin No. 519 Official Proceedings October 5, 1943, p. 66; Bulletin No. 526 Official Proceedings January 11, 1944, pp. 19-20; Morning Advocate, October 6, 1943. Peter Finney, The Fighting Tigers Seventy-five Years of LSU Football (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p. 154, maintains that "Beyond doubt, the backbone of American football in 1943 was the U. S. Navy, with its famed preflight and physical training courses . . ." even though LSU managed to field an all-civilian team. He also relates (p. 156) that some members of Coach Bernie Moore's 1943 LSU team physically reached the Orange Bowl in Miami that year only because Tiger fans had saved their gasoline rationing coupons for the trip.
Conditions on Louisiana college campuses did not improve until after the war, when returning veterans created an abundance of students. Several of the colleges would establish special Guidance Centers to help veterans select the proper studies and to assist them in obtaining federal education benefits.53

While Louisiana's entire education system encountered various problems and challenges during the war years, facilities for black students remained separate from — and decidedly unequal too — those for white students. In 1940-41 there were only forty-five public and ten private high schools for blacks accredited by the state. In addition, twenty-three public and one private high schools were "approved" by the state. Incredibly, fourteen parishes provided only elementary schools for their black students. The State Department of Education's report for 1941 noted that "the number of Negro educables in several of these parishes does not justify a high school."54 The report made no mention of the undeveloped potential in those fourteen parishes. Thirty-nine parishes employed black supervisors for their separate black schools, but the black administrators were subordinates


of both the white supervisors and superintendents. Black education in Louisiana continued to focus almost entirely on vocational training: agriculture, home economics, and industrial arts. Some schools, however, provided academic courses for the few students who needed them as a foundation for professional training.\(^55\)

The State Department of Education had recognized by 1940 that

> By no principles of economics or ethics can a state progress or reach the highest stage of development with a large proportion of the population unskilled, shiftless, ignorant, and diseased. Neglect of the Negro and indifference to his home life, his health, his education, and his training for useful and gainful employment are detrimental to public welfare.\(^56\)

Despite this recognition, the Louisiana Educational Survey Commission found in 1942 that the state had done little to improve black public education. The Commission — most often called the Washburne Commission after its head, Dr. Carleton Washburne — repeated almost exactly the same sentiment as the Department of Education had expressed two years earlier:

> The value of the Negro as a plantation worker, as a tenant farmer, as a farm owner, as a domestic servant, as a laborer, as a mechanic, as a professional man or woman rendering service to his own race, can all be greatly increased by the right kind of education.\(^57\)

\(^{55}\)Ibid., pp. 109-119.


The Commission, however, realized that improvement of black education in Louisiana would be difficult. Most white Louisianians were not aware of the poor conditions in black schools, while many others shared the traditional southern prejudice against educating blacks. Several parishes even subsidized white education by expropriating the money provided by the state for black teachers and schools. Black education could ill afford the loss. Louisiana in 1942 spent $66 per year for the education of each white child but only $15.50 per year for each black child.\textsuperscript{58}

The Commission also found that black schools could do little to liberate their students from a substandard home environment. Two- or three-room frame cabins often housed large black families with barely adequate shelter. Parents themselves were often no more than poorly educated sharecroppers who could provide no newspapers or books for supplemental learning.\textsuperscript{59} Schools were equally deficient. About two-thirds were one-room buildings with several grades demanding the teacher's attention at the same time. The school building was usually on the same level as the surrounding homes — a wood frame structure heated by a wood stove, providing primitive toilet facilities at best, and surrounded by inadequate playground space. In addition, black schools were typically staffed by teachers who were ill-trained and paid less than their white counterparts. Instruction and available textbooks (often cast-offs from white schools) were also geared to

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., pp. 114-116.

white norms and values, and thus failed to arouse, or even to awaken, the black children's desire to learn.\footnote{60}

Despite wartime problems, Louisiana enabled more blacks to receive at least the rudimentary education available in the state's black schools. By 1946, the state provided 128 public high schools (eighty-three state-approved and forty-five non-approved).\footnote{61}

The findings of the State Department of Education and of the Louisiana Educational Survey Commission only reflected part of a regional pattern. Blacks in the South had been traditionally relegated to subservient roles in a society which was content to provide only substandard facilities for blacks (when it provided any facilities at all). World War II, however, changed relations between the races, both nationally and in the South. Richard M. Dalfiume notes that the war marked the turning point at which blacks decided no longer to accept unequal treatment without protest. "The dominant attitude in World War II came to be that the Negro must fight for democracy on two fronts — at home as well as abroad."\footnote{62}

Louisiana blacks, including black educators, joined in this fight. Eight black citizens of East Baton Rouge Parish asked the School Board in May, 1943, to begin adjusting salaries "so that white and black teachers with equal qualifications and equal experience would receive

\footnote{60}Washburne, \textit{Louisiana Looks At Its Schools}, pp. 109-114.


equal salaries." J. K. Haynes, President of the Louisiana Colored Teachers' Association, asked Governor Jones in June, 1943, to use his influence to persuade the State Board of Education to equalize teachers' salaries in order to prevent more teachers from leaving their profession for jobs in defense industries. Daniel E. Byrd, State President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, also requested that Jones work for equalized salaries and pointed out that despite the contention of the white Louisiana Teachers' Association — that equalized salaries would mean lower salaries for whites because the state did not have sufficient funds to increase black salaries to match those of whites — no such event had occurred in Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Alabama, Oklahoma, Florida, Tennessee, Kentucky, or Texas, all former slave states which had already equalized salaries. And while Jones agreed in principal ("We cannot consistently hold the Negro to excessively low educational and economic standards without suffering some of the ill effects of the low standards"), a revised statewide salary schedule prepared by Superintendent Coxe based a teacher's salary on experience, education, and merit, but maintained unequal salaries for blacks and whites. 63

Black educators filed several lawsuits during the war years to establish equal pay scales for white and black teachers. The first of these equalization suits was McKelpin v. New Orleans School Board.

63 Petition, May 15, 1943; Daniel E. Byrd to Sam Jones, June 14, 1943; J. K. Haynes to Jones, June 15, 1943; "Meeting of Committee on Equalization of Teachers' Salaries," June 7, 1943; H. W. Wright to Jones, May 11, 1943; William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
filed in June, 1941. In this case, McKelpin, a permanent teacher in New Orleans, claimed that he and other black teachers and principals in the system received uniformly lower wages than white employees possessing equal qualifications. The school board lost a motion to dismiss the case from the federal district court in 1942, and consented to eliminate salary differences based on race. Other cases followed.

In November, 1944, for example, a federal district court in Baton Rouge heard a suit brought by Wiley Butler McMillon and two other Iberville Parish teachers. The plaintiffs had originally filed in December, 1943, charging that their Parish School Board had violated their rights to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by maintaining separate pay scales for black and white teachers. Upon receipt of the original suit, the School Board instituted a new salary schedule based on education, experience, merit, and responsibility. Thurgood Marshall of New York, Special Counsel to the NAACP representing the plaintiffs, argued that the School Board minutes showed the use of color classification in granting raises, and that the word "race" had not been eliminated in salary schedules until late 1944. Salary lists Marshall introduced revealed that white teachers in Iberville Parish received an average salary of $1,749 for a nine-month school year ($194.33 per month), while black teachers average $637 for seven or eight months ($91 per month for a seven month year). The plaintiffs requested that

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the School Board adopt a salary schedule based solely on education and experience, and equalize black and white teachers' salaries for the 1946-47 school year. 65

Black educators failed for the moment, however, to persuade either the courts or the educational establishment to equalize salaries. By 1944, black teachers' average salaries had increased by more than fifty per cent over the 1940 levels, but that increase occurred mainly because Orleans Parish, which employed 12 per cent of the state's black teachers, had equalized salaries as a result of the McKelpin case. Black teachers waited until 1948 for equalized salaries to be provided statewide by Governor Earl Long as part of his ambitious legislative program introduced at the beginning of his first full gubernatorial term. 66

Nor were blacks immediately successful in improving the quality of black graduate education. The first black student was admitted to LSU's Law School in 1950, and only then as a partial result of the United States Supreme Courts' ruling in Sweatt v. Painter, in which the court found that a "separate" black law school in Texas was "unequal" to the state's law school for whites. 67

65 Morning Advocate, November 28, 1944; Bulletin No. 548 Official Proceedings January 8, 1845, pp. 66-68.


In summary, Louisiana's public schools had grown and taken on additional responsibilities during the war. Superintendent Coxe reported to the State Board of Education in 1942:

In this supreme effort, our educational forces have duties as clearly defined as those of our soldiers . . . there must be drastic action by the teachers of America . . . May our schools . . . indoctrinate our children with love of freedom and will to sacrifice; with passionate fervor for our living, growing democracy; with courage, confidence, and conviction in a complete victory and a better world.  

Louisiana's schools successfully met that challenge with sweeping changes in instructional method and in the curriculum. The greatest wartime failure of Louisiana's educational establishment was its inability to improve black educational facilities and standards, even though leaders of both races realized that black education was substandard to white education in all respects. Generations of inequality, however, had bred acceptance of substandard black education in Louisiana, the South, and the nation at large. The first stirrings of determined black protest occurred during World War II, but achievement of educational equality over the objections of conservative white southerners who adopted the strategy of "massive resistance" lay far in the future. World War II permanently altered public education in Louisiana, but it had nowhere near the effect on dismantling racially segregated public schools as did the United States Supreme Court's

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68 Bulletin No. 480 Wartime Education in Louisiana Schools, p. 3.

decision in the case of Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, et. al. (1954). Those events, however, are well beyond the scope of this study.
CHAPTER IX

LOUISIANA AGRICULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II

Louisiana agriculture during 1939-40 retained many of the aspects which had characterized it since Reconstruction when it adjusted itself to the loss of slave labor by adopting the tenantry system and depended on animal power to produce its staple crops. Louisiana's farm population in 1939-40 typically lived on a farm consisting of less than fifty acres. Of the 150,007 farms in Louisiana in 1940, 12,508 consisted of less than ten acres, 62,989 consisted of ten to twenty-nine acres, and 33,487 consisted of thirty to forty-nine acres. Even though a majority of rural Louisianans lived on these small-to-medium size farms, the number of large farms (858 containing 1,000 or more acres, for example) skewed the average farm acreage to just over sixty-six acres in 1940.¹

Many Louisiana farmers in 1939-40 were still tenants. The Census Bureau attributes one "operator" to each farm, so it found 150,007 farm operators in Louisiana in 1940. Of this total, 52,936 were listed as full owners, 7,376 as part owners, 528 as managers, and 89,167 as tenants (not quite sixty per cent of the total). Within the ranks of tenancy, the share tenant (31,460) and the sharecropper (39,631) far outnumbered the 11,201 cash tenants, the 1,469 share-cash tenants, and the 5,406 tenants who farmed under other arrange-

The farmers of Louisiana in 1939-40 typically grew at least some cotton. Of Louisiana's 150,007 farms in 1940, 114,291 reported cotton acreage. Cotton produced more farm income in 1940 than any other crop: $33,540,333 in cotton lint and an additional $6,333,126 in cotton seed. (The crop closest to cotton in total income produced was "all cereals" — $28,122,337.) Each farmer, however, typically produced only a few bales of cotton. While 9,210 farmers reported growing one bale of cotton or less in 1940, 14,011 reported one and one-half to two bales, 14,779 reported two and one-half to three bales, 14,984 (the largest number in any category) reported three and one-half to four bales. From that point the numbers decline: 13,706 farmers reported four and one-half to five bales, for example, and 11,509 reported five and one-half to six bales. The Census Bureau found only twenty-four farmers in Louisiana producing over 400 bales of cotton in 1940. Eight farmers reported 400 to 500 bales produced, and sixteen reported over 500 bales.

Louisiana farmers still depended on animal power to produce their crops. The 1940 Census found only 6,937 tractors throughout the state.

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2 Ibid., p. 4.


Mules and mule colts, on the other hand, constituted the second most valuable category of livestock on Louisiana farms. The value of all cattle and calves totaled $26,591,163, while the value of all mules and mule colts totaled $18,981,112. Moreover, the value of all horses and colts (many of which were draft animals) totaled an additional $8,918,969. The livestock next in value to the draft animals were hogs and pigs, totaling $3,497,974.5

Louisiana farmers utilized these traditional resources but also found that they had to abandon or modify many of them during World War II as they wrestled with "the uncomplimentary requirements of high farm production caused by war needs, and farm labor shortages caused by the military draft . . .".6 Despite the difficulties posed by the latter, Louisiana farmers, with the help of the agricultural establishment, struggled to fulfill the former.

American agriculture in 1939 had survived almost two decades of severe depression. Farm prices, temporarily high because of abnormal demand and scarcity during World War I, collapsed during the early 1920s, long before the Great Depression began to afflict the rest of the American economy in late 1929 and early 1930. Gross agricultural income in the United States fell from $17,700,000 in 1919 to $10,500,000 in 1921. Louisiana agriculture shared in the national "bust." Per capita farm income in Louisiana fell from $322 in 1919

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to $129 in 1921, and fluctuated throughout the rest of the 1920s, but always remained less than $250. Then, the Great Depression added its burden to Louisiana farmers. Per capita farm income in the state sank to $80 in the bleak year of 1932. By 1933, however, the effects of early New Deal agricultural programs had initiated a weak recovery. Farm income reached a Depression high of $207 in 1937 before declining again to $153 in 1940. That income rose dramatically during the next four years: to $230 in 1941; $360 in 1942; $476 in 1943; $497 in 1944; and $528 in 1945. (A post-war boom lasted until 1948, when per capita income reached $752.)

President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal wrestled with the problem of Southern rural poverty throughout the 1930s, but none of the several programs designed to alleviate it succeeded in eliminating widespread deprivation on southern farms. Even though George Brown Tindall found that "The [New Deal] farm program . . . clearly helped the South more than any other region in benefits, prices, and income," he also found that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the succeeding Soil Conservation Service both failed to limit production and thus increase prices. The 1937 cotton crop, for example, produced 18,946,000 bales, and the surplus on August 1, 1939 exceeded 13,000,000


bales, a surplus which depressed the market until 1941.  

Demand for agricultural produce during the years of World War II, however, accomplished what the New Deal had not done — war needs substantially raised farm income by creating larger markets for expanded production. Louisiana farm income increased every war year except 1944, growing from $113.90 annual cash income per farm in 1940 to $133.60 in 1941; $192.40 in 1942; $260.50 in 1943; dipping to $248.50 in 1944; and rebounding to $271.40 in 1945.  

The reasons for this growth in farm income are simple: the world needed more food and fiber than the producing countries could supply, and Louisiana farmers shared in the rise in agricultural prices, caused by the favorable operation of the law of supply and demand.

All was not high production and high prices for Louisiana farmers, however. Bad weather and insects, the bane of the farmer's existence from the earliest times that mankind shifted from a food-gathering to a food-producing creature, plagued Louisiana agriculture. Bad weather was the principal reason why the total value of Louisiana's crops declined some $24,000,000 from 1939 to 1940. Drought and boll weevil infestation devastated the cotton crop in north Louisiana and east Texas during 1941. The cotton yield in the area dropped to less than 25 per cent of normal. Mrs. N. E. Teagle of St. Maurice wrote to


Senator Allen Ellender that the 1942 crop year was no better: "... it has been one of the turbelst (sic) years I have ever expearenced (sic) and I am 64 years old." Fortunately, New Deal relief agencies still in operation prevented the destitution that normally would have followed such a catastrophe. In addition, late spring weather, combined with lack of labor for seedbed preparation and fears of difficulty in finding labor for harvest in 1944, led to the smallest number of acres (930,000) planted in cotton in Louisiana since 1915. The 1944 crop year turned out badly. A hot, dry summer followed a late, wet spring, and both total acreage harvested and average yield per acre declined in most areas. Fortunately for the farmers, however, prices increased slightly over 1943.

Farmers expect bad weather and occasional poor harvests as a normal course of their business. The war years, however, brought an additional problem that was not successfully solved. The tremendous demand of the American military machine and war-related industry which provided relatively high wages and a steady income in contrast to farming caused a shortage of farm workers. Louisiana farmers attempted to solve the labor problem in two ways: they increased

11 Shreveport Times, December 22, 1941; New Orleans States, November 21, 1941; R. S. Wilds to Allen J. Ellender, October 9, 1941; G. J. Posey to Ellender, October 10, 1941; Max Cockerham to Ellender, October 10, 1941; Lon H. Law to Ellender, November 7, 1941; Grover B. Hill to Ellender, January 17, 1942; Mrs. N. E. Teagle to Ellender, December 17, 1942, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection).

12 Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 13, December 22, 1944; New Orleans Item, April 2, 1945.
mechanization of farming procedure, and recruited ex-farm or non-traditional farm labor.¹³

Mechanization of Louisiana agriculture had proceeded slowly. There were only 1,691 tractors on Louisiana sugar cane farms in 1930. By 1940, that number had increased to 3,327 (an increase of 1,636); by 1945, however, it had increased to 6,499 (an increase of 3,172 in just five years). The human labor shortage caused sugar farmers to switch to mechanical labor wherever possible. The number of cane harvesters increased from 79 in 1942 to 124 in 1943; 192 in 1944; 329 in 1945; and 422 in 1946. In addition, county agents in the sugar parishes reported 266 flame cultivators (used to replace hand hoeing of sugar crops) in use in 1945, and 313 in 1946.¹⁴

Mechanization of other crop production in Louisiana lagged behind that of sugar. The first mechanical cotton picker did not appear in the state until the 1945 harvest season when it was used on a plantation near Cheneyville. It performed well, even though rain caused a lengthy delay between defoliation and harvest, so that the machine gathered an inordinate amount of trash along with the cotton. Even though this cotton picker worked, true mechanization of the American cotton crop did not occur until after the war. Cotton production during 1940-1945 still relied as much on hand labor — especially

¹³Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration House of Representatives 77 Congress 2 Session Part 28 Washington Hearings February 12 and 13, 1942 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 10857. This Committee, for example, found that all of south Louisiana and the Mississippi and Red River valleys in the state sorely needed seasonal farm labor.

"chopping" (thinning) and picking — as had antebellum cotton planters. ¹⁵

Mechanization of rice harvest lagged even further behind. The problem with rice was that successful mechanical harvesting required a moisture content in the grain well in excess of that needed for successful storage. While the use of tractors in planting and cultivation before World War II signaled the beginning of mechanization of rice production, mechanical harvesting devices could not be utilized until the development of modern grain drying facilities during the post-World War II years. ¹⁶

While machines helped to fill some of the demand for farm labor, Louisiana agriculture still relied primarily on hand labor and animal power. Even though the number of horses and mules on Louisiana farms decreased from 317,282 in 1940 to 293,226 in 1945 while the total number of tractors increased during those same years, only 8.8 percent of Louisiana farms in 1945 were equipped with a tractor. ¹⁷ In addition, tractors often only supplemented, and did not completely replace, draft animals or hand labor on many farms where they appeared during the war.

Therefore, farmers and the agricultural establishment sought to recruit farm workers from non-traditional sources of rural labor.

¹⁵Morning Advocate, September 21, 1945.


These sources included people who had never worked on farms before, but had agreed to do so. Many of them received training in agricultural tasks at Emergency Farm Workers' Schools provided by the Louisiana Department of Education. High school students throughout the state also enrolled in the "Victory Farm Volunteers" to help harvest agricultural produce. In exchange for their work, the students received small payments — two cents per pound for picking snap beans and between $1.50 and $3.00 per day (depending on individual ability) for digging Irish potatoes, for example. School principals occasionally rearranged course schedules to allow time for students to work in the fields, and almost 1,400 students in Terrebonne Parish alone helped harvest the 1945 crop.

Louisiana farmers also hoped to recruit farm labor among former agricultural laborers who had migrated to towns seeking work (or at least income) during the Great Depression. If the former laborers proved reluctant to return to the farm, then farmers hoped to force them back by removing the income which permitted them to remain in town. The Caddo Parish Police Jury on December 11, 1941, unanimously passed a resolution calling upon the Works Progress Administration, the Shreveport City Council, and the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce to help return "idle labor now on relief rolls" back to farms. Juror J. P. Fullilove attacked the "idleness of the city" and begged fellow jurors: "For God's sake, let's get these fellows back on the

19Morning Advocate, June 3, 1945.
The next year, J. M. Crutcher, state WPA administrator removed 2,600 farm workers from the WPA rolls, and in addition, removed 7,600 persons from the "awaiting assignment" list and announced that they would not be considered for WPA payments while farm work was available. "The WPA will not be a party to such a labor shortage," Crutcher said, "but will do everything in its power to see that men of farming experience go back to the farms if the work is there for them."  

Louisiana farmers, however, were not desperate enough to accept unanimously the offer of Harry Itaya, an American citizen of Japanese descent who wrote to the editor of the Shreveport Times in 1943 from the relocation camp in Arkansas to which he had been transported after the beginning of the war. Itaya suggested that Japanese-Americans should be released from the internment camps to which the United States government had assigned them and be relocated on farms and plantations where they could grow staple and vegetable crops for both military and civilian use. Some Louisianians approved Itaya's proposal, calling it a "wise observance of our great American creed of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and "a concrete way to show that democracy is still alive in our country." Other Louisianians approved it because "a few persons of the type of these Japanese-blood American citizens can do more work than a large number of negroes (sic) when it comes to farming and usually can do it better." Still other

20 Shreveport Times, December 12, 1941.

Louisianians adamantly disapproved the suggestion, contending that the "present low standard of living" in Caddo Parish, "would be dragged lower still." One person referred to his son in the military and wondered: "What he would think if I stood by without opposing it and let this parish be filled with cheap Jap (sic) labor while he is risking his life fighting to free this nation of Jap (sic) rule and domination." Louisiana's opinion, of course, remained a moot point. The United States internment policy prevented any serious consideration of Itaya's suggestion.

While the prejudice against Orientals and the searing memories of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor prevented utilization of native Japanese-American labor, Louisiana farmers felt no hesitation about using German or Italian prisoner of war labor.

Axis prisoners of war came to the United States as a result of American entry into the war following the Pearl Harbor attack. As American troops participated in the North African campaign against German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Corps, captured German soldiers began arriving in the United States. The prisoners posed a problem to American authorities: where could they be safely interned for the duration of the war? Decision-makers in Washington eventually decided that the POW internment camps had to be as isolated and as

22 Shreveport Times, August 1, 1943; Milton S. Eisenhower, The President Is Calling (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 95-127. Eisenhower, national director of the relocation, chronicles the United States government's imprisonment of Japanese-Americans. The widespread perception of the need to imprison them is also revealed in the quote from Westbrook Pegler (p. 102), who wrote that "The Japanese in California should be under guard to the last man and woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is over."
heavily guarded as possible. In order to discourage escape or sabotage attempts, emergency wartime regulations decreed that the camps could not be located within about 170 miles of a coastline, within a 150-mile-wide "zone sanitaire" along the Mexican and Canadian borders, or near shipyards, munition plants, or vital industries. Despite these rulings, approximately two-thirds of the POW base camps (containing approximately three-fourths of the prisoners) were located in the southern and southwestern regions of the country.\footnote{Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York, Stein and Day, 1979), pp. 27-28. The United States government eventually yielded to pressure from the Louisiana Sugar Cane League and Louisiana Congressmen and allowed the POWs to work in parishes bordering the Gulf of Mexico.}

Officials located the camps in these areas for more than security reasons. Maxwell McKnight, Chief of the Administrative Section of the POW Division, Camp Operations Branch of the Provost Marshal General's Office during the war, noted that the mild southern climate also appealed to army planners: "Oil was a problem back in those days... If you could have the prisons down South where the winters were milder, you had less of a problem with heat." Problems with the extra screening and sanitation to shield POWs from southern mosquitoes partially offset the advantages of the warm climate, but did not stop construction of the camps.\footnote{Judith M. Gansberg, Stalag: USA (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977), p. 24. Gansberg also noted that the mosquitoes could be used to the army's advantage to discipline the POWs, as in an incident at Camp Wynne, Arkansas, where camp authorities ordered some POWs who refused an increased work load to stand out-of-doors naked for several hours exposed to mosquitoes.}
state had more camps than any other southern state except Texas and Arkansas. Texas had thirty-three such camps, while Arkansas tied Louisiana for second place among southern states, each with seventeen camps.  

The United States treated its prisoners of war under the guidelines set forth at the Geneva Convention of 1929. These guidelines stipulated that prisoners of war other than officers could be required to work, but that the work could not be directly related to war operations, and could not jeopardize the health or the safety of the prisoners. These restrictions, however, did not preclude agricultural labor and prisoners of war in the United States helped to alleviate the agricultural labor shortage. In the South, the prisoners picked cotton, cut sugar cane, harvested tobacco and peanuts, cut pulpwood, and worked in fertilizer plants.

Louisiana first became involved with imprisoning enemies of the United States in late 1941, when the government sent Japanese, German, and Italian enemy aliens to the Quarantine Station at Algiers. Then

25 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, p. 31. The other southern states and their number of camps are: Mississippi and Georgia — 13 each; Alabama — 11; Florida — 8; North and South Carolina — 7 each; Virginia — 5, and Tennessee — 4.


27 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, pp. 35, 90; Gansberg, Stalag: USA, p. 34; Matthew J. Schott and Rosalind Foley, Bayou Stalags German Prisoners of War in Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, n.p., 1981), pp. 5-6. Krammer notes that a Huntsville, Texas, farmer remarked that POWs did not know "a stalk of cotton from a goddamn cockleburr."
in 1942, the United States Army Provost Marshal General ordered the preparation of Camps Livingston, Polk, and Ruston to house enemy aliens and prisoners of war.²⁸

Camp Livingston received its first enemy aliens, all Japanese men, in early June, 1942. Newspaper reporters allowed into the camp in July reported that the camp authorities treated the prisoners well. The United States had reason to treat the Japanese well, even though popular sentiment might have demanded otherwise. The Japanese government had failed to ratify the Geneva Convention, and was thus not bound to abide by its guidelines, even though the Japanese had generally agreed to adhere to them. The difference between the Japanese government "ratifying" and "agreeing to" an international accord allowed the United States some leeway in its treatment of Japanese prisoners.²⁹ United States authorities hoped that news of humane treatment Japanese prisoners received in this country would filter back into Japan and temper treatment of Americans held captive there.³⁰ This consideration became increasingly important after the fall of Corregidor and Bataan in May, 1942, left thousands of American prisoners in Japanese hands.

German prisoners reached Louisiana on July 9, 1943, when captured members of Rommel's Afrika Corps arrived at Camp Livingston, just north of Alexandria in central Louisiana. Camp Livingston, along with near-

²⁸ Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 2.


³⁰ Alexandria Daily Town Talk, July 14, 1942 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk).
by Camps Claiborne and Beauregard and Camp Polk near Leesville, were primarily constructed as training camps for American inductees, but were also pressed into service to house POWs. Prisoners housed at these camps lived a life quite similar to that of an American soldier in a military prison: reveille at 5:55 A.M.; roll call at 6:15; breakfast at 6:30; lunch break, 11:30-1:00; and end of the work day at 5:00.31

Louisiana POW camps eventually housed prisoners from virtually every Axis country, but most authorities permitted little interaction among the various nationalities. Camp Claiborne officials located the German compound southwest of the main entrance of the camp, and the Italian compound far to the west. The United States Army also attempted to separate hardened Nazi POWs from those who had been drafted into the ranks of the Axis armies. Subsequently, Camp Ruston became an anti-Nazi camp with a population primarily composed of non-Germans.32

The Louisiana POW camps housed thousands of able-bodied young men. The Geneva Convention governing their treatment did not prevent their employment in occupations not directly related to the war effort. Louisiana farmers needed farm hands to replace labor lost to the war effort. Therefore, quite logically, the farmers and their spokesmen began asking for POW labor to cultivate and harvest Louisiana crops.

Their inquiries began even as the German prisoners arrived in the

31 Ibid., August 2, 1943.

32 Ibid., December 8, 1979; Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 3.
state. Charles A. Farwell, educational director of the American Sugar Cane League, announced on July 3, 1943, that his association had explored the possibility of using the Germans to harvest the fall sugar cane crop. Senator Allen Ellender announced on July 8 that Louisiana would receive farm help from German and Italian POWs, but their use in the sugar crop would be limited because of Southern Defense Command prohibition against establishing a prison camp within 150 miles of a coastline (a restriction which officials later lifted). By the height of the 1943 harvest season in October, more than 950 German prisoners worked on farms surrounding Camp Livingston and the sub-camp established at Franklin specifically to provide laborers for the sugar harvest. The Army also permitted an expansion of camps and sub-camps at various locations throughout the state to house workers near areas with farm labor shortages. Camp Claiborne received German prisoners from Camp Polk on November 4, Port Allen housed POWs at a compound established at the Parish Fair Grounds, Lafourche Parish received several temporary camps to house workers beginning with the 1943 harvest. Sub-camps at Rayne, Eunice, Jennings, Sulphur, and Welsh housed POWs used in the rice harvest. The decentralization of the POW population continued into 1944 because of the continued shortage of farm labor. Senator John Overton, for example, successfully requested a

33 Morning Advocate, July 4, October 6, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 9, 1943.

sub-camp at Bastrop to house POWs which area farmers wanted to help harvest the cotton crop. 35

Farmers in an area with a shortage of farm labor worked closely with State Supervisor of Emergency Farm Labor Carl E. Kemmerly to establish the sub-camps. Farmers contributed to the construction of the prison compounds, then Kemmerly contacted Army inspectors to certify that the facilities met Geneva Convention housing specifications. Employers had to provide suitable buildings for kitchens and mess halls; sanitary facilities had to include one shower per twenty men and one faucet per fifteen men (counting both prisoners and guards); and each compound had to be equipped with water and electricity. If the facility passed Army inspection, Army guards escorted prisoners to the site and maintained surveillance of the area. The expense of contributing to the construction of the compounds, plus the daily wage of $1.20 to $1.50 per day (usually seventy cents paid to the government for operating expenses of the compounds and eighty cents paid to the prisoner) for a minimum contingent of ten workers meant that only substantial farmers or businessmen could afford POW labor. 36

Louisiana farmers needed help from any source to harvest the 1943 crop. Not only had the armed services taken their workers, but war industries actively recruited farm workers at higher wages than they

35 Joseph N. Lockwood, "The German Concentration Camp, Bastrop, Louisiana," North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Spring, 1980, p. 34.

received on the farms. This activity began in 1942, when the boom in defense industries caused industrial labor shortages. P. Theo Landaiche, a St. Gabriel rice farmer, complained to Senator Ellender in January, 1942, that several individuals who owned trucks facilitated the farm labor flight to industry by using the vehicles to transport farm workers to defense industries in Baton Rouge (for a fee, of course). Moreover, Landaiche complained, "These jobs are strictly (sic) a union proposition . . . The pay on these jobs are (sic) from $4.00 to $6.00 per day for these common farm Negroes . . ." Congressman Overton Brooks complained to Paul McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, that the WMC placed advertisements in Louisiana newspapers offering jobs in both in-state and out-of-state industries, and thus contributed to the drain of Louisiana's agricultural labor. McNutt replied that the WMC and the United States Employment Service carried on their search for available workers nationwide, and no agency of the federal government had designated northwest Louisiana a critical labor area.37

The industrial raids on the agricultural labor pool continued into 1943. Mark H. Brown, a Lake Providence lumber mill operator, complained in May, 1943, that government contractors sent trucks to transport labor to their construction sites for "grading, sodding, and beautifying" frills, while producers of forest products and farmers lacked sufficient help. Furthermore, H. B. Naquin, a small-scale

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manufacturer of a mechanical sugar cane harvester, reported to President Roosevelt that the giant Higgins Industries, producing ships and other war implements, depleted the available labor supply within "40 or 50 miles" in all directions by providing buses to transport workers from rural areas into New Orleans, and that "our sugar planters cannot compete with the prices that they are paying per day." Instructions issued by the WMA and the USES subsequently provided that individuals currently or most recently employed in agriculture could not be referred to non-agricultural employment without prior consultation between the USES and a designated representative of the War Food Administration (usually a County Agent of the State Agricultural Extension Service). This provision proved to be ineffectual. Relocation of agricultural labor continued to be a problem throughout the war.

Geography, climate, traditional southern racial attitudes, and legalized segregation in the South thwarted one effort to ease the labor shortage by utilizing workers from the West Indies. The governments of the United States and Jamaica agreed in 1943 that Jamaican workers could come to the United States. The major concentration point for the West Indian laborers was Camp Pontchartrain, adjacent to New Orleans. The extra labor was therefore tantalizingly close to Louisiana farmers. The Jamaican government, however, had agreed to export workers to the mainland only with two stipulations: they had to re-

38 Mark H. Brown to Allen J. Ellender, May 10, 1943; H. B. Naquin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 15, 1943; Ellender Collection.

turn to Jamaica after the 1943 harvest season so they would not be exposed to a harsh North American winter, and they could not be used in the South. Some south Louisiana farmers asked Senators Ellender and Overton to prevail upon the federal government to seek changes in the original bilateral agreement. The War Food Administration subsequently asked the Jamaican government to extend the period of employment of its nationals in the United States, and allow their use in the Louisiana and Florida sugar cane fields, where the harvest season extended far beyond that of other crops. Despite pleas from Louisianians, however, both the Jamaican and Bahamian governments agreed to allow their nationals to remain in the United States over the winter of 1943-44, but stipulated that they could be employed only in Florida, where the winters more closely matched the mild, tropical winter.

Failure to secure imported workers left only the POWs as a large pool of untapped labor. Their subsequent work in the fields of Louisiana brought them into close contact with many more Louisianians than would have associated with them otherwise. The attitude of many Louisianians was more favorable toward the primary enemies, the Germans, than toward Italians, Southern Europeans, or Asians. Black Louisianians, closely associated with the POWs in agricultural work, were of two minds about the prisoners: some blacks resented the competition for their work and the special treatment some prisoners

40 Charles A. Farwell to W. C. Kemper, July 31, 1943; Paul V. McNutt to Allen J. Ellender, August 17, 1943, September 14, 1943; Walter Godchaux to Farwell, August 2, 1943; Godchaux to Ellender, August 2, 1943, September 2, 1943; Wilson R. Buie to Ellender, August 28, 1943; Godchaux to Frank Wurzlow, August 23, 1943, August 30, 1943; Marvin Jones to Ellender, October 30, 1943; Ellender Collection.

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received; other blacks found satisfaction in seeing whites sharing menial field work. Despite official attempts to discourage fraternization, hundreds of personal relationships developed between prisoners and both black and white Louisianians. 41

Louisiana's use of POW labor reached its peak during the 1945 crop year after Germany's surrender, but before the prisoners were repatriated. Many farmers and others who utilized POW labor in the forest industry feared continued agricultural labor shortages throughout the South after the war and wanted the government to keep the POWs for an extended period, but by 1946 POW labor disappeared from Louisiana. 42

Despite the problems posed by bad weather and the agricultural labor shortage, Louisiana farmers continued to produce their three historic major staple crops: sugar cane, cotton, and rice. Each subdivision of agriculture responded to the challenge of the war in its own way.

Louisiana sugar farmers during the war were confined mainly to the triangle with apexes in West Baton Rouge, Iberia, and Lafourche Parishes, covering an average of 266,200 acres during those years.


Production from 1940 to 1944 averaged 4,800,000 tons. The Sugar Act of 1937 regulated that production during the war. Congress planned the Sugar Act to apply to crops only until 1940, but the beginning of World War II caused Congress to extend the Act until 1944.

The Sugar Act of 1937 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture (Henry A. Wallace, until his election to the vice presidency in 1940, Claude Wickard thereafter) to estimate the annual consumption requirements of the United States in December of each year, or at other times if he deemed it necessary, and then allocate portions of the total to farmers in the sugar-producing areas of the country. The Secretary of Agriculture thus had broad powers to manipulate the price of sugar through his power to determine consumption requirements. In addition, an international agreement reached in 1937 between sugar importing and sugar exporting countries allowed the exporting countries to produce sugar at high levels, thus in effect helping to hold down sugar prices. This international agreement nominally lasted until 1942, but the war caused new problems in the international sugar market before that date.

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45 Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 243; Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, p. 35.

Following the beginning of the war, American sugar merchants, many of whom remembered the short supplies experienced during World War I, bought large quantities of sugar, even though Roosevelt and Wallace assured them that the United States surplus of 800,000 tons of sugar would prevent shortages in the new world situation. Nevertheless, the buying spree caused Roosevelt to suspend all quota restrictions on September 11, 1939. He reinstated the quotas on December 26, 1939, but by then Louisiana sugar farmers had planted a 1940 crop far in excess of any reasonable quotas. The Department of Agriculture ruled, therefore, that the farmers could harvest up to 110 per cent of their proportionate share of the 1940 crop without deduction from their payments. Nature, however, had the last word on the 1940 sugar cane crop. Adverse weather conditions destroyed much of it. In addition, Japanese expansion in the Pacific threatened United States imports from Hawaii and the Philippines. Therefore, the USDA, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes agreed in April, 1941, that all acreage restrictions should be lifted from sugar production. The marketing quotas remained, however, and were not lifted until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After that attack, the government encouraged full production and distribution of sugar. 47

Aid to the sugar industry as originally assigned to the Defense Supplies Corporation, which on October 14, 1942, announced that it would reimburse United States refiners of Louisiana raw sugar for

certain transportation costs they incurred in shipping the raw sugar
to refineries designated by the War Production Board instead of the
refinery nearest the raw sugar mill. The government hoped to keep
the raw sugar supply distributed to all available refineries so that
some would not be inundated with raw sugar while others lay idle. The
Commodity Credit Corporation assumed responsibility for this program
on December 16, 1942, and the CCC continued the reimbursement payments
for the 1943-1946 crop years. 48

The CCC also supplied assistance payments for harvest of the 1943
sugar cane crop. On October 22, 1943, it offered a payment of 33 cents
per ton of Louisiana standard sugar cane to be paid through the proces-
sors to the growers. 49 The early freeze during the 1943 harvest
season threatened to reduce the amount of sugar produced, so the CCC
extended the payment program to include salvage operations for the
freeze-damaged cane. 50

Despite these attempts to bolster domestic sugar production, the
United States and its allies supplied less than their need. Therefore,
United States consumers seldom received all the sugar they could use.

48 Earl B. Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls 1941-1947 Volume I
Wartime Controls Volume II, pp. 592-607. This program was designed
to keep all refineries operating at full capacity. The alternative,
the USDA thought, would be to allow refineries near the raw sugar
mills to be choked with surplus sugar, while refineries further away
operated at partial capacity or stood idle.

49 Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, pp. 85-86; Volume
II, pp. 608-612.

50 Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, p. 86; Volume II,
pp. 613-614.
Per capita consumption in the United States fluctuated during the war. The 1942 per capita consumption of 86.2 pounds fell to 80.3 pounds in 1943, rose to 89.1 pounds in 1944, and sank to 73.6 pounds in 1945. Furthermore, beginning in 1942, consumers received ration books which allowed them to purchase only a limited amount of sugar (originally slightly more than one-half pound per week, eventually falling to less than one-third pound per week), and then only within a carefully specified time.  

Cotton crops covered more acres in Louisiana during the war years than any other single staple crop — an average of 995,000 acres during 1940-1944. Cotton production was also more widely spread over the state. A survey in 1945 found cotton on 61.3 per cent of Louisiana farms, sugar cane grown for sugar on 6.51 per cent and rice on 4.94 per cent. All areas of the state except Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and Orleans Parishes produced at least some cotton during the war.  

Cotton, of course, was the historic crop of the South, and southern farmers could grow cotton well — so well, in fact, that they had repeatedly flooded the market during the 1930s, thus depressing

51 Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, p. 87; Volume IV, pp. 1321, 1351.

52 Louisiana farmers grew corn on an average of 1,300,000 acres during the war, but corn was not a staple crop grown primarily for sale. Instead, the farmers generally used the corn either as food for themselves or their workstock.

prices. Cotton, because of the use of cotton lint in armament production, became an important commodity during the war. Therefore, the Louisiana Agricultural Extension Service concentrated on improving the quality of the cotton produced. The United States Department of Agriculture, however, recognized that the huge stockpiles of surplus cotton precluded the need for production stimulation programs. The United States in March, 1941, had a carry-over of almost 12,000,000 bales, and the carry-over never fell much below 10,500,000 bales at any time during the war.54

Therefore, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard introduced a 1941 Supplementary Cotton Program in an attempt to reduce the supply in two ways: the USDA paid cotton farmers to reduce their cotton acreage with stamps which could only be used to purchase cotton clothing at local stores participating in the program; and it paid farmers to grow vegetables on land taken out of cotton production.55

The second part of this program met with little success. The

54 Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 289; Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, p. 704; Frederick W. Williamson, Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana 1860-1948 How It Opened the Road for Progress in Better Farming and Rural Living (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Division of Agricultural Extension, 1951), p. 222. Dr. Henry G. Knight, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and Engineering and Regional Research Laboratories, told the House Appropriations Committee on March 2, 1942, that the Southern Research Laboratory in New Orleans had developed a way for cotton lint to be used in the production of smokeless gunpowder. Knight admitted that the resulting shells were more explosive than shells with regular linters and therefore required more careful handling, but the use of cotton virtually guaranteed an unlimited supply. States, March 2, 1942.

payment to the farmers was a token $1.50 for a one-fourth acre plot which had to be protected from livestock and which had to grow at least six kinds of vegetables. A farm family could also receive a $3.00 payment for producing and storing 300 quarts of frozen or canned foodstuffs. Many farmers, accustomed to producing staple cash crops, however, disliked vegetable gardening and failed to understand the importance of family food production in diversified farm management. Despite the admonitions from Georgia Farm Bureau President R. L. Wingate that "We cannot eat surplus cotton," many cotton farmers throughout the South, including Louisiana, preferred to continue producing the crop they understood best.

Rice, Louisiana's third staple crop, was confined mostly to the southwestern corner of the state during the war years. Between 1940 and 1944, Louisiana rice farmers planted an average 558,400 acres. Rice was a crop of restricted acreage because it required the impervious subsoils found in southwest Louisiana which are used to hold the irrigation water that discourages weed growth during the growing season. Southwest Louisiana produced 83 per cent of Louisiana's total

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58 Tindall, Emergence of the New South, pp. 704-705. It should also be noted that it was not unprofitable to grow cotton during the war. The price of cotton on the New Orleans market reached 20.77 cents per pound including government soil conservation payments in January, 1942. This price exceeded cotton prices back to 1929. Times-Picayune, January 23, 1942.
rice harvest during the war years, but Louisiana's share of the national rice market fell from 40.6 per cent in 1939 to 28.6 per cent in 1944. As in most other commodity areas, the United States government encouraged unlimited rice production and guaranteed prices. Loss of normal Asiatic supplies to Japanese expansion sharpened the American realization that it needed more domestic supplies, and raised total plantings to the practical limit of 1,500,000 acres over the country. Louisiana farmers harvested 88,690,000 bushels of rice worth $147,819,000 between 1941 and 1944.

Louisiana farmers also increased production of other crops during the war. They had grown soybeans for years, but primarily for hay, forage, and soil improvement. The federal government, however, called for more soybeans for vegetable oil production, and Louisiana's farmers responded. Soybeans remained a minor crop during the war, however, covering an average 31,800 acres between 1941 and 1944.

In addition to vegetable crops, Louisiana farmers also increased production of meat and meat products. Swine, beef, poultry, egg, and milk production all increased during the war. The entire pig crop of 1942 — 1,106,000 — was 7 per cent above that of 1941. The New


61 Reiling and Wiegmann, *Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends and Current Status*, pp. 34-35; Williamson, *Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana*, p. 229. The real "boom" in Louisiana soybeans occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The average yield between 1940 and 1944 was 388,000 bushels. In comparison, average yield between 1972 and 1976 was 46,500,000 bushels, reaching a high of 63,000,000 bushels in 1976.

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Orleans market received 79,202,000 pounds of milk in 1940, compared to 105,452,000 pounds in 1941, and 112,651,000 in 1942. Louisiana farmers produced about 10,000,000 chickens in 1942, and improved egg production 17 per cent over the previous year. During the spring and summer of 1942, Louisiana farms supplied over 100 railroad cars of eggs — over 1,000,000 dozen — to the egg dehydration plant at Ruston in north Louisiana. 62

Louisiana sweet potatoes provided another source of income to Louisiana farmers. The B. F. Trappey family of Jeanerette had moved their agricultural canning operation to Lafayette shortly after 1930, and there developed a process for canning formerly discarded sweet potatoes that were not of the highest quality by packing them in a heavy sugar syrup which preserved both the shape and sweetness of the potato. By the beginning of World War II, the Trappeys had introduced their "candied yam" to much of the middle South. The Allied armed forces included the potatoes in their field ration kits and thus created an unprecedented demand. The Trappeys expanded their cannery and produced about 12,000,000 pounds of canned sweet potatoes for the military before the end of the war. In addition, five plants in Louisiana — Warriner Starch at St. Francisville; American Foods at Opelousas, Trappey, and Little and Company at Lafayette, and Frank Tea and Spice at New Iberia, produced dehydrated sweet potatoes. These plants in 1943 used nearly 1,000,000 bushels of raw potatoes, for which they paid $2,500,000. The Quartermaster Corps bought their entire

production. 63

Louisiana's forests also contributed to the war effort. As the United States shifted its national defense preparedness program into high gear, the government became the country's largest lumber consumer. In September, 1941, alone, the federal government ordered 2,000,000,000 board feet of lumber for the construction of cantonments. 64 Southern pine timber producers supplied much of the government's need. Louisiana then had about 16,193,000 acres of forest land (about 55 per cent in public ownership and 88.1 per cent in private ownership. About one-half of this acreage was in hardwood timber, and the other one-half in pine. 65

The federal government did not impose stringent controls on the forest industry, but industry trade groups instead organized production of this valuable source of war material. The Southern Pine Association, headquartered in New Orleans, for example, pledged its full support to the war effort; the government accepted lumber of poorer grade than it had permitted before, and the timber industry boomed. 66 By the end of 1945, Louisiana had produced 82,000,000 board

63 Morning Advocate, May 27, 1944; Dismukes, The Center, pp. 52-53. In addition to sweet potatoes, the army also bought Louisiana-grown Irish potatoes. In 1943 the army needed 5 railroad cars (1,500 sacks) each day for its camps in Louisiana. Town Talk, April 29, 1943.


66 Fickle, The New South and the 'New Competition', pp. 350-351; William
feet of timber in excess of its need, and 475 timber operators in the state had paid $50,000,000 to some 40,000 people working in the timber business, even though Louisiana timber producers struggled with shortages of labor, equipment, and transportation, as did timbermen in other sections of the United States. North Louisiana Soil Conservation District forestors noted at the end of the war that the heavier-than-normal cutting caused by war demand had improved the north Louisiana timber stands by removing many weak "weed" trees of questionable value and thus leaving room for healthy trees to grow.

World War II caused many changes on Louisiana farms. While the amount of land devoted to farming remained virtually the same — 9,996,108 acres in 1939 (34.6 per cent of Louisiana's total area), and 10,039,657 acres in 1944 (34.7 per cent of the total area), the number of farmers declined from 150,007 in 1940 to 129,295 in 1945. In addition, the characteristics of the farm population changed noticeably. More farmers became full or part owners of the land they worked during the war. In 1940, 52,946 farmers owned their farms outright. By 1945, that number had increased to 58,761. This trend toward farm ownership cut across both races. The number of white full owners increased from 43,410 to 48,357, while the number of black full owners increased from 9,526 to 10,404. Overall, the percentage of


Morning Advocate, December 7, 1945; Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legislators, p. 238.

Shreveport Times, August 26, 1945.
Louisiana farms operated by owners increased from 40.2 in 1940 to 50.4 in 1944.69

While the number of farm owners increased, the number of farm tenants declined during the war years as agricultural workers found jobs in war-related industry or entered the armed services. The number of all classes of tenants fell from 89,167 in 1940 to 63,541 in 1945. The decline occurred in tenants of both races, but more whites than blacks left tenancy during the war years. The number of white tenants fell from 40,787 in 1940 to 25,263 in 1945 (a decline of 14,524), while the number of black tenants fell from 48,380 to 37,278 (a decline of 11,102). This trend held true even for the poorest of Louisiana agricultural workers — the sharecroppers. The number of 'croppers fell from 38,631 in 1940 to 25,221 in 1945. In this category the decline was greater for blacks than for whites. The higher number of black sharecroppers at the beginning of the war, however, still left more black than white sharecroppers at the end of the war. The number of white sharecroppers declined from 12,082 to 6,110 (a decline of 5,972), while the number of black sharecroppers declined from 27,549 to 19,111 (a decline of 8,438).70

The scarcity of farm labor during the war years is also revealed in the startling decline in the number of hired hands. Louisiana farmers reported 56,712 hired hands on their farms in 1940. By 1945, 

69 Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends in the Agriculture of Louisiana, pp. 5, 7.
70 Ibid., p. 5.
however, that number had fallen to 18,954,\textsuperscript{71} a decline of 37,759. 
(No wonder Louisiana farmers agreed to risk using German POWs on their farms!)

Louisiana farmers also grew older during the war years. Their average age in 1940 was 44.2 years, while in 1945, their average age had increased to 46.7 years. It is no surprise that the number of farmers in the "Under 35" age group declined most sharply -- from 42,104 in 1940 (29 per cent of the total number of farmers) to 25,707 in 1945 (20 per cent of the total). The young farmers, of course, were most susceptible to the draft. Also, many of them had less of a stake in farm life, and therefore felt less reluctance to leave the farm for industrial jobs. All other age categories of farmers rose in their percentage of the total number of farmers during the war years. The "35-54" age group fell in actual numbers from 64,710 in 1940 to 64,359 in 1945, but their percentage of the total number of farmers rose from 45 per cent to 50 per cent. The "55-64" age group similarly fell in real numbers -- from 22,877 to 22,837, but increased slightly in percentage from 16 per cent to 18 per cent. The "65 and Above" age group, however, increased in both real numbers and percentage -- 13,948 (10 per cent) in 1940 to 15,106 (12 per cent) in 1945.\textsuperscript{72}

Louisiana agriculture also experienced a slight trend toward larger farms during the war years. The "Under 30 Acres" farm

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. 14.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 6.
classification showed a decline from 50.3 per cent of all Louisiana farms in 1939 to 46.1 per cent in 1944, while all other classifications (30-49 acres; 50-99 acres; 100-179 acres; 180-259 acres; 260-499 acres; 500 or more acres) showed increases. These increases, however, were slight. The "50-99 acre" classification, for example, showed the largest percentage increase, and it was only 1.3 per cent. The "180-259 acres" and "500 or more acres" classifications, in contrast, showed the least increase (.4 per cent). 73

The relative prosperity of the war years also brought more amenities to farm life. The number of trucks on Louisiana farms increased from 17,005 to 20,974 from 1940 to 1945 (a 23.3 per cent increase), while the number of automobiles increased from 34,891 to 40,651. 74 In addition, 17,481 farms in 1945 (13.7 per cent of the total) reported running water in the main dwelling; 31,558 farms received electricity (24.4 per cent of the total); 63,025 were equipped with radios (48.7 per cent of the total); and 6,434 had a telephone on the premises (5 per cent of the total). 75

In summary, Louisiana agriculture faced many difficult challenges during the years of World War II which it met with varying degrees of success. Perennial problems with bad weather and insects, of course, are beyond the total control of farmers at any time. The labor problem likewise remained beyond the ability of Louisiana farmers to

73 Ibid., p. 8.

74 Ibid., p. 13.

75 Ibid., p. 14.
solve completely, although several human and mechanical substitutes were used effectively.

Despite these difficulties, however, the unprecedented worldwide demand for agricultural products created by the war brought Louisiana agriculture out of the economic doldrums caused by the loss of a captive market following World War I and the Great Depression. The war demand, however, while it stimulated Louisiana's agricultural economy, failed to reorient that economy toward new crops. Louisiana farmers both before and after the war concentrated on growing their three traditional staple crops: cotton, sugar cane, and rice. Fortunately for them, the war created demand for these specific commodities — cotton for both fiber (including military uniforms and accessories) and ammunition, sugar cane and rice because German naval attacks threatened to disrupt dependable sources of supply, and because Japanese expansion in the Pacific and Asia destroyed traditional sources of both sugar and rice. Louisiana farmers, therefore, could sell their favorite crops in a most favorable sellers' market and enjoy the attendant prosperity — while that market lasted.
CHAPTER X
LOUISIANA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II

During World War II, the South received some $4,442,000,000 in federal funds for war plants, 17.6 per cent of the national total. Louisiana received more of these funds than any other Southern state except Texas — about $1,773,713,000.¹ The South had trained many recruits during World War I, and federal officials in World War II, including President Franklin Roosevelt, remembering that contribution, sent thousands of new recruits for training in the South again. In addition, Southern urban areas contained relatively large pools of workers needed in wartime industry. Therefore, the South, and especially Southern cities became important centers in the headlong rush to enable the United States to participate in the war.²

Increased federal spending for war projects helped to bring Louisiana and the South out of the economic doldrums of the Great Depression, but many people felt a great reluctance to let go of New Deal agencies which had ensured their subsistence and had attempted to bolster their morale by emphasizing work rather than charity during the dark days of the 1930s. The Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, and other agencies had brought hope when there appeared to be no hope


during the decade of despair, and such programs remained popular even after wartime prosperity made them less necessary. As late as 1939, the WPA remained a major employer in Central Louisiana, sponsoring a nursery school in Alexandria, community centers in Grant, Natchitoches, Rapides, and Winn Parishes, archeological expeditions studying Indian village and burial sites in LaSalle and Avoyelles Parishes, the Historical Records Survey in ten parishes, and a unit of the Veterans' Graves Registration Program, venereal disease control projects in Rapides, Natchitoches, LaSalle, and Concordia Parishes, and a Vital Statistics Project in LaSalle and Rapides Parishes. The Rapides Parish Police Jury in 1940 turned over one entire floor of the old parish courthouse, which the parish government had just vacated to move to a new building, to the WPA district office and its sixty-nine employees. In addition, Alexandria provided all utilities to the WPA office without charge.3

Even though the WPA continued approving projects for Louisiana — street construction and repair for Baton Rouge in March, 1941, and statewide recreational facilities for soldiers in September, 1941 — Louisiana's labor force increasingly moved off WPA rolls and onto payrolls. The state led all others in the percentage increase in the private sector employment rate from September through October, 1940. Louisiana's increase was 141.8 per cent. New Orleans WPA rolls

reached their peak in April, 1939, when the agency carried 17,698 names on its payrolls. By March, 1942, however, only 6,489 names remained, and about 250 men per week left those rolls as they found work.\(^4\)

By December, 1942, when President Roosevelt ordered liquidation of the WPA, the Baton Rouge \textit{Morning Advocate} thought that the time had indeed come to issue a eulogy for that beneficial federal agency:

For its purpose, when it was created, the WPA was one of the soundest experiments of the emergency relief era. It served the double purpose of giving the taxpayers some return for their money, and of helping to preserve the self-respect of those receiving relief.

But those days of emergency unemployment are gone — if not forever, at least until the war has been won.\(^5\)

The National Youth Administration also shifted the last phase of its work in Louisiana to the war effort. The NYA announced in July, 1940, that it planned to spend $1,271,038 in Louisiana during 1941, and that it would place increased emphasis on projects designed to provide work experience and basic training in mechanical pursuits to provide additional preparation for jobs in industries expected to expand because of increased production for national defense — including plumbing, electricity, automobile mechanics, welding, painting, carpentry, blacksmithing, woodworking, cabinet making, truck driving,

\(^4\)\textit{Shreveport Times}, December 4, 1940; \textit{Morning Advocate}, March 19, 1941; \textit{New Orleans Times-Picayune}, March 28, September 18, 1942.

\(^5\)\textit{Morning Advocate}, December 18, 1942.
dispatching, telephone work, hospital work, and army messenger work. In addition, the Civilian Conservation Corps during the early 1940s oriented the training of the youths in its program to the war effort. Some CCC workers, for example, engaged exclusively in work on military reservations.

The 1940 Louisiana legislature also enacted a law to ensure federal-state cooperation in upgrading rural housing. The statute created regional housing authorities, to which a farmer could donate one acre of land. The housing authority then built a small but substantial home on the property and rented it to the farmer for $4.25 per month. In addition, the farmer could purchase the house anytime within the next sixty years.

The beginning of World War II in Europe brought an immediate boom to the American economy as businessmen on all levels rushed to stock up on materials and products which they feared might become scarce because of war demand. The immediate boom collapsed after concurrent public consumption and export booms failed to develop, but the American economy rebounded, albeit more slowly, in 1940. Louisiana's economy

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6 Times-Picayune, July 2, 1940; Town Talk, January 9, 1941; New Orleans States, July 2, 1941.

7 Hubert Humphreys, "In a Sense Experimental: The Civilian Conservation Corps in Louisiana," Louisiana History, Fall, 1964, pp. 347, 349-350, 367.


improved along with that of the United States during 1940. Standard Oil Company in Baton Rouge began an expansion program including synthetic rubber production; Higgins Shipyards in New Orleans recorded banner profits in 1940; the federal government spent approximately $13,000,000 for construction of training camps around Alexandria; the Louisiana Employment Service placed approximately 57,000 people in jobs (16,000 in work on the army camps alone); new passenger car sales in the state increased from 27,882 in 1939 to 33,064 in 1940; and crude petroleum production increased from 90,000,000 barrels in 1939 to almost 102,000,000 barrels in 1940. Retail sales in Baton Rouge during the 1940 Christmas season increased twenty-five per cent over 1939 Christmas sales, and topped the 1929 record sales. Baton Rouge, in fact, ranked seventh among United States cities in increased retail buying power in 1940, according to the Federal Reserve System report for the year. In addition, the National Industrial Conference Board found that earnings per person during 1940 had increased in only three southern states; Virginia (to $408), Louisiana (to $390), and South Carolina (to $296). All three states stood above the 1929 level of income per person, but their citizens were only relatively better off. Even the highest southern state (Virginia) remained well below the United States average income per person ($546), and received less than half the earnings per person of the highest state in the Union (Connecticut, with $818 per person).

10 Town Talk, December 27, 1940.

11 Morning Advocate, December 28, 1940; March 8, 10, April 1, 1941.
The construction industry in Louisiana had begun to recover from the Depression even before the advent of the war. The Federal Housing Administration reported that during the first week of March, 1939, it had accepted more mortgage loans for construction or improvement of private dwellings than during any comparable time period in its experience in Louisiana. Following the federal government's decision to construct training camps in Louisiana, however, the building industry recovered even more, especially in Central Louisiana with its concentration of war camps and influx of population. The city of Alexandria issued sixty-five building permits for construction worth $75,517 in April, 1940, alone. Building permits for the entire year reached a value of $1,276,957 (the 1939 total value had been $774,460.57). The value of building permits issued throughout the state grew 32.4 per cent in 1938; 32.8 per cent in 1939; declined 14.0 per cent in 1940; increased 84.3 per cent in 1941 (height of the war-camp construction boom) and declined again in 1942 and 1943.\(^\text{12}\)

Industrial growth during the war occurred throughout Louisiana. While New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport were the major industrial centers, small manufacturers located their plants in smaller towns. Most of the state's industrial development, however, occurred in the three major cities.

Baton Rouge, in 1940 boasted a population of 34,719. By 1945, its population numbered 110,000, an increase of 75,281 in just five

years. Much of that growth resulted from the city's industrial development.**13** Baton Rouge became a major oil refining center following establishment of the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana refinery in 1909 to process oil from the mid-portion of the continent.**14** During the 1940s, the city became a vital cog in the nation's war machine because of Standard Oil and other major industries located there. The Standard Oil complex, alone, included the first catalytic cracking plant ever built, which contributed heavily to the badly-needed production of 100-octane aviation fuel and also produced by-products useful in making synthetic rubber. In addition, the complex included an alkylation plant which made high octane blending agents for aviation fuel, plants synthesizing both ethyl and isopropyl alcohol from petroleum, and plants which produced synthetic rubber — Buna-S used primarily to make tires, and special use Buna-N and Butyl rubber. By June, 1945, the Standard refinery had produced its one billionth gallon of high-octane aviation fuel, and the government estimated that it had fueled one plane of every fifteen used in the war effort.**15**

In addition to Standard Oil, Baton Rouge was also the site of a bauxite reduction plant, financed by the Defense Plant Corporation of the federal government and operated by the Aluminum Company of America **14**"Morning Advocate, November 25, 1945.


to reduce bauxite ore to aluminum used in aircraft and other construction. By April, 1944, the Baton Rouge facility produced enough aluminum for 2,000 fighter planes per month and employed approximately 800 persons.  

Baton Rouge became, finally, a large concentration depot for United States Army supplies in Louisiana. This project more than doubled railroad trackage capacity in the old Illinois Central Railroad yards. The Morning Advocate noted, however, that income from this source would obviously end with the war.  

Increased deposits in Baton Rouge banks revealed the city's growing prosperity. Deposits set new record levels during 1940. At the end of that year, Fidelity Bank and Trust Company reported deposits of $5,550,537.83 compared to $5,078,262.56 at the end of 1939. In addition, City National Bank reported $11,009,595.14 on deposit at the end of 1940, compared to $10,860,227.90 in 1939, and Louisiana National Bank reported $11,876,391.81 on deposit compared to $11,250,811.90 the previous year. Growth in bank deposits continued throughout the war. The three banks during 1942, for example, received an additional $15,378,778 in deposits.  

Baton Rouge was not the only city in Louisiana which experienced the flush of wartime prosperity. In northwest Louisiana that prosperity centered in Shreveport. The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce  

16 Morning Advocate, March 24, 1942; April 16, June 2, 1944.  

17 Ibid., May 30, 1942.  

18 Ibid., January 2, 1941; April 1, 1943.
sought with determination to bring defense industries, contracts or army bases (with their attendant payrolls) to northwest Louisiana. The Chamber sent a committee to Washington to attend a meeting during which President Roosevelt unveiled his "favored areas" for war industries. The committee reported that Shreveport was included in a "favored area," and the Chamber began contacting aircraft manufacturers in an attempt to obtain a factory near the city. The Chamber Board of Directors directed its industry recruiters to offer manufacturers free sites supplied by the city for their factories provided that the industry offered sufficient revenue to justify such a contribution.¹⁹

Even though the Chamber failed to lure an airplane manufacturer to Shreveport and failed in its prolonged effort to convince the federal government to build an Army cantonment near the city, it provided information on raw material priorities, labor relations, allocations, contract services, and other business problems which stemmed from the war emergency and actively sought small war contracts for small businesses.²⁰

Several Shreveport businesses contributed to the war effort. The J. B. Beaird Company, for example, employed approximately 800 people in 1943, and produced shell casings, tanks for the production of synthetic rubber and storage of high octane gasoline, landing barge anchors, and armored tank parts. The Brewster Company plant in Shreve-

¹⁹Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, June 13, 1940. Microfilm copy, Microform Division, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

²⁰Ibid., March 13, 15, May 8, November 6, December 11, 1941.
port produced 250-pound aerial bomb bodies. This plant received raw steel tubing which it cut, shaped, finished, and then shipped to shell loading plants. 21

Northwest Louisiana also could load the shell casings it produced. This step in bomb production, however, was completed not in Shreveport, but at the shell-loading plant located in Minden, approximately twenty miles east of Shreveport in Webster Parish. The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce began lobbying the Army Ordnance Department in 1940 for a munitions plant for the Shreveport area. The War Department informed them in February, 1941, that the requirements for munitions plants were relatively rigid: sites of at least 6,000 acres, without any pipelines or oil or mineral leases, served by two railroads and by highways, and preferably within twenty-five miles of a town of 100,000 population. Northwest Louisiana could supply these requirements. (The 1940 Census found just over 110,000 people in metropolitan Shreveport) and on April 1, 1941 the War Department notified local officials that it planned to locate the ordnance plant at Minden, provided it could obtain sufficient land. The proposed site was then held by 105 private landowners, but by September the War Department had acquired sufficient acreage to begin clearing the site of agricultural crops, and auctions in November and December disposed of some

600 dwellings and farm buildings. Costs of constructing the Minden Shell-Loading Plant ran higher than original estimates, because contractors found that the site was too flat to drain properly without an extensive network of ditches and canals. In addition, they found the water table too high and the soil too unstable for construction without larger and heavier foundations than originally thought necessary, thus adding to the total cost.

Nevertheless, by 1943 the massive plant encompassed 16,025 acres, and included 430 buildings, one hundred miles of road, forty-eight miles of railroad, sixty miles of fence, eleven deep water wells, fifteen miles of sewer line, fifteen miles of gas line, and forty-one miles of water mains. War Department officials demanded that munitions plants be diffuse for two reasons: to provide protection against sabotage bombings and against accidental explosions. If one building exploded, the rest of the plant could continue production.

War prosperity came to southwest Louisiana at Lake Charles, which became an important petro-chemical center. Lake Charles' industrial growth began even before the war. The city and Calcasieu parish in 1921 began constructing a ship channel to connect Lake Charles with the Gulf of Mexico. By 1926, the ship channel and a newly-completed port facility provided a new outlet to the Gulf. By 1931, tonnage at

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22Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, August 8, 1940, February 13, 1941, July 10, 1941; Shreveport Times, August 11, 1943; Allen J. Ellender to various radio stations in Shreveport, June 5, 1941; Frank Wurzlow to various radio stations in Shreveport, July 11, 1941, Ellender Collection.

23Shreveport Times, August 11, 1943.

24Ibid.
the port exceeded 1,000,000 tons per year. (Senator Allen Ellender intensely lobbied to convince the War Shipping Administration to use the port of Lake Charles for more rice shipments during the war, especially those to Cuba and Puerto Rico, but met with little success.)

Industrial development in Lake Charles began in 1933 when the Mathieson Alkali Works invested $7,500,000 in a new plant, followed by Swift Packing Company with a $2,500,000 plant. Calcasieu Parish also produced some 12,000,000 barrels of oil annually by 1939 and about 25,000,000 more barrels moved through the port. The availability of petroleum led Continental Oil Company in 1939 to construct a vast $5,000,000 complex including an oil refinery, a tank farm, and a pipeline to transport crude oil from large oil fields in the vicinity.

The war, however, brought an intensified development of the Lake Charles petro-chemical industry. Mathieson enlarged the alkali plant in 1941. Cities Service Company built a high octane gasoline refinery that by 1945 produced 25,000 barrels per day. Firestone Rubber Company produced synthetic rubber at a plant financed by the Defense Plant Corporation, which also financed a butadiene plant, an ammonia plant,

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25 Kathleen Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World," Louisiana Heritage, Volume II, Number III, pp. 13-14; E. S. Land to Allen J. Ellender, May 29, 1943, July 2, 1943; T. A. Smith to Alva P. Frith, July 8, 1943; Frith to Ellender, July 27, 1943; Ellender to Frith, August 5, 1943, Ellender Collection. Ellender eventually had to report that the WSA would not promise to ship the entire 1943 Louisiana rice crop through the port of Lake Charles, as its boosters wanted.

and a magnesium plant in Lake Charles. 27

While much of Louisiana's economic development centered in cities, other areas of the state also shared in the wartime prosperity. Louisiana's oil and gas industry had experienced dramatic growth during the latter half of the 1930s. The value of Louisiana petroleum products doubled between 1935 and 1938, reaching slightly above $130,000,000 in the latter year, according to official figures. Louisiana oil operators, spurred on by the national defense effort, drilled some 202 holes in 1941, and discovered twenty-nine new fields. These new discoveries brought the state's known reserves officially to 925,972,000 barrels (third in the nation). Again according to official figures, Louisiana's production of crude oil rose from 214,888,995 barrels in 1940-41 to 275,709,168 barrels in 1944-45. Lack of labor and steel for oil field production caused the number of wells drilled in Louisiana during 1942 to drop to 137. By 1943, however, Louisiana's approximately 7,300 wells spread over forty-six parishes produced eight per cent of the entire United States output. 28


Oil and gas contributed more severance tax revenue to the state than any other natural resource. State Collector of Revenue Roland P. Cocreham reported that during the 1944 fiscal year, Louisiana collected a total of $16,015,733 in severance taxes from all sources. (Oil tax contributed $13,344,804 of the total, while gas contributed $1,661,998.) Sulphur, produced principally in the marshy Mississippi Delta of Plaquemines Parish and used in producing steel for armored plate, gasoline, and synthetic rubber, contributed $715,463 in severance taxes. (Timber was the only other natural resource to produce more than $100,000 in revenue — $257,771 — all other resources together produced only $135,092.)

While many parts of Louisiana shared in the wartime industrial development, New Orleans remained the state's most industrialized area, producing a myriad of goods ranging from Liberty Ships to tents. Louisiana Shipyards, Delta Shipbuilding Company, and Higgins Industries all built ships in New Orleans. Delta Shipbuilding, for example, launched its first Liberty Ship in May, 1942, after working on it 242 days. Improvements in construction techniques cut the time necessary for Delta to build a Liberty Ship to slightly over sixty-seven days.

1944-1945, p. 15. L. M. Moffit, secretary-treasurer of the Triangle Drilling Company of Shreveport, testified to this subcommittee that many independent operators dared not start drilling a well without having all the necessary casing already on the site. Otherwise, he might drill to a productive sand and then find a delay in bringing the well into production.

by January, 1943, when the yard launched its thirty-first ship (the "Leonidas Polk").

In addition, Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation of Downey, California also operated an aircraft production plant in New Orleans, building, among others, the Consolidated Model 31, a "flying boat" ordered by the Navy, powered by two 1,000 horsepower Wright engines and capable of cruising at 160 miles per hour at high altitudes.

New Orleans also had a number of smaller manufacturing plants that produced an astonishing array of war materiel. Rheem Manufacturing Company produced 105-millimeter shell casings; the Neptune Boat and Davit Company built lifeboats; Edwin H. Blum manufactured 161,000 pairs of trousers in 1944; the Federal Fiber Mills produced manila and sisal rope (the only such plant in the South, which, by 1944, had produced enough rope to encircle the globe); the Snider Poster Process Company produced decals which speeded production of airplanes by eliminating handlettering of instrument panels; the National Blow Pipe and Manufacturing Company produced metal ammunition shipping containers; the Crescent Bed Company built berths for Liberty Ships; the International Lubricant Corporation produced specialized greases ordered by the armed forces to keep their equipment running when exposed to sea water or extremes in temperatures. Other plants

30 Morning Advocate, April 8, 1941; Item, July 18, 1941; Times-Picayune, March 28, 1942, January 8, 1943.

31 States, July 11, 1943, October 5, 1944; Item, July 11, 1943.

32 Morning Advocate, August 12, 1941, December 31, 1944; States, January 19, 1945; Allen J. Ellender and John H. Overton to Robert S. Maestrí, September 13, 1941, Ellender Collection.
produced other goods, but listing them would only belabor the point — New Orleans became a prominent war-materiel production center.

New Orleans' most dominant war industry, however, was the manufacturing empire of Andrew Jackson Higgins. Higgins' business career began in his hometown of Columbus, Nebraska at age nine when he began a lawn care service. He migrated south, first to Mobile, Alabama in 1906, and on to New Orleans in 1910, where he entered the lumber business. His lumber business crashed in the post-war slump in 1922, but Higgins recouped his fortunes as a boatbuilder. During 1930 and 1931, his boats set New Orleans to St. Louis speed records on the Mississippi River (seventy-two hours, four minutes). In his work designing racing boats, Higgins evolved a design which allowed his boats to jump logs and small spits of land without injuring vital components. From that discovery, he developed the Higgins Eureka, a thirty-six-foot motorboat that could rush onto a beach without damage. Oil companies quickly realized the usefulness of Higgins' design, and used his boats in their oil exploration forays into the marshes of Louisiana, the Amazon Basin, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East. By 1935, Higgins was selling $87,000 worth of boats per year. His association with the armed forces began in 1936, when the Army ordered two river steamer inspection boats. The United States Navy ordered its first landing boats from him in 1938, and Higgins produced Eurekas for the United States, Britain, Finland, and Holland. By 1941 he was selling landing boats, ramp-type welded steel tank lighters, and patrol
torpedo (PT) boats worth $1,000,000 per month.\(^{33}\)

Higgins, like the more famous Henry J. Kaiser, used radical new production methods to build ships quickly. In September, 1940, his company employed 400 production workers. By 1941, Higgins employed 1,800 workers and spent $700,000 monthly for Louisiana labor and products. By 1944, the number of Higgins employees had grown to some 20,000, blacks as well as whites, turning out twenty-five landing craft and PT boats daily in seven different manufacturing units in New Orleans. The company eventually sold more than 14,000 combat boats of all types to the Allies. In September, 1943, the United States Navy reported that 12,964 of its 14,072 vessels were either designed or built by Andrew Jackson Higgins.\(^{34}\)

Higgins, however, shared in the misfortune common among American manufacturers during the war years. He planned to operate a vast new shipyard built by the federal government in which he proposed abandoning conventional shipways containing only one keel at a time and substituting larger ways accommodating several keels at once. A keel would


be placed on rollers at the head of the way and eased toward the water's edge. Workers would construct the ship as the keel slid gradually toward the water. The United States Maritime Commission in 1942, however, canceled its order for 200 Liberty Ships which Higgins planned to construct at this yard because of the shortage of steel necessary to construct both the ways and the ships.  

Higgins criticized the "dollar-a-year" men who ordered cancellation of his Liberty Ship contract for the Michaud plant, but despite a rare agreement between Governor Jones and New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri, both of whom peppered Washington with appeals to restore the Liberty Ship contract, the Maritime Commission chose to cancel the order permanently. Higgins then cast about for another war product to build at his huge Michaud plant and settled upon airplanes. He first hoped to build the Curtiss C-76 Caravan all wood-troop transport, but the Army canceled its plans for wooden airplanes. A complex series of negotiations with federal defense officials brought Higgins Aircraft, Incorporated, a contract in 1942 for 1,200 Curtiss C-46 Commandos, an all-metal transport designed to carry paratroopers, light artillery, or freight. The plant had turned out only one of these

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airplanes when the Army canceled the C-46 contract in August, 1944. Higgins then expanded production in the Michaud plant of a newly-designed rescue boat sturdy enough to be dropped by parachute from high altitudes to airplane crash or shipwreck survivors. The Michaud plant also produced parts for the Atomic bomb designed by the Manhattan Project.  

Higgins' difficulty in obtaining and keeping war production contracts demonstrated the vagaries of fortune experienced by businessmen who turned most of their industrial production to war contracts and thus depended upon the continuing need of the federal government for specialized products which changes in the military situation might make obsolete overnight. Even beyond that difficulty lay the problem of obtaining sufficient workers to produce the goods, and the question of labor union representation for those workers.

The increased industrialization of Louisiana created labor union conflicts within the state. Louisiana labor troubles symbolized the larger labor problem which existed in the United States during the war. The labor union movement was then still split into the rival American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Each group capitalized on the favorable union attitude of the federal government and the shortage of manpower, and each increased membership in the South. Unions made these gains despite a growing

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36 Morning Advocate, August 4, October 31, 1942; Town Talk, August 12, 17, 1944; Congressional Record 78 Congress 2 Session Appendix Volume 90 Part 10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. A3541-A3545; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?", p. 12; Hoeling, Home Front USA, p. 53.

antunion sentiment which increasingly equated unionism with dangerous
cradicalism. Many Louisianians shared this sentiment, even though
Louisiana remained more friendly to unionism than other southern states.
By the summer of 1943, for example, the AFL reported its organization
of the Aluminum Company of America, DuPont Chemical, Copolymer, and
Bell Telephone workers in Baton Rouge. In New Orleans, union con­
tracts protected metal trades workers in marine repair shops, the
Delta Shipyards, and Higgins Industries, as well as about 500 office
workers and an unspecified number of teamsters, who were members of
new locals of their unions. In addition, the Louisiana legislature
refused to pass anti-labor legislation (primarily "right to work" laws
and other measures limited strikes or regulating union internal af­
airs), while other southern states including Texas, Arkansas, Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi enacted such laws as part of a conservative
38

The United States labor union movement sought to preserve during
the wartime emergency the improvements it had obtained for workers
since the New Deal came to power in 1933. The Roosevelt Administration
wanted peace within the factories to ensure production of war materials
to meet the emergencies of the 1940s. In exchange for unions in
genral agreeing not to stage strikes detrimental to war production
(even though some walk-outs occurred), the unions obtained support of
"maintenance of membership" — a union could recruit enough new members
to keep its membership at pre-war levels — and protection of wages

from the effects of inflation — the "Little Steel" formula by which wages were pegged to the cost of living increase between January 1, 1942 and May 1, 1942. Nevertheless, major strikes occurred in the coal, steel, and railroad industries and caused severe criticism of "greedy" unions endangering the lives of American soldiers by not producing the maximum number of armaments the factories could turn out. Many Americans also resented the relatively heavy initiation fees they had to pay to join unions working on defense-related jobs. Union, therefore, lived an uneasy coexistence with individuals, newspapers, and officials ready to criticize their every perceived misstep and curtail their hard-won rights, if possible, at least for the duration of the war.

Despite a resolution passed on May 11, 1942 by the Louisiana State Federation of Labor urging all affiliated unions to adhere to a strict no-strike policy for the duration of the national emergency, some conservative Louisianians remained heavily critical of unionism. Unions in Louisiana suffered from the disrepute cast upon unionism in general by strikes elsewhere, and because of strikes which affected Louisiana directly.


Governor Jones noted the rising anti-union sentiment in the nation and state as early as April, 1941, and told the state American Federation of Labor convention in Baton Rouge that "I want you to keep your right to strike; I want you to share fully in all the profits of defense industries — but unless you keep first and primarily the confidence of the American people you stand in grave danger of losing all the things labor has won for itself in a bloody, uphill struggle over half a century." 42

Unions in Louisiana had much public sentiment to overcome. The Morning Advocate in March, 1941, derided "greedy professional labor leaders" who were "winning some battles in America for Mr. Hitler" by "sabotaging the national defense program." Later in the month, the newspaper railed against reports that construction jobs on the new airport being built north of the city were reserved for union members, and that only about one-half of the construction jobs at Camp Polk near Leesville were filled by Louisiana men because of union membership requirements. 43

The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution on December 11, 1941, which decried "unnecessary strikes delaying war preparation work" and called upon President Roosevelt, Congress, "and other such persons as may be in position of authority" to pass legislation outlawing strikes in industry essential to warfare during the

42 Sam Jones Address, April 7, 1941, James B. Aswell, Jr., and Family Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

43 Morning Advocate, March 23, 27, 1941.
emergency period.\textsuperscript{44}

A\textit{Times-Picayune} editorial of March 18, 1942, attacking labor unions elicited comments both favorable and unfavorable. Mrs. W. F. Russo reminded\textit{Times-Picayune} readers that her two sons in the armed forces "are on duty 24 hours a day and $21 a month is the miserable sum they get," while labor unions clamored for increased wages at home. Another reader wrote that the proposed "time-and-a-half" pay for overtime work would only be "the incentive for deliberate slow-downs which prevent the government from getting a fair output per worker at the established normal union wage scale," and observed that too strict observance of "business as usual" in the face of threats from Adolf Hitler "ruined France." Carl Mitchell of Bogalusa, a self-styled "working man," condemned "selfish, greedy groups of so-called labor leaders who are destroying the influence of labor by taking advantage of war to promote a labor dictatorship." Labor also found its defenders in this episode. Mrs. Bertha T. North of Algiers wrote that "your lying, filthy editorial . . . should be condemned by every decent working man and woman in the city of New Orleans . . ." and Henry Gegenheimer remarked that the newspaper attempted "through distortion of the facts, to assign to the laboring man the dubious role of profiteers, which said role seems to be the motive of the interests you seem to be serving."\textsuperscript{45}

Official union spokesmen in Louisiana also fought back. E. H.

\textsuperscript{44}Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, December 11, 1941.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Times-Picayune}, March 18, 20, 26, 1942.
(Lige) Williams, state AFL president, in April, 1942, described recent attacks on organized labor as "well thought out." They reminded him, he said, "of the well-known Hitler plan to divide and conquer." Also, Steve Quarles, president of the Central Trades and Labor Council of New Orleans, reminded Louisianians that union members had sons in the armed forces "just as are the sons of the manufacturers' association and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States ... and labor today is not asking for more than it has been asking in the past 60 years, so we are not profiteering in this crisis." In addition, labor union leaders in Winnfield reported to Representative A. Leonard Allen that they had denounced press attempts to stampede Louisiana officials into precipitate antiunion action: "There is no more loyal and patriotic group in America than organized labor."^46

Despite the encouraging words from labor leaders, Louisiana experienced several strikes during the war years. A small group of workers walked off their construction jobs at Camp Polk in April, 1941, because they thought that negotiations between union and government representatives were too slow. Their wildcat strike idled 400 other workers until international union officials ordered them back to work.47 Workers established a picket line (even though Industrial, Pipefitters, Welders, and Helpers Union [AFL] business agent R. O. Middleton insisted that "no strike was called") against Stone and Webster Construction Company, which was constructing the expansion of the Ethyl Gasoline

^46 States, April 6, 1942; Town Talk, April 3, 1942.

^47 Morning Advocate, April 5, 1941.
plant at Baton Rouge. The unions demanded a "closed shop" and that workers who refused to join the unions be discharged. The dispute ended some two weeks later when Paul A. Rasmussun, president of the Baton Rouge Building Trades Council, announced that the Ethyl plant would reopen as a "union shop" with Union members given preference in employment. Members of Local 260 United Construction Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) struck the Johns-Manville Products Corporation plant in Marrero, in August, 1941, and idled about 400 workers in a dispute concerning overtime pay. Louisiana Shipyards and Delta Shipbuilding Company both faced strikes in 1941 called to enforce demands for a closed shop. And garbage men and incinerator workers in New Orleans struck for higher wages during 1943.

As the war neared an end in 1945, Louisiana experienced even more strikes. Employees at the Cities Service refinery at Lake Charles struck in April, 1945, to protest recent rent increases in the privately-owned Maplewood housing project for war workers. The strike was crucial because the Firestone Tire and Rubber plant next door depended on the Cities Service refinery for a steady supply of butadine to use in its production of synthetic rubber. Subsequently, Governor Davis asked President Truman to take over and operate the refinery. Truman, in turn, ordered Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to seize the plant because interruption of its production would "unduly impede or delay" the war effort. The workers, however, agreed to return to their

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48 Ibid., Jun 4, 1941; States, June 20, 1941.

49 Times-Picayune, August 19, Septmeber 27, 30, 1941; States, September 15, 1943.
jobs the next day, but continued working for rent reductions in Maplewood and requested the Federal Housing Authority to take over the privately-owned property.\(^50\)

Louisiana was also directly affected by a strike against Greyhound Bus Lines which spread across five southeastern states in July, 1945 in support of five employees discharged on June 14, because they had refused to drive their assigned buses on May 1, when the union called a one-day walk-out to protest the War Labor Board ruling in a retroactive pay case. The Bus Drivers Union (AFL) claimed that the five drivers were arbitrarily fired, and called the July strike. The Eighth Regional War Labor Board in Dallas ordered the striking employees back to work on July 31, but about 950 employees of the Teche Greyhound Bus Lines serving Louisiana refused. The strike ended soon after that, however, when the WLB adamantly refused to consider the strikers' grievances until they returned to work.\(^51\)

Louisiana's two bitterest strikes occurred early and late in the war. The first of these was the 1941 strike called by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL) against Gulf States Utilities. The IBEW maintained that GSU refused to bargain collectively with it, and instead negotiated with the Gulf States Electric Employees' Association, a company union. GSU, however, maintained that the National Labor Relations Board on May 10 had ruled that "we find that the unit contended for by the brotherhood is inappropriate

\(^{50}\) Morning Advocate, April 13-14, 18-20, 1945; Town Talk, April 19-20, 1945.

\(^{51}\) Morning Advocate, July 30-31, 1945; Item, August 1, 3, 1945.
for purposes of collective bargaining and shall, therefore, grant the motions of the Company and the Association to dismiss the petition for investigation and certification of representatives filed by the Brotherhood," and that the IBEW now illegally tried to force its recognition as the collective bargaining agent despite the NLRB ruling.\textsuperscript{52}

The \textit{Morning Advocate} recognized that "The right to strike and the right to picket peacefully are well-established principles of law" but also commented that when massed picketers prevented other employees from working or threatened their personal safety, then "law enforcement officers should come on the scene."\textsuperscript{53} The public mood against the strikers became even more sour after a blackout left large sections of Baton Rouge and the surrounding area in darkness during the night of July 12-13. GSU officials maintained that the blackout resulted from the work of saboteurs who had drained the oil from a transformer at Oak Grove in Ascension Parish causing it to explode. The officials also announced that the saboteurs could be prosecuted under federal anti-sabotage acts which made the disruption of the flow of electricity to the national defense effort illegal. In addition to the power supplied to local defense industries, the lines at Oak Grove fed electricity into the Tennessee Valley Authority system, which, in turn, supplied power for the manufacture of aluminum. GSU offered $500 reward for information leading to arrest of the saboteurs and strongly implied that IBEW members had drained the oil from the Oak Grove

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Morning Advocate}, July 11, 1941.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, July 13, 1941.
The utility presented its side of the dispute in a series of advertisements published in Baton Rouge newspapers portraying the strikers as slackers who neglected the national defense: "The experienced men who are on strike are needed on the job so that Gulf States service to homes, stores, factories, and to industries so vital to our local and national welfare again will have behind it a full personnel adequate to take care of emergencies and growth."  

Howard Colvin, southern regional director of the Labor Department Conciliation Service, announced on July 20 that he had failed to settle the dispute between the IBEW and GSU, and the Defense Mediation Board assumed jurisdiction over the case while extra patrols of deputy sheriffs, city police, and state police guarded company property. The NLRB issued the last ruling in the dispute in February, 1942, when it held that GSU had not interfered with the right of its employees to organize and had not dominated the formation of the Gulf States Electric Service Employees' Association, which it held to be a labor union within the provision of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB also recommended dismissal of charges brought against GSU by the IBEW.  

The bitterest strike Louisiana experienced during the war years occurred at Higgins Industries as the war drew to a close during 1945.

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54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., July 18, 20, 1941.

56 Ibid., July 20, 22, 23, 1941, February 4, 1942.
In 1943, Andrew Higgins had portrayed a cozy relationship between labor and management at his New Orleans plants when he testified in Washington before the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (the Truman Committee). Higgins reported that his was an organized shop with his workers represented by the American Federation of Labor. Senator Truman inserted into the record a letter from Holt Ross of the AFL in which he maintained that "Labor has an abiding confidence in Mr. Higgins and the teamwork between him and his employees is remarkable." Higgins added that when grievances arose, he called his business managers and the union leaders together "in a soundproof room" and settled the problem. Labor union bands helped him to boost the workers' morale when larger rush orders for boats arrived by providing patriotic music for pep rallies he held to convince his employees to work harder and complete such assignments. ("When the tears are running down their eyes (sic), then I have the silver-tongued labor leader tell them what's expected of them. I ask them how they are going to do it, and we get along fine.") Unions helped keep absenteeism low at the Higgins plants by detailing members to find out why a person missed work.  

By late 1944, however, any good feelings built up between management and labor at the Higgins yards disappeared in acrimonious charges and countercharges further complicated by a CIO attempt to supplant the AFL as representative of a majority of Higgins workers. Higgins and the AFL had negotiated their closed shop agreement during August,  

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1940, and the agreement was scheduled to remain in force until September 13, 1945. The company, however, terminated the agreement on January 1, 1945, charging the AFL with a "substantial breach of contract." The dispute arose over a fundamental difference in labor philosophy: Higgins preferred to negotiate only one contract with all workers; the AFL sought to negotiate separate agreements for each trade. The dispute broke into the open over the so-called "Hot Ship" episode. The problem arose as the winter of 1944-45 approached. Great Lakes shipbuilders had about one hundred ships under construction and the delays threatened by the approaching winter weather caused the Navy to request that they be completed in ice-free areas. Higgins agreed to finish a portion of them and received one. His unions, however, declared this work to be ship repair or conversion, and asked for double wage rates for overtime work. The United States Maritime Commission refused to let Higgins pay the higher wage scale and the unions thereafter ordered their members not to work on the "Hot Ship." Between thirty and fifty anticipated ships were not sent to Higgins for completion, and on November 30, 1944, Higgins notified the unions that their contracted would be canceled January 1, 1945. The CIO muddied the situation even more when it filed for an election to determine which labor organization legitimately represented Higgins' workers.  

Trouble developed soon after the beginning of 1945. Higgins first

58 Item, November 1-2, 1945; Stuart S. Hellman to Allen J. Ellender, June 8, 1945; Stuart S. Hellman, Background of Present Dispute Between Higgins Industries Incorporated and the American Federation of Labor (n.p., n.d.), p. 3. Ellender Collection.
sought to close his facilities, but announced that he would keep his
plants in operation soon after the National Labor Relations Board
ordered a collective bargaining election to determine whether his
workers wanted to be represented by the AFL or the CIO.59

Labor trouble simmered at the Higgins plants throughout 1945.
In June, some 7,000 members of the Building Trades and Metal Trades
unions walked off their jobs, thus idling about 5,000 additional
workers, because Higgins had hired ex-servicemen to work at the plants
without requiring them to join unions. Morris Gottesman, treasurer of
Higgins Industries, subsequently announced that his office was pre­
paring a list of the names of striking workers eligible for the draft
which he would forward to General Raymond H. Fleming, Selective Service
Director in Louisiana. A union spokesman replied that union members
would "rather fight the Japs than be browbeaten by Higgins."60

The War Labor Board directed the strikers to return to work, but
the employees on June 5 refused to do so. The next day, John P. Frye,
international president of the Metal Trades Workers, directed the New
Orleans local to resume work at Higgins' plants pending appeal of the
War Labor Board approval of Higgins' cancellation of the original con­
tact. As long as the appeal was not settled, he maintained, the con­
tact remained in effect. Local union officials added their approval
of Frye's plea and recommended a fifteen-day return to work during
which they hoped to iron out their differences with Higgins. The

59Morning Advocate, January 6, 1945.
60States, June 4-5, 1945; Hellman, Background of Present Dispute, p. 3.
strikers, however, voted to remain off their jobs, and did not return to work until July 13, after union leaders informed them that Army and Navy officials had reported to them that the strike was depriving both branches of the armed service of badly-needed war equipment. The strikers formally announced that they were returning to work because of the armed service need for boats, not as a favor to Andrew Higgins. 61

Higgins, however, realized that cutbacks in war contracts caused by the winding down of the conflict gave him new leverage in the situation. He announced during the first week of June that some 1,500 of the strikers would not be needed at his City Park plant alone, even if they voted to return to work. Treasurer Gottesman announced on August 16 that the company planned a $25,000,000 reconversion from production of landing craft to production of boats for civilian use, but cancellation of Higgins Industries' remaining $20,000,000 in war contracts meant that about two-thirds of its workers would be laid off, many of them permanently. 62

His diminishing need for workers allowed Higgins to act more independently than he had in the past. In October, he walked out of a Washington meeting with members of the NLRB and the union, declaring that he could no longer work with the unions. A work stoppage occurred at his plants again on October 29. Union members claimed that Higgins had locked them out and declared an open shop. Higgins, meanwhile, said that he knew nothing of such action; that while he had not

61 States, June 6-7, 9, 12, 1945; Morning Advocate, June 6, 13, 1945.
62 Morning Advocate, August 16-17, 1945; Times-Picayune, August 17, 1945.
received official notification of a strike, union members were not on their jobs; and that the CIO unions (which then claimed to represent a majority of Higgins workers, even though the election had not yet been held) had called the walk-out because he had broken off contract negotiations with them. This action proved the last straw for Higgins, and he announced that he planned to close his three remaining New Orleans shipbuilding plants (at City Park, Industrial Canal, and Bayou St. John -- the Michaud plant was government-owned) -- sell them to the highest bidder, and subcontract his remaining obligations to other firms. He would devote his energy then, he said, "to [a] crusade to see that men who want work can get it without paying tribute to anybody."63

Jack Rawls, vice president of the New Orleans Metal Trades Council, called the closures a "red herring" and AFL spokesman William L. Donnels, joint chairman of the Metal Trades and the Building Trades Council, said that Higgins had "the mind and spirit of an old-time plantation overseer," but Higgins remained adamant that he would not negotiate with the unions under prevailing conditions. 64

Higgins hinted, however, that he did not completely discount continuing boat production in New Orleans under a different arrangement. Subsequently, he announced that he planned to liquidate all his holdings (Higgins Industries, Incorporated [the boat division], Higgins Aircraft, and Higgins Plastics) out of court, and carry on his

63 States, October 29, 1945; Item, November 1-2, 5, 1945; Morning Advocate, November 2-3, 1945.

64 Item, November 2, 1945; Morning Advocate, November 5, 1945.
operations with a new firm, Higgins, Incorporated, which would, in effect, take over and consolidate all his old holdings. Union leaders claimed that his action was only an attempt to break the strike by means of questionable legality, but police protected prospective employees who lined up for the jobs Higgins offered. He was no more successful with the new company than he had been with the old, and continued labor disputes eventually forced the closure of Higgins' boat-building empire.

While other areas of the state attracted industrial development along with its attendant problems, the central Louisiana area's economic development during the war rested on the training of United States Army troops. This training program included both a series of massive maneuvers which brought thousands of soldiers into the area and the construction of more permanent army posts in which inductees received their regular basic training.

Central Louisiana's association with training camps had begun during World War I. Late in 1917, workers completed Camp Beauregard just north of Alexandria as one of sixteen centers built to train National Guard units from Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. During the post-war demobilization, however, the Army sold most of Beauregard's 5,200 acres, but retained a small area to provide facilities for training Louisiana National Guard troops. Between the World Wars, Louisiana National Guard units used Beauregard as a summer training ground and target range. The camp also became a Citizens'

65 Morning Advocate, November 6, December 1, 1945, January 8, February 2, 1946; Item, November 10, 29, 29, 1945.
Military Training Camp. The CMTC nation-wide program began soon after World War I in response to the realization that American youth had been poorly prepared for military training when called upon in 1917. The CMTC program provided high school boys with thirty days experience in military organization, management, discipline, instruction, athletics, recreation, and social contacts during their summer vacation from school.66

Adolph Hitler's stunning conquests of his European neighbors brought a quickening of life at Camp Beauregard. The Army resumed work on a military air field just north of Beauregard in 1939, and during 1940 Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embrick of the United States Army Fourth Corps Area headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, selected the central Louisiana area as the site of Army training maneuvers. The 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers began in May and eventually involved more than 70,000 troops spread over Rapides, Natchitoches, Sabine, and Vernon Parishes. Foot soldiers cursed Louisiana's mud and heat, but the maneuver area pleased Army officials so well that they returned in the autumn of 1940, and in 1941, 1942, and 1943.67

The maneuvers brought Central Louisiana to the nation's attention, and brought thousands of Americans from other regions into Central Louisiana. Alexandria Mayor V. V. Lamkin reserved a block of parking

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67 Sanson, "Cenla During World War II," p. 18; "Extensive War Games in Louisiana," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1940, pp. 67-68; Town Talk, March 25, April 8, 1940.
spaces near the Visitor's Bureau at Hotel Bentley in the downtown area for exclusive use of the Army during the spring, 1940, maneuvers, and announced that because of the heavy traffic the city's traffic lights would continue to function until 12:00 midnight instead of going off at 10:00 P.M. as they had in the past. 68

The soldiers and the civilian population showed a keen interest in each other. Hundreds of local residents drove to Camp Beauregard to see the weekly progress of the tent city which rose at an astonishingly rapid rate. The Town Talk remarked that "The men in the ranks have taken to Alexandria as though it were their home — and have received a royal welcome." Never were they more welcome, of course, than the occasions when they stormed into the city on week-end leave with money to spend. A warm week-end in early May, 1940, brought such an influx. The Town Talk reported that "Every roadside establishment in the local area was crowded with troopers ... and while they were here there was a steady tinkle of cash drawers in every establishment where refreshments and sandwiches could be obtained." 69

The 1940 Maneuvers pumped large amounts of money into the Central Louisiana economy. The troops involved in the fall maneuvers, for example, received some $700,000 in pay and allowances, and needed approximately $130,000 in goods for subsistence. (The total cost of these maneuvers was $1,826,200 or some $87,000 per day.) 70 Not all

68 Town Talk, April 19, May 3, 9, 1940.
69 Ibid., May 6, 11, 1940.
70 Times-Picayune, August 17, 1940; Town Talk, August 21, 1940. The crush of business experienced by small firms is revealed by the sales of the Olympia Cafe in Alexandria on August 23, 1940: 1,448 sandwiches, 362 pies, and 362 dishes of potato salad. Town Talk, August
of the money found its way into the Central Louisiana economy, of course, but the amount that did whetted Central Louisiana’s appetite for more.

It had not long to wait. The 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers easily eclipsed the magnitude of the 1940 exercises. Army officials sought to make the maneuvers as close to real battlefield experience as possible. They formulated a background scenario in which the "nations" of Kotmk (Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, and Kentucky, with its capital at Houston), and Almat (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee, with its capital at Birmingham) squared off for battle as tensions between the two, increasingly tense since the end of a war between them in 1919, broke down over failure to secure Kotmk navigation rights on the Mississippi River.71

Preliminary maneuvers began in late May as the two "countries" began deploying their troops to strategic locations as the navigation conference between their Inland Waterways Commissions supposedly dragged on at Memphis. Troops arriving early were acclimated to battle noises by recordings of dive bombers, machine guns, cannon, and the wail of gas-warning sirens broadcast over loudspeakers placed throughout the Beauregard practice range. The first skirmish of the maneuvers occurred on June 17, but full "hostilities" broke out in August. As the starting date of the maneuvers neared, Central Louisiana

24, 1940.

71 Morning Advocate, August 3, 5-6, 1941. One has to wonder why Army planners obviously spent so much time constructing this elaborate plan, which included jeering slogans "Almat" troops could hurl at "Kotmk" troops about Kotmk Premier Kodunkis: "Kodunkis is the Bunkis"!
was inundated with people. During the latter part of July, between 300 and 400 Army vehicles passed through Alexandria each day. Soldiers arrived at the nearby camps by the thousands — about 5,000 on July 30; 10,000 on July 31; and 5,000 on August 1.  

The Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, the largest peace-time maneuvers in American history up to that time, were a landmark in the development of the United States Army's strategy and planning for war because they proved the usefulness of tanks in modern warfare. The Spring, 1940, maneuvers had demonstrated the capability of armored columns to overrun a defending army as General Joseph Stilwell commanded a "blitzkrieg" invasion of Louisiana just as Hitler's forces had used similar tactics to slice through the Low Countries and France. The 1941 maneuvers further revealed the weakness of conventional defense against armored might as General George S. Patton proved that tanks could operate effectively even in the marshes of Louisiana. In addition, the Army learned about reconnaissance and troop supply problems encountered in battlefield situations during the fall of 1941, and thus had several months to seek solutions to these problems before the United States entered the war.

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72 Morning Advocate, May 5, 9, 30, June 6, 10, 17, 1941; Town Talk, July 30-August 1, 1941.  
Just as the 1941 maneuvers were important to the development of an effective United States fighting machine, they were also important to the Louisiana economy. The Army payroll for the last part of August, for example, was the largest made up in Shreveport up to that time — approximately $900,000 issued through the Commercial National Bank. Alexandria merchants stocked their shelves in anticipation of extra-heavy business, and they were not disappointed. Most of them remained open on Labor Day, and troops on holiday crowded stores in the maneuver area, sometimes buying out a store's entire stock, especially tobacco, candy, and refreshments. Theaters and restaurants both experienced continuous lines for seats, and some smaller store owners reported selling as much in a day as they normally sold in a year. One study of the maneuvers estimates that they were worth about $25,000,000 to the state. 74

The Army descended upon Central Louisiana again in 1942 and 1943 for more maneuvers but these exercises were much less extensive than the massive 1941 maneuvers. Additional maneuvers planned for April, 1944 did not occur because the Army needed the units scheduled for participation in the maneuvers to bolster the forces then being readied for the cross-Channel invasion of Europe. 75

74 Viola Carruth, Caddo 1000, p. 173; Town Talk, August 29-September 1, 1941; G. Patrick Murray, "The Louisiana Maneuvers: Practice for War," Louisiana History, Spring, 1972, p. 123.

While the maneuvers contributed to the Louisiana economy through payrolls and purchase of supplies, they also contributed to problems that hampered transportation of people and goods in the maneuver area throughout the war. The Army recognized that its training exercises would damage roads and bridges not designed for heavy use and requested that the Louisiana Highway Commission station a representative in Alexandria to cooperate with them in road maintenance and repair. The average vehicular traffic in the maneuver area during 1941 rose to 95,023 vehicles per day (from 40,762 daily in 1940), an increase of 133 per cent over the previous year. Louisiana requested $1,407,150 from the Public Works Administration in August, 1941, for improvement of highway markings for nighttime driving during the maneuvers, and in December, 1941, presented the United States Public Roads Administration a bill for $2,014,689.30 to repair road damage in the maneuver area.\footnote{Town Talk, May 6, 1940, December 31, 1941; Morning Advocate, May 30, August 9, 1941; Shreveport Times, January 1, 1942.}

The state found, however, that it faced a great deal of difficulty with bureaucratic red tape, and labor and material shortages. Therefore, road damage within the maneuver area remained a problem. Many people had difficulty reaching their jobs at Camp Polk; adequate supplies failed to reach rural stores; school buses and mail carriers often failed to make their rounds; doctors sometimes failed to reach their patients; and farmers found it difficult to bring their produce to market. The Public Roads Administration started repair work on February 1, 1944, and comandeered some engineer troops to assist in...
grading and hauling, but only had $400,000 for its maintenance program.  

The maneuvers held in Louisiana brought thousands of troops, the attention of the nation, and the excitement of "war" to Louisiana, but the training camps constructed in the state contributed more steadily to the local economy. The complex of camps around Alexandria, called "the center of national defense activity in the state," began as the 1940 maneuvers ended, when Representative A. Leonard Allen and Governor Jones announced that the Army planned to take over Camp Beauregard from the Louisiana National Guard. Jones and Louisiana National Guard Commander Raymond H. Fleming had traveled to Washington in May, 1940 to propose to Army officials that they use Beauregard as a training facility for National Guard troops as soon as Congress passed the bill (then pending) calling Guard units into one year of active service. Congress passed the Guard bill on August 27, 1940, and work began almost immediately on Camp Beauregard.  

In September, the Army announced plans to construct two additional training camps in Central Louisiana, one near Tioga, just north of Alexandria (eventually named Camp Livingston), and one near Forest Hill, some eighteen miles south of Alexandria (eventually named Camp

77 J. H. Anderson to Allen J. Ellender, December 31, 1943; J. G. Christiansen to Ellender, February 29, 1944, General Richard Donovan to Ellender, March 9, 1944, Lois Whittaker to Ellender, May 29, 1944, Thomas McDonald to Ellender, September 28, 1944, Ellender Collection; Shreveport Times, January 1, 1942.

Claiborne). The need for still more training facilities led to plans announced in October to construct a large training camp for an armored contingent of about 10,000 troops near Leesville in Vernon Parish (eventually named Camp Polk) which became the largest armored force training camp in the United States. By April, 1941, over 32,000 troops were training in the camps around Alexandria. 79

These camps, plus the Alexandria (now England) Air Base, Barksdale Field near Shreveport, other air bases at Baton Rouge and New Orleans, and the Coast Guard base in New Orleans, provided both construction jobs and income from maintenance and service requirements. By October, 1940, some 8,000 workmen were employed constructing Camps Beauregard and Livingston. The number employed grew to a peak of 36,857 in January, 1941, before tapering off. In April, 1941, however, construction employees at these two camps plus Camps Claiborne and Polk numbered 80,000. It is impossible to determine exactly how many of these workers were residents of the area, but the United States House of Representatives found in 1941 that seventy-five per cent were nonresidents of Rapides Parish, even though Rapides Assessor Trent L. James had set up an employment headquarters at his office in the courthouse to secure work for unemployed citizens of Central Louisiana. The nonresident group included residents of other parishes and nonresidents of Louisiana brought in by construction companies or unions. The Louisiana State Employment Service, for example, had directed many

79 Morning Advocate, October 20-21, 1940; Item, November 18, 1940; Town Talk, December 7, 18, 1940, January 3, 11, 21, 1941, July 29, 1957; New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 22, 1943; Shreveport Times, August 31, 1943.
sugar workers into jobs at the camps. The workers were available for immediate placement at the end of the short 1940 harvest season, and needed the money because of the poor crop. Army camp construction, however, paid as much as $1 per hour for an eight hour day, six days per week, and many farm workers continued to hold these jobs rather than return to the uncertain income from farm labor. 80

General Fleming commented in August, 1940, that placement of the training camps in Louisiana would mean "the expenditure of millions of dollars more in Louisiana for the subsistence of men."

General Fleming proved to be correct. The Army estimated in November, 1940, that the costs of operating Camps Livingston and Claiborne would reach some $500,000 per day, and that they planned to use local suppliers for perishable and immediately expendable supplies ($12,000 per day for gasoline and $600 per day for stovewood, for example) whenever possible. Louisiana farmers also often found a ready market for their produce at the Army camps, even though they sometimes complained of Army purchasing procedures that seemed unnecessarily stringent or complex. 81


81 Town Talk, August 22, 1940; New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, Novem-
In summary, the war had a significant impact on the Louisiana economy. Most elementally, the war brought more people into the state. In addition, those people made more money and paid more taxes. The 1940 Census found 2,363,880 people in Louisiana, while 1950 found 2,683,516, an increase of 13.5 per cent. Louisiana's population growth occurred primarily in the urban industrial areas or the training camp areas. Greater New Orleans, for example, grew by 64,463 (to 559,000) individuals between 1940 and November, 1945; greater Shreveport grew by 17,775 (to 130,000) inhabitants during the same years, while Baton Rouge grew by 75,281 (to 110,000); Alexandria and Pineville by 28,756 (to 60,119); Lafayette by 5,790 (to 25,000)

This sharp increase in population strained the ability of many areas to provide housing and basic services. Fresh ground-water use increased ten per cent from 1940 to 1943 (to about 50,000,000 gallons per day), for example. Rental property in Alexandria became virtually

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unobtainable. By October, 1941, 693 Army personnel paid $31,497 in combined monthly rent in Alexandria; 8,437.25 in Pineville; $1,132.50 in Bunkie; and $2,059.50 at Glenmora (near Camp Claiborne). War workers moved into the Fournet War Housing Project in New Orleans even before New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated, could connect the electricity and gas. Alexandria's number of gas meters increased from 4,125 in 1941 to 6,142 in 1943. During the same period, the number of electricity meters increased from 6,900 to 8,672 and the number of water meters from 5,500 to 6,237. Renters in many areas around army camps in central and north Louisiana complained of unjust rent increases. A survey of rental rates in the Shreveport area in December, 1941, for example, found that rents had decreased slightly during 1939 and 1940, but had increased after September, 1941, as new workers and armed forces personnel began arriving in greater numbers and thus created unprecedented demand.83

This increased population resulted in more income and more taxes. The United States Department of Commerce reported in 1942 that incomes of people in Louisiana had broken their record 1929 levels in 1941. Combined income of Louisianans had been $863,000,000 in 1929, had fallen to 86,600,000 in 1940, and shot up to 1,028,000,000 in 1941. Louisiana received $7,655,654.30 from income taxes in 1941; $8,541,137.84 in 1942; $9,039,769.82 in 1943; $11,213,417.96 in 1944;

and $11,464,000 in 1945. Total state revenue rose from $96,830,000 in 1939 to $145,000,000 in 1945. In addition, bank deposits in Louisiana topped $1,000,000,000 for the first time in October, 1943.\footnote{Shreveport Times, July 20, 1942; Times-Picayune, October 16, 1943; Louisiana Revenue Bulletin, July 25, 1943, pp. 8-9; January 25, 1944, pp. 6-8; July 15, 1944, pp. 6-7; July, 1945, pp. 14-15; Financial Statistics of States: 1939 Louisiana Volume I Number 20 (Washington, D.C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1941), p. 1; State Government Finances in 1945: Louisiana Volume I (Washington, D.C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1945), p. 1. The relative prosperity of urban areas is demonstrated in the tax returns. In 1943, for example, St. Helena Parish (the lowest) had only 25 inhabitants who paid income tax (a total of $544.69), while Orleans Parish (the highest) had 34,290 inhabitants who paid a total of $1,775,508.63 income tax. The second-highest parish, Caddo, had 7,356 people who paid $485,168.03. Furthermore, Cameron, Red River, St. Helena, and West Carroll had no firms which paid corporate income tax, while Orleans had 705 and Caddo had 180. Louisiana Revenue Bulletin, March 25, 1944.}

Many Louisianians shared with other Americans a surplus of money and a scarcity of consumer goods. Therefore, bank deposits increased steadily throughout the war. Bank deposits increased by 7.7 per cent in 1940; 10.8 per cent in 1941; 33.5 per cent in 1942; 15.8 per cent in 1943; 21.4 per cent in 1944; and 21.9 per cent in 1945. Reappearance of consumer goods on the market in 1946 brought bank deposits down by 7.5 per cent from 1945. The steady increase in bank deposits, however, did not mean that Louisiana business suffered. Department store sales, for example, grew 12.6 per cent in 1940; 14.8 per cent in 1941; 14.6 per cent in 1942; 24.9 per cent in 1943; 15.6 per cent in 1944; and 11 per cent in 1945. (They spurted to 25.3 per cent growth in 1946.)\footnote{Louisiana Business Review, January, 1941, p. 16; January, 1942, p. 18; January, 1943, p. 18; January, 1944, p. 19; January, 1945, p. 19; January, 1946, p. 19; January, 1947, p. 19. The 1946 spurt may have also resulted from the introduction of Charga-Plate, a credit card acceptable at 12 area stores introduced in New Orleans late in 1945.}
Much of Louisiana's wartime prosperity, of course, stemmed directly from federal government expenditures. The state received $1,733,713,000 worth of war contracts issued between June 1, 1940 and October 1, 1944 (compared to some $205,000,000,000 issued throughout the United States). Some Louisianians, Governor Jones among them, hoped that the industrialization brought on by the war would result in a more balanced economy with less dependence on agriculture. The Louisiana Department of Commerce and Industry created a fifty-member Economic Development Committee to help attract businesses to Louisiana in the post-war period to provide jobs. Louisiana remained a rural state during the war, however. In 1945, for example, 192,836 people worked on farms, while in 1947, only 132,464 people worked in manufacturing in Louisiana.

A composite index of overall Louisiana business activity using the activity of the average month of the period 1937-1939 as 100, reveals that the overall index stood at 105.2 in 1940; 130.3 in 1941; 179.3 in 1942; 205.0 in 1943, and 210.4 in 1944. The years of World


87 Louisiana Business Review, January, 1942, p. 3; January, 1943, p. 3; January, 1944, p. 3; January, 1945, p. 3.
War II thus marked Louisiana's return from the economic doldrums of the Great Depression — a fundamental shift in which employment offices quit attempting to find a job for every applicant and instead frantically sought a worker for every job. And while the war did not completely industrialize Louisiana, it did set Louisiana's economy on the road to industrialization — a trend it shared with the rest of the South. Its further industrialization during the late 1940s and thereafter, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

88 Manpower Review, May, 1943, p. 16.
CHAPTER XI
LIFE IN WARTIME LOUISIANA

Military concerns and requirements intruded into Louisiana's society and culture during World War II. The conflict moved people to unfamiliar locales, rearranged relationships within families, curtailed freedoms generally enjoyed by American citizens, removed many consumer goods from store shelves, altered traditional holiday themes, demanded money and scrap, and helped set in motion civil rights movements which gathered momentum in the ensuing decades. World War II, in short, affected almost every aspect of life in Louisiana.

It was impossible to escape the war. Soon after the conflict began, the American Radio Relay League prohibited amateur shortwave radio operators from contacting anyone in the warring countries. Moreover, they were not to voice an opinion or lament the existence of the war when talking to citizens of neutral countries.¹

While such prohibitions affected few Louisianans, many more witnessed the Nazi invasion of Europe at movie theaters. Louisianans during the terrible spring of 1940 could choose among movie-houses offering "My Favorite Wife," starring Irene Dunn; "Gone With the Wind" ("shown here in its entirety, exactly as presented at Atlanta and Broadway premiers"), starring Clark Gable and Vivien Leigh; "Typhoon" (a "Tornado of Tropic Love! See tidal wave! See forest fire! See typhoon! RED LIPS . . . WHITE ARMS . . . BLACK PEARLS") starring Dorothy Lamour and Robert Preston; among others. The newsreels,

¹New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, October 1, 1939.
however, brought the war into Louisiana's visual consciousness: "GER­MAN BLITZKRIEG in Holland and Belgium"; "War Bulletin! Europe Aflame! Paramount newsreel flown from war zone gives first graphic evidence of chaos of 1940!"\(^2\)

While some Louisianians saw only the destruction the war caused in Europe, other glimpsed a deeper meaning in the chaos. The Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Baton Rouge offered "The Way Out of the present World Muddle" in 1940. The war was not the end of the world. Instead, "This is the Earth's Hour of Destiny . . . the solution of its age-long problems -- War, Disease, Poverty, Crime, Insecurity -- is at hand. The evidence is so clear that you will rejoice in the bright prospects of the future."\(^3\)

The war also spawned a change in clothing styles throughout the United States. Vests, cuffs, ruffles, and patch pockets disappeared to conserve cloth. The summer of 1940 also brought on a boom in red, white, and blue costume jewelry -- American flags, eagles, and stars.\(^4\)

Deeper changes also occurred in Louisiana society. Many debutantes in New Orleans in 1941 abandoned the usual round of parties for civilian defense activities, learning about air raid procedures, ambulance driving, and other skills useful in wartime society. New Orleans,

\(^2\)New Orleans States, January 25, 1940; New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 16, 22-23, 1940. The producers of "If I Had My Way" starring Bing Crosby, however, used a different tack: "Forget the Blitzkrieg! Come Laugh and Sing and Enjoy the Year's Hit Show!"

\(^3\)Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 27, 1940.

the state's premier "party town," found its social ranks thinned. Weddings and other less spectacular observances substituted for the glittering social events of other seasons. New Orleans held a Washington's Birthday dinner in February, 1942, for example, which attracted 449 people including Mrs. Claire Chenault. James A. Noe announced that proceeds from the dinner would be split evenly between a contribution to the Democratic National Committee to help erase its debt and a donation to the fund he had created to buy a bomber for General Chenault, a native Louisianian then in charge of American volunteers readying China's air defenses against Japanese attack.⁵

Providing entertainment for soldiers stationed in the state partially replaced normal means of recreation. Between 500 and 1,000 Shreveport girls agreed to become "military maids" and attend dances for soldiers on one or two Saturday nights per month. The Young Men's Business Club in New Orleans scheduled picnics, athletic contests, and seafood dinners for visiting soldiers. Baton Rouge provided block dances, private homes opened to soldiers for a meal, and the Elks Club and YMCA provided showers at a nominal five cents for soldiers traveling through the city. The Masons located a Masonic Service Center at Alexandria to provide stationery, stamps, magazines, newspapers, books, games, and puzzles, available to all soldiers. DeRidder received the first United Service Organization (USO) Center completed in the United States, in December, 1941. The one and one-half story white frame building provided an auditorium, showers, locker rooms, library, game

⁵States, December 18, 1941; Times-Picayune, January 30, February 24, 1942.
room, and kitchen for soldiers at nearby Camp Polk. Recreation facilities remained segregated, however, as did most of the rest of the society. Newspapers throughout the war reported activity schedules for the USO centers and separate schedules for the "Colored" USO centers, as they were known.\(^6\)

Louisianians shared with other Americans an interest in reading during the war. The Louisiana State Library loaned 1,300,000 books in 1941, and filled 78,000 additional requests for information. Technical books -- "how to" books of skills development, nutrition, the current world situation -- vied with books of inspiration, escape, and adventure for readers' attention. The most popular books at the East Baton Rouge Parish Library in March, 1945, were: Nonfiction -- Wendell Willkie's One World; Robert Scott's God Is My Co-Pilot; Sumner Welles' A Time For Decision; Walter Lippman's U. S. War Aims; Ernie Pyle's Brave Men and Here Is Your War; and Gordon S. Seagrave's Burma Surgeon.

Fiction -- Frances Parkinson Keyes' Crescent Carnival; Lloyd C. Douglas' The Robe; Somerset Maugham's The Razor's Edge; and Betty Smith's A Tree Grow in Brooklyn.\(^7\)

The war caused an increase in marriages as men "popped the question" either to avoid the draft (which usually proved futile) or to

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\(^6\)Morning Advocate, May 28, July 7, 12, August 3, 9, 1941; New Orleans Item, July 5-6, 1941; Town Talk, July 22, 26, December 1, 3, 1941; Lake Charles American Press, December 1, 1941; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 10, 1941, microfilm copy, Microform Division, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

\(^7\)States, June 3, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 10, 1942, March 4, 1945; Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph, p. 238.
marry just before leaving for an overseas assignment. The number of marriages drifted upward during 1940. In Orleans Parish, for example, marriages during the first quarter of the year ran behind those for 1939, then approximately equalled the 1939 level by mid-1940. Then Congress passed the Selective Service Act in August. In October, 581 couples married in New Orleans, up from 283 in October, 1939, and second only to June, 1920, when soldiers returning from World War I helped escalate the number of marriages to 628. Marriages in Rapides Parish more than trebled between 1939 and 1941, and especially increased after the army troops arrived in the area during the last quarter of 1940. In all of 1940, only 889 couples married in Rapides Parish. In 1941, however, 2,212 couples bought marriage licenses at the parish courthouse. The number of marriages continued climbing in 1942 (to 3,766), then tapered off in 1943 (3,736) and 1944 (2,693). Rapides Clerk of Court Julius F. Arial estimated that about one-third of the 1941 and 1942 licenses had been issued to out-of-town couples, and that about one-half of all licenses issued between 1940 and 1945 had been issued to couples at least one member of which was a native of central Louisiana. 8

The crime rate in Louisiana fluctuated during the war. Alexandria, with its concentration of army troops, in 1942 added twenty officers to its police force, which was augmented by one hundred military police. The city court collected fines totaling $16,845 in 1940 and

8 Sunday Item-Tribune, July 26, 1940; States, August 27, 1940; Item, November 1, 1940; Town Talk, December 2, 1941, January 2, July 1, 17, 1942, August 22, 1945.
$36,452 in 1941. The police made 4,746 arrests in 1940 and 5,963 in 1941. Over the state, the crimes of arson, burglary, confidence games, narcotics, and sexual offenses generally increased, while murder, manslaughter, assault, embezzlement, forgery, kidnapping, counterfeiting, and felonious assault generally decreased.\(^9\)

Officials of the federal Narcotics Bureau in New Orleans reported that supplies of illegal drugs in the city had dropped during the war, while prices had skyrocketed. As peacetime sources of these drugs — Japan, Japanese-mandate Pacific islands, and the Balkans — became inaccessible, drug users had to pay exorbitant prices for inferior Mexican drugs. Marijuana cigarettes, formerly available on the streets of New Orleans for the price of two for twenty-five cents, by 1945 sold for $1.50 each. A pack of marijuana cigarettes, which cost three dollars before the war, rose to fifteen dollars when available. The New Orleans community conducted an extensive anti-marijuana campaign during the spring of 1942. At that time, police officials suspected the existence of two marijuana cigarette factories and about one hundred street peddlers in the city. The street peddlers worked crowded street corners, barrooms, night clubs, and poolrooms. Customers approached a peddler and asked either "Where's the boy?" or "What's that you're holding?" as a code to indicate that they wanted marijuana. Police officials also reported that black users of marijuana outnumbered white users by about three to one, and that most users were men, primarily between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Heroin, once

\(^9\)Town Talk, January 7, September 13, 1941, February 5, 28, 1942; Times-Picayune, August 30, September 18, 23–26, 1941.
twenty-five to thirty per cent pure in the New Orleans trade and priced at twenty dollars per ounce, by 1945 was one per cent pure and cost $150 per ounce. The supply situation became so acute that some addicts forged prescriptions, broke into drugstores, or raided doctor's medical bags to obtain drugs, while others gave up and conquered their dependency. 10

Gambling, especially in New Orleans and its suburbs, continued throughout the war, despite periodic ineffectual police raids. The Smoke House Bar, the Blue Eagle Lottery Company, the Louisiana Daily Keeno Combination, were only a few of the gambling establishments raided by New Orleans police. Such raids typically drove gambling underground a few days until officials again looked the other way. 11

The presence of illegal activity in the state offended the sensibilities of several groups. The New Orleans Ministerial Union launched a massive crusade against gambling in 1944. In that same year, the East Baton Rouge Police Jury recognized "open and widespread gambling in the parish," and called on all law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction to enforce anti-gambling laws. Other groups deplored illegal activity, and attempted to use the war to reform American and Louisiana morals. The East Louisiana Baptist Association complained in October, 1941, that beer was available to soldiers even in camps located in "dry" parishes and wards, and that during the recent maneuvers "Government trucks were used and men in uniform doing the

10 States, January 24, 1945; Item, March 19-26, 1942.

11 Morning Advocate, September 5, 1944; Times-Picayune, September 18, 23-26, 1941.
delivering, and that protest by citizens was met with rough retort."
The Association protested "the action of the Army officials in deliver­ing our soldiers over to the tender mercies of the brewers, whose sole purpose is to exploit them for their pitiful army wages . . . "
The First Baptist Church of Ashland, Louisiana in 1942 protested the use of scarce sugar in the production of intoxicating liquors. The Women's Missionary Union of Zion Hill Baptist Church in Winnfield urged the prohibition of the sale of liquor and suppression of vice within specified zones around army camps, and industrial or other strategic areas. The Louisiana Moral and Civic Foundation ("representing and supported by 350,000 Protestant citizens of Louisiana") petitioned President Roosevelt to close "all night clubs and gambling halls in these United States . . . until one year after peace is declared . . . "
The Foundation held that such places were non-essential to the war effort, caused absenteeism, used supplies of gasoline and rubber, absorbed money in profit that people could otherwise use to buy War Bonds, and contributed to juvenile delinquency and the overall crime rate.12

Perhaps the most stringent suggestion for the suppression of supposed immoral activity came from the Winn Parish Baptist Association on November 16, 1942. The Association called on Congress for a law closing all establishments in the United States engaged in the

the manufacture, sale, or storage of alcoholic beverages; a law to place all "diseased" prostitutes in "concentration camps" and treat them as saboteurs and to conscript healthy prostitutes into war industry; a law to conscript all men with venereal disease in the United States, along with all criminals, and place them in a "foreign legion"; and a declaration of a period of prayer every night except Sunday at 9:00 P.M. throughout the country. United States Representative A. Leonard Allen dutifully introduced this petition, and it disappeared into the Military Affairs Committee.  

The war affected almost every aspect of life in Louisiana. Cities reduced garbage pick-ups, many stores stopped delivering packages, dairies reduced deliveries, and launderies no longer used bags to cover clothes after they were cleaned. State Highway Directory W. Prescott Foster and Superintendent of State Police Steve Alford warned Louisiana drivers, pedestrians, and boat operators in 1942 not to loiter around the state's bridges. The state posted armed guards to protect these vital links in the transportation system and "any motor vehicle driver, owner or operator of a boat, or pedestrian not observing the warning may be seriously injured or killed." Transportation systems struggled to maintain schedules in the crush of increased numbers of riders and the scarcity of replacement parts for buses. Traditional vacation trips virtually disappeared during the war because of gasoline and tire rationing and overcrowded public transportation. New Orleans

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beer drinkers found their beer bottled in quart bottles by the New Orleans Brewers' Association in order to save scarce metal bottle caps ("Let us serve you beer in quarts and split the serving with a friend," the Association urged). Sliced bread disappeared from store shelves in 1943 when the Office of Price Administration allowed bakers to stop slicing bread in order to offset an increase in wheat prices without raising bread prices. Unsliced bread caused many hardships among younger housewives unfamiliar with the task of slicing bread, and furthermore, many older housewives had donated their bread knives to scrap metal drives, confident that they had no more use for them. Unsliced bread lasted from January to March, 1943, when Food Administrator Claude R. Wickard announced that he would again allow bakeries to sell sliced bread because "the savings are not as much as we had expected."14

Insurance agents warned their clients in 1942 that normal homeowner's automobile, and property insurance would not cover damages resulting from military attack, and offered "as a patriotic war gesture" a new War Risk and Bombardment Policy. The policy had some quirky clauses. It covered, for example, loss of personal or real property resulting from enemy attack or from United States military defense, but did not cover loss caused by America's allies resisting an attack in one's neighborhood.15

14 Town Talk, March 23, 1942; States, April 2, June 11, 29, 1942; Item, June 8, 17, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 25, 1942, January 3, 28, March 9, 1943, February 27, 1944.

15 Item, June 9, 1942.
Despite a widespread feeling throughout the United States and Louisiana that Americans were not sufficiently patriotic early in the war, Louisianians joined enthusiastically in various patriotic gestures. The Town Talk suggested in May, 1942, "Let's Have Some Hoop-La:"

One thing missing in this war is the good old hoop-la that gets under the toughest hide, brings one's heart up into his throat, and turns humdrum mechanics and prosaic clerks into dashing heroes.

We need the firecracker enthusiasm of 1917 and 1918. We need flag waving, troops marching, one-minute speakers. We need war songs that will spring to our lips as spontaneously as "[It's A Long Way to] Tipperary" and "Over There" did a quarter of a century ago.

Let's have some songs, some slogans, some cheer-leaders, some flag-waving, some name-calling, some enthusiasm, something to let the ten millions who are going to be in uniform know that we're with them, not away behind.16

Town Talk editorial writers need not have worried. Louisianians responded to the patriotic tenor of wartime life, even though their initial enthusiasm for scrap and bond drives waned during the later war years. Paul Maloney, Federal Revenue Collector in New Orleans, even noticed in 1941 and 1942 a change of attitude on the part of people paying their income taxes. About 200 Louisianians in 1941 made voluntary tax contributions ranging from $1.50 to $1,000. The same feeling persisted into 1942. One individual return in that year included an extra $20 and a note: "I felt I owed something more than $3 to a government that's doing so much for me, and also upholding freedom in the world." One man came to Maloney's office and handed a

16 Town Talk, May 6, 1942.

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deputy collector $5, remarking "I expect a Jap for every dollar. I
guess they're worth a dollar each dead..." Crowds waiting to pay
taxes, silent and sullen in previous years, now talked openly of Hitler
and the Japanese and expressed a militaristic outlook: "I want my
money used to kill a regiment," for example.17

Many Louisianians left on the home front felt that they could
contribute most directly to the war effort by their unstinting support
for scrap collection and war bond and stamp sales rallies. These
activities brought the war home to many people, and gave them a purpose
and a place in the war effort. They may have been unable because of
age, health, or sex to fight against Germany and Japan on the battle­
field, but they could help supply scrap to be recycled into war
materiel, or provide the money necessary to buy new supplies.

The collection drives began in Louisiana early in 1941, primarily
to aid Britain and France. The local "Bundles for Britain" chapter in
Baton Rouge collected money and merchandise, and made hospital gowns
for shipment overseas. Shreveport patriotic societies began collec­
ting old automobile license plates as a source of scrap metal for ship­
ment to England. By March 1, 1941 (some two months after they began),
Louisiana had collected about eighteen tons of old license plates.
Students at John McDonogh High School in New Orleans organized a
British War Relief Club in March, 1941, which collected old clothes,
wool, silk, and cotton for quilts and air-raid covers, and raised money
for British Relief. (After Pearl Harbor, this organization became the

17 Morning Advocate, March 19, 1941; Times-Picayune, February 29, 1942;
Item, March 12, 1942.
War Relief Club and widened its scope to "all countries helping to pre-
serve democracy."\(^1\)

Scrap drives for domestic use began before American involvement
in the war, with the aluminum scrap drive during the summer of 1941.
The Item predicted accurately that the aluminum drive "will be small
training for larger things later." Louisiana threw itself into this
first of the nationwide scrap drives. Mayor Robert Maestri's Aluminum
Committee met with principals of forty-five black schools in New Or-
leans to ensure participation by black schoolchildren (some 25,000 volun-
teeered). The New Orleans posts of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and
United Spanish War Veterans staged a parade to begin the aluminum
drive in the business sections of the city. Xavier University held a
bazaar and charged one piece of aluminum per person as admission.
Members of Rapides Parish 4-H clubs collected scrap. (4-H club agent
B. W. Baker challenged them to "Let's see what we can find for the
cause of democracy and the defeat of the powers that are trying to
destroy democracy." ) Boy Scouts in Metairie, Pineville, Baton Rouge,
and other areas served as collection agents. Edmund D. Davis, execu-
tive director of Louisiana's National Defense Council, reported in
September that Louisiana had contributed 132,090 pounds of aluminum
to the drive. New Orleans led the list with 53,000 pounds, followed
by Shreveport with 20,306 pounds, which in turn was followed closely
by Baton Rouge with 16,540 pounds, Alexandria with 16,407 pounds, and

\(^1\) Morning Advocate, January 7, March 1, June 10, 1941; Town Talk, Janu-
ary 13, 1941; "The War Relief Club of the John McDonogh High School,"
Lafayette with 16,102 pounds.\textsuperscript{19}

Utilization of material previously thought worthless, however, began in earnest after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent United States entry into the war. Governor Jones appointed Oakdale businessman Parrish Fuller to head the state's "Salvage for Victory" campaign in February, 1942, and Louisiana was soon rummaging through attics, barnyards, and back lots for waste paper, rags, metal, and articles made of natural rubber to recycle for use in the war effort. Housewives began saving waste cooking fats in the summer of 1942, after the government asked for them because they could be used to produce glycerin for explosives.\textsuperscript{20}

Louisiana organized itself for participation in the massive nationwide scrap drive held during the autumn of 1942. Fuller's office cooperated with parish school systems to enlist schoolchildren. Teachers and school administrators explained carefully to the children the items they were to collect, and assigned each child a specific section of the community to canvass, held poster and slogan contests in each school to focus attention on the campaign, and integrated the scrap drive into English classes by directing each student to write three letters in which they expressed in their own words the purposes of the drive and its uses in the war. Students then hand-delivered the letters to their parents, and to the people living on either side of them. Local schools offered War Stamp prizes to the student who

\textsuperscript{19} Item, July 3, 1941; Sunday Item-Tribune, July 13, 1941; States, July 19, 1941; Town Talk, July 21, September 21, 1941; Morning Advocate, July 22, 25, 1941.

\textsuperscript{20} Morning Advocate, February 27, 1942; Town Talk, July 17, 1942.
collected the most scrap each week, and many schools also granted "military rank" to students based on the amount of salvageable material collected: any scrap earned the rank of "private;" ten pounds brought the rank "private first class;" twenty pounds equaled "corporal;" thirty pounds equaled "sergeant;" forty pounds equaled "top sergeant;" fifty pounds equaled "2nd lieutenant;" and seventy-five pounds equaled "1st lieutenant."  

In addition, Louisiana's newspapers sponsored an intensive house-to-house search for scrap metal throughout the state on October 5, underwrote the expenses of the campaign, and provided cash prizes for the most scrap collected in certain geographical areas. The scrap metal drive turned up an odd assortment of objects. Shreveport mayor Sam Caldwell donated the city's old firebell to the newspaper scrap metal drive. O. P. Oglivie, publisher of the Coushatta Citizen, donated a complete press retired from service in 1935 and standing useless since then. The 1942 scrap metal drive also uncovered old steamboat paddlewheels, World War I helmets and bomb casings, Civil War cannonballs, cooking pots and swords, abandoned cars and appliances, all of which went to provide metal to the war effort. In addition, Baton Rougeans contributed brass, nickel, silver, and copper for war industries to a "Victory Key Kan" drive conducted independently of the newspaper scrap metal drive during the autumn of 1942.

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21 Parrish Fuller, "Outline of Overall Plan For Enlisting School Children In The Collection Of Scrap Iron, Rags, Rubber, Etc.," Louisiana Schools, September, 1942, pp. 10-11, 30; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 23, 1942, H. S. Weigel Family Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Weigel Collection).

22 Shreveport Times, September 19, October 5-6, 1942; Morning Advocate,
The *Shreveport Times* commented of the concerted effort to collect scrap that "This isn't just another drive. It's a do-or-die drive and it's the boys in uniform — our sons and our neighbor's son who die if we don't do." This concept of the importance of the drive caused an extreme episode in Baton Rouge suggestive of surveillance methods used in totalitarian countries. The *Morning Advocate* on October 6 published a "Kibitzer's Koupon" to be clipped out by anyone knowing of uncollected scrap and mailed to the local scrap drive chairman:

> I'm no snooper, but I think that somebody ought to know about the scrap I have seen at the following location: ______________________

> I hope somebody will call at this location and get this cleaned up before the scrap drive is over.

> Yours for Victory  
> (No Signature Required)

Louisianians responded so well to the scrap drive that, ironically, collectors ran out of space to store it until it could be used.²³

Collection drives continued throughout the war. Alexandria's abandoned street car rails fell victim to the war in 1943, and the D-Day invasion of France spurred an increase of blood donations to the Red Cross for use by the armed services at the collection center in New Orleans. By 1944, however, most scrap drives lagged behind projected goals. The *States* noted in July that from June 27 until July 18, October 4, 1942.

²³*Shreveport Times*, October 6, 1942; *Morning Advocate*, October 6, 11, 1942.
New Orleans had collected only about two ounces of waste paper per person. The Morning Advocate reported in August that previously unused tin cans could now be "detinned" at a new plant in Birmingham, Alabama, and urged people to salvage them. By the end of the month, however, Baton Rougeans had collected only enough tin cans to fill about one-third of one boxcar.24

Excess patriotic zeal remaining after the scrap drives could be directed into war stamp and bond sales. The federal government sold war stamps and bonds in seven issues heralded with much fanfare to help meet the enormous economic burden of the war. The first series of stamps and bonds appeared in 1941, and were dubbed "defense" stamps and bonds. Louisiana entered into the spirit of stamp and bond sales just as it did the scrap drives. Members of the Alexandria Chamber of Commerce agreed to sell stamps in their stores to make them more available to the public. In addition, delivery boys for the Times-Picayune, States, Morning Advocate, and State Times delivered stamps to their customers. Students at Tulane University held a "Blackout Ball" in the school gymnasium and used the proceeds to buy defense stamps and bonds. (A "Blackout Ball" featured a one minute "lights out" every fifteen minutes.) During the months May to December, 1941, Louisianians purchased over $11,000,000 in savings bonds and $5,418,000 in stamps. (In comparison, Mississippi purchased $7,090,000

24 Town Talk, June 8, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 24, August 9, 31, 1944; States, July 26, 1944.
Louisianians continued buying war stamps and bonds during 1942, even before the first of the big war bond drives, in September. The Town Talk congratulated its readers for their continued orders for stamps and for asking for stamps in lieu of change when they made a purchase. The Morgan and Lindsey store in Amite created a "Defense Window" in June, 1942, displaying pictures of local residents in the armed services in an effort to boost bond sales. The Shreveport Retail Merchants' Association sold $601,615.85 in War Bonds in July. The total bond sales in Caddo Parish that month reached $1,489,000.

Each War Bond drive in Louisiana followed the same general pattern: numerous newspaper advertisements extolling the patriotic and economic virtues of War Stamps and Bonds; business, civic, and fraternal organization members manning booths or otherwise assisting in bond sales; visits by celebrities who entertained at rallies boosting war bond sales. The later bond drives often also included appearances by members of the armed forces demonstrating equipment purchased with bond sales, and programs in both black and white schools to encourage schoolchildren to purchase war stamps.

The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce urged its members to buy as many bonds as they could afford and give their time and energy to bond

25 Town Talk, September 10, 1941; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, November 23, 1941; States, November 26, 1941; Morning Advocate, January 18, February 21, 1942; Times-Picayune, December 12, 1941, February 8, 1942.

26 Town Talk, April 14, 1942; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, August 13, 1942; Merle Weigel to H. S. Wiegel, June 28, 1942, Weigel Collection.
drives. The Louisiana Councils of the Knights of Columbus added war bond sales to their varied war activities. Hollywood luminaries who came to Louisiana to sell bonds included Laraine Day and Andy Devine, who appeared at the Baton Rouge dinner which cost a $1,000 war bond to attend (The dinner raised $340,000); Fred Astaire, James Cagney, Lucille Ball, Judy Garland, Mickey Rooney, Betty Hutton, Greer Garson, and Harpo Marx, who attracted over 100,000 people to a "Cavalcade of Hollywood Stars" rally in New Orleans — each member of the audience had to present a receipt for a Third War Loan Drive Bond to gain admittance; and Robert Young, who appeared at a mock invasion rally in Baton Rouge.27

As the seemingly interminable war bond rallies continued, the federal government attempted to whip up patriotic fervor by enlisting soldiers to sell bonds. Some 600 soldiers "invaded" Canal Street in Infantry Day ceremonies to boost Fifth War Loan Bond sales (and incidentally to celebrate the anniversary of George Washington assuming command of the Continental Army during the Revolution). Richard W. Leche, Jr. described to his father a rally he had attended at New Orleans City Park Stadium in 1942: displays included jeeps, motorcycles, six-ton trucks, light trucks, and howitzers. Live demonstrations included flame throwers and tank destroyers. (A live demonstration of phosphorus grenades in New Orleans in 1945 resulted in 250

27 Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 8, 1943; Roger Baudier and Millard F. Everett, Anchor and Fleur-De-Lis Knights of Columbus in Louisiana 1902-1962 (New Orleans, Louisiana State Council, Knights of Columbus, 1965), pp. 351, 354; Morning Advocate, September 17, 26, 1942, June 13, 15, 1943; States, November 16, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 21, 1943.
spectators receiving burns when one grenade landed too close to them.)

Baton Rouge witnessed an "invasion" of the Louisiana State University football stadium during the Fifth War Loan Drive. "The roar of cannon and the crackle of machine gun fire, punctuated by soaring, varicolored flares, gave the crowd a small sample of what infantrymen are enduring in their section of hell in France." The Seventh War Loan Drive brought a mock air attack on Harding Field north of the city. Alexandria witnessed an "invasion" by Higgins boats and Camp Livingston soldiers during the same drive. 28

Louisiana exceeded its quota in each of the War Loan Drives, beginning with the First Drive, in which it bought $11,778,000 in bonds compared to the quota of $8,250,000. The later bond sales slowed, especially the "E" small denomination bond for the individual investor. Editorial writers pushed the "E" bonds in the Fifth War Loan Drive by appeals to patriotism. The Morning Advocate reminded its readers to

> Just remember that each time you buy a bond you are furnishing a fighting man with the equipment he needs to win ... each time you buy a bond you destroy one more Nazi or one more Jap ... 

The States similarly reminded its readers that while firecrackers were outlawed for Fourth of July celebrations,

> Bombs for Berlin and Tokyo, and grenades and shells to shoot against the Nazis and Nippies are not. Your bond will buy a bomb that will

28 Item, June 15, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 16, 1944, May 31, June 18, 1945; Town Talk, June 13, 1945; Richard W. Leche, Jr. to Richard W. Leche, Sr., November 30, 1942, Richard W. Leche Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
destroy a German pillbox or a plane factory, depending on the size of your investment...29

State War Finance Committee Chairman Leon Tujacque announced in August, 1945, that Louisiana had exceeded its quota in each of the war loan drives by the following amounts:30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOND DRIVE</th>
<th>LOUISIANA QUOTA</th>
<th>LOUISIANA SALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$8,250,000</td>
<td>$11,778,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$50,515,000</td>
<td>$79,721,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$123,000,000</td>
<td>$139,750,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$96,000,000</td>
<td>$126,839,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$126,000,000</td>
<td>$165,995,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$110,000,000</td>
<td>$146,149,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$112,000,000</td>
<td>$177,882,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Louisianians also found that they could contribute to the war effort and fill time left empty by the disappearance of traditional leisure activities by working in Civilian Defense. Louisiana, with its miles of unpopulated coastline, war production facilities, and concentration of training camps, was considered a prime target for enemy infiltration. The warning network for such attack established by the United States Office of Civilian Defense depended on citizen volunteers "of known probity" scanning the skies for approaching enemy airplanes twenty-four hours a day throughout the United States. The

29 Town Talk, October 13, 1942; Item, June 13, 17, July 12, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 8, July 9, August 9, 1944, July 18, 1945, January 11, 1946; States, July 3, 7, August 1, 1944. Warden D. D. Bazer reported in September, 1943, that Angola prisoners had exceeded their quota in bond purchases (quota — $8,271; sales — $13,375) in the Third War Loan Drive, largely because of the dedicated efforts of the prison's inmate bond sales director - James Monroe Smith. Times-Picayune, September 19, 1943.

30 Item, August 20, 1945.
object of this system, of course, was to alert the Air Force of enemy attack at the earliest possible moment so it could intercept the invaders before they inflicted heavy damage on important installations. The effectiveness of this system rested on a close distribution of watchers so enemy aircraft could not slip through the network undetected. When that distribution was not possible because of the scarcity of population in coastal parishes in Louisiana, the Office of Civilian Defense depended on intracoastal bargemen, fishermen, trappers, and oystermen who knew the marshy coastal areas well. In other areas of the state -- New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, for example -- volunteers enrolled in the more common air warning system.

The National Defense Council of Louisiana chaired by Colonel L. Kemper Williams, spearheaded Civilian Defense in the state after its organizational meeting on July 23, 1940. In addition, Civilian Defense received support from fraternal and civic organizations and from the state government. The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce, for example, created a National Defense Committee to help develop a community-wide organized effort to prevent sabotage and "fifth column" activity. The

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32 Morning Advocate, August 1, 1941; Item, December 8, 12, 1941; Shreveport Times, December 10, 1941, February 5, March 12, 1942; Town Talk, February 6, 1942.
Hammond Veterans of Foreign Wars urged all former members of the World War I American Expeditionary Force to volunteer for civilian defense work at an open VFW meeting. In addition, the Louisiana State Police conducted a two-week workshop in blackout enforcement, anti-sabotage, and other police duties related to national defense for peace officers during 1940.33

By 1942, over 100,000 Louisianians had either received training or were receiving training in some phase of national defense work. Air raid warden was the most popular job, with 17,982 individuals enrolled, while aircraft spotter was in second place with 13,700. Other Civilian Defense jobs attracted fewer volunteers. In general, however, Louisiana's urban areas and their surrounding parishes organized more thoroughly for Civilian Defense than did the more rural areas.34 By 1942, for example, Caddo Parish boasted both a Shreveport Defense Council and a Caddo Parish Defense Council. Other parishes had one parish defense council, typically located in the largest town in the parish, usually open only part-time. In some rural parishes, especially in North Louisiana away from the coast, unless they contained a defense-related activity, Civilian Defense remained largely non-existent, even though many of these parishes cooperated fully in

33 States, July 23, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, January 17, 1941; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, July 11, 1940; Baudier and Everett, Anchor and Fleur-De-Lis, pp. 351-354; Roman Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law: Louisiana's State Police (Topeka, Kansas, Josten's Publications, 1980), p. 53.

bond and scrap drives.  

Louisiana, of course, did not experience an enemy invasion during the war. The closest combat to Louisiana's shores consisted of a series of offshore torpedo and depth charge incidents. For instance, at least three torpedoes struck and sank a United States cargo ship just as it entered the mouth of the Mississippi River south of New Orleans at 3:05 P.M., May 12, 1942, bringing warfare to the lower Mississippi for the first time since 1862. The ship lost 27 crew members killed and 14 seriously burned. In addition, a mysterious explosion (suspected to have resulted from a torpedo) had damaged a jetty earlier that same day. Two more ships sank on May 13 at an unspecified location in the Gulf of Mexico, and the survivors were brought to New Orleans and Key West, Florida for treatment.  

Even though the threat to American ships lessened after the 1942 rash of attacks, the sinkings brought the war dangerously close to home in Louisiana.  

Louisiana also experienced no major espionage episodes during the war, but attacks on ships in the nearby Gulf and the frightening rapidity with which Adolph Hitler's forces brought the horror of war to the civilian population of Europe left many Louisianians convinced


of the need for adequate preparation within the United States and sus- 
picious of any activity perceived to be friendly toward the Axis 
powers. Discovery of Nazi flags flying from flagpoles at Martin Behr- 
man High School and a playground in Algiers on May 24, 1940, led local 
citizens to form the "American Vigilance Committee of Algiers" to in- 
vestigate all un-American activity in the area. Baton Rouge was 
rocked in July, 1940, by the discovery of four men digging under a 
wire fence at the DuPont Ethyl plant. The men escaped, leaving behind 
four sticks of dynamite and a mystery. East Baton Rouge Sheriff 
Newman deBritten dispatched deputies and bloodhounds to the scene, but 
the men (spies? saboteurs? someone with a grudge against the company?) 
had disappeared into the night. This episode, occurring so close to 
a vital war plant — only one other plant in the country, DuPont's 
facility at Wilmington, Delaware produced the tetraethyl high-octane 
leaded fuel produced at the Baton Rouge plant — led State Police 
officials to redouble their security measures.

On at least two occasions, however, common occurrences caused a 
flurry of undeserved excitement because of wartime anxiety. An un- 
announced flight of four airplanes excited Baton Rouge on the night of 
September 9-10, 1940. People jammed telephone lines reporting the 
flight as the airplanes faded away into the night. After the excite- 
ment passed, sheriff's deputies learned that the airplanes were on 
night training maneuvers from Barksdale Air Force Base. In another 
instance, Alexandrians awakened on the morning of March 21, 1942, and

37 States, May 24, July 6, 1940; Item, July 6-8, 1940; Morning Advocate, 
July 6-9, 1940; Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law, p. 52.
found a fine, yellow dust covering the outdoors. Speculation that the powder might be a poison or residue of a poison gas sprayed by enemy airplanes during the night caused a flurry of concern until chemists from Camp Beauregard and Louisiana College confirmed in separate tests that the mysterious yellow powder was, in fact, normal spring pollen blown from trees in an especially powerful March wind.  

The perception that Louisiana was vulnerable to an enemy attack contributed to the development of Civilian Defense in the state. Alcee Legendre, coordinator of Civilian Defense in the New Orleans area, stated on December 9, 1941 that his office was already laying the groundwork for practice blackouts in the area. City attorneys in New Orleans discovered, however, that the city had no ordinances covering violations of blackout orders, so the city council had to pass a special blackout ordinance providing ninety days in jail and a $100 fine for anyone failing to comply with blackout orders. New Orleanians rushed to hardware stores to purchase flashlights and candles, thus quadrupling normal demand for these items, and also created a "run" on guns and ammunition in local gun stores. New Orleans newspapers on December 15 published a full-page instruction sheet prepared by the United States Office of Civilian Defense informing people what action to take during an air raid: 1. Keep Cool[!] 2. Stay Home 3. Put Out Lights 4. Lie Down 5. Stay Away From Windows (the instructions also included directions for handling any unexploded incendiary bombs that happened to fall near you: "Spray a fine mist of water [over it]."

38 Morning Advocate, September 10, 1940; Town Talk, March 21, 1942.
Streams or buckets of water will make it explode." The Orleans Parish School Board cancelled all night activities in the public schools to remove any possible interference with the blackouts.39

As the initial outburst of enthusiasm for Civilian Defense waned during 1942, some Louisianians maintained that many of their fellow citizens had not yet fully realized the importance of Civilian Defense in a war of such magnitude as World War II. The Shreveport Times commented early in 1942 that a "vital defense plant destroyed in a token air raid is just as completely destroyed as by any other type of attack . . ." while the Town Talk remarked "It is time to pinch ourselves, wake up, and decide we better [sic] dig a few trenches, build some bomb shelters, and do something -- anything -- to remind us that we are living in a dangerous age." The height of this attitude in Louisiana appeared in a Louisiana Municipal Review editorial entitled "America Needs to be Bombed," which maintained that Americans were too worried about high taxes, profits, and rationing of consumer goods, and not worried enough about winning the war. Governor Jones expressed much the same sentiment in a Shreveport speech: "We are still judging this war as being the same kind of war we had in 1917-1918. That war was a mere fist fight in a side street compared to this world-wide conflict."40

New Orleans held its first test blackout on the night of March

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39Times-Picayune, December 10, 15, 1941; Item, December 12, 18, 1941; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 14, 1941.

6-7, 1942. Legendre proclaimed the test "99% effective," but reporters in an airplane circling the city reported that some automobile headlights remained on, lights stayed on along the wharves, as did streetlights along the waterfront, that aircraft warning beacons atop the WWL radio transmitting tower, and the Mississippi River bridge navigation warning lights remained on, all of which clearly outlined highly vulnerable locations in the city. Baton Rouge followed with its first practice blackout on the night of March 31-April 1, and met with similar results, but this time officials ordered lights atop the state capitol, the Mississippi River bridge, and the WJBO radio tower to remain on. (Soon after, however, Manager of Executive Buildings Frank Grevemberg ordered the spotlight illuminating Huey Long's grave extinguished for the duration of the war.) The first statewide practice blackout did not occur until the night of February 5-6, 1943, almost fourteen months after the beginning of the war. 41

World War II intruded on daily life in Louisiana in other ways as well. Consumers faced shortages and rationing of many commodities to which they had become accustomed. The first shortage developed after the federal government announced its seizure of all raw silk supplies in the nation for the national defense program as Japanese expansion threatened normal supply areas in Asia. American women clogged department stores as they rushed to stock up on silk stockings, despite official assurances that a new duPont chemical plant would assure an adequate supply of substitute nylon hose. Hosiery, however,

41 Item, March 7, 1942; Morning Advocate, April 1, May 31, 1942; Times-Picayune, May 17, 1942; Town Talk, February 6, 1942.
continued to be a scarce item during the war.\textsuperscript{42}  
Automobile owners faced the twin trials of tire and gasoline rationing. Tire rationing began in January, 1942, in order to conserve supplies of natural, and later synthetic, rubber for use of the armed forces. Gasoline rationing followed in the spring of 1942 in order to conserve gasoline itself, and also to suppress needless use of tires by eliminating all but essential driving. Tire rationing provisions were stringent. Parish ration boards could not issue certificates authorizing an individual to buy a tire until inspection showed the old tire to be no longer safe at the speeds the individual would normally be expected to drive even if retreaded and recapped. Furthermore, a certificate did not guarantee a tire. Each parish received a monthly allotment of tires and people holding valid certificates often encountered great difficulty locating an available tire. Rapides Parish, for example, received an allotment of 42 passenger car tires and 143 truck and bus tires in January, 1942. Orleans Parish, with about 100,000 cars and trucks registered, received an allotment of 1,282 tires for the same month. Scarcity of tires led to theft. Citizens of Shreveport formed the Automobile Vigilante Society in March, 1942, to combat the increasing occurance of tire theft. New Orleanians reported 823 tires stolen between December, 1941, and August, 1942 (159 in July alone).\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42} Morning Advocate, August 5, 1941.

\textsuperscript{43} Town Talk, January 2, 1942; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 4, 1942; Item, March 3, 1942; States, August 10, 1942; L. E. Frazar and J. E. Brumfield to All Members of War Price and Rationing Boards State of Louisiana, June 22, 1943, Sam Jones to W. Scott Heywood, December 28, 1943, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter

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Gasoline and tire rationing caused various problems throughout the state. Workers sometimes faced great difficulty obtaining sufficient gasoline to drive to defense or other vital jobs and had to plan their trips carefully. Ration boards received instructions to urge compliance with the thirty-five mile-per-hour speed limit to conserve fuel and tires.  

Gasoline rationing in a state which produced as much oil as Louisiana seemed pointless to many people, including Governor Jones. Jones maintained that gasoline rationing would wreck the state's petroleum-based economy. The otherwise rebellious 1942 legislature agreed with the Governor, and sent President Roosevelt a resolution decrying the expected slump in oil and other business in the state. The Morning Advocate, however, adopted a positive attitude toward gasoline rationing. The United States needed to conserve its rubber supply, and moreover, "maybe the states will find some way to get along without depending on the motorist for such a large chunk of

44 W. Scott Heywood to Ray C. Martin, July 1, 1943, Heywood to Major B. A. Hardey, October 12, 1943, Heywood to To Whom It May Concern, December 30, 1943, F. J. Gimble, Charles A. Clark, and W. Scott Heywood to All Motorists, May, 1944, Jennings–Heywood Collection; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 3, 1942, November 15, 1942, Weigel Collection. The severe limitations placed on Louisiana motorists is revealed in the state's shipments of motor gasoline during November, 1943, when it shipped 44,796 barrels. Only 9,437 barrels of this total were shipped for local demand. Minutes of Natural Gas and Natural Gasoline Committee District 3 Records, Cline Room, Magale Library, Centenary College, Shreveport, Louisiana.
Louisianians also experienced either stringent rationing programs or shortages of food supplies. They lined up at local schools to register for sugar rationing books which entitled the individual to purchase a limited amount of sugar within a specific time period. Sugar coupon number one, for example, was valid only from May 5 until May 16, 1942, number two from May 17 until May 30. Sugar rationing continued to be a common reminder of wartime sacrifice. As late as May, 1945, for example, Baton Rougeans sought to stock up as much as possible on sugar after hearing a rumor that sugar allotments were to be reduced.\textsuperscript{46}

Rationing and shortages caused various changes in Louisiana. Coffee, a mainstay of many Louisianians, became scarce. Merle Weigel reported to her husband her surprise that refreshments at a recent club meeting in January, 1943, included coffee "even second cups — and plenty of sugar." In February, she reported that the shortage of coffee had boosted afternoon tea consumption in its place, but "I guess I'm just Southern enough that nothing can ever really take the place of coffee . . ." In May, she reported that visitors often brought along their own coffee, butter, and sugar so they would not deplete their host's supply of rationed items. Ice cream virtually disappeared from store shelves. Mrs. Weigel wrote to her husband that

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Morning Advocate}, May 25, 28, June 2, November 27, December 4, 1942.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}, February 19, April 27, 1942, May 6, 1945; \textit{States}, May 4, 1942; \textit{Town Talk}, May 6, 1945.
rationing "makes us very careful with our food — we can't waste it, and we can't make fancy desserts, pastries, etc. — but those are really unnecessary . . ." 47

Intermittent food shortages also plagued Louisianians during the war. Restaurants instituted "Meatless Tuesdays" in 1942, substituting fowl, animal organ meat, or egg dishes for traditional meat dishes. Abattoirs throughout the state closed in 1943 until the Office of Price Administration could establish slaughtering quotas. Louisiana existed on "short rations" and tight supplies for much of the war. Restaurants reduced portion sizes early in 1943, and some began serving meat dishes only every other day. Shreveporters formed the Shreveport Clean Plate Club to reduce food waste. Officials at Charity Hospital in New Orleans announced in 1945 that a shortage in the hospital's rationing point allotment caused undesirable modifications in patient diets. OPA officials could offer little help during these shortages. New Orleans district director Gilbert J. Fortier reassured people in July, 1945, that "There is still enough for all of us to eat," but also reminded them that "Not until after the war is over and the liberated peoples are self-sustaining will we be able to buy and eat as extravagantly as we did before Pearl Harbor." 48

Other, more minor, shortages developed during the war. Chewing gum became a war casualty in 1942, because of shortages of both sugar

47 Merle Weigel to H. S. Wiegel, January 14, February 1, 7, April 8, May 3, 28, 1943, Wiegel Collection.

48 Morning Advocate, November 18, 1942, February 26, 1943, July 14, 17, 1945; Town Talk, February 4, 12, March 25, 1943, July 11, 1945; Shreveport Times, July 12, 1943; States, July 12, 1945.
and chicle, a product of South America temporarily displaced by war materials in intercontinental shipping and a major ingredient of gum. Louisianians suffered through a shortage of seafood because fishing boats lacked crews, fuel, and spare parts. Black pepper became scarce because suppliers and the OPA could not agree on an adequate price for it. Ice became scarce in New Orleans during the summer of 1944 because of a labor shortage at the ice-house until the War Manpower Commission directed the United States Employment Service to scour the city for able-bodied workers. Metal license plates disappeared from Louisiana in 1943, replaced by a new fiber plate to conserve steel. (Louisiana also then switched from requiring both front and rear plates to rear plates only.)

As often happens in situations in which people are deprived of products to which they have become accustomed, some Louisianians sought ways to circumvent rationing requirements. Thieves broke into the safe in the rationing board office in the Old State Capitol in Baton Rouge in April, 1944, and stole rationing coupons for gasoline, shoes, food, and sugar. Those not bold enough to break into rationing board offices, but who still desired additional goods could patronize the black market. Illegal markets existed for sugar, hosiery, and meat. Revenue Collector J. O. Fernandez reported in 1945 that eight individuals had admitted participating in black market vending in New Orleans and paid $71,968.39 tax on an estimated $1,500,000 unreported profit for the past year. Some New Orleans consumers who banded

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49 Item, June 8, 1942, February 23, July 1, 4, 1944; Morning Advocate, February 3, 1943; Shreveport Times, October 1, 1943; States, December 1, 1943.
together to oppose both black market activity and some grocers' prac-
tice of charging more for items than the OPA allowed found that their
grocers refused to sell them groceries. 50

It is impossible to determine exactly how much black marketing
occurred in Louisiana during World War II. The very nature of the
enterprise makes it impossible to determine its dimensions. It is
safe to say, however, that a black market existed because some
Louisianians were eager to supply scarce items and reap a profit and
others were just as eager to obtain a lion's share of rationed items,
even at an expensive price and the constant risk of detection.

World War II also impinged upon traditional holiday celebrations
in Louisiana, in general imbuing each with a new patriotic flavor not
normally associated with them. Traditional American holidays, of
course, provided even more reason for patriotic themes. This new
tendency to make holidays into quasi-patriotic celebrations is es-
pecially obvious in wartime Christmases.

America's last peacetime Christmas gave people the opportunity
to reflect on their good fortune at living in a country still at peace.
Many of them also sought to symbolize this appreciation (and inciden-
tally celebrate the first flush Christmas some of them had enjoyed
since 1928) by making Christmas, 1940, into a joy-filled, light-filled
holiday. New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated (a utility which
also wanted to sell increased amounts of electricity) accurately re-
flected this feeling in an advertisement published early in December:

50 Morning Advocate, April 1, 3, June 18, 1944, March 11, April 22,
1945; Times-Picayune, June 18-19, 1944, April 22, 1945.
Abroad there is fear and blackout. In America there is liberty and light.

Thus, Christmas lighting now becomes the symbol of the freedom that shines in the heart of every American. That is your warrant for making the lighting of your tree and your home this year a ceremony to drive home this truth, that liberty and light go together.  

Other, more economically disinterested, sources reflected the same opinion. The Hammond Vindicator asked its readers to light whatever lights they controlled on a Christmas Eve Night of Light "to show the light of liberty still in the United States." The Alexandria Garden Club offered $100 in prizes for the best decorated lawn, porch, and tree. Times-Picayune editorial writers looked over Canal Street and rhapsodized that "one inevitably thinks of the blackouts in Europe and realizes that what is seen here is almost too good to be true." 

Sam Jones, however, raised the ghost at the banquet: "The only note of sadness in this Christmas," he said, "is the war in Europe." Indeed, the war news of December 25, 1940 portended darker days ahead. Some 300,000 Nazi soldiers invaded Rumania from Hungary as Adolph Hitler secured a Balkans base for his proposed spring offensive against Russia. The West, of course, saw only the expansion of Naziism, without knowing of Hitler's secret plan that lay behind it.

The next Christmas, the "Pearl Harbor Christmas," was dominated

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51 States, December 11, 1940.

52 Town Talk, December 7, 1940; States, December 11, 1940; Times-Picayune, December 24, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, December 20, 1940.


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by the Japanese attack in Hawaii and the awesome task that now faced the United States as a full belligerent in the conflict. The Lake Charles American Press editorialized on the overriding bittersweetness of the day: "It is the opportunity to share Christmas one more time with those who are dear to us . . ." The States used the occasion to assure its readers that the Christ whose birthday they celebrated was undoubtedly on their side in the conflict:

Christ was no isolationist. He believed in the brotherhood of man . . . He wouldn't have believed in the rule of the Hitlers and Mussolinis and their yellow and grinning Allies. He would have believed in the kind of rulers that [sic] are asking their people to never give up the fight until freedom is won . . .

Despite the dark foreboding which clung to this Christmas, many people attempted to keep the ritual as normal as possible. Catholic and Episcopal churches held their regular midnight services, charitable organizations distributed gift baskets to the poor, and carolers serenaded their friends. But everything was not the same. As the Item commented,

The soldiers aren't tin soldiers, the rumble of tanks and the roar of guns form a backdrop for 'Peace on Earth, good will to men,' the swelling notes of 'Oh, Say Can You See' mingle with tinkling 'Jingle Bells' . . . there is no peace on earth.

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54 American Press, December 11, 1941; States, December 25, 1941.
55 Item, December 24, 1941; States, December 25, 1941; Times-Picayune, December 26, 1941.
Later Christmases continued the military theme. In 1942, for example, the theme of the Town Talk's Doll and Toy Fund, by which it solicited donations to purchase toys for poor children, was "Give Scrap to Kill a Jap and Bring Joy to a Girl or Boy." Donors were to donate scrap metal to be sold to scrap dealers for the war effort and the proceeds used to purchase dolls and toys. An individual could thus be patriotic and philanthropic at the same time. As the tide of war turned in favor of the Allies, Christmas celebrations retained their militaristic overtones, but also took on a more positive cast than the early wartime celebrations. The Christmas holiday did not return to normal, however, until the 1945 holiday season witnessed the most joyous Christmas mood since Pearl Harbor.

The New Year's holiday similarly gave Louisianians a pause to reflect upon the conditions of the world and their unique place in it. New Year's Day, 1941, dawned on gloomy predictions about life in Louisiana for the next year. A. L. Wedgeworth, President of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce, expected "A cessation of living for individual gain and the lighter things of life." Walter E. Jacobs, president of Shreveport's First National Bank remarked that "... our Democracy cannot be maintained as we have known it by wishing. It is going to be necessary to work harder and to make sacrifices that our generation has never known." Despite predictions of hardship and sacrifice, however, other Louisianians reflected a happier mood.

56 Town Talk, November 11, 1942.

57 Morning Advocate, December 22, 1944, December 24, 1945.
Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell called for "living to the fullest extent of the present age . . . and embrac[ing] progressive ideas and opportunities." The Town Talk remembered the years of economic want experienced during the Great Depression, and hoped that "1941 will be a happy and prosperous era to the people of Louisiana . . . and that the hardships and vicissitudes experienced in the past will not arise to plague and harass the people."

The year 1941 brought some measure of economic recovery to the United States, but, of course, it also brought war in early December. Therefore, New Year's celebrations welcoming 1942 were relatively subdued and quieter than usual, even though many people realized that it might be their last holiday together for several years. Also, officials prohibited use of industrial whistles to welcome the New Year because they were also used as air raid warnings and therefore could cause a panic.

Rain began to fall in Louisiana at dark on New Year's Eve, 1944, so the state quietly ushered in the year that proved to be the last of the war (New Year's Eve was also a Sunday). New Year's Day, 1946, however, saw a revived holiday celebration as Louisiana followed its first peacetime Christmas with a return to traditional New Year's Day activities.

58 Shreveport Times, December 29, 1940; Town Talk, January 1, 1941.
59 States, December 30, 1941; Item, December 30, 1941; Times-Picayune, December 31, 1941; Shreveport Journal, January 1, 1942.
60 Morning Advocate, January 1, 1945, January 1, 1946.
The holiday most publicly connected to Louisiana, Mardi Gras, was a war casualty. The last wartime Mardi Gras occurred in 1941, one of the largest, giddiest celebrations up to that time, with thirty-five balls and twelve large parades:

Outflanking the ramparts jealously guarded by high society, the common people, seeking relief from thoughts of bombs, blitzkriegs, and blockades in the fantastic world of Mardi Gras, make carnival its greatest success in nearly a century of madness.61

Only five days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, governing committees of New Orleans carnival organizations announced that "because it would be inconsistent with the present status of the nation," there would be no Mardi Gras parades or balls in 1942, thus cancelling the celebration for the first time since 1919. The School of Design, sponsor of the Rex Parade, asked its members for full 1942 dues to cover expenses already incurred in design and construction of 1942 floats, then assessed reduced "stand-by" dues for the rest of the war. The Harlequin Krewe held the only ball of the 1942 season, a dance in honor of 1,500 visiting servicemen. The theme of the ball was military — The Occupation of Iceland.62

Mardi Gras day, February 17, 1942, found not the usual crowds of revelers in the streets of New Orleans, but instead found the normal

61 Ibid., February 16, 1941; Times-Picayune, February 19-26, 1941.
62 States, December 12, 1941; Item, December 12, 1941; Times-Picayune, December 13, 28, 1941; Charles L. Dufour and Leonard V. Huber, If Ever I Cease To Love One Hundred Years of Rex 1872-1971 (New Orleans, The School of Design, 1970), pp. 191, 111. Mardi Gras celebrations had been cancelled twice before — during the Civil War and during World War I.
business-day crowd. New Orleanians celebrated by purchasing War Bonds — between $150,000 and $200,000 on Mardi Gras day alone. New Orleans continued to use Mardi Gras to boost bond sales for the remainder of the war. The 1943 sale brought in $1,000,000 during Mardi Gras week. The 1945 season featured twenty costumed individuals selling bonds outdoors on Canal Street, and retail merchants throughout the city participated in the sales drive either by purchasing bonds or setting aside a small space in their establishments for bond sales. As the war ended, however, officials of the Mardi Gras krewes decided in the latter part of August, 1945, to hold the 1946 carnival season as usual. 63

Other holidays acquired a military tinge. The New Orleans St. Patrick's Day parade was cancelled and replaced by church services and bond sales rallies. Observers commented also on the seriousness of April 1, 1943: "... perhaps [the April Fool] was too busy at his defense job, preparing to give the world's greatest hotfoot to those dignitaries Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo ..." Easter, the traditional holiday of hope among Christians, became an even greater symbol of hope. The Morning Advocate commented in 1941 that Easter symbolized "something immortal and immutable in the soul of man that cannot be crushed by oppression and hatred," and noted that "This bright Easter is a challenge to the spirit of man ... to out-live and overcome despair. Few years have needed Easter's promise and hope more." While the traditional trappings of Easter disappeared (the chocolate Easter

63 Times-Picayune, February 18, 1942; Morning Advocate, March 14, 1943, August 19, 1945; States, February 13, 1945.
bunny and candy eggs were casualties of sugar rationing, and a temporary downturn in egg production caused a shortage of eggs in 1943) the spirit of Easter remained strong throughout the war. The Morning Advocate commented on the last wartime Easter that:

Today we can give thanks not alone for the sacrifices of Him who died for mankind but as well for the sacrifices of the many thousands who have died that freedom and the principles of Christ might not be driven back into the catacombs.64

The changes in holidays, hemlines, diets, and restrictions of unlimited movement caused by the war proved temporary. The years of World War II also brought the beginning of more permanent change in Louisiana's social life. These changes are most graphically illustrated by the experiences of two groups: blacks and women, both of which edged closer toward equal treatment during the war.

American blacks at the beginning of World War II still experienced the inequality which had historically dominated race relations in the United States. Many students of the civil rights movement see the years of World War II as the turning point at which many blacks decided not to accept continued unequal treatment without protest. Many blacks still harbored bitter memories of World War I, when they had followed W. E. B. DuBois' admonition to subdue racial grievances only to be subjected to lynchings, race riots, and continued discrimination during the 1920s and 1930s. "The dominant attitude during World War II came to be that the Negro must fight for democracy on two fronts —

64 States, March 2, 16, 1942; Item, March 17, 1942; Morning Advocate, April 13, 1941, April 4, 7, 1943, April 1, 1945.
Black Americans had to overcome the effects of generations of unequal treatment in politics, education, and employment. Their secondary role in American life was revealed in a study completed during 1940. During World War II, the black population of the United States numbered about 12,000,000 and about 2,200,000 were between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four. Of these, at least 500,000 were unemployed. Moreover, the average black youth with a job worked forty-nine hours per week for $8.71, while the average white person in the same age group worked forty-four hours per week for $15.17. In addition, 9.5 per cent of the black youth obtained semi-skilled jobs, compared to twenty per cent of white youths, and only two per cent received skilled jobs, compared to eight per cent of white youth. It did blacks little good to hope for redress from the political system, for they had virtually no political voice. Ten states used poll taxes, head taxes, educational tests, or outright intimidation to deprive blacks of the right to vote, while fifteen states segregated public conveyances and places, and eighteen states provided segregated school facilities.

World War II, however, provided a bit of hope for improvement among black Americans. The labor shortage, for example, provided opportunities for black workers to enter new fields of work and

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establish a recognized position before the post-war slump, which many economists predicted, forced workers back out of jobs. Economic development also set southerners on the course of acquiring more education and increased sophistication, which helped to undermine traditional systems of race relations based on economic relationships in an agricultural society. The war — "the fight for democracy" — provided blacks the opportunity to prick the conscience of white America by stressing the anomalous position created for the United States: fighting for liberty in foreign countries and yet maintaining an unequal status quo at home. As one black soldier commented: "If I've got to die for democracy, I might as well die for some of it right here and now."

Black Americans also responded to the same stirrings of patriotism as did other Americans, but contributions to the war effort could also be used in future drives for equality. As Dr. Felton G. Clark, Negro...

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Coordinator of the United States Civilian Defense program in Louisiana, remarked:

No better argument for a better integration of the Negro into the opportunities of American life and democracy can be given than the record of serving his country in a crucial hour as the present one.  

Various segments of the black community made concentrated efforts to focus attention on the war effort. The theme of the Annual Parish Achievement Day for Rural Negro Schools in East Baton Rouge Parish in 1941 was "Home-school-community coordination for national defense." The Louisiana Colored Teachers' Association conducted a drive to urge all black schoolchildren to buy at least one Defense Stamp per week for the duration of the war, and also urged its members to join the payroll allotment plan for the regular purchase of War Bonds. A report in 1944 revealed that blacks in New Orleans had bought $585,000 worth of bonds in the current bond drive, while blacks in Bogalousa had bought $12,000, in St. John the Baptist Parish $5,000, and in Ouachita Parish $2,500. The Baton Rouge Negro Chamber of Commerce in 1944 pledged its support of the Community War Chest Drive.

Black Louisianians received recognition from some sources of opinion within the white establishment. The Monroe News-Star, for example, in 1941, remarked that "It is wise and right that both in the military services and in defense industries, broadening opportunities

68 Times-Picayune, December 23, 1941.

69 Morning Advocate, April 2, 1941, December 5, 1942, October 13, 1944, June 12, 1945; Times-Picayune, March 20, 1942.
should be opening up for Americans of colored blood."

Nevertheless, other Louisianians looked less benignly on the stirrings of change in the black community. The Town Talk suspected that "fifth columnists" were at work among the black population "spread[ing] . . . theories of Naziism." E. A. Stephens, in his 1942 Senate campaign against Allen Ellender, raised the "black threat" issue, just as did other southern politicians engaged in a difficult campaign. Stephens pointed out that draft boards inducted more whites than blacks, thereby "depleting the white manhood in the South." The emerging situation, Stephens said, was intolerable: "... we of the South cannot pour out our young manhood and leave our streets and roads populated by negroes incited by northerners to seek social equality." Southern parents were willing to sacrifice their sons to protect the United States, he maintained, but "they must not pay for this patriotism by the loss of their dignity and the social balance that we know to be right and just."  

The specter of the "outside agitator" haunted thought about the problem of racial inequality during the war. Charlton H. Lyons told fellow members of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce that white men of the south should begin solving the problems associated with the "negro question" before outside agitators attempted to settle those problems without proper knowledge of the south's social structure. The same organization passed a resolution in April, 1943, asking

70 Monroe News-Star, July 7, 1941.

71 Town Talk, July 27, 1940, August 10, 1942.
Louisiana Congressmen and state officials to stop Office of War Information distribution of a booklet the OWI had published recounting ("extolling" in the parlance of the Chamber) black contributions to the war. The Chamber held that "most of this literature is prepared by individuals not acquainted with the negro problem and not acquainted with the problems of the south, and who are imbued only with the theory of an impractical approach of the social worker." It further held that "distribution of such literature in the south tends to create racial unrest and misgivings, promote a feeling among the negroes that the federal government desires social equality between the races." The Shreveport Times urged all Louisianians to close ranks to prevent racial unrest "regardless of any outside influences." In his retiring speech to Congress in 1944, James Domeneaux said that "[e]xcept when aroused by self-seeking demagogues" southern blacks "were always assured of a security far surpassing in its real benevolence the bureaucratic schemes of modern days . . ." The culprits, he said, were "self-seeking demagogues" who "lure [blacks] by false promises to hope for a status they know [they] can never attain."  

The federal Fair Employment Practices Commission appeared to the white south to be the ultimate "outside agitator" of the race question. The Morning Advocate commented cattily that the FEPC sought to protect blacks and Mexicans, but ignored "tens of thousands of persons available for work" — the Japanese-Americans. The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce maintained that FEPC actions "had created ill will between

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72 Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 8, 1943, July 8, 1943; Shreveport Times, June 25, 1943, April 5, 1944.

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races," and opposed any further existence for the Commission. Fifth District Congressman Charles E. McKenzie called the FEPC a "fraud on American constitutional rights" which had "tried to make it appear that the South is a hot bed of prejudice and bigotry."

The conservative reaction against the FEPC and stirrings of equality proved to be ineffectual attempts to turn the tide of progress. The South learned that the federal government had a new commitment to equality, and that it had no hesitation to reinforce that commitment by granting or withholding federal funds. Shreveport, for example, lost $67,000 in federal funds for construction of a health center because the city administration refused to acquiesce to the requirement that twelve per cent of the unskilled workers on the job be black. Mayor Caldwell angrily criticized "bureaucrats in Washington" for attempting "to cram the negro down our throats." "We have lost the health center," Caldwell said, "but thank God we have retained our respect and white supremacy. We are not going to be bribed by federal funds to accept the negro as our political or social equal."

The tide of social and political equality, however, was too strong to be stemmed. Local southern officials might stymie federal action by refusing to accept federal money available only with the stipulation

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73 Morning Advocate, August 16, 1943, August 2, 1945; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, June 8, 1944. Louisianians were not alone in their condemnation of the FEPC. John Rankin of Mississippi, for example, called it "the beginning of a communistic dictatorship." The FEPC expired in June, 1945. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, p. 715.

74 Morning Advocate, September 17, 1943.
that blacks also be included in the benefits, but they found that United States Supreme Court writs ran throughout the South, even when they overturned traditional political and social practices. The Court, for example, ruled in the 1944 Smith v. Allwright case that the Texas system of all white Democratic party primaries, which effectively excluded blacks from voting, was unconstitutional. Political leaders throughout the South were outraged, not least in Louisiana. Senator John Overton pledged that "The South at all costs will maintain the rule of white supremacy." If white primaries were now ineffective, "The negro can be kept from the polls by educational qualification tests . . ." The Shreveport Times editorialized that the decision bore two potential dangers: it brought the Supreme Court into disrepute, and, more seriously, it set the stage "for new, unwanted, and needless conflict between the people of this nation on racial philosophies . . ." State Senator Wellborn Jack of Caddo Parish introduced a new "white primary" bill in the 1944 session of the legislature, but the House Committee on Elections sidetracked it with an unfavorable report. Committee members and members of the Davis administration thought that present state laws were adequate to prevent black voter registration without conflicting with the Court ruling.75

While the Court's ruling in Smith v. Allwright had the immediate effect of strengthening the hand of southern conservatives, 76 who

75 Shreveport Times, April 4-5, May 7, 17, June 7, 1944; Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Burger (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1979), pp. 190-192.

began a rear-guard struggle to preserve the virtual white monopoly of the ballot box, it also opened the opportunity for black voter registration. That registration proceeded slowly, however. Rapides Registrar of Voters P. T. Haworth reported in August, 1944, that 17 blacks had registered to vote in the parish — thirteen as Democrats and four as Republicans. Haworth remarked that no blacks had been registered to vote in Rapides Parish for twenty years, and that no one could remember a black registered as a Democrat in the parish, and also noted that he had disqualified about as many blacks as he had registered because they could not complete the voters' registration form "intelligently." Assistant Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa Parish Merle S. Weigel reported to her soldier-husband in August, 1944, that no blacks had yet attempted to register: "Of course, we don't intend to let any register, but don't want any trouble about it." The number of Louisiana blacks registered to vote rose from 886 (.1 per cent of the total voters) in 1940, to 7,561 (one per cent of the total) in 1946, but it was not until October, 1964, that every parish in the state had some blacks registered to vote.77

World War II also witnessed the testing of other racial barriers in the South, especially by black soldiers used to the relatively

ruption of the Solid South (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1972), p. 35.

77 Town Talk, August 8, 1944; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, August 11, 1944, Weigel Collection; Riley E. Baker, "Negro Voter Registration in Louisiana 18769-1964," Louisiana Studies, Winter, 1965, pp. 338-339, 345. Black determination to win the vote was revealed soon after the war when Edward Hall, a resident of St. John the Baptist Parish, sued parish registrar T. J. Nagel in November, 1945, claiming that Nagel's questioning of black registrants but not white registrants violated the 14th Amendment. States, November 24, 1945.
freer societies of other areas of the United States. Public transporta-
tion, especially buses, historically segregated in the South, became
increasingly crowded as shortages of gasoline and tires for private
automobiles caused increasing numbers of people to depend upon them
for transportation. Whites crowded into the rear seats of many buses,
the seats normally assigned to blacks, thus causing blacks to stand
in the aisles, or to be left at the bus stop because the bus contained
no more room. Nevertheless, southern society demanded maintenance of
traditional roles. For example, two black soldiers from Camp Living-
ston attacked Alexandria bus driver L. J. Bell after he attempted to
force them to move from the "white only" section of his bus, where
they had found seats.78

Friction between the two races occasionally erupted into violence.
Louisiana's major racial disruption occurred during January, 1942, in
Alexandria. The incident began on Friday, January 9, when soldiers
crowded into the city following receipt of their paychecks. Black
military police normally patrolled the black neighborhood centered on
Lee Street where most black entertainment establishments were located.
The "Lee Street Riot" began after a patrol of about sixty white mili-
tary police entered the neighborhood and arrested a black soldier be-
cause of "disorderly conduct." The ensuing free-for-all fight left
businesses along several blocks of Lee Street with broken windows, and
approximately twenty-eight black soldiers hurt, including three to five

78 Town Talk, November 14, 16, 1942; Tindall, Emergence of the New
South, pp. 716-717; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, March 11, 1943,
Weigel Collection.
who were shot and seriously wounded. One eyewitness later reported that "Bullets were whistling and bricks were flying. The Japs might as well have been attacking as far as I was concerned. I ducked."
The official army investigation of the incident reported that a show of force might well have been necessary following the initial arrest, but that civilian law enforcement officials (some twenty Alexandria police and ten state troopers), along with one of the military policemen, "indulged in indiscriminate and unnecessary shooting."

Other incidents between whites and blacks were less damaging than the Lee Street incident. A small group of black soldiers attacked two white military police officers and a white taxicab driver in New Orleans in 1942 to protest the arrest of two black soldiers for "disorderly conduct."

Even though blacks enjoyed some measure of improvement in their social and economic condition, they remained trapped in a segregated society in Louisiana during the war years, just as they did in the rest of the south. Politically they remained virtually powerless. The number of blacks registered to vote remained low and thus no Louisiana politician thought it necessary to accommodate their needs. Blacks entered the state's political arena only in the form of a threat, notably during the 1940 gubernatorial election during which the Longites called their opponents friends of the blacks who wanted

79 Morning Advocate, January 11, 1942; Town Talk, January 12-13, 21, 24, 1942; Myrdal, An American Dilemma Volume One, pp. 419, 421.

80 Town Talk, November 17, 1942, May 3, 1943; Morning Advocate, September 27, 1944.
to enable them to vote and have a voice in the governing of the state, and in the rumblings of dissatisfaction which emerged as the Roosevelt administration belatedly aligned the federal government with the aspirations of blacks for equal protection of the laws and equal economic opportunity. Powerful public reaction against the threat to "the southern way of life" caused by this new federal determination, however, prevented the dissolution of the segregated society during the war years.

Blacks, nevertheless, had the opportunity to participate in many homefront activities — entertaining soldiers, buying war bonds and stamps, collecting scrap, learning about civilian defense. This participation was carefully kept separate from white activities in the same vein, however, in deference to the fiction of the "separate but equal" society.

While blacks shared in the enhanced economic opportunity created by the demand for increased agricultural and industrial production needed to carry out American participation in the war, they did not break down all economic barriers which had limited their opportunities for economic advancement. Increased prosperity allowed many black tenants to become landowners, but many more were left in tenancy at the end of the conflict. Demand for industrial workers brought black agricultural workers into higher-paying factory jobs, but many remained on the farms. Those blacks who obtained industrial employment remained workers and did not move swiftly up the employment scale.

Black education in Louisiana, one of the most visible symbols of the "separate but equal" society, experienced little improvement during the war years. The general survey of Louisiana education ordered by
the reformers after their 1940 victory revealed the inadequacies of black schools, and some white public officials publicly recognized the state's problems with its system of black education. A shortage of funds and lack of widespread popular support limited the improvements made in black education. The most impressive gain made by black educators during the war was the equalization of black and white teachers' salaries in Orleans parish. That limited victory still left sixty-three other parishes with antiquated unequal pay scales for black and white teachers with equal education and equal experience, but it provided a promise that the old days of inequality were numbered.

While the World War II experience did not bring an immediate realization of a desegregated society in Louisiana, it awakened the modern resurgence of the drive for black equality. The comprehensive achievement of that equality, however, lay well beyond the war years and the years of conservative reaction which followed.

Another traditionally inhibited minority group began edging closer to the mainstream of American life during World War II. Women, customarily relegated to civic pursuits, housework, or "women's jobs" in the workplace, used the labor shortage caused by the war just as the blacks used it — to stake a claim on non-traditional forms of employment. Women became stock board markers at the New Orleans office of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Bean; they ran parking lots, drove taxicabs, welded and repaired aircraft, delivered newspapers, worked in machine shops, and managed stores, often replacing men who had gone
to war. In addition, more than 400 Louisiana women applied to the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps Officers School during the first week after the government began accepting applications in 1942.

The movement of women into non-traditional roles received a mixed reaction in Louisiana. The Times-Picayune New Orleans States editorialized that:

> It would be foolishly optimistic to suppose that we shall be able to win this war by employing only a part of human resources... It is better to foresee [the] necessity for the full mobilization of our energies and prepare for it, than to have it dawn on us a little later that we have neglected another opportunity to ready ourselves.

The Town Talk added that:

> Woman's place now seems to be in the munitions factory... By thousands and tens of thousands they pour into the factories and tackle war jobs formerly sacred to men... From their hands come casings for bombs and a thousand other things.

> It looks like an industrial revolution. These women are not enslaved, but released. And they are regarded with new respect.

Nevertheless, women still faced traditional conservative attitudes. The same Town Talk editorial cited above, for example, also

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81 Item, December 6, 1941, March 12, 1942; Times-Picayune, February 8, 1942; States, March 28, July 27, 1942; Morning Advocate, February 28, 1943; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, July 1, 1942, Weigel Collection.

82 Item, May 27, June 6, 1942; Town Talk, July 23, 1942.

commented on women's war work that "It is surprising how they take to it. Especially so when it is remembered how inept with machinery women were always supposed to be."

Legislators also objected to a bill introduced in 1942 which would have eliminated the requirement that women had to register separately for jury duty. The bill was designed to replenish the supply of potential jurors, depleted by the large number of men away at war, by automatically including women as well as men voters on jury rolls when they registered to vote. The Louisiana Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs favored the bill, but it went down in defeat. Many legislators obviously agreed with the anonymous representative who maintained "we [have] already gone too far in abandoning our southern rights," and another who maintained that women jurors would sometimes be required to hear unsavory testimony, from which southern womanhood had to be protected. The Morning Advocate, however, commented on the defeat of the bill that "We'll have more of this sadly comic business as long as the idea persists that women are, after all, much inferior to men and don't deserve an opportunity to prove that the holders of these opinions are wrong."84

Women entered the workplace for a variety of reasons. Michelina LaCerva, Rosemary Jones, and Ruth Arcenaux, the first women hired at the Rheems Manufacturing plant in New Orleans, said that "We hope to turn out our work fast, so that the ones we love can blast the Japs."

84 Morning Advocate, June 26, 1941, June 14, 17, 1942. Mrs. W. D. Burke, Sr., and Mrs. Inez Creadman became the first women sworn in as prospective jurors on December 18, 1941, when they volunteered for jury duty. Item, December 19, 1941.
A job, however, sometimes also in part assuaged the loneliness experi­
enced by many women when their loved one left for war. Merle Weigel
wrote to her husband that "I've been working extra hard lately. I'm
so glad I have a job for it keeps me busy all day and when I get home
at night I'm tired and can sleep."\(^\text{85}\)

Loneliness became a daily companion for many Louisiana women, just
as it did for Mrs. Weigel, but her feelings can be chronicled in the
collection of letters she wrote to her husband and which are now
available at the Louisiana State University Archives. Mrs. Weigel
involved herself in numerous war-related activities which replaced her
usual activities. She resigned from her bridge club, she wrote her
husband, because "my heart is not in a bridge game when there are so
many more useful things I can be doing." She volunteered for Red
Cross bandage-making and knitting, worked at the Ration Board office,
as well as working first in an Amite drug store and then as Assistant
Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa Parish and being a single parent to
two early adolescent boys.\(^\text{86}\)

Her numerous activities, however, did not completely fill her
days: "When I go to the Post Office in the morning and don't get a

\(^{85}\)States, March 28, 1942; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, July 10, 1942,
Weigel Collection.

\(^{86}\)Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 19, 27, November 30, 1942;
Amite Progress, February 11, 1943, clipping, Weigel Collection. Other
organizations throughout Louisiana went the way of the Amite bridge
club, usually for the same reason. Louis Panzeri and Carole Lawrence,
for example, found that the New Orleans Music Teachers' Association
in 1943 decided to hold only one meeting per year for the duration of
the war because members were too busy with other activities to attend
regularly. Louis Panzeri and Carole Lawrence, New Orleans Music
Teachers' Association 1905-1980 (New Orleans, New Orleans Music Tea-
letter from you I'm blue all day — and when I get one I'm 'pepped Up' all the rest of the day," she wrote in June, 1942. "Nothing seems right in any way since you are gone. I get so terribly lonesome for you — even when everyone is swell to me" she wrote in September. Holidays she found even more lonely: "I'd give so much to know where you are today and what you are doing;" "I dread [Christmas] without you with us;" "It just seems like everything I go to do brings back memories of the many good times we've had together;" "You've been in my mind continually;" "I've been praying for you all day to-day darling and wondering just where you are today ..."87 Despite her worry, Mrs. Weigel was fortunate because her husband returned at the end of the war. For many women, the loneliness, the uncertainty, the adjustments caused by the war were only the beginning of even more adjustments necessary because their loved one did not return alive from the war.

Women retreated somewhat from their wartime gains during the late 1940s and 1950s just as did the blacks. These two groups, however, did not forget their wartime foray into prosperity and equality. Their permanent acceptance into fulltime participation in the American culture and economy, however, occurred some twenty years after the conclusion of the war, and is therefore beyond the scope of this study.

87Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, June 28, July 2, 4, August 6, September 9, 15, December 15, 21, 24, 25, 1942, June 6, 1944.
CHAPTER XII

LOUISIANA AT WAR’S END

Shortly after the United States became involved in World War II, its leaders began to consider the economic and social readjustments that would be necessary to reconvert the country from a military power to a peacetime society once the conflict had ended. Many feared that another economic depression with high unemployment and low industrial production would occur when the need for war materials ceased. New Deal experience with large-scale planning programs to meet social and economic emergencies, however, provided hope that with careful preparations, the country could escape such major social and economic dislocation.¹

In Louisiana, concern for the economic dislocations expected at the end of the war surfaced as early as 1941, and reflected a basic division among the state’s interest groups into those who favored continued federal spending on peace-time programs to soften the impact of unemployment with public improvement programs similar to those of the New Deal, and those who feared that a continuation of federal spending to support the economy during the reconversion period would result in severe repercussions later. Governor Sam Jones, for example, announced his concern about post-war developments on June 10, 1941, when he warned Louisianians that even though many of them had found


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jobs in the new defense industries and thus enjoyed a sudden rush of prosperity after the lean years of the depression, the industrial production would, at best, be reduced after the war, and that industrial workers should prepare themselves for the possibility of post-war unemployment. Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell, meanwhile, announced in December of that year that he expected heavy federal spending in post-war programs to absorb many of the unemployed when the war ended.²

Many Louisianians, however, remained unconvinced that continued federal spending would be a proper way to soften the impact of eventual reconversion, thus sharing the view of the Truman administration's senior reconversion planner, John W. Snyder, who thought that the end of the war would cause "an immediate and large dislocation of our economy," but that "we will not manufacture a single shell, nor a single piece of equipment above absolute minimum military needs, for the purpose of reducing the shock of terminating war work." The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce exemplified the conservative reaction against massive federal spending programs in January, 1942, when it warned against "an orgy of spending" by the federal government after the war and decided to analyze the local economic situation in order to formulate a plan of reconversion. The subsequent Post War Readjustment Council Report maintained that ". . . the most basic of all [reconversion] efforts must be directed toward the developing of a better national understanding of the influences of government and their ultimate effect, unless property directed, upon the existence of

²Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 11, 1941; Shreveport Times, December 5, 1941.
communities and upon the lives of individuals." The report, there­fore, called upon the United States Chamber of Commerce to initiate a nationwide program to "maintain capitalism or American free enter­prise," while local chapters stood watch over the inevitable spending of federal money, and proposed that any federal project should benefit the local area economically — expediting traffic and commerce, for example. The Shreveport Chamber's post-war department conducted a post-war industrial survey, promoted industrial development, and main­tained a file of names of servicemen available for work in the post-war period.³

The Louisiana Bankers' Association also formulated post-war plans. The bankers sought to ease the return of veterans to the community (and increase bank profits) by establishing a Committee on G. I. Ser­vices which kept abreast of all benefit program developments provided by the G. I. Bill and other benefit programs available to veterans, including, of course, those programs which featured government­guaranteed loans, and held a series of "G. I. Meetings" explaining these benefits to returning veterans.⁴

In the public sector, the Louisiana Department of Public Works urged parish police juries to establish a planning board, make an

³Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, January 8, 1942, January 13, 1944, no date (1942?), microfilm copy, Department of Microforms, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; Goulden, The Best Years, p. 92.


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inventory of parish resources and facilities, and develop a three-pronged plan for efficient use of those resources and facilities in the post-war world. The plan was to include projects to be completed by the parish, including improvement of roads, bridges, and drainage systems; projects carried out by private corporations; and improvement projects for individual landowners. East Baton Rouge Parish called upon its citizens to suggest post-war projects. The restrictions on the suggestions, however, were that the project had to facilitate the return of veterans to civilian life, create wealth-producing jobs which would increase the income of the community, and create cultural projects necessary to the growth of the community.\(^5\)

Governor Jones announced his plan for the post-war South in August, 1943. The Governor's plan called for diversification of agriculture, utilization of natural resources and raw materials in developing an industrial South, development of commerce by improvement of waterways, highways, railroads, and air transport facilities, and abandonment of traditional one-party Democratic political allegiance which, he thought, had "done nothing but maneuver us into a corner and further impoverish our people."\(^6\)

Louisiana's master plan for post-war development, announced by Department of Public Works Director DeWitt L. Pyburn in September, 1944, included many of Jones' ideas, even though by then he had relinquished the governor's office to Jimmie Davis. The Louisiana plan,

\(^5\)Morning Advocate, July 12, 1944; Gertrude Bouque, "Planning and the Postwar World," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1944, p. 16.

\(^6\)Morning Advocate, August 20, 1943.
clearly a product of officials who had accepted the importance of government spending during the economic reconversion period, provided for expenditure of approximately $500,000,000 on a vast construction program including armories, health centers and laboratories, hospitals, college buildings, farmers' markets, airports, and wharf and dock facilities at the New Orleans port, in addition to improvement of state parks and the state's drainage system.  

While some Louisianians formulated plans to prepare the state's economy for the cessation of hostilities and the expected downturn, other Louisianians turned their attention to the diplomatic necessities of the post-war world. The war years witnessed a continued acceptance of a major role in international relations for the United States which editorial writers for the state's major newspapers had developed between the beginning of war in September, 1939, and the Pearl Harbor attack in December, 1941.

The immediate international consideration, of course, was a victorious conclusion of the war. As the Alexandria Daily Town Talk remarked, "Winning comes first." Or as the Shreveport Times observed: "What we must do now is put our shoulder to the wheel of war and try to grind out victory so that we may have a chance to do something when the time for peace comes."  

The golden days of peace, however, could only be preserved by United States participation in a post-war international organization.

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7 Ibid., September 17, 1944.

8 Alexandria Daily Town Talk, March 6, 1942 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk); Shreveport Times, July 23, 1942.
The lesson of United States failure to undergird the League of Nations during the 1920s and 1930s haunted discussion of the post-World War II world. The Monroe Morning World editorialized in late December, 1941, that

Surely it would seem apparent to anyone today that there must be established a League of Nations which will be capable of enforcing world peace and of compelling international justice.

In 1919 after the first World War, our senate refused to let us join a League of Nations to preserve world peace.

Now we are compelled to join with other nations and help fight and finance another world war in order to save ourselves.9

World War II, while terribly expensive in money and lives, provided new hope among editorial writers for continued international cooperation in the post-war world. The Morning Advocate observed in January, 1942, that

... the allegiance which contributes so momentarily to the effective waging of war may well point the way to alliance in the world in peace when the war is over.

... it took a war to bring [this alliance] into being. Let us safeguard its spirit of unity and determination, in the hope that some of its high courage and fine spirit may be salvaged to guide us in making peace.10

9 Monroe Morning World, December 26, 1941.

10 Morning Advocate, January 11, 1942.
The *Town Talk* in February, 1942, speculated on the future of the "United Nations" (then only the name for the powers allied against the Axis): "Ties can be strengthened as we fight together for our ideals... close association in a big and righteous war should be in itself a power to hold the partners together on broad lines of common interest [in the post-war world]."  

As the war drew to a close and representatives of the Allied Powers met in San Francisco, California, to plan a permanent international peacekeeping organization for the post-war world, the *Morning Advocate* warned that

If the men at San Francisco fail, if the rest of us fail, then another Hitler certainly will rise, perhaps in a comparatively short time. And when the last explosion of that war dies down, it may easily be that over the entire world there will descend the silence of death that has descended over Berlin, while savage and degenerate survivors pitch their tents in the ruins of civilization.  

While the United States could plan for a peaceful post-war world, it first had to complete the massive war in which it was engaged. Louisiana, along with the rest of the country, recognized a major turning point in the conflict as Allied armies gathered in England for the cross-channel invasion of Europe during the early summer of 1944. Several Lóuisiana mayors issued proclamations as early as the first week of May designating "D Day," whenever it came, as a day of

11 *Town Talk*, February 16, 1942.

12 *Morning Advocate*, May 4, 1945.
devotion and called upon churches to remain open and citizens to attend prayer services. Jimmie Davis' first gubernatorial proclamation called upon Louisianians for prayer and for "spiritual protection, safety, and success" of American fighting forces on the day of the European invasion. 13

News of the Allied invasion of Europe reached Louisiana on radio news bulletins broadcast at 2:32 A.M. on June 6, 1944. It was a day of mixed emotions — joy that the invasion at last had begun; concern for family members or friends who might be involved. J. E. McLaughlin, assistant pastor of St. Rita's Catholic Church in New Orleans began a forty-hour prayer vigil at 4:00 that morning upon hearing the news. Navy cadets at Tulane heard the news at the regular 6:45 reveille and broke into cheers. Archbishop Joseph Francis Rummel, awakened early and told the news, issued a statement ("I have absolute faith in the bravery of our armed forces, and feel that they are determined to pursue their effort to a victorious conclusion, thus bringing the prospect of peace nearer"), then paced in his garden. Mayor Robert Maestri called upon "all citizens to interrupt the daily routine of their lives to join in universal prayers for God's blessing upon our armed forces." Many Alexandria residents stopped by open churches on their way to work for a few moments of prayer, and others continued to file in throughout the day. Governor Davis called a special joint session of the legislature for 12:00 noon. Legislators and guests jammed the House chamber as Davis and Chaplain Edwin Olsen of Harding Field delivered prayers for the success of the invasion and the

protection of Louisiana citizens involved.\textsuperscript{14}

The Normandy beaches bought with such terrible cost on June 6, 1944, established a foothold from which Allied soldiers pressed on to liberate Nazi-dominated Europe. By the spring of 1945, many observers realized that Germany could not sustain the war effort much longer and looked forward hopefully to a quick end to the war. The nation, however, had to pass through one more trial before it could savor a victory over the Nazis: President Franklin Roosevelt died at his Warm Springs, Georgia, retreat on April 12. While some Louisianians had opposed Roosevelt during his third and fourth campaigns, the president had nevertheless remained popular in the state. Lieutenant Governor J. Emile Verret articulated the feelings of many Louisianians in his remarks at a memorial service for Roosevelt held in New Iberia: "I personally had never seen or known the President, yet I personally feel that I have lost a friend. Well, I have other friends, nearer to me perhaps, but still I regret the loss of this particular one. From him, I have drawn strength." One unidentified New Orleans woman was in her yard on the afternoon of April 12 when her neighbor called to her to turn on her radio. The woman reported that she started toward her house to do so when she overheard a report that Roosevelt had died: "I couldn't get up the steps. It was like a member of my family [had died].\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Item}, June 6, 1944; \textit{New Orleans States}, June 6, 1944; \textit{Town Talk}, June 6, 1944; \textit{Morning Advocate}, June 7, 1944.

\textsuperscript{15}J. Emile Verret, "Eulogy," April 14, 1945, J. Emile Verret Papers, Dupre Library, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette; \textit{Item} April 13, 1945.
New Orleans stores remained open as usual that night, but clerks reported that the crowds were lighter than normal and bought very little. People gathered around radios in department stores and hotel lobbies listening for details of the events in Warm Springs and the transfer of power in Washington. The Roosevelt Hotel closed both its lounge and restaurant for lack of business. A security guard at Pat O'Brien's club reported that the crowd was "quiet and gloomy." The city's Catholic churches tolled their bells for five minutes beginning at 8:00 P.M. Mayor Maestri ordered all flags on city buildings lowered to half-staff. Officials closed parish and parochial schools and all colleges and universities in the city. In Baton Rouge, Governor Davis ordered flags on state buildings lowered, and declared April 15 an official day of mourning for Roosevelt in Louisiana. All state offices closed on that day, as did many stores, the Stock Exchange, the Cotton Exchange, and the Board of Trade in New Orleans. Many people throughout the state attended memorial services.\(^\text{16}\)

Even while it mourned its fallen leader, Louisiana also welcomed the new president. The Morning Advocate reminded its readers that

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\text{The place of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the great humanitarian, the great liberator, the foremost citizen of our time, will be unique in history. But there is always a place in the sun for others. The truly great are always needed and there is always a place for them.}\(^\text{17}\)\]

\(^{16}\) Item, April 13-15, 1945; Times-Picayune, April 14-16, 1945; Morning Advocate, April 13, 1945; Shreveport Times, April 13, 1945.

\(^{17}\) Morning Advocate, April 15, 1945.
As Allied armies pushed close to Berlin in the spring of 1945, rumors of peace swept Louisiana, along with the rest of the United States, beginning in March. The desperate longing to finish the war was revealed in the eagerness to confirm any hint of peace. Callers jammed the telephone switchboard of the Shreveport Times in late March, asking whether peace had finally come. The calls stemmed from an incident at a local radio station which had "plugged" its news department by announcing that its listeners should stay tuned for later newscasts and "the big news stories of the day."\(^\text{18}\) Peace rumors again swept through Louisiana in late April. Bars closed in Shreveport in accordance with agreements between owners and police attempting to curb excessive celebrating. Church bells pealed in Baton Rouge announcing the victory, but official denials of a peace settlement quickly scotched the celebrations.\(^\text{19}\)

Ironically, Louisiana remained calm during the days preceding the actual German surrender. Peace rumors of May 5, 1945, brought no new round of celebrations because skeptics now demanded proof before believing the end of the European war had come. They had not long to wait, however. Germany surrendered at 2:41 A.M., Monday, May 7, 1945 (7:41 P.M. Central War Time, May 6, in Louisiana). Louisiana began its celebration of "Victory in Europe Day" even before President Truman officially announced the peace settlement at 8:00 A.M. (local time), May 8. Churches throughout the state again opened for prayer

\(^{18}\) *Item*, March 17, 1945; *Shreveport Times*, March 28, 1945.

\(^{19}\) *Morning Advocate*, April 29, 1945; *Shreveport Times*, April 29, 1945.
and meditation, businesses closed, shopkeepers nailed boards across vulnerable plate glass show windows, workers in the Whitney Bank Building and the American Bank Building in New Orleans sent showers of torn newspaper, telephone books, and other paper items fluttering down as impromptu confetti. Old-timers, however, remembered the Armistice Day rallies in the city following World War I as rowdier. The major reasons for the relatively sober celebration was that only one phase of the war had ended. As one New Orleans policeman commented, "bullets are still flying in the Pacific."²⁰

During the months between the surrender of Germany and the surrender of Japan, Americans increasingly turned their thoughts to the consumer goods which would become available at the end of the war. An informal survey conducted in New Orleans during August, 1945, asked what an individual would purchase for dinner in a grocery store fully stocked with pre-war supplies. Eight people replied "steak"; two replied "meat of any type"; and one each replied "vegetables" and "chicken." A Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce survey of 2,585 persons asked, "What will be your first purchase after the war when there are plenty of things to buy?" The replies reveal the pent-up demand for consumer goods: the most popular reply was electric washing machine, followed by automobile, hand electric iron, kitchen stove, electric refrigerator, radio, furniture, furnace, electric mixer, and electric food freezer.²¹

²⁰States, May 7-8, 1945; Morning Advocate, May 9-10, 1945; Town Talk, May 8, 1945.

²¹Item, August 1, 8, 1945; Goulden, The Best Years, pp. 93-94.
Rumors of a peace settlement with Japan swept through Louisiana as early as August 10, but official confirmation that the Japanese had indeed surrendered reached the state minutes after it was announced at 6:00 P.M., August 15, 1945. The state erupted in a spontaneous victory celebration. New Orleans witnessed the largest celebration since the 1941 Carnival. Confetti piled six inches deep on some downtown streets; stores and offices closed; church bells rang; boats in the harbor sounded their whistles; and shopkeepers again boarded up vulnerable windows. (New Orleans police made only 107 arrests, however.) Crowds jammed Third Street in downtown Baton Rouge within fifteen minutes of the announcement, and filled the air with confetti and the noise of whistles, sirens, and bells. Governor Davis proclaimed a two-day state holiday. Shreveport celebrated with closed stores and offices, joyous celebration, and much noise. The Alexandria business district filled minutes after the announcement. The Town Talk reported comments randomly heard on the streets: "Thank God, it's done"; "How soon do you suppose my husband will come home"; "Oh, Gee"; "I'm going to cry"; "Praise the Lord that it's over"; and most poignantly, "I wish my son could have lived to see this day."

The federal government announced the end of gasoline rationing only a few hours after the Japanese surrender and thus initiated another round of celebration on August 16. Many motorists shared the pleasure of one Baton Rougean who reported that "I immediately drove my car to a gas station and said 'fill it up,' something I haven't

22 Item, August 10, 15, 1945; Morning Advocate, August 14–16, 1945; Town Talk, August 14, 1945; Shreveport Times, August 15, 1945.
been able to do for a long time. I hope I never need those gas
coupons again." One Baton Rouge gasoline station which had normally
sold 1,000 gallons of fuel per day during rationing, sold 6,000
gallons the day rationing ended. New Orleans motorists rushed to
filling stations, causing the president of the New Orleans Service
Station Association to comment that "Everybody said 'fill 'er [sic]
up' just for the pleasure of saying it."23

Even as the state celebrated the end of the war, however, many
Louisianians were concerned about the new weapon which had precipitated
the unconventional conclusion of World War II. The consequences of
possible misuse of atomic technology concerned editorial writers
throughout the state. The Town Talk commented on August 7, that

The responsibility of the possession of knowledge
is a serious matter. Lest it become the monster
by which man with his own hands and mind destroys
himself, it behooves us to examine carefully,
even prayerfully, the uses to which this Franken­
stein is put, and the hands in which its secrets
lie . . . 24

The next day, the Shreveport Times noted that the further mankind pro­
gressed, the more it acquired the ability to destroy "vast chunks of
the world." On the same day, the Item reported that "one common re­
action to [the atomic bomb] seems to be that it is very unfortunate
for humanity that so terrible a weapon had to be invented. For at
least a dozen of our acquaintances have expressed in varying terms the

23 Morning Advocate, August 15-16, 1945; Item, August 16, 1945;
Goulden, The Best Years, p. 91.

24 Town Talk, August 7, 1945.
feelings that atom-cracking will destroy us all, if not the world along with us."\textsuperscript{25} The \textit{States} speculated on the possibility of outlawing the new weapon as "the answer to fears that another war will end civilization": "It seems to us that attempts to outlaw the atomic bomb are doomed to failure unless they can be approached through strong international controls of the very process involved in the manufacture of atomic power," while the \textit{Morning Advocate} asked: "how can any logical person argue that any effort, no matter how great, on behalf of lasting peace, is not entirely justified?"\textsuperscript{26}

The threat of nuclear proliferation appeared to some observers even in the virtual afterglow of the wartime detonations. This danger, some thought, might even enhance the possibility of constructing a lasting peace. The \textit{Morning Advocate} commented that

\begin{quote}
Against the atomic bomb, there is no defense. From it, there is no hiding. By this frightful invention, the strongest fortifications known to man can be crumpled like tinfoil, the deepest shelters can be blown open, and the very mountains toppled.

We are now trying to establish machinery to keep a lasting peace. We had better make it work. This may be our last chance to avoid the pocalyptic [sic] destruction with which the science of war so long has threatened us.

Peace will come. Will it come now, or after the final holocaust when atomic power has split the world asunder? Will it be the peace of a brave new world -- or the peace of the grave? Atomic power offers mankind the choice. Mankind must choose.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Shreveport Times}, August 8, 1945; \textit{Item}, August 8, 1945.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{States}, October 29, 1945; \textit{Morning Advocate}, November 29, 1945.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Morning Advocate}, August 8, 1945.
The end of the war, even though it brought unimagined fears and the brooding threat of atomic warfare, also brought the beginning of American reconversion to a peace-time society. Many Louisianians celebrated Labor Day, 1945, the first peace-time holiday since Thanksgiving, 1941, with short automobile trips fueled by unrationed gasoline. The telephone company assured Baton Rougeans that new telephones were on the way to fill the backlog of 33,186 orders for residential or business telephones. Scarce china, silver, and crystal appeared on store shelves and met a brisk demand. One New Orleans jeweler remarked that "Victory Brides" created much new demand, but that "many of our old customers are replenishing their stocks or changing their china and silver patterns. They've had to do without fine things for so long." Ex-servicemen crowded into the state's colleges. Long-awaited floor samples of new Frigidaire electric refrigerators appeared on October 31. Customers could only place an order, but stores promised "Deliveries As Soon As Frigidaire Are Available." Applications for new trucks numbered 400 for every vehicle brought into the state. The Baton Rouge USO held its closing ceremonies in January, 1946.28

The Louisiana economy entered the post-war reconversion when the war industries announced cancellation of war contracts soon after the Japanese surrender. Higgins Industries lost all its war contracts by August 16. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft announced that it would complete the airplanes actually on the assembly line, but would begin no

28 Morning Advocate, September 2, 19, 27, 1945, January 10, 28, 1946; States, October 29, 31, 1945; Item, November 15, 1945.
new construction. Rheem Manufacturing lost two of its three war contracts by August 16. The last ship left the Delta Shipbuilding ways on October 11, thus bringing to a close the World War II era of shipbuilding in New Orleans.29

The Item regretted the resulting loss of employment, but editorialized that "efforts to prolong production at public expense, without need" would have proven even more costly: "Sudden increase in employment at unprecedented wages was an abnormal condition brought on deliberately to meet the abnormal demands of an abnormal situation. Now it is time to return to normal living." Senator Allen J. Ellender called on workers to "forget this holiday spree" of high wartimes wages so that United States production costs could be lowered sufficiently to allow American products to compete in the international market. 30

Many workers realized that the future might not be as exciting (or as profitable) as the past. An Item survey of workers at the Consolidated Vultee plant elicited the following comments: "Before the war, I was a seamstress, but I'll never go back to it. I'd rather starve"; "My husband's in the Pacific and I hope he'll be back soon. So, I'll keep house for him. However, I'll sure miss those rivets. Housekeeping will seem mighty dull now"; "I guess I'll go back to [accounting]. I know it won't pay as well, but I figured on that and will be satisfied."31

29 Item, August 16, 1945; States, October 11, 1945.
30 Item, August 20, 1945; Morning Advocate, August 30, 1945.
31 Item, August 17, 1945.
Louisiana in 1945 was not the same state it had been in 1939 when the war began. While precise measures of change are impossible to determine for 1945, the entire decade of the 1940s brought continued population growth to the state. Louisiana's population in 1950 numbered 2,683,516, an increase of 319,636 (13.5 per cent) over the 1940 total. Urban growth, moreover, outstripped rural growth. Total urban population increased by 383,350 (39.1 per cent) during the decade, while rural population lost 63,714 (-4.6 per cent) from the 1940 total. Moreover, the 1950 Census found that Louisiana contained more population in urban areas (50.8 per cent) than in rural areas (49.2 per cent). Urban growth, however, left a recognizable state. No new urban area emerged to displace New Orleans as the state's most populous city. Urban areas in 1940 continued to be urban areas in 1950, but they had grown rapidly. The state's urban growth had been uneven. New Orleans grew more slowly than any other urban area (15.3 per cent), while Shreveport increased by 19.6 per cent; Alexandria by 29 per cent; Monroe by 36.3 per cent; Lafayette by 74.6 per cent; Lake Charles by 94.6 per cent; and Baton Rouge by a staggering 261.8 per cent. The most impressive growth in Louisiana's urban areas during the 1940s were the gains made by Baton Rouge, which by 1950 threatened to displace Shreveport as the state's "second city."

Louisiana, however, ranked fifth in the South in population growth during the decade. Florida, Virginia, Texas, and North Carolina

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grew more rapidly, while Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi grew more slowly.\textsuperscript{33}

Louisianians in 1950 were also relatively better educated than they had been ten years before. In 1940, the median grade completed for white residents was 8.2. By 1950, that number had increased slightly to 8.8. Blacks had reported 3.9 as the median grade completed in 1940. By 1950, that number had increased to 4.6.\textsuperscript{34} The increase for both races however, was slight.

The Census of Manufacturers, completed in 1947, illustrates the economic shift toward industrialization in the Louisiana economy. The 1939 Census had found 1,779 manufacturing establishments in the state employing 70,453 workers and paying wages of $55,083,540. The 1947 survey found 2,389 manufacturing establishments, employing 132,464 workers at total wages of $309,871,000.\textsuperscript{35}

In summary, then, Louisiana had experienced much change since 1939. Events of the six-year period which began in that year affected state and national political considerations, the economy, and virtually every aspect of life on the Louisiana homefront.

State politics had been affected most, however, not by America's involvement in the war, but by the venality of Longite politicians who in 1939 incurred the wrath of the voters by their greedy excesses.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 18-7.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. viii.

From Huey Long's death in 1935 until the exposure of the Louisiana Scandals in 1939, top officials in the Longite organization lived ostentatiously expensive lives largely financed by fraudulent or improper use of state resources. Their ambition to continue enjoying the "good life" ran into the political ambition of former Longite James A. Noe, who alerted federal officials to the misuse of state money.

The result of the federal investigation was that the Longite machine, exposed as greedy and unworthy, was banished temporarily from control of the executive branch of the state government which it had controlled since Huey Long's election as governor in 1928. Their banishment left open the way for the anti-Long faction of the Democratic party to prove its ability to govern Louisiana honestly and effectively.

Anti-Long forces had been out of power for eleven years, however, and thus did not have recent experience in governing the kind of state that Long and his associates had created. The anti-Longs' "last hurrah" before the Louisiana Scandals had been their impeachment of Long in 1929, which he thwarted. For eleven years, Long and his allies had constructed by parliamentary maneuver, legislative act, and executive fiat, a powerful organization capable of keeping virtually all its opponents out of office.

When that domination of the executive branch ended in 1939, the reformers who swept into office on the tide of voter disgust had to learn how to govern and not merely criticize the government in office. In addition, voter revulsion at the excess of the scandals did not sweep all Longites out of positions of influence. Therefore, when
reform Governor Sam Jones sought to dismantle the highly-centralized state administration Huey Long and his associates had created, he found a strong Longite faction in the legislature which sought to derail his reforms at every turn. The 1940 legislature granted Jones many of his reforms because the memory of the scandals was too recent to ignore. During the 1942 session, however, Longites in the legislature had regrouped and virtually brought the governor's efforts to a standstill until he outmaneuvered them by withholding funds from the New Orleans Charity Hospital. The Longites subsequently agreed to certain key measures in a special legislative session.

Moreover, Longites mustered a series of "taxpayer suits" against Jones' reform laws which nullified many of his reforms as the courts examined them closely. Jones, then, proved that Louisiana could be governed honestly, but the effectiveness of his reform administration was blunted by the powerful Longite bloc in the legislature and the unfavorable judicial decisions.

Jones' successor, James H. Davis, continued the reform thrust in Louisiana state politics, but his soothing personality, and his frequent absences from the state took some of the edge off the factional strife during the last two years of the war.

Even the relative success of the anti-Long administrations, however, proved that both Long and anti-Long candidates stood a serious chance at election. The result was a system of effective bifactional politics within the Democratic party, which gave Louisiana a political system resembling somewhat the national two-party system with the relatively conservative reforms (a rather anomalous concept in itself).
resembling the Republicans and the more liberal Longites resembling the Democrats.

This system of effective bifactionalism which began in 1939 lasted until 1960, when the race issue began sweeping aside the old politics based on economic issues. While it lasted, however, it gave Louisiana three reform governors — Jones, Davis, and Robert Kennon — and the same Longite governor three times — Earl Long, who carried on many of his older brother's social welfare programs without the attendant concentration of political power that Huey had achieved.

During the war years, Louisiana experienced development on two levels of national politics: the congressional level and the presidential level. National politics on the congressional level often reflected the state's bifactional division with candidates seeking the endorsement of the Longite organization or the reform administration. Even though Longite congressmen in the 1940 election suffered along with their allies at the state level from the exposure of the Louisiana Scandals, they were not completely eliminated from office. Six of them were defeated, but Longites always retained two seats throughout the war — Overton Brooks' Fourth District and A. Leonard Allen's Eighth District. Moreover, Louisiana's two Longite United States Senators, Allen J. Ellender and John Overton, successfully defeated reform challengers.

Congressional races in Louisiana during the war years generally turned on two issues: the corruption of the Longite organization (and thus reflected the bifactional system), or the United States war effort. Reformers often concentrated on the former issue, while Longites
often concentrated on the latter in an attempt to downplay the aura of fiscal malfeasance which clung to Longite politicians. Concentration on these two major issues varied from campaign to campaign and from district to district, depending on the success of the war effort or the personalities of the candidates involved. Even in campaigns which concentrated on the war issue, however, the corruption issue always loomed as a ready weapon with which a reformer could attack his Longite opponent.

Franklin Roosevelt overrode all other concerns in presidential politics throughout the United States during the war years, and the force of his personality displaced bifactionalism in Louisiana during presidential campaigns. No matter how far apart reformers and Longites stood on various other issues, they found common ground in their general support of Roosevelt's presidential candidacies.

Nevertheless, Louisiana shared with the rest of the South some rumblings of discontent with the continued urban, liberal, and black drift of Roosevelt's Democratic party. The stirrings of racial equality which were a feature of the war years, and which Roosevelt's brand of New Deal democracy fostered, brought the first stirrings of unhappiness among many southern white Democrats. The war emergency helped to contain the Southern revolt against the party, even when Roosevelt chose the eccentric Henry A. Wallace as his running mate in 1940, but by the first peace-time presidential election in 1948, President Harry Truman could no longer retain the unquestioning loyalty of the South, and Louisiana, along with three other southern states, bolted to Strom Thurmond and the States' Rights Democrats. Once it

Not only in politics, but almost all aspects of life in wartime Louisiana experienced change. Sentiments of non-involvement with the rest of the world gave way in the months between September, 1939, and December, 1941, to a realization that the necessity of the United States assuming a major role in defeating the Axis required a repudiation of earlier non-intervention. Major sources of public opinion in the state, furthermore, adopted the concept that the United States repudiation of its international role in the League of Nations during the 1920s and 1930s had helped lead the world into the explosive situation which burst into World War II. Therefore, many Louisianians repudiated any idea of another post-war retreat into non-intervention and embraced the new international organization designed to keep the peace in the post-World War II international situation.

Louisiana's educational system met the challenge of World War II on two levels, one practical the other idealistic. On the practical level, Louisiana educators sought to provide technical training required by new workers in both industrial and agricultural pursuits made necessary by the war effort. Schools also became major components of wartime scrap collection and war stamp sales drives, as well as registration and distribution centers for the federal government's rationing program.
On the idealistic level, Louisiana education re-dedicated itself to the traditional role of inculcating a healthy patriotism in its students. Patriotic themes dominated consideration of history and civics courses, but teachers also used wartime necessity to urge their students to read more, or to do well in math and science.

Institutions of higher learning in the state suffered from declining enrollments as male students became involved in the war effort, but partially offset the resulting loss of income by obtaining military training programs. Collegiate athletics suffered a temporary curtailment, and various curricula were modified to accommodate technological modernization brought on by the war.

The Louisiana educational system achieved many of its goals during the war years even though it suffered from a shortage of teachers caused by the military draft and by higher salaries in defense industries. It also experienced change on the domestic level as Governor Jones and State Superintendent of Public Education John E. Coxe imposed their own reforms. Jones included the Department of Education in his general state reorganization plan in 1940, and thus the department suffered along with other state agencies in the administrative chaos that resulted from the unconstitutionality of the Jones plan. While Jones sought to liberate Louisiana's education from the politicalization it had suffered under the Longites, Superintendent Coxe imposed internal reorganization to provide a more professional orderliness in the state educational administration. Throughout all these challenges, however, Louisiana's Department of Education struggled to continue providing the education required by students in the new,
threatening world situation.

The Louisiana economy, both agricultural and industrial, shared in the economic prosperity of the war years which obliterated the Great Depression of the 1930s by the simple law of supply and demand. Louisiana agriculture, for example, was called upon to help fill the insatiable appetite for food and fiber of the Allied war effort and shared in the attendant prosperity.

The war introduced no major new crops to Louisiana agriculture, but it did have the fundamental effect of accelerating mechanization because of the acute shortage of labor on Louisiana farms caused by United States military needs and the labor requirements of new indus­trialization within the state. Louisiana farmers attempted to remedy the labor problem by utilizing the labor of Axis POWs incarcerated in the state and met with varying degrees of success depending on the crop and the abilities of individual prisoners, but also relied on increased mechanization. The mechanization of Louisiana agriculture was uneven, however. Sugar cane production led the way in mechanization, while cotton and rice production lagged behind.

Nevertheless, the acceleration of mechanization caused by the war resulted in major changes in Louisiana's black population during the late 1940s and on into the 1950s and 1960s, when blacks in increasing numbers left agriculture and the shanties provided by landowners on the periphery of the fields and either left the South or moved to one of its urban areas.

World War II also caused an acceleration of the industrialization of Louisiana's economy. Major manufacturing establishments in the
state provided vital material and petrochemicals to the Allied war effort. Industrialization, however, continued along the paths it had already begun in the state. New Orleans, with its major shipbuilding, aircraft, and other manufacturing plants, remained the state's major industrial area. Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Monroe, Alexandria, and Lake Charles continued to be industrial and urban centers as they had been earlier, while other areas of the state, even though they slightly increased their industrial production, lagged behind.

Louisianians also shared in the curtailment of American life experienced by the rest of the country during the war. Shortages and rationing removed some customer goods from store shelves and made others difficult to obtain. The population, used to deprivation during the 1930s, probably survived these shortages with more equanimity than they or their descendents would had they occurred during the Age of Abundance of the 1950s and 1960s, but those with money from war-time jobs found the shortages galling, for now they had money to spend after doing without during the lean years of the Depression, but had few consumer goods to spend it on. Shortages and rationing of scarce gasoline and tire supplies severely hindered traditional American freedom of movement. Traditional holiday celebrations assumed a military and patriotic tinge. Traditional recreation and personal concerns were replaced in many instances by involvement in civilian defense, scrap collection drives, and war bond and stamp sales, which provided the individual a sense of participation in the titanic struggle to rid the world of the Nazi menace in which the country was engaged.
Two substantial minority groups in Louisiana, blacks and women, historically denied full access to participation in all aspects of the state's economy and society, utilized the opportunity presented by the war years to establish themselves as heirs of the full equality accorded other Americans. Blacks purposefully, and women more by default, moved out of traditional low-paying jobs and into more lucrative jobs formerly dominated by white males who were now away at war. The gains made by both, however, proved only the beginning of true equality. Many women retreated to traditional roles with the advent of peace, and blacks had to endure the white backlash of the 1950s and beyond, but the experiences of equality sown by the war in both cases lay ready as a foundation for the struggles to broaden and to achieve true equality during the 1960s and beyond.

In summary, Louisiana changed a great deal during World War II. Politics, economy, and many aspects of the state's society were recognizably different in 1945 from the way they had been in 1939. World War II, however, only started many changes. The forces it unleashed in the state came to fruition only in the succeeding decades. Louisiana in 1945 had experienced change, but stood on the threshold of even more change set in motion by the state's experience in the massive United States war effort and by domestic forces which happened to surface during the war years.

George Brown Tindall maintains in his massive study of the New South that the southern states emerged from World War II with social and economic conditions much different from those they had known in
1939 and had even more radical changes in store. Louisiana's experience conforms to this interpretation, even though life in post-war Louisiana resumed many of its pre-war aspects. After the thousands of troops left, Louisiana's army camps were either abandoned and torn down or their functions were reduced to fit the needs of peacetime. Nevertheless, Louisiana could not return completely to the pre-war world. Just as it is still possible to stumble upon a concrete foundation at the abandoned sites of Camps Livingston or Claiborne, it is also possible to perceive the permanent changes wrought in Louisiana and the memories deeply etched into its collective or individual conscience by the war.

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