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HEIDEGGER’S RELATIONSHIP TO KANTIAN AND POST-KANTIAN THOUGHT

A Thesis

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in

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by
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This Thesis is Dedicated to my Parents,

and to the Mountains and Wildlife of Colorado
The ideas for this thesis first began with conversations with Francois Raffoul and suggestions from Edward R. Johnson. Conversations with Francois were of great help prior to writing, and Frank Schalow, aside from being the person who initially taught me Heidegger and Kant, provided many helpful comments. I am also indebted to Donald Hanks for teaching me much of the historical background that figures prominently in this text. Discussions with John Sallis regarding the *Beiträge* and German Idealism upon a visit he made to LSU proved invaluable. Conversations with Ted Kisiel regarding Heidegger and Aristotle at the 2003 Heidegger Conference were very enlightening and provided much encouragement. Greg Stone also provided many helpful discussions on Heidegger throughout my time at LSU. Thanks to Ian Crystal, whose conversational, seminar style classes are a model for how philosophy should be taught, for very stimulating discussions about ancient philosophy. Thanks also to Jon Cogburn for discussions about the nature of mind that, while in a totally different and largely materialist direction, helped me to rethink some of the most basic problems in Heidegger. Thanks to Gregory Schufreider for being my liaison to the graduate school while I was writing in Colorado and also for providing very helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks to my friends Robyn McPherson and Jason Verlander, who I had the pleasure of staying with in Denver during part of this project. Charlie Bigger has provided a continual dialogue throughout my studies of phenomenology, and I have benefitted from his unmatched breadth of insight. Finally, John Protevi has been a continual friend, provided many helpful comments, and has also been the most influential person upon my thinking of politics and ethics, truly encompassing “the best of the new left” in political philosophy.
Abstract

I provide a close analysis of truth and freedom in Heidegger’s work during the passage from *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit)* in 1927 to the *Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie)* in 1938. This analysis demonstrates the passage from a Kantian style transcendental analysis of the self to an Idealist inspired study of being-historical thinking. Throughout this shift in thinking, the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling is shown to play an increasingly decisive role in Heidegger’s thought, finally leading him to an understanding of the self in terms of freedom, community, culture, and history that carries important implications for political philosophy.
Introduction: Truth, Freedom, and Being

My objective in this project is to demonstrate the historical dimensions of the development of Martin
Heidegger’s thought in its dialogues with Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, in
regards specifically to the philosophical problems of truth and of freedom and the praxis and politics
that emerge from those analyses. This analysis will trace the passage from *Being and Time*, through
the controversial “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking, and finally into the later work of the 30’s with the
*Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie)*, covering the problems of truth and freedom
in perhaps the most crucial decade of Heidegger’s thought. It is the stated opinion of this thesis, firstly,
that the earliest of Heidegger’s work contained strong, though latent, Idealist indications and concepts
that were later expressed in the writings of the 30’s, particularly *Beiträge*, secondly, that these
developments are based primarily on Heidegger’s dialogue with the history of philosophy, and thirdly
that the early work is a Kantian project, while the later work is a German Idealist mediated break with
the earlier Kantian position. One result is that *Being and Time* can be viewed as a work of ethics, and
the *Beiträge* can be viewed as a work of politics.

In the very tradition of German Idealism, the work of the late Heidegger is at once a
simultaneous break from and a continuous development of the Kantian line of thought. That is to say,
much as Fichte saw himself as a realizer of the Kantian project at the same time as being a critic of the
received Kantian position, Heidegger is both a critic of his early work as well as a preserver of that
work who realizes the most fundamental ontological insights of fundamental ontology within a larger
being-historical structure that is no longer individualist and ahistorical. One of the features of this turn
toward his late thought is a new emphasis on praxis. Heidegger even goes so far as to conceive of his thinking on praxis as a development of Kant’s second and third critiques, a development which I situate as happening directly in the midst of the turn, finally to settle on the thinker who I will show to be central to the period of the 30s: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling.

Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of truth plays a pivotal role in his thought in both the 20’s and the 30’s, serving to define the role that Kant and the Idealists play in his thinking. One of the central insights of Being and Time is that truth, when conceived of phenomenologically, requires that it be described in a dialogue with and in an unveiling of being itself. The phenomenological allocation of truth becomes a process of revealing things that are covered over in experience by preconceptual and mechanistic frameworks of understanding. The phenomenological notion of truth expressly discards the idea that truth can be found within the structures of propositional logic or assertional correctness. Rather than revealing truth, those mechanistic assumptions stand directly opposed to everything that phenomenology stands for. Described from its Greek etymology, phenomenology is a type of unconcealing seeing that presents itself through the openness of language (Heidegger, 1962: 58). For the phenomenologist to possess truth, he must discard trying to give reductive analyses of objects that break them into parts, robbing them of the richness afforded by their presentation within the experiential openness of Dasein to the world in which it encounters the being that it wishes to gain insight to. Dasein should instead stand open to the world, allowing the being in question to present itself to Dasein while Dasein opens itself to letting that being be what it is, letting language express the experience of disclosedness within the richness of its openness rather than its propositional assertions (Heidegger, 1962: 272).
What phenomenological truth also means for Heidegger is that Dasein and the beings presented to it must bear some relation with being itself as a primordial field that underlies the horizon of self manifestation and presentation of all beings in the world. A preunderstanding of being by Dasein is required for Dasein to have the capability to be in truth. Truth is the unconcealment of beings, and in their most primordial form, beings are presented within the larger field of being itself. Heidegger will show that Dasein experiences the most authentic presentation of a being when it does so in an attunement with being that is granted through the temporal openness of Dasein. The significance of this finding that being is essential to phenomenological truth is that the first and foremost task of the phenomenologist must be to gain an insight into being, to bring it itself into disclosedness (Heidegger, 1962: 61-62).

The early conception of freedom for Heidegger, that to be found in *Being and Time*, is not unrelated to truth, but it does serve to downplay the relationship between truth and freedom and does not even come close to conceiving the two notions as equiprimordial. It is a frequent philosophical move performed by Heidegger, especially in *Being and Time* but also throughout his later works, to conceive of two concepts as coconstituting one another, not as being identical, but as originating together and as functioning together within the same structure in a relationship of dependence and emergence together: the world for example, cannot be thought of with the things that are within it. Much like being and Dasein are equiprimordial in *Being and Time*, so will be truth and freedom at a

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1John Sallis explains in an essay that “*Being and Time* supplies no developed analysis of freedom comparable to those of understanding and disposition. Functioning as an operative rather than a thematic concept, this determination provides Heidegger with a powerful resource for expressing the comportment of Dasein to its own possibilities” (Raffoul and Pettigrew: 4).
later stage of Heidegger’s thought. It is the further elaboration of this equiprimordiality of being and Dasein within the Kant book as the structure which allows Dasein to experience things in the world—to possess truth not epistemologically as Kant is often read, but ontologically—that perhaps will lead Heidegger to necessarily rethink what he means by truth and freedom, discovering that unconcealment and freedom are both so essentially present in Dasein’s experience in the world that the two cannot be easily disentangled. These are developments that I will outline in my second chapter which covers the Kantian phase of Heidegger’s thinking, during which he wrote *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

The early view of freedom is essentially tied to Dasein’s existence as care and being in the world. To be Dasein is to be in the world, constantly tied in at every moment with a relational nexus of things that emerge from the world to present themselves to Dasein and to also form the always unstable identity that is Dasein. Dasein, at the same time, coequally forms the world in which it dwells, providing the site in which that world can reveal itself and always changing that world in terms of how Dasein relates itself within the world, using beings in the world as tools or choosing not to attend to some things, comporting itself to being within all pervading moods that change not only Dasein but also the world in which it dwells. Dasein is free in the sense that it always has the ability to make choices in its encounters with the world and that it can never cease to encounter and coconstitute that world. That freedom has boundaries, because Dasein exists in a world not wholly of its making, a condition expressed by Heidegger as thrownness, but Dasein is always at the same time free, because it plays, in every instant, a role in the constitution and disclosedness of that world. Dasein is free in its ability to be authentic, always free to experience its own finitude, and has the freedom to choose to choose, the
ability to make decisions to take action in the world. In the later work, thrownness will play a larger role in the sense that in the *Beiträge*, Dasein is more firmly embedded in a historical environment not chosen by it, but mediated by *Ereignis*. The freedom of Dasein in this world will be constituted more in terms of the ability to be immersed in the openness of *Ereignis*. Praxis will require truth.

Heidegger’s discourse on freedom finally brings us into the realm of the political within his thought. The *Beiträge* raises the question of whether Dasein, and consequently man, possesses the freedom to act politically outside of being directed through a historical and communal process. Does the irreducability of Dasein to materiality allow for Dasein to escape the manipulative process of machination, or does it in fact leave Dasein at the mercy of larger political structures, the formation of which it cannot control? Politics for Heidegger in the *Beiträge* can be thought of as the nexus of culture, language, art, and *Ereignis*. He does not refer to himself as having a politics, but he does speak of these forces as working together to form the world that Dasein lives in, and the argument can be made quite strongly that describing the process by which the social sphere of Dasein is historically formed and the process by which it is changed does necessarily entail a politics. This is where we find already prefigured the passage from Heidegger into post Heideggerian political works by thinkers such as Deleuze and Foucault: the communal praxis of late Heideggerian thinking leads one to entertain questions of collective action, as one can well ponder in Marx, and the process by which Dasein is formed historically raises questions about subject formation.

The Marxist themes of the *Beiträge* resonate in Heidegger’s obsessive concern with technology, machination, calculation, teleology, history, and communal decision. Heidegger is no Marxist to be sure. He is not a materialist and does not believe that the history of being is directed
towards a final telos as the result of the industrial development that he refers to as machination. He is however a strong expresser of the aforementioned Marxist themes and Idealist inspired obsession with praxis. His project is more to rethink those categories in being-historical terms. At this stage, one can then finally speak of a Heideggerian politics. It is a politics that is just as problematic as the ethics that he presents in *Being and Time*, however, a politics that is brilliant for reconceiving the political in apolitical terms and for producing a beguiling ambiguity as to how to use the text as a doctrine for actually acting.²

One learns from Heidegger the importance of giving birth to the new beginning and has something of a hint as to how to arrive at such a new epoch, and the Heideggerian valuation of the earth as a site for truth and the devaluation of the technological as a mode of concealing and destructive and dominating revealing is a potentially exciting avenue for the study of environmental philosophy. One could argue that the problem of environmental destruction and even of wide scale technologically mediated and structured violence upon societies, as has been seen in many 20th century genocides, is a problem that is partly rooted in a scientific and representationalist world view of domination and imposition that can be, at least in part, combated by undermining the Cartesian set of assumptions upon

²*Beiträge* conceives of the political in apolitical terms in the sense that it provides no express study of politics any more than *Being and Time* contains an express study of ethics, but it uses terminology and concepts that would suggest a latent politics. While Heidegger does not use a moralistic vocabulary to elevate the status of the original beginning or the ones to come and to denigrate machination, he does seem very clearly to find certain epochs, such as the original beginning or the new beginning, to be preferable to others, such as what he describes as the present epoch of machination and the forgetting and withdrawal of being. The political then becomes apolitical in the sense of being subsumed by the history of being, much as one could argue that in *Being and Time*, ethics is subsumed by ontology.
which that model of the world depends. Heidegger at least can be said to offer the tools with which
one can in part carry out such a project, such as a definition of truth that undermines calculation in favor
of revealing and a view of space that emphasizes a dwelling place as opposed to a quantifiable location.

The problem I must nonetheless confess to is that one can receive very little in the way of a
directive as to how to bring about the new beginning that Heidegger so lucidly expresses in the
Beiträge. This is a virtue of the text just as much as a problem, however. Not only has Heidegger
phenomenologized Idealist discourse, but he has also imported Nietzschean elements into it. By
creating a work of beguiling ambiguity and self evolution, Heidegger has attempted to formulate a view
of praxis that plays a generative role in the formation of new political, cultural, artistic, and linguistic, that
is to say being-historical structures. While Foucault traces the role of institutions in the formation of the
body, Heidegger traces the role of being-historical structures in the formation of Dasein. Just as the
soul is an artificial construct for Foucault, for Heidegger contemporary Dasein is the construction of
being-historical structures expressed in contemporary language. As is always the case in Heidegger,
Dasein can be changed and can regenerate both itself and the world around it—consequently it can
change the political sphere from the ground up.

There is no stable politics to be found in the Beiträge and no blueprint for action, but rather the
stimulation to rethink old problems anew in the hopes of finding a way out of the present conundrum
that technological civilization finds itself trapped in, without leading to the type of totalising disaster to be
found in the Third Reich, Stalinist Russia, and scientific, industrial, and theologically imperialist America.
Heidegger famously believed Germany to be caught within the pincers of American industrialism and
Russian communism, seeing the Third Reich as a way to offer a third choice and mediate between the
eastern and western disasters. Having seen the Nazis themselves to be a disaster, Heidegger offers a sweeping criticism of all three political forms within the _Beiträge_, while avoiding the disastrous strategy of offering a definite roadmap to respond to them, as he previously believed the Third Reich to be a valid political and mythological response to industrialization.\(^3\)

The Heideggerian unraveling of the link between science and Christianity that one discovers in the _Beiträge_ is condemnatory of biology, industry, science, and mass movements all together, showing them all to be the result of the same epoch of the forgetting of being, to be countered only by a radically new way of thinking. In some ways this is then a hallmark of the development of later leftist French thought that seeks to offer a politics of radically reevaluating traditional structures through a mode of criticizing and analyzing the processes through which those structures are formed and influencing the construction of one’s political sphere through everyday interactions rather than through a preplanned directive to be carried out by all. The chief disagreement between Heidegger and Deleuze and Foucault would center on Heidegger’s rejection of materialism, his emphasis on communal action, and his always overriding questioning of being. This is of course a massive difference, but I nonetheless see strong intellectual currents in the way these thinkers all believe that the processes by which subjects are

\(^3\) Heidegger offers no express and direct refutation of these three political forms, but he very clearly rejects the principles of all three by criticizing calculative thinking, acceleration, the gigantic, mass movements, machination, industry, biologism, and the media throughout the _Beiträge_, but especially in the chapter on echo. The consideration of the world that existed at the time of the _Beiträge_ as being an epoch in which being has withdrawn to leave Dasein in distress and concealment would seem to not find any existing political system to be acceptable, and the three modes of political organization competing for power were industrial democracy, national socialism, and Marxist-Leninism.
constructed must be studied, rethought, and harnessed by those subjects themselves in order to think
within a radically more open decision from which new political solutions can be generated.

The Heideggerian emphasis upon language as structuring the constitution of Dasein, the
community, and the political is also a common theme that is shared with the contemporary French
philosophers. In the end, I would see a politics that emphasizes a community of openness in which the
subject can rethink itself and its world as being the common project of Heidegger in the Beiträge and
also of the contemporary leftists. Further development of the Beiträge as a political work should well
complement the sense in which Being and Time may be viewed as a work of ethics, and doing so is a
primary goal of this study, a goal to be carried out through an elaboration of truth, freedom, and praxis
in Heidegger’s dialogue with Idealist philosophy. While attempts to formulate an ethics based on Being
and Time lead to such great ambiguity in regards to determining how one should act that it may seem
as though the text is a disaster for ethics in any sort of practical sense–brilliant though it is for
discovering a new way to approach ethics–that very ambiguity may be seen as a strength for a
Heideggerian politics, nonetheless, because it is a precise way to counter contemporary political
landscapes of totalization and domination. One way in which a politics first begins to be carried out is
through Heidegger’s destructive reading of the philosophical tradition, a project that opens up new
possibilities for studying the construction of western discourse and institutions.

One of the major parts of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is his project of destroying
the history of western metaphysics as a way to reach an originary understanding of being as it had once
been experienced by the ancient Greeks, only later to be forgotten through the rise of ontotheology,
Christianity, and science with the corresponding eternal presencing which would come to be
erroneously thought of as being by the philosophical tradition. The rise of ontotheology, that insidious stamping of a stable and eternal moment that erects itself upon a world of flux, dynamism, and unfolding temporality, for Heidegger begins with Plato, and most especially with his middle dialogues. The Platonic system gave birth to a rational system with notions of eternity, permanence, and eschatology. For a more original understanding of being, Heidegger turns to the ancient Greeks, most particularly Anaximander and Heraclitus, with their notions of a field that permeates all things in the world (the boundless oblivion of being for Anaximander and the play of the logos between opposites for Heraclitus), much as Dasein would later be thought to be immersed in all aspects of the world, always constituting, changing, and being constituted by that world (Heidegger, 1975: 56-57, 77). A return to an authentic understanding of being would be a reemergence of the earliest of ancient Greek philosophical thoughts, those of the presocratics, and also a reemergence of the revealing to be found in ancient Greek poetry and mythology.

To recover this lost understanding, Heidegger must destroy the great philosophical texts, particularly those from Descartes to Kant, and uncover their insights within the problematic of fundamental ontology. Despite complaints from Heidegger’s critics that he never completed this project of *Being and Time*, he did in fact carry out his studies in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Having completed this project, Heidegger was led to explore new dimensions of being within the temporal horizon and analysis of Dasein that he had already successfully described. It is then through his study of Kant in the late 20's and early 30's that Heidegger begins to inaugurate a rupture from fundamental ontology that coincides with a redefinition of what truth and freedom mean for
Dasein. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger describes Dasein in terms of its ability to ontologically unconceal beings through a temporal framework that is first introduced by Kant. Kant then becomes the great philosopher since Aristotle, not because he was a great epistemologist, but because he was the first philosopher to conceive of and to structurally elaborate the temporal constitution of the subject that allows for it to receive and co-constitute the world of object relations to beings. This early study of Kant is not so difficult to reconcile with Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time*, because it retains the same central relationship between Dasein, being, and the world, a relationship mediated by the ontological difference and the horizon of temporality.

The Kant book also uncovers problems for Heidegger, however. His study of Dasein within the Kantian problematic leads him to ask new questions about what it means for Dasein to be free, leading him to a reevaluation of Kant from the standpoint of his practical philosophy and practical reason. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant provides a study of the subject in terms of features of the self that were left as impossible to study by way of the antinomies of the first critique. That is to say that as Kant established the boundaries of reason in the first critique, he was left with philosophical problems that could not be solved, because finite reason overreaches itself when it attempts to think of god, freedom, and immortality. While these things cannot be known, they can be thought, and Kant conceives practical reason as the faculty that allows for the philosophical study of freedom, ethics, and immortality. It is particularly the role that Heidegger’s study of freedom in Kant’s practical ethics plays in his rethinking of freedom through the “turn” that will make up the substance of my third chapter. This rethinking of the freedom of Dasein, and the rethinking of truth that is correlative with it will ultimately lead to a new encounter between Heidegger and his German Idealist predecessors.
Because the freedom of Dasein is necessarily tied to its existence within the world, that freedom is most basically determined by Dasein’s choices in how it comports itself to the world. With the Kant book, Heidegger realized that Dasein is so intrinsically constituted by the horizon in which that world presents itself as unconcealment that freedom and truth must be more intimately related. The traditional reading of Kant is to see him as an epistemologist, a thinker who maintains the separation between the self and the world, but Heidegger’s destructive rereading of Kant reveals that he is first and foremost an ontologist. To make assertions about what truth is for Kant is to make assertions about how Dasein provides a space for the being of beings to be revealed. Because Dasein is always playing the role of concealing and unconcealing beings, and always must choose how it comports itself to those beings, freedom begins to play a more fundamental role in truth.

Heidegger will not wish to totally discard his notion of truth as unconcealment, and I think it is erroneous to read him as totally discarding a prior definition in favor of a newer one. While thinking of these texts as providing us with definitions provides us with a useful convention for describing the texts, as a phenomenologist, Heidegger wishes to offer a definition at no point, but instead is providing us with a description that becomes increasingly nuanced as his thinking progresses. To see the early view on truth as a definition of unconcealment and the later view as the definition of freedom is to miss the nuances of the role that freedom plays in the coconstitution of Dasein and the world in *Being and Time*, and also to miss the importance that unconcealment still holds for freedom and truth as Heidegger offers his new description.

The major figures of Idealism: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, all figure prominently throughout the later thought, but it is the influence of Schelling that predominates first and foremost. The initial split
from a Kantian architectonic style study of the subject of experience towards the direction of community, epoch, and history follows a Fichtean line of thought. It is Fichtean in the sense that Fichte believed himself, in writing the *Science of Knowledge*, to be the great realizer and elaborator of the Kantian system by constructing a philosophy that made the transcendental subject both the source and the experiencer of all things in the natural world. Under Fichte, the ego, or as he terms it the “I”, is capable of constituting the phenomenal world in the form of generating it while at the same time remaining distinct and ontologically apart from that world, but at the same time being able to possess absolute knowledge of that world by way of its privileged position within it. Fichte felt his philosophy to be the ultimate realization of Kant, because it provided the strongest and most formal statement of the transcendental subject operating as the ontologically prior agent that constitutes the world of nature and experience, brushing aside the problems of an unknowable thing in itself.

Heidegger has an unfortunate habit of not acknowledging his debt to other thinkers, and any project that hopes to reconstruct Heidegger’s development and relations to his numerous sources must necessarily trace the connections between ideas that resonate in both thinkers rather than relying on Heidegger’s express admission of his debt to other philosophers, as Dennis Schmidt points out in regard to Heidegger’s debt to Fichte within his rectoral address (Raffoul and Pettigrew: 165). I will resultantly have to often show the similarities and foreshadowings of ideas that exist between Heidegger and his sources, rather than relying solely on his express mentions of them. In the case of Fichte, he does figure prominently in one of Heidegger’s lectures from the period of the turn covering the Idealist movement as a whole, but he figures even more prominently in an unacknowledged sense in regards to Heidegger’s notion of being in the world and in the way that he will critique Kant.
Fichte is ultimately not the great Idealist for Heidegger, and Hegel also figures prominently in Heidegger’s encounter with German Idealism. We are particularly lucky to have preserved a lecture course on Hegel that occurred in the period of 1930-1931, roughly approximating the time of the “turn.” The lecture is primarily valuable not for Heidegger’s agreement with Hegel, but for outlining the specific philosophical problems that Heidegger was interested in exploring in Hegel and for helping to clarify exactly why it is Schelling who is to become the great Idealist for Heidegger. Heidegger will object most explicitly to Hegel for undermining the importance of freedom to the Idealist project of system building and also object to what he sees as a lack of temporality in the Hegelian system. He will further show the importance of the dialectic to ontology.

My discussions of Fichte and Hegel are comparatively brief and schematic, because it is Schelling who will prove to be the most crucial thinker for Heidegger at the time of the Beiträge. Heidegger’s dialogue with Schelling serves as the backdrop for his later inquiry into the history of being and also for his departure from Kant. Heidegger’s chief criticism of Kant is in regards to the Kantian positioning of time within the subject. This philosophical move allows Kant to ignore being as itself the temporal horizon. For the later Heidegger, being is presented not through time but by way of freedom. The freedom of Dasein opens up a horizon of decision and of unconcealment within Ereignis through which being can be manifested; being and temporality merge into the history of being, while Dasein experiences being in Ereignis rather than ecstasis. This event of appropriation spans not through the primordial constitution of the individual Dasein, but through the historical and social nexus of freedom within which Dasein is always immersed. Because Ereignis opens into a socially structured nexus—the world of Dasein—it is constituted within history, and can be segmented into epochs. These epochs
encompass different manifestations of being into the world. Within each epoch, Dasein experiences being differently and experiences the world in which it dwells differently as well.

To demonstrate the importance of Schelling and the new dialogue concerning truth, freedom, and praxis in German Idealism to the new idea of Ereignis (and the corresponding fourfold), I will focus on three texts from roughly the same period, the two lecture courses Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom and Basic Questions of Philosophy, and the incomplete magnum opus Contributions to Philosophy, written shortly thereafter. With Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger neatly ties together many of the themes present throughout the turn. Most importantly, he revives the problem of truth as one of freedom for ground, demonstrating how this problem in fact underlies the work of the Beiträge. In the 1936 lecture course, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger makes clear that the Schellingian project of systematizing human freedom into a grand metaphysical construct provides the final element of his turn away from the analysis of the temporialized subject.

For the Idealists, time is conceived historically, forcing Heidegger into the position of having to rethink the somewhat lacking historical dimensions of his early view on temporality. To encounter Idealism is to encounter a set of historical and communal philosophical problems, and in the case of Schelling it is human freedom that provides the grounding for those problems. That freedom is the ground not only for time but also for history, because Idealism follows Kantian practical philosophy in that the subject is no longer the “I think” of transcendental philosophy but has become the “I act.” It is not possible to consider being from the perspective of radical subjectivity and temporality within this horizon. One must instead study the subject as it networks its way into a larger community and
historical context in which decisions and actions are made and in which the ground opens itself through those actions. The early notions of being in the world certainly did tie Dasein irreducibly to the world around it and to being with others, but those early views also make it difficult to conceive of the world and of being beyond the way it is experienced by a Dasein. It is true that Mitsein is a part of the constitution of Dasein in the early work, but it is only to a single Dasein that Heidegger speaks of disclosedness taking place in Being and Time: never the disclosedness of the Mitsein but always the concealment of the they self (Heidegger, 1962: 156, 213). In the later work, we learn to discover the mythological processes by which Dasein and the world are themselves formed in their appropriation by being, and we also discover how Ereignis unconceals beings not only to single Daseins, but to an entire people.

The Schellingian project in On Human Freedom of grounding a system within freedom itself rests on the ability of the subject to choose between good and evil. With the decision to choose the good, ground is opened up into history, while the choosing of evil brings a withdrawal and withholding. The extension of this choosing throughout history leads Heidegger into the view of a historical decision making, a revealing, and a withdrawal of being. One crucial insight that Heidegger derives from this is the claim that being contains within itself a primordial evil. This evil in its primordiality finds its expression in the Beiträge through the notions of distress and machination and also through the idea that an entire epoch can be dangerous and destructive as being reveals itself in a dominating way that forces the earth into concealment. Because unconcealment always entails that concealment be present at the same moment, and because any withdrawal of Ereignis also serves to protect what is left concealed, a reversal awaits the epoch of the withdrawal of being with the result that a new beginning
must lie at some point in the future. The withdrawal and appropriating aspects of Ereignis parallel Schelling’s dual presencing of good and evil within any choosing and opening of the ground.

Finally, I will show ways in which the latest of Schelling’s writings and attempts to formulate a system, Ages of the World, contributes to the Beiträge and to Heideggerian thinking about freedom. Heidegger gives little explicit mention of the three incomplete drafts of this work, but it works out many of the projects laid out in On Human Freedom, dealing especially with the problems of genesis and time. These insights that would be difficult to neglect in any study of Schelling and the Beiträge, particularly in regards to Heidegger’s notion of giving birth to a new beginning. Ages of the World is an extension of the system of freedom that confronts the problem of genesis not from a choice between good and evil but from the capacity of the subject to will the generation of a future by performing actions that will overcome the stasis of the past, and I will conclude with a discussion of how this thinking helps Heidegger to conceive of a new beginning being the product not only of an Ereignis that history must await to come into openness, but as something that can be brought about by a certain type of thinking to be performed by Dasein.

In attempting to construct a reading of so many sources and concepts in Heidegger’s work, one is immediately faced with a methodological concern as to how to deal with the large variety of texts found in the corpus. The Gesamtausgabe is composed of lecture courses, published books, published essays, public lectures, and previously unpublished manuscripts, leaving one with the question of what status to attribute to which of Heidegger’s works within such a massive corpus. Any reading requires dealing with a relatively small number of these texts, because an all encompassing discussion of Heidegger’s publications would simply be too massive an undertaking. I would suggest a dual response
to this problem: no work should be taken out of context of the entirety of the *Seinsfrage* but it is also the case that fragments of Heidegger’s work can point towards the whole. The essence of hermeneutics lies in the ability for the part to point towards the whole, such as the question of being to which Dasein already possesses some sense. To this end, I place primary weight upon Heidegger’s singular published magnum opus, *Being and Time*, and upon his later posthumously published and incomplete second magnum opus, *Beiträge*.

The Kant book has an unusual status in the sense of being both a published text and also a work on another thinker rather than only an elaboration of Heidegger’s own original thinking. It was published shortly after *Being and Time* in a period in which it would have been expected for Heidegger to continue his problematic of fundamental ontology, and this work stands out to me as a continuation of *Being and Time* in the sense of exploring Heidegger’s continuation of his project of destroying the history of metaphysics. The *Beiträge* may cause some concern as a text that is unfinished and was never published, but it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger did in fact intend for the posthumous publication of this work, claiming it to have held great importance. We cannot then say that it is a thinking that Heidegger was to consider unsuccessful. Rather, a further account, which is beyond the scope of the present work, may readily demonstrate that much of Heidegger’s later work seems to have been drawn directly from the *Beiträge* and developed out of it. While the text is incomplete, which may incline one to claim that it is unsuccessful, it may also be said that the very nature of being-historical thinking requires that it be incomplete. A thinking within the jointure (*Fuge*) is necessarily an incomplete thought, as Walter Brogan has pointed out, and it may then be the very incompleteness of the work that makes it a success (Scott, Schoenbohm, Vallega-Neu, and Vallega: 174).
Between these works, I show a conduit of thought that takes place in Heidegger’s lecture courses, and the value of these courses may very well lie in the fact that they show Heidegger’s thinking in evolution as it transitions from one point to the next. The framework for interpreting them lies in a taking hold of concepts that exist in Heidegger’s published works to discover the process by which those concepts are transformed into later published texts and manuscripts. While the Kant and Schelling lectures do not demonstrate what I would term as a final thinking of Heidegger’s, they can elucidate ideas that reach their final formulation in other texts and unfold the subterranean conduits (connections to and dialogues with other thinkers in Heidegger’s lecture courses which occur beneath the public edifice of his publications) by which these transformations take place. The Schelling lecture is quite simply the most extensive discussion of jointure that occurs in Heidegger prior to the Beiträge, and while we cannot take the Schelling lecture as a final position, it would be remiss not to reasonably accept that Heidegger had the problems of that lecture course in mind as he was writing the Beiträge almost contemporaneously.
Transcendental Philosophy and The Kantian Period

The early and most famous phase of Heidegger’s thought, that of the late 20's, is what I term as the Kantian period.\footnote{Reiner Schürmann and William J. Richardson also find Heidegger’s work of the late 20's to have a very Kantian bent. Richardson stresses that the Kant book was originally intended as the first of the second part of Being and Time, and explains that Heidegger’s project at this time is Kantian in the sense that fundamental ontology attempts to lay the foundation for ontology just as Heidegger interprets Kant as attempting to lay the foundation for metaphysics (Richardson: 33). Schürmann finds Heidegger’s project of this period to be Kantian as well, in that Heidegger attempts to use analytic principles and categories to carry out a transcendental project of deducing and legitimating a structural whole (Schurmann: 157-161).} At this time, Heidegger was attempting to undertake an analytic of Dasein as a way to understand the presentation and concealment of being. This project is Kantian in its analysis of the subject that functions as both the precondition and the coconstituter of the world in which it is immersed. It was at this time that Being and Time (1927) and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) were written. The two books are closely related, and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics is in some ways a continuation of Being and Time. The same can be said for the 1927 lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology and the 1927-1928 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. They are continuations in the sense that they continue the problematic of recovering a lost understanding of being by way of studying the temporal structure of the subject—the project of fundamental ontology—and also by way of destroying the history of metaphysics as Heidegger expressly considers necessary in Being and Time.

The Kant book is perhaps the most crucial phase of Heidegger’s destructive reading of the history of philosophy because of the underlying problematic that he is wrestling with as he encounters
the metaphysical tradition: the problem of the subject. It is the subject as it is construed within modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant that is the most contemporary form of metaphysics, and that traditional idea of the subject must be destroyed if an understanding of being is to be regained. It must be destroyed, because the notion of the subject as transcendental conceals what for Heidegger is most truly transcendental—being itself (Sein des Seiendes) as it is experienced by Dasein. The project of Being and Time is one of explicating time as the transcendental horizon for the question of the sense of being, but this entails an explication of Dasein as a being that is transcendental by virtue of its temporal constitution and that is divorced of the subject/object distinction; it is therefore fitting that a confrontation with Kant will force Heidegger to rethink his most fundamental ideas, drawing his early work to a close.5

A close study of the Kant book in light of Being and Time sheds light on the role that Kant plays in both the writing of that treatise and also in the movement beyond it. The central problematic that concerns a study of truth and freedom is that of precisely how the temporal constitution of the subject contributes to truth and freedom in this phase of Heidegger’s thinking. The Kant book is first and foremost an exposition on time as it both constitutes Dasein and allows for Dasein to experience beings. With this text, the temporal constitution of Dasein plays a more foundational role in questioning experience than had been the case in Being and Time. For Dasein to be in the world with the

5Dasein is a transcendental being in the sense that time is the transcendental horizon that is foundational to Dasein’s experience. While Dasein is already immersed in the world, leaving it unnecessary to bridge a gulf separating subject and object, Dasein still is transcendental in the sense of being the place that allows for the encounter between being and beings. The ontological difference then requires that Dasein be a transcendental being in the sense of reaching beyond this divide.
possibility of experiencing beings, it is primordially existent as a temporal being, temporal first and foremost because it is temporality that allows for the imagination to produce representations of objects in the world, as Heidegger will show. Dasein is now not only first and foremost, from an ontological perspective, the being that poses the question of being; it is also the being that exists as temporal in its most fundamental constitution. The horizon of time itself becomes the openness of Dasein, because Heidegger understands Kant as locating the possibility of knowledge within the temporal character of the imagination, and Dasein’s preconceptual understanding of being is the direct result of this temporal constitution (Heidegger, 1990: 121).

Heidegger’s understanding of Kant is, to be sure, un-Kantian in its most fundamental arguments, presuppositions, and conclusions, but this is not the result of an error on Heidegger’s part as he uses Kant to develop his own thinking of truth and freedom. As always, Heidegger is less interested in explicating his historical predecessor than he is in showing how his predecessor can contribute to his larger philosophical endeavor of the restoration of being as the primary focus of philosophy. His view of Kant is un-Kantian, because it does not take seriously the Kantian separation of the subject and the thing in itself or the Kantian understanding of objects of experience as being conditioned epistemically rather than ontologically. This is the direct result of Heidegger’s own appropriation and reorientation of transcendental philosophy. It is a reorientation that is quite radical in opposing traditional

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6While *Being and Time* does already demonstrate the temporality of Dasein, there is a difference of emphasis and methodology. In that text, temporality becomes apparent only after an inquiry into Dasein’s experience in the world. In the Kant book, by contrast, the formal temporal constitution of Dasein is itself the starting point. This does not contradict *Being and Time*, but it allows for Heidegger to open a pathway into changing where he places the emphasis of his questioning into being by way of time, opening the possibility of a less individualistic view of time.
understandings of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a work which is almost always considered an inquiry into knowledge rather than being, particularly by the Neo-Kantians, the school of thought that is most explicitly being attacked here. Heidegger reads Kant not as an epistemologist, but as an ontologist, an ontologist not because he is writing a treatise to continue the tradition of western metaphysics, but because he demonstrates that metaphysics cannot survive unless one first provides an ontological ground from which to ask questions about metaphysics (Heidegger, 1990: 7). This ground is not a ground in the Cartesian tradition of the foundational metaphysical principles from which to construct a larger system, but it is a ground in the sense of placing the subject in a certain position, ontologically speaking, from which it can have the possibility of experience. The Kantian problematic is then one of the ontology of the self—an early insight into what Heidegger would later term fundamental ontology.

When Heidegger claims that Kant is trying to lay the foundation for metaphysics as a science, he means that Kant is trying to find an ontological basis for metaphysics: if pure reason is to be studied *a priori* as the foundation for metaphysics, then this entails the study of the ontology of pure reason within the self (Heidegger, 1990: 11). This is again one of the prime Heideggerian reasons for valuing Kant as the greatest post Greek philosopher. Kant is unique in understanding that metaphysics has entered into a crisis because it lacks an appropriate understanding of ontology. While not going so far as to realize the forgetting of being, Kant does carry out work that points strongly along that path by unveiling the need for an understanding of ontology if metaphysics is not to be swept aside. He is then the person who most fully realizes the crisis of metaphysics from the standpoint of ontology. Kant, of course, was trying to salvage metaphysics from the very persuasive Humean objections of the 18th century, but for Heidegger, Kant failed in not realizing that the crisis of metaphysics was the result of the
need to study not only beings but being itself, to not only demonstrate how beings present themselves to
the self but also to demonstrate how being participates in and makes possible this presentation. Had he
seen the fundamental opposition between ontology and metaphysics, Kant would have understood in
Heideggerian terms the need to sweep aside metaphysics itself to salvage being. In the sense of trying
to study being from experience, Heidegger’s project is itself in some ways a continuation of the earlier
Humean project of discarding metaphysics in favor of experience. The difference is that Heidegger
wishes to further the study of ontology, because he sees being as itself necessary for the presentation of
experience, rather than wishing to scrap all discourse about being, a discourse that contains within itself
the historical metaphysical problem of freedom.

In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asks the question of what conditions allow for the very
possibility of unified and rational experience; in more specifically metaphysical terms, he asks what gives
rise to knowledge of the synthetic a priori, the domain of experience within which all metaphysical
problems must fall if they are not to be simply discarded as was suggested by Hume (Kant, 1929: 55).
This is what traditionally leads to the interpretation of Kant as an epistemologist, one who asks the
question of how knowledge is possible. The Heideggerian unraveling of the opposition between subject
and object, however, makes such an understanding of Kant impossible, because Heidegger destroys
the tradition of epistemology by unraveling the separation between subject and object upon which that
tradition depends. He accomplishes this by demonstrating that Dasein and the world are so
fundamentally intertwined that Dasein’s own experience of itself is conditioned by its existence as a
being in the world with worldly concerns and a relationship to things in the world that would traditionally
be considered external to the subject. In the midst of the collapse of the subject and object into the
unified field of being in the world, problems of knowledge become problems of ontology. Rather than
the self being a subject which contemplates an external object that it tries to gain knowledge of, the
Heideggerian problematic becomes the problem of how the being of the self experiences beings in the
world within which it is immersed. Additionally, as someone studying the knowledge of metaphysics as
it is conditioned by the self, Kant is inquiring into both being itself and also into the being of the self,
though only in the veiled and misunderstood way that metaphysics entails a certain idea of being. The
job for Heidegger is to sweep away the metaphysical baggage from Kant in order to demonstrate how
his study of the temporality of the self contributes to an understanding of beings, of the being of man,
and of being itself. One must then ask what the consequences to freedom and truth are in light of this
radical destruction of the Kantian system.

For Kant, the most basic and initial presentation of beings in the external world takes the form
of intuition. The Kantian notion of intuition is recast by Heidegger into the idea of lived experience,
because there is no external world for Heidegger. Rather than forms of intuition being conditioned by
concepts of understanding such that external objects are experienced by a subject severed from a thing
in itself, Dasein experiences the world as it is thrown into it and coconstituted within it. The self is still
transcendental for Heidegger, but it is transcendental in the sense of being a horizon that bears a special
and privileged relationship to being itself. Fundamental ontology is itself the project of destroying Kant

7Intuition for Kant means quite simply to have an experience, and an entire transcendental
apparatus is required in order for this to take place. Heidegger likewise is carrying out a study of
experience and its conditions, which in *Being and Time* is the horizon of being in which beings become
manifest, but in the case of Heidegger, Dasein is always already immersed in experience. Given his
close relation to Kant, it does not seem unreasonable to see his notion of lived experience as a
reconsideration of intuition within phenomenological presentation.
as an epistemologist and developing his insights as an ontology, bearing an essential relation to Kant within the larger problematic of transcendental philosophy. The question then becomes that of how can, not reason, but the being of man allow for the conditions of experience? Rather than grappling with the finitude of reason, the issue then becomes a grappling with the finitude of existence and of experience itself, an experience that includes knowledge of the self, because for Heidegger self knowledge and knowledge of the world are inseparably intertwined. Kant saw keenly that the transcendence of the self into the world requires a study of finitude and is itself conditioned by finitude, but he always placed this finitude in the context of reason; it is Heidegger who understands the finitude that conditions experience in terms of the finite existence of Dasein (Kant, 1929: 47). The finitude of the self and being as conditioned by temporality becomes the issue for transcendental philosophy.

Transcendence for Heidegger means to supercede or to reach beyond, but in Kant the meaning of transcendence is more specifically a mode of a priori knowledge of objects, an a priori knowledge which, in Heideggerian terms, makes possible a transcendence from the subject to the object, but Heidegger places a unique twist upon this notion, seeing transcendental philosophy as the philosophy that destroys the separation and opposition between subject and object in such a way as to mesh the two together (Kant, 1929: 58-59). Rather than allowing for the subject to transcend itself to encounter things external to it, Heidegger collapses the notion of subjectivity to demonstrate that the self is already immersed in the world at its very core, functioning transcendentally in the sense of coconstitution rather than mere precondition. This is a fundamentally un-Kantian approach taken by Heidegger, because

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8Transcendental for Kant refers to a priori preconditions, but in Heidegger’s vocabulary the term refers to a reaching beyond or a superceding rather than a precondition. This would seem to
Kant is more expressly drawing a separation between subject and object and then schematizing these ontologically distinct entities than he is destroying such a separation. Heidegger will also perform a further violence to Kant by demonstrating that transcendence also occurs towards being itself (Heidegger, 1990: 155). Prior to Descartes and modern philosophy, the subject was not conceived of as an agent separate from the world around it. There were attempts to place the self on a different plane ontologically, but in epistemic terms it was assumed that the subject could experience objects of knowledge as they in fact were. This epistemic understanding of modern philosophy that reaches its height in Kant is one of the main thrusts of Heidegger’s critique, but he at the same time wishes to demonstrate the role of the self in the constitution of truth.

Having relocated the problem of transcendence from epistemology to ontology, transcendence will become a crucial part of the developing discourse on freedom for Heidegger. The self as a transcendent being has the ability to stand beyond its mere self, altering itself and projecting itself into the world around it. In the case of the Kant book, this transcendence takes place by way of temporality, much the way that Dasein transcends itself in *Being and Time*, except that now transcendence must be the result of the productive imagination, because it is the a priori faculty that temporalizes the experiences of Dasein and makes possible its ecstatic constitution. Self reflection also plays a role that is reminiscent of *Being and Time*: transcendence takes place as the self reaches
beyond its present instantiation and into self-consciousness to discover a temporal horizon that allows for it to reconstitute itself. One may argue that within this horizon exists freedom, because to be free, Dasein must be able to have a grasp of its identity as constituted from the past and the present and projected into futural possibilities of which it can spontaneously choose. As Heidegger says in the Kant lecture of 1927-1928, “Time is original receptivity and original spontaneity. Original temporality is that in which the primal activity of the self and its concern with the self is grounded. And it is the same temporality which at any time makes possible a self-identification of the self,” and also, “we are not concerned with the momentary now [das momentane Jetzt] but with the identity and sameness of the genuine self insofar as it is free and determined by the ‘I can’” (Heidegger, 1997: 267-268). There is a further transcendence in the ability of the self to reach into the world around it to gain ontic knowledge of beings, and finally a form of transcendence that Heidegger finds latent in Kant: the ability to use the temporal roots of the synthetic a priori to gain insight into ontological knowledge, or the question of being in general. The fact that transcendence points towards both the ontic knowledge of beings and the ontological knowledge of being means that the ontological difference is embedded within Kantian philosophy.

Having ontologized Kant, it is a short leap for Heidegger to come to the conclusion that the ontological constitution of the subject is what allows for the revealing of truth. In the early view on truth, Heidegger describes truth as disclosure to Dasein, aletheia. This disclosure rests on the comportment of Dasein to beings in the world and on the presenting of the ontic within the horizon of being. The comportment of Dasein, however, always indicates that Dasein has the capacity to actively choose its comportment to the beings it experiences. How Dasein constitutes the beings of its
experience is dealt with more directly in the Kant book, through Heidegger’s discussions of the transcendental productive imagination. Heidegger isolates this by showing that the transcendental imagination belongs to the faculty of intuition as the original, pure synthesis that forms “the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thinking (apperception)” (Heidegger, 1990: 88). Even without an object it is a form of sensible intuiting that lacks connection to the being that it intuits, because it is able to form images. It is first and foremost, however, a faculty of synthesis that brings together intuitions into objects of knowledge (Heidegger, 1990: 89). As Dasein opens itself to the world in a temporal context, it receives intuitions that are projected onto the transcendental power of the imagination within a temporalized structure to be synthesized as apprehension, reproduction, and recognition.

Heidegger relies on Kant’s use of space and time to solve the problem of schematism in the first critique as a way to demonstrate the essentiality of time to both intuition and imagination. The problem of the divide between the transcendental unity of apperception and the thing in itself is solved in Kant by relying on space and time to connect the thing in itself to the categories under which it must be brought to become thinkable. This argument is used by Heidegger to show that time is prior to space, because space is merely a map for intuitions. Time, on the other hand, has a preeminence as the universal intuition that is the foundational element of pure knowledge. The essence of his argument is that it is possible to have an experience that lacks any spatial reference, but it is not possible to have an experience that lacks a temporal context. Space can only provide “the totality of those relations according to which what is encountered in the external sense would be ordered,” that can only be understood as presented within the ordering into succession of time (Heidegger, 1990: 32). Heidegger is then able to demonstrate that there are appearances within the “inner sense” which lack any spatial
reference but contain elements of temporal succession, such as the all important moods. He argues that it is not possible to likewise conceive of a spatial appearance outside of time, claiming that “time has a preeminence over space. As universal, pure intuition, it [time] must for this reason become the guiding and supporting essential element of pure knowledge, of the transcendence which forms knowledge” (Heidegger, 1990: 32). Dasein is then capable of transcending itself as it stands beyond itself into the world around it which is the very same world from which its identity cannot be severed.

This transcendence finally occurs in the imagination, because it is here that intuitions are synthesized to form objects, making possible the presentation of beings to Dasein. Prior to being formed into objects by the productive imagination, beings are not understandable. Rather, they are presented as pure intuitions of time and space. Of these intuitions, we have seen that it is time that is primary for Heidegger; time is the central structure of the transcendental self, and it is through temporality that the productive imagination operates on schematized intuitions. The constitution of the productive imagination as lying in the temporality of the subject indicates that the subject at its most basic is a thing of change, an ecstatic being, the experiences of which are always already presented within a temporal structure. The fact that the imagination is productive and active in constituting experience is crucial to freedom: Dasein is not only always openness; within that openness it always has the freedom to choose how it takes part in constituting the world around it. As productive, the imagination is then always the freedom of Dasein if we follow the consequences of the Kant book. This may not seem to be explicit in the text, but Heidegger has already demonstrated the essentiality of both transcendence and temporality to the freedom of Dasein throughout *Being and Time*, and it is now in the imagination that he locates the constitution of both of these aspects of the self. Freedom does not
ever play a central role in *Being and Time*, but it is an oft mentioned background concept that figures into key sections of the book, such as the discussions of death and authenticity, and the more formal study in the Kant book of the relation between temporality and transcendence makes it possible for Heidegger to begin a discussion of freedom as being equivalent to the transcendence of Dasein (Nancy, 1993: 35). Dasein must always choose in how it constitutes beings within imagination, because its ontical intuitions are not shaped into representations until the imagination has taken an active role in that constitution. A being is not presented as a thing in itself, but as an objectification constructed by the producing of Dasein. In its imagining, Dasein is therefore always acting. A being that acts in order to determine its own primordial grounding and constitution is then a being that is at all times free, spontaneously and autonomously entering a new state.\(^9\) Without this primordial freedom of Dasein, it would not be possible to ever have access to the world in which Dasein finds itself always immersed; there would be no disclosedness.

This very Kantian idea of truth and what it may entail for freedom is a very important continuation of Heidegger’s “transcendental project” in *Being and Time*, but it at the same time contains some foreshadowing of Heidegger’s abandonment of fundamental ontology. Truth is not merely the disclosure of a being to Dasein; it is also the constitution of Dasein itself as it allows for that being to present itself as it is. This is all predominantly in agreement with *Being and Time*, but what

\(^9\)The productive imagination is not a willfully acting faculty, because it is the faculty that makes thought itself possible and therefore necessarily comes prior to any sense of willing, making it clear that the activity of imagination does not interfere with Heidegger’s view of Dasein as a being that is not constituted by will. It rather demonstrates that the horizon by which Dasein encounters beings is fundamentally changeable, as Heidegger previously elaborated through his discussions of comportment and disclosure in *Being and Time*.  

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then is this constitution of Dasein? As demonstrated by the schematism and the productive imagination, it is first and foremost temporality, but this at the same time demotes thrownness. In the Kant book, temporality takes methodological precedence even above being in the world and care, because it is only in the structure of temporality that Dasein can have an encounter with beings in the world. This is an ever so subtle shift from *Being and Time*, because in that text, Dasein as factical could lose sight of its existence as an ecstatic being. Time seemed to be the way for Dasein to transcend towards being rather than towards the world. Now we discover that time is the key to both ontic and ontological knowledge. The possibility of the self to exist in truth is predicated upon it being a temporalized entity: to be known, an object must be brought within the structure of temporality (Heidegger, 1990: 127).

This is still a natural consequence of *Being and Time* in many respects, but it is also a step towards a radical rethinking of time and being. It is a natural consequence, because having unveiled being as a horizon that is accessible through the temporality of Dasein and having shown that being is itself the horizon allowing for the presentation of beings to Dasein, it must then be the temporal structure of Dasein that makes it possible for Dasein to have experiences of any being that is situated in the world. It is in the Kant book that we then receive the elaboration of that temporal structuring of the subject as it allows not only for an experience of being but as it also allows for all experience. Heidegger has begun his shift away from *Being and Time* very subtly, however, because time now comes methodologically prior to being in the world, opening a way to think of time and being in a less subjective way than fundamental ontology would suggest. That is to say, the Kant book makes possible a formal study of time that does not include the everyday experience of Dasein. It also suggests the possibility of time having a productive role that was not present in *Being and Time*. 
Shortly, Heidegger will move even further from his individualist themes, showing the history of being as prior to immersion in experience. Temporality has begun to take precedence even above Dasein, because it is through horizontal temporality that being manifests itself. This pervading necessity of time for truth to present itself points us towards being-historical thinking. All that Heidegger has to do to move beyond his transcendental position is to show that the structure of temporality is prior to Dasein itself, rather than merely a constitutive feature of Dasein. In fact, one of Heidegger’s chief complaints against Kant is that his placing of temporality as something entirely within the transcendental subject prevents him from questioning further into the structure of time as unveiling being itself (Heidegger, 1990: 167-168). The Kant book begins this movement towards a temporality that is prior to Dasein, because it shows the structure of temporality itself to be what is crucial to truth–if that structure does not depend on Dasein, then Dasein is a site for truth rather than a transcendental arbiter. To make this clear, it is necessary to take a closer look to the relationship between time and being, the analysis of time by way of being that Heidegger was famously supposed to include in Being and Time and that is found in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

The Kant book and Being and Time demonstrate that Dasein and being both share that they are constituted by temporality. This brings us to two different forms of temporality, however, a feature that is not particularly elaborated in the Kant book or in Being and Time. Heidegger is not willing to run the risk of collapsing being and Dasein into the same ontological entity by saying that they share the same constitution, requiring him to demonstrate that there are two different forms of temporality: the temporality of being itself and temporality as it is experienced by Dasein. Dasein and being are too ontologically distinct and both too primordially immersed in time to be composed of the very same
temporality. The temporality of Dasein is its existence as an ecstatic being, while the temporality of being must be expanded throughout all temporal unfoldings of the world as a whole, encompassing a much larger structure than Dasein—encompassing world history itself. Dasein can only ever temporalize its own existence and the beings around it; it cannot serve as the primordial horizon of all beings.

The temporal structure of being itself must then be a horizontal structure that expands outward to ground the possibility of beings and Dasein both. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger does indeed demonstrate that there are two different forms of temporality: the ecstatic temporality of Dasein, or the Zeithlicheit of Being and Time, and also the horizontal temporality of being itself, or Temporalität. We already learned at the end of Being and Time that by way of immersion within its own temporal field, Dasein could recover an understanding of being which it already preconceptually possessed within itself, that it is precisely this temporality that prestructures Dasein to experience being as such, but it is not fully made clear that time makes possible all experiences of beings. The strongest statement that Heidegger makes in this direction is in regards to care as being structured by temporality, explaining that, “The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality,” and then going on to explain that a more primordial study of time is required from the standpoint of being itself (Heidegger, 1962: 375). This more primordial study that makes up horizontal temporality is the most lucid key to being-historical thinking that rests in the Kantian phase of Heidegger’s work. This is time not as it is experienced by the individual Dasein but as it is unfolded by being. Horizontal time necessarily entails history, because it is in this horizontal structure that all beings, all of the world of all Daseins, and all nature unfolds. Any further temporal investigation must therefore
unfold from the perspective of being itself in history. This new understanding of time, being, and history will coincide with a new understanding of truth and freedom.

We also find the first clear statement of the ontological difference in the Basic Problems lecture course, and it is derived directly from Heidegger’s new study of temporality. The ontological difference for Heidegger is an additional element of the turn that is prefigured by the Kant book, and it is not possible to understand his thinking on freedom without shedding some light on this, precisely because freedom involves the transcendence of Dasein. The transcendence of Dasein is, in part, the ability of Dasein to supercede itself: its existence as an ecstatic being. As factical, Dasein comports itself to beings, and as transcendent and ecstatic Dasein has an understanding of being, but it is the ontological difference that is the space between being and beings, a between that can only be overcome by the transcendence of Dasein. Heidegger tells us that, “Only through freedom, only a free being can, as transcending, understand being—and it must do so in order to exist as such, i.e., to be ‘among’ and ‘with’ beings” (Heidegger, 1984: 189). One can then say that ontological difference is fundamental to the development of freedom. It is a concept that already exists in Being and Time to be sure. The difference between being and beings is fundamental to the possibility of their disclosedness within the transcendental openness to being itself that is made possible by Dasein. Again we find a difference of emphasis. In Being and Time, ontological difference is secondary to the most crucial distinction in Being and Time, that between Dasein and things. Because Heidegger is explicating Dasein as it exists

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10 The ontological difference, according to Reiner Schürmann, will be transformed into the thinking of world and thing rather than being and beings after the turn (Schürmann: 162). In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger was exploring connections between world and freedom as early as 1928 (Heidegger, 1984: 185).
as a being thrown into the world, he must constantly draw the careful and tenuous line between Dasein and the things that it dwells with in that world.

Dasein is unique for being the transcendent being that makes possible the disclosure of other beings, and the divide between being itself and beings cannot yet be distinctly described, because Heidegger is still in the process of searching for being, trying to recover it. Having recovered some understanding of being, the final important aspect of the Kant studies of this period is the finding of the ontological difference. This difference is also vital to truth, because it is the nothing between being and beings. For truth to be manifest, this space must somehow be bridged and overcome. Beings must be allowed entry into the horizontal structure of being. As Heidegger elaborated in the Basic Problems lecture, this means that they must stand forth within horizontal time, or history as it is experienced by being. Truth requires that beings be swept into the history of being. This is Heidegger’s first thinking of Ereignis, though he lacks the vocabulary to describe it. If truth now means the entry of beings into the horizontal temporalizing space of being, the structure which is itself temporalized horizontally, or the history of being, then Dasein as the transcendental space between being and beings must be the site not of disclosing beings through its comportment but of allowing them to be swept into the swaying of being itself, swaying being understood as the temporal aspect of being’s constitution. Heidegger must now describe truth in terms of the entering of beings into being’s sway. For Dasein to be this place it must be receptive to the ground of being. Heidegger is still far from redefining truth as freedom, but he has opened up a dialogue that will lead to the inevitable reevaluation of the subject not as the “I think” of the earlier Kantian work, but in terms of the later Kantian work, the subject as “I act.” This agent of praxis will lead to the inevitable definition of truth as the freedom of Dasein to be open to ground.
The turn in Heidegger’s thinking, according to my schematic, is primarily composed of a reevaluation of Kant in terms of his practical philosophy. Rather than thinking of the self in terms of “I am,” as Kant did in the first critique, Heidegger studies the self in terms of “I act,” as Kant did in the second and third critiques. The great text of this period is the lecture course *The Essence of Human Freedom* of 1930. This is the text from which one can reconstruct the authoring of Heidegger’s papers “On the Essence of Ground” and “On the Essence of Truth,” the place where his encounter with Kant’s practical philosophy is the most direct, and also the place where the strongest inclinations of a shift towards Idealism are evident. It also contains Heidegger’s most sustained thinking on the combined problems of truth and freedom.

The 1930 lecture course shows us how Heidegger’s thinking shifts from a transcendental philosophy to a thinking of praxis in direct relation to his encounter with Kant. The lecture course divides into a discussion first of the problem of truth in Greek philosophy and then into the problem of freedom in Kant, providing the most accessible and rigorous analysis of the combined problems of both truth and freedom that can be found in Heidegger’s corpus (Heidegger, 2002: 52, 93). The lecture course shows a more express thinking on Kant’s conception of freedom than is the case in Heidegger’s other encounters with Kant, even in regards to the first critique. This is because Heidegger sees Kant’s practical philosophy as dependent upon and consistent with his transcendental work. For this reason, the text manages to embrace both the phase of Heidegger’s work in which he studies fundamental
ontology and also his being-historical thinking phase, reminding us that the turn is more a shift in emphasis for Heidegger than it is a discarding of his prior work.

The portion of the text dealing with the problem of truth takes the form of a prolonged analysis of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics, Book Theta*, chapter 10, and it studies truth by way of the Greek concept of being, a preparatory analysis that will prove crucial for Heidegger’s thinking of freedom in Kant (Heidegger, 2002: 57). Being is understood as constant presence by Aristotle, resulting in a definition of truth as being-true, becoming a prelude for Heidegger to provide a prolonged discussion of actuality and potentiality in Aristotle as dealing with the problem of change within the structure of being itself, an essential problematic because the ability for matter to enter into motion contains within itself the problem of time within being. It is an investigation that Heidegger was later to continue in the lecture course on *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta 1-3* of 1931, another key indication of the importance of actuality and potentiality to the problem of truth in Heidegger’s thinking of this period. This discussion is central to Heidegger’s consideration of the essence of human freedom, because actuality in Aristotle relates directly to the essence of what a thing is (Heidegger, 1995: 6-7). Actuality is the currently present aspect of a being, which in Aristotle qualifies as truth in the form of being true. Likewise, to understand the substance of a thing is to deconceal its truth within the horizon of being itself as it is constantly present. The potentiality of a being is the extent to which it has the capacity to change into a new actuality, unveiling the problem of time. The problem of actuality and potentiality in Aristotle is then the problem of truth as it relates both to being and to time. This problem of truth underlies the problem of freedom, because freedom is in part the ability of the self to enter into spontaneous and
For Aristotle, motion and change are one and the same; motion is merely change as Aristotle describes it in the context of nature, which is itself eternally in motion. The four types of motion include change of substance (generation and corruption), change of quality (alteration), change of quantity (increase or decrease), and change of place (locomotion) (Aristotle: 342-343). The form of motion that Heidegger is least interested in is local motion, which is undermined by his linking of the movement of the self together with the world. The importance of the other forms of motion are to be understood not in the sense of a willful subjectivity that sets into motion a causal process, but rather in terms of Bewegung, or the movement of the self. The importance of Aristotle to Heidegger's examination of freedom in Kant is underscored by his lecture course of 1931, Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force, only two semesters after the Kant course. In this lecture course, Heidegger explores movement in relationship to actuality and potentiality, and this could be seen as a resource to think of freedom in relation to movement but without placing freedom under the constraints of causality and legislation, as in Kant.

In the Aristotle lecture course of 1931, Heidegger explains energeia, or actuality, in relationship to kinesis, or motion, which is a bringing into actuality of force. The nous, or understanding, in Aristotle is itself a type of movedness of the soul. So we can see how it is possible to read autonomous motion, a conclusion that can only be reached through a bringing together of Kant's two definitions of freedom and Aristotle's thinking of actuality and potentiality.\footnote{For Aristotle, motion and change are one and the same; motion is merely change as Aristotle describes it in the context of nature, which is itself eternally in motion. The four types of motion include change of substance (generation and corruption), change of quality (alteration), change of quantity (increase or decrease), and change of place (locomotion) (Aristotle: 342-343). The form of motion that Heidegger is least interested in is local motion, which is undermined by his linking of the movement of the self together with the world. The importance of the other forms of motion are to be understood not in the sense of a willful subjectivity that sets into motion a causal process, but rather in terms of Bewegung, or the movement of the self. The importance of Aristotle to Heidegger's examination of freedom in Kant is underscored by his lecture course of 1931, Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force, only two semesters after the Kant course. In this lecture course, Heidegger explores movement in relationship to actuality and potentiality, and this could be seen as a resource to think of freedom in relation to movement but without placing freedom under the constraints of causality and legislation, as in Kant.\footnote{In the Aristotle lecture course of 1931, Heidegger explains energeia, or actuality, in relationship to kinesis, or motion, which is a bringing into actuality of force. The nous, or understanding, in Aristotle is itself a type of movedness of the soul. So we can see how it is possible to read autonomous motion, a conclusion that can only be reached through a bringing together of Kant's two definitions of freedom and Aristotle's thinking of actuality and potentiality.}}
him as actually making possible an understanding of thinking that is on a par with physical movement (for instance, a functionalist and materialist view of the soul). In any case, Aristotle says that, “actuality and potentiality extend further than the mere sphere of motion” (Aristotle: 1651). They apply to both rationality and to the soul. Ted Kisiel, in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, is able to demonstrate that Heidegger as early as 1924 held motion in Aristotle to be an important component to his thinking on truth as unconcealment, explaining that all praxis and thinking is itself movement, “a changeover from one thing to another, here un-concealment” (Kisiel: 302). This was an early insight of Heidegger’s that helped to develop his notion of facticity out of Aristotle, and his rethinking of freedom necessarily entails a return to his thinking of motion in the constitution of the self. Aristotle is therefore essential to Heidegger’s understanding of Kant. The early lecture course of 1921-1922, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle offers a close demonstration of this. The motion of the natural world is rethought by Heidegger to consist in the motion of the self with the world, because the world is itself constituted by Dasein’s immersion within it.

This early text presents itself as an interpretation of Aristotle, but then quickly becomes a discussion of facticity with little mention of Aristotle. This is precisely because this early example of Heidegger’s thinking on facticity finds its thrust in a reconsideration of Aristotle’s categories of motion as categories of life and of the self rather than categories of physical change. John Protevi explains that “‘life’ – is motion, Bewegung, a motion that is not locomotion, Ortsbewegung, but metabolé, the ‘presence of change [Anwesendsein des Umschlagens]’” (Protevi, 2001: 155). Heidegger will arrive understand freedom as movedness of the self that is not willful. Movedness should rather be understood in terms of actuality and potentiality, which are concepts employed in the study of beings.
at the conclusion that life is involved in a constant motion against itself, always in decline by way of what Heidegger terms ruinance, an early thinking of what he will later describe as falling. In ruinance, the self is always overridingly pulled towards facticity, a decline so extreme that it involves not only the individual Dasein but also draws the world and history towards a decline as well. This motion of the self and of matter as together pulled towards the decline of life within ruinance takes place precisely because the self and the world cannot be separated. To rethink the categories of motion in Aristotle as applying to the self in no way limits those categories to only the constitution of Dasein in this early work, rather it places the self and the world in a motion together. This is the case, because there is no world to be constituted outside of lived experience. Heidegger explains that, “In a formal (and easily misleading) way, we could say that life is in itself world-related; ‘life’ and ‘world’ are not two separate self-subsistent Objects,” and also, “The nexus of sense joining ‘life’ and ‘world’ is precisely expressed in the fact that, in characteristic contexts of expression in speech, the one word can stand for the other” (Heidegger, 2001: 65). One must conclude then that the decline of Dasein is the decline of the world, a decline that must take place in a historical context, because Heidegger has not thought of there being a temporality of Dasein that is different from the progression of things in the world.

From this perspective, it is easier to see how actuality and potentiality can be so crucial to Heidegger’s later thinking of the actions of Dasein as a being in motion. The question of actuality and

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13 Heidegger would seem to undermine the role of the body within processes of life, but he fails to fall into a Christian thinking of life as spirit, because Dasein is changeable in a way that spirit is not. What finally emerges is a collapse of the distinction between spirit and body into a structure that is interlinked and changeable. A pragmatist could argue that the dispute between body and spirit becomes irrelevant, because one is left with a changeable self whether it is spirit or material.
potentiality becomes even more fundamental in light of Heidegger’s questioning of the *essence* of human freedom. To study essence as actuality is to begin down the path of discovering precisely what it means for a thing to be said to have an essence. This question becomes even more fine tuned when one considers that freedom itself always includes the ability to change. In every definition of freedom discussed by Heidegger, the capacity for the self to undergo some type of change is a part of what constitutes it as a free self. The question of the essence of human freedom may then be said to be the question of the actuality of human potentiality: the ability for the self to potentially undergo a change by nature of its very being as an actuality and without an imposed and external impetus.

Heidegger has now unveiled the problem of praxis as it relates directly to human existence and to being itself. At a later point in the lecture, he points out that for Kant, praxis relates not only to ethics but also to physical change. Through Aristotle and Kant, Heidegger is able to demonstrate the necessity of the study of praxis in order to undertake any study of being. The discussion of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics, Book Theta* is then itself a crucial portion of Heidegger’s turn towards Idealism. Much as the Aristotle of the *Nichomachean Ethics* played a large role in the Kantian period of Heidegger’s thought, the Aristotle of *Metaphysics Theta* plays an important role in the Idealist phase of his thinking.\(^\text{14}\) A closer, though necessarily brief, examination of the place held by Aristotle in both periods makes this seem almost obvious, as Heidegger’s early work draws chiefly on Aristotle’s ideas of man as having dispositions and also as being possessed with phronesis as practical wisdom of life. While

\(\text{14}\)This is especially clear when one considers that Hegel attempted to explain the infinite being of finite beings in terms of a self starting and self governed motion, a movement of the being of man that can be elucidated by the relationship between actuality and motion.
contemporary ethics draws a sharp divide between virtue ethics and deontology, it is important to realize that deontology is based almost entirely on the work of Kant’s second critique, disregarding any way in which an ethics may be constructed out of his study of reason and the self as transcendental rather than practical agents. One of Heidegger’s great early accomplishments was his merging of features of Kantian transcendental philosophy with features of Aristotelian practical philosophy, leaving neither in its original form, but modifying both positions to fit within fundamental ontology. The notion of the transcendental self as having dispositions is of course not at all counter to transcendental philosophy. One of the main thrusts of Aristotle’s arguments in the *Nichomachean Ethics* is that the self is a moral agent expressly in regard to how it relates to its environment by way of predicates that it manifests within its own ontology as the result of its encounters with the world: experience and action determine internal constitution, at least to the point of accidental predicates, which Aristotle calls virtues. If one accepts this much of Aristotle and discards his notion of the self as a substance, Heideggerian transcendental philosophy seems very much at home with his practical thinking. The Heideggerian transcendental self is, after all, constituted by its encounters with the world and also serves to precondition its experience of that world, much as in Aristotle, moral encounters with the world lead to the evolution of features of the self, a community education which preconditions one’s future encounters

15 The self is a substance for Aristotle in that the essence of man remains the same regardless of what predicates one takes on. To undergo a change of substance is to undergo generation or corruption in which one would cease to be man. In other respects, the Aristotelian self is constantly undergoing change, because to think is to carry out a movement of the soul. One is then left with man as a being in constant motion, but with an underlying substance that persists through all motion. The Heideggerian alteration is to think Dasein without the underlying category of substance, such that actuality and potentiality become even more pressing to the study of the being of man.
with the world in any specifically moral sense. Embedded here within Aristotelian practical philosophy is then an overlooked precedent for transcendental philosophy. If one takes the Aristotelian idea of self and thinks it in terms of predicates rather than as a subject, one can almost arrive at the thinking of Dasein.

Similarly, one aspect of the phenomenological appropriation of Kantian practical philosophy is then the reordering of that philosophy to entail not only the ethical actions of the self but to include within its parameters all actions of Dasein within the world that bring about the physical changes of that world and changes in the being of Dasein. Because Dasein and the world are always in motion, truth is in part conditioned by the reconstitution of this experiential nexus though freedom itself. The case for this is made even more pointed when one looks at the constitution of the self in *Being and Time* as having primordial guilt embedded within its very ontology. In its thrownness, Dasein bears an unavoidable level of guilt for all occurrences in the world, a guilt that arises from Dasein’s role in shaping the very world that it is inescapably thrown into. In this sense, the ontology of Dasein makes Dasein a moral agent in its every action in the world.\(^\text{16}\)

The Idealist period requires a rethinking of this early approach to Aristotle, because the transcendental is de-emphasized in favor of the practical, or at least transformed into an Idealist type transcendental philosophy that emphasizes the practical. Rather than studying the way that the self

\(^{\text{16}}\text{The discussion of thrownness in *Being and Time* unveils Dasein’s responsibility in the constitution of its own experience and its own world. While the issue of whether the text contains an ethics is of course arguable, it may be seen as a covertly moral text that incorporates the ethical into the ontological, failing to rely on traditional distinctions between good and evil, but making value distinctions in terms of the connotations given to states such as authenticity: responsibility then leads to guilt.\)
preconditions practical encounters, Heidegger shifts his focus, and the capacity for historical actuality to withhold and unleash new potentialities within the history of being becomes the predominant theme as action, cultural development, and thinking form the world through Dasein’s site of freedom. Aristotle’s study of being is then more important than his study of the self at this point in Heidegger’s thinking, because the self and the beings in motion around it are the same and are all fundamentally grounded in freedom itself. This begs for an encounter with Idealism as being manifests itself through the historical unfolding of its potentiality through Dasein. The Beiträge itself shows further how actuality and potentiality figure as important aspects of Heidegger’s appropriation of Idealism. The Beiträge struggles with the problem of how the event of being is able to give rise to a potential new beginning from the horizon of the actual historical and cultural circumstance. Actuality and potentiality are studied on the scale of being-historical thought and are themes that resonate throughout any attempt to develop a Heideggerian politics from the Beiträge. On the scale of culture and history, actuality and potentiality are perhaps even the most crucial concepts to the formal study of political philosophy as a whole. Politics is, after all, the field that studies social relationships both as they exist and as they can be changed, forcing one to ask the question of what is the better way to potentially structure a society and also the question of how one is to actually attain this improved state.

These are also crucial themes of the late Kant and of the Idealists. The self as “I act” is a self that grapples continually with its own potentiality as it exists within its actuality. Having set aside a causal understanding of the self in his later work, Kant will struggle with understanding the self as a being with the potential to act autonomously. The self as free stands outside of the causal chain of nature, able to engage new potentialities as the result of its own actual freedom without being compelled
or coerced by sensory intuition. Within Idealism itself, a similar problem of actuality and potentiality is centrally embedded. The construction of a system attempts to encompass all potentialities within a single actuality. In the case of Schelling, this attempt will be grounded in the freedom of the self as it stands as an actuality embedded within a field of potentialities from which it must choose, constituting itself and the world with its choosing, and bringing ground itself into presentation on a world historical scale as it chooses.

In the second part of the lecture, Heidegger turns his attention towards Kant directly. His project is to show how Kant’s own thinking on freedom is at bottom a study of the being of man. Kant’s study of freedom is divided by Heidegger into two distinct phases, but these two phases are both ultimately two sides of the same coin—they are not in opposition towards one another any more than Heidegger’s later thought is in opposition to his early thought. Kant does in fact give two distinct definitions of freedom and two means of realizing the freedom of man. The first approach unveils transcendental freedom and the second approach discovers practical freedom, but the practical will be shown to be parasitic upon the transcendental while at the same time being primordially embedded within critical philosophy itself. The practical and the transcendental will then become equiprimordial, not a surprise given that Heideggerian thinking entails that actions in the world and the preconditioning of that world both function together in the same relational field. This is a clear pointer towards an Idealist merging of theory and praxis.

A look at a statement that opens the 1930 lecture addresses philosophy as a whole and seems strongly Idealist in its inspiration. In this statement, Heidegger returns to the problem of philosophy as a science, a problem that plagued both Kant and the Idealists as well as phenomenology ever since its
Husserlian inception, arguing that philosophy is a going to the root that studies the whole. He particularly raises the question of theory and praxis, the merging of which is one of the chief projects of Idealism, and the merging of which he accomplishes by way of Kant’s two approaches to freedom. This introduction would seem to suggest that Heidegger has already begun to destructively appropriate Idealism. He refuses to accept the merging of theory and praxis, while at the same time refusing to separate the two or to give precedence of the one over the other. Rather, he wishes to understand the two problems within the same questioning of ground, claiming that “Philosophy is not theoretical knowledge together with practical application, nor is it theoretical and practical at the same time. It is more primordial than either, for both of these pertain primarily to the particular sciences” (Heidegger, 2002: 14). One can then say that in the 1930 lecture Heidegger questions the ground of the inseparability of theory and praxis, both of which come together in his thinking of truth. This lecture may therefore be seen as Idealist in both its theme and its inspiration as it also studies freedom as the basis of truth, without which there could be no science. The first portion of the lecture treats of truth, which is often described as scientific or theoretical knowledge, and the latter half deals with freedom, most especially in regards to ethics or praxis. This is then a lecture that seeks to provide a dual grounding for truth and praxis within human freedom, and it succeeds in doing so by using transcendental and practical freedom as a ground for theory and praxis.

Heidegger explicates Kant’s transcendental idea of freedom as the absolute spontaneity of the self in its causal ability to generate new states; the corresponding practical view of freedom is described

\[17\text{Heidegger will later explain that the project of Idealism is to use freedom to both found and incorporate science within a system, as is pointed out elsewhere in this text.}\]
in terms of the autonomy of the self, its freedom from external sensory coercion. The latter is grounded in the former, and Heidegger demonstrates the inseparability of practical philosophy from transcendental philosophy, again showing the sense in which his later work continues and depends upon his earlier analyses. The transcendental concept of freedom is itself a strong corollary of Heidegger’s own view of freedom in Being and Time, as the self is able to construct facets of its own constitution and comportment to the world. The overriding question within both of these views of freedom is that of how the being that is the self emerges in new potentialities that are not imposed upon it. The question of actuality and potentiality lies embedded throughout, and one of the sharpest divisions between these two conceptions of freedom lies in Kant’s thinking of causality. The causality of freedom at first appears to be distinct from the causality of nature, but it turns out that the distinction between the two lies in the finding of the causality of freedom as a particular species of causality within the larger structure of causality in nature, rather than a type of causality that stands in contradistinction to or that defies natural causal laws. The derivation of practical freedom from transcendental freedom holds one of the main keys to Heidegger’s new Idealist inspired idea of freedom. This derivation relies precisely on the fact that transcendental freedom already requires practical freedom. Transcendental freedom is the spontaneous generation of new states from the being of the self, making it innately causal. Practical

\footnote{The third antinomy works out the problem of how to understand the freedom of the self within the structure of causal experience in nature. Experience would seem to indicate that natural causality is not the only causal process in the world, because free action sets some events in motion, requiring a causality of freedom. The antithesis is that the laws of nature would seem to dictate that all causation must be natural, rendering freedom impossible as a result of determinism (Kant, 1929: 409). Kant solves this antinomy by showing that critique entails a thinking backwards in the causal chain to explain what conditions make an intuition possible. The result is that natural causality necessitates the causality of freedom as a basis for its own presentation in experience.}
freedom is the autonomy of the self. These two views on freedom are primordially bound by actuality and potentiality, as it would not be possible to generate potential new states spontaneously without having actual autonomy.

The conclusion of Heidegger’s discussion of Aristotle and truth in which he transitions into his discussion of Kant and freedom is one of the clearest expositions of how the problems of being and truth become problems of freedom. Heidegger says that the site of the being that can be said to have truth and that asks the question of being is still the central path to these questions but that the constitution of that being must be understood in terms of freedom now, because it is being that is primary even above Dasein, and Dasein and truth are to be understood in terms of the ability to stand forth in being rather than in terms of an architectonic. For all of this, freedom is essential, because it is freedom that allows for being to open itself, spontaneously and without imposition. Man is not the administrator or arbiter of freedom, but is instead the site that takes part in the freedom that is allotted to it. Letting be becomes important to freedom, because of the ontological primacy of freedom itself as that which makes possible Dasein. In one of the strongest statements of the reorientation of his thinking, Heidegger says, “If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the root of being and time, and thus the ground of the possibility of understanding being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in his existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in the whole become revealed, i.e. he is that particular being through which beings as such announce themselves” (Heidegger, 2002: 93-94). This statement is remarkable in both its clarity and its scope, demonstrating the new importance of freedom in Heidegger’s thinking, the even more radical break with the anthropomorphic tradition, and in many respects the continuation of his earlier project within the new
thematic of freedom. The question of the constitution of the self and the questions of being and time are still crucial, but they are now understood in the light of a freedom that grounds both being and Dasein rather than from the perspective of Dasein. The chief original characteristic of the turn is then not a discarding of prior questions or conclusions of Heidegger’s, but a new thinking of freedom, a way of thinking freedom which is Idealist at root.

The majority of the discussion of freedom in Kant involves an account of causality. Heidegger questions whether causality underlies the connection between freedom and ground, a problem which clearly raises the earlier question of motion. This portion of the lecture is then pervaded by the previous considerations of actuality and potentiality in the sense that Heidegger’s study of freedom in Kant is thought primarily in terms of causality. Heidegger has a very different view from that of the traditionally received opinions of Kant’s moral philosophy which allows him to grant such extreme importance to causality. He firstly resituates practical reason to demonstrate its dependence upon transcendental reason. Secondly, he shows that ethics is grounded first and foremost in freedom. Finally, he shows freedom to be grounded in causality as a result of practical freedom depending upon transcendental freedom. While this does differ from more popular versions of Kantian inspired deontology, it is a very rigorous approach to Kant. Even the most popular instances of deontology recognize rationality as the constitutive feature of the categorical imperative and understand that it is grounded in the autonomy of the self. The logical implications of this are hard to deny: the categorical imperative is grounded in freedom because it is grounded in autonomy, and this thinking on freedom is grounded in the first critique, because it is here that Kant studies the very rationality that must be the basis for any ethics.
To study freedom from the perspective of causality is to study freedom in terms of finitude, because any causal relation implies a perishing.\(^{19}\) Heidegger is then continuing his great study of finitude in Kant by showing how Kant’s later work can be rethought ontologically in terms of finitude just as was done with his early work. The finitude of Dasein becomes the finitude of knowledge in the first critique and the finitude of freedom in the second critique. It is then the problem of finitude that underlies the problem of freedom, but rather than freedom being grounded in finitude, finitude is grounded in freedom. Man is finite precisely because being taken over by freedom necessitates a finite existence. Freedom reveals itself in ground, and cause is itself a type of ground that “expresses the innermost questionability of the constitution of animate and inanimate nature” (Heidegger, 2002: 101).

Time and causality are both finite in nature, and it would not be possible to have free action without both of these components which create the temporal context of any possible action, in that Kant’s conception of causality is primarily constituted by a relation to time, meaning temporal succession.

Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of causality in Kant: causality of nature and causality of freedom. Causality in general applies to nature, but there is a special and more narrow type of causality that applies specifically to freedom but that is nonetheless based on the more general causal processes of nature. This demonstrates the role that causality plays in determining both the constitution of the self and of the world. If freedom is to come prior to both being and to Dasein, it is essential that it be able to ground the constitution of both the world and Dasein. By showing causality to constitute

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\(^{19}\)A causal relation implies a perishing in the sense that it requires that one state of affairs be replaced by another. For instance, the hurling of a baseball across the room would require a change of location that eliminates the state of affairs in which the ball previously had been sitting atop a bookcase.
both of these ontological categories and to contain the essence of freedom, Heidegger is able to demonstrate this. It is causality that is the issue for Kant, because he must show that the causal relationships of nature do not place conditions on the self that remove its freedom by forcing the self to conform to nature. Rather, for the Kantian self to be free it must be able to spontaneously begin a new causal process from *within* itself. This is finally demonstrated, because causality is itself a transcendental category of understanding that must necessarily include freedom within it as a transcendental concept of nature in order to make possible all experiences of nature; freedom does not violate causality but is rather necessitated by it as it is only a free action that can begin a series of events, forming a totality out of a series of appearances which therefore makes possible those appearances.

While transcendental freedom treats of possible or potential freedom through causality, practical freedom treats of actual freedom in terms of personality, which is defined as self-responsibility with the implication that one have the ability to legislate oneself, but for Heidegger what is really important about this kind of freedom is that it is the practical actuality of the prior kind, a fact that results from a more primordial causality. Heidegger will finally reverse the question of causality and freedom to demonstrate that it is in fact freedom that makes possible causality as a type of temporalized being, leaving freedom as the means to question into being itself. This questioning of freedom as the means to understand being places Heidegger on a trajectory that leads him directly to Schelling.
Schelling’s System of Freedom and the Beiträge²⁰

After the 1930 lecture, Heidegger’s philosophy departed into a more overtly Idealist direction, though he maintained a continuous discourse with Kantian philosophy, publishing further studies on him from time to time, and beginning his study of Schelling with an overview of Kant’s approach to system. The turning towards Idealist avenues of studying being was already prefigured in even Heidegger’s earliest work, and a look at Fichte shows the presence of Idealist threads within Being and Time itself.²¹ Heidegger’s discussion of being in the world deals with the self as it encounters the world within a hermeneutical circle. The world that Dasein engages is also the world that Dasein helps to construct and has a prior relation to. It can never be separated from this world, nor can it be reduced to it. Similarly Fichte, in the Science of Knowledge, conceives of the self as the pure transcendental I and of

²⁰In this section, I offer a reading of Beiträge that pursues one particular aspect of the text from which I think it can be most fruitfully read. The manuscript draws on a number of sources, and a framework for encountering such a complex text will necessarily involve decisions in regards to how to weight the role played by the thinkers from whom Heidegger most extensively draws. The chief of these sources, other than Schelling, who I consider to be the most important are Nietzsche and Hölderlin. The importance of Nietzsche surfaces in the fragmentary, self evolving, and musical features of the text, which in many ways is structured like a musical composition. The importance of Hölderlin centers around Heidegger’s concerns with volk, gods, poetry, and destiny. There could be very productive studies that place a greater weight on either of these thinkers as opposed to Schelling, but it is Schelling who is the standout figure in Heidegger’s continual development of early concerns in his work precisely because it is the debt to Schelling that centers around the problem of freedom, a problem which captures some of the most important feature of the turn and which, according to my account, most clearly leads the way from fundamental ontology into being-historical thinking.

²¹The early work prefigures the Idealist orientation of Heidegger’s later work in that its emphasis on facticity brings Dasein and the world together into the same historical sweep—towards the direction of decline in the form of ruinance. Additionally, Werner Marx points out that Hegel is a useful figure in understanding even Being and Time, because Hegel and Heidegger both “deal with the problem of Being and essence and in this sense move within the same realm” (Marx: 44).
In his lectures on Hegel and Schelling both, one can see Heidegger engaging the question of how Idealism is not only to found knowledge, but to actually generate it. In the Hegel lecture, he discusses how the system serves to both ground knowledge and also to contain all knowledge by virtue of itself being the totality of knowledge. The consequence is that the system is not only the collection of all knowledge, but is the actual generation of knowledge from its grounding in spirit itself. The Schelling lecture engages the question of generation much more directly, as is discussed throughout this chapter.

Fichte differs most strongly from Heidegger in that he sees the transcendental self as something that is ontologically reducible from the world that it generates, but he does not suggest that the self ever actually exists in any such context. Rather, he has shown the necessary ontological intertwining of the transcendental subject and its objects of knowledge, what Heidegger would later conceive of as the ontic, and could arguably be said to have been the first thinker to collapse the dichotomy between subject and object, claiming that “the not-self is posited in the self; for it is counterposed; but all such counterposing presupposes the identity of the self, in which something is posited and then something set in opposition thereto” (Fichte: 106). The Fichtean notion of the self and the possible Heideggerian derivation of being in the world from it both contain within them a thinking of actuality and potentiality, as one in both cases encounters a being that both engages an otherness and also generates new potentialities from its primordial ontological foundation as it encounters the surrounding world. This question of generation from grounding is one that will figure all throughout Heidegger’s encounter with Idealism.22

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22In his lectures on Hegel and Schelling both, one can see Heidegger engaging the question of how Idealism is not only to found knowledge, but to actually generate it. In the Hegel lecture, he discusses how the system serves to both ground knowledge and also to contain all knowledge by virtue of itself being the totality of knowledge. The consequence is that the system is not only the collection of all knowledge, but is the actual generation of knowledge from its grounding in spirit itself. The Schelling lecture engages the question of generation much more directly, as is discussed throughout this chapter.
Heidegger was fascinated with the philosophical ambition of the attempt to build a system that would encompass all of knowledge and history within the realm of the transcendental subject, and it was through freedom that he believed this Idealist project to reach its greatest height, famously proclaiming in his 1929 paper “On the Essence of Ground” that truth consists of Dasein’s freedom to receive ground in the midst of its letting be. Although Heidegger offers no mention of Idealism in that discussion, it is a useful sojourn for us, because Heidegger will very shortly, in his Hegel lecture of 1930-1931, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, describe Idealism’s attempt at building a system to be a means of attaining absolute knowledge without the need for a prior foundation. In his Hegel lecture, Heidegger discusses how philosophy became a science for Hegel not only because it is the foundation for science, as conceived since Descartes, but also because—as a philosophical system—it is itself absolute knowledge, undercutting the need to have a foundation (Heidegger, 1988: 9-11). As the absolute, systematic philosophy becomes the primal expression of being divorced from time. Hegel is

23 This interest of Heidegger’s throughout his studies of Idealism is well exemplified in the way that he describes the impulse towards system as being the unifying feature of the Idealist tradition and the chief concept according to which the success or failure of an Idealist philosophy can be judged. Hegel is on the one hand dismissed for betraying the notion of system, and Schelling is praised for successfully completing a system that can incorporate freedom and necessity. Finally, the system is shown to be an important feature of discourse about freedom for Heidegger, because it is the inclusion of freedom that he emphasizes as the most important concern of system within the Idealist movement. This is still further reason to accept his use of jointure as a way to reorient systematic philosophy in the Beiträge. Jointure is also a clue to one of the most problematic aspects of Heidegger’s work: the structural unity of his thinking and the interconnected and unique vocabulary which it uses—features which are traditionally hallmarks of systematic philosophies, though Heidegger denies that he is constructing a system. As is often the case with Heidegger, he both is and is not an exemplar of a traditional notion of philosophy—he has recast the traditional notion of system into a new type of structure, and the status of the Beiträge is elevated within the Heideggerian canon if one sees the thinking of jointure as finally providing a solution to this puzzle of the status of system in Heideggerian thinking.
ultimately to fail as the purest expression of German Idealism for Heidegger, because his system makes the mistake of conceiving of the absolute and of being itself as absolute presence, making Hegel the grand culmination of the history of metaphysics for Heidegger: a thinker who could encompass everything that exists within the thinking of absolute presence.

Hegel betrays what Heidegger believes to be the true spirit of German Idealism in his conceiving of spirit as the absolute presencing that empties itself into the world, never having to encounter difference between itself and the world as it subsumes the world, and never having to account for time, making it impossible for temporality to open the possibility of freedom to the subject (Heidegger, 1988: 12). What had traditionally been called substance is placed within the subject itself by Hegel, a subject that is infinite as Hegel’s system both begins and ends with the absolute, sublating finite difference within the infinitude of the absolute (Heidegger, 1988: 76-78). It is this linking between time and freedom that unveils the movement of Heidegger’s thought at this time, and it is the failure to account for freedom, praxis, collectivity, and history adequately in his early work that led Heidegger to embark on the project of being-historical thinking. The existence of freedom requires genesis, and genesis cannot be thought without the thinking of history.24 By focusing his analysis if not solely, then at least primarily, upon the subject in his early work, Heidegger divorced Dasein from the historical reality of its ability to act. By reconceiving of truth as not mere disclosedness, but as the freedom to receive

24To think of genesis is to think of a historical event. Generation is an event, because it is the process of creating one state of affairs as the outcome of a previous ground. It is a thinking of past, present, and future within a certain context in the world, and the thought of creation requires an understanding of what exists prior to that creation, a historical circumstance that serves as the possibility for the historical event of genesis.
the grounding of that openness, Dasein becomes a site for Ereignis rather than the sole arbiter of its environment.

Jean-Luc Nancy offers a powerful rejoinder to Heidegger in Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, by demonstrating the highly unstable elements of Hegelian thought that in fact serve to create a foundation for the dynamism found in 20th century philosophy, Heidegger being a chief case in point. An interesting case could perhaps be made using Nancy’s reading of Hegel to claim that much of what Heidegger attributes to Schelling could also be found in Hegel. Nancy is able to find freedom as a much stronger component of Hegel’s system than Heidegger would allow credit, because he finds as much anarchy in Hegel as he does necessity, anarchy being a consequence of the recurring negations in Hegel’s philosophy that render being into becoming and that turn the free subject into a free being-with as its existence as a single being is negated. The key claim that Nancy makes is that Hegel is first and foremost a philosopher of negation and that his system must be studied in terms of the negativity that is introduced to counter what may appear as a stable system. Following Nancy’s logic, the absolute becomes absolute negation. Rather than Hegel offering a totalizing view of freedom that sublates particulars into universals and sweeps individuals into the movement of the dialectic and the desires of world spirit, the opportunity for liberation is presented as individual subjects are joined together into a self negating totality. Nancy elaborates this and says that, “In fact, freedom is the name for the necessity to be in itself and for itself detached from all fixity, all determination, from every given, and every property. But even more, it is the necessity to be detached, not as an independence fixed in itself, but as the movement of detachment right at the surface of every determinacy. In exposing this necessity as such, one gives it the form of a constraining logic. But one also exposes that its veritable
content is “freedom and independence”” (Nancy, 2002: 67). Freedom becomes a problem that intersects between subjects, constituted by their coexistence rather than by the activity or constitution of a single agent, highlighting the importance of community in Hegel’s thought, a community that offers liberation through its joinings and negations. This negativity undermines the necessity in Hegel’s system and perhaps renders the understanding of Hegel as a philosopher of absolute presencing to be obsolete, but while this may undermine Heidegger’s discarding of Hegel, it does not undermine what he finds to be most crucial to Idealism in his study of Hegel.

What emerges from Heidegger’s reading and criticism of Hegel is that the two most important aspects of the German Idealist movement as a whole, the prime goal of its philosophical pursuits, is to attain both system and freedom (Heidegger, 1988: 15-16). System is necessary, because the goal is to gain rational knowledge of everything in the universe within a rational philosophy that provides its own foundation, and freedom is equally important because the Idealists asked the question of the role played by human beings within the system, as seen by Hegel’s continual studies of history, religion, culture, the state, and art. Indeed, he understood freedom as the having of one’s place within the culture of the time, within spirit as a whole, and Heidegger will himself delve into a much deeper exploration of these themes in the mid to late 30s (Hegel: 292, 357, 363).

The question of the system will be rethought later by Heidegger to become the thinking of the jointure (Fuge), a joining together into a totality that is not comprised in terms of rationality, but it is a thinking that begins in the 1936 lecture course on Schelling. Heidegger first discusses the jointure in

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25 Jointure is a merging into a larger structure for both Heidegger and Schelling, highlighting the extent to which Heidegger’s usage of the term demonstrates a debt to Schelling as well as the
this lecture as a feature of Schelling’s philosophy because of the way in which freedom reorients the system from its Hegelian pristine absolute presencing within rationality into a system of dynamism and generation in which necessity entails difference and becoming within being itself (Heidegger, 1985: 32-34). Schelling emerges as the great Idealist in the Heideggerian canon of philosophy for understanding the true importance and role of both freedom and system within Idealist philosophy. It is his attempt to construct a system based on freedom in the treatise On Human Freedom that interests Heidegger most keenly, but a prefatory look at his earlier System of Transcendental Idealism, the text that served as a building block for Hegel’s later Phenomenology of Spirit, is also helpful in understanding why it is Schelling who ultimately provides the basis for Heidegger’s response to transcendental philosophy, keeping in mind that Idealism is itself a certain type of transcendental philosophy that emphasizes praxis.

In the System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling begins his work from the direct aftermath of Fichte’s project in Science of Knowledge, basing his system in the absolute knowledge that is entailed by self knowledge and demonstrating the generation of both the external world and particular items of knowledge based upon the transcendental ego. In this work, all truth is on a par, so that no knowledge can be said to be more true than another. There are however degrees of knowledge in the sense that from the standpoint of the transcendental subject, one form of knowledge may provide the foundation

importance of Schelling to the Beiträge. The difficulty faced by Heidegger in the Beiträge is to demonstrate the historical continuity, ruptures, and points of intensity within an entire sweep of history without resorting to a traditional telos or final destiny. According to Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, “Leaving reason behind as the measure for beingness of beings entails parting with the system of reason. But such a parting does not terminate in disorderliness; rather, it proceeds into a transformed inner order which traces out the swaying of the truth of be-ing as enowning. Such inner order is the jointure as the structure of the six joinings of Contributions” (Scott, Schoenbohm, Vallega-Neu, and Vallega: 122).
for the others. Any true proposition about the external world is then just as true as a true proposition about the self, but knowledge of the self is nonetheless what provides the grounding for knowledge of the external world (Schelling, 1978: 15).

The major difficulty to be solved under this rubric pertains to the status of the subjective and the objective within any instance of knowing. As Schelling puts it, “In knowing as such—*in the fact of my knowing*—objective and subjective are so united that one cannot say which of the two has priority” (Schelling, 1978: 5). Truth is then a problem of both epistemology and of ontology, a question of epistemology, because subject and object are still distinct from one another such that one may inquire philosophically as to how the subject gains access to the object in order to make it become an item of knowledge, and a question of ontology, because the subject and object are both treated as having distinct ontological statuses that somehow become intertwined in the act of knowing, making knowledge in some sense a question of ontology—an important Heideggerian precursor. Within this system, freedom and truth are intimately connected as the result of all knowledge essentially originating in the activity of the self. This can readily remind one of why praxis is so centrally rooted in Idealist philosophy: the external world is itself the generation of the subject, making every thinking an action and every action a thinking.

Freedom then plays a very important role in this system, but it does not play the central role that it will play in *On Human Freedom*. Schelling at this stage would seem to have recognized the importance of freedom to the idea of system, understanding the difficulty of allowing freedom to exist within the necessities of systematization, but it would seem that freedom is the byproduct of a truth that is the result of the transcendence of the self into the objective. From Heidegger’s philosophical
orientation, freedom is crucial, because the system could not account very well for lived experience if it
left all action as necessitated by the absolute, nor could such a system which excluded freedom account
for the Heideggerian view that truth is itself manifold as opposed to being defined by rational necessity.

The physical motion of the material body is always free in Schelling’s early work, because it is based
upon the outward production of the subject into the objective world to shape it according to its free
willing, but the case has not yet been made that the primordial freedom of the subject is itself the
impulse that leads to the generation of truth and the world. Schelling has already captured a crucial
Heideggerian theme however, the essential relationship between transcendence, truth, and freedom.

What must now happen is for freedom to be used as the basis for the system itself rather than
only functioning as a necessary internal component. The mechanics for this already exists in System of
Transcendental Idealism, because one can make the argument that the transcendence of the self into
the external world and into knowledge requires freedom, and Schelling has actually made this argument,
but only to prove that freedom exists, not to show that it is itself the ground of the system. The
argument is that the self as self-consciousness is necessarily free, because it alone is what Schelling
terms as an intellectual intuition, a type of knowing that is absolutely free by virtue of being a pure act of
contemplating its own object. The object of knowledge and the act of knowing are indistinguishable
within intellectual intuition, and this pure subjective act upon which nothing external impinges is
necessarily free, because it is bound only by itself and even produces itself, while all other objects of
knowledge require that they receive their foundation within this pure self-consciousness of the self
(Schelling, 1978: 27). As acting in the external world, the self is also necessarily free, because the
external world is itself a generation of the transcendental subject, body and causality included, because
“to say that something happens in the external world undoubtedly means no more than that I produce it, for nothing whatever exists in the external world save by means of my producing” (Schelling, 1978: 184). Clearly, Schelling has the basic components for a later system of freedom in place at this stage and is a profound thinker of the problem of freedom and necessity even in his earliest work. A more radical break with Fichte’s account of the generation of the object from the subject will provide freedom with an even more pivotal role in his system.

The question of how to reconcile system with freedom is the one that becomes most important for Schelling and is also the central concern of Idealism for Heidegger. For the later Schelling in particular, the problem with any philosophical system is that of how to reconcile necessity with freedom. In modern philosophy, nature and freedom are kept separate, allowing for the possibility of nature to encompass necessity while at the same time leaving open the possibility for human actions not to be governed by what is deemed necessary according to the causally determinist structure of nature. For any system to be successful, it must place the world of morality into the world of nature, forming a grand structure that is to some extent a return to the Greek idea of humans and nature together forming an innately intelligible world. Unlike Greek philosophy, however, Idealist philosophy is systematic in the sense of requiring necessity and totality. Human action becomes governed by the necessity of the system, leaving freedom as an impossibility. Schelling understood this problem lucidly and therefore made the founding of the system within freedom itself the first and foremost condition of his ontology in his later work, such as *On Human Freedom* and *Ages of the World*. In so doing, he did in fact have an early insight of much of what the existentialists were later to find fault with in Hegel. The Schellingian system was not intended as one that would encompass all action within the grand sweep of the dialectic
and that would reduce all temporality to the absolute of spirit, leaving the metaphysics of presence in place within Idealism as Heidegger would complain in regards to Hegel. In a great flash of insight, Schelling became the Idealist who led the way out of Idealism and at the same time provided its greatest realization by allowing for the system to truly encompass all of knowledge and being while making its internal necessity manifold rather than singular.

The Schellingian conception of freedom in *On Human Freedom* is distinct from others in that it conceives freedom as the choice between good and evil, but what is important about this to Heidegger is that choice implies an ontological consequent in regard to the relationship of the subject to ground. It is this idea that freedom implies ground, influencing the generation within being, and that evil can be intrinsic to being itself that are some of the most significant findings in Schelling for Heidegger. The essence of human freedom is the foundation of the system for Schelling, and it is also the foundation of truth for Heidegger. These views are not so far apart as they may seem. We must consider again what the notion of system means to German Idealism, according to Heidegger. The system is the absolute, containing true and absolute knowledge. The system provides its own ground within itself, because it contains the entirety of all truth within itself. What Heidegger ultimately is able to then discover in Schelling is that system understood specifically as freedom is the very foundation of truth.

In *On Human Freedom*, Schelling will create precisely this type of system, and the result is that his system stands as much more distinct from both Fichte and Hegel. Freedom is the very basis for the system in *On Human Freedom*, because it is the free choosing of man that brings about the generation of the world into actual existence from its primordial ground. The transcendental subject, in its capacity as a free being, wills freely to shape the external world of objects. The most fundamental choice that
can be made within this later system is that between good and evil, and it is the choosing of good that is primary, because only by choosing the good can ground itself be brought into existence. The ontological, and at the same time theological grounding, of God is instantiated into objects by a choosing of the good. The choice of evil, on the other hand, fails to bring transcendence into a relationship with ground, resulting in a decline that is the converse of God. The system expresses the fundamental optimism of German Idealism, because Schelling is a pantheist, and it is only through the choosing of good and with the concert of the ground that the world can truly be generated by the self, necessitating that good triumph over evil. Primitive though this battle within the self over good and evil may seem, Schelling is brilliant in the way that he ontologizes the problem of good and evil and renders it transcendental. It is this maneuvering that will prove to be so helpful and influential for Heidegger.

At this stage, Schelling prefigures Heidegger’s later projects, because he has maintained the important connection between transcendence, truth, and freedom but has also added the essential components of ground, existence, and being to the system. Some explication of these terms is called for. By ground, Schelling means the foundation for a thing; by existence he means not only what is, but what is generated into being, and by being he means identity. His philosophy is then fundamentally a philosophy about the genesis of the world from its foundations and the process whereby this generation takes place, rendered necessary by the identity of the process as a whole. His understanding of being as identity, of course, is something that is objectionable to Heidegger’s understanding of being, but Schelling does have a more intricate and nuanced understanding of being that underlies this notion of identity, and in this sense his thought of being will very much appeal to Heidegger and serve as an important basis for the Beiträge: Schelling conceives of being as having a jointure.
Schelling’s thinking of being is then much more sophisticated than the mere definition of being as identity would suggest. Because he is a philosopher of genesis, Schelling must think of being not only in terms of what is as a certain identity but also in terms of how that identity is itself generated. The question of being for Schelling then includes the distinction “between Being insofar as it exists, and Being insofar as it is the mere basis for existence” (Schelling, 1936: 31). Within being itself there is, for Schelling, the distinction between ground and existence or the process by which a particular existing being is generated from its foundation. This distinction between ground and existence that embeds a continual process of generation into being itself is what Schelling describes as the jointure. Being is always in a process of genesis with its identity being something that is fundamentally unstable in terms of being able to be subdivided into a process of emanation rather than a stable and essential identity, as a more Aristotelian approach would dictate.

In his examination of the Heidegger/Schelling relationship in *The Experience of Freedom*, Jean-Luc Nancy considers the encounter with Schelling to be the culmination of Heidegger’s attempt to think freedom as primordial with being, describing Hediegger’s project as “on the one hand in the direction of freedom as ‘archi-foundation,’ and on the other, through a repetition of the philosophy of freedom destined to displace freedom’s relation to causality, in the direction of a freeing of the resources of ‘foundation’ at the core of the philosophical tradition itself” (Nancy, 1993: 36). Nancy sees the encounter with Schelling as a failure for Heidegger that will later leave him to abandon the problematic of freedom, but Nancy does not consider the role that the investigation of freedom could have played in the *Beiträge*, particularly in regards to inceptual thinking, which would seem to be a freeing up of the foundational resources of philosophy through freedom that continues throughout
Heidegger’s later work on the fourfold and thinking. Nancy does, however provide a description of the last pages of the lecture course that comes close to realizing the later importance of this work, in which the “essential character of freedom has been attained in the necessity for man to assume his proper essence as that of a decision relative to ‘essence and deformation of essence’ (p.156), which means to good and evil as the realization of this couple of essences in a ‘history’ (ibid.) That involves ‘encountering a destiny’ (p. 162), insofar as destiny consists precisely in man’s exposure to his own necessity” (Nancy, 1993: 37). While freedom may thematically drop out of Heidegger’s work after the 30’s, it has already been used to rethink the relationship between Dasein and being in terms of a certain type of thinking that Heidegger will continue to discuss.

This thinking of jointure becomes one of the most helpful and important indicators for Heidegger in the Beiträge, because there he must think of being as having a jointure that gives it a totality throughout different modes and events of its enowning. The Beiträge does after all aim at the understanding of the whole historical sweep of being, but it wishes to do so not in terms of a system, the system being something that would impose a rational order upon being. Heidegger also must think of being as a site of generation. The Beiträge is an attempt to think being from the very site of its ownmost event in Ereignis rather than from Dasein’s experience of being, and this entails that being be something from which beings are generated in terms of their truth, because it is the horizon of being itself that makes those beings manifest. From the perspective of being this must also happen on a historical

26A brief but prior mention of jointure occurs in Introduction to Metaphysics in the context of technē, machination, framework, the overpowering imposition of a directive, and a governing structure in the discussion of Sophocles (Heidegger, 1959: 160). There, Heidegger is more concerned with Fug, than Fuge, however.
scale, because being, as the unifying whole of all beings, does not aim at particular beings but rather at
the entire sweep of beings. The temporality of being is therefore historic as it sways, because it
encompasses the all of the temporal regions of beings. The earth can also be said to perform a Schellingian role within Heidegger’s thinking of ground
in the *Beiträge*. The earth is not to be mistaken for the ground, but is rather the sheltering and
preserving from which ground opens a temporal-spatial swaying towards truth. In the *Beiträge*,
Heidegger explains, “There exists an originary relation between ground and truth, but *truth* grasped as
*sheltering that lights up*” (Heidegger, 1999: 216). Sheltering preserves truth, and it must be initially
released in a lighting up for an event of truth to take place. It is the earth that conceals, protects, and
withholds beings in their truth, covering them over to be unconcealed in later events of *Ereignis*, and
forming one corner of the dance that occurs in the fourfold during the event of enowning itself.

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27 Nietzsche plays an important role in the text at this point as he is one of Heidegger’s sources of the idea of an end to a historical epoch, a characterization of Nietzsche that emerges in Heidegger’s nearly contemporaneous Nietzsche lectures, where one can see emerging a thinking of the end of the epoch of metaphysics in philosophy (Heidegger, 1979: 208). He also plays a crucial role in the musical structure of the *Beiträge*, a text that resembles a symphony in structure, but that can be broken down into smaller aphorisms. This fragmentary musical structure is the shape given to thinking within the jointure, leaving Nietzsche an important source to Heidegger’s transforming of this concept from the way that it is used in Schelling.

28 Hölderlin provides another source of Heidegger’s thinking on the earth that can fruitfully be explored here, but Heidegger’s understanding of the earth would seem to bear borrowings from Schelling, Nietzsche, and Hölderlin all at once. Much as Heidegger usually traces concepts throughout several thinkers, his appropriation of the earth has multiple sources. One of his great achievements would indeed seem to be his resurrecting of this term from a number of philosophers, although it is not considered traditionally to be a philosophical term. Hölderlin is not considered traditionally to be a philosopher; Nietzsche uses a vocabulary that leaves one questioning whether a word is employed as a philosophical concept, a literary metaphor, or a visual allusion, and Schelling is a thinker of ground rather than earth. Heidegger examines all three of these thinkers in his many discussions of earth and
in the most extreme violence against beings, the earth shelters and protects in a way reminiscent of how
ground in Schelling withdraws from any act of evil, because evil is in violation of the primordial ground
of generation. It is the event of Ereignis that brings beings into truth, and this event is a type of
generation, because as Ereignis appropriates a being into being itself, it wrestles that being out of
sheltering within the earth and transforms it into bearing a type of ontological relation to being itself. In
this event, the ontic is made to transcend into the ontological by which it is appropriated.

Heidegger is able to, as he often does, rethink the ontological aspects of Schelling through the
removal of the theological components from his system. In the Beiträge, he demonstrates that the
unconcealing sway of being triumphs through history, because it is always being itself that plays the
generative role within history itself, but for Heidegger there is a much sharper, continual, and essential
swaying between revealing and concealing than there is between good and evil in Schelling. For
Schelling, the true triumph of evil would require that the individual will completely supercede and
destroy the universal will, but this is not possible ontologically. There may also be an era of withdrawal
and concealment of being in Heidegger, but this era is always temporary and is directed towards a new
beginning in which being breaks through, not as a culmination but as yet another epoch in a cycle that
repeats part of the original beginning as a retrieval while at the same time generating totally new features
of the world, because the concealment of being is a type of ontological lack that creates a distress
which will in turn bring about a need for and a remembrance of being. It would not be possible for
machination and concealment to win out anymore than it is possible for evil to triumph in Schelling’s

may be interpreted as showing that ground and earth are in fact intertwined, as will become more
evident in the fourfold.
system, because being plays an essential role within ground for Heidegger just as God does for Schelling. Freedom in the *Beiträge* is always essential because it is expressed in the jointure within being itself. Being is always swaying and generating, and Dasein is always partaking of this freedom as it enthinks being. It is this primordial freedom itself that makes possible the generation of historical epochs through the movement of being.²⁹

It is necessary to again backtrack to our discussion of motion if we are to grasp the primordiality of the movement of being itself. Being, no longer an essence but a horizon of change and generation, is primordially opened to the world and to history within its swaying, a swaying that becomes essential, just as being was once understood as essence and just as freedom is the essence of the being that is man. The event of being, temporalized in such a way as to blur the line between actuality and potentiality, is in motion as it opens itself in *Ereignis*. We have already seen that all motion implies the question of actuality and potentiality, and we have also clearly seen that freedom is a type of motion bearing a relation to causality, a relation to causality based on the fact that freedom involves an action that brings about an effect that is understood as succession within time. Temporal succession implies the three ecstases, because for one event to succeed another, there is the requirement of past, present, and future all being involved in the occurrence of change, the displacement of an actuality by a potentiality. Being itself bears some relation to causality, because it is the temporal event that brings about the horizon of the disclosure of history. It is therefore always in a causally

²⁹The movement of being is manifest in the fourfold, and Hölderlin (as source of the fourfold) once again plays an important background role throughout the *Beiträge* as Heidegger presents an early version of the fourfold in terms of man, gods, world, and earth (Heidegger, 1999: 218).
related temporal motion as an actuality from which is opened the possibility of historical potentiality.

Bearing a causal relation does not mean that being is causal, but rather that it relates to the unfolding of events in the temporal succession of time-space. Being is not directed or coerced by sensory things, and being is capable of spontaneously generating a new state, as when it suddenly reveals itself to Dasein and to history within Ereignis as a new thinking or a new epoch or a new artwork. Being is therefore necessarily grounded in freedom, and Heidegger’s late philosophy is a philosophy that demonstrates the generation of history, culture, and Dasein from freedom itself.

In defense against objections or misreadings of the Beiträge as a text of determinism, it is rather a text of the ultimate and utmost freedom. While Dasein does find its identity and its self knowledge in its being appropriated by being and by being placed in a historical context, larger structures that it may not fully control, being and history are themselves grounded in freedom itself and are temporal events made possible by that very freedom. In being appropriated, Dasein then is able to actually find its very own releasement through freedom. This is why inceptual thinking plays such a crucial role in the Beiträge. It is only possible to understand what Heiddegger really means by this form of thinking when we read the text with freedom in mind. By inceptual thinking, Heidegger refers to the primordial generative capabilities of Dasein as it thinks solitarily within Ereignis to bring forth a new beginning. In this type of thinking, Dasein can attune itself to freedom in such a way as to rethink the world around

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30Walter Brogan is helpful in understanding originary inceptual thinking as he tells us that “originary thinking is not representation at all. Rather it is a thinking that stays with and gives witness to the unpresentable yet double moment of emergence/withdrawal,” and, “The peculiar character of this moment of jointure is such that no connection with other moments is possible. As the origin of all connections, it is itself radically disconnected. Originary, inceptual thinking therefore occurs in loneliness and cannot be shared” (Scott, Schoenbohm, Vallega-Neu, and Vallega: 177-178).
it. Being never truly directs history then; it allows for history to be created by preserving the site for freedom. The *Beiträge* is then one of the great liberal political texts of the 20th century, because Heidegger has made possible the radical necessity of individual and historical freedom, by allowing for Dasein to enter into a generative nexus from which it can form totally new instantiations of being-historical structures. It can never be the case that being directs Dasein to play a certain role in history, because Dasein itself plays an important role in *Ereignis* that is passive in receiving being but is at the same time active in its thinking and contribution to how being is revealed, as Heidegger states clearly that *Ereignis* is itself shaped by Dasein, by language, by art, by thinking, and by the culture of the volk. The consequence is that Heidegger has very cleverly accounted for both individualist notions of freedom, such as the freedom of the self from coercion, because the self is able to transcend the factical as it is appropriated by being, and is also able to account for the type of collective freedom that is so prevalent in German thought, as Dasein finds freedom in having its place within the community of volk and within the history of being.

This freedom is made more clear in *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, a lecture course that Heidegger presented in Freiburg in 1937-1938 as he was writing the *Beiträge*. In that lecture, Heidegger discusses how the distress of not knowing how to act leads to a sense of wonder that requires a primordial thinking about a new beginning, finally making possible a decision that will lead to a new essence of Dasein (Heidegger, 1994: 139). The distress of which Heidegger speaks takes place in a strange ungrounded time-space that Heidegger refers to as the “between.” The immersion of Dasein within the distress of this ungrounded time-space precisely necessitates that Dasein enter into a relation with ground. It is a displacement that affords Dasein the opportunity of making the most radical
decision to found itself anew as a direct product of distress. The freedom that exists in this decision, very much the same decision of which Heidegger speaks in *Beiträge*, is among the most radical that he ever discusses, and it is a freedom made possible by the appropriation of Dasein. This text brilliantly displays Heidegger’s concerns with Idealism and freedom and also unveils the Aristotelian roots that underlie his thinking of this period, bringing his early thinking on disposition in a direct exchange with his later thinking on actuality, potentiality, freedom, decision, and the new beginning. It is after all a free changing of the foundation of the essence of man that is at stake in this lecture.

Only through a primordial association with being that comes through freedom is Dasein able to instantiate a new world, because the world is formed through language, culture and art, all of which can be transformed through inceptual thinking. That is to say that Dasein finds the revealing of its inceptual thinking as it partakes in the freedom of the generation of works of art. Art of course is also of central importance for Schelling, another place of commonality between these two thinkers. It is the work of art that is crucial to transcendence in Schelling, because it is here that freedom is most readily at play in the generation of an object from the transcendental subject which experiences its conscious and unconscious processes unified and brought into harmony with the objective in the form of the work of art. In the case of Heidegger, the modernist subject ceases to play an expressionist role in the creation of the work of art, a cessation because it is being itself that is revealed in the work of art. The revelation of being, however, does entail the primordial freedom of Dasein, because it is only within this freedom that Dasein is able to have an experience of being and to generate truth in the form of art.31

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31 This thinking had already begun in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” where art is elaborated as an event of truth that occurs through Dasein’s openness to being.
Poetry plays the most important role as a work of art, precisely because it is here that language is rethought, and because language plays such a pivotal role in the ordering of the world and of the self. To think poetically is not merely to write poetry, but is to use language as a site of genesis. Language is the dwelling place of being, but Heidegger is often misunderstood on this point as meaning that language used poetically as Heidegger speaks of can only allow for the revelation of being in certain types of poetry. This is quite simply false and fails to understand the role of language as both an ontological seeing and an ontic practicality and also fails to understand the necessity of freedom in being. It further underestimates the role of poetry as founding a mythology. To think poetically is to discover new structures of words that reshape how the world is thought of and resultantly how the world actually is, because there is no cut and dry distinction between thoughts and things. The ancient Greek poets themselves created worlds out of mythologies embedded in poems, and the capacity to construct such a mythological structure in language is one feature of poetic thinking. Heidegger proclaims at the end of *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, “For the future, the situation of the powers which ground truth in the first place, namely poetry (and consequently art in general) and thinking, will be quite different than it was in the first beginning. Poetry will not be first, but in the transition the forerunner will have to be thinking. Art, however, will be for the future the putting into work of truth” (Heidegger, 1994: 164).\(^3\)

This thinking of generation makes Heidegger much akin with Schelling’s late work, the *Ages of the World*, a radical text about the problem of genesis itself. This is Schelling’s last attempt at building

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\(^3\)For Schelling, it is the plastic arts that are primary, and one can perhaps see Heidegger expressing this in “Origin of the Work of Art” as he somewhat uncharacteristically discusses the Greek temple rather than his more usual discussions of poetry as his preferred art form.
The problem of destiny and history is particularly well framed in Heidegger’s thinking of Hölderlin, particularly of Hölderlin’s idea of homecoming. The homecoming is a realization of the destiny of a people that is at the same time a returning, and it would be remiss to discuss the new beginning in Heidegger without an account of this thinking. Heidegger may be seen as rejecting the idea of a destiny while at the same time embracing some type of arrival at a historic point of intensity. This is belied by the difference between the historic and the merely historical. Heidegger is interested in the jointure as being intrinsically historic as it not only partakes in history but plays a role in found ing it. Much as Dasein is both active and passive in ereignis, being is itself historic as it founds history and historical as the history of a people serve to create the space for the fourfold, opening a space for the realization of some type of culmination as being is revealed while at the same time undermining the finality of destiny.

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At this point, it is very difficult indeed to dispute Heidegger’s debt to and essential relationship to the historical movement of German Idealism. He has appropriated Idealism by providing phenomenological expression to Idealism’s most crucial insights, demonstrating that truth, praxis, freedom, and transcendence can all be understood within the same being-historical structure of genesis, and he has allowed this history of being to be played out on a world historical scale in being-historical thinking. This then leaves us with many paths for further investigation, one of the most exciting of which is the working out of the political consequences of the Beiträge. Once the text is read in the spirit of Idealism as providing a means for contemporary Dasein to engage history and politics in a practical sense through what Heidegger describes as inceptual thinking, an entire new domain of Heidegger studies is opened, and the possibility for an entirely new political thinking lies in wait.
Bibliography


Vita

Ryan Stephen Hellmers was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, and began studying philosophy at the University of New Orleans under Donald Hanks. He completed 30 philosophy classes as an undergraduate in the history of philosophy, philosophy of language, and continental philosophy. He then completed another 14 philosophy classes and served as a teaching assistant for 5 classes as a graduate student. His emphasis is upon ancient philosophy, Heidegger, Kant, Whitehead, aesthetics, and analytic metaphysics. He holds Bachelor of Arts degrees in philosophy and in drama and communications with an emphasis on film, from the University of New Orleans. He is assistant organizer of the 2004 convening of the North American Heidegger Conference in New Orleans with Francois Raffoul and Frank Schalow. He likes to cook French, Italian, Mexican, Spanish, Greek, Russian, Moroccan, Chinese, Thai, Japanese, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Cajun, and Creole food, continues to study film, and works on photography in the mountain regions of Colorado.