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POLITICAL IMAGEMAKING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TELEVISION COMMERCIALS AIRED DURING LOUIS LAMBERT'S 1979 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN

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POLITICAL IMAGEMAKING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TELEVISION COMMERCIALS AIRED DURING LOUIS LAMBERT'S 1979 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech

by

Thomas Joseph Karam
B. S., Louisiana State University, 1977
M. A., Louisiana State University, 1979
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Finally, my love and sincere thanks to J. M. J.
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the televised political image-making of Louis Lambert during his unsuccessful 1979 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign. During the campaign, over $20 million was spent by the six major candidates for the office of governor. Lambert spent approximately $3.5 million, with the majority of his money being spent on televised advertisements.

The study includes an overview of Lambert's campaign, followed by an analysis of his campaign. The three different phases of the campaign and the three media consultants Lambert employed is analyzed. The study also examines the verbal and non-verbal aspects of Lambert's political commercials.

The study revealed that political image-making is an important factor in a campaign. Moreover, the negative image a candidate projects can possibly have worse effect on an individual's candidacy than a positive image. The study also contends that additional aspects of political communication, such as campaign organization, direct-mail, phone banks, polling, and campaign strategy, work together with the image-making aspect to strengthen a campaign.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1950's there has been a proliferation in the use of television by candidates for public office. More and more the politician is becoming dependent on TV as the principal medium for presenting his platform and, equally important, his image, to the electorate.

As to the latter, television in political campaigns frequently raises the argument that the focus has shifted from issues to image. To analyze this argument properly, one needs to reflect on pre-television days, when issues were supposedly the main focus.

Emmett J. Hughes claims that image has always been an important criterion. "Personality has always mattered critically in politics - back through the age of radio to the street-corner rally and the doorbell-ringing campaigns." Dan Hahn contends that "the focus has always been upon image, or upon image as a manifestation of the issues ... When a voter cast his ballot for "The Great Commoner," he was voting for image-plus, he was voting for a whole series of issues which were somehow tied in with the image ... When a person cast a vote in 1960 for the "mature" Nixon or the "vigorous" Kennedy, he was voting for an image intimately connected with the issue of leadership."
A candidate's use of image is a part of his type of persuasion. Political consultants attempt to build a desirable impression of their candidates. The vote-winning capacity of a particular candidate's image centers on those qualities which he or she believes will constitute a desirable impression, and the ability to convince voters that the candidate has those qualities.

Political researchers who have analyzed the literature concerning opinion polls and surveys find that the candidate's experience is the most important characteristic, with integrity, honesty, education, and intelligence following. Also listed as significant qualities are independence, leadership, administrative ability, aggressiveness, youth, attractive personality, sincerity, and "a stable family life." 4

The 1950's marked the beginning of the television commercial's ability to shape a candidate's image. Dwight D. Eisenhower is considered the first television candidate because of his image as portrayed through that medium. Television's influence in image-making was also evident in the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign.

The dominant feature in that campaign was the candidate's series of debates. Their colloquies provided researchers the opportunity to test television's effectiveness in presenting a candidate. In one such study, by Elihu Katz and Jacob J. Feldman, the researchers concluded
that viewers did not get sufficient information from the debates to cause them to change their choice. However, viewers had "learned something about the candidates themselves. They discovered how well each candidate could perform in a debate, and the images of each candidate."  

Television commercials are only one of many stimuli acting on the voter, but apparently they are one of the strongest influences on the voter's decision. The candidate is no longer a man alone, but rather a member of a group organized to accomplish the task of communicating. An important member of that group is the media consultant whose function is to communicate the image of the candidate to the voter through the medium of advertising.

**METHOD**

This is a descriptive analetic study regarding the televised commercials aired during Louis Lambert's 1979 gubernatorial campaign. This does not purport to be an experimental study. Data were gathered through interviews and from literature on the topic. Since the interviews were with media consultants, people involved with a particular campaign, and politically astute individuals, the study borders on field research. Interviews were conducted with political media consultants James Carvin of New Orleans, Louisiana and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Roger Ailes of New York, New York; with Lambert's campaign manager, Frank Brown and his campaign
director, Gary O'Neill; with Wayne Davis, media director for Gillis Long's 1971 gubernatorial campaign, with Nancy Todd, secretary for Matt Reese and Associates of Washington, D. C.; with long-time political consultant Edmond Reggie of Crowley, Louisiana; with polling expert Jim Lloyd of Lance Terrance and Associates of Dallas, Texas; and with political researcher and writer James Gray of Washington, D. C.

In the concluding chapter, the writer makes impressionistic observations concerning the effectiveness of image-making in Lambert's campaign. The conclusions drawn are based primarily from the information gained through the interviews and past research in the area of political image-making. The writer's judgments and opinions are simple observations of the political commercials.

The specific purpose of the study is to analyze the image-making techniques of televised political commercials used in Louis Lambert's 1979 gubernatorial campaign.

The potential exists for television news coverage, or "free" media, to have a significant impact on a candidate's image. News reporting may either contradict or enhance an image the candidate is attempting to project through his political advertisement, and the news media can certainly influence voters. Gerald Ford's 1976 presidential campaign, for example, underscores this point. His stumbling while leaving an airplane was reported as a clumsy action, creat-
ing a contradiction to the image Ford had been trying to establish. His stumbling was in sharp contrast to his cultivated image as a distinguished and gracious leader.

Hofstetter and Buss remind us that news reporting may also be biased. They state that bias in reporting may consist of outright lying, distortion, aggregating and diffusing certain facts but not others, or disagreement over basic values or beliefs. A significant political characteristic of television is its power to establish an image of an individual. Since researchers generally agree that TV can promote a certain image of a candidate, news reporting can also affect the image the electorate has of the candidate. Due to the differences in structure and intended purposes of political advertising and news reporting and to the vast scope of the latter, the respective contributions of these two forms of political communication can not feasibly be analyzed in the same study. Thus, the present study is limited in scope to the analysis of the political advertisements during Lambert's campaign.

Lambert's campaign did not follow a pre-planned media strategy as to viewer targeting. Consequently, the Lambert organization apparently kept no record of their media time purchases. Also, attempts to obtain this information from broadcasting stations throughout the state proved unsuccessful. For the purpose of this study, the
potential audience viewing Lambert's advertisements will be defined as the registered voters in Louisiana in 1979. According to the census data in 1979, of the voting-age population, 1.9 million or 70%, were registered to vote. Therefore, the potential viewing audience is the 1.9 million registered Louisiana voters during 1979.

A political commercial is a message that is aired in a time period purchased by a candidate. The commercial is frequently limited in time to 10, 20, 30 or 60 seconds. The concentration here is on 30 and 60 second commercials, since these were the prime basic units used by each media consultant. The study focuses on the verbal and non-verbal messages and the images communicated to the Louisiana electorate.

Chapter II includes a review of literature on the topic of political image-making. The literature includes texts on the subject matter, interviews with professionals in the area of image-making, journal articles, and newspapers. This chapter also focuses on political research.

Chapter III includes an overview of the entire campaign. This chapter also includes an historical sketch of Louis Lambert - his background, his past political involvement and his reasons for seeking the office of governor.

Lambert recognized the important role his media consultants would play in the campaign. However, during the course of the campaign, Lambert was forced to employ three different consultants. Each consultant was instrumental in shaping a new image of Lambert. It therefore seems
important that the work of each consultant is analyzed.

A brief description of the consulting firms is provided in order to better understand the personalities behind the image makers. This chapter includes a descriptive analysis of Lambert's paid political advertisements and the effectiveness of these advertisements. Finally, attention is given to the reasons for the dismissal of the consultants.

Chapter IV also provides an overview of the primary election results. An analysis of the court battle that followed the primary election and the four Democrat candidates who endorsed the Republican candidate is included. This examination reveals the severe problems the Lambert campaign encountered prior to the general election. The Chapter also examines the third consulting firm involved in the campaign and the reasons for hiring this firm.

Chapter V is a content analysis of the verbal and non-verbal aspect of the political commercials. The various aesthetic techniques employed by the media consultants are analyzed.

Chapter VI is the conclusion of the study and includes an overall analysis of Lambert's campaign for governor. Attention will be given to the strengths and weaknesses of his organization and his campaign. This chapter provides a final examination of the effectiveness of the numerous television advertisements on the images which were being communicated to the Louisiana electorate.
FOOTNOTES


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

It is necessary to review several bodies of literature in order to place the present work properly within the existing body of knowledge.

This review is highly selective and is not intended to be a comprehensive coverage of selected areas. The review is intended to provide a basis for the development of this study of political image-making.

Great men, even during their lifetime, are usually known to the public only through a fictitious personality. Hence the modicum of truth in the old saying that no man is a hero to his valet. There is only a modicum of truth, for the valet, and the private secretary, are often immersed in the fiction themselves. Royal personages are, of course, constructed personalities. Whether they themselves believe in their character, or whether they merely permit the chamberlain to stage-manage it, there are at least two distinct selves, the public and the regal self, the private and human.

Images, "the pictures in our heads," are of increased concern in the study of political communication. An image is an individual's cognitive attribute. It may be a memory, a belief, an opinion or an attitude. Moreover, an image is "a subjective representation of something previously perceived," the "conception of qualities that people associate with certain objects, products, or individuals." In a word, images are mental pictures which
people use the better to comprehend the world around them. These mental pictures are, in turn, shaped and provoked by our personal attitudes and feelings. 

It seems as though we are living in a world where the image is of more importance than the original, which has itself become the original.... The shadow has become the substance." In past political elections, the politician's ideals have frequently been displaced by images. The image, writes David Boorstin, "is a pseudo-image ... it is synthetic, believable, passive, vivid, simplified, and ambiguous." For the purpose of this study, an "image" is the mental pictures the electorate has of the political candidate.

The political actions of individuals seem to be "found­ed by the images of political reality ... which we carry around with us." Moreover, individuals seem to treat im­ages like the environment itself. Their actions appear to be governed by "an image of the present in which the act oc­curs, an image of the past preceding the act, and an image of the future subsequent to the act." 

Individuals involved in the political arena should also focus attention on image. Kenneth Boulding noted that a candidate's image consists of the subjective impressions that the voters have of him. "These impressions can be of any type - thoughts about a candidate's values and campaign successes are as much a part of his image as are ideas about his personality and leadership."
Stephen Shadegg, a special consultant and active member of the Republican National Committee, advanced this concept of a candidate's image: "The image of a candidate is the public appreciation of the candidate's personality, philosophy, intelligence, competence, and performance record. The image is what the public sees, knows, and believes about the candidate." However, political images are a complicated combination of information and evaluation and are often difficult to separate.

When an individual views a televised advertisement, he may have a different impression of a candidate. An individual's impression of a candidate can be either stylistic or political. Stylistic impressions are associated with the candidate's mannerisms and campaign performances. This includes such factors as the candidate's personality, campaign success and style, and personal background. Conversely, political impressions are concerned with the candidate's governing actions and capacities such as his issue position.

An example illustrating the difference between stylistic and political impressions is the Gerald Ford-Jimmy Carter 1976 presidential campaign. Ford's image was primarily political, as the electorate's impressions focused on his presidential tenure, leadership, and political actions. During the campaign, however, these impressions were downplayed, while stylistic impressions, such as his personality, were emphasized.

Carter's impression focused on the stylistic, rather
than the political. His personality, reflecting his background, was a positive factor that aided him throughout the campaign.

A candidate's image will not be significantly changed by new information, once the image has been developed. "The developed image will limit the impact of subsequent news about the candidate."  

**IMAGE RESEARCH AND POLITICAL POLLS**

According to nationally prominent political advertiser Douglas L. Bailey, "political campaigns these days live with polls, maybe too many polls." The winning candidate is usually the one who most effectively responds to the concerns of his constituency. Therefore, it seems the most effective means of learning their concerns is through opinion research.

In developing campaign strategy, the candidate's research staff must consider both issues and image. In 1978, research revealed that voters best remembered the issues from past campaigns. Prior to the election, however, image was more important than issues in shaping voter attitude. When speaking on an issue, the candidate should use that issue as a means to portray the intended image to the voters.

Political polls and opinion surveys, if properly conducted and analyzed, can be effective tools for giving the candidate reliable information as to what is going on in the minds of the voters. As political pollster Lance
Terrance points out, most surveys provide answers to such pertinent questions as: What are the key issues in the election? How many voters know of the candidate? Of this number, is their opinion good, bad or indifferent? If they like, or dislike the candidate, why? What is their opinion of the other candidates? If the election were today, how would it come out? Where do the voters get most of their political information? All such questions provide the pollster with information useful in planning the campaign strategy.

Various methods of sampling are available to the pollsters. Two common types are "probability" and "quota" sampling. Probability sampling assumes that the individuals selected for interview are representative of the entire population within the candidate's geographical regions.

Population quota sampling involves the analysis of census data to identify the distribution by such characteristics as age, sex, income and education. Quota sampling also enables the pollster to achieve equal representation of the designed population.

The information gathering process begins once the subjects for survey are selected. Questions put to the respondents can be either open-ended or close-ended and can be presented to the respondent by mail, by telephone or in person.

Survey research involves various stages. First, the
project preparation should include several considerations, such as hypothesizing (deciding what will be studied), designing (establishing procedures and methods to be used), planning (determining materials and personnel needs), and financing (arranging support for the survey). Second, the sample selection technique is determined for choosing those people to be interviewed. Third, the questionnaire must be prepared. Questionnaire construction includes drafting (framing the questions for use in the field) and construction (planning the format of the questionnaire). Fourth, the field work, which includes pre-testing, training of interviewers, briefing, interviewing, controlling and verifying. The final stage is data processing, which includes coding, processing, analyzing and reporting the data.

When the polls are completed, and the results tabulated, the staff can begin further organization of the campaign. Robert Agranoff explains various types of information pollster Lou Harris found useful in planning campaign strategy. Key group breakdowns, for example, will indicate the political makeup of the constituency, including area differences, racial and religious patterns, nationality, group differences, occupational patterns, differences by size and place and how past elections were decided.

Polls also give campaign planners an indication of the public's perception of the candidate as a public figure, the candidate's name recognition, past voting record (if
any), and the candidate's favorable and unfavorable qualities. Political polls provide information indicating the public's opinion of issues and problems they consider most urgent. Finally, the researcher obtains information necessary to develop the proper image, to shape the candidate's personality into one pleasing to the voters.

Various factors are merged in formulating a candidate's overall image: the candidate's partisanship, position on issues, public perception of the candidate's competence, and the candidate's personality. If a positive characteristic be considered lacking, the media consultant in his planning should work with the candidate to correct the deficiency.

ELEMENTS SHAPING A CANDIDATE'S IMAGE

Political images consist of individuals' subjective impressions, which include the public's perception of their elected official's campaign successes, personality traits, and leadership abilities. Also significant are their appearances, philosophies, intelligence, competence, and performance records. It must be kept in mind that politicians are viewed as concerned, friendly, honest, or, at the other end, indifferent, unfriendly, dishonest. Unfortunately, these impressions are frequently based on hasty judgements, inaccurate or incomplete information, biases, and distortion of motives or actions. Various elements work together to create ethos - the distinguishing character or tone of a
person or group conveyed at a given time. If politicians implement methods of strengthening their credibility, for example, the credibility element of their ethos will improve. Other elements which shape the ethos are: character and trustworthiness, intelligence, identification and attractiveness, or charisma.

Political scandals and unethical activities, such as Watergate, Abscam, and Brilab, have caused the public to carefully scrutinize the actions of their elected leaders and have made them more watchful for any trace of political manipulation or deceit. Politicians must therefore be sure in their campaigns that their actions and words emphasize their good character and trustworthiness, and that their abiding interest is in meeting the needs of the electorate. Any trace of self-serving action, hidden motives, or undercover deals cannot but damage the candidate's, or elected official's, credibility and, hence, his image.

Similarly, the politician's character can be strengthened or weakened by the degree to which he displays sincerity. According to media specialist Gene Wyckoff, sincerity is viewed as even more preferable than skill. People are more "tolerant of bumbles and obvious ineptness if the individual tries hard."

A second factor contributing to the politicians' credibility is intelligence. They must appear knowledgeable concerning current and relevant issues, both general and particular.

Although public officials need not be considered "ex-
perts," they should still be viewed as competent, and almost as important, self-confident. Studies reveal that a source's competence is effective in influencing the reception of that source's idea. Each time they display success in performing a task, their image of self-confidence can be enhanced.

Another important characteristic that strengthens the politician's credibility is identification with the audience. He should always analyze the audience in order to gain better understanding of its composition. According to Kenneth Burke, politicians are persuasive insofar as they talk their audience's language - by speech, gesture, tonality, image, and attitude - by identifying with their audience's way.

When such identification is achieved, politicians appear to share common values with their audience and this seems to increase their credibility. A good example of this was the immense success of John F. Kennedy's speech in West Berlin in the early 1960's. Kennedy won the hearts of those assembled by stating, in German, "Ich bin ein Berliner." (I am a Berliner).

Another example of the importance of identification was provided by Louisiana's legendary governor, Huey P. Long. In his travels through various section of Louisiana in the early thirties, Long successfully identified with the different groups by his dress and his accent. When speaking to a group of poor, uneducated farm workers, he wore casual slacks and spoke with a slightly broken accent. But, when addressing a
group of prominent New Orleans business executives, he would wear a suit and necktie and speak at the intellectual level of his audience. Such audience adaptation appeared to be a significant element in Long's success. By identifying with them appearing like them, being one of them, he strengthened his credibility.

Credibility also allows the politician's ideas to be more readily accepted. By touching the emotions of the electorate, political officials can communicate a more personalized message. For example, instead of just talking Medicare, one could cite a specific case of a father, mother or other needy person benefited by Medicare. Instead of speaking of Hubert Humphrey's record, one could emphasize how the vice-president's work related to the people and the national welfare.

A final element of credibility is attraction, or charisma. The attraction of a candidate refers to the orientation toward another person or persons; it involves a psychological approach, rather than avoidance; moving toward someone, rather than against or away from them. Politicians' attraction can come from their observable talents, achievement, occupational status, personality and appearance, style, and overall life experience.

A public official's interaction results in the public's formulation of two different impressions - stylistic and political. Stylistic impressions refer to the official's political mannerisms and performances. This includes such factors as the politician's personality, personal background,
and campaign techniques.

The politician's image transmitted during his run for office usually becomes a part of him, because of the greater amount of his exposure during the campaign. The degree of forcefulness, consideration, and sportsmanship exhibited by the official provides valuable information to the public and contributes to his public's image. Therefore, by being always conscious of his campaign behavior, the politician may avoid the "creation" of information that the public may misinterpret.

Political impressions focus on the politician's governing actions and capacities, such as leadership, and ability, political background and issue positions. For example, the electorate had a negative political impression of Jimmy Carter during his presidency because they perceived him to be lacking qualities as a leader. As a result, a great part of his 1980 campaign was spent in his effort to strengthen this quality. Decisions such as the Tehran raid, as well-intentioned as they may have been, were generally considered also to be attempts to erase his poor leadership impression.

The politician's physical delivery can be an important ingredient of his charisma. Politicians' delivery can project an aura of credibility by allowing their ideas to have maximum impact. The public official should be aware that good delivery reinforces the speaker's ideas. It should appear not obtrusive, but natural and spontaneous, and be appropriate for the audience and the occasion.

Ronald Reagan's performance in the 1980 debate illus-
trates the role of good delivery in strengthening a politician's image. He employed various physical techniques to erase his negative image as a "dangerous" candidate. His use of "shrugs and smiles seemed to convince the public that Carter's portrait of Reagan that of a weapon-prone, right winger, was a political caricature." He reinforced his message by using such simple devices as the waving of his hand and direct eye contact, thus indicating that non-verbal behavior, too, can strengthen both the politician's message and his image.

Also vital to the politician's attempt to project a positive image are his mannerisms, physical appearance, and dress. Here again the Reagan-Carter debates provide an illustration. Reagan usually wore a dark, two-piece suit and a dark tie, the traditional attire of presidents. This, coupled with his large stature (compared with Carter's) seemed greatly to aid his creation of a "presidential image." His physical appearance was so imposing that even some of Carter's aides conceded that Reagan's presence was Superior, was more that of a man to be called "Mr. President."

In contrast, Carter wore a more stylish blue suit, red and white tie, and a gold collar pin. Rather than appearing "presidential" his appearance was more that of a businessman. Seen next to Reagan, he appeared smaller, almost fragile, which seemed to emphasize the strong and authoritative figure of his opponent.
Good vocal delivery can also enhance the politician's image. In their interaction with the public, the politician's vocal style, articulation, speech tempo, and pronunciation can be persuasive. Several qualities are present in good vocal delivery. First, the volume must be sufficiently loud and the tempo, or rate, slow enough to be heard without difficulty. Second, the delivery must be such as to create interest in the message. Third, the vocal manner should contribute to the mood the speaker seeks to create and not distract the listeners.

The Ted Kennedy-John McCormack senatorial debate in the 1960's exemplifies the importance of vocal delivery. As the debate became more heated, McCormack's image began to diminish; "the tone and aggressive intent of McCormick's remarks seemed to characterize him as an unpleasant and undesirable image candidate."

Accordingly, politicians should look to both their verbal and non-verbal behavior. In all situations, whether social or political, the politician can be judged by his gestures, mannerisms, and utterances which could be subject to public scrutiny.

The public official's image, synonymous with the people's overall impression of the official, can often determine the future of the political career. Therefore, ethos translates into a politician's being positively perceived by his audience, the voters. It is evident, therefore, that to be successful in the political arena, poli-
ticians should recognize, understand and seek to control all the elements that make for a good image.

IMPORTANCE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN IMAGE-MAKING

Research has been conducted concerning the effect of mass media on the viewing public. The major conclusion indicates that what the listener, viewer, or reader brings into the media situation (his background and preconceived motions) is a much more important determinant of media impact than anything in the media themselves. His is a perception of the image of the particular media source.

Political participants themselves have recognized the importance of the candidate's image in a campaign and the significant role the various media play in the image-making process. There is among them, however, disagreement as to the most effective medium for political communication.

A study by Atwood and Sanders noted considerable variance in audience perceptions of media use and credibility. Keating and Latane refer to a Roper study which found that from 1959 to 1971 TV had overtaken newspapers as the source from which most people received their news. TV was also the most believable medium. The Roper study compared television, radio, newspapers, and magazines and found television to be the most believable and desirable medium. The study showed that 65% of respondents received most information on candidates through television, which 24%
selected newspapers, and 4% radio.  

Prior to television and radio, the most important component of a candidate's image was probably his personal character and reputation, as depicted by newspapers, pamphlets, posters, and campaign slogans. The advancement of communication technology, however, has changed the art of political campaigning.

Newspapers are more informative than television. Studies revealed that in the 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns more people reported voting for the candidate espoused by newspapers than those promoted by other media. The studies also revealed that newspapers seem more effective because they eliminate confusing arguments of campaigns.

Granting that newspapers are a highly informative source, there is question concerning their effectiveness. Media specialist Gene Wyckoff argues that newspapers are less influential than television in conveying a candidate's image. He claims that readers derive their image of the candidate's character from descriptions of their deeds and reputation, whereas viewers judge character from directly perceived appearance and demeanor. Furthermore, says Wyckoff, television images are more effective because they are perceived directly, whereas newspaper images must be derived by indirect perceptual process: the reader first sees printed data and then, through his cognitive processes interprets the data; only then can he formulate an
image from the printed data. On the other hand, some individuals claim newspapers to be the most effective conveyance of a candidate's image. According to Thomas Patterson, "the newspaper is the superior transmitter of information."

Throughout the 1940's, radio was the most trusted and popular political medium in America; but with the upsurge of television in the fifties, radio's political appeal declined significantly. Today, although not as frequently used as the other media, radio is effective in reaching those audiences generally missed by newspapers and television. According to Dan Nimmo, the average suburban commuter spends ninety minutes of every working day in his car. Millions of housewives listen to radio while doing their chores and many of the elderly, who grew up with the radio, still rely on its news broadcasts for information about politics.

Selection of the vehicle for communicating a political message is frequently dependent on the given situation. Regardless of which is the primary vehicle used, the other media should be included to augment the primary one. According to Roger Ailes, former media consultant for Richard Nixon, the media used in a campaign should be coordinated "so that when television is running, radio and print and whatever else you're going to do is running at the same time to get maximum synergistic effect."

Since 1960, television had become the favorite medium for communicating political messages and was the primary
medium used in Louisiana's gubernatorial campaign of 1979. Further illustrating its virtues is the fact that television evokes both aural and visual attention. "Unlike written or audio speeches, TV provides a concrete image of the speaker. Facial expressions and bodily gestures as well as verbal intonation punctuate a message." It affords the political candidate a different more dramatic way to communicate with his electorate and, although it is an expensive and technical medium, its usage "endows the candidate with an aura of importance."  

"While television pictures lack any capacity to enlighten voters about the candidate's policy positions, they certainly contribute to the development of people's images of the candidate." Keating and Latane supported this contention by citing the 1960 Presidential debate. Although the Kennedy-Nixon debates failed to alter the attitudes of the electorate toward the debate issue, the image of the candidates was changed by the debates.  

Research indicates that a variety of viewers tend to see the same personal image of a televised candidate, but that the influence of the candidate's image may vary. The most common effect of a candidate's image on the viewing electorate is crystallization, rather than conversion. For example, the public's belief that Kennedy's image was superior to Nixon's aroused more voters, already inclined toward a Democrat candidate, to work for and vote for Kennedy. Crystallizations indicate the electorate will
vote for the candidate of the party to which they were habitually inclined.\textsuperscript{79}

In past elections the use of issues in campaigns "have been either ignored or underplayed because the don't lend themselves to television advertising or journalism."\textsuperscript{80} The emphasis has been on candidates persuading the electorate by focusing on their personal image. Since the 1960's, the electorate has been persuaded more by a candidate's projected image than by the candidate's stance on political issues. Frequently, though, the candidate does use issues to enhance his image. Some research indicates that the electorate has difficulty recalling campaign issues. Approximately 25\% of the electorate could not recall any issue during a senatorial campaign in 1972.\textsuperscript{82}

In political advertisements, words often seem less important than pictures. The effectiveness of the advertisement "can come from the dramatic whole, from the rapid sequence of still pictures, each a frozen movement itself, slipping by so fast as to leave a mere impression of a greater-than-life character."\textsuperscript{83} Another of television's strong points is the fact that TV sets are found in approximately 98\% of American households.\textsuperscript{84} "We are now a visual world. The majority of the population has lost its ability to visualize ... TV is a substitute for the non-thinking person."\textsuperscript{85}

Television, however, is not a flawless political aid. There are limitations to its ability to project effective-
ly a candidate's image. Hofstetler contends that political ads can reinforce or strengthen a pre-existing image, issue positions, and candidate perceptions. "Any changes in viewer imagery of perception ... might be mostly in degree or intensity, but not in direction. Television, then, would not seem to be as great a tool for viewer manipulation as might be expect."

Even though television is a highly influential mass communication channel, "no sensible candidate places exclusive reliance on it." Campaign experts generally advise the usage of all available media. Various other advertising devices should be considered - billboards, radio, television, newspapers, letter writing, telephone committee programs, handbills. The cartridges "must be fired because, among the multitude of blanks, one may be a bullet." We might say that candidates are marketed, similar to the way a company markets its products.

Joe McGinnis, in his book, The Selling of the President, explained the serious problem he and Richard Nixon's staff encountered during the 1968 presidential campaign in the effort to present Nixon to the voting public.

Now you put him on television, you've got a problem right away. He's a funny-looking guy. He looks like somebody hung him in a closet overnight and he jumps out in the morning with his suit all bunched up and starts running around saying, 'I want to be president.' I mean this is how he strikes some people. That's why these shows (his advertisements) are important. To make them forget all of that."
To enhance Nixon's image, McGinnis' advertising staff took control of all aspects of his presentation to the public. The staff members insisted on creating a proper, controlled environment for their candidate. For example, a televised panel discussion featuring Nixon was planned to project him as knowledgeable and well-respected, personal qualities lacking in Nixon's unsuccessful presidential campaign of 1960. In preparing the show, such factors as proper color, designs, sounds, and lighting were selected. In this endeavor they went so far as to have Johnny Carson's make-up man prepare Nixon for the cameras. The carefully chosen panel for the discussion included one Negro (two would have looked too obvious), a Jewish lawyer, the president of a local Polish-Hungarian group, a housewife, a businessman, a representative of a middle-class group, and two newsmen. The panel members were briefed as to which questions they were to ask.

The audience attending the panel discussion, also carefully chosen, included 300 citizens, black and white, from a local Republican organization. Since no reporters were allowed in the audience, the planned production went unnoticed. Following certain remarks made by Nixon, an applause sign would appear and the crowd would cheer. At the close of the show, the audience was instructed to "mob Nixon," thus creating the impression that Nixon was
enthusiastically received.

This elaborate show, and other techniques used by the advertising staff, were successful in "selling" their candidate, in convincing the public that Nixon was the best man for the office of president.

Other devices employed to aid in communicating the political message to the voters were used in Jimmy Carter's 1976 presidential campaign. The media consultant, Jerry Rafshoon, focused on five-minute commercials (which previously had never been attempted). The purpose of the commercials was to insure that Carter would have more to say on the issues than any of his opponents. The format of the commercials was substantially: Carter would touch on five or six questions, devoting 40-50 seconds to each, rather than dwelling on any single issue. This technique was designed better to hold audience attention. According to Carter's campaign manager, Hamilton Jordon, "Candidates don't create issues. Issues exist in the minds of the voters. Candidates respond."

Another technique employed by the Carter team was the use of two-minute ads, considered more effective than five-minute ones. Rafshoon then decided to mix the two and five-minute ads. This combination proved to be an effective strategy, for later in the campaign viewers often thought the commercials were network news programs, instead of political advertisements.

David Garth, political consultant from New York, has
employed many unique and successful techniques in his po-
95 litical advertisements. An example was evident in his
handling of John Lindsay's 1965 New York mayoral campaign.
Garth had the attractive, but unpopular Lindsay campaign
"through the streets of New York, coat over his shoulder,
shirt sleeves rolled up, tie askew, the picture of youth
and vigor in a city bored and disenchanted with the pre-
dictable plodding ways of 'Bumbling Bob' Wagner." This
type of campaigning was an effective element in Garth's
image-making process.

Dan Walker's gubernatorial campaign is another ex-
ample of the success of Garth's technique. Walker had
been the "quintessence of a slicked-down, limousine-riding
business executive," until he hired Garth, who drastical-
ly changed that image. His hair grew longer, the fancy
suits came off, replaced by blue jeans, flannel shirts
and a red bandana. Walker was elected.

Garth's ads are usually simple, direct and honest.
His commercials come across not as overly impressive, but
are effective. His advertising uses printed key words at
the bottom of the TV screen, "to amplify and expand." In
his commercials there is considerable information that the
viewer cannot take in all at one viewing. "Our commercials
are designed for the long haul," he says. "We know that
people are going to be seeing them ten to twelve times
during a campaign and we want to keep them interested. We
want to leave them with a bit of a message everytime they
see it, so that by the end of the campaign they will have taken in a lot of facts backing up one impression."  

Gene Wyckoff suggests that TV commercials should be moving—a visual continuity, reaction shots, and pictorial flowing from one sequence to another. He notes that a common mistake in political ads is to dwell too much on the candidate, that more shots should be shown, for example, of concerned people listening. Another mistake is that campaign films often talk too much. Rather, the advertiser should "let the drama speak."  

Wyckoff favors the use of such techniques as "cutting to music," and "ancestral motivation." The first term emphasizes the importance of proper music in advertising. It provides a musical buildup to "catch the audience in the mounting excitement." For this technique to be successful, he says the music must flow in a proper rhythmic montage.  

As ancestral motivation Wyckoff uses certain elements of personality in campaign tactics. The family tradition theme has been successfully used by many politicians who have an ancestry of political figures. It employs emotional appeal in presenting the candidate's message.  

Another suggestion of Wyckoff is that dramatic commercials make the candidate remembered: "frequently words can be less important than pictures." The effect, therefore, can come from the dramatic whole: "from the rapid sequence of still pictures, each a frozen moment in itself,
slipping by so fast as to leave mere impressions of a greater-than-life character." 105

Other production techniques that may increase or heighten the illusion that the political campaign is a drama are the reaction shot and the rigid time-period factor. The reaction shot shows a candidate surrounded by applauding and cheering people as he finishes a speech or appears at a political function, seeking to give the impression that the candidate has positive effect on his audience. 106

The rigid time-period fact device, employed when the advertiser has only a few seconds of minutes to communicate the message, calls for the commercial to be concise and the impression is based not on substance, but rather on style. 107

Another method to create the proper image is panel discussions carried on by several intellectual or well-known people who interview the candidate. 108 The intent of this format is to create the illusion of endorsements by well-known citizens. The members on the panel ask prepared questions which allow the candidate to state his views on the particular issue. In these panels, the entire format must be completely rehearsed to avoid the embarrassment of the participants being caught off guard.

The filmed documentaries plan is an entertaining format for making political appeals, a technique similar
to those used in show business. A symbolic scene representing the film's basic theme is devised, and repeated at appropriate times, to convey to the audience the desired image. The strategy here is "don't reveal too much about the candidate; give the impression that he can control situations without actually showing him doing so. Keep the candidate off the screen by using his voice with his picture, but not the candidate himself." In this, by maximizing the visual effects, the pictures can speak for themselves; the spoken is adapted to the visual, rather than the reverse. The same phrases are not used repeatedly. In personal appearances the politician must be redundant to give attention, but this is not true of film.

Finally, Wyckoff's studies show that television viewers learn more from hearing the audio and watching an unrelated video than from having the speaker give them the message via audio and video together.

According to Dan Nimmo, it is all-important in TV advertising to select spots where there is the heaviest viewing audience and an audience composed of the electorate composition the candidate wants to address. Advertisers feel that personalities not issues or political parties, win votes. Therefore, the advertisers plan should be to "continue spontaneity, and make the effort to appear uninhibited, candid, open, and credible, without an unrehearsed performance."
The advisors exploit the best features of the candidate in order to form his political personality - how he performs on the medium, his political role, and his political qualities. The political role of the candidate refers to the impression he gives of his ability as a politician - his astuteness, grasp of issues, knowledge, and ability to control any situation. Depiction of his personal qualities should show him to be sympathetic - able to share the feelings and emotions of his audience. His personality should relate to "the attention - getting image of ourselves, our image of our behavior." Campaign advisors should intermingle all these aspects of personality. This, as all phases of a successful campaign, requires a team of advertising experts with a sound program, a media plan which is a strategic blueprint, listing the campaign's assumptions and the objectives.

Included in the media plan are the personality traits that need to be stressed, the issues that may arise, and the basic image that should be created. Also, the plan must be designed with the mood of the state, parish, or nation in mind. The plan also outlines the form the advertisements should take and the way it should be marketed, targeted, and phased.

The assumptions of the plan relate to the environment, the candidates' position at the beginning of the campaign, and the objectives indicate where the candidate would like
to be at the end of the campaign; the object is to get the candidate to that position.

Campaign appeals are usually made to specific groups, but there should be concern about a backlash of opposition. Democrats ordinarily attempt to hold together their electoral coalition, while Republicans try to increase their base of support by denying the accusation that they are the party of the rich and big business.

Frequently, the plan of the campaign is to destroy the image of the opposition. Instead of playing to their candidate's strength, they attack the opposition's weakness. This strategy was seen in 1964, when the Democrats attacked Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater on his stand on nuclear weapons with an advertisement showing a girl picking a daisy, while a time clock ticked away toward a nuclear blast.
FOOTNOTES


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20. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 94.

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84. Interview of the writer with James Gray of Washington, D. C., July 22, 1980.


89. McGinnis, *The Selling of the President*, p. 52.

90. Ibid., p. 101.

91. Ibid., p. 103.


93. Ibid., p. 18.

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96. Ibid., p. 22.

97. Ibid., p. 25.

98. Ibid., p. 23.

99. Ibid.


101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., p. 89.

103. Ibid., p. 90.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., p. 92.

106. Ibid., p. 94.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., p. 97.

109. Ibid., p. 98.

111. Ibid., p. 170.
112. Wyckoff, The Image Candidates, p. 98.
113. Ibid., 145.
114. Wayne, The Road to the White House, p. 82.
115. Ibid., p. 84.
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117. Ibid., p. 87.
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119. Ibid., p. 68.
120. Ibid., p. 71.
CHAPTER III
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN

Six major candidates sought to succeed Edwin Edwards, the outgoing, two-term Democratic governor, in the 1979 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign. All six were completing terms as elected public officials.

THE CANDIDATES

James E. Fitzmorris, of New Orleans; completing his eighth year as Lieutenant-Governor. He also served as Chairman of the state board of Commerce and Industry.

Paul J. Hardy, St. Martinville; elected to the State Senate in 1972 and, in 1976, elected Secretary of State.

E. L. "Bubba" Henry (only north Louisianian in the race); elected Speaker of the House in 1972, a position he held during the campaign.

Louis J. Lambert of Gonzales; elected to the State Senate in 1972 and in 1974 elected to the State Public Service Commission.


David Treen, also from New Orleans, was the only Republican in the campaign. He was elected to the U. S. House of
Representatives in 1972. In 1975, Treen was an unsuccessful candidate for governor. He was re-elected to Congress in 1978 and served in that capacity during the campaign.

THE MEDIA CONSULTANTS

Since 1964, the choice of the media manager of a campaign has been critical to the candidacy of the individual. The choice has ranked with that of campaign manager and chief fund raiser as a first imperative of candidacy. The media man must be artist and businessman all at once. He must be able to shoot film, to edit the film, to buy the time slots, and to locate network audiences he hopes to reach.

The enormous amount of money each candidate had collected for the campaign enabled all to employ top talent in media consultants, "the men who decide how to present the candidate to the voters." The consultants enlisted, prominent both nationally and locally, presented Louisiana's television-viewing voters with political TV which matched in quality that of a presidential campaign.

Rusty Cantelli and Tom Varisco, from New Orleans, produced the television commercials for Lt. Governor Jimmy Fitzmorris. Relatively new media consultants, their largest account up to that time had been State Senator Nat Keifer's unsuccessful bid in 1978 for mayor of New Orleans.

Raymond Strother and Gus Weill, of Baton Rouge, managed
the media portion of Paul Hardy's campaign. Strother and Weill had been associated with Louisiana politics for more than twenty years and had managed numerous campaigns, including Edwin Edwards' successful re-election in 1975 and several other statewide campaigns in 1979.

Bubba Henry hired Charles Guggenheim of Washington, D. C. His "reputation as a media consultant is formidable. He has produced television for two presidential, and more than sixty gubernatorial campaigns." His productions have won two Academy Awards for documentary films. He also managed Senator Edward Kennedy's 1980 presidential campaign.

Three different consultants managed Louis Lambert's media campaign. Jim Carvin, of New Orleans, the first Lambert hired, had been involved in Louisiana politics for more than thirty years. He had managed more than fifty campaigns in the state, including Edwin Edward's successful 1971 gubernatorial race; the 1978 campaign of Ernest Morial, New Orleans' first black mayor; and Gillis Long's unsuccessful bid for governor in 1965. Carvin was later replaced with Robert Squires of Washington, D. D., another nationally-prominent media consultant. Squires was later replaced by Strother and Weill.

Sonny Mounton began his campaign with David Garth of New York, "the heavyweight champion of political consultants." Garth's political victories have included his handling of Hugh Carey's Gubernatorial campaign, Mayor
Edward Koch's successful quests for mayor of New York, and the election of Los Angeles' Tom Bradley, the first black mayor of a major city. Garth's political record lists 71 victories and only 16 defeats. These victories include elections of state candidates, gubernatorial candidates, and U. S. senators and representatives. Midway through the campaign, however, Mouton became dissatisfied with his campaign and replaced Garth with Charles Roemer of Bossier City, Louisiana, Governor Edwin Edwards' commissioner of administration. Roemer served Mouton as media consultant until the end of the campaign.

Dave Treen employed Ronald Facheaux and Jim Farwell, the two youngest media men in the campaign. With the exception of Governor Edwards' 1971 campaign, this campaign was the first major media-consulting experience for Facheaux and Farwell. They received assistance from professional Republican media consultants from Houston and Los Angeles.

**CAMPAIGN EXPENSES**

In Louisiana voters were exposed to the most expensive gubernatorial campaign in the state's history. The gubernatorial candidates spent $13.4 million through the reporting period that ended fifteen days before the primary election. Of this amount, approximately $8 million went for advertising.

Other campaign costs included public opinion polls,
fees paid to political organizations, telephone banks, direct mailings, signs and posters, and paid staff members.

Television advertising is expensive and costs approximately $4000 for producing a 60 second advertisement. If the media consultant elects to hire a film crew and produce a 60-second commercial, "on location," the cost can increase to upward of $30,000 per advertisement. 6

Added to the candidate's campaign expenses is the cost of television time. The charge for time depends upon the television station and its ratings. Generally, a 60-second "prime time" interval during the campaign ran between $500 and $1600. 7

Media consultants receive approximately 15 percent in commissions for placing political advertisements. For example, Raymond Strother's fee for handling Paul Hardy's campaign ranged from $2500 a month to $10,000 a month. In addition, Strother received 15 percent of the cost of all television time. 8 Cantelli and Varisco's fee for the Fitzmorris campaign was "$100,000 or 15 percent of the media money spent, whichever is greater." 9

Lambert had raised approximately $2.85 million as of October 12, 1979, and spent more than $2.9 million during that time. Most of his expenditures were for media advertising, which totaled $1.6 million in payments to agencies alone. He also made payments of slightly less than $300,000 to Matt Reese and Associates, an internationally
known political organizing and canvassing firm.

Lambert spent approximately $11,270 on political organizations which endorsed him. He gave money to more than forty groups, which "are supposed to provide canvassing, advertising, ballot distribution and other campaign and election day services."

The runoff cost Lambert approximately an additional $800,000, according to campaign finance disclosure reports. The campaign period extended from October 28 to December 8. He spent approximately $150,000 from his campaign funds in a court battle defending his second-place finish in the October 27 primary election.

OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The official results of the October 27, 1979 open primary indicated that Democrat Louis Lambert would face front runner Republican Dave Treen for the Louisiana governorship on December 8. Of the 1.9 million registered voters in the state of Louisiana, "approximately 1.4 million votes were cast for governor, or 70.5 percent of all registered voters in the state."

The official vote revealed that 17,000 votes separated the three top candidates. Dave Treen received 297,674 votes, or 21.8 percent of the total's, Louis Lambert was second, receiving 283,266 votes or 20.7 percent; and Jimmy Fitzmorris was third, with 280,760 votes, or 20.6 percent. The other major candidates were Paul Hardy with 227,026
votes (16.6%); E. L. "Bubba" Henry with 135,769 (9.9%); and Sonny Mouton with 124,333 (9.1%). The unofficial results of the open primary election were contested by Fitz-morris who originally finished second in the unofficial count. However, the later official total placed Lambert second. After several days of court proceedings, Fitz-morris's suit was dismissed and Lambert was declared the second place finisher.

Lambert's highest support came primarily from a large block of parishes, consisting of the Florida parishes and those bordering the Mississippi River, from Point Coupee to St. John. Lambert's lowest support came from the Acadia and Lafayette parishes and the northwest area of the state. He finished first in two standard metropolitan statistical areas - Baton Rouge (40.9%) and Lake Charles (23%), and second in Alexandria with 20.4% of the vote. The official statistics showed Lambert receiving the most black support of the campaign, with 40% of the total black vote.

In the December 8 general election, Republican Treen defeated Democrat Lambert to become Louisiana's first Republican governor since the Reconstruction era. Treen received 50.3% or 690,691 votes to Lambert's 49.7% or 681,134 votes. Although Lambert carried 42 parishes compared with Treen's 22 parishes, the voter participation in the parishes carried by Treen provided the necessary margin of victory. Lambert received his largest support in Allen, Red River,
Jackson, and the Florida parishes. Lambert captured 50.3% of the urban vote compared with Treen's 53.1%. 15 Although Lambert again received solid black support, approximately 90% of the black vote, it was not enough to overcome Treen's majority.

LOUIS LAMBERT - THE MAN

Louis Lambert, born in DeRidder, Louisiana, December 21, 1940, grew up in Sorrento, Louisiana in Ascension Parish. He has been a resident of Gonzales, Louisiana since 1966. He attended the public school system in Ascension Parish, studied at Southeastern Louisiana University, and received his B.A. from Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. After earning his law degree from Loyola University in New Orleans, Lambert practiced law in Gonzales and later served as that municipality's city attorney. He is married to the former Mary Gayle Smith of Gonzales. They are the parents of three children. 16

Lambert was first elected to public office in 1971 as a state senator from District 18, which encompasses Ascension, St. James, and Livingston parishes. As a senator, he served in the Finance, Transportation and Highways agencies and Local and Municipal Affairs Committees. In November, 1972, he was elected a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, during which he was named chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources and Environment.
In 1974, Lambert was elected to the Public Service Commission from a district comprising over one-third of the state - parts of Southeast Louisiana and most of Southwest Louisiana, from Calcasieu, Beauregard, and Cameron on the west, to East and West Feliciana, Tangipahoa, and Livingston on the east, and East Baton Rouge on the north. When the Public Service Commission was expanded from three to five members, Lambert's district was reduced to the Flordia parishes, the Baton Rouge area, and various river parishes. Following his election to the Public Service Commission, he was selected that commission's chairman.

Lambert had hoped to use his membership on the Public Service Commission as a springboard to the governor's office, the strategy successfully employed by three past Louisiana governors, Huey P. Long, Jimmie H. Davis, and John J. McKeithen, all of whom were members of that agency during their gubernatorial campaigns. "That route to the mansion has required a bit of populist approach. Long certainly had the common touch, Davis was everybody's favorite country singer, and McKeithen became identified with the nickel phone call." Lambert had hoped to follow the populist tradition by campaigning to "make fuel more available to Louisianians at cheaper prices, hold down utility costs, make the nuclear plants shape up and fight OPEC to the last drop." Lambert gained statewide political attention by confronting the big utility companies on a variety of issues.
In the Senate, in the Constitutional convention, and as Public Service Commission Chairman, he had attacked the utility companies. In his announcement for governor, he made his positions clear. He was against nuclear power; he favored doing away with industrial tax exemptions; he wanted to bar utilities from charging consumers in advance for the cost of power plant construction, and he opposed permitting the phone companies to charge subscribers for directory assistance calls.

Lambert planned to follow his past political campaign philosophy for sharing his political ideas with the public. "I will take my case directly and forthrightly to the people who, I believe, have always seen in me a true friend, and a man who has always stood by their interests: I am confident of their sound reason and their strong desires to elect a man who can improve the lot of all the people of this state, a man who has never been captured by special interests or forgotten from where he came."

THE ISSUES

Finding the most compelling issues in any political campaign is no easy matter. Different candidates stress different issues. Lambert's initial basic platform consisted of four major planks: public education quality, gubernatorial appointments, taxation and finance, and labor-management relations.

"I find no businessman, no mother, no father, who does
not agree with me that Louisiana's number one problem is the poverty of its educational system. One of his public education plans was to strengthen screening devices (such as teacher placement tests) to insure teacher competency. He also urged schools to participate in insuring classroom competence by hiring above average new teachers, improving education policies, awarding less tenure, implementing in-service programs for faculty, and encouraging teachers to work together to perfect skills. Finally, Lambert proposed that the allocation of state education dollars be made on a program basis, rather than a pupil-to-dollar basis.

Lambert's plan for improvement of gubernatorial appointments was to employ the most competent and independent people. His proposal called for the use of a task force to advise in the selection of appointments. "The general criteria I will adopt are an emphasis on minorities, women and young people, as well as ordinary citizens who possess various talents, but have never been asked to serve in government." A third area of interest to Lambert was taxation and finance. He announced his intentions of controlling spending and establishing priorities so that more and higher taxes are not required. On the issue of state aid to local government, he argued that state support of local government "must be based on the long run development of the region and the state - not on charity."
The topic of labor management relations was of concern to all candidates in the race, primarily due to the controversial Right-to-Work Law, which was strongly supported by business groups, but bitterly opposed by labor groups. Lambert's official comment on this issue was: "I feel that the Right-to-Work Law has not been in effect long enough to determine its true economic impact. An independent study should consider the effect of the law on employment, industrial inducement, living standards and economic growth."^25

Although Lambert's positions at the outset of the campaign portrayed him in the image of a populist, he was prepared for criticism: "In each of my elections I have been opposed by large and special interests. I am not their captive and will never be... in the forthcoming election."^26

**LAMBERT'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION**

According to longtime Louisiana political observer Edmund Reggie, organization is a key ingredient in a political campaign. "Our (Louisiana) political organization is so much better, so much more in detail than other states. We organize campaigns in this state, statewide, and that is over 2,000 precincts. We organize them down to the precinct level."^27

A campaign organization is a group of people whose coordinated efforts are aimed at helping elect the candidate they support. The groups consists of supporters who
have assumed leadership roles, volunteers who have agreed to work in the campaign, and all voters who have been identified as supporting the candidate. The strength of an organization depends on the number of people involved, their dedication to the candidate, and how well they are motivated and organized.

Lambert's state headquarters was located in Baton Rouge, and it was at this location that his organization staff was housed. This staff, responsible for proper and continuous communications at all levels of the campaign, consisted of the campaign director, political director, field director, communications director, finance chairman, volunteer director, dialogue chairman, leadership survey director, Go-Day director, scheduling director, labor liaison, minority liaison, and headquarters manager.

The "Campaign Political Committee" geographically organized the state by using committees. The committee consisted of two regional directors. One of them organized the North staff, consisting of a Northwest and Northeast manager; the other organized the South staff, employing the Southwest, Acadia, and South Central managers and managers for the Florida and River parishes, as well as Jefferson and Orleans Parish.

There were also two regional field floaters. These individuals were in the field making personal contact with district and parish coordinators. Their duties consisted of resolving difficulties that arose among fieldworkers,
giving state headquarters another perspective on activities in the field, and monitoring the progress of projects originating at headquarters. The Floaters reported to their respective regional coordinators for direction.

When completed, Lambert's organization was ready to assume responsibility for strategic planning, decision-making, information gathering and the vital communicating necessary in the course of political campaigns. He was ready to begin.

THE BEGINNING STRATEGY

Jim Garvin's first poll for Lambert was taken by Bowles and Groves of Dallas, Texas in early 1978. The purpose of the poll was to determine Lambert's name recognition throughout the state. The results revealed that he had a low name recognition outside his Public Service district. Although not desirable, at the outset of a campaign this is not necessarily harmful to the individual's candidacy. Both John J. McKeithen and Edwin Edwards, for example, had low name recognition before they began campaigning for governor.31

But Lambert's low name recognition prompted Garvin and other advisors to make an early official announcement. They planned an elaborate public announcement, to be unfolded during a three day period. The first announcement came during a press conference in New Orleans on the morning of June 28th. Lambert and his staff then in private
planes flew to Baton Rouge for a noon announcement and to Shreveport for a cocktail party and fund-raising event that evening. The next morning they flew to Monroe for a press conference, to Alexandria for a noon luncheon, and then to Lafayette for another fund-raising meet. On the final day, June 30th, they held a morning press conference in Lake Charles; flew to Houma for another, and completed the day with an afternoon press conference in Hammond.

During the three-day announcement period, staff workers and volunteers placed 4 x 8 signs in the Florida parishes, in sections of north Louisiana, and along stretches of Interstate 10 between New Orleans and Lake Charles. The signs were dark blue, with the message, "Lambert, '80 Governor," printed in white and light blue.

Carvin's next strategy was to prepare a tabloid emphasizing Lambert's various positive qualities. The 8-page color tabloid positioned Lambert with students, farmers, oil and seafood employees, his family, and Public Service Commission members and Carvin arranged for the tabloid to appear as a supplement to the Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the Lafayette Advertiser, the Lake Charles American Press, the Zachary Plainsman News, the Sunday Iberian, the Opelousas Sunday World, the Houma Courier, the Slidell Times, the Daily Sentry News, the Clinton Watchman, the St. Francisville Democrat, the Gonzales Weekly, the Greater Plaquemine Post, the Bogalusa
Sunday News, and the Slidell News Banner, and in newspapers in the northern part of the state.

The main purpose for circulating the tabloid statewide was to extend Lambert's name recognition. Each campaign year, the Baton Rouge Advocate commissions a statewide survey to estimate the strength of potential gubernatorial candidates and it was hoped that the tabloid would also "influence the Advocate poll." Carvin had placed the tabloids in the various newspapers two weeks prior to the 1979 poll, at a cost of approximately $100,000.

The results of the initial Advocate gubernatorial polling showed Dave Treen and Jimmy Fitzmorris "significantly ahead of all other potential candidates. Although Lambert was in fourth place with 6-7%, he was in front of possible candidates such as Commissioner of Administration, Charles Roemer and Attorney General William Guste. The results of the poll made Lambert a viable candidate in the eyes of the press and the public."

During the opening stages of the campaign, Carvin organized the distribution throughout the state of bumper stickers, 4 x 8 signs, billboards, buttons, and literature. His production and circulation of these various support materials began the public phase of Lambert's image-making. The primary purpose of support materials is to increase the positive name recognition of a candidate, "to have a set of identifiers that people can understand," or "to reinforce the support a candidate is already receiving."
Carvin was careful in his choice of Lambert's campaign colors because of the importance of colors in overall image creation. "The link between color and a product, consistently pursued, leads to subconscious identification, [and] is used by advertising artists with particular success in the creation of an image." The impact of the candidate's selected color is usually made on the subconscious level of the electorate. Although a person may be unconscious of the colors around him, his behavior may be powerfully affected by these colors. Tests have shown that colors can add to the retentive power of an image. Carvin used a royal blue color in all Lambert's campaign support materials because "it is not a color that turns people off. It's a cool color and it has a neutral effect ... also, Lambert had gray hair and it (his hair) worked well with blue."  

Media consultants frequently rely on particular colors which may reinforce an intended image of the candidate they wish to project. Jimmy Carter, for example, used the color green in his 1976 presidential campaign. This infrequently used political color aided the Carter staff in their attempts to portray Carter as a different, new politician. While campaigning as an "outsider" trying to restore honesty and integrity to the White House, Carter's use of the green color seemed to support his image as a new breed of politician.

Another example of color selection in a political cam-
paign was Paul Hardy's use of a redish-orange color in his 1979 gubernatorial campaign. This color apparently was used to reinforce Hardy's overall image of a flamboyant, aggressive candidate.

In summary, the color a candidate uses can support the image he attempts to create. Although colors are not a main element in the image-making process, they have proved helpful in aiding an establishment of an overall image.

With the campaign strategy planned and his organization intact, Louis Lambert's campaign for governor of Louisiana was prepared for the long and extensive race. A vital part of the campaign would be the image he would project to Louisiana's electorate.
FOOTNOTES

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
20. Lambert's announcement handout.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Interview of the writer with Edmond Reggie of Crowley, LA., September 25, 1979.

28. Ibid.

29. Lambert Newsletter to campaign workers.

30. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


37. Carvin interview.


40. Carvin interview.
CHAPTER IV
LAMBERT'S IMAGE-MAKING CAMPAIGN

PHASE I

As related, Louis Lambert's media consultant for the beginning of his campaign, Phase I, was Jim Carvin. Carvin's style in producing political commercials lays special stress on the artistic quality of filming and on the staging of the ads, but is active in all phases of the campaign work. For each advertisement, Carvin "writes the spot, plans it, then shoots the spot so that I know that the end product is what I started out with on a piece of paper." He also is involved in political strategy and campaign organizing, planning the campaign "along the lines of a system developed for building a nuclear submarine. It's intended to ensure that everything gets done at the right time, that everything possible is anticipated, and that there's flexibility for emergencies."  

Carvin's image-making strategy for Lambert's campaign was "to position Lambert in the middle of the road, as a populist candidate who was generally conservative ... a conservative populist, very much in the style of Edwin Edwards and John McKeithen." Carvin planned to have Lambert appeal to blacks and to blue-collar voters by meeting them in face-to-face settings. His rationale for this strategy was that many blacks and blue-collar
voters are more than ordinarily concerned with such problems as family income and health care. Only during the last couple of weeks of the campaign do they become firmly decided for which candidate they will vote. By appealing to these groups in an interpersonal manner, rather than through media, Carvin was able "to position Lambert in the middle of the road." In campaigning face-to-face with black and blue-collar voters, Lambert appeared as a populist candidate while projecting a conservative image when campaigning on television. Since the face-to-face gatherings reached small audiences, his attempts to remain a conservative candidate to his larger television audience was better insured.

Carvin's media strategy for projecting Lambert as a conservative populist began with his first television ads. These initial 30-second biographical ads were aired statewide, and "said things about Lambert that he couldn't say about himself." They showed him walking along a road in Sorento, Louisiana, talking about his plans for the state. A second biographical ad produced identified Lambert with a city (Baton Rouge), because "we wanted also to give him an urban image, not just a country guy who was running for governor."

In these, and the remainder of the ads Carvin produced, he used a Steadi-Cam, a sophisticated camera capable of filming constant movement without disrupting the quality of the film. The Steadi-Cam "involved Lambert in the spot, while adding action to the production." The constant move-
ment of the camera showed him "as a man with vitality, vigor, and activity." Carvin's decision to have Lambert walking toward the camera began as an experiment, but the technique "looked like a good gimmick so we made it ours." Aged thirty-eight, Lambert was the second youngest candidate in the race and his election would have made him the youngest governor in the history of the state. Carvin recognized this as a potentially negative characteristic and countered by portraying Lambert as an experienced middle-aged candidate. Lambert's conservative wardrobe and silver hair aided Carvin in this effort.

Following the introductory biographical ads, Carvin produced a new set of commercials. The image of Lambert in this series was derived from the information received in a poll taken by Bowles and Groves, which revealed that "the people were vitally interested in energy, inflation, and utility rates." This information impelled Carvin to portray Lambert as "a champion of the consumer and a fighter of higher costs."

Lambert's physical appearance was also altered for the new series of commercials. He was persuaded to dress in an attractive two-piece suit, which "made him look like a governor." This attire seemed to enhance his perceived ability to communicate and to appear to discuss the various topics he addressed with authority.

In attempting to communicate to the electorate Lambert's concern for a "cancerous" inflation rate, fueled by rising-
utility and energy costs Carvin's ads "attracted attention " for Lambert, and then controversy." These spots showed him on Wall Street in New York addressing the issue of the high cost of living; at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, explaining the dangers of nuclear plants; and in Geneva, Switzerland, criticizing the OPEC nations for the high price of energy.

Carvin was criticized for these three out-of-state ads, primarily because of Lambert's refusal directly to address the issues in Louisiana. Also, the public felt that Lambert was wasteful in traveling far distances to address issues facing Louisianians. Carvin defended the ads by explaining the circumstances that led to his decision to produce them. In March, 1979, prior to the ads' appearance, Carvin commissioned Bowles and Grove to administer a poll of the public's opinion of various issues and of Lambert's position in the polls compared with that of the other candidates. Results of the poll showed Lambert in 4th place, with 12% of the vote; Hardy 3rd, with 19%, Fitzmorris with 27%, and Treen, 32%. The poll also revealed that Lambert's image in the Baton Rouge area was highly positive, because of his continual challenges of the utility companies while chairman of the Public Service Commission. Therefore, Carvin decided that Lambert's stand against the utility companies was the image to be projected to the electorate statewide.

During this period, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate ran a series of articles attacking the Public Service Commission. One article, quoting a source from Wall Street,
claimed that Lambert was not properly representing the consumers of Louisiana. Lambert's reaction to this article - informing the electorate that wealthy Wall Street executives were against him - fitted the classic populist image that the working class hates Wall Street. Carvin felt that the most effective commercial for refuting this negative publicity was to film the ad at Wall Street.

While preparing to shoot the Wall Street ad, the Three Mile Island nuclear mishap occurred. Lambert went before a Legislative committee as chairman of the Public Service Commission and declared he would go to Three Mile Island. When he announced this plan, Carvin decided to capitalize on this, too and two spots were shot on this subject. These spots inspired Carvin's idea to stage the ads in a manner similar to a newsman on locating covering a story.

The third controversial ad, the Geneva spot, moving some to think Lambert a financially wasteful and flamboyant candidate, was planned because Lambert feared his opponents would attack him on the rising cost of utility rates. The ad was intended to show that utility rates were not being increased by the Public Service Commission, but were the result of the fuel adjustment clause. Carvin used the approach that the Arabs were responsible for this increase. In June 1979, OPEC met in Geneva and Carvin decided to film the ad from that location. His strategy was to employ an "affirmative defense ... blame others for our problems."

Carvin defended his decision for the Geneva spot by
claiming the ad "was effective ... a bold and daring thing to go outside the country." It appeared, though, that the commercial "gave people more to talk about than just the issue." But the production of the three out-of-state advertisements did seem to have damaged Lambert's image. "He began to look too showy, he began to show a lack of substance to the point of using props more than intellect."

A general assumption of communication theorists is that non-verbal communications have meaning within their specific context. While some non-verbal communications are used as a means of self-expression, others have persuasion as their intent. The various commercials produced throughout Lambert's entire campaign transmitted important non-verbal messages to the viewing audience.

Harvard psychologist Robert Rosenthal developed a measure of sensitivity to non-verbal communication. His research made 200 segments showing an actress portraying various emotions in certain contexts. People were so accurate in recognizing the scene and emotion portrayed that the experiments cut the exposure length to see at what point accuracy diminishes. Even at an exposure of 1/24 of a second, people were correct over two-thirds of the time. These findings confirmed Edward Sapir's observation in 1927 that "we respond to gestures with an extreme alertness and, one might say, in accordance with an elaborate and secret code that is written nowhere, known by
none, and understood by all."²²

The major criticism of the Carvin spots was the positioning of Lambert in locations outside of Louisiana. When the viewers saw him speaking from Wall Street, from Three Mile Island, and from Geneva, it appeared that their negative perception of Lambert was the result of where he was, rather than what he was saying. The denotation of the message was that Lambert was a worldly, sophisticated man who was knowledgeable enough to deal with large problems. However, the connotation of the message was significantly different than the denotation. The electorate's connotation of these three sites was one of elaborate unnecessary expense and an insensitivity to the concerns of occurrences in Louisiana. Consequently, the non-verbal aspect of the message was overpoweringly negative.

Following this series of ads, Lambert dropped further in the polls. Carvin produced a new series, but they were not effective enough to erase from the public's minds the negative image of Lambert resulting from the others.

PHASE II

As a result of his decline in the polls following the Carvin spots, Lambert's supporters demanded a change in political consultants. His fourth place ranking had "chief supporters screaming that Lambert was slipping and something had to be done ... and the person out front is the one who creates and he's the one to go quickly."²³ There-
fore, Carvin was fired as media consultant on September 2, 1979, and replaced by Robert Squier and Associates, of Washington, D. C.

Lambert's campaign strategist re-examined the situation which found Lambert in the open primary against the conservative, Dave Treen, and recognized the difficulty of his running against such an arch-conservative Republican. The results of a Bowles and Grove poll indicated that Lambert must be more successful if his image were changed from a conservative to a populist candidate, an image typical of the traditional Louisiana Democrat politician. This re-evaluation resulted in Lambert strategists altering their candidate's image midway through the campaign.²⁴

Squier had been recommended to Lambert by Louisiana Congressman Gillis Long, a Lambert supporter, who cited the results of the 1979 Kentucky gubernatorial campaign that Squier had recently completed. Squier's candidate in that race was John Y. Brown, a politically inexperienced, multimillionaire businessman, who announced his candidacy nine weeks before the Democratic primary.

While conducting the Brown campaign, Squier used television to communicate his message. "His TV spots sidestepped issues and concentrated on image."²⁵ For example, a widely used two-minute commercial showed Brown and his new wife (celebrity Phyllis George) in a coal mine, wearing headlamps. "To make clear the new Mrs. Brown was no femme fatale (just a down-home cheerleader from Texas), a five-
minute spot included twenty-two silent seconds of Phyllis signing autographs. This type of political advertising by Squier was followed by Brown's primary victory and eventual gubernatorial triumph. The account of Brown's victory persuaded Lambert to hire Squier.

Squier's philosophy of political media was the converse of Carvin's. Rather than focusing on artistic dimension, Squier placed emphasis on communicating his intended message to the targeted audience without stressing the artistic dimension. His political spots reflected the findings of the public opinion polls.

In organizing his campaign staff, Squier employed two prominent political campaigners from Washington, D.C., pollster William Hamilton and organizational specialist Matt Reese. Squier's aim was to exploit all available resources that enable a candidate to win votes.

Before analyzing the image Squier created for Lambert, it is necessary first to examine the sophisticated techniques Matt Reese used in targeting Lambert's constituency. The targeting system he employed was called "Claritas," a precise technique for pinpointing supporters and opponents of issues or candidates ... of categorizing citizens by neighborhood groupings, called clusters." Claritas is used to discover the commonalities of certain neighborhoods as to social class or affluence, race, and ethnicity, age and family composition, urbanization and housing style, and other lifestyle indicators at a small population level.
This process results in the identification of forty clusters which represent most types of American neighborhoods. For example, Cluster 24 is defined as "young consumers, well-educated, largely white, reasonable affluent and fairly well distributed across the nation." The Claritas system enabled Reese to locate approximately 280 households called block groups, and assign each a cluster designation. "A politician then can target his appeal ... or political message to his audience."

Maintaining proper communication between Hamilton and Reese was a key factor for the success of the Claritas system. Hamilton's responsibility was to survey a sample group of voters in the state and inform Reese what types of people - rich, young, or religious, for instance - think of a specific issue or candidate. This allows Reese to tailor his campaign strategy to appeal to his target groups.

According to Reese, "Polls by themselves are valuable but inadequate." For example, a poll may reveal that working-class Catholics do not favorably view a particular candidate. But Claritas is able to specify block groups which are most likely to contain working-class Catholic women, and then further specify which of those working-class women favor and which oppose a particular candidate. An example of the actual operation of Claritas was seen in Missouri in 1978 when Reese was hired to defeat the right-to-work amendment. Hamilton's poll revealed that 69 percent of the voters were in favor of right-to-work, while
30 percent were opposed. "Even among labor union families the measure was favored 57 to 35 percent."\(^{32}\)

Reese's strategy was to spend only 15% of the 2.5 million dollar campaign budget on media. Reese's reasoning behind this strategy was that commercials could arouse the opposition and attract opponents who normally would not vote. He, therefore, "concentrated on registering citizens likely to vote his way."\(^{33}\) In addition, post-cards, telephone calls, and personal visits inundated households identified by Claritas as the exact target audience. The result of this "quiet, directed attack worked - 60 percent of those who voted rejected the amendment." Reese estimates that "110,000 new voters who registered in Missouri that season registered because of labor's efforts."\(^{34}\)

Reese used targeting to determine which key parishes contained the highest concentration of Lambert "persuadables" and would accordingly deserve extra effort. Two hundred thousand "persuadable" households throughout the state were targeted for special telephone, mail and personal contact programs.

Claritas was employed by Reese to identify Lambert's constituencies which would be targeted - blacks and labor. This research indicated that attention should be concentrated on "all laborers and blacks, rural and country whites."\(^{35}\) Upon completion of the research, the entire target area was isolated. "So, all Squier had to do was plug in that feeling into his TV and not worry about a cer-
tain part of society." The research indicated that media should concentrate on those areas where people most likely to vote for Lambert were located. Those areas identified as "upper middle class, conservatives were left alone because they would never go for us (Lambert) regardless of what we had ... logically, we would find out 'hard' (committed) people, confirm they were for Lambert, identify our soft vote (persuadable) and work on them hard (i.e. by use of phone bank, mailings, voter contact programs) and then work on the undecided, which were a large percentage up until the election day, and Treen's soft vote." Once the necessary group had been targeted by the use of Claritas, Reese used telephone banks for voter identification and recruitment. For example, Lambert's computer personnel pulled out phone numbers, addresses, and names of voters registered as Democrat, people under 35 years of age, blue-collar workers, and citizens with less than two years of college. First, the natural constituency was determined by this list, and then the main group on which the phone banks would concentrate. Then and only then would phone calls be made. Interviewers classified the recipient as "neutral," "definitely against," "a worker," or "a decided that won't work." Next, "the workers" were set up in a program involving direct mailing in which they were asked to distribute campaign materials. The success of the system depends on communication between the phone bank personnel and the workers to insure that the proper work is
being carried out. 38

A major task for the Lambert telephone workers was identifying potential Lambert voters, recruiting volunteers, and getting the voter out on election day. Lambert's main phone bank, located in Baton Rouge, was manned by 140 callers. The phone center operated seven days a week, with the days divided into two six-hour shifts. The phone banks operated from the last week of September until election day, October 28.

Hamilton's research discovered that labor and blacks were Lambert's biggest supporters. Therefore, Squier attempted to present Lambert as an appealing candidate to his supporters by having him adapt to the particular audiences in each commercial. The image Carvin attempted to create was to depict Lambert as a "fighter for the poor and underprivileged." 39

His technique for producing political commercials is "cinema verite," (truth film), which does not require the candidate to read or memorize a script. Rather, the candidate is filmed on location, talking extemporaneously into the camera or to a particular group of people. From the extensive amount of footage collected, Squier then edits the film into selected political ads "which best captures issues, personalities, and images." 40

Once Hamilton had completed the necessary research, his information was presented to Squier, who translated it into commercials. As the employment of Squier marked
the beginning of the second phase of the Lambert campaign, the governor's race simultaneously started taking shape as the constituencies began to fall into place. For example, during the early stages of the campaign, Treen was receiving between 18% to 20% of the black and labor vote, due primarily to Treen's high name-recognition with these two groups. "But, by the time Squier came in, the blacks and labor were beginning to fall to Lambert - people were learning about Treen and Fitzmorris and everyone was going back to where they belonged." 41

Squier decided to maintain the campaign materials designed by Carvin. In addition, he used the theme - 'Louisiana First, Louis Lambert for Louisiana.' The use of alliteration tends to make the theme memorable and probably therefore, effective. The theme was repeated following all commercials. This theme was selected as a result of polling conducted by Hamilton which revealed that citizens felt Louisiana was not progressing as were other states.

Squier's series of commercials showed Lambert addressing a small group of citizens on a variety of issues, such as energy, inflation and unemployment. In each spot, the casually dressed Lambert spoke extemporaneously to a small gathering of people. His image was that of a concerned politician willing to discuss issues with the general public and to fight for their particular causes. In the background of these spots was a small gathering of the audience Squier was targeting - laborers, farmers, the elderly, etc.
In addition to the series of thirty-second ads, Squier began frequent attacks on front-runner Treen's voting record on social issues. With approximately one month remaining until the open primary, Lambert was lodged in fourth place, behind Hardy, Fitzmorris and Treen.

The commercials attacking Treen began with the caption, "Why Dave Treen can't be governor of Louisiana," and continued by attacking his voting record. "The anti-Treen spots are to the point, hardhitting and extremely negative." The main objective of this ad series was to add credibility to Lambert's image as "the poor man's candidate" and his concern with the social issues of the state.

Lambert's campaign director stated that the attack on Treen was to eliminate Paul Hardy from the race. Since the conservative Treen was in command of first place, there was no need to "remind diehards of what a hard-line right-winger Dave Treen is. Paul Hardy, meanwhile ... is picking up a lot of conservative support that logically should go to Treen." Therefore, for Lambert to make the runoff, he had to surpass Hardy and Fitzmorris.

Lambert's attacks forced Treen to defend his record "as a fiscally responsible conservative, trying to hold the line in Washington against the wild freespenders like Lambert. Treen's stirring call to arms brings conservatives flocking even closer to him." This particular strategy seemed to have been successful since Hardy's momentum was reduced and Lambert advanced to the second-place position.
But with all his strategies and effort, it seems that Squier was unsuccessful in creating a positive image of Lambert. Since the research isolated Lambert's constituency, Squier's main responsibility was to aim his commercials to this already supportive audience. Instead of showing Lambert as a passive, respectable candidate of labor and blacks, he portrayed him as a harsh, loud, rugged candidate. These commercials seemed to have unnecessarily angered other segments of the population, particularly the undecided voters who had yet to decide on the candidate they would support. "That wasn't the type of guy you wanted to be governor. Those advertisements were harmful to Lambert's image because people felt he was 'mudslinging ... that Lambert's campaign tactics were nauseating and disgusting."

Squier's usage of negative advertising was not positively received. Instead of helping Lambert, the ads seemed to turn voters away from him. The anti-Treen ads, it appears, were not appropriate for a gubernatorial campaign. Daniel Bailey, a nationally-known political consultant, said: "television is a living-room communication vehicle, and the subject matter, and the approach, and the emotions that are appropriate in the living-room, are appropriate on the screen. But, if they're not appropriate in the living-room, they're not appropriate at all."

The initial ads produced by Squier were designed to portray Lambert as "the poor people's candidate," actively involved and interested in their needs. The non-verbal
messages in these ads may have affected the audience's perception of Lambert. In thirteen of the fifteen ads in which Lambert appeared, he was standing within two or three feet of from two to fifteen people. Lambert's close position to his audience seemed to connote his intimate concern for the people. The spatial distance in the ad appeared to "give a tone to the communication, accent it, and at times even override the spoken word. The flow and shift of distance between people as they interact with each other is part and parcel of the communication process."

Communication theorists have observed that the interpersonal distance of two and one-half to four feet is used when discussing subjects of personal interest and involvement. In thirteen of the fifteen ads in which Lambert appeared, he was involved in the discussion of the personal interests of his audience. It has also been noted that an individual's voice is associated with specific ranges of distance. When interacting, the individual's voice should be soft and the volume low. In ten of the fifteen ads, Lambert's voice seemed hostile and unpleasant. This type of vocal projection would have been more appropriate had Lambert's audience been standing more than four feet away. From five feet onward, a full voice is acceptable. However, by using a full and forceful vocal delivery while standing two or three feet from an audience, it seems Lambert was perceived as being an angry and harsh candidate.

Squier's technique of surrounding Lambert with members
of his target audience appeared effective. In the eighteen ads in which this occurred, Lambert seemed to establish direct identification with that group of viewers. These ads seemed to have strengthened Louis Lambert's association with groups such as the elderly, blacks, and blue-collar workers.

Lambert also adapted to his audience by the clothes he wore. In twelve ads, he appeared in a shirt and tie, in contrast to the two-piece suits he wore in all of the ads in Phase I.

Lambert also used numerous gestures while speaking. In eleven of thirteen ads in which he appeared, Louis Lambert used gestures to emphasize a point while communicating with his audience. Gestures are most effective when "they are natural and not affected, when they enhance and harmonize with the verbal message." He frequently attempted in a non-intimate manner obtrusively to shake hands with members of his audience. This stilted gesture, coupled with poorly timed back-patting, hinted of insincerity on Lambert's part. His message of wishing to be close to the people seemed to be ineffectively communicated.

During the week preceding the October 27, 1979, open primary, a survey was conducted at Louisiana State University concerning the gubernatorial campaign. A formal questionnaire was administered by telephone to a random sample of Baton Rouge residents to determine the public's opinion of the gubernatorial candidates. A section of the study focused on the public's perception of the major candidates
in four areas: qualification, honesty, leadership, and intelligence.

Results of the study indicated that Lambert had a negative image in the eyes of the public. On a scale of one through five, with one being most positively perceived, and five being most negatively, Lambert received the lowest score, a 2.986 and a 3.233 mean value, on the issues of honesty and qualifications. The most honest and qualified candidates received scores of 2.417 and 1.928.

Lambert was also viewed as the candidate with the poorest leadership qualities. He received an average value of 2.986, compared with the high of 1.819. On the issue of intelligence, Lambert was viewed by the public as the second least intelligent candidate, 2.568, compared with the most intelligent candidate's average of 1.917.

Although Squier's ads did properly target Lambert's constituency and did portray him as being similar to them, they apparently did not enhance his credibility. The image Squier created did not seem to project a positive image of Lambert. Lambert's constant shouting, his harsh attacks on his main opponent, and his outwardly aggressive mannerisms seemed harmful to his overall image.

The official results of the October 27 open primary placed Louis Lambert in second place, behind frontrunner Dave Treen. There were various factors which could be responsible for Lambert's strong finish. It could have been Squier's ads, targeted to a well-defined audience.
Although Lambert's overall image may have been negative, he was perceived in a positive manner by his targeted constituency.

Another factor which probably contributed to Lambert's second-place finish was the well-organized strategy of Matt Reese. During the last two months prior to the campaign, the Reese organization located and trained 1635 different people in all parts of the state who volunteered their assistance on "getting the vote out" on election day. In addition, Reese located and tested 234 volunteers who helped with various programs in selected parishes and another 411 volunteers who went from door-to-door in special target precincts.

While the Reese organization was being coordinated in the field, telephone operators in Baton Rouge and New Orleans were calling throughout the state. This operation resulted in the recruitment of 10,340 block captains and Lambert leaders, volunteers who go door-to-door or who agree to call selected voters in their neighborhood.

Although Lambert did make the runoff, constant image adjustments and a negatively perceived image proved harmful throughout the campaign. His second-place finish was described by pollster Dan Walker as "an incredible feat, when you consider the guy started out with one constituency, shed it, and then found another constituency. He campaigned for eight months as a moderate conservative. Then he pulled together a labor-black coalition against Treen."

Lambert's
second place finish can be attributed to the organizational workings of Matt Reese and his "claritas" operation. This sophisticated targeting system seemed effective in identifying and persuading Lambert's constituency to vote for Lambert during the general primary. The poor image-making of Carvin and Squier was offset by the effectiveness of Reese's "behind-the-scenes" organization.

Although Lambert finished second in the open primary, the official results were delayed until there was an extensive re-evaluation of the votes cast on October 28. The unofficial tabulations of the vote by the Associated Press and United Press International indicated Fitzmorris the second place finisher. However, following a recount of absentee ballots and a retabulation of the votes, Lambert replaced Fitzmorris for the runoff berth.

The confusion over Lambert's and Fitzmorris' final vote tabulation was intensified when Fitzmorris filed a suit in District Court alleging that Lambert won the runoff position through election fraud in the open primary. The subsequent trial proved most harmful to Lambert's campaign. First, the legal suit prevented Lambert from campaigning and attempting to raise the additional monies required for the runoff. Second, his image was tarnished by the suit's claim of wrongdoing on Lambert's behalf.

Pollster Bill Hamilton noted the suit damaged Lambert's credibility and that Lambert's behavior during the entire episode further weakened his image. "He acted like a
dishonest man. He wouldn't talk to reporters, he wouldn't try to communicate with them. He started to shut them out of his campaign, he started to get scared."

Shortly following final settlement of the suit, Lambert was beset with another political obstacle. The four major Democratic gubernatorial candidates, Hardy, Mouton, Henry, and Fitzmorris announced their endorsement of the Republican candidate, Treen. Their endorsements seemed to leave the public with the impression that Lambert was not a worthy candidate since four Democrats would not support their fellow Democratic candidate.

The endorsements and the Fitzmorris legal suit, coupled with an already poor image, placed Lambert in a difficult position as he prepared for the December 8 general election. From November 14, following the trial, to November 22, Squier continued to air negative ads which attacked Treen's record. Although such ads may have been responsible for placing Lambert in the runoff, they were not appropriate for the general election campaign. Since the general election was only twenty days away, Lambert's organization was forced to move quickly. The political situation demanded that there be instantaneous media capability because of the new information being received daily. Because of his political involvement in campaigns in other states, Squier began neglecting the Lambert campaign. This was harmful to Lambert's campaign, preventing his being able quickly to react to charges or damaging statements made by his
opponent.

Rather than addressing the new problems which arose, such as Lambert's loss of credibility, Squier continued to air old commercials showing Lambert speaking to citizens and attacking his opponent - reinforcing the negative image he received during the open primary.

As a result of his ineffective consulting, Squier was discharged, replaced by Gus Weill and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge. With only sixteen days remaining before the election, a poll revealed that Lambert had 23% to 24% of the vote, compared with Treen's 54%; 32% of the voters were undecided.

**PHASE III**

As preparations were made for the final sixteen days of the campaign, significant circumstances were occurring behind the scenes. The cast of players for the Lambert organization had suddenly changed and the campaign, too, changed a third time, with Ray Strother assuming the role of media consultant. Lambert's staff changed for two reasons: first, Gillis Long became involved in the campaign and sent various aides to assist Lambert; and second, Edwin Edwards also sent aides to help him. During this time a member from both Long's and Edward's staff was traveling with Lambert, so as to give each group access to Lambert. This constant involvement of Edwards' and Long's staff in the campaign seemed to cause confusion rather than
to help and actually was disrupting the Lambert's organization.

After assuming control of the third phase of Lambert's campaign, Strother immediately ordered a poll to be taken by Bill Hamilton "to find out the strengths and weaknesses of Louis Lambert; where his natural constituency was, what the problems were." It was his last-minute effort to change the image of Lambert and to solve his greatest problem - the lack of credibility.

Strother's poll revealed that blacks and labor were in support of Lambert, mainly because they had no other candidate they could ideologically support, so the ads were targeted to this audience.

The commercials produced by Strother were in direct contrast to the spots used by Squier. Strother dressed Lambert in attractive, conservative suits and had him speaking directly to the people. He attempted to show Lambert as the underdog, the candidate of the poor people. In one ad, the comparison was made between Lambert and Truman, noting that the press and big politicians tried to defeat Truman and were now trying to defeat Lambert.

Strother also attempted to give Lambert an Edwin Edwards image. Lambert's appearance was similar to that of Edwards - a handsome man with silver hair. He had Lambert make complimentary reference to Edwards and Edwards, in turn, produced several ads endorsing Lambert. The purpose here was to exploit fully the endorsement of the politically
A negative image, however, continued to develop. Lambert's appearance, both to live and TV audiences, seemed to change from that of a strong, firm, and independent leader to one lacking authority and confidence. His attempts to associate himself with Edwards were becoming over exaggerated; he seemed to suffer from the comparison with Edwards.

Strother knew that Lambert's black and labor support was not enough— that additional votes must be had for victory. He began by changing Lambert's demeanor, "not allowing him to be angry, dressing him very well, having him sit in front of the camera. He wanted him to look into the lens of the camera because a candidate can gain credibility by looking at his constituency.

In new commercials Strother "stripped away all the trimmings ... because we thought it was coming off a little fake." Lambert's new image was to be that of a passive, nice man. "We wanted to show the public that Lambert wasn't a bad, mean mobster. He's like you, he's not angry, he's an attractive man. He looks like a governor."

This description of the candidate seemed to have been effectively communicated to electorate in three thirty-second ads. They showed Lambert seated in a white chair, with a "homey" look provided by a table lamp and a picture. Lambert spoke in a low, mild tone—a complete contrast to his vocal delivery in the commercials of Phase II—and his non-verbal messages were minimal and subtle. Altogether
the new ads were effective in portraying Lambert as a compassionate, honest and genteel candidate.
FOOTNOTES

1. Interview of the writer with Jim Carvin of New Orleans, LA., June 25, 1981.


3. Carvin interview.

4. Interview of the writer with Wayne Davis of Baton Rouge, LA., June 14, 1981.

5. Carvin interview.


10. Carvin interview.

11. O'Neill interview.


15. Carvin interview.

16. O'Neill interview.

17. O'Neill interview.


24. Strother interview.

25. Davis interview.


27. Ibid.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


39. O'Neill interview.


41. O'Neill interview.

42. Baton Rouge Metro, October 11, 1979.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

46. Bailey interview.


49. Ibid., p. 125.

50. Study conducted by LSU Marketing Department, Fall, 1979.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.


54. Todd interview.


57. Strother interview.

58. Davis interview.

59. Ibid.

60. Strother interview.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.
CHAPTER V

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LAMBERT'S POLITICAL COMMERCIALS

AN ANALYSIS OF THE VERBAL CONTENT

In the communication process, a central position is occupied by the content. Communication content represents the information which one person or group communicates to another. Communication content contains such a vast quantity of valuable human experience that a single system of substantive categories cannot describe it. However, a scientific method exists which does describe various facets of content in summary form. This method is called content analysis - a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.¹

Wright suggests three reasons why it is advisable to study systematically the content of communications.² First, despite the high frequency of exposure to media content, the experience of each individual is limited and selective. Second, these individuals tend to over-generalize from their particular communication experiences, thereby obtaining a distorted picture of reality. Finally, during the everyday exposure to communications content, recipients are seldom motivated to analyze meaningful aspects of the communication.
Most discussion of content analysis dealing with the purposes, uses, and functions of the technique concern themselves with distinguishing between three areas: descriptions of the texts of communication, attempts to draw inferences from the texts as to their antecedents, and attempts to draw inferences from the texts as to their effects.

A sophisticated use of content analysis couples it with additional information about source, channel, receiver, or feedback. It could also include conditions such as attitude, personality or demographic characteristics. From this, predictions concerning the communication process can be made. In this case "content analysis is a tool used with other methods of inquiry to link message content with other parts of the communicative process."

Although the emphasis of content analysis is upon the message, concern is given to developing information concerning the sender and receiver of the message. The analysis of content that can develop information regarding the initiator and recipient of the message while investigating the message is the basic assumption of the technique. Berelson lists three other assumptions of the technique which define this basic assumption.

Berelson states that content analysis assumes that inferences between intent and content or between content and effect can be validly made, or that actual relationships can be established. He also argues that content analysis assumes that the study of manifest content is meaningful.
This assumption requires that the same meaning be imparted by the message to the communicator, communicatee, and analyst. Finally, content analysis assumes that quantitative description of content, such as frequency of occurrence of symbols or words, is meaningful. 5

THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY

Validity is concerned with how the findings of the study relate to some measure of the actual or reality. Berelson notes that content analysis dealing with material which is more manifest than latent will be more valid. He further states that validity in a content analysis is not usually a problem if a careful definition of the categories and alternative selections of indicators is performed. Validity is high where agreement exists on the definition of relevant categories. 6 Every effort was made to define the list of categories for this study by using an established checklist. 7

George recognizes that one way to check the accuracy of the inferences of content analysis is by an internal check on the logic and plausibility of the reasoning. Another way to check the accuracy of the inferences is by evaluating the degree of confirmation enjoyed by the generalizations used in support of the specific inferences. 8

THE PROBLEM OF RELIABILITY

Reliability is a measure of how the results of a content analysis compare with a re-analysis by a second analyst or group of analysts, or between a present and sub-
sequent analysis by the same individual. The disagreement among different analysts frequently determines the amount of error of particular measurement, and, therefore, constitutes the problem of reality. Moreover, reliability is a measure of consistency among analysts or through time. Different coders should produce the same results when applying the same set of categories to the same content. Or, a single coder or group of coders should produce the same results when they apply the same categories to the same content at different times.

Reliability is a function of the precision in which the rules of content analysis are set up and the ease with which the discriminations can be made between types of content specified by the rules. When assertions are evaluated, there is a need for reliability to be measured. The analyst is forced to make subtle distinctions that a measure of reliability is needed to show whether or not certain cases are inconsistently coded, thus causing worthless results.

TYPE-TOKEN RATIO AND HUMAN-INTEREST TEST

A series of tests were employed to determine the overall effectiveness of the verbal messages Lambert communicated to the electorate. The type-token ratio was used to measure the variability in Lambert's working vocabulary, with the scores based on the number of different words found in samples of standard length. This test indicates the
verbal clarity of the message presented. A human-interest test is another method used to determine the clarity of the verbal message. This test examines the interest level of the message and enables one to judge the speech on a scale ranging from dull to interesting to dramatic.

In each phase, Lambert used three different deliveries in communicating his political messages. In Phase I, he memorized from a prepared script his message to be delivered on television. In Phase II, he delivered all messages extemporaneously. Finally, Lambert read from a cue card the advertisement copy in Phase III.

The two tests employed reveal which of the three methods of presenting the message was clearest and most effective. The type-token ratio provided the opportunity to test the clarity of Lambert's messages. The ratio for each advertisement is as follows: Phase I 7.26, Phase II 6.8, Phase III 7.09. The type-token scale indicates that the closer the number is to one, the more elementary and more simplified is the message. The scores reveal the three messages were relatively equal in terms of degree of clarity, but that their verbal content was not presented in the clearest possible manner, considering the audience to which the message was geared. Although different methods of delivery were employed in each phase, the level of their clarity remained consistent.

The human-interest test allows the researcher to determine the interest-level of the message presented.
Scores ranging from 0-5 are considered "dull," from 6-30, "interesting," and from 31-80, dramatic. Results of the human interest test reveals: Phase I, 41.9; Phase II, 36.7; Phase III, 46.1. Accordingly, the verbal messages Lambert communicated could be considered "interesting." The type of delivery for each phase is significant. Phase III ads, in which Lambert read from a cue card, were viewed as the most interesting, followed closely by the memorized script used in Phase I. His extemporaneous delivery, in Phase II, rated the least interesting of the three ads.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE VISUAL CONTENT

In modern day American society the political aspirant has abundant opportunity to develop and structure his image, especially through the use of television, generally considered the most powerful communications medium. Consequently, the politician must be ever conscious of how the TV viewing public is perceiving him - the type of image he projects.

Political television, which allows presentation of the image of a politician, in turn, provides the viewer with visible clues to the politician's character and personality. The influential non-verbal content in a televised political advertisement is the means frequently used for projecting the candidate's image. "When the verbal and non-verbal content of television material come into conflict with each other, it may be certainly predicted that the lasting effects on the viewer are likely to be
those of the non-verbal elements exclusively, the imagery of television that stems from the presentation techniques producers use.  

Dan Nimmo argues that the visual message has a greater effect on total impressions than the verbal message. "What the candidate says is less significant than how they look. Style, not content, prevails."

The objective elements of political television, such as camera framing, camera angle, juxtaposition, form part of the basis along which television advertisement pictures are perceived. According to research on this topic, the influence of television is primarily in the picture and secondarily in the accompanying language. Baggeley and Duck's experiments confirm the influence of the non-verbal aspect of political advertisements: "the simple visual imagery of television production actually dominates its verbal content."

The 1979 gubernatorial campaign served as a testing ground for examining television's influence in shaping the electorate's perceptions. Public opinion generally blamed Lambert's defeat on four Democrats' endorsement of a Republican challenger. Others attributed it to the detrimental effect of Lambert's court proceedings with challenger James Fitzmorris and still others think the cause was the negative image Lambert projected during his campaign.

Those closest to Lambert's actual campaign suggest his loss was in great part due to ineffective use of the media; that inept media advisors caused him to undergo
three different image changes during the six month campaign. The extent to which Lambert's political television advertisements formed and re-formed his image invites analysis, with attention given the possible subtle influences of television that are unique among the media.

The framing of an image or scene by the television camera creates a visual field. The elements arranged within this defined space, the context or sequencing of the visual image, the dynamics of movement within the frame, and the images all interact to create a meaningful visual message for the viewer.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze systematically the visual content of the televised advertisements of Louis Lambert and to determine his portrayal by that medium. Previous limited research in visual communication and principles of film and television aesthetics are used as bases for analyzing the visual content.

Using visual recordings of Lambert's advertisements, eight categories were set-up to chart the visual content of each advertisement. The form devised for the coding included the following factors: 1. Camera framing; 2. Subject movement; 3. Eye contact of speaker with camera; 4. Eye contact of speaker with audience; 5. Facial expression of candidate; 6. Facial expression of audience; 7. Vertical camera angle; 8. Number of shots per advertisement.

Since the data represents the total population of shots rather than a sample of the shots, statistical tests were not
necessary. To verify the reliability of the data, however, several tests were conducted by independent coders. In each instance, the data measured in seconds, showed discrepancies of less than 2.5 seconds. Since the coders were dealing in hundreds of seconds, this 2.5 precision can be considered insignificant and, thereby, did not contaminate the study.

CAMERA FRAMING

Camera framing can intensify the candidate's visual image by directing the viewer's attention to the eventful details or by giving the image greater detail. Indeed, empirical research gives limited support for this proposition. Alyward, for example, found that viewers expressed a more favorable attitude toward the use of certain shots, particularly close-ups.\(^{19}\)

A "shot" is "the interval between two distinct video transmissions, frame splice to splice, or from cut to cut, dissolve or wipe."\(^{20}\) While a television ad is perceived as a whole, it is composed of various elements. The altering of these individual elements would, theoretically, have an effect upon the perception of the whole presentation.\(^{21}\)

The camera frame is an isolating device which enables the director to confer special attention on what otherwise might be overlooked in a wider context.\(^{22}\) Close-up, medium, and long shots were those traditionally used in Lambert's advertisements. Each merits certain emphasis.

The audience is better able to observe the facial ex-
pressions and subtle nuances when the camera is drawn closer to the subject. The close-up shot "stimulates an empathetic response on the part of the viewer." Gerald Millerson says that close-up shots emphasize the subject's strength and importance, while the inclusion of longer shots tends to cause drops in tension and subject importance. Other studies contend that the use of the close-up shot has no significant effect upon interest level, regardless of where employed. The use of the long shot results in a decline in the audience's interest level whenever employed.

Significant differences in camera framing were observed in each phase of Lambert's campaign. In Phase I, eight advertisements totaling 278 seconds showing Lambert were aired. Lambert was framed in a medium shot (waist to knee) 227.1 seconds or 27.1% of the time. During only 33.9 seconds or 12.2% of the time was Lambert framed at his mid-torso and only 17 seconds or 6.1% of the time was Lambert framed in a close-up shot. In Phase II, of the 515 seconds of advertisements featuring Lambert, 247.7 seconds or 48.1% of the shots were framed at the waist-mid torso, 156 seconds or 30.3% of the shots were close-ups, while 52.7 seconds or 10.7% were devoted on extreme close-up. During 11.4% of the time, Lambert was not shown. Finally, during all 90 seconds of the Phase III ads in which Lambert appeared, the traditional long shot-medium shot-close-up sequence prevailed. 65.2 seconds or 72.4% of the advertisement
relied primarily on the close-up framing.

Carvin's extensive usage of the loose shot in Phase I seemed effective by allowing appropriate background to be seen with each political message. The loose shot also allowed the audience to view Lambert walking because "motion is the strongest appeal to attention." Squier employed the medium shot predominantly throughout Phase II. The main purpose of this framing was also to show Lambert standing closely with his targeted constituents, namely blue-collar, black, and the needy. Weill and Strother relied on the "slow zoom" shot, with a focus on the close-up shot. The political messages of the Phase III advertisements apparently proved more difficult to match to appropriate settings, so these messages were given with a background consisting of a lamp and picture.

The persuasive emphasis on the various backgrounds is noteworthy. The media consultants' inclusion of specific backgrounds in framing the shots must be analyzed. A study by Baggaley and Duck examined the effects of adding a background to a production. They discovered that, presented against a picture background, a speaker was perceived as more profound, honest, reliable, and fair than when seen against a plain background. They continue that the background selected for a political advertisement "may consequently exude implications far more extensive than ever the producer imagines." Carvin's decision to use the Wall Street, Three Mile Island, and Geneva background for
Lambert’s initial campaign messages may have appeared to be a unique technique. However, the public’s negative reaction and vocal disapproval of the advertisements as "wasteful" spelled disaster for Phase I. It seems that the emphasized background, made obvious by the loose-framing and the continual references made during the advertisement, was responsible for the negative image Lambert projected during the early stage of his campaign.

Squier relied, in Phase II, on reaction shots of the audience as the background. However, during 155 of the 255 seconds, or 60.8% which included a personal background, the audience appeared either bored, uninterested, or unimpressed with Lambert’s message. Studies by Baggeley and Duck reveal these negative reaction shots of the audience could be viewed "as more confusing, more shallow, and more inexpert." Even though background shots are not an essential part of the discourse, they can represent the interest value of the candidates message. Past studies reflect the persuasiveness of background shots. The insertion of favorable reactions may substantially increase the motivational value of the taped message. The possible negative influence on the viewer’s reaction to a speaker may outweigh any benefits to be derived. In Phase II, Lambert’s message was clear and appropriately aimed toward his target audience. However, the negative reactions of the audience to Lambert’s message seemed to outweigh its positive impact, resulting in the image of Lambert as un-
VERTICAL CAMERA PLACEMENT

Directors in television manipulate the visual content in an attempt to focus audience attention and elicit particular responses. A well-documented principle of television aesthetics is that the vertical camera placement can influence the importance or dominance of the photographed individual. Livingston suggests that the camera angle may affect the audience's psychological reaction. "The angle of a shot has a marked influence on the audience's psychological reaction to the subject matter photographed. As demonstrated ... angles shooting upward cause the subject to appear stronger, more powerful than the audience, while angles shooting downward give the audience a feeling of strength and make the subject appear weaker." 

The role of camera angle is also referred to as the principle of dominance. According to Bretz, if a person is looking up at an object, the object takes on a greater importance than the viewer. "We feel we are figuratively as well as actually 'looking up' to it. Conversely, if the camera shoots down on someone, he is less important than we are." 

The angle from which a subject is photographed determines much of its meaning. Empirical studies revealed that as the camera angle moved from high through medium to low, the ratings of the model improved. Furthermore,
individuals were judged more active or potent if the person was photographed from a slightly low angle and if the person engaged in at least a slight amount of activity.\textsuperscript{34}

Various camera angles can also influence the audience impression of a candidate's credibility. Research findings indicate that the high angle shot can raise a televised figure's credibility. This does not mean, however, that the mere inclusion of a few high angle shots will increase credibility.

The designation of each angle is determined on the basis of where the camera is placed in relationship to the subject. In the three phases of the campaign, virtually all shots were judged as being at eye-level, but subtle differences in camera angles were difficult to determine. Eye-level shots depend on the eye of the beholder. Although not immediately remarkable, the eye-level shot can have significant effect over the course of the film. In only one 60 second advertisement in Phase II did the director employ a low angle shot. The decision to employ eye-level shots placed the audience viewer "on equal footing with the subject, implying a sense of parity."\textsuperscript{36}

The directors in each phase opted to present Lambert as an equal with his targeted audience. This selection of camera angle appears effective, considering Lambert's strategy of identification with various audiences. The use of a lower angle would have separated Lambert from his public. Rather than appearing on the level of his public, Lambert
could have been negatively created as one with a sense of dominance over his viewers.

**SUBJECT PLACEMENT**

In his works on television aesthetics, Herbert Zettl suggests that the placement and movement of objects affects a viewer's perception of that object. Zettl's concept is called "asymmetry of the screen." There is general agreement that the right and left sides of a visual field are perceived differently. Studies by Millerson suggest that a preference for the right side of the screen results from a right-handed cultural bias. The filmmaker will often exploit this psychological phenomenon to reinforce his idea.

There are those who argue that the left side placement is more effective. Since the eye tends to read a picture from left to right, "physical movement in this direction seems psychologically natural, whereas movement from right to left often seems inexplicably tense and uncomfortable." According to Mercedes Gaffron, the observer experiences a picture as if he were facing its left side. The viewer will, therefore, subjectively identify with the left side and will attach greater importance to whatever appears there. He continues: "The audience is inclined to look to its left first and to identify with the character appearing on that side ... the left side is considered the stronger. The one farthest left dominates
The screen placement of Lambert in Phases I and II was particularly noteworthy. In Phase I, Lambert was positioned on the right side of the screen 35.7% of the time, on the left side 31.6% of the time, and in the center of the screen 32.7% of the time. In each placement, Lambert was walking from right to left, left to right, or center to camera. The directors' choice for photographing these various movements seem to suggest psychological implications. The shots of Lambert starting from the left and walking to the right is a natural movement for the viewer's eyes. Whereas, the movement from right to left may be seen "as overcoming stronger resistance; it pushes against the current, instead of drifting with it." The shots of Lambert walking to the camera, on the other hand, seem friendly, inviting. Lambert is attempting to move closer and become more open with his audience.

In Phase II, Lambert was positioned on the left side of the screen 32.5% of the time, on the right side 37.0% of the time, and centered in the middle of the screen 19.1% of the time. These various positions also seem to suggest similar implications as discussed previously. The more natural and, consequently, more effective positioning of Lambert were the shots positioning him on the left side of the screen.

Finally, in Phase III Lambert was positioned in the center of the screen with the camera moving slowing from a
medium shot to a close-shot. This technique seems to position Lambert as being on the same level and as being near his audience, once again attempting to project a friendly, personal image.

It seems that the positioning of Lambert on the left side of the screen and walking toward the right is the more effective technique because this "natural movement" of the candidate is more pleasing to the viewer. Subsequently, this technique may have a psychologically pleasing affect on the viewer. More research, however, is needed to better determine the effectiveness of the varying techniques.

EYE CONTACT

A candidate's appearance may be amplified or minimized by his use of eye contact with the camera. A speaker's eye contact with his audience can serve as a measure of his liking of his audience. There are conflicting findings in eye contact research concerning an individual's effectiveness when employing direct eye contact with the camera.

Since 1960, a variety of studies have supported the concept that direct eye-contact in television content is a powerful technique. On the other hand, findings by Baggeley and Duck suggest that an audience attaches greater reliability and expertise to the half-profile image as opposed to the front eye-contact image.
In Phase I, Lambert maintained direct eye contact with the camera for 201 seconds or 72.3% of the time. His direct eye contact seemed to personalize his message, to make him appear to be communicating with the public on a one-to-one level.

In Phase II, on the other hand, Lambert maintained minimal eye contact with the viewing audience. Rather, he concentrated on focusing his message toward those members in the advertisement. During Phase II, Lambert maintained eye-contact with his immediate audience 85.6% of the time. This type of eye-contact seemed sincere and natural as the viewing audience observed Lambert communicating with the electorate.

The Phase III advertisements resorted back to the direct eye-contact technique. The "talking head" shots again projected Lambert as speaking directly to the voting public.

A study by Raban concluded that in the half-profile condition, significantly higher ratings of the speaker's reliability and expertise were obtained. On the rating scales, the half-profile condition drew more favorable ratings than the direct-to-camera condition.

Studies also revealed that the disruptive effects of speaking to a camera do not give the important feedback that is customary in normal interaction. Baggaley and Duck contend that the full face shot actually leads to less favorable assessments of the speaker. On the other hand, Raban argues that "the directness of the straight
address to a camera is factual and authoritative, whereas, a speaker framed in half-profile, talking away from the camera is likely to appear less so. Overall, significantly more favorable ratings were obtained in the half-profile condition. The half-profile condition drew more favorable ratings than the direct condition, even though differences between the two approaches were not always statistically significant.

In the campaign philosophy of having Lambert communicate directly with the people, it seems difficult to conclude which technique most effectively complimented his attempts to project the more positive image with his viewing audience. In different situations either technique, the direct eye contact or the half-profile, may prove more effective in assisting Lambert in projecting a positive image. Additional research should further investigate the impact of these tactical questions which may enhance the candidates televised image.

**VOCAL AND FACIAL CUES**

Lambert's vocal and facial expressions appear to have influenced the audience's perception of him. Mehrabian's experimental research concluded that when the liking of a source is at issue, the relative impact of discrepant verbal, vocal and facial cues were as follows: total liking = 7% verbal liking + 38% vocal liking, + 55% facial liking.
A speaker communicating via television should transmit warmth, enthusiasm, vitality, poise, confidence and directness. These intangibles are frequently received through subtle, non-verbal cues and are frequently received at the peripheral or subliminal level by the viewer. Many negative intangible qualities seemingly were transmitted through Lambert's non-verbal cues.

Lambert's facial expression was viewed as an important factor in the way he was perceived by his audience. Independent coders rated Lambert's facial expression as either friendly, natural, or angry.

In Phase I, Lambert's facial expression communicated calmness and sincere interest during 254 seconds or 91.4% of the shot. During 24.0 seconds or 8.6%, he smiled and appeared happy. In contrast, Phase II showed Lambert appearing serious, harsh, or angry during 391 seconds or 85.7% of the time, as opposed to being shown as a relaxed candidate 14.3% of the time. His facial expression portrayed him an angry candidate. In Phase III, Lambert's facial expression during all 90 seconds was that of calmness and interest.

Lambert's vocal expression parallel his facial expression. In those ads where Lambert appeared harsh, serious, or angry, his vocal qualities seemed to support his facial expression. In those where he appeared relaxed, calm, and interested, his vocal qualities matched his facial expression. Research suggests that the separate
aspects of a person's performance may conflict, and his voice may be the main determinant of favorable reaction to him, while his visual appearance was less favorable. \(^4^9\)

Lambert's vocal cues seemed to distract from his message because of his harsh, over-serious and loud vocal delivery. His failure to vocalize in a pleasing manner prevented his increasing listener interest. Consequently, he projected an image that was perceived negatively.

**NUMBER OF SHOTS PER AD**

Research has dealt with the problem of how often to change shots in an advertisement. Aylward found that a dynamic style of editing is superior to a static style in terms of information gained. \(^5^0\) Ellery found that in terms of interest expressed by the viewer, the program shot with only a medium close-up was favored over the program which used loose-shots, medium-shots, and close-up shots. \(^5^1\) Finally, Jaspen found that the less visually diverse presentations were superior to the presentations containing more shots in terms of information gained. \(^5^2\) These studies have determined that a camera using just one shot is more effective than the multiple camera technique.

In Phase I, an average of three shots per advertisement was presented. Phase II averaged approximately 3.2 shots per advertisement and Phase III used just one shot per ad. Based on the research conducted, it appears the shot selection for Phase III was most effective because the
viewer was able to focus clearly on the dominant image being projected. In contrast, the use of multiple shots in Phase I and II probably impeded achievement of the desired image.
FOOTNOTES


6. Ibid., p. 168.


10. Ibid., p. 31.


18. Ibid., p. 364.


24. Ibid.


27. Baggaley and Duck, Dynamics of Television.

28. Ibid., p. 81.

29. Ibid., p. 95.

30. Jon Baggaley, Margaret Ferguson, and Phillip Brooks, Psychology of the TV Image (New York: Praeger


36. Giannetti, Understanding Movies, p. 15.


38. Ibid.


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41. Ibid.


44. Baggaley and Duck, Dynamics of Television, p. 92.

45. Ibid., p. 81.

46. Baggaley, Ferguson, and Brooks, Psychology of the TV Image, p. 28.

47. Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion: Understanding, Practice, and Analysis (Massachusetts: Addison-

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52. Ibid., p. 36.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The end of Edwin Edwards' two-term reign as governor of Louisiana opened the road for an intense campaign to elect his successor. Six well known Louisiana politicians and office holders announced their intention to seek Louisiana's highest political position.

Louis Lambert's gubernatorial campaign began early in 1979. His early announcement was supported with advanced planning by his campaign staff, including the careful selection of a media consultant. The other candidates for the office also enlisted the aid of nationally prominent media advisors. As a result, the Louisiana voters were witnessed a massive political campaign conducted primarily via television.

Since 1964, the employment of media consultants for political campaigns has proved to be vital to candidates success. The consultants' importance has been considered equal to that of campaign manager or chief funder.

The media manager must be artist and businessman all at once. He must be able, to shoot films in 30 or 90 seconds, or five minutes, that catch the voice that gives his candidate nobility, force, regular-fellowship or statesmanship. He must know how to edit this film, know where to buy the time slot, and precisely what local or network audience he hopes to reach - the earnest citizen, common slob or union man.1

Louis Lambert fully appreciated the role of the media
Consultants and began his campaign by hiring Jim Carvin of New Orleans, Louisiana, successful and widely experienced in his field. Midway through the campaign, however, Carvin was dismissed and replaced by another successful media consultant, Robert Squier of Washington, D. C. Near the end of the race, Squier also was discharged and replaced by Gus Weill and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge, who completed Lambert's campaign.

Lambert's consultants relied almost exclusively on television for communicating their message, and, as it developed, projected different images of Lambert to the people. Squier, in addition to using television extensively, also relied on sophisticated polling and phone banks for communicating to the electorate about Lambert.

The work of Lambert's and the other candidates' media consultants in the 1979 gubernatorial campaign gave the Louisiana electorate vast amounts of information on the aspirants for the office. Through the medium of television they obtained a detailed picture of each candidate - his appearance, mannerisms, gestures, voice quality and articulateness. Besides these personal attributes, the voters were exposed, via television, to the candidates' knowledge of and interest in significant issues affecting the state and its people and to make personal estimates of their sincerity, ability and other qualities. On the candidates' side, the campaign gave Lambert and the others a channel for projecting a positive image that could translate into votes.
According to a poll conducted by Samuel Lubell, the overwhelming majority responded that they were more interested in how the televised candidates looked and handled themselves, rather than issues. His survey analysis revealed that once viewers found themselves unable to cope with the issues, they settled back and judged the candidate as in a personality contest. This finding fitted the 1979 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign also, for in it personalities and images apparently over-rode issues.

Further research by Michael Rothchild, prominent political communication researcher, lends support to the authors conclusion. It appeared that Lambert was engaged in a low involvement campaign. According to Rothchild, three factors must be present in a low involvement campaign: the issues are not volatile, one candidate has a substantial lead over his opponent, and it is not a national election.

When a candidate, such as Lambert, is engaged in a low involvement campaign, there are strategies he can incorporate into his campaign. Rothchild's low involvement model is applicable to Lambert's situation. Since Lambert was in second place in the general primary and since the issues were not volatile, he would probably have been more effective had he focused on a competitively consistent image rather than undergoing numerous image changes. Conversely, Treen employed a consistent and repetitive image throughout his campaign. Rothchild's research tends to imply that Treen's success can be attributed to his main-
aining a consistent image. However, Lambert's defeat can be blamed, in part, on his inability to establish a clear and consistent image.

Image-making appeared to be an influential factor in Louis Lambert's pursuit of voter support. During each phase of the campaign, the media consultant of the time attempted to project a Lambert that would be positively perceived by the electorate.

In Phase I of his campaign Jim Carvin portrayed Lambert as conservative and flamboyant. Lambert received much criticism early in the campaign. A reason for such scrutiny was a result of his early announcement to seek the office of governor. By beginning his campaign approximately five months earlier than the other five candidates, Lambert may have encountered the problem of overexposure. Saturation seems to have an educational effect, making voters more sophisticated about what they see. According to media consultant Raymond Strother, when a candidate appears in a political commercial, "people can either like you, dislike you, or they can be indifferent. But, if you start real early, you are giving people more of an opportunity to dislike you." Lambert's early start may have caused people to formulate opinions of Lambert before they could judge him in light of the other candidates. Once the remaining candidates announced they were to seek the governorship, many voters had either eliminated Lambert or formulated a negative image of him.
Carvin's decision to place Lambert in different parts of the country further damaged Lambert's image. Although the Three Mile Island, Geneva, and Wall Street commercials did focus on timely issues, the setting prompted waves of criticism which proved harmful to the campaign.

Carvin's spots did not improve Lambert's fifth place standing in the polls and resulted in Carvin's dismissal. Robert Squier assumed the role as Lambert's media consultant. Squier joined the Lambert organization in September, 1979, and enlisted the aid of pollster Bill Hamilton and campaign organizer Matt Reese. These three men worked together and remained in constant communication prior to the production of any shot. Before any commercial was produced, Hamilton conducted research to determine the targeted audience. This advance research seemed the key to Phase II. The research indicated that the commercials should focus on laborers and blacks. "Those identified as upper-middle class were left alone ... we would confirm those who were for Lambert and work on them hard by use of phone banks, mailings, voter contact programs." This type of organization seems to have been more influential than the advertisements Squier produced.

Since the research isolated Lambert's constituency, Squier's main responsibility was to aim his commercials at this already supportive audience. Instead of improving Lambert's image with his targeted audience and the undecided voters, Squier showed Lambert as a harsh, angry,
rugged candidate. In addition to creating a negative image of Lambert, Squier also angered segments of the electorate with his commercials.

Although Lambert did make the runoff, the image Squier created for Lambert was not the main reason for the second place finish. Rather, it seemed that the "behind the scenes" work of Reese and Hamilton provided the margin of victory. Lambert's angry messages and attack on Treen's record tarnished his overall image. Lambert alienated and offended voters who would remember his negative image during the runoff.

With only sixteen days until the runoff election, Squier was fired and replaced by Raymond Strother. The commercials produced by Strother contrasted with the Phase I and Phase II commercials. Strother attempted to show Lambert as the underdog, the candidate of the poor. He attempted to change Lambert's image by not allowing him to be angry. "We wanted to show the public that Lambert wasn't a bad, mean monster. He's like you; he's not angry, he's an attractive man. He looks like a governor."

Strother also associated the Democratic candidate with outgoing governor Edwin Edwards. However, continued attempts to make this association seemed to harm Lambert's image because they suggested he was lacking leadership. Lambert's repeated references to Edwards implied that he was not independent but rather a model of Edwards. This continued association with Edwards may have tarnished the com-
petent image Strother strove to create.

In conclusion, image-making appeared to be an influential factor in Lambert's pursuit of voter support. The image Lambert projected through his televised political advertisements did not strengthen his candidacy. The image Lambert communicated was not a positive factor in his campaign. His negative image, however, was an important factor which served to weaken his candidacy. Had Lambert conducted a positive image-making campaign, he may have been more successful in his quest for the governorship of Louisiana.

Image-making is important in a political campaign. Image-making alone, however, does not win campaigns. Rather, a campaign also needs good organization and the proper campaign strategy. In Lambert's case, his organization appeared unsettled throughout the campaign. There were frequent organizational shake-ups and re-evaluated strategies. Such campaign confusion seemed to harm Lambert's candidacy because his organization frequently changed its intended course of action.

Lambert's campaign, however, did make effective use of phone banks. This sophisticated campaign technique seems responsible for Lambert's strong voter support in the two primaries. The phone banks seemed successful in targeting voters and persuading those to vote on election day.

Lambert's black and labor support can also be a reason for his strong finish. The impact of the bloc
vote is still undetermined. However, it is the view of this writer that the labor and black vote is powerful in the selection of public leaders.

The total effect of political commercials is still unknown. Television political advertising's effect on voting behavior has produced no concrete conclusions as to whether it may increase the vote or have no effect whatever on the electorate. New research is needed to determine the influence of political advertisements on voters. With various communication media (i.e. radio, newspaper, direct mail) working in conjunction with television, it is difficult to assess the complete impact of television political advertisements on the electorate.

Further research is also needed in the area of television aesthetics in political advertisements. Conflicting and limited research contend that certain camera techniques are more effective than others. With politicians' heavy dependence upon television in campaigning, a better understanding of the effectiveness of various television techniques is mandatory. A certain camera technique may have subtle psychological influences unknown to media consultants. These psychological influences of television whether positively or negatively affecting a political advertisement, need further examination.

Finally, additional research should investigate the influence of news reporting regarding the political candidate. The news accounts could alter a candidate's image.
Also, future research should examine the effectiveness of the targeting of commercials to insure that each commercial is reaching the intended audience.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 52.


5. Interview of the writer with Wayne Davis of Baton Rouge, LA., June 14, 1981.

6. Strother interview.
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Approved:

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