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A HISTORY OF JEFFERSON BARRACKS, 1826-1860

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of History

by

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PREFACE

The years from 1826 to 1860 were dramatic ones in the history of the United States. The nation expanded its western boundary to the Pacific Ocean and established its dominion over the North American continent from Canada on the north to Mexico on the south. Large numbers of American settlers moved into the Mississippi River valley, Texas, the Great Basin region, and Pacific coastal areas. Throughout this period, the army and Jefferson Barracks were called upon to render vital services in protecting the new American settlements and maintaining peaceful relations with the Indians, as well as providing "touches of civilization" that were otherwise absent.

This study demonstrated that Jefferson Barracks was a typical army post of the pre-Civil War period. The daily activities of the post garrison were routine in nature, with the soldiers devoting most of their time to drill and fatigue duties. The long hours of monotonous garrison duty contributed to alcohol abuse and desertion, and these were chronic problems at Jefferson Barracks as at other military installations.

This study supports the thesis of Professor Francis Paul Prucha in Broadax and Bayonet that the army was an agent of American "civilization" on the frontier. Soldiers stationed at or mustered into service and equipped and trained at Jefferson Barracks acted as a peace-keeping force for the Mississippi River valley. They took part in military operations against the Indians in Florida and on the Western Plains, the Mormons in Utah, and the Mexicans.
In addition to its role as a recruiting and training center, Jefferson Barracks served as the base for a military reserve force for the entire western frontier. Jefferson Barracks' strategic location on the Mississippi, a short distance below the mouth of the Missouri River, enabled the War Department rapidly to transfer men and supplies from the post for service at military installations or in the field throughout the trans-Mississippi West. No matter how large or how small its garrison might be at any particular time, the War Department viewed Jefferson Barracks as one of its most important military installations in the period from its establishment to the Civil War.

In addition to having a key position in the western defense system, Jefferson Barracks also played an important role in the economic development of St. Louis. The Barracks offered a place of employment for numerous St. Louisians, and many farmers in the area around the post were dependent upon quartermaster and commissary department contracts for their survival. Although soldiers from the post sometimes created disturbances in St. Louis, the city's residents viewed the Barracks as a major asset to the city and surrounding region.
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ABSTRACT

Jefferson Barracks was established in 1826 and was one of the army's major posts until 1860. Located twenty-six miles below the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, the Barracks served as a concentration point for supplies for the various army installations in the Missouri River valley and along the upper Mississippi and its tributaries.

When Jefferson Barracks was established, the army intended for the post to act as the Infantry School of Instruction, but the School was never formally organized. The first soldiers stationed at the post were required to construct their own barracks and other auxiliary buildings, and when they finished constructing their barracks, they were needed to fight in the Black Hawk War of 1832.

Jefferson Barracks played an important role in the nation's changing military policy following the Black Hawk War. The Barracks was the training site for the First Dragoons, which Congress established in 1833, and also was the location of the central reserve force for the western frontier. Utilizing its strategic location on the Mississippi, the reserve force at Jefferson Barracks could quickly reach the western frontier regions in order to overawe the Indians or protect United States' possessions from any foreign threat.

This reserve force was not established at Jefferson Barracks until 1843, because the soldiers at the post were needed to fight in the Second Seminole War. Even after the western strategic force was placed at Jefferson Barracks, it did not remain at the post for long.
In 1844, the War Department ordered all available soldiers at Jefferson Barracks to proceed to Texas to defend against hostile actions by the Mexican government. Following the end of the Mexican War, in 1848, Jefferson Barracks resumed its primary role as a recruit and supply depot for the western frontier army.

Throughout the entire period 1826-1860, Jefferson Barracks had a close and important relationship with St. Louis. Jefferson Barracks offered excellent business and employment opportunities to numerous St. Louisians, and they looked upon the Barracks as a regional economic asset.

The primary source of materials used in the preparation of this dissertation were the records of the several divisions of the War Department in the National Archives. Among the most important were Records Groups 92 (Records of the Office of Quartermaster General), 94 (Records of the Adjutant General's Office), 98 (Records of the United States Army Commands), 107 (Records of the Office of Secretary of War), 108 (Records of the Headquarters of the Army), and 153 (Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General). Additional useful information was obtained from various other government documents, the archives of the Missouri State Historical Society in St. Louis, and the St. Louis newspapers.
Chapter I

BUILDING THE POST, 1826-1830

Jefferson Barracks was one of the army's most important installations from the time of its establishment in 1826 until the end of the Mexican War, and was an army post until after the end of World War II. For a short time following its establishment Jefferson also served as the Infantry School of Instruction, which taught infantry tactics to recruits and other soldiers as they were rotated through the post. The post's location made it the prime point of concentration for supplies for the various army installations, such as Forts Atkinson, Armstrong, Crawford, Leavenworth, Snelling, and Winnebago, in the Missouri River valley and along the upper Mississippi and its tributaries. Furthermore, the post also served as a supply center for southern posts at Baton Rouge and New Orleans, and for Forts Gibson, Jesup, Macomb, and Towson. Jefferson Barracks was closely identified with St. Louis and afforded the contractors and merchants of that city profits which they would not otherwise have enjoyed.

Jefferson Barracks had its beginning on March 4, 1826, when the Adjutant General's Office instructed Major General Edmund P. Gaines, the Commanding General of the Western Department of the Army, and Brigadier General Henry Atkinson, commanding officer of the Sixth Infantry Regiment and of the Right Wing of the Western Department, to select a healthful site within twenty miles of the mouth of the Missouri River
suitable "for the establishment of an Infantry School of Instruction." In compliance with this order, on June 6, 1826, General Gaines left his headquarters at Cincinnati for St. Louis to meet Atkinson and begin their work.  

At the time, Cantonments Atkinson and Bellefontaine were the two main army posts in the Trans-Mississippi West. Cantonment Atkinson, located at Council Bluffs, 800 miles above the mouth of the Missouri, was the army's western-most post. It had been established by the Yellowstone Expedition in 1819, but was to be abandoned in 1827 because its location was unhealthy, and it was too far north to protect the Santa Fe Trail. Cantonment Bellefontaine, located on the right bank of the Missouri, four miles from its mouth and only twelve miles from St. Louis, was the most important military post west of the Mississippi before 1826. The

1 General Order No. 13, March 4, 1826, General Orders issued by the Office of the Adjutant General (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as General Orders, AGO.

2 Butler to Jones, June 5, 1826, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.

3 Sally A. Johnson, "Fort Atkinson at Council Bluffs," Nebraska History, XXXIII, (September, 1957), 234.

4 For an explanation of the purpose of the Yellowstone Expedition, see Letter of John C. Calhoun to A. Smythe, December 29, 1819, American State Papers: Military Affairs, II, (Washington, 1834), 33.

5 Robert Fraser, Forts of the West: Military Forts and Presidios and Posts Commonly Called Forts West of the Mississippi River to 1898, (Norman, Oklahoma, 1965), 85.

site had been selected by General James Wilkinson, governor of Louisiana Territory. It had been occupied in the summer of 1805 by troops under the command of Colonel Jacob Kingsbury, who immediately began erecting the buildings.\(^7\)

Wilkinson was one of the most controversial individuals in the United States Army. He had entered the army in 1776, and received a captain's commission. After rising to the rank of brevet brigadier general, he became involved in the Conway Cabal and was forced to resign his commission in 1778. In 1779 he became Clothier-General of the Continental Army, but irregularities in his accounts forced him to resign this position.

After several years in civilian life, in which he became involved in plans to separate Kentucky from Virginia as well as encouraging the activities of the Spanish in the Mississippi Valley, in 1792 Wilkinson received a commission as a lieutenant colonel in the regular army, and in March, 1792, became a brigadier general under Anthony Wayne. Wilkinson proved to be an unfaithful subordinate and conspired to discredit his superior. Upon Wayne's death in 1797, Wilkinson became the ranking officer of the army, but he was unpopular with the soldiers along the Northwestern frontier because of his statements about their hero, Wayne.

In 1798, Wilkinson transferred to the Southwest, and in 1803 aided William C. C. Claiborne in taking possession of the Louisiana Territory. In 1805, Wilkinson became governor of Louisiana Territory and in that capacity selected the Cantonment Bellefontaine site. This action created

\(^7\) Kate L. Gregg, "Building the First American Fort West of the Mississippi," Missouri Historical Review, XXX (July, 1936), 353. Hereinafter cited as MAR.
considerable controversy in St. Louis. Residents of the city suspected the General of profiteering in the site selection process by choosing a location for the army post that would enhance the value of adjoining property which he owned. Although never substantiated, these allegations forced his removal from St. Louis.  

The allegations of misconduct in office concerning Cantonment Bellefontaine proved to be just the tip of the iceberg in Wilkinson's infamous career. In the 1806-1807 Burr Conspiracy, John Randolph accused Wilkinson of being Burr's co-conspirator, but once again these allegations remained unproven, although they "tarnished" his military record. Wilkinson's career ended with the War of 1812. After an undistinguished performance during this conflict, he was retired from the army on June 15, 1815. Wilkinson eventually went to Mexico to pursue a Texas land venture, but before he could fulfill his land dream, he died on December 28, 1825. 

Jacob Kingsbury, a Revolutionary War veteran, served with the Connecticut Line from 1777 to 1780. In 1789, he received a commission as a lieutenant in the infantry. He progressed through the ranks, being promoted to lieutenant colonel in the First Infantry on April 11, 1803. On August 18, 1808, he received his promotion to regimental commander and retired from the army on May 17, 1815. 

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9 Ibid., 226.

10 Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1903, (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 601.
Wilkinson and Kingsbury deemed the location of Bellefontaine to be healthful and strategically sound, but Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bissell, who assumed command of the cantonment in the Spring of 1809, disagreed. Bissell had been appointed an ensign in the First Infantry on April 11, 1792, and was promoted to lieutenant on January 3, 1794. He succeeded Kingsbury as regimental commander of the First Infantry on August 18, 1808.

Bissell reported to Secretary of War William Eustis that Bellefontaine, situated as it was below a high bluff, was indefensible. Furthermore, a board of inspection had described the post's buildings as "decayed and ruinous" and "unfit to be inhabited." The cantonment was also situated on a low, damp bottom land, that was unhealthful and in danger of being cut away by the Missouri.

Not wishing to abandon the area completely, Secretary of War Eustis authorized Colonel Bissell, on July 7, 1809, to erect a new post within

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12 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 221.

13 Bissell to Secretary of War, June 16, 1809, Clarence E. Carter, (ed.), The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1806-1814, (Volume XIV of The Territorial Papers of the United States. 28 Volumes to date, (Washington, 1934-), 176.

14 James House, Robert Lucas, and Louis Lorimier to Bissell, June 1, 1809, ibid., 277-78.

15 Edwin James, "Account of Stephen H. Long's Expedition, 1819-1820," Reuben Gold Thwaites, (ed.), Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, XIV, (Cleveland, 1905), 122-23. That this threat became a reality is to be seen in the observation of Major Stephen H. Long made when he passed the Cantonment on his ascent of the Missouri in 1819. He commented that the original post site was occupied by the bed of the river.
the reservation belonging to Bellefontaine. Bissell quickly erected new buildings on the bluffs a short distance back from the river.\footnote{16}

Apparently, the new site was not much better than the old one, for in the 1820's the War Department proposed abandoning Bellefontaine because it was unhealthful and its wooden buildings were again decaying.\footnote{17} Furthermore, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun believed it to be "bad policy" for the army to maintain a large number of small posts in the Indian territory. In his opinion, the discipline of the troops could be better maintained, and the Indians more effectively overawed and controlled, by the maintenance of larger military forces at a few places.\footnote{18} Calhoun's successor, James Barbour, agreed. Thus, on March 4, 1826, Generals Gaines and Atkinson were ordered to select a site for a new installation near the mouth of the Missouri River.

Atkinson, the son of a North Carolina tobacco planter, was a highly experienced frontier army officer. In 1808, he received a commission as a captain in the Third Infantry Regiment and was assigned to duty at New Orleans to aid in the defense of the Gulf Coast from possible British attack. Atkinson spent five years in the Southwest performing routine duty. He gained valuable experience as a company commander and as inspector general and adjutant on General James Wilkinson's staff.

\footnote{16} Secretary of War to Bissell, July 7, 1809, Carter, (ed.), The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1806-1814, 284.


In 1813, Atkinson transferred from the staff of the Seventh Military District to be the inspector general of the Ninth Military District headquartered at Burlington, Vermont. Atkinson served with distinction on the northern frontier, and on April 15, 1814, he received recognition for his excellent service by being promoted to colonel and assigned as commanding officer of the newly organized Thirty-Seventh Infantry Regiment. Before he could assume his new command, however, on May 9, 1814, Atkinson was wounded below the right knee in a duel with Captain Gabriel H. Manigault. Although strict army regulations prohibited dueling, Atkinson was not punished for his actions, and on July 19, 1814, he assumed command of the Thirty-Seventh Infantry stationed at New London, Connecticut. The war with England ended in 1815, with Atkinson still stationed at New London and confronted with the prospect of being dropped from the army. Atkinson had performed his assigned duties in a competent and diligent manner, but since he had had no combat duty, he did not have a notable reputation.19

Eighteen hundred fifteen, however, did not end Atkinson's military career, but marked an important milestone. On March 17, Congress consolidated the Eleventh, Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Seventh, Twenty-Ninth, and Thirty-Seventh Infantry regiments into the Sixth Infantry Regiment with Atkinson appointed as the new regiment's colonel. The War Department assigned the Sixth Infantry to garrison duty at Plattsburg, New York, and it remained there from June 1, 1815, until February, 1819, when the regiment transferred to St. Louis to take part in the Yellowstone Expedition. Secretary of War intended to send a military expedition to the

confluence of the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers to counteract the influence of the British among the Indians of the northwestern frontier, but the Panic of 1819 forced the cancellation of the expedition after it reached Council Bluffs.  

Although the Yellowstone Expedition did not reach its intended goal, Atkinson's career did not suffer. In May, 1820, he returned to St. Louis and was promoted to brigadier general and assigned command of the Ninth Military District. Atkinson's tenure as brigadier general was, however, brief. On March 21, 1821, Congress passed legislation that reduced the size of the army to 6,000 men. The reorganized army was to be commanded by one major general and two brigadier generals. Major General Jacob Brown received command of the army with Brigadier Generals Winfield Scott and Edmund P. Gaines being appointed commanders of the two administrative units, the Eastern and Western Departments. Atkinson was reduced to colonel and appointed the Adjutant General, but he refused the appointment. He informed General-in-Chief Brown that the only position he would accept, "has been offered to me by the Secretary of War—a regiment, with [the rank of colonel and] brevet rank of brigadier." The War Department consented to this demand, and on August 16, 1821, appointed Atkinson colonel of the Sixth Infantry.  

In July, 1821, before Atkinson assumed command of the Sixth Infantry, General Gaines appointed him to be commander of the Right Wing of the Western Department with headquarters at St. Louis, and for the

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20 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 92; Nichols, General Henry Atkinson, 53-54 and 65-68.

remainder of 1821 until early July, 1824, Atkinson performed this command
duty. In July, 1824, the War Department appointed Atkinson as one of
the members of a commission known as the Yellowstone Expedition of 1825.
The purpose of this expedition was to make treaties of peace and friend-
ship with the Indians of the northern Plains. The expedition departed
St. Louis in early 1825 and by the first week in June reached the Ponca
Indians in present-day northeastern Nebraska. By August 17, the expedi-
tion reached the confluence of the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers and
established Cantonment Barbour, on the left bank of the Missouri. After
ascending the Yellowstone to the Porcupine River, near present-day
Forsyth, Montana, the expedition turned back and descended the Yellow-
stone and Missouri, reaching Council Bluffs on September 19. After
spending three weeks at that place completing reports to the War Depart-
ment on the treaties they had concluded with the Indians of the Upper
Missouri, Atkinson and the other commissioners departed for St. Louis,
reaching there on October 20. From St. Louis, Atkinson journeyed to
Louisville, Kentucky, where he was married on January 26, 1826. In March,
1826, the War Department ordered his return to St. Louis to help select
the site for the new army post.

Edmund Pendleton Gaines, the other officer on whom devolved the
responsibility of choosing the site for a new military post, was a
decorated hero of the War of 1812. He had joined the army in 1797 as
an ensign, but was immediately promoted to lieutenant. On February 28,

22 Nichols, General Henry Atkinson, 90.
23 Ibid., 105-106.
1807, Gaines was advanced to captain. He was the arresting officer at the apprehension of Aaron Burr and was a witness at the latter's trial. Gaines was promoted to major in the Eighth Infantry on March 24, 1812, and to lieutenant colonel in the Twenty-Fourth Infantry on July 6, 1812. From March 24, 1813, to March 9, 1814, he was the regimental colonel of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry and participated in the Battle of Chrysler's Field and commanded the defense during the British attacks at Fort Erie. Gaines was awarded promotion to brigadier general and brevet major general for these heroic actions. In 1821, Gaines became the commanding officer of the Western Department.

Immediately upon receiving orders to choose the site for a new military fort, Gaines and Atkinson acted to carry it out. They proceeded to St. Louis and, in company with General William Clark, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at that place, they examined the military reservation at Bellefontaine, as well as a range of bluffs on the right bank of the Mississippi eight miles below the mouth of the Missouri, a site above the Missouri in the neighborhood of present-day Alton, Illinois, and a piece of woodland ten miles below St. Louis on the right bank of the Mississippi.\(^{26}\) The reconnaissance party summarily dismissed the Bellefontaine site for the reasons already mentioned. It rejected the location eight miles below the mouth of the Missouri because the bluffs were


\(^{26}\) Atkinson and Gaines to Brown, July 3, 1826, Letters Sent by the Department of the West in the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, West Dept.
one-half to three-fourths of a mile back from the river, and the intervening bottom land was covered with many ponds and sink holes. It disliked the site near Alton, because it did not offer a convenient landing on the Mississippi, most of the land was privately owned, and it was too close to the village of Alton. General Gaines wrote, proved "the manifest evil effects of placing Barracks or Arsenals in the immediate vicinity of towns or villages..." with their saloons selling cheap whiskey and their houses of prostitution.

The location finally fixed upon by Generals Gaines and Atkinson was the wooded area on the right bank of the Mississippi ten miles below St. Louis. The farmers in this area, the Vide Poche, as it was called, were willing to relinquish their dubious claims to the land so long as it would be used for military purposes. The river here had a good limestone bank a few feet above the high water mark which offered an excellent landing. Its location below the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi would make it easier and cheaper to bring supplies and agricultural products to the post than if it were farther upstream. The bottom land here was 400 to 500 yards long and forty to sixty yards deep. Some sixty yards back from the river was a gentle elevation of sixty feet which led to an area suitable for the construction of barracks. This site was well timbered, interspersed with numerous limestone quarries, and possessed a dry and somewhat sandy soil. The two generals concluded that the location would have a favorable influence on the discipline and health of the troops.

27 Ibid.
28 Gaines to Brown, July 18, 1827, ibid.
29 Id to Id., July 18, 1826, ibid.
When Gaines returned to Cincinnati, though, he discovered that the tract of land which he and Atkinson had recommended to the War Department as the site of the new post was twenty-six miles from the mouth of the Missouri, and it was therefore outside the area prescribed by the Adjutant General. Nevertheless, the Secretary of War approved the recommended site, and on July 28, 1826, Adjutant General Jones wrote to Atkinson ordering him to start immediately on the construction of "substantial and comfortable" barracks for two infantry regiments. He was to select as many carpenters, blacksmiths, stonemasons, and general laborers as possible from among the troops of the First and Third Infantry regiments, who were to be assigned to the new post.

Before Atkinson could begin building the new installation, the government had to gain clear title to the land. On July 31, 1826, the Quartermaster General, Thomas Jesup, ordered Captain Joshua B. Brant, the assistant quartermaster at St. Louis, to obtain the transfer of the title from the villagers of Vide Poche. Brant obtained from them an area of 1,800 acres for a military reservation, and on August 21, 1826, so notified General Jesup.

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30 Ibid.
31 Jones to Gaines, July 28, 1826, Letters Sent by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, AGO.
32 Jesup to Brant, July 31, 1826, Letters Sent by the Office of Quartermaster General, (Record Group No. 92, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, QMG.
33 Brant to Jesup, August 21, 1826, Letters Received by the Office of the Quartermaster General, (Record Group No. 92, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., QMG.
With the title to the land secure, Adjutant General Roger Jones ordered a battalion of the First Infantry, under the command of Brevet Major Stephen Watts Kearny, and the Third Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Henry Leavenworth, to occupy the new post. Kearny's command arrived on July 10, 1826, and established a temporary camp, known as Cantonment Adams, which it occupied while constructing the permanent post.\(^{34}\)

Kearny was a contemporary of Atkinson's. He had entered the army on March 12, 1812, as a first lieutenant in the Thirteenth Infantry. A year later, on April 1, 1813, Kearny was promoted to captain because of "conspicuous gallantry" in action. In 1815, Kearny transferred to the Second Infantry, and moved to the Third Infantry in 1821. In 1819 he accompanied Henry Atkinson on the First Yellowstone Expedition, and on April 1, 1823, because of "ten years' faithful service in one grade," he was made a brevet major. In 1825 he again accompanied Atkinson on the Second Yellowstone Expedition. When he returned to Missouri in 1826, he was ordered to commence construction of the new Infantry School of Instruction.\(^{35}\)

The initial plan of the post called for the erection of five buildings—two enlisted men's barracks and three structures to serve as officers' quarters. These buildings were to be situated generally

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in the shape of a parallelogram. The enlisted men would occupy barracks erected along two parallel sides running back from the river. Each would be 640 feet long and one story high in the front and two in the rear, with an eight-foot-wide portico across the front. Each of these two buildings could accommodate the enlisted men of one regiment, and each was divided into rooms, so that each company would have one 37-by-20-foot storerooms, one for provisions and the other for clothing. The barracks also contained rooms for the regimental band and sutler.

The officers were to be housed in three buildings—one at the river end of each barracks, and one across the west side of the parallelogram. The two officers' quarters erected at the end of the barracks measured thirty-seven by ninety feet. Their fronts, facing the parade ground were two stories high, while the backs were three stories, with a ten-foot-wide portico on the fronts and both ends. Each building was divided into sixteen rooms, those in the front measuring eighteen by sixteen feet, and those in the back fifteen and one-half by sixteen feet. The kitchens and storerooms would be located on the first floor of each building. The structure to be erected across the back of the parallelogram was two stories in the front and three in the rear, and was divided into rooms for officers of the same size as those in the other two officers' quarters. The usual kitchens and storerooms were on the first floor.

36 Brant to Jesup, January 22, 1827, Consolidated Correspondence File of Jefferson Barracks in the Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, (Record Group No. 92, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as CCF, QMG.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.
The buildings were to be built with exteriors of brick and stone, since these materials would be fairly easy to procure and relatively inexpensive. Brick and stone, as well as the wood used in the framing and interior work, could be obtained locally on the military reservation itself or in St. Louis.39

Immediately after Kearny's battalion arrived at Cantonment Adams, it began to build its own barracks and officers' quarters. To save money, the officers supervised construction, while the enlisted men did the work.40 By the end of December, 1826, the enlisted men's barracks had been finished and the officers' quarters were nearing completion.41

The Third Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Henry Leavenworth, arrived at the site of the new post on September 17, 1826, and established temporary quarters known as Camp Miller.42 During the summer, when it became apparent to General Atkinson that the Third Infantry would arrive late and that it would be impossible for the regiment to build and occupy its own barracks before winter, he authorized Captain Joshua B. Brant, assistant quartermaster at St. Louis, to arrange for part of the work to be done by a civilian builder. Accordingly, Brant hired J. H. Cannon

39 Atkinson to Gaines, August 7, 1826, Letters Recd., AGO.
40 Atkinson to Jesup, June 30, 1827, CCF, QMG.
41 Atkinson to Gaines, August 7, 1826, Letters Recd., AGO; Missouri Advocate, (St. Louis), September 21, 1826; Missouri Republican, (St. Louis), September 21, 1826.
42 Mitchell, Hist. of J.B., 8.
and Benjamin Wilder of St. Louis to construct a barracks building and have it ready for occupancy by December 1, 1826. 43

Disregarding the original construction plans, this building was 400 feet long, 45 feet wide, and 19 feet high. The ceiling of the first floor was 7-feet-8-inches tall, and the second floor 9-feet-4-inches tall. The structure's walls were two feet thick from the foundation to the first floor, and twenty inches thick from there to the eaves. The army agreed to supply stone from the quarries located on the post, and to supply bricks manufactured at the post, using a kiln built by the First Infantry. Cannon and Wilder received $3,000 for their work. Of this sum, they received $750 when they completed the first 100 linear feet of work, and the remainder in quarterly installments when Captain Brant approved the work. 44 Special stipulations in the contract governed the rate of payment should the building be larger or smaller than that called for in the agreement. On August 14, Captain Brant granted an extension on the completion date until December 30, 1826, to allow for sickness among the workers or delays caused by inclement weather. This contract extension was needed by Cannon and Wilder because they had lost approximately two and one-half weeks' construction time due to excessively wet weather during August and September. 45

Although Cannon and Wilder were able to use the services of the enlisted men at the post, they also employed civilian laborers. They,

43 Contract between J. H. Cannon, Benjamin Wilder, and Joshua Brant, August 12, 1826, CCF, QMG.
44 Ibid.
45 Memorandum of J. B. Brant, Assistant Quartermaster at St. Louis, August 21, 1926, Ibid.
for instance, hired a number of skilled stonemasons from St. Louis.\(^46\)

Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup opposed the construction work performed by Cannon and Wilder because he did not want to incur the additional expense involved in the employment of civilian personnel. Replying to his remonstrances on this subject, General Atkinson explained that, since the Third Infantry would be late in arriving at the post, this outside assistance was necessary, but that the timber construction would be performed by the personnel of the regiment.\(^47\) Despite Jesup's objections, General Gaines approved the agreement.\(^48\) Cannon and Wilder completed their part of the work soon after the end of the year, and on January 22, 1827, the army terminated their contract. Whatever remained to be done on the Third Infantry's barracks was left to the mechanics of that regiment to complete.\(^49\)

In the meantime, when the construction work on the First Infantry's barracks and officers' quarters was about half finished, the new post was given its official name. On October 23, 1826, Adjutant General Roger Jones issued General Order No. 66, which stated, "The Barracks ordered to be constructed... on the right bank of the Mississippi, near St. Louis, will be denominated, 'The Jefferson Barracks.'"\(^50\) This

\(^{46}\) On August 24, Cannon and Wilder advertised for 12 or 15 good stonemasons who would work at the post. "Notice for Stonemasons," Missouri Advocate, August 24, 1826. On September 26, 8 to 10 more stonemasons were sought to work at the post, "Notice for Stonemasons," Missouri Republican, September 28, 1826.

\(^{47}\) Atkinson to Jesup, August 25, 1826, CCF, QMG.

\(^{48}\) Butler to Atkinson, September 5, 1826, ibid.

\(^{49}\) Brant to Jesup, January 22, 1827, ibid.

\(^{50}\) General Order No. 66, October 23, 1826, General Orders, AGO.
action honored the third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, who died on July 4 of that year.

The first official statement of the cost of Jefferson Barracks was that of Quartermaster General Jesup, made on November 6, 1826, in which he estimated the total outlay for the barracks, officers' quarters, storehouses, and hospital at $20,000.51 An accounting of the actual expenses, made by Captain Joshua Brant to General Atkinson on November 25, 1826, showed expenditures totaling $18,783.44. They included the sum paid to the residents of Carondelet (Vide Poche) for the relinquishment of their claims to the land for the military reservation, expenditures for the purchase and transportation to the construction site of tools, carts, oxen, forage, and building materials, salaries paid to the civilian mechanics employed at the post, and bonuses paid to the soldiers who had been detached from their units and placed on special duty as construction workers. The largest single expense was for tools and building materials, which could be considered permanent fixtures at the post, and for oxen and their forage.52

Early in 1827, it became apparent that the cost of the post would exceed existing funds, and that additional sums would be needed to complete it. In a report of January 17 to Secretary of War James Barbour, Quartermaster General Jesup estimated the additional amount required at between $5,000 and $10,000.53 This estimate, he pointed out, assumed that the soldiers would do most of the remaining work, with a minimum

51 Jesup to Secretary of War, November 6, 1826, Letters sent, QMG.
52 Brant to Atkinson, November 25, 1826, CFG, QMG.
use of civilian labor, and made no provision for the erection of storehouses or a hospital.\footnote{Brant to Jesup, January 25, 1827, CCF, QMG.}

In an effort to improve the efficiency of building operations and to promote economy, at the beginning of January, 1827, Lieutenant Clifton Wharton was appointed assistant quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks, and on January 13 all construction was placed under his superintendence. Wharton had joined the army on October 28, 1818, as a second lieutenant in the Light Artillery. In 1825 he was promoted to first lieutenant and was transferred to the Sixth Infantry on March 24, 1826. The following May he became the assistant regimental quartermaster.\footnote{Heitman, \textit{Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army}, I, 1022.}

Prior to Wharton's assuming direction of the construction work at Jefferson Barracks, as was mentioned earlier, each regiment, under the supervision of its commanding officer, was responsible for the construction of its own barracks. This plan led to a duplication of workshops, and often had caused a waste of building materials.\footnote{Wharton to Jesup, January 4, 1827, CCF, QMG; Id. to Id., January 13, 1827; \textit{ibid}.} Under the new arrangement, the work on Jefferson Barracks proceeded slowly. Lieutenant Wharton reported to Captain Brant that during January, 1827, the carpenters had only installed a few window sashes and door and window casings, the stonemasons had worked a little on some officers' quarters, and a storehouse, and an embankment in the rear of the north range of barracks had been excavated. The lag in construction, he explained,
had been due in part to inclement weather, but also to the fact that Wharton had been unable to supervise all the work properly.57

Captain Brant provided Wharton with a civilian clerk, some supervisory functions were assigned to the regimental officers, and work assignments were made more explicit. By a brigade order of January 19, 1827, the stonemasons and bricklayers of the First Infantry Regiment, under the superintendence of Major Kearny, completed the stone and brick work on that unit's officers' quarters; the Third Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Henry Leavenworth, assumed responsibility for completing the remaining work on its barracks and officers' quarters; each regiment provided its own burnt lime, quarried stone, and sand; and the carpenters of both regiments were placed under the superintendence of one officer. All of the superintending officers received their orders directly from General Atkinson. The post quartermaster retained, however, control of all the public material and tools issued to the regiments and their mechanics.58

Bad relations between General Atkinson and Colonel Leavenworth also slowed construction. Leavenworth, a distinguished and experienced frontier officer, entered the army on April 25, 1812, at the age of twenty-nine as a captain in the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Regiment. For "distinguished service" at the battles of Chippewa and Niagara he was promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel and then to brevet colonel. Retained in the army following the War of 1812, on February 10, 1818, Leavenworth was promoted

57 Wharton to Brant, February 4, 1827, ibid.
58 Wharton to Jesup, March 20, 1827, ibid.
to lieutenant colonel in the Fifth Infantry. With a detachment of this regiment, in 1819, he built a cantonment at the confluence of the Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers, later named Fort Snelling. On October 21, 1821, Leavenworth was transferred to the Sixth Infantry and placed in command of Fort Atkinson on the Missouri in present-day Nebraska. From there, in 1823, he led a controversial punitive expedition against the Arikara Indians. The following year Leavenworth was promoted to brevet brigadier general for ten years' faithful service in grade, and on December 16 he was made regimental colonel of the Third Infantry and stationed at Fort Howard at Green Bay, Wisconsin. In 1826 he was transferred with his regiment to Jefferson Barracks.  

The feud between Atkinson and Leavenworth became a matter of record on November 25, 1826, when Leavenworth wrote to Adjutant General Jones complaining about the command situation at Jefferson Barracks. He stated that the assignment of General Atkinson as post commander was "highly prejudicial" to his, Leavenworth's, character as an officer and a violation of his rights and privileges. Leavenworth pointed out that the garrison at Jefferson Barracks consisted of the Third Infantry Regiment and four companies of the First. This number of troops, he asserted, should be commanded by a colonel, not a brigadier general. A general officer's usual command was a division or corps. Leavenworth then claimed that he, and not Atkinson, should be in command of the post.  

On March 5, 1827, Leavenworth again complained to Jones about the position of General Atkinson as commandant of Jefferson Barracks.  


60 Leavenworth to Jones, November 25, 1826, Letters Recd., AGO.
He noted that, although Atkinson was reported by the Secretary of War to be the post's commanding officer, he had never been so listed in any report issued from the post. Leavenworth claimed that, since Atkinson was not an officer of either of the two regiments stationed at Jefferson Barracks, he could not properly be in command of the post, and the position rightfully belonged to him, Leavenworth.61

On March 31, 1827, Adjutant General Jones answered Leavenworth's complaints, stating, "On the 8th of November, 1826, General Gaines assigned to Brigadier General Atkinson' the command of 'Jefferson Barracks.'" Furthermore, Jones observed, General in Chief of the Army Alexander Macomb, in an advisory opinion, approved the designation of Atkinson as commandant of Jefferson Barracks, and that settled the matter.62

A second complaint of Leavenworth's against Atkinson was that the latter, by virtue of his position as commanding officer of the post, assigned undesirable personnel to Leavenworth's regiment and detached experienced soldiers from his unit for service in building the post without the Colonel's approval. Leavenworth declared that the undesirables assigned to his regiment were military prisoners of the Third and Sixth

61 Leavenworth to Jones, March 5, 1827, ibid. The post returns for Jefferson Barracks do not clear up this muddled question of command. For December, 1826, General Henry Atkinson is listed as the post commander, but throughout 1827, the returns were submitted by regiment with either Major Stephen Watts Kearny or Colonel John McNeil listed as commanding the battalion of the First Infantry present at the post. Henry Leavenworth was listed as commanding the Third Infantry Regiment. Starting with the Monthly Return of January, 1828, the separate regimental returns were consolidated into one single post return, and Brigadier General Henry Atkinson was listed as post commander. Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, Register of Post Returns, found in the Records of the Office of Adjutant General (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Post Returns, AGO.

62 Jones to Leavenworth, March 31, 1827, Letters Sent, AGO.
Infantry regiments held at the Barracks, and they were a bad influence on the rest of the men. Despite his protests, Atkinson continued the practice. The War Department did not reply to this complaint and the matter was eventually dropped.63

Other clashing ambitions slowed construction. Captain Brant, the assistant quartermaster in St. Louis, for example, did not get along with Lieutenant Wharton, the assistant quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks. The problem grew out of the fact that Wharton was under orders from the Quartermaster General to obtain all building supplies for Jefferson Barracks through the assistant quartermaster in St. Louis. This involved a fairly complicated procedure. Wharton had, in the first instance, to indicate to Brant what materials were required. Brant would then try to purchase them from civilian suppliers. When he had acquired the requested materials, he would notify Wharton, who would then place a requisition for the goods, and Brant would fill it. If Brant was unable to obtain precisely what Wharton wanted, or in the quantities asked for by Wharton, he sometimes purchased substitute materials, or quantities different than those requested. Brant then expected Wharton to make his requisitions conform to these purchases. Wharton objected strenuously to this, and the two men engaged in a rather acrimonious exchange in a series of letters in April, 1827.64

Wharton insisted that his requests should be honored precisely as presented without any changes in either kinds or quantities of materials. Brant, he declared, should have no discretion in filling the orders

63 Leavenworth to Jones, September 23, 1826, Letters Recd., AGO.
64 Wharton to Brant, April 4, 1827, CCF, QMB; Brant to Wharton, April 12, 1927, ibid.
of either the commanding general or the assistant quartermaster at
Jefferson Barracks. Wharton found the whole system of requisitioning
building supplies through the assistant quartermaster in St. Louis irk-
some and explained to Brant that much of the confusion and delay at the
post could be avoided if he were authorized to order goods directly without
going through the assistant quartermaster in St. Louis at all.\textsuperscript{65}

Brant replied that he had made, and would continue to make, every
attempt possible to comply with the instructions of the Quartermaster
General concerning the furnishing of supplies for Jefferson Barracks.
He would, in the future as in the past, act in a diligent manner, but
he hoped that Wharton would comply with the Quartermaster General's orders
and place his requisitions through the quartermaster's office in St.
Louis. Brant concluded with the observation that the great amount of
vituperation that each officer had hurled at the other was a disgrace
to the army, and any further disputes could be avoided if both men would
practice more care and caution in their work.\textsuperscript{66}

When Wharton purchased supplies for Jefferson Barracks without
going through the quartermaster's office in St. Louis, Brant directed
Wharton to cease violating the orders of the Quartermaster General,
and not to purchase directly any more materials for the post unless
explicitly commanded to do so by General Atkinson or a superior officer
in the Quartermaster General's Office.\textsuperscript{67}

Not long after this heated dispute between Wharton and Brant,
on August 1, 1827, the construction of Jefferson Barracks suffered a

\textsuperscript{65} Wharton to Brant, April 13, 1827, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{66} Brant to Wharton, April 20, 1827, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Id. to Id.}, April 21, 1827, \textit{ibid.}
serious setback when a fire destroyed 11,000 feet of pine planks. The fire took place in the kiln used to dry the unseasoned lumber after it was cut. Some 30,000 feet of planks had been dried previously without any difficulty. The accident happened during the day, when the workers were carefully supervised, so there was no question of negligence on their part. The probable cause of the accident was a sudden gust of wind, which caused the drying fire to flare up too high. In addition to the loss of the planks, the fire spread and caused some damage to the south range of barracks, and it was only through the valiant efforts of the whole garrison that the buildings were saved from complete destruction.68

Although the loss of the timber was an important factor in retarding the construction of the post, more important was the exhaustion of the funds allocated for that purpose. On August 13, 1827, Colonel Leavenworth wrote Quartermaster General Jesup that the $20,000 appropriated for the erection of barracks and other quarters at the post had been exhausted, and that there was only enough money left to pay Cannon and Wilder for the work which they had completed in January. There was no money with which to pay the master workmen, superintendents, and mechanics and laborers who had been detached from regular military service and were entitled to extra pay. Furthermore, the supply of construction materials was exhausted. Consequently, wrote Leavenworth, "... the barracks and quarters cannot be made comfortable for the command without a considerable additional expenditure. ..."69

68 Clark to Jesup, August 1, 1827, ibid.; Brant to Jesup, August 18, 1827, ibid.

69 Leavenworth to Jesup, August 13, 1827, ibid.
On August 18, 1827, Captain Brant made a detailed report to General Jesup on the financial situation at Jefferson Barracks. This report accounted for the money which Congress had appropriated on March 2, 1827, and had been used during the first half of that year for the construction of the storehouses and hospital. The amount of money spent for those purposes was $11,029.32, which left $8,970.67 which had been applied to the completion of the barracks and officers' quarters. This meant that more funds for the completion of the storehouses and hospital would have to be granted in another special appropriation.\(^70\)

The Assistant Quartermaster explained that one of the main causes for the shortage of funds was the increase in the size of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks. He stated that since the initial appropriation for the construction of the post had been made, the size of the barracks had been expanded to accommodate twenty-two companies instead of the original sixteen. This made a total garrison of 1,120 men, excluding the officers of all the regiments stationed at the post.\(^71\)

Despite the exhaustion of all construction funds, on October 3, 1827, General Atkinson wrote Captain Brant instructing him to furnish the necessary materials for the completion of the barracks, officers' quarters, storehouses, and hospital. The General stated that, even though the appropriation for that purpose had been spent, he was bound by the original order of the General in Chief to proceed with the work by making special requisitions on the Quartermaster's Department for building materials still needed.\(^72\)

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\(^70\) Brant to Jesup, August 18, 1827, ibid.

\(^71\) Ibid.

\(^72\) Atkinson to Brant, October 3, 1827, ibid.
Brant immediately answered General Atkinson, stating that he had been informed by General Jesup that the $20,000 appropriated in March would be all that was required to complete work on the post, and that no more funds would be granted for that purpose, and that any expenditure made over the appropriated sum would be charged to the account of the responsible officer. Brant then informed General Atkinson that the expenditures already made, combined with the agreements entered into with civilian laborers and contractors, already exceeded the appropriated funds. He asked Atkinson to stop the purchases of any more materials.\(^\text{73}\)

Ignoring this plea, the General ordered Brant to comply with his orders of October 3. The public interest, he declared, demanded that the work on the post not be stopped. Construction had progressed so far, he asserted, that it would be neglect and disobedience of orders on his part not to press for its completion, especially since the remaining expenses would not be so great as to impose on the public any real financial burden. On the following day, the General wrote, "... Therefore I have to require and direct that you furnish materials, etc., as specified in my instructions of yesterday [October 3, 1827]."\(^\text{74}\) This order momentarily resolved the impasse, and the construction of the barracks continued through the rest of 1827, with Brant requisitioning materials and charging them to deficit accounts.\(^\text{75}\)

As consequence of Atkinson's deficit spending, in February, 1828, Captain Brant informed General Jesup it would be necessary to ask Congress

\(^{73}\) Brant to Atkinson, October 4, 1827, ibid.

\(^{74}\) Atkinson to Brant, October 4, 1827, ibid.

\(^{75}\) Brant to Jesup, February 18, 1828, ibid.
for a supplemental appropriation to satisfy the claims of the suppliers of building materials for the post. Brant expected Atkinson to continue to requisition supplies for construction work at the post during 1828. He informed the Quartermaster General that he would, as in the past, object, but would fill the orders.\textsuperscript{76} The Captain assured General Jesup, however, that he would keep a careful watch on the materials and money used at Jefferson Barracks and hold General Atkinson accountable for them.\textsuperscript{77}

As Brant had anticipated, construction on the barracks and officers' quarters continued throughout the Summer of 1828. Concerned about the increasing costs which were being incurred, on August 23, Major Trueman Cross of the Quartermaster General's Office wrote the assistant quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks to ask about the feasibility of discontinuing all building activities at the post.\textsuperscript{78} Captain John Clark, the new assistant quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks, stated that the work should not be stopped and gave a detailed account of the state of construction. He reported that all the officers' quarters were completed, except for a coat of plaster and the installation of assorted window panes and handrails. The barracks were also finished and had been occupied for several weeks, and many of the auxiliary buildings, such as the main storehouse and guardhouse, were either completed or nearing completion.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} Id. to Id., April 8, 1828, ibid.

\textsuperscript{78} Reference to this communication is found in Clarke to Cross, September 8, 1828, ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Clark to Cross, September 12, 1828, ibid.
On September 14, 1828, General Atkinson expressed his opinion that as much of the work then underway as possible should be completed. If some had to be suspended, it should be only that on the back side of the officers' quarters nearest the river on the southern line of the parallelogram.80

Anticipating that part of the work would be discontinued, Captain Clark wrote Quartermaster General Jesup about the advisability of selling several of the oxen at the post. He stated that he and General Atkinson had agreed that sixteen could be marketed, leaving thirty-two. Clark pointed out that the reduction in the herd would result in a great savings in the amount of money spent for forage and attendance upon the animals.81 Captain Brant concurred in this opinion and also suggested that some of the tools at Jefferson Barracks could be sent to Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien or to the site of the proposed new post at the portage of the Fox and Wisconsin rivers.82 There is no evidence to show whether or not these recommendations were followed.

Despite the threat of a cessation of construction, General Atkinson was determined to see Jefferson Barracks completed. He planned that the work remaining in 1828 be done by the personnel of the Sixth Infantry, who had been stationed at the post since May 1827. His plans were threatened when Adjutant General Jones proposed to transfer these troops to Fort Leavenworth to be used to protect the Santa Fe Trail. Atkinson protested that they had not yet received the full benefit of instruction

80 Atkinson to Clark, September 14, 1828, ibid.
81 Clark to Jesup, November 6, 1828, ibid.
82 Brant to Jesup, October 30, 1828, ibid.
and training in the Infantry School and were not ready for such an assignment. He wanted them to be left at Jefferson Barracks to complete their training, as well as to finish building the post. The General was successful in his protests, and the Sixth Infantry remained at the Barracks. 83

Although building activities at Jefferson Barracks were curtailed, Atkinson was able to keep the work going on a limited scale. In May, 1829, for example, he was having porticos erected on the back of the barracks to keep the water from dripping down from the roof onto the walls and making the rooms on the lower floor damp. 84 Following that, in the Fall of 1830, the men of the Sixth Infantry installed guttering on their barracks and whitewashed them. 85

With the completion of these small tasks, the construction of Jefferson Barracks ended, at least for the early period. Thus, despite what he considered to be the foolish bureaucratic operations of various officers in Washington, Atkinson prevailed and saw the completion of this important new military installation on the Mississippi. In doing so, he established a good relationship with St. Louis through the purchase of large amounts of commodities and supplies for the Barracks through local merchants, and the employment of skilled civilian craftsmen during the post's construction.

83 Atkinson to Jones, February 5, 1828, ibid.
84 Atkinson to Jesup, May 20, 1829, Letters Sent, West. Dept.
85 Order No. 135, October 19, 1830, Brigade Order Book in Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Brigade Orders, USAC.
Chapter II

MILITARY TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, SUBSISTENCE, AND

GARRISON LIFE, 1826-1832

One of the main reasons the government established Jefferson Barracks was to locate there a school of instruction where infantry tactics could be taught to all incoming recruits and refresher courses in tactics could be given to regular troops as they were rotated through the post. The course of instruction at the school included infantry tactics, especially close order drill, plus additional artillery, cavalry, and rifle marksmanship exercises. Instruction stressed the use and service of every type of field piece and shoulder weapon. The training program also embraced the preparation and storage of ammunition used by these weapons.¹

The officers of the various infantry regiments stationed at Jefferson Barracks composed the faculty of the school. Brevet Major Stephen Watts Kearny and Major David E. Twiggs, both of the First Infantry, for example, served as drill masters.² Twiggs was the son of Revolutionary War veteran Brigadier General John Twiggs of Georgia. He was appointed a captain in the Eighth Infantry on March 12, 1812. During the War of 1812, he served in minor capacities, and on September 21, ²

¹ Order No. 38, November 6, 1826, Order Book of the Department of the West in the Records of United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited at Order Book, West. Dept.


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1814, he was promoted to major in the Twenty-Eighth Infantry. In June 1815, however, the Twenty-Eighth Infantry was disbanded in the post-War of 1812 army reorganization, and Twiggs was given an honorable discharge. He was reinstated, however, on December 7, 1815, as a captain in the Seventh Infantry and awarded the rank of Brevet Major from September 21, 1814. In December 1821, Twiggs transferred to the First Infantry and was promoted to major on May 14, 1825.3

In September 1827, the Inspector General of the Army, Colonel George Croghan, inspected the troops at Jefferson Barracks and reported that Kearny and Twiggs were performing their instructional duties extremely well. The brigade at Jefferson Barracks, he noted, could execute the most difficult maneuvers of close order drill, and was one of the best drilled in the entire army.4

Croghan was the son of William Croghan, a Revolutionary War hero. At the outbreak of hostilities against England in 1812, Croghan became a volunteer aide-de-camp to William Henry Harrison and he so impressed the "Hero of Tippecanoe" that Harrison recommended him for a commission as a captain in the regular army at the age of twenty-one. Croghan was appointed a captain in the Seventeenth Infantry on March 12, 1812, and assigned to defend Fort Stephenson in northern Ohio. His heroism and "gallant conduct" in the defense of this post against a numerically superior British force on August 1, 1813, won national acclaim for Croghan. On August 2, he was awarded the rank of brevet lieutenant colonel for

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3 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 976; William A. Ganoe, "David Emanuel Twiggs," DAB, XIX, 83.

his action, and eventually, in 1835, Congress awarded him a gold medal. Croghan resigned the army in 1817, but in 1825 he was reinstated at the rank of colonel and served for many years as Inspector General.\(^5\)

A vital part of the instruction at the Infantry School was training in rifle marksmanship. The weapon issued to the troops at Jefferson Barracks when the post was first established was the United States Flintlock Musket Model 1816.\(^6\) It was a muzzle-loading, 0.69 caliber, smoothbore gun, with a forty-two inch barrel, and had a total length of 57\(\frac{1}{4}\) inches.\(^7\) The troops did not like the musket, for it had a defective lock mechanism. The pan steel failed to shut closely upon the pan, with the result that the priming powder often either fell out or burned unevenly. The former caused the gun to misfire, while the latter caused the priming fire to flare up and burn the marksman on the face.\(^8\)

Despite its defects, the brigade at Jefferson Barracks continued to use the Model 1816 musket until 1828, when Major General Jacob Brown, senior officer in the army and General-in-Chief of the Army from 1821 to 1828, ordered General Atkinson to equip his command with the United States Flintlock Rifle Model 1819, and to test the new rifle in every field and drill exercise practicable and report the results to the adjutant general's office.\(^9\) This new rifle had been designed by Captain John H.

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\(^6\) Arcadi Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles, and Carbines, (Buffalo, 1948), 137.

\(^7\) Joseph Shields, Jr., From Flintlock to M-1, (New York, 1954), 37.

\(^8\) Inspection Report of Jefferson Barracks, April 13, 1829, I.G. Reports.

\(^9\) General Order No. 61, December 11, 1827, General Orders, AGO.
Hall in 1811, and the Harper's Ferry Arsenal began manufacturing it in 1824. It was a 0.52 caliber, breechloading weapon, with a total length of 52-3/4 inches and weighed ten pounds.\(^\text{10}\) In tests at the Infantry School, the rifle proved to have defective sights, making it impossible to aim it accurately. General Atkinson, therefore, recommended that the tests be suspended until its sighting could be corrected.\(^\text{11}\)

Upon completion of this correction, the tests resumed, and they revealed other defects in the weapon. Most serious was a substantial gas leak at the breech, which proved to be extremely distracting to the marksman, and caused the rifle to be erratic in its muzzle velocity, and thus its accuracy. So, despite the Model 1819's superiority over the muzzle loaders from the standpoints of speed and facility of loading, and a reduction in the danger of overloading, the weapon was even more unpopular with the soldiers than the old flintlock.\(^\text{12}\)

The Hall rifle proving unsatisfactory, the Ordnance Department reissued the old Model 1816 flintlock to the brigade. However, the target practice results with this weapon were not appreciably better than with the Hall rifle. Ordinarily, approximately twenty men at a time went to the rifle range to train. They fired three rounds each at a distance of sixty yards, and their performance was usually good if they got as many as twenty hits in the bullseye. On one occasion, however, the marksmen did much better. On July 19, 1831, Company C of the Sixth Infantry

\(^{10}\) Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles, and Carabines, 205.
\(^{11}\) Atkinson to Jones, June 18, 1828, Letters Recd., AGO.
\(^{12}\) Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles, and Carabines, 209.

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was, by mistake, issued buckshot instead of ball shot cartridges, and when the marksmen finished firing, the target was shot to pieces.\textsuperscript{13}

Although the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks did not make a very impressive showing on the target range, they kept their arms in excellent condition. On August 16, 1831, Inspector General Croghan found the muskets and cartridge boxes to be in "...as finished order as the most exact care of the soldiers can place them." In Colonel Croghan's opinion, the guns and accoutrements suffered from too much care, rather than too little, for when the officers wanted to punish their men they had them clean and polish their guns and cartridge boxes. Under normal and proper care and usage, they would last twenty years, but if the existing treatment continued, he noted, the gun barrels would be worn thin and bend from the constant rubbing, and the cartridge boxes would become so stiff and heavy that they could no longer be carried or their lids opened. Their useful life would be six to eight years. Observed Croghan, "I have in six years service seen almost two generations of muskets..." He suggested that if every post had an armorer, the abuses which he had noted would be brought to an end, and the government would save thousands of dollars.\textsuperscript{15}

Besides muskets and rifles, the armament at Jefferson Barracks consisted of only two six-pound cannon. According to Colonel Croghan,

\textsuperscript{13} Reports of target practice at Jefferson Barracks, July 15-August 15, 1831, Letters Received by the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd. West. Dept.; Smith to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, July 10, 1831, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{14} Inspection Report of Jefferson Barracks, August 6, 1831, I.G. Reports.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}.  

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the post magazine was too small and unsafe to support more cannons. Although relatively little ammunition could be stored at the post, there was not much danger of running short, because more could always be obtained from the arsenal in St. Louis. 16

A major purpose of the training given the troops in the Infantry School was to instill in them a high degree of martial spirit and a respect for military law. That this purpose was not fully achieved is evidenced by the record of courts martial of personnel stationed at the post. Among the enlisted men, the most common violations of military law were drunkenness and desertion. Between 1826 and 1832, an average of fifty to sixty soldiers were court martialed for drunkenness each year. Many of these men were habitual drunkards who were eventually drummed out of the service. They obtained their illicit whiskey mainly from grog shops in the town of Carondelet and from civilians who smuggled it onto the post.

Most cases of drunkenness were tried before garrison and regimental courts martial. On October 19, 1827, for example, a court martial of the Sixth Infantry tried and convicted seven enlisted men on this charge. In this, as in most such cases, the accused pleaded not guilty, were convicted of the charge, and were sentenced to be reduced to the rank and pay of a recruit. Many sentences also included the loss of the regular whiskey ration, a gill a day, for a period of from twenty to thirty days. 17

16 Ibid.

17 Order No. 131, October 19, 1827, Regimental Order Book of the Sixth Infantry in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Order Book, 6th Inf.
For persons found guilty of repeated and habitual drunkenness, the usual punishment was dishonorable discharge from the army. One such case involved Privates James Galleghar and George McMullin of the First Infantry. On February 17, 1828, their company commander, Captain Richard B. Mason, charged them with being confirmed and habitual drunkards who were unfit for military service. Colonel John McNeil, the regimental commander, ordered their court martial, and they were found guilty and discharged from the service.18

Drunkenness at Jefferson Barracks, and in the army generally, became so serious that in 1830 the House Committee on Military Affairs investigated the possibility of abolishing the whiskey ration. In its report, the Committee stated:

... experience demonstrates that the habitual consumption of ardent spirits, even in moderate quantities, creates a desire for more, and generally leads to the grossest excess. It [the Committee] believes that drunkenness operates more extensively than all other causes combined, in producing in subordination, desertion, disease, and death, among our troops...19

The Committee recommended that coffee and sugar be substituted for whiskey in the ration, but when Commissary General of Subsistence George Gibson pointed out that this change would increase the cost of the rations to the government by $21,900.00 per year, Congress dropped the matter, and whiskey continued to be issued to the troops.20

18 Mason to McNeil, February 27, 1828, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
19 "Report on the Expediency of Discontinuing the Whiskey Ration;" February 8, 1830, House Reports, 21 Cong 1 Sess, No. 166, (Serial 199), 2.
20 Ibid.
Drunkenness often led to desertion, the second most common offense committed by the enlisted man at Jefferson Barracks. A much more serious crime than drunkenness, it carried a maximum penalty of death, either by hanging or by firing squad. The severity of the punishment for those who were apprehended and convicted failed to deter a rather large number of soldiers from running away. Eighty men out of a total garrison of about 400 deserted from Jefferson Barracks, for example, between September 1826 and January 1827. A much greater number absented themselves without leave to visit houses of prostitution or grog shops in St. Louis, but they were either easily captured or returned to the post on their own after a few days. Following their apprehension, deserters were tried before a general court martial, usually composed of seven officers. These courts tried from three to five men at one session, and also authorized the payment of the bounty placed on the deserter's head.

All court martial decisions were subject to review by a higher authority, and the President reviewed most death sentences. In all cases he could reduce, but not increase, the sentence of the court, and, in practice, he virtually always reduced the sentence. Such was the case of James D. Buzzey, a Private in Company D, Third Infantry Regiment, who had been sentenced to death for desertion and was then pardoned by

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21 Missouri Republican, September 28, October 19, December 18, 1826.

22 Department Order No. 5, February 13, 1830, Order Book, West. Dept.; the average bounty for returning deserters was $50.00 per man.

23 Atkinson to Jones, July 16, 1830, Letters Recd., AGO.
President Jackson on June 12, 1830, and given a dishonorable discharge in September. 24

Few deserters received the death sentence, the usual punishment for desertion being confinement at hard labor. An example is the case of deserter Private Otis Powers of Company H, Sixth Infantry Regiment. On February 8, 1828, Powers was sentenced to be confined in the guardhouse at Jefferson Barracks for twenty days, to make good the time he was away, to serve out the remainder of his enlistment at hard labor, with an iron collar weighing eight pounds around his neck, at the fortifications on the lower Mississippi, and to have his pay stopped until the government had been reimbursed for all the expenses it had incurred in his apprehension and return to the post. Finally, Powers was sentenced to be "indelibly marked" on the thigh with the word "deserter" and drummed out of the service when his enlistment was finished. The branding was actually never done, for a presidential order stated that such punishment would be inhumane. 25

On December 17, 1831, the House Committee on Military Affairs investigated the problem of desertion, as well as that of drunkenness. It concluded that the only solution was to recruit better caliber men by reducing the period of enlistment from five to three years and increasing their pay. 26

Another important reason for desertion not considered by the House Committee on Military Affairs was the lure of the collection of multiple

24 Jones to Atkinson, August 7, 1830, Letters Sent, AGO; Order No. 92, August 24, 1830, Brigade Orders, USAC.

25 Woolley to Jones, February 2, 1828, Letters Recd., AGO.

26 "Report on Desertion in the Army," December 27, 1831, House Reports, 22 Cong 1 sess, No. 63, (Serial 224), 1-5.
bounties for enlistment. An example is the case of Private William Huston. He had been inducted and assigned to the Sixth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks in December 1827, and then deserted in April 1828. The following month, Huston re-enlisted at Natchez, Mississippi, and collected a second bounty payment. Even though he was eventually captured, court-martialed, and dishonorably discharged, Huston's experience did not deter other soldiers at Jefferson Barracks from following the same course.

Although most of the legal action against soldiers stationed at Jefferson Barracks occurred in military courts, cases involving murder were tried in the circuit court of St. Louis County. General Atkinson authorized trial in civilian courts to such cases in order to give the accused all the constitutional aids and protections available there and not present in a military tribunal. Most murders were committed by one soldier against another. They often grew out of disputes over such trivial matters as the ownership of a pair of boots or the amount of whiskey drawn in the daily ration. Crimes involving soldiers and civilians at Jefferson Barracks were also tried in St. Louis. An example is the case of James Jenkins, who, on August 24, 1830, was tried and convicted of murdering his wife.

Not all punishable offenses committed at Jefferson Barracks involved enlisted men. The number of officers engaged in activities of this nature was proportionally just as great. In 1827, for example, eight

27 The St. Louis Beacon, April 20, 1829.
28 Missouri Republican, Trial Results of the St. Louis Circuit Court, December 6, 1827, September 1, 1929, August 24, 1830.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
separate incidents involving officers came before military courts. The most common complaints made against them were conduct unbecoming an officer and disobedience of orders. A number of trials also grew out of quarrels between officers.

Although involving no criminal action, the first major quarrel between two officers was that of Brevet Major Stephen Watts Kearny, of the First Infantry Regiment, and Brevet Major Daniel Ketchum of the Sixth Infantry, and was over the question of rank. Ketchum had entered the army as a second lieutenant in the Twenty-Fifth Infantry in 1812, and after two promotions in 1812, was awarded the rank of brevet major on July 25, 1814, for distinguished service at the Battle of Niagara Falls. When the army underwent its post-war reorganization, Ketchum was transferred to the Sixth Infantry Regiment. 31

The dispute between Kearny and Ketchum arose on July 4, 1827, when General Atkinson ordered the troops to parade and pass in review before him. 32 He placed Ketchum in command of the troops on this occasion. When Kearny complained that he should have been chosen commander because he was senior in rank, Atkinson replied that, although Ketchum was his junior in his permanent grade of captain to some other officers of the garrison, including Kearny, he was the senior brevet major at the post and therefore was entitled to the command. 33 Kearny appealed Atkinson's decision to General Edmund P. Gaines, Commanding General of the Department of the West, arguing that the person holding the senior permanent rank

31 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 595.
32 Kearny to Atkinson, July 6, 1827, Letters Recd., AGO.
33 Atkinson to Kearny, July 7, 1827, ibid.
should be the commander. Under Atkinson's interpretation of the prerogatives of brevet as against permanent rank, he pointed out, Ketchum would command men senior to him in grade not only in parades, but would even command his own regiment in the absence of General Atkinson, the regimental commander.  

In his reply, Gaines overrode Atkinson and directed that Kearny should be the next in command of the post. He declared that the command of the Infantry School of Instruction and the Artillery School of Practice at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, which was organized and reported as a single regiment, were alike. Under this interpretation, the command was given to Kearny, because he was the senior captain, and privileges of brevet rank did not take effect within a single unit.

Gaines' decision naturally displeased Major Ketchum, and he appealed it to Secretary of War Barbour. Ketchum asserted that the command situation at Jefferson Barracks was entirely different from that at Fortress Monroe. The garrison at Jefferson Barracks, he pointed out, contained the headquarters of three infantry regiments—the First, Third, and Sixth—and the garrison therefore could not be considered as one regiment. According to Ketchum's interpretation of Army Regulations, when elements of two or more regiments were located at a single post, the officer with the senior brevet rank would be in command. Barbour and the adjutant general upheld this line of reasoning, and on December 31, 1827, the

34 Kearny to Gaines, July 7, 1827, Order Book, West. Dept.

35 Department Order No. 24, August 24, 1827, Order Book, West. Dept.

36 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 586 and 595. The record shows that Kearny received his captaincy on April 1, 1813, and brevet majority on April 1, 1823; while Ketchum received his captaincy on September 30, 1813, and brevet majority on July 25, 1814.
latter notified General Gaines that Brevet Major Ketchum was to assume the command of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks when General Atkinson was not present or until another officer of superior rank should be stationed there.\textsuperscript{38}

Soon after the settlement of the issue between Kearny and Ketchum, early in 1828, Captain John Gantt of the Sixth Infantry asked that he be granted a court of inquiry to investigate the truth of rumors being spread around the post to the effect that he was guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer.\textsuperscript{39} Gantt had been commissioned a second lieutenant in the Regiment of Light Riflemen on May 24, 1817. He was promoted to first lieutenant on April 5, 1818, and transferred to the Sixth Infantry on June 1, 1821, where he was again promoted to captain on February 28, 1823. Although he received promotions through the company grades, his was an undistinguished military career.\textsuperscript{40}

According to rumor, Gantt refused to repay a loan made to him by another officer, or even to acknowledge the debt. When several officers claimed to have seen Gantt borrow the money, he took the position that, since the transaction had not been a matter of written record, he was free of any obligation. However, when it appeared that the court of inquiry might decide that the allegation was true and recommend that he be court martialed, Gantt settled his debt and said no more about a court of inquiry.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} Jones to Gaines, December 31, 1827, Letters Recd. West. Dept.

\textsuperscript{39} Gantt to Atkinson, January 15, 1828, ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Heitman, \textit{Historical Register and Dictionary of the U.S. Army}, I, 444.

\textsuperscript{41} Holmes to Atkinson, January 18, 1828, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
Later that same year, Gantt was again in trouble. On December 16, 1828, Lieutenant Colonel Abraham R. Woolley of the Sixth Infantry charged the captain with making a false report concerning the issuance of a new musket to a private of Company G, and he was brought to trial. The court martial found Gantt not guilty. Gantt was soon in more serious difficulties, and this time did not fare so well. On March 19, 1829, Woolley charged Gantt with "knowingly signing false certificates in relation to his pay." The court found Gantt guilty and sentenced him to be dismissed from the army. Although Gantt appealed to President Jackson for clemency, the President rejected the appeal, and the sentence was executed on May 12.

While Woolley thus played a major role in securing the dismissal of Gantt, the captain had no small part in Woolley's own undoing. In November, 1828, Gantt charged Woolley with conduct subversive to military discipline and unofficerlike and ungentlemanly conduct. Gantt claimed that Woolley had placed him under arrest for countermanding and disobeying an order without formally charging him, that he told Gantt that he was in the habit of making sloppy and sometimes false reports, and called him a liar and threatened him physically. Gantt called Captains Bennett Riley and Thomas Noel, Privates William Carroll, John Stanley, Philip Logan, and William Harrow, and Robert Stewart, a civilian, as witnesses. Furthermore, Gantt charged that on November 22, 1828, Woolley, without any provocation, threatened him with violence and called him a liar.

42 Order No. 29, December 23, 1828, Order Book, West. Dept.
43 General Order No. 35, May 12, 1829, General Orders, AGO.
44 Gantt to Atkinson, November 26, 1828, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
a liar; that he, by the use of a malignant and highly colored charge, obtained a general court martial of Captain Gantt on December 16, (as related above), and that during the trial he accused Gantt of making a false report and attempting to steal his command. The captain further said that Woolley, during an earlier court martial, on October 10, 1828, addressed the Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Albert Sidney Johnson of the Sixth Infantry, in a rude and ungentlemanly manner as follows, "I see the Muelish [sic] curl of you lip," and at the same trial threatened Lieutenant M. W. Bateman of the Sixth Infantry with bodily harm if the Lieutenant testified against him. Gantt finally alleged that on October 17, 1828, Woolley threatened him with the prospect of being brought before a general court with the intent of drumming the captain out of the army. 45

Two more charges were made against Woolley. One stated that he conducted himself in a manner subversive to the good order of the troops and military discipline by flogging Private Thomas Powell of Company D, Sixth Infantry, on December 12, 1828, so severely that Powell was disabled and unable to perform any duty for nine days. 46 The second charge grew out of the December 1828 trial of Gantt, described above. In that trial, the court, after acquitting the captain, directed Lieutenant Reuben Holmes, the judge advocate, to prefer charges against Woolley for "oppressive conduct and maladministration of his military duties." 47

Woolley's trial was scheduled for March 2, 1829, before a general court of seven officers. When news of the impending event reached

45 General Order No. 28, May 1, 1829, General Orders, AGO.
46 Ibid.
47 Department Order No. 29, December 23, 1828, Order Book, West. Dept.
Washington, it met with the stern disapproval of Major General Alexander Macomb, newly appointed Commanding General of the Army. Under instructions from Macomb, Adjutant General Jones informed the members of the court of the General's disapproval and encouraged them to see that the charges were dropped.48

But the charges were not dropped, and on March 14 the court martial of Lieutenant Colonel Woolley began. Woolley pleaded not guilty to all charges, but the court found him guilty of every one and sentenced him to dismissal from the army. In forwarding its report of the proceedings to the Adjutant Generak, however, the court asked that the reviewing authority show clemency and allow Woolley to remain in the service.49

Upon reading the trial record, Major General Macomb, reversing his earlier view of the matter, recommended to the Secretary of War that the sentence stand. Woolley's career, he noted, had been marked by frequent investigation by courts of inquiry and courts martial, and the cumulative evidence indicated that the Lieutenant Colonel was unfit to command troops, due to an "irregularity" of temper and lack of self-discipline.50 Apparently acting upon Secretary of War John H. Eaton's recommendation, President Jackson refused to grant executive clemency to the Lieutenant Colonel on the ground that flogging a soldier without due authorization was such a severe crime as to forbid it. And so Woolley was dismissed from the service on May 1, 1829.51

48 Department Order No. 3, January 4, 1829, ibid.; General Order No. 12, March 24, 1829, General Orders, AGO.

49 General Order No. 28, May 1, 1829, ibid.

50 Macomb to Secretary of War, April 15, 1829, Letters Received in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., SW.
One of the most common offenses for which officers were court martialed was the abuse of enlisted men. In April 1828, the major surgeon of the Sixth Infantry, John Gale, was brought to trial for having excessively and inhumanely whipped Private Archibald Allison of Company B, Sixth Infantry. Witnesses testified that Gale had administered some 300 lashes upon Private Allison's bare back and legs. In defending Gale's actions, Surgeon William H. Nicoll, a subordinate of Gale's, testified that Allison was a habitual drunkard and refused to obey orders or accept treatment of his alcoholism. Although the court martial found that Surgeon Gale did flog Private Allison, because of the soldier's misconduct, it did not impose any punishment on the surgeon. Allison asked that a general court hear his case, but it refused his appeal.

Even General Atkinson became involved in an unfortunate dispute with a junior officer at Jefferson Barracks. In September 1831, he ordered Lieutenant Charles L. C. Minor of the Sixth Infantry arrested and confined to the post. Minor was an 1826 graduate of the United States Military Academy, and had been commissioned a second lieutenant in the Sixth Infantry. He had served at numerous frontier posts from 1826 to 1830 before transferring to Jefferson Barracks in October 1839 as the assistant quartermaster of the post.

51 General Order No. 28, May 1, 1829, General Orders, AGO.
52 Atkinson to Woolley, April 24, 1828, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Procedures of Regimental Court Martial, April 25, 1828, ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 George Washington Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., From Its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890. With the Early History of the United States Military Academy, 3rd ed., Revised and Extended (3 vols., Boston, 1891), I, 379. Hereinafter cited as Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA.
Atkinson accused Minor of disobeying orders and disrespectful conduct toward the quartermaster officers at the Barracks and himself. Apparently assuming that Minor would be tried in the near future by a court martial, in October Atkinson left for Louisville, Kentucky. During Atkinson's absence no action was taken to bring Minor to trial. Finally, therefore, Minor wrote the Quartermaster General, the chief of his branch of service, explaining his situation and pointing out that sixty-five days had passed without a date's having even been fixed for his trial. The Quartermaster General complained to the Adjutant General of this mistreatment of his officer, whereupon Colonel Jones ordered that the Lieutenant's court martial be held early in January 1832. The court heard the case and acquitted Minor. But a report of the affair reached President Jackson, and on April 28, 1832, the Adjutant General informed General Atkinson of the President's strong disapproval of the dilatory manner in which Minor's case had been handled in allowing that officer's confinement for 108 days before his being brought to trial. Should General Atkinson mistreat in a like manner any more officers at Jefferson Barracks, he would come under severe presidential censure and disciplinary action, warned the Adjutant General.

Most of the courts martial of officers at Jefferson Barracks grew out of personal differences between the individuals involved. As in the case of Gantt and Woolley, they often resulted in the two parties'

55 Minor to Jesup, September 8, 1831, Register of Letters Received in the Records of the Headquarters of the Army, (Record Group No. 108, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., HQA.

56 Id. to Id., December 5, 1831, ibid.

57 General Order No. 37, April 28, 1832, General Orders, AGO.
pressing charges against each other and in both being convicted. These disputes and trials must have been harmful to the morale of the officers at the post and were frowned upon by the higher ranking officers in Washington and especially the Secretary of War and the President. It must be observed, however, that such quarreling and litigation as has been described above was characteristic not only of army officers of the period, but also of Americans generally, and especially those living in frontier areas.58

As previously mentioned, desertion was one of the main disciplinary problems in the army, and specifically at Jefferson Barracks. A contributing factor to desertion was the quality of food and subsistence provided the soldiers in the army. The responsibility of providing the food for the personnel and animals at Jefferson Barracks, both while they were at the post and away, was the function of the Department of the Commissary General of Subsistence. This function was the responsibility of an assistant commissary of subsistence stationed at Jefferson Barracks. He was under the direct command of George Gibson, Commissary General of Subsistence in Washington, and coordinated the activities of his office with those of the post quartermaster and General Atkinson.

Gibson was a highly experienced officer who spent a total of fifty-three years in the army. Commissioned a captain in the Fifth Infantry in 1808, he attained the rank of major in the Seventh Infantry by November 1811. During the War of 1812, Gibson was promoted to lieutenant colonel. After the war, on April 18, 1826, he was appointed a colonel

and quartermaster general. Two years later, Gibson was transferred to the Subsistence Department where he became commissary general of subsistence.59

Proposals for rations for Jefferson Barracks were drawn up by the post commissary of subsistence and were advertised in the St. Louis newspapers. From July 16, to September 13, 1827, for example, the Missouri Republican carried a contract proposal for the following items: 1,500 barrels of pork, and 3,250 of flour; 20,800 gallons of whiskey, and 6,000 of cider vinegar; 22,800 pounds of soap, and 10,400 of candles; and 1,450 bushels of beans, and 400 of salt.60

The first contract issued for the supply of rations at Jefferson Barracks was granted to Barr, Sodwick and Company of Cincinnati on November 14, 1826. This contract called for the delivery of 800 barrels of pork, and 1,600 of flour; 10,000 gallons of whiskey, and 3,000 of vinegar; 600 bushels of beans, and 300 of salt; and 12,000 pounds of soap, and 5,000 candles. The contract set the delivery dates of quarter amounts on December 1, 1827, and March 1, June 1, and September 1, 1828, thus allowing the contractor time to procure and deliver the required supplies. The Commissary Department estimated that the pork, flour, whiskey, soap, candles, and vinegar would supply 800 men, the salt 1,000 men, and the beans 650 men for the period of the contract, or one year. The total amount of the contract was $18,095.00.61

59 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 453.
60 Missouri Republican, July 26, 1827.
61 Subsistence Stores Contract, November 14, 1826, Register of Contracts, Records of the Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, (Record Group No. 192, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Register of Contracts, CGS.
This agreement did not provide for any fresh beef. That was supplied under separate contract. One such was that negotiated by Lieutenant Reuben Holmes, the post commissary of subsistence, with Paul Kingston. Holmes was an 1823 graduate of the United States Military Academy who was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Sixth Infantry. From 1823 to 1827, he served on frontier duty with that regiment, being promoted to first lieutenant on February 15, 1826. In 1827, he transferred to Jefferson Barracks and served on commissary duty until 1832.62

By the terms of Kingston's agreement, he was to make weekly or biweekly deliveries of beef to the post at a price of $2.29 per hundredweight. The animals were to be slaughtered within one mile of the post, and preferably on the Illinois side of the Mississippi so the smell of the rendering and slaughtering processes would be carried away from the Barracks by the prevailing westerly winds.63 These contracts to supply food and related items to Jefferson Barracks were representative of all those which were negotiated, the only variations being in the quantities contracted for and the period of the agreement.

Contracts to supply provisions were made with a relatively large number of individuals and firms. An important reason for this was the frequent failure of contractors to honor the terms of their agreements. All too often they did not meet the stipulated dates of delivery, or delivered the wrong quantities of goods, or provided merchandise of unsatisfactory quality. In September 1828, for example, Yarnall and Mitchell

62 Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA, I, 303.

63 Register of Fresh Beef Contracts, January 2, 1827, Register of Beef and Fresh Meat Contracts, Records of the Commissary General of Subsistence, (Record Group No. 192, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Register of Beef and Fresh Meat Contracts, CGS.
of Wheeling, Virginia, failed to deliver food as provided by their contract. In October, Lieutenant Holmes wrote Commissary General George Gibson that existing food supplies would last until the next scheduled delivery in December, and that the supply of whiskey would last longer. However, there was an immediate need for beans and vinegar. Apparently, with the authorization of the Commissary General of Subsistence, Holmes purchased ninety-five bushels of beans and 300 gallons of vinegar in St. Louis and had them transported to Jefferson Barracks. The following month he had to arrange for the purchase of flour in St. Louis. Fortunately, Yarnell and Mitchell made their December delivery as scheduled.

During February and March of 1829, an emergency arose due to an ice jam on the Mississippi River, which prevented the shipment of rations from St. Louis and Cincinnati to Jefferson Barracks. Shortages developed in the supplies of flour, candles, and salt, and Lieutenant Holmes was again forced to make special purchases of these commodities in St. Louis. He bought seventy barrels of flour at $8.00 per barrel, and sixteen bushels of salt at $1.50 per bushel. At this time, Barr, Sodwick and Company of Cincinnati held the contract for supplying the post with salt pork. On March 19, 1829, Lieutenant Holmes reported to General Gibson that some twenty barrels of pork received from Yarnall and Mitchell had been condemned by a board of survey as spoiled beyond use. The meat, he noted, was from garbage-fed, rather than corn-fed hogs, and had been packed.

64 Holmes to Gibson, October 18, 1828, Letters Received by the Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, (Record Group No. 192, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., CGS. Id. to Id., November 17, 1828, ibid.

65 Id. to Id., March 2, 1829, ibid.
in too little brine. As in the case of similar shortages, Holmes was forced to purchase twelve barrels of meat, as well as other supplies, in St. Louis. 67

Throughout 1830, the commissary department was constantly plagued by contract shipments not arriving on time and being short of certain items. The shipment from Barr, Sodwick and Company of January 1, for example, was short of candles, soap, and whiskey. These shortages were not infrequently due to loss or damage in transit, as is shown by the fact that the whiskey barrels sent by Barr, Sodwick had been tapped while enroute from Cincinnati to St. Louis and fifty gallons had been consumed by the boat crew. 68

In all cases where shipments of meat or other supplies seemed to fail to meet specifications, they were examined by a board of survey, whose function it was to determine whether or not the articles in question could be used. In those instances in which the merchandise was found to be unsatisfactory, the commissary of subsistence at Jefferson Barracks reported the facts to the Commissary General of Subsistence, and required suppliers to replace it with articles of acceptable quality.

A fairly typical situation was that reported to Commissary General Gibson by Lieutenant George H. Crosman, the commissary of subsistence at Jefferson Barracks. He was an 1823 graduate of the United States Military Academy who received his commission as a second lieutenant in the Sixth Infantry on July 1, 1823. From 1823 to 1826, he served on frontier duty at such posts as Forts Mackinac, Howard, and Atkinson, and

67 Id. to Id., March 19, 1829, ibid.; Id to Id., April 13, 1829, ibid.

68 Crosman to Gibson, January 3, 1830, ibid.
accompanied the Second Yellowstone Expedition in 1825. In 1826, Crosman accompanied the Sixth Infantry to Jefferson Barracks, and was assigned to commissary duty by General Atkinson. He was promoted to first lieutenant in the Sixth Infantry on August 30, 1828, and assigned to duty as an assistant quartermaster on October 15, 1830.69

Writing in July 1830, Crosman informed Commissary General Gibson that he had received a shipment from Manluis V. Thompson of Georgetown, Kentucky, containing 120 barrels of pork of poor quality. Thompson had apparently purchased the meat in St. Louis, where it was impossible to obtain large quantities of corn-fed pork. Upon examining the meat, a board of survey condemned it as being, "soft, mash-fed, and such as ought not to be issued." The board's finding so prejudiced the officers of the post that they would not accept any of the post's existing supply for issue to their men, even though, in Crosman's opinion, much of it was fit for consumption.70 As a matter of fact, Crosman had issued sixty of the 100 barrels he had in stock before the board of survey reported. Under the circumstances, however, Crosman was forced to sell the remaining forty barrels at auction in St. Louis at half the price originally paid, or about fifty cents per barrel. The buyer then shipped the meat to New Orleans and sold it for $10.00 per barrel. The costly result of the board of survey's action pointed to a serious flaw in the method employed at Jefferson Barracks, and other army posts, to determine the acceptability and usability of goods purchased from private suppliers.

69 Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA, I, 315-16.

70 Crosman to Gibson, July 2, 1830, Letters Recd., CGS; Id. to Id., July 16, 1830, ibid.
Its effective functioning depended upon the competence of the officers comprising the boards. Crosman complained to the Commissary General of Subsistence that, at Jefferson Barracks, competent officers would not serve on the boards of survey because they believed such duty was beneath their status as well as too time consuming. The only other persons who could or would serve were, "Honest, intelligent, noncommissioned officers," or civilians employed as assistants in the subsistence store.  

The trouble with the Indians of the Upper Mississippi which culminated in the Black Hawk War, brought some special duties to the commissary of subsistence at Jefferson Barracks. In anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities with the Sauk and Fox, in April 1832, General Atkinson ordered Lieutenant Nathaniel J. Eaton, the commissary of subsistence at Jefferson Barracks, to purchase 100 barrels of pork and 200 barrels of flour, plus small amounts of other rations and deposit them at Rock Island, Illinois, by May 1 for use by regular troops who would be taking the field.  

A few days later, General Atkinson ordered Lieutenant Reuben Holmes to buy 150 barrels of flour and 100 barrels of pork for the use of the regular army troops commanded by the General. The pork cost $9.50 per barrel and the flour $7.00, for a total of $2,000.00. This price included the shipping charges to Rock Island.

There were several problems in delivering supplies to the troops in the Illinois-Wisconsin area during the Black Hawk War. The expense of their transportation was one. The Upper Mississippi was difficult

71 Id. to Id., July 16, 1830, ibid.
72 Eaton to Gibson, April 17, 1832, ibid.
73 Holmes to Gibson, April 20, 1832, ibid.
and dangerous to navigate, especially where there were rapids in the river, as above St. Louis or near the mouth of the Des Moines River. At other places the currents were tricky. As a result, army keelboats and steamboats sometimes sank in ascending the river with the loss of all or parts of their cargoes. Goods shipped in open boats were sometimes damaged by weather, and there were often losses due to pilferage.  

Another problem was the diversion of supplies intended for the army to the civilian population. The Indians had so ravaged the land in the spring and summer of 1832, destroying crops and stealing livestock, that the military authorities had sometimes to feed the people of certain areas to prevent them from starving.

The loss of supplies and the necessity of feeding the civilian population of the Illinois frontier brought unexpected expenses to the commissary department at Jefferson Barracks. On June 4, 1832, Lieutenant Holmes reported to the Commissary General that he had drawn upon the credit of the commissary department in the sum of $15,000.00 from H. S. Coxe, the Cashier of the Branch Bank of the United States in St. Louis, to pay for stores purchased and to be bought for General Atkinson.

Besides supplying the troops with provisions sent from St. Louis, General Atkinson directed that Commissary of Subsistence Holmes have a herd of seventy cattle driven along with the troops going up to fight Black Hawk's band. These cattle were procured at an average cost of 3½ cents per pound, and were to feed both the troops and friendly Indians.

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74 Eaton to Gibson, May 28, 1832, ibid.
75 Holmes to Gibson, June 1, 1832, ibid.
76 Id. to Id. June 15, 1832, ibid.
The commissary officer considered fresh beef to be more healthful for the troops than salt pork, and it was easier to transport.\(^\text{77}\)

In July 1832, as military operations against Black Hawk were reaching full scale, General Atkinson placed Lieutenant Holmes in charge of provisioning the whole force fighting the Indians. Holmes made several large purchases of foodstuffs and other items for the Illinois militia. He, for instance, bought 200 barrels of pork, 300 of flour, and five of salt, and five boxes of candles and five of soap for the Illinois soldiers at Fort Deposit on the Illinois River. In addition, he purchased 100 barrels of pork, and 150 of flour for their supply depot at Galena, Illinois.\(^\text{78}\) Throughout the summer of 1832, the commissary department was required to establish field depots from which rations would be issued. The average size of these issues was 60,000 rations with the largest being 200,000 and the smallest 10,000. The issues were reported as single rations, but each soldier actually received anywhere from seven to ten days' food supply at a time.\(^\text{79}\)

In a final accounting to the Commissary General of Subsistence at the end of the Black Hawk War, Lieutenant Holmes reported that the contractors, John and George Atchison and Company of Galena, Illinois, delivered a total of 89,561 rations to the Illinois militia. At a charge of eighteen cents per ration, their cost was $16,120.98. This price

\(^{77}\) Id. to Id., June 17, 1832, ibid.
\(^{78}\) Id. to Id., July 5, 1832, ibid.
\(^{79}\) Id. to Id., July 29, 1832, ibid.
Holmes considered to be high, but the difficulties and distance of transportation, he explained, accounted for it.\(^{80}\)

One item of which the commissary department at Jefferson Barracks had a surplus before and during the Black Hawk War was whiskey. It was a perishable commodity, for on March 1, 1832, Lieutenant Nathaniel J. Eaton reported to the Commissary General of Subsistence that the liquor was evaporating and recommended that the Commissary Department sell some 1,800 gallons at auction in St. Louis. Eaton pointed out that the Commissary Department would realize a tidy profit, because the liquor would reach the St. Louis market before the river commerce resumed its spring and summer season. This meant that the government whiskey would command a price well above its cost of thirty cents per gallon, whereas if the whiskey were sold after the river traffic opened, the price would be well below that price.\(^{81}\)

Besides obtaining and issuing rations for the troops at Jefferson Barracks, the assistant commissary of subsistence was responsible for the procurement of feed—usually corn, hay, or oats—for the post's draft animals. The feed was purchased on contract with the successful civilian bidders from the adjacent community. Sometimes the post commissary worked with the quartermaster officers at Jefferson Barracks and in St. Louis in advertising for bids. On August 1, 1829, for example, Captain Henry Smith, the quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks, in conjunction with Lieutenant Holmes, asked for bids on thirty-two tons of good hay free from

\(^{80}\) *Id.* to *Id.*, September 20, 1832, *ibid.*

\(^{81}\) Eaton to Gibson, March 1, 1832, *ibid.*
weeds and brush and well cured, and 1,500 bushels of corn. On August 19, 1829, Captain Joshua B. Brant, assistant quartermaster at St. Louis, requested bids of 1,800 bushels of unshelled corn to be delivered to Jefferson Barracks in three separate and equal installments in October 1829, and January and April 1830. As noted above, in the procurement of provisions and fodder, the commissary of subsistence had frequent and often frustrating dealings with civilian contractors. Seldom were the terms of contracts carried out faithfully. Problems of insufficient quantities and inferior quality of merchandise, and its tardy delivery were commonplace. Nevertheless, in this early period there was no better way of securing these goods, and an important effect of the practice was to stimulate the economy of the eastern Missouri-southwestern Illinois region and to promote its growth and development.

Although, as discussed earlier, the main purpose of the troops at Jefferson Barracks was to engage in military training and drill, they participated in many non-military activities, such as building the post, caring for its draft animals and driving them, working in the post's gardens and on wood-chopping details, and performing such off-post duties as serving on boat parties and working at the United States Arsenal near St. Louis.

One rather important and regular fatigue activity performed by the troops at Jefferson Barracks was the care and feeding of the post's animals—its horses, mules, and oxen. Included in these were, for example,

82 The St. Louis Beacon, August 1, 1829.
83 Ibid., August 29, 1829.
the twenty to twenty-five oxen used as draft animals in post construction work. Soldiers were usually detached from their companies for this duty for periods of four to five days at a time.  

Although their work was not especially difficult, it was unpopular because of the filth and unpleasant smell associated with it.  

Besides the men assigned to care for the animals at the post, others were ordered to act as teamsters. In addition to driving the teams used in the construction project, the teamsters also hauled food and other supplies for the commissary and quartermaster departments between Jefferson Barracks and St. Louis. At first, the post quartermaster selected the men to be used for this type of duty, and he naturally chose the soldiers who were most skilled in the proper handling of the animals. But then, Captain Thomas Jefferson Harrison of the Third Infantry complained to Colonel Henry Leavenworth, his regimental commander, that the quartermaster always picked his best men for this assignment, leaving him with nothing but raw recruits and the more indolent and inept personnel. Both General Atkinson and Colonel Leavenworth felt Harrison's complaint was legitimate, and instructed the quartermaster department at the Barracks to stop this practice and to use all the available personnel on a rotating basis for this fatigue duty.  

84 Brigade Order No. 139, October 30, 1828, Brigade Orders, USAC.  
85 Clark to Leavenworth, June 20, 1829, Letters Recd., West. Dept.  
86 Special Order No. 125, November 30, 1830, Brigade Orders, USAC.  
Gardening and wood chopping were largely seasonal activities, with gardening occurring in the spring, summer, and early fall, and most of the wood cutting in the late fall and winter. Soldiers at Jefferson Barracks engaged in gardening in compliance with the established army policy that each post should be responsible for the production or procurement of its own kitchen vegetables, such as potatoes, beans, carrots, and turnips. In the spring planting and fall harvest seasons there were as many as twenty to thirty men assigned to the gardening detail. The summertime detail was not as large, because its main task was cultivating the plants and hoeing the weeds. Although most wood was cut from November through March, this activity went on all year long, because each regiment had to furnish the necessary wood for its own mess and barracks.

A common form of fatigue duty was the policing of the grounds. Each regiment was responsible for the clearing of its area, but regimental commanders were often remiss in discharging this responsibility, allowing the grounds around the barracks to become so filthy that General Atkinson had to issue special orders commanding that they be policed. Most of the rubbish and animal matter was burned, but when the fires threatened to destroy some of the trees on the military reservation, greater care had to be taken in rubbish disposal. The men then either dumped the trash in the Mississippi or burned it in the non-wooded areas.

88 General Regulations of the Army, September 11, 1818, American State Papers: Military Affairs, II, 265.
89 Brigade Order No. 30, May 9, 1830, Brigade Orders, USAC.
90 Brigade Order No. 129, October 22, 1830, ibid.
91 Brigade Order No. 44, June 13, 1830, ibid.
One unusual but extremely essential extra duty assigned a number of soldiers was to serve in the post's fire brigade. These men were placed under the command of Lieutenant Charles L. C. Minor of the Third Infantry, who was assisted by Brevet Second Lieutenant John S. Van Derveer of the Sixth Infantry, an 1830 graduate of the United States Military Academy. The brigade was composed of men from all the companies at the Barracks, and selection was made according to the relative strength of the companies. 92

Some fatigue duty was performed off the post. An important example is service on boat parties which were charged with the delivery and return of government keelboats. These vessels were used to ship supplies from Jefferson Barracks and St. Louis to Forts Armstrong, Crawford, Snelling, and Winnebago, located along the Upper Mississippi and its tributaries. 93 The normal complement of a boat party was one officer, usually a second lieutenant, one noncommissioned officer, and ten privates. The work was very difficult and dangerous, as many of the soldiers were inexperienced rivermen and ran a great risk of losing their lives by falling into the river and drowning. 94 Besides those assigned to serve in boat parties, a number of soldiers were sent to work in the United States Arsenal located between Jefferson Barracks and St.

92 Brigade Order No. 170, December 24, 1830, ibid.; Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 981.

93 Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860, (Madison, Wisconsin, 1953), 145.

94 Brigade Order No. 85, September 10, 1828, Brigade Orders, USAC.
Louis. One of their tasks was to mix different kinds of gunpowder to meet special requirements.  

Besides being generally unpopular, fatigue duty often interfered with the performance by the troops of their principal function—military training and discipline. In July 1839, for example, Captain Zalmon C. Palmer of the Sixth Infantry, a veteran of the War of 1812 who had risen through the enlisted ranks to become sergeant major of the Sixth Infantry, and who was commissioned as a second lieutenant on July 16, 1817, and was eventually promoted to captain on February 15, 1826, was assigned the extra duty of superintending the construction of porches around the regimental barracks. Palmer applied himself to this task so zealously that he neglected the drilling and training of his company to such an extent that, in the opinion of Colonel Leavenworth, it was the poorest disciplined company at the Barracks.

Similarly, enlisted men often missed their exercises in the Infantry School because they were assigned to fatigue duty. Such was the case of Private Almus D. Robinson of Company A, Third Infantry, who arrived at the Barracks in October 1826, and was immediately detailed to extra duty as a carpenter by the post quartermaster for a period of sixteen months. Upon the complaint of Colonel Leavenworth, such practices were brought to an end, and troops assigned to fatigue duty were, after a reasonable

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95 Special Order No. 98, July 13, 1828, ibid.

96 Brigade Order No. 58, June 28, 1830, ibid.; Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, I, 768.

97. Brigade Order No. 113, October 6, 1830, Brigade Orders, USAC.
period, returned to their units in order to receive instruction in infantry tactics. 98

Fatigue duty not only interfered with the soldiers' discipline and training, but was extremely hard on their clothing. Captain Henry Smith of the Sixth Infantry, for example, stated that men assigned to work as lime and mortar carriers in the construction of the barracks destroyed or damaged more clothing in one week than they did in a month's regular service. The Captain continued that, since the men seldom got any extra pay for this work, they found it impossible to purchase new clothing, and thus his company presented a very sloppy appearance when mustered for inspection or review. 99

The ability of the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks to perform fatigue, as well as regular, duty depended upon their physical well being. Although the garrison enjoyed fairly good health, when the troops did become ill they received the best available treatment. Among the medicines used at Jefferson Barracks were sulphate of quinine, arrow-root, and smallpox vaccine. Sulphate of quinine was slowly being introduced as a treatment against malaria, a disease which was a constant threat at the post because of the swampy bottom land located across from the military


99. Smith to McRee, July 17, 1831, ibid. The Paymaster General reported that the pay of a private was $5.00 per month. The cost of replacing pants, shirts, and boots was charged against his monthly pay. The Commissary General of Subsistence reported that overalls cost $2.37½ per pair, and a private's shirt cost $0.51. "Report of the Secretary of War," October 24, 1831, American State Papers: Military Affairs, IV, 727, 764-65.
reservation on the Illinois side of the Mississippi. Arrow-root was used as an all-purpose medicine in the treatment of such ailments as rheumatism, colds, heart disease, old age, and just about any other disease the post surgeon had to combat.

Smallpox posed a special threat at Jefferson Barracks because of the frequent movements of troops between that post and New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and other southern military installations, which were considered to be notoriously unhealthy. An outbreak of the disease might well decimate the garrison in a very short time. As a preventive measure, therefore, all troops who were rotated through the post were vaccinated.

One problem that continually faced the medical officers at Jefferson Barracks was the depletion of the post's medical stores to supply the various military expeditions that were sent out from there and from St. Louis. The supplies for these parties were usually included in the yearly allotment of medical stores made for the post, but the estimates on which they were based seemed always to be well below the actual requirements. The problem was aggravated by the fact that the troops usually took more stores than they needed, which resulted in much waste. Furthermore, as they moved through such places as Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien, the medical officers at those posts appropriated some of the parties'...

100 Lovell to Harney, October 25, 1826, Letters Sent by the Surgeon General in the Records of the Office of the Surgeon General, (Record Group No. 112, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, SGO.

101 Gale to Lovell, July 13, 1829, Letters Received by the Surgeon General in the Records of the Office of Surgeon General, (Record Group No. 112, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., SGO.

102 Harney to Secretary of War, January 22, 1827, Letters Recd., SW.
medicines. In effect, thus, Jefferson Barracks was helping to meet the needs for medical supplies of other posts out of its own allotment. The surgeons at Jefferson Barracks protested this sort of thing often and vigorously, but in vain.

Whenever the situation at the Barracks, as a consequence of either an unusual amount of sickness or lack of medical officers present, required it, doctors from St. Louis were employed by the post surgeon. However, a serious outbreak of illness at Jefferson Barracks usually coincided with a similar situation in St. Louis, with the result that the St. Louis doctors could give only limited service to the personnel of the post. In addition, the use of enlisted men in the hospital as nurses, apothecaries, and stewards, often caused more problems for the surgeons than if they had no assistance at all. Not only were the nurses and stewards often poor workers, but they frequently fell victim to the illnesses of the patients and spread them among other personnel.

While, as noted above, the general health of the troops stationed at Jefferson Barracks seems to have been fairly good, from time to time the post surgeons complained to the Surgeon General about the poor physical condition of the recruits. Early in 1827, Dr. Benjamin F. Harney, Surgeon of the Sixth Infantry, for example, declared that the "utmost inattention" had characterized the enlistment of new personnel. Unless

103 Gale to Lovell, January 5, 1828, Letters Recd., SGO.
104 Lovell to Nicoll, November 13, 1830, Letters Sent, SGO.
105 Lovell to Brant, July 6, 1832, ibid.
107 Ibid.
greater care were taken to obtain healthier men, he observed, the army
would become a "Corps of Invalids."

Besides their poor physical condition upon entering the army,
the troops sometimes engaged in actions which were detrimental to their
health. During the construction of the post, many of the men used the
excavations for the foundations of the barracks and the sink holes along
the Mississippi River as latrines. Mosquitoes flourished in the stagnant
water in these places, and the men consequently exposed themselves to
malaria. Although not understanding the cause, the medical officers
did recognize the unhealthfulness of the practice and persuaded General
Atkinson to issue a command that it cease.

Whenever the post was threatened with an epidemic, drastic health
measures were taken. To prevent the spread of malaria or cholera, for
example, chloride of lime was used extensively. It was mixed in a pro-
portion of four ounces to one "part" water. This solution was then
diluted by adding one part of the liquid to forty parts of water. It
was spread over the pavement and ground in the rear of the barracks, in
the kitchens and cellars, and particularly in and about the sinks and
latrines. Furthermore, special receptacles were placed around the post
into which the troops were to spit. Any soldier caught violating this
regulation was severely punished.

In addition to the infectious diseases, like cholera and malaria,
the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks were afflicted by a number of other

108 Harney to Lovell, January 19, 1827, Letters Recd., SGO.
109 Brigade Order No. 23, May 17, 1827, Brigade Orders, USAC.
110 Brigade Order No. 70, July 20, 1830, ibid.
ailments. One of the more common of these was "chronic rheumatism." According to Dr. Benjamin F. Harney, regimental surgeon of the Sixth Infantry, its cause was the poor physical shape of the men and generally harsh conditions under which they lived. Due to a lack of cleanliness, a rather large number of men suffered from ulcerated sores on their legs and arms. Venereal disease, acquired by the troops at houses of prostitution in St. Louis, was a constant headache to the post surgeons and they were constantly issuing warnings about the hazards of the disease, but with little effect.

As vital to the smooth functioning of the post as the good health of the troops was the entertainment and recreation available to them in their leisure time. There were occasionally parties at the post, especially for officers. Some celebrated personal events, like weddings, while others were part of holiday observances. The officers and troops of Jefferson Barracks gave a military ball for prominent citizens of St. Louis on January 1, 1827. The ball was held in one of the unfinished buildings of the post, with the scene illuminated by candles stuck into the muzzles of the troops' muskets. In return, the residents of St. Louis gave a ball for the officers of the past at the residence of William Clark, former governor of Missouri Territory and Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St. Louis. The music was provided by the Sixth Infantry

111 Special Orders No. 31, April 17, 1828, Order Book, West. Dept.; Special Orders No. 46, July 5, 1828, ibid.; Special Orders No. 56, September 16, 1828, ibid.

112 Special Order No. 36, May 25, 1828, ibid.; Special Order No. 3, February 10, 1829, ibid.

Regimental band.114 It was one of the most talked-about parties in St. Louis in years. General Clark served "the best wines and other liquors, cigars and everything else to constitute good cheer, . . . in the greatest abundance."115 The visits of military dignitaries, such as the visit of Major General Jacob Brown in 1827, were also festive occasions at the post.116

The regimental bands played an important role in entertaining the troops. These bands were organized in response to letters from the officers at Jefferson Barracks to Adjutant General Jones, suggesting that bands would aid in stimulating the martial spirit of the garrison. The bands played at all military reviews, as well as at dances and concerts which were held with some regularity.117

The troops who read in their leisure time usually read the St. Louis newspapers, but there were also books in the regimental libraries. The most popular reading material was personal mail. In 1928, a post office was established at Jefferson Barracks, and in 1829, a mail delivery contract was granted to William Y. Wetzel of St. Louis.118 He delivered mail to the Barracks from St. Louis every Sunday, Wednesday, and Friday, and carried it from the post to St. Louis every Tuesday, Thursday, and

114 Ibid.
115 Missouri Republican, January 11, 1827.
116 Ibid., July 5, 1827.
117 Atkinson to Jones, September 1, 1829, Letters Recd., AGO.
118 Mail Route Contract with William Y. Wetzel, January 9, 1829, Record of Mail Route Registers, Records of the Post Office Department, (Record Group No. 28, National Archives).
Saturday. By April 1829, the average mail delivery amounted to some twenty-nine or thirty personal letters a week.

The soldiers at Jefferson Barracks engaged in a number of recreational activities common to frontier Army life everywhere in the period, such as gambling, horse racing, rifle marksmanship contests, and hunting and fishing. Whenever possible, many of the soldiers engaged in their favorite recreational activities in the grog shops and houses of prostitution in St. Louis, which was only ten miles up the river. Despite these diversions available in and near the post, life for the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks, as at any frontier army post, was generally rather hard and dull and monotonous. It had few attractions to offer the average American.

119 The St. Louis Beacon, July 18, 1829.
120 Missouri Republican, April 28, 1829.
Jefferson Barracks had been constructed to give the army a post at which it could concentrate large numbers of troops. These troops, after undergoing infantry training, were to be used in guarding the frontier. Because of the post's strategic location, twenty-six miles below the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, its garrison could be moved rather quickly to aid in the protection of both the Missouri and Upper Mississippi frontiers.

Soon after the men of the First and Third Infantry regiments arrived at Jefferson Barracks, they were sent into the field to suppress a Winnebago Indian disturbance which had erupted in the Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin area. Five hundred-eighty soldiers under General Atkinson's command left the post on July 15, 1827, on the steamboats Essex, General Hamilton, and Indiana. They arrived at Prairie du Chien during the last week in July.¹

This trouble had been precipitated by an incident known as "Red Bird's Massacre." Red Bird, a noted brave of the Prairie LaCross Band of the Winnebago, accompanied by three braves of the same band, killed and scalped Registre Gagnier and Solomon Lipcap, and wounded and scalped

Gagnier's twelve-month old daughter in June 1827. Red Bird then fled to his village, eighty miles north of Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi. On July 30, he led another attack against whites, when about thirty-five or forty Winnebago attacked a keelboat bound from Fort Snelling to Prairie du Chien. Two of the boat's crew were killed. These two incidents were accompanied by other scattered attacks by the Winnebago against the lead mining camps of the northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin area. Afterwards, the Winnebago secreted their women and children and assembled in a large body in the area of the Rock River, where they presented a fairly substantial threat to the whole area.

The trouble with the Winnebago had started as early as 1820, when white settlers began to move onto their tribal lands in great numbers, seeking lead deposits and mining opportunities. There were scattered incidents of violence against the whites throughout the 1820's, but none so violent or threatening as the one in 1827. This "war" was the start of a period of trouble with the Indians of northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin that would last until the conclusions of the Black Hawk War in 1832.

Upon reaching Prairie du Chien, Atkinson and his command moved up the Wisconsin River, and on September 6 camped at the Wisconsin portage. There the Winnebago chiefs, intimidated by the size of his force, met

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2 Atkinson to Gaines, September 28, 1827, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.

3 Ibid.

4 Nichols, General Henry Atkinson, 119-22

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Atkinson in council, and on September 8 entered into a provisional peace settlement. By its terms, the chiefs promised to surrender Red Bird and the others who had committed the murders at Prairie du Chien and led the attack on the keelboat. As a guarantee of the delivery of the malefactors, the chiefs surrendered as hostages six principal men and three men of lesser note. When Red Bird and the three other braves involved in the June atrocities surrendered to Atkinson, he granted the Winnebago nation peace, reopened their country to licensed traders, and assured the Winnebago that they would be treated as friends so long as they conducted themselves in a proper manner. Red Bird and the other Winnebago prisoners were held in the Fort Crawford guardhouse. Imprisonment was hard on the Indians, and Red Bird died on March 16, 1828. The remaining Winnebago prisoners eventually were tried and sentenced to death, but President John Quincy Adams pardoned them in November 1828.

Upon Atkinson's return to Jefferson Barracks, Adjutant General Jones conveyed his congratulations to the General on the successful completion of his mission. The Adjutant General commented that the expeditious manner in which Atkinson handled the situation proved the correctness of the policy of concentrating troops at Jefferson Barracks.

5 Atkinson to Gaines, September 28, 1827, Letters Recd., AGO.
6 Treaty Between General Atkinson and the Winnebago Indians, September 22, 1827, ibid.
7 Atkinson to Gaines, September 17, 1827, ibid.
9 Jones to Atkinson, October 16, 1827, Letters Recd., AGO.
The next major action against Indians involving the garrison of Jefferson Barracks came in the Summer of 1829, when the Governor of Missouri, John Miller, asked General Atkinson to send troops to prevent depredations by the Iowa and Sauk Indians against whites in Randolph County, Missouri. The Indians were resisting the movement of the whites onto their tribal hunting grounds by stealing livestock and burning crops and an occasional house. When the white residents of the county appealed to Governor Miller, he asked the army for help. Since Atkinson was in Louisville, Kentucky, at the time, Colonel Henry Leavenworth, the acting commander of the post, immediately dispatched to the troubled area a detachment of soldiers, composed of elements of the Third and Sixth regiments, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baker of the Sixth Infantry. Baker was a veteran officer with thirty years' experience. Entering the army in 1799 as an ensign, he achieved the rank of major during the War of 1812. Following the war, he served for many years with the Third Infantry, but in May 1829, he was transferred to the Sixth Infantry.

When Baker and his command arrived at Franklin, Missouri, approximately 145 miles up the Missouri from its mouth, the Iowa and Sauk were so intimidated that they agreed to leave the area and go to Cantonment Leavenworth where the government had established a reservation for them. Nineteen hostages were taken to insure against the Indians' violating

10 Leavenworth to Atkinson, July 23, 1829, ibid.

11 Missouri Republican, July 28, 1829; Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1903, (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 726.
their word. Following the removal of the Iowa and Sauk to the Kansas area, on August 19, 1829, the troops returned to Jefferson Barracks.12

The Indian situation along the Upper Mississippi frontier began to worsen in 1828. One of the provisions of the peace made with the Winnebago by General Atkinson in 1827 allowed licensed traders and miners to go onto Indian tribal lands. With their usual disregard for laws respecting intercourse with the Indians, however, unlicensed whites poured into the area seeking to open new lead mines. By November 3, 1828, the situation had reached a state such that Joseph Street, the Indian Agent for the Winnebago at Prairie du Chien, feared another outbreak of violence.

The problem of white intrusion continued to grow more serious, and finally, on November 3, 1828, Secretary of War Peter B. Porter asked General Atkinson to try to stop the rapid movement of unauthorized people into the area.13 It soon became apparent, however, that the citizens of Illinois were going to resist any attempt to restrict their free access to the lead mines. The situation thus became one in which the Indians resented the whites' presence in the area, but feared the army, while the whites sought to move into the area under the protection of the army, but did not want the army to provide protection to the Indians.14

In the Summer of 1830, finally, the army acted. General Atkinson moved to preserve the safety of both the Indians and whites by issuing a proclamation against any further intrusion on the Indian lands. He

12 The St. Louis Times, December 25, 1829.
13 Porter to Atkinson, November 3, 1828, Letters Sent in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, SW.
instigated this action upon the advice of General William Clark, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St. Louis, that a war between the Winnebago and the whites was imminent. The General issued a proclamation calling for all the people on the Indian lands who did not have a proper license to leave. If they failed to do so, the army would remove them.15

General Atkinson directed Colonel Willoughby Morgan of the First Infantry Regiment at Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, to publish his proclamation to the intruders and supervise their removal from the Indians' lands. Morgan was a veteran of the War of 1812. Com­missioned a captain in the Twelfth Infantry in 1812, following the war he served in the Rifle Regiment, attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel by 1818. Following nearly ten years' service in the infantry, in April 1830, Morgan was promoted to colonel and given command of the First Infan­try.16

In addition to removing the white intruders, on June 8, the Commanding General of the Army, Major General Alexander Macomb, informed General Atkinson that Secretary of War John H. Eaton felt that the commanding officer at Fort Crawford should arrest some of the more warlike Winnebago chieftains to insure the peace.17 On June 26, therefore, General Atkinson ordered Major Stephen Watts Kearny to take a detachment of the First Infantry to Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien in order to

15 Proclamation of General Atkinson Against Intruders of Indian Lands, June 21, 1830, Letters Recd., AGO.

16 Atkinson to Morgan, June 22, 1830, ibid.; Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U.S. Army, 1, 726.

17 Macomb to Atkinson, June 8, 1830, Register of Letters Sent in the Records of the Headquarters of the Army, (Record Group No. 108, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, HQA.
aid General Clark and Colonel Morgan in their efforts to pacify the Winnebago. In addition, Kearny was to stop at the Dubuque Mines, located on the right bank of the Mississippi across from Galena, Illinois, and evict and/or arrest any white intruders on the Indians' lands.  

As a result of these measures, a tenuous peace was maintained throughout the remainder of 1830, but a new Indian crisis developed in the Spring of 1831. It was precipitated when Black Hawk and his band of Sauk Indians attempted to reoccupy their village, Saukenuk, located on the right bank of the Rock River three miles above its confluence with the Mississippi, in violation of the Treaty of 1804, by which the Sauk and Fox ceded their lands north of the Rock River to the United States. The returning Indians found whites in their village who were prepared to resist the Sauk attempts to regain their land.  

Alarmed at the return of Black Hawk and his followers, and aroused by the clamor of the white population, Governor John Reynolds of Illinois appealed to General Clark and Edmund P. Gaines, commanding general of the Western Department of the Army, then at Jefferson Barracks, for aid in protecting the settlers of the Rock River area. After a conference with the governor on May 29, General Gaines, on the next day, embarked with six companies of the Third and Sixth Infantry regiments via steamboat for Fort Armstrong at Rock Island. The troops took with them two light

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18 Atkinson to Kearny, June 27, 1830, Letters Recd., AGO.
20 Ibid., 85-89.
21 Gaines to Jones, May 30, 1831, Letters Recd., AGO.
six-pound cannon, with 100 rounds of fixed ammunition (buckshot and ball, grape, and cannister) for each one; a supply of muskets and 100 Model 1819 Flintlock rifles, with ammunition for each musket and rifle; one month's supply of hard bread; fifteen days' rations of salt pork; and a moderate supply of camp equipment.22

Shortly after his arrival at Fort Armstrong, General Gaines began to counsel with the Indians. He explained to them the terms of the treaties of 1804, 1816, and 1825, by which they had ceded their lands in Illinois north of the Rock River and confirmed that cession, and then firmly insisted that they honor those treaties and move west of the Mississippi. He even offered the use of his boats to aid their crossing. On June 5, 1831, the General learned of an invitation sent by Black Hawk to the Prophet's band of Winnebago (with some Potawatomi and Kickapoo) to join him in resisting the whites' intrusion upon the Indians' land. Fearing that hostilities were imminent, Gaines ordered the available companies of the regular army at Prairie du Chien and the Illinois mounted militia to join him at Fort Armstrong. He then notified the frontier settlers to bring their families to that place for protection.23

Black Hawk and his "British Band" of Sauk failed in their efforts to obtain the assistance of the Winnebago, and some of the more pro-American Sauk under the leadership of Keokuk began to move back to the right bank of the Mississippi. On June 7, Black Hawk, with the principal braves of his band, visited General Gaines. In their conference, Black Hawk insisted, as he had previously done, that the land in dispute had

22 Ibid.

23 Id. to Id., June 5, 1831, ibid.
never been ceded, and announced that he and his band intended to remain upon it. General Gaines replied by offering the Indians, "... as much corn as any two good men would say their fields already planted would produce in the present season...." but demanded that they recross the Mississippi within three days or they would be removed by force. 24

After Black Hawk threatened war against the whites, early in June 1831, General Gaines called on Governor Reynolds for additional volunteers, who were immediately furnished. They assembled at Rushville, fifty-six miles northwest of Springfield, and marched to a point on the Mississippi eight miles below Saukenuk, where, on June 19, they were issued arms and provisions and mustered into the United States service by Major John Bliss of the First Infantry. 25

On June 20, the volunteers marched towards the Sauk village. At the same time, the regulars left Fort Armstrong for the same point. Under the guidelines of Gaines' operational plans, the Illinois volunteers were to drive the Indians from a small island in the Rock River near Saukenuk on which they were encamped. Before the assault, General Gaines ran his steamboat up to the south point of the island and fired several rounds of canister and grapeshot into the bushes. After some delay in crossing the river, the volunteers found that Black Hawk had abandoned Saukenuk and crossed to the west side of the Mississippi on the morning of the attack. 26 General Gaines immediately demanded that Black Hawk return to Fort Armstrong for a "peace talk," and when some Indians came in without him, they

24 Id. to Id., June 8, 1831, ibid.
25 Stevens, The Black Hawk War, 93-94.
26 Ibid., 95.
were sent back with the word that unless all the warriors came in, Gaines would pursue and chastise them.27

On June 30, 1831, in full council, Black Hawk and twenty-seven principal men signed a treaty with General Gaines and Governor Reynolds, whereby the Indians promised to remain west of the Mississippi from that time on and give up all claim to any land east of that river. In addition, they agreed to cease intercourse with the British posts in Canada and acknowledge the right of the United States to establish military posts and roads within their country. The treaty also established a lasting peace and friendship between the United States and the "British Band" of Sauks.28

The incident which finally led to the eruption of real hostilities between whites and Indians was the massacre, on July 31, 1831, of a party of Menominee Indians by a party of Sauk and Fox near Prairie du Chien. Black Hawk's band of Sauk considered the Menominee and the Sioux to be allies of the whites, and felt that the forced removal of the Menominee and Sioux to lands west of the Mississippi would place the Sauk and Fox at the mercy of the Menominee and Sioux. After the attack, the war party fled down the Mississippi and took refuge in Black Hawk's village.29

General Atkinson, upon hearing of the incident, immediately reported it to General Gaines and warned of further Indian trouble. He also noted that the war parties of Black Hawk's band had ascended the

27 Ibid., 96.
28 Gaines to Jones, July 6, 1831, ibid.
29 Atkinson to Gaines, August 10, 1831, ibid.

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Missouri River looking for trouble with the Sioux.\footnote{Ibid.} Atkinson, in a letter of August 10 to Major John Bliss, commanding officer at Fort Armstrong, referred to the massacre of the Menominee as a violation of the September 1827 treaty signed at Prairie du Chien, in which the Indians of the northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin area had agreed to be at peace with each other, and ordered that the offenders should be surrendered to the authorities of the United States.\footnote{Atkinson to Bliss, August 10, 1831, \textit{ibid}}

Felix St. Vrain, Indian agent for the Sauk and Fox, in conjunction with Major Bliss, called together the principal chiefs of those tribes and demanded the surrender of the leaders of the massacre at Prairie du Chien. This council was held at Fort Armstrong on September 5, 1831, and, while the Indians did not refuse to surrender the offenders, they did evade any commitment to do so immediately.\footnote{Stevens, \textit{The Black Hawk War}, 105-108.} Atkinson, in a September 22 report to Adjutant General Jones proposed that the War Department take a cautious policy toward the Sauk and Fox. He believed Bliss and St. Vrain should be given ample opportunity to secure the surrender of hostages before any hostile action was taken against the recalcitrant tribes.\footnote{Atkinson to Jones, September 22, 1831, \textit{Letters Recd.}, AGO.}

The War Department followed Atkinson's advice, but after waiting for six months for the surrender of the perpetrators of the Menominee massacre, it decided to move against the Sauk and Fox. On April 1, 1832, the Adjutant General directed General Atkinson to proceed with all

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Atkinson to Bliss, August 10, 1831, \textit{ibid}}
\footnote{Stevens, \textit{The Black Hawk War}, 105-108.}
\footnote{Atkinson to Jones, September 22, 1831, \textit{Letters Recd.}, AGO.}
\end{footnotesize}
available troops from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Armstrong. If this display of force did not persuade the Sauk and Fox to surrender the criminals -- "say not less than eight or ten including some principle [sic] men" -- Atkinson was to use force to apprehend them.\textsuperscript{34} 

While being given full authority to move against the Sauk and Fox, Atkinson was cautioned to keep General Clark and all the Indian agents fully informed of his actions.\textsuperscript{35} Accordingly, on April 2, Atkinson went to St. Louis to confer with General Clark and at the same time issued orders to arrange for carrying the troops from Jefferson Barracks to Rock Island.\textsuperscript{36} Three days later, Atkinson ordered six companies of the Sixth Infantry Regiment to be ready to depart on April 8 on the steamboats Chieftain and Enterprise. He directed the company commanders to see that each soldier was provided with one chakor (a jacket with a high collar), one great coat, one blanket, two shirts, one grey jacket, two pair of pants, one pair of boots, and one pair of shoes. Each company would be furnished with four axes and four spades. All other company clothing and equipment was to be placed in storage, except the summer clothing which would be packed up and put in charge of the quartermaster of the post to be ready for shipment up the Mississippi should it be needed.\textsuperscript{37} 

\textsuperscript{34} Jones to Atkinson, March 10, 1832, Letters Sent by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, AGO.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Atkinson to Macomb, April 3, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.

\textsuperscript{37} Special Order No. 1, April 5, 1832, Brigade Order Book in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Brigade Orders, USAC.
While preparations were being made at Jefferson Barracks for the movement of the troops up the river, on April 6, Major John Bliss and Felix St. Vrain held an important meeting at St. Vrain's home in Rock Island with the Winnebago Prophet concerning the rumor of his having invited Black Hawk's band to join him in resisting the whites. St. Vrain had received the information about this invitation a week earlier through his brother, Charles, from Keokuk and the Stabbing Chief, the friendly Sauk leaders. These two chiefs thought that Black Hawk would accept the Prophet's reported invitation and return to the Sauk's old village near the mouth of Rock River to make a corn crop the ensuing summer. Bliss and St. Vrain wanted to investigate this rumor and warn the Prophet of the consequences of such a rash move by Black Hawk.\footnote{Bliss to Atkinson, March 30, 1832, Brigade Order Book in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Brigade Orders, USAC.}

In reporting to General Atkinson on the council held with the Winnebago Prophet, Bliss stated that the Prophet had admitted inviting Black Hawk's band of Sauk to come to his village, located about thirty miles upstream from Saukenuk on the Rock River, to live. The Major had warned the Prophet that if Black Hawk crossed the Mississippi it might well mean war between his band and the United States. The Prophet, according to Bliss, replied, "I have nothing to say, if you think so, you can make war," and left the council.\footnote{Minutes of a Conversation Between Major John Bliss and the Winnebago Prophet, April 6, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.} Upon the Major's suggesting to Felix St. Vrain that they seize the Prophet and send him to St. Louis,
the Agent advised against doing so, because it might be considered an act of hostility by the Indians.

On April 8, 1832, the Sixth Infantry Regiment, as ordered, left Jefferson Barracks on board the steamboats Chieftain and Enterprise for the Upper Mississippi. On April 10, the expedition reached the Lower Rapids of the Mississippi at the mouth of the Des Moines River, and there Atkinson learned that on April 5 Black Hawk and his band had crossed the Mississippi to the east side at Yellow Banks, near the mouth of the Iowa River. At this time, Atkinson began to have doubts concerning the adequacy of his force to go against the Indians, whom he believed to number between 800 and 1,000 warriors. 40

On April 12, Atkinson and his command arrived at Fort Armstrong. The General found there awaiting his arrival reports from Major Bliss covering in some detail the actions of the Indians since they had recrossed the Mississippi. Some friendly Sauk and Fox under Keokuk and Stabbing Chief, reported Bliss, who had come in to counsel with St. Vrain, thought Black Hawk would strike a blow against the northern Illinois settlements and then retreat to the Great Lakes and on into Canada. Some settlers and their families had already come into Fort Armstrong for protection from the Indians. 41

Now convinced that his force was too small, Atkinson decided not to pursue Black Hawk until he could be reinforced. Any military failure

40 Atkinson to Macomb, April 10, 1832, Letters Received in the Records in the Headquarters of the Army, (Record Group No. 108, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., HQA.

41 Bliss to Atkinson, April 9, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Id to Id., April 11, 1832, ibid.
on his part, he feared, would give the Indians confidence and add to their numbers. In a detailed report of the situation to Governor Reynolds, Atkinson said that it might become necessary to call out the Illinois militia to help subdue the hostile Indians.\footnote{Atkinson to Macomb, April 13, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.} The General then held a council with Keokuk, where he again called for the surrender of the Menominee murderers, but the Chief replied that they had joined Black Hawk.

At the same time, Atkinson prepared for military operations against Black Hawk and his followers. Leaving the soldiers of the Sixth Infantry at Fort Armstrong under the command of Major Bliss, on April 14 he proceeded to Fort Crawford where he alerted the troops, counseled with the Sioux and Menominee, and took measures to keep them from attacking Black Hawk and starting a general Indian war that the army would not be able to control.\footnote{Special Order No. 5, April 14, 1832, Brigade Orders, USAC.}

After his meeting with the Sioux and Menominee, Atkinson returned to Fort Armstrong. On his way down the Mississippi, the General stopped at Galena, Illinois, to confer with local authorities and Colonel Henry Dodge, the leader of the volunteer militia of the southern Wisconsin mining area. Atkinson advised the miners to take precautionary measures, and promised to send them 200 stand of arms to be distributed among the citizens, if needed.\footnote{Atkinson to Macomb, April 18, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.}

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march against the hostile Sauk and Fox. In writing to General Macomb on April 18, Atkinson again expressed doubt that the regulars could handle the situation and suggested that a mounted force of 3,000 men should be called out to join the regulars at Dixon's Ferry. 45

On April 19, 1832, after several days of counseling with Keokuk, the chief finally surrendered to Atkinson three of the principal men connected with the Menominee massacre. Although eight or ten people had been demanded, the good conduct of Keokuk and Stabbing Chief, and their apparently sincere efforts to comply with the government's wishes, prompted the General not to press them for the immediate surrender of any additional participants in the massacre. 46

In the meantime, General Atkinson sent a series of messages to Black Hawk urging him to return to the west side of the Mississippi. Receiving no reply, on April 24 the General wrote the Sauk warrior a final note that there was still time for him and his band to return to their lands west of the Mississippi, but concluded, "You will be sorry if you do not come back." 47 To this last message, Black Hawk replied through Henry Gratiot, sub-agent for the Winnebago living on Rock River, that he would not return to the west side of the Mississippi and would fight any force sent against him. Gratiot told Atkinson that Black Hawk was

45 Ibid.
46 Id. to Id., April 19, 1832, ibid.
47 Atkinson to Black Hawk, April 24, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
48 Gratiot to Atkinson, April 27, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
flying the British flag over his camp near the Prophet's village and would not recognize any other standard. 49

In anticipation of Black Hawk's defiance and in response to Atkinson's mention of the possible need of militia support, on April 16 Governor Reynolds called for 1,600 militiamen to assemble at Beardstown, fifty miles west of Springfield. Among those who responded were two companies of volunteer infantry, in addition to the mounted soldiers. From Beardstown the volunteer force marched to Fort Armstrong, where they arrived on May 7. The next day, General Atkinson placed them in federal service and assumed command of them. 50

Anticipating that some of the volunteers would be unarmed, on May 5 Atkinson authorized Brevet Major Thomas Beall, the new commanding officer at Fort Armstrong, to issue twenty-five muskets to these men and 12,000 ball cartridges to the whole militia force. He also ordered Lieutenant Sidney Burbank, acting commissary subsistence at Fort Armstrong, to issue them thirty-five barrels of flour, twenty of pork, and three of whiskey. 51

To carry out his mission of driving the hostile Sauk and Fox across the Mississippi and capturing the Menominee murderers still at large, Atkinson had two companies of the First Infantry, six of the Sixth Infantry, and 1,600 Illinois militiamen, of whom about 1,300 were mounted. In preparing to move against Black Hawk, Atkinson placed Colonel Zachary Taylor of the First Infantry in overall command of the regular and

49 Atkinson to Macomb, April 27, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.
50 Special Order No. 8, May 8, 1832, Brigade Orders, USAC.
51 Special Orders No. 8, May 5, 1832, ibid.; Special Order No. 9, May 5, 1832, ibid.
volunteer infantry, and ordered him to proceed by water to Dixon's Ferry. Atkinson ordered the Illinois mounted volunteers, commanded by Brigadier General Samuel Whiteside, to march overland via the Winnebago Prophet's village to Dixon's Ferry. If he should come upon the trail of the hostile Indians, Atkinson authorized Whiteside, if he thought it advisable, to pursue them.  

With his command underway, General Atkinson moved his headquarters to Dixon's Ferry, where, on May 18, the General learned of the defeat, four days earlier, of a battalion of 175 Illinois Rangers commanded by Major Isiah Stillman near Sycamore Creek. The Major had hoped to surprise and capture Black Hawk, but when the Sauk warrior sent eight peace emissaries to Stillman, the inexperienced and fearful militiamen killed three of them and started chasing the others. Black Hawk then took forty braves and ambushed the pursuing whites. Stillman's militiamen began a panicky retreat which soon developed into a complete rout. Following this incident, the hostile Sauk and Fox dispersed and moved in the general area of the Fox River of Illinois.

Despite this untoward event, Atkinson still hoped to accomplish his mission with a minimum of violence. Accordingly, on May 19, he sent out a reconnaissance party to discover the hostile Indians' position, and he moved his force farther up the Rock so as to be in a better position to pursue them. He also ordered Colonel Seth Johnson from Dixon's

52 Special Order No. 13, May 9, 1832, ibid.
53 Special Order No. 12, May 9, 1832, ibid.
54 Atkinson to Macomb, May 19, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.
Ferry, with four companies of mounted volunteers, to protect the duPage and Fox River communities from Indian depredations. On the morning of May 22, near the mouth of Sycamore Creek, about thirty-five miles above Dixon's Ferry, the army met the reconnaissance party which had been sent out on the nineteenth. It reported that the red men had crossed over toward the headwaters of the Fox River. Atkinson immediately ordered the Illinois mounted volunteers to follow, and, if possible, to overtake and force the Indians to surrender or drive them west toward the Mississippi. Atkinson, not wanting to leave his base of operations unprotected, then fell back to Dixon's Ferry to await the outcome of Whiteside's mission.

Soon after his return to the Ferry, on May 26, Atkinson received word from Colonel J. M. Strode, who commanded the Illinois militia at Galena, of some minor clashes between hostile Sauk and Fox and whites in the vicinity of that place and along the road between Galena and Dixon's Ferry. One of these skirmishes occurred at Buffalo Grove, just twelve miles north of Dixon's Ferry, with the whites being chased back to Galena. Strode gave an account of the defensive measures taken at Galena and asked that his regiment be placed under Atkinson's command. The General refused to assume responsibility for the defense of Galena, and admonished Colonel Strode not to declare martial law, seize private property, impress

55 Special Order No. 20, May 19, 1832, Brigade Orders, USAC
56 Order No. 11, May 22, 1832, ibid.
57 Atkinson to Macomb, May 23, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.
58 Strode to Atkinson, May 23, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
workers, hire steamboats, or incur any expenses that might not be honored by the United States. Atkinson sent his reply to Strode in care of Felix St. Vrain and six other men. The day following their departure from Dixon's Ferry, the Agent and his party were ambushed by the hostile Sauk and Fox near Kellogg's Grove and four of the men, including St. Vrain, were killed.

At this time the terms of enlistment of the Illinois Volunteers expired, and most of the men refused to serve any longer. They had been in service the whole spring and wanted to go home to plant their crops. Most of them were discharged on May 17, 1832, at Ottawa, but upon a plea of Governor Reynolds, some 400 of them volunteered to serve an additional twenty days. Following the departure of the main body of militia, General Atkinson found that his army consisted of only 400 volunteers at Ottawa and 300 regulars at Dixon's Ferry.

To continue the war, a new citizen army was needed. On May 14, 1832, therefore, Governor Reynolds issued a call for 2,000 new volunteers. They were to meet on June 10, 1832, at Hennepin, on the Illinois River, and be organized into brigades. Fearing that this force would be inadequate to defeat the Indians, General Atkinson asked Governor Reynolds

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59 Atkinson to Strode, May 26, 1832, Letters Sent by the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, West. Dept.

60 Strode to Atkinson, May 26, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.

61 Whiteside to Atkinson, May 27, 1832, ibid.

62 Atkinson to Macomb, May 31, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.

63 Missouri Republican, May 22, 1832.
for 1,000 more men, as well as a few companies of rangers to patrol the frontier. The General requested that 2,500 of the 3,000 militiamen be mounted, and they all were to rendezvous at Ottawa between June 12 and 15, 1832. The Governor complied with Atkinson's wishes and called for 1,000 additional men. 64

By June 14, all the Illinois volunteers had arrived at Fort Deposit, at the Rapids of the Illinois River near Ottawa, and during the next week were organized into three brigades: the First, commanded by Brigadier General Alexander Posey; the Second, commanded by Brigadier General Milton K. Alexander; and the Third, under the command of Brigadier General James D. Henry. 65 Following their organization, these soldiers, together with the regulars stationed at Fort Deposit, marched down the Rock River to Dixon's Ferry. One regiment of the Third Brigade remained behind to secure the frontier in the Fort Deposit-Ottawa area. 66

Assembled at Dixon's Ferry, Atkinson not only had a new army of Illinois Volunteers, but additional regulars as well. These included two companies of the First Infantry, commanded by Brevet Brigadier General Hugh Brady, whom Atkinson had ordered down from Fort Winnebago on the Wisconsin River, and two companies of the Sixth Infantry, commanded by Colonel William Davenport, from Fort Leavenworth on the Missouri. 67

64 Atkinson to Reynolds, May 29, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.

65 Special Orders No. 39, June 19, 1832, Brigade Orders, USAC; Special Orders No. 40, June 20, 1832, ibid.

66 Atkinson to Macomb, June 12, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.

Doubting that even the new militia troops and added regulars would be sufficient, Atkinson, through Joseph Street, Indian Agent at Prairie du Chien, secured the services of about 225 Sioux, Menominee, and Winnebago warriors. Although failing to obtain any friendly Potawatomi through Thomas Owen, the agent at Chicago, Atkinson did learn from these Indians that the hostile Sauk and Fox were, or had been, encamped on a small creek in the vicinity of the confluence of the Pekanolicka and Rock Rivers in extreme northern Illinois near the Wisconsin border.

Acting on the information received from Owen, Atkinson ordered Colonel Zachary Taylor from Ottawa to Dixon's Ferry to secure the latter place. If Taylor should happen to meet any sizeable body of hostile Indians, he was to avoid direct contact with them, for a military success on their part might give Black Hawk renewed confidence and, most important of all, add to his numbers many of the discontented young Winnebago. Furthermore, Atkinson instructed Taylor, after reaching Dixon's Ferry he was to give immediate aid to Fort Armstrong should the Indians threaten that post.

Atkinson himself left Fort Deposit with the main body of the volunteer army early in June, and by the twenty-fifth arrived at Dixon's Ferry. He was now determined, if possible, to meet and defeat Black Hawks decisively in battle, and not merely drive him back to the west side of the

68 Street to William Clark, June 7, 1832, enclosed in Clark to Secretary of War, July 2, 1832, Letters Received in the Records of the Office of Indian Affairs, (Record Group No. 75, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., OIA.

69 Atkinson to Owen, June 4, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.

70 Atkinson to Taylor, June 7, 1832, Letters Sent, West. Dept.
Mississippi. In this way, not only could he secure the Menominee murderers, but he would also be able to use the defeat of Black Hawk as an example to help keep the other Indians of the Northwestern frontier under control. With a total force of 4,000 volunteers and regulars, Atkinson wrote General Macomb he would have no trouble in ending, "the perplexed state of hostilities in this quarter."\(^{71}\)

Atkinson began his offensive at the end of June. On the twenty-eighth he sent his main army, composed of 440 regulars under Colonel Taylor and the Third Volunteer Brigade of about 900 men, up Rock River towards Lake Koshkonong in present southern Wisconsin, where Black Hawk and his band were supposed to be. Atkinson and his staff accompanied these troops, leaving Captain Zalmon C. Palmer of the Sixth Infantry, with forty regulars and a company of mounted volunteers from the Third Brigade, at Dixon's Ferry to secure that position and protect the public stores left there. Atkinson ordered the other two brigades of volunteers to carry out minor excursions before joining the main force at Lake Koshkonong.\(^{72}\)

While ascending the Rock with most of the Third Brigade and the regulars, Atkinson began to have his characteristic doubts about whether he had enough men to deal with the enemy toward whom he was moving. On July 1, therefore, he ordered the mounted volunteers who had been left at Dixon's Ferry to join him as soon as possible near the mouth of the River of the Four Lakes, just south of Lake Koshkonong. In the meantime, the main army pushed on up Rock River, where on the morning of July 3,\(^{71}\)

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71 Atkinson to Macomb, June 15, 1832, Letters Recd., HQA.

72 Atkinson to Jones, November 19, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
it reached the foot of Lake Koshkonong. There it was joined by the Second Brigade on the evening of the fourth, and by the First Brigade with the battalion of Michigan Volunteers on the following evening.\textsuperscript{73}

As his army was assembling, Atkinson sent out scouts to locate the enemy. The discovery of a large camp site on Lake Koshkonong, which they had occupied only a few days before, gave the General reason to believe that Black Hawk and his band could not be far away. A careful reconnaissance of the area revealed that the hostile Indians had apparently taken refuge in a great swamp several miles above the lake.\textsuperscript{74}

Atkinson's army was running low on rations and was far from its supply base, and the General, consequently, was anxious to find the enemy and bring him to battle quickly before it would become necessary to stop to resupply his command.\textsuperscript{75} In an attempt to close any possible escape routes to Black Hawk and his followers, on the morning of July 6 Atkinson ordered the Second Brigade to cross Rock River at the foot of Lake Koshkonong, join Colonel Dodge, and march up the right side in the direction of the hostile Indians. The General ordered the First Brigade to cross the river below the lake and join him at its lower end. The regulars and the Third Brigade were to march up the left bank of the river under the command of General Hugh Brady. On July 5, learning from his Winnebago scouts that Black Hawk's band was in a swamp a few miles ahead, Atkinson proposed to attack. On July 7, with the Third Brigade and regulars, he moved up the river over a difficult and almost impassable route

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Special Order No. 49, July 5, 1832, Brigade Orders, USAC.
for some fifteen miles to the White Water River, where he was joined by the Second Brigade and the Michigan volunteers. At that point, it was discovered that the Indian guides had lied. Instead of being nearby, the hostile Sauk and Fox had moved north from Lake Koshkonong toward the headwaters of the Rock.  

At this time, because of the difficulties presented by the intervening swamps and muddy creeks, and the exhaustion of their provisions, Atkinson was forced to suspend his pursuit of the enemy until his army could be resupplied. After a council of war with Generals Alexander, Brady, Henry, Posey, and Colonel Dodge, on July 9, 1832, Atkinson ordered the Second and Third Brigades and Dodge's Battalion to Fort Winnebago to draw twelve days' rations and to return without delay. Should they discover the trail of the hostile Sauk and Fox, either going or returning, they were to notify General Atkinson, and pursue them.

While encamped on the White Water River, Atkinson received an express from General Winfield Scott, notifying him that President Jackson was displeased with Atkinson's conduct of the campaign. He was particularly angered with Atkinson's decision to suspend the pursuit of Black Hawk's band from mid-May to mid-June. On June 15, Jackson ordered Scott to assemble a force of 1,000 regulars and move from Detroit via Chicago to the battle area and assume command. On July 11, however, the new

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76 Atkinson to Jones, November 19, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
77 Special Order No. 51, July 9, 1832, Brigade Orders, USAC.
78 Atkinson to Jones, November 19, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
commander notified Atkinson that the presence of cholera among his troops would delay his arrival for some time. 79

By the middle of July, the army was ready to resume its pursuit of Black Hawk and his band. On the sixteenth, a supply train of thirty-six wagons arrived at the camp on the White Water by way of the Blue Mounds from Dixon's Ferry and Galena. The next day, the Second Brigade returned from Fort Winnebago, and two days later Atkinson ordered it and the regulars to join the Third Brigade and Colonel Dodge's Battalion some twenty miles above Atkinson's camp on the White Water.

The Third Brigade and the Michigan volunteers, numbering about 800 men, did not return to Lake Koshkonong, for on their way back from Fort Winnebago, they came upon the trail of Black Hawk's band and started in pursuit. The path which they followed ran along the Rock River above Lake Koshkonong in the direction of the Wisconsin River. Upon learning that the Third Brigade and Michigan troops were following Black Hawk's trail, Atkinson immediately ordered the regulars and the Second Brigade back from the wilderness above Lake Koshkonong, and on the morning of July 21, started with them in the direction of the Blue Mounds to cooperate in the pursuit of the hostile Indians. Captain Gideon Lowe of the Fifth Infantry, with his company, was left in charge of the supplies and the sick at Fort Koshkonong. 80

In the meantime, the Third Brigade and the Michigan volunteers, by forced marches on July 19 and 20, overtook the hostile Sauk and Fox

79 Nichols, General Henry Atkinson, 166; Stevens, The Black Hawk War, 211-12.

80 Atkinson to Scott, July 21, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
on the twenty-first and defeated them in a battle near the Wisconsin River. Instead of taking advantage of their victory and continuing to pursue Black Hawk's band, they fell back to the Blue Mounds to await the arrival of the rest of the army. There Atkinson found them on the evening of July 24.81

Atkinson determined to pursue the hostile Indians without delay. Accordingly, on July 25, he moved his entire command from the Blue Mounds to Helena, sixteen miles away. The next day, after much difficulty, it crossed the Wisconsin on rafts constructed by the Quartermaster Department.82 On July 28, Atkinson and a reduced army consisting of 400 regulars, under Colonel Taylor, and 900 volunteers, including parts of the First, Second, and Third Brigades, and Colonel Dodge's Battalion, took up their line of march in search of the enemy. After going a few miles, it found Black Hawk's trail and followed it by forced marches through rugged and difficult country generally westward for five days. Evidence of the Indians' great distress and hasty flight appeared in the kettles and skins which they had abandoned along the way.83

On the evening of August 1, the troops found themselves within a few miles of Black Hawk's position on the left bank of the Mississippi near the mouth of the Bad Axe River. After halting for a few hours, at dawn on August 2, General Atkinson, with the regulars and Colonel Dodge's Battalion, set off after the enemy, leaving the Illinois volunteers to

81 Atkinson to Jones, July 19, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
82 Atkinson to Scott, July 27, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
83 Atkinson to Scott, August 5, 1832, ibid.; Atkinson to Jones, November 19, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
follow as soon as they were ready. After a march of about three miles, the advance guard of Dodge's Battalion came upon a small party of Sauk and attacked and killed eight of them. In the meantime, the rest of the force formed in order of battle, the regulars in an extended line, with three companies held in reserve. Dodge's battalion aligned itself on their left, and the whole command advanced expecting to find the Indians in the woods before them. The First Brigade soon arrived and took a position on the right of the regulars, and shortly after, the Second Brigade came up and formed on the right of the First. Not finding the Indians as anticipated, General Atkinson sent out scouts to the left, and at the same time, dispatched one of his staff back to the Third Brigade to hasten its advance. But the Third Brigade had already found the main body of the Indians at the mouth of the Bad Axe River and attacked them. Soon after learning of the enemy's location, Dodge's battalion came up and joined the battle on the Third's right. They drove the Sauk and Fox through the river bottom to some small willow islands in the Bad Axe, where the Indians concealed themselves and kept up an effective fire. Colonel Taylor ordered the regulars to cross over to the islands and rout them. In the ensuing engagement, five regulars were killed before they were able to drive the Sauk and Fox from their positions.

The Indians attempted to flee across the Mississippi, but many of them either drowned or were killed by the troops on board the steamboat.

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84 Atkinson to Scott, August 9, 1832, Letters Recd., West. Dept.

85 John A. Wakefield, History of the War Between the United States and the Sac and Fox Nations of Indians, and Parts of Other Disaffected Tribes of Indians (Jacksonville, Illinois, 1834), 132.
Warrior, which had arrived at the mouth of the Bad Axe during the afternoon of August 2, or by the Sioux and Menominee scouts employed by the army. For several days prior to this battle, some of these same friendly Indians had been capturing or killing members of Black Hawk's band, especially women and children, who had been floating down the Wisconsin River in the hope of making their way back across the Mississippi.

Following the battle at the mouth of the Bad Axe, Atkinson's army was too exhausted to pursue the fleeing remnants of Black Hawk's band. Those few warriors who did make their way across the Mississippi were later captured and surrendered by either the Sioux or the Friendly Sauk and Fox. Black Hawk and the Winnebago Prophet, rather than crossing the Mississippi, fled into the Dalles of the Wisconsin above Fort Winnebago. There they were captured by a party of friendly Winnebago warriors and delivered up to Agent Joseph Street on August 27. He immediately turned them over to Colonel Zachary Taylor at Fort Crawford. With the end of hostilities, General Atkinson and his army descended the Mississippi to Fort Crawford. There the volunteers were released from federal service, following which they returned home and were disbanded.

On August 7, 1832, General Scott finally reached Fort Crawford from Chicago and assumed command of the troops. He approved of all Atkinson's actions. Leaving the negotiation of the peace settlement to Scott, on August 15, Atkinson and his staff and the Jefferson Barracks garrison embarked on the steamboat Warrior for home, arriving at the post

86 Street to Secretary of War, August 28, 1832, Letters Recd., OIA

87 Atkinson to Jones, November 19, 1832, Letters Recd., AGO.
on August 18.\textsuperscript{88} A few weeks later, Atkinson received from the Secretary of War a note conveying the information that the President "... appreciates the difficulties you had to encounter and that he had been highly gratified at the termination of your arduous and responsible duties..."\textsuperscript{89}

Although Atkinson received the congratulations of the President and Secretary of War on the successful completion of the Black Hawk campaign, he was also criticized for his conduct of the operation. President Jackson, it will be recalled, was so exasperated with Atkinson's slowness in pursuing the Indians that he replaced the General as commander of the operation; and Zachary Taylor, Atkinson's subordinate and immediate commander of the regular army troops, thought Atkinson was too cautious. Taylor believed Black Hawk's band could have been tracked down and destroyed before it reached the wilderness of Wisconsin had Atkinson been a more aggressive leader. In Atkinson's defense, however, it must be noted that his initial objective had been to maintain peace among the whites and Indians and to keep the Indians on the northwestern frontier from uniting in a war against the whites. Atkinson was hampered in his efforts by the Illinois militia, who wanted not peace but the destruction of the Indians.\textsuperscript{90}

Following the negotiation of the peace treaty at Rock Island, General Scott had Black Hawk and the Winnebago Prophet and five other

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Stevens, \textit{The Black Hawk War}, 247.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Secretary of War to Atkinson, October 24, 1832, Letters Sent, SW
\end{itemize}
important prisoners imprisoned at Jefferson Barracks. They were held there until their transfer to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, the following April. The defeat of Black Hawk and his band and the treaty made at Rock Island brought peace to the Upper Mississippi frontier which was to endure for several decades.

91 Stevens, The Black Hawk War, 250-53.
Chapter IV

QUIESCENT PERIOD, 1833-42

Following the return of troops from the Black Hawk War, Jefferson Barracks entered into a quiescent period that was to last for the next ten years. During this time, the garrison was relatively small, and the post played a reduced role in the country's military affairs.

During the first few years after the Black Hawk War, the garrison continued to be troubled by outbreaks of cholera. These were caused, at least in part, by the constant movement of troops through the post. On August 10 and November 6, 1834, General Atkinson stated that cholera had been "introduced" to Jefferson Barracks at least five times by the arrival of recruits from the Sixth Infantry Recruiting Depot at Newport, Kentucky.\(^1\) By mid-June, 1834, Dr. Lyman Foot, post surgeon, reported that twenty soldiers had died from the disease and an equal number were still hospitalized with it.\(^2\) The incidence of cholera increased throughout the summer, but by October it abated. During this period, an average of 9.08 percent of the total garrison was ill with cholera, with the months

\(^1\) Atkinson to George A. McColl, August 10, 1834, Letters Sent by the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Atkinson to Jones, November 6, 1834, Letters Received by the Office of Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.

\(^2\) Lyman Foot to AGO, June 16, 1834, Letters Recd., AGO.
of June and August being the worst. Lasting from 1833 to 1836, the epidemics affected at least one half of the garrison at one time or another.

The cholera epidemics at Jefferson Barracks coincided with similar outbreaks throughout the United States. Cholera was an exceedingly virulent disease. At its onset it was characterized by diarrhea, acute spasmodic vomiting, and painful cramps. Consequent dehydration, often accompanied by cyanosis, gave its victims a deathly appearance—a blue, drawn face, cold extremities, and drawn and puckered skin.

There was no one single method of treatment for cholera used by the medical profession. At Jefferson Barracks the medical officers ordered the barracks and surrounding grounds disinfected with chloride of lime. For the soldiers infected with the disease, the most common treatment was a heavy dose of calomel, a chalky mercury compound. Other treatments used at Jefferson Barracks were bloodletting and massive dosing with laudanum, but calomel was the favored one. Festering gums, symptomatic of mercury poisoning, resulting from the calomel, was regarded by the medical officers as a positive recuperative sign, and the patient was "regarded out of danger when the inside of his mouth [became] covered with bilious discharges."

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3 Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, June-October, 1834, Register of Post Returns in the Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Post Returns, AGO.

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4 Hughey to Lovell, April 3, 1835, Letters Received by the Office of Surgeon General, (Record Group No. 112, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., SGO.
Calomel dosage was a conservative treatment. More adventuresome physicians in St. Louis advocated treating cholera with tobacco smoke enemas, electric shocks, and the injection of saline solutions into the veins. Dr. Thomas Spencer, president of the New York State Medical Society, suggested that the rectum be plugged with beeswax or oilcloth to prevent the ravages of diarrhea. No matter what treatment was used, the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks could certainly agree with the Reverend Charles G. Finney of New York, that the means used to cure him of cholera left his "system [with a] terrible shock, from which it took [a] long [time] to recover." Indeed, Dr. William Hughey, post surgeon at Jefferson Barracks, reported to Surgeon General Joseph Lovell, that so many soldiers were "in a debilitated state" after recovering from cholera that the post resembled "a public poor house." 

The post became so notorious for being unhealthy that the desertion rate skyrocketed. No sooner would recruits arrive there than they would sneak off to St. Louis and obtain passage on steamboats bound usually for Cincinnati or Louisville. Desertion became such a great threat to discipline and morale that the War Department offered mass pardons to deserters who had fled the post during cholera outbreaks. Adjutant General Jones instructed post commanders to accept the surrender of any soldier who had fled his duty station because of cholera, and not to regard or report these men as deserters.


6 Jones to Commanding Officer at Jefferson Barracks, July 17, 1833, Letters Received by the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., West. Dept.
The disease even drove one man to commit suicide. On September 7, 1835, Zena Hingle, a German immigrant recruit, became so depressed over the prospect of contracting the disease during a cholera epidemic at the post that he slashed his throat with a razor.⁷

The cholera epidemics at Jefferson Barracks also made it extremely difficult to move troops in and out of the post. In June 1833, for example, the captain of the steamboat Warrior refused to board soldiers in transit from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Leavenworth. The captain had heard of the presence of cholera at Jefferson Barracks and was afraid that the soldiers would bring the disease on board with them. Even though Dr. Robert McMillan, post surgeon, certified the detachment as healthy, the captain persisted in refusing to take the men.⁸

General Atkinson was deeply disturbed by these epidemics and took stringent measures to deal with them. In periods of widespread sickness, he periodically issued orders to the garrison not to eat any uncooked fruits or vegetables, in the conviction that raw food was unsafe and harmed the digestive tract. Believing that the locally produced whiskey which the soldiers obtained from the saloons in Carondelet and St. Louis was very injurious to their health, especially by undermining their natural resistance to disease, the General also ordered the post sutler to issue one gill of "pure French Brandy" daily to each soldier. Atkinson hoped the soldiers would prefer the brandy to the locally produced

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⁷ Ibid.; Palmer to Jones, September 7, 1835, Letters Recd., AGO.
⁸ McMillan to Atkinson, June 8, 1834, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
whiskey, and stop drinking the cheap liquor, but his hopes were frustrated. The soldiers persisted in drinking the local whiskey in great quantities.  

Why did cholera become such a severe endemic disease at Jefferson Barracks? General Atkinson was partially correct in his belief that "bad whiskey" and uncooked fruits and vegetables were factors contributing to the rapid spread and persistence of the disease at the post because cholera is an infectious disease usually caused by contaminated food or water. A more basic factor, however, was the overall physical condition and health of the soldiers. Dr. William Beaumont, senior surgeon of the Sixth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks, reported to Surgeon General Joseph Lovell that the low quality of recruits and re-enlistees was largely accountable for the poor health of the men at the post. Beaumont pointed out that at least thirty members of the Sixth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks suffered from chronic alcoholism and adynamia, the medical term used to describe the lack of a vital force, or debility, and were of no use to the government.  

Some of these men had not performed one week's duty out of ten, having spent the rest of their time either frequenting "whiskey shops and groceries," in confinement in the guardhouse, or lying sick in the hospital.  

One reason for this high rate of "invalids and inebriates" was the recruiting practices used by the army. Dr. Beaumont complained that recruiting depots were extremely lax in their screening procedures. He

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9 Atkinson to Macomb, June 27, 1834, Letters Recd., AGO.
10 Beaumont to Surgeon General, October 12, 1834, Letters SGO.
11 Ibid.
pointed out that he currently had an invalid and confirmed drunkard in the post hospital for whom he had signed a certificate of disability in 1831. This soldier had then re-enlisted in 1832, and was sent to Jefferson Barracks where he immediately resumed his addiction to alcohol and entered the post hospital. Beaumont declared that such practices were a detriment and disgrace to the army.12 In this regard, however, Jefferson Barracks was not atypical, for the entire army suffered from careless recruiting.

Although no important military campaigns took place during the years of the cholera epidemics, Jefferson Barracks remained important to the defense of the frontier. By the early 1830s, the frontier had moved to the edge of the Great Plains, and American traders and settlers were crossing that vast area to New Mexico and the Pacific Coast. As a result, they were increasingly coming into contact with the hostile mounted tribes of the West. The difficulties experienced by infantry troops during the Black Hawk War prompted the War Department to ask Congress to provide a body of cavalry to deal with the Indians. In 1832, Congress authorized the formation of a battalion of 600 mounted rangers. These new troops were to be one-year volunteers who would provide their own equipment, horses, and arms, and would receive one dollar per day in pay.13 These rangers did not fulfill the army's needs. The short enlistment term and the requirement that each man provide his own arms and horse made the rangers little more than a special mounted militia.

12 Ibid.
13 United States Statutes At Large, IV, 533.
Secretary of War Lewis Cass realized that the rangers were not a satisfactory answer to the army's need for mounted troops. He wrote President John Quincy Adams and the House Committee on Military Affairs that a permanent regiment of dragoons—mounted infantrymen—would not only be more efficient, but would save the government approximately $154,000 per year. The one-year enlistment term, he pointed out, meant that each year a whole new regiment of rangers must be recruited and trained. This resulted in a great loss of time and was very costly. Furthermore, the other branches of the regular army held the mounted rangers in contempt, viewing them as nothing more than glorified infantry. The formation of a dragoon regiment, Cass argued, would greatly improve the esprit de corps of the army as well as keep the United States abreast of improvements in cavalry tactics made in other nations. Cass concluded that although permanent military posts garrisoned with infantry could exert an important moral influence over the Indians, the cavalry was "indispensably [sic] necessary" to "overtake" and "chastize" the hostile bands of western tribes.

After much debate, Congress finally accepted these arguments, and on March 2, 1833, passed an "Act for the More Perfect Defense of the Frontier," which provided for the organization of the regiment of dragoons. The regiment was to be composed of ten companies of seventy-five men each, and was initially to be stationed at Jefferson Barracks. Colonel Henry Dodge was appointed commanding officer of the new regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny was made second in command with the

responsibility of regimental recruitment and training. Kearny was to recruit "respectable men" and experienced horsemen, who were natural-born citizens, between the ages of twenty and thirty-five. Kearny's recruitment service quickly filled the command.  

The first task confronting the new cavalry recruits was the construction of their barracks and stables for their horses. The recruits thoroughly disliked this task, as they had to cut timber on the Illinois side of the Mississippi River, float the rough-cut logs across the river, and construct the new buildings, all without receiving extra duty pay. "This regiment," complained one dragoon, "was not enlisted to build stables, and some of our men have signified their disrelish of the work by not remaining to see it finished."  

Not only were these new horse soldiers required to perform onerous fatigue duties but, complained Colonel Dodge, they were not adequately equipped. Because they had been assured by recruiting officers that their military clothing would be waiting for them at Jefferson Barracks, the recruits left their surplus civilian clothing behind. When they arrived at Jefferson Barracks, however, they were outfitted with only one uniform, and as a result of their hard fatigue duty, their uniforms were soon in

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15 General Order No. 15, March 11, 1833, General Orders issued by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as General Orders, AGO; Jones to Kearny, August 22, 1833, Letters Sent by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, AGO.

Colonel Dodge's principal complaint with Jefferson Barracks, however, was that the post was too far removed from the frontier. In a letter to Adjutant General Jones, the Colonel stated that if the dragoons were to be stationed at Jefferson Barracks, they might as well be dismounted infantry. Steamboats could then transport them up the Arkansas, Missouri, or Mississippi Rivers to where they were needed, thus saving wear and tear on the horses. This was the very method used so unsuccessfully by the infantry against the western tribes. Dodge advocated moving the dragoon regiment to a western post, either Fort Gibson or Fort Leavenworth, where the soldiers could train in the red man's environment and learn the tactics they would have to use against the Plains Indians. There they would be close to where they would be needed.

Colonel Dodge soon got his wish. On October 11, 1833, the War Department ordered the dragoons to proceed immediately to Fort Gibson and establish winter quarters. Lieutenant Colonel Kearny opposed the move, protesting to the Adjutant General's Office that three out of the five companies still did not have their proper arms. Furthermore, the bridles and saddles had arrived at such a late date that many dragoons had received little or no mounted training. Without further training at Jefferson Barracks, Kearny thought, the dragoons would be no match

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17 Ibid.
18 Dodge to Jones, September 15, 1833, Letters Recd., AGO.
19 General Order No. 88, October 11, 1833, General Orders, AGO.
for mounted Indians.20 Kearny's objections notwithstanding, on November 20, 1833, five companies of the dragoons left Jefferson Barracks for Fort Gibson, arriving at their new post in mid-December.21

Following their departure, Jefferson Barracks served as the main recruit and supply depot for the dragoons. New recruits continued to be processed through the post throughout 1834, receiving not only their basic clothing issue, but also obtaining their horses, saddles, and other specialized cavalry equipment there.22

The dragoons proved to be so successful in dealing with the Plains Indians that on May 23, 1836, Congress established a second regiment of mounted troops. They were initially headquartered at Jefferson Barracks, with Colonel David E. Twiggs as commanding officer.23 The Second Dragoons were plagued with the usual supply problems. After almost twelve months at Jefferson Barracks, Colonel Twiggs complained to the War Department that his regiment had received only enough horses to mount approximately half of his command. Furthermore, before they could be fully outfitted with horses and other equipment, additional stables would have to be constructed at the post, since there were only four suitable stables, and the Second Dragoons alone needed at least ten.24

20 Kearny to Jones, October 28, 1833, Letters Recd., AGO; Id. to Id., November 8, 1833, ibid.
21 Dodge to Jones, December 18, 1833, ibid.
22 Kearny to Jones, April 12, 1843, ibid.
23 United States Statutes At Large, V, 33.
24 Twiggs to Jones, June 6, 1837, Letters Recd., AGO.
Writing to Adjutant General Jones, on July 12, 1837, Colonel Twiggs stated the reason he had not complained sooner about the lack of horses was that he believed it was the responsibility of General Atkinson, as post commander, to supply his command. But since Atkinson had been temporarily assigned to Louisville, Kentucky, as presiding officer of a general court martial, the Colonel was himself requesting additional horses and other supplies.\(^{25}\)

In reply, the War Department directed Twiggs to purchase no more horses than he had men present at the post. Half the dragoon regiment was already in Florida, and the portion of the regiment remaining at Jefferson Barracks was to be sent to that place in time for an autumn campaign against the Seminoles. To obtain enough horses to supply the whole regiment would be a great waste of money.\(^{26}\)

The role of the army in defending the western frontier underwent a drastic change in the decade of the 1830s, and Jefferson Barracks was deeply involved in this change. The changing function of the army resulted from the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830. This act provided for the removal of Indian tribes residing east of the Mississippi River to lands farther west, thus creating an anticipated permanent separation between Indians and whites.\(^{27}\)

\(^{25}\) Twiggs to Jones, July 12, 1837, ibid.

\(^{26}\) Jones to Twiggs, July 27, 1837, Letters Sent, AGO.

\(^{27}\) United States Statutes At Large, IV, 411-12. For a more complete discussion of the formation of American Indian policy and its enforcement in the 1830s, and the 1840s, see Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). Ronald N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era, (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1975).
The removal of some Indians started as early at 1817, following President James Monroe's message to Congress stating that the Indians living near the white settlements would have to adopt the whites' culture or be removed to territories west of the Mississippi River. Believing that the former would not happen, he urged Congress to establish a coordinated program of removal. Although Congress failed to pass removal legislation at that time, some bands of Indians and individual families did move to lands west of the Mississippi in the ensuing years.

The presidency of Andrew Jackson brought a change to American Indian relations. The new President believed that if the Indians did not move to the western territories, they should be made subject to the laws of the states where they resided. Jackson's publicly stated views encouraged the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi to extend their laws over the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek tribal lands, and the President finally persuaded Congress to pass the Indian Removal Act.

The army then began to play a role in the relocation process. The western military posts became centers for protection of and assistance to the emigrating tribes. The army provided escorts for the tribes, giving them protection from unscrupulous white traders and hostile and resentful western tribes. Once the eastern tribes arrived and began to

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29 Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, 233-34; Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era, 9-31.

settle in their new tribal grounds, the troops provided much needed assistance in the distribution of government annuity payments and in the construction of roads through the wilderness region.  

Of all the "civilized tribes" of the southeastern region of the United States, the Cherokee were the most advanced, best organized, and the most determined to resist forced emigration to the western territories. On December 29, 1835, a small faction of the Cherokee signed a treaty with the United States ceding the tribal lands in the states of Alabama and Georgia to the United States. A large majority of the Cherokee rejected this treaty, and Secretary of War Cass assigned Brevet Brigadier General John E. Wool to take command of the Tennessee Volunteers who had been mustered by the governor of that state, and reduce the Cherokee to submission. The Cherokee were able to defeat this force, and their resistance to removal became so great that the War Department ordered Major General Winfield Scott, commanding officer of the Eastern Department, to the Cherokee country with a force of regular troops to obtain compliance with the 1835 treaty. In a series of difficult operations during the winter of 1838-39, Scott's command was able to remove...

31 For the removal of the Choctaw and the efforts of the army to facilitate this event, see Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians, (Norman, 1932), 20-104; for the Creek removal, see ibid., 108-90; for the Chickasaw removal, see ibid., 193-225.

32 Kappler, ed., II, Treaties, 439-49.

33 Documents relating to Wool's command in the Cherokee country of Alabama are found in American State Papers: Military Affairs, VII, 532-71.
and escort some 13,000 Cherokee from Alabama and Georgia to their new western home. 34

In January 1836, anticipating the need for additional troops to aid in the removal of the Cherokee, the War Department ordered the Sixth Infantry Regiment from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Jesup, Louisiana, "as soon as the season and navigation will permit." Although Brevet Brigadier General Atkinson was the regimental commander, he was ordered to remain at the post and continue to exercise command of the Right Wing of the Western Department and the northwestern frontier. 35

By mid-February the ice on the Mississippi had melted and the Quartermaster Department in St. Louis had obtained river transportation, and on February 29, 1836, the Sixth Infantry left Jefferson Barracks for Louisiana. 36 With its departure, Jefferson Barracks was almost deserted. Except during the Black Hawk War, the post had almost always been garrisoned with at least 200 men. Now, although still the commander of the Sixth Infantry, as well as the post commander, General Atkinson was left with an effective command of only a second lieutenant, a brevet second lieutenant, an assistant surgeon, and thirty-one enlisted men. 37

Although the General did not like to see Jefferson Barracks and his overall command so stripped of its troops, he kept quiet, but not

34 For a thorough discussion of the Chefokee removal, see Foreman, Indian Removal, 229-312.
35 General Order No. 9, January 25, 1836, General Orders, AGO.
36 Atkinson to Jones, March 1, 1836, Letters Sent, West. Dept.
for long. In May 1836, he asked that the Sixth Infantry be returned to the post "as soon as its services are no longer required in the South." Atkinson stated that Jefferson Barracks was the largest, best equipped, and most centrally located post in the west, and, consequently should have a permanent garrison sufficiently large to defend "the Lakes, the Upper Mississippi, the Missouri, the Arkansas, the Red River, New Orleans, [and] the Floridas." The General's plea was ignored by the War Department, and Jefferson Barracks remained without a garrison.

The main reason General Atkinson wanted the garrison at Jefferson Barracks returned to its full strength was that the Indian tribes of the Northwest were again becoming restive. These tribes still had not completely accepted their forced removal from Illinois and Wisconsin to areas west of the Mississippi, and they also were contemptuous of the newly arrived "civilized tribes" from the Southeast. The General advised the War Department that the Indians within the area of his command "appear to be acquainted with all the occurrences in the south as soon as we are, and exult at the success of their red brethren [sic]." Having been stripped of his regular army units, should any significant hostilities occur the General would be forced to rely upon state volunteer forces to deal with the Indians. Atkinson believed, as a result of his Black Hawk War experiences, that state volunteers were unreliable. He, therefore, urged the War Department to return the Sixth Infantry to Jefferson Barracks.

38 Atkinson to Jones, May 19, 1836, Letters Sent, West. Dept.
39 Atkinson to Jones, June 6, 1837, Letters Recd., AGO.
40 Ibid.
The continuing unrest among the northwestern tribes also worried the War Department. Partially heeding Atkinson's admonitions, on June 6, 1836, Major General Alexander Macomb, General-in-Chief of the Army, asked the governor of Missouri to issue a call for 1,000 volunteers, half cavalry and half infantry, to serve twelve months on active duty during a two-year period. General Atkinson was instructed that should any Indian disturbances occur he was to use any part of this Missouri volunteer force he might think necessary.  

Volunteer forces were called into active service soon after, but under circumstances not pleasing to Atkinson. The occasion was an incident between a party of five whites and a band of Potowatomi who were migrating across western Missouri. The whites were the "Heatherly Gang" of whiskey vendors and alleged horse thieves. Following an unsuccessful bid to sell whiskey to the Potowatomi, one evening the Heatherlys stole eight of the Indians' horses. Discovering the theft the next day, the Potowatomi went out and, after a brief search, found the stolen horses with the gang. When the Indians demanded that their horses be returned, the Missouri horse thieves opened fire. In the ensuing skirmish, the Potowatomi killed two of the gang, drove off the remainder, and recovered their horses.  

General Atkinson believed that this incident was an isolated one and would not disrupt the peace along the Missouri frontier, but Daniel Dunklin, the governor of Missouri, decided that there was danger of

41 Macomb to Atkinson, June 6, 1836, Letters Recd., AGO.
42 Duncan to Kearny, June 21, 1836, enclosed in Atkinson to Jones, August 3, 1836, Letters Recd., AGO.

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general Indian hostilities, and that the Potowatomi should be chastised and all the Indians removed from the state. Acting without consulting Atkinson, the Governor mobilized 200 mounted volunteers for that purpose. Atkinson was angered by Dunklin's actions. He assured the Governor that the army would protect the western Missouri settlements without his interference, but the Missouri chief executive ignored the General. Appealing to the War Department, Atkinson declared:

If the authorities of the state raise troops at [their own] discretion and take the management of Indian difficulties into their own hands, I cannot be accountable for the results, as my authority is not paramount to the will of the governor.43

The Potowatomi who had been involved in the incident surrendered to Lieutenant Colonel Kearny at Fort Leavenworth, and General Atkinson suggested that the Heatherlys be arrested, but the Missouri civil authorities took no action.44 Although there was no decisive conclusion to this incident, the relations between the Missouri civil authorities and the army forces at Jefferson Barracks were strained for some time afterward.

At the very time General Atkinson was involved in his frustrating relations with Governor Dunklin, the Indian removal process in the Southwest deteriorated into a conflict which would plague the national government and involve the garrison at Jefferson Barracks and all the United States military forces until 1842. This conflict was the Second Seminole War, which started in 1835 over the attempts of the government to remove

43 Atkinson to Jones, July 25, 1836, ibid.
44 Ibid.
the Seminole Indians from their tribal lands in Florida.\textsuperscript{45} The removal matter involved three treaties between the Seminoles and the United States. The first treaty granted a reservation in central Florida to the Seminoles in return for the tribe's relinquishing its claim to the rest of Florida.\textsuperscript{46} Following the passage of the Indian Removal Act, the Seminoles were induced to agree to cede their Florida reservation and emigrate to western lands. This second treaty provided that members of the tribe could examine and approve of the western land before making the exchange.\textsuperscript{47}

The tribal representatives arrived at Fort Gibson in November 1832, and were shown part of the Creek Indian reservation on which the government proposed to settle the Seminole. The delegation was persuaded to sign an agreement, the Treaty of Fort Gibson, stipulating that they approved and accepted the western land. Later, however, the whole Seminole tribe refused to accept the new land because they believed the western territory was not equal in quality of quantity to their lands in Florida, and they did not want to be considered a subdivision of the Creek nation.\textsuperscript{48}

After the Seminoles renounced the Fort Gibson agreement, the army was assigned the task of forcibly removing the tribe from its Florida lands. The War Department believed this would be a relatively easy task. In his annual report to the President, Secretary of War Cass stated that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} A full treatment of the war appears in John K. Mahon, \textit{History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842}, (Gainesville, Florida, 1967).
\item \textsuperscript{46} Kappler, ed., II, \textit{Treaties}, 203-207.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 344-45. This treaty, the Treaty of Payne's Landing was signed on May 19, 1832, but not ratified and proclaimed until April 12, 1834.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 394-95.
\end{itemize}
fourteen companies of infantry had been placed under the command of Brevet Brigadier General Duncan L. Clinch and instructed to "impose a proper restraint" upon the Seminole. Cass estimated that this operation would be completed within two or three months, and the troops quickly returned to their regular duty stations.⁴⁹

The removal of the Seminole proved to be anything but easy. The Indians resisted Clinch's early attempts to remove them, so in January, 1836, Major General Winfield Scott, commanding general of the Eastern Department headquartered at New York City, was ordered to Florida to assume command of the Florida campaign. This arrangement might have placed Scott in conflict with his service rival, Major General Edmund P. Gaines, commanding general of the Western Department, since Scott had been instructed to "pursue [his] operations . . . without regard to any . . . divisionary lines."⁵⁰

Before General Scott could get to Florida, however, General Gaines entered the conflict and attempted to track down the hostile Indians. The Western Department Commander, however, only succeeded in getting his force involved in an ambush along the Withlacoochee River. The Indians made several attempts to overrun Gaines' position, and although supplies ran so low that the soldiers were forced to eat some of their horses, the combined force of six companies of the Fourth Infantry and a regiment

⁵⁰ Ibid., VII, 217. The command conflict arose because the Florida peninsula was divided, north to south, between the Eastern Department and Western Department, by a line drawn from the tip of the peninsula (Cape Sable) to the head of Lake Superior at Fond du Lac.
of Louisiana Volunteers maintained its position. Unable to defeat this force, the Seminole eventually returned to the swamps, and Gaines' command was able to proceed safely to Fort Drane. From there Gaines left for Tallahassee and Mobile, and eventually the Louisiana-Texas frontier where the events leading to the Texas revolution had created several problems for the United States.  

Scott was now left in command of the army regulars and Florida volunteers, but he had no better luck against the Indians than had Gaines. In a series of poorly coordinated maneuvers, Scott moved his force from St. Augustine to Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay. Scott had hoped to catch the Seminoles during this maneuver, but all that resulted was the concentration of United States forces at Tampa Bay. Now much of Florida was unprotected from hostile Indians, so Scott was forced to disperse his command throughout the peninsula while he returned to St. Augustine. From there he was ordered, on May 17, 1836, to go to Georgia to deal with a series of disturbances among the Creek Indians.

As commander of the Florida forces, Scott was replaced by the territorial governor, Richard K. Call. The regular army troops disliked Call, and he was soon replaced by Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup. In the early spring of 1837, Jesup embarked on a coordinated and continuous

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51 A complete accounting of the command conflict and action of Generals Gaines and Scott may be found in the "Proceedings of the Military Court of Inquiry, in the Case of Major General Scott and Major General Gaines," Senate Document No. 224, 24 Cong., 2 sess., (Serial 299).

52 Scott to Jones, April 12, 1836, American State Papers: Military Affairs, VII, 267.

53 Ibid., 194.
attack against the Seminoles, and on March 6, 1837, was able to force
the major chiefs to capitulate. The Indians agreed to assemble at Fort
Brooke to await their emigration. The United States promised to supply
their transportation and all necessary subsistence for twelve months.\(^5^4\)
The peaceful conduct of the Indians as they arrived at Fort Brooke con­
vinced General Jesup that the Seminole War was over, and he began to
disband his fighting force. The War Department ordered the regular troops
distributed to posts in climates where they might recover their health
after the debilitating duty in Florida.

Acting in compliance with the War Department directives, the Second
Dragoons returned to Jefferson Barracks in May 1837, increasing the size
of the garrison to seventy officers and 470 enlisted men.\(^5^5\) General
Atkinson, however, was absent at the time, having been temporarily ordered
to Fort Jesup.\(^5^6\) The garrison was further augmented by the arrival of
the First Infantry Regiment, during July, bringing its strength to a total
of 637 officers and enlisted men.\(^5^7\)

\(^5^4\) "Capitulation of the Seminole nation of Indians and their allies,
by Jumper, Hotahtochee, or Davy, and Yaholoochee, representing the prin­
cipal chief, Micanapy, and fully empowered by him, entered into with Major
General Thomas S. Jesup, commanding the United States forces in Florida,
this sixth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven,"

\(^5^5\) *Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, April and May 1837, Post
Returns, AGO*.

\(^5^6\) *Atkinson to Brant, June 5, 1837, Letters Sent, West. Dept.*

\(^5^7\) *Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, July 1837, Post Returns,
AGO*. Four companies of the First Infantry arrived July 19, from Fort
Snelling, and six companies on July 21, from Fort Crawford. The regi­
ment was commanded by Colonel Zachary Taylor.
Jefferson Barracks was to keep its large garrison for only a short time. On June 5, 1837, General Jesup informed the War Department that the Seminoles, who had gathered at Fort Brooke to prepare for their emigration, had fled back into the swamps of central Florida. This was an embarrassing development for Jesup, for he had disbanded his army and sent it away after feeding and supplying the Indians.

Jesup proposed a new campaign against the Seminoles in the autumn. He informed the new Secretary of War, Joel Poinsett, that he needed more than 6,000 regular troops -- 1,700 to garrison the Florida army posts, 750 to escort and protect supply trains, and the remainder to pursue and subdue the hostile Indians. In order to comply with the General's request, the War Department stripped the frontier posts of their garrisons and quickly transferred the available regulars to Florida. It also mustered an additional 4,000 volunteers into service with instructions to be ready for an October campaign.

The setback in Florida and subsequent transfer of regulars had a dramatic impact on Jefferson Barracks. On July 31, 1837, the War Department issued General Order No. 50 directing the entire First Infantry and three companies of the Second Dragoons stationed at the post to begin preparations for service in Florida. The regimental commanders were instructed to depart the Barracks in sufficient time to arrive at Tampa Bay between October 10 and 15.

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58 Jesup to Poinsett, July 15, 1837, American State Papers: Military Affairs, VII, 872-74.

59 General Orders No. 50, July 31, 1837, General Orders, AGO.
This order proved to be difficult for the commander of the First Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel William Davenport, a veteran of the War of 1812, and troop commander during the Black Hawk War, to obey because he was short of officers. On August 19, 1837, he reported this shortage to Adjutant General Jones and requested additional officers. Jones replied that General-in-Chief Macomb sympathized with Davenport and endorsed his request to the Secretary of War. The Secretary believed, however, that no additional officers were available, and the First Infantry would have to prepare to leave for Florida with its existing personnel.60

The First Infantry and the Second Dragoons left Jefferson Barracks by October 1. While the First Infantry was not up to full strength in officers, many of the men of the Second Dragoons appeared to be unfit for duty. In reporting the regiment's movement through St. Louis on its way to Florida, on September 5, the St. Louis Missouri Republican observed that although the dragoons were "all well mounted and equipped" for the journey, the soldiers, themselves, did not present a very inspiring picture. "There were too many pale and sickly faces among them, and if we mistake not, too many of them are of such recent importation,

60 Jones to Davenport, September 7, 1837, Letters Sent, AGO. The Jefferson Barracks post returns for the months of July and August, 1837, show that the First Infantry had seventeen officers -- Lt. Col. through Second Lt. -- for duty. In August, the Regiment had fourteen officers present for duty. The number of NCO's and enlisted men present for duty was July, 244, and August, 194. By comparison, the Second Dragoons, who were also present at the post, had thirteen and sixteen officers present for duty in July and August; and 360 and 341 NCO's and enlisted men for each month. It would appear that the First Infantry, although deficient in the number of officers present for duty, was in no worse shape than the Second Dragoons. The First Infantry was, however, severely deficient in overall manpower. In July, it was 226 men short of authorized strength, and in August, 218 men lacking. Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, July and August, 1837, Post Returns, AGO.
that they will be but badly qualified to serve in the arduous duty to which they are destined." 61 With the departure of the two regiments, Jefferson Barracks was once again a post virtually without a garrison, and General Atkinson a general without a command. The total post garrison was sixteen in November 1837, and twenty-five in December 1837. 62

From 1838 to 1841, the yearly average of men present at the post was 46.75, with the post's primary function being that of a recruit depot. During this four-year period there were some drastic fluctuations in the number of soldiers at the post. These variations were caused by the movement through the post of troops bound for Florida and other locations.

In June 1840, for example, seven companies of the Eighth Infantry arrived at Jefferson Barracks from Fort Crawford, near the mouth of the Wisconsin River, increasing the size of the garrison from thirty-four to 532 men. This regiment departed on September 26, 1840, and the size of the garrison declined to thirty-seven men. Similar fluctuations occurred in 1841, and early 1842. In March 1842, the Sixth Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus Loomis, an 1811 graduate of the United States Military Academy, veteran of the War of 1812, and experienced Indian fighter, who had seen action against the Creeks in 1825-26, and the Sauk and Fox during the Black Hawk War, returned to the post from Florida. This regiment, with its 714 men, was under orders to proceed to Fort Towson, however, and departed Jefferson Barracks on April 16. It was not until the following autumn that the post received a substantial garrison. In September,

61 Missouri Republican, (St. Louis), September 6, 1837.

62 Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, November and December 1837, Post Returns, AGO.
October, and November of 1842, the whole Fourth Infantry, some 563 men, and units of the First and Fifth Infantry and the Second Dragoons made Jefferson Barracks their regular duty station.63

In addition to sending its garrison of regular army troops to fight in the Seminole War, Jefferson Barracks also served as a rendezvous and supply depot for the Missouri Volunteers who fought in Florida. In the 1837 general mobilization of forces to deal with the Seminoles of the War Department asked for volunteers from the states, and Missouri was one of many states to respond. On September 11, 1837, General Atkinson wrote Major A. G. Morgan, post sutler at Fort Leavenworth and battalion commander of the Missouri militia, who lived near Liberty, Missouri, informing him that he, Atkinson, had been authorized by Secretary of War Poinsett to call for 200 mounted volunteers to serve for one year. Three days later, the General wrote Morgan that the authorized strength of the volunteers had been increased to 300 men.64

Atkinson soon learned that there would be difficulty in raising these volunteers. On September 19, 1837, Morgan informed the General that the terms of enlistment, and particularly the low pay offered by the War Department, would preclude the possibility of meeting the government's quota. Although the War Department offered the prospective

63 In 1838, the monthly average of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks was 39.7 men. In 1839, this average dipped to 34.25 men, increased to 42.25 men in 1840, and topped out at 70.818 in 1841. Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January 1838 - December 1841, Post Returns, AGO; and ibid., September - November 1842, ibid.

64 Atkinson to Morgan, September 11, 1837, Letters Received by the Headquarters of the Army, (Record Group No. 108, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., HQA. Atkinson to Morgan, September 14, 1837, Letters Sent, West. Dept.
volunteers the same pay as army regulars (starting at $8.00 per month for privates), the men could earn $25.00 per month employed in farming and "easy labor." The Sutler added that his fellow citizens were not lacking in patriotism, for if their own frontier was threatened they would fight "without fee or reward." However, since volunteer Indian scouts were to receive $45.00 per month for service in Florida, Morgan felt his men should receive the same. It was for the Missourians, Morgan stated, "more... a matter of pride than anything else. We consider ourselves at least as good and efficient soldiers as the worthless Indians on our frontier." 65

The Indian program referred to by Morgan was a War Department proposal to employ friendly red men as scouts to aid the army in Florida. As the regulars and volunteers of the United States forces in Florida began to pursue the recalcitrant Seminoles, they found the hostile Indians could disappear into the "hammocks and swamps without hardly [sic] a trace." In an attempt to thwart the ability of the Seminoles to escape into difficult and inaccessible terrain, General Jesup, commander of United States forces in Florida, ordered "a band of friendly Indian warriors... be immediately raised and organized for special service." Jesup anticipated a brigade of 200 to 300 Creek warriors would comprise this force which would be mounted, equipped, and supplied as mounted volunteers and serve for twelve months, "unless sooner discharged." 66

65 Morgan to Atkinson, September 19, 1837, Letters Recd., HQA.

The Creek warriors rendered valuable service to Jesup's command, but there were several individuals, most notably Lewis Cass, who believed the use of these Indians to be unwise. Writing to Colonel John B. Hogan, Superintendent of Creek Removal, Cass stated that he had received information from unidentified sources which indicated that a large number of the Creeks intended to desert and join the Seminoles. This would, Cass believed, present a dangerous threat to the United States military position in Florida. Furthermore, the use of Creek scouts in the Seminole conflict would delay the removal of the Creeks from Alabama, thus further aggravating the already tense Indian-white relations in that state.67

Secretary of War Poinsett, heeding Cass's advice, decided to stop using the Creeks and replace them with friendly northern Indians. On July 22, 1837, Poinsett notified Major R. W. Cummins, Indian agent at Fort Leavenworth, that he was to "engage" the services of 400 Shawnee, 200 Delaware, and 100 Kickapoo to serve as army scouts in Florida. The Indian agents to the Choctaw and Sauk and Fox tribes were also to raise 200 and 100 braves, respectively, from each of those tribes. Each tribal group was to be divided into bands of fifty warriors; all Indians would serve for six months, with the chiefs of each band receiving $69.50 per month, and each warrior $45.00 per month. These Indians would provide their own weapons, but would receive horses and other necessary supplies from the government.68

These northwestern Indians were successfully recruited and sent to Florida, arriving there by mid-October 1837. They served in an

67 Cass to Hogan, January 21, 1836, NASP: MA, IX, 164.
68 Poinsett to Cummins, July 22, 1837, ibid., 168.
"admirable manner" and helped Jesup's forces bring the Seminoles to heel.\textsuperscript{69}

Even though these Indian scouts rendered valuable aid to the army, their use, and especially the terms of their service and pay, were greatly resented by volunteer units, especially those of the state of Missouri.

General Atkinson was incensed by Major Morgan's letter and its suggestion of shabby treatment given the Missouri volunteers. He declared, in writing to Secretary of War Poinsett, that no deception had been used in recruiting the volunteers, in announcing either the terms of their pay or their service. The General continued, "If they will not march and be mustered into the service [under the enlistment program made by the War Department] it would be better they should [stay] in their homes. . . ."\textsuperscript{70} Morgan largely failed to recruit the requested volunteers for service in Florida, but probably more because of their apprehension concerning the safety of their families as a result of the increased tensions between Mormons and non-Mormons in western Missouri than because of the low pay offered for their service. Morgan was ultimately able to bring one company of fifty mounted volunteers to Jefferson Barracks on November 2, 1837. By then, Atkinson's anger had subsided, and he mustered the volunteers into service, on the War Department's terms, and on November 7 dispatched them to Tampa Bay via New Orleans, commenting, "They are good men and will be serviceable in the field. Besides, it would have created a great excitement to have turned them back."\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69} Jesup to Poinsett, July 6, 1838, American State Papers: Military Affairs, VII, 187.
\textsuperscript{70} Atkinson to Poinsett, October 4, 1837, Letters Recd., HQA; Eugene W. Violette, A History of Missouri, (New York, 1905), 216.
\textsuperscript{71} Atkinson to Jones, November 8, 1837, Letters Sent, West. Dept.
At the very time General Atkinson was contending with Major Morgan over the terms of enlistment for the mounted volunteers, the governor of Missouri, Lilburn W. Boggs, wrote the Jefferson Barracks commander offering the services of the First Regiment of Missouri Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Richard Gentry. The Governor informed Atkinson that Colonel Gentry had been ordered to assemble his regiment at Columbia, in the central part of the state, then to await further orders.\textsuperscript{72}

General Atkinson informed the Governor that the Secretary of War wished the Missouri Volunteers to be mustered into United States service for a six-month period. He added that it was "all important that the Regiment should be ready for embarkation at Jefferson Barracks by the 15th of [October] with a view of reaching Tampa Bay by the 1st of November."\textsuperscript{73}

Although Atkinson stressed the importance of prompt mobilization, it was not achieved. Heavy autumn rains flooded rivers in western and central Missouri and slowed the progress of volunteer units to their rendezvous points. Furthermore, political opponents of Richard Gentry and Thomas Hart Benton, United States Senator from Missouri, slowed the volunteer recruitment campaign. Benton had incurred the political wrath of many Missourians by his actions against the Bank of the State of Missouri. He had been a leader in the United States Senate fight against the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States, and he was now involved in the same type of battle in Missouri. During the Senate

\textsuperscript{72} Boggs to Atkinson, September 25, 1837, Letters Recd., HQA.

\textsuperscript{73} Atkinson to Boggs, September 28, 1837, ibid.
debate over the Second Bank of the United States, Benton displayed his opposition to all forms of paper money. With the expiration of "Biddle's Monster," Missouri chartered a state bank that issued paper bank notes. "Old Bullion" rallied his supporters in the state legislature in an attempt to induce the state lawmakers to pass laws rescinding the paper money, but the "soft" money forces were able to prevent the passage of these laws. The defeat of the Benton supported banking legislation commenced a split within the anti-Bentonites alleging that Benton's enthusiastic support for the use of the Missouri Volunteers in Florida was just a smoke screen to cover his defeat in the Missouri legislature. Despite these obstacles, on October 11, 1837, five companies of the Volunteer Regiment left Jefferson City, and five or six additional companies were due to depart four days later.74

Prior to the Missouri Volunteers' arrival at Jefferson Barracks, General Atkinson had to arrange for their equipment, supplies, and transportation, and forage for their animals. The General instructed Captain George H. Corsman, Assistant Quartermaster at St. Louis, to secure the services of two large class steamboats and have them ready for use by October 19, 1837. He was also to arrange for 1,500 bushels of oats for their horses on the voyage from the post to New Orleans. The Missourians were to be issued Halls Patent rifles. Normally, arms would not be issued to volunteers until they reached Florida, but General Gaines ordered that they be distributed at Jefferson Barracks so that the volunteers, "might become familiarized to the use of [the rifles] before they approached

the enemy; and, not as some other volunteers, ordered to Florida, go unprepared for action, depending on promises that might never be fulfilled."75

The Missouri Volunteers left Jefferson Barracks on October 15, 1837, and with their departure the post became a recruiting depot for the Sixth Infantry. It soon began receiving soldiers from the army recruiting station at Newport, Kentucky, and the Illinois-Missouri region. The new personnel remained at the post an average of two months before being sent to permanent duty assignments.76

The post commanders at Jefferson Barracks were responsible for providing a number of routine services for the troops while they were stationed at the post. One of the most important of these was to arrange for their pay. Paying soldiers was the particular responsibility of the Pay Department in Washington, which was administered by the Paymaster General and a deputy paymaster. Because the Pay Department was authorized only two full-time officers, regular line officers served, on temporary duty, as assistant paymasters. Each assistant paymaster was assigned a circuit of posts as his responsibility. Jefferson Barracks was often included in the Upper Mississippi-Missouri circuit, with the paymaster operating from either Cincinnati or Louisville. Although such a centralized system simplified recording keeping for the Pay Department, it created numerous financial hardships for the soldiers. Very often, the

75 Atkinson to Crosman, October 15, 1837, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Gaines to Jones, October 26, 1837, Letters Recd., AGO.

76 Atkinson to Jones, October 18, 1837, ibid.; Atkinson to Jones, December 1, 1837, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January 1838-December 1841, Post Returns, AGO.
Paymasters in the frontier regions were reluctant to leave their base of operations with enough money to make a complete circuit before returning home. Consequently, they would pay the troops at one post and then return to Cincinnati or Louisville before going to another post. As a result, the garrison at Jefferson Barracks was paid only once every two or three months, and in extreme cases, every six to eight months. The soldiers at the post were, consequently, forced to borrow from the post sutler if they wanted to buy something. When the paymaster arrived at the post, the sutler would claim the amount owed him before the troops received the balance of their pay. Not infrequently, many enlisted men, as well as officers, received no cash at all and were forced to resume buying from the sutler on credit. In an attempt to remedy this situation, in 1834, a paymaster's office was established at St. Louis, but, even so, the payment of the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks did not become more prompt. 77

Post commanders were also responsible for providing uniforms for the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks. Supplies of these were frequently inadequate during the 1830s. There were particularly chronic shortages of dress blouses, winter great coats, and woolen long underwear. The shortages of the latter two items caused great discomfort to the officers, as well as the enlisted men, during the winter months. 78


78 Atkinson to Quatermaster General, February 17, 1838, Letters Received by the Office of the Quartermaster General, (Record Group No. 92, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., QMG.
General Atkinson complained to the Adjutant General's Office that many of the clothing shortages at Jefferson Barracks were caused by the post quartermaster's having to procure the necessary articles from New York supply agents. According to the General, the New York suppliers would delay these shipments until they could find a reason to claim cost increases which would be passed through to the army. Furthermore, the time involved in the transporting of goods from New York to St. Louis aggravated the situation.\textsuperscript{79}

New York merchants, however, were not totally to blame for the clothing shortages at Jefferson Barracks. In an 1833 inspection of the post, Inspector General of the Army, Colonel George Croghan, commented that the location of the main western frontier quartermaster depot in St. Louis, rather than at Jefferson Barracks, was very inconvenient, uneconomical, and created unwarranted delays in supplying the post. Very often there were great discrepancies between the orders submitted by the commanding officers of the frontier posts and the items acquired and issued by the quartermaster officers in St. Louis. Croghan recommended that the War Department consolidate the quartermaster function for the entire Upper Mississippi-Missouri frontier region in one office at Jefferson Barracks. However, his recommendation was ignored, and clothing and supply shortages persisted at the post.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Atkinson to Jones, July 19, 1834, Letters Recd., AGO.

\textsuperscript{80} Inspection Report for Jefferson Barracks, November 10, 1833, Register of Post Inspections in the Records of the Office of Inspector General, (Record Group No. 159, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Post Inspections, IG.
Low and infrequent pay as well as deficiencies in clothing issued contributed to the low morale of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks. Low morale, in turn, contributed to desertion and intemperance, two problems that plagued commanding officers not only at Jefferson Barracks, but throughout the army during the first sixty years of the nineteenth century.

In the decade of the 1830s, 483 men deserted the post, or about twenty-two percent of its garrison every year. Desertion could occur at any time, but most often occurred when units were under orders to transfer. In 1833, after the Sixth Infantry returned from the Black Hawk War, and the size of the garrison averaged 370 men, the desertion rate was only 18.65 percent. But in 1837, however, when the Second Dragoons and First Infantry were ordered to Florida and the Seminole War, the desertion rate soared to 49.93 percent. Despite this dismal picture, there were extended periods when there were no desertions from the post. Between January 1837, and December 1842, there were a total of thirty-six months in which no one deserted the post. These months, however, were times when the garrison averaged only forty-seven men present for duty.\(^{81}\)

For the commanding officers at Jefferson Barracks a high desertion rate meant a noticeable reduction of their command; for the entire army, it represented a great waste. In 1831, Secretary of War Cass reported to Congress that deserters were costing the government approximately

\(^{81}\) Post Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January 1833 - December 1842, Post Returns, AGO. The average desertion rate was 48.3 men per year. The average size of the post garrison during this period was 213.9818 men per year. Rounding off the decimal fractions, \(48/214 = 22.4299\). In 1833, there were 119 deserters and the garrison size averaged 238.3 soldiers.
$81.60 per deserter, and the total number of deserters for that year was 1,450 — approximately one-fourth of the total authorized strength of the army. Cass explained that the monetary loss per deserter was computed by adding costs incurred by the army in recruiting, clothing, housing, feeding, and, very often, offering and paying a reward fee, usually $50.00, for the apprehension and return to military custody of each deserter. 82

Some remedy for this situation was absolutely necessary, and in March 1833, Congress responded with an act "to improve the condition of non-commissioned officers and privates of the army and marine corps of the United States and to prevent desertion." The new law reduced the enlistment term from five years to three; increased the pay of privates from five to six dollars a month, with the provision that one dollar a month be withheld for the first two years of service and paid in a lump sum at the end of that time, provided the soldier had no bad marks on his service record; granted a reenlistment bonus of two months' pay; and restored whipping as a punishment for men convicted of desertion by a general court-martial. 83

The new authorization to whip deserters was warmly received and vigorously carried out by order of general courts-martial at Jefferson

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<th>Number Deserting</th>
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82 American State Papers: Military Affairs, IV, 708. Secretary Cass presented a very dismal picture for the desertion rate in the 1826-31 period.

83 United States Statutes At Large, IV, 647-48.
Barracks. At a trial conducted in November 1834, seven privates were charged with desertion and were tried and convicted. The sentence of Private Ephraim Hendricks, Company A, Sixth Infantry Regiment, was typical of the sentences of all seven. The Private was:

... to receive fifty lashes on his bare back, with a rawhide well laid on in the presence of the prisoners of the guard house. To be indelibly marked on the right hip with the word 'Deserter;' and then drummed out of the service with the rogues march.

He was also to forfeit all pay and allowances that were due, or would become due, at the time his sentence was executed. The General-in-Chief of the Army, as the reviewing authority, approved the sentence of whipping, drumming out of the service, and pay forfeiture, but disallowed the branding.\textsuperscript{84}

The post commanders at Jefferson Barracks and War Department officials viewed drunkenness and intemperance as equal to desertion in disrupting the good order of the service. Much of the drunkenness among the soldiers was attributed to the daily ration of one gill of whiskey allowed the troops which, it was charged, whetted the mens' thirst for stronger drink. During the 1820s, vigorous opposition to the liquor ration developed, and in 1830 the War Department ordered its termination.\textsuperscript{85}

It was hoped that the substitution of coffee and sugar for whiskey in the ration would help promote temperance among the soldiers.

At Jefferson Barracks, however, this was not the case. On November 10, 1833, Inspector General Croghan noted that, "the order prohibiting ... whiskey ... or other spiritous [sic] liquors ... has

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\textsuperscript{84} General Order No. 29, May 9, 1835, General Orders, AGO.

\textsuperscript{85} General Order No. 72, December 8, 1830, \textit{ibid}.
not been attended by the happy results expected of it." Rather than reducing the consumption of alcohol, the temperance order increased it. Croghan observed that privately owned taverns and grog shops had been established just outside the military reservation, and the owners of these businesses "vie[d] with each other in their effort[s] to wheedle [the soldiers] from their quarters at all hours of the night to join in scenes of drunken excess and riot." The Inspector General felt that the post sutlers should be allowed to sell liquor on the military reservation, provided they prevented the soldiers from indulging too freely. Croghan closed his report with a prophetic warning for the temperance movement at Jefferson Barracks and all other army posts:

Disbar by order a soldier from the [access to] spirituous liquor, and you at once create in him an appetite for it, you induce him to get drunk, who was never known to indulge too freely, when he was left at liberty to drink whenever he thought proper.

At Jefferson Barracks, drunkenness was dealt with in the same manner as desertion, with severe corporal punishment. The case of Private John Dawson, Company C, Sixth Infantry, is representative of the manner in which chronic drunkards were treated. The private was charged, tried, and convicted of "confirmed and habitual drunkenness." He was sentenced to receive fifty lashes on his bare back, to forfeit all pay and allowances due him, and to "be tarred and feathered from the top of his head to his hips and drummed out of the service with the rogues march." Major

86 Inspection Report for Jefferson Barracks, November 10, 1833, Post Inspections, IG.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.
General Alexander Macomb, General-in-Chief of the Army, remitted the tarring and feathering, but approved the remainder of the sentence, and encouraged the officers at Jefferson Barracks to be zealous in their efforts to curb drunkenness within the garrison.89

Due to the constant movement from one post to another of military personnel in the frontier army, and the isolated conditions under which they lived, officers, as well as enlisted men, were subject to loneliness, were bored by the routine of training, and suffered from a lack of social contact. As a result, officers, as well as enlisted men, sometimes became addicted to alcohol, and they also occasionally absented themselves from duty without leave. Moreover, the officers at Jefferson Barracks disliked extra duty just as much as the enlisted men. They objected to performing such extra duties as supervising water hauling and wood cutting details, caring for livestock, and special maintenance work on the barracks structures particularly, because these duties cut into valuable training time. Moreover, in carrying out these fatigue assignments, the officers not infrequently damaged their uniforms beyond repair and they were forced to purchase new clothing, which often cost more than their uniform allowance.

Two surgeons -- Clement A. Finley and Samuel G. I. DeCamp -- got into special difficulties while they were at Jefferson Barracks. On March 16, 1835, Finley was court martialed on a charge of "neglect of

89 General Order No. 29, May 9, 1835, General Orders, AGO.
duty, disobedience of orders, and unofficer-like conduct." Finley had been assigned to the First Dragoons as a regimental surgeon and stationed at Fort Leavenworth. When a battalion of the Second Infantry left that post for Jefferson Barracks, the Surgeon was temporarily detached by Major Alexander R. Thompson, battalion commander, and ordered to accompany several ailing infantry men to the Missouri post. When Finley arrived at Jefferson Barracks, he reported to General Atkinson and sought permission to go to Philadelphia to visit his family. The General replied that he had not received any orders placing Finley under his command and he, Finley, was "at liberty to do as he thought proper, taking the responsibility of doing so upon himself." Just as Finley was about to set out, he was stopped by Dr. William Beaumont, the post surgeon, and shown an extract of Special Order No. 126, which transferred Beaumont to Fort Crawford and Finley to Jefferson Barracks. According to Dr. Beaumont, Finley refused to acknowledge the legality of the extract and left for Philadelphia. While there, Finley was placed under arrest and returned to Jefferson Barracks to stand trial.

Before his departure from Philadelphia, Finley wrote Surgeon General Joseph Lovell defending his actions. Finley stated that in 1833, he had volunteered to accompany the Dragoon Regiment, as its surgeon, on the Regiment's expedition to the Rocky Mountains, doing so with the

90 Court Martial Proceedings Against Surgeon Clement A. Finley, March 16, 1835, Court Martial Proceedings in the Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, (Record Group No. 153, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Finley Court Martial, JAG.


understanding that upon his return he would be able to take his family to a post of his choice. Upon his return from the Rocky Mountains, however, he had been ordered to Fort Leavenworth without his family. The errant Surgeon stated he believed that in accordance with his agreement to accompany the Dragoons, it was permissible for him to return to Philadelphia and rejoin his family. He was not, Finley concluded, neglecting any assigned duty. The Surgeon General replied to Finley that he considered the extract of the Special Order as sufficient notification of the change of duty station, and for this reason, Finley was being charged with neglect, disobedience, and unofficer-like conduct.93

The court martial found Finley "not guilty of all charges and specifications," and totally acquitted him of any negligence. Upon reviewing this case, the Inspector General, Colonel John E. Wool, found the entire proceedings "unmilitary and highly improper." The Colonel stated that Major Thompson had been wrong to order Finley from Fort Leavenworth without instructions to return to the post. Atkinson was, in turn, incorrect in not then placing the Surgeon on duty at Jefferson Barracks, or sending him back to his post, since the General was the commanding officer of the Right Wing of the Western Department which included Jefferson Barracks and Fort Leavenworth. Finally, Finley was wrong in leaving Jefferson Barracks after he received official notification of Special Order No. 126, without further consultation with General Atkinson. But the Inspector

93 Finley to Lovell, October 23, 1834, ibid.; Lovell to Finley, October 25, 1835, ibid. Finley claimed that Surgeon General Lovell approved the stipulation that, in return for accompanying the Dragoons on their march, Finley would be able personally to choose his next duty station. Lovell neither acknowledged or denied this agreement's existence.
General concluded that the basic fault was Surgeon General Lovell's for having failed to honor his previous agreement with Finley.\textsuperscript{94}

In 1839, the Surgeon General's Office became involved in another dispute with a medical officer at Jefferson Barracks. On September 19, Surgeon Samuel G. I. DeCamp was assigned the extra duty of providing medical service for the St. Louis Arsenal and the army officers stationed at St. Louis. In March 1840, DeCamp informed Surgeon General Thomas Lawson that although he had been available to render medical service at the Arsenal and in St. Louis, in nearly six months he had not been called to the city a single time, and had treated only four or five patients at the Arsenal. The post surgeon believed this extra duty could be suspended and he asked to be relieved from its performance.\textsuperscript{95} The Surgeon General replied that DeCamp's services had, in fact, been needed, but that DeCamp had failed to perform them. He informed DeCamp that he, Lawson, had received a statement from Dr. William Beaumont of St. Louis claiming payment for services rendered to army personnel in St. Louis and the Arsenal at the very time DeCamp was under orders to provide such medical service. Lawson informed the Post Surgeon that Beaumont's charges would be deducted from his pay. When DeCamp strongly objected, the Surgeon General broadened his accusations to charge DeCamp with negligence in the performance of his duties during the Seminole War. According to Lawson, while serving as the medical officer for the Second Dragoons on

\textsuperscript{94} "Remarks of Inspector General John E. Wool," \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{95} Special Order No. 71, September 19, 1839, Selected Letter File in the Records of the Office of Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Selected Letter File, AGO. DeCamp to Lawson, Marcy 31, 1840, Letters Recd., SGO.
their movement to Florida in 1837, DeCamp, "strewed . . . sick soldiers along the road" to Florida. 96 DeCamp vigorously denied the allegation, and took his case to Secretary of War Poinsett, who made no reply. DeCamp continued to ask to be relieved of responsibility for treating army officers in St. Louis and military personnel at the St. Louis Arsenal, but without success. The matter ended in 1842, when DeCamp was ordered to accompany the Sixth Infantry to Fort Towson. 97

Although this dispute was not resolved to the satisfaction of Surgeon DeCamp, he did not have to pay the bill for Dr. Beaumont's services to military personnel at St. Louis and the Arsenal. Post Surgeons at Jefferson Barracks, however, were still required to perform this sort of extra duty.

The quiescent period at Jefferson Barracks ended on a sad note. On Tuesday, June 14, 1842, Brevet Brigadier General Henry Atkinson died of "billious [sic] dysentery." 98 The General had been a firm believer in the importance of Jefferson Barracks to the defense and security of the western frontier, and his strong, steady leadership would be missed,

96 Lawson to DeCamp, July 14, 1840, Letters Sent by the Office of the Surgeon General, (Record Group No. 112, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, SGO; DeCamp to Lawson, July 23, 1840, Letters Recd., SGO; Lawson to DeCamp, August 8, 1840, Letters Sent, SGO.

97 DeCamp to Poinsett, September 2, 1840, Letters Received by the Office of the Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives); DeCamp to Scott, December 21, 1844, Selected Letter File, AGO; Special Order No. 12, April 8, 1842, Order Book of the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives).

98 Graham to Jones, June 14, 1842, Letters Recd., AGO; Missouri Republican, June 15, 1842.
not only at "his" post, but throughout the army. Although, during the last years of the General's life, the post had declined in importance, Jefferson Barracks would play a key role in future plans for the defense of the frontier.
Chapter V

MEXICAN WAR PERIOD, 1842-48

While troops from Jefferson Barracks were fighting in the Seminole War in Florida and providing protection for the emigrant southeastern Indian tribes, the War Department was beginning to make plans for a coordinated western frontier policy. Key features of these plans were the continued permanent separation of white and red men and the maintenance of peace among the Indian tribes.

The first of these plans was proposed by Secretary of War Lewis Cass in early 1836. The House and Senate committees on military affairs asked for his ideas on western defense, and on February 5, 1836, Cass presented them a detailed plan. He was deeply concerned about the concentration of Indians along the line of white settlements in the western regions, for he estimated that when the removal program was completed, about 93,530 Indians would be added to the indigenous tribes of the Great Plains, making a total of approximately 244,870 Indians living between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains. Although many of the Plains Indians lived far from the white settlements, their horses enabled them to extend their "war excursions" over great distances, thus threatening the frontier settlements. Not only did the Plains Indians present a threat to the white settlements, but they also warred on the emigrant eastern tribes. The best way to protect the white settlements and prevent inter-tribal warfare was through the use of sufficient military force
to overawe the Indians, to "intercept any parties who might be disposed to make erruptions [sic] upon our settlements," and to provide a means by which troops could be rapidly concentrated wherever they might be needed.¹

To achieve these goals, Secretary Cass proposed the construction of a military road running "from some place upon the Red River, not far from Fort Towson, . . . to the right bank of the Mississippi, above the mouth of the Des Moines, and below the St. Peters."² Stockaded posts would be constructed along the road and garrisoned by dragoons and infantrymen. In order to provide enough men to construct and adequately garrison the posts, Cass anticipated abandoning several posts east of the Mississippi and reducing the function of several other military installations, including Jefferson Barracks.³

This plan met with quick legislative approval, and, on July 2, 1836, Congress passed "An act to provide for the better protection of the western frontier." The President was authorized to survey and open a military road running from Fort Gibson to the vicinity of Fort Snelling and to have military posts constructed along the road wherever they would be judged most efficient for the defense of the frontier. The new law specified that army troops were to be used in the construction of the road, so long as this extra duty did not interfere with their normal

¹ Lewis Cass to Thomas Hart Benton, February 19, 1836, American State Papers: Military Affairs, VI, 150-51.
² Ibid., 151.
³ Ibid., 152.
duty; and called for the causewaying of wet and marshy locations and the bridging of streams with insufficient fords.\textsuperscript{4}

Although Cass's military road project received congressional approval, it never progressed beyond the initial development stage. In October 1836, Cass resigned from the War Department and was succeeded, temporarily, by Benjamin F. Butler, who had doubts about the soundness of the proposal. Butler believed that the protection of the emigrant Indians from the hostile Plains tribes and unscrupulous whites was the primary function of the frontier army. To accomplish this task, the army would need military installations in territory already settled by whites as well as in advance of the settlement line, and, accordingly, Butler recommended a slow-down in the development of Cass's program.\textsuperscript{5}

Butler's temporary administration of the War Department ended on March 7, 1837, when Joel R. Poinsett became the new Secretary of War. Poinsett believed that the primary function of the frontier army was the protection of whites from hostile Indians, and in December 1837, he submitted a new plan of western defense which was opposed to the Cass plan.\textsuperscript{6}

The new Secretary submitted his proposal to the Senate together with two detailed operational plans for carrying it out. One was written by Chief Engineer Colonel Charles Gratiot and the other by Acting Assistant Quartermaster General Trueman Cross. Gratiot's plan called for establishing a series of defensive points along Cass's military road,

\textsuperscript{4} United States Statutes At Large, V, 67.

\textsuperscript{5} Report of Benjamin F. Butler, December 3, 1836, American State Papers: Military Affairs, VI, 815.

\textsuperscript{6} Report of the Secretary of War, December 30, 1837, \textit{ibid.}, VII, 777-78.
with large concentrations of reserve forces to be maintained at Baton
Rouge and Jefferson Barracks. The Chief Engineer buttressed his proposals
with a comprehensive explanation of the lines of supply to be utilized.

The major objection to Gratiot's proposal was that the number of troops
necessary to carry it out -- two dragoon regiments, ten infantry regi­
ments, and ten artillery regiments, or a total of 12,940 men -- was too
high. Poinsett thought the manpower requirement was clearly too great,
and therefore, did not recommend it. Instead he supported the recommend­
ations and opinions of Colonel Cross. Cross criticized Cass's plan for
a military road, which was conceived, he said, "in a very erroneous esti­
mate of its importance for purposes of defense." The notion of the
military road running from north to south along the edge of settlement,
Cross stated, violated a fundamental principle of military science. He
wrote:

The lines of communication should be diverging or perpen­
dicular to the frontier, not parallel with it. The
resources of an army are always presumed to be in its
rear, from whence it can draw its supplies and reinforce­
ments under cover of its own protection and by lines of
communication which are secured from interruption by the
enemy. It is clear that no army can maintain its position
long under any other circumstances. Roads between the
posts on the frontier might be found convenient for oc­
casional passing and repassing in time of peace; but as
routes of communication they would be wholly useless in
time of war. Exposed as they would be to constant in­
terruption by the enemy, it is evident that nothing short of
a force competent to take the field for offensive operations
could expect to march upon them with safety.

But I do not perceive the necessity of keeping open
these communications between the posts on the line of the
frontier at so much hazard. It could only result from the
error of making posts occupying a very extended front de­
dependent on each other for support, which would be inverting

7 Gratiot to Poinsett, October 31, 1837, ibid., 779-81.
a plain military principle. If reinforcements are required, they should be drawn from a corps of reserves posted in the rear, by means of rapid water conveyance and by roads leading to the frontier, not by flank marches through the enemy's country, on a line parallel with the frontier.8

Cross recommended two lines of frontier posts -- an exterior line of posts "advanced into the Indian country far beyond our boundary," and an interior line which "is required for the special protection of [our] settlements," and would be within the settlement boundary line. Colonel Cross proposed that the first line include Forts Snelling, Leavenworth, Gibson and Towson, "with the addition of a post at the 'upper forks' of the Des Moines River." He also advised the reoccupation of Council Bluffs, which would then relegate Fort Leavenworth to the "inner line of defense."9

Since the interior line of forts was to provide protection for the frontier settlements, these installations would serve as "post of refuge" in time of danger. For that reason, they should have an ample number of large barracks structures but provided with only small garrisons of regular army troops and light defenses, "just sufficient to protect them from seizure by the enemy." In times of need, the civilian settlers themselves would augment the fighting forces at these interior posts. "The positions of these posts of refuge," stated Cross, "must necessarily be governed by the course and extent of the settlements." It would be impossible to indicate their exact locations, he stated, because he did not have sufficient data about western settlement patterns.

8 Cross to Poinsett, November 7, 1837, ibid., 783
9 Ibid., 782
He did, however, suggest that the interior line be composed of two posts between the Red and Arkansas Rivers, four posts between the Arkansas and the Missouri, and two posts between the Missouri and Mississippi.\(^{10}\)

Supporting the exterior and interior lines of establishments would be a central corps of reserve, and Cross selected Jefferson Barracks as the location for this reserve. The Barracks was, in his judgment, "above all other places," the proper location for the reserve force. Cross explained:

The line of the frontier, especially if it be extended to include Council Bluffs, describes an arc of a circle, whose chord would pass nearly through [Jefferson Barracks]. From its central position, and its proximity to the mouths of the great rivers leading to the frontier, reinforcements may, by means of steam transports, be thrown, with great rapidity and nearly equal facility, up the Missouri, the Arkansas, and the Mississippi as circumstances shall require. A reserve post there would, in fact, be an available force for the whole line of the frontier, and it would, I think, be difficult to find a more eligible position.\(^{11}\)

Under optimum military circumstances, in order to protect the western frontier settlements from attack by hostile tribes and meet the government's treaty obligations to the emigrant tribes, stated Colonel Cross, a "military force of thirty thousand men on the western frontier would scarcely be adequate . . . ."\(^{12}\) But "political expediency," he stated "would not tolerate it, however, it might be justified by military considerations." Under his plan, the minimum force necessary to

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10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 782-83.

12 Ibid., 783
give protection to the border settlements and the emigrant tribes was only 7,000 men.\footnote{13}{Ibid., 784. The distribution of this 7,000-man force was:}

Poinsett supported Cross' proposal and stated it was superior to either the Cass or Gratiot plans. In the Secretary's annual report of December 1837, he referred to the $100,000 which had been appropriated for Cass' military road and noted that the road could not be surveyed and constructed until the locations of the posts it was supposed to connect had been chosen, and the selection of those sites would depend upon settlement lines from the interior to the frontier, not the arbitrary exterior line itself. Accordingly, Poinsett suggested that work on the military road be stopped, and it was.\footnote{14}{Report of the Secretary of War, December 2, 1837, ibid., 575.}

In his report to Congress, even though endorsing the Cross proposal, Poinsett reduced the manpower request. He asked for only 5,000 men to garrison the exterior and interior lines of posts, plus "a competent reserve at Jefferson Barracks, and an effective force at Baton Rouge," which he thought would "both ensure the safety of the western frontier, and enable the government to fulfill all its treaty stipulations, and preserve its faith with the Indians." He suggested, however, the creation of an
auxiliary force of volunteer troops to be raised in the frontier states, to be trained a certain number of days each year by regular army officers at regular army posts, in order to "be at hand to march to the succor of the border settlers and repel invaders" whenever called upon by the proper authorities.  

One of the basic ingredients in the thinking of the War Department personnel who developed plans for frontier defense was the reserve force. The exterior and interior line posts were to be of simple design and construction, and garrisoned by no more than one or two companies of infantry or artillery, thus freeing the bulk of the troops for mobile duty to meet threats of trouble or actual hostilities wherever they might occur. Secretary of War Cass' plan for the western military road was based upon this idea of the movement of reserve forces. Colonel Cross' 1837 plan also endorsed the mobile reserve idea, but in a different manner. His proposal called for a permanent garrison of 200 men at Fort Leavenworth, with a mobile reserve of 1,000 men at the Kansas post. At Fort Gibson, the permanent garrison would be 300 men, "leaving a disposable force of 1,200 [at that post] that might take the field at a moment's warning, and march in the direction of the alarm." Jefferson Barracks would support the whole western frontier with its mobile reserve force of 1,500 men.

Secretary of War Poinsett emphasized the plan of the whole reserve even more than Cross. In his 1838 annual report, he recommended that

15 Poinsett to R. M. Johnson, December 1837, ibid., 778.
16 Cross to Poinsett, November 7, 1837, ibid., 784.
the nation's regular army be concentrated in four key centers. One
center on Lake Champlain would protect the northern frontier; Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, would serve the East Coast north of Chesapeake
Bay, and a third center near the headwaters of the Savannah River would
be for the defense of the Southeast. As the fourth reserve center,
Poinsett recommended Jefferson Barracks. It was to serve the entire
western frontier from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. Small gar-
risons of regulars, augmented by volunteers and state militia, would
occupy and defend the frontier posts until the "corps d'armée" from the
reserve centers nearest the point of attack could march to their relief.
"In no other way," Poinsett concluded, "can an extensive line of frontier,
like that of the United States, be defended by a small army such as
ours."  

During the late 1830s, the demand for troops in the Seminole War
and the needs of the western and northern frontiers made it impossible
to build up any reserve at Jefferson Barracks or anywhere else. When
the regular army troops were reassigned after the Florida affray, the
reserve idea became feasible. In the Autumn of 1842, the Fourth Infantry
Regiment was assigned to Jefferson Barracks to become the nucleus of the
western frontier reserve force. By December 1842, the reserve at the
post numbered 616 men, with the arrival of the Third Infantry Regiment
in April 1843, its size was increased to 1,059. Although the reserve
garrison never approached the desired 1,500-man level, it was maintained

17 Report of Joel Poinsett, November 28, 1838, Senate Documents,
25 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 1, (Serial 338), 99.
at 900 to 1,000 men throughout the remainder of 1843 and until April and May 1844, when both infantry regiments were ordered to Fort Jesup, Louisiana. 18

The reserve force at Jefferson Barracks, even though it was not at full strength, was highly valued by the War Department. The post commander, Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny, reporting to the Adjutant General's Office on the status of the Third Military Department, stated that the reserve at the post was able to reinforce any garrison within the Department, should the need arise. Without this reserve capability, the Colonel elaborated, the government would be required to increase greatly the size of the garrison at each frontier post. Kearny concluded, "a reserve [at Jefferson Barracks] is indispensable [sic]." 19

Major General Winfield Scott, Commanding General of the Army, concurred in Kearny's opinion. He stated to Secretary of War Poinsett that the only post in the interior with a garrison of one company or more was Jefferson Barracks, whose garrison was the "Western reserve." The post was so centrally located as to offer reserve protection to the 1,700-mile

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18 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September-December 1842, Register of Post Returns in the Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Post Returns, AGO. Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, April and May 1842, ibid. In September 1842, two companies of the Fourth Infantry Regiment joined the post garrison with the headquarters and remainder of the regiment arriving in October and November. Over this four-month period, the arrival of the Third Infantry in April 1843, the size of the garrison increased to an aggregate of 1059 men. For the remainder of 1843 the garrison average was 989.11 men per month. With the transfer of the Third and Fourth Infantry regiments, the size of the post garrison declined to twenty-eight aggregate in May 1844.

19 Kearny to Jones, November 9, 1842, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.
frontier stretching from the head of Lake Superior to the Gulf of Mexico. Without this reserve at Jefferson Barracks, declared Scott, it would require at least five additional infantry regiments to provide the bare essentials of defense for the frontier settlements. Even Baltimore and the nation's capital, he avowed, were within the protective cordon of the reserve garrison. Utilizing the Ohio River, troops could be moved from Jefferson Barracks to Baltimore in less than ten days. The only other military installation equal to Jefferson Barracks as a reserve center of strategic importance, in Scott's opinion, was Fortress Monroe.

Scott analyzed the factors which made the reserve at Jefferson Barracks such a vital military force. One was transportation. The post was located so as to be able to utilize the United States' inland river system as well as the developing network of railroads. The healthiness of the location and its suitability for military instruction and for the reception of supplies were also important. "The position of Jefferson Barracks," Scott stated, "fulfills the first and third of those great conditions." Despite the periodic outbreaks of cholera, malaria, and other endemic diseases, Jefferson Barracks was, in Scott's opinion, healthier than any other frontier army post, and because of its location it was a post which was easy to supply. Furthermore, Colonel Kearny was achieving significant improvement in the military instruction given to recruits as well as regulars.

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20 Scott to Poinsett, November 24, 1843, Senate Documents, 28 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, (Serial 431), 63.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
Scott's glowing assessment of the excellence of the reserve force at Jefferson Barracks was echoed by Inspector General of the Army, Colonel Sylvester Churchill, who made an inspection tour of Jefferson Barracks on May 18, 1843. The Inspector General found the soldiers of both the Third and Fourth Infantry to be performing their garrison duties and military training in a "very good" manner. The only point of criticism Colonel Churchill noted was the worn-out condition of the garrison's arms. Both regiments had received their muskets before they served in Florida, and, as a consequence of hard use in that southern climate, the weapons were rapidly becoming unserviceable.23 The regimental commanders, Lieutenant Colonel John Garland, Fourth Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Ethan A. Hitchcock, Third Infantry, noted that their troops' muskets were of the "old pattern" and were not in good firing order because the locks were deficient.24

Both Garland and Hitchcock considered Jefferson Barracks to be a suitable location for the reserve force. The barracks buildings could adequately house both regiments without any dangerous crowding. Only the post's water supply was a source of concern. The Mississippi had changed channels, placing the main water flow on the Illinois side of the river. This meant that the garrison had difficulty in obtaining fresh water, especially in the winter and times of low water stages. Cisterns


needed to be constructed, Garland and Hitchcock stated, in order to pro-
vide a more reliable water supply.\textsuperscript{25}

Despite the water supply problem, in other ways the training and
daily life at Jefferson Barracks had greatly improved over what they had
been during the Seminole War. The training, directed by Colonel Kearny,
was exacting and rigorous, and was achieving the desired results. The
soldiers were becoming very proficient in company line movements and were
showing great progress in mastering complex battalion line movements.
Despite the rigor of the training, discipline was excellent. Harsh pun-
ishment for minor infractions of military regulations had ceased, with
the most usual punishment for enlisted men for minor offenses being the
stoppage of pay or, at the most, "walking the track" -- that is, being
made to march from one end of the parade ground to the other from 6:00
A.M. until 6:00 P.M.\textsuperscript{26}

Not only did Colonel Kearny improve infantry training techniques
and greatly reduce the harsh treatment of enlisted men, he also attempted
to change the conduct of officers within his command. The Colonel believed
that one of the gravest problems confronting the officer corps was its
careless neglect of orders, especially the habit of overstaying leaves
of absence. In an attempt to eliminate this problem, Kearny ordered that
any officer within his command who reported to his duty station after
the expiration of his leave of absence, or who had been reported "absent
without leave," would be arrested and charged with "desertion." An

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Garland to Churchill, May 18, 1843, \textit{ibid}.
enlisted man, if he did not return to his duty station upon the expiration of his leave of absence, Kearny explained, was reported as a deserter, and, if apprehended, was punished accordingly. "Why should an officer guilty of the same offense pass with impunity," he questioned. To correct this evil, in Kearny's opinion, "examples should commence with officers of rank and experience, who know or who should know, the necessity of a prompt compliance with orders, and attention to duty." 27

Although the secretary of war, the War Department, and the commanding general of the army received Kearny's command policy with great indifference, the Colonel instituted it within the Third Military Department.

Kearny continued improving the quality of life at Jefferson Barracks by employing a post chaplain and schoolmaster. On October 18, 1842, the Reverend C. S. Hedges was employed as the post chaplain. Reverend Hedges also maintained a five-day per week school for the children of officers and enlisted men at the post, and two or three times a week he taught a night school for off-duty soldiers. In addition, he maintained a library for the Fourth Infantry. 28

The major problem of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks in 1843 was its health. On May 18, 1843, Dr. Samuel G. I. DeCamp, post surgeon, reported to Inspector General Churchill that the monthly average of soldiers sick and either confined to quarters or in the hospital was 178, or one out of every three. The death rate during this time was one out

27 Kearny to Jones, November 28, 1842, Letters Recd., AGO.

of every sixty-two men. These were unusually high sickness and mortality rates, but they were not attributed to any special conditions at the post. Both the Third and Fourth Infantry regiments had only recently served in Florida, and when assigned to Jefferson Barracks, they brought many "disease ridden" soldiers with them. The Fourth Infantry was especially hard hit because it made the move from sub-tropical Florida to the Missouri post in November 1842, at the onset of an exceptionally hard winter. The post surgeon, Samuel G. I. DeCamp, did not seem to apprehensive about the high incidence of sickness, and expressed the opinion that an increased use of quinine would greatly reduce the problem of "intermittent fevers." Despite Dr. DeCamp's optimism, the high rate of illness at Jefferson Barracks did not decline as long as the Third and Fourth Infantry regiments were stationed at Jefferson Barracks.

While the Third and Fourth Infantry were stationed at Jefferson Barracks their general function was to act as the strategic ready reserve for the western frontier. In order to be ready to carry out that role, their daily function and routine was to drill veteran soldiers and train recruits in infantry tactics. This was tedious work, and often led to squabbles between officers, as well as non-commissioned officers, over such matters as privileges of rank and uniform. Minor differences of this nature were sometimes carried to extremes. In one such incident, an orderly sergeant of Company H, Third Infantry, complained to the regimental commander that he, the sergeant, was not being accorded the proper

29 DeCamp to Churchill, May 18, 1843, I.G. Reports.

30 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, June-December 1843, and January-May 1844, Post Returns, AGO.
station, as senior sergeant, when his company was involved in unit drill with other companies. Colonel Hitchcock replied that the commanding officer of the drill formation had the "right to select who he please[d] of the n[on] c[ommissioned] officers to serve as his first sergeant." This answer did not satisfy the sergeant and he appealed the decision to the department commander, Colonel Kearny, and eventually to the general in chief of the army. Both of those officers concurred with Hitchcock's opinion and verbally reprimanded the sergeant and his company commander, First Lieutenant Stephen D. Dobbins, for pushing the matter beyond its reasonable limits and thus harming regimental morale.  

The daily tedium of drill and its associated personnel problems were ended when the Third and Fourth Infantry were ordered to Fort Jesup in the Spring of 1844. With the removal of the western reserve from the post, Jefferson Barracks once again entered into a period of quiet. During the remainder of 1844, from May to December, the garrison averaged only 21.25 men, with the monthly report of July showing only ten men present at the post. The size of the garrison did not appreciably increase until January 1845, when a detachment of recruits from the Second Dragoons arrived.

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32 The Third Infantry Regiment left for Fort Jesup on April 17, 1844, with an aggregate of 330 men. See Vose to Jones, April 28, 1844, Letters Recd., AGO; The Fourth Infantry Regiment left for Louisiana on May 7, 1844. See Vose to Jones, May 7, 1844, ibid.

33 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, May-December 1844, Post Returns, AGO; Thompson to Assistant Adjutant General, January 9, 1845, Letters Recd., AGO.
During the early months of 1845, Jefferson Barracks functioned as a recruit depot and supply depot for the First and Second Dragoons. Recruits were received at the post, given their basic uniform issue and fundamental training, and then sent to their western duty stations. The dragoon recruits also picked up and escorted remount horses from the post to the western cavalry units.

Although the post was relatively inactive during this period, the post commander, First Lieutenant Philip R. Thompson, First Dragoons, who served in the dragoons until he was cashiered on September 4, 1855, for appearing drunk before a court martial, considered Jefferson Barracks to be more than just a recruit depot, and so petitioned Secretary of War William L. Marcy for a double ration allotment, which was allowed commanders of permanent garrisons. "It has been decided by this department," Adjutant General Jones replied, "that at least one company of troops are necessary to constitute a permanent or fixed post garrisoned with troops [within the meaning of the 1842 Army organization law]." Recruiting stations and depots were not considered to be permanent posts. Since Jefferson Barracks did not have at least one company, or approximately seventy-five to eighty men, as a permanent garrison, it could not be legally considered to be a permanent post.

34 Post Order No. 4, February 27, 1845, Letters Received by the Department of the West in the Records of United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Post Order No. 6, April 16, 1845, ibid.

35 Thompson to March, April 23, 1845, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Jones to Thompson, June 3, 1845, Letters Sent by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, AGO.
Although Thompson's claim was rejected, and, in a technical sense, Jefferson Barracks did not qualify as a "permanent post," the War Department did not intend to abandon the post or reduce its role in western defense. In August 1845, the Fifth Infantry, under the command of Brevet Brigadier General George M. Brooke, was ordered to the post from Buffalo Barracks, New York. While this regiment was enroute to Jefferson Barracks, the War Department altered its plans. The advance battalion, composed of five companies, was to proceed directly to New Orleans and thence to Corpus Christi, Texas. The remaining three companies were to proceed to Jefferson Barracks, await the arrival of recruits from the recruit depot at Newport, Kentucky, and then proceed to the Texas Gulf coast region.

Despite the change in plans for the Fifth Infantry, the War Department was still committed to re-establishing a strategic reserve force at Jefferson Barracks. Accordingly, the First Infantry Regiment was ordered to concentrate at the post from scattered locations along the Upper Mississippi frontier. The headquarters and four companies of the regiment arrived on September 23, 1845, from Fort Crawford; Company I, Company E, Company F, and Company H, Fifth Infantry Regiment, joined the garrison at Jefferson Barracks in early September 1845, with Companies E and F departing the post in the latter part of that month. Company H left the post for Texas in October 1845, Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September-October 1845, Post Returns, AGO.

36 Extract of General Order No. 37, August 5, 1845, Letters Recd., West. Dept.

37 Jones to Brooke, August 23, 1845, Letters Sent, AGO. Companies E, F, and H, Fifth Infantry Regiment, joined the garrison at Jefferson Barracks in early September 1845, with Companies E and F departing the post in the latter part of that month. Company H left the post for Texas in October 1845, Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September-October 1845, Post Returns, AGO.
from Fort Winnebago, on September 19; and Company F, from Fort Snelling, on October 2.\(^{38}\)

Two companies of the regiment had been ordered by Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny to garrison Fort Leavenworth while that officer led the First Dragoons in the Summer of 1845 on an expedition to protect the Oregon and Santa Fe Trail caravans and pacify the Indians. Colonel William Davenport, commander of the First Infantry, was irritated with this development and demanded of Brevet Brigadier General George M. Brooke, the commander of the Third Military Department, that the two companies of his regiment be returned to Jefferson Barracks. Davenport was a veteran of the War of 1812, and had served on the western frontier with the Sixth and Seventh Infantry regiments since 1821. He was promoted to colonel in June 1842, and assumed command of the First Infantry in July 1843. Davenport insisted that the whole regiment needed to be together for training and better to provide a strategic reserve. General Brooke endorsed Davenport's request observing that the performance and training of the six companies at Jefferson Barracks was "very much improved," but would be further enhanced by the presence of the two missing companies. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, however, denied Davenport's request. He was both surprised and disappointed that Brooke and Davenport should attempt "to break up the established system" of having the reserve at Jefferson Barracks provide company size infantry garrisons for the Upper Missouri frontier posts.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{38}\) Cleasy to Lee, August 26, 1845, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, September 1845, Post Returns, AGO.

\(^{39}\) Davenport to Brooke, October 4, 1845, Letters Recd., AGO; Endorsement of Brigadier General George M. Brooke, February 4, 1846, ibid.; Endorsement of Adjutant General, February 21, 1846, ibid.
Army commanders at Jefferson Barracks and other military establishments realized that repetitious training exercises eroded morale and encouraged large-scale neglect of duty and desertion. Accordingly, company and post funds, supported by individual contributions from the troops of the garrison, were established in an attempt to provide relief from the boredom of training and to improve the quality of life at the army posts. There was, however, considerable trouble with the post funds at Jefferson Barracks. In order to comply with army regulations, Colonel Davenport ordered that a council of administration audit the post fund, and, upon completion of the audit, deposit fifty percent of the total amount in the First Infantry regimental fund. After much delay, the council met and determined that there was a total of $340.23\text{\footnotesize{f}} in the post fund, but the council refused to appropriate any of it to the regimental fund believing that, instead, the money should be divided among the contributing companies. Colonel Davenport was angered by the council's rebuff. He, therefore, dismissed it and appointed a new one, and instructed the new group of officers to comply with his original order. The new council, however, proved to be equally reluctant to appropriate money to the regimental fund, and Colonel Davenport was forced to carry the dispute to the Third Military Department. General Brooke did not want to get embroiled in an intra-regimental squabble, but he agreed with Davenport that fifty percent of the post fund should be appropriated to the regimental fund. The General, however, admonished the Colonel that in the future he, Davenport, should not ignore the advice or wishes of
the regimental officers concerning the appropriation or expenditure of their soldiers' money. 40

A short time later, Colonel Davenport was forced to turn to General Brooke to settle a minor dispute between two officers at the post over a matter of privileges of rank. During the first week of December 1845, Captain William R. Jouett, Company I, First Infantry, arrived at Jefferson Barracks and claimed the quarters occupied by Captain and Brevet Major John J. Abercrombie, commanding officer, Company K, First Infantry, by right of seniority. Jouett had entered the army as a second lieutenant of the First Infantry on February 19, 1818, and served with that regiment for twenty-eight years. He had been promoted to first lieutenant in 1819, and to captain on May 1, 1829. Abercrombie was an 1822 graduate of the United States Military Academy, and had served with the First Infantry at numerous frontier posts from 1822 through 1836. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1828, and to captain in September 1836. He fought in Florida in the Seminole War where he was promoted to brevet major on December 25, 1837, for "gallant and meritorious" service. Although senior to Jouett in brevet rank, Abercrombie was junior in permanent rank. Abercrombie refused to give up his quarters to Jouett, citing an interpretation of army regulations, made by Major General Scott, which held that in a mixed command the privileges of brevet rank would be recognized. Captain Jouett, however, persisted in insisting that it was permanent rank that counted. Colonel Davenport was unable to persuade the two

40 Post Order No. 100, October 7, 1845, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Minutes of Council of Administration, October 11, 1845, ibid.; Post Order No. 127, October 30, 1845, ibid.; Minutes of Council of Administration, November 3, 1845, ibid.; Garnett to Davenport, November 8, 1845, ibid.
officers to compromise their disagreement, so he referred it to the Third Military Department. Not wishing to decide the issue, General Brooke forwarded the matter to the Adjutant General's Office, and Adjutant General Jones decided that General Scott's opinion on the privileges of brevet rank was in effect and applied in this case. Abercrombie would keep his quarters and Captain Jouett would have to seek quarters elsewhere.41

Although it would seem that intra-regimental squabbles were a major activity of the officers at Jefferson Barracks, their main function was still training in infantry tactics and keeping the ready reserve force for the western frontier prepared for action. This reserve force was called upon in the decade of the 1840s to participate in the military affairs associated with the annexation of Texas and the boundary controversy with Mexico.

Anticipating problems with the Mexican government over the expected annexation of Texas with its southern boundary of the Rio Grande River, the War Department assigned Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor to command the First Military District at Fort Jesup. On April 27, 1844, Taylor's command was enlarged to form a "Corps of Observation," which was to be sent to the Texas boundary as soon as the annexation process was complete. The backbone of this new Corps was the Third and Fourth

41 Jouett to Wood, December 15, 1845, Letters Recd., AGO; Abercrombie to Davenport, December 27, 1845, ibid.; Davenport to Brooke, January 16, 1846, Letters Sent, AGO; Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1903, (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 150, 584.
Infantry regiments which had been ordered to the Louisiana post from Jefferson Barracks. 42

In August 1845, following the annexation of Texas in March, General Taylor moved his Observation Corps to Corpus Christi. Taylor selected a campsite on the right bank of the Nueces River near its mouth. From this location he would be able to observe and gather information about Mexican actions, and, at the same time, organize an effective defense should any Mexican force move across the Rio Grande and threaten Texas. 43

During the Summer and Fall of 1845, as rapidly as soldiers could be freed from other duties, the War Department sent reinforcements to Corpus Christi. On August 6, 1845, Adjutant General Jones wrote Taylor conveying the Polk Administration's views with regard to Taylor's mission:

> Although a state of war with Mexico, or an invasion of Texas by her forces, may not take place, it is . . . proper and necessary that your force shall be fully equal to meet with certainty of success any crisis which may arise in Texas and which would require you by force of arms to carry out the instructions of the Government. 44

Accordingly, Taylor's command was strengthened until, my mid-October 1845, it had grown to 3,922 officers and men organized into three brigades. These troops represented approximately one-half of the total strength of the army and constituted the largest force assembled in one command since the War of 1812. The concentration left only one regiment to guard

42 Memorandum to Secretary of War from Adjutant General's Office, October 7, 1845, Letters Sent, AGO; Vise to Jones, April 28, 1844, Letters Recd., AGO; Id. to Id., May 7, 1843, ibid.

43 Taylor to Jones, August 15, 1845, House Executive Documents, 30th Cong., 1 Sess., No. 60, 132-33.

44 Jones to Taylor, August 6, 1845, ibid., 83-84.
the nation's 2,000-mile border with Canada, and three regiments to pro-
tect the 1,500-mile Indian frontier. One of the three regiments
protecting the Indian frontier was the First Infantry stationed at
Jefferson Barracks.

In early February 1846, the War Department ordered General Taylor
to move his command from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande River and en-
camp opposite Matamoros, Mexico. Taylor immediately complied, and by
March 28, 1846, he had established his main camp across the Rio Grande
from the Mexican city. To strengthen his command and further secure his
position, Taylor asked the War Department for even more reinforcements.

The War Department responded, and on April 18, 1846, ordered a
battalion of the First Infantry from Jefferson Barracks to Texas. Adju-
tant General Jones, upon issuing this order to General Brooke, as commander
of the Third Military Department, directed the General to see to it that
the battalion was brought to full strength and sent off without delay.
Companies C, E, G, and K were designated as the ones to be transferred,
and the other companies were stripped of as many men as were needed to
fill the Texas-bound companies. They left the post on May 2, 1846, for
Texas via New Orleans. Upon receiving notification of their departure,

45 Henry Putney Beers, The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846,

46 Taylor to Jones, March 29, 1846, House Executive Documents,
30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 60, (Serial 520), 99-100.

47 Jones to Brooke, April 18, 1846, Letters Recd., AGO; Jones
to Davenport, April 18, 1846, ibid.; Order No. 14, April 28, 1846, De-
partment Orders of the Third Military Department in the Records of the
United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives).
Hereinafter cited as Dept. Orders, 3d Mil. Dept.; Davenport to Jones,
May 3, 1846, Letters Recd., AGO.
Adjutant General Jones asked General Brooke why they were so late in getting started. General-in-Chief Scott, he informed Brooke, thought the battalion should have left the same day it received its marching orders. Given the importance of the battalion's mission, the delay was unwarranted.\(^{48}\)

Colonel Davenport, the regimental commander, explained the delay as growing out of the work involved in bringing the four companies to strength. Orders to effect the many personnel transfers from other companies to those going to Texas had to be drawn, muster rolls and pay rolls had to be changed, and quartermaster and commissary records had to be updated to reflect these personnel changes before the battalion could leave the post, as was required by army regulations. In addition, a large number of officers neglected attending their military duties because they were making provision for their families in St. Louis, since they were not certain when the battalion would return to Jefferson Barracks. General Brooke added that inclement weather also contributed to the delay. There were "very heavy rains" during the four-day period of the troop transfer. They hindered the collecting and packing of the battalion's supplies and made the roads used by the wagons to haul the battalion's baggage from the post to the river landing almost impassable. Although Brooke's and Davenport's explanations for the troop delay were eventually accepted by the War Department, Adjutant General Jones informed the two officers that in the future similar delays would not be tolerated.\(^{49}\)

\(^{48}\) Jones to Brooke, May 13, 1846, Letters Sent, AGO.

With the departure of the battalion of the First Infantry, numbering 257 soldiers, the garrison left at Jefferson Barracks was very small. During May, June, and July 1846, there was an average of only forty-four men present for duty, including two understrength companies of the First Infantry which had been left behind. When additional recruits for the regiment did arrive at the post, they were quickly sent to Fort Leavenworth to aid in frontier defense. 50

Not long after the departure of the battalion of the First Infantry for Texas, Jefferson Barracks became the mustering point for a regiment of Missouri Volunteers who were destined for service in Mexico. Learning of a buildup of Mexican forces opposite his army, on April 16, 1846, General Taylor asked the War Department for additional forces. Upon receiving Taylor's request at New Orleans on May 3, Brevet Major General Edmund P. Gaines, commanding general of the Western Division, immediately called upon the governors of Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri for state volunteers. The governor of Missouri immediately ordered the St. Louis Regiment of the state volunteers to assemble at Jefferson Barracks for active duty, and Colonel Davenport mustered these volunteers into federal service on May 20. 51

The St. Louis Regiment left the post on May 23, but not before a disagreement erupted between Colonel Davenport and Colonel A. R. Easton,

50 Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, May, June, and July 1846, Post Returns, AGO; Special Order No. 17, June 2, 1846, Dept. Orders, 3d Mil. Dept.

51 Taylor to Jones, April 26, 1846, House Executive Documents, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 60, 288; Daily Missouri Republican, May 15, 1846; Davenport to Easton, May 20, 1846, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
the commander of the volunteer regiment, over the pay and rations which the St. Louis Regiment was to receive. Easton claimed that his regiment had been ready to be mustered into federal service on May 18, and should, therefore, receive pay and rations from that date, rather than two days later when they were actually mustered. The St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican agreed with Colonel Easton blaming Colonel Davenport for the two-day delay in mustering the troops. Citing the appropriate army regulations, Davenport insisted that the volunteers must be paid from the date of actual enrollment. Once mustered into United States service, he added, the volunteers were under his command and must accept and obey his directives. Although he reluctantly accepted Davenport's decision, Easton noted that when the national government so desperately needed state volunteer units, it was certainly "poor practice" for the regular army to treat the volunteers so shabbily.\(^{52}\)

On June 3, 1846, soon after the St. Louis Regiment had departed Jefferson Barracks, General Brooke notified Adjutant General Jones that the Governor of Illinois, Thomas Ford, had volunteered the service of three regiments of that state's militia for federal service. Brooke asked the Adjutant General what he should do, since he had received no instructions concerning the mustering of Illinois volunteers into United States service. The following day, Brooke received orders from the Adjutant General's Office that the War Department had accepted the service of the Illinois volunteers, and had instructed Governor Ford to send the volunteers to Jefferson Barracks, where they would be mustered into federal service.

service and receive their partial pay and rations before their transfer to Texas. 53

The Illinois volunteers arrived at Jefferson Barracks on July 5, drew pay and rations, and commenced basic infantry training. They were inspected and mustered into federal service on July 13, by the Inspector General, Colonel George Croghan, who noted that these volunteers were not the best he had ever seen, but certainly were not the worst. Following the mustering ceremonies, the Illinois volunteers readied themselves for shipment to Texas, and, on July 23, 1846, approximately 800 Illinois soldiers left the post for New Orleans on board the steamers *Sultana* and *Eclipse*. They were, in the opinion of Colonel Davenport, "somewhat improved by [their] visit to Jefferson Barracks." 54

At the time the Illinois and Missouri Volunteers were moving through the post, the Western Division of the Army underwent a major change in command. The War Department had become dissatisfied with Brevet Major General Gaines' administration of the Division. Secretary of War William L. Marcy particularly complained that, upon receipt of General Taylor's dispatches calling for reinforcements, Gaines had panicked and made unauthorized appeals to state governors for the services of state militias and volunteers. The result had been mass confusion in the War Department and the Western Division especially, which had interrupted


54 Fondry to Lee, July 6, 1846, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Id. to Id., July 8, 1846, ibid.; Id to Id., July 13, 1846, ibid.; Id to Id., July 24, 1846, ibid.; Davenport to Jones, July 23, 1846, Letters Recd., AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, July 7, 1846.
an effective reinforcement process so necessary to Taylor's command. On June 2, 1846, Gaines was ordered to Washington to face a court of inquiry, which eventually found him guilty of exceeding his authority, but recommended that no further action be taken. None was, and in late August Gaines became Commanding General of the Eastern Division with headquarters in New York City.55

Brevet Brigadier General George M. Brooke succeeded Gaines as the new commander of the Western Division, and Jefferson Barracks became the new division headquarters. Brooke, although pleased at becoming division commander, did not like being ordered to have his headquarters at Jefferson Barracks. He preferred to stay in St. Louis because he felt Jefferson Barracks was lacking in several necessities of a good headquarters. Writing to Adjutant General Jones, he stated:

I find on examination that there is no kind of public furniture at Jefferson Barracks, and no hotel or other house, where I could board or lodge. Under these circumstances, I should be put to considerable pecuniary expense in purchasing furniture and all other articles of house keeping, and not knowing how long I may remain at that post, it would subject me to much expense when suddenly ordered away. . . . The mail only reaches Jefferson Barracks three times a week, while at this place [St. Louis] it arrives every day. All the staff of the department with whom it is necessary to communicate reside in this city, and I am in some measure isolated, as it regards an active efficiency of my duties, when necessary.56

Despite Brooke's protest, the order stood, and by mid-July 1846, he had moved to Jefferson Barracks and assumed command of the Western Division.


56 Daily Missouri Republican, June 11, 1846; Brooke to Jones, June 16, 1846, Letters Recd., AGO.
Division. When he moved to the post, Brooke formally relinquished command of the Third Military Department, and appointed Colonel William Davenport, commanding officer of the First Infantry Regiment, as his successor. From July to mid-October, both General Brooke and Colonel Davenport exercised their respective commands from the post. Brooke maintained his headquarters at Jefferson Barracks until October 1846, when the Adjutant General ordered him to move his headquarters to New Orleans, where he would be able to exercise greater control over the effort to reinforce and resupply Zachary Taylor on the Rio Grande.

At the very time the Illinois and Missouri Volunteers were moving through Jefferson Barracks and General Brooke and Colonel Davenport were assuming new command responsibilities, the Polk Administration was increasing the United States' commitment against Mexico. On May 1, 1846, President Polk sent a message to Congress asking it to vote a formal declaration of war against Mexico. The President stated that General Taylor's movement to Corpus Christi, and then to the Rio Grande, had been designed "to meet a threatened invasion of Texas by Mexican forces, for which extensive military preparations have been made." The United States had made efforts at reconciliation, he stated, but "Mexico . . . had invaded our territory and shed American blood on American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are at war."  

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57 Order No. 16, July 16, 1846, Order Book, 3d Mil. Dept.
58 Jones to Brooke, October 2, 1846, Letters Sent, AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, October 24, 1846.
Following a bitter debate in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Polk Administration was successful in getting Congress to approve an "Act providing for the prosecution of the existing war between the United States and the Republic of Mexico." The law authorized the raising of 50,000 volunteers to serve for either a year or the duration of the war, whichever was shorter. The volunteers were to furnish their own uniforms, and, if cavalry, their own horses, but they would be reim­bursed for their uniforms and receive forty cents per day for their mounts. Otherwise, they would be paid the same as regular army troops.  

While Congress was declaring war on Mexico and calling for the service of volunteers, it was also expanding the size of the regular army. It passed an act authorizing the President to increase the number of privates in artillery, dragoon, and infantry companies from 75 to 100 men. This increase was to be accomplished by volunteer enlistments for a maximum period of five years, "unless sooner disbanded by the President." Congress also authorized the creation of a company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers within the corps of engineers, and the raising of a regiment of mounted riflemen. This new regiment was to have a strength of 810 men and be organized into ten companies of 75 men each. The men of the Mounted Riflemen, as they were enlisted, were assigned to Jefferson Barracks. They began to assemble during August 1846, and by the end of the month detachments of eight companies were present at the post. The riflemen increased the size of the garrison from seventy-one to 449 men,

60 United States Statutes At Large, IX, 9-10
61 Ibid., 11-13.
and once again gave the regular personnel at the post "a sense of useful purpose" as they worked with these new recruits. 62

At Jefferson Barracks, the Mounted Riflemen were supposed to receive their issues of uniforms and arms and initial training in both cavalry and infantry tactics. The training, however, was deficient because the riflemen lacked arms. Colonel Davenport wrote Adjutant General Jones explaining that the only rifles at the post belonged to two companies of the First Infantry and a detachment of the First Dragoons, who were using their weapons in their own training. It was impossible for the recruits of the Mounted Riflemen to share in the use of these weapons, and consequently their training would very quickly cease. Davenport added that a field officer of the Mounted Riflemen might be assigned to the post. As it was, all the regiment's officers were involved in recruiting activities. On September 9, 1846, there were 272 riflemen, or approximately three and one-half companies, at the barracks, and Davenport could not devote all his time to supervising their training and still fulfill his responsibilities as the commanding officer of the post and the Third Military Department. 63

The Adjutant General responded by ordering Major George S. Burbridge, the regimental major of the Mounted Riflemen, to visit Jefferson Barracks and inspect the training of the recruits. Not satisfied by this gesture, Davenport again accused "higher authorities" of not only neglecting the

62 Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, August 1846, Post Returns, AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, August 10, 22, 31, 1846; Davenport to Jones, August 22, 1846, Letters Recd., AGO.

63 Davenport to Jones, September 9, 1846, Letters Recd., AGO.
Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, but also showing a lack of "proper concern" for his responsibilities as post and departmental commander. He insisted that Burbridge be stationed at Jefferson Barracks. The details of organizing the rifle regiment, he insisted, must be left to the officers of the Rifle Regiment, and if they performed them poorly, it was not his responsibility.  

The War Department was slow in supplying the needs of the men in the Rifle Regiment. In October, Colonel Davenport reported to the Adjutant General that they were "still without arms or clothing." Although arms were expected soon, as for clothing, "I have heard nothing further than it has been [requisitioned] again and again."  

Three companies of the regiment were under orders to join the army assembling in Texas preparatory to the invasion of Mexico, but Davenport felt that the men were inadequately prepared for active service. They had received no training in the manual of arms, and they were not properly equipped with horses. Davenport pleaded with the Adjutant General to delay the regiment's departure until the men had received weapons training and were fully mounted. By November 1, the regiment's situation had improved in that at least two companies had received their uniforms.

64 Id. to Id., September 22, 1846, ibid.
65 Id to Id., October 3, 1846, ibid.; Id. to Id., October 19, 1846, ibid. In the 1846 act establishing the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, Congress appropriated $76,500 for the "mounting and equipping said regiment," but the War Department, in its confusion with running the war in Mexico, was very neglectful in providing the appropriated supplies.
66 Freeman to Davenport, October 16, 1846, Letters Sent, AGO; Freeman to Burbridge, November 3, 1846, ibid.
and, as Davenport was informed, the remainder would receive theirs at Point Isabel, Texas.\textsuperscript{68}

On inquiring at the St. Louis Arsenal concerning the arms for the Rifle Regiment, Davenport learned that they had been sent to New Orleans and would be issued to the regiment as it passed through that place on its way to Mexico.\textsuperscript{69}

Notwithstanding their lack of arms and serious shortages of clothing, in November and December 1846, six of the eight companies of the Mounted Riflemen stationed at Jefferson Barracks were transferred to Point Isabel, Texas, via New Orleans.\textsuperscript{70} With the departure of the main body of the Mounted Riflemen, Colonel Davenport could look forward to a return to a more normal routine at the post. Irritated with the problems of command and the seeming lack of concern on the part of the War Department over the plight of the Mounted Riflemen, the Colonel decided that he wanted a new assignment. On December 14, 1846, he wrote the Adjutant General requesting a transfer to the United States forces in Mexico. Although expressing an appreciation of Davenport’s discontent with his situation, the War Department denied his request. Adjutant General Jones explained that, "the interests of the service imperatively demand that some officers of rank and experience shall serve . . . at the important permanent posts or stations."\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{68} Id. to Id., November 7, 1846, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{69} Id. to Id., November 10, 1846, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Daily Missouri Republican}, November 30, December 4, 23, 28, 1846.

\textsuperscript{71} Jones to Davenport, December 29, 1846, Letters Sent, AGO.
Although asserting the need to keep Colonel Davenport at Jefferson Barracks, in March 1847, the War Department changed its mind and ordered him to Matamoros, Mexico, to assume command of the United States army garrison at that place. At the same time that Davenport was ordered to Matamoros, the remainder of the First Infantry Regiment at the Barracks -- companies F and H -- an aggregate of 157 men, was also ordered to Mexico. This left the post with a garrison of only sixty-two men.  

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Staniford of the Eighth Infantry Regiment succeeded Davenport as commanding officer of the Third Military Department and of Jefferson Barracks. He was a veteran of the War of 1812 who was retained in the army as a first lieutenant during the 1815 reorganization. From 1815 to 1838, Staniford served in the Second and Sixth Infantry regiments, and from 1838 to 1846, when he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Eighth Infantry, he served in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth regiments. He was a decorated hero of the battles of Palo Alto, Resca de la Palma, and Monterrey. Staniford had arrived at the post on April 2, 1847, to convalesce after breaking several ribs while on duty in Mexico. After arriving at Jefferson Barracks, Staniford asked to be placed on limited duty, and even though he was the most readily available field officer for the vacant command, he was, nevertheless, surprised to receive such an exalted assignment.

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72 Jones to Davenport, March 24, 1847, ibid.; Davenport to Jones, April 2, 1847, Letters Recd., AGO; Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, March 1847, Post Returns, AGO.

73 Staniford to Jones, April 2, 1847, Letters Recd., AGO; Jones to Staniford, April 5, 1847, Letters Sent, AGO.
The first major task confronting Staniford after assuming his new command was the mustering of various units of the Illinois and Missouri Volunteers which had been called into national government service on March 3, 1847.\textsuperscript{74} Jonathan E. Edwards, governor of Missouri, encouraged Staniford to proceed with their mustering process, and especially that of the Missouri troops, as quickly as possible. To delay it, he observed, would increase the desertion rate among these citizen soldiers. Their desertion, the Governor stated, would certainly hinder the progress of the military action against Mexico and make the recruitment of additional volunteers within Missouri even more difficult.\textsuperscript{75} Heeding the Governor's advice, Staniford quickly mustered into United States service the first group of Missouri Volunteers to report to the post. These were mounted troops, and they were to serve along the Oregon and Santa Fe trails, so the commissary and quartermaster departments at the post had to provide them with the necessary equipment and rations for an overland journey from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Leavenworth. To the credit of Colonel Staniford and the regular army garrison at the Barracks, this task was accomplished in such an efficient manner than within one week some 150 Missouri Volunteers were processed through the post and sent on their way westward.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74} Jenkins to Lee, June 15, 1847, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Daily Missouri Republican, April 15, 1847.

\textsuperscript{75} Edwards to Staniford, June 17, 1847, Letters Recd., AGO.

\textsuperscript{76} Jenkins to Lee, June 16, 1847, ibid.; Daily Missouri Republican, May 22, 29, 1847.
The Illinois Volunteers arrived at the post after the Missouri Volunteers had left and underwent the same processing as the Missourians. The Illinois Volunteers, however, spent more time at the Barracks receiving basic cavalry and infantry training from the regular army cadre. This additional training proved to be very beneficial and greatly improved the discipline and "esprit de corps" of the Illinois troops. The editor of the Daily Missouri Republican noted that as the Illinois Volunteers passed through St. Louis on their way to New Orleans, their demeanor and military discipline were far superior to that of the Missouri Volunteers, who had just recently gone through the city. The officers at Jefferson Barracks, the editor concluded, were to be congratulated in their excellent training achievement. 77

The volunteer forces were not the only new recruits to pass through Jefferson Barracks during 1847. The First and Second Dragoons and the First, Twelveth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Infantry regiments established regimental recruit depots at the post, and a general recruit depot was formed to serve all infantry regiments. By September 1, there were 376 recruits at the post with a permanent cadre of five officers and six non-commissioned officers to handle their training schedule. 78 This was too small a cadre to train the recruits adequately, and so the Adjutant General began to move additional officers to the post.

Anticipating the creation of a Third Dragoon Regiment, the War Department ordered Captain Enoch Steen of the First Dragoons from Fort

77 Daily Missouri Republican, August 13, September 9, 1847.
78 Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, September 1847, Post Returns, AGO.

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Leavenworth to Jefferson Barracks. Steen had joined the army in 1832 as a second lieutenant in the Mounted Rangers, but transferred to the Second Dragoons in 1833. He served in both the First and Second Dragoons during the 1840s. Steen was to take charge of the new dragoon unit as it was formed at Jefferson Barracks. Adjutant General Jones instructed him to "establish and enforce a rigid system of instruction and discipline." One of Captain Steen's first duties was to ascertain the equipment and supplies the mounted troops required, and then acquire them, practicing, however, "the strictest economy in all [of his] arrangements."^79

To help Steen with the training of the dragoon recruits, Captain and Brevet Major Joseph H. LaMotte, commanding officer of the First Infantry recruiting office at St. Louis, was also transferred to the Barracks. LaMotte was an 1827 graduate of the United States Military Academy. From 1827 to 1837, he served at numerous frontier posts, including Jefferson Barracks. He saw action in the Seminole War in 1837-38 with the First Infantry, and aided in the transfer of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia to the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) in 1838-39. From 1840 through 1845, LaMotte was again stationed, for brief periods, at several different frontier army posts, including Jefferson Barracks, Fort Crawford, Wisconsin, and Fort Leavenworth. He served in the Mexican War, and was severely wounded at the Battle of Monterrey. In 1846 he was transferred to St. Louis to recover from these wounds. Prior to his move to the Barracks, LaMotte was instructed that if he determined additional training cadre were needed, he was to close his recruiting office in St.

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^79 Jones to Steen, August 18, 1847, Letters Sent, AGO.
Louis and move his entire party to the post to assist him. LaMotte immediately went to Jefferson Barracks, where finding that he would need extra help, he closed his recruiting operations in St. Louis, and by mid-September 1847, was supervising the training of infantry recruits at the Barracks. 80

Captains Steen and LaMotte and the St. Louis recruit depot personnel were a much needed addition to the training cadre at Jefferson Barracks. From September to December 1847, the post cadre processed an average of 179 cavalry and infantry recruits per month, doing so with a permanent training garrison of fourteen officers and non-commissioned officers. 81

By mid-September 1847, the United States forces, under the command of Major General Winfield Scott, had defeated the Mexican forces at Chapultepec, forced the surrender of Mexico City, and driven the Mexican army into its garrison at Guadalupe Hidalgo. Even though the fighting was over, a peace settlement had not been reached, and Scott's forces were faced with the difficult task of controlling the enemy capital and other Mexican territory which they occupied. 82 The United States

80 Erving to LaMotte, August 16, 1847, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, September 1847, Post Returns, AGO; George Washington Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, N. Y., From Its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890. With the Early History of the United States Military Academy, 3d ed., Revised and Extended, (Boston, 1891), I, 399. Hereinafter cited as Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA.

81 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September-December 1847, Post Returns, AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, November 7, 1847.

82 For a detailed account of Scott's campaign in Mexico and the problems of occupation, see Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-48, 306-51.
also had to maintain its army in New Mexico and California. Hence, there still was a need for a steady supply of fresh troops.

Jefferson Barracks played an important role in supplying the newly trained cavalrymen and infantrymen needed for the Mexican and western occupation forces. The training of these soldiers was, however, accomplished with great difficulty by the little garrison at the post. For, despite the addition of Captains Steen and LaMotte, there was still a desperate shortage of experienced training cadre. Writing to Adjutant General Jones, Captain William Eustis of the First Dragoons, who was the commanding officer of the dragoon training depot at the Barracks, requested that a permanent party of dragoon non-commissioned officers and enlisted men be stationed at the post. Eustis was an 1830 graduate of the United States Military Academy who transferred to the First Dragoons in 1833, and, after an uneventful career, resigned in August 1849. "A few non-commissioned officers are indispensible [sic] to control and drill the recruits," the Captain stated, "and without a small permanent party it will be impossible to keep horses here . . ." At the moment, the Captain was the only cavalryman at the post, and he could not properly supervise all facets of recruit training. Eustis suggested the addition of three sergeants, one bugler, and six or seven privates. The War Department approved Eustis' request, and by the end of January 1848, the additional troops were transferred to the post. 83

83 Eustis to Jones, January 21, 1848, Letters Recd., AGO; Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January 1848, Post Returns, AGO.
Although most of the regular army recruits and militia volunteers who were processed through Jefferson Barracks were of good quality, some were misfits. Private Nathaniel Freeman of Company I, Seventh Infantry Regiment, was such a person. Freeman had entered the service in August 1847, and was assigned to Company A as a recruit trainee. Failing to adjust to infantry training, he was transferred to Company I in the hope that a change in cadre and technique would have a positive effect, but the change proved fruitless. Freeman demonstrated, in the opinion of Lieutenant L. M. Laws, the commanding officer of Company I, "utter worthlessness as a soldier." All the training cadre found him incapable of being trained for military service, "his physical defects and mental stupidity being complete bars to all acquirements [of education and training]." Furthermore, Freeman was suffering from alcoholism and was becoming a bad influence on other recruits. On April 6, 1848, Lieutenant Laws asked that Freeman be dishonorably discharged from the service, and Brevet Captain Franklin Gardner, regimental adjutant, endorsed this recommendation, and it was carried out. 84

The poor quality of some of the recruits was not the only problem confronting the training cadre at Jefferson Barracks. Desertion continued to plague the garrison. Although the rate of desertion was not as great as it had been in the Seminole War period, during the second half of 1847, an average of eight recruits per month deserted. 85 Actually,


85 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, May-December 1847, Post Returns, AGO. During this period there were 8,125 desertions per month. The garrison averaged 240 men per month. This resulted in a desertion rate of 3.385 percent of the garrison each month.
there were more unauthorized departures from the post than this figure indicates, but many of the absences were of such short duration, with the soldiers voluntarily surrendering, that the authorities at Jefferson Barracks did not count them as desertion.

The case of Private C. B. Howard, of the detachment of infantry recruits, is a good example of this benevolent policy. Howard had enlisted on July 23, 1847, and reported to Jefferson Barracks. Because of a shortage of supplies and adequate quarters, he had been forced to sleep outside on a barracks porch. Disillusioned with these conditions, on July 26, 1847, Howard left the post. After remaining at large for one week, he surrendered to the military authorities and was taken back to the post. As punishment, he was put to work as an assistant to the hospital steward. Howard served in this position satisfactorily for eight months and was granted an official pardon on May 28, 1848, on the recommendation of Dr. Walter V. Wheaton, the post surgeon, and Major Pitcarin Morrison, the post commander.86

Problems at Jefferson Barracks associated with a shortage of training cadre and desertions notwithstanding, the regular army garrison excelled in providing replacement soldiers for the occupation forces. During the period January through April 1848, 500 recruits per month were processed through Jefferson Barracks. They spent an average of three weeks at the post receiving uniforms and cavalry or infantry training before being transferred to Mexico or Fort Leavenworth and then farther west.87

86 Howard to Wheaton, January 30, 1848, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Wheaton to Garland, May 19, 1848, ibid.

87 Daily Missouri Republican, January 18, April 17, 1848.
As new recruits were sent out from Jefferson Barracks, so, too, were members of the regular garrison. On January 18, 1848, Lieutenant Colonel Staniford was ordered to join his regiment, the Eighth Infantry, in Mexico. Upon his departure, Lieutenant Colonel Clifton Wharton of the First Dragoons became commander of the Third Military Department. Wharton had entered the army in 1818 as a second lieutenant in the Light Artillery. After serving in artillery units for eight years, in 1826 he transferred to the Sixth Infantry and was promoted to captain. In 1833, he joined the First Dragoons, and in 1836 was promoted to major. In 1846, Wharton was advanced to lieutenant colonel, but met an untimely death on July 14, 1848. Captain and Brevet Major Joseph H. LaMotte of the First Infantry became the post commander, and then in February, Major Pitcarin Morrison of the Eighth Infantry succeeded LaMotte as commanding officer of the Barracks. Morrison had entered the army in 1820 as a second lieutenant in the Artillery Corps. He transferred to the Fourth Infantry in 1822, and was promoted to captain in 1836. He transferred to the Eighth Infantry as a major in September 1847. Wharton remained in command of the Third Military Department until April 18, 1848, when Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Colonel John Garland of the Fourth Infantry Regiment assumed command. Garland was a veteran of the War of 1812. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Fourth Infantry in 1839, after twenty-six years in the army. He was a decorated hero of the Mexican War, having been awarded the rank of Brevet Brigadier General for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Battles of Contreras and Churubusco. Major
Morrison retained command of the post until June 30, 1848, when Brigadier General Stephen Watts Kearny assumed the position. 88

At the same time that these command changes were occurring, the War Department ordered large numbers of troops to the post. In July 1848, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen and the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Infantry regiments returned to the Barracks from Mexico. With the addition of the Illinois and Missouri Volunteers, who were returning to the post to be mustered out of United States service, by Mid-August the number of soldiers there exceeded 5,000. 89

The first troops to arrive at Jefferson Barracks from Mexico were the Mounted Riflemen, commanded by Major Winslow F. Sanderson. Sanderson joined the Mounted Riflemen in 1846, with the rank of captain. He was awarded the rank of brevet major on August 20, 1847, for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, and was promoted to major on January 8, 1848. Upon the regiment's arrival at the post, Sanderson received instructions from Adjutant General Jones that he was to prepare and equip his command for service in Oregon. The Adjutant General encouraged Sanderson to establish a recruiting office in St. Louis and Jefferson Barracks, and advertise the regiment's intended destination, and commence increasing the size of his regiment until each company reached a limit of 100 privates. Jones informed Sanderson that


89 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, July and August 1848, Post Returns, AGO.
100 recruits for his regiment were enroute from New York. The regiment's refitting and resupply operations, he suggested, could be accomplished within one month.  

The Adjutant General, however, was unaware of the serious manpower deficiency of Major Sanderson's command. When the Mounted Riflemen arrived at Jefferson Barracks, the regiment was 600 men under strength. Furthermore, Congress aggravated the situation by passing legislation on August 14, 1848, which allowed all personnel of the Mounted Riflemen to apply for an early discharge. On August 28, Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Colonel William W. Loring, who had replaced Major Sanderson as the commander of the regiment, informed Adjutant General Jones that 350 men of the regiment had asked to be discharged under the provisions of this law. If all who applied were discharged, it would leave only 225 men in the regiment.  

Loring had fought in the Seminole War with the Florida Volunteers. He joined the Mounted Rifles in 1846, and was promoted to captain on May 27, 1846. He was promoted to major in February 1847, and to lieutenant colonel in March 1848. He made brevet lieutenant colonel on August 20, 1847, for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, and he was advanced to colonel on September 13, 1848, for heroism in the Battle of Chapultepec. 

90 Jones to Sanderson, July 28, 1848, Letters Sent, AGO.  
91 United States Statutes At Large, IX, 306; Loring to Jones, August 28, 1848, Letters Recd., AGO; Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U. S. Army, I, 642.
In order to start part of his command westward as soon as possible, Loring organized one company of seventy-five men and sent it to Fort Leavenworth. He formed the riflemen left at Jefferson Barracks into three skeleton companies whose numbers would be augmented by new recruits. Eventually, in mid-September 1848, two of these companies -- C and I -- numbering five officers and 137 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men moved out to the Kansas post. It was, however, too late in the year to make the arduous journey to Oregon before the onset of winter. Accordingly, the Adjutant General informed Colonel Loring that his regiment would remain in garrison at the two posts until early Spring of 1849 before commencing its westward journey. Jones noted that this delay would give Loring and his recruiting service the opportunity to build the Mounted Riflemen up to their authorized strength.92

Before the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen was placed under orders for Oregon, there was a period of celebration at Jefferson Barracks. On February 2, 1848, the Mexican government had agreed to peace terms and signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Under the terms of the treaty, Mexico renounced its claims to Texas, California, and New Mexico, and the United States agreed to remove its occupation forces from the Mexican nation. After the United States Senate ratified the treaty on March 10, 1848, the occupation army began its withdrawal from Mexico.93

92 Kearny to Jones, August 29, 1848, Letters Recd., AGO; Loring to Jones, September 18, 1848, ibid.; Jones to Loring, September 20, 1848, Letters Sent, AGO.

93 Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848, 384-88.
By mid-August 1848, there were some 3,500 troops at Jefferson Barracks, most of whom had returned from Mexico, and before they were either discharged or reassigned to other duty stations, Brigadier General Stephen Watts Kearny, commanding officer of the post, decided to hold a military review to which the citizens of St. Louis were invited. The review was scheduled for August 6, at 5:00 P.M., in order to avoid the heat of mid-day. The St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican reported that the ceremony was "an imposing spectacle, being a larger number of troops than have ever been assembled at the Barracks at one time," and that "an immense concourse of citizens, among them a large number of ladies, were present." Two steamboats were chartered to convey the St. Louisians to the Barracks, and the roads from the city to the post were jammed with carriages and omnibuses. The review was an immense success. It greatly impressed the residents of St. Louis with the proficiency of the garrison, and generated much local good will toward Jefferson Barracks, its garrison, and the army.94

Immediately after this mid-August review, the large garrison at the Barracks began to disperse. The detachment of Missouri Mounted Volunteers, numbering 200 men, were given their discharges, and the Second Infantry Regiment was placed on orders for transfer to California. At the time it received its orders, the California-bound regiment numbered 691 men, but it was authorized to be brought up to full strength at 1,000 men. Following preparations that took two and one-half weeks, the Second

94 Daily Missouri Republican, August 17, 1848.
Infantry left Jefferson Barracks on September 5, 1848, for California, via Fort Columbus, New York, and an all-water transit to the West Coast. After the departure of the Second Infantry, the Barracks became a key component in a general army reorganization. The Third Military Department was abolished and the Sixth Military Department was created to replace it. The new department, with its headquarters at Jefferson Barracks, was responsible for the protection of the central Plains from Kansas to the Canadian border. The first order of business for Brigadier General Kearny, the departmental commander, was the assignment of troops throughout his command. The seven companies of the Sixth Infantry at the Barracks were sent to the Upper Mississippi region. They relieved soldiers of the Seventh and Eighth regiments, who were ordered to return to Jefferson Barracks and await further orders. Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus Loomis, commanding the Sixth Infantry, was to establish his regimental headquarters at Fort Crawford, Wisconsin, and also function as deputy departmental commander. Loomis was a graduate of the United States Military Academy who was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Regiment of Artillerists. He served in the War of 1812, and was captured at Fort Niagara in 1813. Following the war, he stayed in the service, and by 1821 was a captain in the First Infantry. In April 1829, he was promoted to brevet major. From 1832 to 1837, he served at several different frontier army posts, including Jefferson Barracks. Loomis fought in the Seminole War from 1837 to 1842. In 1840, he was transferred to

95 Extract of Special Order No. 6, August 4, 1848, Dept. Orders, 3d Mil. Dept.; Memorandum From Adjutant General's Office, August 30, 1848, Letters Sent, AGO; Kearny to Jones, September 5, 1848, Letters Recd., AGO.
the Sixth Infantry and promoted to lieutenant colonel. From 1843 to 1846, he was stationed at posts in the Indian Territory, and he fought briefly in the Mexican War in 1848. 96

Upon being stationed at Jefferson Barracks, the Seventh and Eighth Infantry regiments acted as the general reserve force for the entire western frontier. The garrison there then numbered approximately 1,000 men through the months of September and October 1848. On November 23, the Eighth Infantry, with 547 men, left for Texas via New Orleans, leaving a garrison at the Barracks of 750, but the transfer of four companies of the Third Infantry and two companies of the Second Artillery to the post brought it once more to over 1,000 men. 97

So many troops severely taxed the post's available barracks and officers' quarters. During the Summer of 1848, more than half of the garrison was forced to sleep in tents because the barracks structures could safely house only 500 men. By the onset of colder weather in November, however, all of the enlisted men were moved into the barracks. Although very crowded, they got along with each other reasonably well. This, unfortunately, was not the case with the officers, as they frequently quarrelled with each other over living quarters.

One such quarrel erupted when a battalion of the Third Infantry was transferred to the post at the beginning of December 1848, and the

96 Jones to Kearny, September 4, 1848, Letters Sent, AGO; Order No. 1, September 13, 1848, Department Order Book, Sixth Military Department in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.; Kearny to Jones, September 18, 1848, Letters Recd., AGO; Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA, I, 97-98.

97 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September-December 1848, Post Returns, AGO; Plympton to Kirkham, November 29, 1848. Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Id. to Id., December 6, 1848, ibid. 

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battalion commander, Major William R. Jouett, applied for quarters already
occupied by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bainbridge of the Seventh
Infantry, on the grounds that he was senior to Bainbridge in permanent
rank. The post commander, Brevet Colonel Joseph Plympton, denied Jouett's
application because he considered Jouett to be only temporarily assigned
to the post and not a member of the permanent garrison. Jouett appealed
the decision to Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus Loomis, newly appointed com-
manding officer of the Sixth Military Department. Loomis sustained
Jouett's appeal, stating that the War Department directive ordering the
Third Infantry battalion to Jefferson Barracks considered that the bat-
talion would become part of the post's permanent garrison. Both Plympton
and Bainbridge appealed Loomis' decision to Brevet Major General George
M. Brooke, commanding officer of the Western Division. Plympton argued
that, under the accepted army practice, Bainbridge's brevet rank of lieu-
tenant colonel gave him seniority and, thus, "the right of choice of
quarters" over junior ranking officers like Jouett. Plympton added that
it was his understanding that the Third Infantry battalion was soon to
be sent to New Mexico, which meant that its officers were only temporarily
assigned to Jefferson Barracks and were not members of the permanent
garrison. Brooke, rejecting Plympton's plea, held that the officers of
the Third Infantry battalion were to be considered as part of the gar-
rison and thus entitled to choose their quarters under the standard
procedure. Consequently, Jouett received the quarters he requested.98

98 Wood to Jouett, December 8, 1848, Letters Recd., West. Dept.;
Jouett to Kirkham, December 15, 1848, ibid.; Memorandum from Lieutenant
Colonel Loomis, December 15, 1848, ibid.; Plympton to Kirkham, December 18,
1848, ibid.; Endorsement of Commanding Officer, Headquarters, Western
A substantial number of the soldiers who came to Jefferson Barracks at the end of the Mexican War were hospital patients who had either become sick or were wounded during their wartime service. The War Department sent them to the Barracks as the post nearest their homes. This influx of sick and wounded began in June 1848, when the post hospital received 322 patients. Ten of those soldiers died, but within six weeks, 224 recovered sufficiently to receive their discharges. In July, an

Division, January 8, 1849, ibid. Much of the problem concerning the officers' quarters at Jefferson Barracks was brought on by the confusion created by brevet rank within the whole army. Because of the slow rate of promotion within each regiment, brevet rank was used to reward officers with advancement when actual vacancies in authorized rank slots did not exist. Most of the Mexican War veterans had received one or more brevets for gallantry in action, and, in 1848, when Congress reduced the authorized size of the army, it allowed officers to retain and exercise command in their brevet ranks. United States Statutes At Large, XII, Chapter CV, 247-48. The controversy concerning Major Jouett arose because Henry Bainbridge had received his quarters because of his brevet rank of lieutenant colonel awarded on April 20, 1847, for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, Mexico. Bainbridge's permanent rank, however, was major, with a date of rank, February 16, 1847. William R. Jouett also was a permanent major, with a date of rank of October 31, 1846. Jouett was senior to Bainbridge in permanent rank, and, since he was considered a member of the permanent garrison, he, Jouett, under existing army regulations, was entitled to preference in selecting quarters.

The participants in this squabble were a typical cross-section of the officer corps. William R. Jouett entered the army in 1818, and served an undistinguished career in the Third and Fourth Infantry regiments until he died in 1852. Henry Bainbridge was an 1821 graduate of the United States Military Academy, and commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Third Infantry. He served in this regiment for twenty-six years, seeing duty at several frontier posts and in both the Seminole War and the Mexican War. In the latter conflict, Bainbridge fought in the Battles of Palo Alto, Reseca de la Palma, Monterrey, and Cerro Gordo. At Monterrey he was seriously wounded and was made a brevet major for his heroism. Bainbridge was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the First Infantry on June 11, 1851, and served at a number of posts in Texas from 1851 to 1857. Joseph Plympton was a veteran of the War of 1812. He served in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Infantry regiments. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Seventh Infantry on September 9, 1847, and on April 17, 1848, was advanced to brevet colonel for gallant and meritorious conduct at the Battle of Cerro Gordo. Heitman, Historical Register of the U. S. Army, I, 182, 584, and 795; Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA, I 173-74.
additional 240 "invalid soldiers" arrived at the post. Of these, twenty-three died and 200 recovered sufficiently to be discharged. August was the month with the largest number of sick and wounded at the post. During the first two weeks, there was an average of 623 soldiers, representing 26.6 percent of the total of 2,239 personnel at the post, in the hospital. During the last weeks of the month, the average number of hospital patients declined to 473, or 20.22 percent of the total personnel at the post. In September, many of these sick and wounded soldiers were either discharged or transferred to other posts.  

Many of the ill soldiers who were returning to Jefferson Barracks were afflicted with such diseases as malaria, measles, and mumps. On April 13, 1848, Dr. Walter V. Wheaton, senior post surgeon, informed Surgeon General Lawson that there were 50 men confined in the post hospital with measles or mumps. Many of the wounded soldiers were beginning to show such symptoms of advanced tetanus as stiffness of the neck and shoulders and severe convulsions. By the time their illness had reached this stage, according to Wheaton, bloodletting proved to be of little value because the soldiers' pulses were so weak that it was almost impossible to locate a vein. The only treatment left was "large doses of opium," which "reduced the attending pain," but did not prevent death.  

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100 Wheaton to Surgeon General, April 13, 1848, Letters Received by the Office of the Surgeon General, (Record Group No. 112, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., SGO.
Even though a substantial number of ill soldiers returning from Mexico were suffering from measles, mumps, and tetanus, malaria was the ailment of which the largest number were victims. On June 11, 1848, Wheaton reported to Lawson that, of the large numbers of sick and wounded at the post, the great majority were suffering from "the shaking ague and intermittent fevers." Their treatment was the administration of twenty to twenty-five grams of calomel and liberal bloodletting.  

The use of quinine in the treatment of malaria was receiving growing acceptance by American physicians by this time, but Surgeon General Lawson rejected it and ordered that army medical officers use calomel and bloodletting to treat the disease.  

Just as the great flood of casualties of the Mexican War was stabilizing, Jefferson Barracks and the entire army suffered a great loss. On October 31, 1848, General Kearny died in St. Louis while starting a medical furlough. The Mexican War hero had contracted yellow fever while stationed at Vera Cruz, and had returned to Jefferson Barracks in June 1848, to complete his recovery. In late September, the General suffered such a severe relapse that the medical officers at the Barracks feared he would not recover. Kearny's health continued to decline throughout the first two weeks of October. Because of his poor health,  


102 Hall, "John Sappington," MHR, XXIV, 187. Each one of Sappington's pills contained one grain of quinine, 3/4's grain of licorice, and 1/4 grain of myrrh, with enough oil of sassafras for flavoring. Dosage was one pill every two hours until the fever was broken, and thereafter at greater intervals as long as anemia and debility continued.
on October 5 Kearny relinquished command of the Barracks, and on October 28 he also gave up his command of the Sixth Military Department preparatory to going on medical furlough. He died in St. Louis the day before he was to leave for his family home in New York. 103

General Kearny's death marked the end of an era at Jefferson Barracks. The post had performed a vital recruit and training function during the Mexican War and had served well as a major convalescence and separation station for veterans of the conflict after its ending. Throughout this period it continued to be a strategic post for the defense of the western frontier, a role it would continue to play in the years to come.

103 Hooker to Jones, October 31, 1848, Letters Recd., AGO; Obituary of General Stephen Watts Kearny, Daily Missouri Republican, November 3, 1848, found in Stephen Watts Kearny Papers (Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis); Hooker to Bliss, September 27, 1848, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Order No. 6, October 28, 1848, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.
Chapter VI

POST-MEXICAN WAR PERIOD, 1849-1855

The acquisition of the vast region of the present-day southwestern United States from Mexico and the rapid migration of large numbers of Americans to California and Oregon presented many complicated problems for the army and for the garrison at Jefferson Barracks. Soldiers at the post would be required to provide safety and security to white settlers scattered over much greater distances, and, at the same time, maintain peaceful relations with more recalcitrant Indian tribes.

Before Jefferson Barracks could fulfill its role in this new phase in the opening of the West, the garrison was again confronted with the threat of cholera. After hearing of an outbreak of the disease in New Orleans, on January 1, 1849, Brevet Major General David E. Twiggs, commanding officer of the Department of the West, ordered Dr. William Hammond, surgeon at the Barracks, to go to New Orleans and investigate the methods of treatment used in the Crescent City. Hammond was to determine whether those methods would be suitable for Jefferson Barracks should the disease be transmitted northward up the Mississippi River. Twiggs, in addition, appointed a board of five officers to examine and report on the expediency of evacuating Jefferson Barracks should an outbreak of cholera occur at the post.¹

¹ Special Orders No. 1, January 1, 1849, Order Book of the Sixth Military Department in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.
This board met on January 3 and recommended that the soldiers at the post give "the most rigid attention to cleanliness in quarters," maintain a high state of personal hygiene, and be extremely careful in the quality and preparation of their rations. The board also recommended that the post's medical officer examine the entire garrison at least once a day and establish an isolation ward in the post chapel for soldiers who were suspected of having "premonitory symptoms" of cholera. The five officers also recommended that if cholera appeared in the vicinity of the post, the garrison should be dispersed into separate campsites located one-half mile below the barracks. These sites had access to the river, but were sufficiently elevated to be free from stagnant ground water. Because this proposed movement would occur in January, the board stated that all tents used at the new sites should have wooden floors and the hospital tents should be equipped with stoves.2

General Twiggs forwarded the proceedings and recommendations of this survey board to the War Department for its approval, but on January 24, Adjutant General Jones replied that Surgeon General Thomas Lawson had serious misgivings concerning the proposed plan. Dr. Lawson did not approve of the encampment of soldiers in field tents in the middle of winter as the most appropriate method of dealing with cholera. Instead, the Surgeon General preferred that the troops be left in warm, comfortable, and uncrowded quarters. He suggested that if cholera struck at Jefferson Barracks, the officers' families be sent to St. Louis or

2 Report of Board of Officers Convened in Obedience to Special Orders No. 1, January 8, 1849, Letters Received by the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., West. Dept.
some other safe location, and the whole post, "hospital, barracks, officers' quarters, and all [be] given up exclusively to the [troops]."

General Twiggs disagreed with Lawson. He informed Adjutant General Jones that the Surgeon General's plans would work well under ideal circumstances, but not at Jefferson Barracks. He pointed out that the evacuation of the officers' families would not provide any additional room for the soldiers unless the officers shared their quarters with the enlisted men, a remedy to which the garrison's officer corps would soundly object. Twiggs reiterated his request for the War Department's approval of the relocation proposal. Adjutant General Jones replied that the War Department had not intended Surgeon General Lawson's opinion to supersede that of the board of officers, but wished it to be used as a possible procedure to be considered in the event of a serious outbreak of cholera at the post.

Fortunately, the total evacuation of the post was not necessary. Although there was considerable sickness at the Barracks during the first quarter of 1849, neither the post commander, Brevet Colonel Joseph Plympton, nor any of the post's medical officers was unduly concerned. Instead of moving the garrison into field tents, General Twiggs and Colonel Plympton ordered the dragoons and mounted riflemen stationed at the Barracks to Fort Leavenworth. This troop movement reduced the size

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3 Endorsement of Surgeon General Lawson in Jones to Twiggs, January 24, 1849, Letters Sent by the Office of Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Letters Sent, AGO.

4 Twiggs to Jones, February 6, 1849, Letters Received by the Office of Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.
of the garrison from 1,094 to 750 men and greatly eased the crowded conditions in the living quarters. Perhaps because of the reduction in the size of the garrison, when cholera did appear in March, only twenty-seven men died out of a total of sixty-six ill with the disease. The mortality rate for the disease was smaller than during previous epidemics at the post.\footnote{Jones to Twiggs, February 17, 1849, Letters Sent, AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, March 21, 1849; Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January-April 1849, Register of Post Returns in the Records of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Post Returns, AGO. The monthly returns show a monthly average of 816 men present at the post, with an 87.5 man per month sick rate. This was a sickness rate of 19.72 percent of the garrison. Twiggs to Jones, April 1, 1849, Letters Recd., AGO.}

So that he would be able to concentrate all his efforts on preparing the post against the prospect of a cholera epidemic, Plympton tried to relieve himself of his other military duties. When he assumed command of the Barracks in November 1848, the garrison was composed of the headquarters and four companies of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, the headquarters and two companies of the First Dragoons, the Seventh Infantry, a detachment of recruits, and small units of the Sixth Infantry. Because the mounted riflemen and dragoons were reorganizing and preparing to move to Fort Leavenworth and then farther west, there was a constant movement of troops in and out of the post. Commanding his own regiment, the Seventh Infantry, and maintaining effective control over the other units at the post was so demanding that Plympton felt he was unable to perform either duty adequately. To deal with the problem, Plympton assigned Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bainbridge to command the Seventh Infantry, while Plympton remained post commander. The War Department, however, disapproved
this arrangement. Adjutant General Jones informed Plympton that Paragraph 99 of the General Army Regulations prohibited field officers from relinquishing their regular commands when they were given additional duties. Plympton would have to command the Seventh Infantry as well as Jefferson Barracks.  

In the Summer of 1849, Plympton was ordered to take his regiment to Florida to fight the Seminole Indians. Because of a series of depredations there, and the fear of an outbreak of general hostilities in the region, on August 6 the Adjutant General's Office telegraphed Plympton "to proceed without delay" with the Seventh Infantry to Tampa Bay and there report to Brevet Major General Twiggs. This order was repeated by telegraph on August 14, and again on August 20. Finally, on August 29, Plympton telegraphed Adjutant General Jones that the Seventh Infantry would be ready to leave Jefferson Barracks on August 31, noting, however, that it was difficult to make all necessary preparations to move on such short notice. Plympton claimed that he had not received official notification of the regimental transfer until August 27, all previous communications allegedly having been sent by the Adjutant General's Office having come to him merely in the form of "rumors."

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6 Plympton to Jones, February 24, 1849, Letters Recd., AGO; Jones to Plympton, March 27, 1849, Letters Sent, AGO.

7 Jones to Plympton, August 6, 1849, ibid.; Id. to Id., August 14, 1849, ibid.; Id. to Id., August 20, 1849, ibid.

8 Plympton to Jones, August 29, 1849, Letters Recd., AGO.
Adjutant General Jones was outraged by Plympton's charge of ineptness in his office. Jones denied any confusion or ambiguity in the sending of the transfer orders, and upbraided Plympton for attempting to cover his own neglect of duty by blaming others. Jones claimed that Plympton was fully aware of the planned transfer of the Seventh Infantry to Florida. Although he conceded "previous orders" directing the regiment's transfer may have been lost, a telegram of August 14, instructing Plympton "to proceed forthwith with your regiment to Tampa Bay, Florida," had reached Jefferson Barracks and was sufficient notification to cause Plympton to take immediate action. "For the subsequent delay in the movement of your regiment, being fourteen days," wrote the Adjutant General, "I am directed to say, that the Secretary of War can see no justification on your part."

In an attempt to find out the facts on the matter, Brevet Brigadier General Newman S. Clarke, commanding officer of the Sixth Military Department, assigned Major Francis Lee to conduct an investigation. Lee reported that there had been no intentional delay on the part of Plympton or his superior, Clarke, in preparing for the Seventh Infantry's move to Florida. When Plympton received the telegram of August 14, he assumed that it was merely to alert him to written instructions coming by mail. General Clarke, making the same assumption, decided not to issue orders directing the Seventh Infantry to move out until he received further orders by mail. The next War Department dispatch, also sent by telegraph, although issued on August 20, was not received by Plympton until August 27.

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9 Jones to Plympton, August 29, 1849, ibid.
Upon receiving it, Plympton asked Clarke for instructions. Clarke "verbally" ordered Plympton to commence preparations for the move, and the following day issued written orders directing the Seventh Infantry to Tampa. The delay resulted because both Clarke and Plympton were awaiting the arrival of orders from the War Department in the mail, and only upon the receipt of the second telegram did they realize that the first telegram of August 14 was, in fact, the War Department's official directive ordering the regimental movement.\footnote{10 Brief Statement of Case by Major Lee, undated, ibid.}

Lee's report did not totally satisfy either Adjutant General Jones or Secretary of War George W. Crawford. Assistant Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas wrote General Clarke that Crawford and Jones wanted Clarke to furnish "exact copies of the telegraphic dispatches" concerning the movement of the Seventh Infantry received by his office and Colonel Plympton. Thomas intimated that Adjutant General Jones still believed the two officers at Jefferson Barracks were conspiring to make the Adjutant General's Office seem incompetent. Clarke sent the requested documents, and also reported that the Seventh Infantry had departed Jefferson Barracks for Florida on August 31.\footnote{11 Thomas to Clarke, September 7, 1849, Letters Sent, AGO; Clarke to Jones, September 29, 1849, ibid.} Clarke's response and the news of the regiment's departure mollified Adjutant General Jones and ended the dispute, but it was symptomatic of the problems the War Department frequently encountered in administering the widely dispersed army.
The departure of the Seventh Infantry from Jefferson Barracks greatly reduced the size of the garrison. The average aggregate number of troops present at the post for the first seven months of 1849 was 678 per month; with the transfer of Plympton's regiment, it was reduced to 82.4 men. The reduction of manpower caused Brigadier General Clarke, on August 28, 1849, to order the Quartermaster Department at St. Louis to "hire such [civilian] mechanics and laborers as may be absolutely necessary for the public service" to be employed at the post to help in the maintenance work. One month later, Adjutant General Jones wrote Clarke questioning the employment of these civilian laborers. He stated that Secretary of War Crawford had received information indicating that the civilian laborers were performing ordinary fatigue duties such as policing rubbish at the post. The Secretary disapproved of this type of civilian employment, so if they were indeed being used in this manner, the laborers were to be discharged. This was, however, not the case. A board of officers had surveyed the condition of the Barracks and determined that, because of the large number of troops at the post during 1848 and the first half of 1849, significant structural damage had occurred to the barracks. There were too few soldiers at the post to perform all the repair work adequately, and the officers' board had recommended the employment of civilian construction personnel. Upon receipt of this information, Secretary Crawford approved the use of civilians, but admonished Clarke to discharge them as soon as the repair work had progressed sufficiently for the soldiers at the post to complete it.12

12 Special Order No. 65, August 28, 1849, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.; Jones to Clarke, September 28, 1849, Letters Sent, AGO; Jones to Bragg, September 29, 1849, ibid.
The service of the Seventh Infantry in Florida was brief, and by mid-June 1850, the regiment returned to Jefferson Barracks.\textsuperscript{13} The troops, however, had very little time after their rigorous service in Florida to enjoy their respite at the Barracks or the pleasures of St. Louis. On August 6, 1850, the War Department ordered the regiment to Fort Leavenworth, where it would be organized, equipped, and trained as cavalry to serve as escorts for the emigrants along the Oregon Trail.\textsuperscript{14} The infantrymen, pressed into duty as cavalry, served in this capacity during the late Summer and early Fall of 1850. By the end of October, however, the Seventh Infantry returned to garrison duty, with the headquarters and six companies coming back to Jefferson Barracks, Companies C and D remaining at Fort Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{15}

While the Seventh Infantry was absent from Jefferson Barracks in Florida, Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Braxton Bragg of Battery C, Third Artillery, was assigned to the post. Bragg was an 1837 graduate of the United States Military Academy who was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Third Artillery. On May 9, 1846, he was promoted to brevet captain for "gallant and distinguished conduct" in the defense of Fort Brown, Texas, against the Mexican army. Bragg was advanced to captain on June 18, 1846, and to brevet major on September 23, 1846, for heroism in service at Monterrey, Mexico. He was awarded the rank of brevet

\textsuperscript{13} Daily Missouri Republican, June 26, 1849; Manson to Jones, June 25, 1849, Letters Recd., AGO; Plympton to Jones, June 26, 1850, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{14} Jones to Clarke, August 6, 1850, Letters Sent, AGO; \textit{Daily Missouri Republican}, August 11, 1850.

\textsuperscript{15} Orders No. 35, September 26, 1850, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.; Plympton to Jones, October 29, 1850, Letters Recd., AGO.

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lieutenant colonel for "gallant and meritorious conduct" in the Battle of Buena Vista, and served on the staff of the commander of the Western Division as acting assistant inspector general from 1848 to 1849.\textsuperscript{16}

Bragg's arrival at Jefferson Barracks fueled speculation in St. Louis that the Barracks would be selected as the new site of an artillery school which the army was about to establish. The editor of the \textit{Daily Missouri Republican} thought that the post was the best site the War Department could choose, since it offered a location central to all points in the nation as well as the "social enjoyments" of St. Louis. The War Department, however, selected Newport Barracks, Kentucky, for the artillery school, and Jefferson Barracks remained as the principal recruit and supply, as well as training, station for the Department of the West.\textsuperscript{17}

The Barracks was active as a recruit depot for the frontier army throughout 1851. New enlistees were received at the post from recruiting stations throughout the eastern and midwestern states and were given initial uniform issues and preliminary military training before being sent to units farther west.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{thebibliography}{999}
\bibitem{16} George Washington Cullum, \textit{Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, N. Y., From its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890. With the Early History of The United States Military Academy}, 3d ed., Revised and Extended, (3 vols., Boston, 1891), I, 663. Hereinafter cited as Cullum, \textit{Biographical Register of USMA}.

\bibitem{17} "Editorial in Favor of Artillery School of Instruction," \textit{Daily Missouri Republican}, November 9, 1849; Robert M. Utley, \textit{Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865}, (New York, 1967), 41. Hereinafter cited as Utley, \textit{Frontiersmen in Blue}.

\bibitem{18} Special Orders No. 15, March 21, 1851, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.; Special Orders No. 24, April 11, 1851, \textit{ibid.}; and Sanderson to Jones, December 9, 1851, Letters Recd., AGO.
\end{thebibliography}
With this constant movement of troops through the post came the recurring problem of disease. On June 18, 1851, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Bragg informed Adjutant General Jones that cholera had again appeared among a large detachment of recruits. Eleven had died, and sixteen others were near death. Bragg recommended that the War Department suspend moving recruits to Jefferson Barracks and change the way in which the new soldiers were transported to the post. The existing manner of sending them "crowded upon the decks of small and filthy steamers" invariably created the conditions in which the disease thrived and spread. Such had been the case with the numerous detachments which had moved through the Barracks during the Summer of 1850, and the same pattern was repeating itself in 1851.19

The War Department, heeding Bragg's advice, temporarily stopped troop movements to or from the post, and by mid-August the cholera epidemic had abated. But then "intermittent fever" -- malaria -- became very prevalent at Jefferson Barracks and in the surrounding region. The Senior Surgeon at Jefferson Barracks, Dr. Charles A. Smith, advised the post commander against the shipment of any new recruits to the post until the end of September or the first of October. By this time, he believed, treating the garrison with quinine would have overcome the fever and the malarial season would have passed. The War Department, although disappointed and upset with the health problems at the Barracks, heeded the

19 Bragg to Jones, June 18, 1851, Letters Recd., AGO.
surgeon's suggestions and stopped the transfer of recruits to the post until mid-October.20

Illness was not the only problem the recruits presented to commanders of Jefferson Barracks and the Sixth Military Department. Desertion was a persistent problem there as at every army post. In their attempts to meet the manpower needs of the army, recruiters often enrolled underage recruits. Upon discovering that military life was not as adventurous and romantic as portrayed by recruiters, many of these young soldiers deserted. Most of them were apprehended, were tried and convicted by courts martial, and received the standard military punishment given deserters; ten to twenty whip lashes on the back and imprisonment in the guardhouse for thirty days. Somewhat more complicated than most was the case of Private William Gray of Company B, First Dragoons. In October 1851, Gray enlisted in the First Dragoons at Alton, Illinois, under the alias "William Jones" and was sent to Jefferson Barracks to receive his initial training. Gray became disenchanted with the army and went to St. Louis for a day or two. Returning to the post, he was arrested and charged with desertion. One of Gray's companions wrote Gray's mother, Mrs. Ann Wood, explaining her son's predicament. Mrs. Wood immediately went to St. Louis and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the St. Louis Magistrate Court on the grounds that her son had enlisted in the army under an alias and was still a minor, and, as such, was illegally detained at Jefferson Barracks. St. Louis Magistrate Court Commissioner Calvin issued the writ on November 21, 1851, and it was served on the

20 Bragg to Jones, June 18, 1851, Letters Recd., AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, June 25, 1851; Loring to Jones, August 12, 1851, Letters Recd., AGO; Jones to Loring, August 30, 1851, Letters Sent, AGO.
Major Winslow F. Sanderson, the next day. In the meantime, Gray was court martialed, found guilty of desertion, and sentenced to forfeit all pay and allowances due him, to be "branded (more properly tattooed) on the hip with the letter 'D,' . . . to receive fifty lashes on his bare back, well laid on with a rawhide, to have his head shaved, and be drummed out of the service." The court martial sentence was executed early on Saturday morning, November 22, and when, later on the same day, the writ of habeas corpus was served on Major Sanderson, he made a sworn statement that there was no soldier at Jefferson Barracks by the name of William Gray and returned the writ to Magistrate Court in St. Louis. When these circumstances became known, the court martial and execution of its sentence created much ill will among St. Louisians against the military authorities at Jefferson Barracks. St. Louis newspapers, most notably The Intelligencer, demanded a full War Department investigation of the recruiting and discipline practices of the army officers at the Barracks, and applauded the fact that Mrs. Wood filed a $10,000 damage suit against Brevet Brigadier General Clarke.

One month after the events at Jefferson Barracks, army headquarters became aware of the controversy surrounding Private Gray, and Adjutant General Jones informed General Clarke that General-in-Chief Winfield Scott wanted a full investigation and explanation of the matter. Scott was

21 The Intelligencer, (St. Louis), November 24, 1851; Order No. 52, November 21, 1851, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.

22 The Intelligencer, November 24, 1851.

23 Ibid., November 24, 25, 1851. This damage suit was eventually dropped when General Clarke proved he had no role in the scandalous affair.
originally disturbed because he had information indicating that Gray's case had been presented to the military court out of the established docket order — that it was adjudicated and the sentence rendered and approved and executed before previously scheduled cases were handled. General Clarke replied that there had been improprieties in the handling of Gray's case. It was true that the case had been taken out of its proper order on the docket, and, stated Clarke, he was censuring the president of the Court, Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Porter of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen. Furthermore, General Clarke also intended to reprimand Major Sanderson for failing to realize the importance of the writ of habeas corpus and the inept manner in which he handled the situation.

Not only did the commanders at Jefferson Barracks have problems with recruits during 1851, they also had to deal with a quarrelsome officer corps. The issue that created the greatest unrest among the officers at the post, as well as within the entire army, was the exercise of command under brevet rank. Dr. Clement A. Finley, senior surgeon at Jefferson Barracks, and Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Braxton Bragg, post commander, were the two protagonists in a heated controversy that developed at the Barracks in 1851. On May 13, Dr. Finley requested that Bragg authorize an additional medical attendant for the post hospital to assist in caring for an increasing number of patients. Bragg denied the request. Six enlisted personnel were already assigned to the post hospital as medical assistants serving a total of sixteen patients.

24 Jones to Clarke, December 26, 1851, Letters Sent, AGO; Clarke to Jones, December 30, 1851, Letters Recd., AGO.
That was enough, Bragg thought. Bragg, furthermore, intimated that Finley was not diligent in his supervision of daily "sick reports" and was allowing a large number of fit and able men to escape fatigue or training duties by feigning illness. Bragg's reply angered Dr. Finley, who then accused the post commander of acting in an irresponsible manner toward the ill military personnel, and demonstrating conduct that was "irreconcilable with any feeling of respect or regard for me officially or personally. . . ." Dr. Finley concluded by stating that he would, in the future, refuse to accept any communications from Bragg that were "not strictly official." Changing his mind on the matter of hospital personnel, Bragg wrote Finley that he would approve anyone whom the Doctor wanted to employ as a hospital attendant. After these conciliatory words, however, the post commander called into question Finley's administration of the hospital. A Private Thomas Lee of Company F, Seventh Infantry, was serving as a cook for the post hospital under an arrangement approved by Lee's company commander. The Private, however, was due a discharge with pension pending the processing of necessary medical certificates in Finley's possession. Bragg instructed Finley to act promptly upon the certificates and send them to his office, criticizing the medical officer for his lack of interest in the enlisted personnel serving under him. Bragg sent his duty

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25 Finley to Bragg and Bragg to Finley, May 13, 1851, Proceedings of a General Court Martial for the Trial of Surgeon Clement A. Finley, July 1851, Records of the Office of Judge Advocate General, (Record Group No. 153, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Finley Court Martial, JAG.

26 Finley to Bragg, May 14, 1851, ibid.
orderly, Private Michael McAnally, to deliver this communication to Finley. When McAnally attempted to hand it to Finley, the Surgeon refused to accept it and instructed the Orderly to tell Bragg, "I don't receive any orders from you sir." Finley then approached Bragg directly and, within the sight and hearing of Brigadier General Newman S. Clarke, repeated his refusal to accept orders from the post commander. The Post Surgeon then went back to the hospital, dismissing Bragg, "in a manner and tone which [Bragg] considered to be highly disrespectful and contemptuous." Bragg ordered Finley restricted to the post and charged him with contempt and disrespect toward his commanding officer, "conduct to the prejudice of good order and Military discipline," and "disobedience of orders."

Finley was tried by a court martial in July. The Judge Advocate's primary witnesses were Bragg, Private McAnally, Brigadier General Clarke, and Private Andrew Minnis, Battery C, Third Artillers, a clerk in the post commander's office. Their testimony supported Bragg's accusations concerning Finley's misconduct. Finley conducted his own defense and centered it on the contention that Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Bragg was neither his superior in rank nor his commanding officer at the time the incident occurred. Finley cited an 1847 Act of Congress granting medical

27 Bragg to Finley, May 17, 1851, ibid.; Charge No. 3, "Disobedience of Orders," ibid.


29 Finley to Bragg, May 17, 1851, ibid.; Order No. 5, June 20, 1851, Headquarters, West. Dept., in ibid.

officers "the same pay and allowances of officers of the same grade" in line and staff functions of the army. Under the provisions of this act, a senior surgeon, such as Finley, was entitled to the pay and rank privileges of a major. On the basis of this law and an opinion of General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, Finley claimed that Bragg, a captain and brevet lieutenant colonel, could not give him orders because he was Bragg's senior in permanent rank. Finley, furthermore, challenged Bragg's assertion that he was the commanding officer of the Jefferson Barracks garrison. The Surgeon argued that because Brevet Brigadier General Clarke was present at the post and the garrison was composed of several different units, under the Sixty-Second Article of War, Clarke must be considered the post commander.

Finley's arguments were of no avail. On July 25, 1851, the court found him guilty of all charges and sentenced him to be dismissed from the service. Three days later, however, all the members of the tribunal "believing that Surgeon Finley acted under an erroneous though honest interpretation of the law" recommended that "favorable consideration"

31 "An Act to Raise, For a Limited Time, An Additional Military Force, and For Other Purposes," United States Statutes At Large, IX, 125. General Scott stated that, "No principle has been more universal and uniform in all armies than this: that no superior or senior officer shall be subject to the command of an inferior or junior [officer]." Opinion of Major General Winfield Scott, Submitted to the Secretary of War, November 16, 1849, cited in Finley Court Martial, JAG.

32 The 62d Article of War provides that "If upon marches, guards, or in quarters, different Corps of the Army shall happen to join or do duty together, the officer highest in rank of the Line of the Army, Marine Corps, or Militia, by commission there, on duty or in quarters, shall command the whole and give orders for what is needful to the service unless otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States, according to the nature of the case." Cited in "Addendum to Court Proceedings," ibid.
be given Finley by the Secretary of War and the President. Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad and President Millard Fillmore concurred with this recommendation, and Finley was restored to duty. Secretary Conrad, furthermore, rendered an opinion to clear the confusion concerning the relationship between line and staff officers raised in Finley's court martial. Citing statements from President Fillmore and Jonathan Drayton, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Secretary stated that in the 1847 legislation, Congress never intended that medical officers, or for that matter any other staff officers, should ever be placed in a situation to exercise command over line soldiers. The nature of staff officers' duties were so specialized that they did not have the time, nor in many instances, the training necessary to command line units.

In Surgeon Finley's specific case, he was partially correct in his contention that when Brigadier General Clarke arrived at Jefferson Barracks, under the Sixty-Second Article of War, the command of the post automatically became his. General Clarke, however, was ordered to Jefferson Barracks to assume command of the Sixth Military Department, and in this position he could name anyone he wanted to exercise command of

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33 Sentence of General Court Martial, June 25, 1851, ibid.; Letter of Consideration, July 28, 1851, ibid.

34 "Statement of Secretary of War," October 23, 1851, ibid. Finley remained in the army, was promoted to Colonel and Surgeon-General on May 15, 1861. He retired April 14, 1862, and was awarded the rank of brevet brigadier general on May 13, 1865, for long and faithful service in the Army. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1903, (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 420.

35 Statement of Secretary of War, October 23, 1851, cited in Addendum to Court Proceedings, Finley Court Martial, JAG.
the post. Clarke decided to retain Bragg in that position, and Bragg exercised this authority over all military personnel, line or staff, present at the Barracks.  

After the Finley court martial adjourned, affairs at the Barracks began to return to normal. In October 1851, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen concentrated at the post for the winter preparatory to their transfer to Fort Laramie. The riflemen's winter sojourn at the post was, however, cut short at the end of October when the regiment received notice that it was needed in Texas to help in the pacification of the Commanche Indians. The mounted infantrymen spent the month of November filling their companies to authorized strength and readying their equipment. The regiment began to depart for New Orleans in December, but ice in the Mississippi River delayed the transit of four companies until January 16, 1852. By the end of February 1852, six out of the eight companies had departed the post, with the two remaining companies destined for service at Fort Laramie.  

The transfer of the mounted riflemen from Jefferson Barracks was not a totally flawless operation. Those soldiers who departed for Texas and New Mexico via New Orleans took all their equipment with them, but left their mounts at Jefferson Barracks. In the rush to depart the

36 Ibid. Although Brigadier General Clarke was present at Jefferson Barracks throughout all of 1851, he did not assume command of the post until May 14, 1852. Clarke to Jones, May 14, 1852, Letters Recd., AGO.  

Barracks, before ice in the Mississippi made the river impassable, some
defective saddles and bridles were taken to New Orleans, and when the
riflemen received their new horses at New Orleans, this equipment proved
to be unserviceable. Brevet Major General David E. Twiggs, Commanding
Officer of the Western Division, instructed General Clarke to send the
equipment belonging to Companies A and K, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen,
stationed at Jefferson Barracks, to New Orleans. In return, Companies
C and E would send their defective equipment back to Jefferson Barracks
where it would be repaired and reissued to Companies A and K.\footnote{38}

This equipment exchange delayed the departure of Companies C and
E for Texas, and General Twiggs was angered with Clarke for allowing the
defective equipment to leave Jefferson Barracks. Twiggs angrily wrote
army headquarters demanding that Clarke be officially censured for im-
pairing the Texas and New Mexico operation. When Twiggs' complaint and
supporting data were presented to Winfield Scott, the General-in-Chief
agreed with the Western Division Commander, and Adjutant General Jones
was instructed to inform Clarke that Scott felt that "the increased ex-
panse incurred in the case [is] the natural result of your neglect to
exercise [adequate] supervision over the acts of [the officers of the
Regiment of Mounted Riflemen]."\footnote{39}

Clarke was, however, prepared to answer the criticism. In a letter
to Twiggs he informed the General that before Company C left Jefferson

\footnote{38} Twiggs to Clarke, February 18, 1852, Letters Sent by the
Western Division in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Re-

\footnote{39} Jones to Clarke, March 1, 1852, Letters Sent, AGO.
Barracks for New Orleans, new saddles and bridles were offered to the company commander, First Lieutenant Washington S. Elliott, but he had refused them. Furthermore, Clarke informed Twiggs, the original order directing the mounted riflemen to Texas via New Orleans was sent to the acting regimental commander, Major Winslow F. Sanderson, who had the responsibility of supervising the preparations for the riflemen's transfer. Just as soon as he became aware that the faulty equipment was in the hands of Companies C and E, Clarke had ordered new equipment sent to New Orleans, retaining halters and watering bridles for the large number of horses remaining at Jefferson Barracks. 40

General Twiggs, unfortunately, was not satisfied with Clarke's explanation. He was further irritated to learn that the halters and watering bridles had been kept at Jefferson Barracks, because they were now needed by rifleman companies already in Texas. 41 Although the mounted riflemen in the Lone Star State eventually received the necessary equipment, this rather trivial matter strained relations between Generals Twiggs and Clarke for a considerable time and detracted from the smooth functioning of the Western Division.

After the equipment controversy, affairs at Jefferson Barracks became relatively quiet. Recruits continued to arrive at the post to receive their initial equipment and uniform issues, and they were dispatched to their line units operating in the western territories. 42

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41 Bliss to Clarke, March 9, 1852, ibid.

were, however, invariably problems in carrying out this operation. Lieutenant J. P. Kingsbury alleged that Acting Commissary of Subsistence Lieutenant Lucien Loeser did not issue the proper rations to members of his company prior to their transfer to Fort Leavenworth, but shorted his men and then pocketed the financial difference between the allotted rations and the amount of rations actually issued. Braxton Bragg, commanding the battalion of the Third Artillery present at Jefferson Barracks, repeated these allegations to Adjutant General Jones and called for a court of inquiry to inspect Loeser's records. Loeser also demanded an inquiry, all the time protesting his innocence. 43

The court of inquiry was scheduled to meet during the first week in October 1852, but before a full investigation started, several of the officers leveling allegations against Lieutenant Loeser reconsidered and withdrew their charges. This forced General Clarke to limit the scope of the inquiry because the facts concerning deficit accounts would not be introduced. Loeser was dissatisfied with a partial investigation that would not give him the opportunity completely to exonerate himself, and he informed General Clarke that if the inquiry would not be "full and complete" he "would prefer that no court be ordered at all." 44 Although General Clarke was not pleased with this turn of events, he could not force a court of inquiry without the testimony of the now reluctant officers.

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43 Clarke to Assistant Adjutant General, September 1, 1852, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Bragg to Jones, September 4, 1852, Letters Recd., AGO; Bliss to Clarke, September 16, 1852, Letters Sent, West. Dept.

44 Loeser to Hancock, October 6, 1852, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Sherman to Hancock, October 6, 1852, ibid.; Clarke to Bliss, October 13, 1852, ibid.; Loeser to Hancock, October 13, 1852, ibid.
officers. Clarke did, however, introduce a new system of double checking on ration issues and supply allocations at Jefferson Barracks, and Lieutenant Loeser was relieved of duty and transferred to Fort Sullivan, Maine.45

With the resolution of the question concerning the accuracy of Lieutenant Loeser's supply records, the attention of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks returned primarily to training activities. Most often, this was dull, repetitious, and thoroughly distasteful work, but there were occasions when drill became a social event. Such were the times when Braxton Bragg's Light Artillery company went through its field target firing exercises. The citizenry of St. Louis often was invited to observe this training, and their presence created a holiday atmosphere. The St. Louisians were very favorably impressed with the accuracy of Bragg's troops, and the St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican observed that this was an excellent public relations event for the garrison at Jefferson Barracks. The St. Louisians felt "it was always a rich sight to see the Colonel drill his command."46

When daily training was completed, fatigue duties occupied much of the garrison's remaining time. Most of this work was routine, but on one occasion it provided a harrowing experience for a detail from Battery C, Third Artillery Regiment. The detail had been instructed to repair the main flagstaff at the Barracks. This flagstaff had been near

45 Bliss to Clarke, November 17, 1852, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Clarke to Assistant Adjutant General, December 8, 1852, Letters Recd., West. Dept.

46 Daily Missouri Republican, May 13, 1853.
collapse all winter, and on March 21, 1853, General Clarke ordered it fixed. The staff was constructed in two sections, a mainmast and a top mast, with crosstrees at the point where the two masts were joined. Private Michael McAnally of Battery C climbed the mainmast to the crosstrees, where he loosened and commenced to lower the top mast. As he did so, the mainmast leaned and snapped off two feet from its base. While the whole flagstaff was falling, McAnally freed himself from the tangled ropes, and, just before the staff crashed to the ground, jumped free, landing uninjured among the other members of the fatigue detail. In reporting this incident, the Daily Missouri Republican commented that this would be an army experience that McAnally would "not soon forget." The flagstaff was not the only structure at Jefferson Barracks that was collapsing or threatening to do so. The barracks buildings themselves were in terrible condition. Shortly after assuming command of the post on May 21, 1853, Braxton Bragg reported to Brevet Brigadier General Sylvester Churchill, Inspector General of the Army, that the physical condition of the post was deplorable. All living quarters were in disrepair, and those of the enlisted men were infested with rats, roaches, and other vermin. The enlisted mens' bunks were double berths, three tiers high, dilapidated and infested with bed bugs. The stables were "delapidated [sic] and unfit for use, unhealthy for horses, destructive to forage, and dangerous in windy weather." The post had plenty of good cisterns, but they were empty because the barracks buildings did

48 Ibid.
not have any gutters or connecting pipes. Bragg was especially angered with the quartermaster in St. Louis who had refused to provide Jefferson Barracks with mosquito netting. In the summer, the enlisted personnel who slept outdoors to escape the heat trapped in the poorly ventilated barracks were plagued by mosquitoes. There was no escape from the heat or mosquitoes outdoors, and during the Summers of 1851 and 1852, the infestation of the pesky insects was so bad that Bragg's entire command was prostrated with "intermittent fevers" from August to December.

"Valuable lives have been lost, and broken constitutions followed by discharges [from the army] are numerous," Bragg observed, and all because of the poor condition of the barracks buildings and the financial tight-fistedness of the quartermaster's office in St. Louis. Inspector Churchill concurred with Bragg's observations concerning the physical condition of the post's facilities, and emphasized the necessity of replacing all the old wooden bunks with iron bedsteads. Although he also agreed to the need for mosquito netting and cistern pipes, it wasn't until one year later that Congress appropriated the funds necessary for the repair of barracks buildings and mosquito netting.

Bragg was forced to cope with the deplorable conditions at Jefferson Barracks until October 1853, when he and his battery were transferred to Fort Gibson and the command of the post devolved upon Brevet


50 Churchill to AGO, June 23, 1853, ibid.; "An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Year ending the Thirteenth June, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-five," August 5, 1854, United States Statutes At Large, X 577.
Major Charles F. Ruff, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen. Ruff was graduated from the United States Military Academy and commissioned a second lieutenant in the First Dragoons on July 1, 1838. During the remainder of 1838, and most of 1839, he served at the Cavalry School of Practice at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In 1839, he was transferred to Fort Leavenworth and until the end of 1843 served there and at Forts Atkinson and Des Moines, Iowa. On December 31, 1843, he resigned his commission to become a farmer in Missouri. On June 18, 1846, following the outbreak of the war with Mexico, Ruff was appointed a lieutenant colonel in the Missouri Mounted Volunteers, and on July 7, 1846, was commissioned a captain in the newly formed Regiment of Mounted Riflemen. He was awarded the rank of brevet major for "gallant and meritorious conduct" at San Juan de Los Llanos, Mexico.  

While assuming command of Jefferson Barracks, Ruff retained his position as commander of the cavalry recruiting depot at the post. In his new role he became involved in a dispute with General Clarke over the depot and the Barracks' relationship to the Sixth Military Department. Ruff held that the depot and the post, as at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, were directly under the army headquarters in Washington and independent of the Sixth Military Department. Thus, when General Clarke directed him to submit the monthly returns of the Barracks to the headquarters of the Sixth Military Department in accordance with Paragraph 962, General Regulations of the Army, Ruff refused. When Ruff

51 Special Orders No. 61, October 4, 1853, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.; Kirkham to Cooper, October 11, 1853, Letters Recd., AGO; Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, November 1853, Post Returns, AGO; Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA, I, 728-29.

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persisted in his refusal, Brevet Major Francis N. Page, department ad-
jutant, informed Ruff that General Clarke insisted that the returns of
Jefferson Barracks be sent to his headquarters. "Jefferson Barracks is
a post in the Sixth Military Department, its commander is subject to the
commander thereof, and necessarily makes his reports, returns, etc., to
these headquarters," wrote Page, but matters that concerned "the peculiar
duties of the commander of the cavalry depot," were not subject to Clarke's
direction.52

Appealing the dispute to the new Adjutant General, Colonel Samuel
Cooper, Ruff noted that the commander of the cavalry depot at Carlisle
Barracks was appointed by the War Department and exercised his command
"incidental to" the command of the post. Field returns of the Carlisle
Barracks Depot were not sent to either the commanding officer of the Third
Military Department or to the commander of the Eastern Division, but went
directly to the headquarters of the Army. Ruff believed the same com-
mand relationship that existed between the cavalry depot and military
post at the Pennsylvania installation prevailed at Jefferson Barracks.
Therefore, he claimed to be exempt from any directions issued by General
Clarke concerning field returns or any other command matter at the Jef-

53ferson Barracks cavalry depot.53

Piqued at Ruff's refusal to acknowledge his authority over the
cavalry depot and garrison at Jefferson Barracks, Clarke withdrew the

52 Page to Ruff, October 18, 1853, Letters Recd., AGO; Ruff to Page, October 20, 1853, ibid.; Page to Ruff, October 20, 1853, ibid.

53 Ruff to Cooper, October 22, 1853, ibid.
regimental staff and recruits of the Sixth Infantry, present at the post, from Ruff's direct supervision. He further ordered that all fatigue and guard duties assigned to the Sixth Infantry troops be approved by his office. 54

Ruff was sustained by the War Department in claiming an independent status for the cavalry depot. On November 11, 1853, General-in-Chief Scott informed Clarke that the cavalry depot was a separate command, responsible only to the Headquarters of the Army and the War Department, and he, Clarke, was not to interfere in its administration. Clarke did, however, have control over the Sixth Infantry personnel at the Barracks. 55

In a January 22, 1854, letter to Colonel Lorenzo Thomas, Assistant Adjutant General, Clarke informed army headquarters that since the garrison at Jefferson Barracks was equally divided between cavalry depot personnel and Sixth Infantry permanent cadre and recruits, he had a legitimate interest in the daily affairs at the post. In addition, he pointed out, nearly all the deserters apprehended within the Sixth Military Department were arrested in St. Louis, and because of Jefferson Barracks' close proximity, were returned and court martialed at that post. This fact, however, presented a considerable problem to Clarke since the Sixth

54 Special Orders No. 71, October 26, 1853, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept. In issuing this order, Clarke acted in his capacity as departmental commander. In assuming direction of the 6th Infantry regimental staff and recruits, Clarke acted in his capacity as regimental colonel. Technically, the headquarters of the Sixth Infantry was at Jefferson Barracks, since Clarke was stationed at that location.

Infantry permanent cadre included no more than five officers. Because the General could not order officers of the cavalry depot to serve on military courts, whenever courts martial were held most of the daily functions of the post were halted because all the available Sixth Infantry officers were involved in legal proceedings. To Clarke, the only apparent solution was to place the cavalry depot under the command of the Sixth Military Department. Otherwise, the wheels of military justice would grind even slower than normal and the morale of the whole service would suffer.\(^56\)

Not content to complain to Army headquarters of the command situation at Jefferson Barracks, on April 14, 1854, General Clarke assumed command of the Barracks and issued orders requiring Ruff to provide the post adjutant with morning reports of the cavalry depot and to assign one non-commissioned officer and six privates of the depot cadre to the daily guard detail. Ruff protested and refused to obey Clarke's directive, citing as his authority for his refusal Headquarters of the Army General Order No. 4, November 11, 1853, and Headquarters of the Army Special Order No. 7, January 12, 1854, which established the cavalry depot as a separate command.\(^57\)

Notwithstanding Ruff's protests, Clarke insisted that he receive the cavalry depot morning report, but he did reduce the guard requirement from six privates to three. Steadfastly maintaining that his command was independent, Ruff appealed his case to Lieutenant Colonel John J. Clarke to Thomas, January 22, 1854, \textit{ibid.}\(^56\) Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, April 1854, Post Returns, AGO; Ruff to Hancock, April 15, 1854, Letters Recd., AGO.\(^57\)
Abercrombie, Superintendent of the Recruiting Service. Abercrombie did not immediately reply, so the command conflict festered throughout 1854 with Ruff and Clarke josting through correspondence with the Adjutant General's office. Neither Clarke nor Ruff was able to persuade Adjutant General Cooper to act in the matter with the result that the morale of the post garrison was hurt. 58

Although Headquarters of the Army General Order No. 4 enjoined General Clarke from exercising any direct command functions over the cavalry depot, it did give the General the authority to inspect the cavalry school of instruction. Accordingly, on February 28, 1854, Clarke ordered his adjutant, Brevet Major Francis N. Page, to inspect the garrison at Jefferson Barracks. Page was an 1841 graduate of the United States Military Academy, who, on July 1, 1841, was commissioned a brevet second lieutenant in the Seventh Infantry. The following October, he was promoted to second lieutenant and transferred to Florida with the Seventh Infantry. On May 9, 1846, at the start of the Mexican War, Page was made a brevet first lieutenant for "gallant conduct in the defense of Fort Brown, Texas." A year later, he was promoted to brevet captain for excellent staff service, and on August 29, 1847, he was advanced to brevet major for "gallant and meritorious conduct" during the fighting at Contreras.

58 Clarke's semi-peace offering is found in Hancock to Ruff, April 15, 1854, ibid., and Ruff's rejection and appeal to Abercrombie are found in Ruff to Hancock, April 17, 1854, ibid., and Ruff to Abercrombie, April 20, 1854, ibid. Indications of the continuing command conflict are Clarke to Cooper, July 17, 1854, Letters Sent, West. Dept., and Ruff to Abercrombie, August 8, 1854, Letters Recd., AGO.
and Churubusco. After the war, Page became the adjutant of the Sixth Military Department and the Department of the West.  

During his inspection, Page found that the officers of the cavalry depot, all of whom were graduates of the United States Military Academy, were "theoretically prepared, intelligent, zealous [in their duties], sober and active," but were lacking in practical knowledge "[so valuable] for future service." This deficiency in the officers' training carried over to that of the noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the depot cadre, who were "obedient, but not well instructed in . . . prescribed [cavalry] drill, nor generally attentive to personal appearance." Furthermore, the cavalry depot noncommissioned officers and privates demonstrated very little expertise with either the sword or carbine and pistol, and could not accurately perform any drill maneuvers. 

Page also mustered and inspected the regimental band and recruits of the Sixth Infantry at the post, and in contrast, found both these groups to be in "fine order and well instructed." The recruits were well trained and performed their drill exercises with a crispness that reflected "much credit [upon] the success of [the Sixth Infantry] recruiting depot."

Upon receiving the adjutant's report, Clarke informed Brevet Major Ruff that he had five months to correct the deficiencies noted in Page's report, and then ordered Page to re-inspect the post and its garrison

59 Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA, II, 103-104.
60 Page to Clarke, March 5, 1854, Letters Recd., AGO.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
at the end of July. At the time of the second inspection, there were 217 men at the post: eighty-two assigned to the cavalry depot, fifty-seven to the Sixth Infantry, and thirty-eight to Company E, Second Infantry, as well as thirty-two general service recruits, and a surgeon and one ordnance sergeant. On July 31, 1854, Page inspected the soldiers of the cavalry depot and Company E, Second Infantry as a "squadron dismounted." He found all the infantry officers in regulation uniforms and presenting a good military appearance. The noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, however, presented a different picture. Page found "a great want of attention to military appearance" among many of the noncommissioned officers, and many enlisted men's weapons were either broken or not in "good order." All personnel in the cavalry depot were in mixed uniforms: some were wearing the new 1851 style, but many were still wearing the trousers and jackets of the pre-1851 mode. Page complained that the faulty uniforms greatly detracted from the "esprit de corps" of the new cavalry recruits. Furthermore, those recruits demonstrated shoddy training in their mounted drill; their horses were not well disciplined, and many of the recruits handled their mounts roughly.

In contrast to the mediocre performance of the cavalry depot cadre and recruits, the soldiers of Company E, Second Infantry, and the band and recruits of the Sixth Infantry performed the parade and drill functions

63 Special Order No. 66, July 29, 1854, Order Book, West. Dept.
64 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, July 1854, Post Returns, AGO.
65 Page to C.O. of Department of West, August 7, 1854, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
66 Ibid.
of the inspection review well. Page attributed the excellent performance of the Sixth Infantry recruits to the superior command ability of General Clarke, and the poor performance of the cavalry depot recruits to the poor leadership ability of Major Ruff.\textsuperscript{67}

Having made these self-serving remarks about the respective merits of the cavalry depot and Sixth Infantry recruits, Page then tempered his harsh judgments with several explanations of the cavalry depot personnel's inadequacies. The depot requisitioned its uniforms from the quartermaster in St. Louis, and he did not have enough cavalry uniforms for all the recruits. Furthermore, he wanted to exhaust his supply of old-style uniforms before issuing the new ones.\textsuperscript{68}

One of the deficiencies Page noted in his drill examination of the cavalry depot was poor horsemanship, but upon examination of the horses and their stables, the Adjutant found that the horses were "generally of [an] inferior quality and hardly adapted for cavalry exercises at the post." In addition, they were in bad shape as a consequence of inadequate grazing and poor quality forage. Furthermore, the animals were treated harshly by inexperienced recruits, and their stables were "scarcely fit for . . . horses." Manure was "heaped up at the side and back doors of the stables" in such a manner as to prevent ventilation. Besides, there was no trained farrier at Jefferson Barracks, and veterinary service was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid. Page noted that the new dragoon overcoat cost $11.08, whereas the old coat cost $7.62\textsuperscript{\frac{1}{2}}. New trousers were $4.54, the old $3.46 per pair. The old uniform coat was $4.87\textsuperscript{\frac{1}{2}}, and the new $6.09. With congressional failure to increase the uniform commutation allowance, the "benefit of the change in uniform [went] to the manufacturers and tailors at the expense of the soldier. . . ."
\end{itemize}
performed in an irregular manner by a cavalry recruit. Page believed that it was "necessary to build [new] stables... if [Jefferson Barracks was] to... continue as a cavalry school of practice." 69

Even though the condition of the soldiers' uniforms and horses was bad, it was, in Page's opinion, not as bad as their barracks, which he described as "present[ly] unfit for occupation." The bunks were old, wooden, and three-tiered, and very often men had to sleep two in a bed, six per bunk. This was "highly conducive" to the spread of contagious diseases and dissatisfaction among the recruits. The barracks' roofs were rotting and the floors in the lower story were so cracked that they were in danger of collapsing. The cisterns, which Lieutenant Colonel Bragg indicated were inoperative in 1853, still needed repair, and the police of the grounds was so neglected as to "render the post unhealthy." Page noted that the quartermaster in St. Louis estimated that it would cost a minimum of $24,346 to repair the post, but if the army contemplated using the Barracks for ten more years, the repair of the buildings was absolutely necessary. 70 Congress was, at the very time Page made his report to General Clarke, in the process of appropriating funds for repairing the Barracks and numerous other army installations, and repair work at the post began in 1854. 71

Throughout the period of conflict over the command of the cavalry depot, and despite the deterioration of the physical facilities at

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 See above note #52.
Jefferson Barracks, the post continued to function as a major recruit training center for the frontier army. General Clarke, in addition to being the Commanding General of the Sixth Military Department, was also the regimental colonel of the Sixth Infantry and exercised command of his far-flung regiment from Jefferson Barracks. On October 27, 1854, the Headquarters of the Army ordered the Sixth Infantry to concentrate at Jefferson Barracks preparatory to its transfer to California via New Orleans and the Isthmus of Panama, but before all the regiment could be assembled at the post, an incident along the North Platte River in present-day Wyoming occurred which altered these plans.

In late July-early August 1854, the Brule, Oglala, and Miniconjou Sioux began to gather at Fort Laramie to receive their annual government annuities as provided for in the Treaty of 1851. On August 18, a Mormon emigrant reported to the post commander, Second Lieutenant Hugh B. Flemming, that a Miniconjou brave had killed and butchered one of his stray cows. The following day, Flemming dispatched Brevet Second Lieutenant John L. Grattan, a recent graduate of the United States Military Academy, two noncommissioned officers, twenty-seven privates, and an interpreter to apprehend the accused Indian from a nearby encampment. Grattan attempted to take the wanted man by force, and a fight erupted. The Sioux swarmed over the outnumbered infantrymen and massacred them.

72 In 1854, the Sixth Infantry provided company strength garrisons for Forts Atkinson, Kearny, Laramie, Ridgely, Riley, and Snelling. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 112, and Special Orders No. 72, September 9, 1854, Order Book, West. Dept.

73 Special Order No. 141, October 27, 1854, HQA, cited in Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, November 1854, Post Returns, AGO.
One survivor eventually reached Fort Laramie, but died several days later.\textsuperscript{74}

As word of this massacre reached the rest of the nation, there was the predictable expression of outrage against the Indians. Reports of the Indian agent at Fort Laramie to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, however, revealed that Flemming and Grattan, through inexperience in dealing with Indians, had underestimated the redmen's character and fighting strength. Congress temporarily accepted this explanation of the incident with Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri expressing the opinion that the affair was "a heavy penalty for a nation to pay for a lame runaway Mormon cow, and for the folly and juvenile ambition of a West Point Fledgling [Grattan]." Emboldened by their rout of Grattan's small force, however, the Sioux began raiding the overland trails along the North Platte River, and the government decided to retaliate.\textsuperscript{75}

Colonel and Brevet Brigadier General William S. Harney, an experienced commander who had seen action against the Seminoles in Florida and had received his brevet generalship for "gallant and meritorious" action in the Battle of Cerro Gordo, Mexico, was appointed commander of the 1855 expedition against the Sioux. He arrived at Jefferson Barracks in April of that year, and then moved his command to Fort Kearny, Nebraska Territory, taking with him the Sixth Infantry Regiment, which became the backbone of his expedition against the Sioux. Harney completed the organization of his force in July, and then called for the Indians who

\textsuperscript{74} For an excellent summary of this affair, see Lloyd E. McCann, "The Grattan Massacre," \textit{Nebraska History}, XXXVII, (1956), 1-26.

\textsuperscript{75} Utley, \textit{Frontiersmen in Blue}, 114-15.
wished to be considered friendly to assemble at Fort Kearny. Those who remained north of the Platte would be considered hostile. Many Sioux came to Fort Kearny, but the Brules and Miniconjous stayed north of the river. Harney then took a force of 600 soldiers to track them down, and, on September 2-3, 1854, he attacked and severely defeated the main band of Brules near the mouth of Ash Hollow Creek along the North Platte River midway between Forts Kearny and Laramie. Harney then proceeded to Fort Laramie, regrouped his force, and then struck out through the heart of Sioux country to Fort Pierre on the Missouri River where he went into winter quarters on October 20.76

Prior to its service with Colonel Harney against the Sioux, the Sixth Infantry Regiment had begun to concentrate at Jefferson Barracks in October 1854, and by the end of the year the garrison had increased to approximately 990 men.77 With this rapid influx of men into the vermin ridden and dilapidated quarters at the Barracks, the incidence of disease soared. From October to December 1854, the number of soldiers confined to the post hospital quadrupled, and on January 11, 1855, General Clarke expressed deep concern to Assistant Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas that


77 The Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks for September 1854, shows there was an aggregate of 115 men at the post. By December 31, 1854, the size of the garrison had increased to 989 men. Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September and December 1854, Post Returns, AGO.
a severe epidemic of cholera or typhus might occur. Clarke stated that if the incidence of disease did not soon abate, the post church and "gun house" would have to be used to house the overflow of patients from the hospital. He suggested to Thomas that instead of sending new recruits to Jefferson Barracks, eastern recruiting stations temporarily hold the new enlistees until "... a disposition of those at Jefferson Barracks shall have been made." Their transfer to Fort Leavenworth to reduce the size of the garrison could not take place until mid or late February because ice still blocked all navigation on the Missouri River.

Army headquarters had not been aware of the dangerous health situation at the Barracks, but upon receipt of Clarke's letter, Adjutant General Cooper notified the Department Commander that the transfer of all cavalry recruits to the post had been temporarily suspended. This action, however, did not entirely prevent the arrival of additional troops at the Barracks. On January 19, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin V. Sumner, who had assumed command of the post in December 1854, reported to Colonel Cooper the arrival of the staff and band of the Second Dragoons, thus increasing the January aggregate to 1,128 men. Although he had joined the army as a second lieutenant in the Second Infantry, Sumner spent most

78 The post returns of October shows nineteen men confined to the hospital. By December, this number was eighty-two and giving every indication of continuing to increase. Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September-December 1854, Post Returns, AGO; Clarke to Thomas, January 11, 1855, Letters Sent, West. Dept.

79 Clarke to Thomas, ibid.

80 Cooper to Clarke, January 18, 1855, Letters Recd., West. Dept.

81 Sumner to Cooper, January 18, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO; Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January 1855, Post Returns, AGO.
of his military career as a cavalryman. Beginning in 1833, as a captain, he served twenty-two years in the dragoons. During the Mexican War he rose to lieutenant colonel, and when the War Department reorganized the dragoons as cavalry regiments in 1855, Sumner was promoted to colonel and became the commander of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment.\textsuperscript{82}

As commander of Jefferson Barracks, in January 1855, Sumner informed the Adjutant General that he could accommodate a hundred more soldiers at the post if the War Department wished to send them there. As a precautionary health measure, he requested thirty wall tents and 200 common tents to enable him to disperse the men from the crowded barracks "as soon as the spring opens."\textsuperscript{83} The War Department resumed sending cavalry recruits to the post, and by the end of February 1855, the strength of the garrison was 1,324. It remained at or near this number throughout March and into April, until the Sixth Infantry departed for Forts Kearny and Riley.\textsuperscript{84}

Even though army headquarters sent additional troops to Jefferson Barracks, none of the requested tents was sent. By the first of March, consequently, the housing situation at the post was becoming desperate. Sumner informed Adjutant General Cooper that if he didn't receive the tents before "warm weather comes on" the men's health would deteriorate even further. This proved to be a grim, but accurate prophecy. In March, 164 members of the garrison were in the post hospital, and when Colonel

\textsuperscript{82} Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of U. S. Army, I, 936.

\textsuperscript{83} Sumner to Cooper, January 27, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO.

\textsuperscript{84} Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, February-April 1855, Post Returns, AGO.
Harney arrived at the Barracks in April, he reported to the Adjutant General that cholera and smallpox had broken out among the cavalry recruits.85

Colonel Sumner hoped that the disease rate at Jefferson Barracks would decline when the six companies of the Sixth Infantry stationed at the post left with Harney in mid-April. This hope proved, however, to be vain, for rather than abating, the incidence of disease continued high throughout the summer. Dr. Joseph J. B. Wright, the post surgeon, reported to Colonel Summer that for the quarter ending March 31, 1855, he had officially listed 1,228 patients on the hospital register at a time when the average strength of the garrison was 1,217 men. This was a sick report of 33.63 percent of the garrison each month. Wright compared this figure to a five percent sick report average at Carlisle Barracks, his previous duty station, which, like Jefferson Barracks, was a recruit depot. Department Adjutant Major Francis N. Page supported Wright's report by stating that in comparison to any other post within the Department of the West, Jefferson Barracks was "actually more than 100 percent more sickly..."86

Summer, Page, and Wright were perplexed by this unwholesome health situation. Dr. Wright was "utterly at a loss to determine what circumstances [were] involved" in the impaired health of the command, unless they were "to be found in the facilities which are present to the enlisted men for obtaining intoxicating liquor." The Surgeon observed that there

85 Sumner to Cooper, March 3, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO; Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, March 1855, Post Returns, AGO; Harney to Cooper, April 12, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO.

86 Sumner to Cooper, April 20, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO; Wright to Summer, April 30, 1855 ibid.; Page to Summer, May 1, 1855, ibid.
were no marshy lands within the vicinity of the post, and the police of
the garrison was exceptional, "more perfect indeed than I have ever be-
fore witnessed at any military post. . . ." Yet, despite these positive
factors, Jefferson Barracks had a constant sick report of twenty percent
and an attraction for cholera as bears to honey. 87

Colonel Sumner was also at a loss to explain the high rate of sick-
ness. The surrounding countryside, he noted, was free of disease even
though the citizens were "... the lower class of dutch [sic]" and lived
in "filthy" conditions. Private citizens who lived in filth were free
of cholera, whereas military personnel whose living conditions were in
"good police" were dying with the disease. 88

Even though Sumner and Wright could discover no obvious reason
for the poor state of health among the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks,
there were a number of probable causes. In their 1853 and 1854 inspections
of the post, both Braxton Bragg and Francis N. Page indicated that the
barracks buildings were in desperate need of repair. The soldiers' bunks
were infested with vermin and the cisterns were non-functioning. Very
little had been done to correct these deficiencies. Cholera struck the
post during the summer, when the soldiers were drawing water from the
Mississippi, downstream from St. Louis, and its untreated sewage effluents.
Furthermore, soldiers at the Barracks planted and harvested vegetable

87 Wright to Summer, April 30, 1855, ibid.
88 Sumner to Cooper, May 1, 1855, ibid.
gardens during the summer, and if the vegetables were improperly prepared, that could contribute to the spread of the disease.\textsuperscript{89}

Despite its health problems, Jefferson Barracks continued to be of vital importance to the frontier army. The cavalry depot sent a steady supply of cavalryme\textsuperscript{89}n to western units. When the Sixth Infantry departed the post in April 1855, the Second Cavalry began to use the Barracks as a recruit and training center. Throughout the spring and summer, the number of cavalry recruits at the post was in excess of 300. Those not assigned to the Second Cavalry were rapidly dispatched to Fort Leavenworth and then farther west to units of the First Cavalry.\textsuperscript{90} The Second Cavalry remained at Jefferson Barracks until autumn, when it was ordered to Fort Belknap, Texas. It departed the post on October 27, 1855, with a strength of 710 men.\textsuperscript{91}

Throughout this period, a generally good relationship existed between Jefferson Barracks and St. Louis, although there were occasional minor irritations. Military authorities at the Headquarters of the Army,  

\textsuperscript{89} Consultation with Dr. Michael J. Ziegler, Professor of Medicine, University of California School of Medicine, San Diego, reveals that cholera, an often fatal intestinal tract disease characterized by profuse diarrhea and dehydration, is transmitted very easily by impure water. Furthermore, if animal manure was used to fertilize the vegetable gardens at Jefferson Barracks and then the harvested produce was not carefully washed and prepared, cholera could be transmitted to the soldiers by the vegetables.  

\textsuperscript{90} Abercrombie to Assistant Adjutant General, June 11, 1855, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Sumner to Cooper, June 16, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO; Lee to Garrard, June 19, 1855, ibid.; Hancock to Clarke, June 23, 1855, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Clarke to Cooper, June 25, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO.  

\textsuperscript{91} Special Orders No. 104, October 9, 1855, Order Book, West. Dept.; Johnston to Cooper, October 27, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO.
the Department of the West, and the Barracks had always viewed the close proximity of the post to the city with some concern, because St. Louis offered soldiers easy access to illicit whiskey, prostitution houses, and it tempted them to desertion.

The most common problem was soldiers stationed at the Barracks either buying whiskey from local merchants and becoming drunk while on the military reservation or being arrested by civil authorities in St. Louis for "public drunkenness." In such cases, the civil authorities usually allowed the military to take charge of the men and discipline them, but in instances of more serious civil and criminal violations, the soldiers were detained and tried in St. Louis courts.

One such incident involved the death of Private James Gunn, a farrier of Company C of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, on November 6, 1851. Company C had just recently returned to Jefferson Barracks from the lonesome and bleak outpost of Fort Laramie. On November 6, Gunn and a number of his comrades went into St. Louis on pass to have a good time. Gunn died under mysterious circumstances at a bordello belonging to Elizabeth Hollis. A coroner's inquest was held on November 7, but the coroner's jury found no reason to suspect foul play. This verdict,

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92 Orders No. 45, December 5, 1849, Order Book, 6th Mil. Dept.; Orders No. 4, February 21, 1850, ibid.; Orders No. 2, January 4, 1851, ibid.; Orders No. 29, July 1, 1851, ibid.; Special Orders No. 49, March 23, 1854, Order Book, West. Dept.

93 Daily Missouri Republican, November 7, 1851. The newspaper reported that Gunn, a man about 45 years old, apparently consumed some poison "with a view to suicide."
however, did not satisfy Gunn's companions, who believed that Gunn was murdered with an overdose of laudanum and $80.00 stolen from his person. 94

When Gunn's body was returned to Jefferson Barracks for burial on Friday, November 8, the sight of the dead soldier's remains created much unrest among the members of Company C. Later than night, at approximately 1:00 A. M., twenty-five to thirty members of Gunn's regiment appeared at Elizabeth Hollis's house and demanded admittance. When they were repulsed, the soldiers, brandishing pistols, bowie knives, clubs and sabers, broke the door open and proceeded to ransack the premises.

In reporting this incident, the St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican noted:

... Glasses, chairs, tables, pictures, beds, all in turn were shivered to pieces or otherwise destroyed. The persons of the inmates too, were not free from molestation. The women, it is said, were mercilessly abused, and one man threatened with instant butchery if he gave the alarm. The woman Hollis states she was robbed by some of the band of money to the amount of $300, which she stored in a drawer and that she was made to take from her finger and deliver a ring valued at $400. 95

After demolishing the furniture, the soldiers set fire to the house and left. On their way back to Jefferson Barracks, the rioters broke into the Arsenal Park clubhouse and stole its store of liquor, cigars, and canned sardines. 96

94 Ibid., November 8, 1851. This was an unusually large amount of money to be in the possession of any army private in 1851, but Gunn's Company had just received six months' back pay when it returned to Jefferson Barracks.

95 The Intelligencer, November 10, 1851; the Daily Missouri Republican, November 10, 1851.

96 Ibid.
When the St. Louis police attempted to break up the riot at Hollis' house, soldiers drove them off. Two St. Louis police officers then hurried to Jefferson Barracks to inform the commanding officer, Major Winslow F. Sanderson, of the actions of the soldiers in the city. Sanderson immediately ordered a regimental formation and took roll at 3:00 A.M., noting all that were unaccounted for. Guards were posted, and all those who were absent without leave were arrested and turned over to the St. Louis authorities when they returned to the post. Eventually, fourteen soldiers were charged by the state authorities in St. Louis with the "public disturbance and riot" at the Hollis house.97

The soldiers were indicted by a state grand jury and their trial commenced on Friday, January 30, 1852, and concluded the following Monday. The jury found ten of the thirteen defendants guilty and then quickly sentenced them to pay for the damages to the Hollis house and Arsenal Park clubhouse, and serve three months in the county jail. The fourteenth defendant, Sergeant Jeremiah Heeps, demanded and received a separate trial, but he too was found guilty and received the same sentence.98 This incident was not at all typical of the relations which existed between the


98 Daily Missouri Republican, February 3, 1852; State of Missouri v. Joseph Barton, et al., February 2, 1852, Records, Criminal Circuit Court, St. Louis, VII, 46; The Intelligencer, February 21, 1852.
soldiers of Jefferson Barracks and the City of St. Louis; it was, in fact, by far the most serious altercation involving soldiers from Jefferson Barracks and St. Louis residents in the entire thirty-five year period between 1826 and 1860. The St. Louis newspapers went to great lengths to stress that only a very small number of the total garrison participated in the affair and the great majority of the men condemned the actions of the rioters.99

Overall, St. Louis and Jefferson Barracks had a very good relationship that was profitable to both the city and the army. The post provided employment for a considerable number of skilled civilian craftsmen and made a sizeable financial impact on the economy of the St. Louis area. In his 1854 inspection of the post, for example, Major Francis N. Page noted that the quartermaster department at the post employed a minimum of seven, and very often as many as twenty, civilians as forage masters, farriers, carpenters, masons, and teamsters. The wages paid these persons ranged from $66.00 per month for the forage master to $2.25 per day for the carpenters.100 Although the War Department viewed the employment of civilians with a jaundiced eye, Major Page defended using them at Jefferson Barracks, stating that a post such as the Barracks, where large numbers of soldiers were assigned to extra duty, "and where the command is composed almost entirely of recruits it is of the greatest importance to employ teamsters and others from among the civilian [population]."

99 Daily Missouri Republican, November 12, 1851; The Intelligencer, November 11, 1851, January 17, 1852.

100 Page to Commanding Officer, Department of the West, August 7, 1854, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
The extra duty took the recruits away from valuable military training, and, because the soldiers were paid only 18¢ a day for performing the same work for which civilian laborers received $1.00, extra duty was the greatest single factor contributing to the high desertion rate. For the long term, in Page's opinion, the extensive use of civilian laborers at Jefferson Barracks would be less expensive to the army that the continued use of recruits on extra duty because the civilian employees did better work than the soldiers, the recruits did not lose valuable training time, and their morale was not weakened by such onerous labor.101

In addition to utilizing civilian laborers, Jefferson Barracks was a large consumer of agricultural commodities produced in the St. Louis area. During the six-year period following the Mexican War, the quartermaster and commissary of subsistence offices in St. Louis purchased from local merchants approximately $40,000 worth of food per year for the post garrison. Additional contracts were granted to individual farmers to provide fresh meat to the Barracks. Brevet Captain Ralph W. Kirkham, regimental quartermaster of the Sixth Infantry, noted that very often a local farmer sold his entire yearly beef and corn production to the post, thus depending on army contracts for his economic survival.102

In discussing the importance of the economic relationship between St. Louis and Jefferson Barracks to the entire frontier army, Colonel

101 Ibid.

102 Subsistence Contracts, January 1849-December 1855, Register of Contracts found in the Records of the Office of Commissary General of Subsistence, (Record Group No. 192, National Archives); Report of Kirkham to Page found in Page to Commanding Officer, Department of the West, August 7, 1854, Letters Recd., West Dept.
Edwin V. Sumner stated that, as late as 1855, the post was still the most centrally located recruit and supply depot for the entire West. Troops and supplies could be moved from Jefferson Barracks with great ease to Texas, New Mexico, the Dakotas, and even California and Oregon. No other military installation offered such advantage. The post's close proximity and economic ties to St. Louis meant that the army's horses, wagons, and subsistence for men and animals could be purchased cheaper in this western city than anywhere else in the frontier region.\(^\text{103}\)

In the post-Mexican War period, military personnel at Jefferson Barracks witnessed many changes. The frontier army now had great responsibilities to control the Indians of the vast area of the Great Plains and Far West. The physical facilities at Jefferson Barracks neared total deterioration, but Congress, at the last moment, appropriated the necessary funds to commence repairs. Health problems still plagued the garrison, but repairing the barracks buildings would contribute greatly to their alleviation. Relations with St. Louis were still good. St. Louisiana sometimes found the soldiers from the post to be something of an annoyance, but the city greatly valued the military establishment. Furthermore, Jefferson Barracks was to play an important role in the future development of St. Louis with the construction of railroad lines out of the city.

\(^{103}\) Sumner to Cooper, May 1, 1855, Letters Recd., AGO.
Chapter VII

CONSTRUCTION OF THE ST. LOUIS AND
IRON MOUNTAIN RAILROAD, 1853-1856

At the time Jefferson Barracks was fulfilling its important support role for the frontier army, the United States was undergoing dramatic changes in its transportation system. The most important of these was the advent of the railroad. The construction of railroads began in the East in the 1830s, but by 1852 a road was completed to Chicago, and two years later St. Louis was linked to the East by a "zig zag" line that would later become sections of the Baltimore and Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad systems.¹

Until 1851, however, no railroads were built in Missouri. But by that date many Missourians began to realize that their state could not continue to depend solely upon waterways for its transportation system. It needed railroads within the state as well as rail connections with the rest of the country.²

As St. Louis businessmen witnessed the extension of the rail lines westward and southward from Chicago in the early 1850s, they became


² Eugene M. Violette, A History of Missouri, (Boston, 1918), 228-9; Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, II, 234.
increasingly concerned at the threat which these lines posed for their city's commercial position.\(^3\) The St. Louis *Inquirer* complained that while many St. Louisians were overly absorbed by the issue of slavery, "Iowa and Illinois were industriously occupied in constructing [rail] roads through both states in order to secure the trade of Iowa to Chicago."\(^4\) Another St. Louis newspaper demonstrated, by example, the economic advantage which railroads were giving Chicago over St. Louis. Reporting from Port Byron, Illinois, located fifteen miles north of present-day Moline and approximately 250 miles up the Mississippi from St. Louis, in October 1854, a correspondent of the *Daily Missouri Republican* explained that it cost 64¢ for a bushel of corn shipped to St. Louis from Port Byron; 25¢ for the corn, 6¢ for the gunny-sacks, 30¢ for the river freight, and 3¢ for commission and insurance. The same bushel of corn shipped to Chicago cost 46¢; 25¢ for the corn, 6¢ for wagon freight to Moline, 12¢ for railroad freight to Chicago, and 3¢ for commission and insurance. With corn priced at 52¢ per bushel in St. Louis, a grain merchant lost 12¢ per bushel if he sold the corn there; but with corn selling for 55¢ per bushel in Chicago, the same grain dealer would receive a 9¢ per bushel profit selling the corn in the Illinois city.\(^5\)

Not only was St. Louis' trade along the Upper Mississippi and throughout Illinois threatened by railroad developments out of Chicago, \(^3\) Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, II, 224-25; Robert E. Riegel, *The Story of the Western Railroads: From 1852 through the Reign of the Giants*, (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1967), 103. Hereinafter cited as Riegel, *Western Railroads*.

\(^4\) *The Inquirer*, (St. Louis), September 1, 1856.

\(^5\) *Daily Missouri Republican*, (St. Louis), October 27, 1854.
but because of a lack of railroads, its trade with the interior of Missouri was failing to develop as it should. In an effort to call attention to this situation, in 1836 an internal improvements convention met in St. Louis and endorsed a proposal favoring the construction of railroads throughout Missouri. Acting on the convention's recommendations, in 1837 the Missouri state legislature chartered a number of short-line railroads to serve as adjuncts to river transportation. A Board of Internal Improvements was also created and assigned oversight of railroad construction as one of its duties. The Panic of 1837, however, cut short this early railroading effort before any construction had begun.6

When Missourians' interest in railroads revived in the 1840s, their principal objective was to secure a transcontinental rail line which would run westward from St. Louis. In March 1849, the state legislature chartered the Pacific Railroad of Missouri, and in January 1850, the company was organized. With high hopes of future glory for St. Louis and Missouri, ground was broken on July 4, 1851, but construction proceeded exceedingly slowly. Five miles of tract were completed by December 1852, but by the end of 1857, the Missouri Pacific extended westward only to Jefferson City, a distance of 125 miles.7

The greatest difficulty confronting the Missouri Pacific as well as every other western railroad, was obtaining adequate capital. It sold stocks and bonds to private investors, but the amount of capital raised

6 For a study of early Missouri railroads, see W. J. Thornton, "Early History of Railroads in Missouri," Missouri State Historical Society Proceedings, (St. Louis, 1903), 28-43.

was very small, so the railroad turned to state and local governments for financial aid. When the Missouri state legislature met in the Spring of 1852, the Missouri Pacific and other Missouri railway companies asked it for substantial financial aid. After considerable debate, in December 1852, the legislature authorized the issuance of $4,750,000 in railroad bonds for the benefit of five rail lines being constructed in the state. 8

One of the railroads receiving state aid, besides the Missouri Pacific, was the St. Louis and Iron Mountain, which was to run southward from St. Louis to the mineral region of the Meremac River Valley and the St. Francis Mountains. Mining operations had been carried on in this region since the early eighteenth century when the French opened several lead mines west of Ste. Genevieve. These mines, however, earned only marginal profits, because of the transportation costs from minehead and smelter to the Mississippi. During the 1820s, small iron works were opened in the Meremac River Valley to serve the growing St. Louis market, but once again transportation costs limited their expansion. An example was a smelter operated at Moselle, Missouri, approximately forty miles southwest of St. Louis on the Meremac River. It cost $5.87 per ton to transport pig iron from this smelter to St. Louis when roads were in good shape. But when they were not, transportation costs escalated to as much as $8.00 per ton. At the lower price, the locally produced pig iron was

8 Riegel, Western Railroads, 23; Violette, A History of Missouri, 237. The five rail lines were (1) the Missouri Pacific, running from St. Louis to Kansas City; (2) the North Missouri, running northwest from St. Louis toward Council Bluffs; (3) the Southwest Branch of the Missouri Pacific, running southwest from St. Louis hopefully to the Pacific coast; (4) the St. Louis and Iron Mountain, running due south from St. Louis; and (5) the Hannibal and St. Joseph, connecting the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers between the cities named in the title.
barely able to compete in the St. Louis market against pig iron produced in Pittsburgh. At the higher one, the locally produced pig iron was too expensive and was excluded from the St. Louis market, which annually consumed approximately 9,200 tons of iron.\(^9\)

The need for better and less expensive transportation into this nearby mining region was clear to St. Louis business interests, and at an 1836 railroad convention held in the city, a railroad line to that area was proposed. The following year, on January 25, 1837, the state legislature chartered the St. Louis and Bellevue Mineral Railroad to meet this need. Unfortunately, the Panic of 1837 stopped all railroad projects in the state, and the proposed line was not started.\(^{10}\)

It was not until 1849 that interest was again shown in pushing a rail line into the region south of St. Louis. In that year, Senator Thomas Hart Benton introduced a bill in the United States Senate calling for the national government to sponsor the construction of a transcontinental railroad from St. Louis to San Francisco. Because there were numerous other proposed routes for the line, the Corps of Topographical Engineers was directed to make surveys of the several possible railroad routes to the Pacific and report back to Congress. As part of its assignment, the War Department ordered a survey from St. Louis to the big bend of the Red River in the Southwest corner of Arkansas. Captain Joshua Barney, United States Topographical Engineers, was designated to make this survey, and on November 6, 1849, his expedition left from the St.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 230-31.
Louis Arsenal to begin work. The first part of Barney's survey followed the right bank of the Mississippi, through the Marine Hospital grounds, the City of Carondelet, and Jefferson Barracks, to the mouth of Platten Creek, near present-day Herculaneum, Missouri, approximately twenty-five miles south of St. Louis. From there, the survey ran up Platten Creek, crossed to the St. Francis River Valley, and then followed this river into Arkansas.  

Barney's survey was presented to Congress in late 1851, and on January 7, 1852, Congressman Robert W. Johnson of Arkansas sponsored legislation calling for a government land grant to a railroad which would run from St. Louis, via Little Rock, to Fulton, Arkansas, located on the Red River, near the Texas border. Congress substituted "a point on the Mississippi River opposite the mouth of the Ohio [River]" for St. Louis, and passed the legislation on February 9, 1853.  

When Congress dropped St. Louis as the eastern terminus of the proposed railroad, Missourians' interest in the Barney survey declined, and they directed their efforts toward the Missouri Pacific's westward

11 "Survey of Route for a Railroad from the Valley of the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean, commencing at St. Louis, Missouri," May 25, 1850, Senate Executive Document No. 49, March 16, 1852, 3d Cong., 1 Sess., (Serial No. 619), 1-13.

12 "A Bill to Grant to the State of Arkansas and Missouri the right of way for, and a portion of the public lands, to aid in the construction of a railroad from St. Louis, Missouri, via Little Rock, to some point on Red River near the town of Fulton in Arkansas, and for branches thereto," House Journal, Bill No. 66, January 6, 1852, (Serial No. 632), 181-82; "An Act Granting the Right of Way and Making a Grant of Land to the States of Arkansas and Missouri to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad from a point on the Mississippi, opposite the mouth of the Ohio River, via Little Rock, to the Texas boundary near Fulton, Arkansas, with branches to Fort Smith and the Mississippi River," February 8, 1853, United States Statutes At Large, X, 155-56.
construction. Nevertheless, there remained a need to push a rail line into the mineral region south of St. Louis. Accordingly, on March 3, 1851, the Missouri legislature incorporated the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company. This company was to establish a line, following the Barney survey route, from St. Louis to Pilot Knob, a distance of approximately seventy-five miles. If this direct line proved to be impractical, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain could establish a junction at any point on the main line of the Missouri Pacific to provide service between St. Louis and Pilot Knob and the mineral region.\(^{13}\)

The people who were developing the mineral deposits of the Iron Mountain area were primarily interested in securing a railroad to St. Louis so their products could move to market at a reasonable cost. It was not particularly important to them whether that railroad was a direct one to St. Louis or a less direct one built and operated as a branch of the Missouri Pacific. In March 1852, the prospects for early completion of the Missouri Pacific appeared good, and the construction of a branch of that railroad to Potosi, some fifty five miles south-southwest of St. Louis, seemed more likely than that of a wholly new railroad, such as the St. Louis and Iron Mountain. The Missouri Pacific, however, was confronted with several serious financial difficulties in 1852, and work on its main line slowly ground to a halt.\(^{14}\)

Faced with the unpleasant prospect of the financial collapse of the Missouri Pacific, on December 23, 1852, the legislature granted

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$10,000,000 in state bonds to the Missouri Pacific and other state-sponsored railroads. The Missouri Pacific was authorized to construct a "Southwest Branch" to the Iron Mountain mineral region and then eventually to the Missouri-Arkansas border. If, within twelve months of receiving its bonds, the Missouri Pacific did not locate and commence construction of a branch line to the mineral region, the portion of the state bonds granted to the Missouri Pacific would be transferred to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company, which was then authorized to construct a direct rail line from St. Louis into the mineral region. 15

Neither the Missouri Pacific nor the St. Louis and Iron Mountain was totally pleased with the legislature's conditional approval of construction bonds for the former company. The Missouri Pacific's board of directors determined that all available funds would be needed just to complete their main line westward across Missouri, and no money would be available for the southwest branch into the mineral region. The organizers of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain were unhappy with the proposed year's delay before they would be able to participate in the state's financial aid program. Accordingly, both railroad companies proposed an amended construction plan. The Missouri Pacific would surrender its right to the mineral region branch to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain, and the latter company would pay the Missouri Pacific for development and survey work already performed on the southwestern branch. The state legislature was easily persuaded to accept this agreement, and on April 13, 1853, the board of directors of the Missouri Pacific formally surrendered

15 Violette, A History of Missouri, 237.
its bonds to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain. The residents and business interests of the mineral district were now to receive direct rail service to St. Louis, and the Iron Mountain Railroad was the company that would provide it.

The first item of business for the Iron Mountain was to determine its route out of St. Louis to Pilot Knob. Several surveys of such a route had been undertaken by the Missouri Pacific, and all of them indicated that the best route was the one surveyed by Captain Barney in 1849. Accordingly, on July 14, 1853, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain board of directors decided to locate their line "... from the river Des Peres[,] through the city of Carondelet[,] and along the Mississippi River..." to the vicinity of Platten Creek.

Approximately one month later, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain directors indicated their desire to expand their service area and make their line a major north-south rail link to Texas and the Pacific Coast. On September 8, 1853, the Iron Mountain's Chief Engineer ordered a preliminary survey of all possible routes southward from Pilot Knob "... to the Arkansas line and also to Cairo and New Madrid, looking specially to the point of connection of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain with the

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16 "Proceedings of Board of Directors," January 20, 1853, Minute Book, Board of Directors, St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad (Office of the Corporate Secretary, Missouri Pacific Railway Company, St. Louis, Missouri). Hereinafter cited as Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.

17 "Minutes of Proceedings of Board of Directors," July 14, 1853, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.
Cairo and Fulton Railroad. Work on these surveys commenced immediately, and by the end of September 1853, the Iron Mountain was ready to start construction on the first three sections of line south of St. Louis. On October 11, however, the board of directors was forced to halt all construction work and reopen negotiations with the Missouri Pacific concerning the possible use of Missouri Pacific tracks by Iron Mountain trains providing service to the mineral region. The major obstacle now confronting the St. Louis and Iron Mountain was its inability to secure a right-of-way through the Jefferson Barracks military reservation.

The 1849 Barney survey route was the most practical way for the Iron Mountain Railroad to construct its line southward out of St. Louis, but this proposed route cut through three separate pieces of United States government property having frontage on the Mississippi: the St. Louis Arsenal, the Marine Hospital administered by the Treasury Department, and Jefferson Barracks. At each of these places, the only practical location for the railroad was close to the river, but in every case this ground was already being used by the government. Each of these three establishments had its own steamboat landing. Furthermore, the limited amount of level ground along the Mississippi at the foot of the Jefferson Barracks bluff was occupied by post buildings, including a storehouse, a bakery, and the commanding officer's quarters and stables. The St. Louis Arsenal grounds were surrounded by a stone wall, and a road from the river landings to the magazines, as well as the boundary walls, would have to be crossed by the proposed railroad line.

18 Ibid., October 11, 1853.
19 Ibid. September 8, 1853.
In order to secure the desired right-of-way, the Iron Mountain Railroad had to appeal to Congress for an easement across the three military reservations. Both the Railroad Company and Congress treated this proceeding as a mere formality, and on February 14, 1853, Congress granted a sixty-foot wide right-of-way through the military reservations. Congress granted the easement, "Provided that the location of said road shall be made subject to the approval of the Secretary of War," and "... provided further, that said location can be made without injury to the public interest in the opinion of the Secretary of War." 20

The Secretary of War at this time was Jefferson Davis, who was keenly interested in the completion of a transcontinental railroad. The Secretary was opposed, however, to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain easement across the military reservations. Davis favored a southern route for any transcontinental railroad and was not inclined to endorse any railroad venture that might pose a threat to such a route. His opposition to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain was intensified when the Company announced its intention to push its track southward from Pilot Knob to the Arkansas border and seek a connection with the Cairo and Fulton. 21

Davis' opposition to the Iron Mountain Railroad grant was reinforced by a letter from the Jefferson Barracks commanding officer, Brevet Brigadier General Newman S. Clarke, to the Assistant Adjutant General of

20 "An Act Granting the Right of Way to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company, and for other Purposes," February 14, 1853, United States Statutes At Large, X, 754.

21 For Davis' interest in the southern route for the transcontinental railroad, see Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, II, 84; Riegel, Western Railroads, 16 and 18; Clement Eaton, Jefferson Davis, (New York, 1977), 82 and 85.
the Western Division at New Orleans. General Clarke stated that the proposed rail line through Jefferson Barracks would run "perilously close" to a recently constructed powder magazine. Furthermore, the railroad line would render access to the post's river landing, commissary store, bakery, and blacksmith shop "dangerous." "Access to these places," Clarke continued, "is necessary and [is] of a constant nature," and any hindrance or interference in this access would greatly complicate the smooth functioning and daily performance of military duties at the Barracks. Clarke suggested that another survey be undertaken to determine if another route less inconvenient to the post could be found.22

Captain Robert H. K. Whiteley, commanding officer of the St. Louis Arsenal, also expressed his objections to the proposed Iron Mountain rail line. Whiteley was an 1830 graduate of the United States Military Academy who, on July 1, 1830, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Second Artillery. He was promoted to first lieutenant in the same regiment on December 28, 1835, and was made a brevet captain for gallant conduct in the Second Seminole War. In 1838, Whiteley was assigned to duty at the Washington Arsenal as an assistant ordnance officer, and, on July 9, 1838, he transferred to the Ordnance Department. In 1841, Whiteley transferred from the Washington Arsenal to the Baton Rouge Arsenal, where he was, on May 17, 1842, promoted to captain. In 1851,

22 Clarke to Assistant Adjutant General, January 17, 1853, Letters Received by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance (Record Group No. 156, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., OCO.
Whiteley became commanding officer of the St. Louis Arsenal, a position he occupied until 1854.  

Writing to Colonel Henry Knox Craig, Chief of Ordnance, on February 4, 1853, Whiteley detailed what he believed to be the dangers posed by the rail line through the Arsenal. The main storehouse, containing small arms and ammunition valued at $944,288.70, would be constantly exposed to fire caused by a "shower of sparks poured over them by every passing train." In addition, the rail line would pass within 300 yards of a powder magazine continuing 1,800 barrels of gunpowder. Should the civilian inhabitants in the immediate vicinity of the Arsenal learn of this danger, Whiteley continued, they would "clamor loudly" for the removal of the government arms and gunpowder. Such removal would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the army, and would cause "immense damage to the general government." If the Iron Mountain Railroad could not be prevented from traversing the Arsenal grounds, Whiteley suggested that the right-of-way be moved closer to the Mississippi, thus reducing the hazard of airborne sparks from passing steam locomotives.

Learning of these negative opinions, the board of directors of the Iron Mountain Railroad sent their consulting engineer, Thomas S. O'Sullivan, to Washington in an attempt to overcome Clarke's and Whiteley's

23 George Washington Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., From its Establishment in 1802 to 1890. With the Early History of the United States Military Academy, 3d ed., Revised and Extended, (Boston, 1891), I, 454-55. Hereinafter cited as Cullum, Biographical Register of USMA.

24 Whiteley to Craig, February 4, 1853, Letters Recd., OCO; Id. to Id., March 30, 1853, ibid.
arguments against granting the railroad easement through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks reservations. Writing to Secretary of War Davis of the importance of the railroad, O'Sullivan explained that the St. Louis and Iron Mountain was considered to be "an essential part of the great system of [national] trunk railroads." The Iron Mountain would be part of a north-south trunk route paralleling the Mississippi River. North of St. Louis this "Mississippi Valley Railroad" would be pushed to the "headwaters region of the Mississippi." South of St. Louis, the Iron Mountain segment would be constructed to the Arkansas-Missouri border, where it would make junction with the Cairo and Fulton Railroad. From the Fulton, Arkansas, terminal of the Arkansas Railroad, the Mississippi Valley line would be extended to New Orleans and Galveston. "Thus would be formed," O'Sullivan stated, "an iron link binding the nation north and south, east and west."\(^{25}\)

The Iron Mountain, furthermore, was vitally important for western railroad development. A significant factor in the construction of western railroads, O'Sullivan pointed out, would be the availability of iron for rails and rolling stock. Iron ore which the St. Louis and Iron Mountain would transport from the Pilot Knob-Potosi region of Missouri to St. Louis could be smelted using coal brought in by the Missouri Pacific from west central Missouri to produce, by O'Sullivan's estimate, "over 120 million tons of superior metal."\(^{26}\) St. Louis, he declared,

\(^{25}\) O'Sullivan to Davis, September 20, 1853.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.
would quickly become a key supply center for the transcontinental railroad and would eventually rival Pittsburgh as a major pig iron producing center.

To play its important role, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain had to have access to St. Louis and, O'Sullivan pointed out to Davis, the 1849 Barney survey had determined the only "practical" route into St. Louis from the south to be along the west bank of the Mississippi. Immediately westward from the river the land rose so much as "to be impractical [sic] for any rail line." Therefore, out of necessity, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain must have the easement through the three government reservations. O'Sullivan refuted Captain Whiteley's claim that the rail line could be located much closer to the Mississippi than called for in the railroad surveys. As surveyed, the rail line was to be at least three feet above the high water mark of the Mississippi at flood stage. To relocate it any closer to the river would threaten the track and roadbed with annual flooding. Furthermore, the Iron Mountain Railroad and St. Louis had already agreed upon the company's route through the city assuming the surveyed line through the Arsenal would be approved. Any last minute changes would cause severe financial hardships for both the company and the city.27

The Iron Mountain would be willing to make whatever arrangements it could so as to cause the army a minimum of inconvenience. Since the commanding officer's quarters were located immediately adjacent to the proposed route, acknowledged O'Sullivan, the occupants of this house would be inconvenienced by the rail line. These quarters, however, had

27 Ibid.
been unoccupied for some time, General Clarke preferring to live in officers' quarters in the barracks buildings. Even so, the Railroad Company was willing to move the house, at its expense, to any site on the reservation Davis and the War Department might select. O'Sullivan suggested that the commanding officer's house would make a perfect depot, and, if the army were agreeable, the Iron Mountain Company would purchase it and use it for that purpose. O'Sullivan believed there would be no problem with other structures near the right-of-way. The bakery, as well as the commissary and quartermaster storehouses, would not be inconvenienced in any manner, and the two latter facilities would actually benefit from improved freight service offered by the railroad. The powder magazine was over 600 feet away from the proposed rail line and out of danger from any airborne sparks. Furthermore, the Iron Mountain was considering fitting its steam engines with a new exhaust system that carried away "all the smoke and sparks in a confined current of air under the train so as to issue out on the ... ground at the rear end [of the engine]."28 The railroad was willing to construct any type of fence along the easement the army might wish. It would provide gates for all river landing accesses, and crossing guards to keep the gates open except when trains were passing. The St. Louis and Iron Mountain intended to establish a depot at Jefferson Barracks at any site suitable to the War Department, and hoped the army would utilize the improved transportation it would provide.

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28 Ibid.
O'Sullivan acknowledged there were some people who opposed the railroad because it meant the disruption of their "idyllic lives" at Jefferson Barracks and elsewhere, but the railroad was "telling of the march of their country's development, civilization, greatness, power and prosperity." The Iron Mountain was "a mere link" in "the greater Mississippi Valley Railroad" to tie the Gulf of Mexico to northern regions.  

On September 22, 1853, two days after Davis received O'Sullivan's letter, Colonel Henry Knox Craig, Chief of Ordnance, gave his opinion of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain's request for an easement. Craig was a veteran of the War of 1812, who was commissioned as a first lieutenant in the Second Artillery on March 17, 1812. He was promoted to captain on December 23, 1813, and served in several artillery units during the hostilities with England. In 1823, Craig was awarded the rank of brevet major "for ten years faithful service in one grade," and on May 30, 1832, he was promoted to major and transferred to the Ordnance Department. He was awarded the rank of brevet lieutenant colonel on September 23, 1846, for "gallant and meritorious conduct in the several conflicts at Monterrey, Mexico," and was promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed assistant chief of the Ordnance Department in March 1848. On July 10, 1851, Craig was promoted to colonel and appointed Chief of Ordnance.

29 Ibid.

30 Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1902, (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 333.
Craig informed Secretary of War Davis that the proposed rail line was located too close to the St. Louis Arsenal's storage building which contained almost one million dollars worth of munitions. Sparks from the locomotives would be a definite fire hazard. The Colonel suggested that the rail line be moved at least 100 feet closer to the Mississippi to reduce this danger. In opposing the line's location through Jefferson Barracks, Craig reminded Davis that the War Department had, for several years, been considering a plan to establish three great munitions depots throughout the nation, with Jefferson Barracks as the prime prospect for the western depot's location. The Iron Mountain Railroad line would make the Barracks "unsuitable" for the western depot, and thus severely weaken the plan. Craig objected strongly to the whole railroad project.  

Taking a view opposite to that of the Ordnance Department, the Quartermaster General, Colonel Thomas Jesup, informed Davis that the rail line would "greatly facilitate the public service." When the frontier region was still accessible by river, Jefferson Barracks was of great strategic importance, but since the frontier had moved much farther west, other military posts had superseded it in strategic importance. Nevertheless, observed Jesup, Jefferson Barracks still had an important role to fulfill as the major western reserve and supply depot. The railroad would enhance the post's ability to fulfill its supply function by providing a rail link between the Barracks and the expanding western rail

31 Craig to Davis, September 22, 1853, Letters Sent by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, (Record Group No. 156, National Archives). Hereinafter cited at Letters Sent, OCO.
network. For this reason, the Colonel enthusiastically endorsed the construction of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain through the post reservation.\textsuperscript{32}

On September 23, O'Sullivan attempted to answer the objection of Colonel Craig and follow up on Jesup's strong endorsement of the rail line. The Ordnance Chief's suggestion that the line through the Arsenal be moved 100 feet closer to the Mississippi would require that a ten-foot high embankment be constructed to protect the road bed and track, and this would be prohibitively expensive and would threaten the financial solvency of the Company. Furthermore, any change in the railroad right-of-way through the Arsenal grounds would radically alter the connection to the Main Street easement granted by the City of St. Louis, and would necessitate putting two sharp curves in the rail line which would reduce the sight lines for both locomotive engineers and the general public at two grade crossings, thus creating a "needless safety hazard."

O'Sullivan also refuted Colonel Craig's claim that sparks from the passing locomotives would be a fire hazard. He insisted the sparks and glowing embers from railroad locomotives would not be as great in number or size as those emitted by steamboats on the Mississippi, which very often passed immediately in front of the west bank of the river because of shifts in the navigation channel. Neither the Arsenal nor the Jefferson Barracks powder magazines had ever been endangered by the sparks from the steamboats, and they would not be endangered by the sparks of passing trains.\textsuperscript{33} O'Sullivan encouraged Secretary Davis to render a

\textsuperscript{32} Jessup to Davis, September 22, 1853, Letters Sent by the Office of the Quartermaster General, (Record Group No. 92, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, QMG.

\textsuperscript{33} O'Sullivan to Davis, September 29, 1853, Letters Received by the Office of the Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., SW.
prompt decision because the Iron Mountain Railroad Company was ready to commence construction and any delay would prove to be exceedingly expensive.

On September 29, 1853, Davis made his decision. "I cannot," he wrote O'Sullivan, "approve the location proposed." Davis' major reason was his doubt that the powder magazines at the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks would be safe from fires caused by exhaust sparks from passing trains.34

O'Sullivan and the board of directors of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain were naturally disappointed with this decision, but they were determined to have the Jefferson Barracks route. Accordingly, on October 5, O'Sullivan wrote Davis proposing a compromise. If the War Department would approve the easement grant, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain would agree to use teams of horses to pull the freight cars through Jefferson Barracks provided:

... notice shall be given, twenty four hours in advance that powder is to be moved upon, or near the track, and that in consequence thereof it is not deemed prudent in the opinion of the commanding officer that locomotive engines should be employed.35

O'Sullivan's communication was followed by one from Luther M. Kennett, President of the Iron Mountain Railroad Company, explaining to Davis the difficulties that would be created for his company by moving the proposed right-of-way. Kennett was a successful eastern Missouri businessman. Because of his business acumen, he was appointed Vice

34 Davis to O'Sullivan, September 29, 1853, Letters Sent by the Office of the Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, SW.

35 O'Sullivan to Davis, October 5, 1853, Letters Recd., SW.
President of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company when it was chartered in 1849, and was elected President of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company in 1853. In addition to his business achievements, Kennett also had an active civic career. In 1850 he was elected Mayor of St. Louis and was re-elected two times. In 1854 he was elected to the House of Representatives, defeating Thomas Hart Benton. As a member of Congress, he had notable success in securing appropriations for navigation improvements for the Mississippi rapids just above St. Louis, and for railroad development in the State of Missouri.\footnote{Howard L. Conrad, ed., \textit{Encyclopedia of the History of Missouri}, III, (St. Louis, 1901), 528.}

In his October 1853 letter to Secretary Davis, Kennett stated that, if forced to change its route through Jefferson Barracks and the Arsenal, the Iron Mountain would have to purchase additional land and invest in an expensive embankment project. This would increase the construction costs an additional $10,000 per mile and cause an even further delay in completing "a vital link in the great Mississippi Valley Railroad."\footnote{Kennett to Davis, October 12, 1853, \textit{Letters Recd.}, SW.}

Davis was partially moved by these appeals, and agreed to a slight compromise. On October 13, 1853, he sent his revised conditions to the Iron Mountain's board of directors: (1) through the Arsenal the rail line had to be moved 100 feet closer to the Mississippi, (2) the railroad company must construct a stone wall and suitable fences along the length of the right-of-way through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks, (3) a minimum of five access gates must be provided at Jefferson Barracks, and one at the Arsenal, (4) the company must keep the gates, fences, and
crossing locations in a "high state of repair" and provide watchmen to provide "timely notice" of approaching trains, (5) it must construct a bridge over the main road leading from the Arsenal storehouses to the river landing, (6) the commanding officer's house, quartermaster and commissary storehouses, and any other "public structures" at Jefferson Barracks that had to be removed from their existing locations were to be moved at the railroad's expense, and, most importantly, (7) the railroad must use "horse power only" when sending its trains through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks. 38

The Iron Mountain's board of directors was very disappointed with Davis' conditions, but upon learning of his firm resolve in the matter it was left with little choice but to accept them. It informed the Secretary of War that the company agreed to his terms, but interpreted the "horse power" clause to apply only when gunpowder was being landed or shipped from within the Arsenal or Jefferson Barracks. 39 Furthermore, in an effort to secure the support of the local public, the board decided to publish Davis' letter in the St. Louis newspapers. 40

Rejecting the board's interpretation of the "horse power" clause, Davis asserted that it applied to all trains in transit through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks at all times. The only way the Secretary of

38 Davis to Kennett, October 13, 1853, Letters Sent, SW; "Minutes of Proceedings of Board of Directors," October 25, 1853, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.

39 Kennett to Davis, October 29, 1853, Letters Recd., SW.

40 Minutes of Proceedings of Board of Directors, October 25, 1853, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR; Daily Missouri Republican, October 7, 1853.
War would agree to change this restriction was if the company relocated its line away from the Arsenal and power magazine at Jefferson Barracks. Unwilling to accept Davis' demand, the board decided to seek congressional relief. It was able to secure the introduction of a bill on February 9, 1854, to grant the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad a right-of-way through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks based upon the War Department's conditions, with the "horse power" clause changed to read:

... that when the government expects to receive, or intends to ship powder at the Magazine landings [at the Arsenal or Jefferson Barracks], upon giving twenty-four hours notice ... horse power alone shall be used ... in passing [the trains through these two government properties] during the receiving or shipping of powder.42

The bill failed in 1854, but it passed two years later.43 According to Kennett, the bill failed in 1854 because of the continued opposition of Davis. Furthermore, Colonel Craig, Chief of Ordnance, continued to oppose the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks easement, and effectively lobbied for his position in both the War Department and Congress.44

The St. Louis and Iron Mountain Company, however, had its supporters lobbying for it. Most important was the City of St. Louis. On March 15, 1856, the city council addressed a memorial to the House of Representatives asking the federal government to sell a strip of land

41 Davis to Kennett, November 8, 1853, Letters Sent, SW.
42 Kennett to Miller, April 5, 1856, Letters Recd., OCO.
43 "An Act Granting the Right of Way to the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad through the Arsenal Magazine and Jefferson Barracks Tracts," July 14, 1856, United States Statutes At Large, XI, 452.
44 Kennett to Miller, April 5, 1856, Letters Recd., OCO; Id. to Id., July 2, 1856, ibid.
running from the northern to southern boundary of the Arsenal reservation, fronting on and parallel to the Mississippi, to the city. This land, it declared, was necessary for a new city street and municipal wharf and to help maintain public schools. The memorial also requested that a right-of-way be set aside within the reservation for the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company. The Ordnance Department had little trouble in persuading Secretary of War Davis to oppose, and Congress to reject, this petition.

Although the Secretary of War and the Chief of Ordnance opposed permitting the St. Louis and Iron Mountain to run its line through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks, the Quartermaster Corps continued to support the company's easement request. The quartermaster officers at Jefferson Barracks and in St. Louis strongly endorsed the construction of the rail line through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks. In an 1854 report to Brevet Major Francis N. Page, Assistant Adjutant General of the Department of the West, Brevet Captain Ralph W. Kirkham, Regimental Quartermaster, Sixth Infantry, stationed at Jefferson Barracks, stated that the Iron Mountain Railroad would be "... in every respect a great benefit to [Jefferson Barracks] ..." It was true, Kirkham continued, the rail line would render use of the existing quarters of the commanding officer of the post "inconvenient," but this was no great loss. These living quarters were in a dilapidated state and had not been occupied for several years. Kirkham believed that the best thing for the railroad

45 A copy of this memorial is contained in Ramsay to Craig, March 28, 1856, ibid.

46 Ibid., Craig to Davis, May 1, 1856, Letters Sent, OCO; Kennett to Miller, April 5, 1856, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.
to do with the house and adjoining stables was to demolish them and erect a new depot in their place.\textsuperscript{47}

Kirkham asserted that the railroad would facilitate the movement of troops to and from the post. There was, he pointed out, no single river landing at Jefferson Barracks that was usable "for all seasons of the year." When the Mississippi was at high water stage, the boat landing was at the base of the bluffs in front of the barracks buildings. When the river was at normal stage, as it was approximately six months out of the year, the landing was a mile down river from the main barracks structures, and when it was at extremely low water, the only usable landing was two miles downstream. At all three locations, the space between the proposed rail line and the landings was thirty to forty yards which, in Kirkham's opinion, was more than ample.\textsuperscript{48}

More important, however, than the distance between the proposed rail line and the river landings was the greatly improved transportation service that would be offered to the army and Jefferson Barracks by the railroad. Kirkham pointed out to Page that ninety percent of the troops who arrived at the Barracks came by river boats which utilized the second landing. When the soldiers landed at night or in inclement weather, they were exposed to the natural elements without shelter. Landing all troops and supplies at St. Louis, and then transporting them to Jefferson Barracks

\textsuperscript{47} Kirkham to Page, July 20, 1854, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
via the St. Louis and Iron Mountain would eliminate this hardship con­fronting the soldiers and also would reduce the damaging of supplies.49

A similar advantage would result when troops were to be shipped from the Barracks up either the Mississippi or the Missouri River. "In the first place," Kirkham stated, "most if not all" river boats running from St. Louis to points upstream on either the Mississippi or Missouri were not insured to travel below St. Louis. In order for such boats to come down to Jefferson Barracks and pick up troops and supplies, the boats' masters had to secure the approval of not only their insurers, but also of the insurers of all non-government freight on board their vessels. This was an inconvenience many river boat captains refused to suffer, and hence there were only a limited number of boats available for government service. Not only that, but those vessels that would drop down below St. Louis to Jefferson Barracks to receive cargoes charged premium prices for doing so. Deck passage from St. Louis to New Orleans, a distance of approximately 1,200 miles, was usually $3.50 per man, and never exceeded $5.00 per man. From Jefferson Barracks to Fort Leavenworth, a distance of less than 400 miles; however, deck passage was "rarely ever less than $4.00 or $5.00, and frequently as high as $6.00 or $8.00 per head." If the army could move soldiers to St. Louis via the railroad, these costs would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, if the army shipped troops from St. Louis instead of Jefferson Barracks, the efficiency of the transfer operations would be increased. Kirkham pointed out that the uncertainty of steamboat arrivals at the Jefferson Barracks landings

49 Ibid.

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often resulted in costly delays and hurt morale. Frequently, soldiers were readied to depart the Barracks, marched to the second, or sometimes the low water landing, and then were forced to wait many hours for the steamboat to appear. If, during the wait at the boat landing, the weather became inclement or night fell, the soldiers were returned to the post. Such a development, Kirkham stated, led to a desertion rate of "ten out of 100 soldiers," and "... another equal number go to the hospital with fever and ague." If the railroad were built and service provided for Jefferson Barracks, Kirkham believed this sort of thing would be eliminated, and the overall performance level of Jefferson Barracks and its garrison dramatically improved.50

Kirkham's support of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad's proposed route through Jefferson Barracks was followed by a "Memorial to the President of the United States" from the major and city council of St. Louis. The city fathers complained to President Franklin Pierce that the conditions imposed on the Iron Mountain Railroad by Secretary of War Davis for the passage through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks "amount[ed] to an almost entire prohibition of this great work." They urged Pierce to use his influence with Congress to secure passage of legislation granting the Iron Mountain Railroad a release from the onerous terms imposed by Secretary Davis.51 The St. Louis and Iron Mountain was not, they declared, just another privately owned enterprise seeking special consideration from the national government. Rather the company

50 Ibid.
51 "Memorial to the President of the United States," undated, Letters Recd., OCO.
was owned jointly by private and public investors. The City and County of St. Louis owned $1,000,000 worth of stock, private citizens and corporations in St. Louis owned $375,000 worth of stock, and private citizens living in the counties along the proposed railroad route owned another $125,000 worth of stock, and no stock in the Iron Mountain Company was owned by anyone who was not a citizen of Missouri. These facts indicated, the city fathers continued, that the Iron Mountain Railroad Company was not a "speculation for private profit," but was a "public improvement for the general welfare of the people," and any "impediment" placed in the way of construction of the railroad was working against the citizens of Missouri, not merely frustrating a deserving private enterprise. 52

The Secretary of War's requirement that "horse power" be used by trains in transit through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks would bring economic ruin to this public project. Most of the rail traffic along this line would be heavy freight -- iron ore from the mineral region -- and the requirement that for the ten-mile distance along the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks frontage the steam locomotives be uncoupled and the freight cars pulled individually through the military reservations by teams of horses would hamper the service. The city fathers enthusiastically predicted that the mineral region would soon be producing enough iron ore to make St. Louis a major iron foundry center. This bright prospect would, however, receive a "mortal blow" if Secretary Davis' "unrealistic restrictions" were allowed to stand. 53

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
The strong appeal of Captain Kirkham and the memorial from the mayor and city council of St. Louis received a positive reception in Congress, and on July 14, 1856, it passed a bill that removed the most odious section of the 1853 restrictions. Henceforth, the only restriction placed upon the movement of rail traffic through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks was that upon receiving twenty-four hour prior notification of the shipment of gunpowder, "horse power alone shall be used" to move the cars through the military reservations. This was a limitation the Iron Mountain Company could accept, and construction of the railroad was resumed in late Summer of 1856, with shuttle service between St. Louis and Carondelet started on October 6, 1856. By early Spring of 1857, construction had progressed through the Arsenal to Jefferson Barracks, and on April 1, 1857, the Iron Mountain commenced daily service to the Barracks. Apparently the "horse power" clause was very seldom, if ever, enforced, since in the Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Directors, the only reference to the service to the Barracks noted that it was profitable, was very popular with St. Louisians, and was not impeded in any manner by "onerous conditions."

The newly opened rail connection proved to be very advantageous to Jefferson Barracks. Captain Kirkham's 1854 prediction of reduced transportation costs utilizing rail service proved to be accurate. On October 27, 1858, Captain Robert E. Clary, quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks.

54 United States Statutes At Large, XI, 452; Minutes of Proceedings of Board of Directors," October 1856, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.
55 Daily Missouri Republican, April 1, 1857; Fifth Annual Report of the Directors, October 1857, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.
Barracks, reported to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston, First Cavalry, who was making an inspection tour of the Barracks, that the costs to the government of moving men from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Leavenworth had been reduced from an average of $5.50 per man to $3.25. This savings resulted from the Army's being able to transport men and their supplies from Jefferson Barracks to St. Louis by rail rather than by boat. The new rail communication also helped the military authorities at Jefferson Barracks improve their relations with the people of St. Louis. The Iron Mountain Company offered special excursion rates to Jefferson Barracks during the spring and summer months, and weekend trips to the post soon became popular with St. Louisians. From 1857 to 1860, the excursion became an annual event for approximately 3,000 students of the St. Louis public schools, with the Daily Missouri Republican reporting that the 1858 trip was a "splendid success," and certainly did much to enhance and strengthen the "feelings of friendship between the citizens of this city [St. Louis] and the military authorities at Jefferson Barracks."  

By early 1860, the Iron Mountain Railroad had extended its track to Potosi, Missouri, approximately fifty-five miles south-southeast of St. Louis, but there construction halted. The outbreak of the Civil War brought a period of setbacks and financial hardships for all railroad companies in Missouri, including the St. Louis and Iron Mountain. It was not until 1865 that construction on the Iron Mountain resumed and the railroad reached Pilot Knob, in the rear of the mineral region.

56 Clary to Johnson, October 27, 1858, located in Johnson to Headquarters of the Army, October 27, 1858, Letters Recd., AGO; Daily Missouri Republican, May 22, 1858.
Because of continuing financial difficulties in early 1868, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Company defaulted on its interest payments, and the public stockholders of the company, the State of Missouri, City and County of St. Louis, and Jefferson, Washington, and Madison Counties, Missouri, were forced to sell their stock holdings. In March 1868, the Iron Mountain Company passed into private ownership and work on the road south of Pilot Knob was resumed. In 1874, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain consolidated with the Cairo and Fulton and became known as the St. Louis, Iron Mountain, and Southern Railroad, and then succeeded in pushing its line south to Galveston, Texas. 57

Initially, the hopes of the financial backers of the Iron Mountain Railroad Company had been high. They received enthusiastic support from St. Louisians and hoped quickly to tap the mineral wealth of the region immediately south of St. Louis. The problem of access through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks, however, delayed construction of the line for three years. This delay and a lack of capital kept the railroad from reaching the Missouri mineral region before the Civil War intervened and led to financial disaster for the investors. 58 Fortunately, the interruption in the building of the railroad to the Gulf of Mexico was only temporary.


58 In 1867, the Board of Directors of the Iron Mountain Railroad alleged that much of the responsibility for the financial hardships of the Company were due to the "obstructionist policies" of Jefferson Davis and his refusal to grant the 1853 right-of-way through the Arsenal and Jefferson Barracks. See 15th Annual Report of Board of Directors, October 1867, Minute Book, St.L & IMRR.
Chapter VIII

CALM BEFORE THE STORM, 1856-1860

While the War Department and officials of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company were embroiled in their controversy over the location of the rail line through the Jefferson Barracks military reservation, the military personnel at the post and the officials of the St. Louis branch of the General Land Office, Department of the Interior were involved in a controversy with the city council of Carondelet concerning the legality of the deed to the Jefferson Barracks military reservation.

In August 1826, the United States had obtained approximately 1,800 acres of land for the reservation from the residents of Vide Poche. Subsequent to the cession, the unincorporated community of Vide Poche received a municipal charter from the State of Missouri as the Village of Carondelet. Following this incorporation, the city council attempted, without success, to revoke its cession for the military reservation. In 1838, then, the city council divided the common land of the village lying south of the River Des Peres into thirty- and forty-acre plots and commenced leasing them to private citizens. Included in this newly leased land was acreage in the northern part of the Jefferson Barracks reservation. Brigadier General Henry Atkinson, post commander at the time, vigorously protested the attempt of the Carondelet authorities to lease any part of the military reservation, and warned the authorities that

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he would use all military force at his disposal to prevent any civilian encroachment upon the government's property.\textsuperscript{1}

Atkinson also notified Major Trueman Cross, Acting Quartermaster General, that there was some doubt about the legality of the 1826 land cession, and he wanted the War Department to check the legality of the deed. Atkinson's concern about the legality of the cession were well founded. On August 7, 1839, he reported to Secretary of War Joel Poinsett that the Surveyor General of the General Land Office in St. Louis believed the 1826 cession to be invalid and the claims of the Village of Carondelet to be sustained by Acts of Congress of June 13, 1812, and January 27, 1831. The former law confirmed the titles and claims of several towns, one of them Carondelet, to "town or village lots, out lots, common field lots and commons" which these former French colonial possessions "inhabited, cultivated, or possessed" prior to December 2, 1803.\textsuperscript{2} The 1831 act relinquished the United States' claim to "the town and village lots, out lots, and common field lots . . . reserved for the support of schools . . ." as established by the 1812 legislation.\textsuperscript{3}

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1 Atkinson to The Corporate Authorities of Carondelet, March 13, 1838, Letters Sent by the Department of the West in the Records of the United States Army Commands, (Record Group No. 98, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, West. Dept.

2 "An Act making further provision for settling the claims to land in the territory of Missouri," June 13, 1812, United States Statutes At Large, II, 748-52. The former French possessions delineated in this legislation were Portage des Sioux, St. Charles, St. Louis, St. Ferdinand, Village a Robert, Carondelet, Ste. Genevieve, New Madrid, New Bourbon, and Little Prairie.

3 "An Act further supplemental to the act entitled 'An Act making further provision for settling the claims to land in the territory of Missouri,' passed the thirteenth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and twelve," January 27, 1831, United States Statutes At Large, IV, 435.
\end{flushleft}
The opinion of the St. Louis Surveyor General notwithstanding, General Atkinson believed the army's claim was still substantial. He reported to Poinsett that the United States Attorney in St. Louis believed that the original inhabitants of Vide Poche had not complied properly with Spanish land regulations when they first made their claims to the "common land" south of the River Des Peres, and, furthermore, that the villagers of Carondelet had ignored the stipulations of the 1812 law that "town or village lots, out lots, or common field lots" not previously claimed by private individuals would be "reserved for the support of schools in the respective town and villages."^4 Since Carondelet was not going to use the land to support public education, asserted Atkinson, its claim to the northern portion of the military reservation was invalid. Atkinson felt certain that future controversies would arise out of these conflicting claims and legal opinions, but urged that the War Department persevere in its claim, because "the limits [of the reservation] cannot be curtailed without great inconvenience to the public service . . ."^5

The controversy over the land claim abated during the 1840s, only to be resumed with greater vigor on both sides in the 1850s. In December 1840, however, an important survey of the military reservation was made that was to figure in the negotiations of the 1850s. On November 6, 1840, Secretary of War Poinsett wrote General Atkinson informing him that the Solicitor of the General Land Office told the War Department that "the

^4 United States Statutes At Large, II, 750.
^5 Atkinson to Cross, March 13, 1838, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Atkinson to Poinsett, August 7, 1838, ibid.
village of Carondelet had no legal claim to the land called the Common . . . " Poinsett, therefore, directed Atkinson to have a survey of a tract of approximately 1,700 acres made for military purposes. The Secretary of War believed this much land would be sufficient for the needs of the army. Atkinson immediately arranged for the survey, and on December 3, 1840, George W. Waters, surveyor for the General Land Office at St. Louis, along with Philip Leux and James Gillon, chairmen, Charles H. Sprague, axeman, and Curley Barnes, flagman, surveyed a tract of 1,702.04 acres.

There the matter rested until 1854, when Willis L. Williams, a St. Louis attorney retained as counsel by the Carondelet city council, wrote Secretary of the Interior Robert McClelland asking the United States to accept a deed to the "Jefferson Barracks Tract" executed by the City of

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6 Poinsett to Atkinson, November 16, 1840, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, SW.

7 "Field Notes of Survey of Reservation for the post of Jefferson Barracks by George Waters," December 3, 1840, John S. Bowen Papers, (Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri); "Survey of the Jefferson Barracks Tract by George Waters," Selected Documents from Missouri Private Land Claim, Docket No. 977, Records of the General Land Office, (Record Group No. 49, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Mo. Dockett, No. 977, GLO. This survey commenced "on the west bank of the Mississippi River [at] the South East corner of survey No. 904." It then proceeded westward for a distance of 121.23 chains, a chain being a unit of linear measure used in surveying equal to sixty-six feet. From the northwest corner of the tract, Waters then proceeded a distance of 150.00 chains to the "north line of Survey No. 3119." From this point, the Jefferson Barracks survey moved in a southeasterly direction a distance of 86.50 chains to the Mississippi and then proceeded northward, along the west or right bank of the Mississippi a distance of 183.50 chains to its starting point.

Part of the acreage contained in this 1840 survey was contested in the 1850's negotiations.
Carondelet on June 27, 1854. This deed was based upon an 1836 survey made for the city and provided for a tract of 1,300 acres as the "Barracks Tract." Aware of the conflicting 1840 Waters survey made for the War Department, McClelland hesitated. Williams then wrote Secretary of War Jefferson Davis asking him to urge the Secretary of the Interior to accept the Carondelet deed. 9

Davis, however, did not press McClelland to accept the deed, and the question of the conflicting land claims lingered throughout 1854 and into September 1855, when Williams again wrote Davis asking that the War Department recognize the 1854 Carondelet claim. The Department's procrastination, stated Williams, was creating "much ill-will" among the residents of Carondelet toward the army. 10

In the meantime, following the receipt of Williams' letter, on October 23, 1854, the War Department asked the Interior Department whether the 1854 Carondelet deed was valid and covered the same tract which General Atkinson had obtained in 1826. Following a careful examination of the 1826 cession, the 1840 Waters survey, and the 1854 Carondelet deed, Thomas A. Hendricks, Commissioner of the General Land Office reported: (1) that the original 1826 cession made no mention of specific acreage, merely referring to the tract as the "Carondelet Common," and (2) the 1854 deed was deceptive in its language because it did not specify the acreage.

8 Williams to McClelland, August 4, 1854, Mo. Dockett No. 977, GLO.

9 Williams to Davis, August 4, 1854, Letters Received by the Secretary of War in the Records of the Office of Secretary of War, (Record Group No. 107, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., SW.

10 Williams to Secretary of War, September 28, 1855, Mo. Dockett No. 977, GLO.
precise length of the boundary lines of the "Barracks Tract," but merely listed the boundaries according to the plat numbers of prior land sales made by the City of Carondelet. Hendricks questioned the legality of the 1854 deed because he could not find in the Act of Incorporation of the City of Carondelet any legal authorization for Carondelet to make such a land transfer. Two months later, Hendricks reported that he had ascertained that the 1854 deed called for the cession of approximately 1,300 acres to the government. He, therefore, recommended to Secretary McClelland that the Department of the Interior instruct Secretary of War Davis to hold in abeyance any final disposition of the exact boundaries to the "Barracks Tract." Acting upon these recommendations, Jefferson Davis informed Williams that before the War Department made any final decision concerning the 1854 deed, the Surveyor General of the St. Louis Land Office would make another survey to adjust the differences in acreage between the 1840 tract covered by the Waters survey and the Carondelet deed.

The survey was actually executed by Charles Delafield, Deputy Surveyor of the St. Louis Land Office, in June 1856. It revealed that the "Barracks Tract" surveyed by Waters in 1840 contained 1,730.25 acres, while the tract deeded by Carondelet in 1854 contained 1,340.25 acres, or 361.79 acres less than the 1840 Waters survey. Delafield's superior, Jonathan Loughborough, Surveyor General of the St. Louis Land Office,

11 Davis to McClelland, October 23, 1855, Letters Sent, SW; Hendricks to McClelland, March 8, 1856, Mo. Dockett No. 977, GLO; Id. to Id., May 5, 1856, ibid.

12 Davis to McClelland, May 20, 1856, Mo. Dockett No. 977, GLO.
therefore, recommended that the Department of the Interior refuse to accept the 1854 Carondelet grant and claim either of the other tracts surveyed by Waters and Delafield.13

When news of the results of the Delafield survey were learned in Carondelet, several of the individuals who had purchased parcels of the "Commons land" became apprehensive about the validity of their titles. These residents of Carondelet, declared William J. Christy, felt that the 1,300 acres deeded to the government in 1854, were "five times as [much] as the Government will ever need or want." By accepting the Carondelet deed, he added, the Interior Department would give "peace and quiet" to the neighborhood," and would bring "positive feelings of gratitude" to the national government. Christy noted that he had purchased two lots from Carondelet within the contested area. These lots had "cost [him] a large amount of money," and if the War Department refused to accept the Carondelet Deed of Relinquishment, he would suffer a "hard loss." The only equitable course of action for the Interior and War Departments was to accept the Carondelet deed.14

Williams presented Christy's appeals to Secretary of War Davis, and reiterated the desire of the residents of Carondelet to settle the land question. Davis, however, refused to accept any reduction in the size of the military reservation, holding that, without a proper survey to support its territorial claim, the Carondelet deed "was suspect." The only valid surveys of the contested region were the 1840 Waters survey

13 Loughborough to Hendricks, August 2, 1856, Mo. Dockett No. 977, GLO.

14 Christy to Williams, July 19, 1856, ibid.
of the military reservation and the 1856 Delafield examination of the Carondelet deed claim and its comparison to the Waters survey. If the War Department accepted the proposed Carondelet modification of the military reservation, the national government would lose some 400 acres of land. This loss, declared Davis, would have a "... materially [negative] effect [on] the public interest in the [Jefferson Barracks] premises and, therefore, the proposed substitution is rejected."  

The War Department's decision did not satisfy the residents of Carondelet, and they appealed the matter to Congressman Frank P. Blair of Missouri, who, on January 18, 1858, introduced legislation to grant relief to the City of Carondelet. This bill, House Bill No. 133, proposed that the Secretary of the Interior issue to the residents of Carondelet warrants for public land equal in amount to the cash value of the tract of land deeded to the government in 1826. On May 4, 1858, the Committee on Private Land Claims reported favorably on the bill, and the following day, the House, acting as a Committee of the Whole, commenced debate on it.  

During the debate, Congressman Blair stated that the 1826 donation contained a reversionary clause that called for the return of the military

15 Williams to Davis, August 3, 1856, Letters Recd., SW; Davis to Williams, February 4, 1857, Letters Sent, SW. The proposed Carondelet Deed of Relinquishment called for a cession of approximately 1,300 acres, whereas the Waters survey delineated a military reservation of 1,702 acres. If the War Department accepted the Carondelet quit claim, it would lose approximately 400 acres of land along the northern boundary of the Jefferson Barracks reservation.

reservation when the government stopped using the land for military purposes. Since the original donation was for approximately 1,800 acres, and the government was only now using 1,702 acres, Blair argued, Carondelet's claim to the unused portion of the 1826 donation should be recognized, or Carondelet should receive compensation for the reservation claimed by the army. Some congressmen, however, did not agree. They objected to the proposed legislation because it would set a precedent that, whenever land was donated to the government and was later disposed of by the government, the original donor should be compensated for his donation. Other congressmen argued that instead of immediately granting Carondelet financial relief, Congress should authorize the city to sue the government in the federal court in St. Louis to determine if the national government had any legal responsibility to Carondelet. Congressman Blair replied that Carondelet had no wish to establish any precedent with respect to its legal claim, and neither did the city wish to pursue the matter in the federal courts. Blair then called for a vote upon the bill to grant financial compensation to Carondelet, and it was defeated. An amendment was then offered to allow Carondelet to sue in the federal courts to determine the legal questions involved, and a motion was made to lay the bill aside for reconsideration. This motion carried, and the Carondelet relief bill died.

17 "Debate of Bill for Relief of the City of Carondelet," May 15, 1858, ibid.
18 Ibid., "Amendment to Bill for Relief of the City of Carondelet," May 15, 1858.
The failure of the relief legislation created disillusionment and some ill-will among the residents of Carondelet toward the military authorities at Jefferson Barracks and the War Department. Most of this bad feeling was, however, limited to a small minority of the people, and by the time Carondelet was annexed to St. Louis in 1871, the 1854 Carondelet claim was forgotten. 19

While the Departments of the Interior and War were involved in a controversy with the City of Carondelet over the extent of the Jefferson Barracks military reservation, and the War Department was embroiled with the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company over the location of the rail line through the reservation, the garrison was maintaining the day-to-day operations of the post. In January 1856, the garrison was composed of a training detachment of the Sixth Infantry, numbering sixty-one men. Even though the garrison never exceeded ninety men from January to April 1856, there was a steady flow of recruits through the infantry depot at the post. This small garrison was reduced to only twenty-five men on April 19, 1856, when Second Lieutenant Silas P. Higgins, Company A, Sixth Infantry, left with a detachment of eighty recruits bound for Fort Pierre, Nebraska Territory, located at present-day Pierre, South Dakota. 20

The infantry training at the Barracks was dull and boring, and the small garrison was, as usual, plagued by desertion. During the first

19 Eugene M. Violette, A History of Missouri, (Boston, 1918), 432.

four months of 1856, for example, an average of ten percent of the soldiers deserted every month. Most of the deserters were recruits. Brevet Brigadier General Newman S. Clarke, Commanding Officer of the Department of the West and Regimental Colonel of the Sixth Infantry, hoped that the desertion rate would decrease when the recruits received orders to leave for their regular units in Nebraska Territory. Instead, when they received their orders, they deserted in even greater numbers. In an effort to make life at the Barracks more pleasant, Clarke ordered the Sixth Infantry regimental band to the post from St. Louis, but it had very little effect on the desertion rate, as it remained at or above the ten percent level throughout the remainder of 1856.21

To deal with the desertion problem, on October 7, 1856, Brevet Major General Persifor Smith, who had replaced General Clarke as departmental commander in September, ordered that all departmental recruits be concentrated at Jefferson Barracks under the command of an experienced senior field officer. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston, First Cavalry, was assigned this responsibility, and on October 23, 1856, he assumed command of the post,22 and Company B, Fourth Artillery was ordered to the Barracks to act as a training cadre and permanent garrison. Johnston and the artillery company had a positive influence upon the recruits, and the morale of the troops was improved and the desertion rate reduced


22 Special Orders No. 145, October 7, 1856, Order Book, West. Dept.; Special Orders No. 151, October 23, 1856, ibid.
By fifty percent.\(^23\) By January 1857, elements of the Second Dragoons, First Cavalry, and Sixth Infantry joined the garrison at Jefferson Barracks, giving Johnston a total of 338 men in his command. These soldiers were not destined to stay long at the post, for on January 21, 1857, they were ordered to Fort Leavenworth "without delay." They were to proceed to Jefferson City, Missouri, via the Missouri Pacific Railroad and then march the rest of the way to the Kansas post.\(^24\) This transfer, however, was delayed for six weeks due to an outbreak of smallpox among some Sixth Infantry recruits. There was only one medical officer at the post, and he had to stay there. Since there was no medical officer to accompany the transferees to Fort Leavenworth, officials of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, as well as all steamboat masters, refused to transport any troops from Jefferson Barracks until the outbreak of smallpox was arrested. By the end of February, the disease was brought under control, and on March 4, the delayed troop movement was started.\(^25\)

With the departure of the dragoons, cavalry, and infantry units, and finally, on March 7, even Company B, Fourth Artillery, the number of soldiers at Jefferson Barracks was reduced to twenty-seven. In June 1857, the garrison jumped to 564 men when eight companies of the Fifth

\(^{23}\) Cooper to Howard, December 22, 1856, Letters Sent by the Adjutant General in the Records of the Office of Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Sent, AGO.

\(^{24}\) Special Orders No. 9, January 21, 1857, Order Book, West. Dept.

\(^{25}\) Johnston to Cooper, February 16, 1857, Letters Received by the Adjutant General in the Records of the Office of Adjutant General, (Record Group No. 94, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., AGO.
Infantry stopped at the post of their way from Florida to Fort Leavenworth. When they left on June 29, only eight men remained at the post. In August this number dropped to five and stayed there through January 1858.26

The eight companies of the Fifth Infantry and the elements of the First Cavalry, Second Dragoons, and Sixth Infantry which had been at Jefferson Barracks, were concentrated at Fort Leavenworth to become part of a 2,500-man force, commanded by Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, which was ordered to Utah to deal with the Mormons.

The Mormons were a radical Protestant sect whose members had been led from Nauvoo, Illinois, to the Great Salt Lake Valley in the late 1840s by Brigham Young. Young had assumed leadership of the Mormons following the murder of their prophet and founder, Joseph Smith, Jr., by an anti-Mormon mob in 1844. In coming to the Great Salt Lake Valley, the Mormons were seeking a place where they could enjoy religious freedom, including the freedom to practice polygamy. The territory occupied by the Mormons was initially Mexican, but was acquired by the United States in 1848 as a result of the war with Mexico.

In 1849, the Mormons organized the squatter state of Deseret, and claimed jurisdiction over a large area of the West and Southwest, but Congress refused to recognize it. Instead, in 1850, it created Utah Territory, including present-day Nevada and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. Young was appointed governor, and the territorial government, including

26 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, June 1857-January 1858, Post Returns, AGO. During this period, the post was commanded by Captain Robert E. Clary, Quartermaster Department, who was supervising three artificers while they performed repair work on the barracks buildings.
the elected legislature, was controlled by the Mormons. Until 1855, relations between the Mormon-controlled territorial government and the national government were generally peaceful, but that year these harmonious relations came to an end when President Franklin Pierce appointed a new territorial surveyor general and three new territorial judges. When David H. Burr, the new surveyor general, announced his intentions to survey their land, the Mormons became apprehensive for their land titles were drawn only upon squatter's claims. They viewed Burr's plans to survey their lands as an attempt by the national government to evict them from land which they had improved through the development of a fairly sophisticated irrigation system.

In an effort to stop the surveys, the Mormons began to harass Burr and his survey parties. Burr accused the Mormons of removing survey corner posts, driving off the horses and mules of his surveyors, and agitating the Indians against the surveyors by telling the red men that Burr and his men were the forerunners of hostile whites who would take their lands. Furthermore, Burr accused Brigham Young and several others of the "Mormon Hierarchy" of conspiring to have

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28 When the Mormons first arrived in the Great Salt Lake Valley, they found a barren, non-productive land, but they immediately set to work to construct a sophisticated irrigation system to bring water from the Wasatch Mountains to the Valley. The success of this irrigation made the Mormon farm lands of the Great Salt Lake Valley some of the most agriculturally productive and valuable of the United States westward beyond the 100th Meridian. See Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier, 4th ed., (New York, 1974), 460-62.
him assassinated. Fearing for his life, Burr resigned his position in
the Spring of 1857, and returned to Washington where he continued his
invectives against the Mormons.29

At the same time that Burr was attacking the Mormons, the three
new Gentile members of the territorial judiciary, W. W. Drummond,
George P. Stiles, and John F. Kinney, also were involved in an anti-
Mormon campaign. These three judges attempted to reduce the influence
of Brigham Young and the Mormon Church in the affairs of Utah Territory.
Drummond and Kinney, for example, attempted to impose the jurisdiction
of the federal territorial court over the probate courts established by
the Mormons. These probate courts handled most civil and criminal matters
within the territory, leaving the federal courts with little business.
Drummond attempted to empanel a federal grand jury to investigate the
probate court system, and when this failed, he embarked upon a letter
writing campaign accusing Brigham Young of being a despotic ruler. He
charged that the Mormons, through physical intimidation, frustrated the
enforcement of national laws by the federal courts, and suggested that
Young be replaced as territorial governor with a Gentile, supported by
sufficient military support, who would be loyal to the national govern-
ment.30

29 "The Utah Expedition," Message of the President of the United
States Transmitting Reports of the Secretaries of State, War, of the In-
terior, and of the Attorney General, relative to the military expedition
ordered into the Territory of Utah, February 20, 1858, House Executive
Document No. 71, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., (Serial No. 956), 116-17. Hereinafter
cited as "Utah Expedition," House Ex. Doc. No. 71; Burr to Hendricks,
August 30, 1856; Id. to Id., February 5, 1857; Id. to Id., March 28, 1857;
Id. to Id., June 11, 1858, ibid., 118.

30 Drummond to Black, March 30, 1857, "Utah Expedition," House
Ex. Doc. No. 71, 212-14

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Judge Stiles became involved in a bitter controversy with Young and the Mormon leadership over the respective roles of the United States marshal and the territorial marshal. The territorial marshal, an office created by the legislature, handled domestic civil matters, which accounted for the bulk of the legal work in Utah, and thus weakened the influence of the federal marshal and the federal courts. In a move to change this arrangement, Stiles ordered that the United States marshal be the only executive officer of the territorial district courts, as well as for the federal territorial courts.\(^{31}\)

The actions of Stiles and the other two judges prompted angry and violent protests from the Mormons. Mormon lawyers threatened Stiles with physical harm if he did not withdraw his order, and when Stiles appealed to Brigham Young, the Mormon Prophet replied that if he could not enforce his orders in his own court, he should close it and leave the territory. With Young refusing to support Stiles, the Mormons continued to harass him, and on the evening of December 29, 1856, a mob broke into his office, siezed his court records and his law books, and threw them into a privy and set fire to them. The outraged judge promptly left the territory for Washington, where he joined Drummond in accusing the Mormons of being in open rebellion against the United States.\(^{32}\)

As a result of the complaints of the displaced federal judges and a wave of national outrage over the Mormon practice of polygamy, in May 1857, President Buchanan was persuaded to appoint a new territorial governor for Utah, Alfred Cumming, a Gentile. To support Cumming against a


\(^{32}\) Ibid.
possible Mormon insurrection, the President ordered a force of 2,500 troops to escort him to Utah, and upon its arrival there to act as a *posse comitatus*. The War Department planned to assemble this force at Fort Leavenworth in June 1857, but there were several obstacles to overcome before it could be ready to depart for Utah. The main body of the escort force was to be composed of the Fifth Infantry, but elements of this regiment had just arrived at Jefferson Barracks in June 1857, following arduous service in Florida, and they needed a period of rest and recuperation before they could be ready for their new mission. The other major component of the escort force was to be eight companies of the Tenth Infantry, but they were in Minnesota and had to proceed first to Jefferson Barracks to receive additional uniforms and new weapons before going to Fort Leavenworth. The main body of the Fifth Infantry departed Jefferson Barracks on July 3 and 4, 1857, for Fort Leavenworth, as detachments of the regiment were still arriving at the post from Florida. Units of the Tenth Infantry did not arrive at Jefferson Barracks until August, and were delayed in transferring to Fort Leavenworth until September. 33

Not waiting until all of the troops for the escort force had arrived, Governor-designate Cumming and a force of 1,200 soldiers left Fort Leavenworth on July 18, 1857. They followed the Oregon Trail, reaching Fort Kearny, Nebraska, in early August, and arriving at Fort Laramie on September 3. From there they followed the regular immigrant trail across

present-day southern Wyoming to Fort Bridger, and then crossed over the Wasatch Mountains and marched down into the basin of the Great Salt Lake.\(^{34}\)

The Mormons were not at first overly concerned by the departure of the federal judges and the resulting controversy, but with the creation of the "Utah Expedition" and its departure from Fort Leavenworth, the Latter-day Saints were galvanized into action. Very apprehensive of the army's intentions, especially because of the violence which had been directed against them earlier in Missouri and Illinois, the Mormons were determined not to see a repetition of such events in Utah. Accordingly, Brigham Young mobilized the territorial militia, and Nauvoo Legion, and instructed it to protect the territory from "foreign invasion."

Adopting a scorched earth policy, the Mormons destroyed livestock forage in the Mormon Battalion's path as it proceeded westward through present-day eastern Utah and southwestern Wyoming. They also drove off the expedition's horses, mules, and oxen, and fortified the main mountain passes into the Great Salt Lake Basin. Although they did not directly engage the federal forces in hostilities, they did attack its supply trains and destroy some of its supplies.\(^{35}\)

The Utah Expedition's chief enemy was not the Mormons, however, but the weather. Beginning early in October, following its departure from Fort Laramie, the Expedition encountered freezing rain and snow, and its livestock started to suffer from a shortage of forage and exposure


\(^{35}\) See Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 119-47, for a detailed discussion of the Mormon resistance.
to wet and cold. Harassed by the Mormon cavalry and plagued by bad weather, the Utah Expedition's progress was so greatly impeded that its commander, Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, decided early in November that it would be impossible to cross the mountains before the onset of heavy snows, and ordered his men into winter quarters at Fort Bridger. There they spent a bleak, cold winter.  

The failure of the Utah Expedition even to reach Utah, and the strong resistance that the Mormons were giving to its advance, prompted the Buchanan Administration to have second thoughts about the mission. At the same time, Brigham Young and the Mormon leaders also began to reconsider the wisdom of their determination to fight the American military force. In an effort to reach a peaceful settlement, President Buchanan sent Thomas L. Kane to Utah to consult with the Mormons. Kane found Young and the Mormon hierarchy willing to accept Cumming as the new territorial governor, provided the United States Government would not try to destroy the Latter-day Saints' Church. In March 1858, Kane went from Salt Lake City to Fort Bridger and persuaded Governor Cumming to return with him to Salt Lake City. In the course of a few weeks' discussion, Cumming was able to assure Brigham Young that he had no intention of interfering in the affairs of the Mormon Church, and did not consider its members to be rebels against the United States. By the end of June, Colonel Johnston had moved his forces into Utah and established Camp Floyd in

the Cedar River Valley, approximately twenty-five miles northwest of present-day Provo, Utah.37

Even though an amicable settlement had been reached with the Mormons, the Buchanan Administration decided to maintain a military presence in Utah Territory to insure the future good conduct of the Mormons. Before learning of the peaceful resolution of the difficulties with the Mormons, the War Department made plans to replace some of the members of the Utah Expedition, especially the Fifth Infantry, who had just completed two successive hardship duty assignments, and to strengthen the unit for an anticipated campaign. Even though the settlement of the government's differences with the Mormons meant that the Utah Expedition did not need reinforcing, the War Department determined to replace its members with fresh troops.38

One of the units ordered to Utah was the Seventh Infantry, which was stationed at Fort Arbuckle, on the Washita River in the Chickasaw Nation.39 Advance elements of this regiment began leaving Oklahoma on February 13, 1858. Traveling by way of Fort Smith, Arkansas, the entire regiment, numbering 569 men, proceeded to Jefferson Barracks, arriving there by the end of March 1858. While at the Barracks, the Seventh

37 See Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 168-203, for a detail discussion of the negotiations that ended the Mormon War.

38 General Orders No. 1, January 18, 1858, General Orders, AGO; Morrison to Cooper, March 11, 1858, Letters Received in the Records of the Headquarters of the Army, (Record Group No. 108, National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Letters Recd., HQA.

Infantry received reinforcements from the general recruiting depot at Fort Columbus, New York.40

Unfortunately, the quartermaster did not have enough new uniforms for all the men, so some of them wore old style uniforms, while others wore new, the regiment thus presenting "an unusual appearance." Similarly, the St. Louis Arsenal was able to provide only two-thirds of the soldiers with new rifles, so the remaining third were forced to use their old ones, even though many of them, in the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Pitcarin Morrison, regimental commander, were "hardly serviceable," and would not be of much use in a period of extended service.41 Compounding the shortage of arms and uniforms for the Seventh Infantry was the arrival at the post of approximately 310 general service and mounted service recruits. These new soldiers were without equipment or uniforms, and before they could be forwarded on to their permanent units they had to receive their basic uniforms and needed some fundamental military training.42

These shortages of uniforms and rifles created serious morale problems at Jefferson Barracks. The enlisted men of the Seventh Infantry were angered over what they considered to be shoddy treatment by the quartermaster department, and three of them were reported to have deserted; presumably for that reason. Actually, according to the regimental commander, more than fifty of his men had deserted, but fifty-one had been apprehended in St. Louis and had been returned to Jefferson Barracks and were awaiting

40 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, March 1858, Post Returns, AGO; Morrison to Cooper, March 31, Letters Recd., AGO.

41 Id. to Id., April 15, 1858, ibid.

42 Special Orders No. 50, April 22, 1858, Order Book, West. Dept.; Sweitzer to Cooper, April 27, 1858, Letters Recd., AGO.
trial. This discontent among the regular infantrymen affected the recruits at the Barracks. Becoming bored with the repetition of training and irritated over the lack of proper military clothing, large numbers of recruits also deserted. It was more difficult to apprehend them because they still wore their civilian clothing. Fearing that the longer they were kept at Jefferson Barracks the more recruits would desert, Lieutenant Colonel Morrison suggested to Major General Persifor Smith, the commanding officer of the Department of the West, that the recruits be transferred to permanent units as rapidly as possible. Smith concurred, and at the end of April, ordered 200 cavalry and infantry recruits at Jefferson Barracks to western duty stations. The morale problem within the Seventh Infantry was largely solved when the quartermaster department finally was able to furnish the regiment's personnel with proper uniforms and the regiment was ordered to Utah.43

With the departure of the Seventh Infantry, the garrison at Jefferson Barracks once again entered a quiet period. The number of men at the post declined from 983 in April 1858, to only six at the end of May. The command of the Barracks devolved upon Surgeon Eugene H. Abadie, who was the only commissioned officer at the post from May to November, and the size of the garrison averaged 16.333 men per month for this six-month period. Captain Samuel D. Sturgis, Company E, First Cavalry, assumed command of the post on November 18, 1858, and his understrength

43 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, March and April 1858, Post Returns, AGO; Morrison to Smith, April 20, 1858, Letters Recd., West Dept.; Special Orders No. 54, April 29, 1858, Order Book, West. Dept.; Abadie to Cooper, May 30, 1858, Letters Recd., AGO.
company was added to the garrison, bringing it up to seventy-three at the end of December 1858. 44

While Jefferson Barracks was nearly abandoned, on October 17, 1858, it was inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston and was found to be in "good order." At the time the garrison was composed of Surgeon Abadie, three sergeants, a corporal, and ten privates of the Seventh Infantry. There were also three privates of the Second Cavalry in the post hospital. Besides the soldiers, there were fifty-three women at the post, nine of whom were laundressess of the Sixth Infantry, thirty-four laundressess of the Seventh Infantry, and ten wives of soldiers of the Sixth and Seventh Infantry regiments.

Johnston found the barracks, hospital, guardhouse, post bakery, and quartermaster storehouse to be in excellent condition. These buildings had been repaired in 1857 at a cost of $26,000, and the inspection officer felt that these improvements would keep the Barracks in excellent condition for the next ten years. The only buildings still in need of repair were the stables, which Johnston called, "frail buildings, a good deal decayed." Johnston suggested that the commissary and quartermaster stores at the post be sent to Fort Leavenworth before they became unusable, and that the Seventh Infantry ordnance sergeant stationed at the Barracks join his unit in Utah because there was no useful work for him at Jefferson Barracks. The Inspector commended Surgeon Abadie on his good maintenance of the Barracks with such a small command. 45

44 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, May-December 1858, Post Returns, AGO.

45 Johnston to Headquarters of the Army, October 28, 1858, Letters Recd., HQA.
Although Jefferson Barracks was in "good order," and fit for greater use, during 1859 it was garrisoned by only a skeleton, caretaker force. From January through December the average number of soldiers at the post was thirty; the largest number, seventy-five, was there during January and February. In March, the band and a detachment of recruits of the First Cavalry, numbering fifty-four men, started for Fort Leavenworth, leaving a garrison of seventeen. It remained at this small number throughout the Summer and early Fall of 1859, increasing with the arrival of a detachment of cavalry recruits in December.46

Even though the garrison was very small, the post continued to function as the main recruit and supply depot for the Department of the West, an immense geographical region which stretched from the Canadian border to Louisiana, and from the Mississippi River to the continental divide in the present-day states of Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana.47

Maintaining an effective supply system for the Department was the responsibility of the quartermasters in St. Louis and Jefferson Barracks, but sometimes the coordination of effort between these officers and the commanding officer at the Barracks broke down. One such instance involved the transfer of twenty head of mules from Jefferson Barracks to St. Louis. The quartermaster office at St. Louis asked its counterpart at Jefferson Barracks to send all the available mules at the post up to St. Louis for

46 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January-December 1859, Post Returns, AGO.

47 See map on inside front cover in Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865, (New York, 1967). Included within the Department of the West were all or part of the present-day states of Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.
transshipment farther west. Captain Robert E. Clary, quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks, was in the process of complying when the post commander, Captain Samuel D. Sturgis, vigorously protested and stopped the transfer. Sturgis complained to the headquarters of the Department of the West that the quartermaster at Jefferson Barracks was under his command and that he, Sturgis, should have been notified of the proposed transfer as a matter of proper military protocol. Furthermore, the quartermaster in St. Louis was attempting to strip the Barracks of its mules in the middle of winter when these animals were needed to haul firewood for the garrison, which at the time still numbered approximately seventy-five. Colonel Edwin V. Sumner, commanding officer of the Department of the West, agreed with Sturgis and informed the Captain that the mules would remain at the Barracks until "the season moderated." In addition, the quartermaster in St. Louis would be told to follow proper communications channels. Sturgis, however, was also informed that in the future he could not assume that the welfare of Jefferson Barracks would be placed ahead of the requirements of the Department. The mules at the Barracks were needed for the planned 1859 Indian campaigns and would not be returned to the post when they were over. Sumner warned that Jefferson Barracks would have to face even grimmer supply problems before the year was out.48

Not only did the reduced size of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks present supply problems for the post commanders, but boredom and the

distastefulness of a variety of fatigue duties which the men had to carry out caused their discipline and morale to decline. As in the past, many ran away to St. Louis where, however, they were usually soon apprehended and returned to the Barracks and court martialed for desertion. Usually found guilty, they were ordinarily sentenced to receive from ten to thirty lashes and to be confined in the post stockade for thirty to forty-five days.49

In one of these cases, however, the court overstepped the bounds of compassion and humanity and sound judgment. On March 3, 1859, it found Private Tedd Barney, Company A, First Cavalry, guilty of neglect of duty and desertion and sentenced him to receive twenty lashes on his bare back and then to be confined in the stockade for thirty days. However, before the sentence was executed, Dr. William Sturgis, a civilian physician from St. Louis who was under contract to act as the medical officer at Jefferson Barracks, examined Barney and found that he suffered from "epileptic fits and subsequent severe cerebral disturbances characterized by obstinate [sic] giddiness and mental confusion." Sturgis discovered that Barney had lost a portion of his skull as a result of fracture and was not, in his opinion, "a fit subject for [any type of] corporal punishment," and should be given a medical discharge from the army. The department commander, Colonel Edwin V. Sumner, concurred, and on March 8, 1859, he remitted the court martial sentence and granted Barney a medical discharge. Sumner reprimanded the members of the court for being so zealous

in their enforcement of army rules and regulations that they neglected to use common sense, and by jeopardizing Barney's life, risked creating much "bad publicity for the national service." 50

The greatest personnel problem at Jefferson Barracks during most of 1859 was not, however, the desertion of enlisted men, but the absence of a competent officer corps. On March 11, 1959, Captain Sturgis was ordered to join units of his regiment at Fort Riley, Kansas Territory. With no officer immediately available for service at Jefferson Barracks, command of the post was turned over to Ordnance Sergeant James Hurdel. 51

As commander Hurdel encountered several rather trivial problems of the kind that taxed a post commander during periods of little activity. The first of these concerned the women at the Barracks. When the Seventh Infantry transferred from Fort Arbuckle to Jefferson Barracks in the Spring of 1858, approximately sixty women, most of whom were wives of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, accompanied the regiment to the Missouri post. These women, as was customary, served as laundresses for the regiment, but when the Seventh Infantry left Jefferson Barracks for Utah, they were left behind. After the regiment's arrival in Utah, approximately half the soldiers' wives accompanied reinforcement detachments to the Mormon territory, but twenty to twenty-five women remained at Jefferson Barracks. These women were entitled to a portion of their husbands' ration issue, and Hurdel was instructed to issue them their


51 Special Orders No. 18, March 11, 1859, ibid.; Special Orders No. 25, March 29, 1859, ibid.
rations and charge the rations against their husbands' accounts. This process required observing careful accounting procedures, even when soldiers and wives were together, but with the husbands in Utah drawing full rations, and their wives at Jefferson Barracks drawing partial rations, confusion and acrimonious disagreements developed between Hurdel and staff officers in St. Louis over the subsistence records. Hurdel complained to Brevet Captain David R. Jones, assistant adjutant general, Department of the West, that he was unfamiliar with subsistence department records and could not keep an accurate accounting of the rations he issued, but Jones replied that all Hurdel had to do was issue the rations as they were supplied to him by the subsistence department in St. Louis. This task, Jones sarcastically stated, should not be too difficult for an experienced non-commissioned officer of Hurdel's "high repute." Inaccuracies in the record keeping, however, continued to occur, and Hurdel's records were soon totally out of agreement with those of the St. Louis subsistence office. The commissary of subsistence in St. Louis demanded an audit of Hurdel's accounts, but this audit proved to be inconclusive.\(^{52}\)

Two other problems that confronted Sergeant Hurdel were thievery at the post hospital and civilian interlopers on the Barracks reservation. On April 19, 1859, Dr. William Sturgis reported to the headquarters of the Department of the West that the hospital at Jefferson Barracks had been broken into and the entire medicinal liquor supply "comprising of a quantity of Port Sherry wine and [several] bottles of brandy" had been

\(^{52}\) Hurdel to Jones, March 16, 1859, Letters Recd., West. Dept.; Jones to Hurdel, March 28, 1859, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Id. to Id., April 1, 1859, ibid.
stolen. Dr. Sturgis suspected that one or two soldiers, acting with a 
civilian accomplice, committed the robbery. Sturgis noted there were 
several civilian interlopers of "low repute" living and maintaining "grog 
shops" in the northern region of the military reservation. He believed 
these civilians influenced some of the soldiers at the post to take the 
liquor. 53

The theft of the medicinal liquor and the presence of civilian 
interlopers on the Barracks' reservation confirmed Colonel Edwin V. 
Sumner's worries about the lack of effective command at Jefferson Barracks. In an attempt to remedy this situation, in May 1859, Sumner wrote 
the headquarters of the Army that it had become "indispensibly necessary 
to have some competent [officer] take charge of Jefferson Barracks." The 
post, he pointed out, was still the main concentration point for troops 
destined for service in the South and West, but with its present small 
garrison, was threatened with destruction. Civilians were constantly 
encroaching on the military reservation, and there were "so many stragglers, soldiers' families, and the like residing there," that the physical 
facilities were deteriorating rapidly without adequate supervision. 
Sumner suggested that one artillery battery stationed at Fort Leavenworth 
be transferred to Jefferson Barracks. This transfer would not be expen- 
sive and would certainly improve conditions at the Barracks. If, however, 
army headquarters deemed this sort of transfer inadvisable, Sumner sug- 
gested that "some good officer, who from disability is not able to take

53 Sturgis to Jones, April 19, 1859, Letters Recd., West. Dept.
the field," be put in command of the post. For the assignment, he recommended Major Nathaniel C. Macrea of the Third Infantry.  

Macrea was an experienced frontier commander. Graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1826, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Third Infantry. From 1826 to 1833, Macrea served in Florida, at Jefferson Barracks, and Fort Jesup, Louisiana, successively. From 1836 to 1840, he was stationed at Fort Smith, Arkansas, as the regimental commissariat. While at Fort Smith, Macrea broke his left leg in a training exercise, and subsequently, the leg was amputated because of gangrene. After recovering from this surgery, from 1841 to 1852, Macrea served on commissary and recruiting duty. In 1853, he returned to frontier duty and served at Forts Union and Massachusetts, New Mexico, until 1857. In May 1857, Macrea was promoted to major and transferred to Cincinnati, Ohio, on "special duty."  

As a temporary expedient, on May 14, 1859, when Assistant Surgeon Joseph H. Bailey reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks, Sumner determined to appoint him post commander until a regular army officer should be sent there. In the meantime, on May 11, 1859, Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, following Sumner's suggestion, offered the command of the post to Major Macrea. Macrea was willing to accept with certain conditions. He wanted


56 Special Order No. 34, May 14, 1859, Order Book, West. Dept.
under his command a "small party . . . of twenty or thirty soldiers," plus "a subaltern" who could supervise "the public property." These soldiers he "deemed absolutely necessary for police, [and] protection of [the] public property," and for the exclusion of civilians from the military reservation. "Without this aid," Macrea concluded, "I could not execute the duty imposed and I therefore would be reluctantly constrained to decline the service." After some hesitation, in November 1859, Secretary of War Floyd agreed to send an additional garrison force of twenty to thirty men to Jefferson Barracks, and on November 1, 1859, Major Macrea assumed command of the post.

When Assistant Surgeon Bailey assumed command of Jefferson Barracks, he ordered Sergeant Hurdel to close out his subsistence records and give them, plus any subsistence department monies he was charged with, to Brevet Major George C. Waggaman, subsistence officer in St. Louis. Hurdel delayed in doing so, and when in September he finally did, it was discovered that he was $240.00 short. Hurdel denied having taken the money, but Bailey ordered a court martial to try Hurdel on the charge of theft. When the court convened on September 9, 1859, Hurdel could not be found, and was charged with desertion as well as theft.

57 Macrea to Cooper, May 15, 1859, Letters Recd., AGO.
58 Thomas to Cooper, June 27, 1859, ibid.; Monthly Return of Jefferson Barracks, November 1859, Post Returns, AGO.
Following Hurdel’s disappearance, Colonel Sumner wrote the Chief of Ordnance, Henry K. Craig, describing the Sergeant as an "old drunkard" and a "perfect pest," and recommending that he be dropped from the Ordnance Department as a deserter. Sumner also alleged that Hurdel was responsible for the April break-in and theft of liquor at the post hospital. Before Colonel Craig or the War Department took any action on Sumner’s letter, Hurdel was apprehended and was confined at the St. Louis Arsenal and ordered to stand trial.60

At the trial, Hurdel was charged with embezzlement of public funds, breach of arrest, and desertion. He pleaded guilty to the first two charges, but not guilty to the charge of desertion. In his defense, Hurdel claimed that during the entire time that he was charged with being gone, he had been present at the post and in the vicinity of his quarters, and offered three witnesses to support his claim. The court found Sergeant Hurdel innocent of desertion, but guilty of embezzlement and breach of arrest and sentenced him to be reduced to the rank of private, and "to forfeit all pay and allowances that are or may become due him up to the expiration of his term of service." Hurdel was to be confined in the stockade with a ball and chain attached to his leg until the expiration of his term of service, and then given a dishonorable discharge.61

Hurdel’s former commanding officer, Brevet Major Daniel P. Whiting, Seventh Infantry, attempted to have the sentence reviewed by Secretary

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60 Sumner to Craig, September 13, 1859, Letters Sent, West. Dept.; Jones to Bailey, September 19, 1859, ibid.; Special Orders No. 98, September 20, 1859, Order Book, West. Dept.

61 "Testimony of Edward Avery, John Freemont, and Mr. Sarah Bell," September 21, 1859, Hurdel Court Martial, JAG; "Sentence of Court Tribunal," September 21, 1859, ibid.
of War John B. Floyd, but Floyd declined, stating that, "the matter [would] be referred to the department commander to whose jurisdiction it properly [belonged]." Colonel Sumner, the commanding officer of the Department of the West, refused to reduce the sentence because, "his [Hurdel's] conduct was so outrageous that I do not think his former services should mitigate his punishment." So Hurdel served his full sentence and was eventually given a dishonorable discharge in January 1860.62

After he resumed command of Jefferson Barracks in November 1859, Major Macrea used the Hurdel affair to justify his claim that the Barracks needed a strong permanent garrison. Writing to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper on January 31, 1860, Macrea cataloged the problems facing Jefferson Barracks. Most serious was the impermanence of the garrison, which was composed of recruits and deserters from the First Cavalry and Second Infantry. According to army regulations, these soldiers were under the command of their regimental commanders and could be transferred from the post at any time. "The public buildings at this post are numerous and valuable," Macrea explained, "and nothing but a permanent force of eighty to 100 men with the appropriate officers can do justice to the public interests in their preservation."63

Without a permanent garrison, declared Macrea, Jefferson Barracks was threatened with destruction. "Such has been the unbridled license of irresponsible persons quartered here," he asserted, any attempt to exercise

62 Cooper to Whiting, November 10, 1859, Letters Sent, AGO; Sumner to Cooper, November 14, 1859, Letters Recd., AGO, cited in Cooper to Whiting, December 5, 1859, Letters Sent, AGO.

63 Macrea to Cooper, January 31, 1860, Letters Recd., AGO.
"Wholesome authority" to preserve and protect the barracks structures was met with "an entire disregard of the interests of the government." The people who had been quartered at the post during 1859 had used unoccupied officers' and enlisted men's barracks as "cow-pens, hen-roosts, dog kennels, and for other filthy purposes," and the furniture within these quarters had been indiscriminately pillaged and destroyed. Macrea held strong suspicions that private citizens within the vicinity of the Barracks, "[had] lent a willing hand in this general destruction and burglary ...." Such untoward activities, he asserted, would be difficult to prevent without a proper permanent garrison for the post.

The War Department was greatly disturbed by Macrea's report. Adjutant General Cooper informed the Major that the army still placed a high value on Jefferson Barracks' importance for the "Army of the West," but it would be impossible to provide the post with such a sizeable permanent garrison as Macrea deemed necessary. At the time Macrea was asking for a force of eighty to 100 men to be stationed at the Barracks, the army was involved in major Indian campaigns throughout the trans-Mississippi West, and all its available manpower was needed there. There simply were not enough soldiers to provide a substantial permanent garrison for Jefferson Barracks, as well as a number of other army posts, and at the same time meet troop needs in such places as Oregon and Texas.

In an attempt to improve the manpower situation at the post, on April 11, 1860, the regimental headquarters of the Second Infantry was

64 Ibid.

moved there, with Colonel Dixon S. Miles assuming command on April 24. Although the new headquarters brought more stability to the garrison, Jefferson Barracks did not receive a large permanent garrison. The bulk of the soldiers at the post were recruits in transit to their permanent duty stations.

On September 26, 1860, Colonel Miles relinquished command of Jefferson Barracks and took the headquarters of the Second Infantry to Fort Ripley, Minnesota. Macrea succeeded Miles as post commander and resumed his pleas to the War Department for a sizeable permanent garrison for the Barracks. He again reported that there were a large number of "thieves and burglars" in the vicinity of the Barracks, and without any reliable troops at the post, the "public property" was in jeopardy of being stolen and vandalized. Macrea suggested that two half-strength companies of the Third Infantry be assigned to Jefferson Barracks and then be recruited to full strength over a period of two years. This would provide the needed permanent garrison and also offer good training for the regulars as well as the recruits. Colonel Edwin V. Sumner agreed

66 Special Orders No. 42, April 11, 1860, Order Book, West. Dept.; Miles to Thomas, April 24, 1860, Letters Recd., HQA.

67 See Special Orders No. 48, April 29, 1860, Special Orders No. 54, May 15, 1860, Special Orders No. 72, June 19, 1860, Special Orders No. 114, August 13, 1860, Special Orders No. 141, October 17, 1860, Order Book, West. Dept.; Miles to Cooper, May 25, 1860, Letters Recd., AGO; and Id. to Id., June 17, 1860, ibid.

The monthly returns of Jefferson Barracks for 1860 show that an average of 97.166 soldiers per month joining the garrison by transfer, and 93.75 soldiers per month departing the garrison by transfer. The discrepancy between these numerical averages can be accounted for by soldiers who received discharges or deserted after joining the garrison. Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, January-December, 1860, Post Returns, AGO.
with Macrea that an adequate permanent garrison was needed at Jefferson Barracks, but he felt "that twenty men [were] sufficient" to maintain and protect the buildings and other government property. The War Department did not follow through on either officer's recommendation, and Jefferson Barracks ended the year with a skeleton garrison of sixteen. 68

The five-year period before the Civil War was a quiet one for Jefferson Barracks. The post and the War Department successfully withstood a persistent challenge to the military reservation from the City of Carondelet. During the very time the army was defending Jefferson Barracks from civilian encroachment, the post was ably fulfilling its assigned role for the Utah Expedition. Following that, the post fell upon hard times, having only a skeleton garrison and suffering relative neglect by the War Department, although it still placed considerable value on the Barracks' position as a recruit depot and staging area for the army on the trans-Mississippi frontier.

68 Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, September 1860, Post Returns, AGO; Macrea to Cooper, October 4, 1860, Letters Recd., AGO; Endorsement of Colonel Sumner, October 5, 1860, ibid.; Monthly Returns of Jefferson Barracks, December 1860, Post Returns, AGO.
CONCLUSION

Jefferson Barracks was established in 1826 to provide the army with a centrally located western post that would serve both the northwestern and southwestern frontiers. The Barracks did this admirably well. Located twenty-six miles below the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, Jefferson Barracks was able to provide soldiers and supplies for the army installations in the Missouri River valley and Upper Mississippi and its tributaries. Furthermore, the post also served as a supply center for Forts Gibson, Jesup, Macomb, and Towson.

In addition to functioning as a personnel and supply center, Jefferson Barracks was also to act as the army's Infantry School of Instruction. This School, however, was never formally organized. The first soldiers ordered to the post were required to construct their barracks and other necessary buildings. Because of their construction responsibilities, the soldiers did not have the time necessary for military training. When the soldiers completed constructing their barracks, they still did not have time to undergo concentrated infantry training because they were needed to fight Indians in the northern Illinois-southern Wisconsin region. Even though the main part of its garrison left Jefferson Barracks in the Spring of 1832 to fight in the Black Hawk War, the post continued to provide vital services, such as furnishing subsistence supplies, for General Henry Atkinson's command of regulars and Illinois militia.

The Black Hawk War demonstrated to the army the difficulty of fighting Indians with infantry only. To meet the new demands of controlling the mounted Indians of the Great Plains region, in 1833, Congress
established a regiment of Dragoons. Although the dragoons were destined to serve in the Indian Territory — present-day Oklahoma — and along the Oregon Trail from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Laramie, they were first stationed at Jefferson Barracks, where the regiment underwent its initial organization and training. Furthermore, after the dragoons left Jefferson Barracks for their western duty stations, the Barracks continued to serve as their regimental recruiting and supply center.

Jefferson Barracks played an important role in a second military policy change following the Black Hawk War. By the mid-1830s, the leading edge of white settlement was poised to push into the eastern Great Plains region. To deal adequately with the westward population movement, the War Department proposed to establish a new line of frontier posts. These new military installations would have company-size garrisons, which, in time of danger, would hold the posts until reinforcements from a central reserve arrived. Jefferson Barracks was designated as the location of the central reserve force for the western frontier. Utilizing its strategic location on the Mississippi, the reserve force at Jefferson Barracks could quickly reach the western frontier regions in order to overawe the Indians or protect United States' possessions from any other foreign threat.

Although the War Department intended to create the strategic reserve at Jefferson Barracks during the mid-1830s, the outbreak of the Seminole War in Florida prevented effecting this troop concentration. Jefferson Barracks, instead of receiving a concentration of regular army soldiers, had its regular garrison sent to Florida and the post was almost deserted. Even with most of its garrison removed, the Barracks, however, fulfilled a vital function in the army's Florida campaign, as the post served as
the mustering and supply station for the Missouri Volunteers destined to fight against the Seminole.

By 1842, the army had subdued the Seminole and began to reassign its forces away from Florida. Still desirous of creating the western strategic reserve, the War Department rapidly increased the size of the garrison at Jefferson Barracks, and by April 1843, the number of soldiers at the post exceeded 1,000. The garrison at Jefferson Barracks, however, did not remain at this large number for long. The possibility of hostilities with Mexico along the Texas border prompted the War Department, in April and May 1844, to order most of the available soldiers at Jefferson Barracks to proceed to Fort Jesup, Louisiana. There the soldiers from Jefferson Barracks became the nucleus of Colonel Zachary Taylor's "Corps of Observation," which eventually moved to Corpus Christi, Texas, and then to an encampment across the Rio Grande River from Matamoros, Mexico. In May 1846, the United States declared war against Mexico, and Jefferson Barracks once again served as one of the army's main wartime enlistment and supply centers. Not only did the small training cadre at the Barracks recruit and provide initial training and uniforms for new regular army soldiers, but the Barracks also served as the mustering and supply point for the Illinois and Missouri volunteers who served in the Mexican conflict.

By 1848, United States forces in Mexico had successfully defeated the Mexican army, and on February 2, 1848, the Mexican government agreed to peace terms and signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. With the end of the Mexican War, the War Department used Jefferson Barracks as one of the major discharge centers for the army. Large numbers of sick and wounded soldiers also were shipped to Jefferson Barracks to recuperate.
before being mustered out of the service. By mid-August 1848, approximately 3,500 soldiers were stationed at Jefferson Barracks, and the size of the garrison was maintained at the 1,000-man level through the remainder of 1848, until February 1849, when the army underwent significant reorganization.

After the end of the Mexican War, the army was confronted with defense responsibilities over a geographical expanse stretching from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, and from Canada to Mexico. Consequently, during the decade of the 1850s until the start of the Civil War, Jefferson Barracks was seldom garrisoned with a large number of soldiers. The post's main function during this period was as a recruiting and supply depot for army units stationed farther west, and although there were several personnel problems at Jefferson Barracks, the War Department continued to count the post as one of its most important military installations.

Throughout the entire period between 1826 and 1860, Jefferson Barracks had a close and important relationship with St. Louis. At the time the post was established, General Edmund P. Gaines expressed some apprehension over the new post's close proximity to the city. Gaines' apprehension was well founded, for soldiers from Jefferson Barracks frequently went there and became intoxicated and then deserted. It must be noted, however, that alcohol abuse and desertion were chronic problems throughout the army and not unique to soldiers from Jefferson Barracks. The causes of these breakdowns in military discipline, moreover, were not the soldiers' close proximity to urban areas, but the soldiers' low pay, frequent harsh treatment, and boring and monotonous life.
Despite the negative effects of their close proximity, Jefferson Barracks and St. Louis had an overall profitable and positive relationship. Although the War Department expected the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks to do the construction work themselves, the construction of the post offered employment opportunities to numerous St. Louisians, including carpenters, farriers, stonemasons, and teamsters. Once the construction of Jefferson Barracks was completed, supplying the garrison offered excellent economic opportunities to many St. Louis businessmen, as well as to farmers of the eastern Missouri and southern Illinois region. Each year the commissary and quartermaster officers at Jefferson Barracks advertised for supplies of fresh beef and forage for livestock, and fulfilling these contracts became the means of economic survival for many farmers and merchants.

Although soldiers from Jefferson Barracks frequented St. Louis and sometimes created disturbances, St. Louisians valued their good relationship with Jefferson Barracks. Whenever given the opportunity to do so, St. Louisians enjoyed visiting the Barracks and observing military reviews, and the St. Louisians were proud that Jefferson Barracks was part of their community.

Jefferson Barracks remained an active military installation until the end of World War II, but its period of greatest importance to the army was the 1826-1860 period when it was the army's main supply and training depot for the nation's frontier fighting force. Just as St. Louis considered itself to be "the gateway to the West," so too can Jefferson Barracks be considered the army's gateway to the western frontier.
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