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Status and Prestige as a Factor in Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1905-1908.

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A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
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in

The Latin American Studies Institute

by

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PREFACE

A graduate thesis on Rui Barbosa sparked the author's interest in Brazil's attendance at the Second Hague Peace Conference and the fascinating relationships between and among individuals and countries that developed on the occasion of the conference. The search for materials for this study led the author to the examination of holdings at the United States National Archives in Washington, D.C., and those at the Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, the Arquivo Nacional, the Arquivo Histórico de Itamarati, the Arquivo Joaquim Nabuco, and the Arquivo Barão do Rio-Branco, all in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

This study examines the Brazilian concern for status and prestige at the personal, national, and international levels as reflected in private and official correspondence during 1905-1908, the period bracketing the Second Hague Conference. The study seeks to emphasize the human dimension that is often obscured in the chronology of events. For this purpose, extensive use has been made of written communications.

The author is grateful to the staff of the diplomatic section of the National Archives for assistance in identification of pertinent United States embassy and consular
material and State Department communications with the United States delegation to the Second Hague Conference. He gratefully acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Dr. Francisco de Assis Barbosa, director of the Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, and the archival staff, especially Maria Elena. Dr. Raul Lima and the staff of the reading room provided invaluable assistance in the use of the Arquivo Nacional, Arquivo Joaquim Nabuco, and Arquivo Afonso Pena. Dra. Martha Gonçalves and her staff at the Arquivo Histórico do Itamarati were most helpful with Foreign Ministry records and archival records of the Arquivo Barão do Rio-Branco.

A special debt of gratitude is owed to my dissertation committee, especially Dr. Jane DeGrummond who offered aid, advice and encouragement through many long years. Dr. Paul Hoffman is highly commended for his incisive critiques and helpful suggestions for the manuscript. As directors of the Latin American Studies Institute (LASI) during preparation and completion of this dissertation, Dr. Roland Chardon and Dr. Leonard Cárdenas gave indispensable guidance and support. Dr. Peter Lunardini and Dr. Charles Patterson, representatives of my minor fields, provided much helpful support and advice. These individuals are responsible for the success of this study, but the author assumes full responsibility for any errors and omissions. I thank LASI for fellowship support, and the Education Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention for a scholarship/loan, without both of which the study could never have been completed.
A special vote of thanks is due Mrs. Miriam DeHart, secretary of LASI, who was always a friend eager to give aid with so many details of scheduling, deadlines, etc. The support and assistance of my colleagues at Mobile College was indispensable to the success of this venture. Finally, I wish to thank my family, especially my wife, for patience and forbearance during the long years of study, preparation, research, and writing culminating in the completion of this study.
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ABSTRACT

This study traces the two traditional Brazilian foreign policy objectives of securing recognition as an important member of the international community, and friendship with the United States, during the period 1905-1908. These two objectives are examined in the light of Brazilian concern for status and prestige at the personal, national, and international levels. The themes of gaining international recognition, and Brazilian-American friendship are interwoven with the interpersonal relations that developed on the occasion of the Second Hague Peace Conference.

The Second Hague Conference (1907) was the first global meeting in which Brazil was represented. It was an opportunity for Brazil to distinguish herself from lesser powers and to enhance her image as a leader in Latin America. An aspiration for great power status led to the cultivation and projection of an image of Brazil as a nation that was European in culture and orientation in spite of its geographic isolation. To support her claims, Brazil mounted an impressive public relations campaign. Furthermore, economic and political considerations fostered a special relationship with the United States. The world conference was the stage upon which the emerging nation made its debut.
Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and Rui Barbosa were the principal Brazilian actors on stage and behind the scenes at the conference. The search for status was the principal motivation for Brazil's attendance at the Hague Conference and played a role in the selection of her delegate, her stance on the conference issues, and her relationship with the United States. Brazil's unrealistic goal of becoming the ninth world power and her conference stance, jeopardized her special relationship with the United States.

During this period these two traditional Brazilian foreign policy objectives were not mutually exclusive, despite some incompatibility. Through the tenacious efforts of Nabuco, the Brazilian-American relationship was salvaged in spite of the hostility of Rui, and the indifference of Rio-Branco. Despite the conflicts over status, the Second Hague Conference did gain for Brazil the reputation of a cultured and cosmopolitan nation able to give a respectable showing in a meeting with the powerful nations of the world.
INTRODUCTION

World events test national goals and aspirations giving rise to new courses of action while providing the opportunity for nations to make an imprint on history. Such was the challenge posed to the emerging Brazilian nation in 1907 by the Second Hague Conference. The Second International Peace Conference (Second Hague Conference) was the first global meeting in which Brazil was represented. It was an opportunity for Brazil to distinguish herself from lesser powers and to enhance her image as a leader in Latin America, especially vis-à-vis Argentina. The aspiration for great power status led to the cultivation and projection of an image of Brazil as a nation that was European in culture and orientation in spite of its geographic isolation. A competent and cosmopolitan foreign service was displayed as evidence. Furthermore, the desire to be the hegemonic power of South America, and thus an equal of her neighbor to the north, fostered a special relationship with the United States. The world conference was the stage upon which the emerging nation made its debut.

Earlier studies dealing with the Second Hague Conference and with the three principal men responsible for Brazil's role there, do not provide a comprehensive treat-
ment of their interpersonal relations nor do they address the concern for status and prestige on the three levels; personal, national, and international.

The two most important books dealing with the Second Hague Conference say little about Brazil's role during that meeting.¹ Calvin D. Davis' *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference* is concerned primarily with the American role at the Hague Conference and only cursorily mentions Brazil or Rui Barbosa, the Brazilian delegate. William I. Hull makes some reference to Brazil and her delegate in *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law*, but his primary concern is a comparative study of the two Hague peace conferences, with emphasis on international law and the role of the United States delegation. *The Two Hague Conferences* by Joseph H. Choate, leader of the American delegation to the second conference, should also be mentioned. Choate emphasizes the proceedings of the conference, with primary reference to the American role, hardly making mention of Brazil.

Brazil's conference role is best covered by E. Bradford Burns in his study, *The Unwritten Alliance, Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations*. Burns devotes sixteen pages to the Hague Conference, providing an excellent summary of the issues addressed and emphasizing the impact of the deliberations on Brazilian-American relations. In deal-

¹Complete citations of sources discussed in the introduction may be found in the footnotes of the main body of the paper and in the Selected Bibliography, pp. 221-30.
ing with individuals, Professor Burns' primary interest is in Rio-Branco and thus he does not treat in depth the complex interrelationships among Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and Rui Barbosa. Burns does not mention the extensive Brazilian international public relations effort nor does he acknowledge Nabuco's secret mission to aid the Hague delegation.

Luiz Viana, *A Vida de Rui Barbosa*, the standard biography of Rui, has one chapter dealing with Rui's role as Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Conference and with the events in which Rui was involved preceding and following the conference. The major emphasis of Viana's work is biographical and he deals sympathetically (and not impartially) with Rui and Brazil concerning this episode in his country's history.

Curiously, Carolina Nabuco does not mention in *The Life of Joaquim Nabuco*, that Nabuco went to Europe for four months during the summer of 1907 and that she and the rest of the family accompanied him. She only devotes two pages to the Hague Conference, most of the space dealing with the controversy surrounding the selection of the Brazilian conference delegate.

Raymundo Magalhães in *Rui, o Homem e o Mito* deals with portions of Brazil's Hague episode in some detail, but as a revisionist, his primary objective is to debunk the "myth" or legend which he says overshadows the life of Rui, and to expose the "intrigue and maneuvering" of Rui and Rio-
Branco during the conference. Magalhães is particularly interested in bringing to light part of the details surrounding the publication of an illustrated magazine supplement which praised Rui highly. He makes much of the fact that this article was paid for by the Brazilian government and was later translated into Portuguese as a "book" purportedly by an "impartial witness" to Rui's magnificent "victories" before the assembled nations of the world. Magalhães isolates this incident and does not put it into the larger context as part of a campaign for publicizing Brazil.

None of these, nor other published material provides comprehensive treatment of the complex interrelations among all three of the Brazilians who together were responsible for Brazilian foreign policy during the Second Hague Conference, although the individuals are treated separately. Nabuco's role during the conference has been virtually ignored by earlier studies, as has the extensive international public relations campaign conducted by Brazil during this meeting.

The essence of Brazil's traditional foreign policy has been succinctly stated by Brady B. Tyson. He lists the four "pillars" of this policy as: expansion then stabilization of her frontiers, maintenance of a balance of power in the Rio de la Plata area, gaining recognition as an important member of the community of nations, and friendship with the United States.²

²Brady B. Tyson, "The Drive for Great Power Status:
By 1907 Brazil had stabilized her frontiers, but the second objective kept her in a continuing rivalry with Argentina. Brazil used her attendance at the Hague Conference to enhance her international prestige, but this threatened to undermine the fourth objective by causing difficulties with the United States.

This study traces the third and fourth "pillars" of Brazil's foreign policy objectives during the period from 1905 to 1908. The themes of securing recognition for Brazil as an important member of the international community and Brazilian friendship with the United States are interwoven with the personal animosities, jealousies, concerns, political styles, and the interpersonal diplomatic relationships that developed on the occasion of the Second Hague Conference.

Concern for status and prestige is seen throughout this study at the personal, national, and international levels. The behavior, personal idiosyncracies, personal goals and interests of Rui Barbosa, Joaquim Nabuco, and Baron Rio-Branco, gave form and substance to Brazil's foreign policy objectives during this period.

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CHAPTER I
THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS

Rui Barbosa at The Hague, Joaquim Nabuco in Washington and in Europe, and Baron Rio-Branco in Rio were the principal Brazilian actors in their nation's debut on the world stage at the Second Hague Peace Conference. They collaborated closely in making the conference a worthwhile venture for Brazil in spite of disagreements, personality clashes among themselves, and Brazilian and international political realities. A better understanding of these men and their actions during the conference can be obtained if the life of each prior to the conference is sketched, with particular attention to demonstrating his position and standing in Brazilian life and culture of that period.

* * *

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Júnior (Baron Rio-Branco), was born in 1845 and was thus slightly older than Rui and Nabuco.¹ His father was in the diplomatic service

and rose to the position of prime minister in 1871. The elder Paranhos, whose ministry was the longest of the reign, was given the title of Viscount of Rio-Branco by Dom Pedro II.

Baron Rio-Branco was a student of Brazilian history from his school days, but he also led the life of a bohemian. After six years in Parliament (1869-1875), Rio-Branco sought a diplomatic appointment, and finally in 1876 was appointed Brazilian consul in Liverpool, where he remained until 1891.  

While assigned to Paris as director of the Brazilian Immigration Service (1891-1901), Rio-Branco went to Washington to represent his country in the Missions territory dispute with Argentina. He gained a resounding victory for Brazil. After thus successfully defending Brazil's claims to Amapá in a dispute with French Guiana, Rio-Branco went briefly to Berlin (1901-1902). In 1902, after living in Europe for twenty-six years, he accepted the post of foreign minister, which he would occupy until his death in 1912. Rio-Branco was wildly cheered as a national hero upon his return to Brazil, where he joined the administration of the newly-elected president, Rodrigues Alves.


2Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 22-27; and Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 70, 73, 57-62.

3Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 183-91; and Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 30-32.
him well for the post of foreign minister:

Those years in Europe gave Rio-Branco practical experience in diplomacy, introduced him to the sources of Western culture, required him to perfect his knowledge of foreign languages, expanded his personal acquaintanceships in diplomatic and social circles, permitted him to visit European libraries and archives, and provided the historian with leisure hours which he could devote to the study of history. 4

During the years (1902-1912) that he served as foreign minister, Rio-Branco's foreign policy was based on gaining international prestige for Brazil, settling the remainder of Brazil's disputed Boundaries, and achieving leadership for Brazil in South America. 5 He also modernized the antiquated foreign policy organization of Brazil, in order to implement his new policy. Continuing the tradition of boundary claim settlements, Rio-Branco arbitrated disputed boundaries with British Guiana, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Greatly aided by Nabuco, the Baron also strengthened Brazilian-American friendship during his tenure. 6

Rio-Branco served as Brazilian foreign minister for over nine years, under four presidents. He ran the ministry as he wished, considering himself accountable only to the

4Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 29.


president and to public opinion. His greatest service to Brazil during his long tenure was the settlement of Brazil's extensive boundaries.  

* * *  

According to his biographers and other observers, Rui Barbosa was probably the most important Brazilian liberal of the nineteenth century. He was deeply committed to liberal ideals, was an expert on law, had a brilliant mind, and was a great public speaker. A.M. Gibson, a New York

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7 Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 37, 49, 56.

Times correspondent, reported the following after an 1889 interview:

A perfect master of English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish, as well as his own language, Conselheiro Barbosa is thoroughly read in the legal, political, and economic literature of those countries. He is the first orator and writer of Brazil.9

Rui's inauspicious background hardly seemed to prepare him for such a future.

Rui Caetano Barbosa de Oliveira (Rui Barbosa) was born in 1849 in Salvador, Bahia and his early years were spent in that northeastern part of Brazil, in the sugar plantation and slaveholding area. Rui came from a financially insecure middle class family. To offset this hindrance to his political ambitions, he cultivated members of the traditional ruling elite, especially Sousa Dantas, the leader of the Liberal Party in Bahia, a member of the Imperial Parliament, and briefly prime minister (1884-1885). Dantas subsequently aided him in rising to political prominence.

Rui began the study of law at the age of sixteen and during his latter student days became an ardent abolitionist. He attended both Brazilian law schools, matriculating at Recife in 1866 and after two years transferring to São Paulo to complete the five-year course. After graduation he became editor of the Liberal Party newspaper in Salvador and

9 New York Times, January 20, 1890, p. 5.
worked in the law office of Sousa Dantas. His reward was legislative seats, first in the provincial assembly, and later in the Imperial Parliament. As a member of the Imperial Parliament from 1877 to 1884, he concerned himself with problems of abolition, direct election, religious liberty, and the spread of education. He was defeated for reelection in 1884, primarily because of his abolitionist stance. After his defeat he continued the abolitionist campaign through speeches and the press.

Slavery was abolished in 1888 and Rui then turned his attention to governmental reform in the interest of more representative government. He at first preferred to support the monarchial structure, but accepted a cabinet post in the 1889 Provisional Government which was formed by republicans with the support of the military. As minister of finance and acting minister of justice, Rui soon became the leading figure of the new government. As a lawyer he drafted many


12 Magalhães, Rui, o Homem e o Mito, pp. 420-21; and Bello, Modern Brazil, pp. 38, 48.

13 Rui was a member of the government from November 15, 1889 to January 21, 1891; he was minister of finance during this entire period and vice-president from December 31, 1889 to August 19, 1890. He was appointed acting minister of justice on November 15, 1889 and served until Campos Sales, the appointed minister, arrived in Rio to assume the
important decrees and was largely responsible for writing the final draft of the 1891 Constitution. Rui devised an elaborate scheme to rescue Brazil from inflation and other economic difficulties of the period. By the time he resigned the financial post on January 21, 1891 after fourteen months, he had extensively modified this theoretical plan in an attempt to make it workable. For almost a decade the country's finances remained in a disastrous state and Rui received the blame, although his plan was completely altered by his successors before it had received a fair test.

After the republican constitution went into effect, Rui attempted to interpret this document and to protect it from the dictatorial tendencies of the president. His opposition made him unpopular with the administration and he had to flee into exile. During the time abroad and upon his return he opposed all acts he considered to be illegal or unconstitutional.

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Rui was chosen as the Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Peace Conference (June 15-October 15, 1907) because of his cosmopolitan image and brilliant oratorical ability. Joaquim Nabuco was Rio-Branco's first choice, but disagreements between the two led to Rui's appointment. As leader of the Hague delegation Rui made a name for himself and his country by opposing the United States and by vigorously supporting the demands of smaller nations for equality with the larger nations in international disputes. This Brazilian antipathy toward the United States and support of the equality of sovereign states was very popular with the other Latin American countries and all of the smaller nations, but apparently ran counter to the long-range strategy of Rio-Branco, who was attempting to forge an informal alliance with the United States. 17

Back at home, he became a perennial candidate for the presidency, seeking to revise the constitution in such a manner as to permit more representative government. In three successive campaigns he stumped the country in an unprecedented effort to take the issues to the people. Knowing that he had little chance of success against the entrenched politicians, he still campaigned vigorously for the presidency in 1910, 1914, and 1919. When Rui died in 1923,

pp. 113-23, 128; Bello, Modern Brazil, p. 97; Rui Barbosa, Cartas de Inglaterra (2nd ed., São Paulo: Livraria Acadêmica, SARAIVA & C.- Editores, 1929); and Lacombe, Rui e a Primeira Constituição, pp. 20-27.

17 See Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 116-31.
at the age of seventy-three, he still occupied his seat in the Brazilian Senate and on the World Court (since 1921) and was considered one of the outstanding citizens of his country.  

* * * *

Joaquin Aurélio Nabuco de Araújo (Joaquim Nabuco) another important Brazilian liberal, was born in Recife in 1849, the same year as Rui Barbosa. Nabuco's father was a member of the Parliament during Nabuco's earliest years. Nabuco attended law school in São Paulo, and two of his class mates were Rui Barbosa and Afonso Pena, who was later to be president of Brazil (1906-1909). After law school he entered law practice in his father's firm, then took up

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journalism. From 1876 to 1878 Nabuco held minor positions in the Brazilian legations in Washington and London. He was elected to Parliament in 1878 and became a crusader for abolition of slavery, direct election, and religious liberty. Nabuco was a born orator and his eloquence was put to good use in the anti-slavery campaign. There was a rapid turnover in ministers and governments during the last years of the Brazilian monarchy, with frequent elections. Rui and Nabuco both often had difficulty being reelected to Parliament because of their abolitionist sympathies and only once were they both elected at the same time.

Nabuco was intensely loyal to the monarchy and, as he feared, the abolition campaign did help to destroy it. After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889, Nabuco remained loyal to that form of government; but as the years passed, the hopes of a monarchist restoration gradually faded. During that period he withdrew from politics and public life, and for ten years his main interests were literary.

In 1899 Nabuco finally accepted an offer to serve the republican government as Brazil's representative in a dispute with Britain over the Guiana frontier. He accepted

21Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, pp. 177-81; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 1-20.
22Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 36-37.
23Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, p. 267; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 31-32; and Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 24-25.
24C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 196-97; and Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 13, 44.
the assignment because he felt it was not a political one. Nabuco worked very closely with the Brazilian minister in London, who was deeply involved in the negotiations. Upon the sudden death of the minister, Nabuco temporarily assumed his duties. He was asked to accept the post as a permanent appointment, and finally agreed to do so in December of 1900.25

At the turn of the century, Washington was becoming increasingly important to Brazil. In 1905 the Americans and Brazilians agreed to raise the status of their diplomatic delegations to embassy status, and Nabuco was appointed as Brazil's very first ambassador. Shortly after Nabuco presented his credentials, Elihu Root was appointed as secretary of state. He and Nabuco had many interests in common and became good friends.26

Nabuco was considered the dean of the Latin American ambassadors in Washington because of his prestige and active leadership in promoting better understanding between the United States and Latin America. Nabuco was strongly pro-American and travelled widely in the United States in an attempt to dispel some of the American ignorance of Bra-

25 Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 74-84, 182-95; Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 21, 27-33; and C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245, 247, 249.

Both Nabuco and Root strongly supported Pan Americanism and were intimately involved in planning the Third Pan American Conference which was held in Rio in 1906. Nabuco persuaded Root to make a personal appearance at the conference, the first official foreign visit by a secretary of state while in office. Nabuco was a delegate to the Rio Conference and was elected president.

Nabuco assisted in Brazilian preparations for the Second Hague Peace Conference. Through his friendship with Root he had access to the instructions to the American delegation, and he succeeded in obtaining American support for an honorary position for Brazil at The Hague. During most of the conference proceedings, Nabuco was in Europe, ostensibly on leave for a health cure. In connection with this trip he was on an official, secret mission to aid the Brazilian Hague delegation. He was very upset because of strong differences between the Brazilian and American delegations at the Hague Conference. He did all he could to

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28 C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 317; and Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, p. 312.

prevent these incidents from affecting the Brazilian-American friendship. Nabuco died at his post in 1910 and Secretary Root eulogized him at the dedication of the Pan-American Union building. 30

* * *

The talents of these three eminent Brazilians combined to produce the desired results from Brazil's attendance at the Hague Conference. They cooperated, and at times clashed with each other, but for the most part kept in mind the national interests of their country.

The following chapter will examine the interpersonal relationships of these three men, highlighting the status of each in relation to the other during the period preceding the conference. The pre-conference policy of Brazil toward the United States will also be discussed.

CHAPTER II
FRIENDSHIPS, PERSONAL STATUS, AND POLICY TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES

During the year preceding the Second Hague Conference, maneuvering related to the selection of the Brazilian delegate became increasingly intense. Varying loyalties were involved and Joaquim Nabuco, Rui Barbosa, and Baron Rio-Branco were all concerned with their own status and the personal status of the other two individuals. Nabuco and Rui generally supported each other and both came to distrust Rio-Branco. Rio-Branco, for his part, played Nabuco and Rui against each other in order to gain his own political ends. Foreign Minister Rio-Branco was committed to a pro-American policy but was jealous of Nabuco, who as ambassador to the United States, had become a close friend of American Secretary of State Elihu Root and threatened to pre-empt Rio-Branco's initiative in Washington.

* * *

Nabuco had been a personal friend of Rui since law school and he was pleased to see Rui's prestige increase—this presented no threat to him. Nabuco was willing to support and increase the status of Rio-Branco as foreign minister as long as it did not conflict with Nabuco's own
pro-American ideas. He was not interested in becoming foreign minister, but was dedicated to promoting United States-Brazilian friendship.

When the Brazilian monarchy was overthrown in 1889 Joaquim Nabuco, a confirmed monarchist, severed his ties with the government, preferring to remain loyal to the deposed emperor.¹ Rui Barbosa, on the other hand, supported the republican government, serving as vice-president, finance minister, and acting minister of justice.² He also rendered additional service by drafting the republican constitution, drawing heavily from the United States Constitution.³

These differing political persuasions caused the two boyhood friends to drift apart. However, after ten years of retirement from political life, Nabuco finally agreed to serve as Brazilian representative in the dispute with Great Britain over the Guiana frontier. He left for Europe on May 3, 1899 to take up this assignment.⁴ On the eve of his departure, Nabuco wrote Rui a friendly note, reconciling their differences:

²Bello, Modern Brazil, pp, 38, 48.
³Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 201-02; Simmons, Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Dom Pedro II; and Lacombe, Rui Barbosa e a Primeira Constituição da República, pp. 7-9.
⁴C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 240-44.
My dear Ruy,

On parting I wish you the best of everything and hope that you will always remember me with the friendship which bound us in the time of our youth, certain that you do not have any greater desire than I to see the perfecting of your talent, the universality of your name, and the immortality of your work. I am more desirous than you yourself to see it enter into its true and superior sphere, and it is sincere satisfaction that accompanies the fullness of your intellectual orb.

Always yours
Joaquim Nabuco

This flattering note was evidence of the effort at reconciliation between the two.

In the selection of the Brazilian representative for the Third Pan American Conference, both Rui and Nabuco were considered for the post. This situation did not cause further friction between them, but rather presented an opportunity for renewal of their friendship.

In May of 1906, the Brazilian foreign minister, Baron Rio-Branco, wrote to Rui Barbosa requesting an appointment to talk with him for a few minutes, in the name of the president, about the Third Pan American Conference. Rio-Branco asked Rui to accept the position of Brazilian representative to the conference, which was to meet in Rio

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5 Joaquim Nabuco to Rui Barbosa, Rio, May 22, 1899, Arquivo da Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, Pasta J. Nabuco; (hereinafter the archive will be cited as CRB). Rui had been one of the first to applaud the acceptance of the position by Nabuco, in "A Missão Nabuco," A Imprensa, March 13, 1889. On that occasion Nabuco replied, "Thank you for your article of yesterday. It is most gratifying to me, that after so long a separation, we return to the old comradeship of our youth when we were both part of the liberal group in law school." Nabuco to Rui, March 14, 1889, quoted in Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 58-59.

de Janeiro later that year. Rui, complaining of poor health at the moment, was not disposed to accept the assignment and asked for time to consider it. After deliberating for fifteen days he refused to accept, stating his reasons in a letter on May 25th.

Joaquim Nabuco, now Brazilian ambassador to the United States, arrived in Rio on July 17, 1906 for the Third Pan American Conference. Soon after his arrival he wrote to Rui, thanking him for his visit and asking to be allowed a few more days before repaying it because he wanted to see Rui when they would have time to talk. He went on to say that he would like to have seen Rui accept the position of Brazilian representative at the conference. Nabuco asked Rui if a joint session of Congress, or at least a session of the Senate, could be arranged to honor Secretary of State Elihu Root and the United States. He said Rui's eloquence at such a session would certainly further the politics of approximation between the two countries. Rui granted Nabuco's request on the social call, saying that old compan-

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8 Ibid. Rui here protests that he is in ill health from overwork and consequently is taking treatment requiring relative rest and is thus unable to accept the position.


ions did not have to stand on ceremony. He did not reject the idea of a special congressional session, but declined to be the orator, pleading that

I am too old, sick, and . . . no longer assume initia-
tives, nor expose myself to reckless actions. The years and the attrition of hostile things . . . have deve-
oped in me a distrust which is only overcome when some irresistible desire commands my blind obedience. Rui went on to tell Nabuco, confidentially, that this was the reason he excused himself from the Pan American Confer-
ence. In reply, Nabuco asked Rui to serve as Brazilian spokesman at the reception for Mr. Root. He begged Rui to accept this role, for Rui's own sake and for the sake of Brazil. He then gave detailed suggestions on what topics to cover at the reception and again implored Rui to do it. Rui, after some reluctance, agreed to welcome Root in the Senate.

11Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 22, 1906, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 295, says Rui accepted the role of orator, citing this letter. However, the letter reads, "Não seria, com efeito, sem analogias na história dos parlamentos a sua lembrança de uma manifestação ao secre-
tario de estado americano pelas câmaras de Congresso. Mas no que não convenho, é no papel, que Vôce me designa." In the same letter Rui later says, "Mas a postura de porta-voz do Congresso, que Vôce me quer dar, a outrem deve cair." On June 26th, Nabuco paid the promised visit to Rui. At that time Nabuco persuaded Rui to change his mind about being orator for the Root banquet on August 2nd. Viana, Rui & Nabuco, p. 70.


14Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 380.
The relationship from their youth seems now to have been renewed. Nabuco sent some gifts and Rui responded by saying, "I thank you very much for these souvenirs, which will be a reminder of the renewal of our good relationship, which I value greatly."^{15}

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Rio-Branco was wary of increasing the status of Nabuco. He knew that Nabuco was being considered as a possible replacement for himself, and he felt that Nabuco had become too pro-American and was independently pursuing that policy without regard to the desires of the Foreign Minister. He believed that Nabuco had seized Rio-Branco's own initiative of Brazilian-American friendship and had wrested it from him.

Nabuco was welcomed as a hero in Brazil on his way to the Third Pan American Conference (Rio Conference) and he attributed that fact to the popularity of his "American Policy."^{16} Rodrigues Alves, the Brazilian president, as well as Afonso Pena, the president-elect, had been law school classmates of Nabuco and Rui.^{17} In organizing the government for 1906-1910 there was speculation about whether or not Pena would replace Baron Rio-Branco as foreign minister.

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^{15} Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 30, 1906, Arquivo Particular de Joaquim Nabuco; hereinafter cited as AJN.


^{17} Ronald Hilton, translator and editor, in preface to C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. xxii.
It was said that Pena favored Joaquim Nabuco, but public opinion leaned toward Rio-Branco.18

Rio-Branco had long been an intimate friend of Nabuco and had sought his advice on whether or not to accept the Foreign Ministry post in the new government of Rodrigues Alves in 1902.19 After deciding to accept, Rio-Branco had written of his decision to Nabuco indicating that he only intended to retain the post for two years, saying,

It is resolved, then that in 1904 I shall try to hand you my staff of office in Rio; if you want nothing of this, then return to London. . . . I shall occupy myself with the Foreign Ministry only until you are freed by a victory in Rome.20

Later events were to prove that Rio-Branco changed his mind in regard to this matter.

At the time Rio-Branco sought his advice, Nabuco had been the Brazilian representative on the commission for arbitration of the boundary dispute between Brazil and British Guiana. King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy was the arbitrator and thus Nabuco, who was assigned to London, was spending much of his time in Rome. Raul, the son of Rio-Branco, was secretary to this special mission in Rome.21

18 Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 369.


During his stay in Rio for the Third Pan American Conference, Nabuco learned that he was to be invited to take over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Rio-Branco changed his mind about leaving the position and wished to continue under Afonso Pena. Since Rio-Branco wished to remain, Nabuco felt it was not difficult for him to refuse the position. However, he also was convinced that his health could not stand the hard work, and he believed he could not be adequately replaced in Washington, which he considered a crucial post for Brazil. By the end of September everyone believed that Rio-Branco would remain as foreign minister after the inauguration of the new administration, and Nabuco was relieved that he did not have to refuse an invitation to the post by his boyhood friend, Afonso Pena.

The highlight of the Rio Conference was the visit by Elihu Root, American Secretary of State. His presence at the conference was primarily due to the persuasion of Joaquim Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245, 247, 249.

Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 383.


Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 384. While assembling a cabinet Afonso Pena, perhaps sensing Nabuco's predicament, wrote him, "For whatever motive, you can bestow your cooperation during my presidency in the post which you judge to be better able to serve our Country." Pena to Nabuco, August 30, 1906, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 437.
In 1905 Nabuco had been appointed as the first Brazilian ambassador to Washington when the two countries agreed to elevate their legations to embassy status. One of Nabuco's first official acts in Washington was to attend the funeral of Secretary of State John Hay. Root, then Secretary of War, succeeded Hay on July 1, 1905. Nabuco and Root soon became good friends and both recognized the desirability of closer relations between their two countries. Nabuco helped Root a great deal on many Latin American matters, but he proved to be a handicap in some respects because the other Latin American countries resented Brazil's self-assigned role of second great power in the

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25 Theodore Roosevelt informed Nabuco that the ambassador was responsible for Root's going to the Rio Conference. C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 317. Burns says that persuading Root to attend the conference was one of the four greatest achievements of Nabuco as Brazilian ambassador. Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 141. The visit was especially notable because it was the first foreign trip by an American secretary of state while in office.

26 Rio-Branco's first telegram to the new ambassador read: "Nabuco, Brazilian Ambassador, Washington. Affectionate regards / to the/ new ambassador / who is / certain to remain there many years, ever developing closer relations with the influential so that in this post you may apply your knowledge and patriotism. Rio Branco." Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Petrópolis, May 23, 1905, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.

27 C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 312.

Secretary Root left for Rio on July 4th in a new Navy cruiser and, at the suggestion of Nabuco, called at three Brazilian ports enroute. At Recife, Nabuco's home, a large crowd turned out to hear a speech by Root in which he praised the Brazilian ambassador highly. When the American secretary of state and his family arrived in Rio, the enthusiastic reception accorded them presaged the festivities meticulously arranged for this visit. Nabuco strongly supported Rio-Branco's policy of aligning Brazil with the United States and Root's visit signified the success of this policy.

The Third Pan American Conference convened on July 23rd in the newly constructed Monroe Palace. Naming of the edifice for President Monroe was another of the moves by the Brazilian government calculated to arouse Brazilian public opinion in favor of the United States. Rio-Branco deliv-

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30 Ibid.
32 Lloyd Griscom to Root, July 16, 1907, DS, 1113/2.
33 Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 114.
34 For a summary of Brazilian efforts to influence public opinion in that direction see a long memorandum by Lloyd Griscom, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. The memorandum, destined as a background paper for Mr. Root's visit, also supplies good, informed, contemporary opinion on political
ered the opening address of the conference, and its first act was to elect Nabuco president and Root and Rio-Branco honorary presidents.  

The Root family arrived in Rio early on July 27th and they were soon involved as spectators or participants in numerous parades, receptions, banquets, and speeches during their week-long stay. On July 31st Secretary Root addressed a special session of the Conference and Nabuco introduced him as the one largely responsible for the meeting and for its program.

The Rio Conference helped to determine the course of the Second Hague Peace Conference and also Brazil's course in that later conference. Root tried to impress upon the delegates the importance of the upcoming Hague conference. In his first speech to the conference he reminded the assembled delegates that, for the first time, all of the American nations would be represented at The Hague, and he hoped that their equal rights as sovereign states would be recognized. He saw this representation as formal acceptance by the world that no part of the American continents was subject to conditions in Brazil. Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2.

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 110.

Jessup, Root, I, pp. 478-79. In preparation for the Rio Conference three major items for the agenda had the potential for substantial conflict among the countries represented. However, the commission preparing the agenda left these three items to be decided at the Hague Conference. The commission was chaired by Root and was composed of ambassadors of the major Latin American countries in Washington. Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 371-72.
colonization.  

In the discussions of the arbitration committee, the close connection between the Rio and Hague conferences was emphasized. Some members wanted the committee report to declare compulsory arbitration as a necessary part of any arbitration agreement. Despite much sympathy for this position, it was agreed that such a declaration would unduly complicate the Hague negotiations. Instead of such a declaration, the committee drew up a strong resolution on arbitration, which the conference adopted.  

Discussion of the Drago Doctrine (named for the Argentine foreign minister) was perhaps the most exciting topic at the Rio Conference and was the second item deferred to the Hague Conference. In December 1902, Luis M. Drago, foreign minister of Argentina, had formulated a principle stating that no public debt should serve as the excuse for armed intervention or occupation of territory in the Western Hemisphere. Root's instructions to the American delegates approved of the Drago Doctrine, but instructed them to rec-  


38 "Resolutions of the 1906 International Conference of the American States," in Report of Delegates of the U.S.  


40 Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 170.
ommend that the conference refrain from taking action on the matter, since by such action it would appear that the debtors were attempting to dictate the actions of their creditors. Root recommended that the topic be reserved for consideration at The Hague. However, after much debate a strong resolution was approved, recommending that the Second Hague Peace Conference examine the issue with a view toward diminishing conflicts exclusively pecuniary in origin.

In his speech at the closing session of the Third Pan American Conference, Joaquim Nabuco recognized the accomplishments, but he emphasized the importance of the Second Hague Conference and the relationship of the Rio conference to the forthcoming one at The Hague:

Although we confirmed thus the existence of an American political system, yet by reserving to The Hague the solution of two important questions, we have shown that we do not recognize the existence of a private system of international law for ourselves and that we do not form a separate community from world civilization. . . . You ratified the adhesion of the American republics to the principle of arbitration, and you made an appeal to the coming Hague Conference to perpetuate this principle in a treaty worthy of the approbation of the entire civilized world . . . . You recommended that our governments consider the advisability of asking the Hague Conference to study the question of the collection of public debts by force and more generally to investigate methods for diminishing the possibility for conflicts exclusively pecuniary in origin.

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Thus the American nations assembled at Rio referred for discussion at The Hague several topics of importance to them.

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Since Rio-Branco's policy of Brazilian-American friendship was being pre-empted by Nabuco, the Baron began seeking ways to counteract the Ambassador's influence with the Americans. Thus, while the friendship of Rui and Nabuco was growing closer, the relationship between Rio-Branco and Nabuco was becoming increasingly strained. This situation was to have an effect on the makeup of the Brazilian delegation to the Hague Conference and cause a delay in the appointment of the Brazilian representative.

Nabuco remained in Rio after the close of the Third Pan American Conference because of the terminal illness of his father-in-law. While in Rio he had hoped to spend some time with Rui, but this did not prove to be possible. Two days before his departure for the United States, he wrote to Rui lamenting the fact that, because of the death in the family, he had been unable to accept Rui's invitation to spend a night at the home of "my old comrade and friend." He asked Rui to send word if he could help him in any way in Washington where he was "serving as the agent of the approximation between Brazil and the United States." 44

Nabuco also wrote to Rio-Branco, praising the Baron for his service to Brazil then saying,

for my part, I congratulate myself on the role that is right for me, because you will not disavow me and will give me liberty of action, without which I can do nothing for our friendship with America.45

Nabuco was serving notice that he intended to pursue his pro-American policy and hoped Rio-Branco would not order a change.

Ambassador Nabuco sailed for the United States, going to New York via London where he took the opportunity to visit his old friends at the Brazilian legation.46 Upon arrival in New York, there occurred an incident which gave ample opportunity for Nabuco’s enemies in Rio to poke fun at him and his American policy. The American immigration authorities, in enforcing a new law, reportedly subjected the ambassador to "humiliating" questions such as whether or not he was a polygamist or anarchist, if he had ever been in prison, if he had been in an insane asylum or poor house, and where he got the money to pay his passage.47 Evidently

45 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Rio, October 12, 1906, ABR-B, 18/1. Since presenting his credentials in Washington, Nabuco had deliberately exceeded his instructions in seeking approximation with the U.S. He later threatened to resign on several occasions if Rio-Branco would not support his position. Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, Washington, May 28, 1905, quoted in Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 354; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18, 1908, ABR-B, 74/1, rec. See also Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN; Nabuco to Pena, Washington, January 23, 1908, AJN; Pena to Nabuco, Petrópolis, February 10, 1908, AJN; and Nabuco to Gomes Feirerra, Washington, February 18, 1908, AJN.

46 Regis de Oliveira to Nabuco, London, November 1, 1906, AJN.

47 Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, November 23, 1906, DS, 3464/1; and Jornal do Brasil, November 18, 1908.
the incident was blown out of proportion because over a month later Root sent the following telegram in code:

Griscom, Rio de Janeiro. Your number 57, Nov. 23rd. Ambassador Nabuco positively denies that any such incident as you refer to ever occurred. Immediately upon reading the story in American newspapers I called upon him personally and was informed by him that the story was entirely false. Please have false statements corrected in Rio. Root. 48

Since Griscom's original report on November 23rd, Rio-Branco had made reference on several occasions, with obvious irritation, to the alleged incident in New York involving the Brazilian ambassador. 49 The American ambassador followed Root's instructions and soon smoothed over the "incident." The case was closed after Rio-Branco published in a newspaper a letter from Nabuco denying that a confrontation had taken place and satisfactorily explaining the incident. 50 Until Griscom called on him, Rio-Branco made no effort to correct the negative impression conveyed by the incident as it was reported in the press. He told Griscom that he had no more authoritative information on the incident than what he read in the press until he received Nabuco's letter of November 28th. 51 Rio-Branco's explanation was considered satisfactory and the matter was dropped, but

Griscom foresaw that adverse consequences would be felt for a long time. Rio-Branco was apparently beginning to retreat from the position of blind adulation of the United States which he had adopted at the Rio Conference. The Baron was also envious of Nabuco's popularity and he perceived the ambassador's growing independence of action as threatening to undermine his authority.

Upon his return to Washington Nabuco received a disquieting letter from José Pereira da Costa Mota, a diplomatic colleague now in Petersburg. This sixteen-page letter marked "confidential," severely attacked Rio-Branco, who had just exiled the author to Russia, to make a place for one of his favorites. Costa Mota quoted José Carlos Rodrigues as saying, truthfully, "Rio Branco is the world's greatest egotist and his friends are only for his own ends; and one deputy told me he is a vain drunkard, and another: he is conceited." He went on to tell Nabuco that the ambassador would be disillusioned when he recognized the situation, and advised him to avoid it as much as he could. Costa Mota said Rio-Branco wanted to be the only one:

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52 Ibid. Nabuco confirmed that Root came to his residence early the next morning to present the apologies of the American government for the reported incident. Nabuco said he told Root there was no discourtesy, and considered the matter settled. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, November 28, 1906, published in the Jornal do Commercio, December 30, 1906.

53 Quoted in Costa Mota to Nabuco, November, n.d., 1906, AJN. José C. Rodrigues was owner and editor of the Jornal do Commercio at this time. Ambassador Griscom described him as "one of the principal factors in moulding of public opinion in Brazil." Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2.
How he has thought of your triumphal march in America and your popularity; everything not of his own making causes him to be envious, and jealous. You will be bowled over to read this; it is the truth. . . . Rio-Branco is now a hard man, who has entrails of steel and a heart of bronze. 54

This attack on the foreign minister could perhaps be passed off as that of a bitter man striking back at his supposed tormentor, if Nabuco would not soon come to hold and privately express similar views. 55

Rio-Branco hoped to have Nabuco lead the Hague delegation, where Nabuco would be obliged to follow Rio-Branco's direct orders and would surely come into conflict with the Americans, thus decreasing his stature and standing in Washington and bringing him back under Rio-Branco's control. Meanwhile, regardless of his private opinions, Rio-Branco continued publicly to praise Nabuco. For example, on November 10th, he spoke to a delegation of Brazilian army officers, responding to their presentation to him of bound copies of speeches delivered by himself and Root at the Rio Conference. After congratulating outgoing president Rodrigues Alves for his American policy, he continued,

I only deserve the merit of having proposed the creation of an Embassy in Washington and the appointment to it of Joaquim Nabuco, who occupies it with such distinction and has known how to do so much there to make Brazil better known and esteemed. The sympathetic movement which has so greatly increased in the United States of America in favor of Brazil is due, without doubt to the rare qualities of our worthy Ambassador, to the perfec-

54 Costa Mota to Nabuco, November, n.d., 1906, AJN.

55 See Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, February 25, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN.
tion with which he knows how to translate the ideas of the Government of his country and the charm with which he inspires all those who come closely in contact with him. 56

Ambassador Griscom about this time took the opportunity, on the occasion of a diplomatic reception, to congratulate the outgoing Brazilian president for the "consistent friendly attitude" which he had maintained throughout the four years of his term of office towards Americans and American interests. 57 Griscom mentioned three incidents that had been of particular importance in furthering Brazilian-American friendship to this point: the Pan American Congress in Rio, the visit of Secretary Root to Brazil, and the elevation of the diplomatic missions to embassy status. 58

On November 15th, Afonso Pena assumed the presidency and the only cabinet member to retain his post was Foreign Minister Rio-Branco. There had been considerable doubt as to whether or not Pena would continue the trend of approximation with the United States advocated by his predecessor. The retention of Rio-Branco seemed to portend little change in Brazil's foreign policy, and the American ambassador was

56Rio-Branco, speech, quoted in Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, November, s.d., 1906, DS, 1113/4.
57Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, November 28, 1906, DS, 2372/3.
58Ibid. Rio-Branco and Nabuco had both been intimately involved with, and primarily responsible for, these three noted achievements of President Rodrigues Alves.
delighted with Pena's inaugural address. The United States was the only foreign nation mentioned in the message and the new Brazilian leader left no doubt that he intended that the closer relations between the two countries should continue.

At Griscom's insistence a telegram was sent from Root, which was delivered personally to Pena, expressing the thanks of the American government for the remarks in his inaugural address. Pena was very pleased with the message from Root and assured the ambassador that it would be the policy of his government to bring their two nations ever closer together. Griscom reported, "I received a most favorable impression from the conversation I had with the President. He appeared forceful and alert and his method of dealing with business was simple and direct." The ambassador concluded his dispatch by thus summarizing his appraisal of the Pena government:

You may feel confident that the personnel and the disposition of the new Government is in every way favorable to the ideas entertained by President Roosevelt and yourself, as propounded by you during your recent tour of South America, concerning the relations which should exist between the United States and the Republics of

59 Ibid.

60 Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, November 16, 1906, DS, 2372/1.

61 Root to Griscom, Washington, November 17, 1906, DS, 2372/2; and Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, November 28, 1906, DS, 2372/3.

62 Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, November 28, 1906, DS, 2372/3.
South America. 63

Thus the stage was set for continuing cooperation between the two countries.

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Nabuco was mentally and physically exhausted from his trip to Rio, as he told his long-time friend, Richard C. Shannon, who was concerned about Nabuco's health. Shannon recognized that Nabuco had been over-worked that year and gave him the following advice: "You will have to go to some good watering place next Summer and have a good long rest; taking Madam Nabuco with you, this time, and all the children." 64

Nabuco recognized the veracity and value of this advice, immediately writing to Rio-Branco that his health was not good and that he needed a year for a complete cure. He further said this cure could only be taken in Europe and that only after he were completely well could the question of whether or not he would continue in his post be resolved. 65

The request, coming at this particular time, may

63 Ibid.


65 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 12, 1906, AJN.
have been due at least in part to Rio-Branco's delay in correcting the impressions of the New York incident. The ambassador, however, apparently considered himself to be Rio-Branco's "dedicated old friend," as he admonished the Baron to care for his own health. He also was deeply sympathetic to his long-time colleague in his lonely position of foreign minister saying, "I very well understand the horror of that solitary prison of Itamarati." 

It is important to determine the state of Nabuco's health during this period, for he was later to cite ill health as a reason for declining nomination as a delegate to the Hague Peace Conference. The veracity of his claim of ill health would also be questioned by many at that time.

In reply to a letter from a Mr. Sours, Nabuco apologized for a tardy response, saying, "I have not been in very good health & that obstructed all my correspondence." However, the Brazilian ambassador continued to honor as many speaking engagements as possible. The day after he wrote Sours, Nabuco wrote Shannon:

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66 See pp. 33 and 34, above, for details of the incident.

67 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 12, 1906, AJN.

68 Hilário de Gouvêa to Nabuco, Petrópolis, March 24, 1907, AJN; and Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Petrópolis, April 1, 1907, AJN.

69 Nabuco to Sours, Washington, February 18, 1907, AJN.

70 Nabuco to Root, Washington, February 18, 1907, AJN.
It is a true sacrifice for me to leave tonight for Buffalo. I had to speak the other night at the University Club Dinner and to remain seating from 7 1/2 to 12 1/2 in a room vitiated by the smoke of 400 cigars. And my poor digestive power did not allow me to touch any of the dishes. As I had already a cold, with the effort I made to stand on trembling legs, like my Father, I came home very tired by one o'clock and had to keep in bed next day until dinner time, when we had a party of friends. My chest is painful and the Doctor, who has been here twice since, says I must be very careful.

This illness was due to the continued hard work and busy schedule of the ambassador and to the strain of preparation for and attendance at the Rio Conference, combined with the death of his father-in-law. On doctor's orders Nabuco took a month of relative rest, which caused his health to improve quite a bit, but he would be ill again the following year.

During Nabuco's stay in Rio, Rio-Branco evidently had asked him to represent Brazil at the Second Hague Peace Conference. In any event, Nabuco was convinced that he would lead the Brazilian delegation to the conference and had discussed it with Shannon. In an effort to prod Nabuco into officially accepting, Rio-Branco evidently prompted a report in a Brazilian paper in Paris, which then appeared

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71 Nabuco to Shannon, Washington, February 19, 1907, AJN. Leão Zagury, of the Brazilian ministry in London, accompanied Nabuco from Rio to London in November, 1906. He now wrote to Nabuco, "I hope that these last months have given you opportunity for complete rest after your long trip and great labors during the last year." Zagury to Nabuco, March 15, 1907, AJN.

72 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN.

73 Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 21, 1906, AJN.
in the Rio press. The following announcement appeared in the December 27, 1906 issue of the Courier du Brésil: "Our envoy to The Hague will be the diplomat who has represented us in Washington for over a year with great prestige, Mr. Joaquim Nabuco." In January the Correio da Manhã quoted that announcement with approval, saying, "It appears that the choice of our government could not have been better." However, just two days later the same paper proposed Rui Barbosa as Brazil's representative to the conference.

Rui's candidacy soon caught the public imagination, and as other papers got on the bandwagon, Rio-Branco realized Rui's popular support. The Baron had not yet made public his selection of Nabuco, so instead he recommended to President Pena that Rui receive the nomination. Until about the end of February 1907, Nabuco was commonly accepted as the Brazilian representative and several persons had approached him for a position in the delegation.

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75 Correio da Manhã, January 14, 1907, p. 1.

76 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Gramier, (Cabo Frio), January 16, 1907, AJN.


78 Oscar Lopes to Nabuco, Rio, January 23, 1907, AJN; and José Verissimo to Nabuco, Rio, February 26, 1907, AJN. However, as early as March 1st, Rui began to receive similar
invited Rui to go to the Second Hague Conference without withdrawing the invitation to Nabuco. A delicate situation ensued, which took some time to resolve.\textsuperscript{79}

Thus, before Nabuco officially agreed to head the Hague delegation, Rio-Branco conceived the idea of sending Rui instead, or both Rui and Nabuco. He perceived Nabuco's reluctance to jeopardize his position in Washington by going to The Hague. Rio-Branco had the idea of advancing Rui's name in the press in order to gauge public reaction and at the same time to prod Nabuco toward acceptance. Rui's candidacy got a surprisingly good reception and Rio-Branco then used a different tactic to undermine Nabuco's position. He offered Rui the position and insisted that both Nabuco and Rui go. Rio-Branco believed that the presence of both would be a big boost for the status of Brazil and would somewhat modify Nabuco's independent pro-American bent. Rio-Branco was convinced that a Hague delegation led by Nabuco, Rui, or both Rui and Nabuco would accomplish his three-fold purpose of increasing Brazil's international status, modifying Brazil's extremely pro-American foreign policy, and decreasing Nabuco's personal influence in Washington. Rio-Branco

\textsuperscript{79}J.G. de Sousa Bandeiral, Rio, March 1, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta XVII; and Magalhães Castro to Augusto Freital, telegram, Bahia, March 2, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta XVII, which reads, "Please obtain Ruy's nomination of my son Leopoldo as his secretary."

\textsuperscript{79}Hilário de Gouvêa to Nabuco, Rio, March 6, 1907, AJN; and Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, March 7, 1907. See also Lins, \textit{Rio-Branco}, p. 373; and Lacombe, \textit{Rio-Branco e Rui}, pp. 71-72.
finally convinced Rui to accept the nomination, but failed to get Nabuco to accompany him, even after the foreign minister persuaded the president to exert pressure on Nabuco.

As the relationship between Nabuco and Rio-Branco became more strained, Nabuco felt isolated from the political situation in Rio. He maintained official correspondence with the foreign minister, but he relied on personal correspondence with two friends to feel the Brazilian political pulse. The two friends, with whom he maintained frank, regular correspondence, were Hilário de Gouvêia and Graça Aranha.

Hilário de Gouvêia, a physician, was Nabuco's brother-in-law and faithful confidant. He was evidently one of the better Brazilian medical doctors, as he had been one of the six specialists called to treat the fatal illness of Viscount Rio-Branco, father of Baron Rio-Branco, who died in 1880. Hilário, a boyhood friend of the Baron, was his personal physician and had also treated the terminal illness of the Baron's wife in Paris in 1898.  

Graça Aranha is best known for his novel, Canaan, which was published in 1902. He was a functionary in the diplomatic service and was serving in Rio at the time. Graça and Nabuco had been together in diplomatic service and Nabuco regarded him as his favorite disciple.  

\[80\text{C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 343; and Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 104, 221, 238-39.}\]

\[81\text{Ronald Hilton, trans. and ed., in preface to C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. xxiv.}\]
with Nabuco on the British Guiana boundary commission in Rome; after Nabuco took over the Brazilian ministry in London, Mrs. Nabuco remained in Paris for a few days and he and Graça had dinner together every day.\(^{82}\) When Rio-Branco offered Nabuco the post of ambassador in Washington, he advised him to talk it over with Graça Aranha.\(^{83}\) In 1906 Graça and Domício da Gama (who was later to succeed Nabuco as ambassador in Washington) organized the demonstrations welcoming Nabuco to Rio for the Third Pan American Conference, and Griscom reported to Root,

> The same men Graça and Domício have arranged that a motion will be made in both chambers of Congress to welcome you to Brazil, and here again the matter has been carefully organized and the eloquence prepared and selected in advance. I mention this to show you that these young men have power and are making active use of it.\(^{84}\)

This influential confidant was an important contact for Nabuco because his distance from the Brazilian political center in Rio made it difficult for him to learn of political maneuverings there. Nabuco felt it imperative to have this intelligence so as to protect his own interests and position in that political arena. Graça proved his value to the ambassador when he wrote a sixteen-page letter to Nabuco on Christmas Day, 1906, saying that Rio-Branco had been very

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\(^{82}\) Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, Rome, April 24, 1904; and Nabuco to Evalina, London, August 1, 1900, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 280.

\(^{83}\) C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 305.

\(^{84}\) Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2.
deceptive and citing several examples. He also told Nabuco that Afonso Pena was being misled by his foreign minister. Toward the end of February Rio-Branco notified Nabuco by telegram that José Rodrigues Alves, Brazilian consul in Washington was to be transferred to The Hague, "Where you will encounter him." Nominated to be the new consul was Gurgel de Amaral. Nabuco was furious over the change in embassy personnel, and wrote to Graça,

I don't know who has been nominated here in place of Rodrigues Alves, that is, I know, but am not acquainted with him. I am completely disgusted with Rio-Branco. He no longer has any friendship for me; he is one of those men whose intimacy (whose intimate sentiment) can be suspended or cut off at will. He ceased being my friend automatically upon being made Minister. The least little thing causes our friendship to become as icy as the north pole.

The same day a concerned Nabuco cabled Rio-Branco,

"Request you cable me as quickly as possible the composition of the Hague delegation. Authorize me to take Velloso. Nabuco." Two days later came the partially encoded reply: "You, Eduardo Lisboa, Ruy invited I believe will

85 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, December 25, 1906, AJN.

86 Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, February 22, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp. This was less than a week before Rio-Branco was to invite Rui to serve as Hague delegate.

87 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, February 25, 1907, AJN.

accept." This was a bombshell, to which Nabuco replied,

Thanks very much. A great pleasure to represent Brazil with Ruy. I will agree should we have the opportunity to improve ourselves in Europe. First name on the list having precedence and ambassador not able to be second, don't hesitate to scratch me if needed to help Ruy decide. Argentina is working for the vice-presidency of a commission. I will need to take Velloso as Secretary. You will not refuse me this aide of many years. Nabuco.\textsuperscript{90}

Rio-Branco was stung by Nabuco's reply and immediately cabled the following:

Request you decipher personally. I consider your telegram on the case of Rui and the question of precedence to be unofficial and as sent friend to friend. Also this reply is from your old friend Rio-Branco. You two have been friends since law school and ought to well understand the division of labor. You will complement each other. Chile has here various delegates of different parties and everything goes well. You are indispensable at The Hague, being acquainted with all the antecedents. Presence of Rui also considered necessary in the opinion of the Government. Superior men such as yourselves must put aside questions of precedence when the glory of our country is involved. At The Hague there will not be ambassadors, all are delegates.\textsuperscript{91}

Rio-Branco then cited several examples relating to precedence. In one example, he said that the previous month at a banquet where Rui was also in attendance, he was given the place of honor. However, if the order of precedence had been followed, Rui (as vice-president of the Senate and third in line of succession for the presidency) would have

\textsuperscript{89}Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, February 27, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.

\textsuperscript{90}Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied.

\textsuperscript{91}Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, March 2, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
had the place of honor. The Baron closed with this appeal:

Having explained the situation, I expect the two of you to be together at The Hague, as it is advantageous. You well know that I am interested in maintaining the dignity of the office of ambassador, since I only obtained creation of it through great effort, overcoming much resistance. Rio Branco.92

Nabuco's response was not long in coming,

I am not disputing precedence. Between Rui and me there is no doubt. Even ignoring the fact that, at The Hague, he remains the Vice-President of the Senate, I always understood that Rui has to be the leader which all delegations have.93

Nabuco argued that Rio-Branco's cited examples were not analogous, then put forth his reasons for not accepting:

(1) Ambassadors must not attend as second delegate. He said that not one nation sent an ambassador to the First Hague Peace Conference, except as first delegate. Some did send a minister in second place, but this lowers the prestige of the office. "We have only one ambassador. We can not make an exception." (2) Having been president of the Third Pan American Conference, serving as second delegate to the Hague Conference would diminish the prestige of the former. (3) Going to The Hague could cause him to lose Washington if Brazil's attitude there were to displease Roosevelt. (4) He needed six months rest and his poor health required treatment in Europe. (5) He could help Rui by collecting and sending information to him from Washington.94

92 Ibid.
93 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 5, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B tel. rec., mostly encoded, translation supplied.
94 Ibid.
Nabuco's contacts in Rio were hard pressed to keep him abreast of the developments in Brazil. Hilário wrote that he was pleased with Nabuco's resolve not to accept the secondary post at the Hague Conference. After Rui was invited, Hilário strongly protested to Rio-Branco, telling him that it appeared he was being pressured into inviting Rui, since the invitation was proffered just after the appearance of an article in the Correio da Manhã attacking Nabuco and praising Rui as the only Brazilian of the caliber to represent Brazil at The Hague. Dr. Gouvêia also rebutted Rio-Branco's examples dealing with precedence, with a few examples of his own. Rio-Branco had asked the physician to appeal to Nabuco's patriotism to accept the position. Gouvêia closed by saying, "Rio-Branco told me today that he sent my telegrams and yours to Pena, and that Pena promised him to cable you asking you to reconsider. I doubt that he will do it." 95

Graça Aranha observed that Rui's nomination was generally well received. He attributed this reception to the fact that Rui was recognized to be an excellent delegate to a conference such as this, where the principal discussion would revolve around juridical questions. He also ventured the opinion that the salary was very low for Rui, who had the habit of spending much more. Graça reported that Rui had not yet accepted, in spite of many appeals by his

95 Hilário de Gouvêia to Nabuco, Rio, March 6, 1907, AJN.
friends, and he still might refuse to go.  

Rui was a friend of Nabuco and was happy to see Nabuco's status increase. He could not directly increase Nabuco's status, but hesitated to accept the offer to lead the delegation for fear of offending Nabuco and lowering the status of his friend. Rui distrusted Rio-Branco and detested the idea of being in the position of carrying out someone else's orders. He coveted the honor of the position and hoped that it would overcome the negative political influences remaining from the encilhamento nearly twenty years earlier and would give a boost to his political career.

Once the president had agreed to invite Rui to attend the Hague Conference, Rio-Branco had set about to obtain his consent:

Once the idea was embraced by the president and by Rio-Branco, his minister, the latter came in person to my house in the Largo Dom Afonso, Petrópolis, to invite me, in the name of the Chief of State, to this high post.  

Rui said that Rio-Branco came back to his house more than once to get him to agree. The foreign minister also sent many others to beg him to accept the nomination.

At the time of Rui's nomination, and since, it has been commonly accepted that Rio-Branco invited Rui because

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96 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Petrópolis, March 7, 1907, AJN. Rui said his friends, without exception, urged him to accept. Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 31, 1907, ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.

97 Rui, speech, quoted in Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, pp. 71-72.

98 Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, p. 72.
of the pressure of public opinion, as expressed in Rio newspapers of the period. However, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Rio-Branco authored the original newspaper article. It is even more probable that he wrote, or caused to be written, subsequent articles in the campaign. The Baron wrote extensive propaganda for the press, most of which was published in the Jornal do Commercio, whose proprietor and editor was Jose Carlos Rodrigues. Rodrigues, "one of the pillars of Rio-Branco," was


100 Rio-Branco's experience as a journalist dated from as early as March of 1873 when he became one of the principal editors of A Nação. During his many years in European diplomatic posts, he wrote the historical section for the Jornal do Brasil. Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 62; Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 29, 34; "O Barão do Rio Branco e o Jornal do Commercio," Jornal do Commercio, April 21, 1957, p. 2; and Elmano Cardim, "A Imprensa na Vida e na Obra de Rio Branco," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro, CLXXXVIII (July-September, 1945), 123-37.

101 Graça Aranha stated that, "the nomination of Ruy was the idea and the initiative of Rio Branco. . . ." Graça to Nabuco, Petrópolis, April 1, 1907, AJN. Rio-Branco, in a speech to some students, later said, "I confess, however, that the indication of Rui for such an important mission was not accomplished solely by me, but also by many of our authorized organs of public opinion." Quoted in "Ruy Barbosa," A Imprensa, December 30, 1907, p. 1. Accioly states that during the conference Rio-Branco spent much time in the editorial offices of the Jornal do Commercio where he often "inspired or furnished notes or articles." Accioly, "O Barão do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferência," pp. 95-96.

102 Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 380, 383. In relation to this point Griscom says, "In fact Baron do Rio Branco is in the habit of himself writing announcements and denials which, although published anonymously in certain of
initially displeased by Rui's nomination. However, in spite of the fact that Rodrigues was opposed to Rui, the Jornal later published most of the notices about the Hague Conference.103

There has been debate as to the actual date on which the invitation was first extended to Rui. In his letter of acceptance, Rui remembered the date as February 26th.104 However, others set the date as February 25th.105 It is certain that it was prior to February 27th, because on that date Rio-Branco officially informed Nabuco of the fact.106

The invitation to Rui complicated the selection of the Brazilian delegation to the Hague Conference. Rui and Nabuco were both reluctant to rupture their recently renewed friendship.107 While Nabuco deferred to Rui, Rui wavered,
in spite of strong governmental pressure to accept. There were many rumors about whether or not Rui would accept the nomination. On one occasion Rui sent the following note to the *Jornal do Brasil*: "My declaration was not that I would accept, but rather that I had not yet decided." On March 13th, the following notice appeared in the *Jornal do Commercio*:

We hear it said that Senator Ruy Barbosa declined the invitation made to him by Baron Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Relations, to be a part of the commission which shall represent our country at the Conference at The Hague.

Rui quickly notified the newspaper that the notice was in error. He also cabled to Rio-Branco that the paper had no authorization from him to make such a statement. On the contrary, he was inclined to accept, but first had to resolve some difficult personal problems. Rio-Branco responded in the following terms, "I quickly perceived that the notice had not been authorized by you. I am convinced that the difficulties to which you refer are not invincible."

Just when it seemed as if Rui were about to accept,

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110 Rui to Rio-Branco, telegram, Petrópolis, 10:00 A.M., March 13, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta IV-A.

111 Rio-Branco to Rui, telegram, Petrópolis, 11:50 A.M., March 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; draft of same, AHI, 273/2/1.
an article appeared in the March 22nd issue of the Jornal do Comércio, which cast doubt on Rui's loyalty to the government. The article, by J.J. Seabra, almost caused Rui to decline the invitation at that time.112

Because of the accusations in Seabra's article, Rui felt compelled to decline the offer of the Hague appointment and wrote to Rio-Branco saying,

Today, in the same paper, I responded to this despicable plot of Seabra. As for myself, I consider the case closed. My conscience is clear. Not everyone, however, knows me well enough to give me a fair hearing. . . . In view of this deplorable situation, I request that you ask the President to allow me to decline the high post of Hague delegate, and to accept my gratitude for this distinction with which he so spontaneously honored me.113

Rio-Branco replied that the incident would not alter his admiration, affection, and respect for Rui. He appealed to Rui's patriotism and vanity, saying,

112 Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 23, 1907, ABR-B, 18/3/34; draft of same in CRB, Pasta Rio Branco. See also Hilário de Gouvêa to Nabuco, Petrópolis, March 24, 1907, AJN. Seabra, a native of the same state as Rui, had served as a federal deputy and was a good friend of Rui's. Seabra was Minister of Justice under Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906) and served in the cabinet with Rio-Branco (Foreign Minister) during that period. In 1903 Rui served with Rio-Branco on the boundary commission for Acre. Rui resigned from that commission over a difference of opinion with the foreign minister. The resignation of Rui did not affect his friendship with Rio-Branco, and they remained on friendly terms. Seabra, whose motive was unclear, in the March 1907 newspaper article attempted to cause a break between Rui and the government by attributing to Rui clandestine and disloyal motives against Rio-Branco and Rodrigues Alves in the 1903 incident. See Lins, Rio-Branco, pp. 289-92; Viana, Vida de Rio-Branco, pp. 342-43; Jornal do Comércio, March 22, 1907; and Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 23, 1907, ABR-B, 18/8/34.

113 Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 23, 1907, ABR-B, 18/8/34.
Now we are discussing a service which the President asks of you in the interest of greater glory for our country in a great international conference. I respect your opinion very much, but I think that an incident of this nature must not cause you to refuse the service which the nation expects of your patriotism and exceptional competence. You can be certain of the confidence of the President and myself in the complete and brilliant outcome of your mission.114

In the meantime Nabuco had written to Graça Aranha giving a complete explanation of why he was unable to accompany Rui on the Hague Conference delegation.115 Graça felt it was preferable to wait until after Rui accepted to show him Nabuco's letters. Graça had talked with Rui, but did not intend to divulge Nabuco's reasons until after Rui's acceptance because he did not want to impede Rui's decision.116

Privately, Nabuco had expressed the dilemma in which he found himself:

Rio Branco wants to send me to The Hague with Ruy, and as much as I wish to give to Ruy this proof of friendship and confidence, as much as I will lose by not being with him in Europe, and to renew our relationship interrupted for so many years by Revolutions, in a word I

114 Rio-Branco to Rui, Petrópolis, March 24, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; draft of same in AHI, 273/2/1, 35. Afonso Pena cabled Rio-Branco, "Completely in accord with your thinking about the delegate to the Hague Conference." Pena to Rio-Branco, telegram, Rio, March 25, 1907, ABR-B, 1/2/81. To Rui, Pena wrote, "My dear Ruy Barbosa, I wish you and all of your family very good health. Once more I stated to you that I will not cease demanding your services and advice. I already claimed your services at The Hague, and now I claim your legal opinion on the following question." Pena to Rui, Rio, March 27, CRB, Pasta Afonso Pena.

115 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN.

116 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Petrópolis, April 1, 1907, AJN.
covet a chance for intimacy with him under conditions in which intimacy can become more intimate, you well know as my bosom friend: I can not go to The Hague as second delegate and he can only go as the first.\textsuperscript{117}

Nabuco then expounded on the reasons he gave Rio-Branco for not attending the conference.\textsuperscript{118} He was also disturbed by the fact that all of the Latin American ministers, his colleagues in Washington, were going to The Hague as first delegates. He professed to be more satisfied than anyone else with Rui's selection and would be honored to serve under him. However, with his deafness and poor health, he would not be the second that Rui would need.\textsuperscript{119}

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Rio-Branco and Nabuco had been good friends at least as early as 1871, when both were in their twenties.\textsuperscript{120} However, the old, intimate friendship began to break down in 1902 shortly after Rio-Branco accepted the post of foreign minister. Rio-Branco was Brazilian minister in Berlin at the time of the invitation to join the cabinet of Rodrigues Alves. He had, however, already accepted the post of Bra-

\textsuperscript{117}Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN. Nabuco said he sent this letter, "very confidentially," to be used for his defense in Rio, and most of all for Rui. He said that his only regret was that Rui did not understand his motives and that Rio-Branco would use this to drive a wedge between them.

\textsuperscript{118}See Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 5, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B tel. rec., summarized above on page 48.

\textsuperscript{119}Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN.

\textsuperscript{120}Viana, \textit{Vida de Rio Branco}, p. 50.
zilian minister in Rome. On the way to Rio to assume the post of foreign minister, he met with Nabuco in London. He asked Nabuco to accept the legation in Rome, but Nabuco refused. Apparently Rio-Branco had the idea that Nabuco would hold the post for a couple of years, then they would exchange positions.\textsuperscript{121} The post of minister in London was the highest step in the Brazilian diplomatic corps at that time and Nabuco did not wish to relinquish it, even though he was spending much time in Rome on the British Guiana boundary arbitration.\textsuperscript{122}

Nabuco's refusal to accept Rio-Branco's offer provoked a heated discussion. Nabuco could not understand Rio-Branco's insistence. To him, the idea was preposterous, but apparently Rio-Branco was enchanted with the prospect of being minister in Rome. Rio-Branco had tried his best to avoid accepting the position of foreign minister, and was already perturbed because he had not been able to persuade Nabuco to accept in his stead.\textsuperscript{123}


\textsuperscript{122} C. Nabuco, \textit{Life of Nabuco}, p. 255.

Nabuco now felt that he was being persecuted by Rio-Branco in the matter of the formation of the Brazilian delegation to the Second Hague Peace Conference. He wrote to Graça,

What did I ever do to this man? I had the misfortune to be nominated Minister in London by Dr. Campos Salles without the position being offered to him. While Foreign Minister, his first idea was to take me from my Legation, offering me the one in Rome. Solely to remove me from London, he created this Embassy. Now he does not even want me to occupy it tranquilly. He is trying to place me in a false position from which I can perhaps escape only by relinquishing this post.124

The relationship between the foreign minister and his ambassador in Washington was at a low ebb. Rio-Branco told Hilário that Nabuco was doing him an injustice, always attributing to him "egotistical visions."125 Nabuco felt that a month of relative rest had done him a lot of good and the requested leave should allow him to recover his health. "However," he said, "my major rest shall be to feel that I am free from the official relations with Rio-Branco."126 Nabuco had reached the point where he felt that a break with Rio-Branco was inevitable.127

Nabuco, concerned about his image being tarnished by the political intrigues of Rio, bared his soul in a letter

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124 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN.
125 Hilário de Gouvêia to Nabuco, Petrópolis, March 24, 1907, AJN.
126 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN.
127 Ibid.
to Graça Aranha, asking him to show parts of it to their mutual friends. Hilário de Gouvêia, from whom he kept no secrets, would be permitted to read it all. He begged Graça, "Do not allow Dr. Afonso Pena to turn against me because of the intrigues which Oliveira Lima, Correio da Manhã, and others may make with my refusal to go to The Hague in second place." 128

Graça responded that he had talked with Rio-Branco, and that José Carlos Rodrigues, in the Jornal do Commercio, defended Nabuco because Rio-Branco had not mentioned that he refused to serve because of ill health. Rodrigues, at Graça's request, was going to explain everything to Pena. Rio-Branco persuaded the president to draft a cable to Nabuco insisting that Nabuco accept the position and questioning the basic motives of his excuse. Graça also said he thought Nabuco must write to Pena. 129

Nabuco had already drafted a letter to President Pena further explaining his position:

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128 Ibid.

129 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Petrópolis, April 1, 1907, AJN. Graça said he did not see the terms of the telegram, which was not sent. The following unsigned note appears on the president's letterhead; at the top is written, in Rio-Branco's hand, "Sent, 2 April." The note, in an unidentified hand, reads, "(Copy.) Draft of a telegram to be transmitted to Dr. Joaquim Nabuco: 'Reasons for refusal to accept Hague Delegation do not appear to be of consequence. I expect you to go with Rui and render new, brilliant Service to the Country in the Conference of Worldwide importance. Regards.'" ABR-B, 4/1/74 expedidas. Apparently the cable was not sent in that form, but was incorporated into Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Rio, April 1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
The political question has now arisen which has a greater scope. It does not appear advantageous for me to go to The Hague, being Ambassador here. The instructions of our government could oblige me to displease this government. You know I oppose the Drago Doctrine. . . . Knowing their interest in this question, as Ambassador in Washington, I could not weaken the North American position at The Hague without sustaining resentment here, where I would be labeled as dishonest. Baron Rio-Branco also must have communicated to you the question of leave.130

Before this letter was sent, Nabuco received a cable from Pena, to which he replied,

Thank you for your telegram. The motives which I gave were inspired by the reasons which determined the creation of this post. The state of my health does not allow me, at this moment, to undertake new labors, for this reason I am obliged to request that you relieve me of the Hague mission. Respectful salutations. Nabuco.131

Nabuco had tired of Rio-Branco's maneuvering and his own poor health gave him a pretext to request a leave of absence from his post in order to avoid being directly associated with the inevitable Brazilian-American clash at The Hague. Rio-Branco finally agreed to grant the leave to the ambassador, but only agreed to supply extra funds on the condition that Nabuco undertake a secret mission to aid Rui while in Europe.132

130 Nabuco to Afonso Pena, Washington, n.d., AJN. Handwritten note at the top in Nabuco's hand, "Not sent." No addressee appears, but internal evidence shows it was meant for Pena. See also Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, AJN, in which Nabuco says he can not agree to go to The Hague because in Rio he would be suspected of being "too American," and in Washington he would be considered disagreeable.

131 Nabuco to Pena, telegram, Washington, April 2, 1907, AJN.

132 See below, pages 70-72.
Rui, meanwhile, continued to vacillate between acceptance and refusal until the last possible moment. He drafted a letter of acceptance on March 28th, made a smooth copy, but failed to send it until later, at which time he changed the date to March 31st. In this letter Rui gave his motives for accepting and his reasons for delaying his response:

Dearest Friend Baron Rio-Branco

The terms of your important letter of the 24th, which rebutted the basis of mine of the day before, and the more than a month which has elapsed in waiting for a final solution will not permit me to continue to delay the response to the invitation to represent Brazil at the Hague Conference. I was honored when, on February 26, you personally came to invite me in the name of the President of the Republic.

I hesitated a long time, and continued to resist: for fear that I completely lacked the competence for this mission, of such a special and extraordinarily elevated nature; because I believed that other Brazilians could be found who much more merit the selection; finally, because I understood that the appointment would be best confided entirely to the talents and singular gifts of Joaquim Nabuco.

I felt restrained from quickly refusing, which was what my feeling of insufficiency and the fear of my weakness dictated that I should do, since in your visit you insistently invoked my patriotism. You reminded me that I had already refused the invitation for the Pan American Conference, and expressed the hope that, "this time," I would not again refuse my services.

Inclined to accept the invitation because of the desire to be useful to the country, but impressed with the solemnity of the situation, and restrained by difficulties of a personal character, I appealed for time, waiting for prudence, or circumstances to bring the confidence to accept, or the energy to resist.

To my sorrow, in appealing for the opinion of all who had helped and counseled me, I did not encounter a

133 Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 31, 1907, ABR-B, 18/8 recebidas; date obviously changed from 28 to 31; written across the top in Rio-Branco's hand, "From Senator Ruy Barbosa, Received 1 April 1907." See also Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 28, 1907, CRB, Pasta Haia IVA; draft of above, text unaltered.
single voice which would approve of my refusal. I probed, as much as I could, the judgement of our countrymen as to what I should do, and found out that even my adversaries felt that I was obliged to accept. When my vacillations were communicated to the President of the Republic by a mutual friend, I found that he would reject my reasons for refusal as inadmissible.

Not finding anyone to defend me, and fearing that a negative reply would be attributed to hatred of our beloved country, and always doubtful of my abilities, with great trepidation I accede to this irresistible pressure.

Please do me the favor of transmitting my assent to the President of the Republic. It is understood, of course, that after the nomination the Senate must give its permission, under terms of the Constitution, article 23, paragraph 2.

Invested with this honor for which I am far from qualified, I ask God to help me so that my efforts will be sustained wherever my resources are limited, aiding me to do the job, under your instructions, at least without dishonor to the country and without disappointment to the government, to whose esteem I owe this honor.

Always with sincere and personal affection of Your Excellency, friend, admirer, and most obliging servant,

Rui Barbosa

The night Rui drafted this letter he had received a letter from President Pena, reaffirming his support of Rui and urging his acceptance of the invitation. The next day, Good Friday, was a soul-searching ordeal for Rui. On Saturday he wrote Pena he had not yet decided to accept the mission, saying in part,

Night before last I received your letter of the 27th, to which I did not respond yesterday because it was Good Friday. However, with satisfaction, I am writing today at dawn. . . . In reference to the Hague mission, I have not yet decided. Truthfully, I did not accept immedi-

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134 Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 31, 1907, ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.

135 Pena to Rui, March 27, 1907, copy not found; referred to in Rui to Pena, Petrópolis, March 30, 1907, Arquivo Particular de Afonso Pena; hereinafter cited as AAP.
ately because of the fear I have of finding the job to be greater than my capacity. You can not imagine how much this vacillation has troubled me.\textsuperscript{136}

At this point, Rui had not yet sent the March 28th letter of acceptance to Rio-Branco. Between the writing and the sending of that letter, Rui drafted another letter to Rio-Branco, \textit{declining} the appointment in the following terms:

Having caused you to wait so long for my reply to the invitation with which the President of the Republic honored me in such a spontaneous and unexpected manner; it is with the most sincere and profound regret that I am, finally, obliged to decline this distinction.

If I delayed too long, it was because I was torn between the ardent desire to serve the country and a restraining, tenacious fear that I would not be able to perform with dignity because of my lack of the necessary aptitude.

As God knows, this fear, the dread of conscience, finally won, but only with the sadness of my soul. I know that this negative reply will be displeasing to you and to the President of the Republic. But I believe that ultimately you will do me justice, not condemning me for these scruples of a man whose own abilities and the abilities of others have caused to have less and less confidence in himself.

Meanwhile, in the short time remaining of my life, I shall remain at the disposition of you and the President of the Republic, whose government I support with the greatest confidence in the patriotism of both of you.

Despite the disclosure of this refusal, which I once again must present, I expect that you shall continue to consider me your servant, admirer and true friend.\textsuperscript{137}

\textit{Rui Barbosa}

The next day, Sunday, Rui altered the date on his letter of

\textsuperscript{136}Rui to Pena, Petrópolis, March 30, 1907, AAP.

The remainder of the seven-page letter deals with a legal opinion with respect to a law judged unconstitutional by the Supremo Tribunal Federal.

\textsuperscript{137}Rui to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, March 30, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco. This letter, filed separately from the above letter, has "not sent" scrawled across the top in Rui's hand.
March 28th and sent it to Rio-Branco. The foreign minister immediately informed the president, who was writing a letter to Rui at that moment. Pena closed the letter: "I just found out by letter from Rio-Branco, that you accepted the Mission to The Hague. I am content. This confirms the telegram which I sent you immediately. Accept an abraço from your colleague and old friend. Afonso Pena."  

Rui's acceptance caused a flurry of activity in Rio and Petrópolis. When Nabuco's friends learned of it, they agreed that Hilário should go apprise Rui of the situation. He went to the Rio station at 7 A.M. the next morning and waited for Rui to arrive from Petrópolis. At the station he completely explained Nabuco's position to him. The friends felt it was necessary to see Rui early, before he had a chance to see the newspapers, because they feared the papers would make it appear that Nabuco resented Rui for accepting the post.

Rio-Branco rushed off a coded telegram to Nabuco in Washington:

Personal. Rui accepted. The President thinks your reasons are without foundation and that you will not deny your services at The Hague. There is already a ministry of eagles, and we shall have there a delegation of eagles if you wish. Since the principal work will be on the commissions, division of labor and reciprocal good

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138 Pena to Rui, Rio, April 1, 1907, CRB, Pasta Afonso Pena. In the first part of the letter Pena thanks Rui for his "magnificent opinion," on the legal question submitted to him earlier.

139 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Petrópolis, April 1, 1907, AJN; Hilário de Gouvêia to Nabuco, Rio, April 2, 1907, AJN; and Hilário de Gouvêia to Nabuco, Petrópolis, April 4, 1907, AJN.
will would prevent misunderstandings. The delegation
will not have a chief . . . but in the arrangement of
names we must observe the rules of precedence which are
established by internal politics.  

Rio Branco then cited examples in which he said no prestige
was lost by delegates assuming a secondary position at a
conference or meeting. However, none of his examples was
totally analogous to Nabuco's situation. He continued,

But I do not wish to discuss nor contradict you on that
which I desire, namely to make a last attempt to per­
suade you not to miss the opportunity to also serve
brilliantly for our Country at The Hague on this occa­
sion which will not happen again in our lifetime. How­
ever, be sure that no one shall respect your resolution
in opposition more than I if you assure me that it is
definite; and for the public I shall only give as a rea­
son that which constitutes the last part of your tele­
gram, that is, some months of rest and treatment are
necessary after eight years of incessant work. We wish
to make the nominations on the 5th. Rio-Branco.

After learning of Rui's acceptance, Nabuco first
cabled Rui, "Health obliges me to decline, but I shall be at
your side in spirit, proud to see Brazil thus represented
among nations. Many, many congratulations. Nabuco."  
The next day he sent this reply to Rio-Branco:

Since you and the President do not judge my reasons ac­
ceptable, there was nothing left for me to do but recon­

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140 Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Rio, April 1, 
1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Rio-Branco's hand and signa­
ture, partially marked for encoding.

141 Ibid. The nomination apparently did not wait,
however, because two "registered" / i.e., notarized / copies
of the decree nominating Rui exist with the date of April 1, 
1907. CRB, Haia Pasta Decretos; on back of the copies ap­
ppears this inscription, "Registered on page 4 of Book 1 of
Leis, Decretos, e Portarias, April 1, 1907."

142 Nabuco to Rui, telegram, Washington, April 2, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; draft copy (typescript) in AJN.
sider whether or not I could now undertake new labors of such great responsibility. Unfortunately, the state of my health obliges me to ask to decline it in the terms of the telegram. Nabuco.143

Nabuco was both disappointed, and relieved at the turn of events. He was disappointed that he would not be leading the Brazilian delegates to The Hague. However, he was also relieved that his frail health would not again be put in jeopardy by attendance at the conference, and that he would not be in the untenable position of defending Brazil against the United States.

Finally the weeks and months of turmoil, controversy, and indecision ended. Brazil was at a disadvantage for having waited so long to designate her representative to the Hague Peace Conference. Rui had barely six weeks between his appointment and his departure in which to assemble the Brazilian delegation and make other preparations for the conference. To make up for lost time, there would have to be much cooperation among Pena, Rio-Branco, Nabuco, and Rui. However, such close cooperation appeared unlikely, because of the divisive circumstances surrounding the selection of the conference delegate.144

143 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, telegram, Washington, April 3, 1907, AJN.

144 As late as May 1, Nabuco still felt it necessary to defend his position to the president: "I never disputed precedence with Ruy. I well knew that I rank after him. If in my first telegram I admitted the possibility of our going on the same plane, placing my name (as Ambassador), in first place, it was because Rio Branco thus casually placed it there as well in his telegram. Also I overlooked the fact that, even absent from the country on a Mission, Ruy would maintain his position of Vice-President of the Senate. . . .
Chapter III will examine Brazilian diplomatic maneuvering and intrigue in her successful attempt to gain prestige at the Hague Peace Conference at the expense of the other Latin American nations.

I took my stance purely to preserve the dignity of Ambassador, based on the unanimous precedence of other nations . . . . Here is my explanation, my dear Friend, Mr. President. You and Rio Branco are not able to feel the official and diplomatic atmosphere of Washington as I am. . . . "Nabuco to Afonso Pena, Washington, May 1, 1907, AJN.
CHAPTER III
THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL STATUS AT THE CONFERENCE

In this her first world-wide conference, it was important for Brazil to persuade the other delegations at the Second Hague Peace Conference of the culture and intelligence of her delegates, and thus make a favorable impression. Rui, with his broad knowledge, command of the French language, and brilliant oratory, was a definite asset in the Brazilian effort. However, the attempt to project an image on the international stage challenged the status quo. The great powers became irritated at the impertinence of Brazil in taking frequent part in discussions of matters which they considered to be their sole province.\(^1\) Nabuco said, however,

\[\ldots\] if, Ruy had not done this he would not have thus revealed the intellectual culture of Brazil. Look, in a conference such as this, it is essential for us to give the impression of great culture. As I said to Azeredo Castro, political errors can always be forgiven, attitudes corrected, but mediocrity is inexcusable.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Nabuco to Azeredo Castro, Frankfort, Germany, August, n.d., 1907, AJN; and letter fragment in Nabuco's hand and signature, evidently written from Germany to someone in Rio about August, 1907 (contains reference to the above letter), AJN.

\(^2\) Nabuco letter fragment \(\underline{\text{Germany, August, 1907}}\), AJN.
A Hamburg newspaper, after criticizing Rui for speaking too often and too long, conceded that he had become one of the notable figures of the conference.\(^3\) Nabuco told Graça Aranha,

> There is no doubt that he has forced all at the conference to recognize the intellectual force that he is. The important thing for Nations such as us is to appear, to take part, to reveal our high culture. Political errors can be corrected; mediocrity and intellectual nullity have no remedy.\(^4\)

Nabuco correctly recognized, however, that the political effects of Brazil's participation could only be judged after the close of the conference.\(^5\)

* * *

Having prevailed in his effort to avoid attendance at the Hague conference in second place, Nabuco now made plans for a leave of absence to rest and seek the curative waters of European spas. After his lonesome five-month trip to Brazil during the previous year, he was determined that his family should accompany him this time if at all possible.\(^6\) Nabuco still had no official approval of leave from Rio-Branco and he informed the foreign minister of the

\(^3\)Ibid.; and Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Wiesbasen, August 5, 1907, AJN.

\(^4\)Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Baden-Baden, July 25-26, 1907, AJN.

\(^5\)Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Wiesbaden, August 5, 1907, AJN.

urgency of the matter.

Now that the question of Brazil's representative to the Hague Conference was settled, Rio-Branco devised a plan to assign Nabuco a special mission in conjunction with his leave in Europe. He then cabled his proposal to Nabuco.

Personal. According to information from our compensation division, your payment while on leave will be fifteen contos. The President agrees that this would be insufficient. However, since you agree to provide preparatory information to Rui we are able to pay, for this special mission of service, two contos, gold, per month and also six contos, gold, to help with expenses. If you agree, we will expedite the necessary orders by official telegram. Rio Branco.

Nabuco, in this telegram, had finally received approval for the leave of absence for treatment, but had not gotten permission to take his secretary, despite several requests to that end. Nabuco then cabled his reply to Rio-Branco:

I do not know how long I will be able to remain in Europe on the amount allotted. I expect extensive treatment and therefore request that you reconsider helping with the cost. Just the round-trip passage for my fam-

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7"In case you intend to concede my leave, I request that you do so in time for me to depart in May, since the price of summer passage is prohibitive." Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, April 18, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec.

8Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, April 23, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15, tel. exp., partially marked for encoding. Although Nabuco had repeatedly requested leave, Rio-Branco had continued to ignore the request and to insist that Nabuco be a member of the Hague delegation. This was Rio-Branco's first official concession of leave for Nabuco.

ily raises the price by six contos, gold. I am taking them because it is impossible to reduce by one-half their expenses here. Velloso wishes to accompany me, and, even while travelling, I always need the services of a secretary. I request you give these items favorable consideration.10

Before receiving a reply, Nabuco informed Rio-Branco that he had already sent Rui all the information available and that he had doubts about using leave for an official mission.11 Nabuco still insisted on official leave for his health treatment, without any official duties.

Finally Rio-Branco acceded to Nabuco's request for additional compensation, provided Nabuco accepted official duties of aiding the Hague delegation. Just three weeks before Nabuco's departure for Europe, Rio-Branco sarcastically cabled Washington,

If it is convenient for you to enlighten the Brazilian Hague delegation about activities of prior peace conferences, the government proposes for you to spend four or five months in Europe with payment of 24 /contos/, gold, and also 12 /contos/, gold, to help with expenses of passage. Say whether or not your state of health will permit you to accept this commission, which will not require a great expenditure of energy.12

 Rio-Branco had still ignored the plea of Nabuco that Velloso be allowed to accompany him. Nabuco reminded him of the

10 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, April 24, 1907, AJN. A year earlier Nabuco had already complained to Rio-Branco that his expenditures were great and that it was difficult for an ambassador to live on his salary, especially one like himself with a large family. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Colorado Springs, April 29, 1906, ABR-B, 74/1 rec.


12 Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 9, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15, tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
oversight and the Baron finally wired that the secretary was authorized to go.\textsuperscript{13}

Since his return from Brazil the previous year, Nabuco had supplied information to Rio-Branco on the upcoming conference, and as the convening date approached he devoted an increasing amount of time to this effort. He talked with Elihu Root, who confidentially showed him the instructions he planned to issue to the American delegation relative to the Drago Doctrine. The two had a long, friendly visit and the Secretary of State granted Nabuco's request that he be allowed to communicate the purport of the instructions to Rio.\textsuperscript{14}

Brazil was not, however, the only nation seeking status at the conference. In late February, the Argentine representative had approached the British Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey, with a proposal that one of the vice-presidents at the Hague Conference be from South America, and that Argentina receive that honor. Grey instructed the British Ambassador in Washington to ascertain the American position on the subject.\textsuperscript{15} However, Argentina had not yet broached the subject in Washington and the Americans did not

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 11, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec.; and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 11, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15, tel. exp.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 9, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied; and Root to Nabuco, Washington, May 10, 1907, AJN.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}James Bryce to Root, Washington, February 26, 1907, DS, 40/89.
\end{itemize}
expect the conference to elect a South American vice-president, assuming the Second Conference would be organized much as the First, where only one vice-president was elected. After learning of Argentina's renewed efforts to secure a vice-presidency at the Hague Conference, Nabuco attempted to contact Elihu Root, who was out of Washington. Nabuco prepared a memorandum for the secretary of state, and immediately upon his return (May 25th) he requested a meeting for Monday, May 27th. Root already had an engagement for Monday, but since Mrs. Root was out of town, he suggested that Nabuco drop by his house that afternoon (Saturday, May 25th) about five o'clock for a little talk. Nabuco accepted the invitation, and had a long conference with Root and delivered his confidential memorandum. At this time he learned that the Argentine representative had already spoken to Root about American support for his country's delegate at the conference.

In the seven-page memorandum, Nabuco pointed out

16 Robert Bacon (Acting Secretary of State) to James Bryce, Washington, March 16, 1907, DS, 40/90.


18 Root to Nabuco, Washington, May 25, 1907, AJN.

that the Russian and Dutch delegates dominated the First Hague Peace Conference, which had a president (Russian), an honorary president (Dutch), and one vice-president (Dutch). He went on to say,

We hear that there is an intention of appointing three Vice-Presidents of the Conference this time instead of one and I wish you to be good enough to ascertain privately, through your Diplomatic Agents, from Holland and Russia, as between them the two Countries organized the last Conference, if there is such intention and what Nations they have in view for the Vice-Presidencies; also, as much as could be known now, how it is intended to divide the other honours of the Conference, which are the (a) Honorary Presidencies, (b) Presidencies, (c) Vice-Presidencies, of Committees or of Sub-Committees. In the last Conference that distribution appears by the proceedings of the Conference to have been left to Holland, whose first Delegate, Jonkheer van Karnebeek, was called by the German Ambassador Count Munster the main spring, the cheville-ouvrerie of the Conference.

This time . . . the distribution of honours must be made on quite a different plan. . . .

If Latin America were to have only one of the honours of the Conference, we think none of its Nations should take precedence over Brazil, the largest and the most populated of all of them. . . . But we expect the Conference will distribute its honours to this Continent more liberally, and in this case the very least that could be done for Latin America . . . would be to reserve for it two of the honours: one for Portuguese America, that knew how to keep together through all vicissitudes, and the other for Spanish America, which less fortunate broke into fragments during the Independence crisis.

The sincere friendship that binds Brazil and the United States . . . encourages me to expect that you will do your best to induce the distributors of the honours of the Conference to give the first Delegate of Brazil one of its Honours (outside of those which naturally in these Conferences appertain to Netherlands and

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to Russia) second to none that be given to the Chief Delegate of any other Nation attending the Conference. The intervention of your Delegation to that effect would be most welcome to us, but as the combination between Russia and Holland may be in progress now, your influence needs perhaps be exercised before the meeting of the Delegates, privately, near the organizers of the Conference at the Hague and at St. Petersburg for a liberal recognition of this Continent in the honours of the Conference, and in any case for our precedence in them, among the Republics of Latin America, that recognition being due to our size, our population, and our history, your interest in us being justified by our long standing and steady friendship.21

Root told Nabuco not to worry about the United States; the chief American concern would be to increase the respect of Europe for the Latin American nations. He promised Nabuco he would instruct the American representatives at St. Petersburg and The Hague to intervene with those governments for support of Latin American honors at the conference. He told Nabuco that Rui should be one of the notable figures of the conference. Root also reported that at his urging Yale University had just decided to invite Rui to give its annual series of spring lectures in 1908.22

21 Ibid.
22 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec., partially encoded, trans. supplied. The invitation to deliver the Dodge lectures was indeed an honor, as earlier lecturers had been men such as a Supreme Court Justice, a Secretary of War, and a Secretary of State. Root himself had delivered the 1907 lecture. Anson P. Stokes, Jr. (Secretary, Yale University) to Rui, New Haven, Conn., May 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Nabuco to Root, Washington, note, May 29, 1907, AJN; John Barrett (Director, International Bureau of American Republics) to Rui, Washington, June 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; John Barrett to d’Estournelles de Constant, Washington, June 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Lee McClung to Rui, aboard the Deutschland, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; John Barrett to Rui, Washington, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV;
Nabuco's close friendship with Root continued to be quite fruitful, for on May 29th he allowed Nabuco to read the complete confidential instructions which were to be given to the United States delegation to the Hague Conference. He was allowed to make notes and to cable a résumé of the United States position to Rio-Branco. Root carried out his promise of support for Brazil and cabled the American legation at The Hague to ascertain the situation in reference to the distribution of offices at the upcoming conference. In response to this initiative, the foreign minister of the Netherlands informed the American minister at The Hague that he would consult with the Russian delegate before drawing up a slate of offices to be presented to the conference, and that he would do all he could to see that the South American representatives would receive their share of the honors.

Before departing for Europe on June 1st, Nabuco began writing letters to his friends who were delegates to the

Elbert J. Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, Germany, August 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, telegram no. 176, n.d., CRB, Haia Pasta XI.

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 30, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec., encoded, translation supplied; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI, Reservado No. 1; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN. These were the final proofs of the instructions; although not yet approved by President Roosevelt, this was the most authoritative information available before Nabuco left for Europe.

David J. Hill (American Minister at The Hague) to Root, The Hague, May 29, 1907, DS, 40/305.

Ibid.
Hague Conference, explaining to them who Rui was.²⁶
This action was necessary because this was Rui's first diplo-
matic mission beyond the borders of Brazil and he was vir-
tually unknown outside his own country despite his strong
involvement in Brazilian politics, government, and society
for over twenty-five years. After arriving in Europe, Na-
buco continued to write letters to the delegates on Rui's
behalf.²⁷ Upon the Brazilian ambassador's arrival, he asked
Rui for a list of the delegates so that he could expand this
project.²⁸

In response to Nabuco's appeal, Count Maurice Prozor
wrote that he wished Nabuco were the Brazilian delegate. He
said he had nothing against Rui, "But he is not you."²⁹
Prozor, a Russian delegate, felt that what was important was
that Brazil get the honor and that her representative could
be honored with the honorary presidency of the First Commis-

²⁶Nabuco to d'Estournelles de Constant, Washington,
April 10, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to d'Estournelles, Washing-
ton, April, 15, 1907, AJN. See also Nabuco to Root, Wash-

²⁷Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco; Count Prozor to Nabuco, The Hague, June 16, 1907,
AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on front and back of cal-
ling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartões."

²⁸Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco. Despite Nabuco's valuable assistance, Rui ap-
parently never knew that he had an official mission to
assist him in preparing for the conference. See Viana, Rui & Nabuco, p. 74; and Nabuco to Rui, Miami, February 4, 1909,

²⁹Count Prozor to Nabuco, The Hague, June 16, 1907,
AJN.
sion. 30 In working with the Dutch government to apportion the honorary positions at the conference, the Russian dele-
gate supported Brazil's claim. Rui attributed the strong support of Count Prozor in favor of Brazil directly to Nabu-
co's "Private Memorandum" to Root.31

During May, Rui had been busily occupied with the final preparations for his European voyage. Prior to his departure on May 21st he went by Pena's office, but the president was out. He later apologized to Pena for not com-
ing to his house for a final "abraço" before departing, but said he was inundated by a heavy stream of people coming to accompany him to the ship.32 Rui sailed aboard the English packet, Araguaya, which made a port call at Rui's hometown of Salvador, Bahia. There he was received with great en-
thusiasm and popular demonstrations.33

Meanwhile Rio-Branco had been preparing for the conference by collecting and sending copies of materials to Rui. He sent books, newspaper clippings, confidential in-
structions, and memorandum to aid in Rui's preparation and to be used as references during the conference. The Baron also made final appointments to the Brazilian delegation and worked out the complete details of the order of pre-

30 Ibid.


32 Rui to Afonso Pena, Rio, May 22, 1907, AAP; and Pena to Rui, Rio, May 22, 1907, AAP.

In addition to the actions already taken in preparing for Brazil's debut at the Second Hague Peace Conference, Rio-Branco made other careful preparations. He insisted that the Brazilian legation at The Hague reserve ample quarters for Rui and his family in a good hotel. Arriving at the Palace Hotel in a resort suburb of The Hague, Rui was impressed:

Scheveningen, the celebrated bathing beach where I am located, is a half hour from the capital by car and 15 or 20 minutes by electric tramway. The quarters, which the Baron arranged for me, are almost princely. It is enough to tell you that Germany has a suite of equal size in the same hotel & France's accommodations are inferior, since they are on the third floor and we are on the first.

Even Nabuco, the well-travelled diplomat, was impressed by the accommodations.

Rui was first nominated as a delegate and minister plenipotentiary, the official designation being, "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mis-

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34 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 3, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 11, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta, VI.

35 Rio-Branco to Hague Legation, Rio, April 18, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9, tel. exp. He also arranged for the accommodations for the two delegates (Rui and Eduardo Lisboa) to be paid for by the government, but food was to be paid from their monthly stipend. Rio-Branco to Hague Legation, Rio, April 19, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9, tel. exp.

36 Rui to Carlos Bandeira, Scheveningen, June 16, 1907, CRB, quoted in Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 307.

sion to Her Majesty Queen of the Low Countries and Delegate of Brazil to the Second Peace Conference at The Hague." However, Rio-Branco decided to change Rui’s status to ambassador, and the official credentials presented Rui as, "Senator Ruy Barbosa, Vice-President of the Federal Senate, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in special mission to Your Majesty, pursuant to the meeting of the 2nd Conference of Peace, at The Hague." Nabuco felt that it was fortunate for Brazil that Rio-Branco had changed his mind, as Rui was the only delegate from Latin America with the title of ambassador. He felt that Brazil’s later selection to an honorary presidency at the conference was due primarily to this "diplomatic coup" by Baron Rio-Branco.

Upon arriving in Paris on June 10th, Nabuco sought out Rui. They had a long meeting at which Nabuco brought

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38 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, April 29, 1907, AHI, 273/3/1; and decree of nomination, Rio, April 1, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta Decretos.

39 Pena to Queen Wilhelmina, Rio, May 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVB.


41 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.

Rui up to date on events in Washington and explained the steps he himself had taken in relation to the conference. He also gave Rui the notes he took from the instructions to the American delegates shown to him by Secretary Root. In addition he sent two essays by President Nicholas M. Butler of Columbia University to give Rui a chance to familiarize himself with American ideas on subjects to be discussed at the Hague Conference.

One of the more interesting items furnished to Rui by Nabuco was a document containing confidential notes to aid Rui in the unfamiliar diplomatic environment. Here Nabuco advised Rui that his best informant on matters pertaining to Hispanic-American countries would be Gonzalo de Quesada y Arostegui, one of the Cuban delegates. Quesada could be relied on as a friend of Brazil, although he was a good friend of Roque Sáenz Peña, an Argentine delegate, whom he had once served as secretary. Nabuco said that Quesada would explain to Rui the value of each of the Hispanic-American delegates. Gonzalo Esteva, first delegate of Mexico, was a former colleague of Nabuco's who always appeared "Very polished and formal." Nabuco explained that Mexico was a rival of Argentina and cooperated with the United States. Her third delegate, Francisco de La Barra, was an

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43 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.
44 Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on front and back of calling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartões."
admirer of Rui. Domingo Gana of Chile was an old friend of Brazil, but might be somewhat cool since he suspected, wrongly, that Nabuco helped to prevent Chile's establishment of an embassy in Washington. Baron de Selir of Portugal had a brother who was a colleague and good friend of Nabuco in Washington. Baron de Selir probably would be the best guide in respect to Holland and the diplomatic corps at The Hague. Rui should cultivate the friendship of Guido Fusinato, one of the Italian delegates, who would be the best guide among the European diplomats. Nabuco closed with some advice to Rui on the position of ambassador, which he said is circumscribed by etiquette and ceremony. He optimistically advised Rui that, since he was not a career diplomat, he would be free of the protocol and formalities which encumber the position. Nabuco said public opinion was the greatest force in the politics of diplomacy. He cited an example of the Russian delegate on the occasion of negotiation of the Treaty of Portsmouth. On that occasion Count Sergei Y. Witte directed an appeal to the American press which changed their attitude from one of hostility to one of general good will toward Russia. Nabuco recommended this approach as "good diplomacy." 47

After meeting with Rui and providing him all the

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. Witte, Russian negotiator of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), was awarded the title of count because of the unexpectedly favorable terms for Russia in the treaty. The New Columbia Encyclopedia (1975), p. 2996.
information he felt would aid the Brazilian cause at the conference, Nabuco wrote a long report to Rio-Branco. He closed the letter,

I am going to the waters of Vittel, from whence I shall be able to furnish whatever information may be requested of me, and after the termination of the Conference, I shall return to my post as quickly as possible. 48

Nabuco felt he had carried out the bulk of his mission and was ready for the rest and recuperation of the European leave he had so earnestly sought.

Rui missed having the experience of a diplomat such as Nabuco near at hand. Since arriving in Europe Rui had become completely absorbed in preparations for the conference. Despite the strenuous pace, when the Second Hague Peace Conference opened on June 15th, Rui had many misgivings about his ability to handle the task of Brazilian ambassador: "Every moment I feel smaller and weaker, in the face of this event and this position. May God have compassion on me." 49

In the next chapter the conference deliberations will be examined, to demonstrate that Brazil, in self interest, abandoned her initial support of the United States in favor of the principle of the equality of nations.

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48 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.
49 Rui to Maria Augusta Barbosa, Scheveningen, June 16, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONFERENCE

The First Hague Peace Conference was called by Czar Nicholas II of Russia and met from May 18th to July 29, 1899.¹ Twenty-six nations were represented at the conference including the United States and Mexico, the only two American states which participated. Brazil, though invited, declined to attend because she felt none of her national interests would be discussed.

The Second Hague Peace Conference was proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt, but was officially convened by Nicholas II. Representatives of forty-four nations met and deliberated from June 15th to October 18, 1907. At the insistence of the United States all of the Latin American states were allowed to send delegates to this conference, although Costa Rica and Honduras chose not to participate. The two conferences considered problems of the international community such as: the limitation of armaments, the laws of war, and international arbitration. In regard to the arma-

ments question the conferences failed to reach any agreement, but they did improve the laws of war and codified them.²

In October of 1904 United States Secretary of State John Hay sent out a circular calling for a second peace conference to meet at The Hague. There was generally an encouraging public response, but privately the statesmen were not so pleased. Theodore Roosevelt strongly emphasized the peace theme in his campaign for the November election. The main impetus for the issuance of the circular apparently was a resolution (called the Declaration of St. Louis) by the Interparliamentary Union. In the declaration the conference delegates resolved that the American President should invite governments to send representatives to a second peace conference. Representatives of the organization presented the document to Roosevelt in September and he promised to approach other governments.³

Meanwhile, the Russo-Japanese War was raging and it was thus an inopportune time for a peace conference. The


³ Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 91-92, 106-10, 112; and Jessup, Root, II, p. 67.
war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905 and a week later the Russian ambassador appeared at Roosevelt's door in Oyster Bay, New York with a letter from the Russian foreign minister. The letter said that Russia, "as initiator of the International Peace Conference of 1899," felt it was time to call another conference. The Russians said they would provide a detailed program for a new conference, and Roosevelt agreed to allow the Czar to assume the initiative.  

The conference was first scheduled by Russia and The Netherlands for the summer of 1906. However, the Third Pan American Conference was already scheduled for Rio at that time. Most Latin American states had too few experts in international law to send delegates simultaneously to conferences on different continents and travel was not rapid enough to allow attendance at both within a few weeks of each other. The dilemma presented by this conflict of dates was resolved by Elihu Root, who persuaded the Russians and Dutch to postpone the conference until 1907. After some reluctance the signatory powers of the arbitration convention of 1899 signed a document admitting to the second conference the non-signatory powers. Thus all the Latin American states were admitted to the Hague Conference system,

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4 Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 123; and Jessup, Root, II, pp. 67-68.

5 Jessup, Root, II, pp. 68-69; Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 129; and Bacon and Scott, eds., Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root, p. 3.
which became an organization of most of the world's states. Although they agreed to admit the lesser powers into the system, the eight major powers intended to remain in charge of the situation as they had been at the first conference.

The second conference met for a total of four months and its deliberations can be divided into three rough chronological divisions: the first five weeks, which were primarily devoted to the making of proposals; the sixth through seventeenth weeks, during which discussions dealt mostly with laws of war on land and sea; and the final ten days, which were devoted to negotiations relative to arbitration and international courts. The conference was organized around commissions, subcommissions, and special committees. Most of the work of the conference took place in these committees, rather than at the relatively infrequent general (plenary) sessions. Many conference delegates, including Rui Barbosa, served on all four commissions and several subcommissions, which caused many complications. "If one can imagine a group of actors trying to perform in several plays at the same time he can understand the problems of the busier delegates." 

The honors of the conference were greatly expanded from the first conference so as to please as many delega-

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7 Ibid., p. 187.
8 Ibid.; and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 40-44.
tions as possible. There were a total of thirty-eight such positions distributed among twenty-three of the forty-four countries represented. The United States was not represented among the seven active presidents, but was assigned two of the thirteen honorary presidencies. Brazil also received an honorary presidency, the highest honor bestowed on a Latin American country. Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were each awarded one of the sixteen honorary vice-presidencies.  

Elihu Root had not sought honors for members of the American delegation, but had given them instructions to support Latin American aspirations as much as possible:

> Of course the United States does not care and I assume none of your commission cares, about the so-called honors, while they seem to be regarded as important by the Latin Americans. I should say that we better give them the benefit of whatever may be coming to us, so far as practicable. If we do this, we will be repaid ten times over by their appreciation provided they do not think we are discriminating in favor of one against another.

At first the deference to the Brazilians seemed to bear fruit, as Brazil voted with the United States and against the rest of Latin America on several points.

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The deliberations of the conference which had the most importance for the international status of Brazil were the discussions relating to: immunity of private property

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10 Proceedings, (1907), I, p. 18; and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 33-34.

at sea, arbitration of contractual debts (Drago Doctrine),
the International Prize Court, and the International Court
of Arbitral Justice (International Court of Justice).

During the first days of the conference, the Fourth
Commission debated the question of the immunity of private
property at sea. The importance to Brazil of this discus­
sion was that it was the first subject of interest to the
United States on which she took a stand. Here Rui supported
the American delegation in its proposal, much to the delight
of the Americans and Nabuco, and to the chagrin of some of
the other Latin American nations, who believed that Brazil
was always going to support the United States uncondition­
ally in all matters brought before the conference. However,
this apparent accord between the delegations contained
a faint hint of future discord. It was rumored that Root
did not want the original American proposal passed; and in
fact, the American delegation contemplated abandoning their
proposal in favor of a very weak Belgian one. Rui and Rio­
Branco were both upset by this prospect and sought Root's
intervention in the matter. On the final vote, Brazil

12 Hildebrando Accioly, "Rui Barbosa na Segunda Con­
ferência da Haia," p. 165; Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France,
June 29, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Rio-Branco to Amaral,
Rio, July, n.d., 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Bacon to
Root, Washington, July 16, 1907, DS, 40/392A; Proceedings,
(1907), III, pp. 748, 770, 795-96, 826-28, 833, 899; and
Rui, speech, October 21, 1908, Rui Barbosa, O Brasil e as
Nações Latino-Americanas em Haya: Discurso Proferido no
Senado em 21 de Outubro de 1908 pelo Senador Ruy Barbosa

13 Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, July, n.d., 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp.
supported the American project, although the proposal was defeated.\textsuperscript{14}

The Drago Doctrine, named for the Argentine prime minister, stated that no public debt would serve as the pretext for armed intervention or occupation of territory in the Western Hemisphere. The Drago Doctrine had occasioned lively debate at the Third Pan American Conference in Rio in 1906, where the United States had attempted to prevent its introduction into the deliberations. However, the Rio Conference delegates resolved that the issue be discussed at the Second Hague Peace Conference in an effort to have the doctrine accepted world-wide as a method of diminishing the possibility of conflict over purely monetary issues.\textsuperscript{15}

In accepting the formal invitation to the Second Hague Conference, Elihu Root informed the Russians that the United States reserved the right to introduce the subject of the Drago Doctrine at the conference.\textsuperscript{16} The American position was that the use of force to collect debts should be permitted, but only after certain conditions had been met. These conditions included the seeking of arbitration and the refusal of the debtor to honor the agreement which resulted

\textsuperscript{14}P\text{roceedings}, (1907), III, 899; and \textit{Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference}, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference}, p. 134; and \textit{Burns, Unwritten Alliance}, p. 170. Also see above, Chapter II, pp. 30-31.

from the arbitration.  

Rio-Branco, on the other hand, had declared to Nabuco as early as February of 1907 that Brazil had no interest in supporting the Drago Doctrine and did not wish for it to be brought up for debate at the conference. He said that Brazil always paid her debts, and besides, was a creditor to Uruguay and Paraguay. Brazil at that time and in the past had relied on credit to finance her industrial development, and after having carefully built up good credit, did not want to give creditors the impression that Brazil might not be willing or able to repay.

Rui was critical of both the Argentine (Drago) and American proposals, but on instructions of Rio-Branco, rejected the Argentine proposal and supported the American one. Rio-Branco fully expected that the proposal would eventually be dropped by the Americans because he felt European opposition would prevent unanimous agreement by the conference. Rui took pains to point out that his vote on the subject was based on Brazilian public opinion, and not

\[\begin{align*}
17 & \text{Accioly, "O Barão do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferência da Haia," p. 73.} \\
18 & \text{Ibid.} \\
19 & \text{Proceedings, (1907), II, p. 310.} \\
20 & \text{Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 8, June 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVA; Accioly, "O Barão do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferência da Haia," 76-77; and Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 257.} \\
21 & \text{Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 11, June 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII.}
\end{align*}\]
on antagonism toward Argentina. However, at least one commentator says Brazil was reluctant to support the Drago Doctrine simply because it was proposed by Argentina, a perennial rival. The conference finally voted to accept the American version of the proposal to refrain from the use of armed force for the collection of contractual debts, unless arbitration of them had failed. Professor William I. Hull optimistically called the agreement "one of the most important achievements of the second conference, and one of the greatest triumphs in the history of diplomacy."

The First Commission was assigned the task of drafting a plan for an international court to decide the legality of captures made during naval warfare. German and British plans were submitted and referred to the second subcommission, which was to deal exclusively with this question. Earlier in a plenary session of the conference, the German delegate had surprised the other delegates by announcing that his country was in favor of such an international court and that he was prepared to submit a plan for consideration. The German suggestion was cordially received by both the

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22 Rui Barbosa, O Brasil e as Nações Latino-Americanas em Haya, pp. 10, 22-23.
23 Magalhães Júnior, O Homem e o Mito, p. 270.
24 Hull, Two Conferences, p. 491. Hull was a professor of history, international relations, and political economy at Swarthmore College. Who Was Who in America, Vol. I, 1897-1942, p. 605.
British and American delegates. 26

Brazil was not a member of the committee of examination which was deliberating the draft convention for an international prize court. However, Rui asked to speak before the committee. On August 22nd he appeared before the committee and strongly opposed the ranking of Brazil below many of the lesser powers in the selection of judges for the court. 27

Davis says,

Barbosa's speech was brilliant--one of the best of the conference. He spoke rapidly, emotionally; yet every sentence revealed preparation. He analyzed the positions of all nations with navies and merchant marines, proving that Brazil ranked above several European powers in merchant shipping. 28

In hopes of improving Brazil's position, Rui proposed that every country have a seat on the court. 29 The other delegates, however, felt that such a proposal would produce an unwieldy court. They felt that some arrangement was necessary to limit court membership, and thus were disposed to give priority to countries with the greatest political influence. 30

Rio-Branco was disappointed with the conference deliberations on the Prize Court, and on August 15th cabled

26 Ibid.

27 Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 796-98. The method of the selection of judges would also be a factor in the latter deliberations on the International Court of Justice.


29 Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 796-98.

Rui,

The organizers of the project worked very hard but com­mitted many injustices, showing a decided preference for the European countries and no consideration for the countries of Latin America. . . .

After giving a list of the classification of the countries and their shipping tonnage, he concluded,

A simple examination of the list above shows how ine­quitable was the work of classification by the organi­zers of the project and we can not but feel that the American delegation, in discord with the protestations of esteem which Brazil and generally the countries of South America have received from their government, are in league with the great European powers to treat, in such a fashion, the nations of our continent.

When the project for the International Prize Court came up before the First Commission for a vote, Brazil, along with Turkey, opposed it. At the plenary session of September 21st, Brazil was the only one to vote against the project. At the close of the conference a convention for a prize court was signed, but it failed to come into force because of the failure of states to ratify it.

The project for a court to decide cases arising be­tween or among nations was given various names, but eventually came to be known as the International Court of Justice, or Court of Arbitration. This proposed court is not to be

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31 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio. no. 80, August 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

32 Ibid.


confused with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague Court), which was originated by the First Hague Conference and which the new court was planned to supplement or supplant. The projected body was originally designated as the High Court of International Justice, but eventually was officially called the Court of Arbitral Justice.

The American proposal for a new court was taken as the basis for discussion. The Germans, British, French, and Americans were already working on a framework for the prize court, and the Americans sought the assistance of the other three in framing the new project. The French chose not to cooperate in the endeavor, so the Americans, British, and Germans drafted a new project to present to the appropriate committee.

The major problem with the court project was in connection with the method of appointing judges. There was controversy over the number of judges to be on the court. The Americans felt that a court with one judge from each of the forty-four nations would be unwieldy and the leader of the delegation, Joseph H. Choate, emerged as the champion of proportional representation, insisting that judges from the larger and more powerful nations serve for longer periods.

37 Choate and Scott to Root, The Hague, August 7, 1907, DS, 40/410; Choate to Root, The Hague, August 10, 1907, DS, 40/412; Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 264; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 410.
than the others. Rui eventually emerged as the champion of equal representation, struggling to prevent any solution except on the basis of absolute equality of sovereign states. Rui first tried to kill the court project in committee, using a number of tactics, including the contention that the committee was not competent to take up the subject. In further attempts to block acceptance of the proportional method of selecting judges, Rui proposed a new court scheme and several modifications. Choate reacted violently to Rui's new proposals, which he considered impractical and impossible of implementation.

By the end of August Brazil was unequivocally committed to defending the principle of the equality of sovereign states in the selection of judges for the International Court of Justice. On August 27th Rui brilliantly defended this position in a speech which Davis said, "was

38 Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 265; and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 412, 423-426.


40 Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 624-27. The committee in question was Committee B of the First Subcommission of the First Commission.

41 Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 40/416A; and Rui to Buchanan, Scheveningen, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.

42 Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 40/416A; and Choate to Root, The Hague, August 16, 1907, DS, 40/417.

43 Choate to Root, The Hague, August 23, 1907, DS, 40/430.
probably the greatest speech of the conference." In the address Rui eloquently defended the position of the minor powers:

Can it be said that equal rights are granted to the different countries in the Permanent Court when to some of them juridicial function is granted for twelve years, whilst to others such function is granted for only a single year?

Hitherto, the States, however diverse because of their extent of territory, their wealth, their power, had, nevertheless, among themselves one point of moral commensuration. This was their national sovereignty. Upon this point their juridical equality could be established unshakably. In this fortress of an equal right for all, and equally inviolable, inalienable, incontestable, each State, large or small, felt that it was so truly its own master and even as safe with regard to the rest, as the free citizen feels safe within the walls of his own house. Sovereignty is the great fortress of a country. It constitutes the basis of the entire system of its juridical defence within the field of international law. But what is it we would do? We would meet, great and small, around a table, each taking part in a concert of a touching international friendship in order to subscribe to a convention which would establish a tariff of the practical value of sovereignties, by distributing among them portions of authority in proportion to the more or less unjust estimation of the weak in the balance of justice of the powerful.

All the difficulties with which this project is beset come from our losing sight of this fundamental fact: the equality between sovereign States.

The American delegation attempted to modify the court proposal so as to appease Brazil and gain her acquiescence in the project. However, by this time Brazil felt her interests were so intertwined with those of the lesser powers that she could not abandon her position without

their consent:

In the second place, in view of the ties which connect us to other States whose rights we defend on this question, we would be in a position of underwriting a different proposal than the one already presented by us at the conference, without the consent of the majority of the excluded countries.

If you agree in the modification proposed by us as to the number of members of the court, and if you obtain in advance the support of the excluded States, we would be able to attempt this solution. But we believe it to be impossible to obtain this support.

But without it we will not have the liberty to follow you because we do not want to be suspected of abandoning our principle and the nations who support it because of the advantage that you offer in giving us a seat on the court.46

The situation reached such an impasse that the delegates feared a court plan would never be approved and a special committee was appointed to make a last attempt to solve the problem of the selection of judges. The members of the special six-member committee included Choate and Barbosa.47 This special committee met several times, but failed to agree after considering various election schemes.48 When the court project came to a final vote, the delegates adopted a voeu (draft convention), to be appended to the conference conventions, in which the project was adopted with the omission of the provisions for appointing judges.49 The conference further recommended that the draft convention be put into effect as soon as an agreement could

46 Rui to James Brown Scott, Scheveningen, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXII.<
47 Proceedings, (1907), II, 687-89.
48 Ibid., II, 689-96.
49 Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 275-76.
be reached, through diplomatic channels, on the appointment of judges. 50

Rio-Branco praised Rui for his defense of the principle of equality:

In reference to arbitration, the principle of equality of representation of states has now been recognized, as it already had been without difficulty in 1899. This time, however, its recognition was due only to the talent and competence with which you defended it. It is a victory which Brazil and all the other countries, with the exception of the eight great powers, owe to you. 51

During the conference, the deliberations of most interest to Brazil were those relative to the immunity of private property at sea, the Drago Doctrine, the International Prize Court, and the International Court of Justice. In the first two cases, Brazil supported the United States' position, to the dismay of the Hispanic-American delegates. However, in the latter two cases, Brazil eventually found herself on the same side of the issue as the rest of Latin America, and in opposition to the American position.

The next chapter will describe the continued strain on the United States-Brazilian relationship as Brazil persistently projected the image of an independent, cultured nation.


51 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 151, September 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
CHAPTER V

BRAZILIAN RELATIONSHIPS AT THE CONFERENCE: UNITED STATES, LATIN AMERICA, AND RUSSIA

As the twentieth century began, Brazil was, despite her huge territorial expanse, a relative bantam weight in the international arena. The Second Hague Conference was an opportunity to make her debut in international politics and to attempt to improve her international standing. Brazil aspired to assume the position of a major power, but this was an unrealistic goal.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Brazil's economic and political focus was in the process of shifting from London to Washington. British economic and political influence was beginning to decline worldwide and American international influence was increasing. For Brazil, New York was becoming a more important financial center than London. Brazil, by aligning herself with the United States, hoped to gain support for her own political and economic hegemony in South America. This shift was evidenced by: the elevation of the American and Brazilian legations to embassy status in January of 1905, the cordial visit of Secretary of State Root to the Third Pan American Conference held in Rio in mid-1906, and the unabashedly pro-American
stance taken by Rio-Branco and Nabuco.¹

During the nineteenth century British influence had been pervasive in many areas of Brazilian life and culture, especially in commerce and economics.² In the first eighty years following Brazilian independence, London was her most important diplomatic post. Beginning in 1900 Joaquim Nabuco became first the unofficial, then the official Brazilian minister in London.³

After Rio-Branco persuaded the United States that the two countries should upgrade their legations to the rank of embassy, he transferred Nabuco to Washington and appointed him as Brazil's first ambassador. Nabuco occupied a special position, since he was one of few representatives there with the rank of ambassador, and he soon became accepted as the dean of the Latin American diplomatic corps in Washington.⁴

Nabuco and Elihu Root became good friends, and the Brazilian ambassador was instrumental in persuading the

¹Graham, Modernization in Brazil, pp. 311-14; Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 95-116; and E. Bradford Burns, editor, A Documentary History of Brazil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 306-11.

²See especially, Graham, Modernization in Brazil.

³C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245-55.

⁴Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 97-100; and Graham, Modernization in Brazil, p. 311. Mexico was the only other Latin American country with an ambassador in Washington, although Argentina was negotiating with the U.S. at that time. The Argentines were shocked and hurt that Brazil had an ambassador in Washington before they did. Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 188.
American secretary of state to personally attend the Third Pan American Conference. Rio-Branco and his ambassador in Washington so closely aligned Brazil with the United States that the relationship between the two countries during his tenure as foreign minister can be characterized as an "informal alliance."  

Root instructed the American delegates to the Second Hague Conference to support the Latin American countries as much as possible. He informed Nabuco of these instructions and the ambassador in turn conveyed this information to Rio-Branco. Initially it appeared that there would be cordial relations between the Brazilian and American delegations at The Hague. On the first substantive point to be discussed at the conference, the collection of public debts by military force, Rio-Branco instructed Rui that it would be inpolitic to differ with the United States on the matter. This stance would alienate most of Hispanic America, but Rui was to assure them confidentially that Brazil was going along with the Americans as far as possible, "only to be agreeable."  

In spite of this Brazilian assurance, the other

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5 The Argentines, who were bidding for holding the meeting in Buenos Aires, were again upstaged by the Brazilians. To help smooth ruffled feathers, Root visited Argentina and other Latin American countries after leaving Rio. Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 188.

6 See Burns, Unwritten Alliance, especially pp. 201-09.

7 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 8, June 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVA. See also Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, telegram no. 11, June 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation supplied; and Rio-Branco to
Latin American nations felt she was going to vote with the United States throughout the conference. 8

Brazil also supported the American position on the question of private property at sea. Nabuco read newspaper reports of the early conference deliberations and congratulated Rui on the position he took.

In today's Figaro I see that you are already getting recognition and especially that you have begun to applaud Mr. Choate. Nothing can put us on better terms in Washington than supporting the American delegates in their attempts at the Conference to make great strides for the Rights of Men.

Unless I am mistaken, I heard that Mr. Root spoke of your support as the greatest proof of the sincerity of our sympathy for the American people.9

At the beginning of July, William I. Buchanan, a member of the American delegation, confidentially gave Rui the new proposals the Americans were going to present on

Rui, Rio, no. 19, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation supplied. (Because of the large number of cited cables between Rio-Branco and Rui, all such telegrams with numbers will be so identified to distinguish them from other telegrams of the same date. A few of the cables do not bear numbers, and a few others were erroneously numbered at the time of transmission. Most such errors in the numbering of dispatches were discovered by Rui and Rio-Branco and corrected in later cables.)


9 Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, June 29, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. See also, "La Conférence de La Haye," Figaro, June 29, 1907; and Lemgruber Knopf, Brazilian Legation The Hague, to Rio-Branco, The Hague, June 29, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec.
the subject of collection of public debts. Although Rui was becoming skeptical of the tactic of supporting the United States, Rio-Branco instructed him to continue to do so.

Soon, however, the apparent accord between the two delegations disappeared and was replaced first by subtle, then by open hostility. By the latter part of August, the Brazilians were very upset because the American delegation was not living up to the fine speech of Elihu Root a year before when at the Rio Conference he had declared,

We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire; and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.

On August 27th, in deliberating formation of the International Court of Justice, Rui expressed these sentiments

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10 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 3, July 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and "proposition of the Delegation of the United States of America concerning the limitations of the employment of force in the collection of ordinary public debts arising from contracts," no date, CRB, Haia Pasta XXII. A French translation is filed here also.

11 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 19, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation supplied; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 6, July 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 7, July 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

12 Root, speech, July 31, 1906, Latin American Addresses, p. 10. Rio-Branco, in reference to this speech, said, "The delegation of the United States at The Hague is not confirming the beautiful words that Secretary of State Root spoke in the July 31, 1906 session of the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro." Rio-Branco to Rui, no. 93 [i.e., 92], August 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.
in his brilliant defense of the equality of sovereign states.\textsuperscript{13}

The divergence began when the Americans maintained complete secrecy about their proposal for a method of selecting judges for the International Court of Justice (Court of Arbitration). Rui, however, through a mutual friend, learned the details of the proposal which "humiliated" Brazil.\textsuperscript{14} Rui considered it essential that some action be taken to counter the planned proposal and Rio-Branco instructed the Brazilian chargé in Washington to find Root immediately and inform him of the pending American proposal.\textsuperscript{15} Rio-Branco quoted from Root's speech at the Rio Conference (see above) where he had declared that the United States supported the independence and equal rights of all countries, and then he said, "The project of the delegation as it stands, would be a humiliation for Brazil and the other Latin Americans and would completely destroy the effect of Root's trip."\textsuperscript{16} Rio-Branco warned that, unless the project were modified, Brazil would be

\textsuperscript{13}See above, Chapter IV, pp. 95-98.

\textsuperscript{14}Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 32, August 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

\textsuperscript{15}Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 34, August 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, August 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.

\textsuperscript{16}Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, August 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15, partially marked for encoding. Same wording as found in Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, \textsuperscript{52}, August 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
obliged to defend the rights of sovereign states. He then closed with this appeal:

'I hope that these ideas receive a favorable reception and that we will not have to come to the unpleasant position of demonstrating our disunity before the conference. If the Latin American countries are going to be treated the way the U.S. delegation has planned, then it would have been better if we had not been invited to The Hague.'

Root was on vacation for the summer, attempting to recover his health in Clinton, New York, and Amaral left immediately for Clinton to speak with Root personally.18 Rio-Branco was pessimistic about any positive results from Amaral's trip and he cabled Rui to be prepared for Brazil to pursue an independent course in the matter.19 Amaral filed a fifteen-page report with the Foreign Ministry by cable. The Brazilian was a guest at Root's home in Clinton, where the secretary of state said he was not in favor of all countries having the same representation on the Court of Arbitration, but declared himself to be definitely opposed to the project of Choate. Root reassured Amaral that he intended for Brazil to have proper representation and had recommended to Buchanan always to support the interests of Latin America. Root was incredulous that Choate would be considering such a project and promised to have the

17 Ibid.

18 Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 5, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C, partially encoded, translation supplied; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 154 [i.e., 54], August 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.

19 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 55, August 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX
State Department immediately cable the American delegation instructions that Brazil have proper representation.  

Root sent the wire as promised and the American delegation responded with its current proposal, which had not yet been presented. Root then instructed the State Department as follows: "Cable Choate proposed plan described for selecting members of new court seems excellent. Root."  

In seeking a compromise, the delegates at the Hague convention were constantly modifying proposed plans for the court. Choate cabled a new proposal to Washington, which was rejected by Root as being "very distasteful to South America." Root continued,  

> We must not on any account sacrifice our position of asserting the national equality of American States with the other powers of the earth. It is far more important to us than the whole court scheme.  

In a further effort to get the Americans to modify their position, Rio-Branco instructed the Brazilian chargé  

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20. Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, August 7, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, [no. 60], August 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.  

21. Root to Acting Secretary of State, Clinton, N.Y., August 5, 1907, DS, 40/408; Adee to Choate, Washington, August 6, 1907, DS, 40/409; and Choate & Scott to Root, The Hague, August 7, 1907, DS, 40/410.  

22. Root to Adee, Clinton, N.Y., August 9, 1907, DS, 40/411. See also Adee to Choate, Washington, August 10, 1907, DS, 40/411.  

23. Root to Adee, quoted in Adee to Choate, Washington, August 13, 1907, DS, 40/412.  

24. Ibid.
to contact the government in Washington. Amaral carried a memorandum to Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, who cabled copies to Root and Roosevelt. The memorandum described Brazil's latest proposal for selecting judges for a permanent court of arbitration. Since a vote on the proposal was scheduled in two days, the Brazilians felt time was critical. After setting forth the details of the proposal, the memo closed thus:

This course of communicating the views of Brazil to the American Government, with a desire of their being transmitted by cable to the American Delegation at the Hague, is taken because the negotiations between the same Delegation of the United States and those of France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia and other European powers are already greatly advanced.

Amaral was frustrated in his attempt to get the American government to act. Indeed, Roosevelt and Root were both out of town and he cabled Rio-Branco, "It is difficult to approach the administration during the summer on terms favorable for negotiation because they are all out of town and they do not even know where Root is today." While

25 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 78, August 14, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

26 Amaral to Adee, "Memorandum presented to the Department of State by Mr. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral, Chargé d'Affaires of Brazil," Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 40/621.

27 Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 15, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied. The expedient conduct of American foreign policy was hampered during the summer of 1907 by the absence of President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Root, and Asst. Secretary of State Bacon. For several weeks during the crucial negotiations at The Hague over the method of selecting judges for the Court of Arbitration, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee was acting Secretary.
awaiting instructions from Root, Adee cabled Choate that a new Brazilian plan had been presented and asked him to get the details from Rui so that he would be prepared to intelligently act on any instructions from Root.  

The Department of State telegram chased Root from Clinton to Southampton, to New York City, and finally to White Plains. In the meantime, after a two-day delay, President Roosevelt had replied that he knew too little of the details to pass a judgement on the matter, and that he felt the United States should be largely guided by the delegates on the spot. Choate also responded before Secretary Root even received his cable. Choate was adamantly opposed to the Brazilian proposal:

Brazilian plan of Permanent Court indicated in your cable absolutely impossible. If insisted on it will wreck the whole scheme of a Court... Do not ask an impossibility. We are doing our utmost to secure a Court on terms of substantial equality.

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28 Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 40/416A.

29 Adee to Root, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 40/427A; Adee to Root, Washington, August 16, 1907, DS, F.W. 40 (i.e., filed with case no. 40). The confusion was compounded because the latter communication was erroneously addressed to New Jersey rather than to New York.

30 Roosevelt to Adee, Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 17, 1907, DS, 40/420. Roosevelt already had doubts about positive results from the Hague Conference. Davis says, "So disgusted was he that after the Peace Conference opened at The Hague he seldom bothered to keep himself informed about it." Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 167.

31 Choate to Adee, The Hague, August 16, 1907, DS, 40/417. Elihu Root was in poor health from overwork and spent some time at his home in Clinton, New York. However, at the time Adee was frantically attempting to reach him, he had been called to the bedside of his dying brother in
Root was upset over Choate's cavalier attitude toward Brazil, but was unable to pressure him into changing it because of his illness and absence from Washington, and because Choate enjoyed the confidence of Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{32} William I. Buchanan, one of the American delegates, became somewhat friendly with Rui and eventually told him in confidence the story of the selection of the American delegation. When Choate, Porter, and Rose were nominated, Root had rejected them because of lack of experience. However, Root was forced to accept them because of an earlier commitment by Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{33}

Clinton. Root evidently was so exhausted that he was unable to remain with his brother in his last days, and ten days before his death he left Clinton, stopped briefly at his mother-in-law's house on Long Island, then went to New York City enroute to White Plains. At White Plains he entered Muldoon's Sanatorium, seeking a cure for his excessive fatigue. Root to Adee, White Plains, New York, August 21, 1907; Root to Adee, White Plains, New York, August 21, 1907, DS, 40/445; and Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 265-67. Root first went to Clinton to rest in July but he was bombarded by cables from the State Department and he was very upset over the fatal illness of his brother. By late September he had recovered his health, but did not immediately return to Washington but went by private rail car for a visit to Mexico City with his family, returning to Washington on October 19th. Jessup, Root, I, pp. 506-07, 515-17; and II, 23-24, 76-77. Elihu's brother, Orem Root, Jr., died on August 27th. See Adee to Choate, Washington, August 27, 1907, DS, 40/435; Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 28, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and New York Times, August 23-27, September 26, and October 20, 1907.

\textsuperscript{32}Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 17, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied; and Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 24, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied.

\textsuperscript{33}Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 112, September 21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
Rui's friendly relationship with Buchanan differed sharply from that with the other members of the United States delegation at the conference. In fact, Buchanan was different from most of the other American delegates in that he was cultured, a diplomat, spoke fluent French, and understood Latin America. Buchanan had quite a bit of experience in Latin America, having been an American delegate to the Second and Third Pan American Conferences, minister to Argentina (1894-1900), and having conducted many special missions to Latin America. He was Root's Latin American "expert" on the Hague delegation; Root wrote the head of the delegation:

Buchanan, as you know, is charged with the special duty of doing all he can to help the Latin Americans in this first appearance on their part as members of the world family. We have taken a great deal of pains to get them into the conference, and I think most of them feel grateful for it and I think it is a good policy to help them all we can.

As early as August 4th, Rio-Branco suggested that Rui approach Buchanan for aid on the arbitration court project. He briefly spoke with Buchanan at the Brazilian banquet and the American heaped lavish praise on him for the sumptuous banquet and extravagant floral decorations. Rui finally sent a confidential letter, in French to Buchanan,

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and they had several long discussions concerning the Brazilian proposal. However, it was already too late to head off a clash between the delegations; and Rui had a heated exchange with Choate in a commission session on August 17th.36

After Rui's exchange with Choate, Rio-Branco cabled that it appeared that the American government would be unable to take the desired initiative because of the absence of Root and Roosevelt from Washington. He went on to say, "Now we can no longer conceal our divergence with the American delegation. We must now frankly take up the defense of our rights and those of the other American nations."37 Because Rui had now become so exhausted and discouraged that he had asked Rio-Branco to relieve him of his position, Rio-Branco closed with some flattery to help encourage Rui to continue: "We are certain that you can do this with firmness and moderation and brilliance, attracting to our country the sympathies of the weak peoples and the respect of the strong."38

36 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 52, August 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Buchanan, Scheveningen, Aug. 16, 1907, CRB, untitled collection of bound mss; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 55, Aug. 18, 1907, CRB Haia Pasta XX; and Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 600-03.

37 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 89, August 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

38 Ibid. See also Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 52, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Senator Azeredo, The Hague, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Pinheiro Machado, The Hague, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
Soon after the conference began, Rui learned that the Colombian government had instructed her delegation at The Hague to always vote with Brazil. However, as soon as it became apparent that Brazil intended to vote with the United States, the other Latin American delegates became upset, and disunity began to appear. After Brazil sided with the United States in the debate over the use of force to collect public debts, it became necessary for Rui to assure the Hispanic-American governments that Brazil had no territorial ambitions, and to assure them Brazil only voted with the United States in the interest of approximation between the two countries.

At one point Rui referred to Gonzalo A. Esteva, the Mexican delegate, as "the best friend we have here." Mexico was a rival of Argentina in Hispanic America and Nabuco felt they were politically much more important because of their proximity to the United States. Earlier Mexican antipathy toward the United States had subsided, and by 1907

39 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 18, July 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII.

40 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 36, July 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII.

41 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 22, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

42 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 101, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

Mexico had become almost a "U.S. agent" to the other Spanish-speaking nations.  

Chile had for the most part maintained friendly relations with Brazil, although since 1902 when she had settled her long disagreement with Argentina, she had less reason to rely upon Brazilian friendship to escape her earlier isolation on the continent. The Chileans were not upset over Brazil's initial support of the United States at the conference, for they understood the reasons for the approximation. Later, in the debate over the International Court of Justice, Chile was gratified by Brazil's support of the principle of equality of sovereign states and her refusal to accept a seat on the court at the expense of Chile and the

44Ibid.
45In South America, the period from independence to the late 1860's was characterized by regional power politics. However, continental power politics emerged in the late 1860's and continued into the first quarter of the twentieth century. During this second period, Chile sought to control the balance of power along the Pacific coast of South America. When Argentina threatened her hegemony, Chile at first sought friendship with Brazil as a counterbalance to Argentina. However, the continued growth of Argentina and the uncertainty of the Brazilian entente led Chile to seek an agreement with Argentina. This agreement was reached by several 1902 treaties which provided for recognition of a Chilean sphere of influence on the Pacific coast and an Argentine sphere of influence on the Atlantic coast of the continent. Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 4, 127-28, 145, 168, 186-87, 198-99, and 245-62.
46Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 192.
other smaller nations. On Rui's voyage to the Hague Conference, the Argentine delegation had also been aboard the Araguaya with him. Rui met all the Argentine delegates and they developed mutual friendships. During the conference, the social relations were cordial and the families of the two delegations became quite good friends. The Brazilian minister in Paris said the relations with all the South American delegations in Paris had been good, and upon Rui's arrival in that city he was invited to a dinner by the Argentine minister.

Despite the personal friendship of members of the Brazilian and Argentine delegations, the likelihood of official cooperation was remote. Brazil and Argentina had been in a struggle for supremacy in South America and this rivalry was evident at the Second Hague Conference. Close association with the United States had been sought by each of the countries in an attempt to gain advantage over the

47 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 82, August 31, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Proceedings (1907), II, 687-98; and Rui to James Brown Scott, Scheveningen, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.

48 Barbosa, Brasil e as Nações Latino-Americanas em Haia, pp. 18-19. During the voyage Rui presented Drago a big box of magnificent Bahian oranges. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

49 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

50 Piza (Brazilian minister in Paris) to Rui, Paris, June 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXI; and Piza to Rui, Paris, June 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXI.
Argentina had been particularly upset because Brazil appeared to be strengthening herself by closer association with the United States, especially after the exchange of ambassadors and the arrival of Nabuco in Washington.

The Argentines had sought to have Buenos Aires designated as the meeting place of the Third Pan American Conference, but Nabuco succeeded in having Rio selected instead. The Brazilians had gained a great deal of prestige by Root's attendance at the Rio Conference, and the secretary of state found it expedient to visit Buenos Aires and other Latin American capitals to assuage injured pride. It was in reaction to Argentine overtures to the United States that Nabuco wrote his "Private Memorandum" to Root, asking that he assist Brazil in obtaining a vice-presidency for her delegate to the Hague Conference.

Rio-Branco had little respect for Estanislau Zeballos, the foreign minister of Argentina. The two had had antipathy for each other since they had represented opposing sides in the Missions Territory dispute. In 1893

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51 Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 186. As the conference opened, Rio-Branco informed Rui that Arabalho, the Argentine minister in Washington, was trying to supplant Brazil in U.S. friendship, but luckily without results so far. Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 11, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation supplied.

52 Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 163, 188; and Jessup, Root, I, p. 747.


54 Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 184.
President Grover Cleveland was chosen as the arbitrator in this dispute, and Rio-Branco and Zeballos represented their respective countries in special mission to Washington. Zeballos felt humiliated when Brazil won an overwhelming victory in the arbitral award.\textsuperscript{55} Rio-Branco had always felt that Zeballos was mentally unstable, but as a result of the stance he directed his delegates to take at The Hague, Rio-Branco became convinced that he was "definitely mad."\textsuperscript{56}

On instructions of their government, the Argentine delegates became secretive, guarding their intentions from the Brazilians. They also began courting the Americans and the British journalist, William T. Stead, to whom they presented a silver service.\textsuperscript{57} After Rui began to clash with members of the American delegation, he began to consider cooperating with Argentina against the United States. However, Rio-Branco said that Brazil must continue to cultivate the friendship of the United States, and that voting with the other Latin American countries against the Americans would give the appearance of the formation of an anti-United

\textsuperscript{55} Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 231-32; and Viana, Vida de Rio-Branco, pp. 183-200.

\textsuperscript{56} Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 122, August 28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, October 25, 1908, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.

\textsuperscript{57} Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 70, August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Stead was an influential journalist of international stature whose influence and sympathy would be of value to any individual or country. See below, Chapter VI, pp. 129-32.
States league. Rio-Branco felt that the efforts of Argentina to enlist Brazil in such an alliance might have been a maneuver on their part to discredit Brazil in the eyes of the Americans.

As noted above, Brazil was upset by the American proposal on the method of selecting judges for the International Court of Arbitration which placed Brazil in a category with very small and weak nations. Brazil then made a counter-proposal which would give them a favorable position in a category following the great powers. However, this ephemeral Brazilian proposal left Argentina in an inferior category, and the Argentines were upset by it. The Brazilians quickly abandoned this proposal in favor of another one which solved the problem of the omission of some Latin American states from the arbitration court by providing that all sovereign states had an equal right to select judges. However, Rui's revised plan caused new difficulties because the conference insisted on a court composed of no more than fifteen members. Rui did not wish to accept a fifteen-member court, as it would discriminate against some smaller states, including Chile and Peru. He cabled Rio-Branco:

58 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 118, August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
59 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 129, August 28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
60 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 122, August 28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
61 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 81, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. See above, pp. 95-96.
We are allied with these States. Abandoning them, besides disloyalty, would remove them from the advantageous position which we occupy. Thus it will be impossible to concur.  

The Argentine delegates continued to maneuver for a more favorable position for their country on the proposed court. This led Rio-Branco to conclude that Argentina would not cooperate with Brazil, but rather would attempt to secure a seat on the court for herself, regardless of what happened to the other Hispanic-American nations. Rio-Branco agreed with Rui that Brazil could not abandon those nations.

Without a doubt, Argentina attempted to gain the sympathy of the American delegation at the expense of Brazil. Brazil's stance in the latter part of the conference was not one to inspire Washington's confidence in her delegate and thus it was difficult to prevent the success of the Argentine tactic.

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Maurice Prozor, a Russian delegate, paid a visit to

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62 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 82, August 31, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

63 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 138, September 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

64 Ibid. Despite the opposition of the Argentine government to Brazil, there continued to be no personal rivalry between the conference delegates of the two countries. One Argentine delegate, Carlos Rodrigues Larretta, even accepted Rui's invitation for him and his wife to spend the following summer in Rio. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

65 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, aboard the R.M.S. Carania, September 27, 1907, AJN.
solicit Brazilian support for a resolution providing for a third peace conference to be also convened by Russia. Rui agreed to vote with them and expressed his appreciation for Russian support of Brazil's position. Rui said that since the beginning of the conference the three Russian delegates had shown sympathy for Brazil. Prozor invited Rui to a dinner celebrating his wedding anniversary; there were only twelve invited guests, of whom eight were Russians. Besides being one of only four foreigners invited to the dinner, Rui was given the place of honor.

This Brazilian-Russian cooperation continued when on September 8th another member of the Russian delegation, Fedor Fedorovich Martens, shared a new proposal for the Court of Arbitration with Rui. The proposal had originated with the French delegation, and Rui was pleasantly surprised to learn that the confidential plan had not yet been revealed to anyone else, not even to the conference president, who was a member of the Russian delegation. The following day this Russian delegate wrote a confidential letter to Rui explaining some modifications which had been

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66 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September 21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Earlier, in reference to a new U.S. proposal in which Brazil was excluded, Prozor told Rui the Americans had said that Brazil did not have the capacity to be a country of the first order. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 89, September 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

67 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113; September 21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

68 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 99, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
made to the plan. Martens was encouraged by Rui's sympathetic acceptance of the plan, but he was not sure of the American and German reactions:

I fear greatly the national and personal sensitivity which unfortunately plays a great role in the lives of men and of nations.

I do not know what Mr. Choate will say.

Yesterday I had the chance to see the Baron Marschall to whom I spoke about my plan. He seemed to be favorable, but appearances are too often deceiving.

I am happy to have found such a sympathetic ear and I count on your kind and strong support in the future.

Rui then assured Martens that he could count on his support, unless he received orders to the contrary from the Brazilian government.

In her first global conference, Brazil had the unrealistic goal of being accepted as the ninth power of the world. She did, however, succeed in making the other countries aware of her existence as a nation and in persuading them of the culture and intelligence of her representative. The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was evident at the conference, despite the personal friendship of the individual delegates, and Argentina sought to gain advantages for herself, at the expense of Brazil. Although Root and Rio-

69 Martens to Rui, The Hague, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.

70 Ibid.

71 Rui to Martens, Scheveningen, September 9, 1907, CRB, untitled collection of bound manuscripts. Rui was particularly excited about the new intimacy of Martens, who began to use the familiar form of speech when addressing him. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 99, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
Branco instructed their delegations to cooperate with each other at the conference, conflict soon arose between them. The Hispanic-American countries were dismayed by Brazil's initial support of the United States, but rallied behind her as her posture changed to opposition, in the name of the equality of sovereign states. With Root ill and Nabuco in Europe, Rio-Branco was unsuccessful in applying pressure in Washington to modify the stance of the American Hague delegation.

Nabuco was dismayed at the apparent damage to Brazilian-American relations caused by the disagreements at the Hague Conference, especially the differences over the Court of Arbitration. He made every effort to minimize the long-range effects of the conference on the relationship between the two countries. Rio-Branco was privately pleaded to see Nabuco somewhat discredited, and to be able to display some Brazilian independence vis-à-vis the United States. Rio-Branco, however, was committed to a long-term cooperation with the United States and welcomed the gradual return to the earlier relationship with that country. Rui Barbosa, on the other hand, was not willing to make any conciliatory gestures toward the United States. He had gained a Brazilian reputation with the aid of the Brazilian press, prompted by Rio-Branco, and he did not wish to diminish his political capital. This topic is treated more fully in the final chapter.

Chapter VI will examine Brazilian attempts to gain
further recognition for the country by courting journalists and by providing lavish entertainment. That chapter will show how Rio-Branco sought to use the occasion of the Second Hague Conference to publicize Brazil, expending large sums for printed materials and extravagant banquets.
CHAPTER VI
PROJECTING A PUBLIC IMAGE

An important ingredient in projecting the new Brazilian image of a country worthy of being accepted as the ninth power in the world was a campaign in newspapers and magazines at home and abroad. During the Second Hague Peace Conference, Rio-Branco placed special illustrated articles in two magazines and made wide distribution of copies of these issues and off-prints of the articles. Later another extensive article was commissioned under the guise of an impartial piece of reporting by a British journalist. Rio-Branco was sensitive to reports about Brazil in the foreign press and, as in the case of the New York Herald, went to great lengths to halt adverse publicity. In addition to commissioned articles, the Brazilian foreign minister approved expenditures of large sums for lavish entertainment—the Brazilian banquets rivalling or exceeding those of the great powers.

Two weeks after the conference convened, Rio-Branco took an opportunity to publicize Brazil among the delegates and the press. The June 8th issue of The Sphere, an illustrated magazine, carried a supplement about Brazil, and Rio-Branco instructed the Brazilian legation at The Hague to
determine the number of copies that would be needed to distribute to "all delegates and secretaries of the entire diplomatic corps, principal correspondents of newspapers (not forgetting Stead) and for the reading rooms of all the principal hotels and restaurants."\(^1\) The legation was then to cable to London requesting that the determined number of copies be sent for distribution as indicated.

After the conference was in session, Rui received a letter from Elbert F. Baldwin, editor of the American magazine, The Outlook. Baldwin sent a proposed "editorial" on Brazil for the magazine and asked Rui to look it over. Rui's reply contained additional information for the article. Baldwin thanked Rui for his reply and also sent a statement from Les Temps which he planned to append to the earlier piece. Because of the opportunity of publicity for Brazil, Rui took time from his busy schedule to send several letters to Baldwin correcting erroneous material and supplying additional information for his magazine.\(^2\)

Toward the end of July, Martinho Botelho, editor of Brazil Magazine, wrote Rui from the Rio monthly's overseas office in Paris. Botelho proposed that his next issue carry an extensive "descriptive and illustrated" article on the Brazilian mission to The Hague. Botelho requested a

\(^1\)Rio-Branco to Brazilian Legation at The Hague, Rio, July 2, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.

\(^2\)Elbert F. Baldwin to Rui, Scheveningen, July 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, July 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; and Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
meeting with Rui at The Hague to discuss such an article, which "would make an agreeable and interesting impression throughout Brazil and would document for posterity, through text and illustrations, one of the most memorable instances of our International prestige."³

After meeting with Botelho, Rui gave his permission for the article and assigned Baptista Pereira, a secretary of the mission and Rui's future son-in-law, to work with Botelho on the project. Upon reflection, Rui decided that he had best obtain Rio-Branco's permission, since the article would involve considerable expense. In making the request to the foreign minister, Rui noted that the Argentines, "our incessant rivals," had already made great efforts to influence the European press.⁴

Rio-Branco cabled his approval and in mid-September the issue appeared with the article on the Hague Conference.⁵ The piece by Botelho was primarily an article

³Martinho Botelho to Rui, Paris, July 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.

⁴Rui to Lembruber Knopf, The Hague, August 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 55, August 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

⁵Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 91, August 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; Botelho to Rui, Paris, August 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXV; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, un-numbered, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII, partially encoded, translation supplied. Actually, three closely related articles appear successively in the issue with a total of 33 pages, 20 of which are devoted entirely to illustrations with no text. See, "A Hollanda e a Conferencia da Paz na Haya;" "O Brazil na Conferencia da Paz na Haya;" and "O Brazil e a Segunda Conferencia de Paz na Haya," Brazil Magazine, II (August, 1907), 1-33.
praising Rio-Branco and the individual members of the Brazilian delegation, profusely illustrated with individual and group portraits, and with scenes of The Hague and the Dutch countryside. Botelho distributed 1075 copies at The Hague and throughout Europe, and provided Rio-Branco with 100 copies for a total cost to the Foreign Ministry of £200. Rui paid £120 for the article and distribution in Europe. A payment of £80 was later made for the additional expenses of distribution and for the copies to be distributed by the Brazilian government.

The story of another special magazine supplement began with Rio-Branco authorizing the Brazilian Hague legation to use some funds to buy influence at the conference:

Lemgruber Knopf,
Brazilian Legation, The Hague
Withdrawal of £200 may be made against reserved expenses and entrusted to Baptista Pereira. I wish

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6 Brazil Magazine, II, 1-33.

7 Botelho to Rui, Paris, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXV; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 107, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Receipt signed by Botelho, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, unnumbered, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Reservado No. 1 (4a secção), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 121, September 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 172, October 18, 1907, Haia Pasta XII; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 132, October 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

8 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 107, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Receipt signed by Martinho Botelho, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 1 (4a secção), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI.
the two men to informally invite two or three or isolated principal correspondents: Stead, Mercadier, Daily Telegraph, Times, Temps, Debats, seeking to obtain their sympathies for Brazil and her delegation. Also, discretely invite some Hispanic American delegates. Rio Branco.9

Two days after this telegram, Rui reported that he had had a long visit with William T. Stead, editor of the Courrier de la Conférence, unofficial journal of the conference. Rui reported:

Today I received a long visit from Stead. We conversed about subjects relative to the conference. We are on the way to a good friendship. Yesterday the Courrier characterized the Brazilian proposal in the conference as the most notable of all.10

That same day Lemgruber Knopf filed this report: "The Ambassador [Rui] and I are on the way to a good friendship with Stead."11 Rio-Branco was delighted when he learned of Rui's growing friendship with the British journalist.12

A day later, on July 23rd, Stead wrote to Rui that he had arranged for a meeting on Wednesday evening, July 24th. About six South Americans were to be present and Stead asked Rui to recommend any other South American dele-

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9 Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf, Rio, July 20, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.

10 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 21, July 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

11 Lemgruber Knopf to Rio-Branco, Brazilian Legation at The Hague, July 22, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec., partially encoded, translation supplied.

12 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 39, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
gates he should invite. On Friday of that week Stead invited Rui to his pacifist conference, but this time Rui declined to attend, pleading pressing business.

* * *

William T. Stead (1849-1912) was born in the same year as Rui. Stead was the son of a Congregational minister, and his remarkable ability as a journalist was recognized early when he was appointed a newspaper editor at the age of twenty-one. Stead's reputation reached its zenith between 1883 and 1890, when as editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, he instituted what Matthew Arnold called the "new Journalism." Under Stead's direction the formerly sedate paper began to initiate many new political and social programs and movements, all in a very dashing and unconventional manner. Stead gave up editing daily newspapers in 1890 when he founded the Review of Reviews, and added an American edition of the magazine in 1891. Stead took part in the "social gospel" movement, and after an 1894 visit to Chicago, wrote the book, If Christ Came to Chicago. As a social reformer he became one of the strongest supporters of the peace movement which resurfaced after the Czar's call for the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899.

13 Stead to Rui, Scheveningen, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV:

14 Rui to Stead, The Hague, July 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

Stead went to St. Petersburg and interviewed Czar Nicholas II prior to the First Hague Conference. He did his best to mobilize American and European public opinion in support of the proposed conference. Stead went to The Hague and, with his family, moved into a villa. At the first conference he attracted much attention, when he published a daily chronicle using the presses of the leading Hague newspaper. Stead was something of a nuisance in gathering material for his paper, and in pursuit of information became a self-appointed friend of Frederick W. Holls, the secretary of the American delegation. However, Stead's persuasive powers in the press were well recognized and the American delegation sought his aid in this manner on at least one occasion.16

In 1907 Stead again appeared at The Hague for the peace conference and, with the backing of Baroness von Suttner and other peace leaders, set up a headquarters for the peace movement. The headquarters, called Le Cercle Internationale, provided a stage where each afternoon conference delegates and peace advocates gathered for debate.17


17 Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 195. Davis states that their debates "were often better organized and more interesting than those of the conference," p. 195.
Stead again published and edited a four-page daily newspaper entitled *Le Courrier de la Conférence*. Here he attempted to make a complete record of everything that took place at the conference. This daily paper in French proved helpful because it was the only place the diplomats could find a comprehensive view of what they were doing.  

Stead, through his articles and editorials, wielded a great influence and later chroniclers of the conference relied heavily on his contemporary record. Professor William I. Hull, who himself attended the Second Hague Conference, admitted his heavy reliance on Stead's *Courrier*:

> In common with all readers of the *Courrier*, the author of this book owes a large debt of gratitude to Mr. Stead for the enterprise and public spirit shown by him in informing the public so fully of the work of the conference, and in stimulating and informing the members of the conference as well.  

Stead's influence was even greater on persons not at The Hague. In Brazil, for instance, the *Courrier* was referred to as the official chronicle of the conference and its articles were accorded as much prestige and credence as the *London Times*, or *Le Figaro*. Also, Stead's paid advertisement which appeared as a supplement to the November 1907 issue of the *Review of Reviews*, was acclaimed as recognition of the value of Brazil and her delegate by an impartial

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20 George R. Chamberlin, American Consul, Pernambuco, October /[i.e., September]/ 24, 1907, DS, 1113/5.
judge. A Portuguese translation of the supplement appeared with appended materials and was touted as a "book" by Stead. This deliberately false impression was allowed to persist in Brazil for over fifty years. Only recently was the record set straight by Raymundo Magalhães Júnior, a modern critic of Rui Barbosa.21

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The fact that Brazil had money to spend on public relations did not escape the notice of Stead, who in his capacity as owner and editor of the Review of Reviews, wrote to Rui:

It seems to me that Brazil has been spending a great deal of money of late in advertising in one way and another. If the advertising fund is exhausted, then you do not need to read further. For this is a proposal for what I venture to think would be a most effective advertisement at a price, which, although high, is not more than it is worth.22

Stead went on to explain that the Review often published a special supplement at the end of the magazine. These supplements were called "Business Write-ups," and one paid a special rate for the publicity secured through these special pages. Stead then continued,

What I am writing to propose to you is that you should take, on behalf of the Brazilian Government, from ten to twenty pages of such an illustrated write-up to appear as a special supplement in the "Review of Reviews" for October, the subject being "Brazil and its Delegation at the Hague" and the price twenty-five

21See Stead, O Brazil em Haia; and Magalhães, Rui, o Homem e o Mito, especially the chapter, "As 'Aguias de Haia' e o Falso Livro de William T. Stead," pp. 281-91.

22William T. Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.
pounds (£25) per page.

In return for this expenditure of from £250 to £500, according to the number of pages devoted to the supplement, you would receive:
1) A specially written sketch of the triumph which Brazil has achieved at the Hague, which I would sign.
2) A copiously illustrated popularly presented description of Brazil—shorter than the Figaro pamphlet, but calculated to interest the public in Great Britain.
3) A narrative of the work you have done here, with portraits of yourself the Delegation etc.23

Stead further explained that, besides the 60,000-copy worldwide circulation of his magazine, he would distribute the supplement to "every sovereign, minister of state and ambassador in the Almanack de Gotha," and 5,000 copies to public libraries, bankers, chambers of commerce, merchants, news rooms, Members of Parliament and members of Congress.

In an effort to sell his proposal, the British journalist closed with an allusion to Argentina, whose delegates had been doing their best to outdo Brazil since before the peace conference convened:

I enclose you a rough sketch of the suggested supplement and would beg you the favor of an early reply. For, if you do not like the idea it may find acceptance in another quarter. But until I hear that Brazil rejects it I will not take it elsewhere. Of course no other supplement would appear in the October "Review of Reviews" than this, if you accept my offer.24

In an apparently related action, the same day (September 6th) that he wrote to Rui proposing a special supplement of Brazil in the Review, Stead published a group portrait of the Brazilian delegation in the Courrier and proposed that one member of the permanent court be a Bra-

23Ibid.
24Ibid.
zilian. The photo was made earlier on the orders of Rio-Branco, and in an apparent bid for publicity, he had also instructed that a print be sent to Stead.

Rui found Stead's proposal for the article entirely acceptable and cabled Rio-Branco the details, urging his prompt acceptance, closing thus:

He requests a prompt reply "for if you do not like the idea it may find acceptance in another quarter." I believe he is referring to the Argentines who certainly will not refuse if they are offered an opportunity to appear superior to us in this situation. I think the proposal is eminently acceptable.

Rio-Branco immediately responded to Rui's cable:

I welcome with great pleasure the proposal from the Review of Reviews. I want 500 more copies to be sent to this ministry for distribution to chambers and libraries of Brazil. I shall cable some recent statistical data which he needs along with some passages of opinion about Brazil from illustrious travellers. He will soon receive "Bresil," by Elisee Reclus which speaks of the similarity between Brazil and the United States. If with the requested increase the price is increased, I request you give me the total so that I may cable the necessary funds.

Rui negotiated with Stead as instructed and the journalist calculated that the addition would bring the

25 Lemgruber Knopf to Rio-Branco, Brazilian Legation at The Hague, September 6, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec.

26 Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf Brazilian Legation at The Hague, Rio, July 28, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.

27 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 94, September 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Lins says that Rui reported to Rio-Branco that the Argentines were prepared to spend a million gold pesos in publicity for their delegation. Lins, Rio Branco, II, p. 571.

28 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 145, September 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
supplement to a total of thirty-two pages at a cost of £800. Stead said, "The addition of 32p to the Review would be unusual but I would rather this was done than to fail on any point." Rio-Branco accepted the adjusted price and cabled Rui to accept the proposal. Stead was very pleased about the expansion of the supplement, but with his other commitments, it became increasingly apparent that the copy would not be ready in time for the October issue of the magazine. In addition, there was some delay in getting the statistics and other materials which Rio-Branco
wanted included in the article. Stead now diplomatically requested a delay in publication in the following terms,

I have made some progress with it. But on reflection I have come to the conclusion that it would be premature to publish it in the October issue. The Conference has still 14 days (it may have 21) to run and in these last days who knows how much may happen that might materially effect the destiny of Brazil at the Hague. Therefore I must postpone the publication of the article till the November number when we shall I hope be able to have the story as triumphant at its close as it has been from the beginning.

Rui concurred with Stead's request, characterizing it as "eminently reasonable."

On October 9th Rui delivered a long speech which served admirably for the triumphal ending for Mr. Stead's article. Stead was ecstatic and dashed off the following note to Rui: "Bravo. Bravo. Bravo. A thousand Congratulations Finis Coronat opus. Can I have your speech tomorrow."

The speech, a defense of Brazil's position in opposition to the formation of the Prize Court and the Court of Arbitration, appeared in the Brazilian press on October 32

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32Rio-Branco to Rui, Petrópolis, no. 154, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 117, September 28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

33Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.

34Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 119, September 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

35Stead to Rui, The Hague, October 9. 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.
16th and made a great impression there. However, the American ambassador in Brazil accurately characterized the speech as "somewhat bombastic, inaccurate and superfluous." Rui proudly quoted to Rio-Branco Stead's note and passages from the Courrier praising his speech.

On October 20th, Rui paid Stead the £800 as previously agreed for the "advertisement" in the Review of Reviews. The following week Stead sent Rui a rough proof of the article and asked him to look it over. In regard to the extremely flattering section about Rui's and Brazil's position at The Hague, Stead apparently was attempting to convince himself when he said, "I would not on any account overstate anything, as nothing would be more likely to create a reaction, but I think I have kept myself well within the facts in emphasizing the importance of the part which you played there." Upon reading an advance copy of the

36 "Conferencia da Haya," Jornal do Commercio, October 17, 1907.

37 Irving B. Dudley (American ambassador in Rio) to Root, Petrópolis, October 17, 1907, DS, 40/617.

38 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 127, October 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 128, October 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

39 Receipt signed by Stead, October 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV. See also Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 1 (4ª secção), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 140, October 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

supplement, Rui was very pleased and cabled Stead, "Received kind letter and advance copy. Very well. Thanks for your benevolent appreciation /sic/ on my own person and role."\(^\text{41}\)

After substantially completing the supplement, Stead conceived the idea of making an English translation of Rui's speeches at the Hague Conference.\(^\text{42}\) Rui had already asked for, and received permission to collect and publish all his speeches and other relevant documents in the original French.\(^\text{43}\) Rio-Branco at first authorized Stead to make English translations of Rui's discourse on the Court of Arbitration and several other, related documents. These were then published in a pamphlet "for distribution in England and the United States with the object of clarifying our position to the official world and public opinion."\(^\text{44}\) As part of the agreement Stead was to translate, edit, and distribute the pamphlet worldwide.\(^\text{45}\) Rui's speeches at the Hague Conference were published in French and Stead made an English translation which came to 100 pages and 5,000 copies

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\(^{41}\)&emsp;Rui to Stead, /Paris/, November 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

\(^{42}\)&emsp;Stead to Rui, London, October 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.

\(^{43}\)&emsp;Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 51, August 15, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 81, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 176, November 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

\(^{44}\)&emsp;Rio-Branco to Rui, Petrópolis, December 1, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

\(^{45}\)&emsp;Rui to Stead, Paris, December 12, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
were printed. The price was about £160, including world-wide distribution of 4,000 copies.46

The articles in both the Review of Reviews and the Brazil Magazine proved to be very popular in Brazil and the entire editions of both were sold out soon after they appeared in Rio.47 Joaquim Nabuco read the Review advertising supplement on Brazil and was quite pleased with it, although he conceded it exaggerated Rui's role. Nabuco sent Root a copy of the article, and it made a favorable topic of con-

46 Stead to Rui, London, March 11, 1908, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV. On orders from Rio-Branco, Amaral had translated, then persuaded the Herald to publish, the complete transcript of Rui's speech of August 20th. Rio-Branco now instructed Nabuco to translate Rui's speech of October 9th, and to secure publication in its entirety in the Herald. Rio-Branco requested that the two speeches be put together in a pamphlet, "for distribution to influential politicians there." Rio-Branco wanted the pamphlet to have a preface, "demonstrating that the major points of our project are the principles of equality of sovereign states and freedom of selection of the arbitrators by the litigants, thereby conserving in the makeup of the new permanent court of paid judges, the organization of 1899." The New York magazine, The Independent, later published an English translation of Rui's October 9th discourse, describing it as the most notable document of the conference. Nabuco requested Rio-Branco's authorization to see that the magazine made wide distribution of the number. Nabuco was forced to stop distribution of the number after he discovered a long passage in the translation which was not in the published French version. Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 15, August 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec. partially encoded; Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 26 / i.e., 16/, August 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, November 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 11, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 12, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.

47 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, December 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
versation among the Washington diplomatic corps. 48

Other publications soon took note of the money spent by Brazil on advertising and several inquiries were received, including one from the advertising firm which published Chamber's Journal. The editor of Chamber's was hoping to reproduce, in whole or in part, the Review article for £15 per page. He closed his appeal by saying that the magazine "is read by the best class of people, and should, we think, appeal to you for the purpose of the publicity which you are desiring to obtain." 49

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Just as it appeared that Brazil was making excellent progress in her relations with the foreign press, a new threat emerged. The New York Herald began publishing extensive dispatches from Aubrey Stanhope, their special correspondent at The Hague. Stanhope was very derogatory of Brazil and the position her delegate was alleged to have taken. Rio-Branco was furious about what he considered unfair treatment of Brazil and instructed Rui to cable the complete text of the Brazilian proposal, including punctuation, to

48 Nabuco to Root, Washington, December 18, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.

49 John Haddon to Rui, London, November 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXV. During the conference, Rio-Branco was always concerned with the mood of the press, at home and abroad. For selected examples see: Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 79, August 15, 1907; no. 80 bis /i.e., 80A/ , August 16; no. 103, August 22; no. 105, August 22; no. 123, August 28; no. 124, August 28; no. 128, August 30; and Petrópolis, no. 155, September 20, 1907,
Amaral the Brazilian chargé in Washington. The Baron then instructed Amaral to make a careful English translation, which the Herald agreed to publish. The complete transcript and associated comments and portraits of Rui and Rio-Branco occupied the front two pages of the August 26th issue of the paper.  

Rio-Branco also cabled Lemgruber Knopf about Stanhope and said,

See if you can convince him that in Brazil the government and the people are completely siding with our ambassador and that now, informed of the situation, all of the governments of South America and Mexico are siding with us.  

The Brazilians were unable to convince the journalist and Stanhope, evidently relishing the role of gadfly, wrote Rui the following letter requesting an interview:

Your Excellency

In view of the attacks being made upon you as wrecker and general obstructor of the Conference, I think perhaps you might wish to say something for publication. Accordingly I place myself at your disposition & beg you will give me a reply "Yes" or "No." If yes, please let me know at what hour I can see you.  


51 Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf Brazilian Legation at The Hague, Rio, August 26, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.

52 Aubrey Stanhope (Special Correspondent of the New York Herald) to Rui, The Hague, Wednesday August 28, 1907 CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.
Rui immediately replied to the journalist:

Dear Sir,

I shall be very glad to receive you, and talk with you on any subject, and whenever you wish, but I will not defend myself against the gratuitous and injurious imputation of being the "wrecker and general obstructor of the Conference."

As a representative of my country I do not care about anything except doing my duty according to my conscience, the instructions of my government and the opinion of my countrymen. Besides this my behavior is fully explained & justified in the considerations preceding my proposal, which have already been published in their entirety in the New York Herald's United States' edition.53

Rui considered the matter closed, but much to his surprise, Stanhope appeared unannounced at his hotel that afternoon and for almost an hour attempted to intimidate the Brazilian ambassador with "incredible charges."54 The correspondent had already filed a derogatory dispatch to the Herald that same day before he went to see Rui. Stanhope was evidently attempting to gather material to justify the report he had filed.55

Amaral sent an eleven-page telegram to Rio-Branco with extensive quotes from the New York Herald of August 28th. The dispatch from Stanhope at The Hague was very derogatory to Rui and to the Brazilian position in opposition

53 Rui to Stanhope, The Hague, August 28, 1907, CRB, Despachos & Cartas; penciled rough of same in CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.

54 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 77, August 28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

55 See Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 127, August 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
to the American proposal for a permanent court. Stanhope's telegram, published in the Herald, contained numerous quotes from "South American" and other unidentified delegates belittling Rui's conduct at the conference. Rio-Branco immediately ordered Amaral to speak with the editor-in-chief about the matter in the name of the Brazilian government.

Rui refuted Stanhope's report of an interview with him, saying he never granted an interview, but limited himself to a rebuttal, which he had already sent by letter. Rui learned from an acquaintance that Stanhope had been sent to see Rui by Horace Porter, a member of the American delegation. Rio-Branco felt that Stanhope had "exaggerated Rui Barbosa and injured Brazil" by his "indelicate comportment," and by publishing many lies including one in which he said Brazil was no more than a country of negroes. The Brazilian foreign minister also said that Stanhope's intrigues were very prejudicial to the influence of the United States in Brazil and to the friendly posture of Roosevelt

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56 Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 28, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.
57 Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 127, August 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
58 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 84, September 1, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
59 Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, September 1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
Brazil also carried on her public relations campaign by entertaining lavishly. Social functions were an indispensable part of diplomacy at the Second Hague Conference and Brazil accepted the challenge. The Brazilian delegation became known for its hospitality, and its banquets were noted as among the most lavish at The Hague.

Even before the work of the conference began, it was obvious that there was quite a bit of importance attached to social events and that social life would demand as much of the delegates as would the conference sessions. The Dutch queen, government, and aristocracy, as well as the delegates gave dinners for each other throughout the summer. One of the largest receptions was given by the American delegation on July 4th.

60 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 131, September 1, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 128, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

61 Stead said, "The dinners of the Conference were almost as useful as its procès verbaux. And the Brazilian dinners were the most magnificent of all. At the Palace Hotel sixty-six dinners were given by the various delegations between June 14th and August 28th. Of these Brazil gave eight—the same number as France—Germany gave nine, the United States thirteen. As a host Brazil was among the greatest of the great Powers in the number of her banquets. But in the splendor and luxury of her hospitality she was easily the first of all the nations." Stead, "Brazil at The Hague," p. 18.

62 Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 198; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 18. Rui would later say, "The terrible weight of banquets is now almost unbearable." Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 31, August 2, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
The South American delegations in particular vied with each other and with some European delegations in showing hospitality. However, the Brazilians exceeded most of the others in expenditures and lavish decorations for their banquets. "Nothing came up to the Brazilian dinners for the good taste and magnificence of floral decoration, and the fascination of the combined effect of music, mirrors, lights, paintings, flowers, and foliage." Indeed the banquet given on August 8th in honor of the nations of the New World was acknowledged to be the most ostentatious of the entire conference.

At this most lavish Brazilian banquet, the hall of the Palace Hotel was decorated in a tropical motif evocative of Rio de Janeiro. There was a miniature lagoon surrounded by palms, ferns, and orchids, all brilliantly illuminated with various combinations of electric lights. Flowers for

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63 Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 198; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 18. Choate, the head of the American delegation, said, "The delegates, among themselves, exchanged civilities not always according to their wealth and ability, but ever in the same cordial and fraternal spirit, and it will not surprise you to hear that our delegation, although making the utmost of the modest allowance made to it by the State Department for that purpose, was left far in the rear by some of the younger South American nations, who seemed to place in the hands of their delegates the means of most rich and brilliant entertainments." Choate, The Two Hague Conferences, p. 90.

64 Stead, "Brazil at The Hague," p. 18.

65 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Courrier de la Conférence, August 9, 1907; Courrier de Scheveningen, August 9, 1907; and Diário de Noticias, August 12, 1907.

66 Ibid.
decorating the tables and halls cost in excess of £300, and many of them were specially imported from London and Paris. The extravaganza made a great impression, especially on the Americans. The dinner given for the Europeans two weeks later was also a big success, with ten ambassadors present. In reference to this latter occasion Rui said, "If nothing else we at least left the extraordinary impression of cultured good taste." 

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In summary, Rio-Branco sought to use the occasion of the Hague Conference to publicize Brazil and he expended large sums for printed materials and extravagant banquets. This public relations campaign began with an attempt to gain the sympathy of influential correspondents at The Hague. Rui, at the urging of Rio-Branco, made the acquaintance of William T. Stead, an influential British journalist and proprietor of the Review of Reviews. Stead, as editor of the Courrier de la Conférence, gave extensive and sympathetic coverage to the Brazilian delegation, especially after Rio-Branco had agreed to place an expensive advertising supplement,  

67 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Stead, "Brazil at The Hague," p. 19. 

68 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Rui quotes the Courrier de la Conférence and Courrier de Scheveningen concerning the "extravagant and incomparable banquet." Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 43, August 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. 

69 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 64, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
ment in his illustrated magazine.

The Brazilians gained additional exposure by sponsoring publication of other articles and pamphlets, which were given world-wide distribution. Rio-Branco was also keenly aware of adverse publicity. Upon publication of anti-Brazilian material in the New York Herald, he immediately sent Amaral for a personal interview with the editor. Brazil also furthered this public relations campaign by entertaining lavishly at many extravagant banquets, sparing no expense to make a favorable impression on the conference delegates.

Next to be examined is the dilemma posed by the clash between personal status and national status in the relationships among the three Brazilian leaders. The following chapter will deal with personal differences and show how they were overcome in promoting the interests of their country.
CHAPTER VII
PERSONAL IDIOSYNCRACIES REVEALED

The three Brazilian statesmen most intimately involved in the preparations for, and deliberations of the Second Hague Conference were Baron Rio-Branco, Rui Barbosa, and Joaquim Nabuco. These individuals were three of the leading figures of Brazil at the time and, although they had disagreements, for the most part they cooperated during the conference. The sustained cooperation of Rui was especially surprising, as it was out of character for him.¹ He was a very independent sort, not disposed to share labors or accolades with anyone. His vacillation in the decision to accept the appointment and his attitude during preparations for the conference, made Rio-Branco sorry to have nominated him.² Nabuco, for his part, could easily have held a grudge against both Rui and Rio-Branco because of the manner in which he was excluded from the conference delegation. Indeed, some of his friends felt he had been treated unjustly

¹Lacombe, *Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa*, pp. 85-86.
²Graça Arahna to Nabuco, Petrópolis, May 28, 1907, AJN.

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and had every reason to retaliate. Rio-Branco had reason to be wary of Rui, for as a member of the Brazilian commission negotiating with Bolivia over Acre, he had disagreed so violently with Rio-Branco and the other member that he had resigned from the commission. Rio-Branco was in a delicate position with regard to Rui and Nabuco because, after privately offering to appoint Nabuco as head of the Brazilian delegation to the peace conference, he chose Rui instead and withdrew the offer of the leadership from Nabuco. Despite the potential for conflict, the three men generally ignored their differences and cooperated in promoting and defending the interests of Brazil.

Rui worked hard making preparations for the conference after his arrival in Europe. He continued at a frantic pace during the first few days of the conference. Less than two weeks after the conference began, in his first numbered telegram to Rio-Branco, he complained that he was already fatigued by the "continuous, exhausting work." Within a month of the inauguration of the conference, Rui felt so overwhelmed by the weight of his responsibilities as delegate that he felt they had already exceeded the capacity of

3 Raymundo Bandeira to Nabuco, Rio, April 24, 1907, AJN.

4 Lins, Rio Branco, pp. 289-93.

5 See above, Chapter II, pp. 41-44.

6 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 1, June 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
his weakened health. By July 25th, a week later, Rui told Rio-Branco that he was so sick that he might have omitted the number on his last cable. Rui had now reached the point where he tendered his resignation:

My telegram in response to the senate alluded to my poor health. It is aggravated by fatigue and the terrible climate, and now I would like to request to be relieved of this position which was given me through the gracious friendship of yourself and the government. Since the principal work of the conference is done, Lisboa could perfectly well complete the rest.

Rio-Branco quickly responded to Rui's request to leave the conference and come home. He said President Pena was very upset with the prospect of his resignation and wanted him to continue. Furthermore, if Rui left, Rio-Branco felt that it would be interpreted as a break with the government. Rui then protested that Rio-Branco had read more than he intended into his cable. He went on to say that he was sincerely dedicated to the Baron, and that if he and the government considered his continuation necessary, he would not insist on leaving. In reply, Rio-Branco instructed Rui to avoid fatigue, and, to boost his morale, praised him highly for a speech he had made nearly a month

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7 Rui to President of the Senate (Rio), The Hague, July 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
8 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 23, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
9 Ibid.
10 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 43, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
11 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 24 (reservado), July 26, 1907, Haia Pasta XX.
earlier.\textsuperscript{12}

Evidently the actual event that sparked Rui's attempted resignation was related to a garbled telegram received in Rio from The Hague. Rui had cabled a résumé of the French text of his latest speech and Rio-Branco had then requested a re-transmission in Portuguese.\textsuperscript{13} Rui reacted as if he supposed the request was made in order to reprimand him.\textsuperscript{14} However, Rio-Branco immediately assured Rui that he had only requested a Portuguese résumé because of errors in transmission and recording of the original cable, that he was very busy with official correspondence, and that he personally handled the task of giving public notice based on correct communication from Rui and desired, soon after looking over Rui's dispatches, to be able to give them to the wire service of the \textit{Jornal do Comércio}.\textsuperscript{15}

Within two weeks of this incident Rui was again complaining about how hard he was working. He felt that he was not getting any help from the other delegates, whom he felt

\textsuperscript{12}Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 44, July 27, 1907, Haia Pasta VIII. Rio-Branco explained his delay in sending congratulations by saying that only the day before had he read the June 28th speech of Rui in its entirety.

\textsuperscript{13}Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 41, July 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII. The text reads in part: "Resume of the speech translated here with some errors... Request you send me a Portuguese resume to be communicated to the newspapers. Rio Branco"

\textsuperscript{14}Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 23, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio. no. 41, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.

\textsuperscript{15}Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 42, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
were even creating difficulties for him. Of the secretaries he observed that the only useful one was Fernando Dobbert, his nephew.16

After Amaral's futile attempts in Washington to persuade the Americans to modify their proposal relative to the Court of Justice, Rui again submitted his resignation. In reply, Rio-Branco cabled Rui praising his work and saying, "We expect that you will finish the work there and we are sure that you will complete it with advantage for the country and the augmentation of your prestige."17 It is probable that the subtle references to the president (i.e., "we") did not go unnoticed by Rui. Rio-Branco also evidently organized a "fan club" to further boost Rui's ego, because in the next several days Rui acknowledged numerous telegrams of congratulations.18

Although again agreeing to continue, Rui was very disillusioned with the work of the conference.19 He ca-

16 Rui to Senator Azeredo, The Hague, August 12, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX, partially encoded, translation supplied. Rui reiterated the statement about Dobbert after the close of the conference. Rui to Azeredo, The Hague, October 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

17 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 86, August 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

18 See, for example, Rui to Ministro Indústria, The Hague, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Governor Estado Bahia, The Hague, Aug. 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Secretário Câmara Deputados, Estado Minas, The Hague, Aug. 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Maria (cable address for Rui's communications with his family in Rio), The Hague, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

19 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 64, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
bled his son about the frantic pace he was maintaining at the conference: "Tell Carlito and all our friends who inquire about the absence of letters from us. You can not imagine our lives. Despite this, the family has written, but I shall only be able to do so after the conference."  

Rui continued to complain about the pace he was forced to maintain and said there simply was not enough time to do everything, and informed Rio-Branco that he was always absorbed with work from five o'clock in the morning until midnight. Just a week before the conference adjourned, he cabled his family in Rio that he was, "sick, disanimated, and disgusted and I am seriously thinking of withdrawing completely."  

At the close of the conference, Rui felt his health had suffered from continuous overwork:

Also it is necessary for me to leave on Sunday for Paris with my family, the more so because of the reaction against four months of continuous work, and because the labors have caused a considerable deterioration in the state of my health. I have thus concluded my mission here and am only awaiting your last instructions and orders.

Rui became very indignant when he did not receive a cable from Rio-Branco for two days. He sent a "hot" tele-

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20 Rui to Tenente Ruy Barbosa, The Hague, August 25, 1907, Haia Pasta XX.
21 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 96, September 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
22 Rui to "Maria," The Hague, October 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
23 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 135, October 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
gram to Senator Azeredo saying he was afraid this was an intentional censure: "This absurd silence causes fright here, everyone taking it as an expression of intentional censure, rather than the gratitude I deserve." Rui also sent telegrams to his family and to Senator Pinheiro Machado, requesting immediate intervention of the latter to bring to an end the "enigmatic" silence of Rio-Branco. Rui also sent a telegram to the president, informing him that his mission would end with the signing of the conventions on the following Saturday, October 19th. He attempted to neutralize the imagined censure by Rio-Branco in his closing remarks: "I did my best to honor our country and I believe that I left her greater in the eyes of the world. I request your orders."  

What had happened in Rio was that Rio-Branco found it necessary to leave his post for a trip to São Paulo. The Hague Conference had continued longer than was anticipated and Rio-Branco felt he must go as planned. While away he had Rui's telegrams forwarded to him. Rio-Branco had informed Rui of the trip and of his intention to return to Rio on Sunday, October 6th. On the same day that he sent the

24 Rui to Azeredo, The Hague, October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.  
25 Rui to Pinheiro Machado, The Hague, October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to "Maria," October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.  
26 Rui to Pena, The Hague, October 17, 1907, AAP.  
27 Rio-Branco to Rui, Petrópolis, no. 161 A7, October 2, 1907, CRB, Hague Pasta XIII.
telegrams to Senator Pinheiro Machado, Senator Azeredo, and President Pena complaining of Rio-Branco's silence, Rui received two cables from the foreign minister which explained his lack of correspondence. He explained that he had not made any transmissions from the 13th to the 16th of October because of other urgent business and because of great fatigue from his trip to São Paulo. In a third telegram he said that he also had been preoccupied with communicating to the press about the Hague Conference. Rio-Branco then attempted to smooth Rui's ruffled feathers with a bit of praise: "Without a representative of your stature, Brazil could not have attained the position which she won in this conference." Rui was conciliatory, thanking Rio-Branco for his praise and in turn praising the foreign minister: "We never could have gotten the result which we obtained if I had not been able to count on your solidarity, support, and the aid of your brilliant zeal and patriotism."

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Nabuco had never doubted that Rui would make a good delegate for Brazil at the Hague Conference. Shortly before

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28 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 136, October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

29 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 170, October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; and no. 171, October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.

30 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 173, October 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.

31 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 136, October 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
the conference opened he wrote the following to a friend:
"I always felt Ruy Barbosa would assume his natural level in
the Conference, rising above all others by intellectual
power and euridiction." 32 Nabuco apparently had no animosity
toward Rui because of the events surrounding the selection
of the Brazilian delegate to the Hague Conference. He ac­
cepted a secret mission to Europe, in spite of his poor
health, and provided Rui with useful information and advice,
both before and during the conference.

After meeting with Rui in Paris and delivering to
him the confidential notes on conference delegates, Nabuco
went to take the curative waters of European spas. He evi­
dently followed the conference proceedings in the press, but
had little direct contact with the conference or conference
delegates for almost two months. By the middle of August
his health was much better and he began to take more inter­
est in the conference deliberations, where he took note of
the controversy over the method of selecting judges for the
proposed permanent court of arbitration. 33

Nabuco was strongly opposed to the American formula
for the selection of judges, and declared that he disap­
proved the classification of nations into categories of
great and small in a court of justice. If that were to be
the case, he felt it would have been better if the great

32 Nabuco to Rodrigo Octavio, Vittel, France, July 4,
1907, AJN.

33 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Wiesbaden, August 17, 1907,
ABR-B, 74/2 recibidas.
powers had not invited the others, but had simply reached an agreement among themselves. However, despite this opposition, Nabuco was not convinced that support of the equality of all nations was in Brazil's best long-term interest.

He was pleased with Rui's success, and wrote:

My Dear Ruy

You can imagine the satisfaction which your triumphs have given me and the pleasure with which I view the repercussions of them in our country. Your agency has doubtless sent you numerous newspaper clippings in which the position you have won at the Conference is recognized throughout Europe. Today I received a letter from Prozor in which he told me how you commanded the respect of the Conference and that your Speeches are no longer measured by length, but by weight.

Nabuco told Rui that he appreciated the difficult decisions Rui was forced to make at the conference:

I greatly sympathize with the delicate position in which you find yourself, forced by national dignity to combat the accord reached by the great Powers on the Prize Court, and I hope that a solution will be possible which will satisfy it /i.e., the national dignity/. I understand that your opposition on this point was above all on principle, with the fear, or foresight, that if the system of rotation were voted for the Prize Court without change, then it would be inevitable that it would be applied to the Court of Arbitration.

Nabuco denounced the system of rotation of judges, and felt that this issue would determine whether or not the small

34 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Wiesbaden, August 17, quoted in Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 145, September 7, 1907, CRB, Pasta XII.

35 Undated, unaddressed letter fragment in Nabuco's hand. (See footnote 41, below.)

36 Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. The draft of this letter with the date of August 27, 1907, is found in AJN.

37 Ibid.
nations would leave the conference in a better position than when they entered.

The Brazilian ambassador to Washington then made some astute observations about the actions of the American delegation at the peace conference:

I do not understand the attitude of the American Delegation on the point of rotation, for it appears they have lost sight of our Continent, preoccupied only with an accord among the great Powers, who quickly would involve the United States in the belligerent systems which they represent. The American spirit of magnanimity is evident in the organization of the Pan American Bureau, in which the vote of the United States with her 80 million population is equivalent to that of Panama or Honduras. The American delegation at The Hague is now deviating most surprisingly from that spirit.

In closing, Nabuco congratulated Rui for the brilliance with which he defended the equality of sovereign states and their equal right to permanent representation in any institution founded by the Hague Conference. However, Nabuco was evidently afraid his remarks would be misconstrued and he appended a postscript to explain that his remarks about equality of sovereign states of different sizes did not apply to parliaments and tribunals, where the law of proportion must be respected.

As the conference wore on, Nabuco became more and more concerned about the situation at The Hague. Rui's "triumphs" were being proclaimed around the world, and Nabuco felt there would be a reaction and Brazil might be the loser in the long run:

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
We noisily triumph, with bursts of fireworks and rockets. Diplomatic victories must be very modest in order not to disgrace the vanquished. There has already been much shouting about the "defeat" of Drago by Ruy; now they will shout about that of the United States! Rui has filled a most brilliant role, but he would be the first to desire that during the rest of the Conference not the least resentment arises between us and the United States. Our grudge might be settled, but at what cost.  

Nabuco was concerned for the future of Brazilian-American relations, and the ambiguity of Brazil's stance:  

Our interest is a quasi alliance with the United States, a perfect accord. A Brazil supported by American friendship would be a much more secure field. . . . I sympathize very much with the difficult position of Ruy, faced with the accord of the great Powers in the proposal, which he feels forced by national dignity to combat. But since we would not be able to prevent the fact of unanimity if it were to be done without us, protesting the entire project in the name of equality of sovereign States is tenuous on our part, because we aspire to be counted among those selected. I do not attach as much importance to the composition of the Prize Court, as to that of the Court of Arbitration.  

It became obvious that the Hague Conference was going to last much longer than Nabuco had anticipated and he began to make plans to return to his post in Washington, even before it ended, if necessary. However, he felt that it was absolutely essential that he see Rui before he left Europe. He wanted to reassure Rui of the good intentions of the American government at the conference and to hear directly from Rui the story of his relations with the Amer-  

40 Nabuco to Gurgel do Amaral, Bad Langenschwalbach, September 5, 1907, AJN.  

41 Undated, unaddressed letter fragment in Nabuco's hand, with notation, "Not sent," also in Nabuco's hand. This fragment was very likely originally written as a part of the above letter to Amaral (see footnote 40).
ican delegation which apparently contradicted those intentions. Nabuco wished to discern whether or not Rui was satisfied with the attitude of the Americans, or if there had been any misunderstanding in relation to their attitude. He wanted to meet Rui in Paris, but said he would come to The Hague, if necessary, to talk with him.  

Rui was very busy and apparently did not relish a meeting with Nabuco, where the seasoned diplomat would certainly pressure Rui to settle his differences with the United States delegation. He did not respond to Nabuco for eleven days, then sent a cable apologizing for the delay. Rui gave the excuse that he was very busy and felt that Brazil's position was becoming more and more tenuous in relation to the court project. He reported that the American proposal had been defeated by the unanimity of the Latin American nations in opposition to it. He said there were new attempts being made to revive the project, but that the Brazilian government was unalterably opposed to a court based on inequality of representation. Rui told Nabuco that public opinion in Rio was really stirred up over the question and that Rio-Branco had admirably supported him in the matter. He was so busy with daily committees and conferences that he could not go to Paris to meet Nabuco.  

42Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. See also Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 106, September 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.  

43Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
However, before Nabuco received Rui's wire, he cabled that he was going to Paris and would be awaiting word there from Rui. He also praised Rui's efforts which he said had caused Brazil to be practically considered one of the great powers. Nabuco felt that only the strong opposition of the other Latin American nations would prevent the United States from supporting Brazil for a position in the same category as the United States.

Rui agreed with Nabuco that Brazil needed support in the stand against the United States and he was pleased that many nations were siding with Brazil during this decisive phase of the conference. Rui felt that Brazilian public opinion would take pride in the decisive role of Brazil, and in a cable to Rio-Branco he proudly referred to Nabuco's comment that Brazil was being treated as a great power.

Despite the crucial point in the conference deliberations, Rui finally met with Nabuco in Brussels. Rui went to that city on official business, and Nabuco came from Paris to see him. Rui was relieved to have a brief respite from the conference deliberations and gave Nabuco a first-hand account of events at The Hague to that date.

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44 Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, September 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
45 Ibid.
46 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 95, September 7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
47 Nabuco to Rui, Paris, September 13, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; Nabuco to Virgílio Gordilho, note on back of calling card, Paris, September 14, 1907, AJN; Nabuco to
Following his meeting with Rui at Brussels, Nabuco went to London on September 21st, from whence he departed for New York on the 24th. While Nabuco was in London, Rui sent him a number of documents pertaining to the conference and brought him up to date on the latest happenings at The Hague.\(^\text{48}\) Nabuco felt that with the materials and the first-hand report from Rui, he better understood the situation and the reason for Brazil's stance at the conference. He wrote Rui that on the basis of these documents, cable traffic at the embassy, and conversations with his contacts in Washington and with Gurgel do Amaral (Brazilian chargé in his absence),

I believe the letters of Choate and other American delegates attempt to make Brazil the scapegoat of the Conference in the eyes of President Roosevelt and American public opinion. With the documents you sent me I can proceed to demonstrate the spirit which animated us.\(^\text{49}\)

Immediately upon his return to Washington, Nabuco set about to neutralize the anti-Brazilian feeling there.

He continued to worry about the repercussions of the Hague conference.\(^\text{\footnote{48}Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.}\(^\text{\footnote{49}Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.}\)
Peace Conference, and its effect on Brazilian-American relations. Nabuco feared that Brazil's perceived success had caused her to temporarily forget her dependence on the United States. At times the Brazilians seemed to think that Brazil, and not the United States, was the greater power.  

Nabuco was very disheartened by the Hague Peace Conference, and felt that his efforts in Washington were all in vain and that politically, he had no real reason to remain as ambassador. He pessimistically wrote to Graça Aranha:

The Hague undid all of my work, which I never considered permanent anyway. In international relations, as with people, friendship depends on a continual exchange of sympathy and a perfect communion of sentiment. The press there /Rio/ has represented the Conference as a duel between Brazil and the United States, terminating in our noisy victory. It has placed Root in a contradictory position. . . . Nabuco decried the fact that for a while the impression of the conference affected Brazilian sympathy for the United States, but he believed that soon the mood would pass, and after the planned reception for the American Naval fleet in Rio, the situation would return to the idyllic one which existed during Secretary Root's visit. Nabuco felt that the saga of The Hague was an abberation, a mistake of Mr. Choate, made while Root was very sick.

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50 Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, Washington, January 7, 1908, AJN.
51 Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, December 5, 1907, AJN.
52 Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29, 1907, AJN.
53 Ibid.
Nabuco was of the opinion that Rui deserved recognition for the long months at The Hague where he was "always fresh and ready to fight" for the rights of Brazil. To Rio-Branco he wrote a long letter suggesting that a great reception be prepared for Rui upon his return to Brazil. Nabuco felt that all Brazilians could take pride in the reputation of a cultured nation which Rui had created for Brazil. 54

Nabuco also congratulated Rui on his brilliant defense of the principle of absolute equality of all states in international organizations. On the other hand, the Brazilian ambassador to Washington did not personally agree with that principle because he faced the same situation in the Bureau of American Republics where the island of Santo Domingo, with two nations, had more value than Brazil. 55 Nabuco felt that Brazil had taken the position she did at The Hague in self defense, but lest she feel it had really magnified her position, it should be remembered that she had not gained anything more than had Haiti and Santo Domingo. He was convinced that the only real gain made by Brazil at the conference was the reputation she had gained of a cultured nation. 56

Although Nabuco was aware that Rio-Branco was closely orchestrating Rui's performance at The Hague (see

54 Nabuco to Rui, Washington, October 22, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; draft of the letter in AJN.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
below, especially page 166), he persisted in flattering Rui and giving him credit for any accomplishments at the conference. Nabuco was motivated by friendship with Rui, by a desire to boost Brazil through her conference delegate, and by a hope that Rui's new popularity and political ambitions would somehow distract Rio-Branco from his anti-American stance. Thus with this tactic of promoting Rui, Nabuco hoped to simultaneously boost Brazilian prestige, begin restoration of the special Brazilian-American relationship, and repay Rio-Branco for his attempt to undermine Nabuco's position and influence in Washington.

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There has been disagreement over the amount of freedom that Rui was allowed in the making of decisions relative to Brazil's posture at the Hague Conference. Opinion has ranged from the assumption that Rui single-handedly made the decisions, to the assertion that all decisions were made in Rio. Graça Aranha, as a functionary of the Foreign Ministry,

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Contemporary opinion was also divided over the issue. Hilário de Gouveia reported, "The stance of Rui at the Hague Conference has made a great impression here, some attributing everything to Rui, others to Rio Branco, depending upon their particular sympathies." Hilário to Nabuco, Rio, September 3, 1907, AJN.

See Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa, pp. 89-90; Freyre, Ordem e Progresso, I, p. 236; Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 381-85; and Accioly, "O Barão do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferência da Haia," pp. 64-68. Rio-Branco and Rui themselves gave different versions at different times and under various circumstances. For example: (1) Rio-Branco in a speech to a group of students said that the work of the conference was done by Rui, and he only exchanged ideas with him and transmitted the ideas of the president on different questions. Rio-Branco, speech, Rio, December 28, 1907,
try in Rio, observed that portion of the Hague drama at close range and offered this opinion of Rui's contributions:

There is nothing original in the stance of Rui at the Conference. He has done nothing more than polish and amplify the orders and ideas of Rio Branco. . . . He has sent to The Hague all of the true feelings of his antipathy at the Conference, all of his secret thoughts on the question of arbitration and on the collection of public debts. The telegrams which are sent to Rui are decisive, definite, and detailed. . . . Rui shall have an ostentatious reception for having developed the ideas of Rio-Branco and for being the "paladin" of the weak and overwhelmed nations at the Conference. What a comedy!59

What is readily apparent is that there was a great deal of communication between Rio-Branco and Rui as is attested by the large volume of telegraphic communications between the two during the conference.60 Cables were exchanged on an almost daily basis, often with several sent on

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59 Graça Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, August 19, 1907, AJN. Graça can not be considered a completely impartial observer, since he worked closely with Rio-Branco and he felt that Rui had taken the appointment which rightfully belonged to his close friend, Nabuco.

60 There are 184 numbered telegrams (numbers 1-176, with some numbers duplicated) from Rio-Branco and 144 (numbers 1-142, with some numbers duplicated) from Rui, with additional unnumbered cables bringing the total to at least 377. See CRB, Haia Pasta VII through XIII, and XX. Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 119, erroneously sets the number at "nearly 175 telegrams exchanged between them."
the same day. Rui was so accustomed to daily contact with Rio-Branco, that when on one occasion he did not receive a telegram from the foreign minister for three days, he became extremely agitated and cabled several friends in Rio requesting their aid in determining the reason for the silence. 61

Before his departure from Rio, Rui had received a great deal of information and instructions on the anticipated subjects of debate at the Second Hague Conference. 62 This, combined with information sent from Washington, and monographs from Rui's extensive personal collection, provided the Brazilian representative with ample material for study before the conference and reference material during the conference. During the deliberations at The Hague, Rio-Branco quite often cabled instructions to Rui by referring to the appropriate page in one of the volumes of works on international law. 63

From the opening of the conference Rui followed his instructions, only asking for clarification in certain

61 See above, pp. 153-55.

62 See, for example, the following 22-page letter: Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 21, 1907, AHI, 273/3/1; and the following telegrams from Rio-Branco to Rui: no. 1 (June 11, 1907), no. 2 (June 11), no. 3 (June 11), and no. 5 (June 12), CRB, Haia Pasta VII.

63 See, for example, Rio-Branco to Rui, no. 3 (June 11, 1907), no. 4 (June 12), no. 31 (July 16), CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
On one occasion during this early part of the conference, Rui failed to follow Rio-Branco's instructions. The foreign minister immediately brought the failure to Rui's attention, but assumed that Rui had made his speech before the arrival of the telegram from Rio. Before long, Rui began to develop a plan of his own, which was submitted to, and approved by Rio-Branco. Rui shared his plan with Buchanan of the American delegation before submitting it to the conference. The Americans requested that he not introduce the plan. Rui felt "very isolated" on the question and requested "an urgent reply" from Rio-Branco as to whether or not he should present the project.

Rio was very upset about the American proposal for selecting judges for the International Court, which placed Brazil in a category with the very small nations. Rio-Branco shared Rui's concern about the proposal and instructed the Brazilian chargé in Washington to see Root in an attempt to prevent introduction of the American plan. It gave Rui great satisfaction to know that Rio-Branco was in

64 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 27, July 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

65 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 35, July 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII.

66 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 11, July 14, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

67 Ibid.

68 Rio Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 52, August 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX. Also, see above, Chapter V, pp. 105-07.
complete accord with him in reference to the American proposal.69 Rio-Branco agreed that Brazil must defend herself, but tempered his response by instructing Rui to defend the Brazilian position in such a way that it would not be impossible for Brazil to agree to a different proposal if their own ideas did not win out.70

Rio-Branco was disposed to retain complete control of Brazil's position at the Hague Conference. However, as early as June 19th he had allowed Rui sufficient discretion to survey the situation and to proceed in the manner that he felt was most in the national interest:

You, being the first delegate, are the second in command and all the personnel are under your direction. The communications of the delegation to the government are to be made by you. You have ample powers so that, in view of the situation there and of the advantages, to always maintain the best relations with the other governments; above all the United States, Chile, England, Germany, Italy, France; and to proceed as it appears most advantageous to the interests of the nation.71

Rio-Branco also recognized that the delegate on the scene often had a better grasp of the situation than the government in Rio. In reference to one proposal to be presented at the conference, Rio-Branco gave Rui the option of executing the plan he had proposed, or of remaining silent. "Whichever of these two decisions you take will be accepted

69 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 35, August 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
70 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 65, August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
71 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 12, June 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, trans. supplied.
by us as the most correct."  

In the discussions relating to the Court of Arbitration, Rio-Branco reminded Rui of the powers conceded to him earlier, then gave him three possible courses of action, leaving it to Rui to adopt what he considered the best course. Despite this concession Rio-Branco still listed the choices in the order of preference, intimating that it would be preferable for Rui to select the course most favored by the Brazilian government. Rui however preferred Rio-Branco's second choice, which he modified slightly. Rui felt that Brazil should maintain the position of supporting the equality of sovereign states, which he had assumed. He requested the government's permission to modify the proposal and he explained that his reasons for this choice were: to maintain the friendship of the Hispanic-American countries, to satisfy his conscience, and to satisfy public opinion. Rio-Branco's second proposal was to defend the organization of the Permanent Court as provided by the First Hague Conference in 1899. One of the provisions approved by that conference was that each of the member nations, regardless

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72 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 25, July 14, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation supplied.

73 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 71, August 12, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.

74 Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 83, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

75 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 53, August 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
of size or power, had equal rights in appointing judges to
the court. 76

Rui continued to insist that Brazil defend the ju-
ridical equality of states in international organizations. 77
Rio-Branco finally agreed to discuss the matter in detail
with President Pena. After the consultation, the Baron ca-
bled the government's permission for Rui to continue to de-
fend the principle of the equality of sovereign states. 78
Rio-Branco then sent two telegrams analyzing Rui's proposal
in detail, and telling him, paragraph by paragraph, what was
acceptable. 79

There continued to be a great deal of discussion, by
cable, between Rui and Rio-Branco on the principle of equal-
ity of sovereign states, especially in reference to the se-
lection of judges for a permanent court. The foreign minis-
ter allowed Rui to defend the principle for the time being,
but Rio-Branco was prepared to abandon it at the proper
time. Rui continued to insist that Brazil must defend that

76 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 52, August 4,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 79,
August 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; and Rio-Branco to Rui,
Rio, no. 83, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

77 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 67 (August 24,
1907), no. 68 (August 24), no. 69 (August 25), CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.

78 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 113, August 25, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 116,
August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.

79 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 118, August 26, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 119,
August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
position to the end, and that they could not lose, even if the proposal were defeated. Rio-Branco finally instructed Rui to abandon the principle of equality and to vote for the American proposal for the permanent court. Rui strongly protested the order, declaring that Rio-Branco did not understand the actual situation at The Hague. Rui believed it was futile to vote for the project, as both Scott and Buchanan had told him the proposal would be abandoned. Rui said, however, that he would reluctantly comply with the instructions of the government:

I shall comply with the instructions, but I know it will be a great error. If the American project were to be defeated or withdrawn, we would have the victory because it would disappear from the field of combat, defeated by our unique principle. That is the unanimous opinion here.

Rio-Branco was persuaded by Rui's appeal, and again gave Rui permission to proceed in the way that he deemed most advantageous to Brazilian interests.

Rio-Branco continued to go along with Rui up to a point, but would not give Rui permission to maintain his

80 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 79, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 80, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 130, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

81 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 132, September 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

82 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 88, September 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

83 Ibid.

84 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 134, September 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
position indefinitely. Rui continued to insist that Brazil should maintain her stance, saying that they would change from winners to losers if it were abandoned. Rui said he was absolutely sure of his position and he further stated that only the support of Brazil was saving the principle of equality of nations. He also expressed the opinion that the Americans would be satisfied with the victory of the principle of equality and that there was no support for the other Brazilian position, which Rio-Branco favored.  

* * * 

Rui attracted a certain amount of attention to himself by his support of the principle of equality of nations and his refusal to support the United States' stand on the selection of judges for the court of arbitration. Rui's speech in opposition to the American proposal was widely printed in the international press and drew a letter of praise from H. Moulin, professor of International Law at the French University of Dijon. A special correspondent for several United States newspapers was sent from London for an interview with Rui. The reporter declared to Rui that the general opinion of the American people supported his position, and that he intended to correct the earlier erroneous  

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85 Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 112, September 21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

86 H. Moulin to Rui, Dijon, France, September 11, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII. There were many requests for copies of this speech (see Haia Pasta XXV).
report of the Herald correspondent.\textsuperscript{87} In Rui's notable speech of October 9th (see above Chapter VI, pp. 136-37) he unequivocally supported the principle of equality of sovereign states, and absolutely rejected any possibility of compromise.\textsuperscript{88} However, Rui did not receive permission from Rio-Branco to assume that inflexible stance until the eve of the speech.\textsuperscript{89} Nabuco, for his part, disagreed with this Brazilian position because it was in conflict with his goal of Brazilian-American friendship.

The renewed friendship of Rui and Nabuco continued in spite of the circumstances surrounding the selection of Rui as the Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Peace Conference and the conflicts between the Brazilian and American Hague delegations. During the conference, out of patriotism and friendship, they continued to cooperate with each other and with Rio-Branco for the good of Brazil.\textsuperscript{90} Rio-Branco, despite repeated assurances to Rui of his freedom of choice, maintained firm control over Brazil's position at The Hague, including many details. He made most of the apparent con-

\textsuperscript{87}Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 102 /A, September 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

\textsuperscript{88}Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 147-56.

\textsuperscript{89}Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 125, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 163, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.

\textsuperscript{90}Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 30, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco, draft located in Pasta J. Nabuco; Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, XXVI; and Rui to Nabuco, Rio, November 12, 1908, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. See also Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, pp. 86-87.
cessions to Rui in order to prevent the resignation of the Brazilian delegate. However, Rio-Branco finally did allow Rui to defend the principle of equality of states to the end of the conference. Despite their differences of opinion over Brazil's stance at the Second Hague Conference, the three Brazilian statesmen continued to cooperate in the interest of patriotism, and they publicly continued to show a great respect for each other.

The following chapter will describe Rio-Branco's efforts to enhance the self-image of Brazil and will show Nabuco's endeavors to prevent Brazilian national pride from creating a permanent break with the United States.
CHAPTER VIII
NURTURING A NATIONAL IMAGE

During the Second Hague Peace Conference there had been an outburst of anti-American sentiment in the Brazilian press, and the American consul in Pernambuco reported that it began with the manipulation of news dispatches from The Hague, but soon broadened into a more general antipathy toward the United States.¹

In Brazil the subject of the Hague Conference was greatly exaggerated, especially the role of Rui Barbosa. The press presented Rui as the dominant intellect of the conference, and proclaimed recognition of that fact by the leading newspapers of Europe and the United States. Stead’s Courrier de la Conférence was given the same credence as such papers as the London Times and Le Figaro, and was widely quoted to support an exaggerated role for Rui. The Brazilian press especially played up their delegate’s antagonism to Choate, and used that as a pretext to arouse distinct ill feeling against the United States.²

Nabuco, Rui and Rio-Branco all cooperated during the

¹George Chamberlin (American Consul) to Assistant Secretary of State, Pernambuco, October [i.e. September] 24, 1907, DS, 1113/5.
²Ibid.
conference to increase Brazilian prestige. Nabuco withdrew from the limelight during the conference, happy to see Brazil boosted, but fearing an end to the special relationship with the United States. By his absence he disassociated himself from the anti-American stance, in hopes that he could later repair any damage. Rui accepted all the credit for Brazil's position at the conference, although it was dictated by Rio-Branco. Rui was entirely willing to cooperate with Rio-Branco in order to boost his own prestige at home and abroad. Rio-Branco boosted Brazil (and incidentally Rui) at the expense of the United States, while at the same time undercutting Nabuco's position.

The Brazilian populace was convinced that as a result of the conference, Brazil's international status was increased and their country had become recognized as the ninth power in the world and as a spokesman for all the smaller nations. The credit for this achievement was given to the Brazilian government, especially Rio-Branco, and to Rui Barbosa, Brazilian advocate before the world powers. After the conference Rio-Branco reversed the anti-American stance of the Brazilian press, protesting that the disagreements at the conference had been between the leaders of the respective delegations and not between the two countries. Nabuco supported and encouraged this renewal of friendship and did all he would to minimize the damage from the conference to Brazilian-American relations. Rui, for his part, reverted to his independent stance, refusing to cooperate in
repairing the damage. He really seemed to believe the Brazilian press reports of his exploits and his victories over the representatives of the great powers. He felt he had taken a stand based on principle and refused to compromise. He believed he had gained national and international recognition, and he was not about to do anything he felt would diminish his prestige at home.

Rio-Branco was the person most responsible for the Brazilian public opinion toward the conference, as he personally edited the telegrams and commentary from The Hague, preparing the information for release to the press.³

An example of the exaggerated importance given to the role of Brazil and her representative at The Hague can be seen in the following excerpt from a Rio newspaper:

An occasion of pride to all Brazilians should be the attitude assumed by the eminent chief of our delegation at The Hague in relation to our position in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, being the Anglo-German-American project.

Thus at this moment all political attention in the world is turned to the figure of our glorious Ambassador, who took the initiative, in accord with our eminent Minister of Foreign Relations, of championing for the nations of the American continent the respect due to their independence and sovereignty.

The Brazilian proposal formulated by Mr. Ruy Barbosa is a proof of the civilization of our country, of our high judicial spirit, of the conscience with which we serve the grandeur of the American name. The Hague Conference gave us the opportunity to call the attention of the world to our country, whose great political

³Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 382-83; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 41, July 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 42, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
and moral progress found in the genius of Mr. Ruy Barbosa its most admirable exponent. 4

Among the great number of exaggerated press comments published in Rio at this time, there appeared only one paper with a more balanced view of the situation at The Hague:

The classification of Brazil as a power of the fifth order, the classification proposed to the Hague Conference, is going to arouse many people from a sleep to which the majority of our population were being put by the telegrams from over there.

Evidently with the news items which are coming to us from The Hague it is happening that a great part of the public is being misled. . . . To them it appears that the labors of the Peace Conference consist principally of listening to what Mr. Ruy Barbosa says. The rest is secondary.

Now, when one reads the European journals, he is filled with wonder at the contrast. They speak, it is true, of the work of our representatives, but speak of them modestly and only occasionally.

. . . . Those who are unacquainted with the rest of the labors of the Peace Conference are likewise believing that there the entire world turns to make obeisance to Brazil. For them the exact representation of that meeting would be that of a numerous group of the most eminent men of all countries, listening open-mouthed and awe-struck, to the interminable discourses of Mr. Ruy Barbosa. The picture appears to them worthy of being hung alongside that of the gospel which depicts our Lord as a child amongst the doctors.

Yet nothing is more untrue. 5

The article then explains that other countries obtained results at the conference by quiet diplomacy, rather than by noisy speeches. Then it continues:

And this quiet diplomacy is what the unmeasured pride of our Ambassador would never permit him to do. Lulled by the music of his own words, accustomed to being treated as an infallible pontiff, he goes on orating and perorating indefatigably, while others devote them-

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4"Tribunal de Arbitragem," A Tribuna, August 23, 1907.

5"Ordem do Dia," A Notícia, August 22, 1907.
selves to tasks less spectacular but infinitely more useful and affording more practical results for the nations whom they represent.

Fortunately, however, the case which is now throwing us into consternation will perhaps not have bad results. For while the speeches of Mr. Ruy Barbosa may be noisily going on, the silent diplomacy of our chancery will, through the execution of telegraphic instructions, do all that may be possible to correct the ridiculous classification. If this should be accomplished the ingenuous will believe that all was accomplished for the most part by some interminable memorial or prolix speech of our Ambassador.6

In light of the situation in Rio, the American ambassador cabled the following to Washington: "Exaggerated importance role of Brazil at The Hague prevalent, susceptibilities hurt, the United States blamed, feeling probably transient but worth quieting."7 Dudley reported that Rui was the theme of seventy-five percent of the telegrams published in Rio from The Hague, and that A Notícia was the only paper not daily eulogizing his work.8

President Roosevelt thought that something should be said to placate Brazil regarding the United States' position on the Court of Arbitration. The Department of State

6 Ibid. A Notícia apparently was the only newspaper which did not follow the official line of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The editor of A Notícia blamed the over-emphasis on the actions of Rui on Rio-Branco's practice of releasing cables from The Hague directly to his friend at O Jornal do Comércio. The other papers, aware of O Jornal's source, closely echoed the sentiments of that very influential paper. See A Notícia, August 22, 1907; Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, July 16, 1906, DS, 113/2; and Griscom to Root, Petrópolis, October 13, 1906, DS, 1070/5. Also see above Chapter II, pages 50-52.

7 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, August 26, 1907, DS, 40/476; a copy of the same is: DS, 40/480.

8 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, August 26, DS, 40/476.
drafted a statement to be sent to Rio-Branco on the subject and submitted it to Root at Muldoon's Sanatorium for his approval. Root endorsed the statement, after adding a paragraph, and it was cabled to Dudley for delivery to the Brazilian foreign minister. The final text of the cable to the American embassy in Rio is as follows:

Tell Minister for foreign affairs emphatically: quote: From the beginning of the Hague conference the delegates of the United States have in pursuance of their instructions bent every effort to secure satisfactory representation of all our countries in the desired permanent court. The influence of the sieter republics of the American hemisphere has all been thrown in this direction.

It is hardly necessary to say that any plan proposed which might be justly distasteful to Brazil could not for that reason be entirely satisfactory to the United-States.

At the same time, although we of the American nations can arrange our own conferences exactly as we wish, stil, at the Hague, we must all yield something to European views when consistent with our dignity and interests. Unless we did this we should have to dissociate ourselves entirely from the Hague and its progressive efforts for world-wide peace and harmony.

The proposal to require that each country shall name a permanent member of the court is equivalent to defeating the proposed court in which we are much interested not for our own special benefit but upon general public grounds. We hope Brazil will not insist upon such a position but will agree to some plan which involves no discrimination against American nations and no derogation from the sovereignty of any but proceeds upon some basis by which the selection of a reasonable number of judges may be accomplished. It would be most unfortunate if the opposition of American republics were to

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9 Adee to Root, Washington, September 1, 1907, DS, 40/no number; Root to Dudley, Washington, September 3, 1907, DS, 40/437; and Adee to Choate, Washington, September 6, 1906, i.e., 1907, DS, 40/445. Only the first line of the above cable was coded. Since the wire was in plain text it was easily copied by the Brazilian "Secret Service" and sent to Rio-Branco. Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 134 bis, i.e., 134A, September 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII, partially encoded, translation supplied.
prevent a practical result for the good of mankind to which European nations equal in population consent.10

Rio-Branco gave his reply in an interview with Dudley and in a subsequent memorandum.11 Rio-Branco persistently argued that the differences were between Brazil and the American Hague delegation, rather than between the two governments. Rio-Branco was evidently distressed primarily because Brazil was not consulted during the preparation of the court project and was taken aback by the low rank assigned her.12 The foreign minister was convinced that Choate was hostile to Brazil and repeatedly criticized the attitude of the leading United States delegate at The Hague.13 Rio-Branco was against establishment of a court of arbitration, preferring to submit questions of arbitration to the head of a government.14 Apparently Rio-Branco was

10 Root to Dudley, Wash., Sep. 3, 1907, DS, 40/437.

11 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 6, 1907, DS 40/444; and Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.

12 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.

13 Ibid. Rio-Branco's conviction seemed to be justified when he received news from The Hague that Choate had purposely omitted Rui's name from a list of judges he considered qualified to serve as members of the proposed court. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 89, September 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 7, 1907, DS, 40/446; and Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, no. 17, September 6, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp. Rio-Branco then instructed Amaral to verbally deliver a protest to Root over the omission of Rui's name from Choate's list. Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, no. 18, September 6, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.

14 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
reluctant to depart from the method of arbitration he had used so effectively in delineating the boundaries of his country.

Despite the disagreement over organization of the proposed court, Rio-Branco maintained a "most friendly spirit" in his conversations with the American ambassador. Rio-Branco said that Brazil was most anxious to maintain cordial relations with the United States. He also expressed the opinion that they had the common bond of both being suspected by the Spanish-American countries of a design to conquer some of their territory or establish some form of protectorate over them.15

Ambassador Dudley was convinced that Brazil's support of the equality of sovereign states at The Hague was a pretext to cover her true opposition to the Court of Arbitration based on her unfair classification as a fifth-rate power:

I had a conversation with Dr. da Cunha, of the Peru-Brazilian Mixed Commission, an intimate friend and counsel of Baron do Rio Branco. He told me that the sole explanation of Brazil's opposition to the Tribunal has been what is considered the unfair classification of that country, an action which is not attributed to you or the President, but to our delegation at the Hague acting under instructions which, it is surmised, did not specifically cover this detail. He further said that the violation of the equality of nations charged to be involved in the classification was an afterthought and a pretext. That objection, it is admitted, has been met by the amendment, but there is aversion to accepting it

15Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Dudley, memorandum, September 5, 1907, DS, 40/542.
upon other grounds.  

Despite the message from Root which Dudley carried to Rio-Branco on September 5th, the press in Rio continued to keep the controversy alive by publishing articles from American newspapers sympathetic to Rui's viewpoint, and by reprinting the offensive and slurring references to Brazil which had appeared in the New York Herald.  

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During the conference Nabuco was very concerned about Brazilian-American relations and he was happy to see that Rui began by supporting the United States. However, as the relations cooled between the two delegations he became increasingly alarmed. Because of the length of the conference, it was necessary for Nabuco to return to Washington before the deliberations ended, but he met personally with Rui before departing for Europe. He wanted to hear the story first-hand to be able, if possible, to help repair any damage to Brazilian-American friendship. Nabuco was pleased about the publicity Rui and Brazil had received from the conference, but he wondered at what cost it had been

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16 Postscript, dated September 14, 1907, to Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.

17 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, October 14, 1907, DS, 2098/69.

18 Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, June 29, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.

19 Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Nabuco to Rui, Paris, September 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta XVII; and Nabuco to Rui, Wimerux, The Netherlands, September 17, 1907, CRB, Pasta XVII.
Nabuco resumed his duties as ambassador on October 2, 1907.21 Rio-Branco was anxious to convince him that Brazil had been forced to take the position finally assumed at the conference, "because the dignity of the nation was in jeopardy."22 He urged Nabuco to examine the correspondence at the embassy to verify that fact.23 Rio-Branco felt that, after calm reflection, the United States would recognize that Brazil was proceeding in good faith at the conference and that the American representatives at The Hague were damaging the hemispheric policy of Roosevelt and Root.24

Rio-Branco had concluded that the misunderstanding was with the American delegation at the conference, and not with President Roosevelt and Secretary Root, who had both continued to manifest friendship toward Brazil.25 The Brazilian foreign minister felt that there was no need for the Brazilian government or people to change their attitude

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20 Nabuco to Rodrigo Octávio, Wiesbaden, August 7, 1907, AJN. See above, Chapter VII, pp. 159-62.

21 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, New York, October 3, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Robert Bacon (Acting Secretary of State), Washington, October 8, 1907, DS, 4737/5.

22 Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Petrópolis, October 13, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.; and Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
toward the United States because of the events at The Hague. Rio-Branco was convinced that the friendship between the two countries would not be affected by these events, and he told American Ambassador Dudley that Root knew that Rui, like himself and Nabuco, was a sincere friend of the United States.²⁶ In reference to the United States, Rio-Branco said,

Our policy toward that country is unchanged, despite Choate and the approval which that unfortunate delegation received in the message. To us that delegation was unfaithful to the Pan American policy followed since Blaine and affirmed on various occasions by President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.²⁷

Nabuco also chose to believe that Brazil's quarrel had been with the American delegation, and not with the government. He continued to believe in the good will of Root, a personal friend:

What a great man, what a good friend! The story of The Hague was an abberation, a gaffe of Mr. Choate alone, at a time when Mr. Root found himself almost incapacitated because of great fatigue, which is still visible today in his changed expression.²⁸

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²⁶ Ibid.; Dudley, however, was dubious about Rio-Branco's denial of anti-American motives, but said that, "Nevertheless the denial discloses a pleasing anxiety to defend and save unimpaired the cordial understanding between the United States and Brazil brought about by Secretary Root's visit to this country." Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, August 26, 1907, DS, 40/476. Dudley could not understand Rio-Branco's insistence that the Brazilian disagreement was only with the U.S. Hague delegation and not with the U.S. government. Rio-Branco to Dudley, memo, Rio, September 5, 1907, DS, 40/541; and Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.

²⁷ Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, no. 1, January ²², 1907 i.e., 1908, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.

²⁸ Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29, 1907, AJN.
Nabuco was anxious to see Root and clear up any misunderstanding arising out of the conference. Unfortunately he would not be able to talk with the secretary of state until he returned from his trip to Mexico on October 19th. However, knowing Root's sympathy toward Brazil, and his stature in the government, he did not think the discord between the two conference delegations would leave any resentment.29

Privately, Nabuco was not so optimistic. He felt that Brazil had been excessively preoccupied with her own position at The Hague and had taken the situation too seriously. He said, "We are the only nation which is impassioned over The Hague."30 Nabuco was so pessimistic that he told Graça Aranha that, as far as foreign policy was concerned, there was no reason for him to continue in his post. He believed that the conference had undone all of his work in Washington. He realized that the friendship between Brazil and the United States depended upon mutual respect and cooperation. He was distressed that the Rio press had represented the conference as a duel between the two countries, terminating in a Brazilian victory.31 He even came to the point where he believed that Brazilian-American relations had been so altered that it would have been better if there

29Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, October 5, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 162, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.

30Nabuco to Tobias Monteiro, Washington, October 9, 1907, AJN.

31Nabuco to Graça Aranha, Washington, December 5, 1907, AJN.
had been no conference:

In reference to The Hague, it would have been better if there had not been a Conference. It caused a great confusion in our ideas and made us forget for a while that there is only one possible foreign policy. The American Delegation was much rebuked; Choate does not have the ideals of Root in respect to our Continent, but at the first blow to us Root intervened. The more quickly we forget this incident, which however served to enhance the Brilliance of Ruy, the better for us. At times, it appears that we are the Great Power and the United States is the small one.32

Even before he was able to speak with Root, Nabuco began to make preparations for giving him assurances of Brazil's friendship with the United States. The ambassador sent a personal cable to Rio-Branco informing him that Edith Root, daughter of the secretary of state, would marry on November 27th. Nabuco's wife was planning to leave London on November 2nd to return to Washington and Nabuco suggested that she could bring a small wedding gift for the bride-to-be, "if you wish to give Root this proof of friendship."33 Rio-Branco approved of the idea and Nabuco sent the gift with an accompanying note:

Dear Miss Root,

I have received from Baron do Rio Branco to hand you in the name of the Brazilian Government, the accompanying little souvenir to remind you, on your wedding day, of the interest our people feels [sic] in your future happiness.

The fact that you marry the grandson of General Grant, whose name is cherished among us by the proofs he gave us of his friendship, makes the wedding doubly memorable to us.

32 Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, Washington, January 7, 1908, AJN.

33 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, personal, Washington, October 23, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.
With my best wishes believe me Yours very truely, Joaquim Nabuco

While Nabuco in Washington was working to restore the Brazilian-American pre-conference cordial relations, Ambassador Dudley in Rio observed that the controversy surrounding the debates on the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague had affected relations between the two countries, but he believed the effect to be temporary.  

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The "fame" of Rui, as trumpeted by the Brazilian press and in paid magazine articles, preceded Rui to Paris, Salvador, and Rio. At each of these places he received a welcome fit for a conquering hero. Rui revelled in the adulations of his countrymen and acted as if he believed the reports that he alone had defied the great powers of the world in the name of Brazil and had been victorious.

Following the peace conference Rui went to Paris, where he was warmly received by the Brazilian colony. The celebration there in the Hotel Continental on October 31st was highlighted by a discourse by the Brazilian minister in Paris. After Rui responded to the speech, he was presented with a large bronze statue representing Glory crowning

34 Nabuco to Edith Root, Washington, November 9, 1907, AJN.

35 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, October 14, 1907, DS, 2098/69.
The symbolism of the gift could hardly have been more appropriate, for the Brazilians had always considered Rui to be a genius, and now they felt he had brought glory and honor to Brazil by his role at The Hague. This was to be only the first of several receptions during the course of his triumphant return to Brazil, culminating in the gala celebration in Rio. During this period the Rio press referred to Rui as, "The Eagle of The Hague," and the epithet was echoed with pride by the Brazilian populace.

In 1907 Rui's name was still remembered in connection with the Encilhamento, which he was accused of causing by his actions as finance minister nearly twenty years before. It was widely believed that his role at The Hague was calculated to improve his popular image, and he was accused by the American consul in Pernambuco of trying to attain this goal at the expense of the good relations with the

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37 On the return voyage there was a jubilant celebration in his native Salvador, Bahia, after a port call in Pernambuco. A planned stop in Lisbon, including an audience with the king, was cancelled because Rui's wife injured her foot in a fall. "O Maior Dos Brasileiros," A Bahia, December 28, 1907; "O Embaixador Ruy Barbosa," Diário da Bahia, December 29, 1907, i.e., 1907/; Rui to Conselheiro Lampreia, Paris, December 12, 1907; and Rui to Brazilian Minister in Lisbon, Paris, December 12, 1907.

38 The Encilhamento was a period of inflation and easy credit, fuelled by speculation, which produced bogus companies and unsound finance. This period of financial instability began in Brazil soon after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889, and reached its peak in 1898. Burns, A History of Brazil, pp. 212, 223.
Public opinion in Brazil was being prepared by Rio-Branco for a great demonstration in Rui's honor, upon his return from Europe—a popular saying at the time was, "Brazil was discovered at The Hague." Part of this preparation was the exaggeration of his exploits and, coincidentally, the denigration of the American stance. An example of the propaganda is the following material, excerpted from William Stead's Courrier, which appeared in the Jornal do Comércio on October 14th:

'But of all the two hundred and twenty-five delegates, the man who caused the most profound impression was Dr. Ruy Barbosa. He is the principal figure of the Conference. He surpassed for Brazil the emulation of the other South American powers and conquered the respect and admiration of the European delegates.

'When he demanded that the smaller countries should be represented on the Court of Arbitration on an equal footing with the Great Powers, . . ./ Dr. Barbosa became the real leader of South America in the Conference, and not of South America only but of all the lesser powers of Europe as well.

'Joseph H. Choate, presenting the American doctrine, was the champion of the Great Powers.

'I learn that upon his return to his country the Brazilians will endeavor to make Barbosa president at the next election. He ought to be a splendid chief executive.'

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39 George Chamberlin to Assistant Secretary of State, Pernambuco, October / i.e., September/ 24, 1907, DS, 1113/5.

40 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, October 14, 1907, DS, 2098/69; Victor de Sá, Ruy e os Constituintes de 91 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento De Imprensa Nacional, 1950), p. 60; and Orlando Ferreira, Ruy Barbosa e Seus Detractores (Uberaba, Minas Gerais: Typ. Jardim, 1921), p. 93.

41 Jornal do Comércio, October 14, 1907, quoting William Stead in Courrier de la Conférence.
Outwardly at least, the propaganda in the Rio papers did not affect the friendliness of the Brazilian government toward the American government.\(^{42}\) In fact, both the Brazilians and the Americans desired a return to cordial relations and both sides expressed the hope that the Rio port call of the "Great White Fleet" in January of 1908 would allow the opportunity for restoration of the former relationship.\(^{43}\) Indeed, Dudley felt that relations would soon return to normal for,

> Important reasons of self-interest, indeed, strongly counsel Brazil to cultivate the good-will of the United States, and I believe it beyond question, notwithstanding her recent course, that President Penna and Baron Rio Branco would sacrifice much to avert its loss. I may also observe that, in connection with proceedings at the Hague, no word has been spoken in Congress in criticism of the United States.\(^{44}\)

The government in Washington took care to advise Nabuco that cordial feelings were still entertained toward Brazil, and that the hope was for an eventual satisfactory solution to the problem of the Court of Arbitration.\(^{45}\)

\(^{42}\) Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, October 14, 1907, DS, 2098/69.


\(^{44}\) Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, October 14, 1907, DS, 2098/69.

\(^{45}\) Bacon (Acting Secretary of State) to Dudley, Washington, November 14, 1907, DS, 2098/70.
Despite Nabuco's continuing support for a close Brazilian-American friendship, Rio-Branco apparently did not continue to be so unreservedly pro-American. By the end of 1907 Rio-Branco had receded from his position where he maintained that the disagreements had simply been between the two Hague delegations. Hilário de Gouvêia told Nabuco that Rio-Branco was now doing his best to minimize the Brazilian popular support for the United States. He said that Rio-Branco had intended to boycott the banquet given in honor of the American naval squadron, but Rui's last-minute refusal forced him to attend. 46

Until the end of 1907 the State Department had been predisposed to believe that Rui was acting on his own initiative in his disagreement with Choate at The Hague. In a speech on December 28, 1907, Rio-Branco quoted a portion of his telegraphic instructions to Rui. 47 When a copy of the speech was received in Washington, the Second Assistant Secretary of State sent it to Root with the following handwritten memo attached:

Dear Mr. Secretary

This will interest you. Rio Branco herein gives the text of the instructions sent to Ruy Barbosa, upon which the latter acted in his squabble with Choate.

We had supposed that Ruy Barbosa's egotism and chauvinism were responsible for his course, but it now seems that he merely obeyed orders. I suspected as much at the time, from some remarks made by Gurgel do Amaral in

46 Hilário de Gouvêia to Nabuco, Rio, March 10, 1908, AJN.

47 Rio-Branco, speech, Rio, December 28, 1907, quoted in A Imprensa, December 30, 1907.
his execution of Rio Branco's cabled instructions to him.

AAA (Alvey A. Adee)\(^{48}\)

Nabuco was distressed at Rio-Branco's new attitude and informed the foreign minister that he should be looking for a replacement for him if Brazil's foreign policy were to change from friendship with the United States. Nabuco also told Rio-Branco, "You will remember that I only accepted this post so as to accomplish in it the policy of approximation with America. . . ."\(^{49}\) Later Nabuco wrote a friend, asking his help to improve the situation in Rio:

During your stay in Rio, do what you can in favor of the approximation with the United States. . . . You, who are one of Rio-Branco's intimates and who had a part in the creation of this Embassy, could render so great service to the country by sustaining the policy of approximation. . . ."\(^{50}\)

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Upon Rui's return from the Hague Conference, he received a hero's welcome. A cannon shot rang out from the fort, causing great excitement among the populace of the city. On December 29, 1907, this salute from Morro do Castello announced that Rui's ship had crossed the bar at the entrance to the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. The waiting crowd, in a delirium of patriotism and gratitude, broke into

\(^{48}\) Adee to Root, memorandum, January 23, 1908, attached to: Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, December 30, 1907, DS, 40/689.

\(^{49}\) Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18, 1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas.

\(^{50}\) Nabuco to Gomes Feirerra, Washington, February 18, 1908, AJN.
spontaneous and enthusiastic applause. A multitude of launches, boats, and small steamers escorted the ship as it slowly entered Guanabara Bay. A band played continuously, and as the ship passed by, onlookers waved hankerchiefs and shouted "viva's".

After anchoring, the ship was boarded by the ranking admiral of the Navy and other high officials anxious to greet the returning delegate. So many persons came aboard that even standing room was difficult to find. A representative of the academic community pronounced a beautiful discourse, effusively welcoming the illustrious Brazilian.

As Rui was transferred by launch from the ship to the quay, there was a surge and movement of the throng, attempting to catch a glimpse of the great Brazilian. The crush of humanity broke the cordon formed by policemen, and the crowd surged nearer. As Rui disembarked, he was greeted by the Brazilian vice-president and the foreign minister.

The Cais Pharoux, the point of debarkation, and the Praça Quinze de November immediately behind, were gaily decorated. Along the quay were rows of flags and banners, and the lamp posts were completely decorated with foliage. Scattered about the area were bunches of beautiful fresh flowers.

Because of the crowd, it was difficult for the dignitaries to begin the procession, which finally commenced with a fanfare of clarions by military bands. The Avenida Central was filled with people wanting to greet Rui and thus
demonstrate to him that his act of "exceptional patriotism" was appreciated. People also lined the Avenida Beira-Mar, and as the procession arrived in front of the Presidential Palace, the Brazilian President invited the honoree to a reception, where he was affectionately toasted by the country's leaders.

The procession resumed and entered the Rua São Clemente, which was decorated along its full extent in a festive aspect. Enormous banners were hung along the street, and flags of the nations were unfurled from closely-spaced flag staffs along the route. Placards were much in evidence, with such inscriptions as "The Country Salutes Her Greatest Son," "Rights Are Equal For All Nations," and "To The Paladin Of Peace." The balconies of the buildings along the street were festooned with bright and festive colors.

A reception was held where a series of multi-colored electric lights were strung across the street in front of the residence of the returning delegate. Here the reception committee presented him with a plaque which read, "To Ruy Barbosa, From The People, 30 December 1907." That afternoon an official vehicle called to take Rui back to the debarkation point for another reception on the quay, where an orchestra played the National Anthem. That evening he was further honored at a gala banquet.  

The above description is based on contemporary newspaper accounts, especially A Imprensa, December 30 and 31, 1907; and Diário de Notícias, December 30 and 31, 1907. For the description of a similar reception for Rui held earlier in Salvador, Bahia, see A Bahia, December 28 and 30, 1907; and Diário da Bahia, December 29, 1907.
While on opposite sides of the ocean, Rui and Rio-Branco had managed to cooperate quite effectively in carrying out Brazil's foreign policy. However, it appeared that there might now be a strain in the relations between the two, for it would be difficult for them to equally share the glory after Rui's return to Rio. After Rui's triumphant return, Rio-Branco was jealous of the spectacular reception accorded him. The Baron even boasted of a banquet given in his own honor, which he said was more extravagant than any given for Rui. Rio-Branco was also very critical of Rui for neglecting to pay him a visit in the ten weeks after his return from Europe.  

Nabuco, in hopes of dispelling any ill-feelings against Brazil stemming from the Hague Conference, urged Rui to accept an invitation from Yale University to deliver a series of lectures. In May of 1907, at the suggestion of Root, Rui had been invited to give the 1908 Dodge Lectures on the theme, "The Responsibilities of Citizenship." Nabuco was grateful to Root for the invitation and said that it would be a great honor for Rui to speak after the Secre-

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52 Hilário de Gouvêia to Nabuco, Rio, March 10, 1908, AJN.

53 Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.

tary, who delivered the 1907 lectures. 55

On behalf of Yale University, John Barrett wrote some of the university alumni, asking them to contact Rui and to urge him to accept the invitation. 56 One alumnus, on his way to Rio via Europe, was sent with a letter of introduction from Root to personally invite Rui to give the Yale lectures, and to answer any questions Rui might have. 57

Mr. Barrett also sent Rui another letter, enclosing a clipping from the New York Daily Tribune, which discussed the benefits of Rui's possible acceptance. He also requested a photograph of Rui and urged him to accept the lectureship. 58

During the conference Rui failed to reply to the Yale invitation, despite repeated urgings of Nabuco and Yale alumni. Rio-Branco finally sent an urgent telegram, encouraging Rui to accept, and explaining that Yale needed a reply so that in case of a refusal, they would have time to obtain a substitute. 59 After hearing from Nabuco, Rio-

55 Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 29, 1907, AJN; and John Barrett to Rui, Washington, June 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV.

56 For example see Elbert J. Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, August 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV. To Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a conference delegate, he wrote, "If you have a chance to talk to him and strengthen the invitation, I hope you will do so." Barrett to d'Estournelles, Washington, June 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV.

57 Lee McClung to Rui, aboard the Deutschland, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.

58 Barrett to Rui, Washington, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV.

59 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 176A, December 3, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; another copy in Haia Pasta XI.
Branco again cabled Rui urging acceptance and informing him that the trip would be treated as an official mission. The foreign minister urgently requested that Nabuco contact Rui directly, with additional information about the lecture series. Rui finally decided to decline the Yale invitation, giving ill health as the reason. Nabuco expressed his regrets to Root over the decision, and Root said that he understood that fatigue from the conference and the long absence from home perhaps made the time unfavorable for the invitation. Nabuco conveyed Root's sentiments to Rui and expressed his own disappointment that Rui would be unable to speak in the United States.

Since Rui was unable, or unwilling, to come to lecture in the United States, Nabuco began looking for another opportunity for the improvement of Brazilian-American relations to present itself. He felt that perhaps the Rio port call of the American Naval squadron in January of 1908 would serve the purpose.

Rio-Branco had decided that Rui would be the appropriate person to give the principal speech at the upcoming

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62 Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXVI.

63 Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29, 1907, AJN.
banquet for the American Naval officers. While Rui was still aboard ship on his return voyage, Rio-Branco informed Nabuco that Rui would be the principal speaker. It gave Nabuco "great pleasure" to hear of Rui's selection and he sincerely congratulated Rio-Branco for nominating him. Rio-Branco had, however, neglected to request Rui's participation, and the day after Rui's return, Rio-Branco asked him to deliver "the principal toast to the American Nation and her Navy." He apologized for the late date of the invitation, but said he had not had the opportunity to extend it earlier. Rio-Branco closed with the appeal that, "The effect in the United States will be immense after the incidents at The Hague."

Nabuco encouraged Rio-Branco to show the American squadron a great welcome, which would have a "great impact" on the relations between the two countries. He believed that the situation offered them a perfect opportunity to remove the bad impression caused by The Hague. Nabuco sug-

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64 The American ambassador also reported to Root that Rui was to be the principal speaker, and closed by saying, "His selection, under the circumstances, appears to be an exceptionally happy one, and calculated to strengthen the existing good relations of the two governments and countries. Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, January 3, 1908, DS, 40/692.


66 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, December 31, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.

67 Ibid.
gested that the two presidents should take the opportunity of the Naval visit to congratulate each other.68

At almost the last minute, Rui informed Rio-Branco that he would be unable to be present at the banquet for the American Naval officers. The foreign minister pessimistically cabled Nabuco:

I received with regret the letter of Rui excusing himself from delivering the toast at the Monroe / Palace / banquet, saying he was fatigued and sick. I also think the incidents in which he figured and the aggressions suffered / at The Hague / impel him to have reservations about a position which would require him to applaud the Pan American policy of approximation. I will insist, in the name of the President, but I do not expect to persuade him.69

In his letter to Rui, Rio-Branco said he did not think Rui's excuses were very good. He said that it would not be bad, after the incidents at The Hague, for Rui to make a speech complimenting the United States. Rio-Branco told Rui that a speech now would demonstrate to the American government and people that he did not hold the United States responsible for the misunderstandings of her delegation at The Hague, nor for the exaggerations of the Herald correspondent.70

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69 Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, January 11, 1908, AHI, 234/4/1 tel. exp.
70 Rio-Branco to Rui, Petrópolis, January 12, 1908, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; handwritten draft in Pasta Rio Branco. Rio-Branco apparently desired to show independence from the U.S., and thereby promote Brazilian nationalism, but at the same time he did not wish to alienate the Americans. Thus he attempted to temper both the pro-American views of Nabuco and the anti-American reputation of Rui.
Rui responded to Rio-Branco’s appeal that he reconsider his refusal to deliver the principal toast to the American Naval squadron, first thanking him for not insisting that he do it. Then Rui denied that his refusal was based on resentments from The Hague, saying "I do not hold the least resentment against the great American nation for the disrespectful actions of her delegation at The Hague." In support of this claim he then explained, in great detail, an incident in which he came to the aid of Scott and the American delegation, rescuing them from a position of great embarrassment before the entire conference. He then quoted an extremely friendly note from Scott to support his contention. He then summarized his own attitude:

You can thus see that my heart is not the least grieved by the actions of the Americans at The Hague. I continue to hold a great admiration for the United States, and I would be most happy if I could concur, in a manner which would bring us honor, in making our relations closer.

Rui concluded the letter with an explanation of why he refused to take part in the ceremonies honoring the fleet:

It is a military demonstration, the greatest and the least opportune and ostentatious naval force which the seas have yet seen.

To praise this martial display during a time of peace would not only violate my sentiments, but would even contradict my actual role at The Hague.

Your position, as Foreign Minister, is different and you must show hospitality and courtesy, which you are not able to avoid. If I were in the same position, I would have to submit to it. However, in my position,

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71 Rui to Rio-Branco, Rio, January 16, 1908, ABR-B, 8/8 recibidas; typescript in CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
72 Ibid.
without such constraints, I am not forced to contribute an apology to a fact which I deplore. 73

Machado de Assis wrote Nabuco to inform him of the festive atmosphere in Rio surrounding the visit of the American fleet and concluded by saying,

In the true pathway there is courtesy on both sides, and you, who collaborated with Rio-Branco in the work of approximation of the two countries, shall receive your portion of the satisfaction. 74

Nabuco meanwhile had spoken privately with Root and filed this confidential report with Rio-Branco:

Today I had a glorious conversation with Root. He told me, 'There is not the slightest resentment on my part.' He did not know of the incidents between the delegations; he was sick and was only consulted on vital questions. His instructions were that Brazil was to always have the highest recognition. He had no more than an academic or humanitarian interest in the questions to be discussed at The Hague. He said, 'If I had wished to obtain any advantage for the United States at The Hague, I should have asked you to help me. . . . So far as our interest goes we did not consider we had any involved. For that reason we did not make any effort to secure assistance of any country. . . .' He is the greatest friend that Brazil has in the world. Please show this to the President. Nabuco. 75

The American and Brazilian presidents exchanged congratulatory telegrams during the fleet visit to Rio, and afterward Nabuco was ecstatic and he told Rio-Branco that the event was viewed with great importance in the United

73 Ibid.
74 Machado de Assis to Nabuco, Rio, January 14, 1907 \i.e., 1908\, AJN
Nabuco saw a copy of the message by President Roosevelt before it was released to the press. Nabuco thanked Assistant Secretary of State Bacon for showing it to him, and continued:

As one who is devoting the remainder of his active life in helping enthusiastically to draw closer the ties of mutual reliance between the United States and Brazil, I consider myself happy in expressing to you my sense of the great service that President Roosevelt's Message will render in the two Countries to that work of the most far reaching consequences and incalculable possibilities for both.

Root and Rio-Branco also exchanged, through their embassies, messages which were released to the press several days later and served to prolong the effect of the visit.

Through Ambassador Dudley, Admiral Evans, commander of the fleet, and Rio-Branco also exchanged cordialities. Dudley was pleased with the outcome of the fleet visit and sent his congratulations to Admiral Evans:

We are endeavoring to maintain and, so far as possible, advance the exceptionally happy relations which have prevailed so conspicuously between the United States and Brazil since Secretary Root's speeches in this country,

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77 Nabuco to Bacon, Washington, January 15, 1908, AJN.
78 Dudley to Rio-Branco, Petrópolis, January 16, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Notes to the Foreign Office; and Rio-Branco to Dudley, Rio, February 5, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Notes from the Foreign Office.
79 Rear-Admiral Robley D. Evans to Dudley, aboard the USS Connecticut, Rio, January 19, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters Received; and Dudley to Evans, Petrópolis, January 23, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters [Sent].
and his contact with leading Brazilian statesmen, in 1906. I may be permitted, therefore, to congratulate myself, and I do you, upon the magnificent / _sic_ / effect produced upon the relations between the two countries by the visit of your great fleet at Rio de Janeiro. 80

Since Rui had been announced as the one to give the principal toast, his absence from the banquet required an explanation. At the banquet Rio-Branco read a message of explanation and regret from Rui, which stated that he declined to speak because of the long strain of the Hague Conference and the precarious nature of his health. 81 Rui's statement was published by the New York Herald, and the press published the greetings exchanged between Root and Rio-Branco and between Roosevelt and Pena. Nabuco pronounced himself satisfied that the mutual sympathy expressed in the messages would prevent any damage to their relationship as a result of the Hague Conference. 82 After the fleet departed; Root, Roosevelt, Pena, Nabuco, and Dudley were all of the opinion that the ill effects of The Hague on Brazilian-American relations had been dissipated. 83

80 Dudley to Evans, Petrópolis, January 23, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters.
81 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, January 27, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Despaches to Department of State.
83 Root to Nabuco, Washington, January 23, 1908, AJN; Nabuco to President / _Pena_ /, Washington, January 23, 1908; Azeredo Castro to Nabuco, London, January 25, 1908, AJN; and Nabuco to Virgílio Gordilho, Washington, January 27, 1908, AJN.
However, Nabuco was concerned because the Americans were now apprehensive about a rumored Latin American alliance, including Brazil and Argentina, against them. To calm this fear, Pena reassured Nabuco that there was no possibility that the Brazilian policy toward the United States would be abandoned.  

Nabuco wrote a twenty-page letter to Rio-Branco giving his view of the results obtained from the naval visit to Rio. He felt that the exchange of presidential greetings was an historic event, and that the events of The Hague were being forgotten. He regretted, however, that not every vestige of resentment was wiped out by the visit and he encouraged Rio-Branco to make every effort to protect Brazilian integrity by avoiding any actions which could be construed as anti-American. Nabuco said he was dedicating the rest of his career to maintaining a close relationship between the two countries, and he repeated that Rio-Branco should replace him if he contemplated a change in this policy.

Ambassador Dudley was of the opinion that all the resentment arising from the situation at the Hague Conference had been dissipated after the naval visit:

While doubtless far other aims than the exchange of international courtesies determined the great cruise of the battle-ship fleet under Admiral Evans, the reception given it at this point of call has afforded the

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84 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18, 1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas; and Pena to Nabuco, Petrópolis, February 10, 1908, AJN.

85 Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18, 1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas.
President and you every reason for gratification. If ever there were grounds to suppose that the effect of your visit here was marred by subsequent happenings at the Hague, I may assure you that now the last trace of irritation has been effaced. Such was, in effect, the statement made to me by President Penna as we watched the departing fleet from his yacht near the entrance to Rio de Janeiro harbor. At the same time he remarked that his sentiment and that of the members of his Government towards the United States had remained unchanged by any occurrence since the manifestation of friendship it was their pleasure to extend to you in 1906.86

Nabuco never ceased in his efforts to maintain and improve the good relations with the United States. In this continuing effort he attempted to convince Rui that his problems with the American Hague delegation had been largely due to misunderstandings. Nabuco wrote to Rui and sent a letter he had received from James Brown Scott explaining how Choate came to omit Rui's name from the list of suitable candidates for court judges. Nabuco said he believed the explanation and did not think that it was a last-minute excuse. He also explained that many of the misunderstandings at The Hague were due to the fact that some members of the American delegation did not have a good command of French and erroneously interpreted many things.87

To commemorate Rui's triumphant return from the peace conference, President Afonso Pena personally presented him with a medal struck especially for the occasion. Riding

86 Dudley to Root, Petrópolis, January 27, 1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Despatches to Department of State.
the wave of popularity generated by the glowing reports of his success at The Hague, Rui became a presidential candidate in 1910, 1914, and 1919. In his campaign he took the issues to the people on a scale unprecedented in Brazil, but he failed to attain the highest elective position in his country.

The actions of Rui and the extensive coverage in the Brazilian press exaggerating the importance of Rui's mission to the peace conference led to a strain in Brazilian-American relations. Rio-Branco and Nabuco attempted to persuade Rui to assist in smoothing relations by speaking at Yale and at a banquet honoring the American fleet, but he refused to accept either assignment. Despite Rui's refusal to cooperate, Rio-Branco in Rio and Nabuco in Washington, were able to prevent the events at The Hague from causing a departure from the friendly relations that existed between the two countries.
CHAPTER IX  
SUMMARY

Brady B. Tyson has correctly identified the traditional Brazilian foreign policy objectives as: expansion then stabilization of her frontiers, maintenance of a balance of power in the Rio de la Plata area, gaining recognition as an important member of the community of nations, and friendship with the United States. This study has traced the last two of the traditional foreign policy objectives of Brazil at the Second Hague Peace Conference interpreted through the search for status on the personal, national, and international levels.

The Brazilian foreign minister, Rio-Branco, with the aid of his ambassador to the United States, Joaquin Nabuco, sought a special relationship between Brazil and the United States. The respective legations of the two countries were elevated to embassy status in 1905 and Nabuco was appointed Brazil's first ambassador. Nabuco developed a close personal relationship with Secretary of State Elihu Root and devoted himself to bringing the countries closer together. Rio-Branco was jealous of Nabuco's success in Washington and felt threatened by what he interpreted as Nabuco's usurpation of his own pro-American initiative. Nabuco detected Rio-
Branco's attitude and felt himself increasingly isolated from the foreign minister.

The strained relationship between Rio-Branco and Nabuco intruded into the process of selection of Brazil's delegate to the Second Hague Conference—the conflict led to the eventual designation of Rui Barbosa, rather than Nabuco, as delegate. In seeking to attain and maintain personal status Rio-Branco, Nabuco, and Rui alternately cooperated and clashed with each other, however, for the duration of the conference, the three men cooperated with each other in the interest of promoting their country in the international sphere. The stand of Brazil's representative, dictated by Rio-Branco, led to increasing conflict with the United States delegation, to the dismay of Nabuco.

The principal Brazilian decision-makers of the conference were members of the ruling elite who sought status and prestige for themselves, then endeavored to project these characteristics on the national and international scene. Rio-Branco and Nabuco were from families who were a part of the ruling oligarchy and Rui, after climbing the political ladder to become vice-president of the Senate, came to be accepted into the group. These men were law graduates of broad, cosmopolitan culture and members of a small group of literate, European-oriented Brazilians. Nabuco and Rui were classmates in law school along with Rodrigues Alves and Afonso Pena, future Brazilian presidents. In this elite group, the paths of the three often crossed—
Nabuco and Rui were fellow members of the imperial Brazilian Parliament and Rio-Branco and Nabuco both served in the Brazilian foreign service.

When Brazil accepted the invitation to attend the 1907 Hague Conference, Rio-Branco needed a nationally known person of prestige to represent the country. He selected Joaquim Nabuco, then ambassador to the United States. However, before the choice was made public, Rio-Branco decided to also extend an invitation to Rui Barbosa. This created a dilemma because Rio-Branco wanted both of them on the delegation, but neither felt he could attend as second delegate.

After delaying until almost the last possible moment, Rui accepted the nomination as chief of the delegation, and Nabuco then absolutely refused to be a delegate, despite the insistence of the president and Rio-Branco. Nabuco was in poor health, which provided a plausible reason for the refusal. The conflicts and political maneuvering of the three individuals thus delayed the appointment of the Brazilian representative until little time remained for Rui to make other than personal preparation before departure for The Hague. This delay put Brazil's representative at some disadvantage vis-à-vis the other delegates, but left the formation of policy firmly in the hands of Rio-Branco.

Nabuco had earlier requested a leave from his ambassadorial duties in Washington in order to seek a health cure at European spas. Rio-Branco had not yet responded to the request for leave, so the foreign minister devised a confi-
dential plan to assign Nabuco a special mission in conjunction with the proposed trip to Europe. Nabuco's friendship with Secretary of State Elihu Root proved invaluable, as he learned from him the details of the American stance at the upcoming conference, and succeeded in securing American support for a position of honor for the Brazilian delegate.

With the bickering over delegate selection behind them, Rio-Branco, Nabuco and Rui united in their efforts to gain recognition for Brazil at the conference. Nabuco and Rio-Branco went to great lengths to boost Rui, and thus Brazil, among the conference attendees. In Europe, Nabuco gave Rui valuable information concerning the conference, which greatly assisted him in the unfamiliar diplomatic environment. The egotistical Rui was spurred to tremendous expenditure of time and energy to live up to their advance billing. Rio-Branco cabled detailed instructions to Rui, but allowed the delegate to receive all the credit. By the end of the conference, Rui believed himself to be responsible for Brazil's gains there.

During the preparations for the peace conference the Argentines attempted to gain, through the intervention of the United States, an advantage over the Brazilians. Nabuco and Rio-Branco immediately sought to counter the move of the traditional rival of their country. Together they succeeded in persuading the United States to obtain for Brazil the highest honorary position of any Latin American country.

From the time of Rui's appointment to lead the Hague
delegation, he, Nabuco, and Rio-Branco cooperated with each other. However, after the conference, personal animosity began to surface again. Rui believed himself the conquering hero and harbored presidential ambitions, much to the chagrin of Rio-Branco. Nabuco blamed Rui and Rio-Branco for greatly straining United States-Brazilian friendship and jeopardizing the result of his years of work in Washington. Rio-Branco, for his part, was jealous of Nabuco's close, personal relationship with American leaders and his single-minded pursuit of rapprochement with the United States.

In her first global conference, Brazil was determined to make a good impression by persuading the other delegations of the culture and intelligence of her delegates. Rui, a gifted and verbose orator, monopolized many of the discussions and irritated the representatives of the great powers. The eight most powerful nations had expected to dominate the conference, and the impertinence of the delegate from a second-rate country was annoying to them. In this conference, Brazil aspired to become accepted as one of the great powers, but this was unrealistic.

The most important conference deliberations for Brazil were those pertaining to immunity of private property at sea, arbitration of contractual debts, the International Prize Court, and the International Court of Justice. The Brazilian delegate supported the American position in the first two cases, to the consternation of the Hispanic-American delegates. Nabuco was pleased to hear that Rui was
cooperating with the Americans. However, the Brazilians disagreed with the Americans on the Prize Court proposal, and violently clashed with them over the proposed court of justice.

Because she was not consulted on the proposal for the selection of judges for the International Court of Justice, and because of the low rank assigned her, Brazil refused to endorse the American project, using the pretext of defending the equal rights of sovereign states. The other Latin American nations, and all the smaller countries supported the Brazilian position, from which she later found herself unable to retreat. As a result, she defended that position to the end of the conference and prevented the creation of the proposed court.

The American Hague delegation had received orders to support Latin American aspirations at the conference. However, Elihu Root was ill during most of the period of the conference and was only consulted by the State Department on the most important matters. Nabuco, who had a great deal of influence in Washington, was in Europe. Thus Joseph H. Choate, chief of the American delegation, had a great deal of discretion during the deliberations. Rui and Choate often disagreed and it appeared to evolve into a personal feud. Their disagreement threatened to disrupt the Brazilian-American friendship which had been cultivated by Nabuco, Root, and Rio-Branco. However, both governments chose to interpret the difference as being primarily between the in-
dividuals involved, and the threatened break never materialized.

Rui attempted to do all the work of the Brazilian delegation except the clerical duties. He personally prepared and delivered all the speeches of the many committees on which he served, regularly working nineteen hours a day. Since he was so involved in the conference deliberations, he tended to take anti-Brazilian moves personally. Thus he blamed Choate when the American and Brazilian positions differed. His dislike of Choate was heightened when Choate omitted Rui's name (intentionally, Rui felt) from a list of those considered suitable to serve as judges on an international tribunal.

Rio-Branco controlled the outlines of Brazilian policy at The Hague, but Rui contributed to modification of the stance. There was almost daily telegraphic communication between them and they cooperated in projecting a favorable image of their country. They aspired to have Brazil accepted as the ninth great power of the world, but above all, to assure that she outranked her perennial South American rival, Argentina. At the beginning Rui faithfully followed Rio-Branco's instructions, but later began to formulate ideas of his own which he submitted to Rio for approval. Rui received approval to defend the proposition of the equality of sovereign states, and his persistent insistence convinced Rio-Branco that Brazil should maintain that position until the end of the conference. The outcome was
trumpeted in Rio as a Brazilian victory over the great powers, but the powers were irritated over this tactic of obstruction which blocked approval of a new court plan.

Brazil's insistence on defending the rights of sovereign states caused her relationship with the United States to become strained. Rui, prompted by Rio-Branco, pursued this course over the objections of Nabuco, who felt that it would lead to permanent damage to the Brazilian-American friendship he had so carefully cultivated and nurtured.

Rio-Branco was the one primarily responsible for influencing Brazilian public opinion toward the conference, as he personally edited telegrams from The Hague and released the information to the press. The Brazilian press presented Rui as the dominant personality of the conference, overshadowing the delegates of even the major powers. The Rio papers especially emphasized Rui's antagonism toward Choate, and used that as a pretext to arouse ill feeling against the United States.

One important aspect of the Second Hague Conference which has been virtually ignored in earlier studies was the Brazilian international public relations effort. The Brazilians began early in the conference to publicize their country by distributing reprints of illustrated magazine articles to the delegates and reporters. Rio-Branco also authorized the withdrawal of a large sum from a special account to be used to buy influence at the conference by entertaining the principal correspondants. Rui commissioned,
in a Brazilian magazine, an extensive article lauding Brazil and her conference delegation. Over a thousand copies of the article were distributed to conference delegations and throughout Europe.

Another part of this public relations effort involved William T. Stead, a respected British journalist, who was editor of Le Courrier de la Conférence, an unofficial daily chronicle of the conference deliberations. Stead wielded a great deal of influence at the peace conference through his articles and editorials. Stead was also editor and proprietor of the British Review of Reviews, and in that capacity approached Rui about placing a paid advertisement about Brazil as a supplement appended to the November, 1907 issue. The Brazilian government was delighted to accept the offer and Rio-Branco suggested additions to the proposal, which brought the published supplement to thirty-two pages. As part of Stead's fee, he also agreed to make a separate world-wide distribution of the supplement to statesmen, public libraries, and commercial establishments.

Stead was a booster of Rui in the Courrier and made frequent laudatory comment about him in his editorials. The Review of Reviews article contained general information about Brazil, as well as an extremely flattering section about the accomplishments of Rui and Brazil at the conference. The supplement proved to be very popular in Brazil, and a Portuguese version appeared, which purported to be the translation of a "book" by Stead giving the unbiased assess-
ment of Brazil's position at The Hague by an imminent and impartial foreign journalist.

Rio-Branco's international propaganda campaign suffered a serious blow when the New York Herald began to publish derogatory reports of Rui and of Brazil's stance at the conference. Alarmed, Rio-Branco ordered the Brazilian chargé in Washington to go to New York for a personal talk with the editor, where he persuaded him to publish a front-page article containing a speech by Rui and portraits of Rio-Branco and Rui.

The Brazilian government agreed to fund publication of Rui's Hague speeches in the original French text, as well as in an English translation by Stead. The English version was published in pamphlet form and given world-wide distribution by Stead. Other publications took note of the money Brazil was spending on public relations, and several inquired if they might be able to also help Brazil in her publicity campaign.

Besides use of publications, Brazil sought to enhance her image through sponsorship of social events. The Brazilians gave more banquets than most of the other delegations and were acknowledged to be the most extravagant with food, wines, and lavish decorations. For their most spectacular event the Brazilians imported orchids, roses, ferns, and palms to decorate the banquet hall in a tropical motif.

After the peace conference Rui went to Paris, where
the Brazilian community christened him, "The Eagle of The Hague." The Brazilian government prepared a huge popular reception for his return to Brazil, but there immediately arose friction between Rui and Rio-Branco because of the difficulty of equitably sharing the honors.

Nabuco talked with Rui about the Brazilian delegate's difference with Choate, and upon his return to his Washington post, immediately set about to reassure Root of the friendly intentions of the Brazilian government and to repair any damages done at The Hague to the Brazilian-American friendship.

In an effort to smooth Brazilian-American relations, Nabuco urged Rui to accept an invitation to deliver a series of lectures at Yale University. After Rui refused to do that, Nabuco hoped he would help dissipate any residue of ill will by delivering the principal toast at a banquet in Rio for the American naval officers of the Great White Fleet. Rui also refused to cooperate in this instance, but the banquet proved to be a success, and provided the occasion for the exchange of presidential greetings which contributed to the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Both the American and Brazilian governments chose to believe that the disagreement had been principally between their conference delegations and was only an aberration in the history of friendship between the two nations. Nabuco was upset that Brazilian public opinion had been so aroused,
and that the exaggerated reports of the clash with Choate had caused such a wave of anti-American feeling. Nabuco bent every effort to restore the relationship, and he believed this had been achieved, for the most part, after the cordial reception of the American fleet.

The search for status on the personal, national, and international levels was the principal motivation for Brazil's attendance at the Second Hague Peace Conference and played a role in the selection of her delegate, her stance on the conference issues, and her relationship with the United States. At the conference Brazil sought recognition as the ninth world power. This aspiration jeopardized Brazil's special relationship with the United States, which had been cultivated. In the process of promoting Brazil, Rio-Branco created a hero's image for Rui Barbosa, who promptly sought to use it for political gain.

The traditional Brazilian foreign policy objectives of international prestige, and of friendship with the United States did not prove to be mutually exclusive, despite some incompatibility. Through the tenacious efforts of Nabuco, the Brazilian-American relationship was salvaged in spite of the hostility of Rui, and the indifference of Rio-Branco. Despite the conflicts over status, the conference did gain for Brazil the reputation of a cultured and cosmopolitan nation able to give a respectable showing in a meeting with the powerful nations of the world.
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