Bureaucratic influence in congressional roll-call voting

William Blair
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3523

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE IN CONGRESSIONAL ROLL-CALL VOTING

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

William Blair
B.A., Louisiana State University, 1991
M.S., Louisiana State University, 1993
May, 2003
DEDICATION

To My Father:

I always wanted you to be proud of me. I wish you were here.

To My Wife:

For her support and understanding.

To My Children:

Dream big dreams. You can accomplish anything with dedication and desire.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Jim Garand for all of his support. I can not imaging a better mentor, both professionally and personally. He has provided both encouragement and friendship throughout this process, and remained a pillar of confidence and strength for me during my time in graduate school. Jim was a constant source of commitment and confidence during the hardest periods of my graduate education. He has made me a better professional and a better person by his mentoring of me. I am eternally grateful for his dedication to my education and his confidence in me.

I also would like to thank my family for their patience, encouragement, and support. They have all been an integral part in the completion of my degree. My wife, Andrea; my mother, Vita; and my father-in-law, Steve, all provided the motivation and the encouragement I needed to complete my degree. I also thank Wayne Parent for his support and friendship. His council brought me though the hardest periods of my graduate education. I will never forget his encouragement and help during those times. Finally, I thank Stacia Haynie and William Clark their constructive comments and support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication........................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................... iii
List of Tables...................................................................................................... v
Abstract.............................................................................................................. vi
Chapter 1: Introduction...................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Legislative Representation: Competing Influences......................... 8
Chapter 3: A Bureaucratic Influence On Roll-Call Voting................................. 29
Chapter 4: Modeling Bureaucratic Influence On Congressional Voting............. 44
Chapter 5: Empirical Findings......................................................................... 67
Chapter 6: Conclusions..................................................................................... 95
References.......................................................................................................... 104
Appendix A: Scatterplot Of Government Employment and NTU Scores......... 109
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics For All Variables Modeled......................... 110
Appendix C: Bivariate Regression Results For Democratic And Republican House Member NTU Scores On Government Employment............ 111
Appendix D: Frequencies For NTU Scores and Government Employment Variables For Pooled Models......................................................... 112
Appendix E: NTU Scores For Democratic House Members By Congress......... 114
Appendix F: NTU Scores For Republican House Members By Congress......... 118
Vita...................................................................................................................... 122
LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1: 98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996) Baseline Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model…………………………………….. 68

Table 5.2: 98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996) Individual Congress Cross-Sectional Regression Model………………………………………..…….. 75

Table 5.3: 98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996) Partisan Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model ………………………………. 79

Table 5.4: 98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996) Midterm Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model……………………….…………… 84

Table 5.5: Midterm Elections For Congress (1983 to 1996) Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model ………………………………. 86

Table 5.6: Presidential Elections For Congress (1983 to 1996) Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model ………………………………. 87

Table 5.7: 98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996) Sector Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model ……………………………… 89

Table 5.8: 98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996) Partisan Sector Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model ……………………. 91
ABSTRACT

The focus of this dissertation is on one of the many relationships that exist between the bureaucracy and government: decision-making by elected representatives and the political influence of government employees on their decision-making. Specifically, it is with bureaucrats and the degree to which they may utilize political influence to create a disproportionate influence over government policy and decision-making in the United States House of Representatives.

I argue that the inherent qualities of bureaucrats suggest that they are significant and influential constituency for representatives. They are an identifiable constituency to representatives, and have the means and opportunity to wield political influence. Therefore, I suggest that bureaucrats are a reelection constituency for representatives. My analysis suggests that representatives do indeed respond to government employees as a reelection constituency.

The findings illustrate several conclusions. First, bureaucrats have a moderating effect on the roll-call fiscal conservatism of representatives. Secondly, the election cycle is revealed to have a mediating effect on this bureaucratic effect. I demonstrate that representatives are more responsive to bureaucrats in the midterm congresses than in presidential congresses. Finally, I identify a party effect on bureaucratic influence that suggests that Republicans representatives that are more attentive to government employees than Democrats. I suggest that Democratic House members are already relatively liberal in their roll-call behavior on fiscal policy and a natural constituency for bureaucrats. Conversely, Republicans may discover that they can cultivate this core constituency for their reelection efforts by become more moderate in their roll-call fiscal conservatism.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“A government which robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul”
George Bernard Shaw

The bureaucracy has often been characterized as the fourth branch of government. This characterization is the result of the depth and breadth of the bureaucracy’s influence in government. It is the means by which government interacts with the public by the implementation and administration of legislation or regulation. From obtaining a birth certificate to receiving Social Security or Medicare benefits, the bureaucracy is a companion of the average citizen over the course of their life. While most may not even realize the pervasive nature of bureaucracy on their daily life, it is certainly the central means by which government attends to the need of the citizenry by the implementation of public policies and the way that the citizenry interacts with its government.

The bureaucracy can be defined as a “professional corps of officials organized in a pyramidal hierarchy and functioning under impersonal, uniform rules and procedures” (Gerth, 1946). In democratic government, the bureaucracy can be thought to be the apparatus that implements and administers the laws and regulations devised by the legislative branch, and processes and administers the public’s response to those laws and regulations. In practice and experience, democratic governmental bureaucracy functions and behaves in a much more active and interdependent manner with the executive and legislative branches of government. Governmental bureaucracy has ascended beyond a simple conduit by which government action is implemented, and has become an active participant in the polity and in policy making. There can be little doubt that bureaucracy is a necessity for the functioning of government. It is the form in which the implementation of law is carried out from which legislative and political intent is carried
forward. Given its essential nature in the political system, bureaucracy’s influence, both real and imagined, on governmental operation and the political systems has intrigued political scholars. This perceived influence has taken many scholarly forms, as scholars have examined the multifaceted nature of the bureaucracy’s relationship to the functioning of government (Meier, 1987; Rourke, 1984; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Borcherding, 1977; Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981; Blais and Dion, 1991, Niskanen, 1971; Fiorina, 1989).

The focus of this dissertation is on one of the many relationships that exist between the bureaucracy and government: decision-making by elected representatives and the political pressure of bureaucracies on their decision-making. While bureaucracy maybe often described as a faceless, unthinking and monolithic enterprise, it is certainly more than simply that characterization. As with any organization, a bureaucracy is also a collection of individuals. It is with these individuals, the potentiality of their collective behavior, and the responsiveness of politicians to that collective behavior that this dissertation is concerned. In other words, I am concerned with the degree to which bureaucrats-as-citizens have a disproportionate influence over government policy.

One might suspect that there should be a readily discernible linkage between political actions or decisions and their antecedents in the socio-political environment. Scholarly inquiry into the nature of representation and the confluence of forces, both internal and external, that change political behavior has demonstrated the multiplicity of factors that may alter elected officials’ decision making. It is true that politicians face many competing influences while formulating their political decision-making behavior, including the political environment, partisanship, ideology, and various constituencies or interest groups. In this dissertation, I make the argument that bureaucrats are indeed one of those constituencies. Furthermore, the inherent qualities of these government employees make them a very significant and potentially very influential constituency. Bureaucrats are
an easily identified sub-constituency to political actors, and have the means and motive to engage in the game of political control. As will be demonstrated, politicians will respond to subgroup constituencies such as government employees. There is simply too much at stake in the building of reelection constituencies to ignore the potential power that this subgroup may wield.

The genesis of this notion that bureaucratic sub-constituencies influence elected representatives finds its beginnings in the work of several scholars, most notably Borcherding (1977), Niskanen (1971), and Fiorina (1989). These scholars were interested in two aspects of bureaucratic influence on government: (1) government growth, and (2) electoral success of incumbents. Concerning government growth, scholars have identified two theories of bureaucratic impact in an attempt to link bureaucracies and bureaucrats to growth in the size of the public sector. The bureaucratic information monopoly theory posits that bureaucracies, because they hold information advantages about the cost of government over their oversight committees in the legislature, are able to maximize their budgets and thereby contribute to increases in governmental expenditures. The other, the bureau voting model, is not a mutually exclusive argument. This theory suggests that the bureaucrats themselves, as self-interested actors, shape election outcomes to their advantage by supporting those candidates that most closely align themselves with higher government spending. Of the many differences between these theories, perhaps the most notable is the environment in which government employees operate. The bureaucratic information monopoly theory should be considered as reflecting an “internal” governmental relationship between the bureaucracy and government, as the functioning of it occurs within the governmental setting. Conversely, the bureau voting model should be considered as reflecting an “external” relationship between the two actors, as the relationship occurs in the public electoral arena.
Scholars have also suggested that the bureaucracy is a contributor to the electoral success of incumbent politicians. Morris Fiorina, in making his case for the reason behind the decline in competitive elections in U.S. House elections since the 1950’s, argues that incumbent politicians de-empathize controversial policy stands and partisan politics, and instead focus more on non-partisan constituent service, of which they rely heavily on the bureaucratic apparatus. Therefore, so the theory goes, bureaucracies are both protected and enhanced due to the electoral advantage incumbent politicians gain by their use. This theory may be considered to describe a relationship more institutional in nature between the bureaucracy and its government, as this constituency service occurs within the confines of a institutional governmental setting.

Theories of bureaucracies and government employees and their relationship to elected officials imply a symbiotic relationship. This relationship is supported by more general scholarly research into the power and influence of bureaucracy (Rourke, 1984; Meier, 1987). For our purposes, it also suggests several things about the potential for influence and mutual benefit between government employees and political actors. The institutional bureaucracy has self-interest in maximizing its budget, has an inherent informational advantage over government, and performs vital tasks that benefit political actors in terms of electoral advantage. Similarly, government employees may be though to also have self-interest in maximizing bureaucratic budgets and may have a significant and disproportional influence on the electoral success of political actors.

What these arguments concerning bureaucracies as organizations and bureaucrats as political participants have in common is the potential to influence the decision-making of elected officials. This influence is inherent to bureaucracies and to government employees by their location in the political environment. Bureaucracies have informational advantages and vital services they perform for elected officials. Government employees have a the potential to provide strong and disproportionate electoral support to
candidates that are more supportive government growth. As such, they both focus on the self-interested desire to maximize government spending to support their continued existence and security. Where they differ is in the mechanism by which this effect is accomplished. For bureaucracies, this effect is institutional in nature and concerns the interaction of the bureaucracy and political actors in their institutional settings. For government employees, this influence is exerted in the political and electoral environment by their constituency effects and concerns the electoral success of candidates that support the wants and desires of those bureaucrats.

In this dissertation, I examine this external electoral constituency aspect of bureaucratic influence. Given the various competing internal and external interests inherent to the representational decision-making process for politicians, I suggest that those external interests that are most closely aligned with election outcomes will have the shortest route to influencing the behavior of elected politicians. Bureaucrats may well constitute just such an external constituency. As the evidence will show, government employees have the potential to have a great impact on election outcomes. It is both the psychology and reality of this context that may drive politicians to heed the wishes and desires of this subgroup or core constituency.

What motivates elected officials to be attentive to their constituencies? Reelection. Legislators have many goals in their public life, from the creation of good public policies to the increasing of personal prestige and power within their institutions, but no desire or goal is greater than reelection. It is reelection that allows for the continuation of these other pursuits. This axiomatic rule of behavior for elected officials suggests one the reason that they will listen closely to those constituency groups that they consider important to their reelection outcomes (Fenno, 1978; Kingdon, 1989). Beyond reelection concerns, it also is important to consider that elected officials will listen to their constituencies in general, to the degree that they consider themselves to be delegates to the preferences of their
constituencies. If legislators are indeed responsive to their constituencies, they should be especially responsive to those sub-constituencies that they identify as supportive electorally. If such a relationship exists, this responsiveness should manifest itself most directly in the voting behavior of such politicians.

This dissertation will examine the roll-call voting behavior of Congressional members to determine if in fact this sub-constituency effect exists and examine the extent of its influence. The focus of this research on the electoral constituency influence of government employees does not mitigate the importance of the institutional side of this potential effect. The institutional effects are equally as interesting and important to understanding the relationship between bureaucracy, government, and political actors. Despite this importance, the nature of this theorized relationship places it outside of the realm of this dissertation. Furthermore, these two aspects of bureaucratic persuasion are certainly not mutually exclusive and instead are complementary in their theoretical underpinnings and components. Any support identified for this electoral effect lends support to the institutional side of this relationship and will suggest further avenues for research and examination.

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

To investigate and understand how members of Congress can be influenced by government employees residing in their districts, we need to understand the motivations for both government bureaucrats and members of Congress. Specifically, why should House members and senators give disproportionate weight to the views of public-sector employees? What is it about public-sector employees that should have the potential for affecting the behavior of their elected representatives? Do government employees have a definable self-interest that can influence members of Congress? These questions, and others, should be established before a causal linkage is purported. To answer these questions, the following chapters will review the literature concerning the influences on
representational process of legislators, suggest why and how government bureaucrats may impact upon that process, and finally, provide unequivocal evidence that bureaucrats can and do impact the voting decisions of members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Specifically, Chapter 2 will examine the literature concerning the relationship between legislator’s and their constituents. I will review the evidence for the responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies in general and the evidences of the existence of sub-constituencies within those broader constituencies. Furthermore, I will relate the factors that mediate the relationship between legislators and constituents. Chapter 3 will offer evidence for government employees as a sub-constituency to members of the House of Representatives. I will relate the values that government employees possess that make them attractive to legislators and the motivations that may drive bureaucrats to support certain candidates and oppose others. Chapter 4 will set out the explicit modeling of the hypothesized relationship between government employees and representatives. The operationalization of various measures that are incorporated into the modeling to properly specify and measure this relationship will be depicted, the model will be expressly identified, and the hypotheses to be tested will be described. Chapter 5 will demonstrate the explanatory strength of the models specified in Chapter 4, and reveal the strong influence of government employees on the roll-call voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives. The influence of party and the election cycle will also be inspected and shown to mediate the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. Finally, Chapter 6 will summarize the evidence collected and results observed in this dissertation. I will opine on the value of the findings of this dissertation, explain what the findings tell us about the representational process, and describe avenues for further research in this area.
If I am to suggest that government employees are a potentially powerful subgroup constituency to members of Congress, it should first be established that Representatives do indeed exhibit behavior that supports such a supposition. As we will see, they do. This type of representational linkage is most often examined by a study of the roll call voting behavior of elected officials as a function of some constituency attributes or pressure that these actors perceive from their constituencies. Typically, scholars develop measures of constituency policy preferences and legislative roll-call behavior, and then link the two measures in a multivariate model to ascertain the degree to which roll-call behavior is responsive to the policy views of legislative constituencies (Miller and Stokes, 1963; McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979).

Miller and Stokes (1963) are the starting point for the modern empirical examination of constituency effects on legislative roll-call behavior. In their seminal 1963 article, they estimate the extent of policy agreement between representatives and their district constituents based upon an election survey from the 1958 election cycle. The examined the correlation between constituent preferences and legislator preferences on the issues of (1) social welfare, (2) foreign affairs, and (3) civil rights. Surprising, Miller and Stokes found little policy agreement between the behavior of representatives and the preferences of their districts. Their results indicated a strong relationship between roll-call behavior and constituency preferences for civil rights issues, but a significantly weaker correlation for social welfare issues and a negative relationship for foreign policy issues. No doubt due to the nature of these findings, several scholars came to question the findings of Miller and Stokes and pursued alternatives in an attempt to explain the relative lack of constituency influence on legislators.
Erikson (1978) contends that the lack of linkage found between legislators and their constituency is due to a significant amount of measurement error found in their analyses. He is critical of the small sample of respondents for each congressional district and the non-random nature of this sample. Erikson suggests that that sampling error for constituency preferences has resulted in the failure to accurately represent the linkage of constituent preferences and congressional behavior. To correct for these problems, Erikson utilizes measures of simulated constituency preferences. His solution of simulated constituency preferences is an approach designed to take advantage of demographic data that are available at the district level, as well as knowledge concerning the relationship between individuals’ demographic characteristics and their policy positions. First, Erikson uses survey data to estimate the relationship at the micro-level between individuals' various demographic characteristics and their opinions and preferences. Second, once these individual-level regression estimates are obtained, the mean district characteristics on these independent variables are substituted into the regression model to yield predicted district-level opinion. Erikson suggests that individual-level variables are related to individual-level opinion, it is highly probable that aggregations of those individual-level variables should be related to aggregations of district-level preferences. He finds that this type of simulation has a stronger association with roll-call behavior than measures based on the small-sample estimates used by Miller and Stokes (1963).

Based on this alternative measure of constituency opinion, Erikson finds that Miller and Stokes significantly underestimated the influence of constituency preferences on congressional behavior. Based on this respecification of the Miller and Stokes’ data, Erikson concludes that there is considerably more congressional responsiveness to constituency preferences than indicated by Miller and Stokes. Furthermore, he argues that this responsiveness has two sources. First, he suggests that such responsiveness
is somewhat inadvertent, since those legislators are members of their own constituencies. Therefore, legislators maintain similar attitudes and values as those constituents, making such correlations partly a function of those antecedent conditions. More importantly however, Erikson does discover that winning candidates display higher correlations with district opinion than losing candidates, which suggests that there is an electoral connection associated with the constituent/legislator linkage.

From this early study of representative and constituent linkages, scholars have progressed to pursue what conditions influence the nature of this responsiveness. Theoretically, responsive roll-call behavior occurs when there is a strong relationship between constituency preferences and roll-call behavior--i.e., when legislators representing liberal (conservative) constituencies tend to be more liberal (conservative) in their roll-call voting than legislators representing more conservative (liberal) constituencies. Because of the varied political and social environment in which the political system operates, it is not surprising that there are many varied conditions that may interfere with or strengthen the level of responsiveness between legislators and their constituencies. The conditions that may mediate this relationship can be thought to divide into two distinct categories: (1) legislator characteristics and (2) constituency characteristics.

**THE INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS**

The characteristics that may affect the responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies involve both the personal characteristics of legislators and the political circumstances that a particular legislator may find in their political environment. In terms of personal characteristics, seniority, retirement and personal perceptions are thought to affect the responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies. The influence of seniority is thought to manifest itself by either insulating members from electoral pressures due to the benefits of incumbency, which may allow less responsiveness over time, or by
purging the unresponsive, which then leaves the remaining legislators as the most senior and the most responsive. Retirees are also thought to be less compelled to follow the wishes of their constituents, as they will not face their wrath in the next election.

Also, on a more fundamental level, it may be important to consider how legislators view themselves. Are they trustees or delegates? Do they take cues internally or externally when forming decisions? These personal perceptions may color the way in which they operate legislatively and dissipate the influence of constituency on the roll-call behavior of certain legislators if they perceive their role as a trustee and not a delegate.

Unfortunately, the difficulties in attaining legislator role orientations have limited the study of these characteristics in the legislative environment.

Perhaps more importantly, the influence of election circumstance cannot be underestimated in its influence on the nature of legislative responsiveness. The short-term political environment in which legislators find themselves can have a significant impact on their responsiveness to their constituencies. Because of the core assumption that most legislators desire reelection, they will be extremely attentive to the collection of constituencies that can influence election outcomes in their districts. To this end, research has identified the influence of electoral victory margins on the responsiveness of political actors. It is not surprising that such election-specific variations can signal electoral vulnerability or that such elections can effect legislator’s decision-making.

**Legislator Characteristics: Seniority**

As indicated earlier, legislative seniority is expected to have an influence on the level of responsiveness of legislators. Surprisingly, most scholars have discovered that seniority seems to allow most legislators increased leeway with regard to their constituencies. This leeway is due to the fact that more senior representatives have the inherent advantages of incumbency. Advantages in name recognition, political capital, and political experience, make such representatives formidable foes in elections. This
protection allows more senior legislators to follow other voting cues such as ideology or party, even if these cues are in conflict with the preferences of their constituencies.

While investigating the mediating effect of election marginality on candidate responsiveness, Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) found results of interest on the impact of seniority. In their analysis of the 1966 Congressional elections in the areas of civil rights, foreign affairs and domestic program responsiveness, the authors discover that increased seniority seems to provide incumbent representatives with insight into the preferences of their constituencies when compared to their challengers, as more senior incumbents are consistently closer to their constituencies in marginal districts. Interestingly, they also found that the advantages of incumbency allowed senior representatives to ignore those preferences, as more senior members achieved reelection almost 80% of the time even when challengers more accurately represented the simulated districts issue opinions. Stone (1979) also finds indications that legislators may not change their behavior over time as their constituencies change their level of issue polarization. In examining changes in issue responsiveness from 1956 to 1972, he concludes that “representatives do not necessarily change their behavior, yet changing mass opinion means the district as a whole loses because there is shaper polarization”. This supports the finding of Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) in that incumbency allows legislators the luxury of unresponsiveness, as they fail to respond to changes in district opinion in Stone’s analysis. Stone surmises that any responsiveness is more the result of the initial similarity rather than a dynamic over time response by the representative.

Also in concurrence with the initial finding of Sullivan and Uslaner, Hood and Morris (1998) find that incumbents often fail to reflect their district’s ideological preferences in their roll-call voting behavior. In their analysis of southern congressional districts from 1983 to 1992, they find that liberal Democrats consistently replaced incumbent Democrats in the South mainly due to death, retirement, or resignation, but
not defeat. Finally, Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) historical analysis of roll call voting suggests much the same for the seniority hypothesis. By finding that great stability in the voting patterns of representatives, they further the idea that incumbents are relatively unresponsive to their constituencies. Poole and Rosenthal suggest that members of Congress begin and maintain their ideological positions until they die, retire, or are defeated.

Despite the previous findings that senior representatives can and do ignore the preferences of their constituents, some research has suggested that senior legislators are actually more responsive than others to their constituencies (Glazer and Robbins, 1985; Zupan, 1990). In their quasi-experimental research design, Glazer and Robbins (1985) attempt to gauge the change in responsiveness of legislators as their districts are altered by the decennial census and resulting reapportionment of their districts. They hypothesize that more experienced representatives are better equipped to both acknowledge and adjust to their potential constituency change. Their results indicate that those members that were more responsive to their constituency change had higher reelection rates. In addition, they found that more senior members exhibited more responsiveness than less senior members. Finally, Zupan (1990) examines the roll call behavior change in congressional members from 1976 to 1978 as a function of retirement or pursuit of another office. He discovers that those members who decided to retire late in their term or decided to pursue another office have significant decreases in their responsiveness to their constituencies. While not directly related to seniority, this finding does indicate that incumbent members are adjusting their personal ideology to accommodate the preferences of their constituencies. Therefore, this finding lends support to the idea that incumbents do not completely disregard their constituencies, as some research has suggested is possible.
**Legislator Characteristics: Retirement**

Various legislative scholars have also considered the influence of the decision to retire on legislative responsiveness and behavior (Hibbing, 1984; Jackson and King, 1989; Lott and Reed, 1989; Zupan, 1990). The rational behind this line of research is that desire for re-election is the primary reason legislators are responsive to their constituents. Considering the fact that retiring legislators are unconstrained by the desire to be reelected, it is hypothesized that representatives who have chosen to retire will quite likely be less responsive to their constituents’ policy preferences than those colleagues who plan to run for reelection.

In his analysis of the retirement hypothesis, Hibbing (1984) finds support for the retirement hypothesis. He finds that retiring representatives are significantly less likely to support transfer payments to their districts than non-retiring members. Conversely, Lott and Reed (1989), have challenged this standard retirement hypothesis. They argue that the problem with the retirement hypothesis is that the legislators most likely to retire are legislators with higher than average seniority and this seniority is quite likely due to their responsiveness to constituent’s preferences. They suggest that that the political environment sorts out those politicians with policy preferences different from those of voters, resulting in legislators that have preferences that correspond with those of his constituents, regardless of retirement status.

Lott and Reed’s competing hypothesis is supported by a similar and more extensive analysis by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). In their demonstration of the stability of the ideological voting patterns of representatives, they also find that the ideological voting patterns of retiring legislators do not significantly change following their decisions to retire. Furthermore, Zupan (1990), finds that the correlations between simulated constituent ideologies and congressional voting ideology are no different between retiring and continuing representatives.
Legislator Characteristics: Role Orientation & Personal Ideology

Legislator role orientation is another mediating factor in the responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies. Due to the internal, psychological nature of role orientations, it has remained difficult to obtain data or information that is amenable to empirical research. This type of information is only obtainable by the use of interviews of legislators. Despite this limitation, McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) have attempted to examine this elusive characteristic. They contend that a stronger linkage between legislators and constituencies should occur when legislators believe themselves to be “delegates” for their constituents rather than “trustees” who use their own judgment in decision making. The authors utilized interviews with members of the California legislature to determine their disposition toward a role orientation. They also use an alternative measure of constituency preference. The authors use the referenda and initiative voting returns by each legislative district as their measure of district opinion. This measure, while unavailable for Congressional level analysis of constituency preference, is certainly an improvement over other alternatives. McCrone and Kuklinski find that a linkage does exist between constituent preferences and legislator behavior. They also discover significant differences between those legislators who considered themselves trustees or delegates. Furthermore, the authors show that the consistency with which the constituency demonstrates its preference will make a difference in the perception of the legislators, although that finding is discussed more fully later.

Related to this orientation factor is a legislator’s own personal preference on public policy. It stands to reason that this personal preference would be more prevalent in those legislators who considered themselves to be trustees. Beyond role orientation, the issue of personal preference by legislators is pervasive in the roll-call voting literature. It is almost a prerequisite when discussing the influences on decision-making to identify the underlying personal preference of the legislator. This characteristic can be
as elusive as role orientation. Despite the nature of personal preference, most authors substitute this unknown with surrogates that can theoretically approach the identification of such preferences. This surrogate is usually a legislator’s party identification or an interest group rating that is used to control this variation when examining other mediators into legislator’s roll-call behavior or examining trends in roll-call voting (Poole and Daniels, 1985; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992; Overby, Henschen, Walsh, and Strauss, 1992; LeVeaux and Garand, 2003; Bernstein, 1989, Kingdon, 1989).

Poole and Daniels (1985) and Poole and Rosenthal (1991) have aptly demonstrated the almost unitary dimensional nature of ideological cleavage in their examination of roll-call voting in Congress, which suggests the powerful nature of ideology and party in the determination of voting decisions by legislators. Furthermore, they demonstrate the stability of this characteristic in legislators over time, which suggests that this core characteristic of legislators are not changeable over time and reinforces this indication of stable personal preference.

The seminal work by Kingdon (1989) provides good evidence of the significance of the personal preferences of legislators in their decision-making. By conducting interviews with members of the U.S. House of Representatives during 1969, Kingdon is able to obtain the unique insight into the decision-making process and the relative influence of differing forces on that decision-making process. While there are many significant findings in Kingdon’s explanation of his “Consensus Mode” of decision-making by legislators, the most fundamental for our purposes here is that legislator’s incorporate their own conception of good public policy into their decision-making. This personal preference manifests itself indirectly by following the cues of fellow representatives and directly by their own ideological conception and the need for voting consistency. Where there is conflict between the forces and goals of legislators,
Kingdon finds that legislators will vote their policy preference consistently on low and medium salience issues and split their behavior between constituency, intra-Washington influence and policy preference on high salience issues. Clearly from Kingdon’s research, personal preference is a significant force in the decision-making process of legislators, and therefore mediates the responsiveness of those legislators to their constituencies.

**Legislator Characteristics: Electoral Circumstance**

The political circumstances in which legislators find themselves are also potential mediators on their responsiveness to their constituencies. For our purposes, these political conditions are related to the election cycle and the effect that these conditions may have on the nature of representation by legislators. In particular, this political circumstance is a competitive election. It is certainly plausible to assume that incumbents who are facing a potentially strong challenge where they have only recently won a hotly contested election may be more attuned to the wants and desires of their district constituents than an incumbent who is not faced with a competitive district. As the election cycle draws near, politicians perceiving an electoral threat will begin to listen to the preferences of their constituents with more focus, in the effort to appear responsive and in-tune to their district, and to stave off any further serious challenge to their reelection.

The electoral condition in which a winning candidate has fallen short of some pre-determined threshold of the popular vote in their previous is termed a “marginal” election. This threshold is typically 55% or 60%, and those incumbents whose previous election falls within that threshold are argued to be “marginal” and subject to a significant electoral challenge and therefore a higher likelihood of defeat. The idea is that incumbents representing these marginal, or electorally competitive districts, face a higher degree of electoral threat. Thus the argument is that those legislators who find
themselves in these types of electoral circumstances will become more attuned to their constituencies in the hope of staving off electoral defeat and ending the perception of vulnerability to potential challengers. Because of the potential to explain such significant political events as election outcomes, incumbency advantage, constituency responsiveness, the occurrence of electoral marginality has received great attention by scholars. In terms of electoral marginality’s effect on the legislator-constituency linkage, early debate seems to have settled upon the existence of an increase in responsiveness when incumbents have experienced a marginal election.

Early scholars such as MacRae (1952) and Shannon (1968) found the existence of marginal election effects. In several studies of state legislative behavior, these scholars found that legislators from marginal districts are less loyal to party in their roll-call voting than were legislators from safe districts. This finding suggested that legislators increased their responsiveness to their constituencies and away from partisan loyalty when reelection was questionable. These findings have been challenged by several authors who found conflicting results. By the inclusion of simulated constituent preferences, both Miller (1970) and Fiorina (1973) argue that they provided a truer test of the responsiveness of legislators to their constituents. Based upon their findings, they suggest that the linkage between constituent preferences and legislator roll-call behavior is not significantly altered by electoral marginality.

More recent research appears to clear up this early controversy over the impact of electoral marginality. In his examination of legislative roll-call behavior in the 1971 California legislature, Kuklinski (1977) finds some support for the marginality hypothesis. He examined the responsiveness of legislators on the policy dimensions of contemporary liberalism, taxation and government administration and found that legislators that experience more competitive elections are more responsive to their constituencies on taxation policy. He also found that those legislators from competitive
districts are also less likely to vote with their party. This suggests that that the impact of competition may have the effect of reorienting legislators.

Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) also investigate the mediating effect of election marginality on candidate responsiveness. In their analysis of the 1966 Congressional elections in the areas of civil rights, foreign affairs and domestic program responsiveness, they test two alternative interpretations to the marginality hypothesis. First, they examine if marginal incumbents will converge to the positions of their constituents; and second, if marginal incumbents will converge to the positions of their opponents. They discovered that candidates tended to diverge from each other in marginal districts and that candidates who are closest to the constituency opinion were considerably more likely to win than their opponent. Furthermore, analysis by Campbell (1981) suggests that controversy concerning the influence of electoral margins is partially due to an incorrect specification of marginality. He argues that the relationship between district competitiveness and congressional responsiveness has been incorrectly specified. Instead of a linear relationship as assumed in previous studies, Campbell argues that the relationship is curvilinear in nature. In his analysis, the introduction of the curvilinear effect demonstrated the significant effect of marginality on legislative responsiveness. Finally, recent analysis by Bartels (1991) demonstrates the unequivocal influence of marginality on the responsiveness of legislators to their constituents. In his examination of roll-call voting and defense spending, Bartels finds the linkage between constituency preference and legislative voting behavior is significantly stronger for members from marginal districts than those of safe districts.

THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS

The character of the political environment may also intervene on the linkage between legislators and their constituencies. In spite of the demonstration that constituencies have a important and significant effect on legislative roll-call behavior,
there is relatively little empirical research into the effect of variation in that constituency on such roll-call behavior. While a substantial amount of research has focused on the effects of various legislator conditions such as seniority and electoral conditions on the representational linkage between legislators and their constituencies, significantly less research has examined the effect of changes in the nature of various constituent conditions on representation.

Kingdon (1989) provides good evidence for the effect of constituencies on the voting decisions of legislators. In his book, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, Kingdon examines the many influences on legislator’s voting decisions, including constituencies, fellow representatives, party leadership, the executive branch, staff, and media. Kingdon argues that constituency influence is of substantial importance. Based on his interviews of Representatives on their decision-making, he finds that they vote with their constituency over 75% of the time when they perceive a position from their constituency. Furthermore, they spontaneously mention constituency 37% of the time when explaining his decision-making calculations, second only to his discussions with fellow representatives. Kingdon does indicate that this constituency influence can be altered by the intensity of preference from the constituency on any particular issue or policy, and weigh the constituency more on those issues that are of high intensity. If the issues are of low intensity to a member’s constituency, they will vote their own preference. When there is conflict between the representative and the constituency on high intensity issues, the representatives tends to seek other actors for advice and attempt to either redefine the conflict. The conclusion to be reached concerning constituency effect is that it is significant and of paramount importance to legislators and usually eclipses other influences on their voting decisions.

Similarly, Glazer and Robbins (1985) provide strong evidence that constituency characteristics do matter in the representative process. The authors utilize the 1980
census and resulting reapportionment cycle to create a quasi-experimental design. They examine whether or not changes in a House district alters member’s roll-call voting behavior. The authors first calculate the relationship between the district presidential vote and the conservative coalition score for each district’s legislator created by the Congressional Quarterly. This resulting relationship is then used to create a predicted change in the conservative coalition score based upon changes in the presidential vote in the reapportioned district. This prediction is then entered into a model explaining the legislator’s conservative coalition score in 1982 in the reapportioned district. They hypothesize that representatives will adjust their voting behavior to the ideological change in their district. What they find is that representatives do indeed change their voting behavior to accommodate changes in their constituencies. Those legislators who were reelected in 1982 were significantly more responsive to constituent changes than those legislators that were not reelected. Responsiveness does seem to matter for the goal of reelection, which undoubtedly incumbents realize. As mentioned earlier, this effect is much more significant in more senior members of the House of Representatives. Glazer and Robbins argue that the selection process of elections parses out the less responsive candidates and rewards those candidates that are more responsive and a better reflection of the constituencies that they represent.

The evidence suggests that constituency characteristics do influence the representational behavior of legislators. Beyond this fact, there are several aspects of a legislator’s constituency that may effect the nature of that responsiveness or mediate the effectiveness of the voice of that constituency (Ardoin and Garand, 2003). First, the heterogeneity of a constituency may create uncertainty in the responsiveness of legislators. If the signals that emanate from the district constituency are too diverse or mixed, effective responsiveness becomes difficult. Secondly, the level of political sophistication and engagement by a district constituency may have an effect. If a district
contains greater numbers of sophisticated or engaged voters, it stands to reason that a legislator would be inclined to respond with more ease and with the knowledge that his or her decision-making was monitored by the electorate. Since reelection is the ultimate goal, the larger these constituencies, the more apt a legislator may be to respond.

There may be subgroups within district constituencies that have a disproportionate influence on the responsiveness of legislators. These sub-groups within a constituency may have a greater centralization or gravitation to an issue or policy. It is this centralization that separates them from the remaining constituency. It may be the case that these core constituencies are vital for the reelection efforts of legislators.

**Constituency Characteristics: Heterogeneity**

It is a compelling rationale that the relative unanimity of a legislator’s constituency can have an impact the amount of responsiveness that will result from that legislator. Just such an argument is suggested by Ardoin and Garand (1996). They argue that homogeneous districts will have constituencies that have relatively homogeneous interests when compared to more heterogeneous districts. They contend that when legislators receive unequivocal signals from their constituents, they are less likely to deviate from the policy preferences of those constituents. Therefore, the legislator/constituency responsiveness linkage should be stronger in such districts. If the message is clear, the responsibility for not adhering to that message could lead to a more significant electoral challenge. Following this argument, they further suggest that heterogeneous constituencies should convey more conflicting or ambiguous signals to their representatives and therefore provide legislators with few tangible constituency messages with which to make roll-call decisions. In a test of this hypothesis with the U.S. Senate, Ardoin and Garand find that when homogenous constituencies generate clear policy signals, senators strongly link their roll-call behavior to constituency preferences. Conversely, if constituency policy preferences are confused or conflicted
by more heterogeneous constituencies, the linkage becomes attenuated. The authors conclude that U.S. senators do vary their responsiveness to the ideological preferences of their constituents based upon the clarity of signals that they perceive.

Similar support is found in Bailey and Brady’s (1998) analysis of Senate votes on free trade policy. They find constituency variables related to support for free trade followed legislator voting behavior more closely for senators from homogenous states. Based upon this evidence, the authors concluded that the evidence supported the hypothesis that constituent heterogeneity influences congressional responsiveness.

**Constituency Characteristics: Political Engagement**

It has also been suggested that the political acumen and activity of constituents may influence how legislators translate that constituency’s preferences into roll-call votes. This hypothesis founded on the argument that those constituencies that are more sophisticated and/or politically active will have a much more accurate and informed idea of the policy positions and roll-call behavior of their representative. This clarity of information should make it much easier for those constituencies to hold their legislator accountable for their decisions.

A test of this hypothesis is the focus of research by Jackson and King (1989). In their analysis of House member’s roll call voting decisions on the 1978 Tax Reform Act, they find that the political engagement of constituents does not have a significant influence on the responsiveness of legislators. However, research by Ardoin and Garand (1996) suggests some support for this hypothesis. In their analysis of representation in the U.S. Senate from 1976 through 1992, the authors find that representation of state constituent ideology in senate roll call behavior increases as the political engagement of state’s constituency increases.
Constituency Characteristics: Core Constituencies

While the research of Glazer and Robbins is certainly instructive to the effects of general constituency change on voting behavior, other scholars have used similar methodology or similar hypotheses to discern other changes in constituency on changes in voting. (Wright, 1989; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996; LeVeaux and Garand, 2003) These authors have attempted to examine the influence of more detailed or distinct subgroups within a legislator's constituency. It is suggested by these authors and others that these subgroups may hold greater sway with legislators than the larger, more defuse general constituency.

This hypothesis concerning subgroups finds its beginnings in the work of Richard Fenno (1978) and later in the work of John Kingdon (1989). Both authors give life to the idea of sub-constituencies and their effect on legislators. While Fenno uses the distinction to describe the political environment that legislator’s themselves perceive in their districts, Kingdon goes further to indicate the political influence such constituencies may have on a legislator’s voting behavior.

In his seminal work, Fenno argues that there are four levels of constituency from the perspective of the members of Congress that he interviewed. These levels of constituency are: (1) Geographic; (2) Reelection; (3) Primary; and (4) Personal. Fenno describes the geographical constituency as the legal boundaries and full population of a district, with the main characteristic differentiating characteristic being the relative homogeneous or heterogeneous nature of the constituency of the district. The personal constituency is only the very few individuals that go beyond even the legislator’s most ardent supporters. These individuals are the member’s closest family and friends that are both politically and emotionally supportive of his or her efforts. It is the remaining two levels of constituency that are of the most interest in the defining of a core constituency. The reelection constituency is considered to be a legislator’s political supporters. They are
the sections of the geographic constituency that have supported the candidate previously are often targeted for mobilization by the candidate. Fenno argues that this reelection constituency is most important in competitive elections, as they can be counted as supporters and voters in a close election. Finally, the primary constituency is that collection of supporters in the reelection constituency that the legislator considers his strongest supporters. They constitute the campaign workers and financial contributors to the reelection effort, and are differentiated by the consistency and intensity with which they support their candidate. Fenno’s interviewees often characterize this primary constituency as their political base or nucleus.

Kingdon (1989) also identifies the existence of sub-constituencies in a legislator’s district. In identifying the multitude of actors that impinge upon the decision-making of members of Congress, he suggests that constituencies are complex and made up of many subgroups, some politically active and others not active. Those subgroups, when politically active or involved in governmental policy areas, are characterized by Kingdon as district elites. Some of these elites form either a “supporting coalition” or a “electoral supporting coalition” for the legislator in their district. In placing the importance of constituency in the voting decision, Kingdon’s evidence indicates that:

“…the presence of elites in the congressman’s perceptual map of constituency, whether there because of the overt elite activity or because he takes account of those groups independent of their activity, considerably enhances the importance of the constituency in his decision”

Other research has attempted to identify core constituencies in legislator’s districts which may fit this pattern of persuasion. Wright (1989) examines the relative influence of different constituencies on the roll-call voting of U.S. Senators from 1981 to 1984. He finds that party affiliation and constituency ideology both have a strong effect on the voting behavior of Senators. Furthermore, Wright finds that incumbents are much more responsive to independent party identifiers and to party elite preferences than the
remaining constituency of their states. Wright’s finding suggests that incumbent senator’s are able to identify core constituencies within their larger statewide constituency and respond to that core constituency with more intensity and interest than the larger constituency.

Several authors have looked to race and a potential indicator of a core constituency (Leveaux and Garand, 2003; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996). The argument presented by these authors is that legislators of different parties may respond differently to the policy views or electoral strength of segments within their constituencies. Particularly, the argument is that Democrats and Republicans respond differently to changes in the racial composition of their district following demographic changes associated with the decennial reapportionment of legislative districts. Because Democratic candidates historically receive the African-American vote and usually depend on it for electoral success, they should certainly be very responsive to changes in that constituency. Conversely, since Republican candidates do not depend on the African-American vote for electoral victory, they should be unmoved by changes in that demographic. In short, blacks make up a large core constituency for Democrats, but not for Republicans.

Overby and Cosgrove (1996) use the 1990 reapportionment cycle to determine if changes in the racial composition of reapportioned districts affect the voting behavior of white incumbent Representatives in 1993. The authors find that Democratic House members are responsive to changes in district racial composition, but that Republican House members are not. This finding suggests that Democratic incumbents are sensitive to the changes in a sub-group of their larger constituency. Furthermore, the lack of responsiveness by Republicans to this change in racial composition suggests that subgroup constituencies may apply to only certain candidates, dependent upon their characteristics.
Also, Leveaux and Garand, (2003), utilize similar methodology to identify changes in incumbent roll-call voting associated with changes in racial composition of their reapportioned districts. They find that Republican House members whose districts underwent increases in black population do not change their voting behavior to reflect that change. Instead, Republican House members actually respond negatively, which indicates that Republicans representing districts with relatively significant black populations after reapportionment actually shift their roll-call behavior in the conservative direction. The authors suggest that when “Republican incumbents are confronted with substantial black subpopulations in their districts; they appear to target their representational behavior toward their (presumably) more conservative white constituents than toward their black constituents.” Conversely, Democratic House members are responsive to changes in black population due to redistricting. They shift their roll-call behavior in a more liberal direction as a function of those changes. The authors also add a test of general responsiveness to general constituency changes due to reapportionment. This test demonstrates that both parties respond in kind to this general change with changes in their voting behavior. This finding suggests that while both party’s incumbents are responsive to the preferences of their constituents in general terms, they respond differently to an important Democratic core constituency. This finding further reinforces the notion of the significance of “core” constituencies on the responsiveness of legislators.

**SUMMARY**

This chapter has reviewed the literature that explores the relationship between legislators and the constituencies that they represent. The findings of this literature certainly demonstrate the significant influence that constituencies have in the decision-making calculus by legislators. Evidence has also demonstrated that there are many mediating factors that effect the relationship between legislators and their constituencies.
These characteristics include both the personal characteristics and political circumstances of legislators and the characteristics of the constituencies of legislators.

The unequivocal finding that constituencies do matter in the decision-making of legislators is critical for the purposes of this dissertation. If I am to purport that government employees have an effect on the roll-call voting behavior of legislators, it is vital to have empirical and theoretical support showing that constituencies are important to the legislators. A review of the literature demonstrates the importance of constituencies to the behavior of representatives. Furthermore, research illustrates that subgroups within the constituency can have a greater influence on the voting behavior of representatives than the more diffuse population of a district. Again, this finding is vital for the relationship that I hypothesize is in effect between bureaucrats and elected representatives. If core constituencies can exist and disproportionately affect the behavior of representatives, the potential for government employee to function as a core constituency may have merit.
CHAPTER 3

A BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING

The weight of the evidence brought forth by scholars suggests that constituency does matter in the decision-making process of legislators. Evidence also points to the ability of political actors to identify sub-groups within their constituencies and respond differently to those sub-groups when compared to the remaining general constituency. Further, an examination of the multitude of forces that mediate this relationship between legislators and their constituents has shown that there are indeed many personal and environmental characteristics that can and do effect the intensity and cohesiveness of that relationship.

In general, it can be said with some confidence that constituencies do matter in the roll-call decision-making of legislators and that those legislators do indeed make distinctions between different segments of their constituencies. They appear to have the ability and the motivation to identify segments within their constituency that they consider to be strong supporters and vital to the goal of reelection. Whether these segments are the reelection or primary constituencies described by Fenno (1978) or the supporting coalitions described by Kingdon (1989), they do seem to exist. Furthermore, there certainly seems to be willingness or even necessity for candidates to subdivide their constituencies to promote their reelection bids.

**ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND CORE CONSTITUENCIES**

It certainly makes good political sense to identify sub-groups within a constituency that a candidate feels will support them above and beyond the remainder of that constituency. Electoral dynamics and the political environment have begun to promote the elections of candidates instead of simply partisan choices (Wattenberg, 1996).
Wattenberg provides a wealth of evidence to argue that the electorate has become more independent or at least less attached to their partisan identification. As such, the electorate has become less dependent of partisan identification as a voting cue and as a perceptual screen through which they evaluate candidates. He points to decline in self-reported partisan identification, the rise in split-ticket voting, the increase in individuals offering “no-preference” as their party choice, and the growing feeling of neutrality toward parties as evidence for this decline in the importance of party in the electorate. Wattenberg suggests that these trends are significant, even as some evidence has suggested that weakened self-reporting of party identification has not altered the partisan voting behavior of those individuals (Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye and Wolfinger, 1992). As a result of these changes, he suggests that candidates have the opportunity to create their own reelection constituencies to enhance their reelection effort.

Candidate centered elections seem to increase the likelihood of targeting core constituencies. As candidates search their constituencies for those groups that will work for their personal election and be counted on to participate on election day. The cultivation of segments of a constituency that have the means and motive to both support and vote for a candidate, above and beyond simple partisan identification, is extremely good politics.

The importance of the identification of supportive sub-group constituencies is further enhanced by the changing nature of the electoral process. While the rise in candidate-centered elections has created the need to solicit constituencies that can be counted on for support beyond the voting cue of partisanship, this effect may be exacerbated by the decline in turnout over the past three decades. Presidential election year turnout has declined, as a proportion of voting age population, from a high of 63% in 1960 to its current level of 51% from the 2000 election. The Congressional election
turnout has followed the same pattern. Congressional election year turnout in 1962 was 47% and reached a low of 36.4 in the 1998 mid-term election cycle. Recent research by McDonald and Popkin (2001), has suggested most of this decline can be attributed to measurement error in the calculation of voting age population. They argue that once non-citizens and felons are subtracted out of the voting age population, the voting eligible population that is left is the truer measure the examination of turnout rates. One this clarified measure is utilized; the declines average a much more modest five percent in both congressional and presidential elections. What doesn’t change is the consistently lower turnout between congressional and presidential elections. The rate of turnout is consistently 15 to 20 percent lower during congressional elections.

Perhaps the most interesting explanation for this turnout decline has been put forth by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and their findings regarding the reasons behind turnout decline remain important to explaining the differences between presidential and congressional turnout rates. Furthermore, this research also contributed validity to the hypothesis that candidates search for sub-constituencies. Let’s first summarize the findings of Rosenstone and Hansen. They argue that the decline in turnout can be traced to two factors. First, they argue that the characteristics of the electorate can explain about half of the decline. These characteristics included a younger, less politically experienced electorate; a weakened sense of social involvement; declining feelings of efficacy; and weakened attachment to political parties and candidates. The other half of the equation that has produced the decline in participation is the lack of mobilization by candidates and parties. They give evidence on several fronts for this mobilization decline. First, they demonstrate that partisan mobilization has declined, with parties replacing labor-intensive canvassing methods with money-intensive media strategies. Second, they show that electoral competition has declined, which makes the need for mobilization to decline. Thirdly, they illustrate that the demand for limited
campaign resources has climbed due to increases in contested primaries. This demand thinned the resources of both candidates to mobilize and voters to participate. Finally, they explain that social movement activity has declined, leaving fewer opportunities to engage and motivate large numbers of voters. The conclude that:

“The actions of parties, campaigns, and social movements mobilize public involvement in American elections. The “blame” for declining voter turnout, accordingly, rests on political leaders as on citizens themselves”

What is most interesting for our purpose of providing supporting evidence for the pursuit of sub-groups by candidates? It is the underlying findings of Rosenstone and Hansen regarding the scope and bias of the political mobilization that occurs. They conclude that candidates, parties, and interest groups attempt to mobilize individuals that are (1) affluent, (2) identifiable and accessible, and (3) likely to respond and be effective. Mobilization efforts by candidates and parties are targeted toward those groups in their constituencies that are expected to be supportive. These mobilization efforts have a great similarity to the reelection/primary or supporting coalition constituencies identified by Fenno (1978) and Kingdon (1989). Rosenstone and Hansen conclude that “democratic government provides few incentives for leaders to attend to the needs of people who neither affect the achievement of their policy goals nor influence the perpetuation of their tenure in office”. Evidently, the identification and mobilization of those core constituencies that support and vote for a candidate are those groups that will see responsiveness from legislators.

Ultimately, the more candidate-centered electoral process and the increase in targeted mobilization suggest that core constituency identification may be an important consideration to representatives seeking reelection. Also, the lower participation rate evident in congressional elections suggests that the pursuit of core constituencies could
be more important to electoral success at the mid-term than in presidential election years.

**GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AS A CORE CONSTITUENCY**

Previous literature has identified several sub-groups that may match the requirements that characterize core constituencies (Leveaux and Garand, 2003; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996; Wright, 1989). It is certainly plausible that other subdivisions within legislator’s constituencies may exist. These subgroups may also be amenable to mobilization and reliable for political support. I speculate in this dissertation that government employees are one such potential constituency sub-group.

Where does one look for the evidence that government employees may qualify as a distinct sub-constituency able to deliver political support above and beyond others in a legislator’s district? I find the evidence of motive and opportunity in the literature on government growth. The findings associated with this literature provide the evidence that bureaucrats may indeed be a core constituency worthy of responsiveness by legislators. Furthermore, the identification of bureaucrats as an important sub-group constituency would also clarify and lend validity to the Bureau voting model's contention of bureaucratic influence on the growth of government.

**Bureaucratic Influence on Government Growth**

The influence of bureaucracy on the political system has been the focus of numerous scholars (Niskanen, 1971; Sears and Citrin, 1982; Meier, 1975; Rourke, 1976; Borcherding, 1977). These scholars have examined the role and influence of bureaucracies and government employees in the decision-making and behavior of government. One such aspect of government behavior that has received a substantial amount of attention concerns the role of government employees in increasing the size of the public sector. Beginning with Niskanen's (1971) influential work, numerous scholars have explored the role of the "budget-maximizing bureaucrat" in shaping the size of the
public sector (Garand, 1988; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991; Borcherding, 1977; Blais and Dion, 1991; Lowery and Berry, 1983; Sears and Citrin, 1982). Typically, these scholars work under the theoretical assumption that government employees are self-interested utility maximizers who seek expanded budgets for government departments and agencies, particularly their own. According to this view, the size of government grows, at least in part, because government employees seek to expand government services to levels beyond that which would be demanded by citizens.

Much of the literature that examines the influence of government employees on the size of government is based on the this core premise that government employees act as rational, self-interested political actors who support increases in the size of the public sector for their own well-being. Public bureaucrats are depicted as using whatever advantages they can muster over elected policy makers or politicians to ensure a steady and, if possible, increasing flow of funds for their agencies and departments. This general theory is a seductive one that commands examination when exploring the explanations for government growth.

Theoretically, what advantages do public bureaucrats have over elected officials, particularly those in the U.S. Congress? Scholars who make the assumption of self-interested, budget-maximizing bureaucrats point to two processes in which government employees exercise a degree of influence over members of Congress. These processes provide the core of two related, but competitive, theories of the effects of public bureaucrats on the roll-call behavior of legislators: The Bureaucratic Information Monopoly Model and the Bureau voting model. Both are intriguing, but the Bureau voting model is of the most interest in discerning the ability of government employees to act as a core constituency.
The Bureau-Information Monopoly Model

The first explanation, termed the "bureau information monopoly" model by Niskanen (1971), proposes that government employees, acting in their own self-interest, use the policy information advantages available to them to their benefit when dealing with Congress or the President over budget allowances. He argues that that the link between bureaucracy and government growth can be explained and modeled from an economic theory, as opposed to more traditional sociological approaches. This economic foundation is based on the assumption that bureaucrats are budget maximizers, who seek increasingly large budget appropriations to create job security and greater life satisfaction. For Niskanen, the power mechanism used by bureaucrats to orchestrate these higher budgets is information. The bureau information monopoly model suggests that bureaucrats have substantial information advantages over members of the explicitly political branches of government. To this end, bureaucrats use their monopolistic control of government output and information about the true costs to supply this output in an effort to secure higher budget allowances. It is argued that larger budgets increase the likelihood that bureaucrats will obtain greater personal benefits (e.g., higher salaries), increase the discretion that they have over their work lives, promote public policies that they and their agencies support, create a happy clientele, and generally insulate themselves from the political branches of government. Since most elected officials cannot compete with the bureaucracy in the control of information relevant to public policy-making, they must give at least some deference to the spending goals of government agencies and departments.

Ultimately, the level of empirical support for the bureau information monopoly theory is very limited. The paramount difficulty with empirical analyses of this model is assessing the degree to which the bureaucracy has a monopoly on information relevant to policy making. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate whether or not information
monopolies are translated directly into legislative decisions that are favorable to the budgetary preferences of public bureaucrats.

**The Bureau Voting Model**

The bureau voting model suggests that the growth and maintenance of the size of government is significantly affected by the advantages in voting power that government employees have over other citizens. First, as with the bureau information monopoly, government employees are assumed to have stronger preferences for greater spending than other citizens. Second, they are expected to translate those preferences into greater electoral support for candidates for office who are willing to promote an expanded public sector. One of the keys components of this model is the expectation that government employees are more likely than other citizens to cast votes on election day. If this assumption is true, candidates who support greater government spending would be advantaged by the support that they are likely to receive from a group of voters (i.e., government employees) who are likely to turn out in greater numbers and may well identify and respond to this group as a core constituency. According to this argument, the end result is a greater tendency for candidates who support an expanded public sector to win on election day. Empirical evidence for the bureau voting model should manifest itself in differences in the ideological and attitudinal dispositions, political participation, and vote choice between bureaucrats and the remaining public.

There is a substantial amount of empirical support for the bureau-voting model, though the findings of previous research are not necessarily definitive. Scholars have generally found significant differences between government employees and other citizens in their partisanship, ideological orientation, and attitudes toward government spending, but these differences are not stark on most issues (Garand, Parkhurst, and

In his research into representative bureaucracy, Meier finds that public employees take a consistently more liberal position concerning issues and party identification in 1972. While not directly related to spending preferences, these findings do suggest the respondent’s liberalism and inclination to support a larger public sector. Aberbach and Rockman (1976) and Cole and Caputo (1979) also discover a liberal bias in the career bureaucracy during the Nixon administration. They find that career bureaucrats have higher rates of support than political appointees for increased social service provision by the federal government, and lower support for administration policies. They also reveal that career civil servants are also much more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. Despite these findings of differing policy and spending attitudes between the bureaucracy and private citizens or other civil servants, conclusions need to be taken with some reservation. These reservations are based on individual-level survey research done by Lewis (1990), who finds that the attitudes of government employees, including government spending preferences, are not significantly different from the rest of the population. This discovery runs contrary to other individual-level survey research conducted by Sears and Citrin (1982) and Garand et al., (1991), who find significant attitudinal differences between government employees and the general population.

Sears and Citrin take a direct approach by the investigation of the attitudinal differences between government employees and the general public toward the tax-revolt measures of California. They contend that bureaucrats should differ in their attitudes based on a rational self-interest to support measures which promote the continuation of government funding for their respective agencies and jobs. They find significant differences between the public employees and the remaining population, with
bureaucrats less supportive of the tax-revolt measures by an average of 41 percent to 65 percent.

Garand et al. (1991) also investigate the attitudinal differences between bureaucrats and the general public. The authors utilize a direct individual level analysis of attitudinal differences, based on data from the American National Election Studies from 1982, 1984, and 1986. Questions concerning general political attitudes, government spending levels, and feeling thermometer measurements for liberalism, which should correlated highly with a pro-spending belief, were employed to measure general political attitudes. Garand et al. find support for an attitudinally liberal stance by government employees. They demonstrate that twenty-seven of thirty general political attitudes are in the expected direction, with fifteen significant, forty-three of the forty-eight feeling thermometers are in the expected direction, with twenty significant; and twenty-eight of the thirty-four spending attitudes are in the expected direction, with 10 significant.

There is also strong evidence that government employees will participate and vote with greater regularity and greater number than other citizens (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; and Garand et al., 1991; Sears and Citrin, 1982). Wolfinger and Rosenstone find that government employees are much more likely to vote than the rest of the population, even after controlling for various demographic and environmental variables. They find that 83 percent of government employees reported voting in 1972, as opposed to 65 percent of the general public. The authors suggest that these differences may be the result of rational self-interested bureaucrats responding to their welfare with the appropriate voting behavior. Sears and Citrin also find higher turnout rates by public sector employees for the tax revolt propositions, with public employee turnout at 51 percent and the remaining population at only 30 percent. These differences remain consistent even after controlling for demographics and yield the
conclusion that bureaucratic opposition to the tax revolt measures stemmed from self-interest and not social advantage.

Also, based on an individual level analysis of turnout, Garand et al. (1991) also find strong empirical support for significantly higher turnout rates of government employees. The authors examined the differences in the general, Presidential, Governor, Senate, and House elections between bureaucrats and the general public, as well as the independent effect of government employment on the probability to turn out. In each midterm election, differences always exceeded 10 percentage points, while in presidential election years the difference remained above 8 percent. Further evidence is found in research by Blair (1993), which utilized the National Election Survey Data from 1982 to 1990 to establish significant differences in the turnout rate for government employees after controlling for a wide range of individual and environmental characteristics. Once again, the differences were much greater during the midterm election cycle.

Finally, government employees are also more likely than other citizens to cast votes for Democratic candidates, though here again the differences are not glaring and vary from one election to the next (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1991; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991). Blais, Blake and Dion (1991) find consistently higher support for parties of the left in western democracies. Concerning the United States, they find significantly higher support for the Democratic Party in five of the seven presidential election years between 1960 and 1984, with significantly different support in 1984 and 1988. Furthermore, Garand et al. (1991) provide a direct measure of the hypothesized vote choice differences with an individual level analysis of the vote for President, House, Senate and gubernatorial candidate. They find moderate support for the vote choice hypothesis of weaker support for the Republican Party. The authors find less
Republican support in all elections, but more strongly in the 1982 and 1984 elections, while discovering less difference in the 1986 elections.

**The Bureau Voting Model: The Key to Motive and Opportunity**

From this previous research, it is evident that the bureau information monopoly and bureau voting models have strong similarities. Both models assume that government employees are self-interested actors who seek to maximize, to the extent possible, agency budgets and/or the size of government. Both models suggest that public-sector employees act in their own self interest, that they exercise some influence over elected public officials, and that the result is an increase in the size of the public sector. Where these two models differ lies in the causal mechanism that presumably results in increases in the size of the public sector. For the bureau information monopoly model, it is the ability of bureaucrats to profit from their information advantage over elected officials in institutional settings that results in the effect on government spending. For the bureau voting model, it is the advantageous position of government employees in the electorate relative to that of other citizens that has the effect on government spending.

The bureau information monopoly model suggests that elected officials respond to information asymmetries that play themselves out primarily in the institutional settings that involve the interaction of the bureaucracy and Congress. In its purest sense, the bureau information monopoly model would seem to leave very little room for government employees to persuade their legislators through elections and other aspects of the representative process. For the bureau information monopoly model, dyadic modes of representation are largely irrelevant, insofar as there is no explicit linkage depicted between government employees who reside in a given House district and the behavior of their individual representatives. Rather, bureaucratic influences are depicted as being much more diffuse and institutional, with the effects of information asymmetries being
manifested in congressional testimony, agency documents, committee hearings, agency budget requests, and oversight instead of in elections.

Conversely, the possibility of dyadic representation and electoral influence is an explicit part of the bureau voting model. The leverage that public-sector employees have over members of Congress takes place outside of institutional settings, and involves the influence of individual government employees who reside in districts or states represented by specific House members or senators. For the bureau voting model, control over elected officials occurs when government employees constitute a large enough proportion of a given constituency that they are able to provide relative electoral advantages to candidates who support their policy positions. Moreover, if government employees constitute a substantial proportion of the electorate in given districts--either because government employees comprise a large proportion of the district population, or because public-sector bureaucrats are more likely to turn out on election day--then the legislators representing those districts may perceive the need to respond to the interests of government employees when casting roll-call votes.

For instance, legislators who regularly vote in favor of greater public-sector spending because they represents a district with a sizeable contingent of public-sector employees (who, presumably, support greater government spending) are not necessarily being influenced by an information monopoly that benefits bureaucrats; rather, these legislators are responding to standard electoral pressures to which they would respond under any circumstances. In this case, the legislators respond as they would to any similarly-sized, high-turnout, knowledgeable group residing in their districts--that is, they support an enhanced public sector because they perceive a strong electoral presence from a group that can have significant influence on future election outcomes. Given this, the observation of a relationship between the relative number of public-sector employees and legislators’ roll-call behavior in favor of an enhanced governmental sector provides
independent evidence of processes that are consistent with those suggested by the bureau-voting model and would demonstrate the effect of government employees as an important sub-group within legislator’s constituencies.

By examining the linkages between congressional roll call voting and bureaucratic electoral influence, the potentiality of government employees as a core constituency for legislators can be established. In addition, some clarity and refinement could be applied to the literature and theories of government growth. Political persuasion that manifests itself in the growth of government would certainly enhance the support for the bureau voting model.

**SUMMARY**

Could government employees be considered a core constituency by representatives? An examination of the literature concerning elections, participation, and the political behavior of bureaucrats seems to indicate this possibility. If candidates and parties are targeting mobilization toward subgroup they consider supportive within district constituencies, government employees seem to have the qualities that candidates could be interested in cultivating for their reelection constituencies or supporting coalitions. Furthermore, the low turnout that exists in congressional midterm elections makes the identification and mobilization of supporting core constituencies even more of a potential impact on the reelection prospects of candidates.

The relationship between government employees and representatives is certainly a plausible theory. The empirical findings from the bureau voting model, while equivocal, do support some ideological and political distinctions between government employees and other citizens. The findings certainly support differences in political participation. Government employees, as rational self-interested actors, do appear to desire increased, or at least maintained, levels of government spending and certainly participate at a higher rate than the remaining population. It is also plausible that
politicians, who are interested in maintaining political and electoral support, will gravitate toward such participatory segments of the electorate as a constituency. Therefore, if government employees are more supportive than other citizens of an expanded public sector, members of Congress should be particularly responsive to these high turnout voters when it comes time to cast roll-call votes on issues pertaining to the size of government. If reelection is the ultimate outcome for politicians, they should be astute enough to modify their political behavior to garner the support of a group such as bureaucrats. It is exactly this relationship that this dissertation will seek to identify.
CHAPTER 4

MODELING BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING

Do government employees constitute a core-constituency to legislators? That is the central question to be addressed by this dissertation. An examination of the literatures concerning legislative representation and bureaucratic voting behavior has hinted that the prerequisites for a relationship may exist between legislators and government employees. Legislators do appear to be generally responsive to their constituencies. Furthermore, they are especially attuned to the core constituencies that they consider to be their reelection constituencies. The literature concerned with the influence of bureaucrats on the growth of government has portrayed government employees as possessing many of the qualities that candidates desire in a supporting coalition. They have a specific and understandable motivation to be engaged in the political system, and have demonstrated that they will participate at higher rates than the remaining electorate.

Despite the complementary nature of the findings between these two literatures with regards to legislative responsiveness and bureaucratic voting power, there has been no scholarly research has attempted to measure the potential influence of government employees on the behavioral responsiveness of legislators. In this dissertation, I seek to explicitly examine this yet unmeasured relationship and discover its existence and influence.

How do we examine the question of government employees as a core-constituency to legislators? First, I propose the hypothesis regarding the expectation of government employees as a core constituency. Second, I suggest the proper specification of a model to measure this hypothesized core constituency effect and define explicitly the variables, data, and method to be utilized to estimate the level of responsiveness of legislators to bureaucratic influence.
Evidence gathered from previous research seems to suggest that government employees have many of the requisite qualities that candidates would consider important in their search for core supporters in their reelection bids. Government employees have more liberal views of the role of government, participate at significantly higher rates than the rest of the electorate, and are more likely to vote for more liberal parties. From the literature on legislative representation, one can find evidence that there is a linkage between legislators and their constituencies. While this linkage may be attenuated by other mitigating influences on the decision-making calculus of legislators, it remains clear that preferences of constituents play a significant role in the shaping those decisions. Election circumstances and personal characteristics may increase or decrease the weight placed on the preferences of constituents, but they remain an influence regardless of those other factors.

Previous research has also demonstrated the existence of certain core constituencies to legislators and their reelection efforts. These reelection constituencies or supporting coalitions are counted upon to produce support during the election cycle and on election day. Scholars have identified both demographic and political constituencies to which legislators appear to be more responsive than their larger general constituencies. Furthermore, current candidate-centered election dynamics and the concentrated and targeted mobilization efforts of candidates and parties indicate the potential for these core constituencies to be of great significance in elections.

Finally, the bureau voting model has suggested that government employees, acting as self-interested utility maximizers, will use their votes to promote their own well-being and life satisfaction. While bureaucrats have not shown drastic differences in political attitudes when compared to the remaining population, they have demonstrated very significant differences in participation rates and significantly more liberal vote choices. As a definable group with a high and consistent level of turnout, government employees
certainly appear to be a highly profitable core constituency for legislators seeking reelection. Furthermore, government employees seem to have a vested interest in election outcomes. As employees of the government, it certainly is plausible that they would seek oversight and decision-making from candidates more sympathetic to their cause. While other voters may identify issues or ideological dispositions that influence their electoral behavior, government employees can be thought of as voting for their livelihood, or at least the desire to maximize the maintenance or enhancement of their status within the government. They certainly would seem to have a much greater personal stake in election outcomes than most others in the population.

It is my central hypothesis that government employees are indeed a reelection constituency or supporting coalition for legislators. As such, legislators should exhibit increased levels of responsiveness to this constituency in their roll-call behavior in the same manner that other subgroups have experienced greater responsiveness than the general population. How exactly this relationship manifests itself in relation to the other mediators on the legislator-constituency linkage is determined by the proper modeling of this relationship. The central hypothesis can be explicitly offered as:

H1: A negative relationship exists between conservative roll-call voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives on budgetary issues and increases in the level of government employment congressional districts

**MODELING BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON LEGISLATIVE ROLL-CALL BEHAVIOR**

For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the linkages between congressional roll-call voting and bureaucratic influence. The level of analysis is the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives provides an excellent source to examine the hypothesized linkage. Because of the constitutional requirement that House districts have equal population, the association between changes in proportion of
government employees and the roll-call behavior of representatives across these districts can be measured with great certainty.

So how do we proceed to examine such a relationship between roll-call behavior of elected officials and government employees? Explicitly for this dissertation, how best should we proceed to explore the predicted impact of public-sector employees on the roll-call behavior of U.S. House members? Ideally, information would be collected for each district on the policy and ideological views of government employees and those of other citizens, and then use this data to evaluate the linkage between the views of these two sets of constituents, on one hand, and the roll-call behavior of House members, on the other. Unfortunately, data on the policy preferences of House constituencies are difficult to obtain, and it is difficult to contemplate even the remote possibility of obtaining policy preference data for occupational subgroups within these districts.

Despite this design difficulty, the potential significance of the hypothesized relationship suggests that an alternative approach be identified. One such alternative approach is to assume that the policy preferences of government employees differ from those of other citizens, and to explore how the proportion of government employees in House districts is related to patterns of roll-call behavior among House members. This assumption has validity given what we know concerning the empirical findings that government employees do appear to hold differing policy views when compared to the remaining population. Therefore, if it is discovered that House members representing districts with sizeable numbers of public-sector employees exhibit greater roll-call support for enhanced government spending than House members representing districts with small numbers of public-sector employees, one could infer that House members are being responsive to the interests of government employees in a manner that is consistent with both the representational literature and the bureau voting model.
For this dissertation, I develop and test empirically several models that permit the exploration of the effects of the number of government employees in each congressional district on patterns of roll-call voting by House members on votes pertaining to government spending. This relationship is evaluated in a multivariate model that permits one to control for the effects of a range of individual-level, state-level, and district-level variables thought to be related to roll-call support for government spending and representational responsiveness. To this end, the data and model to be utilized are discussed below.

**The Dependent Variable**

Because the focus of this dissertation is on roll-call support for greater governmental spending among House members, it is necessary to have a dependent variable that represents the tendency of House members to support or oppose increases in the size of the public sector. Several approaches are available to measure this concept. One could rely on data representing the positions taken by House members on individual roll-calls that relate to increases in spending and/or taxes. Alternatively, many of the roll-call indices produced by various interest organizations reflect an underlying liberal-conservative policy dimension; insofar as the ideological orientation of legislators represents their views toward the size of the public sector, roll-call indices such as those associated with the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) or the American Conservative Union (ACU) could be adequate proxies for pro- or anti-spending behavior, and should generally be appropriate for studying support for or opposition to increased government spending.

For this dissertation, I adopt a third alternative. Like Payne (1991), I rely on the roll-call indices created by the non-partisan National Taxpayers Union (NTU). This NTU score is a measure of the roll-call behavior of House members on spending measures before the U.S. House of Representatives. This spending score is the most comprehensive rating of the roll call behavior of individual members of Congress
concerning votes pertaining to budgetary matters and fits the specific type of responsiveness I expect to model between legislators and government employees. The NTU measure is scaled so that a higher score indicates members’ greater fiscal conservatism—i.e., opposition to greater spending and/or support for reductions in federal spending, and has a score range between zero and 100. The NTU score should provide a sound measure of the strength of support for reducing spending by members of the House of Representatives.

The National Taxpayer’s Union analyses every roll-call vote taken during each congress and selects those votes that affect the amount of money spent by the federal government. Each vote is assigned a rating from zero to 100 in order to properly weight each vote’s effect on the federal budget. NTU scores are then computed by dividing the total of votes cast against higher spending by the total number of spending issues on which the member voted. The number of votes included for each congress varies from a low of 369 to a high of 508. The inclusion of such a comprehensive number of votes on budgetary issues and the weighting of such votes provides an unbiased estimation of congressional spending attitudes. Furthermore, the weighting of each vote is done by the NTU and two Federal budget experts, which is intended to reduce any bias in the weighting of those votes.

While this subset of roll-call votes just pertains to votes concerned with the impact on the federal budget, the NTU scores do correlate highly with each representative’s rating from the ADA and with Poole and Rosenthal’s roll-call ideology measure (-.789 and .856 respectively). This high correlation indicates that NTU scores are not a biased subset of roll-call votes by representatives, but instead are a subset of the more general ideological disposition of each representative. Because of these highly significant correlations, any relationship to be discovered between representatives and government employees would be similar if any of these measures of representative roll-call voting were utilized. Despite
this fact, I argue that the use of the NTU roll-call scoring captures the true responsiveness to be found toward the subgroup of government employees. The correlations are high with these other measures of representative roll-call voting, but they are not perfect. Therefore, the NTU score does appear to be capturing something unique in the roll-call voting of representatives. For this reason, I will utilize the mean spending score given to each representative by the NTU during each Congressional session from 1982 to 1998. The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of this variable is provided Appendix B.

**Independent Variable: Government Employment**

The critical independent variable to this analysis is the measure of the relative strength of public-sector employees in each congressional district. This variable is measured as the number of government employees as a proportion of the total voting-age population residing in each congressional district. Since the dependent variable is measured in the direction of conservatism toward increased government spending, it is hypothesized that the coefficient for this variable will be negative, suggesting a negative relationship between district government employment and NTU scores.

Voting-age population is utilized as the denominator because the resulting percentage more closely approximates the relative voting strength available to a candidate when calculating decisions on roll-call votes. The variation in the number of government employees in each congressional district varies from 4.2% to 27.6%. This proportion of government employees in each congressional district for the 1980s and 1990s is indicated in Appendix B.

A distinction will also be made between federal, state, and local government employees. The ranges of these subgroups are .59% to 18.04% for federal employees, .60% to 11.68% for state government employees, and 1.74% to 10.20% for local government employees. All government employees may not be the same. While it is
probable that they share many similar interests, it is also the case that there are some areas in which the interests of public-sector employees will differ depending on whether they work for the federal, state, or local level of government. At all levels of the bureaucracy, the motivation to support increased spending by the federal government should be in operation. It is the strength of this motivation that may differ between the groups. Because federal employees are directly affected by the spending decisions made by the federal government, the strength of the hypothesized relationship is most likely to function the strongest with this sector of public employees. The relationship should still exist for state and local government employees, as they are also affected by federal spending decisions, but less directly. Because federal spending decisions do affect intergovernmental funding levels, state and local bureaucrats may be somewhat less responsive to the spending behavior of representatives. Fortunately, the U.S. Census, from which the government employee data is obtained, reports public-sector employment broken down by level of government. Given this, several alternative versions of the linkage models are estimated to include separate variables for federal, state, and local government employment. I have hypothesized that each representative’s NTU score will decrease as the level of government employment in their district increases. This relationship should be consistent for all levels of government employment, but perhaps stronger for federal employees due to the direct effect of federal spending decisions on their life satisfaction.

Other Independent Variables: Legislator and Constituency Characteristics

In order to estimate the hypothesized effect of government employees on the roll-call behavior of members of Congress, it is of paramount importance to properly specify my statistical model. By including additional variables into the model, I am building a comprehensive model explaining the variance in NTU scores and controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. This control allows an unbiased estimate of the effect
of government employees on representative’s NTU scores. A review of the literature has given several suggestions for inclusion in our model. These suggestions can be classified into two broad categories: (1) Constituency Characteristics and (2) Legislator Characteristics. By including the political and social-demographic constituency contextual information for each congressional district, it is possible to identify the true effect that variation in government employment across districts has on roll-call voting behavior. This same rationale applies for legislator characteristics. The inclusion of the personal characteristics and electoral circumstances of representatives helps estimate the relative impact of changes in government employment on those representative’s decision-making calculus. Once these environmental and individual characteristics are included in the model, the true nature of our hypothesized relationship can be realized.

Party Identification and Ideology

Considering the significant ideological differences between the Democratic and Republican parties in Congress, I include each representative’s party identification in the model of congressional responsiveness to roll-call spending votes. The reason for including party identification in my model is to control for the organizational influence that party has on representative’s roll-call voting (Pool and Rosenthal, 1997; Kingdon, 1989). These organizational effects are independent of the effect of constituent preferences. The party leadership and other partisan members of the House of Representatives have an affect on the roll-call voting of representatives. To the extent that party organizes the decision-making process of individual members, it will have an influence on the roll-call behavior concerning budgetary policy. The coefficient for party identification is expected to be positive, as it a dichotomous measure with Republicans coded as a “1” and Democrats coded as a “0”. Therefore, I hypothesize that Republican members of congress are more conservative than Democratic members in their roll-call behavior and are less supportive on increases in the federal budget.
I also include each member's rating by the Americans for Democratic Action as a measure of the ideological roll-call behavior of representatives. Although there is a strong correlation between NTU scores and ADA scores, I believe that these are both subsets of the total roll-call voting history of each representative and that the ADA score is a good indicator of general ideology, while NTU scores are specific to the budgetary allocation of government. While Pool and Rosenthal have aptly demonstrated the historical continuity of roll-call behavior of legislators, I contend that these two measures are highlighting different aspects of each representative’s voting record. Furthermore, inclusion of the ADA scores is important to capture the general ideological predispositions of each member. Therefore, I hypothesize that increases in the each representative’s ADA score will have a negative effect on each member’s NTU score.

**Congressional Seniority**

Congressional seniority is measured as the numbers of year’s a member has continuously served in the House of Representatives. There are two different hypotheses regarding the relationship between member seniority and congressional responsiveness in the literature. First, Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) have found that the advantages of incumbency allow more senior representatives to ignore the preferences of constituents, with these more senior members achieved reelection almost 80% of the time even when challengers more accurately represented the simulated districts issue opinions. Second, Glazer and Robbins (1985) argue that more experienced representatives are better equipped to both acknowledge and adjust to constituency preferences. Their results indicate that those members that were more responsive to their constituency change had higher reelection rates. Therefore, there are two different expectations for seniority: (1) relationship between constituent preferences and congressional voting behavior will decline as congressional seniority increases and (2) the relationship between constituent preferences and congressional voting behavior will
increase as congressional seniority increases. Research by Payne (1991) suggests the direction seniority should take concerning issues of government spending. He illustrates that more senior legislators are more likely to support increased government spending. Payne demonstrates that as representatives increase their seniority in the congress, they become captured by the institutions they serve by a process of persuasion. He describes the situations whereby representatives are surrounded by a “culture of spending” which, over time, persuades that representative that government spending is needed. Therefore, I hypothesize that seniority should have a negative influence on the NTU scores of representatives.

State Ideology and District Ideology

Previous research has indicated the strong influence of constituency opinion on legislative roll-call voting decisions (Kingdon, 1989; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; Wright, 1989; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996). Therefore, I utilize several measures to capture the disposition of each representative’s constituency. The best source to measure district constituency preferences or opinion would be from survey level data for each congressional district. Such measures would directly capture the opinions and preferences of those constituencies and provide an excellent source of the true preferences for each congressional district. Unfortunately, there exists no such explicit large scale sample of each district’s constituency preferences. The collection of 435 large scale survey samples of constituent preferences during each election cycle has proved to be too difficult an endeavor for social science to attempt. Consequently, the measurement of constituency ideology has been a major concern scholars interested in studying constituency effects on legislative responsiveness.

Previous research has made various attempts to find alternatives to direct survey data by congressional district. This research has produced several alternative measures that are available for use as surrogates for a true measure of constituency preference.
Scholars have used demographic variables (such as income, industry, education, urbanization, racial composition), small-sample estimates of public opinion (Miller and Stokes, 1963), presidential and election results (LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997), simulated opinion based on the extension of estimates from individual-level models to the aggregate district level (Erikson, 1978), and referenda voting (McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979). Unfortunately, these alternative measures of constituency opinion have all proven to be significantly less satisfying than what one would obtain if large-sample estimates of opinion were available across all districts.

State Level Constituency Ideology

The first two measures of constituency preference are borrowed from the work of Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). The authors have developed statewide measures of constituency characteristics that can be used to approximate constituency preferences. These statewide constituency preference measures are: (1) state partisanship and (2) state ideology. While not at the district level of analysis, these measures can provide some contextual control for the mass ideology and partisanship environment of representatives. The partisanship and ideology at the state level have importance for several reasons. Representatives and their districts do not exist in a vacuum. Representatives may be tempered in their responsiveness to their district constituencies by the larger political context of their respective state. While certainly of a secondary nature, the state political context can give a representative insight into the trends and demographics of the state at large, especially when their district is not representative of the remaining state. Politicians are aware of their surroundings, making the larger political context potentially important to all representatives, especially those that may desire eventual senatorial or gubernatorial positions. Representatives are also called upon to make decisions that impact beyond their own district. It is not unreasonable to expect members to need and desire perspective on the larger political context of their state when
making decisions that will impact the state. Finally, representatives often look toward their fellow membership when deciding how to proceed on public policy (Kingdon, 1989). To the extent they look to members of their state delegation for guidance, the inclusion of state partisanship and ideology will help to capture that influence.

Erikson, Wright, and McIver utilized data from the CBS News / New York Times surveys to create large-sample estimates of state liberalism and partisanship for the period of 1976-1992. These estimates were done by aggregating respondents across surveys to create samples for each state that are sufficiently large to permit reasonable estimates of state political characteristics. Erikson et al. utilize respondents' partisan and ideological self-reports to create measures of mass partisanship and mass ideological conservatism for each state. These state-level contextual variables are utilized to capture the general political environment of each representative's state. While other district-level measures are utilized, the statewide context still has validity for determining the general political disposition of the state from which each district is drawn.

Because these variables are measured in the liberal direction, it is hypothesized that each will have a negative effect on the dependent variable. Accordingly, it is suggested that more conservative state environmental conditions should lead to stronger inclinations on the part of House members to reduce government spending.

District Level Constituency Preferences

There are several different avenues taken by scholars in the attempt to simulate true district constituency opinion or preference. These different approaches include the use of demographic variables, referenda voting, and simulation of district preferences. Each of these alternatives has merit, but each also has deficiencies that make them less than ideal.

The use of demographic measures to estimate constituency preferences involves estimating a model in which legislative roll-call behavior is depicted as a function of a
wide range of district demographic characteristics obtained from the U.S. Census (Erikson, 1978; Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 1984; Wink, Livingston, and Garand 1996). This type of measurement does have merit. Both Fenno (1978) and Kingdon (1989) have demonstrated that members of the U.S. House think about their geographic constituencies in terms of a number of attributes, including demographic characteristics. There is difficulty with demographics as a surrogate for constituency preferences because these individual demographic characteristics must be interpretable at a higher level of aggregation. The assumption that the individual level demographic processes at work are interpretable in the same manner as aggregate relationships between demographic characteristics and aggregate policy preferences can be problematic due to issues related to ecological fallacy.

Another type of surrogate for constituency ideology that involves demographic variables is simulated district opinion. This measure is designed to take advantage of demographic data that are available at the district level, as well as knowledge concerning the relationship between individuals’ demographic characteristics and their policy positions. In this type of simulation, data from a lower level of aggregation, such as individual-level surveys, are used to simulate opinion at a higher level of aggregation, such as the district (Erikson 1978). Simulated measures of opinion have been found to have a stronger association with roll-call behavior than measures based on small-sample estimates (Erikson 1978). The most important concern with this approach is that the individual-level regressions upon which the simulations are based often exhibit relatively low levels of fit to the data. With adjusted R-square levels often below 0.10, measures of simulated district-level opinion have a significantly large amount of random error associated with them, which suggests that while these measures are an improvement over those obtained from other analytical approaches, they remain somewhat imprecise indicators of constituency opinion.
Scholars have also suggested presidential election results as a surrogate measure of district ideological orientation (Johannes, 1984; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997). The problem with this approach is that not all presidential elections are equally ideological in nature, which gives this measure a lack of reliability. While certain presidential elections may be highly ideological and therefore reflect the ideological characteristics of constituencies, some elections are much less ideological. LeoGrande and Jeydel’s (1997) exploration of the possibility of utilizing presidential election results as a surrogate for district ideology found only moderate correlations for presidential election results between adjacent elections, suggesting that the reliability of the aggregate presidential vote is not extremely high. Therefore, the use of the presidential vote is not consistent with long-term effects implied by constituency ideological orientations.

Referendum data has also been utilized as a surrogate for true constituency preferences. Referendum elections allow voters to explicitly express an opinion on the policy put to the vote and allow scholars to utilize district-level data on referenda election results to estimate the policy preferences of those constituencies. The use of referenda data as a surrogate measure of constituency policy preferences is best represented by the work of McCrone and Kuklinski (1979). They use data from California referenda to estimate the positions of district constituencies on three dimensions that emerge from a factor analysis of the referenda data. While these scholars find that referenda data can provide quite reliable measures of district ideology, this type of data is only available at uneven times in a limited number of states, which makes their use in comprehensive roll-call studies problematic.

For this dissertation, I utilize a measure of district constituency ideology developed by Ardoin and Garand (2003). This measure is a simulation of district ideology, but differs from previous simulations. Their measure makes the best use of
the data available for all congressional districts and does not have the defects of other measures of district constituency preferences. Ardoin and Garand have developed a more reliable and useful measure of district opinion by employing an alternative approach to simulating constituency ideology. Specifically, they adopt a “top-down” simulation approach, which involves using data from a higher level of aggregation (i.e., the American states) to simulate opinion at a lower level of aggregation (i.e., congressional districts). First, they use state-level data to estimate the relationship between state ideology, as measured by Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993), and various demographic and political variables. Once the estimates of the parameters of the model of state ideology are obtained, data from U.S. House districts are substituted into the model to yield predicted levels of opinion liberalism for House districts.

The resulting predicted values represent the estimated ideological orientation of each U.S. House district, based on (1) the observed relationship between these variables and state ideology, and (2) the values of these variables for each U.S. House district. The results provide estimates of House district ideology that reflect the observed relationships between constituent ideology and various independent variables at the state level, as well as the values on these independent variables in U.S. House districts. This alternative measure seems to most closely approach the true district preferences, and is the choice among the alternatives for inclusion in this model of legislative responsiveness. This measure of district ideology in coded in a liberal direction, it is hypothesized that this variable will have a negative impact on the dependent variable.

Other Control Variables

Several other district level measures are be incorporated into the model to capture the district constituency characteristics that are though to mediate the responsiveness relationship between representatives and their constituencies. Specifically, these district-level control variables are introduced into the model to represent the remaining district
characteristics that are expected to influence the level of legislative responsiveness to constituencies in general and also predicted to affect the propensity of House members to support or oppose greater public-sector spending. As such, these variables permit us to control for any intervening effects for the relationship between government employees and each member's spending scores. The following measures are included in the analysis: (1) district median family income, (2) district outlays by the federal government; (3) district urbanization; and (4) district racial composition.

Median Family Income and Urbanization

There are several measures available that can serve to test alternative explanations for representative's roll-call behavior on government spending policy. There are many competing explanations beyond those theories tied to bureaucratic information monopoly or bureau voting model effects that attempt to explain the growth of government (Borcherding, 1977b; Goetz, 1977; Lowery and Berry, 1983; Garand, 1988; Cameron, 1978). Most of the alternative explanations of government growth, such as fiscal illusion, international economic interdependence, or supply-side revenue collection are not amenable to the examination of the variation in individual representative’s roll-call voting behavior on spending policy. These explanations are concerned with either the nation or state as the level of analysis and seek to explain changes in growth in the size of government over several decades. Since there is no appreciable variability across congressional districts for most of the measures associated with these theories, they cannot be included in this type of analysis. Despite this lack of compatibility, there are several measures that can be included in an attempt to provide an improvement in the specification of the model. The inclusion of these measures of alternative explanations of government growth will provide enhanced support for the bureau voting model should the expected effect be found. By controlling for other factors which may be affecting the decision-making calculus of representatives on budgetary spending votes, any
explanatory value remaining as a function of variability in the proportion of government
employees that reside in a district will lend confirmatory evidence for the bureau voting
model.

Income and urbanization are incorporated into the model to represent the
explanation of government growth associated with Wagner’s Law (Wagner, 1877; Lowery
and Berry, 1983; Borcherding, 1977). This theory suggests that increases in the spending
by government are in response to changes in the socio-economic environment of the
nation. It argues that the process of industrialization lead to an increase in the expansion
of the public sector in several ways. First, it is argued that increasing economic affluence
in society leads to the demand for increases in government expenditures. While scholars
have argued over the validity of Wagner’s assertion that the elasticity of public
expenditures is greater than one, it remains valid to contend that increases in public
income should lead to some increase in public demand for increases in government
services. As society becomes more affluent, individual have the propensity to seek
increases in quality of life rather than simple subsistence. This ability to diversify demand
or desires could certainly create increases in demands on the public sector concerning
issues such as transportation, law enforcement, recreation or entertainment. A second
closely related factor associated with this theory is interdependence. Borcherding explains
that “as the economy develops and its population becomes larger, more densely settled,
and more urbanized, types of interdependence develop that are not well handled by
private markets” (Borcherding, 1977b, pg. 52). It is not difficult to imagine that increases in
urbanization have led to the government becoming more involved in policy areas such as
transportation, healthcare, and social support.

The inclusion of measures of urbanization and median income for each
congressional district will serve as indicators of these hypothesized effects of Wagner’s
Law. If there are Wagner’s Law effects, they should be associated with increasing
urbanization and median income in congressional districts. As those districts become more urbanized, the interdependence of the population should lead to increased demand for government spending in those districts. Also, increasing levels of income should result in increased demand for government spending to enhance the quality of life in those districts. If House members are attentive to the demands of their constituents, and the Wagner's Law explanation for increases in government expenditures has validity, it is hypothesized that increases in urbanization and increases in district wealth will lead to increases representative's NTU scores.

**District Budgetary Outlays**

The amount of federal budgetary outlays to each congressional district is included as a control on the roll-call behavior of representatives on spending votes. It seems plausible that representatives will seek to maintain and protect the spending levels associated with their districts (Stein and Bickers, 1994). Insofar as these outlays to districts are helpful to constituents and allow for the claiming of credit for their procurement and continuance, the desire to maintain levels of spending can be well understood. Stein and Bickers (1994) find that awareness of new projects in a congressional district increases the vote for the incumbent by almost 10 percent and that as the proportion of new outlays in a district increases, the vote for the incumbent also increases. These findings certainly suggest that representatives may be sympathetic to increases in federal spending. This sympathy may lead to representatives with large amounts of federal spending in their districts to be more supportive of federal spending to maintain this flow of spending to their districts. Also, the inclusion of this control measure will clarify the relationship between district outlays and district government employment. Any correlation between government employment and House member roll-call voting behavior may actually be a spurious relationship. It could simply be the funding of government, with the attendant employment of government workers, that is explaining any relationship, not the
attractiveness of bureaucrats as a core constituency. By including district outlays, I can therefore help to discern the true nature of the relationship between House member roll-call behavior and government employment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that as outlays from the previous year become larger, the NTU scores of members of the House will decline.

Racial Composition

The proportion of African-Americans in a congressional district is included to serve as a control on proportion of government employees as subgroup and to control for demands that African-Americans make for goods and services in society. Previous literature has indicated that changes in racial composition can affect the voting behavior of legislators, especially those representatives of the Democratic Party (Overby and Cosgrove, 1996; Leveaux and Garand, 2003). Because some proportion of government employees are African-American, this group is included to confirm that any influence that government employees have on the voting behavior of legislators is not merely the close association between the Democratic Party and African-Americans. Furthermore, African-Americans have several demographic characteristics that suggest that they may make greater demands on the social structure than others. Government statistics indicate that African-Americans have lower educational attainment rates, lower median incomes, and higher proportions of individuals without adequate healthcare. African-Americans, in general, make greater demands of the government than other identifiable groups. Insofar as House members are attentive to their constituencies, the model hypothesizes that increases in the proportion of African-Americans in congressional districts will have a negative effect on NTU scores. With all of the measures specified, the model to be testing can be described as follows:
NTU Score = a - b₁ (Government Employment) - b₂ (State Partisanship) -
          b₃ (State Partisanship) – b₄ (District Ideology) –
          b₅ (Median Income) – b₆ (District Urbanization) –
          b₇ (Racial Composition) – b₈ (District Outlays) +
          b₉ (Representative Party) – b₁₀ (Representative ADA) – b₁₁ (Seniority)

**METHODOLOGY**

As indicated above, a comprehensive model is developed in the effort to accurately
capture and explain the linkage between bureaucratic influence and roll-call spending
behavior. Specifically, I employ cross-sectional analysis of each Congress from 1982
through 1996 and also pool these Congresses into a single pooled cross-sectional model
to capture any idiosyncratic effects and form more generalizable conclusions as to the
predicted effects. The pooled, cross-sectional analysis allows for the introduction of time
into the analysis, thereby providing an accounting of the continuity and robustness of the
expected effects. As noted, the data used in this dissertation are collected for each
House member serving in Congress from 1982 to 1996. My unit of analysis is each
member of House of Representatives, with data collected for each ith member in each
ith Congress over the course of the time period under study.

For the cross-sectional analysis, I utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
This type of analysis is typical for estimating influences on a dependent continuous
measure such as NTU scores. Examination or the relationship between the dependent
variable, representative’s NTU scores, and the independent variable of interest, the
proportion of government employees in each congressional district, reveals the
existence of heteroscedasticity. The scatterplot of the relationship between the two
measures is available in Appendix A. The nature of this relationship suggests the
violation of the regression assumption that the variance in the error term for each case is
constant. If this variance is inconsistent or biased as the value of a variable increases or
decreases, the significance tests associated with OLS regression can become unreliable because of distortion in OLS standard errors. As such, it is necessary to correct for this heteroscedasticity to avoid the misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the findings of the tested models. Therefore, I incorporate White’s Standard Error correction into the cross-sectional models to correct for any bias associated with the dependent variable of interest (White, 1980; Long and Ervin, 1999).

Furthermore, the pooled cross-sectional model utilized also may present some problems for model estimation. Although ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is typically used in analyses of legislative representation, the pooling of data over several congresses necessitates the use of alternative estimation procedures. First, because member cases are not independent over time, one might expect serial dependence in the data, also referred to as the problem of autocorrelated errors or autocorrelation. This means that the error terms for individual senators at time t are likely to be correlated with the error terms for subsequent time periods. Second, unequal variance across cross-sections or time, another form of heteroscedasticity, is inherent in pooled data. For pooled data, the differential variance in the error term is likely to affect whole sets of data and could be of greater harm to the validity of the results of the models estimated. While autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity do not necessarily bias OLS estimates, they can make the usual tests of significance invalid and produce potentially misleading conclusions about the statistical significance of estimated regression coefficients.

In order to correct this problem, I utilize the generalized estimating equation (GEE) approach described by Zeger and Liang (1986). The GEE approach is an extension of the generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects estimator, and is appropriate when the number of cross-sections (i.e., House members and senators) is larger than the number of time points. This model can also be used with unbalanced data—that is, data in which the number of data points for each cross-section are unequal.
Most importantly, this procedure yields parameter estimates that are uncontaminated by the effects of autocorrelated and heteroscedastic errors.

I have also examined the model to be measured for the incidence of multicollinearity. One of the assumptions of linear regression is the absence of perfect multicollinearity, meaning that none of the independent variables are perfectly correlated with another independent variable. The presence of this problem can create estimation difficulties because it will produce large variances in slope estimation and hence large standard errors. Therefore, multicollinearity will bias significant testing. Fortunately, there are statistical tests available to identify the presence of multicollinearity. For the models to be examined in this dissertation, I produced the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to identify the existence of such an effect. Fortunately, the results indicated no severe multicollinearity. While the independent variables measuring each representative’s ideology and party identification were correlated, the VIF measures were relatively low. Furthermore, these two variables measure distinctly different theoretical concepts, making their inclusion necessary. Ultimately, the testing for multicollinearity suggested that the specification of the models used are not biased by that effect.
CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In this dissertation, I hypothesize that government employees have influence on the roll-call voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives. The basis for this hypothesis is the empirically verified voting behavior and theoretically consistent motivation for that voting behavior. I suggest that government employees, acting as self-interested actors, seek to support candidates that are more supportive of their desire to increases or maintain the level of federal government spending. Evidence of this candidate support and candidate’s perception of this potential support should manifest itself in variation in the roll-call voting on government spending by members of the House of Representatives. With the supporting literature identified and the modeling of this relationship described, I am left finally to answer the questions: Do government employees constitute a supporting coalition or a reelection core constituency to members of the House of Representatives? Does government employment affect the roll-call voting behavior of House members?

BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: BASELINE MODELS

As we will see, the answer is yes. Based upon the empirical results reported below, there does appear to be a linkage between bureaucrats and their representatives. The relationship between government employees and representative’s roll-call voting on spending measures is strong and consistent. In Table 5.1, I report the results of the core analysis of the relationship between the proportion of government employees residing in each House member’s district and that House member’s NTU score controlling for the effects of other variables. This model uses pooled data from congressional sessions from 1983 to 1996 to demonstrate the strength of this relationship. First, the core model fits the data closely, explaining a significant portion of the variance in NTU scores for House members, as represented by the Pseudo-R² of .7847. Secondly, all of the
### Table 5.1
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Baseline Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-27.2035</td>
<td>-2.523***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>16.8769</td>
<td>12.501***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2449</td>
<td>-13.241***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2777</td>
<td>-6.862***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.1028</td>
<td>-3.058***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1380</td>
<td>-2.421***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2201</td>
<td>-8.493***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization (-)</td>
<td>-0.0321</td>
<td>-1.837**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income % (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>1.349*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1260</td>
<td>-4.662***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-1.955**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Congress</td>
<td>3.9332</td>
<td>11.126***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress</td>
<td>-3.1835</td>
<td>-7.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Congress</td>
<td>2.3403</td>
<td>4.884***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress</td>
<td>4.7850</td>
<td>9.162***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd Congress</td>
<td>6.4998</td>
<td>5.858***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Congress</td>
<td>15.0534</td>
<td>14.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>51.0056</td>
<td>20.313***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each $i$th House Member's NTU Score for the $t$th Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
  *  = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square = .7847
Number of obs = 2942
Number of groups = 764
Obs per group: min = 1
       avg = 3.9
       max = 15
Wald chi2(17) = 8333.48
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
coefficients in the model are statistically significant and in the correct direction except one, the median income in each congressional district. Thirdly, and most importantly, the measure of the proportion of government employees in each congressional district is found to have a strong and significant negative relationship on the spending conservatism of House members.

The finding that government employees have a significant measurable effect on the roll-call voting behavior of House members is the central finding of this dissertation. From the core model (Table 5.1), it is clear that bureaucrats are having an impact on legislative decision-making on roll-call votes pertaining to spending policy. Even after controlling for other possible influences on the roll-call vote spending decisions of House members, the relationship remains strong. Table 5.1 indicates that after controlling for other effects, a 10% change in the number of government employees in a congressional district results in a 2.7 point decline in a House member’s NTU spending score. Since the range of this independent variable is 23.4% (from a low of 4.2% to a high of 27.6%), the predicted difference in NTU scores for the two extremes is approximately 6.3 points. Bureaucrats do appear have an independent impact on the budgetary roll-call voting behavior of House members.

It is also worth noting the effect of the additional independent variables included in the baseline model. By controlling for the variety of other factors that may contribute to the roll-call voting decisions of House members, the value of the discovery that government employees have a discernable influence on that roll-call voting is greatly enhanced. The control variables included in the model are repeatedly found to have effect on the roll-call voting behavior of legislators in other scholarly research. By confirming the impact of these other measures in this dissertation, I accomplish two things. First, these other factors are found to have significant explanatory value in their own right. This finding lends support to the specification of the models tested. Secondly, the explanatory power of
these control measures neither marginalizes the influence of the central independent variable nor the hypothesis tested in this dissertation. If government employees are found to have an independent effect on roll-call fiscal conservatism, even after controlling for the variety of factors included in the model, the validity of this finding is certainly strengthened.

The independent variables representing legislator characteristics are all found to be significant and in the correct direction. As Table 5.1 indicates, House member’s partisanship and ideology each have an independent influence on roll-call voting on government spending policy. Holding the effects of all other variables constant, Republican House member’s NTU scores are 16.8 points higher than those of Democratic House members. This difference is due to the conservative nature of the NTU score. That Republicans are on average more fiscally conservative in their voting for government spending items is confirmed. Furthermore, House members’ ideology is also influential in their roll-call vote decisions. The core model indicates that the higher the rating by the Americans for Democratic Action for House members, the less fiscally conservative is their voting on spending measures. The results demonstrate that the NTU spending score of a House member declines by approximately one point for every four points of increase in the ADA score for that member. The results for both individual partisanship and individual ideology are found to have the expected effect on roll-call spending decisions, as more conservative House members, both politically and ideologically, are more supportive of fiscal conservatism in government spending.

The seniority of House members is also found to have a significant impact on the roll-call voting of those House members. The results in Table 5.1 demonstrate that as a House member gains more seniority with Congress, they become less fiscally conservative in their voting behavior. The results indicate that the NTU spending score for House member will decline by approximately one point for every four years of seniority gained in the Congress. This finding mirrors the research of Payne (1991), who suggests
that legislators are effected by the institutional and political actors associated with the federal government. This influence leads to the persuasion that government spending is needed and desired to accomplish the needs of the country, and therefore ultimately leads to less fiscal restraint by more senior members in the Congress. More seasoned House members do appear to become socialized into supporting higher levels of governmental spending. This finding lends additional support to the debate over the effect of seniority on representatives roll-call voting. At least where fiscal matters are concerned, seniority does seem to produce different effects.

The model also demonstrates strong empirical support for the influence of constituencies on the roll-call decision making of legislators. The three measures of general constituency (state partisanship, state ideology and district ideology) are all significant and negatively related to House member’s fiscal conservatism in roll-call voting. The negative coefficients for state partisanship and state ideology confirm the hypothesis that representatives are cognizant of their political surroundings when making roll-call decisions. According to the results of Table 5.1, a one point decrease in a House member’s NTU score is associated with an approximate 10 point change in state partisanship and an approximate nine point change in state ideology. It appears that representatives do take into account the prevailing political landscape beyond their own district and consider their states in totality to some degree in decision-making. The political environment beyond their district does have influence on decision-making for spending issues.

In addition, the ideological disposition of House members’ district constituency effects those members’ voting behavior. The “top down” simulation of district constituency ideology developed by Ardoin and Garand (2003) does appear to permit one to estimate the impact of constituency preference or opinion on the roll-call voting of legislators. According to the model results, a one point change in a House member’s NTU
conservatism is associated with an approximate five point change in district conservatism. While not a replacement for true constituency opinion at the district level, this measure seems to capture the nature of ideology for congressional districts. As such, the spending conservatism on budgetary legislation by House members decreases as those district constituencies become more liberal.

The district contextual environment measures also lend support to the specification of the model. Based upon the findings from Table 5.1, increases in district urbanization decreased the fiscal conservatism of House members. A 33% increase in the urbanization of a congressional district lowers a representative’s NTU score by one point. This lends some support to the theory proposed by Wagner’s Law that increases in the interdependence created by urban society increases pressure for government spending. The same support is not observed in the finding for the median income coefficient. An interpretation based upon Wagner’s Law suggests that increases in income should result in increased demands for government service. The positive coefficient associated with spending conservatism suggests empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this hypothesis. According to the results of Table 5.1, a $10,000 increase in district median income results in a one point increase in NTU scores. Alternatively, the measure of median district income may be considered to be a measure of relative district affluence. If the competition for many scarce government resources and services are decided and allocated by need, representatives from those more affluent districts may be less inclined to vote for services that will not affect their constituencies.

Also, the spending conservatism of House members declines as the proportion of African-American increases in those districts. According to the results of Table 5.1, an 8% increase in black district population is associated with a one point decline in House
member NTU scores¹. This is consistent with the hypothesized effect. Insofar as African-Americans are a Democratic constituency, an increase in their proportion of a district’s population should increase the likelihood of democratic representation is a district, with the attendant lower NTU scores. In fact, there is a significantly negative correlation between Republican representation and black proportion in a congressional district (correlation = .30, sig. > .001). Furthermore, African-American’s make substantial demands on the government for services and support. It stands to reason that increases in the African-American population, on average, will make attentive legislators more inclined to support spending by government that will benefit their constituencies.

Finally, the level of congressional district federal outlay dollars also has a significant effect on House member’s roll-call decisions on spending issues. The results indicate that a 3.4 billion dollar increase in district outlays is associated with a one point decline in fiscal conservatism on roll-call voting on spending measures when other measures are controlled. While a change of this magnitude only effects about a quarter of the congressional districts, the range of outlays available in the Appendix suggests that outlays could account for a several point decrease in the NTU scores of congressional members with significant levels of spending in their districts. For the purposes of this dissertation, the main significance of this measure is to confirm that the effect of government employment remains important beyond the spending level in congressional districts².

¹ An interaction between African-American proportion and government employment produced no appreciable change in the results, indicating that the empirical finding of government employment effects is not an artifact of black population in congressional districts.

² Although not reported, this effect survives the interaction of government employment with federal outlays, retaining its significance and influence.
In summary, the results of the core model reported in Table 5.1 indicates that there is a relationship between the proportion of government employees in a congressional district and the budgetary roll-call voting by House members, as measured by those member’s NTU scores. While the relationship is modest in impact, with a possible change of 6.3 points in a representative’s NTU score, it is still a significant change and an independent influence when the varied other explanations for roll-call decision-making are controlled.

Confirmatory empirical evidence to support the core hypothesis is illustrated Table 5.2. An analysis of the influence of the same predictors for each Congress provides the same results for the impact of government employees on the budgetary roll-call voting behavior of House members. In every instance, the coefficient for the proportion of government employees in a congressional district is significant and in the correct direction, with a range from \( b = 61.91 \) to \( b = 16.19 \). This indicates that there is some fluctuation in the effect of government employees over individual congresses, but that this effect is always significant in nature. Furthermore, the R-square for these models follows the lead of the pooled model in Table 5.1 in that they explain a significant proportion of the variance in NTU scores in each congress. The R-squares for these congressional year models are between .6923 and .9469. These congressional year models demonstrate the robustness of the measure of government employment across congresses and illustrate that the findings associated with the pooled model are not an artifact of the large number of cases in that pooled model. Also, the individual congress results in Table 5.2 suggest that the impact of bureaucrats can almost triple the pooled model coefficient during some congresses. Furthermore, the findings from the core specification of the model suggest the need to explore a little deeper into the influence of government employees on representatives.
### Table 5.2
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Individual Congress Cross-Sectional Regression Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2821</td>
<td>-8.411***</td>
<td>-0.1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2761</td>
<td>-5.208***</td>
<td>-0.4255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.2484</td>
<td>-3.955***</td>
<td>-0.2447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2208</td>
<td>-2.148**</td>
<td>-0.1738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1251</td>
<td>-1.738**</td>
<td>-0.0697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization (-)</td>
<td>-0.0414</td>
<td>-1.307*</td>
<td>-0.0133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income % (-)</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>3.412***</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.0061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.604</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>42.5449</td>
<td>8.913***</td>
<td>39.0936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square: 0.7427

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-61.9136</td>
<td>-4.556***</td>
<td>-38.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2367</td>
<td>-7.749***</td>
<td>-0.3558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2623</td>
<td>-4.557***</td>
<td>-0.2867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.2096</td>
<td>-4.503***</td>
<td>-0.0758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1280</td>
<td>-1.512</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.0201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization (-)</td>
<td>-0.0198</td>
<td>-0.630</td>
<td>-0.0121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income % (-)</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>3.746***</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>0.1070</td>
<td>3.264***</td>
<td>-0.0175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>41.1443</td>
<td>10.541***</td>
<td>55.6192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square: 0.7052

Dependent Variable is each House Member's NTU Score for each Congress

**t-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors**

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
** = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*  = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: PARTISAN EFFECTS

Are Democratic and Republican House members equally responsive to the influence of public-sector employees in their districts? In the classic sense, one would hypothesize that a constituency suspected of a great desire to increase government spending would necessarily gravitate toward the Democratic Party, no doubt due to the traditional Democratic Party’s inclination for governmental solutions to societal issues. In this regard, government employees would function much in the same way as other reelection constituencies have functioned in the literature. This functionality would mean that Democratic House members would be very responsive to government employees as a core reelection constituency and react accordingly with an increased propensity to spend government resources with increases in the proportion of the district composed of bureaucrats. On the other hand, Republicans would be uninspired by the demands of a reelection constituency so ideologically consistent with the Democratic Party. Republicans would appear either unresponsive to changes in the level of government employment in their districts, or could even become more conservative in an appeal to their base supporters in the effort to counteract any effect of a Democratic government employee core constituency.

An alternative approach may suggest just the opposite result. This approach suggests that government employees behave as rational actors seeking to maximize the likelihood of their effectiveness in the political marketplace and utilizing their vote accordingly. This behavior is consistent with the assumption inherent to the hypothesis of this dissertation that government employees are acting as a core constituency seeking the reward of increased or maintenance in government spending in return for their support electorally. This reelection constituency would not be governed in the same partisan or ideological way that other cores constituencies in the literature have been demonstrated to behave. In this relationship, actions (and not ideology) cement the linkage. This
pragmatic, or some may say cynical, approach does not mean that government employees are not generally a Democratic Party reelection constituency. Quite the opposite. Instead, this argument suggests that government employees may become Republican reelection constituencies if Republican House members are appropriately reserved in their budgetary roll-call voting behavior. With incumbency returning most incumbents to Washington D.C with regularity, government employees may make the rational choice to support Republican candidates when there is either no viable alternative or the Republican incumbent is moderate enough in their roll-call behavior on spending policy. In essence, government employees may be trading their effectiveness as a core reelection constituency to Republicans for moderation in the fiscal conservatism or those members. Furthermore, Democratic House members may appear unresponsive to changes in government employee proportions in their constituencies, as these House members are already predisposed to vote for increases or maintenance in spending levels regardless of the bureaucratic effect.

This alternative possibility finds support the difference in means for NTU scores for Democrats and Republicans and the difference in standard deviations in NTU scores for the two parties. The Democratic House member mean NTU score is 26.96 while Republican House member mean NTU score is 59.34. The Democratic NTU standard deviation is 9.4 while the Republican NTU score standard deviation is 15.2. This data demonstrates that Democrats are already very liberal in their voting on spending matters and don’t have as much variation away from this liberal score in their membership. Conversely, Republicans are more conservative in their NTU scores, but have a much wider variability in those scores. This is not exactly shocking news, but it does suggest that a self-interested reelection constituency, such as government employees, has more room to influence Republican voting behavior than their Democratic counterparts. What does this hypothesizing portend?
The results reported in Table 5.3 give some indication as to how the relationship between government employment and roll-call behavior differs by party. The difference in the relationship for Democratic and Republican House members is estimated by including an interaction variable for party and government employment. The non-interaction government employment variable represents the effects of district public-sector employment on NTU scores for Democrats; the interaction variables reflect the difference in effect for Democrats and Republicans. The estimated effect of public-sector employment on spending restraint for Republican House members can be calculated by adding the coefficients for the non-interaction and interaction variables. As the results for the interaction model indicate, it is Republican House members who are most strongly affected by the proportion of government employees in their districts. In Table 5.3, the coefficient for district government employment, reflecting the effect of this variable for Democrats, is not in the expected direction \( (b = 9.7515) \), and fails to approach conventional levels of statistical significance.

It appears as if Democratic House members are virtually unresponsive to the level of government employment in their districts. After controlling for the effects of other variables, Democratic House members are relatively and uniformly more liberal in their roll-call voting on budgetary issues than Republicans. This is evidenced by the coefficient for the party variable, coded in the Republican direction \( (b = 26.5155; t = -10.110) \) that suggests that Republicans have average NTU scores that are almost 27 points higher than Democrats. The plot thickens when we examine the partisan interaction measure. The coefficient for the party-employment interaction variable is negative and highly significant \( (b = -127.7373; t = -4.085) \). This coefficient suggests that Republicans are very responsive to the level of public-sector employment in their districts.

In essence, Republicans representing districts with relatively large numbers of government employees are more liberal in their roll-call voting on spending policy, while
### Table 5.3

98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)

Partisan Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>9.7515</td>
<td>0.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-127.7373</td>
<td>-4.085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>26.5155</td>
<td>10.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2410</td>
<td>-13.269***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2848</td>
<td>-7.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.0955</td>
<td>-2.817***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1466</td>
<td>-2.521***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2151</td>
<td>-8.461***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization (-)</td>
<td>-0.0239</td>
<td>-1.348*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income % (-)</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1375</td>
<td>-5.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>-2.852***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Congress</td>
<td>4.0043</td>
<td>11.422***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress</td>
<td>-3.1213</td>
<td>-7.459***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Congress</td>
<td>2.4915</td>
<td>5.213***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress</td>
<td>5.0112</td>
<td>9.563***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd Congress</td>
<td>7.1091</td>
<td>6.432***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Congress</td>
<td>15.7734</td>
<td>14.871***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>46.7045</td>
<td>18.937***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each *i*th House Member’s NTU Score for the *t*th Congress

Z-Scores are based on White’s Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square = .7886
Number of obs = 2942
Number of groups = 764
Obs per group: min = 1
avg = 3.9
max = 15
Wald chi2(18) = 8667.79
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Republicans representing districts with fewer government employees tend to remain strongly oriented toward fiscal conservatism. Conversely, Democrat House members respond almost randomly to variation in the strength of public-sector employees in their districts, though the coefficient for the party variable indicates that Democrats are systematically less supportive of fiscal restraint--at least as defined by the NTU--than Republicans.

The magnitude of the coefficients can be used to estimate the effects of district government employment on roll-call spending orientations for Democrat and Republican House members. The coefficient for Democrats (b = 9.7515) suggests that a 10% increase in government employment in a House district represented by a Democrat would result in only a .975 decline in a member’s NTU scores. This reflects a substantively trivial effect of government employment on NTU scores for Democrat House members. Conversely, the effect for Republican House members can be estimated by adding the non-interaction coefficient with the interaction coefficient, yielding an effect for Republicans of –117.986. Therefore, a 10% increase in district government employment generates a predicted decline in NTU scores of -11.7 points for Republican House members, holding constant the effects of the other independent variables in the model. Ultimately, these coefficients suggest that there is a substantial effect of government employment in Republican-held districts, while government employment has no substantial effect on Democratic House members.

What explains the disparate influence of district government employment on the roll-call voting behavior concerning government spending for Democrats and Republicans? The results found in Table 5.3 suggest that Republican House members are more responsive than Democrats to the preferences of government employees, who are undoubtedly among the most politically-active, politically-sophisticated constituents that legislators are likely to face in their districts. This finding and the attendant supporting
evidence in Table 5.3 suggest that the second, pragmatic hypothesis proposed above is in effect.3

As hypothesized, to the degree that government employees act collectively, they are probably somewhat more likely to be seen as a clientele group for Democratic candidates. Given this predisposition, much of the influence of government employees on the behavior of Democratic House members may have already occurred at the electoral level. For Republicans, government employees may be seen as electorally "in play," since they are unlikely to be mainstays of the Republican coalition. Republicans in districts with a high proportion of government employees may perceive themselves as having some chance of earning support from government employees in subsequent elections if they are less conservative in their budgetary roll-call behavior. Democrats, on the other hand, may be in a better position to assume at least some level of electoral support by government employees, at least in relation to their Republican challengers. As evidenced by the findings in Table 5.3, Democrats exhibit relatively high levels of support for enhanced or maintained government spending regardless of district government employment. In other words, since Democrats are already more likely to be more supportive of an enhanced public sector, the potential impact of government employees in Democrats' districts is marginalized. Conversely, Republican House members may vary in their support for government spending, and may recognize that they can make inroads among government employees if they temper their tendencies toward fiscal conservatism in budgetary roll-call voting.

In summary, the question regarding the partisan effect on bureaucratic influence has been empirically answered. Democrats are unresponsive to government employees, 3

3 I tested several models to determine if competition or marginality might explain the partisan differences found in this analysis. I found no marginality or competition effect concerning government employment influence. While these effects are certain to effect the decision-making of representatives, the influence of government employees appears to be maintained at all levels of electoral competition.
while Republicans are more responsive. I suggest that the reasons behind this behavior have motivations within both camps: government employees and representatives. Government employees are seeking support for an enhanced public sector to protect their life satisfaction; House members are seeking constituencies that can be counted upon to produce on election day. Since Democratic House members are already relatively liberal in their voting on budgetary items, there isn’t much slack in the electoral chain for government employees to pull. Conversely, Republicans in search of a highly motivated, politically savvy constituency for reelection support or in fear of a highly motivated, politically savvy constituency bent on their ouster may be more amenable to altering their roll-call voting to accommodate these constituencies to the benefit of their reelection prospects.

**BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: ELECTION CYCLE EFFECTS**

Does the cycle of elections have an effect on bureaucratic influence? To examine this potential effect, I investigate the differences between mid-term and presidential elections for government employee effects. I find that the effects of partisanship continued to be supported when the potential for election cycle effects are examined. To understand the rationale behind any potential election cycle effect it is imperative to recall the most appealing characteristic of government employees to any potential political suitor. That characteristic is the participation rate of government employees. Previous literature has demonstrated a consistent and significantly higher turnout rates for government employees when compared to the remaining electorate. My discussion of the impact of turnout in Chapter 3 referenced previous research that
has demonstrated a consistent pattern of higher turnout by government employees, with the most drastic differences occurring during the mid-term election cycle.\footnote{Blair (1993) finds that mid-term election turnout differences averaged over 14\%, while Presidential election year turnout differences averaged approximately 9\%. Furthermore, the explanatory value of government employment is only significant in midterm elections when included in a comprehensive multivariate analysis.}

This higher turnout rates is reasonable to predict given the hypothesized nature of government employee motivations. If this is a reelection constituency with strong motivational impetus to support their candidate of choice on election day, government employees should maintain support regardless of the election cycle. Because of the nature of the particular self-interested motivation, this group should be less undone by the relatively passive nature of mid-term congressional elections. Government certainly doesn’t stop spending money during midterm congress. Government employees, unlike other sectors within the electorate, do not need the attention of presidential election years to stimulate their turnout. Therefore, the turnout differential in mid-term election years should increase the relative influence of government employees in the electorate, as their participation remains constant and the remaining electorate declines in its participation rate. Applying the bureaucratic power index (Borcherding, 1977), this approximate 15\% turnout differential leads to government employees averaging over 20\% of the electorate during midterm elections. This certainly makes government employees a significant potential contributor to election outcomes during the midterm and certainly a sound political investment to candidates seeking reelection constituencies to enhance their election prospects.

The initial results of the test of midterm congressional effects are reported in the results of Table 5.4. The hypothesis that government employees have a stronger impact during off year elections is supported by the findings. First, the level of government employment matters in presidential election years, as evidenced by the statistical
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-20.2254</td>
<td>-1.991**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm * Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-15.7481</td>
<td>-2.245**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>16.8586</td>
<td>12.468***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2451</td>
<td>-13.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2778</td>
<td>-6.862***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.1032</td>
<td>-3.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1374</td>
<td>-2.411***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2202</td>
<td>-8.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization (-)</td>
<td>-0.0321</td>
<td>-1.834**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income % (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>1.354*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1258</td>
<td>-4.651***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-1.963**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Congress</td>
<td>8.0500</td>
<td>6.267***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Congress</td>
<td>-2.5086</td>
<td>-2.305**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress</td>
<td>-3.1818</td>
<td>-7.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Congress</td>
<td>-4.1006</td>
<td>-3.927***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress</td>
<td>4.7864</td>
<td>9.171***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Congress</td>
<td>15.0971</td>
<td>14.158***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>50.3124</td>
<td>20.146***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each 1th House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress

Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square = .7849
Number of obs = 2942
Number of groups = 764
Obs per group: min = 1
avg = 3.9
max = 15
Wald chi2(18) = 8447.36
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
significant coefficient of -20.2254 (t = 1.991). This finding means that a 10% increase in government employment in a congressional district results in a two percent decline in representative’s NTU scores. Secondly, the midterm does appear to provide some additional strength to the affect of government employment on the NTU scores of House members (b = -15.7481; t = -2.245). Midterm congresses almost result in the doubling of the effect of government employment. Midterms produce an additional 1.5 percent decline in fiscal conservatism for every 10% increase in government employment. Therefore, midterm congresses result in a 3.5 percent (2% + 1.5%) decline in NTU scores for every 10% increase in government employment in congressional districts.

The results of a separate analysis of midterm and presidential election year congresses and party differences are found in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Once again, the model fits the data quite well (psuedo-R² = .779 and .786, respectively). Furthermore, the general pattern follows the partisan differences discovered in the assessment of potential party effects on bureaucratic influence. In both midterm and presidential election year congresses, Republican House members are found to be strongly and significantly effected by the number of government employees residing in their districts, while Democratic House members are decidedly unresponsive to levels of government employment in their districts. Furthermore, the hypothesized increase in the influence of government employees between midterm and presidential year congresses is confirmed. As Tables 5.5 and 5.6 indicate, the Republican coefficient for government employment increases between presidential and midterm congresses (b = 98.455 to b = -165.386).

In essence, a 10% increase in government employment in a Republican congressional district produces a 9.8 % drop in NTU spending score conservatism in congresses immediately preceding presidential election years, and a 16.5 % decrease in congresses immediately preceding midterm election years. This represents over a 50% increase in the sensitivity to the level of government employees in Republican House districts during
### Table 5.5
Midterm Elections for Congress (1983 to 1996)
Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>10.3204</td>
<td>0.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-165.3864</td>
<td>-4.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>27.4633</td>
<td>9.129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2725</td>
<td>-13.584***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2332</td>
<td>-5.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.1124</td>
<td>-2.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.0885</td>
<td>-1.387*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2441</td>
<td>-7.039***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization % (-)</td>
<td>-0.0125</td>
<td>-0.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>1.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1313</td>
<td>-5.212***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0006</td>
<td>-3.294***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Congress</td>
<td>-1.3570</td>
<td>-3.838***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd Congress</td>
<td>2.7771</td>
<td>2.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>55.2552</td>
<td>15.961***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each 1th House Member’s NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
  *   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square   =   .7180
Number of obs    =   1262
Number of groups =   638
Obs per group: min = 1
avg               = 2.0
max               = 7
Wald chi2(14)    =  2924.61
Prob > chi2      =  0.0000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>2.4240</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-98.4554</td>
<td>-3.399***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>23.8280</td>
<td>9.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2522</td>
<td>-12.728***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2775</td>
<td>-8.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.1200</td>
<td>-3.773***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1598</td>
<td>-2.799***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1649</td>
<td>-6.171***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization % (-)</td>
<td>-0.0158</td>
<td>-1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>2.151**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.0992</td>
<td>-4.658***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-1.492*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress</td>
<td>-3.2059</td>
<td>-7.684***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress</td>
<td>4.6762</td>
<td>9.097***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Congress</td>
<td>14.5735</td>
<td>14.131***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>45.3556</td>
<td>17.724***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each i\textsuperscript{th} House Member's NTU Score for the t\textsuperscript{th} Congress

Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square = .7794
Number of obs = 1680
Number of groups = 735
Obs per group: min = 1
avg = 2.3
max = 8
Wald chi2(15) = 7151.96
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
midterm congresses. Additionally, the remaining control measures maintain their consistency and similar relative impact on the dependent variable, increasing the confidence that the change between midterms and presidential year congresses in Republican responsiveness is related to government employment levels. Clearly, there is a midterm effect in the influence of government employees on the spending roll-call voting of Republican members of Congress.

**BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL EFFECTS**

In the final specification of the model, I disaggregate the government employee variable into its federal, state, and local government components. I expect to find that federal government employees have the strongest effect on the roll-call behavior of representatives. I suspect that state and local government employees will also have an effect on the fiscal conservatism of representatives, but that this effect will be less robust. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that federal government employees are the ones that are most directly affected by the spending level of the federal government. Therefore, those employees should be motivated to bring influence to bear with the most fervor. Conversely, state and local officials, while affected by federal spending levels due to intergovernmental transfers of dollars to states by the federal government, are also affected by the spending practices of the state and local governments. By including separate independent variables for federal, state, and local government employment, any change in the influence of the components of government employment can be discerned.

The results of Table 5.7 appear to demonstrate the validity of the hypothesized effect. Federal government employees are the only sector of public employment to have a statistically significant effect on the roll-call spending behavior of representatives \( b = -49.6546; t = -2.838 \). This finding suggests that a 10% increase in federal government
### Table 5.7
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Sector Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District FED Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-49.6546</td>
<td>-2.838***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District ST Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>0.2072</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District LOC Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1998</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>16.6959</td>
<td>12.326***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2476</td>
<td>-13.345***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2798</td>
<td>-6.908***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.1046</td>
<td>-3.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1489</td>
<td>-2.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2349</td>
<td>-8.745***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization % (-)</td>
<td>-0.0288</td>
<td>-1.616*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>1.761**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1315</td>
<td>-5.233***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>-2.445***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Congress</td>
<td>3.9773</td>
<td>11.185***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress</td>
<td>-3.0860</td>
<td>-7.258***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Congress</td>
<td>2.4849</td>
<td>5.098***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress</td>
<td>5.0264</td>
<td>9.249***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd Congress</td>
<td>6.6393</td>
<td>5.763***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Congress</td>
<td>15.2424</td>
<td>13.712***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>49.3390</td>
<td>16.207***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each $i^{th}$ House Member's NTU Score for the $t^{th}$ Congress

Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square = .7857
Number of obs = 2942
Number of groups = 764
Obs per group: min = 1
avg = 3.9
max = 15
Wald chi2(28) = 9474.78
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
employment results in a 4.9 % decline in representative NTU scores. The effect of state and local government employees is random and trivial.

The disaggregation of government employees into its federal, state and local components by political party produces some very interesting insights into the nature of bureaucratic effects on the spending inclinations of House members. The results are represented in Table 5.8. The coefficients for the control variables and the overall model's explanatory power are consistent with the previous iterations of the model of bureaucratic influence (Pseudo $R^2 = 0.794$) and the control measures are consistent with previous models as well.

From the results of Table 5.8, it appears as if Democrats are indeed responsive to the proportion of federal government employees in their House districts, but that this effect is lost in the aggregation of the measure of government employment. The findings indicate that a 10% increase in the proportion of government employees in a Democratic congressional district is associated with a 4.1 point decline in Democratic House member NTU scores. Conversely, the same 10% increase in state or local government employees will produce increases in budgetary conservatism among Democratic House members (+3.3% for state government employees and +27.5% for local government employees). Clearly, Democratic House members respond as originally expected to federal government employees, but they are unresponsive – or else responsive in the wrong direction – to state and local employees.

The effect for Republican House members is just the opposite. Republican House members are unresponsive to federal government employee levels in their districts, but they are very responsive to state and local government employee levels in their districts. A 10% increase in state government employment is associated with a 6.3 point drop in NTU roll-call fiscal conservatism and a 10% increase in local government employment is associated with a 57.7 point decrease in NTU scores for Republican House members.
Table 5.8
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Partisan Sector Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District FED Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-41.4986</td>
<td>-3.238***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District ST Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>32.7383</td>
<td>1.54*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District LOC Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>274.5089</td>
<td>5.179***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP District FED Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-23.4602</td>
<td>-0.662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP District ST Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-63.3272</td>
<td>-1.899**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP District LOC Gov't Employ % (-)</td>
<td>-576.6124</td>
<td>-9.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID (+)</td>
<td>48.4968</td>
<td>14.789***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score (-)</td>
<td>-0.2363</td>
<td>-13.431***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority (-)</td>
<td>-0.2676</td>
<td>-6.704***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State PID (-)</td>
<td>-0.0842</td>
<td>-2.412***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.1591</td>
<td>-2.774***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology (-)</td>
<td>-0.2080</td>
<td>-7.879***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Urbanization % (-)</td>
<td>-0.0346</td>
<td>-2.012**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income (-)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>1.547*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Black % (-)</td>
<td>-0.1664</td>
<td>-6.656***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Federal Outlays (-)</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>-3.933***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Congress</td>
<td>4.1349</td>
<td>11.977***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress</td>
<td>-3.0051</td>
<td>-7.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Congress</td>
<td>2.6095</td>
<td>5.413***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress</td>
<td>5.2507</td>
<td>9.631***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd Congress</td>
<td>7.4738</td>
<td>6.698***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Congress</td>
<td>15.9014</td>
<td>14.764***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>34.2346</td>
<td>9.889***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable is each $i$th House Member's NTU Score for the $t$th Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors

*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)

Pseudo R-square = .7937
Number of obs = 2942
Number of groups = 764
Obs per group: min = 1
avg = 3.9
max = 15
Wald chi2(22) = 9474.29
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Clearly, Republican House members are very sensitive to the proportion of state and local government employees in their districts, while Democratic House members are sensitive to the level of federal government employees in their districts.

What is the dynamic at work that would cause such differentiation in responsiveness between Republican and Democratic House members? It may be the case that Democrats and Republicans have different ideological belief systems relative to the role of different levels of government. By this I mean to suggest that the parties see different roles for government in society. Republicans are generally though of as supporting the idea of a federalist system of decentralized government. They are supportive of efforts to return decision-making and political control to state and local governments. Republicans are often supporters of divesting the federal government of control over public policy and limiting the size and scope of federal government involvement in the public policy making. Conversely, Democrats are often most closely associated with federal government promotion and the centralization of decision-making. They seek solutions to public issues through federal government solutions and administration. As a result, members of the two parties may perceive their political support as differentiated by the different sectors of bureaucratic employment. Because they are more supportive of state and local government, they may be more responsive to this reelection constituency, while Democrats seek support from federal government employees.

Similarly, the government employees of each sector may also perceive themselves as more consistent reelection constituencies to the party that is more sympathetic to their role in government. State and local government employees may see Republican candidates as supporters of local and state control of government and more sympathetic in their roll-call voting on spending policy for state and local governments. Furthermore, this support could extend to non-spending matters as well.
If state and local government employees view Republican representatives as supporters of the enhancement of their level of government, that support could be perceived as increasing their security and life satisfaction. Conversely, federal government employees may see Democrats as their standard bearer. They may believe that Democrats will be more supportive of an expanded federal government role, and lend their support as a reelection constituency accordingly. These perceptions by House members and government employees would not be inconsistent with the rational choice supposition made of government employee motivation. It would also be consistent with the disposition of House members to identify and seek support from the constituencies with which they identify and with which they can find ideological consistency in their roll-call voting decision calculus.

**SUMMARY**

What has the empirical evidence demonstrated about the relationship between government employees and members of the House of Representatives? First, the evidence demonstrates the unequivocal effect of government employment on the roll-call voting behavior of House members. For each iteration of the model tested, government employment has a statistically significant effect on the level of fiscal conservatism of House members. The findings also reveal the mediating effect of the election cycle on the influence of the public sector. Evidence suggests that representative become more responsive to the level of government employment in their districts leading up to midterm elections than in congresses leading up to presidential elections. It is hypothesized that this increased effect is due to the higher turnout rates for government employees in midterm election years. In those elections, government employees represent a larger proportion of the electorate, which increases their attractiveness to legislators. Therefore, House members become more attentive to this sub-constituency during the midterm in the effort to garner their support.
Finally, and most interestingly, a partisan differential is discovered. This relationship is depicted in Appendix C. The results of the analysis illustrate that Republicans are more attentive to government employees than Democrats. Democrats appear to be unresponsive to government employees, while Republicans are significantly more responsive. I argue that Democratic House members are already relatively liberal in their voting on budgetary items, therefore there isn’t much more that government employees could ask of Democratic House members. Conversely, Republicans may discover that they can cultivate this core constituency for their reelection efforts by become more moderate in their roll-call fiscal conservatism. The disaggregation of government employment into federal, state and local sectors produces some surprising partisan results. Republican House members are attentive to the core constituency of state and local government employees, while Democratic House members are attentive to federal government employees. I suggest that this differential roll-call responsiveness to each constituency may be due to differences that each party sees for the role of government in society. Republicans are attentive to the desires of state and local government employees because they support advent of that level of government in society, while Democrats are responsive to federal government employees because they are supportive of the role that level of government has in society.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

I began the research that became this dissertation with the thought of merging the strengths of two literatures to examine the extent of bureaucratic influence on legislative responsiveness. The literatures concerned with legislative representation and government growth have occupied the research agendas of many scholars over the previous decades. Legislative research has identified the multitude of factors that can mediate the level of responsiveness by legislators to their constituencies. Individual factors, such as seniority, and constituency factors, such as demographics, have been shown to affect the responsiveness of legislators. Research has also indicated the variation in responsiveness to different sub-groups within legislator’s constituencies, which have typically been related to reelection constituencies or supporting coalitions that provide political support to elected officials.

Literature on government growth has introduced the theory that bureaucrats can promote an increase in the growth of government by utilizing their voting strength in the electorate. They use this voting strength to elect candidates that are more sympathetic to increased government spending, thereby increasing their own security and life satisfaction. It seems to me that the combination of these two literatures of representation and government growth has the potential to complement each other on the issue of bureaucratic influence on legislative decision-making. Could government employees be thought of as a core constituency? Could they use electoral voting strength to alter the roll-call decision-making of legislators? These questions are the central thesis of this dissertation. It is my belief that I have answered those questions definitively with a “yes”.

95
SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE

An examination of the literature concerning elections, participation, and the political behavior of bureaucrats certainly indicates the potential to be a core constituency. If candidates and parties are targeting mobilization toward subgroup they consider supportive within district constituencies, government employees have the qualities that candidates should be interested in cultivating. The relationship between government employees and representatives is certainly a plausible theory.

The empirical findings from the bureau voting model, while equivocal, do support some ideological and political distinctions between government employees and other citizens and significant differences in political participation. Government employees, as rational self-interested actors, do appear to desire increased, or at least maintained, levels of government spending and certainly participate at a higher rate than the remaining population. It is also plausible that politicians, who are interested in maintaining political and electoral support, will gravitate toward such participatory segments of the electorate as a constituency. If reelection is the central to the decision-making calculus of representatives, they should be attentive enough to modify their political behavior to garner the support of a group such as bureaucrats.

The empirical evidence demonstrated in this dissertation has illustrated several conclusive findings about the relationship between government employees and representatives. First, the findings show the significant moderating effect of government employment on the roll-call fiscal conservatism of representatives. Secondly, the findings reveal the mediating effect of the election cycle the bureaucratic effect. My research demonstrates that representatives are more responsive to government employment in the midterm congresses than in presidential congresses. I suggest that this behavior is the effect of higher turnout rates for government employees in midterm election years. In those elections, government employees represent a larger proportion
of the electorate, which increases their attractiveness to legislators. Finally, I identify a party effect on bureaucratic influence. This relationship is depicted in Appendix C. Analysis indicates that it is Republicans representatives that are more attentive to government employees than Democrats. I suggest that Democratic House members are already relatively liberal in their roll-call behavior on fiscal policy, which doesn’t leave much reason for bureaucrats to persuade this group with electoral support or threats. Conversely, Republicans may discover that they can cultivate this core constituency for their reelection efforts by become more moderate in their roll-call fiscal conservatism. The disaggregation of government employment into federal, state and local sectors produces some surprising partisan results. Republican House members are attentive to the core constituency of state and local government employees, while Democratic House members are attentive to federal government employees. I suggest that this differential roll-call responsiveness to each constituency may be due to differences that each party sees for the role of government in society.

SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE BUREAU VOTING MODEL

The central focus of this dissertation is the pursuit of evidence that government employees are an influential reelection constituency to members of the House of Representatives. Fortunately, the examination of this question of bureaucratic influence has provided some confirmatory evidence for the bureau voting model. Recall that the bureau voting model suggests that the growth in the size of government is affected by the differences between the voting behavior of government employees and other citizens. The theory contends that bureaucrats are utility maximizers who covet increased government expenditures to promote their relative life satisfaction. Therefore, they will be motivated to higher rates of participation than the remaining population in the electorate, which is borne out in the literature on this theory. It is suggested that this increased likelihood political participation will produce the effect of government
employees having a proportionately greater effect on election outcomes and public policy than the remainder of the population. This self-interested voting behavior should be directed toward the support of increased government spending to promote greater job security and life satisfaction, but should also contribute to higher rates of government growth.

The representational linkage illustrated in this dissertation also provides supporting evidence for the bureau voting model. The bureau voting model suggests that public-sector employees are more likely than other citizens to cast votes on election day, and by so doing provide electoral advantages to candidates who support their policy agenda, and this dissertation, by examining how government employees residing in congressional districts affect the roll-call spending behavior of their representatives, has produced an alternative test of this theory. Because the examined relationships between government employees and representatives are most likely the end product of processes implied by the bureau voting theory, the empirical evidence that government employment is linked to roll-call voting behavior for budgetary matters provides is evidence in support of the bureau voting model.

In essence, I have produced an alternative empirical test of the bureau voting model by seeking to understand the influence of government employees on the spending behavior of legislators. This alternative test produces some clarity in the implications of the bureau voting model and provides insight into the effects of public sector employees on the roll-call behavior of House members. Because representatives do appear to moderate their fiscal conservatism to attract support from the bureaucracy as a supporting coalition, the result may be increases in the size of government. The illustration of this linkage supports the theoretical foundation of the bureau voting model.
SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION

The investigation of government employees as a subgroup constituency to members of Congress also yields confirming evidence for the existence of a general representational linkage between representatives and their constituents. This linkage has a long tradition in the representational literature. This dissertation has only served to confirm many of the accepted beliefs about the nature of that relationship. Most often, these relationships are examined as a study of the roll call voting behavior of elected officials as a function of some constituency attributes or pressure that these actors perceive from their constituencies. Scholars develop measures of constituency policy preferences and legislative roll-call behavior, and then link the two measures in a multivariate model to ascertain the degree to which roll-call behavior is responsive to the policy views of legislative constituencies. This dissertation has followed in that tradition and operationalized a model of legislative responsiveness as a function of government employment levels in congressional districts.

In properly specifying the model of responsiveness to government employment, I have confirmed many previous findings regarding the mediators on the representational linkage. The control variables included in the model are repeatedly found to have an effect on the roll-call voting behavior of legislators. The independent variables representing legislator characteristics are all found to have a significant effect on roll-call behavior. House member’s partisanship has a strong influence on roll-call voting on government spending policy, as measured by the National Taxpayer’s Union roll-call voting score. Republicans partisanship is found to result in more fiscally conservatism. Furthermore, House members’ ideology is also influential in their roll-call vote decisions. The analysis of my core model indicates that the higher Americans for Democratic Action ratings for House members results in the less fiscally conservative in voting on spending measures. These findings confirm previous research results that ideology and
partisanship are good predictors of legislative roll-call behavior. Also, seniority is found to have an effect on roll-call voting. The findings indicate that House member seniority reduces fiscal conservatism. These results suggest that more senior representatives are indeed more responsive to their constituencies. This dissertation also illustrates strong empirical support for the effect of constituencies on the roll-call decision making of legislators. State partisanship, state ideology and district ideology are all related to House member’s roll-call behavior, which confirms the influence of constituency preferences on the decision calculus of representatives.

It is in the literature concerning the effect of distinct subgroups within a legislator’s constituency that this dissertation makes the largest contribution to the research on representation. Research illustrates that subgroups within the constituency can have a greater influence on the voting behavior of representatives than the more diffuse population of a district. Scholars contend that constituencies are complex and made up of many subgroups, some of which are politically active. Some of these core constituencies form a supporting coalition or reelection constituency for representatives. Partisan and racial subgroups have been identified in the literature, and have shown distinctly greater influence over representatives believed to be consistent with their preferences. Because of the strong relationship revealed between government employees and representatives, the results of this dissertation lend support to the literature on constituency subgroup effects.

**SOME AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

The discovery that government employees seem to constitute a reelection constituency to House members, but that this reelection constituency operates differently at different sectors of government employment suggests that additional inquiry is needed into the dynamic at work to produce this effect. I have offered the suggestion that the difference in partisan responsiveness is potential a function of the different ideological
disposition of the two parties toward the role of government. State and local employees support Republican’s based on their federalist tendencies, while federal employees support Democrats based on their espousal of federal government supremacy.

While this explanation may be plausible, it is by no means the only potential answer. The examination of survey data to establish the underlying characteristics of federal, state and local government employees may uncover differences that may explain the differences in responsiveness to these groups by Democratic and Republican House members. Ideological or political dispositions may differ between these different sectors of the public sector. Also, the collection of interview data for representatives could certainly help clarify the relationship between legislators and government employee and further detail the effect I have illustrated.

Furthermore, an examination of each individual vote choice included in the NTU score may yield additional information. A subdivision of those votes into the different areas of funding by government could produce answers for the partisan differences, and indicate the true nature of the bureaucratic effect. By separating out the different funding mechanisms and sectors, and applying more diversity to the spending roll-call behavior of representatives, a clearer picture of the effect of each of these roll-call decisions could be modeled.

Survey data could also yield another information and clarity for the explanation of the general party differences revealed in this dissertation. Recall that in the baseline model of partisan differentials, Republicans demonstrated a strong responsiveness to changes in government employment levels in their districts, while Democrats were unresponsive to such changes. This finding runs counter to past research on the linkage of bureaucratic voting behavior and government. This past research has hypothesized that government employees will support candidates who are supportive of public-sector spending and an active role for government and it is understandable that this assumption
would be made because of the evidence that Democrats are more supportive than Republicans of a more activist and pro-active public sector.

I offered another possible rationale for the unusual finding of Republican responsiveness. I suggested that government employees are utilizing different, or at least more complicated, voting cue than the average citizen. Bureaucrats have much more of a personal stake in election outcomes and therefore may engage in a more complicated vote choice rationale. In strongly Democratic districts, or in non-competitive Democratic elections, government employees may indeed use simple partisan voting cues. In such districts, this is likely to be a safe bet, since Democrats are typically more supportive of enhanced spending than are Republicans. However, in strong Republican districts, or in non-competitive Republican elections, government employees might not be inclined to waste votes by voting simply with their party cue, but may instead utilize information on the predisposition of competing candidates to support the role and spending levels of government. By shifting votes to Republican candidates, they do not waste their votes by voting for a Democratic candidate who is highly unlikely to win, and by doing so they increase their chances of developing a role in influencing Republican candidates and, eventually, Republican House members. This theoretical voting scheme may be tested given the proper survey data and information on the competitiveness of districts and incumbency. Furthermore, the examination of government employee strength and the behavior of newly elected representatives could further enhance the understanding of the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats.

Regardless of further investigation, this dissertation has successfully merged the strengths of two literatures of bureaucratic influence and legislative representation. I have demonstrated the validity of identifying government employees as a core constituency to representatives. Furthermore, I have uncovered both election cycle and partisan difference effects that mediate on that relationship. The results have also given
support to the bureau voting theory of government growth and given support to the legislative representation literature, especially with regard to the existence and effectiveness of core constituencies in the electorate.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

SCATTERPLOT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND NTU SCORES
## APPENDIX B

### DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES MODELED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTU Score</td>
<td>3025</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>40.5126</td>
<td>20.11861</td>
<td>404.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.2342</td>
<td>.0421</td>
<td>.2763</td>
<td>.100748</td>
<td>.0287969</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.1745</td>
<td>.0059</td>
<td>.1804</td>
<td>.022392</td>
<td>.0181128</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.1108</td>
<td>.0060</td>
<td>.1168</td>
<td>.028295</td>
<td>.0171440</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.0846</td>
<td>.0174</td>
<td>.1020</td>
<td>.050061</td>
<td>.0104169</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party ID</td>
<td>3042</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.4188</td>
<td>.49344</td>
<td>118.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score</td>
<td>2983</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>47.7821</td>
<td>34.42509</td>
<td>1185.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>8.7011</td>
<td>8.26706</td>
<td>68.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Partisanship</td>
<td>3010</td>
<td>53.06</td>
<td>-20.57</td>
<td>32.49</td>
<td>7.3881</td>
<td>7.11303</td>
<td>50.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ideology</td>
<td>3010</td>
<td>28.74</td>
<td>-27.32</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>-12.0331</td>
<td>.0181128</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Ideology</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>82.18</td>
<td>-46.71</td>
<td>35.47</td>
<td>10.6582</td>
<td>13.66765</td>
<td>186.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Median Income</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>55765.00</td>
<td>8434.00</td>
<td>64199.00</td>
<td>24614.3145</td>
<td>9403.83938</td>
<td>88432195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization %</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>86.90</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>74.0744</td>
<td>22.38963</td>
<td>501.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black %</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>92.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>92.18</td>
<td>11.3392</td>
<td>14.99999</td>
<td>225.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>2942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTU Score</td>
<td>3025</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>40.5126</td>
<td>20.11861</td>
<td>404.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP NTU Score</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>77.5000</td>
<td>19.5000</td>
<td>97.0000</td>
<td>59.3373</td>
<td>15.240275</td>
<td>232.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM NTU Score</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>66.5000</td>
<td>8.5000</td>
<td>75.0000</td>
<td>26.99283</td>
<td>9.4668082</td>
<td>89.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.2342</td>
<td>.0421</td>
<td>.2763</td>
<td>.100748</td>
<td>.0287969</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>.2089</td>
<td>.0426</td>
<td>.2514</td>
<td>.099324</td>
<td>.0292656</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>.2342</td>
<td>.0421</td>
<td>.2763</td>
<td>.101784</td>
<td>.0284420</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.1745</td>
<td>.0059</td>
<td>.1804</td>
<td>.022392</td>
<td>.0181128</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP Federal Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>.1745</td>
<td>.0059</td>
<td>.1804</td>
<td>.021720</td>
<td>.0194996</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM Federal Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>.1742</td>
<td>.0062</td>
<td>.1804</td>
<td>.022887</td>
<td>.0170470</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.1108</td>
<td>.0060</td>
<td>.1168</td>
<td>.028295</td>
<td>.0171440</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP State Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>.1023</td>
<td>.0067</td>
<td>.1090</td>
<td>.027976</td>
<td>.0158707</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM State Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>.1108</td>
<td>.0060</td>
<td>.1168</td>
<td>.028520</td>
<td>.0180201</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov't Employment</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>.0846</td>
<td>.0174</td>
<td>.1020</td>
<td>.050061</td>
<td>.0104169</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP Local Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>.0740</td>
<td>.0183</td>
<td>.0923</td>
<td>.049628</td>
<td>.0102657</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM Local Gov't Employment</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>.0846</td>
<td>.0174</td>
<td>.1020</td>
<td>.050377</td>
<td>.0105246</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

BIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN HOUSE MEMBER NTU SCORES ON GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC HOUSE MEMBERS

REPUBLICAN HOUSE MEMBERS
APPENDIX D

FREQUENCIES FOR NTU SCORES AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT VARIABLES FOR POOLED MODELS

DEMOCRATIC HOUSE MEMBERS AND NTU SCORES

DEMOCRATIC HOUSE MEMBERS AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Std. Dev = 9.51
Mean = 27.0
N = 1756.00

Std. Dev = .03
Mean = .102
N = 1756.00
REPUBLICAN HOUSE MEMBERS AND NTU SCORES

REPUBLICAN HOUSE MEMBERS AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
APPENDIX E

NTU SCORES FOR DEMOCRATIC HOUSE MEMBERS BY CONGRESS

DEMOCRATIC NTU SCORES FOR THE 98TH CONGRESS

DEMOCRATIC NTU SCORES FOR THE 99TH CONGRESS
DEMOCRATIC NTU SCORES FOR THE 102ND CONGRESS

DEMOCRATIC NTU SCORES FOR THE 103RD CONGRESS
DEMOCRATIC NTU SCORES FOR THE 104\textsuperscript{TH} CONGRESS

Std. Dev = 10.70
Mean = 33.8
N = 198.00
APPENDIX F

NTU SCORES FOR REPUBLICAN HOUSE MEMBERS BY CONGRESS

REPUBLICAN NTU SCORES FOR THE 98TH CONGRESS

![Histogram for the 98th Congress]

REPUBLICAN NTU SCORES FOR THE 99TH CONGRESS

![Histogram for the 99th Congress]

 Std. Dev = 13.94
Mean = 54.2
N = 167.00

 Std. Dev = 11.02
Mean = 54.0
N = 181.00
REPUBLICAN NTU SCORES FOR THE 102\textsuperscript{ND} CONGRESS

REPUBLICAN NTU SCORES FOR THE 103\textsuperscript{RD} CONGRESS
REPUBLICAN NTU SCORES FOR THE 104TH CONGRESS

Std. Dev = 4.37
Mean = 76.0
N = 228.00
VITA

William M. Blair received his bachelor of arts degree in political science in 1991 from Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He began his graduate study in political science at Louisiana State University in the Fall of 1991. After earning his master of science degree in 1993, he continued to pursue his doctorate at Florida State University and Louisiana State University. Bill’s major field of study is American politics. Within American politics, he has concentrated on the areas of bureaucratic politics, legislative politics, electoral behavior and public policy. His second field of study is comparative politics and his third field is public administration.

Bill’s scholarly research has centered on bureaucratic electoral behavior and bureaucratic influence on the political system. He has presented numerous research projects at regional and national political science conventions and has submitted several research projects to scholarly journals.

Bill is presently a legislative analyst with the Louisiana House of Representatives. He is responsible for research and analysis for members of the Louisiana Legislature. Bill is a lead staff person for the Legislature’s 2000 reapportionment efforts. He has worked extensively with census data and geographical information systems to develop plans and other research for the members of the legislature.

Bill will obtain his degree of Doctor of Philosophy in May 2003.