Hale Boggs: a Southern Spokesman for the Democratic Party.

Dorothy Nelson Kirn
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3491
INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University Microfilms International
300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND
KIRN, DOROTHY NELSON

HALE BOGGS: A SOUTHERN SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col. PH.D. 1980

University Microfilms International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England
HALE BOGGS: A SOUTHERN SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech

by
Dorothy Nelson Kirn
B.A., Louisiana College, 1968
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1973
May 1980
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION. .........................1-8

Chapter II
SOUTHERNERS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1962-1972. ... 9-28

Chapter III
HALE BOGGS' LIFE AND CAREER ..............29-51

Chapter IV
THREE SPEECHES DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. . .52-104

Chapter V
TWO CIVIL RIGHTS SPEECHES DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
........................................105-133

Chapter VI
THREE GOOD GOVERNMENT SPEECHES DURING THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
........................................134-158

Chapter VII
CONCLUSION. ..............................159-162

Bibliography
ABSTRACT

Hale Boggs, United States Representative from the Second Congressional District of Louisiana, served most of his years in Congress as part of the Democratic leadership, eventually becoming majority leader. He was often called on to speak on behalf of Democratic policies and proposals. At the same time, he was one of the most influential and powerful southerners in the House.

This study deals with Boggs' attempts to bring about reconciliation and compromise between southern Democrats and other Democrats in the House of Representatives, and to bring about reconciliation and compromise between Democrats and Republicans in the House. Eight speeches are studied which provide evidence of Boggs' efforts to assume these roles on the floor of the House. Many of the ideas which motivated him are expressed as central themes in the speeches dealt with.

Analysis of the speeches centers on the situation in which they were delivered. Characteristics such as the nature of the speech (organization, themes, supporting material, etc.) and the use of language in the speech are viewed in context of the specific speech occasion. This analysis produced several conclusions.

First Boggs really did serve as reconciler and compromiser in many instances. He was in tune with the mood and make-up of the
House, and was able to find common chords among members of disparate groups. Second, Boggs' attempt to develop the image of reconciler and compromiser was at least partly fostered by personal ambition. Third, Boggs was especially adept at using a speech which appeared to be for a particular purpose as a vehicle for achieving another, less explicit purpose. Fourth, Boggs' speeches are especially useful as examples of attitudes and ideas which reflect the political and social times in which they occurred.

Boggs appears to have seen his involvement with the national Democratic party always as uniquely southern, and his view of southern politics always as uniquely Democratic. He was not willing to give up his southerness or his national perspective. Essentially, this study reveals how Boggs used these attitudes in speeches to influence fellow congressmen in the House of Representatives.
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Hale Boggs, United States Representative from the Second District of Louisiana, considered himself both a southerner and a national Democrat during a period when southern Democrats and national Democrats were parts of opposing congressional factions. One of the principal roles which he envisioned for himself was that of a man who could reconcile southern conservatism with national liberalism in the Democratic party and who could foster compromises not only between Democratic factions, but between Republicans and Democrats in the House.¹

Another role which Boggs envisioned for himself was that of spokesman for his party. Members of his family, his staff, and his biographers have all mentioned his frequent speeches. In 1962 The New York Times alluded to this role in a feature story, observing that "when Hale takes the floor, there's always order in the House."² It is the combination of these two roles--reconciler or compromiser, and public speaker--which forms the focus of this study.


Statement of the Problem

Entitled "Hale Boggs: A Southern Spokesman for the Democratic Party," this study examines several speeches delivered on the floor of the House between 1962 and 1972 as an attempt to understand how Boggs used congressional speeches as tools to accomplish reconciliation and compromise. Boggs was born and raised in the South and spent almost his entire adult life as the representative of a deep South congressional district. His ties to the region were strong.

Perhaps equally strong were Boggs' ties with the Democratic party. Boggs was introduced into the party leadership in the House. Sam Rayburn pushed for the creation of the post of deputy majority whip for Boggs in 1953. From that time on he was committed to the Democratic party on a national as well as a regional or local level. His ties with the national Democratic party would not be unusual had they not spanned an era of regional strife and division within the party. A coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans routinely opposed the policies and legislative proposals of national Democrats. It was difficult to align oneself as both a southerner and a national Democrat.

This regional division is especially significant within the time frame dealt with in this study. The sixties and early seventies are often referred to as "the second Reconstruction." These years were the years of prolific and influential civil rights legislation,

but they also brought votes on other issues which had traditionally divided the South from the rest of the nation. Boggs faced the problem not only of bringing together disparate factions of the Democratic party in the House, but also the problem of doing so while still retaining his official leadership role and his ability to be re-elected at home.

The central question which this study attempts to answer is how did Boggs attempt to solve these problems in his speeches on the floor of the House. How did he use speaking situations in Congress to try to bring about reconciliation and compromise in the House and among members of his own party?

Methodology

This study is an attempt to analyze several of Boggs' speeches within a situational framework. The individual speech is viewed as both a complete rhetorical event and as part of another, larger rhetorical plan. Essential to understanding the methodology is accepting the idea of a speech as a temporal event--an act which occurs at a particular time in a particular situation.

However, the focus is limited to an exploration of how these speeches represented, affected, or were otherwise associated with Boggs' attempts to act as a reconciler and compromiser in the Democratic party. In order to do this, three fundamental steps were involved. First, current political, social, and personal situations related to or surrounding the speeches were explored. Second, an
analysis of the audience and the nature of the speech itself was undertaken. Third, an effort to evaluate the speech was made.

Exploring the Situation.

In this study the situation was considered to include political, social, and personal factors which could affect the speaker, his message, and the audience. Not only was attention given to attitudes and events related to the stated purpose of the speech, but elements of the situation which could at first glance appear to be merely peripheral were also examined. Details of the immediate occasion, such as time of day, other business considered on the same agenda, and preceding speakers were searched out. Special note was also made of any correspondence, memoranda, or personal notes in Boggs' files which indicated the nature of the situation. All other analysis in the study actually is based on the exploration of the situation. Evaluations of the message and its effectiveness are made only after considering the situational context of the speech.

Analyzing the Nature of the Speech.

Analysis of the nature of the speech primarily involves determining the speaker's purpose, the themes of the speech, the supporting material used to develop these themes, the arrangement of ideas and supporting material, and the speaker's use of language. This section of analysis focuses on the text of the speech and its verbal message. These categories were chosen because they are useful in analyzing the text in terms of the situation. The main emphasis in this section is on the message choices made by the speaker as a response to or an
attempt to manipulate the situation. Themes, examples, statistics, patterns of arrangement, and language choices are not viewed as static, isolated elements of the speech, but as elements of the message being delivered from speaker to audience in the specific situation described.

Special attention is given to the speaker's purpose. With the exception of Boggs' eulogy to Sam Rayburn, the speeches which are analyzed here were given in support of particular pieces of legislation. However, it is questionable whether these speeches were really attempts to influence the outcome of voting on the specified bills and amendments. In general, the speeches seem to function more as ceremonial addresses than as attempts at immediate persuasion. Some were presented primarily because Boggs was expected to speak on the occasion. Others may have been delivered as an attempt to influence the outcome of some long-range, broad-based decision not even mentioned in the speech.

An effort is made to consider not only the stated or apparent immediate purpose of each speech, but also the unstated and secondary purposes of the speeches. In some speeches the unstated purpose may be the primary purpose. A distinction is made between Boggs' purpose as stated in the text of the speech and his purpose as exemplified in the situation.

Justification

There is no existing study on the speaking of Hale Boggs. Although Boggs' speaking was frequently referred to by his friends
and congressional colleagues, and despite his recognized role as a congressional leader, little attention has been given to the ways in which he used speech occasions to achieve his personal and political goals.

For scholars interested in the concept of southern rhetoric, Boggs' speeches are interesting because of his frequent references to regional images and ideals and because of his identification with southern causes and life styles. A great deal of attention is given in this dissertation to the role of Boggs as a southern spokesman, and to Boggs' self-concept as a representative of the deep South.

The speeches which are dealt with in this study are chosen from the "new Reconstruction" period of 1962 to 1972 and include speeches delivered during three different presidential administrations—Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.

Sources and Materials

Sources and materials cover a wide spectrum. Books by historians, sociologists, political scientists, and public policy analysts were sources for both background material and for information applied directly to analysis of the speeches studied. Most of the material dealing directly with Boggs has been written by popular journalists and published in popular periodicals or special editions. Among the most significant of these are Rosemary James' and Philip Moreton's article which appeared in the July, 1971 issue of New Orleans
Magazine, shortly after Boggs' election as House majority leader, Larry L. King's article about the campaign for majority leader which pitted Boggs against Morris L. Udall, in the June, 1971 issue of Harper's Magazine, the New Orleans States-Item special publication, 1973, by Bruce Eggler, entitled The Life and Career of Hale Boggs, and a special U.S. government publication of Memorial Addresses delivered in Congress, which is a memorial volume of written and spoken eulogies to Boggs after his disappearance in a plane over Alaska in 1973.

The texts of the speeches themselves were all drawn from the Congressional Record. Chapter III deals with the reasons for using these printed texts and with their authenticity. Popular news magazines were relied on extensively to provide insight into the political focus of each speech situation. These magazines also offered information regarding audience reactions to several of the speeches.


The other types of sources critical to the study are personal interviews and Boggs' congressional papers. Interviews with associates, aides, and family members were used primarily to gain information about Boggs' personal role in the situation and about his speech preparation. The congressional files included correspondence, personal notes, staff memoranda, clippings, programs, and other papers which were useful in several areas. Although the papers have been donated to the Tulane University Law Library, they are currently housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Access to the papers is available with permission of the Boggs family.

Special note should also be made of materials accessible through the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. Transcripts of interviews with congressmen and other political figures, prepared as a part of a University of Texas oral history project, provided ideas and information not found in ordinary published sources.
Chapter II

SOUTHERNERS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1962-1972

The objectives of this chapter are four-fold. First, the writer will briefly examine the nature of the Democratic party and its organization. Second, she will establish a historical perspective of southerners in the Democratic party. Third, she will examine attitudes and roles of southerners in the Democratic party between 1962 and 1972. Fourth, the writer will identify and discuss themes and issues in the Democratic party relevant to the present study.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ITS ORGANIZATION

Almost all of the political theories attempting to explain American political party organization agree that the party involves three essential and inter-locking elements: the party-in-government (individuals elected or appointed to office under the party's label), the party organization (party officers and activists who maintain the organization as an ongoing structure), and the party-in-electorate (the party's supporters among eligible voters). ¹Although Hale Boggs was clearly involved in all three elements of the Democratic party, the principal interest of this study is in his role in the party-in-government.

¹ Frank B. Feigert and M. Margaret Conway, Parties and Politics in America (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1976), pp. 7-8.
In January of 1971 the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report indicated that in congressional roll call votes in the ninety-first Congress (1969-70) the average Republican voted with the majority of his party in Congress only 60% of the time, and the average Democrat only 59% of the time. Clearly there appears to have been no binding "party position" in the most powerful governing body in the United States. However, as political scientist Frank J. Sorauf of the University of Minnesota suggests, "it still remains true that party lines, however loosely drawn, are the chief lines in American legislative voting behavior. In the roll calls of Congress and the states there is a degree of party cohesion which cannot be dismissed."\(^2\)

The first formal meeting an incoming or re-elected congressman is likely to face at the beginning of a session is the party caucus. At this time each party selects its leaders and its policy committee. Despite the fact that most of its power is informal, the party structure in the United States Congress has become fairly imposing. If a member of Congress wants to be appointed to important committees, have his legislative proposals well-researched and treated seriously, bring federal funds into his district and generally succeed in his term in Congress, usually he must exhibit a high degree of party loyalty.\(^3\)

Most political observers also agree that Democratic party policy in the contemporary Congress is essentially that adhered to by the Democratic leaders in Congress. Usually the terms "leader" and


\(^3\)Sorauf, p. 2.
"leadership" are used to refer to the Speaker of the House (if referring to the majority party), the majority or minority leader, the party whip, and their closest associates. This policy is likely to be gleaned from the party platform, from presidential programs if the president is a Democrat, and from long-standing party positions. During Boggs' career in the House there was no Democratic policy committee in the House. Speaker Sam Rayburn very much opposed any such decentralization of legislative policy-making powers.4 After Rayburn died in 1962, Speaker John McCormack did not interfere with the establishment of a steering committee, although that committee never really became an effective tool for the formulation of legislative policy. The legislative policy of the Democratic party in Congress may differ from the legislative policy of the national Democratic party organization. This seems to be largely because of the centralization of power in the Democratic party in the House. Political sociologists Thomas Madron and Carl Chelf note that "In the case of Congress, open hostility may exist between the congressional party and other units of the national party organization."5

Hostility, however, is not the norm. Many members of Congress double as officers and activists in the national party organization. Boggs, for example, served on the Democratic National Committee for

5 Madron and Chelf, p. 294.
many years, chaired the 1968 platform committee, and fulfilled other organizational duties. There are also times when the Democratic National Committee lends its support to particular pieces of legislation which reflect the party's platform or a central political and philosophical commitment. For many years of Boggs' career the editorial department of the Democratic National Committee released "Special Feature Material" which explained and called for the support of certain bills, often featuring the photograph and arguments of a sponsoring congressman. Certainly the national organization plays a large role in determining the nature of the legislative policy adhered to by the Democratic leadership in the House. Basically, the legislative policy of the Democratic party in the House is the leadership's interpretation or estimation of the legislative policy of the president and of the national organization.

In a 1967 report for the Brookings Institute, Randall B. Ripley suggested that a survey of research and theoretical literature indicates five important elements in understanding the impact of party leadership in the House:

1. Intraparty friendships are stronger than interparty friendships and this helps produce a feeling of party unity that can have legislative consequences.

2. Action on the House floor can involve psychological pressures that push an individual member to act in accord with the majority of his party.

3. There are other loyalties in addition to party that motivate members, the most important of which is loyalty to the constituency.

4. Party leaders seem to be especially important in influencing the roll call behavior of their members.
5. Party machinery has an impact in persuading members to support the party leaders. (example: the Democratic Whip organization)\(^6\)

Other writers support these assertions. Each of these observations provides a key to understanding Boggs' role as a party spokesman.

**HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

The single most important factor in understanding Boggs' role as a national Democrat was his position as a representative from the deep South, a region long known for producing Democrats different from those throughout the rest of the nation. Technically, Louisiana was a one-party state. As Billington suggests, "Louisiana politics has been notable for its bifactionalism. Within the single, dominant Democratic Party, Louisiana politics approximated the workings of a two-party system."\(^7\) At least six other deep South states had similar systems. At this level the Democratic party included all the electorate, for opposing organizational units and every elected official from the state were all Democrats. Between 1962 and 1972 there were no Republican congressmen from Louisiana. In 1962 there were no Republicans in Louisiana's state legislature, although by 1972 there were two. Despite the fact that Louisiana gave its electoral votes in the 1964 presidential election to Republican Barry Goldwater, and despite the fact that Republican Dave Treen


mounted fierce campaigns against Boggs in 1964 and 1968, the structure of Louisiana politics remained essentially that of a one-party state.

This one-partyism in the Deep South had two implications for congressional political strategies: (1) nearly all the southerners in the House were Democrats, and (2) between 1954 and 1974, one-third of the Democrats in the House were southerners.8

The complexity of Hale Boggs' role as a southern Democrat and a national Democrat is more easily understood when the power structure of party politics in the United States is surveyed. In his book The Ethnic Southerner, George Tindall lists what historians consider standard groupings of party power in the United States between 1976 and 1968:

1796-1828 Federalists-Jeffersonian Republican System
1828-1860 Democratic-Whig rivalry
1860-1898 Democratic-Republican rivalry
1898-1968 Democratic supremacy

Tindall describes the Democratic dominance in the South as beginning well before the Civil War. Although he mentions several other non-Democratic party movements, Tindall focuses on the Whigs as the as the major challenge to Democratic dominance. However, the Whigs never became more than just a challenge. Their party in the South was primarily made up of planters, urban bankers and merchants, rooted in sectional peace and compromise. After the Civil War they merged with Democrats to fend off the threat of Republicanism.

8 Billington, p. 180.

The election of Hayes as a president in 1876-1877 was the forerunner of sectionalism in the Democratic party. Southern Democrats split off from northern Democrats in a congressional compromise. After that, Hayes was conciliatory to southern Democrats, disheartening Republicans in the South and emboldening Democrats. The elections of 1880 marked the emergence of a firm sectionalism. When William Jennings Bryan ran for president as a Democrat in 1896, one-party politics was firmly established in the south. It was not until the middle 1960's that serious Republican challenges appeared in most parts of the deep South.  

It is not difficult to imagine some of the things this meant for the Democratic party as a whole. First, there was a larger number of public officials from the South in the Democratic party than from other regions which operated under a two-party system. Second, virtually every powerful, influential southern official or politician was a Democrat. Third, the combination of regionalism, sheer numbers and influential personalities meant that Southerners in the Democratic party had a natural and powerful alliance. Southerners in the Democratic party have often been able, or at least have tried, to look after their regional interests selfishly and separately.

10Tindall, The Ethnic Southerner, p. 44.

Political observer Walter Dean Burnham speculates that below the presidential level, "the nationalization of party organization and voting alignments" in the South "has begun to have statewide ramifications only since 1960." Frank Feigert and Margaret Conway have pointed out that since virtually all southerners are Democrats, but no all Democrats are southerners, the southern member of party-in-government is likely to identify himself as a defender of southern policy rather than Democratic policy. Madron and Chelf remind us that in 1948 southern Democrats walked out of the national convention and nominated their own candidates as the Dixiecrat party. Billington suggests that these southern Democrats considered themselves true Democrats and thought of the rest of the party as being rebellious.

The Dixiecrat rebellion marked two important alignments for young Congressman Hale Boggs. First, he remained with the national party

---


13 Feigert and Conway.


15 Billington, p. 132.
organization. Second, by remaining loyal to the organization, he also continued with his powerful friend Sam Rayburn. Sam Rayburn not only was opposed to the States Rights Democrats (the name they officially chose for themselves), but he was chairman of the national convention in which the walkout of thirty-four Alabama and Mississippi delegates took place. The disagreement had grown out of Truman's civil rights program and the inclusion of a compromise, "almost invisible" civil rights plank in the party's 1948 platform.16 Most political observers agree that it was about this time that Boggs' reputation as a "loyalist" to the national Democratic party and as a "moderate" on civil rights issues began to be established. If Boggs had joined the majority of southerners on this occasion, he probably would never have achieved the prominence and power he held in the House of Representatives.

Tindall claimed that "the Dixiecrat rebellion marked the end of the Solid South in the electoral college" and in other ways.17 The civil rights battle in America had officially begun. Billington wrote that "modern Republicanism received its greatest boost from the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948."18 Presidential Republicanism increased throughout the decades of the fifties and sixties in the South. Tindall suggests that between 1956 and 1975 Republicans have "created

18 Billington, p. 132.
a durable opposition in the South" for the first time since the Whigs did so in the 1840's. He claims that southerners were "unburdened of old restrictions" during the time and that southern politics were opened to a wider range of possibilities." 19 Certainly the Democratic party had been and remains dominant in southern politics; but it has ceased to be omnipotent.

ATTITUDES AND ROLES OF SOUTHERNERS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1962-1972

The years on which this study focuses, 1962-1972, were years of crisis and conflict for southerners in the Democratic party. Many social historians and political theorists include these years in the period they call "the second Reconstruction." The old institution of segregation had been torn down in the courts and the legislative bodies, and the federal government would go as far as calling troops (the National Guard) to see that the new laws were enforced. Northerners and midwesterners were pouring into southern communities in attempts to influence local political and social institutions. The issues of states' rights and socialism were co-equal in importance with the issue of civil rights.

Four factors must be examined in order to understand the attitudes and roles of southerners in the Democratic party during this time. First, the political issues involved in civil rights legislation and jurisprudence must be considered. Second, attitudes toward the presidency and the growth of presidential Republicanism in the

South should be surveyed. Third, the influence of southern nationalism on party politics must be determined. Fourth, the internal struggles and fragmentation of the Democratic party must be examined.

A number of political theorists agree that the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964 and 1965 "have primarily affected minority group voting rights."²⁰ It is unlikely, however, that many southern Democrats in the sixties and early seventies would agree with that. To the typical southerners, as Tindall points out, these acts represented more than the specific language or intent of the particular legislation. To blacks and whites alike they were benchmarks of change.²¹ Numan V. Bartley wrote that because of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts "the sixties was a period of sweeping change in the nation and especially in the South." Political sociologists have suggested that perhaps the South was experiencing a kind of "culture shock" which led to social and political confusion.²²

It may not be completely true, as Samuel DuBois Cook asserts, that "racism is the key to the southern historical process,"²³ It does appear, though, that race or race-related issues were those which most dramatically set southern Democrats apart from other party members.

²⁰ Feigert and Conway, p. 37.
²¹ Tindall, The Ethnic Southerner, p. 47.
Paul M. Gaston suggested in 1974 that "During the Civil Rights Movement the region became, in the popular national imagination, the quintessence of evil, and Americans went through an orgy of South-hating." Sociologist Raymond Mack said that "Southerners and non-Southerners alike have become accustomed to the image of the Southerner as a bigoted, uneducated, rural boob."25

It would probably not be accurate to suggest that the southern delegation in Congress was losing control, but southerners as a whole were certainly losing influence in national legislation and in the national Democratic party organization. The single--and crucial--exception is that a number of blacks who had only been on the periphery of party politics before were suddenly in important committees and delegations. Old-line politicians were sometimes left out. The national Democratic party organization seemed to be supporting Congress time and time again while legislation aimed specifically at southern social and political institutions were passed. "The fact that the Democratic party, the traditional friend and protector of the South, and the historical defender of states rights and rugged individualism should have been the author of most of these political innovations did not ease the situation in the South or conduce harmony within the Democratic party in Southern states."26 Donald Matthews and James state that the politics leading up to this time "had left Southerners


25 Cook, p. 132.

puzzled, confused and of several minds about the Democratic and Republican parties."27

Many southern political leaders seemed to take the old Dixiecrat stance that the national party organization was the root of all evil and that they themselves were the true Democrats. A Republican-Southern-Democratic coalition was gaining strength in Congress.28 In Louisiana, former governor Robert Kennon launched his 1964 campaign for the Democratic nomination for governor with a series of speeches blasting the national Democratic party as a socialist body, and continued via a series of statewide television programs called "Kennon versus the Party."29 This approach to campaigning hints at the conflicts between Democrats at the national, state and local levels.

Most southerners, black and white, thought of themselves as Democrats. A 1963 study showed that among whites, identification with the Democratic party was positively associated with identification with the South as a region.30 Virtually every black who identified himself with any political party identified himself with

28 Weeks, p. 236
30 Madron and Cheff, p. 83.
the Democratic party. An interesting phenomenon, however, was interfering with the concept of party identification. "By the beginning of the 1960's . . . two-party rivalry had come to stay in presidential elections, but . . . in other elections the Solid South was still largely intact and the Democratic primaries were still in reality the final elections for most congressional seats and statewide and local elective offices." 31

Louisiana journalists Rosemary James and Philip Moreton called the sixties "a time of vengeful hysteria against the presidency that exceeded almost anything known in American history since the venal attacks made against Lincoln." 32 Bruce Eggler reported that many southern Democratic congressmen tried to remain as separate as possible from the Democratic presidents of the time. 33 Three presidents served the country during the period of this study: Democrat John F. Kennedy, until his death in 1963, Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson, until his decision not to run a second time in 1968, and Republican Richard M. Nixon. The only one of the three who easily carried southern electoral votes was Richard Nixon.

During this time Hale Boggs appeared on the national scene "close to the presidency." As Eggler explained it, "Most of the time, Hale Boggs was not one of those who acted as if Truman, Kennedy, and

31 Weeks, p. 236.
33 Eggler, p. 6.
Johnson were the names of the opposition rather than his own party's leaders.\textsuperscript{34} This was a relationship which many political observers claimed a southern Democrat congressman—even one from a metropolitan district—could not maintain at a very visible level if he wanted to be re-elected.

Boggs was frequently accused by others from the South of not being a real southerner. Accusations against him of being unpatriotic to the South highlight this era. Paul M. Gaston wrote of a "new burst of sectionalism that made all outsiders suspect."\textsuperscript{35} Many southerners felt that their representatives in Washington were sent there to stand up for the South against the rest of the nation. It was also true that in some ways southerners were excluded from full participation in the political processes of the Democratic party. For example, it was generally accepted that a southerner could not be elected president. A number of political observers have noted that when Lyndon Johnson began to realize presidential ambitions, he carefully and no doubt wisely cultivated the image of a westerner rather than a southerner.\textsuperscript{36} The idea of southern separatism in the 1960's and early seventies seems to be more than a myth, more than self-conscious creation of wounded political pride.

Regional divisions, however, were only one kind of division that plagued the Democratic party. There were the issues of fiscal

\textsuperscript{34} Eggler, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{35} Gaston, p. 32.
conservatism versus social legislation, along with the urban-rural and hawk-dove dichotomies. Journalist Larry L. King wrote that by the convention of 1968 "the Democratic National Committee had been reduced to bones . . . ."37 King called the convention itself "the fratricide of Chicago."38 Historian Herbert S. Parmet wrote of the bitterness of the party activists at this time, and of an intensity that was not only dividing Americans, but "threatening to rip apart the Democratic party."39 For Hale Boggs, a member of the Democratic National Committee, a member of the House Democratic leadership and chairman of the party's controversial platform committee, the decade between 1962 and 1972 represented not only the time of his greatest personal political challenges, but also of the greatest challenges to his political party.

"At no time since the New Deal," wrote Parmet, "had the condition of the party come under closer scrutiny. There were the inevitable questions about parties themselves as meaningful political institutions."40 The conflicts between issues and personalities deepened into conflicts between basic political philosophies. The party activists bickered over rules, procedures and structures as well as strategies. In 1972 many Americans agreed with Democratic Congressman Wayne Hays that "the Democratic Party is in shambles."41 In December, 1972, a New York Times editorial declared that "Win,

37 King, p. 41.
38 King, p. 41.
39 Parmet, p. 282.
40 Parmet, p. 282.
41 Parmet, p. 296.
lose, or draw, the Democratic party can be counted on to tear itself apart." Of course, the structure of a political party is never as neat and smoothly operative as the structure of business or special interest organizations. There are always rumors that the party in power is falling apart. The years between 1962 and 1972, though, were a particularly difficult time for the Democratic party.

SOUTHERN THEMES AND ISSUES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Although civil rights questions may have dominated the popular press during this period, the issues which created most of the conflict with southerners in the Democratic party were the same issues which had concerned southerners for decades. Racial segregation, states' rights, the rights of small businessmen, and free trade were matters on which southern lawmakers and public officials were forced to focus. The themes of political arguments in the South in the sixties and seventies were echoes of some of the oldest and strongest themes of southern life and southern myth. The myths of the Old South, the maligned South, the Solid South and the Lost Cause, along with an acute consciousness of the past, were reflected in the positions and the policies of the Democratic party from 1962 to 1972.

The southern consciousness of the past is a phenomenon many regional writers have deal with. For example, T. Harry Williams

explained that "More poignantly than other Americans Southerners realize that the past impinging on the present, and more often than their fellows in other sections, they related the present to something in the past." \(^{43}\) C. Vann Woodward insists that "The southerner is profoundly influenced by history." \(^{44}\) This sense of history is closely related to the idea that there is a known way of doing things, and that this way must be maintained. \(^{45}\)

The idea of the Old South is, as Lewis Simpson points out, a natural outgrowth of this concept. Simpson labels the Old South "idealized." \(^{46}\) Williams calls it "one demonstration of the southern talent for Fantasy." It may have been this legend or myth which to some degree enabled southern Democrats to cling to a passing era and to reject ideas whose times had clearly come. It has been suggested that "all of this indicates a tendency to lose reality, to live in a Never-never land." \(^{47}\)


\(^{45}\) Woodward, p. 12.


\(^{47}\) Williams, p. 16.
Part of this never-never land is the political myth of the Solid South. V.O. Key dealt with the myth—insisting that it was a myth and not functional reality—in the 1949 edition of Southern Politics in State and Nation. Throughout the sixties, however, journalism referred to a "Southern block" and to a "Southern-Republican coalition" in Congress. It is possible that this grew out of the reality that southern Democrats tended to control congressional committee chairmanships and other powerful positions. Perhaps Time's 1976 report explains the situation: "Since politicians from the Deep South long had no chance of rising to the presidency, they concentrated on holding power through the Congress. Elect'em young and keep'em there was the credo—and for most of this century, Southern House and Senate committee chairmen, who attained their positions through seniority were effective . . . ."49

Undoubtedly the political myth of the Sold South is somehow related to other myths—the maligned South and the Lost Cause. Time staff writer Paul Gray reminds readers that there is a most important southern story, "the one everybody knew by heart: the brave defeat in defense of an ignoble cause."50 C. Vann Woodward writes that the political history of the South "includes large components of frustration, failure and defeat. It includes not only an overwhelming military defeat but long decades of defeat in the provinces of

48 V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Peter Smith, 1949).
economic, social and political life." In 1976 Mississippi Congressman David Bowen spoke of southern feelings of apprehension and persecution in the Democratic party. He claimed, "We southerners feel we've been discriminated against, just as the blacks were discriminated against." For the southerner it was not true, as it was for other Americans, that anything could be accomplished, that any force could be stopped, that God was on the side of the winner. For the southerner, defeat and persecution were real and looming possibilities.

Based on the materials dealt with in this chapter, it seems that during the period of this study southerners in the Democratic party were keenly aware of their political actions as historical actions. As southerners, they were to some degree bound to the past, or at least imbued with a strong sense of the past, and change was not something to be taken lightly. They were aware of their power, both as the overwhelmingly dominant party in their region, and as the largest and most powerful regional block in the House of Representatives. They were, however, equally aware of the possibility of defeat, failure and persecution.

51 Woodward, p. 19.
52 Time, 27 September 1976, p. 45.
Chapter III
HALE BOGGS' LIFE AND CAREER

Hale Boggs never left the deep South until he went to Washington, D.C., as member of the House of Representatives at age twenty-six.\(^1\) He was born in Mississippi, schooled for the most part in Louisiana, and raised in a family steeped in the traditions of the South. Just after the Civil War his grandfather built the family home in Long Beach, Mississippi, where Hale was born. Many years later Boggs announced before Congress that his great uncle had "surrendered at Appomattox," and that his grandfather "served on the staff of General Robert E. Lee throughout the bloody War Between the States."\(^2\)

On February 15, 1914, Boggs was born in Long Beach to William Robertson Boggs and Claire Josephine Hale, but with his family moved to Gretna, Louisiana, at an early age--seven according to most sources, five according to Boggs himself. In 1924 the family began living in Metairie, Louisiana. At some point they returned to Mississippi where Boggs graduated from Long Beach High School in 1931, though he claimed later to have spent every year of his life in Louisiana since he was five. In 1931 Boggs entered Tulane University, intent

\(^1\) Personal interview with Lindy Boggs, New Orleans, La., August 1976.

\(^2\) Congressional Record, 9 July 1965, p. 16221.
on studying law. Years later he said, "When I was fourteen years old I was reading Blackstone, a book I borrowed. What do you propose to do they asked. I propose to be a lawyer and a member of Congress, I said. I entered Tulane University with a scholarship and thirty-five dollars."³

At Tulane, Boggs participated actively in campus life and in journalism. He was campus correspondent for the New Orleans States in his junior year and worked on the States' copy desk one summer. During the 1934-35 academic year he was editor of Hullabaloo, the Tulane student newspaper. His first recognition for his speaking ability was the award of Tulane's Carnot Medal in 1931 for a public debate on French politics. While at Tulane, Boggs became a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa (leadership), and Beta Theta Pi (social).

In 1935, after earning a B.A., Boggs entered the Tulane Law School, where he was awarded an Ll.B. degree in 1937. Admitted to the bar in 1937, he joined deLesseps Morrison (later the mayor of New Orleans) and Jacob Morrison in a law practice. In 1938 he married a cousin of the Morrisons whom he had met at Tulane, Corrine Morrison (Lindy) Claiborne, from New Roads.⁴

Boggs' first serious involvement in politics came when he joined a small number of young men in New Orleans to form the "People's League," a reform oriented group which included his law partners,

³ James and Moreton, p. 24.
deLesseps (Chep) Morrison and Jacob Morrison, along with James Coleman, James McCain, Bernard D. Mintz, George Tessier, Dave McGuire, Laurence Eustis, Jr. and a handful of others. Its members were too young to be individually powerful. In 1939, however, they administered a powerful blow to the political heirs of Huey P. Long by starting the exposure of corruption in state politics known as the Louisiana Scandals, and by demanding an end to the corruption. Naturally, the group began to participate in campaigns for office. The gubernatorial race of Sam Jones in 1940 was one project. Soon the young members of the People's League became interested in running for office. Boggs' cousin-in-law, Chep Morrison, announced his candidacy for the seat in the House of Representatives from the Second Congressional District. With only days left to file, Morrison withdrew from the race, and Boggs declared his candidacy. He ran against Paul H. Maloney, a ten-year incumbent and beat him (with the help of Jones) by linking him with the Long-Maestri forces which the League had attacked. This was the beginning of Boggs' career in public office, but it only lasted for a two-year term.

In 1942 Maloney was re-elected. Boggs became an attorney for the state Conservation Department and the first executive director of New Orleans' International House. In November of 1943 he enlisted in the Naval Reserve and spent the rest of World War II in Washington.

5 James and Moreton, p. 42.
6 Eggler, p. 3.
In 1946, though, he returned to New Orleans to help Morrison in an upset victory over long-time mayor Joseph Maestri and to get himself re-elected to Congress after an absence of four years. He held the same Second District seat for the next twenty-eight years, until he disappeared in a plane flying over Alaska in October, 1973.  

During that twenty-eight year period Boggs developed a number of complex interests and relationships which helped him to become one of the most powerful men in the country. He may not have been a figure the American public was quick to recognize, but he was the power behind the power—a member of the Democratic leadership of the House for nearly eighteen years. How did this happen? What was the man like who achieved and maintained this kind of position? Boggs' relationships with three groups must be examined in order to answer these questions: (1) his Louisiana constituents, (2) the National Democratic party, and (3) his colleagues in Congress.

Boggs' Relationship With His Louisiana Constituents

Gary Hymel, Boggs' long-time administrative aide, declared that Boggs "was really a big-city regular Democrat." In many ways this seems true. Louisiana's Second Congressional District for twenty years of Boggs' term (until re-apportionment in 1966) included uptown New Orleans, plus all of Jefferson, St. John the Baptist and St. James parishes. Boggs represented New Orleans' Irish Channel, a large uptown Italian population, all of New Orleans' silk-stocking

7 Gary Hymel.
district, the suburban commuters of Jefferson Parish and the French and German country people of rural South Louisiana. The ethnic diversity of Boggs' district was equal to the most complex district in the country.  

Although he started as a reformer, Boggs became part of the established government system in New Orleans after Morrison became mayor in 1946. He was close to the seat of power locally. Until 1964 when young Republican David Treen caught 43% of the vote on Barry Goldwater's coattails, Boggs faced to serious opposition. In 1968, running against Treen for the third time, Boggs felt compelled to throw all the money and energy available to him into a campaign for re-election.

During this time several interesting developments occurred. First, in 1951, Boggs campaigned for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination (actually the general election in then one-party Louisiana). Backed by Morrison, the young Senator Russell Long, and former Governors Jimmie Davis and Sam Jones, Boggs ran third, apparently unable to muster statewide support. He then threw his support to Judge Robert F. Kennon of Webster Parish, who was elected. This election was, however, the last time Boggs became involved with state politics. From this point on he was interested primarily in the United States Congress and the Second Congressional District of Louisiana.

Secondly, Boggs was working in Congress to produce visible results at home. His position in the House Democratic leadership
allowed him to produce more federally-funded projects for his area than most members of Congress could have done. He was always interested in projects which made life better for his constituents: roads, schools, hospitals and housing. While his stands on these issues may have contributed to his liberal reputation (no political asset in conservative Louisiana), they also produced programs voters could see and experience on an individual basis.

Thirdly, Boggs was staying carefully in touch with the mood of his district on the issues of human and civil rights. Boggs' national reputation and his intense personal interest in government seemed focused on questions of trade and economy, but these matters did not make or unmake political leaders in Louisiana. Although Boggs was best known as a moderate and is perhaps best remembered for his progressive civil rights stands in the late 1960's, he was a segregationist for most of his career. In 1956, Boggs signed the "Southern Manifesto," a document initiated by Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond urging all members of the House and Senate to join in the employment of every available legal and parliamentary weapon to prevent school desegregation. He voted against the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960 and 1964, making clear his opposition to Civil Rights legislation. In 1961 he introduced a constitutional amendment to reserve control of the public school systems to the states and bar any interference with them by the federal executive or judiciary.

It is probably true, as reporter Rosemary James suggests, that his voting record is "about as liberal as any deep Southerner could
have and still remain in Congress." 9  It is important, though, not to let Boggs' later bold stands on Civil Rights issues and his liberal record on economic and welfare issues obscure the fact that on this most emotional of southern issues, he did, for the most part, represent the views of his constituents. He was silent in 1960 when Orleans Parish schools experienced the school desegregation crisis. It was not until 1965 that he asked southern congressmen, "Can we say there has been no discrimination? Can we honestly say that from our hearts?" and answered for them, "It is not so." 10 It was not until 1968 that he put his seat on the line by supporting the controversial open housing bill in the House.

Perhaps this reluctance to speak out for desegregation is partially explained by the concept Boggs had of his own southern identity. Colleagues in Congress, former Boggs staff members and personal friends agree that he definitely saw himself as a southerner, representing southern views. Even when he became prominent in the activities of the national Democratic party, he still seemed to maintain a strong regional identification. Boggs believed that he could be both a traditional southern congressman and plan an important role in the national Democratic party at the same time. Political scientists, historians, and other political observers have written much about the peculiar differences between the Democratic party in the South and the Democratic party at the national level. Boggs, however,

9 James and Moreton, p. 42.
10 Congressional Record, 9 July 1965, p. 16221.
managed in some significant ways to overcome these differences.
It is clear that he saw himself as a bridge between southern and
national Democrats. For seventeen years he served as Vice-chairman
of the Democratic National Committee. He spoke often of his pride
in his ability to unite big-city northern Democrats and southern
Democrats.\textsuperscript{11} When former aide Gary Hymel was asked if Boggs intentionally tried to "bridge the gap" between northern and southern Democrats, he replied, "Was it intentional? It was his purpose in life!"\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{BOGGS' RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY}

From 1962 through 1972, Boggs maintained an important status in
the national party, established close ties with presidents who were
not always popular in Louisiana (Kennedy, Johnson), voted with the
national party stand when that point of view was unpopular in his
district, and still was re-elected every two years. An unsigned
article in \textit{New Republic} referred to him as "a Southerner with a
Northern accent." The article continued, "He enjoys compromise and
is practiced at it."\textsuperscript{13}

It is difficult to describe the relationship which Hale Boggs
had with the national Democratic party. It is clear that for most
of his congressional career he was intimately involved with its
operation and its philosophies. With the clear exception of early

\textsuperscript{11} Myer Rashish.
\textsuperscript{12} Gary Hymel
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{New Republic}. 
civil rights bills, the party's stand can be traced to a large extent, issue by issue, in the voting record of Hale Boggs. Not only serving on the party's national committee, he stumped for its candidates for national office, identified himself with the part to colleagues and constituents alike, and even chaired the sensational and controversial platform committee at its 1968 convention.

Some of Boggs' enthusiasm for the national Democratic party probably grew out of his close friendship with House Speaker Sam Rayburn, begun in the 1950's. Some of the enthusiasm may also have sprung from his realization of aspirations to power among party members in the House of Representatives. If he were to be successful as a Democratic spokesman in the House, he would have to establish himself clearly as a non-factional Democrat in the national party.

BOGGS' RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN CONGRESS

It was in the House of Representatives that Hale Boggs worked, flourished, struggled, and rose to power. Boggs' relationship with Congress is the key to understanding the man and his persuasive communication. There are several factors which must be considered in analyzing that relationship: (1) Boggs viewed himself as a compromiser and worked at being one; (2) he was successful in being appointed or elected to important committees and worked faithfully at committee chores; (3) he cultivated and maintained personal relationships with other Congressmen which paid off politically in the House; and (4) he had personal policies or strategies of a general nature for speeches and debates on the floor.
Boggs was a compromiser within his own party in the House and within the House as a whole. It has already been pointed out that Boggs considered achieving unity between southerners and other factions to be a major personal goal. The kind of value Boggs placed on overcoming regional obstacles to successful government for all is expressed in his glowing description of his mentor, Sam Rayburn: "This man had not one iota of provincialism about him. He was the most un-parochial man I ever knew. He thought about the United States as one great, vast Nation." 14

Fifteen years later his associate Myer Rashish said of Boggs: "There was nothing parochial about him. He felt that we were all Americans, in this together." 15 The same spirit was expressed in a 1970 speech concerning an amendment to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. Boggs said: "This is not a liberal amendment. It is not a conservative amendment. It is not a Republican amendment. It is not a Democratic amendment. It is an amendment for the House of Representatives." 16 Boggs considered himself a southerner, a Democrat, a moderate, a man who could be labeled, but who would not permit himself to be limited by his labels. Nor did he think about other members of Congress as people who should allow themselves to be so limited. Essentially, this kind of attitude was at the core of Boggs' view of himself as a compromiser in the House of Representatives.

14 Congressional Record, 18 January 1962.
15 Myer Rashish.
16 Congressional Record, 27 July 1970, p. 1510.
This openness to compromise was one element which perhaps made it possible for Boggs to work closely and often effectively with the dramatically diverse points of view present in the House. He made close friends with Democrats of every possible political hue. He counted a number of Republicans among his personal, if not political allies. On the other hand, this spirit of compromise may well have created as many problems as it did advantages. Dixiecrat southerners claimed he was too liberal. Hard-core northern liberals claimed he was too conservative. For most of his career in Congress, Hale Boggs ran the very real risk of being caught in the middle.

Another important factor in understanding Boggs' relationship with his fellow Congressmen was his ability to adapt quickly to the operations of the House--the committees and hearings and informal sessions which are at the core of the American legislative processes. He did not hesitate to enmesh himself in the day-to-day drudgery and attention to details that drafting and passing legislation require. It is no doubt true, as Myer Rashish suggested, that "Hale could never have been a great legislative draftsman like Wilbur Mills, laboring over carefully wording bills for days at a time. He couldn't sit still that long." It is, however, equally true that Hale Boggs did give the long hours to study and analysis which committee success required. His first committee appointment was to the important Banking and Currency Committee. His second position

17 Myer Rashish.
was secured with Sam Rayburn's help when he was elected to the powerful Ways and Means Committee by the Democratic Caucus in 1949.

Boggs spent time acquiring the background necessary to understand the complex and often technical bills he was dealing with. He rapidly became an expert in foreign trade policy and American economic issues. He pored over position papers, expert testimony and similar materials. He traveled abroad to confer with economic leaders in other countries about impending tariff legislation. Staff members insist that Boggs could never rely on what some other Congressman told him would be the effect of a bill, but always found out for himself. "He thought of himself as something of a good-old boy," said Rashish, "but he really was very intellectual, very well-informed. I think he probably knew more about some aspects of foreign trade than any man alive."  

These were two of the keys to Boggs' work in committees and other congressional groups--a knowledge of proposed legislation and a willingness to undertake the everyday chores successful legislation requires. Another important key was the role of the Ways and Means Committee as, among other things, the "Committee on Committees." This mean that Boggs had a great deal to say about who would end up where when it came to committee assignments. When Boggs edged out Morris Udall in a tight race for majority leader in 1971, Udall admitted, "He played the freshmen like a virtuoso; he could pass out more goodies than I."  

18 Myer Rashish.
19 King, p. 41.
Of course there was much more involved in Boggs' rise to power in the House than a commitment to compromise and hard work. Boggs was tapped for power by Sam Rayburn shortly after Boggs' second election in 1946. Before long he became known as a Rayburn protege, and in 1955 Rayburn more or less created the position of deputy whip for Boggs. The Democrats in the House had never had a deputy whip before, never heard of deputy whip, and many congressmen agreed that it was just a move by Rayburn to bring his favorite young colleague into the leadership circle. It may well have been. The move clearly put Boggs in line behind majority whip Carl Albert, majority leader John McCormack and Speaker Rayburn to ultimately become Speaker. It was generally acknowledged at this time that Boggs had ambitions to one day become Speaker of the House, and that this appointment was a signal of Rayburn's support of these ambitions. Another result of the move was to officially designate Boggs as a young man who wanted to move up and who had the power behind him to do so.20

His close friendship and association with Sam Rayburn give him an aura of power and importance in the house which Boggs would not have been able to achieve on his own for many years. Several reporters and biographers have called Sam Rayburn the greatest influence on Boggs' life. Boggs himself said that "More than any other Member of Congress he influenced my life. Probably more than any man, except my father."21

Almost from the beginning of his congressional career, Boggs' colleagues

20 Eggler, p. 4.

21 James and Moreton, p. 45.
identified him with Sam Rayburn and with the power Rayburn wielded. When Rayburn died in 1961, and everyone on the leadership ladder moved up a rung (Boggs to majority whip), the consensus was that Boggs had served a long apprenticeship on the inside.  

Rayburn was not Boggs' only close friend in Congress. "Boggs was a very gracious man," reported the top aide of another congressman who served in the House with him for fifteen years, "He treated people on a very personal basis." Myer Rashish said that Boggs bragged about being "close friends with those Irishmen from big northern cities. And he was. He had close friends in Congress. He wasn't like some of his rivals who only had one or two close friends." Throughout most of his career people described Hale Boggs as gregarious. He was famous for his garden parties, to which all Members of Congress and sometimes hundred of others were invited. "He really practiced southern hospitality," a staff member recalled. It was this same kind of graciousness which led him to be dubbed by Capitol Hill secretaries "the most charming Member of Congress." It was probably these same personality traits which made him so effective in the cloakroom. He always seemed to know who he was talking to and something about that individual's personal background and viewpoints.

In many ways, though, the very things which made him friends also made him enemies. "There was something of the smoothie about him,"

22Eggler, p. 4.
24Myer Rashish.
wrote Larry King, a former congressional aide, in 1971, "He dressed like a dandy by the timid House standards . . . he had a high appreciation for good whiskey, and even the best brands sometimes loosen tongues or inhibitions." King wrote appreciatively of Boggs' "sly, tough, intelligent power," and suggested that "if times got hard and he had no other choice, then Hale Boggs might go on the road and very successfully sell lightening rods." In the middle and late 1960's a number of young liberal and reform-minded congressmen who came into office were not attracted to Boggs' smooth salesmanship. Perhaps it was not in keeping with the times. Boggs had something of a playboy image, though he was in reality untouched by scandal, and kept his wife so closely attuned to his congressional business that no one doubted the stability of his family. Still, Boggs did not satisfy the Young Turks of the Democratic Party or the more reserved Republicans in the House. 25

None of these problems were helped by the fact that between 1968 and 1970 friends and adversaries alike thought that Boggs' behavior was sometimes erratic. King wrote that he "became by turns glacial and wildly exuberant." In the summer of 1969 the Wall Street Journal reported that Boggs was bewildering colleagues with his behavior. It was widely rumored in the press and private conversations that Boggs was an alcoholic. 26 After his disappearance, however, it was revealed that Boggs suffered from a manic-depressive condition that

25 King, p. 42.
26 King, p. 42.
was fairly well controlled with medication. "But Hale would
decline he didn't need to take it, that he could handle it," a close
associate reported, "and that was when he would do something out
character."27 Most of his associates felt that he had triumphed
over these problems by the summer of 1971, and that he was no longer
troubled by them at the time of his disappearance. A staff member
recalls, however, "Everytime I heard someone say he was an alcoholic,
I breathed easy. That was something people could kind of accept."28

Despite this problem, though, Boggs was sustained personally and
politically by a large number of friendly relationships with other
members of the House. He was good at trading favors and other kinds
of manipulations, sometimes making political use of his friendships.
He was, however, a man who genuinely liked other people and who was
genuinely liked in return.

The fourth factor in understanding Boggs' relationship with
his colleagues in Congress is the central focus of this study--the
role as a speaker on the floor of the House. There are several
matters of a general nature which are helpful in understanding the
specific situations to be examined in the following chapters. These
matters include the kinds of occasions on which Boggs was likely to
speak, the attention he gave to his speeches off the floor (both in
preparation and follow-up), and the type of delivery he was likely
to use.

27 King, p. 42.
28 Gary Hymel.
Occasions for speaking

After his initiation into the House leadership, Boggs was, with the exception of Hubert Humphrey, the chief spokesman for the Democratic Party in Congress. He was certainly the chief spokesman in the House of Representatives. Neither John McCormack nor Carl Albert was as adept at or interested in speech-making and debate as Boggs. Although McCormack was known as a "bruising debater," he seemed to lose interest in speaking after his election as Majority Leader.

There were two types of occasions when Boggs was most likely to speak: when he was introducing a bill and attempting to explain its intent, and when it was time to pull together the issues in a debate on a party-sponsored bill or amendment. These speeches were usually delivered at someone else's request. Gary Hymel claims that Boggs almost never initiated a speech himself. He was careful not to speak too often or too trivially. "He didn't want to waste himself," staff members and friends have said, all choosing the same expression to describe Boggs' careful timing. "He usually waited for a dramatic moment," Hymel recalls, and adds that "He only spoke when there was a full House." Because Boggs usually spoke at the request of a committee chairman or the Democratic leadership, and because most members of the House were in attendance, his speeches were often significant events.

29 Time, 19 January 1962, pp. 16-17.
30 Gary Hymel.
31 Gary Hymel.
Boggs' speeches were important because of their timing, and because of his personal power, but there was also much more behind their significance. Boggs only talked about subjects on which he was well informed. Much of his speaking centered on explaining either the roots, intent or practical effects of proposed legislation. Another aspect of his speeches which made them important was that the speaker gave his listeners a guide to exactly what point of view the leadership held regarding the issue at hand.

**Preparation and follow-up of the speeches**

Boggs did much of his own speech preparation. He was likely to use a carefully written-out speech for non-Congressional, formal occasions, but most of his speeches on the floor and on informal non-Congressional occasions were what he called "off-the-cuff." Beginning in 1968, Boggs employed Dick Rivers, whom everyone refers to has his "speech writer." Rivers, however, spent more time carrying out press duties and research than actually writing speeches. Rivers' colleagues recall Boggs more than once carrying a manuscript onto the floor and scribbling notes on the back, generally ignoring the carefully worded manuscript when he rose to speak. "Sure, Hale uses my speeches," Rivers is reported to have joked. "He uses them to make notes on about what he's going to say."32 33

---
32 Lindy Boggs.
33 Gary Hymel.
Several colleagues share Myer Rashish's impression of Boggs' House speeches. "He was always pulling out papers and notes and things, but not usually one carefully written manuscript." 34 Frequently, Boggs did not really plan exactly what to say until he heard what the speakers before him said. After all, legislative debate is debate, he insisted, and not just a series of position papers. The picture of Boggs listening carefully to speakers and scribbling furiously on some scrap paper still stands out strongly in the minds of those who worked with him. Then he would stand up and speak from those notes, often sounding carefully polished. Speculation by political observers is that Boggs was so well prepared by his knowledge of the issue that he was actually quite carefully prepared to speak, though he had not consciously chosen exact words. This congressional eloquence has often been contrasted with his forgettable "stump" speeches in Louisiana. 35

The day a speech was delivered in the House, proofs of the text for the Congressional Record would be sent to Boggs' office. It was apparently not Boggs' habit to make extensive changes in these transcripts. Frequently checks and corrections were left to staff members, who were more interested in correcting errors than in making substantive changes. If the office staff was busy with more pressing matters, speeches would sometimes be left unchecked altogether. Although it is possible for a Congressman to turn over a manuscript substantially different from the delivered speech,

34 Myer Rashish.

35 James and Moreton, p. 25.
or to make corrections which change the speech completely, these were uncommon practices in Boggs' office.36

There was also no set procedure for following up a speech. The nature of the occasion and the reaction generally determined whether comments were collected or some effort was made to gauge the response. In many cases Boggs saw his speeches as part of total efforts by sponsors of a particular bill and would not have viewed his speeches as gleaning a separate response. Notes, letters and comments in the press were sometimes placed into files headed with the appropriate bill title or number along with constituent letters and odds and ends of information.37

Delivery of the speeches

No single type of delivery fully characterized Boggs' speaking. His speeches on the floor of the House ranged from long, technical explanations to brief, emotional exhortations, and his delivery style stretched along as broad a continuum as did the speeches themselves.38

"He could be very quiet and deliberate, or he could give 'em hell," reported Gary Hymel. "His delivery style was totally dependent on the situation."39

Another frequent comment about Boggs' speech delivery is that he had a powerful voice. "He had a lot of lung power," Myer Rashish recalled. "You know, he had that booming voice," Gary Hymel

36 Gary Hymel
38 Lindy Boggs.
39 Gary Hymel.
remembers. Fellow Congressman Philip Landrum of Georgia spoke of his "booming, articulate voice." Boggs himself was reported to have given up smoking primarily because he thought it had a bad effect on the way he sounded.

As mentioned before, Boggs rarely read a speech, or even made extensive references to a manuscript. He often used notes, but they were usually of the hastily scribbled variety. On many occasions in the House, he spoke with no notes at all.

There is no doubt that Boggs' colleagues viewed him as a spokesman for his party in Congress, that they considered him an accomplished speaker and debater, and that they generally viewed his speeches on the floor of the House as having some significance. After his disappearance, a number of eulogies and commentaries made specific mention of his speaking ability. "I know of no one more gifted as a speaker than Hale," Senator Russell Long said of him. Representative John Smith of Georgia said, "I have heard many people say, and I have on many occasions myself made the statement that Hale Boggs was perhaps the most articulate Member of this House." Jim Wright, who eventually became majority leader, said that "Hale was one of the most forceful and effective debaters I have ever heard."

40 Myer Rashish.

41 Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses.

42 Lindy Boggs.

43 Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses.

44 Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses.

45 Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses.
Because he worked at compromise, worked at the day-to-day tasks necessary to successful legislation, maintained genuine personal relationships with fellow congressmen, and was generally considered a successful speaker for his party in the House, Boggs maintained a position of power and influence among his colleagues. Of course, there were those who were neither influenced nor impressed. Also, there was a period between 1968 and 1971 when his relationship with his colleagues was disturbed by his manic-depressive condition to a small extent. This was not enough, however, to prevent his election as majority leader in 1971.

Carl Albert, later Speaker of the House, said in 1973 that Boggs "had a feel for the house, he had insight into the legislative problems of this Nation that few men have had. He... was very articulate, very knowledgeable, very skillful in debate. But he also had an understanding of the problems of this generation." Russell Long asserted that "Hale loved the House of Representatives. For him it was the fundamental institution of American Government. This Chamber and this well he regarded as the town hall of our Nation".

This attitude, perhaps, is at the heart of understanding Boggs' relationships with his constituents, his national party and his colleagues in the House. He did not short-change his Louisiana constituents or his party, but it was the House of Representatives to which he gave his most devoted attention. It was here that he worked hardest at reconciliation and compromise. It was in the House that

46 Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses.
47 Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses.
his personal power rooted and flowered. When he spoke to members of the House--whether in the cloakroom or on the floor--Boggs was doing what he did best and care about most.
Chapter IV
THREE SPEECHES DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

During the year and a half dealt with in this chapter, Boggs was involved in his first term as an officially elected member of the House Democratic leadership. For the first time, failure by Democrats to achieve unity in the House or to join together in support of administrative proposals was likely to be viewed as failure by Boggs himself. His need to fill the role of reconciliator and compromiser was more publicly exposed than before.

This was a time, however, during which the majority Democrats were split along sectional lines in such a way that they rarely formed a true majority in legislative voting. Each of the three speeches considered in this chapter deals with that split in a different kind of way. The first speech, Boggs' eulogy to Sam Rayburn, is an appeal for anti-sectionalism and anti-factionalism in general. It attempts to lay the groundwork for future pleas to Representatives to view the nation as a whole. The second speech, which introduced eight hours of debate on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, tried to unite southern Democrats in general. The third speech, an appeal for solidarity in Congress in viewing the presidential policies, aimed at minimizing the effects of factionalism and sectionalism in the Democratic majority in Congress. Although none of the three speeches is entirely
a speech of reconciliation and/or compromise, the three together illustrate some of the ways in which Boggs functioned as a reconciliator and compromiser in the speeches he delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives.

EULOGY TO SAM RAYBURN--JANUARY 18, 1962

The situation

When Sam Rayburn died on November 16, 1961, at age 79, he had been a member of the House of Representatives for nearly 49 years and a Speaker of the House for 17 of those years. During those 17 years he was certainly the most powerful member of Congress, and many believe he was the second most powerful man in the country, out-ranked only by the president. He had hand picked a few Democrats to join him in the party's congressional leadership--most notably John McCormack of Massachusetts, Carl Albert of Oklahoma, and Hale Boggs of Louisiana.¹

The first time the House convened after Rayburn's death was when the Second Session of the 87th Congress opened on January 10, 1962. One week later, a day was scheduled for eulogies to Sam Rayburn. Boggs delivered his speech sometime between one and three in the afternoon on that day, Thursday, January 18. It is useful to examine reactions to Rayburn's death in Congress and the press, the political situation in Congress at the time, and the specific procedural events leading up to the speech.

The January 19 issue of *Time* reported that "the House had rarely given a Speaker such wholehearted trust and respect" as it gave to Rayburn.² *Newsweek* reported in its January 15, 1962, issue that "Sam Rayburn was revered among the professional politicians"³ and that he was able to run things almost single handed."⁴ His death created a stir in Congress for two reasons. First, he was genuinely loved and respected by most members. He had been so much a part of the House for so long that things didn't seem right without him. "The House was haunted," claimed a *Time* staff writer on the first day of the new session, and a number of congressmen echoed that observation.⁵

Second, it was obvious that some things were going to change in the House of Representatives. Experts knew before the congressional session opened that John McCormack would be elected Speaker. They also knew that John McCormack could not or would not hold onto all of Rayburn's power intact, and that much of it was likely to be dispersed among committee chairmen and other members of the Democratic leadership. There was speculation that because so many committees were chaired by entrenched southern Democrats, Congress might take a sectional turn, allowing conservative tendencies to flourish. Although this was a "second session" (not an election year) House, it was still a time of transition and some degree of uncertainty.⁶

---

⁵ *Time*, 19 January 1962, p. 28.
⁶ Boggs Files, National Archives (uncatalogued).
Congressional politics in the House gained an importance not evident since the Democrats gained control in 1955. McCormack was easily elected Speaker, but there was talk that he was too liberal for the conservatives and too conservative for the liberals. Carl Albert was unopposed in the Democratic Caucus for the post of majority leader, but only after Missouri's Richard Bolling withdrew bitterly, not even offering the usual words of conciliation and plea for unity. Boggs was appointed Democratic whip by Albert at McCormack's request. Everyone simply stepped up one rung on the ladder. They were all graduates of what Albert called "The Sam Rayburn School of Political Science." To a large extent they were the House establishment.

As the majority leadership's role required them to be, they were also close to the administration. The theoretical responsibility of the leadership was to act as liaison between the president and the Congress. It was a two-way street. The president was told the mood of Congress--what the body would bear. Congress, on the other hand, was often pressured to support the administration's legislative program. The consensus was that the Kennedy program would meet with difficulty in the House this session. Although Democrats ostensibly out-numbered Republicans 263 to 174, a conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats made the prospects of passage of any moderate or liberal legislation doubtful. Time suggested that "the Administration must scratch and claw to put together a

7 Boggs Files.
winning margin."\textsuperscript{8} Again, there was the prospect of division along sectional lines.

A great deal of attention was given to the new leadership and the 87th Congress in the press. The new speaker, John McCormack, appeared on the covers of \textit{Time} and \textit{Newsweek} the third week in January. \textit{Time} included an article in the January 19 issue on "Strong Speakers" in the House in American history.\textsuperscript{9} The television networks all gave McCormack special attention on January 10, the day he was sworn in.

This survey of the situation reveals several factors which seem important. First, the House of Representatives had a new and unpredictable leadership. Second, there was a potential for sectional division on a number of issues. Third, the absence of Rayburn's influence for compromise or reconciliation meant the loss of a powerful mediating force.

Proceedings in the House

An examination of the proceedings in the House from January 10 until January 18, the day of the speech, indicates that Rayburn was being constantly thought of there, too. The House met at noon on the tenth, according to the Clerk of the House, for the purpose of electing a Speaker. Only a handful of Representatives were absent. McCormack reminded the House that "Mr. Speaker Rayburn was not only a

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Time}, 19 January 1962, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Time}, 19 January 1962, p. 27.
great man, but a good man," words that Boggs would later use in his own tribute to Rayburn. After the chaplain offered the opening prayer that day, the House stood for one minute of silent prayer in memory of the late Speaker Rayburn, a gesture not accorded every deceased Congressman.

Texas Representative Earl Patman asked for unanimous consent that on Thursday, January 18, after the day's business, "I be permitted to address the House and to yield time to other Members for the purpose of eulogizing our late beloved Speaker, the Hon. Sam Rayburn." This kind of request is standard, but the week's notice to the entire House marked the proposal as different from many others. Resolutions expressing sorrow on the death of several congressmen was passed. Rayburn's death was one of these. The resolution on Rayburn seemed much longer and more elaborate than the others.

On Thursday, January 11, President Kennedy presented the State of the Union Message to a joint session of Congress. The specific nature of his legislative program became clearer. The House adjourned until Tuesday, January 16, at which time a few odds and ends of business were taken care of. A number of people were eulogized, including former congressmen Louis Charles Rabaut, Own Brewster, John J. Riley and a Congressman's wife, Mrs. William K. Van Pelt.

Members of the House did not assemble again until noon on Thursday, January 18, the day scheduled for tributes to Rayburn.

10 Congressional Record, 10 January 1962.
11 Congressional Record, 10 January 1962.
Three hundred thirty-eight members were present. The principal business of the day was the presentation and explanation of the President's budget message. About one o'clock Representative Patman was granted the floor, with permission to yield to other speakers. Informal protocol required that members of both the majority and minority leadership speak and that they speak in a particular order. Other representatives could then speak if they desired. It was also common at this kind of occasion to speak only a few words and then extend one's remarks or have included written material in the Congressional Record, and a number of people did so on this occasion. All members of the leadership, though, did speak. Several, including Boggs, apparently did not extend their remarks to include material other than their delivered or written speeches.

After Patman's initial eulogy, Boggs was the seventh speaker to whom the floor was yielded. It was still early in the afternoon's series of memorial addresses. McCormack, Albert, Martin, Vinson, Walter nad Kierwan had preceded him. Usually, eulogies are offered to an almost empty House or as a brief addendum to the day's business. Tayburn's death was not just the passing of another congressman. Almost everyone everyone in the House had been his friend in some sense. Also, the common knowledge that Hale Boggs had been a special kind of friend to Rayburn must have affected the attention that was given to his speech.

The nature of the audience

Members of the immediate audience were probably there for three reasons: (1) to hear the president's budget message presented and explained; (2) to show respect to the late Speaker Rayburn; and
(3) because it was early enough in the session that absences had not become routine. There was not much excitement or anticipation of surprises in an afternoon of eulogies. Some people probably were interested in listening for indicators of new policies or attitudes from the new leadership, but this was a secondary interest. It is unlikely that anyone other than an intimate friend or two came to hear Boggs' speech in particular.

It is also likely that Boggs was too well aware of the fact that what he said would be recorded for history to ignore the existence of a secondary audience. There is no indication, however, that this was a large concern of his at the time. For the most part, he seemed to be speaking to his fellow members of Congress.

The nature of the speech

The speaker's purpose

Essentially, Boggs' speech was ceremonial. It appears that he delivered the speech primarily because he was a member of the House leadership and protocol demanded that he speak on the occasion. He joined all other members of the House majority and minority leaderships, each man rising to speak in order of his rank. Many representatives inserted written tributes into the Congressional Record, but each member of the leadership stood and paid oral tribute. It seems likely that even if Boggs had not been named Whip, his closeness to Rayburn would have compelled him to speak. However, the fact that the entire leadership spoke on this occasion indicates that Boggs did not have to make that kind of personal decision.
Boggs made clear his express purpose in the speech after a brief introduction. "... I, too, would like to add just a few more sentences about what made this extraordinary American leader what he was." It is this specific purpose which paved the way for Boggs to make the tribute to Rayburn also a tribute to sectional and factional unity. An examination of the themes, supporting material, and strategies of the speech reveals how Boggs approached this dual purpose.

Although the speech was clearly a ceremonial speech intended to eulogize Sam Rayburn, the idea of anti-sectionalism was extremely important. Boggs was apparently suggesting to his audience that sectionalism was an evil which virtuous men avoid. At this point he was not concerned with specific issues, but with the history and the prospect of division in general. Even in a speech of this type, Boggs managed to include references to the Civil War.

Since the speech itself did not deal with specific political issues, Boggs may have been laying the groundwork of future pleas to fellow representatives to consider that nation as a whole rather than their own sectional interests. As indicated earlier, sectional divisions were predicted by the press, and were considered the greatest threat to passage of Kennedy's legislative program. It appears in this speech that Boggs was objecting to sectionalism in principle, hoping to link himself with the concept of reconciliation and paving the way for anticipated appeals.

Organization

This speech was clearly divided into an introduction, a body and a conclusion. Boggs used the introduction to relate to the audience's
common experience of gathering to honor Rayburn the summer before when he had served twice as long as Speaker as had any of his predecessors. He also made references to the eulogies that just been presented. Perhaps the most important use of the introduction, though, was to present his statement of specific purpose: "to add just a few more sentences about what made this extraordinary American leader what he was."

The body of the speech was arranged in terms of qualities which Boggs attributed to Rayburn. Basically, it was a topical form of arrangement on which the primary divisions were judgment, compassion, lack of parochialism, anti-sectionalism, understanding of the speakership and faith. In each case, Boggs would assert that Rayburn possessed the particular quality and then either offer examples of the quality in Rayburn's life or re-word generalizations which seem meant to explain that quality.

The conclusion of the speech consisted mostly of an attempt to picture Rayburn on the last trip of his life, sitting in a fishing boat in a Tennessee lake reminiscing about his childhood. Neither here, nor anywhere else in the speech, did Boggs make use of summaries, lists, reviews or other similar devices.

Emergence of themes

These themes emerge as the most crucial of the speech. The first is national unity versus sectionalism. Second is the bridging of the gap between ideologies, time, and individuals. The third theme is the role of the Speaker as an institution. Throughout the speech Boggs emphasized Rayburn's role in pulling together a House and a nation splintered into sectional fragments. He made several
statements about Rayburn's anti-sectional position. "Sectionalism was something completely foreign to his nature. He thought about the U.S. as one great, vast Nation. He was the most un-parochial man I knew."

Boggs did not let his audience forget that Rayburn was a southerner who saw beyond the clear sectional division of the House in 1962.

The second themes almost includes the first. Boggs asserted that Rayburn was a man who bridged gaps. One gap, of course, was that between southerners and other sectional groups. Another was the gap in time between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Boggs said, "He lived to bridge the time from the horse and buggy to the jet planes and intercontinental missiles . . . ." The principal function of the Speaker was also defined as bridging the gap between the president and the Congress in translating the mood of the nation. Boggs made it clear that he saw Rayburn as compromiser and reconciliator, though he did not limit his vision to sectional issues.

A third theme which runs throughout the speech is an interest in the role of the Speaker of the House as an institution. In his introduction, Boggs compared Rayburn to Balfour, Churchill, and Gladstone. Later in the speech he traced the history of the Speakership. "It comes from the ancient parliamentary practices and early parliamentary system of Great Britain," Boggs said. Repeatedly Boggs emphasized the historic and powerful role of the Speaker.

The mergence of these themes reveals an important persuasive strategy which Boggs employed in an attempt to influence attitudes toward himself and toward his personal goals for sectional and factional reconciliation and compromise. In Chapter III it was pointed out that Boggs viewed himself as a man able to reconcile
southern Democrats with national Democrats and other sectional groups. This was not merely a role identified by political observers, but a role he actively sought. He attempted to place Rayburn in a similar role. He also emphasized the fact that Rayburn was a southerner, a native of Tennessee and Representative from Texas. By emphasizing Rayburn's understanding of the Speaker's role, Boggs may have been attempting to exhibit his own understanding of the position.

Essentially, after Boggs proposed to discuss the qualities that made Rayburn an extraordinary leader, he proceeded to enumerate his own best qualities. The obvious inference is simply that if these are the qualities which made Rayburn extraordinary, then another man who possesses them is likely to be extraordinary, too.

Boggs, however, did not leave everything to inference. When Boggs praised Rayburn's good judgement in encouraging Lyndon Johnson to run for vice-president, he made it clear that Rayburn had acted on Boggs' personal advice. He also linked himself directly with Rayburn by pointing out the times they spent together: when Rayburn was honored at a testimonial luncheon in Sherman, Texas, when he was talking to school children in his office and when Rayburn was fishing back home in Tennessee. Without actually saying so, Boggs seemed to be trying to keep his close relationship with Sam Rayburn in the minds of the audience.

Supporting material

In this speech Boggs tried to show that Rayburn was an extraordinary leader because he possessed certain qualities, including a disdain for sectionalism, an ability to reconcile
divided groups, people or forces, and an understanding of the institution of the Speakership. In supporting these ideas Boggs made use of examples, comparisons, restatement, emotional appeals, and ethical appeals.

Example. For each quality that Boggs wished the audience to believe Rayburn possessed, he presented a specific example of Rayburn exhibiting that quality. Rayburn's good judgment was verified by the example of his advising Lyndon Johnson to run for vice-president on the Kennedy ticket. His un-parochial nature was exemplified by his compassionate refusal to push a Member of Congress beyond a position that member could live with. As an example of Rayburn's disdain for sectionalism, Boggs quoted Rayburn's words in reaction to a proposal to re-enact the Civil War on the 100th anniversary of that struggle: "Lord, can't we forget this mistake into which we were led one hundred years ago rather than rekindle and revive the sectionalism and hatred which went with it?

Comparison. Boggs employed comparison throughout the speech, mainly to establish the idea that Rayburn personified the institution of the Speakership. The speaker compared Rayburn to several British statesmen, including those listed specifically in the introduction and a more general comparison at other points in the speech. Boggs also reminded the audience that Rayburn associated with presidents, monarchs and heads of state. He compared Rayburn's concern for the House to human concern for other important things. In an apparent attempt to make such a comparison he quoted Rayburn as saying, "The House of Representatives has been my life, my love, and my romance." Early in the speech he compared Rayburn's role as
Speaker to being a spokesman for the nation as a whole. Comparison, both implied and explicit, played an important role in supporting the dominant themes of the speech.

Restatement. Boggs also supported his ideas by using restatement as a means of amplification. For example, the following four sentences were used to support the idea that Rayburn opposed sectionalism: (1) "Yet this man had not one iota of provincialism about him." (2) "He was the most un-parochial man I ever knew." (3) "He thought about the United States as one great, vast nation." (4) Sectionalism was something totally foreign to his nature." These statements appeared at different points in the speech, although they all express essentially the same idea.

Another example of Boggs’ use of restatement is in his explanation of the function of congressional leadership. Among statements he used in explaining this function were: (1) "Mr. Rayburn knew how to articulate representative government." (2) "... the Speaker was literally the representative speaker, man who spoke for the representatives of the people." (3) "The function of leadership ... is to translate the mood of the House which we know reflects the mood of the Nation. Speaker Rayburn had almost a second sense about this. ... ."

Emotional Appeals. Although the supporting material in this speech consisted largely of the logical proofs listed above, emotional appeals played a role in supporting the central themes. Boggs made use of appeals to the motives of patriotism and brotherhood, shaping the appeals not only through the ideas expressed, but through the use of specific language.
Appeals to patriotism were evident in Boggs' frequent references to "the Nation" and to "the United States of America." In praising Rayburn for his "faith in the future of the United States" and for his acting "in the interest of the United States of America," Boggs implied that agreement with Rayburn's philosophies and perhaps future agreement with Boggs' philosophies, was an indication of patriotism. Boggs even inserted a reminder of his own patriotism. "...we enjoy today more freedom, we have greater prosperity, greater abundance, than at any time in the recorded history of mankind and in all the history of all the peoples of mankind." When Boggs used the example of Rayburn talking with school children in his office, he spoke of watching him take the time "to quietly kindle in them love of country, love of our institutions."

The appeals to brotherhood centered on Boggs' references to the House as a body and to common experience shared in the House of Representatives. Boggs asserted that those who loved Sam Rayburn "included every Member of this body." He referred to several occasions when members of the House came together for one purpose or another, and indicated that these were occasions which bound them together as representatives of the American people as a whole. He spoke of the "mood of the House which we know reflects the mood of the Nation." Inclusive language was a part of this appeal. Boggs referred to "our body" a number of times during the speech. It is not difficult to infer that these references to a common activity and common purposes lead easily to an attitude which precludes absolute divisions along sectional or partisan lines.
Ethical appeals. Boggs' strategy of identifying himself with Rayburn which was described under the sub-heading "Emergence of Themes" can best be considered an ethical appeal. He was clearly trying to enhance his own credibility with the audience, both in order to succeed in this speech and in order to succeed in future communications.

By using logical proof in the form of examples, comparison and restatement, along with appeals to emotions and ethical appeals, Boggs sought to support the central theme of this speech.

Use of language

The language of this speech can be understood best in terms of appropriateness, complexity, formality and directness.

Appropriateness. This speech was delivered on a ceremonial occasion. Memorial addresses, as they are called in official congressional descriptions, seem to be partly ritualistic. For example, a member of Congress must always ask for a special order, certain relationships within Congress appear to create an obligation to speak, and speeches on these occasions are marked by a greater solemnity and formality than is characteristic of speeches during the day-to-day business of the House. Stylistic choices also appear to be somewhat dictated by the occasion. In this particular speech the slang and southern colloquial expressions which Boggs liked to use are absent. There are few casual references to individual members of the audience. The emphasis is on the third person references to Sam Rayburn. Another point of note is that, despite the persuasive intent of the speech, Boggs chose language which sounds or reads as language appropriate to a ceremonial occasion.
Formality. In this speech the choice of appropriate language also involves the choice of language which is suitable for both the occasion (from the audience's point of view) and the primary intent of the speech (from the speaker's point of view). Boggs' speech is not ornate or as oratorically pretentious as some of the speeches he delivered on what he considered "high" occasions. In fact, the language of the speech seems more moderate or casual than the language of many of the other speeches delivered by members of the House in the same afternoon. Phrases typical of more everyday language, such as "you know" and "so here" appear in the speech often.

Complexity. The sentence structure of the speech is fairly complex. However, what appear at first reading to be long, complicated sentences are often only a series of short, simple sentences joined by the conjunction "and." Boggs also often used "and" to join phrases. For example, he said of Bayburn's love for the House, "Because of him and because of this understanding and because of this dedication, we are a greater Nation." It is not difficult to locate sentences within the speech in which "and" appears four or more times.

Directness. Direct language can be considered language which is essentially non-metaphorical, relatively un-ambiguous and focused on the speaker's central ideas. This speech lacked directness in several ways. One is simply that Boggs left many of his central ideas unstated, relying on inferences and associations to produce understanding in his audience. He did not always address his ideas or his audience with absolute focus. Perhaps because of the ceremonial nature of the occasion and the persuasive strategies that
Boggs employed, the language of the speech was not as direct as it was in several of the other speeches included in this study.

**Evaluation of the speech**

The techniques which Boggs employed in this speech could be labeled uncomplicated, but rhetorically sound. The most salient characteristic of the speech is its lack of complexity. The only thing which the audience is called upon to induce for itself is that Sam Rayburn's greatness was produced by the same qualities which Hale Boggs possessed. Boggs made his specific purpose clear by stating it outright. The organization of the speech is equally clear. Boggs began each main division of the speech by making an assertion, which he followed with examples, comparisons, restatements and other supporting material. There are no major assertions or implications left unexplained or unsupported. Indeed, the transcript of the speech flows smoothly and coherently from the first sentence to the last.

The speech exhibits no major weaknesses of structure or style. There is also substantial supporting material for each of the dominant themes identified earlier in this chapter. Superficially Boggs' speech differs from those of his colleagues delivered that day mostly in its emphasis on sectional reconciliation and compromise. The personal qualities he attributed to Rayburn, with exception of his lack of patrarchicalism, were the same qualities attributed by other speakers. The examples of Rayburn's activities and experiences were different in content but similar in nature to the examples used by other speakers, a characteristic to be expected of eulogies.
It is possible that the same qualities were cited by speaker after speaker because these were the qualities which Rayburn actually possessed.

Boggs delivered a simple, well-constructed speech which stood apart from other tributes to Rayburn delivered that day primarily in its emphasis on anti-sectionalism. It also seems that Boggs intended the speech to be not only a tribute to Rayburn as a man who viewed the country as a whole and great nation, but an antecedent to future anti-sectional appeals which Boggs would make himself.

SPEECH ON THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT, JUNE 27, 1962

The situation

It had been rumored that Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was created by a Kennedy Task Force on foreign economic policy in order to present a reluctant Congress with a major piece of legislation it could pass. While this rumor no doubt contained the proverbial grain of truth, a close look reveals that several more concrete factors were involved in the development of the Act. The Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, nurtured by Cordell Hull, was scheduled to expire in 1962. This meant, among other things, that the president's power in tariff negotiations would be sharply curtailed. It was a natural time for legislation to re-establish or extend those powers. It was also a time of growing interest in the European Common Market, which United States economic experts had not yet fully identified as friend or foe. Kennedy's advisors felt that extended power for presidential negotiation and a general reciprocal trade (some called it "free"
trade) policy with Europe would give the United States considerable
power in dealing with Common Market countries.

Boggs' involvement with this particular legislation was inevitable. He was bound by his role as Democratic whip to help pilot a good
portion of the administration's program through the House. Foreign
trade was an area he had studied and maintained an interest in, even
outside of his congressional duties. Furthermore, interest in the act
also fell within his official capacities as a member of the House
Committee on Ways and Means and as chairman of the Foreign Trade
Policy Sub-Committee of the Joint Economic Finance Committee
(popularly called the Foreign Economic Policy Committee.

Boggs' interest came early in the life of the legislation. Apparently Kennedy and his advisors were encouraged by Boggs' belief
that the South would go along with "free trade," despite the fact
that free trade had lost its hallowed position in the South with the
rise of the textile industry in the mid-fifties. For at least a
year before the speech occurred, Boggs was actively involved in
laying the groundwork for this bill. In September of 1961 he visited
the Headquarters of the Common Market in Brussels and met with founder
Jean Monnet in Paris. On October 6, 1961, Boggs held a press
conference in which he asserted that the Common Market could "help or
hurt" the United States, and called on the president to "urge bold
new action." A series of "study reports" were authorized by the
sub-committee, and the first was prepared by Christian Herter and
William Clayton in November. Two weeks of hearings were held,
December 4 through 14. By the end of the year it was clear that
Congress would consider a significant trade bill during its next
session, and that the president would give efforts to secure its passage much attention.

Besides Boggs' official involvement in the bill, he was clearly important to its passage because he was a southern Representative. As mentioned before, a coalition of conservative southern Democrats and Republicans were expected to block passage of most of Kennedy's proposed legislation. Free trade, however, was an old southern issue, and an issue on which conservative southerners might be separated from their Republican allies. Boggs was informally designated as a man who perhaps could create the necessary unity between liberal and moderate national Democrats and conservative southern Democrats.¹²

When the new session of Congress opened the second week of January, news reports were full of the administration's legislative program. Most agreed that the Trade Expansion Act would be one of the most important proposals, and one most likely to get a great deal of attention from the president. On January 25, President Kennedy sent a message to the Congress explaining his intentions in pushing for such legislation and urging support.

On January 28, Speaker John McCormack scribbled a note to Boggs and marked it "personal."

Dear Hale:

I think the time is right for some speeches in the House in strong support of the President's recommendations on international trade, showing the reasons for action and what will happen if no action is taken.

May I suggest that you take the lead in this and also get a few other Members to speak.

¹² Myer Rashish.
We should develop a team of Members who will take the floor on various questions.

With kind regards I am

Sincerely,

John

There is not a record that such a team was actually formed or that speeches sprang up the next week because of McCormack's suggestion. The note, however, does seem to confirm Boggs' role as chief spokesman in the House for this legislation.

In New Orleans on Friday morning, February 16, the New Orleans Times Picayune reported that representatives of eight local women's organizations had organized to "study new developments in foreign trade." Chaired by Mrs. Charles A. Crawford, and largely under the auspices of the League of Women Voters, the Committee for International Trade Information operated in Orleans Parish. This "non-partisan" group which sponsored scout projects and library exhibits had a board of advisors made up of representatives from the Dock Board, International House, the International Trade Mart, Chamber of Commerce and the Export Managers' Club—all organizations which favored the President's stand on trade. Boggs was frequently in touch with these constituents.

At the end of March the Editorial Department of the Democratic National Committee circulated "Special Feature Material" labeled "for release April 4." The story was headed "Special Washington Report," subtitled "Majority Whip on New Trade Program," and accompanied by a photograph of Boggs. A number of newspapers throughout the country

13 Boggs Files.

14 Times Picayune, 16 February 1962, Boggs Files.
printed this explanation by Boggs of the President's trade program and why it should be supported. Obviously, support for the Trade Expansion Act was a genuine national Democratic party effort.15

On April 30 Boggs began answering constituent letters favoring the act by writing that "the Committee on Ways and Means has concluded extensive hearings and we are now meeting in executive session to write a bill." He seemed more optimistic about its success than some political observers were.16

During the next week, on May 4, President Kennedy delivered a major address at the dedication of the new wharf in New Orleans. Its subject was the Trade Expansion Act. In the beginning of the speech he flattered Boggs and mentioned that Boggs and the other congressional leaders breakfasted with Kennedy after Tuesday. In the last few minutes of the speech he saluted "men such as . . . your own congressman Hale Boggs, who are preparing for its passage."17 On May 10, Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills extended his remarks in the Congressional Record to praise Hale Boggs for his dedication and his "superb knowledge of the subject at hand."18

At this point several important things were apparent: (1) this bill was getting greater-than-average attention in the press and from congressional leaders; (2) Kennedy was putting his strongest efforts behind this bill; (3) Boggs, perhaps along with Wilbur Mills, was the

---

15 Boggs Files.
16 Boggs Files.
17 Congressional Record, 10 May 1962.
18 Congressional Record, 10 May 1962.
recognized expert on this particular act and on foreign trade in
general.

Proceedings in the House

Two weeks before considering the act, the House defeated Kennedy's
farm bill after a disorderly debate. Almost everyone called it a blow
to the administration and a defeat for the Democratic leadership.
Rumors of inept leadership abounded. *Time* reported that "Albert and
Boggs have yet to prove that they can count noses before the vote
comes." But on June 22, five days before his speech, Boggs wrote to
Morris G. Maher, president of the Export Managers' Club of New Orleans,
that the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 "will be debated, and I am confident,
passed by the House of Representatives."20

That confidence was not shared by everyone. *Time* claimed the bill
"seemed in danger."21 Most news reports indicated that the bill was not
really decided until after the floor debate. On the morning of
Wednesday, June 27, Carl Albert had counted only 201 votes for the act;
219 were needed to pass it.22

The House met at noon and considered a few minor pieces of business.
Three hundred ninety-three Members were present. Richard Bolling called
up House Resolution 712, which could make the debate "closed rule"—
eight hours of debate only, amendments to be offered only by the
committee and a limit of one motion to recommit. Bolling pointed out

20 Boggs Files.
21 *Time*, 5 July 1962, p. 43.
22 *Time*, 5 July 1962, p. 43.
that the 8th and 83rd Congresses had adopted the same rule in debating similar acts. Opposition to "closed rule" was raised by those who opposed the act. Most of these agreed with Representative Dent of Pennsylvania: "Although this is the most serious and by all measurements the most important issue to face this generation of Americans, the rules of the House make it possible for this legislation to be acted upon with the opposition forces practically stifled by the rule granted with makes open debate and free discussion limited by time, the selection of the speakers and the time allotted to each speaker." 23

After about an hour of protest, the "closed rule" was accepted. A couple of conference reports followed and then four hours each were granted to Democrat Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and to Representative Noah Mason, the ranking Republican of the committee. After a few words of introduction, Mills yielded fifty minutes to Hale Boggs. By all reports, an air of tension and solemnity pervaded the House. There was a minimum of milling around and conferring. What was being said was important--more important than usual. 24

The nature of the speech

Boggs' speech fulfills a traditional function in this kind of situation by introducing and explaining legislation. Perhaps a more important purpose, though, was that a genuine effort to win votes.

23 Congressional Record, 27 June 1962.
24 Time, 5 July 1962, p. 43.
Boggs knew at the moment he stood up to speak that there were not enough firmly committed votes to carry the bill. He was also aware that some who would support the act if it actually came to a vote would prefer to recommit the bill for consideration at some later time. Boggs faced the task of persuading his immediate audience that the legislation was good and that they must enact it immediately.

A secondary purpose, explaining the historical perspective and impact for interest Americans in general, was discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. Another secondary purpose, though, was equally important. This speech launched an eight-hour debate, and therefore was not a simple, autonomous speech. One of its purposes was to raise crucial issues and set the tone for the arguments to follow.

The role of the speech in reconciliation and compromise is simple. There was a sectional rift in the House, described earlier, which pitted a coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans against moderate and liberal national Democrats. Although Democrats held a majority of seats in the House, the Democratic administration could not count on a majority vote for its legislative proposals. Boggs' task was clear. He had to convince southern Democrats that the issue transcended the regional split and the Republicans that it transcended partisan lines.

Organization

The speech was divided into two main parts. Each part could be viewed organizationally as a complete speech, with an introduction, body, and conclusion. In the first part of the speech, Boggs developed
the idea that this was "a historic debate" on a subject which has historically been a matter "of national discussion and a matter in some instances of national division." The bulk of this part of the speech is arranged chronologically as a result of American manifestations of success in free enterprise. Boggs concluded this part of the speech with a summary of the current world trade situation, centering on American relationship with the Common Market under existing legislation.

Boggs introduced the second part of the speech with three questions which he combined in a single sentence: "Where does this leave us and why is this legislation necessary and what is the connection between this legislation and what I have been talking about?" These questions led into a simple problem-solution pattern of organization. Boggs presented the problem of standing united with the countries of the Common Market against Russian Communism or facing (and probably losing to) Russian Communism as a disjointed, divided force. As a solution he offered the bill under consideration. The conclusion to this part of the speech, in which Boggs suggested that the Trade Expansion Act offered to come together against Communism, also served as the conclusion to the speech as a whole.

Emergence of themes

Because this speech was extremely long, it is difficult to isolate a few dominant themes. However, there are two themes which seem to emerge as most important. The first is that we must have unity within the United States. The second is that we must have unity within the Common Market. These two ideas are enhanced and developed by
supporting material which sometimes centers around secondary rather than primary themes.

In arguing for unity within the United States, Boggs focused on several main ideas. He argued that there was historical precedent for the bill under consideration. He attempted to dissociate the bill from the issue of free trade and other sectional issues. He also attempted to dissociate the bill from partisan issues. He reminded the audience in the first few minutes of the speech that "It was President Jackson who said the Union would be preserved . . ." and he continued to use the idea of union throughout the speech, both overtly and by inference.

The theme of unity with the Common Market involved more complex relationships between supporting ideas than did the theme of unity within the United States. Most of the main ideas, however, can be identified: Communism is bad; free enterprise is good; the Common Market is our friend against Communism and for free enterprise; unity with the Common Market is not a partisan issue, a sectional issue or a philosophical issue. These sub-themes, however, were not always stated as clearly and un-equivocally as were the sub-themes which related to unity within the United States. Boggs' appeals which supported these sub-themes were sometimes (though not in every case) more subtle or vague than those which supported the first set of sub-themes.

The primary strategy for the speech was to create the impression that this was a bill for everybody, a bill which could not be associated with a regional or partisan point of view, or with the current administration or President. In much of the speech, Boggs showed
awareness of the anti-administration sentiments of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans. An important secondary strategy was to arouse a fear of the results of not passing this legislation.

Supporting material

Boggs attempted to support his ideas in this speech by using examples of historic precedent, statements of authority, statistics and fear appeals.

Examples of historic precedent. Throughout the speech Boggs attempted to minimize the amount of change that adoption of the bill would bring about. He offered a number of examples which apparently were designed to show that nothing unprecedented was being proposed. Portraying the Trade Expansion Act as logical extension of what had worked in the past rather than a radical new idea, Boggs cited acts in 1890 and 1897 which delegated power for negotiations on tariff matters to the president, and claimed that his "fundamentally is what we are asking for here today in this year of our Lord 1962."

In a more complex example, Boggs also referred to the precedent of sectional division over tariff legislation. He spoke of the 1832 Tariff of Abominations and John Calhoun's doctrine of nullification. The most likely explanation for this strategy is that by reminding southern Democrats of the tradition of "free trade" in the South he hoped to persuade reluctant and tradition-bound southerners to justify voting for the 1962 Act, which had been linked with northern liberalism.

Almost in the same breath, though, he sought to dissociate the bill from free trade, offering the example of Cordell Hull and the
Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934. "Mr. Hull said that his program was not free trade—and it was not free trade. And what we are doing here today is also not free trade. It is mutually beneficial trade."

In case some were not convinced, Boggs asserted that "we do have much free trade here in the United States" anyway. As examples he offered products such as bananas, coffee and other tropical products which could only be produced in the United States at great cost, still hinting that this was not what the bill currently under consideration really dealt with.

Another example of historic precedent which Boggs used was the Marshall Plan. He suggested that the success of the Marshall Plan, which was based on avoiding a piecemeal approach to international affairs, was an indication that the Reciprocal Trade Act would enjoy similar success. To some degree, Boggs attempted to draw an analogy between the bill under consideration and the Marshall Plan.

In general, Boggs seemed to be arguing by example of historic precedent that although the United States had outgrown existing tariff legislation, the proposed legislation was only a natural extension of already tried and proven policies.

Statement of authority. Boggs offered a number of statements by authorities on foreign trade or economic policy, both living and dead. He cited Cordell Hull's opinions on reciprocal trade. He cited Eisenhower's opinion, offered in the 1950's, that we must have "an instrument through reciprocity. Herbert Hoover's statement in favor of the bill, made only a few weeks earlier, was mentioned. These statements, however, were not as extensive or as central to the
dominant themes of the speech as were the less specific associations which Boggs made with great men and great causes.

Boggs began his use of authority through association with President Jackson in 1832 and ended with the 1960 presidential candidate, Richard Nixon. Throughout the speech he mentioned over thirty well-known men and organizations that supported the act. He also mentioned a number of deceased statesmen who he implied would have supported the act had they been alive in 1962. Among this group were not only Jackson, but President McKinley (former chairman of the Ways and Means Committee), Cordell Hull and George Marshall. Near the end of the speech Boggs simply listed a number of people who supported the bill: former Secretary of State Christian Herter, former President Eisenhower, former President Hoover, Richard Nixon, former Republican presidential candidate Landon, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the United Steelworkers of America and the American Farm Bureau.

Boggs also managed to associate the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1962 with the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, which he related to the end of the Great Depression. As mentioned above, he associated it with the success of the Marshall Plan after World War II. Perhaps the most important association of all, however, was his association of the act with the struggle against Communism. This association will become more apparent when the use of fear appeals is examined later in this chapter.

Statistics. Boggs made extensive use of statistics in the speech. Most of the statistics were used to indicate the growth and strength of the European Common Market. For example, he indicated
that whereas the United States had about 185 million people with the same training, demands and basic life styles. At another point in the speech he pointed out that the rate of economic growth in Common Market countries in 1961 was approximately 6 percent, three times what it was in the United Kingdom, twice that in the United States.

Boggs also used statistics to show the meaning of the predicted results of the act in terms of dollars and cents. When he spoke of American exports, Boggs said, "Last year, for instance, our total exports were $20 billion. Of that amount almost $1200 million came from our farms and $2800 million came from our factories." Only a few minutes later he stated that "Exports accounted for approximately 30 percent of the tobacco produced in this country, 50 percent of the cotton, the soybeans and the grain." It seems that in almost every case these statistics were used to support the idea that the United States must have some kind of unity with the Common Market. While the use of statistics was not directly related to regional and partisan reconciliation or compromise, it was indirectly related in the sense that Boggs attempted to indicate the urgent need for some kind of common action.

**Fear Appeals.** Throughout the speech Boggs played on two fears which were shared in 1962 by southerners and northerners, Republicans and Democrats alike: the fear of economic disaster and the fear of the spread of Communism. Boggs used appeals to these fears to support both the idea that we must have unity within the United States and the idea that we must have unity with the Common Market. These emotional appeals were also used in such a way that they led to the formation of a circuit (or series) type of reasoning: if we are to
avoid economic disaster and the spread of Communism, we must have
unity with the Common Market, but if we are to have unity with the
Common Market, we must have unity within the United States.

Boggs reminded the audience that the great crash of 1929 was
quite possibly the result of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which
represented the opposite economic policy from the 1962 act. "The
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was was designed to bring about prosperity,
brought the opposite." He continued, "But in place of prosperity, the
downward spiral continued and we had great economic dislocation on the
farms and in the factories and in the cities and elsewhere throughout
this vast Nation of ours."

Appeals to the fear of the spread of Communism were more prevalent
in the speech than those to the fear of economic disaster. Most of
the second part of the speech dealt with this threat. Boggs began by
reminding the audience that after World War II "we looked down the
long, rough road ahead and we saw Communism moving across Europe." In
an even more obvious threat, Boggs reminded thr group that the
rise of the Common Market from a military point of view "means a vast
new military force will arise on earth." In a final plea for
acceptance of the bill, Boggs claimed that the Common Market was the
most effective weapon against Communism available. He insisted that:

\[ \ldots \text{ if you will look at the kind of world we are living in you will see a world which has great opportunities; a world which for the first time sees the Communist empire shaken to its very foundations; a world which sees the people of Communist China rebelling on account of lack of food, a world which sees Russia floundering, being overcome militarily, economically, politically, and ideologically. This bill will let us live in this kind of world, let us work together with people who have been our friends, let us grasp the opportunities} \]
presented, and let us contribute, with our friends, to a stronger world, so that the threat of Communism will not blight you or your children. That is the issue here, Mr. Chairman, and I will hope and believe that the committee bill will pass.

Essentially, Boggs created a logical argument which included the two dominant themes of the speech. He argued that in order to avoid economic disaster and the spread of Communism unity with the Common Market was necessary; but that in order to achieve unity with the Common Market it was necessary to achieve unity within the United States (both sectional and partisan). He supported this argument with examples of historic precedent, with statements of authority, by associating the proposal with great men and causes, by using statistics, and through appeals to two common fears.

Use of language

The language which Boggs used in this speech is best characterized in terms of formality, clarity, complexity and the use of rhetorical questions.

Formality. The word "eloquent" has been used often to describe this speech. There are several elements in this speech which suggest that Boggs considered this a "high" or historic occasion. Not only were slang and colloquialisms absent, but only at one point in the speech, near the end, did Boggs make any reference to preceding speakers or events of the day. Boggs' speeches in the House were typically laced with references to individual Members, references to preceding speeches or procedures, etc. There also were few references to Boggs' own experiences and his own involvement in the development of the bill. The word "I" appears mostly in phrases
such as "I want to say" or "I would like to turn again to . . . ."
In fact, from the beginning through the first eight paragraphs of
the written transcript, the word "I" appears only once, and first
person referents such as "me" or "my" not at all.

Complexity. Although this speech does not include the kind of
casual and rambling language typical of Boggs' style, he made use of
many long and complex sentences. Most were full of "ands" and "buts"
or interjected phrases. For example,

We buttress that principle because for the first
time we wrote that into this bill, and this was
a committee amendment, a clear provision which
calls for the President to move . . .

Boggs' wife recalls that he frequently spent a great deal of time
preparing speeches which included the sort of factual or technical
information included in this speech, and the speech may have been
written out and delivered close to the written manuscript. This would
account for the length and complexity of some of the sentences.

Clarity. Despite its complexity, the language of the speech was
not obscure or difficult to understand. Even the use of elevated
language and occasional embellishment in phrases such as "In this
greatest of all nations . . ." did not interfere with the clarity
of the language. The impression of clarity may in some way be
associated with Boggs' fluent use of words and sentence structure.
"Words always seemed to roll out of his mouth," Myer Rashish recalled
in a discussion about this particular speech.

Rhetorical questions. A frequent stylistic device in the speech
was the use of a series of rhetorical questions. This occurred at
several different points in the speech. For example, Boggs listed products which came into the United States without tariffs and asked "Why?", then offered an explanation. Other questions included: "Who were the great architects of that time?" "What happened?" "What does the market's growth rate mean?" "Where does this leave us?"

**Evaluation of the speech**

From every indication, the speech made a difference in the outcome of a legislative vote. *Newsweek*, *Time*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* credited Boggs' speech with affecting the results of the roll call vote. The figures back them up to some extent. As mentioned earlier, Albert had counted only 201 votes for the bill on the morning of Boggs' speech. The next day the legislation was passed by a vote of 299 to 125. *Time* called the vote "unexpectedly large." 26 The speech probably did contribute to the bill's passage.

There were, however, several intervening factors which should be noted. First, seven hours of debate followed, some of which surely affected voting decisions. Of course, much of this debate consisted of shorter addresses, explanations and questions--including a number of questions to Boggs the following day. Second, political historians have speculated that opposition leader Mason, whose lengthy speech immediately followed Boggs', adopted such an extreme position that he actually won some votes for the bill. 27 Third, Boggs speech

---


27 Myer Rashish.
occurred on Wednesday. The vote did not occur until Thursday. During that time there was a great deal of one-to-one conversation and off-the-floor activity which probably affected some votes.

Still it is probable that Boggs' speech fulfilled its two primary purposes. It was an appropriate introduction and explanation of the bill, and it was successful in leading some Members of the House who had not made up their minds to vote for the bill. Myer Raslsh wrote from the White House in a letter dated July 2, 1962, "Dear Hale: I just want the record to show that I think you did an extraordinarily effective job before the House last week in producing that phenomenal result." Newsweek reported in its October 1 issue that "the story of the finest hour of the 87th Congress hinges upon the vision and determination of Rep. Hale Boggs." On Wednesday, September 26, Terry Flettrich quoted the article as the lead story on New Orleans' WDSU-TV's "Midday Show," giving Boggs an important public congratulation.

Although much of the publicity did not appear until the bill was finally cleared by the Senate in September, during the first few weeks which followed the speech, Boggs' name appeared in every major issue of a news magazine and most major newspapers in the country, always linked with the bill's success. The speech itself was given admiring attention, which is somewhat unusual treatment of a Congressional

28 Boggs Files.

29 Newsweek, 1 October 1961, p. 32.

speech by the national press. Such response indicates that the speech was significant and influential.

It also seems justifiable to claim that Boggs' efforts at reconciliation and compromise were successful to some degree simply because he succeeded in uniting enough members of the separate factions to win passage of the bill. There is no evidence that he was successful in uniting splintered sectional or partisan factions on any issue except those dealt with in this particular speech as a result of this speech. However, Boggs did appear successful in terms of achieving immediate, short-range goals.

SPEECH ON PUBLIC OPINION OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES, MARCH 6, 1963

The situation

In March of 1963, John Fitzgerald Kennedy had been President of the United States for just over two years. During this period of time there had been much discussion and speculation in the press about Kennedy's personal popularity coupled with inability to succeed in having his legislative proposals passed by a Congress with a Democratic majority. The opposition of a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans to Kennedy's program was well known, and was discussed in the preceding divisions of this chapter. The same coalition had existed for years. A Democratic majority in the House did not really mean a Democratic president could expect a majority of members to vote for a Democratic proposal.

The current Democratic leadership in Congress had been operating officially without former Speaker Sam Rayburn for just over a year.
Speaker John McCormack, majority leader Carl Albert, and majority whip Hale Boggs had also been the subjects of scrutiny and speculation. When Kennedy's legislation was not passed they were often charged with ineptness. When administration proposals were passed, they were given much of the credit. It had been a time of challenge and testing for these men.

Apparently two things had happened in the week or two just prior to this speech which made Boggs feel compelled at this time to speak. Senator Myers had been asked by U.S. News and World Report for an interview on a series of questions. He asked the magazine to submit the list of questions and this was done, with an indication that "other magazines asked similar questions of other congressmen. The Senator then inserted the list of questions into the Congressional Record of March 4, 1963. The second thing which happened was that a representative of the U.S. News and World Report called on Boggs. As he explained it in the speech, "I had a gentleman from this magazine come to see me and ask me some of these questions. He did not hand me the questions, however.... I was informed that they had been circulated." There were a number of questions, but four in particular which had upset Boggs. He listed these four in the speech.

1. Why is President Kennedy, as a Democrat, able to exert so little influence over a House and Senate that have majorities heavily Democratic?

2. White House messages and ideas go to Congress and seem to disappear. As far as anyone can see they generate no response out in the country. Why?

3. Has the President failed to get into tune with the mood of the country?

4. Is there a feeling that the President's plans do not command wide support among the voters?
As the discussion of the nature of the speech which follows indicates, Boggs interpreted these questions as being a charge that Democrats in Congress could not get together to pass administrative proposals. The split between southern and national Democrats had apparently resulted in a split between the President and the Congress, or perhaps, as the questions charged, a split between the President and the American people.

Proceedings in the House

On Monday, March 4, Boggs asked for permission to address the House following the legislative program of the day on Wednesday, March 6. He was granted permission to use thirty minutes and also to revise and extend remarks and include extraneous matter. The House did not meet on Tuesday, March 5. The first two hours of Wednesday's meeting were spent on the record of the Committee on Education and Labor. Boggs' speech was the first non-legislative item of the day.

This special request by Boggs for time to speak on a non-legislative topic was unusual. Although "special orders" as they are called, are common in the House, Boggs generally limited himself to speeches on occasions when he was expected or required by tradition to speak or when he was specifically asked by someone else to speak on behalf of particular legislation. The first sentence of Boggs' speech revealed his own awareness of the unusual situation. "Mr. Speaker, I believe this is the first time I have had a special order since I was freshman Member of the House of Representatives. I do so only now, as I see it, to set straight a record which I think should be set straight.
I would not even do that if I were not concerned about some effort being made to distort the record and the impact that this effort could have."

The nature of the audience

This was not a day when major legislation was being considered in the House. Neither is there any indication that Boggs' special order received special attention or interest prior to the delivery of the speech. In general, the audience seems to have assembled in order to carry on its everyday business in an everyday manner. Boggs' speech was incidental to the day's events.

In this case, however, the secondary audience may have been of unusual importance. Discussion of the speaker's purpose and of the emergence of themes in the speech indicates that Boggs was very interested in those who might read the speech and those who might read comments or summaries reported by the press. There is also the possibility that Boggs saw the press itself as an important secondary audience.

The nature of the speech

The speaker's purpose

Earlier in this study it was pointed out that Boggs clearly saw himself as a person able to bring together members of conflicting factions in the Democratic Party. It was also pointed out that Boggs was keenly aware of the role of the House Democratic leadership as a liaison between the President and the Congress. This speech indicates that Boggs felt the questions themselves, as worded and already
entered in the Record, were an attack upon the President and the leadership. Because they indicated factionalism in the Democratic party, and because Boggs viewed himself as an opponent of factionalism, he may also have viewed them as personal attacks or criticism. Boggs suggested that the purpose of the speech was "to set straight a record which I think should be set straight." This statement along with similar statements throughout the speech, indicates that he was perhaps as interested in the secondary audience as in the immediate audience. He appeared to be taking the opportunity to make available arguments and information which he felt defended the President, the House leadership and the Democratic party against the charges implicit in the questions listed.

Organization

This speech includes a lengthy introduction, a randomly arranged body, and what appears to be a carefully stated conclusion. Boggs reminded the audience in the first sentence of his speech that he had not asked for a special order since the first year he served in the House. The two other things which Boggs did in the introduction were to emphasize his respect for the press and to read the four questions which had most upset him.

The body of the speech does not have a clear pattern of arrangement. There are three points at which Boggs attempted to deal with three of the questions he had read, but in each case he wandered away from his stated topic. Apparently he had intended to use a topical form of organization based on the four crucial issues raised by the four reported questions. However, interruptions, interjection
of marginally related ideas and new appraisals of the situation seemed to affect the consistency and clarity of the organization of the body of the speech.

Boggs concluded the speech with reference to the only monument on the Capitol Grounds, honoring former Senator Taft of Ohio, and an explanation of the point he was trying to make by the reference. In a sense this example served as an illustration and as a summary of the problem with which he was trying to deal.

Emergence of themes

Essentially, the problems Boggs was concerned with were Democratic problems, perhaps even problems limited to a large extent to the Democratic leadership. Nevertheless, he made an effort to build a common concern for these problems. This is exemplified in his appeals to non-partisanship and in his attempts to make the problems of which he spoke seem like attacks on the Congress as a whole. In a sense he was saying, "We should all be upset about this."

This is the idea at the heart of the speech. It is not a peripheral argument, or even an argument to support a central idea, but the central thesis of the speech itself. Boggs implied that other Democrats and perhaps even Republicans should join the leadership and regular Democrats in rejecting the charges inherent in the cited questions. The dominant theme in the speech was not that members of the Democratic party or of Congress as a whole should unite, but rather that some form of unity already existed.

Boggs attempted to develop this theme by employing several strategies. First, he construed charges against Democratic members
to be charges against all of Congress. Second, he tried to establish President Kennedy as the clear leader of the Democratic party.

Boggs tried to interpret the implied charges against Democratic congressmen as charges against the Congress as a whole. "In many ways, though, this is an attack on Congress," he claimed. Republican Representative Curtis suggested that since the questionnaire was not widely circulated "Maybe it is just putting a needle through your leadership." At first Boggs responded, "It could be." Mid-way through the speech, though, Boggs countered, "I do not care whether you are a Democrat, a Republican, an independent or whatever you call yourself, what this really is is an attack on Congress itself." Near the end of the speech the same assertion was made: "So in many ways this really constitutes an attack upon the free institution of Congress itself which is the ultimate safeguard of the liberties of the people of the United States of America."

As in many of his speeches, Boggs appealed to a non-partisan view of the congressional function. In the present case, his appeal grew out of the claim that the questions were an attack on all of Congress. But he developed the idea further than that. Observing that "I do not care whether he be Republican or Democrat," Boggs compared every American Congressman with members of parliamentary bodies around the world. Asserting that "I think that in every category we would compare favorably," he also quoted Sam Rayburn's comment about Republican President Eisenhower: "Either he is my leader and the leader of the United States of America or we have no leader . . . ." He reminded the House that when there was a
Republican majority, in the 80th and 83rd Congresses, he "had profound respect for their leadership." In a sense, it was a request for reciprocal respect.

Boggs dealt more directly with the issue of Democratic factionalism in his efforts to establish Kennedy as the clear leader of the Democratic party. The following section on supporting material includes examples of how Boggs used specific instances in this effort. He developed this strategy with a line of reasoning which focused on the idea that if Kennedy were not the leader of the Democratic party and of Democrats in the public at large, Democrats would not have added seats to their majority in Congress during an off-year election. He also made an effort to show how Democrats had united to support a number of Kennedy's stands.

Primarily though, the development of these strategies was intended to counter the charges Boggs felt were inherent in the questions asked him by the reporter. For the most part, these strategies were aimed at establishing the idea that the charges extended to all Democrats, regular and southern conservative alike, and perhaps even beyond Democrats to all members of Congress.

Supporting material

The main idea of the speech was supported by the use of specific instance, definition, and several emotional appeals.

Specific Instance. Specific instances formed the bulk of supporting material used in the speech. They were used principally to establish the idea that Kennedy was the leader of the Democratic party. Throughout the speech Boggs cited instance after instance
showing support for Kennedy. For example, Boggs attempted to counter charges that the President's messages "disappeared" by arguing that, "there was a state of the Union message on on January 14. No one will take exception to a state of the Union message by the President of the United States. Then on the 17th of January there was the budget message. If anyone says that it has disappeared, then obviously no one is watching television programs or reading editorials in the press or listening to witnesses before the Ways and Means Committee or before the Appropriations Committee." Boggs also cited the President's economic report, messages on mental health, juvenile delinquency, taxes and domestic self-help programs.

Specific instances of Democratic legislation which had been passed by the 87th Congress were also used to support the idea that Kennedy was the leader of the Democratic party. At one point or another, Boggs cited approval of defense build-up, the Peace Corps, the drug bill, space program, housing programs, public work programs, and a number of other specific areas of legislation. Apparently Boggs not only tried to provide verifying instances but to provide them in large enough quantities to firmly establish his ideas.

Definitions. Boggs emphasized two definitions throughout the speech. He attempted to define the role of the President as leader of the party and also to define the function of Congress. The first definition was used to support Boggs' claim that charges against Democrats in Congress and against the President were really charges against the Congress as a whole. It centered around development of a single statement: "It is the duty of the executive branch of Government to give direction and to execute and administer the laws
enacted by Congress. The executive branch must carry out the foreign policy of the United States and perform all the other duties that are enunciated in the Constitution and in the statutes passed by Congress."

At several points during the speech Boggs expanded this idea by suggesting particular boundaries and limitations on presidential responsibilities. He narrowed the initial statement to focus on partisan leadership in legislation, though he insisted with some contradiction that failure to pass partisan legislation perhaps represented failure of the Congress as a whole.

Boggs attempted to create party unity through establishing Kennedy as the leader of the whole body of Democrats in Congress. This attempt is fairly clear in his effort to define the President's leadership role as a role involving human or subjective judgment. Near the end of the speech Boggs asserted that "the President of the United States cannot be right about everything; but, on the contrary, he cannot be wrong about everything either." It is not difficult to interpret this kind of defense of the President's role as a call for party unity. The underlying inference which Boggs offered in his explanations of the President's role was that the "mood of the people"—certainly the mood of the Democratic people—was not one of a hundred percent solidarity and therefore the President could not be one hundred percent in agreement with one hundred percent of the people. He claimed that "this does not mean you (as a Democratic congressman) have to acquiesce to everything the President is for, not by any stretch of the imagination." Boggs further indicated that the role of the President as party leader was to guide, not to dictate.
Another important definition which was more simply explained was, "I do not think that any Congress should be a simple echo of the executive branch of the Government. I have had the great privilege of serving here for a good many years, and I respect what this body is--a House Representatives. I consider myself first, last, and always a Representative of the people who elected me." Throughout the speech he developed his definition of Congress as a body designed solely to represent the people of the United States at large. Reflecting his seemingly contradictory suggestion that there is solidarity in disparity, Boggs argued that "This is the way Democratic institutions are supposed to function." Several times he reminded the audience simply and explicitly that the function of Congress is to represent the people of the United States.

Emotional appeals. Boggs incorporated a number of emotional appeals into this speech, with the most significant appeals invoking the motives of patriotism, responsible action and teamwork.

Appeals to patriotism centered on a plan to recognize what is best for the country. Boggs clearly inferred that party and Congressional unity was crucial to country as a whole. Stressing the them of unity, throughout the speech Boggs referred to "the Nation," the American tradition, and the United States of America." He attempted to identify his reaction to the magazine's questions with support for the country as a whole. In the final few minutes of the speech, Boggs said, "We have the greatest nation on the earth and the freest nation on earth." Although he did not directly link this statement or others similar to it with the list of questions, he was clearly using these statements to gain acceptance of his ideas.
The appeals to responsible action were exemplified by Boggs' admonition that freedom and greatness could be lost by being irresponsible. In some ways this resembles an appeal to reason rather than emotion, but a close look indicates that Boggs perceived "responsibility" as being an important part of the self-images of many congressmen. Essentially, Boggs argued that a responsible representative would recognize and encourage unity in the Democratic party, would recognize Kennedy as the leader of the Democratic party, and would consider the charges made by U.S. News and World Report to be non-partisan charges.

He stated that "the tenor of the questionnaire alarmed me from the point of view of objectivity. . . ." and continued throughout the speech to imply that passively answering it without objection indicated a lack of responsibility. He also reminded Democrats "When you are in the majority to act, you have to decide, you have the responsibility." Appealing to responsibility in another way, he asserted that "Our first responsibility is to the people of our districts . . . ."

The appeal to responsible action was closely related to Boggs' appeal to teamwork. In reality, Boggs was concerned with two "teams" in this speech--the Democratic party in Congress and the Congress as a whole. The use of this appeal was complicated by the fact that he was dealing with an accusation that the Democratic party in government was not working as a team. He was not arguing, however, that the Democratic party should work more as a team, but that indeed it worked effectively as a team. His feeling about the Congress as a whole was more divided. At times he indicated that Congress
supported many Democratic policies and even some specific legislation. He labelled critics' accusations as "in effect . . . an attack upon the free institution of Congress itself which is the ultimate safeguard of the liberties of the people of the United States of America," suggesting that Congress did work as a team, and should consider implications that it did not as very serious charges.

By using these three emotional appeals along with specific instances and two important definitions, Boggs attempted to show that Democrats in Congress did work together, and to make charges of Democratic factionalism appear as charges against Congress as a whole rather than against the Democratic party.

Use of language

This speech was less tightly constructed than the other two speeches dealt with in this chapter. Several times Boggs had to respond to questions and comments from other members of the House. Although this did not have an obvious effect on the content or strategy of the speech, it does appear to have affected the style. The language of the speech is characterized by elements of formality, directness, complexity and vividness.

Formality. The language in this speech can be considered informal. The only examples of formal or ornate language are those references to the United States and to the greatness of the nation as a whole. In general, the language is quite casual and informal. Much of the speech was constructed of spontaneous statements, sometimes in response to questions, arranged in a random order and worded in everyday, casual language for the most part. Perhaps the language of
this speech is best described by the word "conversational." It was very personal language in some respects.

Directness. Part of the reason that the speech seems conversational is its directness. Not only does Boggs avoid metaphorical language or sophisticated associations, he also focuses his ideas to this audience in a very personal and direct manner. Boggs made references to the audience which did not appear to be attempts to relate to the audience on a strategic level or to establish identification with the audience, but rather appear to be a stylistic approach. In other words, these second-person references are more a product of the occasion than of the strategy of the speech. Regardless of the purposes of the speech, though, Boggs did make numerous references to "you" and to "Members of the House" in this speech.

Complexity. The language of this speech is less complex than that of the other speeches included in this study. Although complexity is not completely lacking, the sentences are shorter and simpler in structure than those Boggs used on other occasions. Superficially, the organization of the speech makes the style appear more complex than it is. Haphazardness, however, cannot really be called complexity. Although the long compound and complex sentences which typified Boggs' language were present in this speech, they were only used occasionally.

Vividness. Just as the speech is characterized by a lack of complexity in language, it is also characterized by a relative lack of vividness. The colorful stories and vivid metaphors which Boggs used in many of his speeches were not employed to any significant degree in this speech. In fact, the language could be labeled
ordinary, colorless or unimaginative. The only really vivid language was used in expressing Boggs' appeals to patriotism. For example, Boggs spoke of "imprisoning free institutions in the bondage of irresponsibility." However, only a few descriptions of this type appeared in the speech, even in references to patriotism.

Evaluation of the speech

There is no clear indication that this speech affected opinions of Congress, the press, or the public regarding disunity among Democrats and a failure of a Democratic majority Congress to pass the legislative proposals of a Democratic president. Questions and comments made during and immediately after the speech by other members of the House, however, show strong agreement with Boggs that the questions were loaded and irresponsible. Several prominent congressmen expressed support for Boggs' point of view. After such expressions of support, other Democratic representatives were apparently reluctant to cooperate in answering similar questions from the press. Three things are certain: no questionnaires were reported circulated in the future; no summary of responses to the questions appeared in U.S. News and World Report; no interview with Senator Myers or Representative Boggs appeared in the magazine during the next few months.

Boggs had made, however, several minor errors in his assessment of the situation. These were emphasized by brief comments from other congressmen during and after the speech. Boggs assumed that copies of the questions with which he was dealing had been circulated to all members of the House and spoke as if that were so. Mid-way through
the speech he claimed to have made no such assumption. He continued with his initial themes and ideas, though, much as if he did not care what the specific situation was.

As pointed out earlier, the organization of the speech was not clear. Boggs was not successful in creating a meaningful arrangement of his main ideas. The introduction and the conclusion do not seem necessarily to tie together the central ideas which appear in the body of the speech.

This speech is not a particularly successful example of Boggs' ability to unite Democrats or to unite members of the House as a whole. It is valuable primarily as an indicator of Boggs' strong concern with party and congressional unity, and of his sense of personal involvement and responsibility in creating and preserving such unity.
Chapter V

TWO CIVIL RIGHTS SPEECHES DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

The shift in Boggs' legislative record on civil rights issues came in 1965 with the "yes" vote for the Voting Rights Act. Just a little over a year previously he had voted against the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. Boggs delivered one of the speeches analyzed in this chapter in support of a southern-led effort to limit enforcement clauses in the Civil Rights Act. In the second address, Boggs offered an impromptu explanation of why he, a southerner, felt compelled to vote for the Voting Rights Act. The two speeches provide a sharp contrast in style and strategy as well as in purpose and point of view.

Speech for an Amendment to the Civil Rights Act, Feb. 7, 1964

The situation

Viewing the situation in retrospect, it is unusual that the events immediately surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 received less attention in the national press than those relating to some of the other legislative proposals included in this study which have had less impact than the Civil Rights Act on American life and government.

105
The major news magazines (Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report) all indicated that the bill was likely to pass. By the beginning of 1964 a survey of their weekly reports shows that the question was not if the Congress would pass a comprehensive civil rights law, but when.

The January 3, 1964 issue of Time featured Martin Luther King, Jr. on the cover, naming him "Man of the Year," but including little comment about pending civil rights legislation. In the same week, U.S. News and World Report included an article reprinted from the Journal of the American Bar Association warning about potential dangers of federal policing in enforcement of civil rights. However, little attention was given to proposed legislation. The February 10 issue, which appeared on February 6, predicted that "A civil rights law is probable," and "Power to withhold federal funds from states or communities not integrating seems unlikely to get approval."

The question with which Boggs concerned himself in this speech (see "Nature of the speech" below) was not the larger question of primary civil rights legislation, but the proposed enforcement measure, which could cut off federal funds to programs engaging in apparent discrimination, and to states or communities engaging in apparent discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 itself was almost sure to be passed. Its preparation had been begun by the

Justice Department under Kennedy's administration and it was originally labeled the Civil Rights Act of 1963. Although newly inaugurated President Lyndon Johnson pushed the act to passage, supporters and opponents alike often called it Kennedy's civil rights program.

As noted previously, some members of Congress felt that the section of the bill providing the power to cut off federal funds, Title VI, would not stand. Many congressmen reportedly felt that Title VI probably would not be abandoned altogether, but would be modified to preclude an automatic cut-off of funds. Speculation by staff members indicates that Hale Boggs, as majority whip, was probably convinced that there was some chance of passing the amendment which he supported. As Boggs' long time aide Gary Hymel asserted, "He didn't mind controversy, but he didn't throw himself into dying causes, either."  

Proceedings in the House

The bill was long and complicated. For an unusually long period of time the Rules Committee kept the bill off the floor, undecided about the best way to control what promised to be a long and perhaps intemperate debate. When the bill was freed for debate, a special set of rules accompanied it: there would be only ten hours of general debate, but any members could speak for five minutes on any amendment.

3 Gary Hymel.
The House began to consider the bill on Monday, February 3. The debate ran into the evening every day that week. On Wednesday, February 5, adjournment did not come until 10:30 p.m. On Thursday, February 6, the meeting hour was moved from its usual noon until 10 a.m. The business of the day was not completed until 9:30 p.m. Friday, February 7, a tired and somewhat frustrated House met at noon. Dozens of amendments had been proposed and debated, but most of them were defeated. In particular, southern-sponsored amendments, mostly designed to weaken the bill, had met ready and unexpectedly heavy defeat.

When Representative Whitener of South Carolina moved for an amendment to strike out all of Title VI, those who really knew the House did not take it too seriously. More seriously considered was the perfecting amendment offered by Representative Harris of Arkansas. Title VI originally provided that when the President determined that an agency (local, state, or federal) was engaging in discriminatory practices, federal funds would be cut off. Harris proposed that no law providing federal funds for any purpose be interpreted as requiring that "such financial assistance shall be furnished in circumstances under which individuals are discriminated against."

On the day of Boggs' speech, February 7, casual attention was focused on the State of Louisiana and on the South in general when Representative Gillis Long reminded Members of the House the following night would bring Washington's annual Mardi Gras ball. Comments in proceedings early in the day indicate that there was a feeling the bill might be passed late that evening.

4 U.S. News and World Report, 27 February, p. 16.
The nature of the audience

As mentioned above, for four full days the House had been debating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the dozens of amendments offered to modify it. This was the fifth consecutive day of debate. The three preceding days had not ended until 10:30 p.m., 10:00 p.m. and 9:34 p.m. Very likely, the audience was tired and frustrated. Southerners and other conservatives on civil rights issues apparently had virtually given up trying to block passage of the bill. In the day and a half preceding Boggs speech, transcripts in the Congressional Record do not indicate any serious objections to the bill in general or as a whole. Efforts appeared to concentrate on changing those aspects of the bill considered most offensive to the South. Four hundred ten members of the House were present. Not only did they expect to vote on modifying amendments that day, but as indicated above, many felt that the bill itself would be brought to a final vote that evening.

Because of the specific nature of the ideas dealt with in the speech (see the Nature of the speech, below), it appears that Boggs was mainly interested in his primary audience, the Members of the House who would vote on the disputed amendment. It is also likely that in the course of the week-long debates, Boggs' speech was somewhat incidental to his audience. He was one of many speakers that day. As an influential Member of the House, though, his speech undoubtedly aroused interest among those who were curious about his personal stand on the controversial issues involved.
The nature of the speech

The speaker's purpose

In this speech Boggs supported a moderate or soft amendment which was considered pro-civil rights. It was typical of his role as reconciliator and compromiser that he urged adoption of an amendment which could make the national-Democrat-supported bill more acceptable to southern Democrats, but which could also be viewed as less reactionary than the most severe southern stance on the issue.

The primary legislative purpose of this speech was to support the perfecting amendment offered by Representative Harris. The reason Boggs spoke on this particular amendment is not absolutely clear, since there is no record of his being asked to do so, nor is there any committee relationship which would compel him to do so. The most probable reason is that Boggs, who had attracted large sums of federal money to the Second District of Louisiana, saw Title VI as a potential threat to the welfare of the people participating in those many federal programs, and therefore as a threat to his own effectiveness.

In order to remove this threat, Boggs could use this speech as a signal to liberals and northerners who might view the perfecting amendment as a favorable alternative to the Whitiner amendment striking all of Title VI.

The speech could also have functioned as an indicator to other southerners that Boggs did not intend to permit a tough civil rights bill to pass without trying to soften the blow. It may also represent Boggs' desire to establish a record, guaranteeing himself an explanation to constituents or colleagues in the future.
Organization

The speech lacked a significant introduction. Boggs simply stated that he had three reasons for urging adoption of the amendment (or for rejecting the disputed section of Title VI). He did not list them, but moved from one to the other, identifying each as he began to deal with it. He concluded by returning to the first of the three reasons, but did not summarize the speech as a whole. In fact, it ended rather abruptly, with not real attempt to tie it together.

The three reasons for rejecting unlimited power to cut off federal funds formed the main divisions of the speech. Presented as a chain of arguments, each one growing out of acceptance of some portion of the preceding reason, the three reasons for rejection were: (1) it is discrimination in reverse; (2) it may have a severe effect on Negro citizens; and (3) it is basically a punitive proposition. These three ideas formed the basis for a speech which was largely argumentative in nature.

Emergence of themes

The central idea of the speech was that giving all agencies of the federal government unlimited power to cut off funds when there is apparent discrimination in use of funds is likely to produce more harm that help for minorities. This idea is developed in the three arguments discussed above. In presenting the three arguments, Boggs focused on two typically southern themes. The first was the idea of the maligned southerner. The second was the idea of paternal relationship between blacks and whites.
The theme of black-white relationships is evidenced particularly in the argument that the legislation as proposed could have a severe effect on Negro citizens. Underlying both this argument and the argument of reverse discrimination was the implication that the southern Negro depended largely on others for his welfare. The term "reverse discrimination" was not used as the term has come to be used in the late seventies. Boggs employed it to assert that since unemployment, poverty, educational and health problems in the South, where discrimination is more common, are more serious among Negroes than among others, then the bill could hurt Negroes more than it would hurt others. Throughout the speech Boggs indicated strongly the kind of paternalistic concern for the Negro which is typically southern.

The theme of the maligned South was most clearly expressed when Boggs developed the idea that the disputed section of Title VI was basically a punitive proposition. Boggs warned against building up bitterness in one's "mind and heart and soul," and reminded members, "I know that punitive measures only beget more punitive reactions." During the entire speech he made it clear that he and others felt the South would be the section most strongly affected by the legislation as proposed. He also indicated, both subtly and overtly, that the punitive nature of the legislation was intentional, and that a vote for it would represent intentional punishment of the South as a section.
Supporting material

This speech was largely argumentative in nature. Boggs supported the principal arguments and themes of the speech largely with examples, statistics and statements of authority. Emotional appeals were not overt, although the two themes discussed above were supported with appeals to motives of altruism and fair play.

Examples. Boggs attempted to support his three reasons for rejecting an unamended Title VI by offering examples. He supported his assertion that cut-off power was reverse discrimination by offering examples of how bills designed to help all citizens would be limited. He cited manpower training programs, educational bills, hospital bills and bills for aid to the mentally ill. At one point he said, "Now let me give you a few examples of what I am talking about."

The idea that cut-off power may have a severe effect on Negro citizens was first expressed in Boggs' generalization that removing federal funds from the South would discriminate most against a group already discriminated against. Boggs specified that Negroes in the South had less education, less training, more poverty and more health problems than other southerners. As evidence that the section might have a severe effect on Negroes he offered the example of old-age assistance, which he claimed "has made a tremendous difference in the way these people live."

Statistics. Frequently Boggs offered statistics to support his points. Noting that "In the State of Louisiana, every Negro over 65 years of age with the exception of about 5 percent draws old-age assistance," he indicated that "of the total amount of manpower
employed in the highway system in Louisiana, about 80 percent is Negro." He further asserted, "I could go on and cite these statistics one after another."

**Statement of authority.** Boggs quoted statements in defense of his position from two authorities—the late Speaker Sam Rayburn and President Kennedy. Suggesting that Rayburn would have opposed Title VI because it was punitive, Boggs quoted Rayburn as saying, "I have never thought that legislation should be passed to punish anybody, any group or any section." Suggesting that President Kennedy "was right when he looked at this provision with a great deal of questioning," the speaker quoted the President's April 1963 statement that "it would probably be unwise to give the President of the United States that kind of power." He offered another statement made in a news conference the same month: "I do not think the President should be given that power." He reminded the audience that in Kennedy's June, 1963, civil rights message he did not make the kind of broad, severe recommendation reflected in Title VI. Boggs clearly implied that his own point of view was supported by Kennedy.

**Emotional appeals.** Although he made few overt emotional appeals in the speech, Boggs did involve altruism and fair play. In appealing to the motive of altruism, Boggs spoke of the need "to help the Negro have exactly the same opportunities (as others) to enjoy a decent standard of living." When he pointed to the fact that 95% of Louisiana Negroes over 65 received old-age assistance, Boggs asked his audience, "But think what it would be like if they were not able to get that assistance?" Indicating that if members
of the audience really cared for people in need, they could not support Title VI, Boggs urged support for "all these things that are designed to help all of our people regardless of race, religion, creed, or whatever it may be."

At times during the speech it is difficult to distinguish appeals to the motive of altruism from appeals to the motive of fair play. However, in his support of the assertion that Title VI was a punitive measure, fair play is clearly the motive with which Boggs was concerned. "I think that is the wrong way to legislate on any kind of issue which may divide our Nation," he said.

Boggs turned appeals to the motive of fair play into a kind of ethical appeal, too. Urging Representatives to act out of fairness and not bitterness, Boggs suggested that they could act fairly, because he himself could act fairly. "I could have built within my own mind and heart and soul a great deal of bitterness and sometimes I found it awfully difficult to eliminate that feeling from my own thinking. But I have refrained from doing so." When he quoted Rayburn's views on punitive legislation, Boggs included the late Speaker's statement that, "I think (legislation) should be passed and made law to bring about justice to everyone as nearly as possible."

Use of language

The language of the speech is best understood in terms of formality, directness, complexity and appropriateness.

Formality. The language in the speech is not the language of everyday conversation and presentations. Although it is not as
formal or "high" as the language Boggs used in some of the other speeches included in this study, it is still somewhat above a moderate level. For example, Boggs' introduction is clearly worded in language which not conversational: "Mr. Chairman, I have been reluctant to participate in this debate for a variety of reasons. The main one being that a great many people wanted to be heard and have been heard. But I am constrained now to support the perfecting amendment to Title VI. I say this with the greatest degree of sympathy for the problems that confront us as a nation and the problems that confront the various groups in our country."

Directness. The degree of directness exhibited in the speech is difficult to identify because of conflicting elements within the speech. The language is fairly straightforward in its lack of emotional connotations. As mentioned above, part of the strategy of the speech was to present a reasoned argument for adoption of the perfecting amendment, untouched by the emotional issues inherent in the bill. This strategy is reflected in the language choices Boggs made. In many ways, the general absence of emotionally charged or highly connotative language is one of the most distinctive features of the speech. However, this directness is balanced by the absence of audience referents and first-person references in much of the speech. This combination creates a language style which can best be called moderately direct.

Complexity. The sentence structure in this speech is generally complex. Boggs included several ideas in a single sentence: "Again, when the President sent up his civil rights message to this body in June, if I remember correctly, he limited his recommendations on this
issue to a request that the law be amended, making it clear that the Federal Government is not required under any statute to furnish any kind of financial assistance to any program in which racial discrimination exists." In length, this sentence is typical of sentences used throughout the speech. Boggs frequently combined ideas that were only slightly related into a single sentence. In some ways, this speech probably demanded more of Boggs' listeners than most of his speeches did.

Appropriateness. The style of this speech appears to have been carefully selected to produce a particular effect. Boggs avoided emotionalism in his general appeals and in his language choices. He had expressed some concern to his staff that the issues involved in the civil rights act were not being approached in a reasonable and "appropriate manner. His attempts to be reasonable and appropriate in this speech are reflected in his language choices as well as in other aspects of his persuasive strategy.

Evaluation of the speech

After the debate on the amendment ended, a flurry of "parliamentary inquiries" followed. There was some confusion as to what was the proper procedure for voting. Representative Harris asked for tellers. The perfecting amendment failed 206 to 80. Boggs' speech was not enough to bring about a major modification of Title VI.

However, the transcript of the speech does reveal a well-crafted chain of argument, with carefully developed causal links and specific

---

5 Gary Hymel.
evidence to support the central ideas and assertions. The significant lack of overt emotional and ethical appeals causes the speech to read as an uninspiring document, although it does seem likely that the lack of emotionalism may have been an intentional strategic choice.

Explanation of a Vote for the Voting Rights Act, July 9, 1965

The situation

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was heralded as a new Emancipation Proclamation and Lyndon Johnson as a new Lincoln. The South and the nation were in a period which social historians a decade later began calling the "second Reconstruction." It was an unhappy and a troubled time. The summer of 1964 brought the signing of the Civil Rights Act into law, but it also brought destructive riots in Harlem, Brooklyn, Rochester and other northern cities where Negro populations were swollen with the influx from the South. Some southerners were reacting bitterly to legislative and judicial attempts to secure Negro rights. Even though the 1964 Act was the most far-reaching civil rights legislation since post-Civil War reconstruction, Johnson was convinced it was not enough.

Johnson wrote in his memoirs, "On November 3, 1964, the American voters gave me the mandate. I moved to use it quickly. I directed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback to begin the complicated task of drafting the next civil rights bill--legislation to secure once and for all, equal voting rights. In many ways I believed this act
would be even more critical than the previous one. Early in March of the 1965 the Justice Department had done most of the work on the draft of the Voting Rights Act. On March 7 the nation's attention was focused on civil rights when a group of marchers were confronted by Alabama state troopers on the edge of Selma, Alabama, unleashing a week of violence which ended with activation of the Alabama National Guard. Johnson's concern with the voting rights of all citizens grew. On Sunday, March 14, at 5 p.m., he met with the congressional leadership to discuss the best way to present the bill to Congress. Boggs was among those present. After much discussion it was decided that Johnson would present the bill in a speech to a joint session the next evening. Johnson's speech that Monday night was one of the most memorable and moving of his career. To much of the South, it was also one of the most inflammatory.

On April 1, Louisiana's Governor John McKeithen sent a telegram to Boggs describing the official position of the administration of Louisiana: "We feel strongly that this matter should be left to the states and that literacy tests are essential." Boggs, however, was already deeply involved in the legislation. A few weeks later, in the "Periscope" section of the May 17 issue of Newsweek, a bold-face heading announced, "Boggs for Civil Rights." The comments that followed were repeated many times: "A no vote would bring down the wrath of his northern colleagues, and in the next Congress they would

6 Lyndon Johnson, p. 161.
7 Lyndon Johnson, p. 164.
8 Boggs Files.
knock him out of the House hierarchy." The observation may have been correct. Boggs was apparently not as fully committed to supporting the bill as he might have been. On May 28 he signed a letter to John M. Gehl. Mr. Gehl had expressed hope that Boggs would vote for the act. Boggs replied, "The bill before the House of now has certain provisions which give me some pause, and I hope that we can work them out."  

Apparently concerned with how his constituents might react to a "yes" vote, Boggs asked several New Orleans friends and supporters to report to him on how such a vote would affect his political future at home. Jim Hornsby reported that voting for the bill might not make Boggs any friends among whites in New Orleans, but that it was not as emotionally charged an issue as other civil rights bills. He wrote that, "People look critically on a fellow who is trying to follow the tradition of the South but who is trying to lock elbows with the Administration." He felt, though, that Boggs was popular enough to stand it. Billy Connick warned that Republicans in New Orleans were going to use a "yes" vote against him. Tom McGee surmised that it wasn't a big issue because people simply expected it to pass. One report included a succinct value judgment: "He'd be hypocrite to vote against it."  

---

9 Newsweek, 17 May 1965, p. 7.  
10 Boggs Files.  
11 Boggs Files.
Proceedings in the House

By the day debate in the House began, Thursday, July 8, it was apparent that Boggs would vote for the bill. It was also apparent that his involvement with the bill had been and was intended to remain rather low-key. The day of the speech, Friday, July 9, the House convened at 11:00 a.m., an hour earlier than usual. The carefully drafted Ford-McCulloch substitute was offered as a conservative replacement for the bill. Debate was to be limited to two hours. No one had suggested or expected that Boggs would speak that day. According to staff and family members, Boggs himself had not intended to speak. 12 About an hour into the debate, though, Representative Waggoner of Louisiana spoke in opposition to the Voting Rights Act. Waggoner charged that Louisiana "has been much maligned during the course of this debate," and that the proposed legislation "will discriminate against Louisiana and its people." His comments prompted Boggs' speech.

The nature of the audience

Four hundred thirteen members of the House were present. For the most part, there is no evidence that they were there for any real purpose other than to vote. Few minds were expected to change in the course of the debate. They were clearly not there to hear Boggs speak, because Boggs himself reportedly did not intend to speak. When Boggs did speak, he addressed three groups of people: his colleagues in Congress, his New Orleans constituents and the

12 Lindy Boggs.
people of America who wrestled within themselves for answers to the questions Congress had to face.¹³

**The nature of the speech**

**The speaker's purpose**

This speech is one of the shortest and most widely publicized of Hale Boggs' career. It only lasted five minutes. It was completely unrehearsed and apparently unplanned. Essentially, the speech explained why Boggs would vote "yes" for a bill his fellow Louisianans claimed was unfairly aimed at their state. The speech also was meant to achieve four other results: First, Boggs could clearly establish his "Southerness" despite his siding with the Northern-liberal point of view on the issue at hand. Second, Boggs could gain sympathy (and thus support) by making it clear that this was not an easy decision for him. "I take this rostrum really more out of sadness than anything else," he said. Third, Boggs was able to indicate heartfelt support for the bill to those who claimed his vote for the bill was just a ploy to stay in the Democratic leadership. Fourth, he could express the emotions that he felt personally.

More than any other speech included in this study, the July 9th speech expressed Boggs' awareness of sectional factions and of his strong desire to see these factions united for what he considered the good of the country. His purpose in speaking was not only to call for the reconciliation of southern and national Democrats, but also to explain the reconciliation of his own southern heritage and views with his support of national Democratic party views.

Though highly emotional, the speech was not primarily aimed at changing votes.

Instead it was a highly personal speech offered as an explanation of Boggs' own vote on the bill. Recalling the speech a number of years later, his wife remembered, "He just felt there were some things he had to say." \(^{14}\)

Organization

The speech was divided into a lengthy introduction, a brief conclusion and a body which lacks clear division of any kind. In the introduction, Boggs explained that he had not intended to speak and reminded the audience of his southern heritage and background. In the conclusion he returned to the theme of his love for the South and announced his intention to support the bill. The body of the speech seems to be a listing of one idea or one thought after another, with no attempt to group related ideas together.

Emergence of themes

Boggs' own words express the central theme of the speech:

"I wish I could stand here as a man who loves my State, born and reared in the South, who has spent every year of his life in Louisiana since he was five years old, and say that there has been no discrimination, and agree with the gentleman from Louisiana. But unfortunately, it is not so." Boggs tried to support his idea by establishing two contentions. First, he attempted to confirm

\(^{14}\) Lindy Boggs.
his southern heritage. Second, he revealed his own emotional involvement in voting for the issue.

Boggs began by asserting his love for the South: "I am part and parcel of it, born and reared there, born in the great state of Mississippi and proud of it." There was nothing subtle in his approach. Boggs wanted to make it quite clear that he was not denouncing the South, or even absolving himself of its sins. Anticipating the accusation which would be raised when his vote was recorded, he did not want anyone to think he was trying to run away from his heritage.

The second point which Boggs tried to establish was that this was an emotional, or perhaps a moral, decision and not a political one. Nowhere in the speech did Boggs talk about expediency or practicality. Instead, he used expressions such as "love" and "fundamental right" and "human progress." Reflecting the emotional nature of the speech, the language of the speech was intensely personal. Boggs talked about himself, his ancestors, and what he had seen and felt. The statistics and examples which he offered were presented in the framework of his own experiences. It was near the end of the brief speech when he said he was speaking "more out of sadness than anything else." He said again, "I love my State, I love the South with every part of me, and I love my country. I shall support this bill . . . ."

Supporting material

Despite the highly controversial nature of the speech, Boggs made significant use of illustrations, examples, statistics and
comparison/contrast as supporting material. He also used ethical appeals based on his experiences as a southern Democrat, and emotional appeals directed at the motives of fair play, candor, and love of region.

Illustrations. Boggs made extensive use of illustrations to support two of the central ideas of the speech. He cited his family involvement in the Confederate cause to show his southern heritage. He told of his great uncle, who surrendered the last Confederate Army in the field, and of his grandfather, who served on the staff of Robert E. Lee. He pointed to his own southern birth and childhood as an example of his link with the region.

Examples. The most extensive use of examples was in support of the assertion that discrimination in voter registration did indeed exist in the South. Boggs mentioned an area "directly south of the great cosmopolitan, metropolitan city of New Orleans" where few Negroes were registered to vote. He pointed to discrimination which had existed in the past in Macon County, Alabama, where the black-dominated Tuskegee Institute is located. However, he also offered examples of how discrimination had been overcome. Again, Macon County was used as an example, along with counties in Georgia and South Carolina, and his own congressional district. These examples supported the sub-themes that non-discriminatory voter registration did not always end up in political chaos or social upheaval.

Statistics. Boggs reinforced these examples with statistics. Pointing to "areas where less than 2 or 3 percent of the nonwhites are registered to vote," he claimed that in his own district "over
90 percent of the Negro citizens are registered to vote, and the Negro citizenry constitutes a large percentage of the entire population." When he cited southern counties with successful non-discriminatory voter registration, he indicated that there were 37 in Georgia, at least 10 in South Carolina, and 4 or 5 in Alabama. He also cited specific figures relative to the area south of New Orleans which he used as an example of discriminatory policy, "where out of about 3,000 Negro Americans less than 100 are registered to vote . . . ." Nowhere in the speech, though, do statistics appear outside of a relationship to specific examples. For this reason, they were used to support the same ideas in the same kinds of ways in which examples were used.

**Comparison/contrast.** Boggs drew several sharp contrasts between the examples he cited. He contrasted the poor voter registration mentioned previously with the 90 percent registration of blacks in the Second Congressional District. He contrasted areas where Negroes were not permitted or encouraged to register to vote with areas in which voter registration drives among Negroes had been successful. Boggs also drew some favorable comparisons between pre-registration attitudes in a specific county or area and post-registration attitudes. He indicated that the negative reactions which many southerners feared did not always actually occur. In two cases, Boggs compared specific examples of community "unrest" before and after registration of black voters, indicating that voter registration had made no significant difference.

**Ethical appeals.** Ethical appeals played an important role in this speech. Boggs gave much attention to establishing his image
as a genuine southerner. The entire introduction is an attempt to confirm his southern heritage. He does this by claiming not to need to. "I do not have to establish my Southern background or ancestry," Boggs asserted. However, his expressed ideas were aimed at achieving just that.

Overt references to his southern background may also have been part of his attempt to build his credibility with the non-southern members of his audience by showing that he was a man of character and goodwill who could set aside the prejudices of his region to vote for what was fair and right. Boggs implied that the vote was not an easy decision for him. Statements such as "I wish I could stand here as a man . . . born and reared in the South . . . and say that there has not been discrimination . . ." and "I take this rostrum really more out of sadness than anything else" seem to be statements intended to enhance Boggs' image as a man who must struggle against the traditions of the region he loves to vote for a bill because it was morally right.

In this speech Boggs attempted to cultivate his own favorite self-image (see Chapter III)—that of a loyal southerner who was also a loyal Democrat, and who could see beyond region or party. Essentially, Boggs' attempts to build his credibility with his southern audience in the House centered on efforts to establish himself as a man who understood the difficulty of other southern legislators, who identified strongly with them. Perhaps he stated it most directly when he said, "Being born and reared a southerner, I know what these problems have been. I sympathize with them. I know what they are. I have lived with them."
Emotional appeals. At points in the speech, it is difficult to distinguish ethical appeals from emotional appeals. This is particularly true of Boggs' appeals to the specific motive of love of region. Love of region is clearly regarded as a virtue by Boggs in this speech. However, he emphasized that he was not referring to sectionalistic or nationistic love of region, but a love in which each citizen "has been received as a fellow American." In a sense, Boggs attempted to establish through emotional appeals the premises of a syllogistic argument:

A true southerner will express his love for his region by voting for any bill that is good for southern people. This bill is good for southern people. Therefore, a true southerner will express his love for his region by voting for this bill.

Boggs' appeals to the motive of honest appearance emerged in his repeated assertions and suggestions that anyone who really knows the South knows that discrimination exists. Rational proofs such as examples and statistics are augmented by statements and questions such as "Can we say there has been no discrimination? Can we honestly say that from our hearts?" I ask the gentlemen (Rep. Waggonner) that question. He knows it is not so." Boggs also implied that it was not honest to claim that Negro enfranchisement would lower the caliber of government. "That fear has dominated the minds of good, God-fearing decent Christian people," he said. "But that fear has been dissipated by experience." Boggs tried to show that an honest man would share his belief that there was discrimination in the South, and that Negro voters would not upset southern patterns of government. Some logical proofs were offered to establish factual assertions, but in many ways the emotional appeal to candor is
stronger than the appeal to rational acceptance of logical argument and proof.

Boggs appealed to the motive of fair play by emphasizing that the audience regarded the right to vote as a fundamental right of American citizens, and that they regarded Negroes as American citizens. Some of the appeals were overt: "to deny the right on the basis of race or creed is to deny a fundamental right of an American." His closing sentence coupled this appeal with a strong appeal to patriotism: "I shall support this bill because I believe the fundamental right to vote must be a part of this great experiment in human progress under freedom which is America." Essentially, though, both overt and implied appeals to the motive of fair play were simply suggestions that all citizens have the right to vote, and that it is not fair to deny that right to any citizen.

Use of language

The language of this speech is best understood by examining the formality, complexity, and repetition.

Formality. The speech was fairly informal, although it has been referred to as "eloquent" and "great." Qualities such as eloquence or greatness are drawn from the emotional content of the speech rather than from the nature of the language of this speech. The speech included a number of colloquial expressions which were relatively informal. For example, "For whatever it may be worth . . . ," and "God bless the people there--" and "if my memory serves me correctly . . . ." Despite the importance of the ideas with which Boggs dealt in this speech, the language is quite ordinary.
Personal references both to the speaker and to the audience were prominent throughout the speech. Perhaps the reason for this was that the speech dealt as much with Boggs himself as with the South or the Voting Rights Act. Boggs used the words "I," "me" and "my" over forty times in five minutes. The language could also be called informal because of its non-metaphorical nature.

**Complexity.** Despite the apparent simplicity of the ideas and supporting material used in the speech, the language itself is fairly complex. Boggs made extensive use of conjunctions or transitions such as "and", "but" or "because" to link long chains of ideas. Another element of style which could mask the complexity of the language is the directness of the speech. The speech is neither difficult nor metaphorical, although many of the sentences are long and complicated.

**Repetition.** The sense of informality and simplicity in the speech is also emphasized by the repetition of certain phrases. For example, Boggs repeated the phrase "I love the South" several times during the speech. He also used the words "I believe" at several points. Although these phrases appeared at several places in the speech, they did not function as parallel wording since no real relationship was drawn between the primary ideas connected with each use of the phrase.

**Evaluation of the speech**

Boggs' simple speech brought the House to its feet in a standing ovation. Even visitors in the gallery stood stunned and moved at what they had witnessed. Among those in the gallery were
Herman Edelsberg of Washington, D.C., who wrote to Mr. Boggs: "I was fortunate to be sitting in the House Gallery when you made your stirring statement on the voting rights bill. It was in my view, the moral high point of the debate and helped ensure the passage of the undiluted bill." Thomas H. Clancy of New Orleans' Loyola University wrote, "Luckily, I was in the House Gallery when you spoke the afternoon of the ninth. It was a great thrill to see and hear such a courageous act." George Betar, Jr., of New Iberia, Louisiana left a note in Boggs' office that afternoon: "I happened to walk into the gallery of the House Chamber at the moment you began your speech on the voting rights bill. I was deeply impressed with your talk and have already requested a copy of the Congressional Record containing it." 

The next day the Associated Press circulated a "Washington Article" featuring Boggs' picture and announcing a 215 to 166 vote for the bill in the House. Parts of Boggs' speech were included in the headlined, front-page Associated Press story in the July 10 issue of the Chicago Sun-Times and other newspapers. On July 13, United Press International released a story on Boggs and the Voting Rights Act which was several paragraphs long. The publicity did not end for weeks. Stories appeared all over the country. For

15 Letter to Hale Boggs from Herman Edelsberg, 14 July 1965, Boggs Files.
17 Boggs Files.
example, the Shebogan Press, in Shebogan, Wisconsin, featured an article headed, "A Profile in Courage."

This (speech) brought the House to its feet in a rousing ovation for the Louisiana Congressman and spurred on the passage of the measure by a 333 to 85 vote . . . . Certainly such men and many other Southerners who have faced these trying times so admirably, are of equal stature to those who graced the pages of the late President Kennedy's famous book, Profiles in Courage.

Letters poured in. Some were critical. A Gretna, Louisiana, resident wrote on August 23, "Your friends and supporters . . . were shocked to learn that you had not only voted for the Voting Rights bill but that you talked for its passage. I am sorry to say but when you did this you signed your political death warrant."

Your eloquent speech made my heart bleed," wrote another constituent, " . . . but it also created a yearning to vote against you." A few days later, an influential Boggs supporter in New Orleans sent a confidential memorandum to two associates: "Hale Boggs' recent Civil Rights speech may . . . go ringing through the ages, but opposition will go ringing doorbells. I suggest we consider standing beside him next year when he will really need our help." Critical letters and correspondence included a telegram from a Minden, Louisiana businessman, sent on July 16: "Do us a favor, keep your big mouth shut." Congratulatory letters included one from Vice-President Hubert Humphrey: "I am so proud of you. Congratulations on your leadership on the voting rights bill. You make all your friends

20 Shebogan Press, 19 July 1965, p. 8A.
21 Boggs Files.
22 Boggs Files.
stand just a little higher and feel a little prouder because of their association with you."24

These letters, news reports and other information included in Boggs' office file on this particular legislation indicate that there were several ways in which this speech may have affected the situation immediately and in the future. The most important result of the speech, in terms of the focus of this study, is that it showed one could be both a southerner and a national Democrat. It erased Boggs' past legislative history of opposition to civil rights legislation, marking him as a southerner not only tolerant of the fight for Negro rights, but actively sympathetic to it. Second, it cemented Boggs' role in the party leadership in Congress, largely by guaranteeing passage of the bill. Third, Boggs received overwhelming publicity from the speech. Fourth, it may well have paved the way for later civil rights legislation, especially by encouraging other southerners to take a stand for civil rights. Fifth, many observers and friends believe it made his 1968 open-housing vote more offensive to some and perhaps contributed to the tough race against Dave Treen in 1968.25

More than other speeches delivered during his congressional career, this speech exemplifies Boggs' role as reconciler and compromiser between southern Democrats the national Democratic party in Congress.

24 Boggs Files.
25 Gary Hymel.
Chapter VI
THREE GOOD GOVERNMENT SPEECHES DURING THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970

In the summer of 1970 two important events happened to Hale Boggs. First, he was in the middle of a loose and ever-shifting campaign for majority leader, although the election was not to be held until January. Second, he was implicated, though not indicted, in a widely publicized influence-peddling case.

The campaign for majority leader both reflected and refined the existing factionalism within the Democratic party. Slowed by age, Speaker John McCormack had announced his intention to step down from the speaker's seat and endorsed Majority Leader Carl Albert as his successor. Most everyone felt that Albert could easily and enthusiastically be elected Speaker. The real question was who would be elected majority leader. Boggs' hat had been in the ring for fifteen years. He had served the appropriate apprenticeship--deputy majority whip for six years, majority whip for nine years--and the next rung up the ladder was the post of majority leader. However, by 1970, journalist Larry L. King noted that Boggs' manic-depressive
condition had apparently resulted in some erratic, though not grossly irresponsible behavior. King reported a colleague's comment:

He made long-winded speeches, maybe brilliant in one sentence--great imagery, sophisticated language, all the oratorical thunders--and then the next sentence might be absolutely meaningless. ¹

Boggs' position was hurt by more than his personal behavior, though. He seemed to be caught in the dilemma that haunted, but ultimately helped, his career. He was considered too old-line, too conservative, by the young liberals in Congress, and too liberal by conventional conservatives. Ostracized by southern congressmen for his pro-civil rights votes in later years, he was criticized by liberals for his anti-civil rights votes in early years. While Boggs maintained a significant core of support, it was not strong enough to prevent Senator Udall, generally considered a "Young Turk" liberal, from being the front runner through most of the spring.

Southern Dixiecrats and the northeastern "Big-city Boys" were searching their own ranks for a candidate. Boggs probably realized that in the end he would look better to the southerners than any other viable candidate. He turned his attention to the northeasterners, led by Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill of Massachusetts, who had considered running for the post himself. Unabashedly, Boggs "ardently courted Tip O'Neill . . . ." ²

Boggs' campaign for majority leader was not helped by the publicity he received in the grand jury investigation of Baltimore

¹ King, p. 42.
² King, p. 43
contractor Victor Frenkil. On June 22, 1970, Chief Judge Roszel Thomas of the United States District Court in Baltimore made public a summary of the grand jury's presentiment in the case of Frenkil, who was official contractor for the House of Representatives. The proposed indictment of Frenkil for attempting to buy congressional favors was announced. Louisiana's Senator Russell Long was identified as the recipient of an offer of money for favors, and Boggs was identified as the recipient of a particular favor--$45,000 worth of remodeling done for $21,000. The July 13 issue of Time made two potentially damaging charges:

The Justice Department had also kept secret its knowledge of the illegal campaign contribution received by Long and Boggs from a Louisiana bank.

The judge's report is hardly less sparing of Long and Boggs, noting that they committed no criminal act but linking their names with a man who the grand jury believes did.\(^3\)

If Boggs wanted to pull together enough votes from a splintered Democratic majority to win the leader's seat, he needed all the help that he could get. When Tip O'Neill began putting together a bi-partisan support group for a "teller voting" amendment to the reformist Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Boggs was quick to lend his aid. The amendment would no away with the anonymous "teller vote" method on amendments and require that even on perfecting amendments, enumerated votes be recorded by name. Supporting this amendment could help Boggs in three ways. First, the original bill was largely sponsored by the Young-Turk liberal

\(^3\) Time, 13 July 1970, p. 31.
faction of the House Democrats, where Boggs' strongest opposition lay. Support for one of their projects might soften some of that opposition. Second, Tip O'Neill was the principal sponsor of the amendment to abolish unrecorded teller voting. Boggs was probably more eager to win O'Neill's favor than that of any other Congressman. The support also gave him an opportunity to identify with the northeastern "Big-City" faction of the House Democrats. Third, this was clearly a reform bill. It presented an opportunity for Boggs to repair his image as a good-government legislator. Gary Hymel suggested that Boggs saw the amendment as an inevitable reform and "hopped on the bandwagon" because he considered it a good thing with which to have his name associated.  

Proceedings in the House

Congress dawdled with the bill throughout the summer, bringing it up for consideration and setting it aside three times before final passage. Boggs spoke in support of the bill on three different days: July 9, July 27 and July 28.

July 9, 1970

The situation

Boggs' July 9 statement was primarily a statement of support, and was extremely brief. There are two reasons why he may have chosen to speak at this early time. First, Boggs' bad publicity
in the Frenkil case was at its peak. The group within the Democratic party in the House which was most upset by the Frenkil case was the Young Turks who were sponsoring this bill. Perhaps Boggs hoped that talk of "right" or "duty" would ameliorate that publicity. Second, the timing placed Boggs in a prominent position. Since this amendment had a large group of supporters, there was the danger of being lost in the crowd. At this point, no one had risen yet to speak out on this amendment. Also, on this day the House was not concerned with the discussion of either this bill or this particular amendment. It was not an important item on the day's agenda.

The nature of the speech

The speaker's purpose

Boggs announced "I have a great many reasons for supporting this amendment." He offered two: "The first one is that it is right." His second reason was that the measure was a good way to get members present and voting. However, considering the brevity of the speech and the unusual timing, it was more likely that Boggs' deeper purposes centered on the two aspects of the situation discussed previously. He wanted to ingratiate himself with Tip O'Neill and with the Young Turks, and he wanted to make sure his support did not appear to be an afterthought.

5 Gary Hymel.
Organization, Emergence of Themes, Supporting Materials

The brevity of this statement precludes a traditional analysis of the nature of the speech. However, because the statement is important as a forerunner of two longer stands on the floor, an analysis of its content and structure is necessary. The two reasons cited in the preceding discussion of the speaker's purpose for supporting the amendment are also the two primary divisions of the speech. They serve both as organizational headings and as central themes. Their most important function may well be their introduction and development as themes to be used in the speeches that follow.

Boggs made no effort fully to support his central ideas at this time. However, he did introduce three kinds of support which became important in the two speeches that followed—amplification, emotional appeals and ethical appeals. Although Boggs did not take the time to develop his ideas on this occasion, he did repeat generalizations which re-enforced his primary assertions. Essentially, he restated the first idea three times, and the second twice. None of these could be considered extensions, since they were not additional explanations or a new way of looking at the ideas, but a simple re-wording. Boggs' first idea was an appeal to the motive of fair play. He spoke of the public's right to know how their representatives voted, implying that one who wanted to limit that right was being deceptive or unfair. Ethical appeals developed from Boggs' reminder that he had spent fifteen years in the House Democratic hierarchy, and from the implication that a man who supports the public's right is in general a man of principle. Like
the other supporting material, though, these appeals were only stated and left undeveloped.

Evaluation of the speech

There is simply not much here to evaluate. It was important to examine this statement, though, because it appeared as a fore runner to two full-fledged speeches. Although it is difficult to determine if this statement alone had any significant effect on the O'Neill amendment, Boggs' personal reputation or factionalism among House Democrats, the statement cannot be ignored as a specific act which was part of a particular persuasive strategy. The primary significance of this speech is the understanding it provides of the background of Boggs' involvement in the legislation dealt with on July 27.

July 27, 1970

The situation

Monday, July 27, was the day scheduled for Tip O'Neill to present his teller voting amendment. Several substitute amendments were also scheduled for presentation that day, including one by Representative Wayne Hays of Ohio and one by Representative Smith of California. Although the debate on the amendment was the principal business of the day, it received only minor press coverage. Most of the interest in the amendment came from within the House itself.
The nature of the speech

The speaker's purpose

Boggs was probably more interested in his fellow congressmen's reactions to his speech than in the reactions of the American public or his own constituents. Although the most superficially apparent purpose of the speech was to secure passage of the amendment, Boggs could have used the speech in several other ways which were discussed above. He could have used it to ingratiate himself with Tip O'Neill, to signal the Young Turk liberals that he supported some of what they proposed, or to help him build a reformist image to balance the summer's bad publicity. Probably, his primary interest was in uniting a variety of House Democrats behind himself, and in demonstrating his ability to draw southern conservative votes for a proposal sponsored by a northern liberal.

Organization

Although the organization of this speech is not as carefully delineated as that of some other speeches included in this study, close examination reveals a fairly simple pattern of arrangement. The introduction was only a few lines long, and consisted solely of amenities and references to the import of the occasion. The almost equally brief conclusion consisted of a story about Alexander Hamilton and a visitor to the House. The body of the speech is arranged in a problem-solution pattern. Boggs first described the problem; historically, teller voting was developed as a way for the will of the people to supercede the will of a "powerful and
vengeful monarch." It served, however, no publiccly useful
purpose in the House of Representatives. Instead, it inhibited
reform, encouraged absenteeism, and fostered the image of
institutional unresponsiveness. The solution he offered was simply
the adoption of the proposed amendment and ultimate passage of the
bill.

Although Boggs deals first with the problem and then with the
solution, it is inaccurate to imply that somewhere a line is drawn
through the middle of the speech, with "problem" falling on one
side and "solution" falling on the other.

Emergence of themes

The central themes of this speech were revealed as independent
assertions. First, Boggs asserted that teller voting is an archaic
holdover from British Parliament. Second, he claimed that it
violated the right of the American people to know how each member
of Congress voted. Third, he suggested that it encouraged
absenteeism. Fourth, he asserted that it interfered with the
responsiveness and flexibility of the House.

Boggs developed the concept of "archaic holdover" with
historical allusions and references to immediate contemporary needs.
In fact, the idea that teller voting was outdated may well have been
the predominant theme. Boggs noted that, "All we are saying by this
amendment is that the archaic system adopted some centuries ago to
protect the members of Parliament from despotic kings should be
abolished in the House of Representatives of the United States of
America as it was in the House of Commons many years ago." Two of
the themes of the speech—that teller voting violates the public's right to know, and that teller voting encourages absenteeism—formed the crux of Boggs' July 9 statement on the amendment. Their development had already begun.

The assertion that teller voting interfered with the responsiveness and flexibility of the House gave rise to another important idea, which can be linked directly with the purpose of this speech. That idea was that this amendment was non-partisan and non-sectional. In this sense, the purpose of the speech is somehow translated into a theme of the speech.

Supporting material

Boggs supported these assertions with a variety of material, including narrative, negation, dilemmas, emotional appeals and ethical appeals.

Narrative. Boggs made significant use of narrative in both the beginning and the end of the speech. The first instance was a summary of the history of teller voting. "Its origin can be traced centuries ago ..." Boggs began. The story of how teller voting originated was the most important and obvious part of Boggs' attempt to establish that the system was archaic. He clearly indicated that the system was designed to serve a purpose which did not exist as a part of American government or philosophy, either historically or currently.

The second use of narrative was in the conclusion. Boggs ended his speech with a simple, narrative example.
Finally, one last thought. A story is told in history about one of the great men who helped found this country, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton brought a visitor into the gallery of the old House Chamber, now Statuary Hall. The visitor sat with Hamilton and noting the pandemonium on the floor, which you frequently see in this body even as of this day, questioned Mr. Hamilton, "What goes on there?" And Hamilton replied, "There sir--there sir, the people govern."

Like the first story, the last was based on history. It was, however, more specific and perhaps more illustrative than the first. Also, it seems to have been used primarily to support the central theme which focused on the rights of the American people. The inference was clear--the House of Representatives was a body, an institution, of the people, and the people had a right to know exactly what went on there.

Negation. During this speech Boggs emphasized what the amendment he was supporting was not, what the House of Representatives was not, and what American ideas were not. Each of these series of negations led to the conclusion that indeed, it was something else altogether. For example, when Boggs spoke of the amendment at hand, he claimed: "This is not a liberal amendment; it is not a conservative amendment; it is not a Republican amendment; It is not a Democratic amendment; It is an amendment for the House of Representatives." He tried to support the image of a responsive, flexible House of Representatives by claiming that the House was not under control of a King, not able to "afford the luxury of a shelter from the public eye," and not a government of deals. Boggs spent more time describing what things were not, or what they should not become, than he did dealing with what they were or should
become. Essentially, though, most of this negation was offered in support of positive ideas—such as the right of the people to govern, and the positive need for responsive and flexible government.

Dilemmas. Several times in the speech Boggs used dilemmas as an argumentative device. Among those dilemmas he posed were the following: Either the House of Representatives is relevant, or no institution is relevant. Either the House of Representatives is representative, or "the last best hope of mankind has been lost." Either a member will "stand up and be counted" or he did not come to Congress to represent the people.

These dilemmas were simply asserted, and offered without any attempt to illustrate or establish that the two possibilities were genuinely exclusive. Although they appeared as logical appeals, expressed as an argumentative device, their actual function may have been based on acceptance at an emotional level by the audience.

Emotional appeals. Among the appeals which Boggs used were appeals to the motives of patriotism, representative ideals, fair play, and group identification or unity.

The concepts of patriotism and of representative ideals run like threads through the speech. Sometimes the two become intertwined, since Boggs equates Americanism with representative ideals, although he never explicitly stated this. He argued, for example, that "the American people are entitled to know the recorded judgment of each Member on the great issues of our times." Most of these appeals were used to support the idea that responsiveness and flexibility in government were best served by the proposed amendment.
He asserted that "the founders of this country never intended its institutions to be inflexible and set in their ways. The architects of our Government intended its three branches to be capable of growth and continuous self-renewal." No evidence was offered to back up these statements, only the assumption that the audience would react favorable toward the idea. Boggs also made references throughout the speech to "American Democracy" and to "the House of Representatives of the United States of America."

Boggs' appeals to the motive of fair play could be considered extensions of the emotional appeal introduced on July 9. When he spoke of the right of the people to know how their representatives voted, he indicated that it was really not fair to suggest that there was any reason for keeping an individual representative's voting record on any issue from any American citizen. Boggs expressed objection to teller voting precedent because he saw the American government as existing "with never a King to fear and only the public to serve. . . ."

In supporting this idea, Boggs used expressions such as "entitled to know" and "do their duty." He implied a sense of obligation, almost a contract, between Congressmen and their constituents, implying that it is violating the spirit of fair play to use the office for anything other than to represent the goals and values of the American people. So, in a sense, Boggs' appeals to the motive of fair play also became a part of his appeals to patriotism and to representative ideals, for what he was arguing was that teller voting was not fair within the context of the American system of representative government.
Ethical appeals. Just as he had done on July 9, Boggs took the opportunity to mention "I have served for 15 years here as whip or deputy whip, and there have been countless occasions when I have spent hours and days attempting to get members to come here and do their duty and walk through that teller line and vote." The speech included several references to his own role as majority whip. These references enhanced his own standing with the audience reminding them that he was a man who played an important role in the House and in voting policies in the House in particular.

Boggs also made two other references to himself which were probably direct attempts to influence the audience to view him favorably. He stated, "Come September 10, I will observe the 30th anniversary of my first election to the House. I came here when I was 26 years of age." Secondly, he referred to his son Tommy's campaign for election to the House. "Today I am proud of the fact that I have a son who wants to come here, too. He believes that service here is a high calling. . . . He thinks the House is relevant. I think it is relevant."

Use of language

Boggs set the tone of the speech when he announced in the beginning, "Mr. Chairman, in my judgment this is indeed a historic day." He approached the rest of the speech with a formality and a loftiness which removed it from the day-to-day style in which he sometimes spoke on the floor of the House. Boggs' use of language in this speech is distinguished by its formality, its clarity, and its directness.
Formality. The language used in this speech is formal. It is not the language of casual conversation. Boggs used many phrases such as "encouraging the full participation of all parties in forging the law of the land" and "the architects of our Government," which are probably more typical of non-conversational language. The closing sentence is typical: "Well, here Mr. Chairman, almost two centuries later, the people must continue to govern. Let us support this amendment." The language is the language of monologue, or one speaker addressing an audience, rather than the language of interpersonal communication.

Clarity. The language indicates that understanding and clarity were sometimes sacrificed for effect. For example, Boggs used abstract phrases such as "forging the law of the land" and "the architects of Government" cited above rather than specific references to legislative acts or individuals in clearly stated roles. The language is not especially complicated, but rather slightly obscured. Although the majority of the language in the speech is not unclear or unusually ambiguous, it is not as clear as the language which Boggs used in some other speeches included in this study.

Directness. The speech lacks directness to the same degree that it lacks clarity. In the speeches included in this study, Boggs tended to be most direct in those speeches which were the least formal. This is true of this speech. It appears that Boggs may have considered the lack of directness to be an element affecting the formality of the language he used. There are very few direct references to the audience in this speech. On those occasions when
Boggs does address the audience he generally uses the pronoun "we" rather than the slightly more direct pronoun "you," even when "you" might be more appropriate, or more accurate.

**Evaluation of the speech**

Hale Boggs reportedly considered this speech a good example of his oratorical skills. Others did, too. After his disappearance, Representative Bob Eckhardt of Texas included it in the *Congressional Record* as a tribute. It also appears in the collection of memorial addresses and tributes published by the U.S. Government Printing Office. Whether or not the speech succeeded in establishing Boggs as a Democratic leader who would bridge the gaps between factions of the Democratic party and between factions within the whole House is not clear.

Two results were achieved. First, the amendment passed. Secondly, Tip O'Neill never entered the race for majority leader, and Boggs was elected in mid-January of 1971. What is difficult to discern is what role, if any, this speech played in either of these events. There is no evidence that the amendment would have been unlikely to pass or Boggs unlikely to be elected if this speech had never occurred. It is true, however, that about this time Boggs' support for the Leader's post began to increase. Probably, however, this speech served to enhance and perhaps to secure his position, rather than to change it.

---

6 Cary Hymel.

7 *Memorial Addresses.*
July 28, 1970

It was unusual for Boggs to speak two days in succession on a bill he was not personally sponsoring. But on Tuesday, he joined the debate again--this time to oppose a group of amendments which would upset the deeply entrenched chairmanship and seniority system in the House. In this position, he allied himself with the northeastern Big-city faction, which was part of the existing system, but separated himself from the Young Turk liberals, who generally opposed the seniority system.

The nature of the speech

The speaker's purpose

It would be easy to conclude that Boggs spoke against this amendment (or these amendments--he used both phrases alternately throughout the speech) because he wanted to halt its passage. However, there is no indication that the amendment had any chance of passing. It is far more likely that Boggs' primary purposes were not the explicitly stated general purposes of the speech. As was pointed out in an earlier chapter of this study, southern Democrats held more than their share of committee chairmanships and influential appointments as regular committee members. The northeastern Big-city Democrats also held a large number of committee chairmanships. This was an excellent opportunity for Boggs to signal his support for the existing system, and thereby ingratiate himself with those who had the strongest stakes in it.
It also provided an occasion to gain the favor of those who were most likely to become his ardent supporters, and to show support for a concept which was a unifying factor among two frequently conflicting factions in the House majority.

Organization

The organization of this speech is more obscure than that of most of Boggs' speeches dealt with in this study. It lacks a clear division into readily identifiable main points, or an easily recognizable pattern of arrangement. For that reason, the most appropriate label for the arrangement is "topical." However, the "topics" are numerous, frequently only marginally related and sometimes only partially developed. The random organization gives the impression that the speech was not carefully prepared, and that Boggs was perhaps talking about an issue he had not planned to speak on.

It is possible to identify an introduction to the speech. Boggs began with apologies, offered a comment by Winston Churchill on democracy, and explained his own involvement briefly in the seniority system in the House. Although he did not provide a lengthy conclusion Boggs did include a summation sentence and a call for action. He ended the speech by saying, "So I say to my fellow reformers--and I consider myself one--that in these amendments you seek to tear down this institution, not to build it up. And I trust and I hope that these amendments will be soundly defeated."
The organization of this speech is also indicative of the role of the speech in Boggs' personal desires to appear reform-minded and to be elected majority leader. In many ways, the speech seems to be hastily or thoughtlessly put together. It seems to be not so much an effort to influence the particular situation as an attempt to enhance Boggs' own image.

It is possible to identify an introduction to the speech. Boggs began with apologies, offered a comment by Winston Churchill on democracy, and explained his own involvement briefly in the seniority system in the House. Although he did not provide a lengthy conclusion Boggs did include a summation sentence and a call for action. He ended the speech by saying, "So I say to my fellow reformers--and I consider myself one--that in these amendments you seek to tear down this institution, not to build it up. And I trust and I hope that these amendments will be soundly defeated."

Like the pattern of arrangement, the themes of this speech are more difficult to discern than those of most of Boggs' speeches. Meaningful ideas were somewhat obscured by a large number of personal references and an informality which indicates a general lack of careful development of central ideas. Two themes, however, form the primary focus of the speech. One is the idea that the proposed amendment violates the spirit of Congress. The other is that there are a great many good and capable congressmen from a number of different factions.
Emergence of themes

Like the pattern of arrangement, the themes of this speech are more difficult to discern than those of most of Boggs' speeches. Meaningful ideas were somewhat obscured by a large number of personal references and an informality which indicates a general lack of careful development of central ideas. Two themes, however, form the primary focus of the speech. One is the idea that the proposed amendment violates the spirit of Congress. The other is that there are a great many good and capable congressmen from a number of different factions.

The idea that this amendment would not be in the interest of Congress as an institution was expressed in terms of destruction and chaos. "You know, sometimes in the name of reform, sometimes in the name of reform, sometimes in the name of change, our institutions are ruined. There are those who would destroy Congress because of a congressman who is not true to his trust. . . . these amendments that we have here, . . . strike at the heart of this institution." Boggs implied that the proposal was an attack on Congress. Coupled with this, of course, was the inference that Boggs understood the function and the operation of the House of Representatives in a way that not all members did. Boggs could use this theme to advance his unstated purpose of gaining favor and support from several different factions.

The same kind of inference can be made from Boggs' development of the second theme, that capable congressmen come from a variety of places and philosophical stances. In many ways this idea sounds similar to the theme which was discussed in several speeches above--the idea that the House is a body of Americans, for America, and not
a group of non-integrated factions. However, in this case, the idea seems to be more specifically refined. An examination of Boggs' use of supporting material reveals his particular approach in this speech.

Supporting material

In supporting the central ideas of the speech, Boggs used examples, comparisons and ethical appeals as his primary forms of support.

Examples. Boggs primarily used two kinds of examples which supported each of the two major themes of the speech. First, in an effort to show that the proposed amendment violates the spirit of Congress, Boggs pointed to examples of specific times when attitudes rather than reason shaped congressional action. Secondly, he supported the idea that there are many good and capable congressmen from a number of different factions by point to specific people who were serving well because of the seniority system.

The first kind of example was used to support the idea that the amendment violated the spirit of Congress, and would no doubt result in destruction and/or chaos. These examples are illustrated below:

Let me give you a few other examples. I remember just a few years ago in the last years of the late revered John J. Kennedy, we had a proposition here to create a Department of Housing and Urban Affairs, and it was voted down. Do you know why it was voted down? Because it had been rumored that a Negro would head up that Department; that is why it was voted down.

The second kind of example was used to support both of the central ideas. These examples of specific people were used to show both that the amendment might be destructive and that many different kinds of people were serving the whole of Congress well.
This was similar to the use of other examples in the speech, and formed a framework for inferences and implications which Boggs could use to achieve his fundamental purposes in the speech.

**Comparison.** Boggs' early comment about Winston Churchill's view of Democracy set the tone for one kind of comparison. Boggs said of Churchill, "He is alleged to have said that it (Democracy) is the worst system on earth until you examine all the others." Boggs did not attempt to compare Democracy to all the other systems on earth, but he did make an important general comparison between democracy and other systems in terms of integration of a variety of people. This is an important part of the support for Boggs' central idea which focuses on the variety of backgrounds and stances of congressional members.

Another kind of comparison was the comparison of the institution of Congress with other institutions in American society. Under "Emergence of Themes" a quotation is included which shows Boggs' comparison between Congress and the Church. He took the comparison even further than that. "There are those who would wreck the free enterprise system because of dishonest businessmen. There are those who would wreck the labor movement because of dishonest labor leaders." Clearly, the implication was that there were those who would wreck Congress because of mis-governing congressmen.

**Ethical appeals.** Much of the introduction to this speech centered on Boggs' own role within the Congress and within the committee seniority system. He was not reluctant to refer to his own experience. "Mr. Chairman, I happen to be the ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means. I sit next to the distinguished gentleman from
Arkansas and I have sat there for many years." With such references Boggs clearly attempted to establish his own credibility as a spokesman for the functioning of the system within Congress. Boggs also implied that his long service in Congress perhaps gave him insights into people and operations that other congressmen might not share. Although these appeals served only as underlying support for the central themes of the speech, it is easy to see how they might have provided motivating factors in securing Boggs' primary goals.

Use of language

The speech is characterized stylistically by its formality, its clarity, and its directness.

Clarity. Many of the sentences are long and perhaps confusing without the pauses and inflections of the spoken voice to help clarify meaning. For example, Boggs asserted "Why, it is not inconceivable that one who was seeking the position as chairman would go out and make himself an arrangement with these various pressure groups and then it is not inconceivable that the chairman, whomever he may be, would make a better deal than the deal I could make." This example illustrates the unclear and complex language of the speech. Although the language probably was heard more clearly than it can be read, Boggs still does not seem to have been especially concerned with using language that was specific, simple and un-ambiguous.
Directness. Despite its informality, the speech was not characterized by direct language. Boggs used words such as "one" and "a person" to replace the common pronouns "we" and "you" which he used more often in his speeches. The language of the speech is generally impersonal. It can be called conversational only because of its rambling informality, not because of its directly interactive nature. The discussion of comparison under supporting materials, above, illustrates some of the uses of metaphor within the speech. Although these were not strong or extensive, they were significant enough to affect the overall sense that the language of the speech was essentially indirect.

This speech lacked the eloquence and the scope of the address Boggs delivered the day before. The language must be considered, relatively colloquial, extremely informal, and almost conversational. In some degree the level of the language is influenced by the rambling organizational pattern. Because the words and sentences are rambling and not clearly laid out, this speech lacks the impact and the sense of high occasion that some of Boggs' more carefully arranged speeches possess. The overall impression is that of a man talking about how he feels about an amendment he does not like.

Evaluation of the speech

As much of the above analysis indicates, this speech is not a good example of speech craftsmanship. It lacks clearly focused ideas, a clearly stated purpose and clear organization. Even the two identifiable central ideas do not seem to be very well-supported. It is difficult to determine how the speech worked, or how Boggs
intended for it to work. What is clear, though, are a few things which happened.

The amendment did not pass. The systems of committee chairmanship and seniority went undisturbed in the face of other overwhelming reforms. But this was only what had been expected before Boggs' speech. The bill itself was finally passed a week and a half later, but Boggs had never really spoken out for the passage of the bill as a whole, although he was known to endorse it. It may be useful to view this speech as a campaign speech in Boggs' race for majority leader. Probably the speech was most successful as an assertion by Boggs of his knowledge and respect for House operations, and as a signal to old-line Democrats that despite his support of O'Neill's Young-Turk-endorsed amendment, he was not defecting to the New Left. This speech can be viewed as a trade-off with the speech of the preceding day--the first designed to appeal to the Young Turks of the party, the second designed to appeal to the conservative southerners.
Chapter VII
CONCLUSION

Almost everything Hale Boggs did and said in his official congressional role reflected his vision of himself as a compromiser and reconciler. The period dealt with in this study (1962-1972) has frequently been called the "New Reconstruction" and it seems likely that Boggs saw himself as a true and good-purposed reconciliator. Never viewing himself as separate or above the people whom he represented, he never removed himself or his staff from the criticism leveled at regionally-oriented southerners. But he did perhaps see himself as a member of Congress able to reach beyond the parochial bounds of region or party.

The speeches studied here provide evidence of Boggs' self-assigned role as reconciler and compromiser. His attempts to be recognized as a southerner, a national Democrat and a non-partisan United States Representative of the people are exemplified in the speeches he delivered on the floor of the House. Many of the ideas which motivated him are expressed as central themes in the speeches dealt with. Analyzing these speeches leads to several conclusions.

First, Boggs really did serve as reconciler and compromiser in many instances. He was in tune with the mood and make-up of the House, and was able to find common chords among members of disparate
groups. Bringing congressional forces together was often a genuine goal. It was also, however, often an under-lying presumption which formed the premise for other arguments. Boggs seemed to assume that his audience perceived unity or at least the ability to work together as a positive and desirable goal.

Second, Boggs' attempts to develop the image of reconciler and compromiser was at least partly fostered by personal ambition. As mentioned earlier in the study, Boggs was always running for one of the leadership positions in the House. No doubt he considered the ability to unite Democrats in the House and to act as liason between Democrats and Republicans a real asset for someone in the party leadership. Many of his speeches which appear to be attempts to reconcile clashing views in the party may be more genuinely directed at developing Boggs' image as a man who could bring together far-flung points of view. In other words, Boggs' ultimate purpose may have been to create the image of reconciler and compromiser, not necessarily to achieve reconciliation and compromises in and of themselves.

Third, Boggs was especially adept at using a speech which appeared to be for a particular purpose as a vehicle for achieving another, less explicit purpose. Beginning with the introductory chapter, this study has contended that many of the "persuasive" speeches studied were actually delivered because a speech was expected at the time, not as a real attempt to influence the outcome of legislative proposals. However, these speeches probably had a persuasive function as well as a ceremonial function. They were really long-range attempts to influence reactions and toward unity
among Democrats and between parties in the House of Representatives. In this sense, these speeches may be considered as single rhetorical acts which are part of a broader-based rhetorical plan.

Fourth, Boggs' speeches are especially useful as examples of attitudes and ideas which reflect the political and social times in which they occurred. For example, Boggs' speech on the voting rights bill is an excellent example of how a southerner formerly committed to segregation might reassess his point of view in the mid-sixties. His speeches on the legislative reorganization act reflect a growing concern among American voters for responsiveness and responsibility in their congressional representatives. He never spoke in social isolation.

These ideas reflect part of the answer to the central question of this dissertation: how did Boggs attempt to solve the problems of reconciliation and compromise in the House through his speeches on the floor of the House. Other answers lie in the nature of the speeches themselves. For example, Boggs attempted to reach his goals by varying his language on different kinds of occasions. Sometimes his language in Congress was informal and personal. Sometimes it was formal, technical and even aloof. These variations are interesting because the speeches were delivered to essentially the same primary audience. Adjustments were made primarily on the basis of differing situations and subject matter, not on different make up of the audience.

In some speeches Boggs relied more heavily on one kind of appeal than he did in others. He made emotional appeals to such motives as loyalty, patriotism, fair plan and a sense of responsibility.
However, he also used patterns of reasoning and supporting material such as examples and statistics which could be considered essentially logical appeals. Frequently both of these kinds of appeals appeared in the same speech, although one usually predominated.

Boggs' constant concern with his own image and reputation makes it difficult to distinguish between ethical appeals used to support Boggs' own reputation in general. The difficulty may stem in part from Boggs' failure to separate himself as a man from the causes he espoused. He used his individual reputation. Boggs tried to reach his goals by keeping both the small and the large pictures in focus at the same time.

And perhaps this was Boggs' truest and greatest reconciliation—his ultimate compromise. He was a man who lived both in his time and beyond his time. Critics unfamiliar with southern perspectives might have called him behind his times, but few true students of southern politics or sociology would accept that view as realistic. Boggs appears to have seen his involvement with the national Democratic party always as uniquely southern, and his view of southern politics always as uniquely Democratic. He was not willing to give up his southerness or his national perspective. Apparently Boggs saw no conflict in the roles of representative of his region, member of his party, and citizen of his country.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Periodicals and Newspapers


Personal Interviews

Personal interview with Lindy Boggs. New Orleans, La. 10 Aug. 1976

Special Publications and Sources

Eggler, Bruce. The Life and Career of Hale Boggs. New Orleans:
States-Item, special publication, 1973.
Hale Boggs: Memorial Addresses Delivered in Congress. Washington:
University of Texas Oral History Project. Lyndon Baines Johnson
Library. Austin, Texas. Untitled transcripts.
Dorothy Nelson Kirn was born December 1, 1947 to Arnold F. Nelson and Donnie Winstead Nelson in New Orleans, Louisiana. Elementary and high school education was in the public school systems of Thibodaux, Louisiana, Slidell, Louisiana, and Mansfield, Louisiana. In 1965 she graduated from Mansifeld High School.

In the fall of 1965 Dorothy entered Louisiana College in Pineville, Louisiana. As an undergraduate she was active in student government, theatre, debate and forensics, and received a number of awards and honors. In 1968 she graduated cum laude with a B.A. in Speech and English Education. Between 1968 and 1980 Dorothy was enrolled in graduate studies at Louisiana State University. In 1973 she received a Master of Arts degree in Speech. Before beginning work the Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1975 she was a student in the LSU Law School. In 1975 she began studies in the Department of Speech, with minor studies in the Department of English.

As well as academic studies, Dorothy has worked in several commercial businesses, with special emphasis on communication related activities. From 1977 to 1979 she was Director of Forensics and Instructor of Speech Communication at Texas A&M University.

Professional and academic organizations in which she holds membership include Pi Kappa Delta, Alpha Chi, Alpha Psi Omega, the Speech Communication Association, the American Business Communication Association, and the American Forensic Association.
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Dorothy Nelson Kirk

Major Field: Speech

Title of Thesis: HALE BOGGS; A SOUTHERN SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

March 26, 1980