Black-woman identity centrality and interference: an examination of political efficacy and policy attitudes

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BLACK-WOMAN INDENTITY CENTRALITY AND INTERFERENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLICY ATTITUDES

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in The Department of Political Science

by
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B.A., Louisiana State University, 2010
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ABSTRACT

While much of the recent literature centers on a discussion of the “inner conflict” experienced by black women, political scientists have not measured this identity conflict or its political consequences. In this article I fill this gap in the literature by employing a black-woman identity interference scale (Settles 2006) to test whether black women experience particular difficulty aligning their racial and gender interests, and how identity conflict affects their political efficacy (internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, and group political efficacy) and policy attitudes. I find that while black women’s political efficacy is only affect by their race consciousness, their race and gender-related policy attitudes are heavily affected by their black-woman identity and identity interference.
INTRODUCTION

Within the black community, there exists a longstanding debate over the relationship between race consciousness and feminist consciousness (Simien 2006). Many black feminist have argued that the interests of blacks, women, and minorities in general go hand in hand, and that interlocking systems of oppression must be addressed simultaneously. In sharp opposition, others have argued that black feminism detracts from race consciousness. This side believes that a focus on sex discrimination brings out competing interests and inhibits the development of race consciousness. Many black women activists who combat sexism within their community have been criticized by fellow blacks who argue that “airing dirty laundry only feeds white efforts at domination” (Simien and Clawson 2004, 797). Black women are “doubly bound” to support their interests as women and as blacks (Gay and Tate 1998), and thus, they experience “inner conflict” (Simien 2006).

While much of the recent literature centers on a discussion of the “inner conflict” experienced by black women, political scientists have not measured this identity conflict or its political consequences. I seek to fill this gap in the literature by employing a black-woman identity interference scale (Settles 2006) to test whether black women experience particular difficulty aligning their racial and gender interests, and how identity conflict affects their political efficacy (internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, and group political efficacy) and policy attitudes. Black women may experience particular difficulties in political decision-making due to their experience of identity interference. Previous research has demonstrated that one of the benefits of having a strong racial identity is that blacks are then able to take the cognitive shortcut of basing political decisions on group concerns as opposed to individual concerns (e.g., Dawson 1994; Harris et al. 2006). However, for black women it may
not be as straightforward if they see politics through a racial and gender lens. Thus, I also
explore whether identity interference affects black feminist attitudes and policy attitudes.

In this study, I apply intersectionality theory and identity conflict theory empirically to
gain a greater understanding of how black women’s identity affects their political efficacy and
policy attitudes. Given the scarcity of empirical political science research concerning
intersectionality theory, the near absence of identity conflict research in politics, and the
significance of these theoretical perspectives in both the social sciences and the humanities, it is
important for political researchers to investigate intersectionality and identity conflict theories
more thoroughly. I hope that this article is only a starting point in this process.
INTERSECTIONALITY

Intersectionality is a construct that has been in women’s studies for thirty years, but we are only now beginning to see intersectionality being integrated into political research. Intersectionality is defined as the “mutually constitutive relations among social identities” (Warner 2008, 454). In other words, intersectionality is the idea that social identities such as race, gender, and class interact to form qualitatively different meanings and experiences. This formulation stands in contrast to the conceptualization of social identities as functioning independently and as added together to form experience. Collins (1990) describes intersectionality as a “matrix of domination” in which all social identities interact with each other to create life situations that are qualitatively different depending on one’s location in the matrix. Also central to understanding intersectionality is that identities are embedded within status and power structures: “intersecting identities create instances of both opportunity and oppression, where a person can, depending on his or her particular identity in a particular social context, experience advantage, disadvantage, or both at the same time” (Warner 2008, 455). An intersectional approach recognizes the simultaneous effects of race and gender in the lives of black women, and it suggests that black women see themselves more in terms of the integrated black woman identity than separate black people and woman (Settles 2006).

IDENTITY INTERFERENCE

Most people belong to multiple social groups and they have numerous roles with which they identify. One might have the identities of woman, worker, wife, daughter, and Christian. In many contexts, individuals can benefit from having multiple identities as they provide them “opportunities for social interaction, economic mobility, and the accumulation of skills and
abilities” (Settles 2004, 487). However, certain identity combinations are more difficult for to
negotiate, and often the result of holding multiple identities is identity interference. Identity
interference occurs when the pressures (i.e., expectations and norms) associated with one identity
hinder the performance or enactment of another identity (Settles 2004). For example, a female
biology college student who feels she must minimize her gender (e.g., not wearing make-up or
skirts) in class to fit in and to be taken more seriously is experiencing woman-scientist identity
interference; she feels that her woman identity cannot be expressed when she is performing her
scientist identity. Similarly, she may experience interference if other women (say, in her dorm)
exclude her from social activities because she is too “nerdy” and competitive (Settles 2009).

Past studies of interference primarily have focused on the incompatibility between the
work and family roles (i.e., spouse/partner and/or being a parent). These studies have typically
found that interference between the work and family roles is associated with negative outcomes,
including lower work satisfaction (Aryee 1992; Kossek and Ozeki 1998; Thomas and Ganster
1995), lower family satisfaction (Coverman 1989; Netemeyer, Boles, and McMurrian, 1996);
poorer job performance (Fried, Ben-David, Tiegs, Avital, and Yeverechyahu 1998; Netemeyer et
al. 1996), greater depression (Frone, Russell, and Cooper 1997), lower life satisfaction
(Kopelman, Greenhaus, and Connolly 1983; Kossek and Ozeki 1998; Netemeyer et al. 1996),
and an increased number of physical symptoms (Cooke and Rousseau 1984; Coverman 1989).
Other studies have found similar results looking at interference between other identity
combinations including student and athlete (Settles, Sellers, and Damas 2002), woman and
scientist (Settles 2004; 2009), and the racial and gender identities of black women (Settles 2006).

Several explanations for the negative relationship between interference and psychological
outcomes have been suggested. For example, Thoits (1991) suggests that experiencing
interference in identities that are part of one’s self-concept may threaten an individual’s sense of self. In other words, threat may result because the self-concept is comprised, in part, of the conflicting identities. Alternatively, identity interference may create a sense of psychological pressure that diminishes an individual’s ability to cope (Cooke and Rousseau 1984) or overtaxes available cognitive resources (Fried, Ben-David, Tiegs, Avital, and Yevechayahu 1998).

Furthermore, Thoits (1991) proposes that interference related to a central identity will be more threatening to one’s sense of self than conflict in a less important identity. Consequently, when an individual holds multiple central identities there is a greater probability that interference will occur between these identities. For example, Settles (2004) examines identity conflict between the woman and scientist identities and the role of identity centrality as a moderator of the relationship between interference and performance and well-being outcomes. She finds that women-scientists who placed importance on either their woman or scientist identity (or both identities), greater identity interference was related to lower levels of performance and well-being (lower self-esteem, higher depression, and lower life satisfaction). However, for those women-scientists for whom neither identities were central, interference was unrelated to performance and well-being outcomes.

Additionally, interference between multiple central identities may be especially likely if the cultures associated with them differ. The culture of an identity is “a shared set of normative beliefs, including values and ideologies that are held by individuals with a particular identity” (Settles 2004, 488; for discussion of identity culture see also House 1981). These cultural beliefs provide a behavioral script to those individuals who share the identity (Thoits 1991). When the cultures of two identities differ and produce discrepant normative expectations, identity interference may result because movement from enacting one identity to another is difficult for
some individuals. Switching between the enactment of identities with dissimilar cultures (e.g., being a parent and an executive) may require a greater use of cognitive, emotional, or psychological resources and may result in the experience of more interference than switching between identities with similar cultures (e.g., being a parent and a spouse). The difficulty of enacting identities with dissimilar cultures is likely to be compounded when those identities are also central because the individual is motivated to maintain and perform both identities well. For aforementioned reasons, black women are highly susceptible to identity interference because they hold two identities (black and woman) that have a strong potential to be central to their self-concept and these identities have different cultures.

Settles (2006) examines the racial and gender identities of black women using an intersectional framework to assess the extent to which black women see themselves in terms of this unique, combined identity. The purpose of her study twofold: 1) compare the relative importance of black identity, woman identity, and combined black-woman identity; 2) assess the effects of black-woman identity interference on the self-esteem and depression level of black women. She measures the importance (i.e., centrality) of each identity with a single item asking respondents to rate the importance of each identity on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). These items were correlated with relevant multi-item identity centrality scales. Specifically, black identity importance was correlated with the black centrality subscale of the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI; Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, and Smith 1997), woman identity importance was correlated with the woman centrality subscale, adapted from the black centrality subscale of the MIBI, and black-woman identity importance was correlated with both black centrality scale and woman centrality scale. In regards to the relative importance, Settles finds that respondents rated their black-woman identity as marginally
more important than their black identity and significantly more important than their woman identity. However, there was not a significant difference between the mean ratings of black identity importance and woman identity importance. Secondly, in terms of psychological outcomes, Settles finds that interference in the black identity from the woman identity was related to lower self-esteem and higher depression. The relationship between identity interference and negative psychological outcomes was only significant when woman identity interfered with black identity but not when black identity interfered with woman identity.

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Researchers have examined the relationship between racial identity and several factors of psychological orientations such as political interest, political awareness, political efficacy, and trust in government (Tate 1991, 1993; Shingles 1981; Miller et al. 1981; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993). They have found that “racial identity potentially heightens political interest and awareness, boosts group pride and political efficacy, alters perception of group problems, and promotes support for collective action” (Chong and Rogers 2005, 350). If woman identity interferes with the activation of black identity it could potentially hinder the positive effect of black identity on various political orientations.

Given Settles’ (2006) finding of the negative effect of identity interference on black women’s self-esteem as well as the extensive evidence of this same relationship among other groups (see e.g., Pietromonaco, Manis, and Frohardt-Lane 1986; Reitzes and Mutran 1994), it seems reasonable to extend their logic to a related political concept, political efficacy. Since this is the first study in political science to apply an identity interference scale, this is the most logical place to start. It is widely acknowledged that individuals’ self-evaluations consist of two dimensions, one that reflects their feelings of moral worth (i.e., self-esteem) and another that
reflects their feelings of competency or agency (i.e., self-efficacy) (Gecas 1989; Hughes and Demo 1989; Thomas and Keith 2001).

Political efficacy refers to an individual’s perception of her ability to impact politics based on the belief that personal effort can have a meaningful effect. Political efficacy is subcategorized into two related dimensions: internal political efficacy and external political efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to an individual’s belief in their competency to understand politics and take part in the political system, while external efficacy refers to one’s belief in government responsiveness to its citizens’ demands. Baxter and Lansing (1983, 51) describe political efficacy as “a measure of the individual’s self-esteem in relation to the political system.” In fact, Cohen, Vigoda, and Samorly (2001) examine whether the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation is direct or mediated by self-esteem, locus of control, and political efficacy and find that self esteem and political efficacy are highly correlated and share the same mediating role. To the extent that black women experience particular difficulties for political reasons, identity interference can be expected to negatively affect black women’s feelings of political self-efficacy. There is already evidence in the literature that black women report the lowest feelings of political efficacy as compared to other race sex groups (Baxter and Lansing 1981).

Traditionally political efficacy captures the individual’s level of influence in politics and the government’s responsiveness to the individual. However, when it comes to black Americans, political efficacy has an additional group component as well. Given blacks strong community ties, it appears political efficacy functions among blacks in terms of group influence and government responsiveness to the group (Mangum 2003). Group or collective political efficacy “refers to a group’s shared beliefs in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the course
of action required to produce given levels of attainment” (Caprara et al. 2009). Just as internal political efficacy could be negatively affected by the interruption of racial identity activation, so too could collective political efficacy.

BLACK WOMEN IN POLITICAL RESEARCH

**Empirical Approaches**

Political scientists have taken four main approaches to studying black feminist consciousness. First, scholars have used on survey items designed to tap feminist consciousness among women in general, not black women in particular. They have relied survey questions that ask about women’s roles in society and in the family (Wilcox 1990), that tap into gendered political stereotypes (Wilcox 1997), or that assess support for the mainstream women’s movement (Wilcox 1992; Wilcox and Thomas 1992). However, these items tap feminist attitudes among primarily white, middle-class women. Black women and white women have experienced sexism in very different ways in this country. Stereotypes of black and white women are very different. Not to mention African-American women are more likely to be heads of household and participate in the workforce more than white women (King 1988; Guy-Sheftall 1995).

Second, other researchers have measured gender identification and race identification and then used the interaction of those two variables to create a measure of black feminist consciousness (Robinson 1987; Gay and Tate 1998). This strategy has been criticized because it treats race and gender as separate constructs and uses them as additive constructs. In other words, it does not capture the simultaneity of oppression. “Just because a citizen has a strong gender identity and a strong race identity does not necessarily mean that person will recognize the unique situation faced by black women in American society” (Simien 2006, 30).
The third method that has been used to measure black women’s attitudes is in comparison to those of other race-gender subgroups (Kane and Whipkey 2009; Ovadia 2001; Ransford and Miller 1983). In a study of public support for gender-related affirmative action, Kane and Whipkey (2009) use the same categories of predictors that have been shown to affect attitudes toward race-based affirmative action (e.g., interests, racial attitudes, and stratification beliefs) to test whether similar measures can explain public attitudes toward gender-related affirmative action. They find that gender related interests, gender attitudes, and gender stratification beliefs do not play as significant a role in explaining attitudes toward affirmative action for women like racial attitudes and beliefs do in explaining affirmative action for blacks. Also, women and blacks and Latinos are significantly more supportive of gender-related affirmative action than men and whites.

The last way that black feminism has been measured in political research comes from Simien (2004; 2006) who outlines four themes of black feminist consciousness. First, she uses two items to capture the concept of intersectionality, which suggests that interlocking oppressions circumscribe the lives of black women through day-to-day encounters with race and gender discrimination (Crenshaw 1995; hooks 1984; King 1988). Second, she asks an item regarding the issue of gender inequality within the black community (Collins 2000; hooks 1984). Third, feminism benefits the black community by challenging patriarchy as an institutionalized oppressive structure. Fourth, black feminist consciousness derives from a politicized identification with black women as a group. She measures this last dimension with an item of linked fate.

I question the legitimacy of Simien’s measure for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, Simien argues that black men can be black feminist because black feminist
consciousness derives from the mere “recognition” that black women are victims of racism and sexism. “Black feminism is about ideology, not biology” (Simien 2006, 39). Based on this idea, some might argue that white women can possess black feminist consciousness simply by recognizing that black women suffer from discrimination on two fronts. Secondly, Simien admits that her identification measure, linked fate with black women, measures attachment based on race not gender. (Simien and Clawson 2004) find that the link fate with black women item loads strongly on the racial identity but does not have a significant loading on the black feminist factor they conclude that this question seems to measure a sense of when fate with black women based on racial solidarity alone. Not to mention Simien claims that this identification with black women “stems from their common experiences with racism and sexism.” This gives the impression that experience is something personally lived. But have black men really lived sexual discrimination in the same way that black women have?

Practically speaking, based on her measure, Simien (2006,16) finds that “black men are equally, and in some cases, more likely to support black feminist tenets than black women.” Collins argues that the black women’s standpoint described above is “‘unique’” to this group, having emerged from the lived experiences within the intersecting oppressions of race, class, and gender. If black men are truly just as likely as black women to hold this perspective, then the proposed relationship between social location and consciousness needs to be reevaluated. Collins (1998, 217) writes: “Shared disadvantages and shared interests are not sufficient for the development of group consciousness.” The black community has a history of putting the needs of black men in front of the needs of black women “for the good of the race.” Simien’s measure does not weed out those that recognize the principles of black feminism from those who are truly committed to political action to achieve equality across the board.
Policy Attitudes

Gay and Tate (1998) examine the effects of black women’s race and gender identification on liberal policy issues. They create an interaction term based on linked fate with women and linked fate with blacks in order to investigate two hypotheses: 1) gender identification among black women increases support for liberal policies; and 2) gender identification among black women boosts the effect of racial identification on liberal policy support. They look at attitudes toward three race-specific policies (government assistance to minorities, busing for integration, and affirmative action) and three general social programs (food stamps spending, spending on schools, and Medicare spending). They find that gender identification slightly enhances the liberal effect of racial identification on all of the policies except government assistance to minorities. However, Gay and Tate’s (1998, 165) results “indicate more conclusively that the liberalism on the six policy issues is best explained by the intensity of black women’s race identification alone.” They suggest that gender identification may be more significant in black women’s evaluation of other policy areas particularly those concerning women such as abortion.

Simien and Clawson (2004) investigate the impact of black feminist consciousness and race consciousness on a gender related policy (abortion) and a race related policy (affirmative action). They test two hypotheses: 1) black feminist consciousness impacts abortion attitudes even when controlling for feminist consciousness; and 2) for affirmative action, race consciousness will override the impact of black feminist consciousness. They find that black feminist consciousness increases support for abortion among both men and women, while feminist identification only bolsters support abortion among black women, but has not effect on black men. Also, race identification leads to less support for abortion among black women. However, black feminist consciousness does not affect blacks’ attitudes toward affirmative
action. Instead, system blame (i.e., race consciousness) drives attitudes toward this policy. And black women support affirmative action less than black men. Simien and Clawson (2004, 808) conclude that “the framing of affirmative action as a race issue dampens the influence of black feminist consciousness while enhancing the effect of system blame.”

**Racial and Gender Discrimination**

It is possible that perceptions of discrimination are significant in predicting black women’s gender and racial policy attitudes. Gay and Tate (1998, 182) claim that black women view politics through a racial lens partly because “most consider racism a greater evil than sexism” but also because “gender is simply a weak vehicle for political identification.” They speculate that this weak identification could be due to the perception that racial discrimination occurs much more often than sexual discrimination. While most blacks acknowledge having experienced racial discrimination, comparatively few women recognize having experienced gender discrimination. This notion is somewhat supported by Levin, Sinclair, Veniegas, and Taylor’s (2002) research which examines the joint impact of gender and race on expectations of experiencing general discrimination. They test two hypotheses: 1) the double-jeopardy hypothesis argues that because black and Latino women are part of two low-status groups they will expect to experience more general discrimination than men of color, white women, and white men; 2) the ethnic-prominence model predicts ethnic minority women will be the same in their expectations of general discrimination as ethnic minority men because these expectations will be influenced more by perceptions of ethnic discrimination. Their results fully support the ethnic-prominence model.

Tate (1993) repeats this speculation in an earlier work in which she compares black women’s racial identity level to that of black men and finds “black women have weaker racial
identities than black men” because they are less likely to see themselves as victims of racial discrimination. However, neither Gay and Tate (1998) nor Tate (1993) tests this theory. We know from previous literature that African Americans for whom race is central to their identity are more likely to attribute an ambiguous discriminatory event to race (Shelton and Sellers 2000) as well as report higher levels of personal experiences of discrimination (Sellers and Shelton 2003). I address this gap in my research by including perceptions of personal discrimination and group discrimination on the basis of gender and race as separate independent variables.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1: Black women who experience less interference between their black and woman identities will have a greater propensity for high political efficacy.

Hypothesis 2: Black women with more central black-woman identity will have a greater propensity for high political efficacy.

Hypothesis 3: Black women who experience significant interference between their black and woman identities will be less likely to express support for race and gender-related policies.

Hypothesis 4: Black women with more central black-woman identity will be more likely to support race and gender-related policies.

SUBJECTS

This study included a sample of 98 black women recruited from the Baton Rouge community in order to ensure diversity with respect to age, education, income, marital status, etc. For convenience purposes, participants were recruited in person from two state agencies (LA Department of Social Services and LA Workforce Commission), three local churches, and around the Louisiana State University campus. Participants were approached in an informal manner and asked to participate in a brief opinion survey on social and political issues. Participation was strictly voluntary and verbal consent was obtained from all participants. Once participants completed the survey, they were explained the purpose of the study more fully and assured their responses would be kept confidential.
MEASURES

Dependent Variables

Policy attitudes. The first set of analyses examines respondents’ attitudes toward five policies. Two of the policies deal with matters of race: preferential hiring for blacks and increasing opportunities for blacks to go to college. The other three policies deal with gender: government assistance for women, equal pay for women in the workforce, and stricter child support laws. Preferential hiring for blacks was measured with the item “Because of past discrimination blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion.” Government assistance for women was measured with the item “The government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic situation for women.” All items were coded as dichotomous variables, “0” for disagree and “1” for agree.

Internal Political efficacy refers to citizens’ feelings of personal competence “to understand and to participate effectively in politics” (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 290). Internal political efficacy was measured on a 4-item index (Niemi, Craig and Mattei 1991) tapping into the respondents’ self-perceptions of the following: how well qualified they were to participate in politics; if they believe they were better informed about politics and government than most people; if they had good understanding of the important political issues facing the country; and if they believe they could do as good a job in public office as most others (see Appendix A for scale items). Responses were measured with a 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) scale (α=0.89).

External political efficacy refers to citizens’ perceptions of the government’s responsiveness to citizens’ demands (e.g., “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think;” “People like me don't have any say about what the government does”). In other
words, external political efficacy measures the degree of influence that people believe they can have in politics due to the functioning of the political system, as opposed to their personal capabilities. Responses were measured with a 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) scale (α=.94).

Group political efficacy “refers to a group’s shared beliefs in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the course of action required to produce given levels of attainment” (Caprara et al. 2009). See items in Appendix A. Responses were measured with a 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) scale (α=0.87).

Independent Variables

Black centrality measures the extent to which an individual defines themselves with regard to race. The racial centrality measure is an 8-item subscale of the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (Sellers et al., 1997). For example, “Being Black is an important reflection of who I am” (see Appendix A). Participants indicated on a 7-point response scale the extent to which they 1 (strongly disagreed) to 7 (strongly agreed) with each item. Appropriate items were reverse scored and a mean score was computed across all items. For the racial centrality score, higher numbers indicated a stronger identity as an African American (α=.83).

Woman centrality measures the extent to which being a woman and belonging to the community of women is important to an individual’s overall identity. The woman centrality scale is an 8-item measure adapted from the racial centrality subscale of the MIBI (Sellers et al., 1997). For example, “My destiny is tied to the destiny of other women” (see Appendix A). Participants indicated on a 7-point response scale the extent to which they 1 (strongly disagreed) to 7 (strongly agreed) with each item. Appropriate items were reverse scored and a mean score
was computed across all items. For the woman centrality score, higher numbers indicated a stronger identity as a woman ($\alpha=.70$).

Black-woman centrality assesses the extent to which black women see themselves in terms of this combined dual identity. An interaction term was constructed based on racial centrality $\times$ woman centrality. This measurement strategy has been criticized for assuming race and gender identification are separate constructs and not measuring the simultaneous effects of race and gender. Instead respondents should be asked to consider both constructs simultaneously. However, when Simien and Clawson (2004) measured linked fate with black women they found that the item actually measures racial identity instead of black feminist consciousness. Furthermore, the interference scale does capture the simultaneous effects of these identities insofar as they conflict.

Black-woman identity interference. The black-woman identity interference scale was created by Settles (2006) to assess the degree to which being black and being a woman interfered with each other. The overall scale consisted of two subscales. The first subscale consisted of four items that measured the extent to which one’s black identity interferes with one’s woman identity, and the second subscale consisted of three items that measured the extent to which one’s woman identity interferes with one’s black identity (see Appendix A). For all items, participants were asked to “Please select the number that best reflects how true each statement is of you.” They used a seven-point rating scale that ranged from 1 (not at all true of me) to 4 (somewhat true of me) to 7 (extremely true of me). A mean of all items in each subscale was computed such that higher numbers indicated more black identity interferes with woman identity ($\alpha=.83$) or more woman identity interferes with black identity ($\alpha=.91$).
Perceived discrimination was measured for both gender and race, personal and group. All items were measured on 7-point scales ranging from 1(not at all/strongly disagree) to 7 (very much/strongly agree). Higher ratings indicate greater discrimination. Perceived personal gender discrimination was measured by the item “I experience discrimination because of my gender.” Perceived group gender discrimination was measured for women by the item “Women experience discrimination because of their gender.” Perceived personal ethnic discrimination was measured by the item “I experience discrimination because of my race.” Perceived group ethnic discrimination was measured by the item “Other members of my racial group experience discrimination.” This measure comes from (Levin, Sinclair, Veniegas, and Taylor 2002).

Controls

To isolate the influence of black identity centrality, woman identity centrality, and black-woman interference, I control for relevant individual-level characteristics and socioeconomic indicators. See Appendix B for a sample survey with exact item wording. Demographic categories include age (coded with “0-3” dummy values for ages “18-29,” “30-44,” “45-64,” and “over 64”); education (coded with “0-6” dummy values for “some high school,” “high school diploma/equivalent,” “some college,” “Associates/2 year degree,” “Bachelor’s/4 year degree,” “some graduate/professional school,” and “graduate or professional degree”); income (coded with “0-5” dummy values for “less than $15K,” “$15-30K,” “$30-45K,” “$45-60K,” “$60K-$75K,” and “over $75K”); employment status (coded with “1” dummy value for employed and “0” for not employed); marital status (coded with dummy values “0” for “not currently married” and “1” for “are currently married”); and religiosity (coded with “0-3” dummy values for “never,” “once or twice a year,” “once or twice a month,” and “at least once a week”).
ANALYSIS

In order to test my hypotheses I run two different set of analyses. First, I use multiple regression analysis to examine the effects of black and woman centrality, identity interference, discrimination factors, and demographic characteristics on black women’s feelings of political efficacy. Specifically, I observe the impact of black centrality, woman centrality, the interaction of black and woman centrality, black identity interference, woman identity interference, and perceptions of racial and gender discrimination on respondents’ sense of internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, and group political efficacy.

In the second set of analyses, I examine the factors that predict black women’s policy attitudes. Because the dependent variables (policy attitudes) are dichotomous, I use binary logistic regressions. Like multiple regression, binary logistic regression is capable of predicting an outcome (in this case, whether respondents will support a public policy) based on a number of independent (or predictor) variables. Unlike multiple regressions, which cannot be used with dichotomous dependent variables, binary logistic regressions are designed exclusively for such purpose. Specifically, I employ binary logistic regression to examine respondents’ propensity to support race and gender-related policies.
RESULTS

DESCRIPTIVES

Table 1 summarizes the frequencies of respondents’ demographic measures. Percentage of respondents is not included since the sample size is 98 and the percent is nearly identical to the frequency. As can be seen from Table 1, the majority of respondents (about 67%) were within the younger cohorts of 18-29 and 30-44, while almost 25% of respondents were ages 45-64 and only 8% were 65 and older. In terms of education, respondents represent a rather educated sample population with over 60% having at least an Associate or two year degree. Specifically, 22 respondents had an Associate or two year degree, 23 had a Bachelor’s, 12 had some graduate or professional schooling and 3 earned a graduate or professional degree. The 12 respondents that indicated they had some graduate schooling were added to the college degree category in Table 1 since it can be assumed that they earned an undergraduate degree before attending graduate school.

In regards to income, the majority of respondents (about 67%) are in the lower income brackets, meaning that their households bring in $45,000 or less a year, while the other 32% of respondents’ household incomes are $46,000 and above. The income categories in Table 1 are expanded for convenience so what cannot be seen is that 10% of respondents bring in less than $15,000 a year and 9% make over $75,000 a year. The vast majority of respondents (75%) are employed and a little more than half (52%) are married. Lastly, respondents represent a pretty religious sample population; almost 75% of them attend church at least once or twice a month. This is not surprising considering many participants were recruited from local churches.
Table 1
Frequencies of Respondents' Socioeconomic Backgrounds

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<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma or less</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college, no degree</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College degree (AA or BA)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate/professional degree</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$30,000 or less</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$31,000-$45,000</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$46,000-$60,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$61,000 or above</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church Attendance</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice/year</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice/month</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice/week</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 98

Table 2 presents the scale means and standard deviations for the identity centrality subscales, the identity interference subscales, and the efficacy scales. Recall that the centrality scales range from 1 to 7 as do the interference scales. The efficacy scales range from 1 to 4. As can be seen, respondents have comparable black centrality and woman centrality means as well as black identity and woman identity interference means. There seems to be greater variance in how they rated the centrality of black identity compared to the standard deviation in the centrality of their woman identity. However, this is not the case for identity interference. This
sample of black women appears to feel that their black identity interferes with their woman
identity just as much as their woman identity interferes with their black identity. Yet, as I discuss
below woman identity interference seems to have a much a significant effect in predicting black
women’s policy attitudes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Scale Means and Standard Deviations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Centrality</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Interference</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Interference</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Efficacy</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Efficacy</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N = 98</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 summarizes the frequency of respondents’ support for the five policy issues. As a
whole, respondents expressed the greatest support for the policy of equal pay for women; about
82% of them agreed that the government should do more to ensure equal pay for women.
Respondents showed equal support for the government increasing college opportunities for
blacks and government aid for women. Stricter child support laws received just over half of
respondents support and preferential hiring for blacks garnered exactly half of respondents’
support. This is likely because the latter two policies which received only half of respondents’
support are more controversial than the rest. College opportunities for blacks and the
government’s involvement in improving women’s social and economic situation seem more
equitable than preferential hiring for blacks. Many blacks want an equal playing field, not special
treatment; something like creating opportunities for them to get a college education so they can
earn a decent living and work their way up in the workforce like anyone else. Preferential hiring
on the basis of race may seem less appealing to blacks because it says nothing about
qualifications or equity. The government aid for women item is rather vague and it does not actually specify a policy such that the government should give women money or any other aid. It simply states that the government should do all it can to improve the social and economic position of women, which can be interpreted in many different ways. This could be why the aid for women policy does not generate obvious divergence like the preferential hiring item nor does it garner overwhelming alignment like the equal pay for women item. The child support item may be controversial on racial grounds, which I will address below in the discussion of the predictor variables for policy attitudes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preferential Hiring for Blacks</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Opportunity for Blacks</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Aid for Women</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Pay for Women</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter Child Support Laws</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POLITICAL EFFICACY

In this first set of analyses, I examine the interaction effect of black and woman centrality, identity interference, discrimination factors, and demographic characteristics on black women’s feelings of political efficacy—internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, and group political efficacy. Multiple regression analysis was independently performed for each of the efficacy subscales. Table 4 presents the multiple regression results for political efficacy. I was completely surprised to find that the only independent variable that reached statistical significance was black centrality. In fact, black centrality was very significant for internal political efficacy (b = -.183, t = -2.007, β = -.266), group efficacy (b = .424, t =3.608, β = .455), and group efficacy (b = -.237, t = -3.043, β = -.383). Specifically, a 1 unit increase in black
centrality is a .183 unit decrease in internal political efficacy. Also, a 1 unit increase in black
centrality is a .237 unit decrease in group political efficacy. Looking at Table 4 at the
unstandardized coefficient for external efficacy it appears black centrality has a positive effect on
external efficacy. However, if we interpret this result using the external efficacy scale items we
see that the positive coefficient actually represents respondents’ greater propensity to agree with
the statements like, “People like me don't have any say about what the government does;” and “I
don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.” Such statements clearly do not
reflect a high political efficacy; quite the opposite, they reflect an individual’s complete lack of
political efficacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Internal Efficacy</th>
<th>External Efficacy</th>
<th>Group Efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality</td>
<td>-.183* (0.091)</td>
<td>.424** (0.118)</td>
<td>-.237** (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Centrality</td>
<td>.010 (.100)</td>
<td>-.075 (.128)</td>
<td>.038 (.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black × Woman Centrality</td>
<td>-.041 (.069)</td>
<td>.084 (.089)</td>
<td>-.079 (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Id. Interference</td>
<td>.079 (.069)</td>
<td>.027 (.088)</td>
<td>-.098 (.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Id. Interference</td>
<td>-.031 (.054)</td>
<td>.080 (.069)</td>
<td>-.042 (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Race Discrimination</td>
<td>.033 (.071)</td>
<td>-.085 (.091)</td>
<td>.017 (.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Race Discrimination</td>
<td>.104 (.079)</td>
<td>-.004 (.102)</td>
<td>.057 (.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Gender Discrimination</td>
<td>-.130 (.090)</td>
<td>.065 (.116)</td>
<td>-.011 (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Gender Discrimination</td>
<td>-.051 (.088)</td>
<td>.043 (.113)</td>
<td>-.029 (.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.009 (.097)</td>
<td>-.107 (.124)</td>
<td>.060 (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.046 (.091)</td>
<td>-.156 (.117)</td>
<td>.088 (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.153 (.104)</td>
<td>.032 (.134)</td>
<td>.051 (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-.067 (.215)</td>
<td>.001 (.277)</td>
<td>-.182 (.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>-.078 (.167)</td>
<td>.131 (.215)</td>
<td>.066 (.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.024 (.081)</td>
<td>.071 (.105)</td>
<td>.028 (.069)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²          .252   .332   .334

Note: b = unstandardized coefficient with standard errors in parenthesis. *p < .05. **p < .01.
POLICY ATTITUDES

I rely on binary logistic regression for my data analysis of respondents’ policy attitudes. Table 5 presents the results of the model used to predict policy attitudes. The results show that black identity centrality, woman identity centrality, and the interaction of the two are statistically significant in the model depending on the specific policy being used as the dependent variable. Black centrality is only significant in predicting attitudes toward government aid for women ($\beta = -4.47, p < .019$). Specifically, for every one unit increase in black centrality, the log odds of supporting government aid for women decreases by 4.47. Woman centrality is significant in predicting attitudes toward two policy issues, preferential hiring for blacks ($\beta = -7.67, p < .006$) and government aid for women ($\beta = -4.18, p < .041$). Black women, for whom woman identity is more central, are less likely to support preferential hiring for blacks and government aid for women. The interaction effect of black and woman centrality is positive for all five policies, although it is only significant in predicting support for three of them, preferential hiring for blacks ($\beta = 1.25, p < .016$), government aid for women ($\beta = 1.0, p < .016$), and stricter child support laws ($\beta = 1.06, p < .028$). It is possible that the identity centrality measures did not register significant for increasing opportunities for blacks to go to college and equal pay for women because the vast majority of respondents agreed with these policies and there was less variance that could be accounted for.

The results indicate that Black-woman identity interference is very significant in predicting policy attitudes. For example, black women who feel that their black identity interferes with their woman identity are significantly less likely to support the government increasing opportunities for blacks to go to college ($\beta = -.932, p < .035$) and stricter child support laws ($\beta = -.588, p < .034$). Oppositely, black women who feel that their woman identity interferes with their black identity are significantly more likely to support increasing college
opportunities for blacks ($\beta = .819, p < .018$), preferential hiring for blacks ($\beta = .748, p < .02$), equal pay for women ($\beta = 1.29, p < .05$), and stricter child support laws ($\beta = .448, p < .05$).

Looking at Table 5, all of the beta ($\beta$) coefficients for black identity interference are consistently negative across all five of the policy issues, while the beta ($\beta$) coefficients for woman identity interference are consistently positive.

An important statistic to report from the table is the Wald, which tests the significance of individual coefficients in the model. The Wald shows whether or not the $\beta$ value for a predictor variable is significantly different from zero, in which case it can be assumed that the predictor is making a statistically significant contribution to the outcome. Looking at Table 5, the model for preferential hiring for blacks, we know for example, that woman centrality has a Wald statistic of 7.57, which is significantly different from zero, with a significance value of .016. The Wald statistic is comparable to the $t$-test used in multiple regression analysis.

In terms of discrimination factors the results show that perceptions of group racial discrimination significantly increases the likelihood that respondents will support increasing college opportunities for blacks ($\beta = .819, p < .02$) as well as significantly decrease the propensity of respondents to support stricter child support laws ($\beta = -.622, p < .04$). Also, perceptions of gender group discrimination will significantly decrease respondents’ propensity to support preferential hiring for blacks ($\beta = -1.23, p < .021$). Lastly, among demographic measures, age was particularly significant in predicting policy support for preferential hiring for blacks, creating more college opportunities for blacks, government aid for women, and equal pay for women. Income was also significant in predicting negative support for increasing college opportunities for blacks and equal pay for women, while employment was significant in predicting positive support for preferential hiring for blacks and college opportunities for blacks.
Table 5
Impact of Black and Woman Centrality Interaction and Identity Interference on Policy Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Preferential Hiring for Blacks</th>
<th>College Opportunities for Blacks</th>
<th>Govt. Aid for Women</th>
<th>Equal Pay for Women</th>
<th>Stricter Child Support Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$ (SE)</td>
<td>$W$</td>
<td>$\beta$ (SE)</td>
<td>$W$</td>
<td>$\beta$ (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality</td>
<td>-3.954 (2.39)</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>.584 (.207)</td>
<td>.079 (2.07)</td>
<td>-1.105 (2.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Centrality</td>
<td>-7.67** (2.79)</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>-2.89 (2.21)</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>-1.283 (2.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black × Woman Interaction</td>
<td>1.25** (.522)</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>.302 (.418)</td>
<td>.522 (4.18)</td>
<td>.104 (.556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Id. Interference</td>
<td>-.105 (.359)</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>-.932 (.443)</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>.356 (.432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Id. Interference</td>
<td>.748* (.313)</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>.819 (3.347)</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>.129* (.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Race Discrimination</td>
<td>-.604 (.315)</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>-.611 (.335)</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>.073 (.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Race Discrimination</td>
<td>.592 (.326)</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>.819 (3.47)</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>.563 (.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Gender Discrimination</td>
<td>-.380 (.376)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.078 (.416)</td>
<td>.035 (.444)</td>
<td>.572 (.541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Gender Discrimination</td>
<td>-1.23* (.533)</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>-.052 (.433)</td>
<td>.014 (.384)</td>
<td>-.656 (.528)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.835* (.421)</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.098 (4.50)</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>.893 (3.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.307 (.384)</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>.375 (.390)</td>
<td>.927 (.340)</td>
<td>.072 (.542)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.454 (.456)</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>-1.4 (4.96)</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>-.360 (.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>2.60** (.957)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.25 (1.031)</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>.223 (.815)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>.114 (.673)</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.197 (.713)</td>
<td>.076 (.592)</td>
<td>.168 (.848)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.278 (.342)</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>-.442 (.342)</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>.080 (.286)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nagelkerke $R^2$ .577 .542 .366 .468 .411

Note: $\beta$ = beta coefficient with standard errors in parenthesis. $W = \text{Wald statistic} = (\beta/SE)^2$

*p < .05, **p < .01.
At the bottom of Table 5, I report the Nagelkerke R² statistic for each policy model. These statistics can be interpreted like the R² in linear regression. The R² statistics do not measure goodness of fit of the model but reflect how useful the explanatory variables are in predicting the outcome variable. As can be seen, the Nagelkerke R² statistics reported in Table 5 indicate that the model is a decent fit for predicting policy support.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to gain a better understanding of how black women manage their “dual identity” which often places them in a position to choose between the interests of the race and those of their gender. While much of the recent literature centers on a discussion of the “inner conflict” experienced by black women, political scientists have not measured this identity conflict or its political consequences. I have sought to fill this gap in the literature by employing a black-woman identity interference scale (Settles 2006) to test whether black women experience particular difficulty aligning their racial and gender interests, and how identity conflict affects their political efficacy (internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, and group political efficacy) and policy attitudes.

By using an identity interference scale I have attempted to build a case for the unique identity resulting from the intersectionality of race and gender that can only be possessed by black women. Previous work on black women in political science (e.g., Dawson 1994; Simien 2006) have tried to show that black men can just as easily be feminist as black women because they too can possess a feminist consciousness. I think this is mistake. Group identity, a sense of belonging to a group, is a necessary component of group consciousness (Gurin 1985). It cannot be argued that black men have been forced to choose between their interests as blacks and their interests as women. Quite honestly, if we argue that black men are just as likely to be feminists as black women (as those like Simien and Dawson have done) then what is the point of studying the differences between race and gender consciousness?

At any rate, I have applied intersectionality theory and identity conflict theory empirically to gain a greater understanding of how black women’s identity affects their political efficacy and policy attitudes. While the results show that black women’s political efficacy is not
affected by woman identity or identity interference, I have made a strong case that at least their policy attitudes are indeed significantly affected by these measures. Still, the finding that black women do not in fact derive their political efficacy from their gender identity but instead only their racial identity is still significant. This study represents a beginning for exploring identity conflict in the politics of black women. The findings are significant enough that future research should continue building a case for the unique political perspective of black women.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: SCALE ITEMS

Internal Political Efficacy Scale (α=.89)
1. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.
2. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.
3. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.
4. I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.

External political efficacy (α=.94)
1. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
2. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.

Group political efficacy (α=.87)
1. If enough blacks vote, they can make a difference in who gets elected President.
2. Black people can make a difference in who gets elected in local elections.
3. If blacks, other minorities, the poor, and women pulled together, they could decide how this country is run.

Black Centrality scale (α=.83)
1. Overall, being Black has very little to do with how I feel about myself. (R)
2. In general, being Black is an important part of my self-image.
3. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other Black people.
4. Being Black is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (R)
5. I have a strong sense of belonging to Black people.
6. I have a strong attachment to other Black people.
7. Being Black is an important reflection of who I am.
8. Being Black is not a major factor in my social relationships. (R)

Woman Centrality scale (α=.70)
1. Overall, being a woman has very little to do with how I feel about myself. (R)
2. In general, being a woman is an important part of my self-image.
3. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other women.
4. Being a woman is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (R)
5. I have a strong sense of belonging to women.
6. I have a strong attachment to other women.
7. Being a woman is an important reflection of who I am.
8. Being a woman is not a major factor in my social relationships. (R)

Black Identity Interferes with Woman Identity Subscale (α=.83)
1. My family and friends would be more supportive of my involvement in Black organizations than my involvement in women’s organizations.
2. I run into obstacles in women’s organizations and activities because I am Black.
3. I sometimes feel that I must sacrifice my goals as a woman to further the progress of Black people.
4. I sometimes worry that being Black detracts from my female identity.
Woman Identity Interferes with Black Identity Subscale ($\alpha=.91$)

1. When I am with a group of Black people, it seems like my opinions are less important because I am a woman.
2. I find that being a woman makes it harder for me to fit in with Black people.
3. It is harder for me to work toward improving the lives of Black people because I am a woman.
APPENDIX B: SURVEY

People have different ideas and opinions about politics. I would like to know what you think about the following matters. Please indicate which choice is most true for you.

1. To have power and improve their position in the United States: Black people should be more active in black organizations OR Each black person should work hard to improve his or her own personal situation.

2. To have power and improve their position in the United States: Women should be more active in women organizations OR Each woman should work hard to improve her own personal situation.

3. Because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Agree Disagree

4. The government in Washington should make every effort to improve the economic situation for women. Agree Disagree

5. The government should do more to increase opportunities for blacks to go to college. Agree Disagree

6. There should be stricter child support laws to hold fathers responsible and better ensure that mothers get the necessary support for their children. Agree Disagree

7. The government should do more to ensure equal pay for women in the workforce. Agree Disagree

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 1 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. If enough blacks vote, they can make a difference in who gets elected President.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Black people can make a difference in who gets elected in local elections.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. If blacks, other minorities, the poor, and women pulled together, they could decide how this country is run.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Public officials don’t care much what people like me think.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. People like me don’t have much say about what the government does.

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Overall, being Black has very little to do with how I feel about myself.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In general, being Black is an important part of my self-image.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other Black people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Being Black is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I have a strong sense of belonging to Black people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I have a strong attachment to other Black people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Being Black is an important reflection of who I am.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Being Black is not a major factor in my social relationships.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Overall, being a woman has very little to do with how I feel about myself.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. In general, being a woman is an important part of my self-image.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other women.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Being a woman is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I have a strong sense of belonging to women.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I have a strong attachment to other women.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Being a woman is an important reflection of who I am.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Being a woman is not a major factor in my social relationships.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. I experience discrimination because of my race.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Other members of my racial group experience discrimination.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. I experience discrimination because of my gender.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Other women experience gender discrimination.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please indicate the number that best reflects how true each statement is of you. 1 (Not at all true of me) to 4 (Somewhat true of me) to 7 (Extremely true of me)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Extremely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. My family and friends would be more supportive of my involvement in black organizations than women’s organizations.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I run into obstacles in women’s organizations and activities because I am black.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. I sometimes feel that I must sacrifice my goals as a woman to further the progress of black people.
4. I sometimes worry that being black detracts from my female identity.
5. When I am with a group of black people, it seems like my opinion are less important because I am a woman.
6. I find that being a woman makes it harder for me to fit in with black people.
7. It is harder for me to work toward improving the lives of black people because I am a woman.
8. I am a worthy member of the black community.
9. I feel I don’t have much to offer to the black community.
10. I am a cooperative participant in the black community.
11. I often feel I’m a useless member of the black community.

The final portion of this survey asks for basic demographic information.

1. How old are you?

2. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a conservative, moderate or liberal?
   - Conservative
   - Moderate
   - Liberal

3. What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? Circle one.
   - a. Some high school, no diploma
   - b. High school diploma/equivalent
   - c. Some college, no degree
   - d. Associates/2 year degree
   - e. Bachelor’s/4 year degree
   - f. Some graduate/professional school
   - g. Graduate or professional degree

4. Which of the following income groups includes your TOTAL FAMILY INCOME in 2012 before taxes?
   - a. Less than $15,000
   - b. Between $15,000 and $30,000
   - c. Between $30,000 and $45,000
   - d. Between $45,000 and $60,000
   - e. Between $60,000 and $75,000
   - f. Between $75,000 and over

5. Are you currently working either full time or part time? Yes  No

6. Are you currently married? Yes  No

7. How often do you attend religious services?
   - a. Never
   - b. Once or twice a year
   - c. Once or twice a month
   - d. At least once a week
APPENDIX C: IRB CERTIFICATE

Application for Exemption from Institutional Oversight

Unless qualified as meeting the specific criteria for exemption from Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight, ALL LSU research/projects using living humans as subjects, or samples, or data obtained from humans, directly or indirectly, with or without their consent, must be approved or exempted in advance by the LSU IRB. This form helps the IRB determine if a project may be exempted and is used to request an exemption.

Applicant: Please fill out the application in its entirety and include the completed application as well as parts A-F, listed below, when submitting to the IRB. Once the application is completed, please submit two copies of the completed application to the IRB Office or to a member of the Human Subjects Screening Committee. Members of this committee can be found at...

A Complete Application Includes All of the Following:
(A) Two copies of this completed form and two copies of parts B thru F.
(B) A brief project description (adequate to evaluate risks to subjects and to explain your responses to Parts 1 & 2)
(C) Copies of all instruments to be used.
(D) If this proposal is part of a grant proposal, include a copy of the proposal and all recruitment material.
(E) The consent form that you will use in the study (see part 3 for more information.)
(F) Certificate of Completion of Human Subjects Protection Training for all personnel involved in the project, including students who are involved with testing or handling data, unless already on file with the IRB. Training link:...

1) Principal Investigator: Alexandra Ghara
   Dept: Political Science
   Ph: (225) 241-3619
   E-mail: rghara1@lsu.edu

2) Co-Investigator(s): Please include department, rank, phone and e-mail for each
   *If student, please identify name supervising professor in this space
   Dr. Jas Sullivan (supervising professor), Dept of Political Science, Associate Professor, (225) 578-6442, jas3sull@lsu.edu

3) Project Title: Political Consequences of Black-Woman Identity Interference

4) Proposal? (yes or no) no
   If yes, LSU Proposal Number
   Also, if YES, either
   ○ This application completely matches the scope of work in the grant
   OR
   ○ More IRB Applications will be filed later

5) Subject pool (e.g. Psychology students) black women
   *Circle any "vulnerable populations" to be used: (children <18, the mentally impaired, pregnant women, the aged, others). Projects with incarcerated persons cannot be exempted.

6) PI Signature
   Date 11/6/2012
   ** I certify my responses are accurate and complete. If the project scope or design is later changes, I will resubmit for review. I will inform the subjects of the existence of the IRB and the names of LSU institutions in which the study is conducted. I also
VITA

Alexandra Ghara earned her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Louisiana State University in 2010. Her research interests include black politics, political psychology, and implicit cognition. She is expected to graduate in December 2012 with her Master of Arts in Political Science.