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## Presidentialism: What it Holds for the Future of Turkey

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PRESIDENTIALISM: WHAT IT HOLDS FOR THE FUTURE OF TURKEY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
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by

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To my daughter Mehtap Sare Gur and my husband Furkan Amil Gur

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## **ABSTRACT**

A transformation from parliamentarism to presidentialism has been an important debate in Turkey since 1980s. After 2010, discussions turned to creating a Turkish-style presidential system which brings many uncertainties for Turkey. Different scholars and politicians focus on the adaptation of presidential system; however, none of these studies provide any empirical work. They only evaluate the literature and conclude that a presidential system will provide political stability and improve Turkey's economic, political, and social development.

In order to fill this gap, this dissertation examines the applicability of a presidential system in Turkey by using quantitative analysis and country-based comparisons. The political instability issue has been the central topic of regime transformation. I evaluate this instability and parliamentary system puzzle and argue that the instability problem is not a result of the current parliamentary system; instead, it is based on the electoral system and highly fractionalized party structure.

I further explore the relationship between government system and political, economic, social development in a time-series analysis covering the period from 1975-2010. The results suggest strongly that parliamentary systems have important advantages over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political and economic development. However, the results in these areas are not equally impressive for presidential systems.

Lastly, I provide a country-based comparison in which Turkey is compared with other states that have or have tried a presidential system since 1975 by examining social, economic, political variables. It appears that each country has its own characteristics and may have different factors that affect its economic or political success. In other words, it is not proper to expect that a regime transformation to a presidential system will, per se, dramatically improve Turkey's economic, political, social development.



I find as well that there may be some difficulties with Turkey's parliamentary system, but these alleged problems do not warrant a whole system change. It is important to analyze all the processes and develop a very well organized plan based on the features of Turkey. Because of the 1982 constitution and a new election procedure for president, it is crucial to focus on a new constitution.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Parliamentarism has been one of the main characteristics of the Turkish political tradition since the 1876 Ottoman constitution. In 1923, with the founding of the Turkish Republic, modern parliamentarianism began in Turkey. From the establishment of the Turkish Republic, political life has been known for its turbulent and unstable nature. Turkey has witnessed four military coups (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997), short-lived multi-party coalitions, and ineffective governments during this time period. Some argue that the main problem associated with this instability is the structure of the government--its parliamentary system-- and thus, several scholars and intellectuals have argued that Turkey must adopt a presidential system as a solution (Kuzu, 2006; Fendoglu, 2010; Gonenc, 2011).

As a result, there are ongoing discussions among academics and senior leaders of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) about the transformation from a parliamentary system of government to a presidential system in Turkey. This debate first arose during Turgut Ozal's period in office in the late 1980s, but ended due to his unexpected death in 1993. Then, President Suleyman Demirel in 1997 brought up the issue again, but did not accomplish the transformation. Former Prime Minister and present President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the issue again in 2003<sup>1</sup>, but this debate became more serious after 2010 (Gonenc, 2005). All of these prominent Turkish political figures have argued that a presidential system is more suitable for Turkish society and political system because Turkey needs an executive authority that can decide and execute decisions more efficiently and quickly (Kalaycioglu, 2005; Uran, 2010).

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<sup>1</sup> "My only wish is to create a presidential or semi-presidential system and the ideal example is the American presidential system (Siyasetteki tek arzum başkanlık ya da yarı başkanlık modeli. Bunun ideali de Amerika'da uygulanan system), Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, on April 2003, see Fendoglu, 2012.

The Erdogan government is serious about its plans to change to a presidential system from a parliamentary system and has begun making some arrangements for this transformation, including changes regarding the election of president. Before 2007, the Turkish President was elected in a secret ballot by the parliament for a seven-year term. A two-thirds majority was required for election. But after 2007, as a result of a national referendum, the President has been elected in a popular plurality election. The presidential term was reduced from seven years to five and the re-election of the President for a second term was allowed (Ay, 2004; Arslan, 2005).

After Erdogan's statements<sup>2</sup> about the presidential system, the debate over presidentialism and parliamentarism became a lively subject of discussion throughout Turkish society. Some argue that this movement toward presidentialism is only related to Erdogan's desire to stay in office longer with greater authority (Egrikavuk, 2011). Others argue that it will create a better political system for Turkish politics, regardless of Erdogan's alleged personal ambitions (Kuzu, 2006; Turkone, 2011). This is not an easy decision. There has been over the past decades a profound transformation towards democratization and freedom in the world. According to Freedom House, the number of countries categorized as a "free" and "partly free" has been significantly raised while the number of "not-free" countries decreased (see Table 1.1).

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<sup>2</sup> "The presidential system is being debated. In the past, May God rest their souls, Mr. Turgut (Özal) and Mr. (Süleyman) Demirel also brought the issue to the agenda. Furthermore, this is not a foreign concept. The Ottoman's practiced a similar system. At present the world's most advanced nations abide by a presidential system. This is what America, Russia and, under the semi-presidential system, France and Latin American nations are experiencing. In other words over 100 countries in the world are going by a presidential system", Erdogan said, On April 2013, in his televised speech speaking at a meeting in Ankara's Kızılcahamam neighborhood with members of his Justice and Development Party, see *Berber, 2013*. On May 2012, Erdogan, during a fashion conference in Istanbul, said that "we can discuss everything about it — whether it will be a presidential system or a co-presidency", see *Demir 2012*.

Table 1.1: Number of Free, Partly Free and Not Free Countries in the World

Year	Free Countries	Partly Free Countries	Not-Free Countries
1973	44 (29%)	38 (25%)	69 (46%)
2013	90 (46%)	58 (30%)	47 (24%)

Source: Freedom House 2013, Freedom in the World data set.

However, a recent successful example of a transformation from pure parliamentary system to pure presidential one (or vice versa) does not exist. For instance, Brazil changed from a presidential to a semi-presidential system in 1960s, but reversed back to presidentialism in 1963. Israel also alters the mechanism of selecting its prime minister in 1992, but then it returned its old system again in 2001. Similarly, Moldova had a semi-presidential system until 2000 but it turned to a parliamentary form of government system in 2000. Armenia turned to a mixed system from a presidential one in the mid-1990s. In other words, there are a few examples (such as Brazil, France, Moldova, and Armenia) but they represent only a transition from pure to mixed and mixed to pure institutional forms (Fendoglu, 2010). For Turkey, the problem is that while the AKP government is talking about a fundamental change from pure parliamentarism to pure presidentialism, there is no example in the world of such a change over the past decades. In addition, the public -- even parliamentarians -- do not fully understand the true operation of presidential system. Erdogan criticizes the US presidential system and argues that it works slowly; as a result he offers to create a “Turkish-style presidential system”<sup>3</sup> (Albayrak 2012).

For a “Turkish-style presidential system,” Erdogan’s aim is to create a unicameral legislature instead of a bicameral one; because he argues that having two bodies slow down the

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<sup>3</sup> “The U.S. president cannot appoint an ambassador, he cannot even solely decide on the sale of a helicopter ... That’s why we should create a Turkish-style presidential system,” President Erdogan said, speaking to a group of journalists on his way back to Turkey from Spain, on 29 November 2012. Erdoğan mentioned a “U.S. decision to sell attack helicopters to Turkey, which had waited for congress approval for years before a vote was finally held last year”, on 29 November 2012, see Demir, 2012.

process. He says that one parliamentary chamber can easily control the president<sup>4</sup> (Albayrak, 2012; Demir, 2012).

To address this troubling lack of knowledge, this study will attempt to evaluate both systems in detail to understand their characteristics and shed light on the applicability of a presidential system for Turkey. It aims to show whether such a change might solve Turkey's main political problems or if it might create more problems for the nation.

The main goal of this study is to answer this primary question: which system of government should Turkey choose? Should it retain the current parliamentary system? Alternatively, should it move towards a presidential system? This study will also evaluate the following research sub-questions: (1) is there another viable approach as a different solution, instead of the proposed rapid fundamental change? (2) What might be the possible consequences of a system change? (3) Is this proposed system change applicable to the Turkey's party structure? (4) How will the proposed system change affect the country's economic, social and political development?

## **1. 1. Literature Review**

### **1.1.1. Presidential, Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems**

There is an ongoing institutional debate in the literature about government structure, and its effects on consolidation of democracy<sup>5</sup>. Much of this debate centers on governmental regime type: i.e., whether the government has a presidential, semi- presidential or parliamentary system.

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<sup>4</sup> "Parliament does the supervision job, having too many supervisors makes the system clumsy," the prime minister said. "We should be practical and get results quickly." President Erdogan said, on 29 November 2012, see Demir, 2012.

<sup>5</sup> See, Linz, 1994; Stepan & Skach, 1994; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a,b; Riggs, 1997; Lane & Ersson, 2000; Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Cheibub, 2007; Gerring et al. 2009.

The most common type of democratic system is parliamentarism, in which the legislative and executive branches are fused, resulting in a government that is controlled by the legislative majority. Parliamentary systems emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most notably in Britain (Wolfgang & Strom, 2000). A parliamentary system is defined as “a system of mutual dependence: first, the chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence and second, the executive power (normally in conjunction with the head of state) has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections” (Stepan & Skach, 1993: 3).

In general, the executive consists of a head of state and a head of government. The head of state has pro forma ceremonial power in the appointment of the Prime Minister, the head of government. The Prime Minister nominates other ministers. In such systems, the government is a collective body which is responsible to the assembly and only indirectly responsible to the electorate. Parliamentary systems imply cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, but neither dominates the other (Verney, 1959). In addition, Siaroff (2003) defines parliamentary government by describing its three main characteristics. The first is the responsibility of government to the parliament; in other words, the government has not been appointed for a certain time, parliament can remove the government at any time. The second characteristic is the election of the government: the government is nominated by the legislature not elected by citizens' votes. Third is the structure of the cabinet; it is collective.

A presidential system, on the other hand, is “a system where policymaking power is divided between two separately elected bodies, the legislature and the president, for fixed terms of office” (Gerring et al. 2009: 15). Sartori (1996) argues that there are three main characteristics of presidential systems: first, the head of state is elected for a fixed term by a popular election;

second, the government or executive cannot be removed by a legislative vote; third, the head of state is also the head of the government.

Lijphart (1999) emphasizes three points to distinguish presidential and parliamentary systems. First, in a presidential system the head of government becomes president as a result of popular election. However, in a parliamentary system the legislature is responsible for the selection of the head of government. Second, in a presidential system the president or the head of government remains in power for fixed term of office. However, in a parliamentary system, there is no fixed term for the head of government; the prime minister and cabinet can be removed at any time by the legislature or may serve until an election is called. Third, in a parliamentary system the cabinet is collective, but in a presidential system it is not (Lijphart, 1999).

In addition to parliamentary and presidential systems, semi-presidential systems are explained by describing their three main characteristics. First, the president or head of state comes to power by direct or indirect popular election, has a fixed term of office, and is not responsible to the parliament. Second, the Prime Minister, who is not directly elected and does not have a fixed term office, is the head of government and is responsible to the parliament. Third, the head of state shares executive power with a prime minister, which creates a dual authority (Sartori, 1996:131; Elgie, 1999: 13).

It is clearly determined that the relationship between the executive and legislative is the main indicator for the distinction between the government systems. The primary point is the responsibility of government to the legislature. If governments cannot be removed by the legislature, the systems are presidential, but if they can, the systems are either parliamentary or semi-presidential. In both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, the parliament is effective in both the formation and survival of governments and has power to dismiss the

government (Cheibub et al. 2010). Government removal in such systems can be achieved by the vote of no-confidence initiated by the legislature, the vote of confidence initiated by the government itself or early elections when the government falls by virtue of the fact that parliament is dissolved (Cheibub et al. 2010: 14). The second point concerns the election of the head of state, whether there is a popular election or not. If there is not an independently elected president, the system is parliamentary. However, if there is an independently elected president and fixed term office, the systems can be either presidential or semi-presidential (Cheibub, 2007). The third point is the responsibility of government to the president. If a government is not responsible to the president, the system is parliamentary, but if it is responsible to the president the system is semi-presidential or presidential (Cheibub, 2007). This classification is shown in Figure 1.1 below.




Figure 1.1: Classification of Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies  
Source: Cheibub, 2007.

There are other indicators which are used to distinguish government systems, such as the nature of the executive power or division of power. While the executive is collective and there is a fusion of legislative and executive power in parliamentarism, the executive is individual and there is a separation of power in presidentialism (Verney, 1992; Lijphart, 1999). The detailed features of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential systems are shown in Figure 1.2.



	Presidential System	Parliamentary System	Semi-Presidential
Nature of Executive	The executive is not collective, it is formed by one person (The President)	The executive is collective. (The President and Prime Minister)	Both the Prime minister and the president are responsible from the executive
Election of executive	The president comes to power for a fixed term by a popular direct election	The executive comes to power as a result of indirect election	President comes to power by a direct election while the prime minister can be appointed by the president or directly elected
Structure of executive	The head of government and the head of state is the same person	Usually the head of state and head of government is different	There is a dual authority between the president and prime minister
Division of Power	There is a separation of power between the executive and legislative	There is a fusion of power between the executive and legislative	Usually, there is a separation of power between the executive and legislative
Legislative Responsibility	Executive and legislative, no one can dismiss the other. But there are some exceptions like impeachment	The government is responsible to the assembly, and it can be removed by a parliamentary vote of no-confidence	The prime minister is responsible of the appointment of the cabinet, while the president is responsible for the appointment of the prime minister. The president can remove the parliament
Executive Accountability	There is a direct accountability of president to the people as a result of popular election	The prime minister is directly responsible to the parliament not to people	The president is responsible to the people, but the prime minister is only responsible to the president or the parliament
Characteristics of the Cabinet	The members of cabinet are subordinated, they have counseling power	The members of cabinet have executive power	Usually, the members of cabinet are subordinated

Figure 1.2: Features of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems

Source: Verney 1959, 1992; Sartori 1996; Elgie 1999; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 2003; Newton 2005; Gerring et al. 2009; Cheibub et al. 2010.

### 1.1. 2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Government Systems

From the characteristics of government systems, some notable advantages and disadvantages of each system can be identified. Four main advantages of presidential system are identified in the literature. First, as a result of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government, a presidential system creates a checks and balance process through the branches. Each branch may check and control the actions of the others and as a result none of them may exercise its power solely for its benefit. Second, the fixed term of office of each branch --the president and the legislatures-- may create stability, predictability, and permanence in the government process. Third, a popular election of president gives more democratic legitimization for the presidential power and gives more prestige to the president. Fourth, because of the existence of individual executive, a president may take decisions more quickly and respond to a crisis more easily (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Parreno, 2003).

For a parliamentary system, three main advantages are evident. First is the accountability of government to the assembly, since the assembly has the power to remove the government if the parliamentary majority is unsatisfied with the government's performance. Second, there is not a rigid system in governmental office. If there is any dissatisfaction in the government performance, the offending official can be easily removed by the legislature. There is no need to wait for a completion of fixed terms of elective officials. Third, coalition governments are common in parliamentary systems in which a proportional representation (PR) election system is used and it increases representativeness by allowing participation of more than one party in the formation of government (Linz, 1994; Cheibub, 2007; Parreno, 2003).

Furthermore, for semi-presidential systems, it is argued that stability is created as a result of the fixed-term status of president, and at the same time, flexibility exists as a result of the

status of prime minister, who must maintain parliamentary confidence. Also, there is a dual leadership between the prime minister and president (Lijphart, 1998; Milardovic, 2005).

On the other side, each system has also some disadvantages. For a presidential system, three main disadvantages can be identified. First is the possibility, as a result of the separation of powers, of serious clashes between the executive and legislature. A second concern is the temporal rigidity in the fixed-term office of the president. Third is the zero-sum game structure inherent in the winner-take-all character of the presidency. There is a lack of incentives, as well, for cooperation between legislative and executive branches if they are controlled by different parties. For that reason, it tends to foster political polarization.

For a parliamentary system, two disadvantages can be expressed. First is the possibility of political instability and discontinuity in politics as a result of coalition governments in multiparty parliamentary democracies. This problem may exist because coalitions are formed by different parties which have different opinions, beliefs; they may not maintain political agreement for governmental policy and may be easily dissolved (Iorio, 2007). Second is the lack of direct accountability to the people, since the prime minister is appointed by legislature not elected by citizens' vote (Milardovic, 2005).

For semi-presidential system, cohabitation or intra-executive conflicts are explained as the main disadvantage. Cohabitation defines the situation when the president and the prime minister, who share power, are from different parties (Elgie, 2005; Kasselmann, 2009; Colton & Skach, 2005). A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each institutional approach is presented in Figure 1.3 below.

	Presidential System	Parliamentary System	Semi-Presidential System
Advantages	Executive stability	Responsibility of government to the assembly	Stability as a result of the status of president
	Democratic election-legitimization of President	Flexibility in removing the government	Flexibility as a result of the status of prime minister.
	Direct accountability of president to the people	Representativeness as a result of coalition governments if there is a PR system	
	Check and balance between the executive and legislative		
	Fastness in decision making process		
Disadvantages	Possibility of high clash between the executive and legislative	Political instability and discontinuity	Cohabitation or intra-executive conflicts
	Rigidity in the fixed term office of the president	Lack of direct accountability to the people	
	Winners get all, zero-sum game		
	Collection of all executive power to one person		

Figure 1.3: Advantages / Disadvantages of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems

Source: Shugart & Carey 1992; Lijphart 1998; Parreno 2003; Colton & Skach 2005; Elgie 2005; Milardovic 2005; Kasselmann 2009.

### 1.1. 3. Comparison of Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems

The presidential-parliamentary debate emerged prominently in the literature in the 1980s. At first, the debate concentrated primarily on the relationship between regime type and democratic consolidation. Then in the 1990s the content of the debate began to change as a result

of the influential works of Shugart & Carey (1992), Mainwaring (1993), and Lijphart (1990). With the effects of these studies, new topics such as the party system and alternative electoral systems were integrated into these discussions of, regime type, good governance, and democratic consolidation (Elgie, 2004).

Linz (1990a, 1990b, 1994) most forcefully focused the scholarly criticism of presidential regimes. Linz clearly explains what in his view is the superiority of parliamentary system and argues that presidential forms of governments are less likely than parliamentary forms of government to provide stable democracies. Linz believes that this instability is endogenous to the form of government (presidentialism), not the result of outside factors such as economic development or political culture. He explains that the institutional weaknesses of presidential systems prevent democratic consolidation. He concentrates primarily on three main alleged flaws: first, the executive and legislative branches in presidential regimes are elected separately and as a result create a situation of dual democratic legitimacy. This system provides a potentially conflicting relationship between the two bodies. Second, the fixed term of office in presidential systems creates an institutional rigidity in the system of government. For instance, winners and losers are separated for the entire presidential term and there will be no changes in the government and no new election as a response to an emergency situation or pressing national issue. And third, a presidential system is a zero-sum game, and generally performs according to the rule of winner-take-all scenarios. Notably for Linz, there is a lack of incentives for cooperation between legislative and executive branches if they are controlled by different parties. For that reason, it tends to foster political polarization (Linz, 1990a, 1990b; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a; Lawrence, 2000; Elgie, 2004).

Scholars such as Stepan & Skach (1994) and Lane & Ersson (2000) support Linz's argument and claim that parliamentary systems result in higher performance than presidentialism and provide more democratic stability in terms of system survival (Lane & Ersson, 2000). Furthermore, it is argued that parliamentary systems are better than presidential systems, especially in a transition period, because divided governments reduce government effectiveness and lead to deadlock (Stepan & Skach, 1994).

However, this argument is not accepted by all scholars. For instance, Power and Gasiorowski (1997), show that there is not a significant relationship between regime type and democratic survival, especially in less-developed countries (123). Additionally, Horowitz (1990) criticizes Linz and argues that Linz concentrates on very selective sample of states, mainly in Latin American, and he does not include the effects of electoral systems. First, Horowitz (1990) points out Linz's argument about the potentially conflicting relationship between the executive and legislative bodies (especially if they are controlled by different parties) and argues that "if the two are controlled by different parties, the system has not produced a winner-take-all result and it is difficult to complain about inter-branch checks and balances and winner-take-all politics at the same time" (75). In addition, he says that Linz concentrates on the presidential election under a plurality system or a majority system, but he claims that such it is not a general rule: presidents "do not need to be elected on a plurality or majority-runoff basis" (75- 76). Different electoral systems can be used in presidential elections and he shows this in practice by evaluating Nigeria and Sri Lanka cases. As a result, he explains that "winner-take-all is a function of electoral systems, not of institutions in the abstract" (76). In other words, parliamentary regimes with plurality systems may also create winner-take-all politics (Horowitz, 1990). In short, Horowitz (1990) argues that "Linz's quarrel is not with the presidency, but with

two features that epitomize the Westminster version of democracy: first, plurality elections that produce a majority of seats by shutting out third party competitors; and second, adversary democracy, with its sharp divide between winners and losers, government and opposition” (Horowitz, 1990: 79). As conclusion, he says that Linz opposes plurality elections, not presidential systems (Horowitz, 1990).

Furthermore, Strom (1990) also claims that there is not a general rule that parliamentary systems need to create majority governments; they may have minority governments, too. For example, from 1946 to 1999 it is showed that fully 22 percent of parliamentary regimes had minority governments. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) also challenge Linz and claim that Linz does not evaluate the variations in presidentialism. They also analyze Latin American states and conclude that presidential systems “vary so greatly in the powers accorded to the president, the types of party and electoral systems with which they are associated, and the socioeconomic and historical context in which they were created” (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b: 435). They assert that the main problem in Linz’s works is the generalization of the consequences of presidentialism. However, they argue that by using different variables these consequences can be different from one presidential regime to another. In a word, not all presidential systems are the same and can vary significantly in their operation.

In the 1990s the debate began to expand, with research from new scholars such as Shugart & Carey (1992), Mainwaring (1990, 1993), Stepan & Skach (1993), Mainwaring & Shugart (1997a, 1997b), and Cheibub & Limongi (1990). They argued that focusing solely on the general system characteristics of each regime type is not sufficient. They assert that the effects of other institutional variables (such as party system, electoral system, and the powers of the executive) also need to be included. At the same time, some scholars such as Sartori (1994)

also include the role of semi-presidential systems into the debate and evaluate its effects on democratic consolidation.

For instance, Mainwaring (1990, 1993) examines the relationship between party systems and regime type and argues that the presidentialism with a multi-party system is contrary to democratic survival. In his 1993 article, he evaluates democratic success in the period of 1967-92 and concludes that social, cultural and economic factors – not just government variables –also impact democratic survival. In addition, his main conclusion is that a very small number of democracies have presidential systems in this time period and all these successful democratic presidential states have two-party systems. He concludes that the problem in presidentialism is the existence of multiparty systems, which may increase the deadlock between the executive and legislature and may increase the possibility of ideological polarization. He argues that in a presidential regime, “parties are less committed to supporting the government [and that] incentives for parties to break coalitions are generally stronger than in parliamentary systems” (Mainwaring, 1993: 200). Carey (2002) also evaluates the party system and argues that presidential and parliamentary systems are more likely to have developed different kinds of parties. The general idea is that parliamentary systems produce highly unified parties while presidential systems have more likely undisciplined parties (Carey, 2002).

Yet, some other studies show that presidential system may also create unified parties and may create an effective government (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000). On the other hand, Persson and Guido (2004b) claim that the differences between the presidential and parliamentary systems are not due to the party systems. Instead, they argue, the electoral system is the main factor that affects the types of government and party structure. The number of parties may change based on the electoral rules. For example, “plurality rule and small district magnitude produce fewer



parties and a more skewed distribution of seats than proportional representation and large district magnitude” (see for example Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1990). If there are a few parties in a parliamentary system, for instance, it is more likely to produce single-party majority governments instead of coalition governments (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; Strom, 1990). But if there is a proportional electoral rule in a parliamentary system, it is more likely create coalition governments (Persson & Guido, 2004b).

Furthermore, Shugart and Carey (1992) address the debate by looking at another institutional variable: the power of the executive. They claim that presidential systems with a president who has less legislative power are less likely to break down than presidential systems with the president who has much more legislative power (Shugart & Carey, 1992). In addition, Cheibub and Limongi (2002) evaluate the debate from a different perspective. They argue that the main difference between presidential and parliamentary systems is the decision-making process. Parliamentarism as a result of the fusion of power characteristics provide “highly centralized decision-making process,” because it is based on a majority in parliament. However, in presidential regimes, presidents cannot count on a majority of seats in the legislature. As a result, this system provides “highly decentralized decision-making process” (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002: 152).

After 2000, the content of the debate has been further expanded with the introduction of economic variables such as the effects of economic development or economic crisis. For instance, Przeworski et al. (2000) compare presidential and parliamentary systems by looking at economic variables and they find that parliamentary regimes are less likely to break down than presidential regimes when controlling for the economic conditions of states. Only in economic crisis situations are presidential regimes more stable than parliamentary regimes. In addition,

they find that multipartism and religious heterogeneity are not well suited to presidential regimes. Presidential regimes in such settings are generally less stable than otherwise. As a result they conclude that “presidential democracies are simply more brittle than parliamentary and hybrid systems under all economic and political conditions” (Przeworski et al 2000: 136). Like Przeworski et al. (2000), Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock (2001) evaluate economic variables, and conclude that “parliamentary regimes tend to be more successful in dealing with the consequences of economic growth, while presidential regimes are more resistant to breakdown in the face of economic crisis” (Bernhard et al. 2001:777).

In general, the scholarly literature has argued that parliamentary systems are superior to presidentialism. They provide better governance; they create stronger economic and social conditions; they have a more-sound constitutional framework (Linz, 1990a, 1990b; Stepan & Skach, 1993; Riggs, 1997; Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Gerring et al. 2009).

On the other hand, opponents claim that while presidential regimes have historically failed at higher rates than have parliamentary regimes, there is not a strong link between presidentialism, per se, and democratic breakdown (Cheibub, 2007). Latin American and African countries are more likely to adopt presidential systems, but these parts of the world already have significant problems, such as military legacy and economic problems, which can prevent the consolidation of democratic systems. On the other hand, parliamentarism is common in Europe and in former British colonies (they have more optimal conditions than some Latin American and African countries). Therefore, there may be other forces that lead to stable democracies or increase the survival rates of governments other than having presidential or parliamentary systems (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a; Lane & Ersson, 2000; Cheibub, 2007). Those include economic conditions (Lane & Ersson, 2000) or geographic location, the physical size of the

country, a military legacy (Cheibub, 2007), or particular decision-making processes (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002). Likewise, some scholars criticize Linz's argument and assert that some parliamentary systems such as the UK may actually have a stronger winner-takes-all characteristic than presidential systems; they argue that switching to a parliamentary system can create more serious problems, especially in presidential systems with undisciplined parties (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a). Some also argue that the problem is not the party systems; instead it is all about the election systems that can determine the party structure and government type (Persson & Guido, 2004b).

In addition, it is claimed that "parliamentary systems do not always operate under a 'majoritarian imperative'; coalition governments are not foreign to presidential systems; decision making is not always centralized under parliamentarism and is not always decentralized under presidentialism" (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002: 175-76). In other words, they argue that the debate between presidential and parliamentary regimes is much more complicated than Linz makes it out to be (Elgie, 2004). Too many scholars, then, Linz has unfairly created a presidential straw man and then beat it with an overly simplistic stick.

In contrast to parliamentary and presidential systems, semi-presidentialism is more problematic than presidential or parliamentary systems because of intra-executive conflicts -- especially competition for power between the prime minister and the president (Colton & Skach, 2005; Elgie, 2005; Kasselmann, 2009).

Overall, it seems that there is not a common scholarly consensus about which system (presidential or parliamentary) is better for democracy or the survival of a government. Some argue that presidential systems are less stable than parliamentary systems because they break down at higher rates; some argue that stability is not related solely to the system of government.

There can be different factors such as economic factors, military legacies and other social factors that affect the survival of democracy or survival of the regime. Some also emphasize the importance of the general conditions of states. In other words, in the evaluation of the government type, it is important to concentrate on the basic characteristics of a state such as party and electoral systems, the power of the president and prime minister (if there is one), the social, economic and historical conditions, and the state's heritage.

## **1.2. Research Design**

To answer the research questions guiding this research, I use different methods, a quantitative analysis, and country comparisons. First, I present a general view about the Turkish parliamentary system. Specifically, I evaluate the debates over the past decades regarding system change. It appears that the instability issue has been always the central topic. Previous supporters of a presidential system (e.g., former President Turgut Ozal, former President Suleyman Demirel and current President Erdogan and deputies of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)) all point to the stability issue. A new system, they argue, will eliminate ineffective coalition governments and provide stability. However, if coalition governments were the main source of this instability, it looks like Turkey has already eliminated this instability problem in 2002, by the creation of a single party government (the Justice and Development party) under the parliamentary system. For that reason, it is important to ask what is the main factor leading to this instability or coalition governments; is it the parliamentary system or is it the election system or party system? To evaluate this instability and parliamentary system puzzle, I examine the party structure of Turkey. First, based on Mainwaring's (1993) analysis and by using Rae index of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and Least Square index, Turkey is compared with a set of stable democracies that have presidential, parliamentary and semi-

presidential systems from 1946 to 2010. Stable democracies (defined as countries with at least 30 years of uninterrupted democracy (Mainwaring, 1993: 4) are selected for the comparison.

Democracy here is defined by three characteristics: First, there must be free, fair competitive elections. Second, there must be nearly universal adult suffrage and, third, there must be guarantees of traditional civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of organization, due process of law, etc. (Mainwaring, 1993: 4). To ensure these criteria, the Polity data set and Freedom House data set are both used. The data include the period of 1946 to 2010. The main point is to identify countries that have had stable democracies for thirty years until 2010.

I duplicated Mainwaring's approach in integrating the Turkish case to the analysis. However, some changes are made to the Mainwaring's (1993) analysis; first, the time period was extended from 1992 to 2010. As a result there have been some changes in status of democratic states. For instance, Mainwaring (1993) evaluates Venezuela under presidential democracies; however, the status of Venezuela was changed by the military coup in 2001. For that reason, it was removed from the analysis. Second, the number of democracies has been increasing and there are some countries -- such as Greece (1967-2010), Mauritius (1968-2010), Spain (1978-2010), Botswana (1966-2010), Cyprus (1974-2010) and Portugal (1976-2010) -- that now meet the thirty years criteria, which were not examined in Mainwaring's analysis; these countries are also added to the analysis, bringing the number of countries in the analysis from twenty five to twenty eight. Third, Turkey is added to the analysis. It is important to mention that Turkey does not meet the criteria of thirty years democratic stability. Stable democracy in Turkey started in 1983, so there have been twenty seven years without interruption in democracy. However, to show the possibility of presidential system under the Turkish party structure, Turkey's case is also evaluated and the number of democracies is thereby increased from twenty eight to twenty

nine. Fourth, the Least Square index (LSq) is also used in addition to the Rae index to clearly indicate the real disproportionality in elections. It is argued that if there are small parties in the election, the Least Square index (LSq) provides better results than the Rae index (Lijphart, 1994). In addition, I evaluate the Turkish party structure since 1923, by explaining the election systems, the characteristics of the party systems and single-party and multi-party periods.

I further explore and test the relationship between government system and political, economic, and social development. The main stated motivation under the idea of adopting a presidential system is to improve economic, political and social development. However, it is important to explore whether or not a presidential system provides a better economic, political and social development. For that reason, I explore theoretically and empirically different forms of government systems and their effects on three policy areas—political, economic and social development. In a time series analysis, I use different dependent variables for each policy areas with the main independent variable being government structure (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism). For the government structure, I created three new variables: the first represents presidentialism, the second shows semi-presidentialism and the third indicates parliamentarism. I use government effectiveness, corruption control, rule of law, government accountability, and political stability as dependent variables in different models for political development. For economic development, I use telephone mainlines, import duties, trade policy, GDP per capita as dependent variables in different models. For social development, mortality rate, life expectancy and literacy rates are used as dependent variables. I use level of economic development (GDP), democratic history of each country, ethnic fractionalization, population, region, religion, legal origin, latitude, oil and gas production, regime durability and

institutionalized democracy as independent variables. Different fixed effect, random effect and GLS-ARMA models are used for each dependent variable.

Lastly, to show the similarities and differences between presidential countries and Turkey, I use a country-based comparison in which Turkey is compared with other states that have or have tried a presidential system since 1975 by using social, economic, and political variables. The main goal is to provide a general view to the reader about Turkey and other presidential systems.

### **1.3. The Organization of the Project**

The dissertation consists of five chapters and the structure of it is as follows. In Chapter 1, I have provided a brief introduction and present a comprehensive review of the literature on presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. I then explain the research design and dissertation plan. In Chapter 2, I focus on the parliamentary system in Turkey by explaining the main characteristics, the pillars and problems of the current system, and by explaining the arguments against and in favor of the current system. In addition, the new change in the rules for the election of president (and a new presidential election following this change) is explained. In Chapter 3, I evaluate the party structure and election system of Turkey and focus on the applicability of adopting a presidential system under the Turkish party structure. In addition, a country comparison based on the number of effective parties is provided. In Chapter 4, I analyse theoretically and empirically different forms of government systems and their effects on three policy areas—political, economic and social development -- to evaluate which government system is more appropriate to produce economic, political and social development. In Chapter 5, I conclude the dissertation with discussion of the results and provide a conclusion, and point to future research.

## **CHAPTER 2: THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC**

### **2.1. Constitutional Development from the Ottoman Period to the Turkish Republic**

The first constitution was written in 1876 (Kanun-i Esasiye, Basic Law) during the Ottoman Empire and was revised numerous times in Turkish history: the Constitution of 1921, the Constitution of 1924, the Constitution of 1961, and the current Constitution of 1982. The 1876 Constitution established a parliamentary monarchy and the Constitution of 1921, written during the Independence War, created an assembly government. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Constitution of 1924 was written and parliamentary elements were introduced. For the first time, Turkey adopted a classical parliamentary system with the adoption of the 1961 Constitution. The current constitution, written in 1982, preserves the parliamentary system while increasing the power and privileges of the president (Gonenc, 2008).

#### **2.1.1. 1876 Constitution**

The first and most important step for the rule of law was the establishment of the 1876 Constitution and with this constitution; the First Constitutional Period was established in the Ottoman Empire. The 1876 Constitution was written by the Young Ottomans who were a reformist group influenced by Western political structures. According to the Young Ottomans the solution for the growing political, social, and economic problems of the Empire was found in Western political institutions, especially the system of “parliamentary monarchy” (Kocak, 2001:72-79). Sultan Abdulhamid II accepted the Constitution of 1876 (Kanun-i Esasi) officially by supporting the Young Ottomans. This constitution recognized the basic rights and freedoms (such as right to liberty, art.10, freedom of the press, art.12, and the right to own property, art.21) for Ottomans and also introduced bicameral legislature as well as other institutions (Meclis-i Umumi, article 42). The General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire was established and



consisted of two branches: the Chamber of Deputies was the lower house of the legislature (Meclis-i Mebusan), and the Senate was the upper house was (Heyet-i Ayan) (Tanor, 1992; Shaw & Shaw, 1995).

Then in 1877, a new reformist group called the Young Turks emerged and created the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and they started to demand revisions to the Constitution of 1876. As a result of the growing opposition, Sultan Abdulhamid II accepted the Young Turks demands and revised the 1876 Constitution in 1908 and the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) in the Ottoman Empire began (Feroz, 1993:31-37). In the Second Constitutional period the Sultan's power and political status started to change in response to the requirements of a system of constitutional monarchy (Tanor, 1992:145). "The executive and legislative powers were separated from the Sultan's sovereignty and granted to different bodies; the Council of Ministers was made responsible to the parliament which had now been given additional powers while the monarch enjoyed only limited powers" (Tanor, 1992:174-175). During the First and Second Constitutional Period, there was a parliament, but it was not the classical parliamentary system of government in reality.

#### 2.1.2. 1921 Constitution

In 1920 with the occupation of Istanbul, the General Assembly was dissolved and the constitutional period ended (Gurbuz, 1982; Hekimoglu, 2010). A new assembly gathered in Ankara in January 20, 1921 to prepare a new constitution which was the Constitution of 1921 (Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu). It was written under extraordinary conditions, the Independence War was being fought, as a result the constitution could not have any detailed provisions; instead it was a very simple document with only twenty-three articles. The constitution did not include any rights, freedoms or anything about functioning judicial systems. The most important part of

this constitution was introducing the principle of national sovereignty, a first in Ottoman-Turkish constitutional history. This principle facilitated the transition from monarchy to republic, declared on 29 October 1923. The 1921 Constitution created an assembly government based on the supremacy of parliament (Loewenstein, 1962:79-85). In this system, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) was responsible for the executive and legislative branches. The executive branch functioned through the Executive Ministers Committee (İcra Vekilleri Heyeti), which was appointed and dismissed by the Assembly. The Executive Ministers Committee elected one of its members as Chairman. These structures were not the same for the Cabinet and the Prime Minister in a parliamentary system. Also, there was not a President as the head of state, only a President of the Grand National Assembly who acted as the President. In other words, the 1921 Constitution formed to meet the needs of the newly established National Assembly without providing a parliamentary system (Kili, 1971:160-162; Özbudun, 1992).

### 2.1.3. 1924 Constitution

After a short time, the constitution was replaced by a new one, Constitution of 1924 (Gurbuz, 1982). The republic was declared on October 29, 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Constitution of 1921 was replaced with a detailed one. The office of the President was created and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first President. As a result of these amendments, the 1924 Constitution established the first Constitution of the Republic and was in force until the 1960 military coup (Earle, 1925:73). It included one hundred and five articles establishing the state as a republic. A unicameral General National Assembly was established with all executive and legislative powers. In the constitution, it was written that the president would be elected by the General Committee among the members of the Assembly for one legislative term. Also in the constitution it was introduced that the prime minister would be elected by the Assembly and had

rights to elect the ministers. It is clear that some degree of parliamentary rule was being applied. In other words, the 1924 Constitution created a mixed of an assembly government and a parliamentary regime (Ozbudun, 2000a; Gurbuz, 1982; Earle, 1925).

#### 2.1.4. 1961 Constitution

In 1960 Turkey faced the first military coup and the Constitution of 1961 was created under the influence of the military. The military increased its legal and institutional privileges by creating the 1961 constitution (Demirel, 2004). The classic parliamentary system was adopted for the first time. The presidential term was increased from five years to seven years for each term in this Constitution (Gurbuz, 1982). This constitution was more liberal and democratic than the previous and following ones. The understanding of a democratic, social and secular state has been introduced for the first time. The 1961 Constitution “advocated pluralistic democracy based on the principles of 1) supremacy of the constitution, 2) separation of powers and a system of check and balances, 3) the structural development of a pluralistic society and it also sought to expand and strengthen basic human rights” (Hazama, 1996:317). Economic and social rights were granted; the right to strike was given to workers and workers were allowed to form unions. A State Planning Organization was established. On the judicial side, the Constitutional Court was established and it was clearly stated that the judiciary become independent (Coban, 2009).

Between 1965 and 1969 the Turkish government had been dealing with the left-right students’ struggle in the streets. In the 1970s, the situation was exacerbated by the high rate of inflation and as a result Turkish Armed Forces declared a memorandum on March 12, 1971. Between 1971 and 1973 some constitutional amendments were introduced to limit civil liberties, and military power was increased once again.

### 2.1.5. 1982 Constitution

Between 1971 and 1980, eleven successive governments emerged and defeated (Davison, 1988). As a result of the economic and political unrest, the military took control once again. On September 12, 1980, the third military intervention occurred by the general Kenan Evren and his friends. After the coup, the 1982 constitution was introduced and it was a revised version of the 1961 constitution (Icener, 2010). The founding Assembly, created by the National Security Council prepared the new constitution. However, the Turkish military after the coup closed down all political parties. For that reason, none of the political parties and civil society organizations could contribute to the 1982 Constitution; it was prepared and amended only by the Turkish Armed Forces (Ormeci, 2012). The 1982 Constitution provided an ideal context for the expansion of military power and created a strong presidency (Sakalloglu, 1997). Ozbudun (1988) asserts that “the Constitution has transformed the presidency from a largely symbolic and ceremonial office into an active and powerful one, with important political and appointment functions” (Ozbudun, 1988:37)<sup>1</sup>.

Turkey is still governed by the 1982 Constitution, although it has been revised over the years. For instance, the voting age was changed from 21 to 20, a constitutional change facilitated in 1987. At the beginning of 1990s, some important changes were introduced. The ban on establishing political parties and civil society organizations were removed and it became much

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<sup>1</sup> Article 104 indicates the power of president which is the longest article in the constitution and gives executive, judicial and legislative power to the president. The constitution allows to president to act alone in certain cases without specifying such cases (Article 105). There are some ceremonial powers such as giving a first speech in the each legislative year, publishing law, or acting as a commander-in-chief in army. On the other hand, there are some items that provide a higher political authority such as appointment of the judges of the Constitutional Court, one fourth of the judges of the Council of State, the Chief public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and his deputy, judges of the Military Court of Cassation, the high military Administrative Court. In addition, the president is responsible from appointment of the university rectors and the members of the Board of Higher Education (Ozbudun, 1988:37).

more difficult to close political parties and civil society organizations and in addition, the voting age changed to 18. Between 1999-2002 “the State Security Courts were abolished, capital punishment was removed, the power of National Security Committee was decreased, all civil liberties were granted in parallel with European Declaration of Human Rights, closing-down of parties was made more difficult etc” (Ormerci, 2012:3).

Furthermore, the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) government emphasized the importance of a creation of a new constitution. One of the election promises of the AKP government prior to the 2007 elections was a new constitution. The AKP government declared that “it would make a new, civilian, and democratic constitution during its second term and the new constitution would (1) regulate the relations between state organs in clear and understandable terms in accordance with the parliamentary system, (2) redefine the status and powers of the President of the Republic, and (3) transform representative democracy into participatory democracy (Arslan, 2007:7). They began to prepare a new constitution in 2007, and a new draft was prepared but an agreement with other parties could not be reached and as a result the draft was shelved. Then in 2010, an amendment package aimed to organize the relationship between the civilian and military and revise the judiciary was prepared. The draft did not pass through parliament and the amendment package was offered up for referendum. The draft was accepted by 58% of the participants in the referendum. In 2012, the AKP government began to talk about new changes in the constitution again, but this time the aim was to rewrite the constitution. The AKP did not have the majority in parliament (326 out of 550) and lack the power to amend the constitution unilaterally. For that reason, they built the Constitution Reconciliation Committee (CRC), which included three members from each of the four parties (AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP) that currently held seats in the parliament. The commission has

been working to write a new constitution since May 2012, and has not made any progress (Chugh & Krueger, 2013).

## **2.2. Turkish Parliamentary System**

Turkey has a parliamentary system introduced in 1923 with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The executive, legislative and judiciary structure of the republic is explained in detail in order in the next section.

### **2.2.1. The Executive Structure**

According to the 1982 Constitution (article 8), executive power is vested and implemented by the President and the Council of Ministers. The President is the head of state and represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation. The President is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and control of the organs of the state to be sure that they work in an orderly and harmonious manner. Before 2007, the President was elected by two-thirds majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for a term of seven years. To be elected, a candidate must be a Turkish citizen, over forty-year old and completed university education. As a result of constitutional amendment which was accepted by a nationwide referendum on October 21, 2007, the president has been elected in a popular plurality election (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2011).

The executive power and duties of the President are listed below (1982 Constitution, Article 104:50-51):

- To appoint the Prime Minister or to accept his resignation upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, to appoint or remove Ministers from office. In the event that he deems it necessary, chair the meeting of the Council of Ministers, or summon the Council to meet under his chairmanship

- To appoint accredited envoys to represent the Turkish State in foreign countries and to receive the representatives of foreign states to the Republic of Turkey
- To ratify and publish international agreements
- To occupy the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly
- To decide upon the use of the Turkish Armed Forces
- To appoint the Chief of General Staff
- To summon the National Security Council to convene and to chair the meetings of the Council
- To proclaim martial law or impose state of emergency by decree to be decided by the Council of Ministers meeting under his/her Chairmanship, and to issue Decrees with the Power of Law
- To approve Decrees as signatory
- To commute or pardon the sentences of certain convicts on the grounds of old age, chronic illness or infirmity
- To appoint the members and President of the State Auditory Council
- To conduct investigations, inquiries and research through the State Auditory Council
- To select the members of the Higher Education Board
- To appoint University Chancellors

The legislative power and duties of the President:

- In the event that he/she deems it necessary, to deliver the opening speech on the first day of the legislative year
- To summon the Turkish Grand National Assembly to session

- To publish laws
- To return laws to the Assembly for reconsideration
- If he/she deems it necessary, to present laws related to changes in the Constitution to public referenda
- Should the whole or some of the provisions of laws, decrees with the power of law or Grand National Assembly internal regulations be considered to be in violation of the terms of the Constitution in term or in content, to file a suit with the Constitutional Court to the repeal of such laws, decrees or regulations
- To decide upon renewal of parliamentary elections

The judicial power and duties of the President consist of “appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, one fourth of the members of Council of State, the Chief and Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Military Administrative Tribunal and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors” (Turkish Grand National Assembly, Constitution 1982, Article 104:52).

The Council of Minister is the second part of the executive branch and consists of a prime minister and the ministers. The president selects the prime minister from the parliament; the prime minister then selects the ministers who are appointed by the president (Article 109). The prime minister as head of the Council of Minister controls the functions of the council and provides the coordination between the ministers (Article 112). Each minister is responsible to the prime minister and responsible to perform their jobs in respect to the constitution and laws. According to the constitution, the tasks of the Council of Ministers are: draft law, prepare decree-laws and regulations, draft budget and final accounts acts, declare martial law, ensure national security, and select the chief of staff.



### 2.2.2. The Legislative Structure

According to the 1982 Constitution (article 7) legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and this legislative power cannot be delegated. It is a unicameral parliament. For the first time, the TGNA united and exercised its legislative power in Ankara on April 23, 1920 after the occupation of Istanbul. Under the extraordinary conditions, this Assembly exercised legislative, executive and judicial powers together for national sovereignty. The 1924 Constitution created a fusion of power between these branches while the 1961 Constitution created the separation of powers principle. In other words, it created a parliamentary system with the principle of separation of powers. The 1982 Constitution used the same framing as the 1961 Constitution following the same principles. The TGNA consists of 550 deputies who are elected for five-year term by universal suffrage. An early election can be decided by parliament before this period is terminated. To be represented in the TGNA, parties need to get at least 10 per cent of the national vote. Every Turkish citizen over thirty-years old has the right to run for a parliament seat (Article 75, 76, 77). The duties of the TGNA are outlined as follows (Article 89):

- To enact, amend and revoke laws
- To control the practice of the Council of Ministers and Ministers
- To delegate to the Council of Ministers the authority to issue “Decrees with Power of Law” for specific subjects
- To debate and pass the Budget and the Bills for Final Accounts
- To ratify the printing of currency and the declaration of war
- To ratify international agreements

- To declare amnesty or pardons for those convicted of crimes other than those specified in article 14 of the Constitution and to ratify the execution of death sentences ruled by the courts and for which appeals have been denied

### 2.2.3. The Judiciary Structure

According to the 1982 Constitution, judicial power is exercised by independent national courts and judges. There is an integrated legal system consisting of civil and military courts, each has a Court of Appeal in Ankara. The Constitutional Court follows the law and rules of procedure of the TGNA and evaluates the constitutionality of laws. When a decision is reached it is published in the official gazette and both the executive and legislative branches enforce the decision. The Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors select the judges and the President makes the appointment.

## **2.3. New Presidential Election in Turkey**

### 2.3.1. The Change in the Election of President

The constitutional amendment, accepted by a nationwide referendum on October 21, 2007 carried forward the regime change discussion into a next level. The existing parliamentary system evolved into a parliamentary with a popularly elected president system by accepting the principle of a popular election of the president. This change was an important step for transformation to a presidential system.

The tenth President of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer's term ended in May 2007. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), in power since 2002, held the majority in the parliament and it appeared possible that the next president was going to be a member of the Justice and Development Party. However, the idea of a new president from the ruling party created a reaction from the secular groups and the military. The concern was that the AKP represents a

religious group and if they occupied the presidents' office in addition to the governmental office, it would weaken the secular principle of Turkish Republic (Migdalovitz, 2007). On April 25, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan declared Abdullah Gul, foreign minister of Turkey and a founder of the AKP, a candidate for the presidency. However, the military and leftist party (Republican People's Party, CHP) did not welcome the idea of Gul for president. According to them, the president is the main power or institution and must represent secularism. For that reason Abdullah Gul's Islamic ideologies and his wife's headscarf, were seen as a threat to the office of president (Taspinar, 2007; Migdalovitz, 2007). However the AKP still supported Gul's candidacy. On April 27, 2007, after the first round of elections, Gul failed to get enough votes to be elected. According to the 1982 Constitution, article 102 (before revision) the president of the Turkish Republic was elected by a two-third majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly by secret ballot. If the majority cannot be reached in the first two ballots, a third ballot will be cast; the candidate who received the absolute majority of the votes would be the president of the Republic. After the first round, the Turkish Armed forces published a press release from the web site of the Office of the Chief of General Staff on April 27, 2007 called an e-memorandum (Sariibrahimoglu, 2007:1). It was an indirect attempt to intervene in the political process, warning and threatening the government for violating the secularism principle (Bacik & Salur, 2010; Sariibrahimoglu, 2007).

In the second round, on May 6, 2007, Gul failed to get enough votes once again. Early election came into question after failure to elect a president. Meanwhile, the AKP prepared a package of constitutional amendments consisting of a popular election of the president and reducing the presidential term from seven to five years. The Turkish Grand National Assembly accepted this package and passed it to President Sezer, he did not sign it and returned it to the

Assembly. It was readopted on June 18, 2007, and for this time, Sezer signed and called for a referendum in which all the amendments were accepted. “On July 22, 2007 early general elections were held and AKP won 46.5% of the votes and on August 14, 2007 Abdullah Gul declared his candidacy on more time. This time, AKP was more powerful and even though the opposition parties (CHP) members did not attend the session for the election of president, the Assembly was able to acquire the required two-thirds majority to convene and Abdullah Gul was elected as the president of Turkey on August 28, 2007” (Uran, 2010:3).

It is clear that a presidential election crisis -- failure to elect a president in the first and second round and an online intervention of the military-- changed the republic by introducing a system of popular election of president from a principle of presidential or semi-presidential systems. It was a reaction to an election crisis, creating serious problems for Turkey in the future (Gonenc, 2007:39-43).

### 2.3.2. The First Presidential Election in 2014

Turkish citizens voted for the first time for the president in the history of Turkish democracy on August 10, 2014. Former Prime Minister Erdogan became the 12<sup>th</sup> president of Turkey by getting fifty-two percent of votes. For the first time, a president was elected directly by the citizens instead of by the Parliament. Of course the new election brought new debates about the Turkish government structure, the functions of the executive structure and the transformation to a presidential system (Kanat, 2014). Ahmet Davutoglu was selected as a Prime Minister by Erdogan to replace him and he became the 26<sup>th</sup> Prime Minister of Turkey on 28 August 2014. The first presidential election brought so many uncertainties for Turkish political system. For instance, how the check and balances system will work? How the relations will be between the President and Prime Minister? How the parliamentary system will work?

There are important results of this presidential election. The most anticipated result is emerging a powerful and active president. During the campaign process, Erdogan regularly mentioned about a strong and active president and it was visible in his campaign slogan which was “National Will, National Power, Target 2023”. Target 2023 shows that he wanted to be elected and then serve for two terms in the presidential office (Oder, 2014). After the presidential election, Ahmet Davutoglu was selected as a Prime Minister by Erdogan and it is argued that Davutoglu is in a secondary position when it comes to take decisions, basically Erdogan is deciding and Davutoglu is implementing his decisions” (Idiz, 2014:1).

The second result of the election is the production of a complicated system vacillating between the parliamentary and presidential one. After the election, Turkey’s political structure became uncertain. It is not a pure parliamentary system since the president began to be elected by people, but also it is not a pure presidential system, since there is a Prime Minister and council of ministers. It may be possible to say that the system turned to a semi-presidential system but the problem is this is not clarified in the constitution. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, said that “for the first time in Turkey, the public will directly elect the president. This means a de facto semi-presidential system and he also added that after the election, it is possible to say that Turkey's system became stronger than a traditional semi-presidential system” (Celebi, 2012:1).

On the other hand, after the election, Turkey faced with very important constitutional challenges; first; after the election Erdogan gave a speech in the main building of the AKP and other party leaders were standing near Erdogan at the podium. However, according to the 1982 constitution, the president cannot be affiliated by any political party. It is possible to say that Erdogan formally cut his bonds with the party but it was just symbolic (Oder, 2014). Second;

after the election, Erdogan summoned AKP's general assembly and he served as the leader which created a second constitutional debate. The main opposition party, the CHP, has already lodged an application before the Supreme Court of Appeals to suspend the summoning of AKP's general assembly under the leadership of Erdogan (Cumhuriyet Gazatte, 12 August 2014; Oder, 2014).

The third result is the increasing discussion about presidential system. Many AKP deputies and many scholars argue that this presidential election was an important step for the transformation to the presidential system. The current system after the election can be categorized as a semi-presidential system like in France. But the main difference is Turkey has a Prime Minister who holds wide-ranging executive powers. A conflict between the prime minister and President Erdogan may be inevitable if a different party comes to power in 2015 election as a result it is argued that a political transformation based on a new constitution is vital for Turkey (Karagoz, 2014).

## **2.4. Presidential System Discussion in Turkey**

### **2.4.1. System-Change Discussion in 1980-1990**

Presidential system debates began with Turgut Ozal (8<sup>th</sup> President) in the late 1980s. Prime Minister and later President Ozal suggested an adaptation of a presidential system in Turkey, he advocated for more serious debates once he was appointed as a president. According to Ozal, presidential system would increase Turkey's global power and create political stability. At the time, Ozal stated, "If we want to become one of the top ten or top five nations in the world, then we need to take an initiative. The only chance would be to transition to a presidential system" (Port, 2012:5). The Justice Party submitted a proposal for direct election of a president, but it did not pass the Assembly, due to the 1980 coup.

In the middle of the 1990s, President Suleyman Demirel (9<sup>th</sup> President) revived the presidential system debate. He said that, “I have seen six governments in four years of my time. From this picture, something is not right here. The executive should be independent from the legislative and legislative and judiciary together have to be able to check and balance the executive appropriately. This can succeed only in presidential system” (Turk, 2011:42). According to President Demirel, the general idea under the regime change was again to provide political stability. The electorate once again began to talk about a presidential system but it did not gain much support. The idea of a system change was not based on the electorate instead it supported President Suleymen Demirel’s desire to stay in power for one more term. In addition, at the time the Assembly rejected any proposal regarding a constitutional amendment. As a result, a new president was elected and a system change debate ended (Turan, 2005).

#### 2.4.2. System-Change Discussion under the AKP Government since 2000

In 2003, the AKP government opened the system change discussion once again. The president of the constitutional committee, Burhan Kuzu, discussed a system change specifically an American style presidential system and its benefits. He clearly took ownership of the idea stating it was not a topic for the AKP. However, four months later, Prime Minister Erdogan in a televised interview said “*I support presidential and semi-presidential system, but for me the ideal one is the US-presidential system*” and added that “we still deal with the bureaucratic oligarchy and for that reason to solve this problem I want presidential system” (Oder, 2005:57).

In December 2004 and in January 2005, the Minister of Justice, Cemil Cicek started to talk about the advantages of a presidential system by concentrating on the stability issues; the main point was that a presidential system would bring continuous stability to Turkey.

From 2005 to 2010, the debate remained largely off the agenda of government officials. In January 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan said that “the discussion of the presidential system may be useful for Turkey, but currently, it is not on our agenda”, then on February 15, 2006, he said that “I also want a presidential system but conditions are not proper for a system change right now” (Fendoglu, 2010:47).

The AKP government started to work on a new constitution in 2010 and the presidential system debate suddenly became a trendy topic in Turkish politics. Former Prime Minister Erdogan and other AKP deputies changed discourse and started to talk about creating a Turkish-style presidential system instead of the US style presidential system. “*The US president cannot appoint an ambassador, he cannot even decide on the sale of a helicopter alone. ... That’s why we should create a Turkish-style presidential system,*” Erdogan said, on his way back from Spain in November 2012 (Kemal, 2013). According to him, Turkey needs to establish a single parliament instead of a congress with two houses (Kemal, 2013).

Lastly, the AKP government presented a proposal including twenty-three articles about a system change to the Grand National Assembly. For the first time, the debates offered a concrete proposal. The proposal included amendments on certain provisions in the constitution. The AKP aimed to by-pass the presidential system by changing some provisions of the constitution.

When the proposal package is examined, it is obvious that the President who is the head of the executive branch is endowed with extraordinary powers<sup>2</sup>. First, the new regulations regarding the legislature indicate a serious limitation to the legislative authority of parliament

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<sup>2</sup> For executive, the authority to appoint and dismiss the ministers, to generate a presidential decree, to appoint and dismiss the public administrators, to choose half of the members of the Board of Higher Education, to select the university rectors, to confirm laws, to return laws to the Turkey Grand National Assembly to be discussed again, to submit amendments on constitutional laws to referendum, and ext are given to the President (the AKP proposal, article 22).



and the legislature is placed under the supervision of executive<sup>3</sup>. Another important issue is the authorization of Presidential Decree which is given to the President and cannot be directly controlled by Parliament<sup>4</sup> (Polatoglu, 2013; Ataay, 2013).

For the judiciary, the AKP proposal does not identify regulations for processing the judiciary and judicial independence. The authority to elect half the members of the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Chief Public Prosecutor is given to the President (the AKP proposal, article 22). In other words, the President gets power to affect the judiciary and judicial decision. The proposal does not provide any regulations on separation of power and increases the President's power (Polatoglu, 2013; Ataay, 2013).

To summarize briefly, when the debates regarding system change are examined from the beginning, first; it is possible to conclude that the stability issue is always the central topic. Previous supporters of a presidential system, Former President Turgut Ozal, Former President Suleyman Demirel and then President Erdogan and deputies of AKP, point out the stability issue. A new system will eliminate ineffective coalition governments and provide stability according to them (Oder, 2005). Second, when President Turgut Ozal started to talk about a system change, he concentrated on the power of the president (giving powers to policy-makers rather than the Parliament). For him the underlying factor behind the system change was to increase the power of the president, in other words, to gain more power for himself. Third, in the 1990s, the

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<sup>3</sup> For legislative, the authority to control the Council of Ministers and the ministers and the power to give the authority to issue decree-laws on certain matters to the Council of Ministers are taken from the rights of the Parliament (the AKP proposal, article 9) and these rights are given to the President (the AKP proposal, article 22/g).

<sup>4</sup> The President in each subject if there is an absence of certain provisions in the laws (except individual rights and freedom) will manage the country by creating a Presidential Decree and the presidential decree enters to force on the day of the publication without controlled by the parliament (the AKP proposal, article 22/4g)

discussions took place between presidentialism and semi-presidential system. Demirel mentioned both a presidential system and semi-presidential system for Turkey but his explanations clearly indicated a semi-presidential system. Fourth, when the AKP government brought this issue to the forefront in 2003, they clearly point out the US-presidential system. In addition, for the first time, they talked about increasing power of the deputies. However, after 2010, the AKP government changed their discourse and started to talk about a Turkish style presidential system. They specifically indicated the disadvantages of a pure presidential system and argue that to solve Turkey's problems there is a need to establish a Turkish style presidential system (Oder, 2005).

#### 2.4.3. Arguments favors of a system change in Turkey

People who favor a system change focus on two main arguments; first, a new presidential system will bring a strong, effective and stable executive. Second, it will establish a strong and efficient legislature governed by creating a check and balance system (Ozbudun, 2005).

The first important problem is instability, from the 1960-1980's Turkey had twenty governments created and defeated; some governments were in power less than one year (Turan, 2005). The second problem is *sui generis* structure of 1982 Constitution, resulting in a complex and incomprehensible government system: it is neither pure parliamentarism nor pure presidentialism. As a result of the changes on the election procedure of the president, the system gets more complicated; it created a parliamentary system with a direct elected president (Kuzu, 1996; Duran, 1984). The third problem is the double-headed executive branch. There could be some internal conflicts between the president and prime minister if they fell into disagreement (Fendoglu, 2010). For example, the 10<sup>th</sup> President Sezer and Prime Minister Erdogan have totally different worldviews; as a result in nearly every situation they fell into disagreement and Sezer

used his veto power (73 times) and send back to decisions to the Council of Minister more than any other president (Uran, 2010:10). Another important problem is the sluggishness of the legislative process. In multiparty coalitions, it takes considerable time to make decisions or to pass legislation. This means that decisions cannot be made quickly and some important regulations might not be passed because of the opposing party conflicts in the coalition governments (Uran, 2010). A solution to all these problems, it is argued that Turkey needs to adopt a new government system. To make faster decisions, to prevent the problems based on coalition governments, to overcome the political crises and increase democracy, it is claimed that the adoption of a presidential system is a solution (Kuzu, 2006). First, a presidential system supports the unified executive branch structure of a presidential system and will create a speedier and more effective decision making process, especially in emergency situations. For instance, at the economic crisis, the US could easily and quickly respond the crisis while many European countries were forced to act more slowly (Evcimen, 1992). Second, because of Turkey's historical structure, a presidential system is more appropriate for the Turkish Republic. Modern Turkey emerged from the Ottoman Empire, and is based on a sultanistic tradition. Third, Turkey is a developing and dynamic country, and has some important economic, social and political issues. In order to overcome these issues, decisions must be made more rapidly and smoothly. For that reason, the argument continues, it is essential for Turkey to adopt the presidential system of the United States or the semi-presidential system of France (Gonenc, 2011).

#### 2.4.4. Arguments against of a system change in Turkey

Scholars who are against the proposed system change in Turkey argue that presidentialism or semi-presidentialism may result in an authoritarian or a dictatorial executive<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For more see, Fendoglu, 2010; Tezic, 1991; Soysal, 2007; Ertan, 2010; Kalaycioglu, 2007.

and may create more instability based on added tensions and conflicts between legislative and executive branch if the president and parliament are not of the same party (Uran, 2010). For instance, in Turkey's case, a lack of democratic stability, the political effects of a powerful military, the lack of powerful judiciary, a presidential system may combine to lead to an authoritarian regime (Soysal, 2007).

The other issue in presidential regimes is the risk of gridlock. If control of the executive and legislative branches comes from opposite parties, the system can fall into gridlock under the presidential system in Turkey (Uran, 2010; Ulusahin, 1999). In addition, it is argued that political parties and the electoral system in Turkey have problematic structures which affect political instability, especially the non-stable characteristics of the party systems. Extreme fragmentation in party structures is important reasons for weak or fragile coalition governments in Turkey (Hale, 1999; Fendoglu, 2010).

Some argue that President Erdogan wants to stay in politics and plans to adopt a presidential system solely for that purpose. As a result, he is planning to be President for two terms until 2023. In other words, they argue that the changes are only related to the political ambitions of Erdogan (Torchia, 2011). After 2010, a system change debate created a Turkish style presidential system instead of a pure presidential system by the AKP government. Former Prime Minister Erdogan started to talk about the disadvantages of a pure presidential system and focused on the creation of a Turkish-style presidential system. According to Kemal (2013) Erdogan's idea about creating a Turkish style presidential system alone explains the desire of power; he criticizes the US system where a president needs approval even for the sale of a helicopter, and this shows that his main goal is power; he wants to be able to decide everything even the sale of helicopter (Kemal, 2013).

Furthermore, people who are against system change mention a large potential cost. They claim that politicians are talking about a system change without mentioning any potential costs which can be classified under three categories and need to be examined before taking any actions. The first one is the technical costs. The government system change cannot be done as a constitution change only. The judicial system needs to be evaluated and renewed based on the needs of a new system. It is argued that more than forty articles of the constitution based on hundreds of laws, rules and regulations will need to be changed or rearranged (Cıtak, 2012). In addition, for some time Turkey has been working to make changes based on the EU's norms and has not completed the process. While changing an article to meet the EU standards has not completed yet, adjusting to a new system will bring more problems instead of solving Turkey's existing problems. The second one is the cost associated with the learning process. It will take some time to learn the operation of a new system--presidential or semi-presidential system-- and operate under new rules. Third one is the foreign response or reaction to a system change. Turkey has been working to be an EU member since the 1950s and the negotiation process started in 2004. For that reason, if there is a system change, the opinions or reactions of the EU or members of EU must be considered. But at least, most of the EU members have a parliamentary system and there are a few examples of a semi-presidential system, currently there is a not government with a presidential system in the union. All these costs must be considered in the evaluation of a system change and it is possible to argue that it may be more costly to make a transition instead of solving the current system problems (Gonenc, 2005).

Scholars also argue that parliamentary regime is a state tradition and Turkey has experience with the current system, for that reason it is more appropriate to solve the problems of the current system and continue with the same regime. Turkey's history is deeply grounded in

the current system and if the entire system changes, it will run counter to all these experiences (Turgut, 1998; Turan, 2005; Soysal, 2006; Gonenc, 2011).

To summarize briefly, it is clear that there are some obvious problems in the current system. The 1982 constitution is not in full accordance with the parliamentary system and it created a mixed or hybrid system. However, it is not proper to expect that a new system will solve all the existing problems immediately; at least a new system will bring some problems and costs in the adaptation process (Senocakli, 2012; Ozbudun, 2005). In addition, it can be said that every strong leader who comes to power puts the presidential system debate on the agenda, their intention is to remain in power longer, and the discussion is not based on the needs of the society.

The Turkish case remains in the middle of the parliamentary-presidential debate in the literature. Scholars, politicians, writers and thinkers give different arguments based on their political views. However, the system transformation cannot be decided on individual political desire or individual political thought, since it will affect society as a whole and the country's future. For that reason, it is important to analyze all the processes and develop a very well organize plan before taking action.

## **CHAPTER 3: PARTY STRUCTURE OF TURKEY: IS IT APPLICABLE TO PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM**

### **3.1. Literature Review**

#### **3.1.1. Two-Party System vs. Multi-Party System**

Political parties are essential for representative democracy (Norris, 2005) and they are crucial for the survival of the democratic system (Olson, 1998; Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Webb & White, 2007). Giovanni Sartori (1976) defines a party as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through election, candidates for public office” (63). More broadly, a party can be defined as “an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions” (Janda, 1980:5). In democracies, political parties compete with each other to implement their ideas. They get power from the people through elections. The main purpose of the general election is to determine which party or parties will form the government and which one or ones will be the opposition (Turk, 1994).

The party system; formation and evaluation of it and its relations with the electoral system play an important role in political science literature.<sup>1</sup> The party system is defined as “the forms and modes of their coexistence which has characteristics that do not appear in individual parties such as; numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical localization, political distribution and so on” (Duverger, 1954:203). Also, Sartori (2005) defines party system “as an interaction between parties, how the parties are related with each other, how they react competitively or otherwise to the other parties” (39). In addition, Wolinetz (2006) argues that there are different characteristics of party systems such as “the number of parties, their relative

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<sup>1</sup> For party formation, see, Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Cox, 1997; Mainwaring, 1999 and for the relationship between party formation and electoral system see, Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Weiner & Ozbudun, 1987; Taagepera & Shugart 1989.

size and strength, the number of dimensions on which they compete, the distance which separates them on key issues, and their willingness to work with each other” (53). For the classification of party system, different scholars use some of these dimensions but the most common one is the effective number of parties in the competition which fights for power, which is generally used to identify the party systems (Duverger, 1990). It is categorized as one-, two- and multi-party systems. In a single-party system, there is only one dominant party which has the hegemonic power. In two-party system, there are two parties which win the most of the votes and share of the seats in the legislature. Multi-party system means that there are more than two parties that are effective in political competition (Lijphart, 1999; Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011).

There are different factors like political traditions, political institutions, regional cleavages, ethnical groups, socio-economic factors, and election system that determine the development of a two-party or a multi-party system (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011). In addition, the government system has an influence on the development of party systems. For instance, it is possible to say that political parties have more influence in parliamentary system than in presidential system. The government is directly formed by a party or parties and also the relationship between the government and the ruling party or parties is more direct greater in parliamentary system. However, in presidential system the head of the government is directly elected by the people even though he or she might depend on a party or not. People choose the president as a person; they do not choose a party, so parties have minor role in presidential system (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011).

### 3.1.2. Party Systems in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems

Mainwaring (1993) examines the relationship between party systems and regime type and argues that presidentialism with a multi-party system is associated with lower rates of democratic



survival. He evaluates democratic success in the period 1945-92 and concludes that social, cultural and economic factors also impact democratic survival rates. In addition, his research shows that a very small number of democracies have presidential systems in this time period and all these successful democratic presidential states had two-party systems. He concludes that presidentialism and multi-party systems are a dangerous combination which may increase the gridlock between the executive-legislative and may increase the possibility of ideological polarization. He argues that in a presidential regime, “parties are less committed to supporting the government [and that] incentives for parties to break coalitions are generally stronger than in parliamentary systems” (Mainwaring, 1993:200).

Carey (2002) also evaluates the party system and argues that presidential and parliamentary systems are more likely to have developed different kinds of parties. The general idea is that parliamentary systems produce highly unified parties while presidential systems more likely have undisciplined parties (Carey, 2002). Yet, some other studies show that presidential systems may also create unified parties and may create an effective government (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000). Also, Linz and Velenzuela (1994) argues that if a state has a multi-party political structure and applies a presidential system, it will probably create a conflict between presidential and parliamentary institutions and will result in a failure of democracy.

### **3. 2. History of Turkish Party Systems**

#### **3.2.1. Political Party System in Turkey**

In classifying political party systems, Sartori (1976) focuses on the number of relevant parties and degree of ideological polarization and as a result he classifies party systems under four categories: two-party, moderate pluralism (multipartism with low ideological polarization), polarized pluralism (multipartism with considerable polarization) and predominant (in which the

same party consistently wins a majority of seats) (Sartori, 1976:283). The Turkish party system is one of the best examples of this classification. The party system started with a single party period until 1950s and then a transformation to a multiparty system occurred. The period between 1961 and 1980 can be categorized as moderate pluralism. After 1975, the party system took the form of polarized pluralism in Sartorian terms, because of the political violence and terrorism associated with-the political and economic crisis in Turkey. Then after 2002, with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and their hegemonic victories in 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections, the Turkish party system can be characterized as a predominant system (Sartori, 1976; Sayari, 2002).

#### 3.2.1.1. Single party period in Turkey (1923-1946)

In Turkey, the period of 1920-1946 was the single-party period. The Republican People's Party was the only party in the Turkish politics from 1923 to 1946. This single-party period cannot be compared with Hitler's Germany, or the Italy under Mussolini. Mustafa Kemal tried to end this single-party period several times.

The first opposition political party - Progressive Republican Party (Trakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi) - was established on November 17, 1924 by Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy who were former military commanders. PRP was more liberal and democratic than Republican People's Party and it was more concentrated on individual freedoms than RPP. The party's main objective was to revive the liberal economic policies again. In a very short time, the party started to become very popular and got more support in the press. However, before the completion of its seventh month of political life, the party was closed by the government on 3 June 1925, with the *Sheikh Said uprising* which was an extreme religious revolt. For the justification of the closure of the PRP, the government argued that the party was against Mustafa

Kemal and they involved in the *Izmir Assassination* which was an attempt to kill Mustafa Kemal and also the party was connected with the Sheikh Said uprisings. As a result, the party's founders and members were on trial and seventeen of them were executed (Ozden & Yilmaz, 2010).

The second opposition political party - the Liberal Republican Party - was founded on August 12, 1930, by Fethi Okyar who was Ataturk's school friend and military commander. Mustafa Kemal wanted an opposition party to end the negative dictatorship image seen from the outside. But at the same time, he wanted to control the opposition from the inside, and for that reason, he asked his friend Fethi Okyar to form a new party. However, after a very short time of the establishment of the party, followers of liberal party started to campaign against to secular state. As a result of this, on December 17, 1930, the party dissolved by its president Fethi Okyar. After that, the opposition became effective in the parliament up to 1946 under the name of the Independent Group (Ozden & Yilmaz, 2010; Arslan, 2005).

#### 3.2.1.2. Multi-party period in Turkey (1946-1995)

With the establishment of the Democratic Party on January 7, 1946, a transformation to a multi-party system was achieved. The Democratic Party was founded by Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan who were the members of Republican People's Party (RPP). It became very successful by winning sixty one deputies in the 1946 elections. However, the election in 1946 was not completely free and fair because open ballot and secret counting procedure was used in the election (Erdogan & Unal, 2013). For that reason, the period of 1946-50 can be defined as the "transitional period" to the multi-party system. In the 1950 election, the Democratic Party won the election with 53.35 percent of the votes. They won the election in 1957 with 47.3 percent of votes. Their popularity and, as a result, their votes had started to decline because of the nation's worsening economic situation. Under the DP rule, the nation's

economic situation started to get worse; inflation rates were increased, economic development started to decrease and the nation faced with the shortage of important goods. The Democratic Party was dissolved on 27 May, 1960, by the military as a result of the first military coup (Arslan, 2005). The party system during the 1950–1960 periods can be categorized as a two-party system. The two parties -- DP and the CHP-- dominated politics and the other small parties had very limited role in politics.

In 1960, Turkey faced its first military coup as a result of the declining economic situations and increased tensions in the society and after the coup the military developed its legal and institutional privileges by establishing 1961 constitution (Demirel, 2004). After the regime breakdown in 1960 and a short period of military rule, Turkish party system faced a new phase. The DP which was one of the two dominant parties of the previous decade was closed and banned from politics by the military. The closure of DP and a transformation from a plurality to a proportional representation system in the 1961 elections increased the party fragmentation. After the coup, many political parties formed. The National Action Party (NAP) and the Socialist Workers Party (WPT) were formed in the 1960s and the New Turkey Party (NTP) and the Justice Party (JP) were established in 1961.

From 1961-1965 different parties tried to take the role of Democratic Party. Especially in 1961 election, voters were confused about which party was the real heir of the Democratic Party. As a result of the proportional representation and the subsequent growth in the number of effective parties, the 1960s was the period of coalition governments (Arslan, 2005; Ozbudun & Myron, 1987). However, then Justice Party (JP; Adalet Partisi) successfully managed to take the role of the Democratic Party and as a result, in 1965 and 1969 elections, the Justice Party under Suleyman Demirel's leadership won parliamentary majorities despite the use of proportional

representation. As a result, in this period from 1965 to 1971, the system turned to a moderate form of multipartism as described by Giovanni Sartori (Sayari, 2002; Tachau, 2000). Sartori defines a moderate pluralist system as centripetal competition between bipolar three-four parties in the elections (Sartori, 1966:139).

Turkey between 1965 and 1969 had been dealing with the left-right students' struggle in the street. In the 1970s, the situation was exacerbated by the high rate of inflation and as a result the Turkish Armed Forces issued a memorandum on 12 March 1971. Between 1971 and 1973 some constitutional amendments were adopted to limit civil liberties. Military power was increased once again. Then, by taking support from the military, Nihat Erim, who was a former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a university professor, formed the government in 1971. This sparked an operation against civil rights and liberties. The Erim government began to make changes in every institution, such as the universities, the press, radio and television, the Council of State, and the Constitutional Court. In addition, any left wing organizations or publications were prohibited and many socialist intellectuals, writers, scientists, university students were arrested in this period (Kircak, 1993). During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a growing ideological polarization between the political left and the right in Turkish party politics (Sayari, 2002) In this period, extremist Islamic and extremist right-wing parties developed and took other centrist parties' place; as a result the domination of two parties was ended (Sayari, 2002).

Between 1971 and 1980, eleven successive governments emerged and were unsuccessful (Davison, 1988). As a result of the economic and political unrest, the military again decided to control the nation's politics. On September 12, 1980, the third military intervention into the country's political system was instituted by General Kenan Evren and his associates. After the

coup, the 1982 constitution (which was an expanded version of the 1961 constitution) was promulgated and the Turkish military closed down all political parties (Icener, 2010). For that reason, any political parties or any civil society organizations could not contribute to the crafting of the 1982 Constitution; it was prepared solely by the Turkish Armed Forces (Ormeci, 2012). The 1982 Constitution provided an ideal context for the expansion of military power (Sakalloglu, 1997). In addition, the military imposed a 10% national threshold system to prevent the small ideological parties from winning parliamentary seats in this period (Ozbudun, 2000b:75-76).

The 1980 coup was very different from the previous military interventions in 1960 and 1971. Military rule was sustained until 1983. In previous coups, only one (such as DP in 1960) or a few small parties (such as Marxist TOP and the Islamist MNP) were banned by the Constitutional Court, while other parties continued to be active in politics. However, after the 1980 coup, all political parties were banned. The general idea was to create new parties based on two moderate centrist parties. There would be no continuity with the parties before 1980s and there would be no extremist radical leftist or Islamist parties (Sayari, 1996-1997; Akarca & Tansel, 2007).

However, a new party, Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), was formed by Turgut Ozal and was allowed to enter the elections. Overcoming opposition by the military, ANAP got 45.1 percent of the votes and 52 percent of the parliamentary seats. Because of ANAP's victory, the power of military in the politics was diminished. As a result of ANAP's majority party government, the period of short-lived and weak coalition governments was ended (Erguder, 1991).

After fifteen years, with the general election on November 2002, a single-party period began in Turkish politics with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The

2002 election resulted in an AKP victory and it created a single party government. In the 2007 election, the AKP won the election again by increasing its votes over the 2002 result. Then, in 2011 election, the AKP increased its votes again and won the elections for a third time since 2002.

Sartori (1976:193-194) argues that if there is a ten percentage point difference between the strongest and the other parties, the leading party can be classified as a dominant party. The AKP satisfies this criterion (the difference between the AKP and the second party was 15% in 2002, was about 25% in 2007, and was about 24% percentage points in 2011) and can be defined as a dominant party (Carkoglu, 2011). In 2002, the AKP created a single-party government. The percentage of votes and number of seats won by parties over the past eight elections is provided in Figure 3.1 and governments in Turkey are also listed in Table 3.1.

### 3.2.2. Characteristics of Turkish Political Parties

Turkish political parties can be categorized under five main groups. The first one is the Kemalist group which is represented by Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party). This is the oldest party in Turkish politics. The second one is the Nationalistic group which is represented by Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Movement Party). The third one is the moderate right-wing party, which is now dominated by the ruling party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti; Justice and Development Party). The fourth one is the Islamist group which represented by the Saadet Partisi (SP; Felicity Party), and AKP's roots lies within it. The last one is the Kurdish group which became effective after 1990s (Carkoglu, 2002; Koseoglu, 2011).

Party	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011
AKP (Justice Development P)	--	--	--	--	--	34.3 (363)	46.6 (341)	49.8 (327)
ANAP (Motherland P)	45.1 (211)	36.3 (292)	24 (115)	19.6 (132)	13.25.1 (86)	--	--	--
DYP (Right Path P)	--	19.1 (59)	27.1 (178)	19.1 (135)	12 (85)	9.5 --	--	0.2 --
CHP (Republican People's P)	--	--	--	10.7 (49)	8.7 --	19.4 (178)	20.19 (112)	26 (135)
DSP (Democratic Leftist P)	--	8.5 --	10.8 (7)	14.6 (76)	22.2 (136)	1.2 --	--	0.3 --
SHP (Social Democratic People's P)	--	24.7 (99)	20.88 (88)	--	--	--	--	--
MHP (Nationalist Movement P)	--	2.9 --	--	8.2 --	17.9 (129)	8.4	14.3 (71)	13 (53)
RP (Welfare P)	--	7.2 --	16.9 (62)	21.4 (158)	--	--	--	--
SP (Felicity P)	--	--	--	--	--	2.5 --	--	--
FP (Virtue P)	--	--	--	--	15.4 (111)	--	--	--
HEP (People's Labor P)	30.5 (117)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MDP (National Democratic P)	23.3 (71)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GP (Young P)	--	--	--	--	--	7.3 --	3 --	--
HADEP (People's Democracy P)	--	--	--	4.2 --	4.8 --	--	--	--
DEHAP (Democratic People's P)	--	--	--	--	--	6.2 --	--	--
Independents	1.1	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.9 (3)	1 (9)	5.2 (26)	6.6 (35)

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Won by Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 1983-2011

Note: The first column indicates the percentage of votes and the second column which is determined by parenthesis indicates the number of seats.

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, General election results from 1983-2011.



Table 3.1: Governments in Turkey, 1983-2011

Period	Type of government	Governing party(s)	Prime Minister
Dec.1983- Dec. 1987	Single party/majority	ANAP	Turgut Ozal
Dec.1987- Sept.1989	Single party/majority	ANAP	Turgut Ozal
Sept. 1989- June 1991	Single party/majority	ANAP	Yildirim Akbulut
June 1991- Dec. 1991	Single party/majority	ANAP	Mesut Yılmaz
Dec. 1991- June 1993	Coalition/majority	DYP, SHP	Suleyman Demirel
June 1993- May 1995	Coalition/majority	DYP, SHP	Tansu Çiller
May 1995- Oct. 1995	Single party/minority	DYP	Tansu Çiller
Oct. 1995- March 1996	Coalition/majority	DYP, CHP	Tansu Çiller
March 1996- June 1996	Coalition/majority	ANAP, DYP	Mesut Yılmaz
June 1996- June 1997	Coalition/majority	RP, DYP	Necmettin Erbakan
June 1997- Jan. 1999	Coalition/minority	ANAP, DSP, DTP	Mesut Yılmaz
Jan. 1999- May 1999	Single party/minority	DSP	Bulent Ecevit
May 1999- Nov. 2002	Coalition/majority	DSP, ANAP, MHP	Bulent Ecevit
Nov. 2002- January 2015	Single party/majority	AKP R.T.Erdogan, A. Davutoglu*	

Source: Data compiled from [www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/hukumet](http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/hukumet)

\*Ahmet Davutoglu became Prime minister when Erdogan was elected as President in 2014.

The first group: Kemalist group adopts the Kemalist ideology which was implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It was the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic. It was defined as the establishment of new Turkish state based on new political, social, cultural and religious reforms. Over the years, this group supports Westernized modern state, democracy, secularism, civil and political equality for everyone. Under this group, CHP was established in 1923 and is one of the main parties; the party got 85% of the votes in 1946 election, 39.45% in 1950, 34.8% average vote from 1954 to 1980. It was not very strong in 1990s, but after 2002 election the CHP became the main opposition party again by getting 19.2 % votes. The first opposition to the CHP under this group came from Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP; Republican Trust Party) which was founded by the politicians separated from CHP. It was effective in 1969 and 1973 elections by getting 6.6% and 5.3% of the votes, respectively, but it only got 1.9% of the votes in the 1977 elections. The second challenge to the CHP under this group was provided by Halkçı Parti (HP;

People's Party), which was only allowed by the junta to join the elections after 1980 military coup. These parties are from the Kemalist group. The second Kemalist party --Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP; Social Democratic People's Party)--was established after the election from by merging of Republican Trust Party and People's Party in 1985. Then, the Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP; Democratic Leftist Party) was formed by Bulent Ecevit, former president of the CHP, in 1985. The latter party belongs to the Kemalist tradition is the Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP; New Turkey Party). It was formed in 2002 and dissolved in 2004. From all these parties, CHP has been the central figure of Kemalist tradition (Koseoglu, 2011).

The other groups --on the Nationalistic and moderate right wing-- became effective after the single-party system was abolished. The second group moderate right wing group supports nationalism, conservatism, democracy, liberal and free market economy. Under this tradition, Demokrat Parti (DP; DemocratParty) was founded in 1946 and represents the right wing and formed the government in 1950 for ten years. Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (MDP; Nationalist Democracy Party), Anavatan Partisi (ANAP; Motherland Party) Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP; Right Path Party) are other examples of the right-wing parties and they were active in politics in 1980 and 1990s. Today, it is argued that AK Party dominates this tradition (Ete, 2008).

The third group: nationalistic group support Turkish and Islam synthesis and Turkish nationalism very strongly. They define their doctrines as a national doctrine that respects to the nation's beliefs, religion, culture, and focuses on science and technology. Millet Partisi (MP; The Nation Party), was established in 1948 and represents the nationalistic group. In 1954, the party changed its name to Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (CMP; Republican Nation Party) and then merged with the minor Ciftci Partisi (ÇP; Peasants' Party) in 1958 and became the Republican Peasant Nation Party. In 1969, the party name was changed to the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

(MHP; Nationalist Movement Party), by Alparslan Türkeş, a retired coronel, who became the leader of the party. In the 1980 coup, MHP was also banned. After the closure of the MHP, a new party the Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (MÇP; Nationalist Mission Party) was formed by the leaders of the MHP. In 1993, MÇP became the MHP once again. In 1993 Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP; Great Union Party) was established under this tradition and in 2002 the Genç Parti (GP; Youth Party) was established by Cem Uzan, who is a media tycoon, under this tradition (Koseoglu, 2011).

In 1970, the Islamist tradition appeared on the scene, and this Islamist group adopts a National Outlook (Milli Görüş) tradition which is a kind of religious nationalism based on anti-Westernization. The National Order Party, formed by Necmeddin Erbakan, was the first party under this group. The party was banned by the judiciary because of the anti-secular activities after a year and then changed its name to the National Salvation Party. In 1983, the Refah Partisi (RP; Welfare Party) was established to represent this tradition. It was also banned by the Turkish Judiciary in 1998 because of the anti-secular policies. That same year, the Fazilet Partisi (FP; Virtue Party) was formed to continue this tradition. In 2001, it was also banned. Some of the followers formed a new party called Saadet Partisi (SP; Felicity Party) and some of them formed the AKP in 2001 (Koseoglu, 2011). Most interestingly, most of the Islamist parties were closed by the judiciary because of the anti-secular activities but after every closure a new party with a different name under the same tradition was established.

The last group is the Kurdish group which became active in 1990 in Turkish politics. This group entered into the political life by demanding their own cultural and national demands. For this group, the main goal is to get independence or autonomy from Turkish Republic. Today, they are looking for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The first party

under this group was the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP; People’s Labor Party). Then, the Demokrasi Partisi (DEP; Democracy Party), the Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP; People’s Democracy Party), the Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP; Democratic People’s Party) and the Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP; Democratic Society Party) were formed in order. All of them were later banned by the judiciary because of their relations with the terrorist organization PKK. Today, the Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP; Peace and Democracy Party) represents this tradition (Koseoglu, 2011). All political parties based on their traditions are showed in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Political Parties According to the Traditions

TRADITION	PARTIES							
Kemalist	CHP	CGP	HP	SHP	DSP	YTP		
Mod. Right	DP	AP	YTP	DEM.P	HUR.P	ANAP	MDP	DYP
Nationalist	MP	CMP	CKMP	MHP	MCP	BBP	GP	
Islamist	MNP	MSP	RP	FP	SP	AKP	HAS.P	
Kurdish	HEP	DEP	HADEP	DEHAP	DTP	BDP		

Source: Koseoglu, 2011.

Moreover, there are different characteristics of the Turkish party system and one of them is volatility, which is defined as “sudden and significant changes in party votes from one election to the next” (Ozbudun, 2000b:74). Electoral volatility defines the net change in the elections by counting individual vote transfers. It shows the net percentage of the voters who changed their votes from the previous election. It is calculated by the Pedersen index<sup>2</sup> and this index ranges between 0 to 1, in which 0 refers that all parties get the same vote as they did in the previous election, while 1 refers that voters vote for different parties.

In addition, the high electoral volatility is one of the main reasons for highly fractionalized parliaments. Highly party fragmentation refers that there are many small parties

<sup>2</sup> The Pedersen volatility index is calculated by using the following formula. In the formula N represents the number of parties.  $V = (1/2) \sum_N (IVote\%_{it} - Vote\%_{it-1})$ .

that receive a small amount of the votes. Party fragmentation is calculated by the fractionalization index (F)<sup>3</sup> that ranges from 0, which means a party gets all of the votes, and 1 refers so many parties receive a small amount of the votes. Electoral volatility and fragmentation in Turkey is presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Electoral Volatility and Fragmentation in Turkey, 1965-2011

Year	Total Volatility	Fragmentation
1961		0.71
1965	23.4	0.63
1969	11.2	0.70
1973	16.8	0.77
1977	18.3	0.68
1983	--	0.66
1987	38.5	0.75
1991	16.6	0.79
1995	17.9	0.83
1999	20.2	0.85
2002	41.7	0.82
2007	18.6	0.72
2011	11.6	0.67

Source: Hazama, 2003, 2004; Kalaycioglu, 2008, 2010; Carkoglu, 2011; Tezcur, 2012.

Note: Electoral volatility for general elections immediately after the military interventions (1960, 1980), was not calculated, since these interventions disrupted the continuity of party systems.

From the Table 3.3, it is seen that for Turkey, the electoral volatility scores are very high, the mean is 19.42 from 1965-2012. It refers that voters change their votes in every election and they vote differently compared to previous elections. Especially, the electoral volatility score reached its zenith in 2002 election (the score is 41.2). It shows that nearly half of the voters changed their vote in 2002 election. After 2002, the electoral volatility starts to decline. Party fragmentation scores are also very high for Turkey; the mean score is 0.73 from 1961 to 2011. It means that there are always many small parties in the system and these parties get a small amount of the votes. However, it is seen that party fragmentation is also declining after 2002

<sup>3</sup> The fractionlization index (F) is calculated by the following formula:  $F = [1 - \sum_N (\text{Vote } \%)^2]$

election with the AKP party. Based on these results, it is possible to say that after 2002 with the entrance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), there is a consolidation and stabilization in the electoral preferences. The second characteristic of the Turkish party system is the lack of stable partisan support which negatively affects party loyalty. These two characteristics—volatility and lack of loyalty—are the main reasons for a less-stabilized party system in Turkey (Sayari, 2002). The third characteristic is the broad ideological spectrum of the system or high level of polarization (Sayari, 2002:10). In 1970s, the left-right ideological polarization was an important characteristic of Turkish party system. In 1990s, in addition to the left-right ideological polarization, secularist/Islamist divides began to take an important role in party system polarization. During the 1990s, the political life has witnessed the tensions between those who wanted to increase the role of religion in politics and those who wanted to endure the secular policies. Most interestingly, in Turkey non-electoral forces, such as the military or bureaucratic elites, are also effective in party politics. For instance, the military after the each coup banned some of the parties or removed some of the party leaders from the politics. From the beginning of the multi-party elections, the party structure can be categorized as instable because of military interventions, party switches and a ban on political parties (Sayari, 2008).

### 3.2.3. Election Systems in Turkey

Electoral systems and their consequences have been intensively studied in the literature.<sup>4</sup> Electoral system is the method that determines the distribution of votes into the seats in parliament or in other government area. There are different factors such as district magnitude, ballot structures, effective thresholds, assembly size, open/closed lists that affect the electoral system, but the most important factor is the electoral formula which is used for the calculation of

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<sup>4</sup> For electoral systems see, Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1971; for the consequences of electoral systems see, Lijphart, 1994; Lijphart & Grofman, 1984; Blais & Massicotte, 1996; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; Farrell, 1997.

votes. There are many different types of electoral systems but the main ones are Plurality system, Proportional Representation, and Mixed system (Norris, 1997). Duverger (1954) argues that the election system goes a long way in determining the structure of the party system. According to the Duverger Law, plurality systems in single-member districts tend to create two-party systems, while proportional systems tend to produce multi-party systems. As a proof of this thesis, Lijphart (1994) compares twenty seven industrialized democracies from 1945-90 by using the effective number of parties index and finds that number of effective parties was 2.0 in plurality systems, and 3.6 in proportional systems (Norris, 1997:7).

Single-Member District Plurality (SMDP) systems, also known as the “first-past-the-post,” are used in the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom and other countries. In such systems, the country is divided into geographical districts, each one of which produces on election day a winning candidate to represent it in the national legislature. Voters in each district cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice and whichever candidate receives the largest number of votes – even if short of a mathematical majority – is declared the winner. One of the disadvantages of this system is the disproportionality between the votes and the seats. Because of the need to defeat all other candidates and the winner-take-all nature of the contest, SMDP tends to eliminate small parties in the parliament (Norris, 1997; Turk, 1994).

Proportional representation (PR) is commonly used in European countries such as Italy, Spain, and Finland. In such systems, people vote for a political party of their choice. Under PR, the seats in the parliament are distributed in proportion to the percentage of the votes received by the parties, and, as a result, medium and small parties can be represented in addition to the large parties. Generally, it leads to multi-party system and provides a fair representation, especially for the minorities.

Mixed-member systems are systems that combine aspects of both PR system and plurality SMDP system. Such systems are used in New Zealand and Germany. Voters cast one vote for their preferred party and one vote for a candidate to represent their electoral district. It is more complicated than the other systems, so it is sometimes hard for voters to understand. Generally, it tends to create multi-party systems (Norris, 1997; Turk, 1994).

Until 1960, the SMDP plurality system was used in Turkey. It is possible to see all the drawbacks of a plurality system in Turkey at that time. The votes of the government party and opposition parties were close to each other, but because of the plurality system, the government party--DP-- had an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament (Turk, 1994). As a result, the absolute power of the DP was not overcome and this hegemonic power of the government led the country into a political crisis that resulted in a military coup. As a result, to prevent this kind of political crisis, the PR system was chosen after 1960 (Cop, 2011).

After the 1960 coup, a new electoral law and a new constitution were implemented. Proportional representation system with the d'Hondt and with district threshold, the *Hare quota*, was introduced. According to this system, for each district a threshold is determined (the votes in the district divided by the number of seats in that district) and if a party vote does not surpass the threshold, it will not get any seats in the legislature. After 1965, the National Remainder system was used. According to this system, first the district threshold was determined based on the *Hare quota*. Then, the total remaining votes were divided by the seats and then the result was divided by each party's remainder votes based on the national results (Cop, 2011). The main goal behind the adaptation of National Remainder system was to prevent the absolute majority of one party in the parliament. As a result of the National Remainder system, the 1965 elections provided the most proportional results in modern Turkish history. The disproportionality level was very low;



for instance, the CHP got 28.7 percent of the votes and earned 29.8 percent of seats, so the deviation was only 1.1 percent. However, in spite of the National Remainder system, the AP got 52.9 percent of the votes and formed the government by itself. After the election, the AP government changed this election system and returned to the previous d'Hondt system. This system was then used in the 1969, 1973 and 1977 elections. Then, after the 1980 military coup, a new election system, which was d'Hondt with the district threshold, was introduced in 1983. In addition, a ten percent national threshold was introduced (Cop, 2011; Turk, 1994), which reduced the probability of small parties winning legislative seats. Turkish election system since 1950 is provided in Table 3.4 and number of parties and effective parties are showed in Table 3.5.

Table 3.4: Turkish Electoral Systems, 1950-2011

Election Year	Election System
1950	Multimember district – Plurality
1954	Multimember district – Plurality
1957	Multimember district – Plurality
1961	PR- D'Hondt with district threshold
1965	PR- D'Hondt with National Remainder
1969	PR- D'Hondt with no threshold
1973	PR- D'Hondt with no threshold
1983	PR- D'Hondt with double threshold <sup>1</sup>
1987	PR- D'Hondt with double threshold and quota <sup>2</sup>
1991	PR- D'Hondt with double threshold and quota
1995	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
1999	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
2002	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
2007	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
2011	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold

Source: Cop, 2011; Information about the 2011 election is added by the author.

<sup>1</sup>: The Hare quota was coupled with a 10 percent national threshold. Parties were required to get at least 10 percent of votes at national level in order to gain representation in parliament.

<sup>2</sup>: The “quota” was an extra seat added to the ones already allocated to the district’s winner party by the d'Hondt system.

Table 3.5: Number of Parties, Number of Parties that Gained Seats, Number of Effective Parties by seats and by votes, 1950-2011

Election Year	N. of Party	N. of Party Gaining Seats	NEP by votes	NEP by seats
1950	3	3	2.2	1.3
1954	4	3	2.1	1.1
1957	4	4	2.4	1.7
1961	4	4	3.4	3.2
1965	6	6	2.7	2.6
1969	8	8	3.3	2.3
1973	8	7	4.3	3.3
1977	8	2	3.1	1.2
1983	3	3	2.8	2.5
1987	7	3	4.1	2.1
1991	6	5	4.6	3.6
1995	12	5	6.1	4.4.
1999	20	5	6.7	4.9
2002	18	2	5.4	1.8
2007	14	3	3.4	2.3
2011	15	3	2.9	2.3

Source: Cop, 2011; Turkish Statistical Institute election results from 1950-2011. Information about the NEP by votes and NEP by seats are added by the author.

For Turkey, when the number of effective parties is examined, most interestingly, the results show that in the last three elections (2002, 2007 and 2011), the number of effective parties is very low in Turkey. There is an emergence of a two-party system in the parliament after 2002 election. What is the reason of this two-party system after 2002 election?

First and the most important reason is the Turkish electoral system; proportional representation with multimember districts under d'Hondt formula and a 10 percent national threshold which is used for translation of the votes into the seats. In the 2002 election, the AKP got almost one-third of the vote (34.3 percent of the votes) and as a result won nearly two-thirds of the seats (363 out of 550) in the parliament. Also, CHP, the opposition party got only one-fifth of the votes (19.4 percent of the votes), but the party won one-third (178 out of 550) of the

parliamentary seats. On the other side, almost forty five percent of the popular votes were wasted because, these votes were shared by other parties that failed to pass the 10 percent barrier. The electoral system clearly damages the proportionality of the party representation in the parliament and it works in favor of the AKP and CHP in terms of seats. And most importantly, the 10 percent national threshold prevents the introduction of other parties to the parliament. For instance, if the threshold was 5 percent in 2002 election, five other parties-- DYP, MHP, GP, ANAP, and DEHAP-- would gain parliamentary representation in addition to the AKP and CHP. So, it is possible to argue that the main reason of the reduction in the number of parliamentary parties is the electoral system (Sayari, 2002).

Second, the voters' dissatisfaction with the most of the established parties was also effective in the change of party system in 2002. High levels of inflation rates, the financial crisis in 2001 negatively affected the credibility of the parties in the coalition government in 1990s. As a result, voters wanted to see a new fresh party in the politics (Sayari, 2002).

### **3.3. Data and Examination**

Based on Mainwaring's (1993) analysis, this study focuses on the effective number of parties in Turkey and compares it with those in other democracies that have presidential and parliamentary systems. Mainwaring (1993) compares the stable democracies from 1967 to 1992 by using the Rae index of party fractionalization and the effective number of parties. Mainwaring (1993) argues that presidentialism and multi-party systems are a dangerous combination which may increase the gridlock between the executive-legislative and may increase the possibility of ideological polarization.

Some changes are made to the Mainwaring's (1993) analysis; first, the time period was extended from 1992 to 2010. As a result there have been some changes in status of democratic

states. For instance, Mainwaring (1993) evaluates Venezuela under presidential democracies; however, the status of Venezuela was changed by the military coup in 2001. For that reason, it was removed from the analysis. Second, the number of democracies has been increasing and the number of countries in the analysis is also increased from twenty five to twenty nine. Third, Turkey is added to the analysis. Fourth, the Least Square index (LSq) is also used in addition to the Rae index to clearly indicate the real disproportionality in elections.<sup>5</sup>

Stable democracies, which are defined “on the basis of democratic longevity, more specifically, at least 30 years of uninterrupted democracy,” (Mainwaring, 1993: 4) are selected for the comparison. Democracy here is defined by three characteristics: First, there must be free, fair competitive elections. Second, there must be nearly universal adult suffrage and, third, there must be guarantees of traditional civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of organization, due process of law, etc. (Mainwaring, 1993:4). To ensure these criteria, the polity data set and Freedom House data set are both used. The data include the period of 1946 to 2010. The main point is to identify democracies that have had stable democracies for thirty years until 2010. Freedom House scores countries on a 1-7 scale for political rights and civil liberties, with the lower numbers indicating a greater degree of these key rights.” The main criterion is to determine the countries categorized as “free” (having free or with scores 3 or lower out of 7).

There are some countries that meet the thirty years criteria, such as Greece (1967-2010), Mauritius (1968-2010), Spain (1978-2010), Botswana (1966-2010), Cyprus (1974-2010) and Portugal (1976-2010), which were not examined in Mainwaring’s analysis; these countries are also added to the analysis, bringing the number of countries in the analysis from twenty five to

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<sup>5</sup> The LSq is employed here because it has been argued that the Rae index does not accurately estimate the real disproportionality if there are small parties in the election. The LSq estimates disproportionality for each election instead of for each party. Lijphart (1994) characterizes this index as “the most faithful reflection of disproportionality of election results” (Kalogirou & Panaretos, 1999:66).

twenty eight. Some countries became democracies after 1946, such as Israel (1948), but still the main criterion is to have at least 30 years of uninterrupted democracy until 2010. These democracies are also included. It is also important to mention that Turkey does not meet the criteria of thirty years stability. Stable democracy in Turkey started in 1983, so there have been twenty seven years without interruption in democracy. It is important to show the possibility of multiparty structure with the presidential system in Turkey. For that reason, Turkey's case is also evaluated and the number of democracies is thereby increased from twenty eight to twenty nine with the inclusion of Turkey. The list of stable democracies is provided in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: Stable Democracies, 1946-2010

Parliamentary Systems	Presidential Systems	Other Mixed Systems
Australia (1946-2010)	Botswana (1966-2010)	Finland (1946-2010)
Austria (1946-2010)	Costa Rica (1946-2010)	France (1946-2010)
Belgium (1946-2010)	Cyprus (1974-2010)	Portugal (1976-2010)
Canada (1946-2010)	United States (1946-2010)	Switzerland (1946-2010)
Denmark (1946-2010)		
Greece (1967-2010)		
India (1950-2010)		
Ireland (1946-2010)		
Israel (1948-2010)		
Italy (1946-2010)		
Jamaica (1959-2010)		
Japan (1946-2010)		
Mauritius (1968-2010)		
Netherlands (1946-2010)		
New Zealand (1946-2010)		
Norway (1946-2010)		
Spain (1978-2010)		
Sweden (1946-2010)		
Trinidad and Tobago (1962-2010)		
Turkey (1983-2010)		
United Kingdom (1946-2010)		

Source: The Political Instability Task Force (PITF), Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2010; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Lijphart, 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000. \*Freedom Ratings 1.00: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Cyprus, United States, Finland, France, Portugal, Switzerland \*Freedom Ratings 1.5: Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Mauritius \*Freedom Ratings 2.0: Trinidad and Tobago \*Freedom Ratings 2.5: India, Jamaica, and Botswana; \*Freedom Ratings 3.0: Turkey

It is clearly seen that the number of stable presidential democracies is quite low compared to the number of stable parliamentary democracies. From the twenty nine countries that have been stable democracies, only four of them – Botswana, Costa Rica, Cyprus and the United States--have presidential system. Twenty of them have had parliamentary systems and four of them have had mixed systems.

### 3.3.1. The Rae index of party fractionalization

Three measures -- the Rae index of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and the Least Square index (LSq) -- are used for the comparison. The Rae index generates scores between zero and one, where zero indicates that all members of a country's legislature came from the same party (i.e., no party fractionalization) and one means each and every representative come from a different party (maximum party fractionalization). Values are calculated by squaring each party's shares of seats and subtracting the sum of all these squares from 1 (Rae 1967). The formula is:

$$Fs = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N p_i^2$$

In this formula,  $F$  represents index of fragmentation expressed in seats,  $N$  shows the number of parties, and  $p_i$  determines the proportion of seats held by the  $i$ th party. If the number is low, it means that a few parties (probably one or two) get a large majority of seats. If the number is high, it shows that there are many parties that have seats (Rae 1967). Party fragmentation determines the number of parties in the system; if there are more parties the party system becomes more fragmented. Sartori (1976) classifies the party system into three main categories: (1) low fragmentation two-party systems, (2) medium fragmentation-limited pluralist systems with between three and five parties, and (3) highly fragmented extreme pluralist systems

with five parties or more (Sartori, 1976:196). The results of party fractionalizations are listed in Table 3.7 below.

Table 3.7: Party Fractionalization in Stable Democracies

DEMOCRACIES	PARTY FRACTIONALIZATIONS
Parliamentary Democracies	
Australia	.565
Austria	.556
Belgium	.667
Canada	.574
Denmark	.755
Greece	.570
India	.487
Ireland	.624
Israel	.784
Italy	.721
Jamaica	.479
Japan	.645
Mauritius	.481
Netherlands	.787
New Zealand	.494
Norway	.691
Spain	.610
Sweden	.685
Trinidad and Tobago	.457
Turkey	.461
United Kingdom	.512
Presidential Democracies	
Botswana	.181
Colombia	.753
Costa Rica	.541
Cyprus	.720
United States	.483
Mixed Systems	
Finland	.716
France	.620
Portugal	.650
Switzerland	.801

Source: Sartori, 2005

### 3.3.2. The Effective number of parties

The effective number of parties is used to count parties in a weighted fashion and also to measure their relative strength. It is used in the comparison of electoral systems in different countries (Lijphart, 1999). The effective number of parties is measured by squaring the each party's share of seats or votes and adding all these squares and dividing 1.00 by this number (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). The formula is:

$$N_s = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

In this measure,  $N$  represents the number of effective parties in seats;  $p_i$  shows the fractional share of seats of the  $i$ -th party. If the number of seats is divided equally between two parties, the number of effective parties will be the same as the number of parties that have seats. If the majority of the seats are dominated by two parties, and the other third party has only fewer seats, the number of effective party will be some number between 2.0 and 3.0 (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979).

### 3.3.3. The Least Square index

Also, to clearly indicate the real disproportionality in elections, the Least Square index (LSq) is used in addition to the Rae index. The LSq is employed here because it has been argued that the Rae index does not accurately estimate the real disproportionality if there are small parties in the election. A least square index is categorized between 0 to 100 and it is calculated by squaring the difference for vote-seat of each party, adding these values, dividing the sum by two and taking its square root (Gallagher, 1991:40):



$$LSq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2}$$

It estimates disproportionality for each election instead of for each party. If there are only two parties, this index estimates exactly the same values as the Rae index. But if there are more than two parties, it calculates a medium value between these two measures. Lijphart (1994) characterizes this index as “the most faithful reflection of disproportionality of election results” (Kalogirou & Panaretos, 1999:66). The main difference from the Rae index is that the total amount of disproportionality is divided by the effective number of parties rather than by the actual number of parties in least square index which is an improvement in Rae index (Gallagher, 1991). Disproportionality tends to be higher in pluralist/majoritarian systems which penalize small parties and reward large ones, and lowest for countries with PR system (Moser & Scheiner, 2012:78). The number of effective parties and the result of Least Square index are provided in Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.

Table 3.8: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Presidential Democracies

Presidential Democracies	Disproportionality Btw votes and Seats The least squares index (LSq)	Number of Effective Parties (Laakso/Taagepera Index)*
	Mean	Mean
Botswana (1966-2010)	14.74	1.42
Costa Rica (1946-2010)	5.16	2.66
Cyprus (1974-2010)	2.00	3.71
United States (1946-2010)	19.61	1.64

Sources: Botswana: Carbone, 2007; Colombia: Cárdenas et al. 2006; Costa Rica, Cyprus and United States: Gallagher, 2014.

\* The ENP by seats are used in here.

\*\* Elections on which calculations are based: Botswana 1965-2009, Colombia 1974-2002, Costa Rica 1953-2010, Cyprus 2001-2011, USA 1948-2008

Table 3.9: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Parliamentary Democracies

Parliamentary Democracies	Disproportionality btw votes and Seats The least squares index (LSq)	Number of Effective Parties (Laakso/Taagepera Index)*
	Mean	Mean
Australia (1946-2010)	9.14	2.50
Austria (1946-2010)	2.49	2.71
Belgium (1946-2010)	3.35	5.63
Canada (1946-2010)	12.24	2.50
Denmark (1946-2010)	1.71	4.57
Greece (1967-2010)	8.46	2.43
India (1950-2010)	6.18	5.76
Ireland (1946-2010)	4.02	2.87
Israel (1948-2010)	1.88	5.15
Italy (1946-2010)	3.96	4.25
Jamaica (1959-2010)	14.21	1.74
Japan (1946-2010)	7.14	2.99
Mauritius (1968-2010)	12.96	2.00
Netherlands (1946-2010)	1.25	4.86
New Zealand (1946-2010)	9.20	2.27
Norway (1946-2010)	4.29	3.66
Spain (1978-2010)	7.24	2.63
Sweden (1946-2010)	2.01	3.52
Trinidad and Tobago (1962-2010)	11.57	1.80
Turkey (1983-2010)	11.76	4.77
United Kingdom (1946-2010)	11.70	2.16

Source: Gallagher, 2014

\* The ENP by seats are used in here.

\*\*Elections on which calculations are based: Australia 1946-2010, Austria 1949 - 2008, Belgium 1946- 2010, Canada 1949- 2008, Denmark 1947-2007, Greece 1946-2009, India 2004- 2010, Ireland 1948-2017, Israel 1949- 2009, Italy 1946- 2008, Jamaica 1949-2007, Japan 1946- 2009, Mauritius 2010, Netherlands 1946- 2010, New Zealand 1946- 2008, Norway 1949- 2009, Spain 1977- 2008, Sweden 1948- 2010, Trinidad and Tobago 1961- 2010, United Kingdom 1950-2010.

Table 3.10: Number of Effective Parties and Disproportionality in Mixed Democracies

Semi-presidential	Disproportionality between votes and Seats The least squares index (LSq)	Number of Effective Parties (Laakso/Taagepera Index)*
	Mean	Mean
Finland (1946-2010)	3.00	5.05
France (1946-2010)	12.61	3.69
Portugal (1976-2010)	4.72	2.84
Switzerland (1946-2010)	2.58	5.22

Source: Gallagher, 2014.

\* The ENP by seats are used in here

\*\*Elections on which calculations are based: Finland 1948-2007, France 1946-2007, Portugal 1975-2009, Switzerland 1947-2007.

Party fragmentation in presidential democracies is lower than party fragmentation in parliamentary or mixed democracies, which indicates that the number of parties are lower in presidential system compared to parliamentary and mixed systems. It is important to clarify that, there is a strong correlations between voting rules and the party systems. Duverger (1954) argues that the election system goes a long way in determining the structure of the party system. According to the Duverger Law, plurality systems in single-member districts tend to create two-party systems, while proportional systems tend to produce multi-party systems. In other word, because of the electoral system that they use in the elections, presidential systems are more likely to have two party systems. Two of presidential democracies (Botswana and United States) are under .500. On the other side, party fragmentation is very high in parliamentary democracies. Only, six out of twenty (India, Jamaica, Mauritius, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey) is under .500, and there are four (Denmark, Israel, Italy, Netherlands) very highly fragmented democracies over .700. For mixed regimes, the party fragmentation is also very high. Four of them are over .600.

The number of effective parties is also lower in presidential democracies compared to parliamentary and mixed democracies. Two out of four presidential democracies (Botswana and United States) have less than two effective parties and two (Colombia and Costa Rica) have less than three effective parties. For parliamentary democracies, there are only two cases (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago) out of twenty one that have less than two effective parties. Four of them (Netherlands, Turkey, Italy and Denmark) have more than four effective parties and three of them (Belgium, India and Israel) have more than five effective parties. Disproportionality between votes and seats is also very high in presidential democracies compared to parliamentary democracies and mixed democracies.

### **3.4. Results and Conclusion**

The applicability of adopting a presidential system in Turkey by focusing on party structure is evaluated. Based on Mainwaring's (1993) analysis, this chapter examines the effective number of parties and compares the set of stable democracies. In so doing, the Rae index of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and Least Square index are used. Stable democracies from 1946 to 2010 are determined for the comparison. Before explaining the results, it is important to clarify that there is not a relationship between the number of effective parties and democracy status of a country. In other words, having two or lower effective parties or more than two effective parties do not imply less democracy or high democracy.

Within the population of stable democracies, the number of presidential systems is very low, while the number of parliamentary systems is significantly higher. From the list of twenty nine stable democracies, only four of them – Botswana, Costa Rica, Cyprus and the United States – have a presidential system. Twenty one of them have parliamentary systems and four of them have mixed systems. In addition, measures of the number of effective parties and party

fragmentation are very low in presidential democracies compared to parliamentary and mixed systems. Half of the presidential democracies have less than two effective parties. However, for parliamentary democracies, the numbers of effective parties are generally high (four and five in some cases) but of course there are some cases that have two effective parties. Disproportionality between votes and seats is also very high in presidential democracies when compared to parliamentary democracies and mixed democracies.

This study provides important inferences for Turkey. First, from 1946 to 2010, parliamentary democracies seem to be more successful in sustaining democracy (four presidential, twenty one parliamentary democracies). Then when the party fragmentation and the number of effective parties are compared, it is seen that they are low in presidential systems compared to parliamentary systems or mixed systems. It does not imply less democracy or not, instead this shows that presidential systems are more likely to have two effective parties from these time periods. On the other hand, parliamentary systems are more likely to have more than two effective parties in generally. However, because of the Turkish complicated party structure, it is not easy to make a conclusion. Most interestingly, Turkish case provides a complicated party system for the examination. First, the multiparty system has been using since 1946 in Turkey. However, because of its election systems --proportional representation with multimember districts under d'Hondt formula and a 10 percent national threshold--, after 2002 election, a two-party system was emerged in the parliament. The electoral system and specifically the 10 percent national threshold is the main reason of this emergence of a two-party system. But with this new structure, it is not proper to argue that Turkish party structure is not proper for presidentialism or parliamentarism. There are important indeed problems in the electoral system, such as representation problem and waste of nearly half of the votes because of the ten percent threshold.

## **CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACTS OF FORM OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

### **4. 1. Introduction**

Does a form of government (parliamentarism-presidentialism) have an impact on economic growth and political development? Or how do these political institution matter and how do they affect economic and political development or government performance? For instance, if a country changes its governmental system from a parliamentary to presidential system, or vice-versa, what happens to its economic and government performance? In the political science literature, there is an agreement that “institutions matter” (Linz, 1990a: 51-69), but disagreement starts when the outcomes of specific institutional structure are analyzed (Tsebelis, 1995).

Differences in institutions (such as systems of representation, arrangements for the division and supervision of powers, methods of organizing interests, and systems of election) create different outcomes for different policy areas. There is not a clear answer to the question “which institutions have which effects under which conditions” (Przeworski et al. 1996)? It is important to start with an explanation of political institutions. The term “political institution” is “a label that has been attached to a wide range of different phenomena from written constitutions, via organizations like political parties or trade unions, all the way to existing social norms” (Persson & Tabellini, 2003:17). This study is focused on the formal rules, specifically the forms of government (parliamentarism-presidentialism).

The main stated motivation for some in Turkey who wish to adopt a presidential system is to improve economic, political, and social development. However, it is important to explore whether or not a presidential system does indeed create a better level of economic, political and social development and whether or not it is applicable to countries that have a certain level of

preexisting socio-economic development. For that reason, this chapter analyses theoretically and empirically different forms of government systems and their effects on three policy areas—political, economic, and social development. Moreover, the main question is this: which government system is more appropriate to produce economic, political, and social development? The first aim is to show, in general, which system is better for economic and political development. Then, the second part of this chapter presents a comparison of Turkey with other states that have (or have tried) a presidential system by using social-economic and political variables. Section 2 discusses why different forms of government may matter for economic and political development. Section 3 presents the data, and section 4 focuses on the empirical analysis and results. Then, section 5 presents a comparison of Turkey with other states and a conclusion is presented in the last part.

## **4. 2. Literature Review and Arguments**

In the literature, the political consequences of government formation, such as regime stability and nature of the party system, have been intensively studied. Recently, however, a large number of studies have started to focus on the relations between political institutions and different policy areas (Persson & Tabellini, 2003-2004a). The effects of government formation on economic and political development are explained, in order, in the following section.

### **4.2.1. Form of Government and Economic Growth**

There are two main differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, separation of power and confidence requirements. These main differences have various effects on economic development. First, why should separation of powers be important for economic policy? The general idea is that checks and balances between different offices prevent politicians from abusing their power. Because parliamentary systems fuse the executive and legislative powers of the state, office holders in parliamentary systems have greater concentration of powers

and sometimes can misuse this power for their personal or political interests. However, in presidential regimes, the existing of strong checks and balances decreases the potential for abuse of power (Persson & Tabellini, 2003). This separation of power between the executive and legislative branches in presidential systems increases the possibility of credible political commitments (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and facilitates the transmission of information to the public about the political process (Persson et al., 1997). This can increase political accountability and may increase economic growth (Benhabib & Przeworski, 2005). Political accountability is important for economic growth (Ferejohn, 1986; Benhabib and Przeworski, 2005). If political accountability is high, citizens may vote based on the politicians' performance. For that reason, politicians must show extra effort and work to generate stronger economic performance (Powell & Whitten, 1993). On the other hand, if different parties control the legislature and the executive, it may result in gridlock. Under this situation, it may be hard to pass or enhance economic reforms (Knutsen, 2011).

Second, another important difference between presidential and parliamentary democracies is the implementation of a confidence requirement. This rule does not apply to presidential regimes and the executive may have power without majority support in the legislature. For that reason, politicians in presidential regimes are more focused on targeted programs instead of broad government programs. However, in parliamentary regimes, the existence of cabinet confidence procedures improves party discipline and high party discipline results in public spending on broad national programs instead of narrow region-specific programs (Gerring et al., 2009; Persson & Tabellini, 2003-2004a).

It is argued that parliamentarism creates better governance and, as a result, it enhances economic policies. One of the reasons behind this claim is that parliamentarism solves the



political coordination problem better than presidential systems, since it “institutionalizes debate and negotiations, and reduces the number of veto players” (Gerring et al. 2009: 354–355). In general, Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentarism creates better economic growth, superior bureaucratic quality, a better investment environment, and longer life expectancy than presidentialism. Also, Persson (2005) finds that reform towards parliamentary democracy may generate higher economic growth by increasing property rights and trade openness, as opposed to reforms in a presidential democracy (but the results are not robust). Particularly, Persson & Tabellini (2003) show that “a constitutional reform from parliamentary to presidential regime would shrink the size of overall spending by about 5% of GDP, and the size of welfare programs by about 2% of GDP” (150).

Compared to parliamentary systems, presidential systems and plurality-majoritarian systems are more likely to have created smaller governments, lower tax rates, less public spending, and they concentrate on targeted, narrow-based programs (Acemoglu, 2005; Gabel & Hix, 2005; Persson et al., 2000; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). They also create less rent extraction than parliamentary regimes (Persson & Tabellini, 2003). In addition, these constitutional rules are also effective in spurring economic growth by systematically affecting governments’ economic policies (Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Rodrik, 1996) and countries’ economic institutions (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Persson, 2005). However, it is not entirely clear which specific types of constitutional structure increase economic growth.

Although some studies show that proportional representation system and parliamentarism have a positive effect on growth, there is not a consensus in the literature. For instance, there are some studies that find that there is not a robust relationship between either parliamentarism or presidentialism and economic growth (Knutsen, 2011). However, some studies find that the

method of government formation does affect economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Kaufmann et al.2000; Mauro, 1995; Persson & Tabellini, 2003-2004a; Persson, 2005).

Institutions affect economic growth by shaping the incentives to accumulate, innovate and accommodate change. For instance, Alesina (1998) shows that institutional quality, as measured by bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, protection of property rights, and the rule of law, is important for growth.

However, it appears there is a consensus in the literature pointing to the importance of electoral rules. The general idea is that PR and semi-PR electoral rules are more likely to create higher growth rates than plurality-majoritarian rules (Knutsen, 2011). Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2000-2003-2004a) and Milesi-Ferretti, et al. (2002) examine the effects of election system on government expenditure. Their conclusion is that to a degree greater than proportional electoral systems, majoritarian systems create smaller governmental expenditure, smaller welfare programs, and focus on targeted programs.

#### 4. 2.2. Form of Government and Political and Social Development

Gerring, et al., (2009) argue that corruption, government effectiveness, bureaucratic quality, political stability, and rule of law represent key indicators of political development and for all these indicators except corruption, high scores produce better governance for political development. But what is good government? Different definitions are used by different organizations. The World Bank defines good governance as “sound development management” encompassing public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development and information and transparency” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3). The UN Secretary-General claims that good governance aims at “ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public

administration.” The UNDP explains governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (Avellaneda, 2010:7). These definitions of good governance generally imply the legitimacy of authority, public responsiveness and public accountability of government (Samarasinghe, 1994).

Przeworski et al. (1996) evaluate the stability of alternative institutional arrangements, focusing specifically on parliamentarism, presidentialism and mixed systems from 1950 to 1990. They find that only one in eight mixed system collapsed during this period; fourteen of fifty parliamentary systems and twenty-four of forty-six presidential systems died. “The probability that a democracy would die under presidentialism during that time period was 0.049; the comparable probability under parliamentarism was 0.014, in other words, democracy’s life expectancy under presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 years” (Przeworski et al. 1996:7). They argue that being in Latin America is not one of the reasons behind the short lifespans of presidential systems. The life of presidential systems changes according to the level of development, economic growth, and presence of legislative majorities (Przeworski et al. 1996).

Similarly, Cheibub (2002) compares presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1950 and 1990 and argues that parliamentary democracies are more likely to survive than presidential democracies. He shows that in these given years “the probability that a parliamentary democracy would die in any given year was 0.0138, corresponding to an expected life of 73 years; the probability that a presidential democracy would die was 0.0477,

corresponding to an expected life equal to 21 years” (284). The country’s economic performance and its military legacy are in Cheibub’s analysis the main reasons for these differences.

The other important difference for forms of government and political development is the accountability. Shugart and Carey (1992) claim that the separation of powers in presidential systems may create different forms of representation and accountability than in parliamentary systems. The separation of power between the executive and legislative in presidential system increases the possibility of credible political commitments (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and facilitates the transmission of information to the public about the political process (Persson et al., 1997). As a result, it increases political accountability (Benhabib and Przeworski, 2005). In general the idea is that presidential systems are more accountable than parliamentary systems.

Also, the nature of the executive creates differences in different policy areas. Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentary systems provide better results in policy than presidential systems and are more strongly correlated with good governance. Specifically in economic and human development areas “parliamentary systems are associated with superior governance” (Gerring et al. 2009: 28). The reasons why parliamentarism may provide better governance include “a) stronger political parties, b) corporatist interest organization, c) tighter principal-agent relationships within the various arms of the bureaucracy, d) centralized (national-level) electoral accountability, e) the capacity for flexible policymaking, f) a more institutionalized political sphere, and g) decisive leadership” (Gerring et al. 2009: 28). Some also argue that parliamentary systems have positive effects on the quality and performance of the government. Particularly, “a parliamentary system with inclusive electoral rules makes possible the coexistence of multipartism with fair representation, socially efficient outcomes and relatively effective government”(Colomer & Negretto, 2005: 74-75). On the other hand, because of the

separate elections and divided powers, presidential systems decrease the quality and performance of government. Moreover, Schmidt (2002) claims that “presidential government performs less well than parliamentary government in policy areas” (154).

Gerring, et al., (2009) argue that corruption, government effectiveness, bureaucratic quality, political stability, and rule of law represent political development and for all these indicators except corruption, high scores produce better governance for political development. But what is good government? Different definitions are used by different organizations. The World Bank defines good governance as “sound development management” encompassing public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development and, information and transparency” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3). The UN Secretary-General claims that good governance is “ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration.” The UNDP explains governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (Avellaneda, 2010:7). These definitions of good governance generally imply the legitimacy of authority, public responsiveness and public accountability of government (Samarasinghe, 1994).

Przeworski et al. (1996) evaluate the stability of alternative institutional arrangements specifically parliamentarism, presidentialism and mixed system from 1950 to 1990 and find that only one mixed system died among eight cases; fourteen parliamentary systems died under fifty cases and twenty-four presidential systems died under forty-six cases. “The probability that a democracy would die under presidentialism during that time period was 0.049; the comparable

probability under parliamentarism was 0.014, in other words, democracy's life expectancy under presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 years" (Przeworski et al. 1996:7). They argue that being in Latin America is not one of the reasons of short-living for presidential systems. The life of presidential systems changes according to the level of development, economic growth and presence of legislative majorities (Przeworski et al. 1996).

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Also, the nature of the executive creates differences in different policy areas. Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentary systems provide better results in policy areas than presidential systems and it is more strongly correlated with good governance. Specifically in economic and

human development areas, “parliamentary systems are associated with superior governance” (Gerring et al. 2009: 28). The reasons why parliamentarism may provide better governance include “a) stronger political parties, b) corporatist interest organization, c) tighter principal-agent relationships within the various arms of the bureaucracy, d) centralized (national-level) electoral accountability, e) the capacity for flexible policymaking, f) a more institutionalized political sphere, and g) decisive leadership” (Gerring et al. 2009: 28). Some also argue that a parliamentary system has positive effects on the quality and performance of the government. Particularly, “a parliamentary system with inclusive electoral rules makes possible the coexistence of multipartism with fair representation, socially efficient outcomes and relatively effective government”. (Colomer & Negretto, 2005: 74-75). On the other hand, because of the separate elections and divided powers, a presidential system decreases the quality and performance of government. Moreover, Schmidt (2002) claims that “presidential government performs less well than parliamentary government in policy areas” (154).

On the other hand, Shugart & Carey (1992) evaluate the form of government and government performance and argue that the high number of veto players and diffusion of power in government branches does not cause the instability or poor governance for presidential regimes. They argue instead that there are other institutional factors (such as “the timing of elections, the legislative authority of the executive and representative apportionment in the legislature”) that can have a negative impact in the context of a presidential system and produce poor governance (Shugart & Carey, 1992). In response, Gerring et al. (2009) claim that parliamentary systems create-effective governance because of the unity and centralization of the lawmaking process and that this results in better performance than presidential systems (with their diffusion of power in different branches of government).

Political institutions affect social development through redistribution and public interest. Hristakopoulos, (2011) argues that political institutions affect human development, and specifically that parliamentary governments perform better than presidential ones in social development. Similarly, Gerring and Thacker (2001) evaluate the impact of political institutions on social development. They find that proportional electoral systems and parliamentary systems increase social development. Also, Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentarism is related to better governance, as measured by indicators of political, economic, and human development (such as GDP per capita, and infant mortality).

In theory, it is argued that a parliamentary government is better in representation, protection of minority rights and voter participation (Lijphart 1992; Linz 1990a, 1990b; Linz & Valenzuela 1994). However, cases studies show that there is a more complex relationship between political performance and form of government. There is not a clear distinction between these forms, because there are many different factors that affect the political performance for each form (Schmidt, 2002). In other words, in the literature there is not a consensus about the effects of forms of government on political developments, some in favor of parliamentary regimes while some support presidential ones.

#### **4. 3. Data and Methodological Issues**

##### **4. 3.1. Data and Variables**

To examine these questions, I utilize two data sets. The first data come from the Quality of Government (QoG) 2015 Standard time-series dataset which contains data from 1946 to 2014. The unit of analysis in the data set is country-year (such as Spain 1946, Spain 1947). However, because of the variation in data availability (there are some missing data before 1975), I evaluate the years from 1975 to 2012. The second source of data, which is used for the country



comparisons, comes from Cheibub (2007). It covers 199 countries, from 1946 to 2002. Both data sets include different variables about type of government system, elections, electoral rules, economic, political and social development and general descriptive characteristics like population, region, religion, GDP.

#### 4. 3.1.1. Dependent Variables

In the current analysis, I seek to evaluate the effects of government systems on three policy areas; for that reason, different dependent variables for each policy areas are examined.

4. 3.1.1.1. Political Development. There are different indicators for political development, such as government effectiveness, corruption control, political stability, and rule of law (Gering et al., 2009). In addition to these variables, government accountability is also evaluated. For all these variables, high scores reflect better political development. Corruption control measures “perceptions of corruption,” which is defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. Corruption is measured by different sources, ranging from “the frequency of additional payments to get things done, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring grand corruption in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in state capture” (QoG: 98). Government effectiveness combines “into single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies” (QoG: 99). The general idea is to present how governments are able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public good (QoG: 99). Political stability indicates the continuity of the government without any unconstitutional and/or violent destruction, including domestic violence and terrorism. Rule of Law includes several indicators, such as “perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and

predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected” (QoG: 100). The Accountability and Voice variable includes “a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions” (QoG: 101).

4. 3.1.1.2. Economic development. Economic development indicators include the number of telephone mainlines, import duties, trade policy, GDP per capita, and investment climate (Gering et al., 2009). For the current analysis, most of these indicators except investment climate are used. Telephone line per 100 people is an important indicator of economic infrastructure and communication (QoG: 116). Trade rate is measure by the sum of export and import rates as a share of gross domestic product. The Export and Import rates variable is defined as the total exports and import of goods and services (QoG: 116). In addition, the level of economic prosperity is identified with real per capita GDP (QoG: 60). For these variables, if the values are higher, it indicates better economic governance.

4. 3.1.1.3. Social development. Some of the social development indicators include the infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and literacy rates (Gering et al., 2009). The infant mortality rate per 1000 people is important to show the health and quality of life of the country. Life expectancy presents the number of years, on average, that a newborn infant will probably live. Literacy rates indicate that the population that is able to read and write in its native language

(QoG: 60). For life expectancy and literacy rates, higher scores and for infant mortality rates lower scores shows better social development.

#### 4. 3.1.2. Independent variables

The most important independent variable is the institutional profile of the political system. For the classification of presidential and parliamentary systems, first the election of the president is evaluated. If there is a prime minister and president, different factors such as the degree of separation between the president and parliament and the power of the two players are considered. As a result, the political system variable is coded as 0=Presidential, 1=Semi-Presidential, 2=Parliamentary.

In addition, the model includes several control variables. In the literature, many political, economic, geographic, demographic, and cultural factors are indicated as useful control variables, but it is not possible to consider all of them in the current analysis because of the lack of data availability. Still, some of these standard control variables are included. Level of economic development (GDP), the democratic history of each country, ethnic (and linguistic) fractionalization, and a large population are more likely to have negative impacts on political, economic, and social development. The geographic location of the country is also important. Being located in Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, and Middle East is expected to have a negative impact. The legal origin, specifically a British legal origin, has a positive impact on political development while other colonial origins are expected to have a negative impact on political developments (LaPorta et al. 1999). The latitude scaled indicates the distance of countries from the equator and it is expected to be positively related with political and economic development (LaPorta et al. 1999). Oil production in million barrels and gas production in metric tons, produce wealth and revenue, but the expectations for these are not certain. In addition,

religion (Protestant, Muslim and Catholic heritage) has an impact. The expectation in the literature is that a Protestant heritage may have a positive effect on state capacity (Gerring & Thacker, 2004), while a large Muslim population may have a negative effect on political and social development (Moon, 1991). All variables are explained in Appendix 1.

#### 4.4. Empirical Analysis and Results

##### 4.4.1. Empirical Analysis

In the Quality of the Government data set, country number is larger than time variable. For that reason, it is not time dependent; instead, it is important to deal with the unit effects. Unit heterogeneity stipulates that differences in units, such as states or countries, are not explained by the independent variables (Wilson & Butler, 2007). To learn whether or not the series has a unit root, and to get more information, the Dickey-Fuller test is used and the result is presented in Table 4.1. The Dickey-Fuller test is one of the most commonly use tests for stationarity. The null hypothesis is that the series has a unit root (not stationary).

Table 4.1: Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

	Test Statistic	Interpolated Dickey-Fuller		
		1% Critical Value	5% Critical Value	10% Critical Value
Z(t)	-69.515	-3.430	-2.860	-2.570

\*MacKinnon approximate p-value for  $Z(t) = 0.0000$

\* \*Number of observation: 5055

According to Table 4.1, the test statistic shows that the political institution series do not have a unit root. The test statistic (-69.515) is smaller than the critical values and, therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis of unit root. The series does not have unit root or, in other words, it is stationary.

If the unit effect is solved, then the correlated error issues are matters of concern. There are two correlated errors: time-serial autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation. In other words, observations of the dependent variable may not be independent of each other.

Specifically, a particular observation can be related with a previous observation and this might lead to either autocorrelation or serial correlation in the error term (Monogan, 2010). Breush-Godfrey and Durbin-Watson techniques are used to test for serial correlation. The null hypothesis in both tests is that there is no serial correlation. To show whether there is any autocorrelation or not, I use both Breush-Godfrey and Durbin-Watson tests and the results are showed in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both tables show that there is not any auto-correlation.

Table 4.2: Durbin's Alternative Test for Autocorrelation

lags(p)	chi2	df	Prob > chi2
1	1.974	1	0.1600

\* H0: no serial correlation

Table 4.3: Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation

lags(p)	chi2	df	Prob > chi2
1	1.990	1	0.1584

\* H0: no serial correlation

Then, to show whether or not there exists a collinearity problem, the Tolerance and VIF test is used and the result is presented in Table 4.4. According to this test, if a VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) values exceed a value of 10, it is accepted as the good indicator that collinearity is a problem. From Table 4.4, it is seen that all VIF values are much smaller than 10. Clearly there is not a collinearity problem.

Table 4.4: The Tolerance and VIF test

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Political system L1.	1.02	0.979974
Year	1.02	0.979974
Mean VIF	1.02	

For time series data sets, the use of OLS models is not proper because of the time and unit variance (Beck & Katz, 1995). For the unit effects, three models (Fixed Effect, Random Effect, and Lag Dependent Variable) are used. Political scientists generally use fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models to examine the unobserved heterogeneity in time series data sets. Each model provides different interpretations. Generally, fixed effect models are more common than random effects models (Wilson & Butler, 2007). In addition, if there are not serious issues or problems in the data set, a GLS-ARMA model can be used.

For political development, I use both fixed effects and random effects models. For each Random effect model, I use the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test which shows the applicability of random effects. If the results show that a random effect model is suitable, then random effect models are used (such as in Control Corruption, Government Effectiveness and Political Stability variables). For rule of law and voice and accountability variables, a random effects model is not suitable based on Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test, so only fixed effects models results are presented. Then, the GLS-ARMA model is used to show a comparison between models. The results are shown in Figure 4.1.

Political Development Model Estimator	Control of Corruption		Government Effectiveness		Political Stability	
	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Parliamentarism	.246***	.223***	.249***	.232***	.238***	.230***
Semi	.074	.061***	.109	.104	-.107	-.110
Presidentialism						
Population	-5.30***	-4.44**	-4.30	5.36	-1.12***	-1.08***
GDP per capita	.0003***	.0003***	.0003***	.0003***	.0002	.0002***
Region	.026**	-.017	.035***	.031***	-.012	-.016
Regime Durability	.009***	.009***	.005***	.004***	.004***	.003***
Institutionalized	.005***	.006***	.008***	.008***	.011***	.011***
Democracy						
Ethnic	-.024	-.004	-.150	-.130	.088	.105
Fractionalization						
Western Colonial	.052***	.057***	.014	.018*	.067***	.070***
Origin						
Legal Origin	-0.56**	-.055**	-.098***	-.097***	.116	.117***
Latitude	1.41***	1.33***	1.33***	1.26***	1.33***	1.928***
Muslim	-.004***	-.003***	-.003***	-.003***	-.006***	-.006***
Other Religion	-.002***	-.001***	-.001***	-.001**	-.008	-.001
Oil Production	-2.48***	-2.67***	-1.75***	-1.88**	-2.89***	-2.99***
per capita						
Party	.082	.056	.115	.102	-.254***	-.276***
Fractionalization						
Plurality System	-.112**	-.109**	-.004	-.001	-.079	-.078
Proportional E. S.	.037	.053	.117**	.131***	-.128**	-.118***
Constant	-1.048***	-1.08***	-.879***	-.911***	-.992***	-1.01***
(Presidentialism)						
Observations	1656	1656	1695	1695	1697	1972
Sample Period	1996-2012		1996-2012		1996-2012	
R2 within	0.7568	0.7579	0.7556	0.7564	0.5613	0.5251
R2 between	0.6887	0.7075	0.7250	0.7409	0.2769	0.3274
R2 overall	0.7431	0.7420	0.7449	0.7441	0.5545	0.5193
F		282.55		304.09		153.60
Prob> F		0.000		0.000		0.000

\*\*\* prob. <0.01 \*\* prob. <0.05 \* prob. <0.10

Figure 4.1: Political Development

(Figure 4.1 continued)

Political Development Model Estimator	Rule of Law		Voice and Accountability	
	FE	GLS	FE	GLS
Parliamentarism	.209 ***	.225**	.294 ***	.306 ***
Semi				
Presidentialism	.049	.054*	-.095	-.092
Population	1.66	1.12	3.10	2.78
GDP per capita	.00003***	2.04	.00001***	.00001***
Region	.021*	.026**	.046***	.049***
Regime Durability	.006***	.006***	.002***	.002***
Institutionalized	.008***	.008***	.009***	.009***
Democracy				
Ethnic	-.102	-.124	.062	.048
Fractionalization				
Western Colonial	.038***	.034***	.002	.0009
Legal Origin	-.081***	-.082***	-.162 ***	-.162 ***
Latitude	1.39***	1.46***	1.73 **	1.78 ***
Muslim	-.002***	-.002***	-.010***	-.010***
Other Religion	-.006	-.0009	-.004***	-.005***
Oil Production	-3.02***	-2.88***	-1.94 ***	-1.85 ***
per capita				
Party	.046	.064	.182***	.189***
Fractionalization				
Plurality System	-.067	-.070	-.058	-.061
Proportional E. S	.022	.008	.225***	.215***
Constant	-1.04***	-1.01***	-.524 ***	-.500 ***
(Presidentialism)				
Observations	1697	1697	1697	1930
Sample Period	1996-2012		1996-2012	
R2 within	0.7689		0.7322	
R2 between	0.6987		0.3450	
R2 overall	0.7560		0.7261	
F	326.25		268.17	
Prob> F	0.0000		0.0000	

\*\*\* prob. <0.01 \*\* prob. <0.05 \* prob. <0.10

For economic development, I use both fixed effects and random effects models. For each Random effect model, I use the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. The results show that the random effect is suitable in GDP and Import model. In addition, to show which model (random effect or fixed effect model) is better, the Hausman test is used and in some cases the



results shows that fixed effect model is better. For that reason, the fixed effect model is used in Telephone lines, Trade and Export model. Then, again, GLS-ARMA model is used to show a comparison between models. All results are presented in Figure 4.2.

Economic Development Model Estimator	Telephone Lines		Trade		GDP		Export		Import	
	FE	GLS	FE	GLS	RE	FE	FE	GLS	RE	FE
Parliamentarism	3.83***	3.40***	20.4 ***	19.3 ***	311***	391 ***	347**	486 **	408	201
Semi	1.58**	1.22	14.7 ***	13.8***	-126	-96.2	406	435	148	107
Presidentialism										
Population	-1.16***	-1.13***	-8.97***	-8.60***	-.0001***	-.0001***	.002***	.003***	.003***	.002**
GDP per capita	.0006***	.0006***	.0018***	.0020***	---	--	.974	4.56***	5.24***	.264
Region	.410***	.385***	.191	-.137	195	377***	115 ***	-675 **	-108*	142***
Regime Durability	.136***	.132***	-.364***	-.387***	130 ***	125***	281	-13.7	-172	-120
Institutionalized	.019	.012	-.006	-.024	11.0	17.0	-496	-557	-175	-36.1
Democracy										
Ethnic	-3.81***	-3.73***	10.3*	12.9**	-181**	-327***	-889***	-919 **	-239	-208
Fractionalization										
Western Colonial	-1.11***	-1.10***	.512	.743	-327	-481***	-403	361	899	-250
Legal Origin	1.06***	1.05***	-4.72 ***	-4.45***	747***	457**	-240 **	-215***	-144 **	-184 ***
Latitude	19.6***	19.8***	-23.7***	-24.6***	905***	833***	292 **	352***	362***	265 ***
Oil Production	-6.06	-6.35	-2.01***	-2.29**	.0003***	.0004***	-.001***	-.001***	-.002***	-.001***
per capita										
Gas Production	.0009	.0008 -	.012***	.015***	-1.61**	-2.95***	116 ***	114***	236***	233***
Per capita										
Party	1.53**	2.05***	4.09	3.67	286***	207***	268***	228	-482	-119
Fractionalization										
Plurality System	.468	.516	-8.47***	-8.31***	323	43.0	429***	338***	222	355***
Proportional E. S	2.22***	2.05	-13.5***	-13.5***	988*	815	-458***	-535***	726***	-609***
Constant	-.572	-.394	92.4 ***	91.2 ***	-774	421	-840	-130**	-130	-599
(Presidentialism)										
Observations	3457		3406		3478		5570		5570	
Sample Period	1975-2012		1975-2012		1975-2011		1975-2012		1975-2012	
R2 within	0.8282		0.2292		0.5752	0.5832	0.9273		0.9154	0.9443
R2 between	0.0467		0.8270		0.4489	0.5608	0.4664		0.6198	0.4683
R2 overall	0.8202		0.2401		0.5140	0.5065	0.8244		0.9007	0.8118
F	1025.84		62.31		319.54		400.81		533.43	
Prob> F	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	

\*\*\* prob. <0.01 \*\* prob. <0.05 \* prob. <0.10

Figure 4.2: Economic Development

For consideration of social development, again both fixed effects and random effects models are used. However, the results for both models started to give very similar results, and for that reason only fixed effect models are presented. Then, again, the GLS-ARMA model is used to show a comparison between models. Results are showed in Figure 4.3.

Social Development Model Estimator	Total Fertility Rate		Life Expectancy		Literacy Rate	
	FE	GLS	FE	GLS	FE	GLS
Parliamentarism	-2.79***	-2.42***	1.17***	.888**	2.12	1.85
Semi	-.926	-.824.	1.38***	1.22**	6.37	4.45
Presidentialism						
Population	4.64***	2.57*	-5.62***	-5.02***	-1.28	-1.50
GDP per capita	.0007***	-.0002***	.0002***	.0002***	.0005***	.0005***
Region	-.981***	.136	-.033	-.068	-.860	-.746***
Regime Durability	.009	.006	.040***	.037***	.114	.124
Institutionalized	.044*	.068***	.062***	.062 ***	.161	.128
Democracy						
Ethnic	2.89	3.50***	-12.0***	-11.7***	-21.1***	-19.3***
Fractionalization						
Western Colonial	-1.33***	-1.03***	-1.21***	-1.17***	-4.03***	-4.32
Legal Origin	.266	.187	-.404**	-.391**	-.170	.262
Latitude	-26.4***	-19.8***	-1.75	-2.07	-16.9	-21.6**
Oil Production	8.10	1.49	2.68***	2.33***	4.19	3.71
per capita						
Gas Production	-.001	-.0009	-.002***	-.003***	-.001	.0005
Per capita						
Party	-.557	-.039	3.08***	3.07***	4.37	3.80
Fractionalization						
Plurality System	-3.29***	-3.04***	.810**	.844**	-2.34	-1.48
Proportional E. S	-1.49**	-1.39*	1.29***	1.32***	-2.10	-1.20
Constant	30.0***	25.5***	71.8***	71.6***	105***	103 ***
(Presidentialism)						
Observations	1075		3478		488	
Sample Period	1975-2012		1975-2012		1975-2012	
R2 within	0.5343		0.6372		0.5389	
R2 between	0.2431		0.4183		0.6068	
R2 overall	0.3666		0.6344		0.5453	
F	65.77		375.94		23.45	
Prob> F	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	

\*\*\* prob. <0.01 \*\* prob. <0.05 \* prob. <0.10

Figure 4.3: Social Development

#### 4.4.2. Results

Figure 4.1 presents the results of different tests of the relationship between presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and political development. In every case, the model fit is good with F values significant at better than the 0.0001 level and  $R^2$  overall ranging from 0.27 to 0.76.

Parliamentarism appears to be associated with better political development than presidentialism, even though some relationships are not significant across all dependent variables. Parliamentarism is strongly correlated with corruption control in both models (RE and FE), but both presidentialism is negatively related to corruption control in both models (RE and FE). There is also a significant positive relationship between semi-presidentialism and corruption control in FE model.

Parliamentarism is strongly and positively associated with both government effectiveness and political stability in both models (RE and FE). However, presidentialism is negatively associated with government effectiveness and political stability in both models (RE and FE). On the other hand, semi-presidentialism is positively related with government effectiveness and political stability but it does not prove a significant relationship in both models.

In addition, parliamentarism is strongly correlated with rule of law and government accountability in both models (FE and RE), while presidentialism is negatively related to rule of law and government accountability in both models (FE and RE). However, semi-presidentialism is positively related to rule of law and negatively correlated with government accountability but it does not provide any significant relationship in all models. In general, then, parliamentarism is positively associated with political development while presidentialism is negatively associated. For semi-presidentialism, some results are inconclusive. Also, from other variables, regime

durability, institutionalized democracy and latitude are positively related with political development in both models, while oil production is negatively correlated with political development.

Figure 4.2 presents the results of various tests of the relationship between presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and economic development. In every case, the model fit is good with F values significant at better than the 0.0001 level and  $R^2$  overall ranging from 0.04 to 0.94. Results suggest that parliamentarism is associated with better telecommunications infrastructure, better export and import rates, and higher levels of per capita GDP across both models. However, presidentialism appears to be associated negatively with certain aspects of economic development and it is negatively related with export, import rates and produces low levels of GDP per capita. Presidentialism seems to create better trade rates than parliamentarism in both models. On the other hand, semi-presidentialism is associated with low levels of trade rates and low levels of telecommunications infrastructure, but the relationship between semi-presidentialism and GDP per capita, export and import rates are not significant.

In general, the models seem to demonstrate that parliamentarism provides better economic development than presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. From other variables, population, legal origin and latitude produce significant values for all models but the results are mixed.

Figure 4.3 presents the results of different tests of the relationship between presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism and social development. In every case, the model fit is good with F values significant at better than the 0.0001 level and  $R^2$  overall ranging from 0.24 to 0.63.

In three cases, presidentialism is associated with higher levels of social development than parliamentarism. Results show that presidential systems are associated with higher levels of literacy rates, fertility rates and longer life expectancy than parliamentarism. The results provide a significant relationship between presidentialism and fertility rates, literacy rates and life expectancy in both models (FE, GLS).

On the other hand, parliamentarism is negatively related with fertility rates and it is positively correlated with life expectancy and literacy rates in both models, while it does not provide a significant relationship in literacy rates in both models. In addition, semi-presidentialism is significantly associated with life expectancy in the both models and it is positively correlated with literacy rates in both models but the results are not significant. Also, the results do not provide a significant relationship between semi-presidentialism and total fertility rates in both models.

Generally, it is possible to say that parliamentary systems have important advantages over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political and economic development. In every case, except the impact of import rates, the results indicate a strong positive significant relationship between parliamentary systems and economic and political development. However, the results are not equally impressive for presidential systems. In most cases, the results show that there is a negative significant relationship between presidential systems and economic and political development. On the other hand, presidentialism provides a better social development than parliamentary systems in both models. For semi-presidential systems, the results are mixed. In some cases, semi-presidential systems are positively associated with social development and negatively correlated with political and economic development, while in other cases the results do not provide a significant relationship.

#### 4.5. Country Comparisons

The second part of this chapter focuses on a country-based comparison and examines Turkey from a comparative perspective. The main goal is to compare Turkey with other states that have or have tried a presidential system by using social, economic and political variables. This comparison provides an opportunity to show the similarities and differences between these countries and Turkey.

It is important to acknowledge at the start that each country has a different political, cultural or social origin. It is not possible, of course, to evaluate all variables, but still the main point is to present a general view or a perspective to the reader. For that reason, the comparison that follows utilizes the basic factors such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, population, religion, region, mortality rate, life expectancy, democracy status, regime stability. In Table 4.5, all free and partly free countries that adopted a presidential system between 1975-2012 are shown. “Year” represents the first year the country adopted a presidential regime. Some presidential regimes have some interruptions between years during which the regime collapsed and when the country readopted a presidential regime. That is also presented in the Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 shows that only Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the United States, and Venezuela have had stable presidential regimes since 1975. Brazil has also enjoyed a stable regime but its presidential system began only in 1979. There are some presidential regimes that have existed for a very short period (six or seven years), such as Liberia, the Maldives, and Indonesia. There are some presidential regimes, including Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Nigeria, Bolivia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Uganda, which collapsed and later readopted a presidential system. Also, there are some countries -- such as Bangladesh and Tunisia -- that have presidential regimes for several years but then adopted a different regime.

Table 4.5: Countries with Presidential Systems from 1975-2012

Country Name	Year
Argentina	1975-1976, 1983-2012
Bangladesh	1976-1991
Benin	1990-2012
Bolivia	1979, 1982-2012
Brazil	1979-2012
Chile	1990-2012
Colombia	1975-2012
Comoros	2004-2012
Costa Rica	1975-2012
Cyprus (1975-)	1990-2012
Dominican Republic	1975-2012
Ecuador	1979-1982, 1984-1999, 2002-2012
El Salvador	1984-2012
Ghana	1979-1980, 1993-2012
Guatemala	1975-1982, 1986-1993, 1996-2012
Honduras	1982-2012
Indonesia	2005-2012
South Korea	1988-2012
Liberia	2006-2012
Malawi	1994-2012
Maldives	2008-2012
Mexico	2000-2012
Micronesia	1991-2008
Nicaragua	1984-2012
Nigeria	1979-1983, 1999-2012
Palau	1994-2008
Panama	1990-2012
Paraguay	1990-2012
Peru	1980-1989, 2001-2012
Philippines	1986-2012
Sierra Leone	1996, 1998-2012
Suriname	1981-1988, 1991,
Tunisia	1980-1984, 2008-2012
Uganda	1980-1984, 2008-2012
United States	1975-2012
Uruguay	1985-2012
Venezuela	1975-2012

Note: Only free and party-free countries are evaluated.

Source: The data for 1975-1990 years are collected from Przeworski et al. 2000 ACLP Political and Economic database; 1990-2008 years are collected from Cheibub et al., 2010, Democracy and dictatorship data set. Years from 2008-2012 are collecting from Keefer, 2010, Database of Political Institutions.

#### 4.5.1. Economic Perspective

For economic comparison, income, GDP growth, annual growth rate are evaluated and population values are showed. Income is the real GDP per capita and it shows the income level for each country. GDP growth is the annual rate of growth of per capita income. Growth rate presents the annual rates for each country and population is classified in thousands and shows the population of each country. In Table 4.6, country comparisons from economic perspective are shown.

#### 4.5.2. Political Perspective

For the sake of comparison, the variables country status, democracy scale, political rights scale, regime durability, and institutionalized democracy score are used. The Democracy scale ranges from 0-10, in which 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. The Political Rights scale shows how people participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely in legitimate elections, compete for public office, and join political parties and organizations. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

Institutionalized Democracy refers an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) and defines the poor to powerful democracies. Regime Durability shows the number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of transition period. Country comparisons from political perspective are showed in Table 4.7.



Table 4.6: Country Comparisons from Economic Perspective

Country	Year	Income	GDP Growth	Annual Growth Rate	Population
1975					
Argentina		6055	-0.02	-1.8	26049
Colombia		2508	2.2	-0.3	25381
Costa Rica		3308	2.1	-0.6	1968
Dominican Republic	1960		5.1	-5.6	5048
Guatemala		2243	1.9	-0.7	6018
United States		13712	-0.3	-2.5	215981
Venezuela		7378	2.8	-0.2	12734
<i>Turkey</i>		2840	6.7	7.1	40026
1979					
Brazil		4074	6.7	4.9	118927.2
Bolivia		2037	0.1	1.4	5240.63
Ecuador		3122	5.2	1.6	7742.05
Ghana		949	-2.5	-7.5	10500.32
Nigeria		1390	6.7	-7.8	68982.88
<i>Turkey</i>		2957	-0.6	-3.2	43531
1980					
Peru		2877	3.0	2.6	17324
Tunisia		2530	7.4	6.7	6384
Uganda		534	-	-6.3	12806
<i>Turkey</i>		2872	-2.4	-2.8	44439
1982					
Honduras		1439	-1.3	-4.1	3808.4
<i>Turkey</i>		2867	3.5	0.3	46688
1984					
El Salvador		1787	1.3	2.2	4730.06
Nicaragua		1889	-1.5	-1.6	3312.71
<i>Turkey</i>		3022	6.7	3.9	49070
1985					
Uruguay		3969	1.4	0.4	3009
<i>Turkey</i>		3077	4.2	1.8	50306
1986					
Bangladesh		1261	4.2	3.7	100956.8
Philippines		1535	3.4	-0.4	56157.121
<i>Turkey</i>		3299	7.0	7.2	51433
1988					
Korea, South		5606	10	10.3	42031
<i>Turkey</i>		3419	2.1	-0.6	53715

(Table 4.6 continued)

Country	Year	Income	GDP Growth	Annual Growth Rate	Population
	1990				
Benin		924	9.0	0.3	4737
Chile		4335	3.7	-0.4	13099
Cyprus (1975-)		8368	7.4	6.0	681
Panama		2881	8.1	3.2	2398
Paraguay		2128	4.1	5.6	4219
Sri Lanka		2096	6.4	2.8	16993
<i>Turkey</i>		3743	9.3	9.6	56203
	1991				
Micronesia		203764	7.4	7.4	98800
Suriname		2510.3	2.8	2.4	413011
<i>Turkey</i>		3666	0.7	-2.0	57305
	1994				
Malawi		462.60	-10	-12	9493.11
Palau			7.3	7.3	
<i>Turkey</i>		3748.3	-4.7	-7.4	60573
	1996				
Sierra Leone		651	6.0	2.3	4630
<i>Turkey</i>		4149.6	7.0	4.9	62695
	2000				
Mexico		9733.7	5.3	7.1	97221
<i>Turkey</i>		3865.7	6.8	6.0	66831.483
	2004				
Comoros		371329	1.9	-1.0	585389
<i>Turkey</i>		4455.4	9.4	8.2	66845.653
	2005				
Indonesia		1273.4	5.7	5.6	2244809
<i>Turkey</i>		4829.7	8.4	7.4	67743.052
	2006				
Liberia		5950	9.8	7.8	3384791
<i>Turkey</i>		5162.7	6.9	5.3	68626.337
	2008				
Maldives		14722	12	5.7	313843
<i>Turkey</i>		5439.3	0.7	1.1	70363.511

Note: Year is the first year for the country adopted Presidential Regimes

Source: 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 and Micronesia data are coming from quality of Government data set 2015. The other years are collected from Cheibub et al., 2010, democracy and dictatorship data set.

Table 4.7: Country Comparisons from Political Perspective

Country Name	Year	Status	Institutionalized Democracy	Democracy Scale	Regime Durability	Political Rights Scale
Argentina	1975	Partly Free	6	7.33	2	2
Colombia	1975	Free	8	8.25	18	2
Costa Rica	1975	Free	10	10	56	1
Dominican Republic	1975	Partly Free	1	5.08	9	4
Guatemala	1975	Partly Free	1	4.66	1	4
United States	1975	Free	10	10	166	1
Venezuela	1975	Free	9	8.91	6	2
Bolivia	1979	Partly Free	0	4.83	1	3
Brazil	1979	Partly Free	2	4.41	5	4
Ecuador	1979	Free	9	8.91	0	2
Ghana	1979	Partly Free	6	6.5	0	4
Nigeria	1979	Free	8	8	0	2
Peru	1980	Free	7	8	0	2
Tunisia	1980	Partly Free	0	1.5	21	6
Uganda	1980	Partly Free	4	5.75	0	4
Honduras	1982	-	6	-	0	-
El Salvador	1984	Partly Free	6	6.5	0	3
Nicaragua	1984	Partly Free	1	3.91	0	5
Uruguay	1985	Free	9	8.91	0	2
Bangladesh	1986	Partly Free	0	3.32	4	4
Philippines	1986	Partly Free	-88	6.08	0	4
South Korea	1988	Free	7	7.75	0	2
Chile	1990	Free	8	8.66	1	2
Cyprus (1975-)	1990	Free	10	10	16	1
Benin	1990	Partly Free	-88	4.16	0	6
Panama	1990	Partly Free	8	7.83	1	4
Paraguay	1990	Partly Free	3	5.91	1	4
Sri Lanka	1990	Partly Free	6	5.83	42	4
Micronesia	1991	Free	-	10	-	1
Suriname	1991	Partly Free	6	6.25	0	4
Malawi	1994	Free	6	7.75	0	2
Palau	1994	Free	-	-	0	-
Sierra Leone	1996	Partly Free	5	5.58	0	4
Mexico	2000	Free	8	8.25	3	2
Comoros	2004	Partly Free	6	6.5	0	4
Indonesia	2005	Free	8	8.25	6	2
Liberia	2006	Partly Free	7	6.91	0	3
Maldives	2008	Partly Free	-	5.27	-	4

(Table 4.7 continued)

Country Name	Year	Status	Institutionalized Democracy	Democracy Scale	Regime Durability	Political Rights Scale
Turkey	1975	Free	9	8.5	2	2
	1980	Partly Free	2	2.91	0	5
	1990	Partly Free	9	8.08	7	2
	2000	Partly Free	8	6.33	17	4
	2010	Partly Free	8	7.58	27	3
	2012	Partly Free	9	7.66	29	3

Source: All data are collected from quality of Government data set 2015.

According to the results of Table 4.6, out of these presidential systems, five have a stable system. The other stable presidential regime, which is Brazil, began in 1979. When we look at the economic variables or these stable presidential regimes, and compare them with Turkey, we see that Turkey's scores are lower than Brazil, the United States, Venezuela, Costa Rica and slightly higher than Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, at the date those countries adopted presidential regimes for the first time.

Table 4.7 shows that the presidential countries present different patterns from a political perspective. Some of them, such as United States, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Venezuela, Uruguay, have very high democracy score, while some, such as Bolivia, Tunisia, Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, have very low scores. For Turkey from 1975 to 2012, general democracy scores are very high, except in 1980 because of the military intervention.

For regime durability, it is seen that fully half of these countries (eighteen out of thirty six) experienced a regime change. But also, there are some countries, such as the United States and Costa Rica that have had a stable regime for more than fifty years. Turkey's political regime, after 1980, survives without interruption.

The Political Rights scale also presents mixed results for these countries. Costa Rica, the United States, and Cyprus are the freest countries, in which people freely and completely participate in the political process. On the other hand, Tunisia, Benin and Nicaragua are the least free countries that provide the least political participation for their citizens. For Turkey, the scores change from 1975 to 2012 but, in general, it can be categorized in the middle.

From the Table 4.7, it is possible to say there may be other factors that provide a presidential regime's stability, in addition to these variables. The United States and Costa Rica have very high democracy scores. However, the Dominican Republic and Brazil have also stable presidential regimes, but they have very low democracy scores and political freedom scores. In other words, it is not valid to make a generalizations about presidential regime based on these variables alone.

#### 4.5.3. Electoral Perspective

The Electoral system and effective number of parties' variables are used for electoral comparisons. Electoral system shows the type of electoral system used in elections in that country in that year. The effective number of parties is used to measure how many effective parties there are in the political system. Country comparisons from electoral perspective are presented in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8 shows the electoral systems and effective number of parties for each country. All these presidential regimes except Nicaragua have the same electoral systems. All these systems -- Single-Member-District-Plurality, Two-Round System and Alternative Vote-- are types of plurality systems. However, Turkey employs a Proportional Representation system.

For the effective number of parties, the results are mixed for these countries. Some countries, including the United States, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Honduras, and

Tunisia, have two or fewer effective parties, Some, including Brazil and Liberia, have more than nine or ten effective number or parties. Turkey has more than three effective parties, in general.

Table 4.8: Country Comparisons from Electoral Perspective

Country Name	Year	Effective Number of Parties	Electoral System
Argentina	1975	3.19	Two-Round System
Colombia	1975	2.37	Two-Round System
Costa Rica	1975	4.01	Two-Round System
Dominican Republic	1975	1.35	Two-Round System
Guatemala	1975	4.6	Two-Round System
United States	1975	2	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Venezuela	1975	3.35	Two-Round System
Bolivia	1979	3.5	Two-Round System
Brazil	1979	11.17	Two-Round System
Ecuador	1979	6.4	Two-Round System
Ghana	1979	3.75	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Nigeria	1979	3.71	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Peru	1980	4.16	Two-Round System
Tunisia	1980	1	-
Uganda	1980	2.24	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Honduras	1982	1.99	Two-Round System
El Salvador	1984	2.56	Majoritarian System
Nicaragua	1984	2.27	List PR
Uruguay	1985	2.74	Two-Round System
Bangladesh	1986	-	-
Philippines	1986	2.26	First past the post
South Korea	1988	4.23	Alternative Vote
Chile	1990	5.3	Two-Round System
Cyprus (1975-)	1990	3.62	Two-Round System
Benin	1990	8.83	Majority
Panama	1990	3.72	Alternative Vote
Paraguay	1990	1.68	Alternative Vote
Sri Lanka	1990	2.74	Two-Round System
Micronesia	1991	-	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Suriname	1991	2.69	Two-Round System
Malawi	1994	2.74	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Palau	1994	-	-
Sierra Leone	1996	4.55	Two-Round System
Mexico	2000	3	Alternative Vote
Comoros	2004	-	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Indonesia	2005	8.55	Two-Round System
Liberia	2006	9.56	Single-Member-District-Plurality
Maldives	2008	-	-

(Table 4.8 continued)

Country Name	Year	Effective Number of Parties	Electoral System
Turkey	1973	3.3	PR- D'Hondt with no threshold
	1983	2.5	PR- D'Hondt with double threshold <sup>1</sup>
	1987	2.1	PR- D'Hondt with double threshold <sup>2</sup>
	1991	3.6	PR- D'Hondt with double threshold
	1995	4.4	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
	1999	4.9	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
	2002	1.8	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
	2007	2.3	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold
	2011	2.3	PR- D'Hondt with national threshold

Note: <sup>1</sup>: The Hare quota was coupled with a 10 percent national threshold. Parties were required to get at least 10 percent of votes at national level in order to gain representation in parliament according to this Hare quota.

<sup>2</sup>. In 1983 and 1987 elections, the “quota” was used which was an extra seat added to the ones already allocated to the district’s winner party by the d’Hondt system.

Source: All data are collected from quality of Government data set 2015.

#### 4.5.4. Social Perspective

Last, region, religion of the countries, and mortality and life expectancy rates are used for country comparisons. Mortality rates are used to show the infant mortality rate. Life expectancy is presented to show the average life time in the country. In addition, the region and religion of each country are presented. In Table 4.9 country comparisons from social perspective is presented.

From Table 4.9, it is seen that most of these presidential regimes are in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. There are a few countries in Asia. There are no presidential regimes in the Middle East. In addition, most of these countries have predominately Christian populations. These constitute the main differences from Turkey. For life expectancy and mortality rates, results are mixed as well.

Table 4.9: Country Comparisons from Social Perspective

Country Name	Year	Mortality Rate	Life Expectancy	Region	Religion
Argentina	1975	24.755	68.05	Latin America	Christianity
Colombia	1975	33.502	62.75	Latin America	Christianity
Costa Rica	1975	29.854	69.54	Latin America	Christianity
Dominican Republic	1975	37.055	61.06	Latin America	Christianity
Guatemala	1975	43.763	55.13	Latin America	Christianity
United States	1975	14.6	72.69	America	Christianity
Venezuela	1975	34.391	66.96	Latin America	Christianity
Bolivia	1979	40.25	51.19	Latin America	Christianity
Brazil	1979	32.222	62.2	Latin America	Christianity
Ecuador	1979	35.334	62.31	Latin America	Christianity
Ghana	1979	43.525	51.98	Sub-Saharan A.	Christianity
Nigeria	1979	46.948	45.18	Sub-Saharan A.	Christianity/Islam
Peru	1980	35.833	60.06	Latin America	Christianity
Tunisia	1980	36.13	62.02	North America	Islam
Uganda	1980	49.051	49.44	Sub-Saharan A.	Christianity
Honduras	1982	42.527	61.21	Latin America	Christianity
El Salvador	1984	35.095	58.74	Latin America	Christianity
Nicaragua	1984	41.476	60.15	Latin America	Christianity
Uruguay	1985	18.155	71.58	Latin America	Christianity
Bangladesh	1986	38.748	57.90	South Asia	Islam
Philippines	1986	34.605	64.16	South East Asia	Christianity
South Korea	1988	15.1	70.40	East Asia	Buddhism
Chile	1990	23.063	73.54	Latin America	Christianity
Cyprus (1975-)	1990	19.048	76.51	Mediterranean Sea	Christianity
Benin	1990	46.302	53.42	Sub-Saharan A.	Christianity
Panama	1990	26.288	73.06	Latin America	Christianity
Paraguay	1990	33.469	68.01	Latin America	Christianity
Sri Lanka	1990	20.621	69.68	South Asia	Buddhism
Micronesia	1991	33.505	66.31	The Pacific	Christianity
Suriname	1991	23.039	67.58	Caribbean	Christianity
Malawi	1994	47.926	46.84	Sub-Saharan A.	Christianity
Palau	1994	-		Pacific Ocean	-
Sierra Leone	1996	43.814	36.03	Sub-Saharan A.	Islam
Mexico	2000	24.148	74.26	Latin America	Christianity
Comoros	2004	39.361	58.82	Sub Saharan A.	Islam
Indonesia	2005	21.376	68.85	South East A.	Islam
Liberia	2006	49.601	56.14	Sub Saharan A.	Christianity
Maldives	2008	21.785	75.87	South Asia	Islam



(Table 4.9 continued)

Country Name	Year	Mortality Rate	Life Expectancy	Region	Religion
Turkey	1975	127.4	55.38	Middle East	Islam
	1980	100	58.69		
	1990	59.8	64.28		
	2000	28.4	69.5		
	2010	12.5	73.7		
	2012	11.5	74.86		

Source: Region, religion, mortality rates data are collected from quality of Government data set 2015. Data on life expectancy are collected from World Bank.

#### 4.6. Conclusion

In the literature, there is not a clear distinction between the forms of government, because there are many different factors that affect the political performance for each form (Schmidt, 2002). In other words, in the literature there is not a consensus about the effects of forms of government on political, economic, and social developments -- some favor parliamentary regimes, while others support presidential ones.

Based on our statistical analysis, it is possible to say that parliamentary systems have important advantages over presidential ones across a wide range of indicators of political, and economic development. In every case, except regarding the impact of import rates, the results point to a strong positive relationship between parliamentary systems and economic and political development. However, the results are not very impressive for presidential systems, in most cases. The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between presidential systems and economic and political development. On the other hand, presidentialism provides a better social development than parliamentary system. For semi-presidential systems, the results are mixed. In some cases, semi-presidential systems are positively associated to social

development and negatively correlated with political and economic development while in others cases the results do not provide a significant relationship.

In addition, from the country comparisons with Turkey and other countries that have or tried presidential regimes since 1975, it is hard to make a generalization about presidential regimes. In general, there are many differences among them and between these presidential regimes and Turkey. It is seen that presidential countries present different patterns from both a political and economic perspective. For instance, some of presidential countries such as United States, Costa Rica have very high democracy score, while some such as Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua have very low scores. For the Turkish case, democracy scores from 1975 to 2012 are very high (except 1980 because of the military intervention). From an electoral perspective, it appears that nearly all presidential countries have plurality electoral systems for president election except Nicaragua, but some of them use PR to elect their legislators. In addition, most of these presidential regimes are in the Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa and they have predominately Christian populations. However, because of Turkey's geographic position and its religion, Turkey is separated from these presidential countries.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION**

The Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been planning to change the current parliamentary system to a presidential system. To that end, they already have begun making some arrangements, including changes regarding the election of president, for this transformation. As a result of a constitutional amendment which was adopted via a nationwide referendum on October 21, 2007, the president is to be elected in a popular plurality election; the first elections following this major change were held on 10 August 2014. Former Prime Minister Erdogan became the 12<sup>th</sup> president of Turkey by winning fifty two percent of the popular vote. For the first time, a Turkish president was elected directly by citizens instead of the parliament. Erdogan's main goal before 2010 was to adopt a presidential system similar to the one in the United States; however, Erdogan and other AKP deputies quickly changed their discourse and started talking about creating a Turkish-style presidential system instead of a US style presidential system after 2010.

This discussion of system change raises several prominent concerns. First of all, the ruling government is talking about a fundamental change from parliamentarism to presidentialism, but there is not a single successful example in the world of such a change over the past decades. Second, the public -- even parliamentarians-- do not know the operational details of the proposed system. Third, after 2010, with the idea of a so-called Turkish-style presidential system, the topic became ever more complicated; the government is not clear about the meaning of "Turkish-style presidential system" (how the system will work, how the separation of power will be executed, etc.). As a result, within these concerns in this study, I attempted to shed light on the applicability of presidential system in Turkey.

In order to evaluate this applicability, in Chapter 2 of this dissertation I explained the Turkish parliamentary system and focused on the system change discussions. In general, there are two important problems in Turkish parliamentary system. First, the *sui generis* structure of 1982 Constitution is problematic, resulting in a complex and incomprehensible government system: it is neither pure parliamentarism nor pure presidentialism. With the changes on the election procedure of the president after 2007, the system got even more complicated; it turned to a parliamentary system with a directly elected president. The second important problem is instability; for instance from 1960 to 1980's Turkey had twenty governments created and defeated; some governments were in power less than a year. For that reason, when the debates regarding system change are examined from the beginning, it is possible to conclude that the stability issue has been always the central topic. Previous supporters of a presidential system, for example former President Turgut Ozal, former President Suleyman Demirel, and then President Erdogan and deputies of AKP, all pointed to the stability issue. A new system, according to these supporters, would eliminate ineffective coalition governments and provide stability. However, it begs the question of what is the main reason of this instability (e.g., weak coalition governments); is it the parliamentary system, the election system, the party system, or some combination thereof? For instance, if coalition governments were the main reason of this instability, it looks like Turkey eliminated this instability problem after-2002 by the creation of a single party government (the Justice and Development party) under the parliamentary system. It is important to clarify once again that, there is a strong correlation between voting rules and the party systems; as it is defined in Duverger's Law: plurality systems in single-member districts tend to create two-party systems, while proportional systems tend to produce multi-party systems. In other words, the proportional representation electoral system and the related highly

fractionalized party structure of Turkey may be the main reasons of coalition governments in Turkey, not the parliamentary structure of the republic.

In order to find an answer to instability and parliamentary system puzzle, in Chapter 3, I evaluate the party structure of Turkey. First, based on Mainwaring's (1993) analysis, by using Rae index of party fractionalization, the effective number of parties, and Least Square index, Turkey is compared with a set of stable democracies that have presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems between 1946-2010. This comparison provides important inferences for Turkey. First, from 1946 to 2010, parliamentary democracies seem to be more successful in sustaining democracy (four presidential, twenty one parliamentary democracies and four mixed systems). Second, in this time period, party fragmentation and the number of effective parties are low in presidential systems compared to parliamentary and mixed systems. This finding does not necessarily imply less democracy; instead it shows that presidential systems are more likely to have two or less effective parties, while parliamentary systems are more likely to have more than two effective parties in this time period. In addition, the Turkish party structure is evaluated since 1946 and the results show that the Turkish case provides a complicated party system for examination. Turkey after 1946 has been characterized as a multiparty system; however, after 2002 a two-party system seems to have emerged in the parliament. The Turkish election system (proportional representation with multimember districts under d'Hondt formula and a 10 percent national threshold) is possibly the main reason of this emergence of two party system in the parliament. Also, high inflation rates, as well as the financial crisis in 2001 negatively affected the credibility of the parties in the coalition government in 1990s; as a result, voters' dissatisfaction with most of the established parties was also effective in changing party system in 2002. In the 2002 election, a newly founded Justice and Development (AKP) party got over one-

third of the votes (34.3 percent) and as a result won nearly two-thirds of the seats (363 out of 550) in the parliament. The opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) got only one-fifth of the votes (19.4 percent of the votes), but the party won one-third (178 out of 550) of the parliamentary seats. On the other hand, almost forty five percent of the popular votes were wasted because these votes were shared by other parties that failed to pass the 10 percent threshold. Clearly, the electoral system damages the proportionality of the party representation in the parliament and, most importantly, the 10 percent national threshold prevents the introduction of other parties to the parliament. For instance, if the threshold was 5 percent in 2002 election, five other parties-- Right Path P. (DYP), Nationalist Movement P. (MHP), Young P. (GP), Motherland P. (ANAP), and Democratic People P. (DEHAP)-- would have gained parliamentary representation in addition to the AKP and CHP.

Based on the findings from Chapter 3, it is not proper to argue that Turkish party structure is suitable for presidentialism or parliamentarism. If it is argued that Turkey has a multiparty structure with a proportional representation system, it may be possible to conclude that the structure of Turkish party systems may be more appropriate to a parliamentary system than a presidential system. Based on the comparison from 1946 to 2010, the results clearly indicate that presidential systems are more likely to have two effective parties, while parliamentary systems are more likely to have more than two effective parties in this time period. However, specifically because of the ten percent national threshold, the Turkish electoral system does not provide the required result of a proportional representation system. Thus, there are indeed important problems in the electoral system, such as representation problem and waste of nearly half of the votes because of the ten percent national threshold.

In Chapter 4, I further explore and test the relationship between government system and political, economic and social development. In a time series analysis, I use different dependent variables for each policy areas with the main independent variable being the mechanism of government formation (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism). Based on the results from Chapter 4, it is possible to argue that parliamentary systems have important advantages over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political and economic development. In every case, except the impact of import rates, the results indicate a strong positive relationship between parliamentary systems and economic and political development. However, the results are not equally impressive for presidential systems. In most cases, the results show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between presidential systems and economic and political development. On the other hand, presidentialism provides a better social development than parliamentary systems in both models. For semi-presidential systems, the results are mixed. In some cases, semi-presidential systems are positively associated with social development and negatively correlated with political and economic development, while in other cases the results do not provide a statistically significant relationship.

In the second part of the Chapter 4, a country-based comparison is provided in which Turkey is compared with other states that have (or attempted to implement) a presidential system since 1975 by using social, economic, and political variables. This comparison provides an opportunity to show the similarities and differences between these countries and Turkey and presents a general view to the reader. First, the country comparisons show that it is hard to make a generalization about presidential regimes. In general, there are many differences between them and between these presidential regimes and Turkey. For instance, from a political and economic perspective, presidential countries present different patterns. For instance, while some

presidential countries have very high democracy score, such as United States, Costa Rica, others have very low scores, such as Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. For the Turkish case, democracy scores from 1975 to 2012 are very high (except 1980 because of the military intervention). Second, the only common feature of presidential systems is the election system; it appears that nearly all presidential countries have plurality electoral systems for president except Nicaragua but many of these countries use PR for elections to their legislature. Also, most of these presidential regimes are in the Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa and they have predominately Christian populations. Turkey is separated from these presidential regimes in following respects: Turkey is placed in the Middle East with a predominately a Muslim population, but the election system provides some similarities with these presidential countries.

Based on the findings from Chapter 4, it is possible to say that a transformation to presidential regime will not guarantee economic and political development for Turkey. The results clearly indicate that parliamentary systems provide better political and economic development than presidential systems. Also, based on country comparisons, results show that it is hard to make a generalization about presidential regimes from economic, social and political perspectives. Each country may have different factors that affect its economic or political success in addition to its presidential system. In other words, it is not proper to expect that a regime transformation to a presidential system per se will dramatically improve Turkey's economic, political and social development by itself.

These findings combine to make a compelling case that arguments of a system change are not reasonable. Some argue that presidential system may ultimately lead to a monarchy, a sultanate or a dictatorship. On the other hand, others argue that a new presidential system may suddenly solve all the problems currently plaguing Turkey. Neither of these extreme views is



correct. First of all, a presidential system is one of the democratic government systems, so it is not accurate to say it may turn into a dictatorship or monarchy. On the other hand, it is very simple and naïve to say that a new system will solve all the problems; at the very least a new system will introduce some new problems and costs (technical costs, costs in the learning process) in the adaptation process. In addition, it can be said that every strong leader who comes to power puts the presidential system debate on the agenda to solve the instability problem, but their intention is to remain in power longer, and the discussion is not based solely – or even mainly -- on the needs of the republic.

This dissertation tells a story of how the Turkish case remains in the middle of the parliamentary-presidential debate in the literature. Scholars, politicians, writers and thinkers support different arguments based on their political views. However, a system transformation cannot be decided on individual political desire or individual political thought, since it will affect society as a whole and the country's future. There may be some clear problems with a Turkish parliamentary system, but these alleged problems do not warrant a whole system change. It is important to analyze all the processes and develop a very well organized plan based on the features of Turkey before taking action. First of all, it is important to emphasize that the instability problem is not the result of current parliamentary system; instead it is based on the electoral system and since 2002,-it looks like Turkey eliminated this instability problem under the current single party government. Second, because of the 1982 constitution (which is not in full accordance with the parliamentary system and created a mixed or hybrid system) and a new election procedure of president, it is crucial to focus on a new constitution in which the operation and division of labor of the two bodies of executive structure should be determined. All the problems in the current systems should be determined and new solutions based on these

problems should be provided. Turkey has a parliamentary tradition, and has experience with the current system; as a result, it is more appropriate to solve the problems of the current system and continue with the same regime. A regime transformation without any detailed plans will bring more problems. Specifically, a new Turkish style presidential system may not be a solution, there is not any example of it, and nobody may guarantee the success of this system. It is important to know the legal mechanisms and the logic of a new system before making any transformations. In addition, the government is not clear about the procedures of this Turkish style presidential system; there will not be any control mechanisms if the current government abuses political power, since they will be the creator of this new system.

This dissertation contributes to the fields of political institutions specifically to government formation. It shows that, in general, parliamentary systems have important advantages over presidential systems across a wide range of indicators of political, economic and social development. On the other hand, it also indicates that it is hard to make a generalization about presidential system from a political or economic perspective; obviously there are other features such as military heritage that affect the country's economic or political success.

Future research on a new Turkish constitution is critical: how should be a new constitution be written and what should be the contents. In addition, the electoral system of Turkey may be examined in detail, especially in regards to solving the problems (such as representation) in the electoral process. There are, of course, limitations of this study due to data availability; it is not possible to examine each characteristic of presidential or parliamentary regimes and provide a comparison with Turkey. But still, I hope this dissertation provides some insights for the regime transformation debate in Turkey.

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## APPENDIX: VARIABLES

### A: Political Development

**Control of Corruption:** It measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of additional payments to get things done, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring grand corruption in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in state capture.

**Government Effectiveness:** It combines into single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on inputs required for the government to produce and implement good policies and deliver public good.

**Political Stability:** It combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the governments in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism

**Rule of Law:** It includes several indicators, which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected

**Voice and Accountability:** It includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

### B: Economic Development

**Telephone lines** (per 100 people):

**Trade** (% of GDP): It is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.

**Export:** Exports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.

**Import:** Imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.

### C: Social Development

**Infant mortality rate:** Total Infant mortality rate

**Life expectancy:** Total Life expectancy at birth

**Literacy Rate:** Total Literacy Rate

**D: Control Variables:**

**Political System:** 0. Presidential. 1. Semi-presidential. 2. Parliamentary. Systems with unelected executives (those scoring a 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness - to be denoted below) get a 0. Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no prime minister, also receive a 0. In systems with both a prime minister and a president, the following factors are considered to categorize the system: a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a super majority to override the veto. b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and / or other ministers. c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential (Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, and Yugoslavia). The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If no information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d). Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary (2), with the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him (if they need a 2/3 vote to impeach, or must dissolve themselves while forcing him out) then the system gets a 1.

**Institutionalized Democracy:** The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.

**GDP:** GDP per Capita

**Population:** Total population

**Region:** The Region of the Country. This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow

- (1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia),
- (2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic),
- (3) North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus),
- (4) Sub-Saharan Africa,
- (5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia & New Zealand),
- (6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia),
- (7) South-East Asia,
- (8) South Asia,
- (9) The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand),
- (10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

**Latitude:** The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1)

**Legal origin:** Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country. There are other possible origins: English Common Law, French Commercial Code, Socialist/Communist Laws, German Commercial Code, Scandinavian Commercial Code

**Ethnic fractionalization:** The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly used ELF-index in for example Latin America, where people of many races speak the same language.

**Colonial Origin:** This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. The categories are the following: (0) Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power (1) Dutch (2) Spanish (3) Italian (4) US (5) British (6) French (7) Portuguese (8) Belgian (9) British-French (10) Australian.

**Protestant:** Protestants as percentage of population.

**Muslim:** Muslims as percentage of population.

**Other Religious Denomination:** Percentage of population belonging to other denominations.

**Oil Production:** Oil production in metric tons

**Gas Production:** Gas production.

## **VITA**

Serap Gur earned her bachelor's degree in political science and international relations at Marmara University in Istanbul, Turkey, in June of 2007. She earned her master degree in Management in Business Department in Gaziantep University, Turkey in 2009 while she was working as a research assistant at the same university. She received a merit-based scholarship from the Turkish Ministry of Education to complete her PhD in the United States and joined Louisiana State University as a PhD student in August of 2010. Serap Gur's areas of study are comparative politics and international relations. She has a particular interest in political institutions, political economy, Turkish foreign policy, Middle East, women rights in the Middle East and political methodology.