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SHIFTING PLACE IDENTITIES IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: IRONY AND MULTICULTURALITY IN QUEMOY, TAIWAN

A Dissertation

Submitted to the GraduateFaculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

The Department of Geography and Anthropology

by

Yi-Chia Chen
B.Arch., Chung-Hua University, 1998
M.L.A., Louisiana State University, 2005
August 2013
In memory of Miles Richardson

for the Quixotic journey we, you and I,
Subvert the Dominant Paradigm
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Seeing this journey reaching an end, I could not resist asking who I should thank for the dissertation’s completion. Although many people start with their families, I would not do so for they deserve my life-long gratitude. So do my late advisor, Dr. Miles Richardson whom I will continuously converse with, as I have accustomed to ask myself “What will Miles say?” When painstakingly digging the meanings of landscape change in Quemoy, I heard, “Let the truth reveal itself.” When writing the seemingly never-accomplished chapter of historical review, I repeated his words, “The present is the key to the past.” And thanks to him, I have not forgotten to “let the good time roll!”

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ABSTRACT

Quemoy is a small island with an area of fifty-eight square miles at the mouth of Xiamen Bay on the southeast coast of China. As a Cold-War front of Taiwan shelled by the Chinese artillery for twenty years, Quemoy is becoming a heritage tourism destination attracting mainland Chinese to sightsee in its military structures. In this study, I examine landscape change in the post-conflict society through the interplay of three social dynamics—reconciliation, demilitarization, and touristification—exploring the cultural mechanism of landscape change and its meaning. Through a review of Quemoy’s history, I identify Quemoy’s geographical characteristics—marginality, cultural hybridity, and islandness—formed and articulated in a repetitive process that I term as the reversal of geographical coordinate system. The reversal coincides with a change of social concerns in the marginal society, whose negotiations with terrestrial and maritime powers direct its engaging front toward the land or the sea, and stimulates distinct human inscriptions in the landscape. Militarization of Quemoy as Chinese Nationalists’ Cold-War front initiated the last reversal, which turned its front toward the mainland China in 1949 and brought forth a military landscape characterized by its rigidity, hierarchy, and pragmatism. Simultaneously, the militarization incurred biopolitical production through militia duty, everyday regulation, combat economy, and battlefield knowledge. As the 1949-reversal is now dissolving under current demilitarization, from reinvention and destruction of military structures I reveal irony in the landscape as a way of cultural demilitarization subverting the significance of the past anticommunist conflicts. Furthermore, by reconstruction of historical landscapes and reinterpretation of symbolic landscapes, Quemoyans (re)localize landscape and jointly engage in a process
of homeland construction. The juxtaposition of historical simulacra and reinvented military relics produces heterotopias of a museum island for heritage tourism. Consequently, the production of irony and heterotopias together serves as the cultural mechanism of the current identity reformulation from a battlefield to a heritage tourism destination. Uncovering the mechanism, I then demonstrate that ambiguity and multiculturality emerging from this irony’s multivocality and heterotopia’s multilocality is a cultural strategy of the border island society to negotiate with the post-conflict situation.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: POST-CONFLICT PLACES AS BATTLEFIELD PARKS

In the last few years of my Master’s study in landscape architecture, I often hovered with a sketch book and a camera in my hands around the Port Hudson State Historic Site—a Civil War battlefield thirty minutes away from the LSU campus—conducting fieldwork for my thesis research to find out what the place means to Southerners today. An answer to my question did not hide for long, and revealed itself expressively in the annual reenactment in the late spring. With southern Louisiana geared up for the summer heat, I watched hundreds of soldiers in heavy wool uniforms, blue or gray, fighting in the field. Musket shots and canon thunders resonated in the open meadow as smoke drifted against the banner proclaiming “Lest We Forget!” In such a Southern assemblage, to carry out the reenactment somebody had to “put on the blue (to enact the Union soldiers), and a certain number of people never want to do that” (Chen 2005, 141). Little boys in gray emulated the older enactors, waving their wooden toy swords and guns, excitingly running behind the line of the Confederate cannons. Following their movements and joyful voices, I found the answer to my research question in a scene they made (Chen 2005, 142):

[Seeing the Stars and Bars falling back, the band of boys in grey ran] yelling at the General in the front, “General! General! We’re losing!” [Hearing them, the reenactor turned toward them with a smile and answered,] “we’re gonna lose, [but] we’ll still kick their butts!” . . . [In contrast to the scene on the Confederate side,] the only thing behind the Union army is an [oxcart collecting the bodies of slain Yankee soldiers] . . . .

At that moment, witnessing the scene, I felt deeply part of the South, the Deep South. Being in the place, participants not only celebrated the significant siege but also polished their Southern identity that in the everyday life could only be expressed in full on such an occasion. In the reenactment, the place let the constructed identity to be: The historic site,
as the Southerners’ creation, was the place for them to be at home, acting out their distinct identity. The experience of studying a historic battlefield inspired me to look into the expressive cultural practice central to local identity in post-conflict places, and also encouraged me to investigate cases involved with even more intricate social relations and entangled interplay of cultural dynamics. From a research interest in understanding the current meaning of post-bellum battlefields, I turned from the Civil War battlefield in the American South to the other side of the Earth across the Pacific Ocean to the Asian Cold War front, Quemoy.

This study seeks to explore three major problems: (1) how the place identity reformulation in the former Cold War battlefield changes its landscapes; (2) the cultural mechanism of the landscape change, orchestrated by an interplay of social dynamics—touristification, demilitarization, and reconciliation; and (3) the meaning of the cultural mechanism, which reveals the post-conflict community’s joint expression in the identity reformulation. In the following chapters, I describe how people in Quemoy collectively shaped their landscape to facilitate their activities to articulate themselves in the post Cold-War era. Their cultural inscriptions on the landscape reciprocally encourage spatial praxes constituting the reformulated place identities. The mutual reinforcement between human activities and the designed environment resonantly amplifies the current identity of Quemoy as an island of heritage tourism. Through an investigation on place formation on Quemoy, its geographic biography discloses why the coastal island has consistently been a contested place. The historical review contextualizes the islanders’ cultural praxes in response to the contestation, and reveals the meaning of the praxes. Unlike their counterparts in the American South, who through commemorative activities bring the past conflict near, people in Quemoy alienate themselves from their collective
past. Through the ongoing process of identity reformulation, the anticommunist past rapidly fades in order to pursue reconciliation. The alienation suggests a continuum of the local negotiations in the inherent territorial contestation stemming from the geographical marginality of Quemoy—a border island in between the land and the sea. In this round of negotiations, boosters in Quemoy create irony and cultural hybridity in the landscape to transfer the place image from a Cold War front to a heterogeneous heritage island. The negotiation strategy disengages Quemoy from the awkward position in the geopolitical either/or dichotomy, and fosters an ambiguous identity that juxtaposes and blurs all geographical representations of Quemoy.

1.1 The Land and Water of Quemoy

Quemoy (aka Kinmen, Jinmen and Chinmen 金門) is a coastal island of the Fukien (aka Fujian 福建) Province in the southeast China (Figure 1.1). In the legendary Chinese geographical text, Collection of the Mountains and Seas 山海經, the ancient Chinese in their cultural hearth, the flood plain of the Yellow River, reported that “the Min [Fukien] is in the middle of the sea 闽在海中” (Yang 1998, 1). Their misunderstanding discloses the remoteness of Fukien for the ancient Chinese and seafaring as the prevalent and particular activity of the peoples there. The geographical and cultural distance of Fukien from the dominant Chinese culture has had a constant effect on Quemoy—situating it as a remote island of a remote region, an outlier of an outlier. Guarding the entrance of Xiamen Bay 廈門灣, Quemoy island controls the southern Fukien region through the Jiulong River 九龍江 flowing through the region and then into the bay (Figure 1.2). With an area of 51.83 square miles, Quemoy is in the shape of a dumbbell with its widest part aligned east to west stretching 12.43 miles (20 km) and its narrowest part aligned south to north in the middle of the island stretching
Figure 1.1. Quemoy in East Asia. [GIS map remade by the author]

Figure 1.2. Quemoy in the Taiwan Strait. The green area is the basin of the Jiulong River flowing into the orange area—the Xiamen (aka Amoy) Bay. [GIS map remade by the author]
1.86 miles (3 km). The satellite island of Quemoy, Lieyu 烈嶼, is 6,000 feet away on its west, and Amoy 廈門, the second large island in the bay (after Quemoy) is nine miles to west of Lieyu (Figure 1.3). Due to the location at the mouth of the Jiulong River, Amoy has been the major entrepôt of the region for centuries, while guarding the accumulated fortune in the region, Quemoy at the entrance of the bay gained greater and greater military significance over the years.

The spine of Quemoy, the Taiwu Moutain 太武山 with a peak rising 840 feet (256 m) above the sea level, runs from the narrowest part of the island toward the northeast (Figure 1.4). The range has only scarce vegetation cover and most of its bedrock (mainly granite-gneiss) is exposed against the strong wind. The hillsides are generally steep, barren, and uninhabitable slopes and are flanked on both sides by the coastal plains. Extending from the range’s crest line to the northeast, a few low hills occupy the island’s northeastern territory. The southwest portion of Quemoy is also a hilly area rising up from the sea, and the walled city built to oversee the maritime traffic is also located in this area. Except for these rugged sections, the rest of the island has gentle topography covered with a bucolic landscape decorated with hamlets and towns. A few hiccups in the landscape produce loose wrinkles like drapes on the silk cloth. Two major creeks in the island flow through the landscape—the Wujiang Creek 沩江溪 in the west, and the Jinsha Creek 金沙溪 in the northeast. They are both short (less than five miles) and cannot hold much fresh rain water. Consequently, their upstream sectors often dry out, until the wet season, when the monsoon rain starts to pour down in the summer. Due to the prevalent dry conditions, artificial ponds and dammed reservoirs of various sizes are common landscape features. However, even with water conservation facilities, the insufficient water supply still makes farming unfruitful toil, and wet-field cultivation is
Figure 1.3. Quemoy in Xiamen Bay. [GIS map remade by the author]

Figure 1.4. Topography Map of Quemoy. [Map remade by the author]
hardly practical on most arable lands in the island. Toward their mouths, both the creeks 
flow into estuaries with mudflats, and along Wujiang Creek there are also mangrove 
forests. The distribution of muddy beaches is generally on the west and north coasts of 
the island facing the mainland, while the east and south coasts consist of mainly sandy 
and rocky beaches. In the past, the locals turned the intertidal mudflats into oyster farms 
and salterns, while they fished and foraged along the sandy and rocky beaches. Inland, 
the two historic urban centers were both river towns, on the riverfront highlands where 
the water in the creeks flowed year round and enabled access to vessels from the sea. 
They were both points of attachment to the mainland society and the local centers of 
commercial activities. Not until the Chinese Civil War severed Quemoy from the 
mainland was a new town built at the foot of the Taiwu Mountain for the protection it 
provided from shelling.

As a Cold War front of Free China in Taiwan, Quemoy has been under Taiwanese 
control since 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist troops successfully repelled a Chinese 
Communist landing operation. With the triumph, the island thus became the forefront of 
“Free China.” Following their defeat, the Chinese Communist army ferociously 
bombarded the island three times in the 1950s, and the last one eccentrically turned into a 
symbolic artillery battle that lasted for twenty years from 1958 to 1978. During the period, 
the Chinese Communist artillery shelled Quemoy on odd number dates, and on the even 
number dates the Chinese Nationalist artillery struck back. The stalemate lasted for 
forty-three years, and put Quemoy under strict military control by the Chinese Nationalist 
army until 1992. That year, Quemoy renounced its role as a military base, and 
reconstituted itself as a tourist island, with the omnipresent military landscapes on the 
island as its selling points.
The change of identity released a great impact on the post-military society. As demilitarization withdrew troops, the masses in Quemoy who relied on military expenditures as their major income source immediately faced difficulty continuing their livelihoods. To cope with the stagnant situation, the county government promoted tourism as the new economic base. By negotiating with the military for land acquisition and autonomy, the local elites developed an island devoted to battlefield tourism, allowing outsiders to enter and to tour the island freely, even those originally military-dedicated facilities. In the recent years, after democratization restored the local autonomy, renovation of historic landscapes mushroomed. In addition, as a way to enrich and to diversify resources of heritage tourism, the locals took the opportunity to renovate and to reinterpret their past. By embodying their reinterpretations in the material settings, they then reshaped the military landscape to fit the image of their homeland. As a result, the renovated landscape articulated the local understanding of Quemoy and its past, from which the place identity and the meaning of homeland reconstruction shone through.

After two decades of tourism development, the islanders have assimilated to the social changes spurred by the demilitarization starting in 1992. Although effective solutions for a lingering economic depression have yet to be found, tourism has become one of the major economic activities in the island. Furthermore, even though the impression of Quemoy as a Cold War front persists and encourages battlefield tourism, the identity as an island of heritage tourism also becomes representative enough to compete with the former place identity (cf. Ou 2005; Chang 2011). Meanwhile, the reconstruction and reinterpretation of landscapes, which demonstrate the social adaptation to the post-military society, are very much alive. In spite of the ongoing status of becoming, the endeavors to reformulate identity on Quemoy have manifested
themselves intelligibly in the landscape. My goal in this study is to reveal the cultural proclamations through an investigation of human interactions with the landscape, which have been made for the end of identity reconstruction for the former military island.

1.2 Accounts on Former Battlefields in Cultural Geography

This inquiry generally involves in two subjects related to contested places: reuse of battlefields and place making. One naturally follows the other after the social structure undergoes significant change following conflicts. Methods chosen to reuse places associated with conflicts traditionally depend on how the dominant group retrospectively defines the historic, and antagonistic events. According to Foote (2003), total obliteration is one option to manage landscapes of violence and tragedy, aside from sanctification, rectification, and designation. However, the destructive method leaves few physical traces for later investigation, and the meaning behind the actions for cultural cleansing is rather frenetically straightforward and dry. In comparison, other methods are more informative especially in the respect of the intricacy of social tapestry, and thence is able to unfold before scrutinizing eyes by analyses of the reuse patterns of landscape (e.g. DeLyser 1999; Gable and Handler 2003). Even with a tempo-spatial continuum from the past under preservation, the reused historic sites nevertheless do not always articulate the whole Truth of the symbolized historical events (see Hurt 2010; Karacas 2010). More frequent than not, as Lowenthal pointed out (1975, 27),

[t]he tangible past is altered mainly to make history conform with memory. Memory not only conserves the past but adjusts recall to current needs. Instead of remembering exactly what was, we make the past intelligible in the light of present circumstances.

Sequentially, some aspects of the conflict are preserved, commemorated, and showcased, while others are put behind, forgotten, and concealed from the public attentions. On that very account, Anderson comments that “[a]ll profound changes in consciousness, by their
very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives” (1991, 204). Forgetting is therefore as important as remembering for historic narratives. Just as the shabby slave quarters are not much a strong suit, among other exquisite exhibitions of the antebellum elites’ life, in a Southern plantation tour, Hoelscher (2003) finds that the annual celebrations of the antebellum heritage in the Natchez Pilgrimage is another way to reassure the racial supremacy of the dominant group. In Sparke’s case study (1998) when Native American nations claim their land rights in court against the Canadian government, the long forgotten heritage of the subaltern group reemerges in the general publics’ attention. Kapralski (2001), on the other hand, exemplifies the dominant group’s art of forgetting by its deliberate “manipulations of landscape” in several Jewish-Polish settlements in the southeastern Poland after WWII, and laments for the oblivion leading Poland to its loss of “a great deal of its own identity” (56). On the subject of battlefield, Gough (2007) outspokenly pointed out that the “contrived” historic narratives pertaining to his studied battlefield (the Beaumont Hamel Memorial in Newfoundland) “prioritized certain memories over others” (693) to “lend authority to a particular reading of the space” (698). Hurt (2010) articulates that a dominant pro-military narrative that has long “silenced Cheyenne histories” (383) in an 1868-American-Cheyenne conflict site (the Washita Battlefield National Historic Site) currently undergoes a reinterpreting process “to better present a balanced historic narrative” (388). As these cases have shown, underneath the most glorified aspect of the past oftentimes the darkest shadow conceals the rest of the very same past. It is such concealment of the dominant culture that lead Richardson to assert, “every culture is a conspiracy, and its principle conspiracy is to deny conspiracy” (2003, 329).
For this reason, a place, or how the tract of land is construed, in cultural geographers’ understanding is not merely products of social construction (Johnston 1991; Relph 1985), or a depository of social relations (Duncan and Duncan 1988), but moreover are themselves “social processes” (Gold and Gold 2003; Hanna 1996; Schwenkel 2006; Till 1999). The view seeing places as social processes lays emphases on practice, simultaneity, and immediacy of the present world that both the authorities and minorities, the core and periphery are jointly engaging in. The conceptual transition of place from products to processes signifies a change in perceiving places from a fixed, passive, and objective “end product” to a fluid, dynamic, and non-representational dialogue, which continuously yields meanings to contest for the place. As shown in the case studies of monuments in Rome (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998), Berlin (Till 1999), Tokyo (Karacas 2010), and Montreal (Osbrane 1998), their meaning changes over time, and their very existence restlessly stimulates contests over their meanings. Edensor (1997) unraveled in his study of the Wallace Monument that the contests, as he termed as “the politics of memory,” are not only negotiations between the present and the past juxtaposing in places associated with conflicts, but also an ongoing dialogue among coeval social groups adhering to different understanding of these places.

In addition to its continuous effects on specific locales, the legacy of conflicts also ignites a comprehensive reshaping process of landscape during the transitional period, especially the time immediately after conflicts. The reprocessing of symbolic landscape often happens hand in hand with the post-conflict reconstruction, which embeds and then showcases narratives of the incumbent dominant groups (see Foote, Tóth, and Árvay 2000; Stangl 2003; Till 2001, 2003, 2005). In some extreme cases (e.g. Falah 1996; Kapralski 2001), the group arbitrarily obliterates the cultural landscape of Others. In any
event, the reshaping consequently produces a set of images which constitutes a
hegemonic representation of the post-conflict place that its dominant group creates to
impose on its residents and outsiders altogether.

Against the imposition, contests over the meaning of place begin, and the politics of
representation follows. The new representation tends to exclude incongruent
interpretations of the contested places by re-emphasizing, appropriating, or obliterating
former cultural inscriptions on the landscape. By maintaining an exclusivity, the
reprocessed cultural landscape can therefore convey narratives of the dominant group to
the public. In the sense, boosterism and place branding in the post-conflict place in the
post-conflict time, to various degrees, manifest such intentions to produce exclusivity
(see Hannam 2006; Palmer 2007; Vitic and Ringer 2007). Since the land is meant to be
construed differently after reconstruction, the reshaping process is a process of place
formation. Moreover, even when the competing representations do not necessarily
exclude one another (see Boholm 1997; DeLyser 2003; Hanna 1996), over long
juxtaposition they can still blur “to become mutually constitutive as a new” (DeLyser
2003, 886). Thus the blurring and contesting both contribute to the evolution of place,
and as a matter of course a battlefield is meant to be something else after the battles.

By examining the social conditions of the post-conflict Quemoy, this study
demonstrates an evolutionary process that begins when boosters reshape the landscape,
providing new interpretations of the past, and consequently reusing the military
stronghold as an island of heritage tourism. The transformation of place image and
representation through the branding activities occasions most phenomena discussed
previously: To reconcile with China, the locals obliterate anti-communist signs and
military structures in the island. By doing so, they intend to pacify the historical
confrontation while at the same time sanitizing traces of the anticommunist struggle. In addition, to develop heritage tourism the local government reconstructs historic landscapes of the antebellum period, and appropriates military relics as tourist attractions. The “touristification” articulates the peacemaking in progress, and suggests, and reinforces, the strong social ties between Quemoy and the mainland. Conclusively, the reshaped landscape and the tourist activities in Quemoy constitute a place image that is supposed to supplant the former representation of Quemoy, the Cold War front. As previous studies have indicated, the known effects of touristification in the post-conflict places may facilitate an identity shift: Working on the landscape touristification can decentralize the former meanings attached to a place (Hannam 2006); can propagate designated narratives of the dominant groups (Cooper 2006; Holguín 2005); can re-fabricate collective group identity (see Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998; Muzaini and Yeoh 2005; Till 2005); and can unshackle the place from the hegemonic social constructions (Adams 1997; Evans 2002). With these changes taking place hand in hand with touristification, politics of memory and representation sequentially emerge.

According to Johnson’s categories (1995), heritage studies are broadly based on two conceptual frameworks that first “examines the view that the heritage industry is mainly a mechanism for re-inscribing nationalist narratives in the popular imagination,” and the other “examines the link between heritage and the cultural changes associated with postmodernism” (552). The battlefield studies included in Johnson’s first conception commonly discuss the sanctification of their studied sites, and offer interpretations to shed light on the phenomena. Through these studies, cultural geographers associate the former battlefields with heroism, nationalism, and patriotism that grant them a quasi-religious quality and therefore incite pilgrimage to pay homage to the dead and
their causes (see Gatewood and Cameron 2004; Lloyd 1998; McLean, Garden, and Urquhart 2007; Stephens 2007). As a result, “identity” in these studies largely refers to group identity instead of place identity, while the latter is what this study of Quemoy mainly focuses on.

Besides, with respect to meaning, although post-conflict societies in these studies bestow these sites with different (re)interpretations along time, their historic significance, despite a contentious one, remains in the social spotlight at all times. The continuous contest facilitates the persistence of their commemorated causes. In other words, these studies focus on the continuum of historic significance of former battlefields rather than the vicissitudes in their semiotic values, which however is the main concern of this study of Quemoy. To reveal the vicissitudes, studies of the latter sort investigate cases of “obliteration” and “rectification,” according Foote’s categories of management methods of tragic landscapes (2003). Atkinson and Cosgrove (1998) examine a monument in Rome that “has been derided throughout its history” and known “to the Romans who pass by every day as ‘The Wedding Cake’ or ‘The False Teeth’” (28). Hoelscher discusses the Nazi regime’s flak towers in Vienna as “monuments that, however much we'd like to forget, simply won't go away” (2008). The military landscape—which the Chinese nationalist impose upon the islanders in Quemoy to coerce them into carrying on the task defending the whole nationalist regime—is not locals’ preferred representation of their homeland. Although out of self-mockery they call their island a “big military camp 大軍營” (Chang 2008, 67; Yang 1996, 97), a great portion of the local efforts in the post-conflict reconstruction are dedicated to undoing the forty-three-year militarization of “their” landscape. The causes commemorated in anticommmunist and patriotic memorials are now inflated social currencies that have only little value among the Quemoy people.
Furthermore, heritage studies with emphases on place identity often concentrate on images, representations, and authenticity of the heritage sites (e.g. Adams 1997; DeLyser 1999; Hanna and Del Casino 2003; Hannaford 2001; Gable and Handler 2003). These place-centered studies fall into Johnson’s second category, in which one examines “the cultural changes associated with postmodernism.” Tourism usually demands (re)production of place and its images, which eventually constitute representation of place. For the characteristic imagery consumption of tourism, the heritage studies in this category often share a common notion that “tourism is ‘prefiguratively’ postmodern” (Johnson 1996, 552-3). The constructivist view of imagineering enables these studies to investigate the socially constructed dimension of space and its relevant issues—the (re)production of space, the blurring of the reality and representations, the politics of representation (e.g. Knox 2006; Stainer 2006; Till 2005). The pursuit of a new place identity in the post-conflict Quemoy through imagineering intersects issues that the postmodern heritage studies have been investigating. As these studies illustrate, the currently perceived representation of place and dominant place identity are partially social constructions that articulate the dialectical relationship of our “social worlds real and imagined” (Stainer 2006, 104).

The post-conflict imagineering in Quemoy—relying heavily on the local studies conducted by local K-12 teachers in the past two decades—concretizes the landscape in memory as well as the local aspirations for their homeland. To satisfy the local yearning for the antebellum landscapes, the post-conflict reconstruction is a culturally orchestrated experiment to revert the militarized reality to the nostalgic images in memory. The exchange of representations of Quemoy—from an anticommunist stronghold in the nationalist and geopolitical view to an insular destination of heritage tourism in the
constructivist and decentralized perspective—reveals the local negotiations with (1) their physical environment, (2) their collective local past, and (3) all the involved interest groups within and outside the island. Veterans, unionists, separatists, and local boosters are all concerned how the past of Chinese Civil War is re-narrated and re-inscribed on the landscape in the current process of identity reformulation. After the meta-narrative of civil religion has collapsed, the locals are struggling to free themselves from the carapace of military culture that they have lived in and under for more than four decades. Toward the end, they take advantage of touristification to justify their end of sanitation of the military landscape. The tourist development thus serves as an effective tool to propagate the new representation of Quemoy as a heritage site through boosterism.

Although studies of the battlefield tourism share common research interests with other heritage studies, they are prone to and distinguished for their focus on the issues of contested places. As a legacy of war, sites of battlefield tourism often arouse polarized opinions on the conflictual past; therefore meanings attached to these sites are not only contested but also confronted. To characterize battlefield tourism—the activity to act out different opinions, scholars at times call it “dark tourism” (Lennon and Foley 2000) or “thanatourism” (Seaton 1999). Both the terms suggest a fact that tragedy, violence, and death in situ constitute the significance of place. As pilgrimages to the former battlefields gradually popularize battlefield tourism, the rite of civil religion sequentially brings about the landscape change/production of the former battlefields (see Gold and Gold 2003; Gough 2007; Knox 2006).

Since the dominant group often attains power to embody their interpretation in the landscape, the touristified battlefields, due to the embedded hegemonic narratives, tend to arouse controversies, and turn into contested places. They beckon disputes over their
meanings held dearly by different social groups, especially the two rival groups previously fighting and involved in the battle (see Hannam 2006; Smith 2007; Frost 2007; Panakera 2007). Due to the symbolic value of former battlefields, changes in the material settings are thus able to articulate the power struggle of the post-conflict communities. As shown in some precedent studies (e.g. Falah 1996; Foote, Tóth, and Árvay 2000; Karacas 2010; Moeller 2005), the dominant group likely undertakes a syncretic approach to reshape the landscape, with a hegemonic discourse overwhelming dissonant sounds made by other dissident groups. With the syncretic observations, these studies suggest an antagonistic incompatibility between the former landscape/power and the post-conflict power structure. However, such is not the case in Quemoy, where the coexistence of military and tourist landscape enunciates their compatibility after re-interpretation.

Touristification of military sites is a tricky business that necessitates both authenticity and demilitarization. The latter however undercuts the former and vice versa. As a result, military sites of battlefield tourism are always a product of compromises between the two: They are partially militarized and partially touristified; both real and imagined. The ambiguity obfuscates the past conflicts, and delivers the compatibility. More importantly, the demilitarization in Quemoy stems from the pursuit of decentralization, democratization, and localization. In the circumstances, although the historical narrative about the past conflict changes after the demilitarization, the changes attribute to observations made from different angles by different social classes, yet, on the same side in the war, instead of totally opposite observations made by the rivals. The common ground between the two narratives provides a base for understanding. When the elite class in Quemoy drastically interpreted features of military landscape form war apparatus to peace tokens, the reinterpretation did not stimulate acute controversies. The
ambiguity of space and the reinterpretations with compatibility brought by tourist development enable and display the cultural hybridity after demilitarization.

Following localization and touristification in Quemoy, the local study gradually becomes a popular subject matter for researchers. However, as the stage of knowledge production remains preliminary, most of the studies in the last two decades devoted to data collection in the extra-textual field of reference, and built an academic basis for advanced exploration later. Under this circumstance, the theoretical and inter-textual studies of cultural geography are scarce. In the present literature, a few studies relevant to mine generally center on two issues: production of space and methods of representation. Scholars studying the first issue share a common interest in revealing the mechanism of landscape production. Chi (2004) identifies a dialectic interaction in the production of space during militarization. The dialectics between the everyday space and the militarized space beget a contested “thirdspace” that “embraces conflicts, confusion, and ambiguities” (Chi 2004, 523). By her study, Chi highlights the impracticality of total hegemony, nationalism in this case, over space construction of Quemoy. Other studies with the same focus investigate the landscape change after demilitarization in 1992. Considering Quemoy as a “border-island,” the geopolitical study claims that “politics, nationalism and military are the three major and influential forces involve [sic] in the landscape transformation process and mechanism” (Chien 2004, 449). On the other hand, the study of urban planning credits the change “from a war-zone to a cultural tourism destination” to the local cultural industry, whose success hinges upon the legacy of militarization—the efficient local institutions and mobilization through the old civil defense mechanism (Yang and Hsing 2001). Last, Chang and Ryan (2006) in their study of battlefield tourism propose that heritage tourism renders Quemoy “a place in transition
from a site of war to a place of normalization” (151), and consider reconciliation as the solo force promoting the landscape change in Quemoy.

Secondarily, studies concerning methods of representation often conclude with suggestions for tourist development or historic preservation in Quemoy. In her exploration of means to interpret former battlefield relics and monuments, Lin (2004) introduces the concept of “counter-monument,” which de-sanctifies the commemorated significance by viewers’ participation in completing the monument. Based on a review of memorialization methods and case studies of war commemorative monuments, she suggests the preservation of the social memory in Quemoy by a decentralized approach. With a discussion on the construction and the management of tourist images, Hou (1999) departs from the methods of recurrence, simulation, and disguise to represent the war history in Quemoy, “but rather, it should be transformed into tangible contents in artistic forms to reveal the universal meaning” (39). In addition to the introduction of artistic forms of representation, he recommends that the current tourist development should create spaces which invite experiential engagement in the historic battlefield, in addition to the traditional sightseeing activity. With these suggestions concretized in the landscape, Zhang (2007) analyzes representation of the war memorials and the touristified military structures; thereby concluding that the increasing awareness of the new place identity—a destination of battlefield tourism—among the local population is central to the success of tourism development. In general, all these studies emphasize the advantages of the experiential, partaking and bottom-up approaches of representation, revealing an underlying discourse of local empowerment and localization in the post-conflict Quemoy.

Through the literature review, I discover a few missing points in the current literature of former battlefields and battlefield tourism. First, research on the subjects tend
to ignore what essentialists call geographical personality (Dunbar 1974; Norton 2000) and constructivists call conventional place image, “built up over many years of accumulated visual and textual representations” (Hannaford 2001). Noting that “former battlefields are often unprepossessing places” (Gold and Gold 2003, 108), research on the subject recognize only the significance of these places after the violent conflicts. Gold and Gold explain that the neglect is mainly due to the homogeneous material settings of former battlefields (2003, 108):

fields of combat tend to lack imposing topography. Flat ground allows infantry commanders to deploy their forces in optimal formation and artillery commanders to establish uninterrupted lines of fire, at best looking for slight undulations or ridges to give themselves points of tactical advantage. Whatever their appearance during the heat of battle, most battlefields scarcely merit a second glance for their inherent landscape qualities once the debris of war has been cleared away.

Since these studies intentionally or institutionally disregard the antebellum past of these places, they then fail to contextualize the conflicts and the venues. On one hand, for studies centering on nationalist narratives embedded in former battlefields, the de-contextualization can be excusable because meanings of these nationalist monuments nearly remains on the same page. However, insofar as the meanings of former battlefields are the focus of investigation, the neglect of context is to map the cultural geography without cardinal points. As this study sees the whole Quemoy island as a battlefield, overlooking its rich history while investigating meanings that locals attach to its landscapes could lead to fallacies and misinterpretations.

On the other hand, for postmodernist studies focusing on politics of memory and representation, their ahistorical view of social constructionism sees the observed phenomena in former battlefields as the outcome of the interplay among present social dynamics rather than a legacy of war. With their focus on the present, the past is construed as a social construct of the current milieu. In the sense, the politics of former
battlefields are overwhelmingly negotiations among social groups in the present. The de-emphasis of the past and its influence on the present thus contextualizes and locks the current landscape in today’s social fabrics. By viewing the past as a manipulatable and manipulated creation for contemporary groups to pursue their social interests, the postmodernist conception realizes place as tools for certain purposes. The view does not account for how a place comes into being nor can it reveal site specificities contributing to place formation. To explore meaning of place without considering the dialectical, improvisatory relationship between praxes and conventions in every appropriation, negotiation, and resistance is to reduce the intricacy of cultural evolution to an image equivalent to any other in the postmodern time. The reduction of “Quemoy” to representations (a Cold-war battlefield or a tourist destination) may likely simplify the current negotiations of identity reformulation. The necessity to take negotiations in the past (i.e. the evolutionary trajectory of place formation) into account and to include the past into the current negotiations for place reformation is key to revealing the meaning of Quemoy and its changing landscapes today. For this reason, I endeavor to include a thorough review of the island’s past in this study to identify its distinct characteristics of cultural geography built in the long-term human-environment co-evolution, and to ground this research on place identity on a solid basis of the local understanding.

Secondarily, another characteristic of former battlefields that the prior studies do not sufficiently address is how drastically the meaning of place and sequentially its landscapes can change after conflicts. The polarized change in their symbolic meanings from place of war to peace or from place of one group’s justice to their opponent’s induces a contradiction. With a great semantic contrast, such a shift in meaning of place introduces irony in landscape. Touristification of the former battlefield further reifies the
irony through reinvention of military relics in identity reformulation that turns the island orientation upside down and inside out. In addition, through a review of the local history, I discover that the ironic shift of place identity from one affiliation to its opposite has repeatedly occurred due to the cultural and geographical marginality of Quemoy. The resurfacing contradictions manifest geographical characteristics of this island on the border, and articulate the irony of human futility in the belligerent struggles for identity construction. The Sisyphean work in constructing a hegemonic identity for the border island through territorialization counter-intentionally brought a vague identity that reveals the locals’ negotiations with marginality and the conventional cognition of Quemoy. The landscapes in the border island are therefore ripe for irony.

As “the cultural signature of the entire [sic] postmodern condition” (Fernandez and Huber 2001, vii), irony “most often is used to express skepticism toward authority,” and “describe[s] a questioning attitude and critical stance” (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 1). The cutting edge of irony makes it “an undercutting instrument” to demystify authoritative meta-narratives (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 3). As Foucault proclaimed, “power projects an image that is all pervasive, unavoidable and inscribed in the very heart of all ventures of knowledge” (Torres 1997, 30). To shatter the power-constituted image, ironies in the postmodern time obtain a greater significance (Knauft 1996, 95):

These ironies are not just discursive, epistemological, or limited to world of trope; they have enormous impact on peoples’ lives. The play of signs is a powerful strategy of domination and disempowerment . . . .

In terms of landscape, the constituent image of power/knowledge emerges from the “inherently descriptive text [of geographers’ writings] in the communication of social pretensions by privileged persons and groups” (Smith 1997, 78). The discrepancies remain between the pretentious myth and the reality “give rise to ironies” (Smith 2002,
324). As Orientalism exemplifies the postmodern irony, the geographical ironies, or precisely ironies in geographical writings, often involve refutation to the imaginative geography, such as the myths of American exceptionalism, American geographical uniformity (Smith 2002) and the Finnish northern imagination (Ridanpää 2007). With the emphases on the “awareness of irony [that] can lead to a salutary dissolution of pretense” (Smith 2002, 325), the current literature of geographical irony weighs in the discursive aspect of landscape texts, but is lack of a practice theory to investigate how social groups reshape their landscape to ignite ironic flair through pastiche and juxtaposition. The landscape change in Quemoy pertinently demonstrates the practice aspect of ironic landscape. As militarization of Quemoy manifests the nationalist pretensions, which cordoned off Quemoy from its nearby areas and produced a rigid, utilitarian, and hierarchical military landscape, touristification subverts the authoritative myth through irony. Irony in the post-conflict reconstruction, which transforms the former military base to a battlefield tourism destination, greatly changes the residents’ everyday life. As such often in the practice aspect of ironic landscape can the unique postmodern condition “have enormous impact on people’s lives” (Knauft 1996, 95).

Furthermore, ironies, as a Woolgar discerned, “are useful for maintaining the ambivalence of things that can never be known for sure” (Torres 199, 20). In the place identity reformulation, their polysemy simultaneously makes Quemoy a heterotopia which “is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). Inspired by the concept, Duncan construes a heterotopia as “sites of difference,” each of which “with its own discourses linked to similar sites” in their discursive fields (1994, 407). Due to juxtaposition of the new and old identities of Quemoy in developing a cultural landscape pastiche for heritage
tourism, the identity reformulation consequently increases place ambiguity. The counterintentionality and contradpectoriness maximizes the post-conflict irony in landscape. It is through the fluidity and eclecticism of heterotopies that the postmodern ironies serve as “a powerful strategy” to emancipate Quemoy from further territorialization.

1.3 A Magpie Roaming in the Park

Throughout my entire enterprise of this research, I heavily rely on the phenomenological research method acquired from my interdisciplinary training in both landscape architecture and cultural geography. Phenomenology, as defined, “suggests that we work to accomplish our efforts through that intensive mixture of experiencing and speaking” that results in “understanding” (Richardson 2006, 2). Students in landscape architecture for design purposes learn from site inventory and analysis to identify distinct qualities and themes of sites. This acquired knowledge sharpens in conceiving site-specific designs to transform their intentions to paper, by which landscape architects perfect their reading in creating new landscapes. Their line of work compels them to locate the sense of place in a design site and to analyze spatial composition of a design. The reading in locating, the deconstructing in analyzing, and the reconstituting in designing disclose landscape architects’ vision of human inscriptions on Earth as landscape paintings, consisting of iconographies, plant materials, design elements, and other manipulable components for aesthetic, ecological re-arrangement. Differing from the vision, cultural geographers however read landscape as texts. In this view, landscape communicates. As Richardson elucidates, “places we call ordinary communicate the taken-for-granted understandings of the present” (1994, 159). For cultural geographers, landscape conveys meaning by offering understandings for interpretations. The approach
to understand landscapes’ meaning resembles the one of language learning that requires total engagement in an estranged reality to acquire understandings through experience. By the understanding, landscape readers can read texts in a meaningful way and interpret their meanings. Through this effort of “reading a world that speaks,” Richardson comments, “reading engages us [creatures of symbolic communication]; through reading we enter the world of the text. The endeavor is . . . more given to addressing the how than the why, more given to pondering words than assigning cause . . .” (1994, 163). Phenomenology is thus a method to let the world reveals itself through our engagement in it.

Since my first trip to Quemoy in January 2004 for this study, nearly ten years have passed. During the decade, I visited Quemoy four times for ten to fourteen days. In addition, I stayed in the island for sixteen months to do my fieldwork before writing this dissertation. In the first few visits, I started out as a participant in tourist pilgrimages, and gradually set my own courses of survey. To witness the landscapes described in texts through my own eyes, I undertook a basic survey over the whole island, proceeding quarter by quarter over the course of one to two days on my rental scooter. I tried to grind over every possible path in the island, and along the way photographed distinct local features, such as the military landscape in Quemoy. In the process of indiscriminate collecting, I felt myself like a magpie roaming in the park, intrusively breaking into its tranquility and compulsively hoarding its distinctive features. The detachment from touristic landscapes enabled me to see the landscape change in a broader view and to re-contextualize tourist development back to the ongoing social dynamics in Quemoy. With a big picture, the meaning of landscape change gradually emerged. In these trips, I also interviewed municipal officials, national park rangers, military officers, local
historians, and professors in Quemoy.¹ Through these talks, I learned from their point of view the meaning of landscape change, and was able to identify the social concerns and controversial issues in the post-conflict society. My experience from the preliminary work channeled my research toward articulating phenomena of cultural change.

In addition to the surveys and interviews, local festivals and events were also informative due to their evocation of situational performance which acts out the local interpretations of the landscape and the collective past. One of the occasions was the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art in 2005, an installation art event taking place in abandoned military facilities. The event included eighteen works created by foreign artists and nineteen local children’s works. By reinventing military relics to be sites of artworks, the event aroused an intense discourse on representation of Quemoy between the nationalist perspective and the one under reformulation. My experience in the rehabilitated space, observations on viewers’ behavior and talks with interpreters, enabled me to approach the local understanding of the landscape change in demilitarization. By analyzing the rehabilitative methods applied to the military space, I also discovered the different interpretations of bunkers between the local and foreign perspectives. In the last trip to Quemoy in 2008, I participated in a workshop held by Kinmen County Government and Taiwan Historica on the subject of the local culture and tourism. The two government organs deliberately designed a five-day program consisting of lectures and fieldtrips from mornings to evenings in order to deliver participants the representative images of Quemoy. In the workshop, participants from Taiwan, like groups of tourists, acted together; transferred as a group from site to site by bus on fieldtrips.

¹ Throughout my field studies, I had conducted nearly twenty in-depth interviews and approximate sixty informal ones. In in-depth interviews, I visited my interviewees, mainly public servants knowing my identity and purpose, and took notes during the interviews with their consent. Others happened in regular conversations.
Even though half of the participants were Quemoy locals, the Taiwanese participants, due
to the controlled environment and tight schedule, experienced only limited aspects of the
everyday life in Quemoy. My participation in the workshop allowed me to observe how
the local elites portrayed their homeland to Others, and how biased the travel experience
of mass tourism can be, due to the cultural immersion in the selected, exquisite images.
By the personal experience in these events, I then could make close examinations into the
imagineering of the demilitarized Quemoy.

Through the understanding obtained from my preliminary study, I submitted my
research proposal to my dissertation committee in December 2008, and with their
approval I initiated my sixteen-month fieldwork in Quemoy. Before residing in Quemoy,
I spent two months in the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Scinica as a visiting student
reviewing the latest literature of Quemoy and exchanging ideas with colleagues in Taiwan.
After that, I again stepped on Quemoy soil in March 2009.

During the sixteen-month stay, I gathered information mainly through three channels:
the local newspaper, my local networks, and my day job. The Quemoy Daily originally
was a military newspaper that after demilitarization became an organ of the county
government. In this daily newspaper, there were local news, editorials, literature
supplements, columns, reader’s opinions and advertisements. Its materials did not differ
much from regular newspapers. However, due to the fact that the government owned this
medium, a great portion of the local news was actually press releases prepared by various
government agencies. As such, the Quemoy Daily continuously served as an important
mouthpiece for the authorities. Knowing this, although it provided a convenient access to
keep track of the social phenomena in Quemoy, I remained cautious about its reports
especially those concerning the local public policies. Nonetheless, the Quemoy Daily was
a major source of citations in this study. Due to the shadows of totalitarian control by the military in the past forty-three years, the restrained masses had grown keenly sensitive to audio recorders and cameras. Learning from experience, I often kept my interviews informal to encourage interviewees to speak freely. Besides, I must confess that I did not always keep field notes in most of the lengthy conversations happening at random, nor did I keep a regular diary to have my interviewee’s words in transcripts. Consequently, the open-ended interviews and my informal data collection rendered the local newspaper a necessary adjunct to my ethnography. For the newspaper articles provided credentials that my findings in casual conversations lacked for, more often than not, the Quemoy Daily substantiated my knowledge of the local opinions on public affairs enlightened by my other sources of information.

The three major informants in my local networks were Josephine (a barista and the owner of a cafe stand), Dan (an innkeeper of a budget hotel), and Bill (my landlord). Josephine’s stand was an information exchange center where her customers brought her the latest news of the community through their chats. She sometimes would share the information with me in our conversations, providing leads to the everyday culture from sundry matters of social life to taboos. Dan’s budget hotel reinvented from an old mansion was the rendezvous of Taiwanese contract workers, travelling merchants, and returned visiting emigrants. His tenants due to the requirements of their business would

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2 For example, one old fisherman in Guningtou village was nervous, and continuously asked me the purpose of my recording and photographing, when we were on our way to his oyster farm. In spite of my explanation and reassurance, he still avoided his face from the camera. When the interview approached questions about the wartime past, the subject made his hair stand up on end. He turned even cautious, and defensively asked what I was asking those questions for.

3 All the three informants’ names are pseudonyms to protect their confidentiality.

4 She once commented on my decision to live in a traditional house in the Guningtou village by myself as a “very bold deed,” for the village and its vicinities were not clean (tainted by unrestful spirits). The area was a gory slaughter ground covered in bloodshed in the Battle of Guningtou and sequential artillery wars. Ghosts and spirits dying in agony were said still lingering on the ground. I later on also received the same comments on my “boldness” from other local acquaintances.
usually have to stay in Quemoy longer than regular tourists and business travelers. Dan on occasion would sit down with some of them after work in the walled front yard, the porch, or the lobby, drinking together and shooting the breeze. In such gatherings, their boasting would retell their impressions of the demilitarized Quemoy and its past. From Dan and his tenants, I then acquired the vision of Quemoy in the minority’s perspective—a vulgar view that texts produced by the elites and the educated class did not often share with their audience. Bill was a carpenter and a wood carving sculptor who mastered the traditional craft of creating religious artifacts. He just renovated his inherited house in the Guntingtou village with the funding from the Kinmen National Park when I was looking for a traditional folk house for rent. After becoming a tenant of his countryside property, I regularly visited his home in the town center, and in our chats picked up piecemeal information of the local knowledge here and there. In addition, his recollections about the antebellum past and his experience in the Battle of Guntingtou in his young days explained the local desire of reconciliation with the mainland society. His investment in the real estate in the Amoy city and business association with a mainland manufacture of wooden artifacts manifested the aspiration. His participation in the annual pilgrimage to his clan’s ancestor halls on the mainland also demonstrated a social reconciliation. However, his only sister, three children, and grandchildren living in Taiwan simultaneously fastened his life tightly with the island with the other side of the strait. Through him, I learned about the new relation established on the old connection, and witnessed such by my tagging-along in one annual pilgrimage of his clan to their common ancestor halls and graves in the mainland. From my informants, I then could hear the voice that announced without the privilege of education and mastery of words; however they spoke the everyday life of the people in the community.
In addition to the fieldwork, I also taught in the Department of Tourism Management in National Quemoy University, and worked as an administrative assistant in its graduate program. In the two semesters, the department assigned me a few space-related courses, including “Reuse of Abandoned Spaces,” “Public Space and Art,” and “Introduction to Urban Planning.” In exploring these subjects with my classes, the teaching assignments reciprocally enhanced my understanding of Quemoy: When the class was concluding the urban planning of Baroque cities characterized by its straight avenues and landmarks at traffic nodes, we also discussed the military hegemony in the traffic network of Quemoy constituted by straight concrete roads and bunkers at the center of traffic circles. In the course, “Reuse of Abandoned Space,” the class focused on the reuse of “ruins,” which were commonplace in Quemoy due to the damaged property, wartime personnel evacuation, and demilitarization in recent years. In an architecture student’s oral report, he demonstrated a reuse case of a beachfront fort turned into a successful bird observation station. The gun embrasures of the fort provided ideal settings for bird-watching, due to their discreet design to protect soldiers from enemy gunfire. Based on the structural characteristics, the transfer of military facilities through reinvention and reinterpretation into peacetime articulated the meaning of landscape touristification. The exchange of information with students in the classes granted me access to their life experience on the subjects concerning my research, and turned the class into a real-time venue of hermeneutics between the extra- and inter-textual fields of reference.

The main responsibilities of my administrative assistant job were two: to conduct a survey of tourism resources in Quemoy and to write grant proposals for the department every once in a while. The survey of tourism resources prompted me to investigate the tourist spots in Quemoy in order to discover their distinct characteristics that produced
the tourist attractions of the island. Furthermore, in order to win the grant committee over, the proposals also adopted a strategy to stress the local specificity. As such, the process of conducting the survey and writing grant proposals led me to a journey of demystification to unravel the *genius loci* of Quemoy. In quite the same way, my involvement in other professional activities—such as site inventory for landscape design projects, review of public projects commissioned by the county government, and research on the local traditional industries—also benefited this study. With all the engagement in the local community, my life experience in the field allowed me to identify the landscape change after demilitarization. In addition, based on the immersion in the chorological culture, I then could reveal the meaning of landscape change according to the local semiotic system.

The accomplishment of my fieldwork and literature review constitutes the following passages of this study. Chapter 2 provides a geographical biography of Quemoy as an overview of the local past from prehistoric sea-nomad cultures to the modern antebellum period. In a fashion similar to sequent occupance, the chapter introduces the past according to a series of representative place identities in each of its development stages. By examining the co-evolution of the environmental and social system, the overview provides a context for the formation of local culture, from which the meaning of cultural landscapes derives. Also the examination uncovered a repeating theme of landscape change throughout local history. Identification of the theme that I term “reversals of the geographical coordinate system” ties the militarization and demilitarization of landscape in the geographical personality of Quemoy.\(^5\) The contextualization then re-presents the

\(^5\) Similar orientation changes also occur in the Baltic countries both in the history of (Tuchtenhagen 2003) and in the post-communist present (Istrate 2012; Nekrašas 2003; Pavilionis 2003) especially in terms of transportation and economy (Himanen 2000).
landscape change in a perspective of historical geography, and permits a new reading of the change that emits irony. Chapter 3 explores the change in a holistic view by considering Quemoy as a whole to examine the shifts of the insular coordinate system. From its repeated reversals, an irony of Sisyphean futility emerges between reterritorialization and deterritorialization. Chapter 4 further looks into the irony in landscape by investigating individual cases of military structures, which underwent different management practices and reinvention treatments after demilitarization. The investigation concludes that the irony in landscape is the embodiment of cultural demilitarization that subverts the anticommunist ideologies, and dispatches the conflicts to the past. Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss the landscape touristification in Quemoy to supplant the military landscape. Through reinvention of military structure, reinterpretation of war memorials, and reconstruction of historic landscape, the post-conflict Quemoy presents a cultural variation. Juxtaposition of these variant cultural features in the landscape collapses the nationalist meta-narrative, and the cultural hybridity encourages the formation of places with ambiguity in Foucault’s heterotopias. Chapter 6 provides an overall conclusion of the study, disclosing the irony in landscape and formation of heterotopias as the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy. By the resulted ambiguity and multiculturality, the identity reformulation in Quemoy therefore articulates the local aspiration to free themselves from the Sisyphean struggle of the either/or dichotomy of the border island.
CHAPTER 2  WHEEL OF HISTORY: FROM NOWHERE TO HOMELAND

Chien Mu 錢穆, a modern Chinese historian had once criticized a popular metaphor that indicated history is a play and geography is the stage of history. He considered the analogy fallacious because actors could repeatedly reenact the same play on numerous stages. However, only specific milieu could induce the idiographic history to occur. As a result, “Confucius cannot be born in India; Buddha cannot be born in Jerusalem; and Jesus cannot be born in China. This [evolution trajectory of a place] comes with double conditions of geography and history” (Chien 2005, 56). Chien emphasizes the uniqueness of a place and its history, and denies their duplicability by refuting the metaphor which however suggests a critical mechanism of place formation. By discovering a repetitive historical theme of Quemoy, I argue that the repetitive social performance is key to its place formation. Just as the Sisyphean toil makes the condemned king, the reiterative theme constitutes the border island. Its marginal environment stimulates the specific social-spatial practice which reciprocally articulates geographical characteristics of the place. Chien considers that geography condition the development of a place, of which accumulation becomes the local history. If so, a study on the local history should be able to reveal the underlying geographical characteristics of a place. Vidal de la Blanche termed these idiographical characteristics as “geographical personality.” According to expositions by cultural geographers, the “personality” is “something that grows through time,” deriving from the local way of life, which signifies inhabitants’ adaption to “the physical characteristics of the land” (Dunbar 1974, 28; Norton 2000, 91). In this chapter, I explore the geographical personality that promotes historical events through a reading of the Quemoy history, discovering how the reiterative historical theme contributes to the formation of the border island and its culture.
Quemoy as an island on the Chinese coast controls the regional entrance of Southern Fukien 閩南 region. Its geographical characteristics are distinct, so are the inhabitants’ adaptations to them. Through its development, Quemoy has been a virgin land for Chinese pioneers, a grazing pasture and saltworks for early settlers, a military base and an international gateway for Imperial China, and a homeland for the overseas Chinese. As an island, its small size and its proximity to the mainland make Quemoy inseparable from the Chinese culture. Nevertheless, as a regional entrance, Quemoy is also susceptible to foreign influence. Located on the periphery of the mainland, Quemoy is far away from the Chinese political center and cultural hearth in Northern China. With mountains surrounding the Fukien region in southeast China and limiting its accessibility, China took thousands of years of political expansion and cultural assimilation to reach Quemoy (1556 BCE-ca. 980 CE). It took Chinese settlers four-hundred years to adapt fully to the insular environment after they landed there (ca. 980-1386). During the adjustment period, Imperial China established two state-owned enterprises on the island—first, horse pastures and later saltworks. Concomitant with development of overseas trading in the Southern Fukien, pirate activities gradually arose, and over time became a thorny issue for the Chinese imperial authorities. Due to the strategic location of Quemoy, empire constructed the island to be a regional outpost. As “Quemoy” in Chinese literally means “the golden gate,” Quemoy had long been an impregnable fortress of empire at the gateway in its seafront frontier.

As early as the seventh century, foreign merchants from as far away as Arabia and Persia had already arrived and settled in Quanzhou 泉州—the capital city of the

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6 The official Quemoy history, Gazetteer of Kinmen (2010), dates the establishment of the first Han settlement in 282 or 317, which the current historians consider problematic (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003; Yang 2004). By a historical review, I propose 980 as the earliest date possible for a continuous Han settlement in Quemoy. Please see 2.3 for details.
Southern Fukien (Shi and Xu 2007). The development of international trade attracted armed mercantile fleets, as well as pirates. In the eleventh century, the first documented pirate activity occurred in Quanzhou, and in 1218 in Quemoy. Thenceforth, the maritime powers and the Chinese Empire continuously skirmished in the vicinity of Quemoy. The constant conflicts prompted the empire to reinforce its military deployment in its insular frontier, and with reinforcement, the scale of conflict ascended. In the confrontation, the characteristics of a military base emerged in the landscape in Quemoy, and every imperial victory further thoroughly impressed the fledging identity on Quemoy. The reiterative constructions of military defenses developed the landscape characteristics of this imperial frontier. I use the action—hammering nails along the edge—as the metaphor for the formative process: The nails, symbolizing the peripheral city and its coastal defenses, would stay on the brink (of the imperial bloc figuratively) after the hammering, but over time, due to impact and wear, they would be the first to fall apart from the edge. The falling beckons another hammering, which eventuates in another falling. In a diachronic view, the construction of Quemoy as an imperial frontier proves to be a Sisyphean task. However, it is through the repetitive efforts of building that the insular society left its cultural impress on the landscape. As such, the futile “hammering” produces the homeland image of Quemoy.

2.1 Theories of Landscape Evolution

In 1893, the American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, presented his Frontier Thesis, asserting that the repeated experience in the advancing western frontiers shaped the American culture, and distinguished it from its European antecedents (1920, 1):

American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character.
Later, the theory received broad critique for its presumptions pertaining to which Norton (2000) summarized a few: The thesis described the cultural formation happening in isolation without interaction with the eastern seaboard area, and presumed that European settlers had generally experienced a primitive livelihood of subsistence production, which was not the typical case of economic activities in the frontiers. And most importantly, Turnerians considered American culture to be founded on the frontier when in fact the direction of cultural diffusion goes the other way around from the eastern seaboard. Nevertheless, aside from its widely debated conclusion, the merit of this thesis rested in its view of the formative process, of which Turner’s emphasis on the continuous repetition of this formative process was obvious. Accompanying the advancing frontier line, the early American settlers relived the frontier experience through reclaiming the “free land” again and again (Nostrand and Estaville 2001). The social development that “has been continually beginning over again” resulted in “this perennial rebirth” of life experience. Both the repetition and the recurrence articulated the Sisyphean character of the process that Turnerians considered to accomplish the characteristics of American culture.

2.1.1 Related Concepts in the Sauerian Tradition

Whereas historians are interested in the immaterial aspect of cultural evolution, geographers focus on the cultural landscape. Following the Vidalan and Sauerian traditions, such a focus is often bound to a geographical delineation with shared cultural traits, namely pays or a cultural region. To constitute a cultural region, diffusion is considered as the major formative mechanism. The place of origin for diffusion is commonly known as a cultural hearth, a core area, or later a homeland, as it is variously called. Accounting for the genesis of a cultural region, Zelinsky considers the indicator of
the establishment as the first effective settlement. He defines such a settlement as the first one with specific characteristics “able to effect a viable, self-perpetuating society” in “an empty territory” or when “an earlier population is dislodged by invaders” (1973, 13). As so defined, the first effective settlement is taken as the starting point of cultural diffusion, from which diffusion of cultural traits gradually forms the sequent cultural region. The clearly theorized start then gives geographers full access to explore the evolutionary patterns of cultural regions from their genesis to the following succession of human occupation. To narrate the evolution of a cultural region, some studies adopt a framework describing the regional development stage by stage in terms of the land-use patterns following the timeline. The framework first conceived by Derwent Whittlesey (Norton 2000) is known as Sequent Occupance, according to which each stage of regional development is identifiable by a prominent way of life that characterizes the human-environment relationships in a specific historical period. Due to the nature of such studies focusing on a cultural region, the identified stages, except the initial one, could be often idiographical and place-specific. Nevertheless, the general trajectory of human society from agriculture to industrialization, and in some case to urbanization also shows in these regions, but they do not always follow in linear sequence.

2.1.2 Meinig’s Model of Cultural Evolution in the American Wests

Cultural areas are each particular, and it is difficult to induce a general pattern of evolution. However, Meinig’s study on the American Wests makes a stride toward a more generalized set of evolutionary stages. This inter-regional study incorporates an economic dimension into the cultural evolution of the regions in the West, and identifies four evolutionary phases of the regions: transplant, regional culture, impact of national culture, and dissolution of historic regional culture (1972, 163; Figure 2.1). The
Figure 2.1. Meinig’s model of cultural evolution in the American Wests [Source: Foote et al. 1994]
transplant stage denotes for the initiation of immigration when bands of pioneers swarmed into the West. In the second stage, regional culture, settlers successfully adapted to the environment, and established six insular nuclei. These nuclei coming with “high potential for cultural lag and divergence” are actually cores of the six regions of Meinig’s American Wests. The development of these cores constitutes the cultural plurality in the regional culture stage. In the third stage, the regional cultures decline due to the impacts of national culture through the “central place network.” The national impact eventually brings “the end of insularity and local cultural identity and the onset of . . . national cultural uniformity” (Norton 2000, 119). In the fourth stage, the cultural integration results in the dissolution of historic regional culture; however simultaneously encourages the “emergence of ethnic mosaic and new innovative centers” (Meinig 1972, 163). Overall, Meinig’s study focuses on the evolution of regional cultures rather than the landscape evolution in a cultural area. In other words, the study emphasizes on the geographical changes instead of changing geography.

Parting from the idiographical narrative of cultural geography, Meinig’s study provides the theoretical latitude to yield nomothetic value through his model. The initial stage requires immigration. The immigrants develop specific ways of life through the process of environmental adaptation in the second stage. Although variant land use pattern and industries may come into being through time, they are theoretically still human adaptations to the environmental and cultural change. Successful adaptations would enable the settlement to endure outside challenges, which in Meinig’s study are the impacts of national culture. These challenges may lead the cultures into demise, or may well reinforce them due to the defense against variant threats. The persistence of a cultural landscape thus relies on the constant reinforcement and the successful adaptation;
whereby the formative process of this stage somehow resembles in the repetitive cycle of the Frontier Thesis. In Meinig’s model, the regional culture eventually diminishes in the last stage due to the impact of national popular culture, and the decline subsequently beckons the dissolution of the cultural regions. Nonetheless, such dissolution refers to the collapse of the core-domain-sphere structure of a culture region but to the demise of regional cultures. Even though cultural regions collapse, regional cultures remain at the core areas, and some even would reversely diffuse outward through the national network of popular culture. Such diffusion forms a cultural mosaic nationwide, and may well further popularize regional cultures to constitute a “patchwork quilt” (Clark and Tsai 2002, 423) of the regional and national culture.

2.1.3 The Homeland Concept

After the cultural regions dissolve and their domains and spheres demise, a cultural region core by itself has little meaning. Also, without research focus on diffusion, a cultural hearth is less significant. When the two concepts decline, the homeland thesis fills in their place in the geographical discourse of place evolution. While the local cultures become parts of a national culture, each of them is still distinguishable. They point back to their origins, and sustain these places as sanctuaries for people practicing the culture. Based on the geographical association, Nostrand conceives the homeland thesis to interpret the evolution of cultural geography in particular places, and seeks to re-visit the humanistic dimension in cultural geography—viewing place as a locale where a group of people imbue their affections. The overtones are manifest in Nostrand’s definition of homeland (1992, 214):

The people must have lived in a place long enough to have adjusted to its natural environment and to have left their impress in the form of a cultural landscape. And from their interactions with the natural and cultural totality of the place they must
have developed an identity with the land—emotional feelings of attachment, desire to possess, even compulsion to defend.

Similar to the Vidalian concept of geographical personality, the homeland thesis also requires human interaction with a place through time. The environmental adjustments, in a form of palimpsest leaving marks on the ground as the people’s landscape impress, also correspond to the concept of *sequent occupance* but without a deterministic sequence. The thesis innovatively treats daily landscapes as the embodied local culture, and considers that the collective identity of the residents greatly hinges on them. As such, in addition to the functionality of daily use, these landscapes consist of symbolic meaning of the place and of the group of people. In this case of the homeland when a cultural landscape is under threat, so is the collective self of the people, to defend the landscape is then a matter of course. Nostrand and Estaville propose five *homeland* ingredients (*people, place, bonding with place, control of place, and time*) and consider *bonding with place* as the key to spur the defense mechanism against outside challenges (2001, xix):

The tie [*bonding with place*] happens when a people adjust to the natural environment, stamp the environment with their cultural impress, and from both the natural environment and the cultural landscape create a deep sense of place. According to the definition, cultural impress refers to human creation capable of triggering the intangible sense of place among the cultural group and stimulating a sense of bonding. Beyond the connection, Nostrand and Estaville move further and affirm a reciprocal relationship between culture landscape and a cultural group (2001, xx):

Bonding with place thus means that a people shape the area with their culture, and the area in turns shapes them: Feeling of attachment and belonging develop. If threatened, desire to possess becomes compulsion to defend.

The idealistic view of homeland, its emphasis on senses, feelings and attachments, allows the thesis to move beyond essential regions and tangible traits, and resorts to a form of *topophilia* (Tuan 1974, 4). Consequently, the homeland concept comprises an idealistic connotation, inasmuch as the constitution of a homeland depends upon the psychological
factors. The defensive compulsion arises when the cultural group encounters outside challenges. To defend is to retain the control of place. Successful defense not only survives the culture but also revives cultural identity, and furthermore makes the culture persist through time by the reinforced self-consciousness (Jordan-Bychkov 2001). As in fact bonding with place is often latent and impalpable until the defensive measures—as the intensive cultural expressive practice—are taken against outside challenges, I propose that only in the struggles can a homeland, constituted by the five homeland ingredients, realistically emerge: A people defend their cultural landscape to maintain its control over time. The defensive action sustains a homeland from assimilation; substantiates bonding with place from intangible sense of place, feelings and attachments; and retains control of place in the process of negotiation. In this regard, repetitive defense is key to homeland constitution, and ultimately, it is such constant negotiations with Others that persist a homeland. As Turner (1920) proposed that the repetitive adaptation to the remote frontiers is key to culture formation of the Euro-American immigrant society, the repetitive outside challenges are also critical to homeland formation. In a marginal island like Quemoy its place formation heavily relies on the situational repetition through collective performance of environmental adaptation and defense against assimilation.

This chapter presents Quemoy as a homeland to substantiate my proposal of homeland formation through the constant negotiation. The conflicts between the maritime powers and the Chinese Empire in Southern Fukien articulate the contest between the nation and the region. As the regional conflicts recur over time, the external challenges and the negotiations with the empire repeatedly appear in the regional coastal frontier, and further strengthen the identity of Quemoy as a border island. Negotiation, aroused by the imperial construction of Quemoy into an exclusive military bastion, repeats similar
life experience among different generations. The cycles of negotiations unfold how the defensive mechanism turns Quemoy from a coastal island into a homeland. The dispute originates from the different views of Quemoy, of which empire saw a vulnerable point of military defense, but people in the region used it as a major gateway to overseas foreign lands. Although the two conflicting parties read the place identity of Quemoy differently, both of the identities stem from the same geographical settings and the historical context. As the geographical personality has greatly influences on the development of Quemoy’s place identities, a discussion on the homeland formation of Quemoy necessitates a review of its geographical biogeography in terms of landscape evolution.

2.1.4 The Four Evolutionary Stages of the Landscape in Quemoy

Based on former theories of cultural regions’ evolution and homeland formation, I propose four stages of homeland evolution in Quemoy. As recognized by cultural and historical geographers, the first two stages are the initial peopling stage and the second environmental adaptation stage. At the end of environmental adjustment stage, the immigrant society has largely left the subsistence production behind through successful environmental adaptations. With the establishment of a functioning settlement, the society proceeds and eventually faces challenges from outside. To cope with these exterior challenges of territorialization, which bring the society into the social struggles with others, the people create their cultural symbols in the landscapes, or attach meanings to the ordinary landscapes. The third stage therefore, as identified in the homeland thesis, is the landscape impress stage. Successful defense against outside challenges not only sustains the culture but also reinforces and may diffuse it outward. With the repetitive success, the residents transform the place into their homeland. Its establishment in Quemoy brings forward the last cultural diffusion stage, and the major struggle of the
society turns into the cultural one. The diffusion of homeland culture does not proceed as a one-way exportation but a bidirectional cultural exchange between Quemoy and the migrant societies. Meanwhile, modernization facilitates the spread of national culture to individuals at home, and also impinges on the local culture. The outcome of the exchange shows in the landscape in a cultural mosaic as Meinig noticed in the last stage of his regional evolution model. The cultural hybridity then represents the latest stage of homeland evolution.

The fact that the culture in an immigrants’ homeland, like Quemoy, is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous is surprisingly refreshing whereas the concept of a cultural hearth being the origin of cultural diffusion and the scheme of cultural core being the typical representation of a cultural group both suggest their cultural purity and intensity. Accounting for another conceptional characteristic, it is noticeable that the homeland evolution does not proceed in a linear progress with one stage following another as sequent occupancy suggests, but in a complex manner with one or more happening at the same time. Immigration should serve as a pertinent example: Immigrants continuously enter Quemoy from the mainland after the initial peopling stage. The latter immigrant groups could come with their own cultural baggage and different ways of life, which trigger additional environmental adaptations, and sequentially create new cultural landscapes. This is to say the homeland evolution is a continuous dynamic process with different major struggles in each stage. The merit of clarifying evolutionary stages rests in the identification of major struggles but not of each stage per se. Although immigrants might face, for instance, the cultural and economic struggles at the same time, for early immigrants the economic ones are the major concern for their society. Such is the case of the Quemoy migrants in their colonies, while the pidgin culture they import to Quemoy
plays a part in the cultural struggle at home. Based on the fact that different milieus could lay weights on respective struggles, cultural evolution eventually hinges upon the co-evolution of environment and social system that constitute the milieus.

2.2 Prehistoric Cultures: Oyster Eaters on the Waterfront

The earliest Human traces in Quemoy date eight thousand years ago. According to the latest archaeological survey, there are four major Neolithic sites in Quemoy (Chen, Liu, and Lang 2001; Figure 2.2). Among them, Fukuotun 復國墩 and Jingueishan sites belong to Fu-kuo-tun culture (6000-3800 BCE), and Pubian 浦邊 and Houfenggang 后豐港 sites belong to the Pubian type (2000-1500 BCE) of Tanshishan 曇石山 culture which originated in the Min River 閩江 estuary in northeastern Fukien. Archeologists have found sizable prehistoric oyster shell middens in these sites (Chen 1997; Chen W. 1999; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005; Figure 2.3). Inferring from these remains that the people practiced a “maritime hunter-gatherer culture” without agricultural activities (Chen 1997, 1998; Chen W. 1999; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005). Chen (1998; 1999) considered the group of prehistoric people in Quemoy among the “sea nomads” on the southeast coast of China. Kuo and Liu (2006) defines the time of Fukuotun culture as the early phase of prehistoric Quemoy, and the time of the Pubian type as the latter phase of prehistoric Quemoy. The human activities between the early and the latter phases (3800-2000 BCE) and between the end of the latter phase and the beginning of the historical era (1500 BCE-319 CE) remain unknown. None of the artifacts from the four prehistoric sites could provide information about the two gaps.

2.2.1 The Prehistoric Sea Nomads in Quemoy

Shell middens sites of the sea nomads are distributed over southeast Chinese seabords and islands. Their widespread geographical distribution marks the territory of
The Distribution of Neolithic sites in Quemoy. The four sites are all located in the favorable habitats of sea nomads, including estuaries, sandy beaches, and mangrove-covered coastal mud flats. The two sites belonging to Fukuotun culture are found on waterfront hills along the estuary and the cove. The other two of Pubian period are located on the flats behind the seafront sand dunes adjacent to muddy beaches. Although there are also sea nomad sites in Leiyu, this study limits its scope in Quemoy only. [Map remade from: Chen et al. 2001]

The Jinguishan Shell Midden Site. The shell middens mainly consist of oyster shells. Archeologists also find stone tools, pottery shreds, and small animals’ bones. They consider these sites belong to a “maritime hunter-gatherer culture” without agricultural activities (Chen 1997; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005). [Source: Chen 2006]
the sea nomads and also proves their seafaring skill. Their far-flung distribution suggests that sea nomads did not belong to a single archaeological culture but different cultural groups practicing similar life styles. Chen identifies four characteristics of the shell-midden sites in the Southeast China, which could also be used as criteria to identify sites belonging to the sea nomads (1999, 52):

1. Most sites are located on the terraces alongside estuaries, or on the slopes of small crescent islands.
2. Most sites are small and have only thin cultural strata, suggesting short duration [occupation] and possible seasonality of settlement.
3. Livelihood depends mainly on fishing and gathering shellfish, with hunting of small animals.
4. No shell midden sites in Fujian or Guangdong show any signs of agriculture.

Chen found shell midden sites in Quemoy that fit all the criteria, and identified all of them belonging to the sea nomads. In addition, the shell-midden deposits of Jingueishan 金龜山 site suggest a migratory life: “The site has only one cultural layer. This stratum spans 4,000 years in one meter from its lower level to its upper level, indicating the short-term settlement pattern of the sea nomads” (Chen C. 1999, 6). The deposits reveal an amphibious life style that sea nomads were not always on the sea, but would at least periodically stay on land when they made shell middens. Even though their livelihood mainly relied on the sea resources, they “cannot be completely divorced from terrestrial resources, and . . . cannot completely separate themselves from the inhabitants on land . . .” (Chen 2002, 52). In other words, they would maintain a “mutually beneficial symbiosis” with semi-nomadic and land-dwelling people (Chen C. 1999; Sopher 1977).

These traits suggest two life patterns of the sea nomads. First, the sea nomads could customarily migrate on familiar routes in a diachronic timeframe since the shell midden deposits of the Jingueishan site disclose an intermittent usage of the place for 4,000 years. They might visit Quemoy periodically. Second, since all prehistoric sites in Quemoy
belong to sea nomads, there must have been some land-dwelling peoples living along the migratory route who exchanged necessities with the sea nomads (Yang 1990). Through contact with these land-dwelling peoples, the sea nomads, by their widespread geographical distribution, simultaneously played a role of cultural transmitters on the southeast coast of China (Chen C. 1999; 2002). Chen considered that the migration of these cultural transmitters might explain the complicated cultural patterns of the Neolithic sites in this area (2002, 53):

In-depth investigation of the pottery, stone tools, jades and other artefacts of these Neolithic cultures show [that] there is both unity among diversity and diversity among unity. All apparently have close relationships but do not belong to a single cultural phenomenon.

Chen attributes the cultural mixture to the outcome of the sea nomads’ cultural transmission: “Their free transmissions interrupted the hypothetical rules of cultural boundaries . . . and made it hard for them [archaeologists] to agree upon the sequence of these southern coastal Neolithic culture of China” (2002, 53). The marine peoples thus contribute to an important linkage between the archaeological cultures in the region.

2.2.2 The Sea Nomands’ Hybrid Culture in Quemoy

Kuo and Liu (2006) speculate that the sea-level change might be responsible for the end of Fukuotun culture and the first gap. According to the geological research, sea level rose ten meters every thousand years until 6,000 years ago during the time of Fukutun culture. In the succeeding period (4000-2500 BCE), the maximum sea level reached about 2.4 meters higher than today (Rolett, Jiao, and Lin 2002). After a short recession, another marine transgression during 2000-1500 BCE caused the sea level to rise 2.3 meters higher than at present (Kuo and Liu 2006). The sea-level change, in terms of cycles of marine transgressions and regressions, might erode the early Neolithic relics on the lowlands and caused the first gap, which was why both the sites of Fukutun culture
were on hills. Otherwise, the gap could simply mean that the people of Fukutun culture left Quemoy. In that case, marine transgressions, which reduced their habitat or changed the environment into an unfavorable setting, would encourage their migration. Despite all the uncertainty, what could be sure was that the marine transgression coincided with the end of the archaeologically documented culture in Quemoy and the outset of Tapenkeng 大坌坑 culture in Taiwan about 6,000 years ago.

Although the sea level changes might cause the end of Quemoy’s early prehistoric phase, nonetheless the following marine transgression (2000-1500 BCE) could be the incentive for a new wave of immigrants to Quemoy. As identified by Kuo and Liu (2006), the archaeological culture of Pu-bian type is closely related to the culture of Chuangpianshan 庄邊山 upper strata phase—a successive type of Tanshishan culture—on the estuary of the Min River in the northern Fukien. Notwithstanding, the artifacts assemblage also shows characteristics of the archaeological culture of Paojinwan 寶鏡灣 site on the estuary of the Pearl River 珠江 in Canton (a.k.a. Guangdong 廣東; Figure 2.4) Kuo and Liu provides an explanation for the phenomenon of cultural hybridity, which Chen, as mentioned before, considers as the contribution of sea nomads, (Kuo and Liu 2006, 193):

The relics of Pu-bian type in Quemoy should attribute to the small-scale immigration of the prehistoric people of the Chuang-pian-shan upper strata phase. The reason urging these people to immigrate possibly has to do with the sea transgression concomitant with a reduction of their habitats. . . . By the time, a few prehistoric people from the estuary of the Pearl River might also immigrate to Quemoy. They live with the people of the Chuang-pian-shan upper strata phase from the estuary of the Min River, and the two peoples together develop the distinct culture of Pu-bian type in Quemoy.

The Pubian type archaeological evidence in Quemoy suggests a cultural mixture by two bands of sea nomads. Their migration validates the early traffic alongside the southeast coast of China which, as Bellwood (1995) claims, have already existed since 6,000 years
Figure 2.4. The Early Neolithic Cultures on the Southeast Coast of China and in Taiwan. The arrows indicate the cultural transmission among the four cultural spheres in the region—Dawan culture in Canton, Fukuotun culture in Fukein, Hemudu culture in Zhejiang, and Tapenkeng culture in Taiwan. Although the artifact assemblages in some sites of Tapenkeng culture show characters of Hemudu culture and Dawan culture, Fukuotun culture has the direct influence on the motif of the early Neolithic culture in Taiwan. The intricate exchange network in the strait also suggests a frequent marine traffic at this time in the southeast coast of China. [Map remade from: Kuo et al. 2005]
### Table 2.1. The Chronologies of Neolithic Cultures in the Early Prehistoric Quemoy
[Source: Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005]

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### Table 2.2. The Chronologies of Neolithic Cultures in the Latter Prehistoric Quemoy
[Source: Kuo and Liu 2006]

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ago “amongst the hundreds of small islands which flank the coasts of Zhejiang [浙江] and Fujian Provinces . . . if the Austronesians ever required a maritime ‘nursery’, it might have been here” (104). Rolett, Guo, and Jiao (2007) reports that the volcanic adzes found in the Neolithic sites in Taiwan are actually made in and transported from Pescadores archipelago in the Taiwan Strait (Figure 2.3). By the exchange networks, he then affirms that the “systematic open-sea voyaging” between Pescadores archipelago and Taiwan “began at least 4000 years ago” (Rolett, Guo, and Jiao 2007, 275). Lapteff (2006) considers that the archaeological cultures in Fukien has direct influences on Jōmon culture in Japan since its early period (4500-3000 BCE, or ca. 5300-3600 BCE) through “direct cross-cultural contact or migrations” (Lapteff 2006, 258). And “the migration [is] limited to some convenient sea bridges, like Fujian-Taiwan” (Lapteff 2006, 262). As early as the time indicated by Bellwood and Lapteff, the only archaeological culture in Fukien was the Fukuotun culture, and sea nomads were the cultural transmitters. They perfected their seafaring skill by voyaging along the southeast coast of China for thousands of years, and then traversed the 140-km Taiwan Strait at the latest 6,000 years ago. As late as 4,000 years ago, the cross-strait voyages had become regular and systematic and supplied the volcanic stone adzes to Taiwan. The relatively frequent marine traffic across the strait and along the southeast coast of China thus rendered Quemoy, sitting at the traffic intersection, one of the major entrepots of the continental archeological cultures, and consequently a place with cultural mixture.

As it might be evident, prehistoric Quemoy achieved such cultural hybridity due to its geographic location. The mouth of Jiulong River and Xiamen Bay providing favorable habitats for sea nomads with estuaries, sandy beaches, and mangrove-covered coastal mud flats on numerous islands (Sopher 1977), has attract the people of Fukuotun to settle
in Quemoy. Its close distance to Taiwan with Pescadores archipelago as the midway point constitutes a convenient sea bridge for migration. The median position on the coastal line of southeast China between Zhejiang and Canton makes Quemoy an essential point on the migration route ascending or descending along the coast. All these geographical characteristics suggest Quemoy was the sea nomads’ traffic node in the southeast coast of China, and consequently brought cultural hybridity to the island.

2.3 Origin Myth: The Northern Elite?

Although the prehistoric archaeological cultures in Quemoy hold noticeable significance in anthropology (see Appendix A), the current inhabitants in Quemoy seemingly have difficulty relating themselves to these findings. Since the discovery of these prehistoric sites in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the local government and commoners together have made only limited efforts to preserve these prehistoric sites. The Fukuotun site, for example, is desolate.\(^7\) Residents in Quemoy commonly identify themselves with the Han Chinese, and do not conceive themselves as genealogically related to these indigenous populations. However, the understanding is a socially constructed misconception because the indigenous peoples in Fukien have endeavored to conceal their indigenous origin for nearly 2,000 years (Chen 2006). The objective of the social practice was for the indigenous people to attain social and cultural equality in the Chinese society. There is a continuum of the indigenous settlement in the coastal Fukien since the prehistoric era till the turn of the last century, and the indigenous people belong to the cultural ethnicity of the sea nomads. Due to the inclination to eradicate relations to

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\(^7\) When I carried out my fieldwork in the summer of 2010, villagers told me that the site was located behind the ancestor hall of Guan clan. However, the path to the site was covered by thick grasses and the site was therefore inaccessible. Notwithstanding, during the winter when the grasses wither, or in the mid-spring after the locals enter the area for a pilgrimage to their ancestors’ graves on the annual tomb scrub day, the site would be in the villagers’ view.
the indigenous people, only a few in Fukien today would identify themselves with indigenous populations. Although the ancestor worship weighs heavily in their religious life, commoners in Quemoy treat the prehistoric sites as the landscape of Others.

2.3.1 The Problem of the Genesis of Quemoy

Likewise, the local members of the educated class share a similar neglect. In the latest official history of Quemoy, the sixteen-volume *Gazetteer of Quemoy* (2010) devotes only three pages to prehistory, while it repeatedly states that Han Chinese emigrants from northern China established the first settlement in Quemoy in 282 or 317. The assertion arbitrarily overlooks the fact that long before such migration became possible, indigenous populations prospered in this region. Although the historians may merely parrot clichés in the previous gazetteers, the assertion reveals the traditional Han-centric perspective of the Chinese intellectuals. Nonetheless, it is intruging that when archeological discoveries abundantly document indigenous settlements in prehistoric Quemoy, the well-informed committee tenaciously maintains a problematic statement offered by early historiographers nearly two-hundred years ago. The presumption of Quemoy’s genesis and the neglect of prehistoric Quemoy are two sides of the same coin. They cannot simply attribute to the limit of the craft of historiography. The central problem of the proposition of Quemoy’s genesis hinges on the cultural inclination toward ethnicities that Quemoy people identify with.

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8 Certainly, one may argue that the great division between history and archaeology can prompt the abbreviation of the discussion on prehistoric Quemoy in the gazetteer: historians can only speak on textual records but not on artifact assemblages. However, the argument is not necessary true as many monographs of regional history, including some of Quemoy, start with pertinent discussions on the regional prehistoric sites and the archaeological findings (e.g. Lee 2005; Shi and Xu 2007; Tang 1995; Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003; Zhu 1985). And even if the argument prevails, it still does not explain why the far-fetched genesis of Quemoy by Han Chinese is dogmatically maintained. The presumption of Quemoy’s genesis and the neglect of prehistoric Quemoy are two sides of the same coin. They cannot simply attribute to the limit of the craft of historiography.
2.3.2 Two Historical Discourses of Quemoy’s Origin

The presumption originally derives from two historic records—one regarding the establishment of Jinan County 晉安郡 in 282 and the other about the Wuhu Chaos 五胡亂華 during the years 304-316. Under current historians’ scrutiny, neither incident in the records can substantiate the presumption of Quemoy’s genesis. In 282, the Chinese administration of Jin Dynasty 晉代 established Jinan County which covered half of the current Fukien Province, mainly the seaboard and the southwest hilly areas. The establishment indicated a growth of Han population in the county and the political expansion of Han Chinese to southern Fukien. However, in terms of regional development, the establishment of this county remained nominally at the level that marked a large tract of land on the map for administrative purposes, but did not signify a full exercise of dominion or widespread occupancy of Han Chinese in the region. In fact, Han Chinese at this time only controlled a small part of this territory, and the vast land of Fukien largely remained in the hand of indigenous peoples. Using the county establishment to date the genesis of Quemoy was therefore problematic (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003, 12):

In fact, before Tang Dynasty [618-907] only the Min River Delta, the northern Fukien corridor [the Min River Valley], and the Jin River Delta 晉江 had been preliminarily developed [by Han Chinese]. Areas that the power of Han Chinese could reach . . . were only limited to the capital cities of prefectures, the county seats, the town centers, as well as the corridors along the major traffic lines. Territory out of these areas was almost undeveloped or only with very limited development. Remote islands like Quemoy and Leiyu were either treated as barbarian land or even unknown to the administration at the time. As a result, the issue regarding which prefecture or county that Quemoy islands belonged to by this time was actually irrelevant.

In other words, although Quemoy was in Jinan County, historians did not interpret the county establishment as an indication that Han Chinese had already settled in, or even known about, this remote island.
The other record in the gazetteer incongruously indicated that the first Han settlement in Quemoy occurred in 317. In the third volume of *Gazetteer of Quemoy* (2010), the section “Genesis of Quemoy People” provided a complete version of the record (Huang *et al.* 2010, 39):

When Wuhu Chaos happened in the Jin Dynasty, Central Plain [in the mid and lower Yellow River basin] was under turbulence. The righteous people following the imperial court of Jin emigrated southward. Six clans—Su, Chen, Wu, Tsai, Lu, and Yan—fled to and resettled in Wuzhou [the toponym of Quemoy before 1386]. This was the beginning of settlement in Quemoy.

Wuhu Chaos was a nomadic invasion during the years 304-316. Northern nomads crossed the Great Wall, and established their regimes in northern China. Following the invasion, Tan (2000) estimated that approximately 900,000 people, equivalent to one eighth of the population in the northern China, moved southward during 304-317. After Han Chinese established a new regime, Eastern Jin 東晉, in southern China, immigrants from the northern China constituted one sixth of its population. These immigrants mainly, if not all, resettled in the immigrant prefectures in the Yangtze Basin and the Huai River 淮河 Basin. Also, the northern border of Eastern Jin was generally demarcated in the two regions. Fukien was located far beyond the northern border, being surrounded by mountains with only a few land routes to communicate with neighboring lands. In addition, indigenous peoples, occupying the Fukien territory, often conflicted with Han pioneers over the control of Fukien at this time (Chen 2006). The geographical condition and the social milieu rendered Fukien a foreign land with dangerous environment and unfriendly population. As a result, Fukien at the time was an unlikely destination for the northern refugees. In fact, the Eastern Jin regime had not established any immigrant prefectures and counties in Fukien. By their geographical distribution, Xie, Yang, and
Wang (2003) took the exclusion of Fukien as a proof that Fukien did not accommodate, at least, a great amount of refugees after Wuhu Chaos. Without the migration waves taking place, the contemporary historians were unable to establish the relationship between Wuhu Chaos and the regional development of Fukien, which in its due course would lead to the establishment of permanent Han settlement in Qemoy. Xie, Yang and Wang further clarified that the presumed relationship actually originated from a theory of the genesis of Fukien—Eight Clans into Min 八姓入閩—from the book History of Nine Kingdoms 九國志 (2003, 12):

In the second year of Youngjia period [308], the Central Plain was under turbulence. Eight clans of the gentry class—Lin, Huang, Chen, Zhen, Zhan, Qiu, He, Hu—were the first [Han] group entering Min [the ancient name of Fukien before 733]. 永嘉二年，中州板蕩，衣冠始入閩者八族，林、黃、陳、鄭、詹、丘、何、胡是也。 However, Xie, Yang, and Wang (2003) considered that even the theory was fictional, but just so well-known that the latter-day historiographers took the theory for granted. The late discovery of tombs from the Jin Dynasty produced a rebuttal to the prevailing theory. According to the dates on these tombs, Han Chinese had already immigrated to Fukien in a constant and small-scale fashion. The immigration continued throughout the East Jin Dynasty (317-410), and directly contributed to the growth of Han population in Fukien (Chen 2006). These Han immigrants mainly resettled in the areas with preliminary development, i.e. the Min River Basin and the Jin River Delta, where the tombs had been found. The tomb owners ranged over all social tiers, and were not limited to the gentry class, and their family did not necessarily belong to the eight clans mentioned in the theory (Tang 1995; Chen 2006).

Although the theory of immigration was not literally correct, small-scale immigration did coincide with the gradual population growth of Han Chinese in Fukien since the turn of the fourth century. It was also at this time that Han settlers initiatively
entered the southern Fukien, in which their settlements mainly concentrated in the Jin River Delta. Due to the initial phase of development, the allegation, suggesting that a considerable amount of war refugees from the northern China had resettled in a remote and not particularly resourceful island like Quemoy, was hardly convincible. Besides, if Han Chinese first entered Fukien in 308 due to Wuhu chaos, the previous record, indicating the year of 282 as the establishment date of the first Han settlement in Quemoy, would simply be wrong. The establishment of the first Han settlement in Quemoy could not precede the one of Fukien. And if the theory of Fukien genesis was correct, the discrepancy in the immigrated clans, in terms of the eight clans to Fukien versus the six clans to Quemoy, would provoke even more suspicions over the second record of Quemoy genesis.

2.3.3 The Alleged Evidences of Quemoy Genesis

Some of the local historians in Quemoy noticed that the two textual records were at odds with each other, and the discrepancy between them and the theory of Fukien genesis generated even more uncertainties. To consolidate their view, they supplied another lead to complement the two records. In 1955 when the Nationalist troops under bombardment constructed defenses in Quemoy, they excavated a brick from the Xiancuo 贤厝 village (Kuo 2006a). It was described as a rhomb-shape solid with geometrical inscriptions on the narrow sides. One serviceman made a few rubbings of the geometric inscriptions, and sent them in a letter to his father, a museum curator in Taiwan. The curator wrote a review on the brick and dated it between 197-618. The review was then broadly cited in the official history of Quemoy but in a manipulated way that the purposely omitted an incongruent opinion in the quotation (e.g. Huang et al. 2010, 39; Kuo 2006a, 13; Kuo 2006b, 63; Kuo 2007, 353). The review indicated that after the serviceman and his crew
found the first brick, they sequentially discovered similar bricks in the foundations of the folk houses and the surrounding stone hedges. Villagers told the serviceman that these bricks were brought back from the mainland China. Although the curator did not agree with the opinion, he included the local beliefs in his review (Zhuang 1958, 356):

There might be ancient relics underground. The inhabitants’ opinion that these bricks were from the mainland was unnecessarily credible. When a scientific excavation could be carried out, I could assure that the findings, if any, must be significant to the Southeast culture.

When the editors of Quemoy gazetteers extracted this passage, they intentionally omitted the sentence indicating the inhabitants’ opinion, and thus concealed one possible origin of the brick. The manipulation to supply a historic evidence for the Quemoy genesis further problematized the historic discourse. Since the villagers understood that these bricks were foreign objects, the manipulation was then projected for Others outside the social circle of Quemoy. Besides, not only the first brick but also those in the nearby village were missing from Quemoy today. Huang (pers. comm.) speculates that all of them must have been shipped to the curator in Taiwan so that he could examine them closely to make the identification. However, the curator stated in his review that his appraisal was merely based on the rubbings. As a result, this discovery of material evidence concerning the Quemoy genesis is unverifiable.

The problems regarding the three “evidences” of Quemoy genesis can go on and on, if one scrutinizes them even further. However, the bottom line is that no sound evidence sustains the thesis, but also none absolutely denies it. Some historians, Xie, Yang, and Wang (2003), for example, consider that it is rather impossible that Han refugees would travel this far to an island like Quemoy, when they actually can find favorable habitats in the Yangtze River Basin that is much closer to their original settlements. The
establishment of immigrant prefectures and counties in the Yangtze River Basin substantiates this view. Nevertheless, historians also cannot rule out the possibility that sporadic Han immigrants ended up in Quemoy without historical records. The inconclusiveness reveals a void that needs to be filled with new historic and archaeological discovery, without which all claims about Quemoy’s genesis suffer. Consequently, the prehistoric Quemoy may extend, from 1500 BCE, further into a latter period, since the historical time of Quemoy have not begun from 282 or 317.

2.3.4 The Non-Han Populations in Fukien

In recently years, some local historians when discussing the development of Quemoy have mentioned the non-Han ethnicities in Fukien (e.g. Huang et al. 2010; Lee 2005; Luo 2010). The ethnicity that they often mention is Yue 越, which is a term that the ancient Han Chinese commonly used to refer to all the indigenous populations living in the current day southern China. The term has a variation as Hundred Yue 百越 (Meacham 1996). These peoples, as Meacham maintains, inhabited southern China between 1000 BCE-1000 CE.9 In history, the interaction of these indigenous peoples with Han Chinese was limited to their borderland, largely in the Yangtze River Basin. Before the third century BCE, the Han Chinese only acquired general knowledge about places beyond their borders. Without reliable historical records, attempts to define the geographical distribution of each ethnicity of Hundred Yue were often unproductive. As the southern Fukien was located in the hinterland of Hundred Yue, the geographical distance occasioned the epistemological unfamiliarity. A better understanding of the ethnography therein would accompany the Chinese political and military expansion into

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9 Chinese historians usually report a much earlier appearance in the early Shang Dynasty 商代 ca. 1500 BCE (Shi and Xu 2007).
the region. Before the expansion, the early Chinese records provided only dubious
descriptions about the culture of these peoples who shared “common traits such as
tattooing, short cropped hair, fighting abilities, adaptation to water environment”
(Meacham 1996, 94).

The Hundred Yues in Chinese History

As late as the eighth century BCE (the beginning of Spring and Autumn 春秋
Period), Han Chinese had recognized the indigenous people in Fukien as Seven Min 七
閩. The name might stand for the seven tribes paying tribute to kings of the Zhou
Dynasty 周代. In the early fifth century BCE, a group of Hundred Yue in the Yangtze
Delta established the state of Yue, which by that time had grown formidable enough,
letting the coeval Chinese warlords to concede its ruler the title of protector-general 霸
(Brindley 2003, 10). The concession thereby ensured the Yue people a role in Chinese
history. As late as the third century BCE, Min people in Fukien established their first
state—Min Yue 閩越. The powerful state had served as an allied force to Chinese
warlords during the revolution war against the Qin 秦 empire (Chen 2006). After their
involvement in the Chinese political games, trace of Min people (Min Yue) then
consistently appeared in Chinese history. The term “Min Yue” thenceforth stood for the
group of Hundred Yue in Fukien. The term “Hundred Yue” first appeared in Chinese
history and became a general term to name all Southerners on the Chinese mainland.
Even with a general understanding of these peoples, the ancient Chinese knowledge of
them was far too general to meet the current-day standards of ethnography. The
recognition of their ethnicities was mainly a byproduct of the political and military
pursuit for Han Chinese at this time, but nowhere near a systematic understanding of their
culture (Meacham 1996).
The Archeological Cultures of Min Yue in Fukien

Indigenous peoples lived in Fukien long before the Chinese were aware of their presence. Of the Yue “mega-culture,” Min people share common cultural traits with other groups of Hundred Yue, such as “the production of stamped geometric pottery, shouldered stone axe, and stepped adzes” (Meacham 1996, 6). Nevertheless, through analyses of the pottery typologies, decoration patterns, types of pottery stamps, late archaeological studies find this “Geometric Stamped Pottery Culture” in Fukien endemic and distinct (Kuo 2007; Kuo and Liu 2006; Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002). Tanshishan culture is the representative of this “Geometric Stamped Pottery Culture” in Fukien, which culminates in the Chuangpienshan upper strata phase (2200-1500 BCE), and diffuses to Quemoy forming the Pubien phase (2000-1500 BCE) as its variation. Wu (2002), by examining the cultivation tools of Tanshishan culture, concludes that the subsistence pattern of Min people is different from the one of Lungshanoid in the Yangtze Delta, who are famous for their sophisticated wet-rice cultivation, a legacy of Hemudu culture (6000-4000 BCE). Instead, the Min way of life, as shown by shell middens, relies on gathering marine resources and hunting small game, along with primitive horticultural activities (Wu 1997; 2002; Zhong 2005). According to Chen’s (1999) definition, the location of settlements and the subsistence pattern both characterize the Min culture as one of sea nomads. It belongs to Meacham’s category of “Yue Coastal Neolithie”—a term he invented “to highlight these archaeological cultures from those of the Lungshanoid” (1996, 96). The foraging livelihood was the cultural hallmark of sea nomads in the southeast coast of China, and remains to be the most prominent cultural trait of the Min people until 1200 BCE, when the sea nomad culture marched into the Bronze Age.
Chinese archaeologists (Wu 1997; Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002) generally agree that the metalwork is a foreign technology, which along with other cultural traits, such as burial customs of mound tombs, defused to Fukien primarily from the Yangtze River Delta. The cultural diffusion consequently brought a series of dramatic changes and even “Chinese characters” to the Min (Wu 2002). These changes signify the inception of a hybrid culture and the formation of Min Yue ethnicity before the third century BCE. The cultural interaction eventually diminishes the endemic quality of the Min culture (Kuo 2007). The exchange of cultural traits with the Lungshanoid cultures turns into a cultural assimilation or even, as some proposed, Sinicization (Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002). However, the “Sinicization” has not thoroughly completed even now, especially when a boat-dwelling people in the southeast coast of China today are considered as the descendants of the Neolithic sea nomads (Chen 2002; Sopher 1977).

Tan People: The Early Settlers in Quemoy?

Chinese historians consider Tan 蜑 as the descendants of Min Yue (Chen 2006; Fu 2007a; Li 2009; Ouyang 1998; Xu 1997). Informed by the genealogical discussion, two views between historians and archaeologists correspond with each other. Both agree that Min people are the ancestors of the Tan, who maintained the sea nomads’ culture. In history, the Tan originally consisted of the remnants of Min Yue after the annexation of their state by Han Chinese in 110 BCE. They spread all over the southeast coast of China, but mostly were active in the river estuaries and islands in their vicinities. Most of the Tan people spent all their lives aboard boats, while a few had straw huts atop platforms on the river banks. Their livelihood mainly relied on collecting marine resources, and, as Sopher points out, their way of life is distinguishable from the one of Han Chinese (1977, 379-80):
Tan are an aboriginally primitive folk, later much acculturated but still subject to segregation and antipathy on account of their “un-Chinese” origin and “un-Chinese” way of life. One may infer most plausibly that their skill in swimming and diving and their boat-dwelling habit[s] were derived from nomadic strand and riverside collecting and fishing, which, in addition to collecting in the forest margins and mat-working, were their principal economic activities.

Chinese, including assimilated peoples with indigenous origins, historically viewed Tan as uncivilized human animals of a pariah class. The view prevailed especially after the tenth century when population pressure in Fukien emerged. Thereafter, Chinese society customarily imposed unjust measures upon them: Land dwellers prohibited Tan people from owning land and deprived them of their rights to change class. The oppression, in the worst case, could lead to lynching till death, when occasionally land dwellers found Tan in their land. Due to their identical physiology, the land-dwelling people demanded Tan distinguishably mark themselves by following specific dress codes and using distinctive hair styles. The social injustice prevented their cultural fusion with Han Chinese, and consequently preserved their vernacular culture. Accordingly, the distinctness of their culture was partially an outcome of the thousand-year segregation from Chinese civil community.

Due to the apartheid, the quarantined “marooned” communities of the Tan people became asylums for other fugitives banished from the Han Chinese society. Rebels suppressed by imperial forces, a Chinese emperor and his followers exiled by foreign conquerors, and defeated warlords and their troops during the revolutions all had been named as the ancestors of Tan in the history (Chen 1946). Due to their nomadic nature, the Tan society usually lacked organization (Ouyang 1998). However, with inclusion of these military-trained personnel, Tan, benefiting from their familiarity with water activities through everyday life, had grown into formidable maritime powers in specific historic moments since the fourth century, and participated in significant and massive
military operations of anti-governmental activities (Zheng 1999). Historians had reported their alliance with various Chinese forces in naval battles, and their engagement in the pirate activities and the overseas trading activities during peacetime. These records not only accentuated their power outside Chinese control, but also underscored their continuous influence on the coastal Fukien.

Based on the studies of the sea nomads, there is clearly a spatial and temporal continuity to the existence of sea nomads in the coastal region of Fukien since prehistoric times (Table 2.3). These sea nomads, concomitant with the Chinese expansion, have been known by variant names—Seven Min, Min Yue, and Tan. Their archaeological cultural transplantation from the Min River Delta to Quemoy effects their sophisticated seafaring skill. With this cultural trait and nomadic lifestyle, their territory includes most of the coastal region of Fukien since prehistoric time. In the coastal region, the mouths of the Min River and the Jiulong River are the two favorable habitats for sea nomads (Sopher 1977). Quemoy is located at the gateway of Xiamen Bay, one that the Jiulong River flows into, and was settled by the sea nomads in prehistoric time. Although no archaeological and historical evidence demonstrates that any sea nomads were active in Quemoy after the disappearance of Pubien phase, they are the most legitimate candidate for the early settlers in Quemoy before the Han Chinese claimed the island.

According to a Chinese monograph of historical geography—Taiping Huanyu Ji 太平寰宇记—written in the 980s (Wang 2007), when Quemoy was in the area of Zhuhai neighborhood 煮海里 in Tongan county 同安县 (Yang B. 2010), the inhabitants in Quemoy at the time still lived as sea nomads:

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10 Lin (2007) a Quemoy local in his late 40’s in 2010 reported that in his father’s childhood (the antebellum days) Tan people still anchored their boats in the Xiashu port 夏墅港 in the estuary of the Wujiang Creek, when they needed shopping or to repair their boats on shore.
Table 2.3. A Summary of Archaeological and Historic Findings Related to Sea Nomads in Fukien [dates of archaeological sites after Pu-bein phase from: Guo and Wu, 2002]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archaeological Cultures</th>
<th>Time (BP)</th>
<th>Life Pattern</th>
<th>Cultural Trait</th>
<th>Chinese Records</th>
<th>Chinese Dynasty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fukuotun culture</td>
<td>8000-5800</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanshishan culture</td>
<td>5500-4200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hang Di</td>
<td>黃帝</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuangbienshan phase</td>
<td>4200-3500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xia</td>
<td>夏代</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pubien upper phase</td>
<td>4000-3500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Huangtulun culture</td>
<td>3500-3000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yue-Ou</td>
<td>Shang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tieshan culture</td>
<td>3000-2400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seven Min</td>
<td>Zhou</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fulingang culture</td>
<td>2400-2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Min Yue State</td>
<td>Han</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Geometric Stamped Pottery</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Neolithic Age

Bronze Age

Iron Age

Historical Time

Mythological time
The area of Zhuhai neighborhood includes four islands in the sea. A total of four-hundred some households live on these islands. There are no farmlands, and the livelihood of inhabitants relies on fishing and collecting shellfishes. 煮海里，一邊
在海中，有島嶼四所，計四百餘家居焉。無田疇，人以釣魚拾螺為業。

Since the record does not name the ethnicity, the incumbent inhabitants in the record were not necessarily sea nomads. However, there was only a slim chance that Han immigrants from an agricultural civilization had adopted their prehistoric life pattern. In consideration of the impossibility of cultural atavism, I am prone to agree that sea nomads occupied Quemoy at the time. Aside from my speculation, the production pattern of fishing and foraging indicates a primitive condition of land use, meaning that even if Han Chinese had established settlements in or before the late tenth century, these settlements remained insignificant. In a view of cultural evolution, inasmuch as these settlers continued the cultural practice of sea nomads, their legacy persists and their culture endures. The progress of cultural evolution remains at a primitive stage. Under the circumstances, whether or not Han immigrants had established settlements before the late tenth century is irrelevant to the current inhabitants to have any essential significance in cultural formation or historical geography of Quemoy. As such, the prevailing insistence on the genesis of Han settlements in Quemoy around the turn of the forth century is essentially not a disputed issue in the realm of history, but rather a constructive one pertaining to the locals’ identity.

2.3.5 Significance of the Discourse of Quemoy Genesis

The people in Quemoy believe they are the descendants of Huang Di 黃帝, and they consider themselves with “no doubt” as Han Chinese (Huang et al. 2010).\footnote{Huang Di is a mythological sage king in the Neolithic time who Han Chinese believe to be their common ancestor and the founder of Chinese civilization. His tomb in northern China has been worshipped for thousands of years. Although no archaeological relics from the Neolithic time have ever been found in the tomb, Chinese held it as the symbol of Chinese ethnicity. The place is significant to all Han Chinese, even in the absence of scientific confirmation. In contrast, the sea nomad relics in Quemoy are assembled and presented as scientific findings, but the inhabitants in Quemoy find it difficult to relate to themselves.} For them to
be Han Chinese, their ancestors had to be immigrants, because Fukien was originally a
territory of indigenous people outside of Han Chinese domain. As the place defines the
identity of its inhabitants, to establish a Han Chinese lineage, the place, too, had to be
Sinicized as early as possible. Once the place has turned into a Chinese territory,
therefore the successors can “naturally” be Han Chinese. The theory of “Eight Clans
into Min” offers the earliest date of the migration of Han Chinese into Fukien, so it is
indiscriminately adopted in historical gazetteers in Fukien. Besides, since the isolation of
Tan and other indigenous peoples geographically confines the non-Han ethnicities to
certain “marooned reservations” from the Chinese community, “Han” people in Fukien
can therefore proclaim themselves as one of the “purest stock” of the Chinese race. With
the production and the circulation of the knowledge through the gazetteers, prehistoric
sites of indigenous people are treated as the landscape of unrelated, if not unwanted,
Others. Under the circumstances, to relate oneself to the prehistoric Others and their
relics one risks being “un-Chinese” with lineage of inferior ethnicities. An indigenous
origin is therefore an unfavorable stigma that Quemoy people prefer to conceal, while the
Han identity, which enables them to mingle in the Chinese community, is desirable for its
cultural utility. The ethnic construction of a Han origin is a social exhibition for external
audiences in the Chinese community, and the concealment of the villagers’ opinion on
the antique bricks exemplifies such construction regardless of the local knowledge of the
bricks as foreign objects. The constructive practice suggests a strategy that Quemoy
intellectuals employ to negotiate with their fellow “Chinese” for the ethnicity of Quemoy
people, and further to consolidate their Han identity. The continuous use of problematic
historic records and the neglect of prehistoric sites in Quemoy then can be read as the
outcome of Han-centrism working on Quemoy, both the land and its people.
The origin myth of Quemoy enunciates its marginality from the geographical and cultural center of China. The distance from the cultural center and the geographical characteristics of inaccessibility make Fukien a relatively late territory claimed by Han Chinese, in comparison to neighboring areas. As an offshore island in the southern Fukien, removed from its political and cultural center to the north, Quemoy is located on the edge of a marginal Chinese territory. Culturally speaking, the majority of people in the southern Fukien have been largely assimilated and, together with immigrants from the northern China, all have been considered as Han Chinese after the eleventh century. However, driven by the geographical marginality, Quemoy people later are still eager to telescope their perceptual distance to the Chinese cultural hearth. They have restlessly endeavored to demonstrate their “Chineseness” by using available testimonies of their history, genealogy, proficiency in Confucianism, and so on. On the other hand, because of the same marginality, one who resists the Chinese hegemony can also conveniently go behind its boundaries, pursuing enterprises, which Chinese elites deem unconventional and even obnoxious, such as overseas trading or piracy. The geographical marginality therefore sets the cultural motif of Quemoy. Both the practice of resistance and compliance to Chinese conventionality constitute the daily life of Quemoy people living in the outskirts of Chinese civilization. Their “Chineseness” or none are two cards in a hand for them to play when either one is found proper to the situation, although, along with the process of assimilation, their non-Chineseness is embraced and compromised by Han Chinese as a regional sub-culture of “Han” in the southern Fukien.

2.4 Sequent Occupance: Industrial Trials Leaving a Mark

Development of the functioning settlement usually demands specific production modes to secure the economic base. In Quemoy, the first two historical local industries
were both state-owned enterprises supplying national consumption. They were horse
ranches and saltworks. Horses and salt were both important resources for the Chinese
regimes, which traditionally held state monopolizes on the two industries, and usually
would set up specific agencies to administer them.

2.4.1 Horses and Salt Industries in the Pre-modern China

The significance of horses for pre-modern China largely stemmed from their use by
the cavalry. The administration of horse breeding conventionally belonged to the
department of military affairs. The most desirable situation was state pastureland in
northwestern China, where the temperate dry climate created a suitable habitat. Otherwise,
the establishment of official horse pastures elsewhere in China often signified the
nomadic invasion in the northern territories. The establishment of official horse pasture in
Fukien was specifically a remedy for the loss of northwestern pastureland. It was the first
and the most short-lived effort to restore military horse populations. As Yu (2007), Ma
(1984), and Nie (2006) reported, during the latter half of the eighth century, the horse
shortage had forced the Chinese government to repeatedly expropriate private horses for
its military. Even though the condition continued, the imperial providers did not establish
horse ranches until 804, but acquired horses through international trade. The horse
pastures in the central and southern China were often ephemeral due to disappointing
reproduction rates, and the inevitable conflicts between ranching and farming. The horse
pastures in Fukien during the time operated only for a year (804-805), and others did not
last over fifteen years in central and southern China (Nie 2005). As a result, these efforts
failed to remedy the horse shortage. According to the Gazetteer of Quemoy (Ni 2010), the
significance of the ranching enterprise lay in its consequent influence on regional
development. The government, in order to establish horse pastures, invested
infrastructure and manpower. These investments laid a foundation for further development in Quemoy.

Salt on the other hand was an important revenue source for the Chinese regimes; therefore the authorities usually enforced strict control over its production and trade. Although Fukien was one of the regions in China capable of salt-producing, its salt industry in China had never been prominent. According to Wang and Lü (2008), both the scale of salt industry in Fukien and the amount of its production were the smallest among other salt-producing regions in China. In addition, due to Fukien’s geographical inaccessibility, the revenue of its salt industry, restrained by the transportation difficulties, was also the lowest. All these disadvantages made the industry in Fukien less important for the Chinese regimes. However, its insignificance granted the salt industry in Fukien more freedom from the imperial control than others. For example, the salt industry in Fukien was the first to adopt advanced evaporation production methods. Taking advantage of the climate with its high evaporation rate, the evaporation method was an invention and found widespread application in Fukien before modern times. Before 1299, six out of ten saltworks had adopted the advanced method, when salt industries in other provinces mandatorily followed the conventional method of boiling (Tang 1995). Wang and Lü (2008) considered that the adoption allowed the salt industry in Fukien to generate great surpluses, which consequently gave rise to rampant bootlegging activities and impacted official salt marketing in the region. The situation forced the imperial administration to lift its strict control over the salt production and trade, while concentrating on tax collection. Salt trade, freed from the state regulation, became an important economic base of the local society in Fukien. The privatization of the salt trade in Fukien signified a success in the environmental adaptation. In retrospect, the
environmental characteristics of Fukien provided suitable conditions for the people to
discover and to perfect the evaporation method, while the social milieu of marginality
enabled them to promote and to adopt the advanced technology. Taking advantages of
both the natural settings and the social milieu, the locals then constituted a specific way
of life to perpetuate their society.

2.4.2 The Early Horse Industry in Quemoy

The Gazetteer of Quemoy views the establishment of the national horse ranches in
Quemoy as the inception of a functioning and permanent Han settlement in Quemoy. The
local history indicates that the headmen with official appointments led twelve-clan
herdsmen to Quemoy in 804, and they “plan and work together to turn the wildness into a
paradise; whereby inhabitants could farm, fish, and produce salt. Their population thus
gradually increases 協謀並力，化荒墟為樂土，自是耕稼漁鹽，生聚蓋日蕃焉” (Ni 2010,
208). According to the entry, the livelihood of the later generations in Quemoy did not
rely on herding horses. Under such circumstance, the establishment becomes only an
ephemeral incident whose significance apparently lies in its contribution to the change of
Quemoy from “the wildness into a paradise” (Ni 2010, 28). The change set the
cornerstones that enabled the Han people to permanently settle in the island by farming,
fishing, and salt making. However, the entry only presents a partial account. Due to the
problematic timeframe of the horse industry, its influence on the landscape in Quemoy is
taken lightly. In fact, the horse industry existed much longer in Quemoy, and operated
long enough to commence and also to implement the initial stage of landscape formation.

A Proposal for the Timeframe of the Horse-herding Past in Quemoy

In recent years, some historians (ex. Lee 2004b; Lee 2005; Xie, Yang, and Wang
2003) express concerns about the authenticity of the information in the entry. First of all,
the founding date of the horse pasture in Fukien and in Quemoy was the same. The latter might borrow its founding date from the former. National historical records pertaining to the establishment in Fukien do not name the exact locales of the five ranches in Quanzhou prefecture, and thus can not validate the local belief of an official ranch in Quemoy during the years 804-805. The earliest time of the establishment in Quemoy that the national historical records can provide is the early Song Dynasty before 1009 (Yang B. 2010). The records regarding the national horse policy provide some clues to its inaugural date in Quemoy. According to these records, only after 980 did the central government of the Song Dynasty dispatch horses to the local official ranches (Bai 1999). Hence, the establishment of the national horse pasture in Quemoy cannot predate 980. Also, as the historical record in the earlier section has shown, people in Quemoy in the 980s still lived like sea nomads without agricultural activities (Wang 2007). In the case, the entry claiming that inhabitants in Quemoy had been living by farming, fishing, and salt making since 804 is problematic, and it is unlikely, too, that the official ranches existed in Quemoy before 980. According to the national historical records, the inception of the horse herding activities in Quemoy likely happened during the years 980-1009. Besides, in order to have a profound influence on the local development, the animal husbandry industry, practically speaking, should have lasted longer than a year for the herdsmen to “effect a viable, self-perpetuating society” (Zelinsky 1973, 13). If national horse ranches did exist in Quemoy during the years 804-805, its short life cycle likely did not produce an outcome as significant as claimed. As a reasonable speculation, the horse-ranching activities may have existed continuously much longer in another time to bring Quemoy the effects as the common belief has insisted. Therefore, I would propose that the
horse industry in Quemoy began during the period 980-1009 and ended during the years 1068-1085 when the government abolished the official horse pastures.

As the local record indicated, the period during 1068-1085 was also the time when the government first set up a thorough administrative system in Quemoy based on the unit of households (Ni 2010). Such an establishment would inevitably involve a census and a land survey, and proceeded with a land reformation and redistribution for the tax purpose. Meanwhile, the government, after the abolishment of the official horse industry, also released the pastureland to civilians for their farmsteads (Wang 2008). By piecing the information together, the establishment of the administrative system in Quemoy thus closely correlated with the abolishment of horse pasture, and both measures were contingent to land reformation. With this in mind, the national and the local history then agree that the demise of the national horse pastures in Quemoy happened during 1068-1085. After all, by pushing back the time frame, the national horse pasture could be in operation in Quemoy for at least fifty-nine years (1009-1068), which is abundant time for the industry to inscribe tangible influence in the landscape. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss these landscape inscriptions. They served not only as material evidence of the unseen past but also as present keys that unlock the past of the horse industry in Quemoy.

**Landscape Inscriptions of the Horse-herding Past**

The locals commonly believe that a few landmarks in Quemoy today link them with historical horse ranching. These landscapes include a historical shrine and a few toponyms: the Horse-wash Creek 洗馬溪, the Horse-lake village 駟湖村, and Mt. Bean-and-straw 菖藁山 (70m). The most prominent landscape feature of the group is the shrine of the Pasture Lord 牧馬王祠. The shrine contains not only historic
significance but also religious ones because the cult of the patron saint of Quemoy originated here. Places and geographical features with names relating to horse herding activities generally occur in the southwestern Quemoy. The legendary pastureland is geographically defined by the Wujiang Creek on the north, Mt. Fonglian 豐蓮山 (46m) on the west, the sea on the south, and Mt. Breast 雙乳山 (82m) on the east (Chang 1996). As the longest watercourse in Quemoy, the Wujiang Creek flows through the middle of the western half of the island. Its southern tributary is the Horse-wash Creek. Although the river is hardly distinguishable in the landscape today, the locals remember it as where the herdsmen washed and watered their horses. Its course meanders by the foot of Mt. Fonglian on its east, and then turns westward flows into the Wujian Creek. Mt. Fonglian refers to a hilly area surrounded by a ring of five hills, which from a distance look like green petals. The hillocky highland obtains its name that in Chinese literally means “the great water lily.” Because of the protective topography with water source and grassland inside, the leaders of the twelve-clan herdsmen established their headquarters in the heartland of Mt. Fonglian. To the south of the Horse-wash Creek stands the Horse-lake village, whose name is after a lake that no longer exists. As the largest water body near the headquarters, Horse Lake has been an important water source for the herdsmen, who would lead their horses to the lake and water them there. The lake also marks the southwest corner of the legendary pastureland. Mt. Breast is located in the middle of the island; consists of two peaks and the in-between saddle terrace. The saddle area, called Green-mountain Plain 青山坪, is a gentle slope where the herdsmen have built straw sheds as shelters for their horses. On the south of Mt. Breast, ravines and gullies cut into the laterite ground, and form a broken coastal terrace overlooking the sandy beach under the seafront cliff. A highland between two ravines called Mt.
Bean-and-straw is where the herdsmen planted the horse fodder, and marks the southeast corner of the legendary pasture.

Narratives in the folklore about the land use patterns not only explain how these places were associated with the horse industry, but also materialized the horse-herding past of Quemoy with and within these locales. Although the site selection of the pasture facilities may have been arbitrary, their interrelation was logically sound, and the land-use patterns suited the geographical characters of each locale. Of course, chances are that some of these narratives are sheer fictional, coming out from folk memories and their inspirations, but, likewise, it is hard to imagine that folklores and oral histories have forged them all. If the existence of the horse-ranching past in Quemoy is beyond question, the land-use patterns of these locales in the narratives should at least be partially true. The shrine of Pasture Lord as the most prominent memorial of the horse-herding past in Quemoy would best represent the complexity of the interwoven historical imagination and reality. As Woodward (1974) once pointed out, “The twilight zone that lies between living memory and written history is one of the favorite breeding places of mythology. This particular twilight zone has been especially prolific in the breeding of legend” (Hoelscher 2003, 663). The narratives revolving around the shrine constitute the discourse of the Pasture Lord, and consequently blur the horse-herding past in the history.

2.4.3 The Cult of the Pasture Lord in Quemoy

The shrine of the Pasture Lord perches on top of Mt. Fonglian, and overlooks the Anchien village sprawling over on the southern slope below. The northern slope of Mt. Fonglian rises immediately from the estuary of the Wujiang Creek on its southern bank, while the Horse-wash Creek washes by the foothill of the eastern slope. The gentle southern slope of Mt. Fonglian stretches down to valleys and lowlands. With one wing on
the Mt. Fonglain, they each lay the other on the surrounding low hills and mounds in the south. On the mildly undulating land a few villages are scattered. The Anchien village is one of them. It is said to be the locale of the headquarters of the legendary horse pasture, and the shrine is located on the northeastern corner of the village. The shrine and its front plaza nestle on the highest terrace of Mt. Fonglian against the ascending woodland on their back. Although the current structure is a 1843 reconstruction, the shrine, according to a poem written by a hermit, Chiu Kui 丘葵 (1244-1333), should have existed at the location before 1333. The major divinity of the shrine is the legendary leader of the twelve-clan herdsmen, Chen Yuan 陳淵, whom the locals deem as the founder of the island and, with the status, the patron saint of Quemoy. Another village on the undulating land is the Yaojing 藥井 village. It squats in a bottomland between Mt. Fonglian and Mt. Shanqian 山前 (40m) on the west of the Anchien village. The name “Yaojing” comes from a well of medical springs that the Pasture Lord created by wielding his sword thrusting at the ground. With the Guangli 官裡 village on the south and the Dongsha 東沙 village on the southeast, these villages on the undulating land encircle an area, around which the Pasture Lord and his ghost army would occasionally patrol at night in a line of red lanterns (Chang 1996). The patrolled area then marks the geographical core of the Pasture Lord cult, and contains rich folklore and landscape features associating with the deity.

Legends of the Pasture Lord

According to the local historical record, Chen Yuan during his lifetime was known for his marvelous horse herding skill. He led the twelve-clan herdsmen to Quemoy in 804,

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12 In the folklore, Chen Yuan was buried in a place called Turtledove Stone 斑鳩石 on the west of the Guanli village, and for that reason he would lead his army marching down the hill from the shrine of the Pasture Lord to his grave and therefore patrolling the area.
and together they converted the island from a wildness to a horse pasture. Because of the
talent and his contribution to the herdsman community, people made him a god and titled
him as the Protector-general of the Horse 護騮將軍 after his death. The location of the
shrine was said to be his home-office and where people enshrined his body as an idol. He
was said to be the incarnation of Pegasus 天降驟精 in a human form born on earth to be
Ancestor of Horse 馬祖. His death further amplified his miraculous power. In 1417,
testimonial stories about how he repeatedly manifested himself to protect the locals from
manifold misfortune by his supernatural power were well propagated. In these stories, the
Lord summoned rain to relieve drought; repelled locust swarms into the sea; created
spiritual springs to cure diseases; and led a ghost regiment to defeat malicious pirates
(Kuo 2008b). In the last incident, Chen Yuan fought the battle with his two assistant
generals and two other officers during 1335-1340, and their names were then known to
the world. After recognizing his accomplishment in the incident, the government praised
all five of them with noble titles and a full expansion of the shrine. The newly built shrine,
thereafter known as the Fuji Temple 孚濟廟, was a compound with six courtyards, and
the Lord, with his newly granted title, became the Saint Marquis of Protection and
Fortune 福佑聖侯. In addition to the miracles that the Lord had performed to aid the
local people, the local history also included a side episode: A Quemoy girl voluntarily
married to the Lord at a cost of her own death, and by his supernatural power she became
a goddess in charge of pregnancy and childbirth. After the pirate incident, the government
also recognized the marriage, and honored the goddess with a marchioness title.

The Production and Circulation of the Knowledge of the Pasture Lord

Other than folklore and oral history, knowledge of Chen Yuan in text largely comes
from the inscriptions on the stone tablets or wood planks in the shrine. The earliest one
among these is a stone tablet engraved with an essay written in 1417 by a serviceman stationed in Quemoy. However, without mentioning his sources of the mythological narratives, the essay is likely a faithful record of folklores and oral histories. Information in other inscriptions from the time basically confirms the original story yet adds records of subsequent events. The only record showing recognizable discrepancies is an essay in *History of Yangzhai* 阳翟誌 cited in the book *Canghai jiyi* 滄海紀遺 published in 1568. The record indicates a different background of Chen Yuan as a figure born in the central China (in the current Gushi 固始 County, Henan Province) during the period of the Five Dynasties (907-979). In addition, both his two assistant generals in the battle with pirates are replaced with famous historical military figures, and also the battle was postponed to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Notwithstanding, the following essay on the subject, written by Lu Ruo-Tong 卢若騰 in commemoration of another reconstruction of the shrine in 1661, refutes all the incongruent sayings in the previous record, and supports the earliest version of the story. The essay then sets the tone for the story, and the discourse about Chen Yuan has never been challenged again until recent years.

**A Discussion on the Discourse of the Pasture Lord**

In the discourse, a change of the divinity from a deity of horse husbandry to the genius loci of Quemoy may be discernible. The first two titles of Chen Yuan—Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse—are actually borrowed from the deity of horse husbandry whom the Chinese authorities pray in the spring for horse reproduction. Of the ancient Chinese belief, both Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse are ultimately the animal embodiment of the Chinese constellation of *Room* 房宿 on Earth (Ma 1983). The deity hence stems from the animistic cult system of natural gods (Deng 2006). In the history, a set of Confucian rituals, prescribed and practiced since the Zhou Dynasty (700-256 BCE), first mention
the divine trinity of horse husbandry (Ma 1983). Four ceremonies in the four seasons for
the deities of horse husbandry produce explicit instructions, and certain ranch works are
contingent to each ceremony.13 These ceremonies reflect instructions defining specific
timing for certain ranch works, through which the knowledge of the four deities circulates
among commoners. Over time, the rituals, in spite of a few modifications and
amendments, have been continuously held until modern times. The deities of horse
husbandry are literally supported by the state power, and are commonly worshipped by
administrators in charge of horse affairs. Even though no historical records show that
these rituals have been performed in the national pasture in Quemoy, they were the only
legitimate rituals that a governmental facility could perform to pray for the success in
horse husbandry in the Middle ages. With the connection to Pegasus and Ancestor of
Horse, Chen Yuan is either an indigenized variation of the Confucian deities in a later
time, or a deity of popular religion influenced by the legitimate official cult from the
beginning. In either case, the discourse of the horse-guarding god in Quemoy owes its
originality to Confucianism. In the discourse of the Pasture Lord, his first honor title “the
Protector-general of Horse” should have clearly pronounced him as a deity of horse
husbandry. In addition, all the miracles that Chen Yuan, the human incarnation of the
Pasture Lord, has performed before death are limited to the trade of horse husbandry. The
specialization should have spoken for the nature of his divinity.

Notwithstanding, after the narrative account detailed Chen Yuan’s death, the
divinity of the Pasture Lord began to change. The change most obviously appeared in his
disaster relief deeds. The Pasture Lord turned from the horse-guarding deity into a deity

13 The instructions in the ranch works include: After the spring ceremony, the herdsmen should put colts
under two years old away from females. Geld horses after the summer ceremony, so it will be tame. Prepare
horses and riders after the fall ceremony. Train coachmen and present horses to the King after the winter
ceremony (Ma 1983).
of the place, and protected the local people instead of the pasture horses from misfortune. The pirate incident marked the watershed of the conversion, after which the Pasture Lord received secular recognitions with a noble title and a temple as instruments to spread the cult. As the poem showed, when the hermit visited the shrine of the horse-guarding god before 1333, he still addressed the deity as the Protector-general of the Horse, in spite of his knowledge of the posthumous marriage. It was then clear that the divinity of horse guardian persisted, but the cult might have barely survived. After the national horse ranch had been long abolished, the hermit described the settings of the shrine as a straw hut in the deep woods with mosses on old stone tablets. On the other hand, given the marriage as a way to bring the deity into the local community, the conversion of the divinity to the genius loci should have already been launched, but not yet completed. The completion came by the governmental recognition after the alleged pirate incident during 1335-1340. In 1417, the inscriptions on the tablet had already included all the testimonial stories and therefore all the secularity had been imposed upon the deity. It was also by then that the human name of the deity—Chen Yuan—first showed in the historical records. By 1568, the cult of Chen Yuan should have spread out from its core area, and therefore people in the Yangzhai village in the eastern half of Quemoy known about the deity. However, their knowledge of the Pasture Lord was different from those in the core area. The nuances of understanding should come from the method of the circulation of his legends, which travelled from one narrator to another, and resulted in the discrepancies shown in the second essay. More importantly, the discrepancies revealed that the discourse of Chen Yuan was founded on collective improvisation instead of historical facts. In 1661, the discrepant understandings of the Lord had been all united, so Lu in his essay asserted, “according to the clear evidences in the past gazetteers, one should have no doubt that the
deity is a figure in the Tang Dynasty 郡邑舊志，皆謂神唐時人，證據甚析，無可疑也” (Hung et al. 2010, 176). The unification of the discourse in the scholarly field thus turned the religious discourse of Chen Yuan into a taken-for-granted historical fact.

In fact, without the figure “Chen Yuan,” the discourse of the Pasture Lord can be separated into two sound stories, one of the horse-guarding god and the other of the patron saint of Quemoy. In light of this, Chen Yuan actually functions in the discourse as a human medium to connect the two narratives into a whole. Furthermore, the discourse also uses Chen Yuan as a human agent to act and therefore to bring forth the connection between him and the Confucian deities of horse husbandry. By performing marvels in the art of herding horses, Chen Yuan establishes his divinity as a horse-guarding god, and earns the titles of Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse, which connect Chen Yuan to the Confucian deity of horse husbandry. The purpose of establishing the connection is the same with the purpose of endowing him a social identity as an official representative. They both aim to provide the Pasture Lord with a legitimate and orthodox origin. In that sense, Chen Yuan likely starts out as a deity of popular religion influenced by Confucianism. Moreover, through his posthumous marriage, the discourse also connects the Pasture Lord to the Quemoy community. As the connection to the Confucian deity legitimates him to assume the status of the horse-guarding god, likewise the posthumous marriage facilitates Chen Yuan to inaugurate the status of the patron saint of Quemoy, not to mention the co-deification of a local woman. In summary, without Chen Yuan as the hinge, the discourse of the Pasture Lord will fall apart into two portions of individual stories. Although the hinges are critical to the discourse as a whole, they are appendixes to each of the stories. For them both, the role of Chen Yuan can either be acted by the
same super being or different ones, and the change will not affect the soundness of each story. Chen Yuan is therefore a replaceable trope in the discourse.

As mentioned previously, the knowledge of Chen Yuan ultimately stems from folklore and oral history, so both Chen Yuan and his belongings are mythical. No historic records can substantiate the existence of Chen Yuan during his supposed lifetime, and even his name is a violation of the naming taboo in the Tang Dynasty (Lee 2004b; Lee 2005). The discrepancies of his birth place and date disclose an improvisational dimension of the discourse. Both the inconsistent facts are subject to his background in the story, depending on the narrators and their intersubjective understandings. Neither Chen Yuan, his subordinates, nor the twelve-clan herdsmen left any descendants, so, too, genealogies cannot provide any of their information (Huang et al. 2010). In the end, no concrete facts can be linked to Chen Yuan, and he is more realistic as a god than a man. However, the mythical existence of Chen Yuan and his legendary story recorded in text in 1417 are used as historical evidence to prove the establishment of the first effective settlement in Quemoy in 804. The abuse of the religious discourse turns itself into a carnival mirror reflecting a distorted image of the past.

Although the theory of the first effective settlement in the Tang Dynasty originated from the misusage of the religious discourse, the landscape and the cult of the Pasture Lord both substantiated a horse-herding past of Quemoy. The cult may coexist with the national horse ranches in operation, which in Quemoy stretched approximately from the late tenth century to the late eleventh century. During the time, the agricultural population in Quemoy increased. Therefore, after the abolishment of the national horse pasture, the government redistributed arable land to civilians and established the administrative units in Quemoy for tax purposes. The population growth provided a congregation for the cult,
and turned the deity of a single trade into one protecting the locals with various occupations. Evaluated by these social conditions, the landscape evolution in Quemoy should have entered the peopling stage at this point. The beginning of the horse-herding activities in Quemoy then marked the establishment of the first effective settlement, which should have happened during the years 980-1009, a much later time than the conventionally proposed beginning of the peopling stage.

By the distribution of the national horse pasture, two inferences of the horse-herding past in Quemoy could be made. Since ranching activities inevitably conflicted with farming, an ideal site of national horse pasture would be locations away from the developed agricultural areas. In a larger scale, the site selection of an offshore island like Quemoy in a remote territory like Fukien for national pasture congruently followed this logic. In other words, when the horse pasture was first established in Quemoy, its development should have remained primeval and the population of the colony did not require intensive agriculture to sustain itself. The historical record about the livelihood in Quemoy in the 980s also confirmed the underdeveloped condition. Second, the concentration of horse pasture in the southwestern Quemoy also implied that the area was less developed than other parts of the island, where other ways of life might coexist with the ranching activity. According to Huang (2010), pioneers in Quemoy inaugurated the salt industry in the early tenth century, and saltworks largely concentrated in northeastern Quemoy. Although Huang might predate the salt industry in Quemoy, the coexistence indeed explained why the ranching activity was exclusively confined to the southwestern area. Concomitant with the development of Quemoy, the population pressure and the demand of food gradually promoted agriculture. Arable land turned to the use of food supply, and forced the demise of horse ranches. After the abolishment of national horse
ranches, the southwestern Quemoy simply became an agricultural area. By contrast, the northeast, due to its propinquity to Quanzhou city and the prosperity brought by the salt industry, was the entrepôt and the political center of Quemoy before the late fourteenth century. Even though the local center of Quemoy shifted to the southwest after the walled city was completed in 1386, the salt industry in the northeast intermittently remained in operation till 1995. The industry led the local society marching forward to the environmental adaptation stage, and further provided the locals an economic base to usher in the landscape impress stage.

2.4.4 The Salt Industry in Quemoy

The northeastern Quemoy commonly refers to the area on the north of Mt. Taiwu (Figure 2.2), consisting of the coastal plain and the low hills. It is roughly in a triangular shape with its two sides on the seafront and the other on the foot of Mt. Taiwu. The Jinsha Creek flows straight through the middle of the triangle, and generally separates the coastal plain on its west and the hilly area on its east. Along the curvy north coastline, pairs of rocky headlands projecting out form beaches bracket several bays, in which the silty clay seabed and muddy flats with a gradual descending slope create a suitable environment for land reclamation. Among these bays, the estuary of the Jinsha Creek is the most characteristic. Mt. Jingui (金龜山) (53m) on the rim of the estuary divides it into two coves in a shape of a tilted “3.” The Jinsha Creek flows into the southern cove, and via its channel, saltwater can intrude deep inland into the coastal plain due to the great tidal range (of which the greatest value of the mean range of tide reaches 6.4m). The intertidal flats in the open areas along the riverbanks therefore are capable of producing salt without direct impact of tidal waves.
Settlers in Quemoy have utilized the vast intertidal zone along the estuary and the riverbank in various ways. The sea nomads in the Jinguishan site and the Pubian site heavily relied on fishing and foraging marine resources in the intertidal zone for their livelihood. Historically, the earliest utilization of the intertidal zone was similar to the dike-and-polder farming. Immigrants in the latter half of the twelfth century brought the farming method to Quemoy from Quanzhou, where a movement to construct irrigation systems arose to cope with the population explosion. Because commoners could not afford the construction of dikes, sluices, and irrigation channels, such developments were often undertaken by the regional elite families with capital and manpower to establish new colonies. Some development involved in encircling a tidal land with stone walls and channeling fresh water into the prospective fields to ameliorate the soil and to wash away the salty sediment. The reclamation ground usually turned into rice paddies, while the lower land subject to intermittent tidal floods and land without accesses to fresh water could be sites for salterns and shellfishes aquafarms. However, these polders required constant maintenance against coastal erosion; besides, storm surges and torrents forced repeated re-construction of dikes and levees. Maintaining agricultural use of the intertidal zone was actually a painstaking and costly job for regular farmers and land owners. A commemorative essay for reconstruction of flooded polders disclosed the fragility of polder farming in the sixteenth century in the coastal Fukien (Zheng 2009, 53):

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14 Huang (2010), according to the records in the genealogy of the Chen clan in Yanzhai, proposed that the founder of the clan introduced salt industry into Quemoy from Tong-an in 913. Yang (2010) agreed on the opinion, and further proposed that the industry should end during 1128-1162 because of a social turbulence aroused by roving rebels at the time. With clarification of the duration, he then proceed to hypothesize that the abandonment of the saltworks in the first half of the twelfth century should occasion the development of polder farming in Quemoy in the latter half of the twelfth century. However, their views of the beginning of slat industry in Quemoy may require further historical research to substantiate in the future. Adhering to the official history, this study takes 1297 as the inaugural year of the salt industry.
Turbulent torrents [destroyed levees and] deluged polders into desolations. . . . [The
reconstruction] took three years and amounted to a thousand gold. . . . Over time,
floods breached levees again, and recurred after every reconstruction, which was
eventually efforts in vain but only cost toil. 溪水横溢，决為煙莽 . . . 三年始成，
計費千金矣 . . . 歲久復决，屡築屡壞，訖無成勞。
The costly nature of polder farming did not deter farmers and landowners from
undertaking the development because of scarcity of arable land in the coastal Fukien and
its goodly yield that “could reach ten times more than regular farming 其稼收比常田利
可十倍” (Wang 2002, 140). However, the plantation economy in Quemoy based on
venture investment of foreign capital eventually declined when social turmoil aroused by
the Mongol invasion disturbed the economy of the planters’ society.

After the Mongol government established the national saltworks in 1297, workers in
order to adopt the evaporation method of salt production then repaired abandoned and
damaged polders as salterns. With state support, salt making gradually prevailed and
became the dominant land use in the intertidal zone. Nonetheless, coastal fishing and
polder farming continuously endured through time, but diminished to minor and
supplementary economic activities in this area. The variant and coexisting land-use
patterns in the intertidal zone demonstrated, on top of a geographic palimpsest of the
traces of economic activities, also a “dynamic cultural landscape mosaic that reflect how
people and their environment have co-evolved” (Clark and Tsai 2002, 427).

The co-evolution in Quemoy between landscape and human society brings forth two
facts: (1) The land-use diversity is a result of environmental adaptation, when immigrants
with different cultural baggage experimented their traditional ways of life in the colony to
determine the fittest adaptation. However, the effectiveness of a livelihood changes along
with the socioeconomic development, and over time the definition of the fittest adaptation
may change and therefore it is dynamic in different milieus. Polder farming of rice
paddies once indicated the fittest utilization of reclaimed ground, when the immigrants had managed the construction technology of irrigation systems. The population explosion in the mainland also prompted the development due to a great demand of staple crops. However, concomitant with the change of the socioeconomic development, the demand of rice diminished before the salt industry prevailed in Quemoy. The Mongol invasion between the Song and the Yuan dynasty decreased the population in the region, and the establishment of the Mongol regime of the Yuan dynasty brought a shift of the ruling and upper class. In this sense, salt production, strictly speaking, did not replace polder farming to be the dominant land-use pattern; it just prospered with a cultural milieu that favored this utilization. The state support manifested such a cultural advantage.

As the Vidalian possibilists proposed, “the physical environment was regarded . . . as a factor that sets limits on the range of possible human options in an environment,” and probablists added, “the various possibilities have varying probabilities of occurrence” (Norton 2000, 53-4). Salt production, polder farming, and aquaculture are all possible human options in the intertidal zone in the northeast Quemoy, but each stands with different probabilities to thrive in distinct milieus. For the salt industry in Quemoy, the relics of polders, repaired and then reused as salterns, indeed increased the probabilities of occurrence for the salt industry as the successor of polder farming. Thereafter, salt production remained as the major land-use pattern in the northeast coast in Quemoy despite the change of socioeconomic conditions until the 1840s. Notwithstanding, its persistence can merely result from a lack of other options of land utilization, rather than from an absolute economic supremacy of the industry. The environmental adaptation highlights the importance of the environment in human activities, while the evolutionary
trajectory points out culture as the determinant for landscape changes. The mosaic landscape in the saltern country then manifests co-evolution of nature and culture.

(2) The polyculture of the intertidal zone suggests the failure of a single occupation in supporting the commoners’ economic requirements, and demonstrates the shift of the major struggle from subsistence to commerce. A single livelihood oftentimes did not suffice for commoners’ economic needs due to the scarcity of natural resources. Settlers in coastal Quemoy could not but pursue multiple livelihoods, as a Quemoy proverb portrayed, “Live by farms when sun rises, by aquafarms when rain falls, and by salterns when sun scorches 日出食田坵，落雨食海坵，日炎食鹽坵” (Chen 2003, 79). Even though salt production was a comparatively profitable mode of land utilization, the industry did not benefit the majority of the population in the saltern country. After being exploited by tax collectors, administrators, and merchants (who in fact were reluctant to purchase salt from the island due to its inferior quality and the extra cost of shipment), immigrant workers often had to live by supplementary employment. Due to stagnant conditions, the government revoked the prohibition against the private salt trade in 1443. However, for common workers who traded through brokers, the revocation was not much help.

The profits of the salt trade, if any more than a minuscule amount, accumulated within the bureaucracy and the gentry. Lee proposed, “Perhaps due to the small-scale production, I had never learnt anyone in Quemoy got rich by the salt trade 可能是鹽場規模不大之故，所以未聞浯洲人因販鹽而致富者” (2004b, 42). On the contrary, Huang proposed, “the salt industry must have a great significance to the economy of Quemoy at the time 鹽業對當時金門經濟的助益，必然佔有很重要的地位” (2010, 13). Huang’s assertion derived from a census of the scholar-bureaucrats born in Quemoy. He found
that more than two third of these scholars were from the saltern country. Based on the
discovery, he argued, it was the surplus of salt trade that enabled the locals to invest in
education. Whereby their young could receive high education and subsequently pass the
imperial examination, becoming scholar-bureaucrats and literati. The incongruence
between the two views on the salt industry actually has roots in the proposition about the
major source of prosperity in the Quemoy society. Huang obviously attributes economic
gain to the salt trade, while Lee inclines toward overseas trade. On account of Huang’s
view, the monetary capital out of salt trade turned, through education, into human capital
which reciprocally contributed to the governmental personnel. The capital accumulation
and transition detained the authority within the gentry group and re-produced the
institutionalized economic inequality. Consequently, the uneven distribution of wealth
thus aroused social struggles.

During the peopling stage, population in Quemoy increased dramatically. Since the
late tenth century, the population grew at least forty times and amounted to 20,000 people
in a hundred years (Lee 2004b). In the 1560s, the estimate of population was
approximately 70,000-80,000, indicating the population increased more than a hundred
times in six-hundred years (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003). The population growth mainly
resulted from immigration from nearby developed areas in the mainland. The reclamation
of the intertidal land by the elite families in Quanzhou was an example of such
immigration. The population explosion produced a significant impact on the landscape,
and overdevelopment of land through deforestation subsequently caused desertification
and depleted insufficient water resources. After the latter half of the sixteenth century, the
deterioration of land consequently reduced the human options for land utilization, and
encouraged employment in a narrow range of activities that were less affected by the
environmental degradation. Salt production, fishing, and trade under the circumstances became even more significant, and accordingly emerged as the crucial economic support for the local society. The significance of the salt industry engendered from the co-evolution of ecosystem and social system marked the completion of environmental adaptation because the social stratification and the economic inequality, which the industry sustained, changed the location of the major struggle from economy to society. As such, even though people in Quemoy in the following ages did not stop adopting other ways of life and other land use patterns, their central problem of life had shifted. The problem was less about how to obtain wealth than about how to fight the wealthy class reproducing social inequalities.

Before the late fourteenth century, immigrants mainly settled in the northeast Quemoy because of its proximity to the developed areas with excessive population in the mainland and its natural setting with the estuary as a natural harbor for immigrants arriving by sea. After the imperial government established the national saltworks, its office, as the highest administrative organ in Quemoy, was situated in northeast Quemoy. With the population concentration and the administrative office, northeast Quemoy served as the first economic and political center of Quemoy for ninety years until the erection of the walled city in the southwest Quemoy. In 1387, the imperial government of the Ming Dynasty ordered the construction of a walled city named Quemoy as a part of the national coastal defense network in order to stop armed harassment by pirates. The military measure officially changed the orientation of Quemoy from looking up at the mainland to overlooking the ocean, and incurred a shift of the identity of Quemoy from an insular colony to an imperial gateway. Meanwhile, the habitat destruction and resource scarcity caused by overpopulation motivated settlers in the eastern half of Quemoy
relocating themselves to the west. The area of population concentration gradually moved to the southwest, as did the commercial center of Quemoy. Together, these socioeconomic changes then switched Quemoy’s front and rear, left and right, and constituted the first reversal of the situation (coordinate system) of Quemoy.

In general, the economic development in Quemoy generally followed the mercantile model of urban development in the Latin America conceived by Sargent (2005; Figure 2.5). Nonetheless, some aspects of Quemoy’s development are incongruent with the model, and the discrepancy underlined the exact characteristics of Quemoy. The development of Quemoy has gone through the first exploration stage in which Han Chinese attained knowledge of Quemoy and the indigenous population theren. The establishment of the national horse pasture lifted the curtain of the initial settlement stage, in which the colonial power, in this case the Chinese Empire, founded permanent settlements with the major objective to exploit the natural resources in the colony. The exploitation shows in two aspects of the horse industry: its objective for exportation and its incompatibility with the subtropical environment.

In comparison with the transplanted horse industry, the development of wet-rice cultivation and polder farming denotes a better adaptation to the environment. However, the plantation economy established by the prestigious families from the mainland still emanates a colonial overture. After all, both horses and rice were essentially agricultural commodities demanded by the market of the mother country. By contrast, the development of saltworks displays a breakthrough from the cycle of colonial economy when the profit from salt trade created a gentry class in Quemoy. The formation of a stratified society connotes the establishment of an internal economic network enabling
Figure 2.5. Sargent’s Adaption of Vance’s Mercantile Model. The model discerns four evolutionary stages of the economic/urban development in Latin America. Although the development in Quemoy generally conforms to the model in its early stages, the last stage does not occur.

[Source: Sargent 2005]
capital accumulation \textit{in situ} and retaining the industrial gains within. The network is a direct result of population growth and establishment of new settlements. In the case of Quemoy, the establishment of saltworks expanded the areas of economic activities from the coastal fishery and the estuarine polder farming to the foot of Mt. Taiwu. In addition, the recruitment of immigrant workers, who founded new settlements in the vicinities of their salterns, also contributed to completion of the network. The development of salt industry therefore exemplifies the stage of \textit{expansion of the network}.

Up to this point, the evolutionary progress of the economic development in Quemoy, in spite of a few nuances, basically conforms to Sargent’s model, however, of which the last stage, \textit{infilling the network}, did not happen in the successive time in Quemoy. The reversal of its geographical situation (coordinate system) prevented the development of this final stage. The shift of the political and economic centers inevitably interrupted the evolutionary progress of the economic/urban network, and consequently spurred its mutation. Whereas Sargent (2005) and Vance (1970) conceived their mercantile models by the empirical data from continents, their inconsistency in the latter stage with the phenomena in Quemoy is not surprising. The “islandness” of Quemoy has absolute effect on its landscape evolution, and the susceptibility of Quemoy to changes—from inside: the environmental degradation, from outside: the state policies, and from the border-crossing: the population explosion—also exemplifies the geographical characteristic of islandness.\textsuperscript{15}

As an offshore islet, Quemoy was not immune to the political and socioeconomic influence of the mainland society. Significant changes in the national scale brought

\textsuperscript{15} For a summary of the current geographical discussions on islands, islandness, and insularity, please refer to the special issues of \textit{Geographical Review} 97(2) and \textit{Cultural Geographies} 20 (2) on islands.
cataclysmic impacts to the insular society. Examples abound, and one is that the refugees escaping nomad invasions resulted in the population explosion and subsequent environmental degradation in Quemoy. Sometimes, even only in the provincial scale, trends and policies can significantly influence the island landscape, and about that, the establishment of horse pastures and the construction movement of irrigation systems provided pertinent demonstrations. Due to the social and the environmental sensitivity, landscape in a small island, compared with those in the mainland, is relatively capricious. The mutability is less perceptible during the initial stage of development due to the long-lasting primordial land-use patterns and the insignificant economic activities of the agro-pastoral life. It often requires further maturity of the socioeconomic system and the magnitude of changes in the colony to overtly reveal the characteristic. In the process of environmental adaptation, the development of the salt industry delivered a social maturity by the formulation of an economic/urban network and class stratification. Against the social condition, the reversal of the coordinate system, as a result of military, political fulfillment, inducing a sharp change in the landscape pertinently exposes the mutability of Quemoy. The shifting landscape thus discloses the susceptibility of a small island.

2.5 Landscape Impress: Hammering a Nail along the Imperial Edge

Pirates had long been a thorny issue in South Fukien where the society thrived on overseas trade. Whereas armed mercantile fleets pursuing overseas trade were simultaneously capable of piracy, pirates and merchants were actually two permutable identities for sailors in the sixteenth century (Office of Historiography 1990; Lee 2004a; Zheng 1999). Mercantile pirates had been active in the vicinity of Quemoy since the thirteenth century. However, no historical documentation indicates islanders in Quemoy were involved in any pirating or overseas trading activities until the sixteenth century.
Nonetheless Quemoy people had randomly suffered from pirate raids since the mid-fourteenth century, as the inscription regarding the sanctification of Chen Yuan showed. Before the construction of the walled city in 1387, piratical pillage in Quemoy happened only once. In other words, the islanders were, for the most part, passively implicated in the conflicts between the imperial forces and the maritime powers when the imperial government first established the coastal defense network in the late fourteenth century. The design of the walled city was thus more to guard the mainland than the border island.

The movement of walled city construction in Fukien as the embodiment of the state policy of coastal defense consolidated the governmental control and its authority over the seaboard region of Fukien (Xu 1999). The walled city in Quemoy, as the centerpiece of the defense network of the island, was also an emblem of the state hegemony. In addition to the walled city, the imperial government constructed four citadels on the southern and the eastern coast of Quemoy, and in-between the city and citadels distributed six encampments, beacons towers, and a navy base. In all these military facilities, the government stationed 1,800 soldiers. In a conservative estimate, the garrisons and their dependants in the walled city amounted to at least 4,000 people (Jiang 2003). By this calculation, the population in Quemoy increased to a total of at least 5,000 people, including soldiers and their families in the four citadels. These new immigrants, coupled with workers in the state saltworks, accounted for a great proportion of the local population. The population boost of the governmental personnel suggested an emerging hegemony that empire could exert over the everyday life of the islanders, in addition to the military control and regular civil administration. Having Quemoy exposed to the national impact, the fulfillment of the defense policy inducted cultural uniformity that
gradually formed through the shared life experience among inhabitants in the imperial outpost. By the master plan of military deployment, islanders come to conceptualize Quemoy as a whole instead of separate neighborhoods or individual villages. It is based on the shared living condition and the holistic perception that islanders first developed an identity with Quemoy (Kuo 2006b).

Through the implementation of the coastal defense network, imperial authorities arbitrarily imposed two divided social categories upon the inhabitants in the coastal Fukien: They were either imperial subjects or malicious outlaws (Chen 2010). The great divide reposed geographically on the imperial defense line. People outside the line were pirates whereas people inside were obedient subjects. Coinciding with the construction of defenses on the seaboard, the authorities simultaneously evacuated inhabitants in the islands along the Fukien coast to isolate the maritime powers. According to the strategy of eviction, one who escaped from the eviction and whom the government left behind after the relocation deadline became “pirates” indiscriminately (Wang 2008). In addition to control of place, imperial powers deprived the locals of their own identities. To enforce the imperial demarcation, the empire required a large army guarding the military facilities on its seafront border. For this purpose, the government conscribed a large number of involuntary civilians, and a portion of the evacuated residents received immediate assignments to serve in garrisons on the military outposts. The rest of the inhabitants, following the governmental instructions, resettled in new towns on the seaboard as reserves for military levies. Serving at garrisons in the borderland was a form of banishment in the pre-modern China, and military service was mandatory for all the male descendants of borderland soldiers. Based on a coeval Jesuits missioner’s observations, lives of these soldiers resembled that of a pariah class (Ricci 1953, 89-90):
There probably is no class of people in the country [China in the sixteenth century] as degraded and as lazy as soldiers. Everyone under arms necessarily leads a miserable life because he is following his calling . . . solely as a subject laboring for an employer. The greater part of the army are bondmen to the crown, and serve in slavery either for their own crimes or for those of their ancestors. When they are not actually engaged in military activities they are assigned to the lowest menial employments . . . .

Conscription accordingly was a form of punishment. According to the imperial definition, the soldiers in the coastal defenses in the Southeast China were supposedly criminals. They consisted of the inhabitants in the seabords and coastal islands, boat-dwelling sea nomads (largely Tan), and seamen serving in the former warlords’ navies. The empire conscribed these people because they lived outside or along the defense line. In this situation, the empire punished these people merely for the geographical locations of their settlements. The rationale for relocation as punishment was that empire considered that these people were, or potentially would be, accomplices of the maritime Others. Wang pointed out that the governmental purpose of the conscription was “to finalize further troubles in the future and to make use of them [as the imperial forces] 以絕後患，且得其用” (2008, 59). The authorities employed conscription as a complementary measure to their defense strategy. The line drawn by the ruling class realized the dichotomy which was instrumental in drawing distinctions between subjects of empire and malicious pirates. The geopolitical borderline thereby works on the local society, and constituted social segregation. The imperial dichotomy arbitrarily created two domains and a social group of Others. In fact, the dichotomy resembled much in the nationalist/communist one that the Chinese nationalist established in Quemoy after 1949. The imposition brought both a great impact on the local culture and on the daily life of the local civilians.

Quemoy as a military outpost of empire was ostensibly a land of obedient subjects. Social identity has a profound effect on the culture of Quemoy. Living on a borderland,
the islanders in Quemoy had been under constant suspicion of involvement in overseas trade and piracy. To offset that impression, Quemoy people “endeavored to mold an image of local culture congruent to the social institutions that empire expected 努力型塑符合朝廷礼治的地方文化形象” (Chen 2010, 83). The image articulated the locals’ submission to the imperial social institution and power relations, especially those between empire and Others. The most frequently employed demonstrations were the accomplishments of the scholar-bureaucrats and the literati from Quemoy. Their achievements signified the local political and cultural submission to the empire. Through imperial examinations, the local gentry attained the status of scholar-bureaucrats whose service for empire implemented the imperial will in the local regions, and became proof of the Quemoy locals’ support to the imperial political and social institution. The local literati’s proficiency at Chinese high culture and Confucianism, on the other hand, served as the manifestation of the locals’ conformity to the imperial cultural and moral canons. Although the institution of the upper class in Quemoy ultimately sustained the socioeconomic inequality, the locals have considered the social production of these scholar-officials as an exceptional achievement of their insular community. These historic figures were undoubtedly the cultural and social capital of Quemoy, and their historic significance should partially originate from their social utility as bargaining chips in the identity negotiation with empire. The material culture remains in relation to them were therefore the early landscape impress central to the identity of Quemoy.

To adapt to the social category of obedient subjects, the islanders also “normalize and interpret their everyday life according to the imperial ideologies and social institution 按照国家的典章制度与意识型态来规范和解释自己的日常生活” (Chen 2010, 83). They interpreted their everyday life to demonstrate their socio-political correctness and
affiliation, and by the interpretation appropriated and justified incoherent conduct.

Together with the overt statements of the local obedience, the normalization carried out a tacit proposition, by which the locals implicitly rebutted the common suspicion about their conspiracy with pirates. It was central for them to claim by the compilation that they, at large, did not engage in overseas trading that empire deemed as a crime and therefore a cultural practice of Others. As such, the cultural image of an imperial frontier community embedded in the text of the local history, and resulted in a dominant representation of Quemoy. The elaborately constituted local knowledge thereby engaged itself in the creation of a “discourse,” which as Foucault defined (Weedon 1987, 108), refers to:

ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the ‘nature’ of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.

By adopting the imperial view, the Quemoy residents’ discourse attached meanings to local affairs, and convinced other imperial subjects of their affinity to the empire. More importantly, it communicated explicitly who they were and implicitly who they were not, according to the imperial dichotomy. Whereas the collective constitution of the discourse first emerged as a cultural strategy to negotiate with the imperial others about the locals’ identity, over time the discourse conversely overrode these people. The identity of Quemoy and its residents that the border society strategically conceived to sustain itself due to the imperial maritime policies, in turn, overwhelmed the locals, who thus consciously and unconsciously affiliated themselves to the empire. Subsequently, the latter generations living in the different milieus took and have taken the cultural identity of obedient imperial subjects for granted. The social strategy thus excises critical effects on the constitution of local subjectivity and the cultural identity.
From the scheme of local historical knowledge, it should be now comprehensible why Huang (2010) proposed that Quemoy’s wealth, which contributed to the social stratification, derived from the salt trade instead of overseas trade as Lee (2004b) suggested. Lee pointed out that the salt industry in Quemoy was on the verge of bankruptcy in the 1540s (Lee 2004b, 42; Yang B. 2010, 379):

Because of the difficulties of overseas transportation and the inferiority of salt, merchants did not want to withdraw [salt from Quemoy] . . . The warehouses eventually collapsed and the government let these sites to civilians for farming 因海 洋遠涉，兼且鹽色低點，商人不願支[領]…其倉[廃]遂至倒廢，地基招民耕種.”

However, most of the gentry in Quemoy had assumed the status of scholar-bureaucrats after the mid-sixteenth century, when the salt trade could not sustain the local gentry. By contrast, piracy, smuggling, and overseas trade were rampant in the vicinities of Quemoy at this time (Zheng 1999; Chen 2010). As historians (Chen 2010; Lee 2004b; Yang 1998) reported, the coeval inhabitants in Quemoy also actively took part in the Others’ operations. The imposed demarcation between the two social groups was fading away. And, their involvement in the trade rewarded them with great fortune (Chen 2010). In this light, the overemphasis on economic effects of the salt trade connotes a latent disparagement to the overseas trading, and more importantly, articulates the discourse that persists to the present.

I witnessed a scene in the 2008 Conference of Quemology, when Chen (2010) presented his research on the historical piracy in Quemoy. He reported that the categories of “pirates” and “decent subjects” were merely social constructions delineated by the Ming Empire. Inhabitants in Quemoy continuously engaged in the “piratical trade” for extenuating reasons. After his presentation, one Quemoy historian immediately expressed his discontent by asking why Chen defamed their forebears as pirates because, according to the local gazetteers, the vast majority in Quemoy were decent people! Evidently, it was
not much a question but more of a declaration. Although apparently the “defamation”
triggered his defensive attitude; in a deeper sense, it was the threat to the historical
discourse of the social dichotomy provoked his “compulsion to defend” (Nostrand 1992, 
214).

“The past is a foreign country,” as Lowenthal remarked, “whose features are shaped
by today’s predilections, its strangeness domesticated by our own preservation of its 
vestiges” (1985, xvii). Similarly, the historical discourse of Quemoy knitted together a
“foreign past” for its general public audience when the first gazetteer of Quemoy came
into being in the 1830s. The gazetteer “preserved” the foreign past shaped by the coeval 
predilections. Under the category of social custom, Lin (1987) described Quemoy as a
simple utopian community: It was the birthplace of prestigious officials and celebrated
literati; land of Confucianism; and home of unsophisticated farmers and fishermen. Such
a portrayal of the “foreign” Quemoy remains authoritative even today. The 1830s’
discourse therefore resembles in a historical Orientalism, producing knowledge of
representation “for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over” Quemoy (Said
1978, 3). By analogy, my intention is to emphasize the temporal distance from the foreign
past that enables an Orientalist lens to work on knowledge production of Quemoy. Along
with the dominance, the discursive practices concurrently constructed an “imaginative
geography,” which Said explained (1978, 55),

For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to
intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between
what is close to it and what is far away.

Likewise, the locals in Quemoy, by intensification and dramatization, developed the
identity with place and the demarcation between self and others. Put differently, the
locals’ image of Quemoy as a homeland was actually the partial reification of this
imaginative geography. Through their dominance, the locals acquired control of place; developed feelings of attachment; and when the discourse was under threat, as in the Conference of Quemology, the compulsion to defend immediately roused up (Nostrand 1992). The bonding with place therefore hinged on a foreign country.

The imperial social categories evidently have significant influence on the local society in Quemoy. However, their significance and persistence did not mean their institution came from an absence of negotiation. Trading activities, despite their insignificance, should have existed in Quemoy since the peopling stage for the growing demand for staples and crafts. As in the face of changes, the locals did not merely comply without resistance. The assigned social category did not impede Quemoy people’s pursuit in smuggling and overseas trade at the time, but turned the economic activities under the table. The neglect of negotiation is, as Thomas (1994) criticized, one pitfall of postcolonial theories today that “treat colonial discourse as ‘impervious to active marking and reformulation by the Other’” (Clayton 2005, 452). Clayton concurrently criticized the same presupposition (2005, 452),

Postcolonialism runs a fine line between subverting and aggrandizing the grip of the colonial past on the present by placing colonialism too securely in the past or placing the colonial past too firmly in the present.

It is obvious that the nineteenth-century Orientalist discourse of Quemoy shared the same pitfalls, and the current-day local historians inherited them.

The defense policy, through its civil administrative measures, begot destructive consequences to the local economy. With the defense line drawn and the seaboard inhabitants evicted, the government further decreed an isolationist maritime policy—the Seafaring Ban 海禁—by which the imperial government prohibited its subjects to sail on the sea. The purpose was to prevent its subjects from contagion by or conspiracy with the
maritime powers. Border-crossing activities due to the decree became transgressions, and trade with sea merchants was illegal and analogous to harboring felons. The regional economy which relied heavily on overseas trade faced a fatal challenge. In addition to trade, the Seafaring Ban directly hampered the operation of fisheries because the policy limited the fishing grounds and the fishing seasons. Consequently, the ban prompted the local fishers to change their occupation or to pursue multiple livelihoods (Ouyang 1998). The ban indirectly effected the stagnation of the salt industry. The diminution of the fishery reduced the demand for salt—the major preservative at the time—and the strict control over water traffic brought complications to shipping freight. In terms of commoners’ livelihoods in Quemoy, fishery and salt production gradually became unsustainable. The ban eventually left these imperial subjects only degraded land which resulted from intense population pressure. Besides, the income from multi-livelihoods was insufficient for survival due to heavy tax and bureaucratic extortions before the Seafaring Ban decree. After the ban further limited their economic activities, the poor farmers and workers reluctantly deserted their fields and salterns to be free from the unsustainable exploitation: “The sea is Fukien people’s farms. [Due to the enforcement of Seafaring Ban] those in the coastal region could not make a living, and suffered from repeated famines. The poor among them often would gather together and form fugitive gangs and engage in piracy” (Fu 2007b, 146). The gravity of economic destruction eventually forced commoners in coastal China to take on the social status that empire defined as “pirates,” while people in their social networks—families, kins, and friends—remained “imperial subjects.”
Chinese historians today commonly consider that the “pirate” problem in sixteen-century China resulted from the rigorous enforcement of the Seafaring Ban largely because it maximally constrained the locals to engage in seafaring economic activities even on the quiet (see Chen 2010; Dai 1982; Office of Historiography 1990; Wang 2006; Yang 1998). While the poor in desperation accounted for the majority of “pirates,” the maritime powers nonetheless consisted of individuals from all social tiers simply attracted by the considerable profit of smuggling and overseas trade. On top of the practical reasons, overseas trading was also essential to the regional culture. Since the twelfth century, the locals in Quemoy had been involved in overseas trading (Lee 2004b).

As Chen remarked, for people in Southeast coastal China in the sixteenth century, overseas trading was not only a way of life but “a part of their daily life” and “a local cultural tradition” (2010, 87). Because of the tradition, there was a fine line between decent civilians and “pirates.” As one scholar-official commented, people along the seabords “were all decent civilians before pirates landed, but after they arrived all became accomplices "賊未至皆良民，賊已至皆奸民" (Office of Historiography 1990, 79). Although the portrayal might exaggerate the connection, the local conspiracy with the maritime powers “was common in Jiangsu and Zhejiang province; serious in Fukien; and especially serious in its Quanzhou and Zhangzhou prefectures 浙直皆然，閩為甚，閩之漳泉尤甚” (Office of Historiography 1990, 79). Chen elaborated, “the half-mercantile and half-piratical operations [that the smugglers in the southern Fukien conducted] oftentimes had the locals’ support and was under protection of their clans 这种亦商亦盗的行径，往往得到民众的支持与乡族的庇护” (2006, 226). The locals treated smuggling and even piracy as “an occupation, a pursuit of the good life, or at least a way of life” (Zheng 1999, 350-1). Their involvement in smuggling, overseas trading,
and piracy supported hundreds of thousands people’s lives in the coastal Fukien (Zheng 1999). Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that one official-scholar cogently stated, “everyone living in the coast was pirates 海濱人人皆賊” (Dai 1982, 32). On account of the situation, Wang (2006) commented that the imperial enforcement of isolationism signified its immature maritime policy and also exposed the unfamiliarity of an agriculture-based civilization with the maritime culture. The cultural clash obviously resulted in the official-scholar’s prejudice against all seaboard inhabitants as sea rovers.

The maritime powers consisted of various bands of sea rovers with loose organization in ongoing conflicts. They by no means were all single-mindedly cooperating with one another, and the relationships among them were oftentimes strategic maneuvers. Chen made a general but straightforward definition about the identity of the actors in the maritime powers: “The so-called ‘pirates’ [in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China] in fact were sea-merchant bands involved in the smuggling trade” (Chen 2010, 85). Based on their backgrounds, historians divided Chinese pirates at the time into two general social groups—the proletarians and the capitalists (Dai 1982; Wang 2006; Zheng 1999). The latter consisting of landocrats, bureaucrats, and the local magnates, mainly undertook international trade, while the former mostly initiated with smuggling. Even so, both groups undertook pillage as an approach to accumulate capital (Fu 2007b). At the same time, Japanese ronins also embarked on piracy on the southeast coast of China, while the Western adventurers, first Portuguese and then Dutch, sequentially arrived at Chinese coast. All of them had more than once engaged in armed conflicts with empire, and all of them had done so for one single purpose—trade. Their complicated relationships between each other and the empire, as He remarked, teemed with “deceitful intrigues and precarious calculations,” but all depended on benefits (2006,
8). By all means, they bribed, lobbied battled, and repeatedly negotiated with the empire for free trade, but each was unsuccessful. On the situation, Fu commented, “these sea merchants’ activities and resistance to the feudal governance was significant to the socio-economy in southern seaboard China. However, their every resistance largely ended with failure” (2007b, 141).

Quemoy was at the center of the armed conflicts, set out as a form of negotiations between the maritime powers and empire. During the years 1522-1620, Xu and Tang (2009) reported forty-seven historical entries in relation to the armed conflicts between the maritime powers and empire in Quemoy and its vicinities, and thirty-one during the years 1620-1645. Based on these findings, they explained the intensity of the armed conflicts in Quemoy (Xu and Tang 2009, 1):

In the mid-Ming dynasty, the private trade prospered in southeast China. Quemoy due to its geographical location was the hot spot of trade in East Asia, and the situation consequently coined its maritime characteristic. [Sequentially] conflicts of interests constantly happened [in Quemoy and its vicinities]. They first showed in the Japanese pirates’ harassment and later in Chinese pirates’ occupation.

In this view, the “maritime characteristic” of Quemoy emerged through the practice of piratical trade, which occurred due to the geographical location of Quemoy, and consequently aroused the constant armed negotiation. If so, the distinctive image of Quemoy, hinged upon its geographical location and the regional cultural practice, appeared for the first time at this time.

Quemoy is located at the entrance of Xiamen Bay, and, during the age of sailboats, it was the last stop before sailing to the ocean. Seaward sailors would often reprovision their ships and wait for favorable winds in Quemoy. Conversely, for the seaborne ships arriving Southern Fukien, Quemoy was often the terra firma when voyagers cry out “Land-Ho!” Its location granted Quemoy significance in the nautical age. However, as
Chen explained the causes of Southern Fukien people’s enterprising characteristics, he clarified, “living in the seafront was only an environmental factor responsible for Southern Fukien people’s enthusiasm for overseas trade and exploration, but not the cultural factor” (2006, 230). Chen also indicated the people had a tradition of undertaking overseas trade that other people on the coastal Fukien did not have. And so, without historical factors in the equation, an investigation into the formation of the maritime characteristics of Quemoy would be incomplete.

After implementation of the scorched earth policy and eviction, most islanders, according to the imperial definition, became pirates. During the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, their islands were the abandoned land of empire, and were largely land “out of governmental reach and free from imperial sovereignty” (Zheng 1999, 15). These coastal islands were therefore the territory of the maritime powers, and some of them were ideal sites for pirate hideouts. Although Quemoy was obviously not an ideal site, most islands in its surrounding waters were the *lebensraum* of the maritime powers. An island ten miles southwest to Quemoy, Wuyu (浯嶼), was the major center of pirates at the time. Wuyu and Quemoy were both on the outer edge of Xiamen Bay facing the Taiwan Strait. While Wuyu guarded the west entrance of the bay, Quemoy did so for the east. They were like the pair of guardian lion statues of Xiamen Bay. The Chinese navy had used Wuyu as their base until 1489, but thereafter pirates occupied the island in the early sixteenth century. Yang (2006) reported that during the years 1518-1549 Portuguese had also established their trading post in Wuyu with a settlement of five to six hundred inhabitants. The main reason for their presence was trade. Two major commercial port cities along the rim of Xiamen Bay, Yuegang (月港) on the west inner corner and Anhai (安海) on the east one, provided the prospective markets for pirates and overseas
merchants. Due to the proximity to the markets and the convenient access to the sea, Wuyu became a favorable habitat for pirates. In terms of the rationale behind the selection of settlement sites, He elaborated on the Wuyu case (2006, 8):

These pillagers [pirates] often selected a small island near the mainland as their lair . . . It often possessed multiple functions, including the venue for transactions, the beachhead for raid, the depository for provisions, plunder, and hostages for ransoms.

As the maritime powers established their base in Wuyu for the Southern Fukien markets, Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese pirates, and even the Dutch in the seventeenth century were all active in the area. They did not limit their activities to Wuyu, but used all the islands in Xiamen Bay for different purposes as needed. Yang (2006), according to Portuguese documentation, mentioned that Portuguese traders/pirates had loaded their goods in Leiyu; repaired their ships and replenished provisions in Haimen 海門; and robbed and burnt civilian boats in a port in Amoy. Their rampant activities in the area, on one hand, contributed to the local prosperity from trade, but on the other hand intensified their conflicts with the empire. Quemoy as the gateway to the trade centers inevitably played a crucial role in the game of negotiation.

The role Quemoy played was not in line with the imperial expectations. As shown by the Portuguese documentation, in Quemoy they had conducted trade, bought necessities, recruited sailors, refilled fresh water, and waited for the favorable winds for sailing out to the ocean (Yang 2006). Chinese historical documentations congruently complemented the Western documentation of the pirate activities in Quemoy. A leading official in the anti-pirate war had explicitly indicated that two locations in Quemoy, Wusha 烏紗 and Laulo 料羅, were where pirates harbored and awaited assistance (Chen 2010), while a Quemoy scholar in the mid-sixteenth century bitterly stated that “Laulo was a pirate lair 料羅為賊巢穴” (Kuo 2008b, 184). In addition, recent historic
research also shows that some Quemoy inhabitants in the sixteenth century also actively engaged in maritime enterprises, a felony at the time. Among these people, commoners conducted overseas trade in Taiwan and Ryukyu Kingdom (current Okinawa, Japan) on a regular basis, and the gentry through their pirate kins accumulated tremendous fortunes (Chen 2010). Furthermore, Quemoyans did not always commit the felony for economic activities but also for noncritical reasons, which suggested international travel was commonplace in Quemoy: A married townsman who enjoy travel sold all his inherited properties for the hobby, eventually abandoned his wife to journey to Luzon, the Philippines, and died there (Chen 2010; Lee 2004b). Informed by these historical records and studies, it is clear that Quemoy residents had long standing involvement in maritime activities. They accommodated the sea rovers and had a complicated relationship with them far from the simple friend-foe dichotomy as the empire designated. On the other hand, pirates did not stop visiting Quemoy even though the island was an “imperial territory,” nor did the deployment of coastal defenses deter them. For the local inhabitants, who constantly embarked on border-crossing activities, it is doubtful how effective the political demarcation of the empire could severe the locals from their conventional lifeworld, from their ties with the sea voyagers, and from their traditional ways of life. The locals’ cognitive territory, in this case, obviously coexisted with the imposed imperial defense line, in the negotiation of forming a new territorial conception.

In addition, some of the facts unraveled by the historical documentation, though they might not be representative of all inhabitants’ conduct at the time, manifested that the locals in Quemoy were not absent from the center stage of the nautical age albeit their pursuits were illegal in imperial eyes. Their involvement in the maritime enterprise developed the distinctive characteristic of Quemoy, which however did not signify a total
conversion of Quemoy into a maritime powers’ territory. The island was still home of imperial subjects, who however could be simultaneously maritime adventurers since their viking identity was undercover and fluid. The place identity of Quemoy at the time was neither an imperial outpost nor a pirate lair, but developed into a continuous process of dialectic becoming in the negotiation. The constructed social reality of Quemoy then articulated the hybrid and ambiguous identities of a border island.

By the neither/nor strategy of identity negotiation, the locals in opposition to the binary identities of Quemoy attained control of place and developed bonding with place in the struggle against pirate raids. In response to the social condition, landscape in Quemoy changed accordingly, and the same ambiguity and hybridity showed in the landscape. In addition to the state fortifications, civilians constructed considerable defense works to protect themselves from pirates. In 1558, only in the western capital of Quemoy, Hopu 後浦, the locals “built a hundred and three forts 築堡百三座” (Wang 2006, 83). Throughout this time, destruction of fortifications in pirate raids aroused another reconstruction with even more fortifications. These defense works militarized the landscape in Quemoy, and gradually consolidated the image of an imperial outpost. On the other hand, the number of ports also greatly increased. Among them, seven ports had ferries in operation to four mainland seaboard cities in the Quanzhou and Chincheo prefecture, while Laulo on the southeast corner of Quemoy was the major port to overseas islands like Pescadores (current Penghu county, Taiwan), Taiwan, the Ryukyu Kingdom (Xu and Tang 2009). The appearances of these transportation facilities emphasized the busy water traffic and the local reliance on the maritime activities in the nautical age. Together the development of water transportation and construction of fortifications revealed a weakening imperial isolationism on its maritime policy and the
locals’ damage control in their pursuit of the maritime activities. The both/and also identity of Quemoy in between an imperial outpost and a maritime adventurers’ habitat emerged, while the fortifications, that articulated the local everyday practice of living in an imperial outpost and pursuing the maritime ventures, became the landscape memorials which embodied the locals’ negotiation with empire and the maritime powers in the constitution of their homeland.

Since the Ming Empire constructed the walled city, Quemoy in 1387, the island’s front reversed from the mainland and turned defensively toward the sea. In opposition, when the maritime powers confronting the Ming Empire captured Quemoy, they would deploy their front toward the mainland. The struggle between the empire and the sea powers had briefly affected the front-rear disposition of Quemoy a few times in the history. Oftentimes, due to the nature of roving bands, their occupation of Quemoy ended swiftly after they completed pillaging raids. Following their departure, the disposition soon turned back with the front toward the sea. However, anomalies did happen. In the seventeenth century, a maritime regime originating in Anhai held Quemoy captive as its capital for two generations, and changed the front-rear disposition for more than half a century.

The band of rovers led by Nicholas Iquan 鄭芝龍 primarily undertook overseas trading, which made them wanted by the government. After consecutive victories over the imperial army, the emerging maritime powers overwhelmed the defensive forces of the declining empire in the region and gradually gained control of Southern Fukien from the 1620s. When Iquan’s fleet anchored on Quemoy and Amoy in 1626, thousands of islanders voluntarily enrolled in his gang. The expansion also helped Iquan to monopolize international trade, especially silk in East Asia. His power grew to the extent that
eventually impelled the empire to compromise, and offered him the position of a naval officer to nominally subsume his fleets under the imperial authority in 1629. The title empowered Iquan and granted his gang official support to “righteously” eradicate his business competitors—other bands of sea rovers. The privilege eventually made his gang a hegemonic power in the South and East China Sea. The Xiamen Bay area, the homeland of most of Iquan’s gang, was the core of this maritime regime—an area that had long been troubled by its ambiguous identities between a pirate hive and the nursery of imperial officialdom. Iquan’s success no doubt maximized the inbetweeness of the identity that its people incubated for centuries to liberate themselves from the dreadful dichotomy of the two conflicting place identities.

In 1644, the Manchu people vanquished the Ming Empire and established the last dynasty of the imperial China, the Qing Dynasty. Iquan’s son, Koxinga 鄭成功, lead his army into battle against the invading troops of the new land regime in order to recover China from the non-Han rule and to restore the Ming Empire. Based in Quemoy and Amoy, his battle against the newly established Qing Empire lasted for thirty-four years until his retreat to Taiwan in 1680. During the war, the imperial troops captured Quemoy twice, and scorched the island during their occupation, evicting everyone on the island. Although the desertion consequently dissolved the six-century development in Quemoy, it simultaneously allowed the overpopulated environment a recess that allowed some natural ecosystem restoration. The evacuation of Quemoy deterritorialized the island, and vaporized its front-rear disposition. Inasmuch as Quemoy turned into an uninhabited island in the buffer zone between the two regimes, the loss of identity abstracted Quemoy from its historical context. Its prepositional relations—front vs. back, upside vs. downside, and right vs. left—largely called in correspondence only to the cardinal points on the
compass. The war wiped out the place identity along with its sense of places. Not until the Qing Empire annexed Taiwan in 1683 and returned the Quemoy natives to their homeland, did Quemoy regain its sense of orientation within a sound geopolitical context.

2.6 Homeland: Diffusion of Quemoy Fraternity Guilds

Since the mid-sixteenth century, emigration from Quemoy followed its overpopulated environmental destruction, the pirate war, and the economic stagnation induced by the Seafaring Ban. Certainly, the development of maritime navigation during the nautical age also promoted emigration to southeast Asia and Taiwan. During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, pirates and overseas merchants were the two major groups of emigrants. Compared with the later overseas emigration waves, the number of emigrants before the mid-seventeenth century was relatively small. After Imperial China annexed Taiwan in 1683, the geopolitical importance of Quemoy, as an imperial frontier, declined. The forefront of empire advanced to Taiwan, and whereby the Taiwan Strait became an imperial territory. Meanwhile, because Amoy Island in Xiamen Bay gradually developed into a major international trading port in the eighteenth century, its growing influence deprived Quemoy of its status as the port of embarkation for overseas voyages. Consequently, most Quemoy ports during the eighteenth century became facilities for domestic traffic (Lee 2004b). Even so, the local enthusiasm for maritime activities did not wither away, and the acquisition of Taiwan as the new imperial territory motivated Quemoyans to embark on overseas expansion through emigration. The Pescadores Archipelago, midway between Taiwan and Quemoy, was the stepping stone in this pursuit. Their expansion to the archipelago resulted in 70 percent of its current population originating from Quemoy (Xie, Yang and Wang 2003). Moving forward, a considerable number of Quemoy emigrants also settled in the major port cities in Taiwan during the
eighteenth century. In these colonies, they built temples for their beliefs, and, by their adherence to the homeland deities, organized fraternity guilds to assist each other in adapting to the new life. Unlike the earlier time when the emigrants from Quemoy were merchants or pirates, the majority of emigrants at the time were peasants. The change of emigrant groups indicated a different objective for permanent settlements instead of trading outposts. The aspiration for the fertile land and opportunities then initiated a new wave of emigration and subsequently set off another landscape evolution by the immigrant communities in Taiwan.

Emigration from Quemoy climaxed after Amoy became one of the five treaty ports of China in 1842. During 1915-1929, a surge of emigration removed 40 percent of the population from Quemoy, amounting to roughly 30,000 people (Fan 2010). Because most of the young worked abroad, the economy of their original society heavily relied on their remittances. Via Amoy, most of the Quemoy young at the age of sixteen or seventeen would leave for the European colonial countries in southeast Asian countries, mainly Singapore, and worked there as contract workers. Some of the single men would return and got married after a few years abroad. After marriage, they would again head to work abroad, and send back remittances to support their families. Among them, a few would be successful enough to return to Quemoy with their savings, by which they generally would build a flamboyant Western-style mansion 洋樓 as the family residence and their retirement home. After construction, these overseas merchants would leave again to their immigrant countries, and worked there until retirement. For the emigrants, marriage, house building, and retirement were their three rites of passage known as “the trilogy of overseas Chinese” (Fan 2010). However, their fate, as a Quemoy proverb figuratively portrayed, was grim, and most of them returned home in coffins: “six die; three stay; and
one returns 六亡三在一回頭” (Chen 2003, 84). In reality, the proportion of returning emigrants was lower than one tenth; “only one or two of a hundred could return home, and not more than two or three of a thousand could return with gains 得歸者百無一、二焉，其貿易獲利歸者千無二、三焉” (Lin 1987, 395). For those who could return for retirement, the Western-style mansions were the tokens of their success in the foreign countries, and also the pompous statement made to the public on the homeland (Jiang 2003). In this sense, the construction of the Western-style mansions encompassed more than the functional purpose of retirement abodes but also a cultural purpose to show off.16 As the construction turned into a customary practice for the returned emigrants, these mansions also became the preeminent landscape signifiers of the emigrant culture.

In Singapore, their major colony, emigrants from Quemoy initially affiliated themselves to the Fukien group, but the majority of the Fukien group—emigrants from other areas of Fukien including Chincheo, Quanzhou, and Yongchun 永春—marginalized Quemoyans due to their origin from a small island (Chi 2003). After growing in number, these Quemoy emigrants then organized their own fraternity guilds on the basis of common lineages, trades, or beliefs. Due to the process of chain emigration, the lineage-based guilds, as the infrastructural but independent units of their emigrant organizations, often outnumbered other guilds organized by profession and religion. However, neither of the two influential guilds with most members was lineage based because the Quemoy emigrants worked only in a few trades in their colonies but came from numerous clans in Quemoy. These organizations often shared similar objectives, such as assisting and accommodating new comers, settling disputes between Quemoy emigrants, gathering strength in conflicts with other ethnic groups, and raising

16 On the subject of showing-off, please refer to Philip Wagner’s monograph (1996) for details.
funds for dead members’ burials. Among these fraternity guilds, the *Quemoy Association* 金門會館 was the most significant one. Quemoy migrants in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia were all welcome to join. The guild was located in the temple of Pasture Lord which had the same name—Fuji Temple—as the original in Quemoy. The location and the naming of place both intended to construct the representativeness of the guild. “The Singapore Fuji Temple symbolized Quemoy,” and by the symbolization “the [founders’] intention to make it the supreme organization of all Quemoyans was obvious” (Chi 2003, 3). In this view, not only the homeland culture, the Pasture Lord belief here, shaped their collective identity as Quemoyans, but the Quemoy emigrants also employed the culture as instruments to structure their power relations and hierarchy in the colony.

The power structure in the colony was often an extension of what existed in the Chinese homeland. For Fukien migrants, Quemoyans from a small border island were marginal and insignificant. Mainland emigrants perceptually discriminated against these islanders in their group and marginalized them. The belittling treatment spurred Quemoyans to establish their own fraternity guilds, and further reinforced their independent group identity. The counteraction to marginalization and the acknowledgement of their independent group identity eventually led the overseas Quemoyans to appeal for the establishment of Quemoy County in 1913. The Fukien provincial government approved the appeal in 1915, and upgraded Quemoy from a neighborhood to a county. The autonomous uplift empowered the overseas Quemoyans in their negotiation with other ethnic groups in the colonies since Quemoy attained a higher status in the administrative system. The change of homeland could also influence the emigrant society. For Quemoy migrants, their clan-centered ideology and localism were how they constituted their imagined community and constructed their group identities in
the homeland. The chain emigration from lineage villages assured the continuity of these ideologies which cued the overseas Quemoyans to conventionally organize their guilds according to clanship. The sectionalism also prompted them to act on the benefits of their own clans and fraternity guilds. The reinvented simulacrum of their home society in the colony thereby reproduced and transplanted the power relations, especially those between clans, from their homeland to the emigrant societies. The politics among Quemoy emigrant groups certainly existed and their fraternity organizations teemed with exclusive sectionalism.

Nonetheless, in the face of challenges from other ethnic groups, Quemoy emigrants were also able to stick together under the same flag of a common local belief. The establishment of the non-exclusive guilds was their strategy to coup with marginalized situation in dealing with others—the mainland ethnic groups and the Western colonial governments—while at the meantime showcasing their collective identity. Even though their fraternity guilds were mostly based on the homeland-bound localism, the same localism also facilitated them to transcend the political boundaries between Southeast Asian countries and to entitle all Quemoy emigrants eligible to be members of the *Quemoy Association*. The contrast between their insistence on the specific geography of homeland and their indifference to the colonial geography disclosed the unsettled geographical understanding of their residence. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization in this sense came hand in hand with cultural diffusion in the diaspora.

While Quemoy exported its people and culture to southeast Asia, a backflow of colonial cultures also imbued Quemoy with modern exotic charm. The Western-style mansions were the most prominent symbol of the emigrant culture in the homeland landscape attesting to the cultural exchange. The two- or three-floor mansions were often
in a hybrid style between Chinese traditional architecture and the Western colonial one. They were made to be readable for the locals in Quemoy about the owners’ overseas success. Despite the hybridity, the architectural principles of Chinese tradition, such as *fengshui*, still overwhelmingly conditioned and contextualized these buildings in the traditional folk villages. Their layout, orientation, and interior design were all compromises between the two styles, while their architectural design, especially of the façade, comprehensively adopted the classic and Baroque architectural features, iconography, and ornamentation (Jiang 2003). On top of iconography (such as British soldiers, Indian policemen, clocks, angels, and the globe), some of the mansions also included owners’ Romanized names, the completion dates in Christian calendar, and even English idioms, like “Union Is Strength” on the façade. With their exotic elements, the great size of these mansions made them prominent statements in the landscape. Both their pomposity and heterogeneity challenged the traditional ideologies and conventions, and aroused another cultural adaptation.

The overseas merchants, as the nouveau riche, formed a new class of capitalists at the time in China. Their rise challenged the conventional social stratification and the gentry’s authority in the feudal society. As nouveau riche gestures in the landscape, these Western-style mansions signified “the formation of a new power structure different from the one in the past in which clan heads and the gentry had the authority” (Jiang 2003, 123). Heights of the mansion were often an issue between the returned emigrants and the authority in their home villages because the traditional architecture principles forbade houses standing above the ancestral halls. The two- or three-floor modern buildings

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17 For details on symbolism, *fengshui*, and iconography of Chinese folk housing, please refer to Knapp’s book (1999) for details.
however oftentimes were higher than the one-story ancestor hall. In a traditional village, the villagers would restrain the construction of the Western-style buildings, and expected the returned emigrants to reinvent their inherited properties inside the village, abiding by the conventional construction guidelines of *fengshui*. Otherwise, for those with the intention to boast their overseas success by the flamboyant architecture, their mansions were rarely situated in the villages. They would need to acquire another lot on the outskirts of the villages to complete their pompous statement to their kins. Nonetheless, even a location on the outskirts could bring conflicts with conventional guidelines obviously when topography was involved in the site selection: As shown in most hillside villages, the periphery, due to its altitude, could still be higher than the ancestor halls, and further complicated site selection. Other than abiding by the conventions, nouveau riche sometimes disregarded the traditional principles, and situated their mansions inside the village.\(^{18}\) In other cases, as villagers generally well adapted to the foreign culture (especially in villages with a large population working abroad) they might by fundraising rebuild the ancestor hall in the Western style to maintain its prominent stance in the community. In this manner, emergence of the mansions in traditional folk villages often had undergone a process of adaptation and negotiation over their locations, orientation, and other architecture details. The negotiated outcome was “an important indicator of social transformation of the overseas Chinese home villages” (Jiang 2003, 169).

These merchants’ wide adoption of the Western material culture in their everyday lives, such as flush toilets, western attire, and culinary fashion, was their way to

\(^{18}\) Jiang (2003) provides Chen Qin-Ji’s 陳清吉 mansion in the Bishan 碧山 village as an example of the disregard of conventions. His three-story mansion is located next to a two-story ancestor hall also in the Western architectural style after renovation. A year before the mansion construction in 1931, villagers had renovated the ancestor hall through fundraising (Jiang 2002). Their tolerance for the mansion might partially attribute to the acceptance of the architectural style since the ancestor hall had already adopted it.
distinguish themselves from their fellow villagers and to flaunt their life experience in foreign countries. Modern inventions symbolized the European colonialists’ privileges of the ruling class in the colonies that most of these emigrants could not attain under their rule in the colonial cities. By the possession of these novelties, the returned emigrants figuratively transferred the colonialist authority to themselves, and employed modernity as their cultural capital construing their social position in their homeland. The cultural superiority derived from the heterogeneity ultimately associating with imperialism in southeast Asia. Their fondness for the Western culture treated as the advanced and the superior inevitably discomfited nationalists and conservatives in the revolutionary era. The conflicts between the authority in the homeland and the overseas merchants were basically ideological, and fundamentally stemmed from their expressive cultural practice and its spatial production. As Quemoy people conventionally addressed the emigration to southeast Asia as “down to the barbarians’ 落番,” the out-of-placeness of these emigrants’ everyday practice and cultural creations against the homeland culture articulated the distinctness of other cultures and more importantly the struggles aroused by the impingement of cultural exchange.

As the cultural transmitters, the overseas Quemoy emigrants mediated the mutual cultural diffusion and brought about cultural hybridity in their colonies and the homeland. Living out-of-place in the foreign lands, they transplanted the homeland culture to be being-in-the-world of Quemoy, while living at home in Quemoy, they transferred the colonial culture to be out-of-place. Their out of placeness and placelessness revealed their constantly dwelling inbetween home and foreign countries. The location of their hybrid culture was neither the homeland nor their colonies but intersubjectivity of its congregation; whereby the place-bound identity of these emigrants was fluid and unstable,
always in motion. The border-crossing activities, as the prevailing cultural practice of Quemoy inhabitants, emancipated their identity from the bonds to a single place. Their identities thus reposed in the multilocality. Through the omnipresent heterogeneity in the landscape, the deterritorialization at home set the Quemoy locals in travel: They were at home in the physical landscape of Quemoy, but were simultaneously not-at-home surrounded by foreign simulacra, novelties, and iconographies/ideologies. The ambivalence of multicultural formations “celebrates the space of margins, of inbetweeness and hybridity, as privileged locations from which to challenge hegemonic notions” (McEwan 2004, 506). For Quemoy inhabitants, the agents of hybrid culture, the border island was the cultural arena to perform and to negotiate with Chinese tradition. The ambiguity and polysemy embedded in the landscape embodied their negotiations to insinuate heterogeneous material culture, such as the Western-style mansions, which articulated their immediate experience of “travelling-in-dwelling and dwelling-in-travelling” (Lury 1997, 78). Their saga was seeking to locate or relocate their culture amid intersubjectivity, to retrieve or reinvent their homeland image in motion continued until the nationalist army isolated Quemoy from outside communication after the Chinese Civil War in 1949.

A distinctive phenomenon in the last negotiation is worth extra attention. Since the sixteenth century, the locals had endeavored to mold an image of Quemoy in accordance with Chinese conventions and cultural norms to showcase their conformity to the dominant culture and to counteract its marginalization. In opposition to this intention, the appearance of the Western-style mansions in the landscape of Quemoy marked the cessation of the social construction. The introduction of European cultural features to the landscape of Quemoy inevitably contaminated the local Chineseness and subsequently
substantiated the marginality of the community. However, in constructing a homeland of overseas Chinese, the insular community compromised their adherence to the Chinese tradition and accommodated heterogenous cultures through negotiation. In this case, the Quemoy locals’ acceptance of Otherness, which tended to undermine their hundreds-years efforts of image producing, signified not only a shift of cultural paradigm but also their emancipation from the labor of Chineseness construction. After all, Chineseness was, from its beginning, a fake issue. Its construction was just a strategy of identity politics for lives in an imperial frontier. With the paradigm shift, when the locals in Quemoy switched their concerns on the clash between the Chinese and the Western cultures, cultural negotiation found itself another arena in the relevant discursive fields. It was just that, however, this time the Quemoy locals would have to negotiate with their own creation.

Through my examination of Quemoy’s history, I identify three geographical characters that promote the occurrence of the historical events: a maritime traffic hub, a supply plantation, and an imperial frontier. These three characters reveal in Quemoy in a temporal order, but affect Quemoy interactively. In addition, all of them contribute to the cultural hybridity of Quemoy. From the beginning of human occupation, Quemoy benefited from its geographical situation and environmental condition, both of which make it an ideal habitat of sea nomads. Quemoy was on the migration route along the southeast coast of China, and more importantly was the starting point of the overseas voyage to Taiwan and other islands on the Pacific Rim. Its character then positioned Quemoy at the intersection of the maritime traffic, and later facilitated the locals in Quemoy to establish their trade network in Taiwan, Japan, and the southeast Asian countries. Due to its geographical situation, Quemoy became a favorable contact point of
the maritime powers with imperial China, and the genealogical origin of many inhabitants in Pescadores and Taiwan. Its character as a traffic node nourished its maritime characteristics in the nautical age and its inhabitants’ enthusiasm for maritime activities, which eventually made Quemoy a homeland of overseas Chinese in the modern time.

On the other hand, its geographical location excluded Quemoy from the Han Chinese cultural sphere. Even long after Chinese annexed the island into its territory, Quemoy never shrugged off its marginal identity. The geographical marginality of Quemoy constantly vexes its inhabitants with consequent cultural marginality. They struggle against their possible identities of inferior others and alternative cultural practitioners, like Tan and the maritime powers. To counteract the marginalization, the Quemoy locals have fostered a tendency to predate their history so as to Sinicize their ancestors and their land as early as possible. For the same purpose, they have also devoted themselves to production of historical discourse that conveys an image of Quemoy in accordance with the Chinese core values of Confucianism. These efforts and the molded image consequently govern the locals’ understanding of their past. Challenges to the taken-for-granted understanding may trigger the defense mechanism out of their bonding with place and control of place through knowledge. However, their construction of the representative image of Quemoy does not always convince their Chinese coevals of their adherence to the Han-centric culture. Ultimately, some of their cultural praxes, especially those of their traditional ways of life, can hardly be attributed to the category.

All the livelihoods transplanted to Quemoy by empire eventually proved unsuccessful and even the best adaptive land use, salt-making, degraded to merely one slightly better option among worse alternatives against maritime economic activities. Although environmental adaptation, as a necessary process of landscape evolution,
contributed to the development of a place in the end, it nonetheless connoted an exploitative nature of colonial enterprises during the adaptive process. The imposition of the livelihoods and of the market demands of the dominant society upon others in the colony constituted the very basis of a plantation economy. The heavy reliance of these colonial industries on the foreign investments in the local economic development explained their susceptibility to the socio-political condition in the mainland. In addition, the arbitrary establishment accompanying with immigration crashed the ecosystem with overpopulation, and the consequent environmental degradation manifested the sensitivity of the islandness of Quemoy. After all, its lack of land and the extra expenditure on shipping had preconditioned Quemoy’s development of these land-based industries, and was often the direct causality responsible for their unproductivity.

Nonetheless, these experimental industries left the Quemoy community essential legacies of which the belief of Pasture Lord, as the genius loci of Quemoy, ranks foremost. The deity and its temple over time becomes one of the cultural emblems of Quemoy. Secondly, the environmental adaptation enabled the constitution of a stratified society and an independent economic network. With the success of environmental adaptation, the emerging local gentry kept the industrial gains within the insular community, and by accumulation ushered the community into its “post-colonial” period. The island thence no longer served as a supply plantation for the mainland market. However, during its development, an essential part of the economic network, the overseas trade, conflicted with the imperial interests. The incongruity led the empire to interrupt the fledging economic development by the construction of an imperial frontier. The coordinate system of Quemoy reversed after the construction along with the gradual development of southwest Quemoy into the economic and political center. Perhaps, in the
imperial view, the imperial frontier should be the best and conclusive environmental adaptation of Quemoy, but for the islanders, being an absolutely obedient subject was an unbearable renouncement to their collective past and future altogether.

The character of an imperial frontier thus constantly provoked negotiation. Through manifold ways—knowledge production, everyday practice, economic activities, and armed conflicts—the locals negotiated with empire about their group identity and the identity of Quemoy. The negotiation brought forth an ambiguous and hybrid landscape that responsively articulated a both/and also identity of Quemoy in between an imperial outpost and a sea rovers’ home. The third-space that the Quemoy locals created then enabled them to resist the hegemonic dichotomy of the imposed place identities, and exempted them from falling into either category of the rival identities. The “real-and-imagined” places were where their homeland identity resided, and the negotiation was their continuous journey to locate the homeland-anchored identity. The homeland turned even more impressive and experiential when the locals in Quemoy initiated chain emigration to southeast Asian countries. In the face of Otherness, the Quemoy emigrants’ everyday cultural performance, or cultural reenactment, reasserted their homeland-bound identities. The repetitive construction of their group identities in the everyday out-of-placeness constituted the daily experience of Quemoyans abroad. To feel at-home, the emigrants in the colonies created a simulacrum of Quemoy to live in, while for Quemoy to be the homeland of its overseas habitants its landscape also have to shine an exotic tint. The deterritorialization injected another dimension of cultural negotiation into the identity evolution of the border island. The multiculturality engaged the real-and-imagined homeland in a continuous process of negotiations.
Through Quemoy’s geographical biography, a repetitive theme emerges in company with negotiations between the locals and empire due to Quemoy’s geographical and cultural marginality. After the Han settlers dislodged the sea nomads and established functioning colonies in Quemoy, the immigrant society, relying on the mainland resources and market, orientated the front toward its mother country. This front-rear disposition persisted till the imperial construction of military facilities along Quemoy’s south and east coast that moved its social center to the western half and drew the social attention toward the sea. The first reversal of Quemoy’s front-rear orientation greatly contributed to the formation of local place identity and group subjectivity, and forwarded the immigrant society into landscape impress stage. The formation of a local gentry class and a stratified society also celebrated and consolidated the Quemoy’s new disposition. With the developing subjectivity and identification, Quemoyans negotiated with empire to adopt a new evaporation method for slat-making and to permit privatization of salt trade so to end economic stagnation. The imperial concession of its salt policy nonetheless did not suffice to sustain the local economy, but allowed the locals to operate mercantile vessels despite the Seafaring Ban. Overseas trade thus grasped Quemoy’s social-economic attention. To the climax of this identity formation, Iquan and Koxinga led the locals to form a maritime regime confronting with the empires based on Quemoy and Amoy. The confrontation re-orientated Quemoy’s front as well as its social concerns toward the mainland for nearly six decades till the imperial annexation of Taiwan in 1683 terminated the maritime regime and the second reversal of Quemoy’s orientation. The imperial military and political expansion to Taiwan ignited the local aspiration for overseas colonization in the new imperial territory and, later, southeast Asian countries. The migration waves re-directed the local social concerns outward toward the sea, and
incurred the third reversal. The new front remained true for 266 years till the Chinese Civil War cordoned off Quemoy to be the forefront of the nationalist regime in Taiwan in 1949. The repetitive reversals of the insular dispositions in the pre-modern Quemoy thematized its history, and ultimately forged its border island identity.
CHAPTER 3  REVERSING THE GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATE SYSTEM: MILITARIZATION AFTER 1949

The orientation of the geographical prepositions, the insular front toward the land or the sea, articulates the social condition of the insular community and its geopolitical relations to other groups in the vicinities. As the reversal and the dissolution of the front-rear disposition has shown, change in the disposition often involves critical social transformation, which, likewise, often brings forth overall landscape change, the construction of fortifications, for instance. For this reason, an investigation into landscape change in regard to the geographical prepositional relations will account for the social relations of Quemoy. This is to say that not only the geopolitical relations of Quemoy are embedded in its landscape, but also its internal social relations are inscribed therein. The prepositional relations represent a schema of social configuration, and provide a general reading of the social state through the landscape composition. With the prepositional relations as measurement, the significance of changes in the landscape can thus be comprehensible.

Symbolisms of the Geographical Coordinate System

A geographical coordinate system denotes for spatial relations generating from bodily experience which produces a set of dichotomous ideas about direction, location, and distance—front-back, up-down, right-left, and by the relative distance in-out (Figure 3.1). Derived from ontological experience, these dichotomous ideas mean more than spatial indexes but also comprise symbolism associated with positive and negative values. Although these values are culturally bound rather than universal, Tuan indicates “certain cross-cultural similarities exist” (1977, 34). Concurring, Richardson further clarifies the value-laden symbolism of the coordinate system (2003, 34-5):
In this particular model, space that is ahead, above, and to the right of the body has a greater positive value than space that is behind, below, and to the left. Translated into time, the future beckons ahead and above, and the past fades behind and beneath. Translated into Christian cosmology, heaven rises above, hell resides below . . . .

Figure 3.1. Spatial Prepositions of Human Body Coordinate and Their Symbolisms [Source: Tuan 1977]

By the clarification, human structuring of their experiential world through sensory organs is both individual and collective. The individuality of the construct hinges up on the bodily engagement in the spatial organization, while the collectiveness unfolds in the process of ramification that culturally begets one signifier after another and another. The symbolic dimension of the spatial prepositions hence manifests the underlying intersubjectivity carrying the value-laden sense of space. Accounting for the collectiveness, Tuan further expands the application of this symbolism from a human body to a man-made environment, and proposes that “the historical movement of a people can give a sense of spatial asymmetry to a whole region or nation” (1977, 42). In other words, a geographic area, for historical or cultural reasons, can also acquire its value-laden spatial prepositions and together a geographical coordinate system. The
symbolism thus constitutes the spatial order that culturally instructs people how to (re)structure their landscape. In a planned environment, people tend to situate things that are important and engaging in the front, on the right, to the top, and at the center. Changes of the coordinate system often signifies a value shift that the important and engaging foci no longer draw social attention. Such a switch of social foci evidently and dramatically emerges when the geographical coordinate system reverses.

In Quemoy, the reversal of its coordinate system has occurred four times since 1387. The fourth reversal of the coordinate system occurred in 1949, when the Chinese Nationalists militarized Quemoy against the communist military deterrence (Tsai 1999). The reversal resembled in Koxinga’s military resistance to the imperial rule in the second reversal, but went even further. Militarization in the modern total war not only induced the front-back reversal and the left-right relocation of the local center, but with its completion also produced a military landscape with rigid demarcations, pragmatic utility, and strict hierarchy. This chapter explores the landscape manifestation of Quemoy’s coordinate system’s last reversal after 1949 under militarization that has hitherto oriented the island to the mainland, and briefly discusses the current dissolution of the forth reversal under demilitarization.

3.1 A New Front toward the Mainland China

After China won the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Chinese nationalists turned their guns toward the communists. U.S. President Truman sent George Marshall to conciliate the conflict between the two major parties of the Republic of China (R.O.C.). Marshall spent a year in China, but left in failure in 1947. Upon his return, the U.S. government declared a non-intervention policy toward the Chinese domestic situation. The Chinese Civil War quickly burst out, and resulted in the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.). The war reached a deadlock in 1949 after the nationalist army won the battle of Guningtou 古寧頭 in Quemoy. By the victory, the nationalist troops successfully stopped the communist troops from advancing further, but the victory also separated Quemoy from the mainland. The arbitrary separation severed the traditional social ties between people in Quemoy and those in the mainland, and ripped apart the economic networks, the religious cults, and the kindred community between the two sides of Xiamen Bay.

Following the collapse of the social structure, the nationalist regime further imposed an antagonistic relationship upon Quemoyans toward the “communist bandits” on the other side of the waters. In an interview with a local historian, Huang, I asked how the Quemoy people today deal with the wartime memory when undertaking reconciliation with the people in the P.R.C., who as the former enemy had killed and injured their close ones in the conflicts and caused their suffering under the shellfire. To answer my question, Huang first pointed out a stranded community of Quemoyans in the mainland, suggesting the civilian impotence during the war and its arbitrariness: When the war burst out in 1949, a considerable number of Quemoy people then travelling in the mainland were involuntarily stranded on the communist side. They generally included three groups of people—first, war fugitives fleeing to the mainland during the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945); second, businessmen and employees working in the mainland before the Civil War (1947-1950); and third in rare cases, enlistees in the nationalist army. Due to the detention, many relatives or acquaintances of Quemoyans have long been in the

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19 Although the total of Quemoy people in the mainland today is unknown, estimates of those in the Fukien range from 4,000 (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 7th Feb. 2001) to 24,000 (Quemoy Daily, 23 Sep. 2004).

20 Several news reports concerning the reunion of people in the two sides illustrate this matter in details: See stories of Wu (Strait Weekly [Xiamen], 20 Jan. 2006), of Chiu (Quemoy Daily, 26 Jun. 2003), of Xu (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 7 Feb. 2001), and of Lin (Quemoy Daily, 9 Nov. 2004).
former “enemy” side since 1949. Mentioning the situation, he then asked, “how do you define [who is the] enemy?” (Huang 2004b). Today for the locals freed from the imposed relationship to the mainlanders, the “evil communist bandits 萬惡的共匪” appearing in the past nationalist slogans were ideological creation of the authoritative propaganda and McCarthyism (Figure 3.2). Huang reminiscently concluded his answer with a proverb: “Being a dog in a peaceful time is better than being a man in a chaotic period 寧為太平犬，不做亂世人. It [the war] was the great tragedy of the epoch 大時代的悲劇” (Huang 2004b). His answer suggested the local elite’s attitude toward the past conflict and the local common desire for peace through reconciliation with the mainland society. In order to undertake the reconciliation, he attributed the past suffering to the turbulent milieu of the anticommunist era, and alienated himself and his fellow Quemoyans from their involvement, if not contributions, in the war. He further totalized all participants in the warfare as victims of the epoch. In so doing, the discourse exempted the past enemy from their responsibility for the local suffering, and emancipated the local community from the antagonistic relationship. The oblivion and alienation therefore assisted the locals to transcend the past conflict in the new age of reconciliation.

The imposition of the binary opposition between we (patriotic civilians) and they (communist bandits) resembled the imperial dichotomy between the obedient subjects and the sea rovers in the late sixteenth century and Koxinga’s dichotomy between the Han nationalists and the un-Chinese invaders in the seventeenth century. As the conflicts constructed the group identities and vice versa the manipulation of identity politics sustained the belligerent condition, the similarities between these wars which caused reversals and dissolutions of the geographical coordinate system of Quemoy revealed a
Figure 3.2. A Slogan on the Folk House. The slogan read as “Annihilate the Evil Communist Bandits” showed on a wall of the folk house at the entrance of Oucuo 歐厝 village. When I visited the village in 2008, villagers covered the slogan with a new layer of white paint to disguise it, but the original words were still readable. [Source of the old photo: Firefly Image Company 1994]
tendency toward historical repetition. However, unlike the historical conflicts, the modern war did not allow the locals to simultaneously remain politically correct and exempt from taking one of the opposite identities. Strategic exercise of the both/and also and neither/nor identity in the pre-modern times was barely feasible when the involvement of civilians and combatants were equally necessary in the modern total warfare. Specifically in an isolated environment like Quemoy where the soldiers greatly outnumbered the civilian population, everyone in the island was under strict and mutual surveillance. The social Panopticon not only articulated the overwhelming totality of military rule over the individual and the local interests, but also ensured the locals to adapt to the identity of patriotic civilians manifested through their daily practice in accordance. The mobilized social synergy swiftly militarized the landscape in Quemoy and installed a reverse geographical coordinate system. The reversal, in comparison with those in the past, was the most thorough and readable one in terms of its landscape inscriptions as geographical statements.

The thorough militarization, which engendered the clarity of geographical statements, largely stems from the characteristics of modern total wars. The scope of war, in addition to the war pattern, also contributed to its thoroughness. Starting as a Chinese civil war, the confrontation in Quemoy over time turned into a conflict between the First and the Second World especially after the Korean War dragged the U.S. into the anti-communist theater (Figure 3.3). Quemoy thereby became an arena of the two global alliances during the Cold War period. On the situation Szonyi remarked (2008, 4):

Militarization on Jinmen [Quemoy] was closely interconnected to geopoliticization...[as] the ways in which life on Jinmen became connected to global politics...Jinnen was affected by outside events tied to international politics...The periodic bombings of the island were driven by issues that had little direct connection to Jinmen.
Figure 3.3. Quemoy in the Global Disposition of the Anti-communist Campaign. Like a wedge in the communist bloc, Quemoy was the front post of the US-led campaign on the Bamboo Curtain in 1954. [Source: Time 1955]
As a Cold-War front, the island’s affiliation became a global issue. To stop communist troops from advancing, the U.S. troops supported the nationalists’ effort to maintain their defenses in Quemoy. The U.S. support successfully contained the expansion of communists, and consequently incurred a series of conflicts taking place in Quemoy (Table 3.1). Among them, the last three were largely the Chinese communists’ reaction to the international containment policy. The military operations were thus not simply means to occupy territory but were tied up with geopoliticization.

Table 3.1. The Major Military Conflicts over Quemoy 1949-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Conflict</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Battle of Guningtou</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Landing operation</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>8,700 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis</td>
<td>1954-5</td>
<td>Intermittent shelling</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>189 civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Intensive shelling</td>
<td>44 days</td>
<td>222 civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. “Shelling on odd-numbered days; no shelling on even days”</td>
<td>1959-79</td>
<td>Shelling on alternate days</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>578 civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Statistics from Kuo 2010]

3.1.1 The U.S. Intervention and the American Aid Programs

After the battle of Guningtou that secured the nationalist control of Quemoy and Taiwan, the Chinese nationalists relocated their central government to Taipei in 1949. The next year the Korean War started, and completely changed the American policy toward Chinese Civil War. Truman issued a statement of the U.S. response to the Chinese communist military involvement in the Korean War (Truman 1979, 257):

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use
armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area . . . . Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . . The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

The Truman administration stretched the U.S. defense line in the east Pacific Rim to Taiwan, but did not include islands along the Chinese coast. Nonetheless the American intervention assisted the Chinese nationalist troops in Quemoy to undertake militarization, and the arrival of the seventh Fleet at the Taiwan Strait efficiently deterred aggression of the communist army. In addition, following the execution of the Marshall Plan, American aid officially entered Taiwan in 1951, and stabilized the political and social unrest under the looming shadow of wars. American intervention directed the confrontation to an equilibrium, which tentatively decreased the possible strikes from the communist army.

In the situation, the nationalist defensive strategy accordingly changed. Construction of temporary defenses in the coastal zone stopped, and the army started to root in the island. Using steel and cement provided by American aid, the soldiers in Quemoy embarked on construction of military infrastructures, pillboxes, barracks, and sentry posts on the strategic points on the island. In addition to the deployment and accommodations, American aid also relieved the shortage of military supplies. In the mid-1950s the estimate of nationalist troops in Quemoy amounted to 72,000, and in the late 1950s the total of soldiers had grown to 100,000 (Kallgren 1963, 38). As a small island with an approximate population of 50,000 civilians, the agriculture-based society could hardly provide sufficient necessities for the soldiers. The timely arrival of American aid helped

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21 Huang (2004b) indicated the influence of the American Aid program. When the soldiers first retreated to Quemoy in 1949, civilians had to provide them with everything. They fed the soldiers; lived together under the same roof; and worked for the army in construction of defenses. However, after the supplies of American aid arrived at Quemoy in 1954, soldiers' life became better than the civilians', and some of them would share their provisions with the local civilians.
the nationalist government in Taipei solve the problem and relieved the Quemoy locals from the unbearable burden.

The American Aid Program

The Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which respectfully managed the military and economic aid, were the two official organizations subjugated to the U.S. embassy in charge of the American Aid program. The U.S. government established the MAAG in Taipei in 1951 to manage the military aid provided for the nationalist troops to defend Taiwan, Pescadores, Quemoy, and Matsu. The MAAG mainly assisted the nationalist army in three ways. As the aided country submitted a list of requirements, the MAAG reviewed the requested weapons, equipment, and supplies, and remitted the list to the U.S. for approval (Scott 1951). Its veterans also assisted the nationalist army to familiarize them with American-supplied weapons, ranging from small firearms to battle vessels and aircraft and provided operational training and technical support. Its military consultants provided advice on the military strategy from the blueprint of the overall defensive plan to the tactics of a single skirmish. The MAAG had a subdivision in Quemoy—Kinmen Defense Command Advisory Team (KDCAT), which provided “expert advice and technical assistance” (Figure 3.4; Shor 1959, 420) to the stationed troops. Their tasks included monitoring the activities of the Communist army and reporting the intelligence of the troops in Quemoy to the headquarters in Taipei (Huang 2003, 70). Meanwhile, the ECA did similar work in the area of economic incentives. It examined and submitted a list of the requested aid to the U.S. for approval. The list of economic aid usually comprised a few major categories: first, material aid (including flour, medication, and
Figure 3.4. The KDCAT in Quemoy. A KDCAT officer in a gun emplacement lectured on shell fuses to the nationalist gun crew. [Source: Shor 1959]
fertilizer); second, heavy construction equipment; and third technical support. In addition to MAAG and ECA, the CIA also had a branch in Quemoy operating under the disguise of the West Enterprise Company during 1951-1954 (Weng 1991). The company trained and equipped the nationalist guerillas to conduct military operations behind the enemy lines, and to collect intelligence of the P.R.C. troops through the guerilla war. With CIA support, the nationalist guerillas launched a series of assaults on the southeast coast of China in the early 1950s. The CIA agents left Quemoy after the Korean War, but the guerillas they trained and equipped remained active in the 1960s. The American activities in Quemoy assisted the nationalist army in turning the island into a full-fledged battle station.

**The First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954**

As the soldiers fortified the island with American aid and advice taken from KDCAT, the Chinese nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, also intensively prepared to invade communist China. Although General MacArthur’s visit in 1950 to Taipei temporarily uplifted the nationalists’ aspiration for recovering the mainland China, their hopes faded away quickly, when President Truman dismissed MacArthur from his duty in 1951. Truman’s policy to retain the war inside Korea disillusioned the Chinese nationalist expectations to launch a full-scale general war in the mainland. In addition, Truman urged Chiang to surrender islands along the Chinese coast in order to neutralize Taiwan. By these political and diplomatic measures, the Truman administration successfully

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22 The MAAG and ECA commonly remained on the policy-making and the administrative level, but did not directly involve in implementation for their policies, which relied on the assistance from the American private sector. For example, the Civil Air Transport Inc. (CAT) headed by Claire Lee Chennault provided transportation for the supplies. The J. G. White Engineering Corporation, a New-York-based company, constructed the majority of infrastructures and industrial facilities in Taiwan.
stabilized the turmoil in the Far East, and prompted a cease-fire agreement that led to the 
Korean armistice and the end of the Korean War in 1953.

The U.S. adopted a containment policy toward the communist bloc by signing 
mutual security pacts with the free countries in Asia since the breakout of Korean War. 
The U.S. policy put the regimes of South Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan on notice 
that the global political climate did not favor their intentions to recover their original 
territories. For the three regimes, the policy solidified the political reality of the loss of 
these territories. In the meantime, the policy also secured their status quo as political 
entities. The Chinese communist leader, Mao Tse-Dong, knew that the American 
vitvement had blocked his chance to take over Taiwan, and the Chinese regime in 
Taiwan would contaminate the legitimacy of his regime and the credibility of his 
leadership. As the U.S. forces were the major obstacle to his conquest of the whole of 
China, further development of the cooperative partnership between America and Taiwan 
would frustrated his master plan. As a result, while John Dulles was signing the Manila 
Pact in 1954, Mao ordered his artillery to bombard Quemoy in hopes of influencing 
America’s interests in signing a similar treaty with Taiwan. Military historians recognized 
the incident as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, which lasted for nine months and consisted 
of several episodes (Figure 3.5).23

23 Military historians also mentioned other triggers for the episodic bombardment. In August 1954, 
Eisenhower, under the Anti-communist request, lifted the Seventh Fleet’s blockade to allow Chiang’s army 
to invade China. Chiang soon dispatched reinforcements to Quemoy and Matsu. In response to Chiang’s 
maneuver, Mao also intended to take the chance to “liberate” Taiwan. The bombardment against Quemoy in 
September 1954 was the prolog of this incident. (Pixley 2005, 12). Dreyer (1997) considered the 
bombardment as a decoy. The operation aimed to distract the nationalist attention from the communist real 
target—the Tachen Islands. In January 1955, the communist troops undertook their onslaught on a 
peripheral island of the Tachens—Ichiang— whose occupation extended their gun range over the 
islands of Tachen. Meanwhile, the communist navy also successfully blockaded the logistic line of the 
islands from Formosa, and the blockade forced the nationalist troops to retreat and to evict civilians in the 
islands in February 1955 (Dreyer 1997, 16).
Figure 3.5. A Timeline of the Episodes in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis

Figure 3.6. The Stalemate in the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait in 1955. After the nationalist troops retreated from the Tachen Islands in February 1955, Quemoy and Matsu were the only two offshore islands left for the nationalists. [Source: US News, 15 Apr. 1955]
In response to the bombardment, Eisenhower adopted a brinkmanship strategy to browbeat China with nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was not as supportive as Stalin was in the Korean War, and the Soviet indifference drove China to submit to the brinkmanship strategy. To express the stern American stance to defend Taiwan, Eisenhower asked John Foster Dulles to stop by Taipei on his way back to the U.S. from the SEATO meeting, and he signed the Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty with the regime in Taiwan in December 1954. Furthermore, in January 1955 both U.S. houses of Congress approved the Taiwan Resolution, which authorized the U.S. President to employ military intervention to defend Taiwan. Thereby Eisenhower openly announced his consideration of using nuclear bombs on mainland China (Figure 3.6). Before signing the mutual defense treaty, the Eisenhower administration asked Chiang to agree on two conditions: first, to surrender the islands along the Chinese coast to communists, and second not to invade China without notifying America in advance. Chiang agreed on the second condition, but he refused to surrender Quemoy and Matsu for the strategic and political considerations for his government in exile.24

Strategically, by the control of Quemoy and Matsu, the nationalists could push their front forward 173 miles to the mainland seaboards, and applied full control to the Taiwan Strait. The reins of Quemoy and Matsu therefore secured Taiwan as the rear base supplying the two fronts with provisions, personnel, and ammunition. Politically, the

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24 In two interviews with American reporters in March 1955, Chiang declared his decision on the Quemoy-Matsu issue. In the interview with Salzburg, he stated, “In any circumstances, our troop will not retreat from the offshore islands. . . It will be a mistake to expect our retreat from Quemoy and Matsu based on our withdrawal from the Tachens. We will indeed fight for the two islands” (Kuo 2003, 49). In another interview with Howard, he repeated, “With or without American support, the Republic of China will by all means defend Quemoy and Matsu regardless of any consequence” (Kuo 2003, 49). In a later interview with a UPI reporter, Miller, in January 1956, Chiang revealed his reason for holding the two islands. He remarked, “We will resolutely defend Quemoy and Matsu till death. We will not give an inch to the communists because Quemoy and Matsu are a part of the overall defense system of Taiwan” (Kuo 2003, 49).
value of Quemoy and Matsu signified that the governance of Chiang’s regime reached Fukien, a traditional territory of China, and subsequently continued Chiang’s legitimacy as the Chinese ruler. In other words, by the inclusion of Fukien territory under the R.O.C. sovereignty, Chiang defined the political reality as two regimes of one China, and renounced the “Two Chinas” scheme. Due to the symbolization, Chiang’s regime turned the two islands into its anti-communist sanctuaries, especially following its arduous victory in the battle of Guningtou in Quemoy. Noticing Chiang’s determination, Eisenhower eventually signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in March 1955, but the areas covered by the treaty excluded Quemoy and Matsu. The treaty nonetheless bought soldiers in Quemoy a few more years to prepare for the upcoming war, which was commonly termed as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (Pixley 2005).

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958

After the communist troops completed their preparation and deployment, they again intensively bombarded Quemoy on August 23rd in 1958 (Figure 3.7). In the first two hours of the bombardment, the communist artillery fired 57,533 projectiles at the island with an area of fifty-eight square miles. The bombardment lasted for forty-four days and a total of 444,423 projectiles landed on Quemoy. In a month, the artillery war caused 222 civilian casualties and demolished 1,918 civilian houses (Kuo 2010). On October fifth, the communist artillery ceased fire for two weeks and announced their subsequent rule of engagement that they would shell Quemoy on every odd number date. The form of engagement, termed as “shelling on odd-numbered days; no shelling on even days 單打雙不打,” lasted for twenty years until the U.S. and the P.R.C. established official diplomatic relations in 1978. Although the P.R.C. guns mainly fired propaganda shells in the twenty-one-year shelling on odd number days, they still caused considerable
Figure 3.7. Deployment of the Communist Batteries during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Unlike those in the First Crisis, the gun range of communist artillery in the Second Crisis covered the whole island and the Liaolo (Laulo) Bay. Consequently, there were no safe places in the island. The situation urged the movement of building underground facilities during the post-war reconstruction. [Source: Shor 1959]

casualties and destruction. Together with the forty-four-day August 23rd bombardment, the twenty-one-year shelling caused eight-hundred civilian casualties (162 dead; 638 injured) and demolished 9,053 houses in Quemoy. Some folk villages, such as Guntingtou, were nearly leveled to the ground by the August 23rd bombardment, and continuously exposed to the random threats of propaganda shells after reconstruction.

Nonethless, the destruction and the casualties were not the worst consequence of the artillery wars, but the life under constant threat for twenty-one years mattered. The communist rule of engagement practically meant that their artillery would not shell Quemoy on even number dates, but might or might not do so on the odd number dates.
However, after midnight of an even number date the communist artillery could strike anytime. As a result, people in Quemoy could only sleep soundly in the first half of the night on an even number date and in the latter half on an odd number day. When the confrontation turned intensive between the two sides, the locals would sleep in the air-raid shelter every night. No one knew the exact what time of the day and how many times a day the communist artillery would strike. The shelling then greatly affected the local daily life, and forced the locals to adapt to the battlefield life under shellfire. For example, to discern different sounds that projectiles made through the air was a necessary survival skill for the locals because these sounds could inform them of how near the projectiles might strike. With the knowledge of the potential impact distance, they then could decide to disregard the shelling or to rush to nearby shelters.

The intense barrage in 1958 sought to force the nationalist troops in Quemoy to surrender, and the communist artillery also employed the fierce shelling as a way to blockade the island from the nationalist logistics from Taiwan. After the inception of the crisis, the Eisenhower administration promptly responded (Szonyi 2008, 71):

President Eisenhower ordered an increase in military aid transfers to the ROC (including artillery capable of firing atomic weapons) and the reinforcement of the Seventh Fleet . . . [said as] the “largest nuclear navy” ever assembled in the history. With the escort of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the nationalist supply convoys successfully broke through the embargo barrages and supplied the troops in Quemoy. The American-aided heavy artillery (M115 howitzers) also enabled the nationalist soldiers to effectively retaliate and suppress the communist fire, and therefore the nationalists have often considered the American aid as the determining factor of the defense’s success of Quemoy in the crisis. Since the first blast of the crisis, political figures in the U.S.-led alliance of the First World urged Chiang to surrender Quemoy and Matsu. In the
international political climate, the increase in U.S. military aid was actually a trade for Chiang’s renouncement to invade the mainland China in a Sino-American communiqué (Chi and Chen 2003, 14). Achieving the diplomatic victory, Mao then ordered his troops to stop the intensive shelling but to shell Quemoy on alternate days to symbolically continue the engagement as a warning to Taiwan and the U.S.

In addition, the international urge to neutralize Taiwan by surrendering the two offshore islands on the Chinese coast also influenced Mao’s ceasefire decision. In both Mao’s and Chiang’s understanding, the two offshore islands were the connection of their two regimes and “[t]he ROC presence on Jinmen [Quemoy] was a reminder that both regimes agreed there was only ‘One China’ that would one day be reunified” (Szonyi 2008, 72). Consequently, either side of the Taiwan Strait would not want the connection relinquished, and, as Szonyi commented, Mao’s ultimate objective of shelling Quemoy was not to capture the island (2008, 73):

As a symbolic link between Taiwan and the mainland, [nationalist] abandonment of the island would be a setback to the goal of preventing permanent separation of the two regimes on either side of the Taiwan Strait. If Jinmen [Quemoy] fell to the PLA [communist troops], “Two Chinas” would be one step closer to reality.

The artillery war that did not aim for a military conquest became an eccentric way for both the regimes to maintain the integrity of their statehood against the international intervention. Likewise, the following alternate-day shelling, a symbolic warfare, also sought to employ military operations to achieve political goals. Therefore, when Eisenhower visited Taipei in 1960, the communist artillery fiercely bombarded Quemoy for three consecutive days, and claimed the shelling was their tokens of welcome and farewell to his visit to Taiwan (Kuo 2010).
Significance of War History in the Age of Reconciliation

Recent studies of the Cold War attribute the crises in Quemoy to international, especially Sino-American, diplomacy and high politics (e.g. Chi and Chen 2003; Jiang 2005; Lee 2005; Szonyi 2008), circulation of knowledge in the age of reconciliation avails the local society against past antagonisms. In recent years, due to the demarcation in the post-Cold-War period, information of the militarized past of Quemoy has become available for researchers. The sensitive and classified documentation in the past concerning the diplomacy and high politics also become accessible, and local interviewees are comparatively at ease and willing to relate their personal experiences during the time of military rule (1949-1992). The availability of these sources of information has initiated a trend of Cold War studies in Quemoy. From the populace’s perspective, these studies of Cold-War Quemoy deliberately weave a past by the collective memory, and challenge the conventional history that they consider serving as the handmaid of nationalist pedagogy (Jiang 2007).

The shift of authorship in the historical narratives from high politics to civilian life brings out a contrasting interpretation of the past. The conventional narratives of the Cold-War Quemoy emphasize the patriotism showing in the collaborative efforts between the local populace and the military and how they eagerly engaged in the anticommunist struggle. Together, they single-mindedly defeated the national enemy and helped each other through predicaments under the enemy threats (see Xu 1996). By contrast, portraying the daily life in a battlefield where the military supremacy and the national hegemony prevailed, narratives in post-Cold-War studies describe the commoners’ powerlessness to resist the military labor levy, property requisition, and strict control over their daily life. While stating their involuntary compliance with the military governance
now, most interviewees also express their understanding of the necessity for civilian mobilization and the emergent measures taken on the brink or under the threats of war (see Xu 2000).

Incorporating information from the two sources, studies of the Cold-War Quemoy (e.g. Chi and Chen 2003; Szonyi 2008) largely present participants in the state-orchestrated anticommmunist struggle as chess pieces manipulated by an invisible hand of the high politics: Civilians acted upon orders of mobilization form the military hierarchical system, which implemented the national strategies contingent on the global politics. By stating that Mao did not intend to occupy Quemoy to avoid “Two Chinas” and Chiang had also secretly given up retaking China to trade for American protection, Chi and Chen comment, “The civilians and soldiers in Quemoy were involuntarily put on the gambling table [as bargaining chips] for the regimes on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to play a Cold-War game 金門的百姓與守軍被迫上了賭台陪兩岸政治體玩一場冷戰遊戲” (2003, 16). Instead of holding everyone in the total war responsible for the suffering and hardships, institutionalization of the past excuses civilians and soldiers in Quemoy from the responsibility for their collective creations that constituted, in Huang’s (2004b) words, “the great tragedy of the times.”

As the (pre)tension that the high politics between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained was a carefully calibrated performance (Szonyi 2008), the efforts that the soldiers and mobilized civilians made to the militarization after the 1960s becomes ironic. Their collaborative preparation against the communist invasion is futile from the beginning since their anticommmunist struggle could not change the political and territorial status quo. Likewise, due to the prearrangement of high politics, the value of their sacrifice, as they believed then, for their nation and other sublime causes—for example,
to rescue the suffering compatriots under the communist oppression—was denied beforehand. Even if the militarization and their praxes of the civil religion of nationalism are teleologically meaningless for any political and military achievement, the militarized past is of critical significance to the soldiers and the locals in Quemoy. Especially for the locals, much of their life memory is constructed upon the communal experience under the forty-three-year military rule in the battlefield. To rest their past in geopoliticization that brought the meaningless tragedy upon them is to vanish their selves in nihility. For the reason, it is therefore essential for the post-conflict society to redefine its past in order to move forward.

By painting the past as a tragedy, the prevailing appeasement today redefines the significance of the Cold-War past, and proposes that the local experience of war should have provided lessons about its ruthlessness and the valuableness of peace (Dong and Huang 2007; Kinmen National Park 2005; Lee 2006). As one of the major proponents, Jiang remarks on the trend of the Cold-War study in Quemoy (2007, 149),

I think it is extremely essential to advocate narrating the war memory for the time being. Only through the process of reinterpreting the history, the civil society in Quemoy can have opportunities to review their own past; to retrospect the cruelty of war; and sequentially to detach from the historical tragedy.

In his view, narrating and writing about the past are ways to depart from the tragedy rather than to sustain it. In re-narrating the past, a new translation of the battlefield experience, apart from patriotism, is necessary. As the meaning of the past is now commonly construed as a reassertion of the valuableness of peace (see Kuo 2008a; Lin 2005), the reinterpretation then facilitates reconciliation and assists the locals in Quemoy to demilitarize their past.
3.1.2 The Front-Back Deployment of the Militarized Quemoy

Accounting for the militarization of Quemoy, Chang has once used a metaphor to describe Quemoy as a “big military camp” where the sense of place resides in (2008, 67), the orderly arranged roadside trees, clean streets, and straight avenues. Military stations guard the periphery of every village, while the interiors of villages are monitored [by civil defense] in the village halls. There are many things that the Quemoy locals cannot do nor possess. These phenomena are similar to those only found in a military camp.

As described, the militarization in Quemoy appears in three elements: construction of military facilities, mobilization of civil defense, and regulation of daily life. In addition to the regular military structures, construction of military facilities includes installation of infrastructures that sustain the troops in Quemoy and facilitate their operation. As the military laid out its infrastructure, their installation inaugurated modernization of Quemoy, and its process, according to Jiang, resembled in the “one of ‘colonial modernity’ . . . established upon the structure of absolute authority of military rule” (2005, 21). The road network was the most palpable landscape manifestation of militarization for it connected military stations in the island to form a collaborative defense network, and its design made the transportation infrastructure a part of the defense system (Figure 3.8). To enhance mobility and efficiency, the military engineers designed a road network for Quemoy that was the densest among all counties in the R.O.C. (Yang B. 2010), and kept the alignment of major traffic arteries in as a straight line as possible. The intersections of routes often took the form of a traffic circle, at the center of which a cylindrical pillbox or a monument was the common visual foci. These centerpiece structures would block the sight of incoming traffic. In addition, to disorient intruders, these intersections often adopted a misaligned layout so that the avenues obliquely converged on the traffic circle and were not in line with one another (Figure 3.9). For the same purpose, there were no
Figure 3.8 (A.B.C). The Road Network in Quemoy. Straight avenues and traffic circles are the characteristics of the road network in Quemoy. At the centers of these traffic circles were military monuments or bunkers.

Figure 3.9. The Misaligned Layout of the Traffic Circles in Quemoy. Avenues obliquely converging on the traffic circle and share similar streetscape. The centerpiece blocked eyesight of automobilists moving around the bunker. The design of traffic circles aims to disorient outsiders.
direction signs and mileposts, and most of the street trees were monotonously the same species to create a labyrinth. The pillboxes were designed with a machine-gun emplacement atop and rifle embrasures at the eye-level aligning the axes of the convergent roads. The soldiers stationed in the pillboxes would monitor the traffic on the straight avenues heading to the intersection. By these designs, the military engineers incorporated the road system into the overall defense plan of Quemoy. Likewise, establishment of other infrastructure during the time of military rule also enhanced military considerations, and aimed to facilitate military operations. Through these constituent infrastructure elements, the military could thoroughly militarize Quemoy.

The construction of the military facilities concentrated on the establishment of coastal defense and an underground tunnel networks. Since the late 1940s, troops in Quemoy had established and managed coastal defenses. Their long-term efforts resulted in a well fortified coastline. Estuaries and lagoons with their outlets sealed off by embankments became water reservoirs. All ports, except a few on the west and south shores that remained in use for transportation to Leiyu and Taiwan, were abandoned (Figure 3.10). Vertically from the tidal zone to the uplands, anti-landing devices, stone walls along the beach edges, minefields in the coastal shrubbery, and military posts atop the sea cliffs are common landscape features in the Quemoy coast (Figure 3.11). Surrounding the military positions, barbed wire, shattered glass implanted on rocks, thorny plants, and occasionally moats are common elements to reinforce the island’s defense (Figure 3.12). The vast majority of the seafront military structures were bunkers stationed with infantry and nearby subordinate sentry posts. These concrete fortresses, often designed with multifaceted walls with embrasures toward the sea and beach, guarded the final line of the coastal defense (Figure 3.13). They were distributed densely
Figure 3.10. The Ports and Water Reservoirs in Quemoy. The military constructed embankments to seal off the topographical gaps, and ordered port abandonment on the north shore. Both measures facilitated the coastal defense, while the construction of ports on the southern shore strengthened ties with Taiwan. [Source: photo by the author; map remade by the author; base map by Ministry of the Interior, R.O.C. 2007]
A defense wall on the north shore extends out from the ramparts of the military compound. It blocks the way of enemy marines and also controls villagers’ access to the sea.

A waning sign on the barbwire in front of a cactus bush appears on the roadside. Minefields are common defense measures surrounding the military compound on a sandy beach.

Anti-landing sticks are also common defenses in the intertidal flats ideal for landing. They were made of segments of rails with one end sharpened and the other mounted on a concrete base to pierce the bottom landing crafts. [photo by the author]
Figure 3.12. Common Defenses of Military Compounds on the Rocky Beaches. Shattered glass and barbed wire are two popular defenses on the rocky beach. Soldiers use cement as adhesive to attach shattered glass on the rocks around their compound. Behind the area of broken glass are obstacles consisting of layers of barbed wire. Sisals and cactuses growing over stone walls and surveillance posts form natural barriers and provide disguise. [photo by the author]
Fig. 3.13. Bastions of the Coastal Fortification. Oftentimes, one will find bastions projecting out under a seafront cliff. They guard segments of narrow sandy shores with their gun embrasures on the multi-faceted bastion walls pointing to all directions of the beach. The seafront military posts usually contained a squad or a platoon position to enable a dense disposition along the coastline since the goal is to guard the entire north and western shores that are mainly sandy beaches. [photo by the author]
along the north and east shore of Quemoy, while the west shore beyond Leiyu and the south shore facing the Taiwan Strait were less intensively guarded.

In addition to the infantry bunkers, the north and south shore, due to their relative positions to the mainland, each became sites ideal for specific facilities. The north shore with a view of the enemy was ideal for observation and broadcast stations. On the northeast corner of Quemoy, the projecting tombolo, Mashan 马山, is the closest location to the mainland and one of the settings for these facilities. Due to its short distance to the P.R.C. territory—1,800 meters on the ebb—an observation station and a broadcast station were located on the island. Also for the proximity to the mainland, the northwest corner of Quemoy was the location of the other broadcast station. The two broadcast stations were apparatus of psychological warfare, and through arrays of loudspeakers embedded on walls erected at the seaside soft female voices resonate in the air to the P.R.C. troops in the seaboards along Xiamen bay. To maximize the effect of propaganda, the military set the facilities on the forefront to allow the voices to reach to the mainland.

Compared with the north shore which was heavily populated with infantry, the south shore of Quemoy harbored a greater diversity of troops. As materiel for the troops in Quemoy depended on the cross-strait transportation from Taiwan, ports and the airfield were all located on the south shore facing the Taiwan Strait. One of the assignments of the infantry stationed on the south shore was to collaborate with the navy and air force in Quemoy to defend these facilities and to secure the supply lines. For this purpose, these infantry positions were heavily armed with artillery or tanks to defend against enemy maritime vessels. Due to the location of ports, the logistics corps also stationed a motor transport company on the south shore to distribute the unloaded materiel. Besides the
logistics troops, the infantry, the navy and the air force, the artillery and the frogmen also had the positions on the south shore. Not only the distance from the mainland made the south shore a relative secure site for logistics troops and transportation facilities, but its position beyond Mt. Taiwu and Leiyu also provided geographical protection for the southern Quemoy to allow the deployment of the non-combat facilities and those of anti-aircraft artillery. For the same geographical advantages, hospitals, warehouses, training facilities, shooting ranges, and the bases of reserve troops were largely located on the southern, especially the southeastern, Quemoy.

Behind the coastal defenses, most military facilities deployed on the second line were artillery troops. Their positions usually hid behind highlands near the coast so that their gun could reach further into the mainland while the geography concealed their locations from any retaliating shelling. Also on the second line were company headquarters occupying strategic points. While coordinating subordinate platoons and squads sent out to guard the coastline, officers commanded a portion of the company’s force to defend its own position on the second line. Further inland the higher ranking officers resided in central Quemoy. The general rule of deployment constituted a systematic defense network in Quemoy and thereby embodied a military hierarchy in its landscape.

Before demilitarization, the army had stationed at least three divisions of troops in Quemoy besides those directly under the command of the Quemoy Defense Headquarter (QDH). In the western half of Quemoy, the army consistently maintained a division of defense forces, while in the eastern half two divisions was respectively stationed in the northeast and southeast Quemoy. Each of the three divisions commanded three infantry brigades as the defense forces and other subordinate troops of other military occupations
such as those in charge of assaulting operations, combat service support operations, and so on. The three infantry brigades dispersed in their division’s defense area each guarded a portion of it, while the division headquarter at the center guarded the core area. In the same manner, battalions under the same brigade also had their assigned areas of defense surrounding their brigade headquarter. The ramification of defense responsibility and of defense areas further applied to the military units of lower tiers, namely companies and platoons, and resulted in a branched structure of the defense system (Figure 3.14). In the structure, the military headquarters of all ranks, from the DQH to a company headquarter, are situated at the branching points in a manner that the higher the ranking of the headquarters, the further away from the coast their positions were. The QDH as the core of the branch structure commands all the army troops in Quemoy through the defense

Figure 3.14. A Model of the Defense System in Quemoy. The hierarchical system spreads roots into the entire island to make sure that it is well-defended, and meanwhile is under the total control of the military. The core and sphere denote respectively for the locations of headquarters and their wartime defense areas. [Source: by the author]
system. The landscape of Quemoy therefore is enforced with a rigid, utilitarian, and hierarchical order that articulates the military culture.

By the deployment of troops, the military reversed the front and back of Quemoy. The newly formed front of Quemoy, facing the mainland to counter the P.R.C. military deterrence, replaced the one of the past few centuries on the south shore defending hostile parties from the sea. The concentration of coastal defense on the north coast blocked off the water traffic and the traditional connections between Quemoy and the seaboard areas along Xiamen Bay. In exchange, the construction of modern port facilities and the deployment of logistics troops on the south shore manifested the establishment of a new connection with Taiwan after 1949. With the reversal of fronts, the mainland became the outside, the territory of Others, while Taiwan across the Strait became the inside supporting troops and people in Quemoy to proceed with the military struggle in the forefront. The reposition of orientation reflected the changing external relationships between Quemoy and its surrounding areas, and meanwhile initiated an internal (re)organization of a multi-layered defense system of Quemoy.

3.2 Construction of the Inside Quemoy

As an island the natural settings of Quemoy predetermined its inside and outside demarcation along the coastline, and the defense system established after the reversal further consolidated the spatial demarcation. Due to the small size of Quemoy, a major purpose of the defense deployment was to bog down the invading enemies and logistical communication. The military deployment therefore formed defense lines encompassing the QDH inside in a hierarchical order. The arrangement produced internal layers of the structural defense network, and consequently highlighted the inside of Quemoy.
3.2.1 Reformulation of the Overall Configuration

The application of multiple layers of defense on Quemoy was a novel praxis in the modern times. Previously defense forces concentrated on the coastline to form a single and strong front line. Implementation of the modern strategy gave prominence to the inside as the core of the defense system, and spurred development inside Quemoy. The Taiwu Range as the spine of the island stretched from central Quemoy to the island’s eastern end, and divided its eastern half into two quarters. Headquarters of the Eastern Quemoy Division were to the east while headquarters of the Southern Quemoy (aka Nanxiong 南雄) Division occupied the southern flank of the range. Formerly, the headquarters of the Central Quemoy Division was on the west end of the range before the military reorganization in 1984. Surrounded by these division headquarters was the QDH in the middle of the range. Situated on the southern hillsides of the range the command centers were protected from shelling, and their concentration drew clusters of military facilities, infrastructure installations, and administrative personnel to the highlands.

Due to the defense buildup, the barren, rocky area that had thitherto remained underdeveloped turned into the political center of Quemoy, and usurped the role formerly played by southwestern Quemoy from 1387. In addition, militarization of Quemoy also influenced the pre-existing economic structure. Before formation of the defense system in the 1950s, the port cities, Hopu, in southwestern Quemoy was the major economic center because it served as the point of attachment for the prosperous treaty port, Amoy, which served west Quemoy. As Quemoy’s economy increasingly relied on the military after militarization, the economic center of Quemoy accordingly moved to the area with military concentration. Eastern Quemoy, with the three divisions of defense forces and the garrison of the DQH, accommodated a great proportion of the total troops in the
island. The large military population therein shifted the economic center from the southwest to the new town, Xinshi 新市, in southeastern Quemoy. The relocation of the economic center then synchronized with the change of the insular front and back, and the new economic center happened to be on the right (east) side of the new orientation. With the shifts of front and back as well as left and right, the modern precept of military defense brought forth an innovative configuration of Quemoy. These landscape changes induced by militarization thereby presented the reversed geographical coordinate system.

3.2.2 Development of the Underground Inside

When war consisted of intensive bombardments from 1954 to 1960, the garrison in Quemoy modified their defenses in response to the new type of warfare. Construction of semi-underground and underground defenses supplemented soldiers’ regular duties, and their endeavors to transfer the military facilities underground created another dimension of inside Quemoy. The most representative work of the sort was the DQH in Mt. Taiwu, where the military took advantage of its granitic geology as the natural air-raid shelter. The military moved all critical military facilities, ranging from small ammunition depots to the wartime command center with nearly eight-hundred seats into these granitic caves underground, and thereby constructed an underground labyrinth with few entrances in the mountain valleys. Numerous underground tunnels connected the excavated caves at different depths, and the subterranean thoroughfares penetrating though the mountain served as the routes for tank troops. Consequently, the militarization of Mt. Taiwu formed a network linking up the division headquarters around the hilly area with the DQH. While the QDH ordinarily collected its forces in the underground chambers, the tunnel network inside Mt. Taiwu enabled these forces to effectively reach out as reinforcements. Due to the advantages of defense and incompatibility with agricultural
use, the area of Mt. Taiwu that had largely remained undeveloped before militarization became the ideal site for military facilities.

In addition to Mt. Taiwu, the military also constructed underground facilities in the low hills on the outer rings of the multi-layered defense system. Since rocky hills were mostly undeveloped land outside villages, these strategic highlands became preferable sites for military stations, which consisted partly of underground structures. Their prevalence in Quemoy reached an extent that, as Huang commended, “in the early 1960s, as long as the military stations were built in the granitic terrain, there were constructions of underground tunnels in the bedrock in process” (2003, 93). Apart from infantry stations, artillery positions were one of the common facilities taking advantage of the bedrock-exposed hills in Quemoy. Entrances of these underground facilities were generally on the inside behind the hills, while gun embrasures aiming toward the mainland were dispersed on the outside of the hills. Branched shaped tunnels connected the entrances and the underground gun emplacement chambers (Figure 3.15). By the design, only the gun emplacements were exposed to the threat of enemy fire, which if hit through an embrasure would only cost a gun emplacement on a branch of the position. The design therefore maximized the defense effects, and minimized the risk from enemy fire. Like artillery positions, landing sites for supplies on the south shore where the materiel arrived were the other target of enemy fire. To ensure successful delivery, the military embarked on the construction of underground docks (Figure 3.16), so that the carrying vessels (LCM or LCVP) could transport supplies from their mother ships to the docks in the granitic caves. From there, the garrison then moved supplies through series of stairways to the grounds behind the hills on the inside of the island. These facilities in the granitic terrain, due to their essential function, attracted converging enemy fire, and
Fig. 3.15. An Artillery Tunnel. The entrance of the artillery tunnel is constantly on the inside behind the hill while its gun-emplacement chambers on the outside rim of the hillfoot. The curvy main (communication) tunnel and its sub-tunnels stretching outward connect the entrance and the peripheral gun-emplacement chambers. Both the curvy tunnel design and the tree-shape layout can reduce the impact and damage by the blast of retaliatory fire. [photo by the author]
Figure 3.16. An Underground Dock for Carrying Vessels. A long stairway connects the underground tunnel to the ground facilities behind the coastal hill. The tunnel can harbor sixty-eight small carrying vessels (LCVP) to unload the supply along the A-shape layout of the channels. Due to the resonant effect in the tunnel, KNP has held a few concerts of classic music therein with the band playing on a barge drifting along the water channel. [Source: photo by the author]
therefore required well fortified positions to withstand the shelling. The endeavor to excavate and mold the granitic caves and tunnels into military use not only created a series of impregnable strongholds but popular tourist attractions after demilitarization due to their ingenuity and sublimity in construction.

In contrast to the military facilities in the rocky hills that took advantage of the protective granitic chambers, installations located in other geological settings, mainly laterite, resorted to the thick reinforced concrete walls to withstand shellings. The military compounds in the areas of earthen hills were usually a combination of tunnels, communication trenches, semi-underground bunkers, and aboveground structures with camouflage. Their layout in the compound closely collaborated with the topography, and important structures were often partially embedded in or covered with earth.

Application of the same defense measures also occurred in the civilian domain. After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, construction of public air-raid shelters initiated the underground facilities for folk villages. Subsequently, the development of underground facilities coincided with the organization of combat villages, by which the military turned the folk villages into quasi-military compounds. A combat village as the basic tactical unit of civil defense consisted of a few small folk villages or a large single one. In these villages, tunnels connected air-raid shelters, folk houses, public buildings, and bunkers on the periphery of villages to form an underground network that enabled the efficient maneuvering of the militia defending their own villages, while providing shelters for the non-combat personnel. For this purpose, the military further commanded the militia to excavate underground command centers, weapon caches, food storage, and wells to sustain the militia in a long-term defense. Consequently, if enemy troops intended to capture a combat village, they would have to break through the defenses on the periphery.
of the village; pacify the resistance in the streets inside the village; and eradicate the reserves underground. The combat village thereby comprised three layers of defenses supporting each other (Dong and Hung 2007). Through the underground tunnels, the militia could synchronically support the two other battle venues in the streets inside the village and on the village borders. The underground structures by linking up with the two other defense deployments considerably enhanced the defensive strength of the combat villages. These underground facilities were essentially the hard-core defenses of the villages. With the development of civil defense, the spatial demarcations of the civilian domain appeared, especially when the multi-layered defenses clearly separated the inside and outside on the ground and created another dimension of the deep inside of the folk villages underground. Militarization of the civilian domain thus consolidated the spatial prepositions by the twofold inside.

3.3 Militia and the Civilian Life in the War Zone

Militarization in Quemoy was certainly not limited to the landscape, but well extended to the brains and bodies of the Quemoy natives in the form of biopower which “regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it” (Hart and Negri 2000, 23-4). The bio-political production in Quemoy mainly relied on mobilization of the civil defense and regulation of daily life. The two approaches to implement social disciplinarity, “[p]utting this society to work and ensuring obedience to its rule and its mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion,” (Hart and Negri 2000, 23) subsequently militarized bodies and minds of the population.

3.3.1 Establishment of the Militia: Marching Quemoy to a Disciplinary Society

The militia in Quemoy was not formally founded until the martial government conducted a census in the 1950s. After the military acquired the exact number of the
able-bodied men and women in every village, they were obligated to serve. The military government mandated men over sixteen and under fifty-five and single women over sixteen and under thirty-five in the combat villages to serve in the militia. Among them, teenagers between sixteen and seventeen and adult males over forty-five served in the reserve militia. Adolescents between twelve and fifteen, married women, and healthy men over fifty-five, although were not officially conscripted, were required to support the militia. As a result, the vast majority of the islanders collectively shared the experience of military life, and all received standard military training from veterans that the military assigned to their villages as drillmasters. Xu (1999) indicated that on New Year’s Day in 1953 the chief commander of the QDH reviewed 5,000 militiamen in a parade in Quemoy, while in 1955 the population of the whole island totaled 40,782. By the fact, the military in 1953 had already turned one eighth of the local population into crack militia troops, and established a disciplinary society in Quemoy.

The general training program for the militia comprised operational practice and political/psychological education. The former aimed to familiarize trainees with the military basics—making/changing formations, simple martial art moves, bayonet-fighting techniques, small arms maintenance, marksmanship, and so on. Besides the field exercise, the trainees spent an equivalent time on political education, which aimed to strengthen the militiamen’s anti-communist beliefs and to prevent the infiltration of the fifth column. The militia held the annual training twice a year with a total of ninety-six training hours and the regular training with two or three terms that each lasted for three months. During the regular training, militiamen reported to their drillmasters two days a week for four days.

25 In the early period of the militia, only parenthood could exempt women from the militia duty, but concomitant with transformation of the conflict into a cold war, the change of confrontation patterns excused all married young women in Quemoy from the militia duty (Xu 1999).
hours of training in the morning (Xu 1999). The drillmasters would lead the militiamen through drill repetitions with emphases on the defense of villages. In addition to the training, the military also requested that the militia participate in military exercises, which usually took three or four days every half a year, to enhance the collaboration between the military and the civil defense. Altogether, the training and the war games would take nearly two months from the islanders’ engagement in their livelihood. Nonetheless, due to the loose schedule of these militia duties, which were widely dispersed in a calendar year, Quemoy locals were constantly involved in the military activities. The military enactment gradually blended with everyday practices and became a fundamental aspect of the local life.

3.3.2 Capillaries of Militarization: Regulation of the Daily Life

Since the battle of Guningtou turned Quemoy into a warzone, Chiang’s regime imposed martial law on the island to maintain military rule. In the subsequent forty-three years, enforcement of the law isolated Quemoy from the rest of the world, but allowed only the military personnel and, in some cases, civilians with official permits to enter or leave the island. The military government ruled the insular environment for a single purpose: to construct the island into an exclusive military stronghold. Due to the military superiority, achievement on other ends along the process of militarization, such as socioeconomic development, were at best welcome byproducts or contingencies in fulfilling the ultimate purpose (Szonyi 2008, 146). Under prevailing circumstances, the economy in Quemoy, without foreign markets, relied heavily on military consumption (Jiang 2005; Yang and Hsing 2001). As the inhabitants built their lives around the military, it in turn controlled Quemoy’s political, social, and economic realms. More significantly, the militarized economy provided a cultural hotbed for the development of capillaries of
militarization that “fed and molded social institutions seemingly little connected to the battle” (Lutz 2002, 724). Drawing on Lutz’s insight into the cultural effect of militarization, it is possible to see that the military regulation of daily life extended over the surveillance and police activities, and encompassed the underlying control, grounded in the everyday practice.

Battlefield Management: Indexical Performance of Militarization

In addition to the militia duties and the shelling on alternate days, the local activities in Quemoy that helped to define its geographical identity as a war zone stemmed from the regulation of daily life. From standard measures of battlefield management (e.g. curfew, movement/travel restrictions, mail inspections) to miscellaneous constraints on petty activities (e.g. prohibition of swimming and enforcement of military etiquette), the military government exerted totalitarian controls over Quemoy (enforcement of military etiquette see Chang 2008; others see Chi and Chen 2003; Dong and Huang 2007; Huang 2003; Jiang 2005; Jiang 2007; Xu 1999). The arbitrary power bolstered military supremacy and ensured the seclusion of Quemoy from outside reach. Enforcement of these regulations disciplined the local population to submit to the military control, and simultaneously imposed an authoritarian military ethos on the social mechanisms in Quemoy. As bodies became the depository of social orders, the disciplining/disciplined practice produced spaces where militarization bodily took place, and where the sense of battlefield experientially revealed itself in the everyday life. The omnipresence of militarization articulated by the daily routines, such as traffic control around bunkers, was largely why Chang (2008) as a Quemoy native compared her home island to a “big military camp.”
The Immanent Control: Cultural Effect of Militarization

Nonetheless, constitution of the disciplined society also works discreetly in an immanent and spontaneous manner that regulates the local daily life without perceptible coercion and sometimes even awareness of control. The regime of power as Foucault indicated is Biopower (Hart and Negri 2000, 24):

When power becomes entirely biopolitical, the whole social body is comprised by power’s machine and developed in its virtuality. This relationship [between power and the social body] is open, qualitative, and affective. Society, subsumed within a power that reaches down to the ganglia of the social structure and its processes of development, reacts like a single body. Power is thus expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of social relations.

From the first gunshot of the battle of Guningtou, the nationalist army unceasingly utilized the looming and lingering shadow of war to motivate the Quemoy locals to surrender themselves to militarization. Such was what the drillmasters preached during the militia training that militarization was the only salvation for everyone in the island standing in the face of war (Chen 2003). The military deterrence from the mainland greatly incapacitated resistance to the militarization, and the life under shellfire also encouraged voluntary affiliation with the military. Apparently, the voluntariness for military enactment presented merely an adaptive strategy to survive the confrontation, if one disregarded the underlying discourses prompting such an action. This is to say that when the nationalist regime preconditioned the binary opposition and held Quemoyan hostage in the same anticommunist boat, the fabrication of discourses allowing the “mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion” to work in the local social life had proceeded (Hart and Negri 2000, 23). The discourses of nationalist civil religion presupposed righteousness of its cause of war, and demonized communists as the public enemies who would harm not only the nationalist proponents but also the general public. It was on the
basis of such a priori knowledge derived from the nationalist discourses that the
voluntariness for military enactment in Quemoy could carry any significance.
Furthermore, it was also by identification of the apriority concealed by the nationalist
discourses that the visage of biopower emerged like the tip of the iceberg from the
taken-for-granted institution.

As an observable form of biopower, militarization in Quemoy, besides construction
of a semiotic structure to attach meanings to the military matters, culturally insinuates
itself into the local social life to ensure its reproduction. Given the insinuation, the form
of power “is thus expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the
consciousnesses and bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of
social relations” (Hart and Negri 2000, 24). As such, militarization is, rather than merely
bound to militia matters or to the military control on the everyday practices, much more
far-reaching that its economic and cultural effect comprehensively integrates into all
aspects of the social life. Thereby, militarization works on Quemoy not only by the
hierarchical defense system in the landscape but also through its immanent engagements
in the local society. In order to survive the warfare, the social synergy conducted by the
biopower constitutes, in the daily life, particular livelihoods of combat economy and local
knowledge. Development of the knowledge and formation of the economy corresponds to
the locals’ best interests. Unlike militia duties and regular control through surveillance,
the epistemological development and the economic formation happen spontaneously for
the locals to better adapt to the battlefield. Inasmuch as militarization preconditions all
social relations, their expressive performance (signifying) and the reflexive landscapes
(the signifier)—the consequences and the venues of these performances—together
constitute an explanatory image of the battlefield (the signified). In this light, the cultural
effect of militarization, founded on the collective experiences of everyday practice, and reinvents the local culture that resulted in the cultural hybridity. The cultural militarization, in other words, formation of the battlefield culture, prominently shows in two aspects of the daily life: first, the change of production modes and then the development of local knowledge. Both aspects ultimately indicate a social adaptation to the life in a belligerent situation.

The Combat Economy

After the military cordoned off Quemoy in 1949, “the situation hindered the development of productive forces” (Yang and Hsing 2001, 78), and the regular remittance from overseas Quemoy workers, which had long supported the local economy, no longer were within reach. Meanwhile, the great number of soldiers, retreating from the mainland theater and swarming into the island, brought with them chaos and demands that stimulated new business. In response to these geopolitical changes, islanders developed a new set of livelihoods that adapted to the war-zone milieu and brought about what Szonyi (2008) called combat economy. The state-owned enterprises and G. I. Joe business—another term coined by Szonyi referring to the retail and service trade with nationalist soldiers in Quemoy—were the economy’s major props. In the 1970s, over 40 percent of the households in Quemoy operated a business, and approximately half of them were in the trade with garrison soldiers. Also, over a quarter of the work force in Quemoy was constantly employed in the public sector during the military rule (Huang et al. 2010). The two economic props, on the one hand, recruited the islanders to serve for the military government, and on the other through the “heavy reliance of the civilian populace on G. I. Joe business created an additional resource to control that populace” (Szonyi 2008, 145). As a result, “the reliance on G. I. Joe business made locals very
vulnerable to changes in the provision of service to the troops and even more to the overall number of troops” (Szonyi 2008, 146). By the economic activities, civilians in the military island tied their lives up with the military and formed an intricate interdependence. The relationship, as observed by Lutz, also occurred in an American military town that after a long history of civilian-military interaction (2001, 251-2), the conditions of life for [inhabitants of the town] . . . were subtly reshaped. They became drawn . . . into a collaborative role, though the full extent of their job remained camouflaged. . . . [M]any decades of a national security culture and state have obscured the reality that the distinction between the civilian and the military has worn down rather than intensified.

The blurring of two identities signifies cultural militarization at work, and proclaims its mode of spatial reproduction in the military city.

**Development of Local Knowledge**

The living experience in the dynamics of militarization provided the mutual understanding to develop local knowledge that encompasses and interprets all cultural particularities contextually in situ. Some of these local “common senses” are necessary for survival, such as the skill to discern the target locations of shellfire by its sound. Some attach meanings to occurrences in the island, the polysemy of gunshots, for example. The military regularly held target practice for anti-aircraft machine guns (M45 Quadmount) emplaced atop bunkers at the traffic intersections in the island at dawn each month. All the guns would fire simultaneously at a signal flare in the southern sky. The loud noise of gunshots immediately woke up all islanders, but the persistent sounds soon put them back to sleep as they recognized the monthly, routine practice (Dong and Huang 2007). The theatricality of the event—its suddenness, intensiveness, and persistence—instead of signifying great danger, deprived the gunshots of such connotation. Their recognition displays the characteristic of common sense as “an interpretation of the immediacies of
experience” (Geertz 1983, 76); whereby the locals, after the first precautious moments, interpret the events insignificance. Without the understanding, the sound could be associated with massive destruction, and may well stir panic reactions.

Oftentimes, people who do not share the local common sense found themselves out of place or even embarrassed in particular situations when their “normal” responses misconstrued the local context, and sometimes brought ironic results. An anecdote in an article narrated by a colonel in KDCAT about his young colleague’s fuss over bombardment supplied such irony. Answering a reporter’s question about casualties of the advisory team in the 1958 bombardment, the colonel humorously remarked (Shor 1958, 422-3):

“I think the worst injury any of this team had suffered was to his pride,” Colonel Dahl laughed. “It happened to a very young second lieutenant who was flown here.”

The fledgling officer’s plane landed on a Quemoy airfield which was under heavy shell fire. Before the craft came to a halt, the passengers threw the door open, leaped to the ground, and dashed to the nearest trench.

There had been recent rain, and the trench was a mudhole. When the firing ceased, the lieutenant’s new uniform was a sodden mess. He hailed a jeep, was driven to his quarters, and jumped into a shower.

“He had just gotten thoroughly soaped,” the colonel continued, “when the Reds open up again. The shells were uncomfortably close and everyone was ordered out to the shelters. Our newcomer raced out of the building, struggled a hundred yards up the hill, yanked open a door, and plunged into our communication cave.

“Wearing only a few bubbles of lather, he found himself face to face with a colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and three majors, none of whom he had ever seen before. He saluted, gasped ‘Lieutenant ——— reporting for duty, sir,’ and spent the rest of the bombardment trying to keep out of sight.

The second lieutenant’s reflexes to hide for safety counter-intentionally made him the worst injured in his exhibition to the team members. His embarrassment might have resulted from misfortune, or from his adherence to the universal practice and his ignorance of the local knowledge.

Other than downplaying, a more significant characteristic of common sense is its constructive end that nurtures particular associations in the local semantic system. In
Quemoy residents’ understanding, bullets and shell shrapnel were associated with their childhood memory of sweetness. Due to a great demand of metal during the wartime, children would forage for bullet and gun shells in the field to trade for sweets in the grocery store. A local ironsmith recollected his source of scrap metal (Szoyi 2008, 121):

“We’d [he and his father] buy shells from the people. Kids would collect the shells, and trade them for candy. You could use them in village shops to buy eggs or whatever, and then the shopkeeper would resell them.”

The candy trade was so central to the childhood memory of the post-war generation that it left an enduring impression on their lives. A local candy maker explained the design of his famous confection, the bullet peanut candy 子彈餅 (Zhang 2007, G-4-20):

“I wanted these peanut candies to represent peace between Taiwan and P.R.C. These bullet-shape peanut candies symbolise those bullets that were left behind after the war. We don’t want anymore conflict, so the best way to deal with these excess bullets, is to eat them!

Without knowledge of the candy trade, it was hard to understand why he suggested that bullets were eatable and eating was “the best way” to manage them. Only by referring to the local children’s interpretation of bullets, can his symbolism between candies and peace be comprehensible. In another interview, he further explained his design by the personal recollections of his childhood instead of the political aspiration (Shi 2010):

“My earliest memory is that I was collecting bullets, selling them to the hardware store, and took the money to buy me some candies. So, I [as a candy maker] came up with an idea—turning bullets immediately into a gourmet food [bullet peanut candies] so that there is no need to collect bullet anymore.

The statement contextualized the design with his personal experience, and regardless of the design intention, apolitical or not, its inspiration was clearly derived from the particular battlefield situation in Quemoy. Whereas bullets in children’s understanding had turned into, first and foremost, a trope of candies, the metonymy could be only possible through the engagement in the dynamics of militarization over time. The semantic transition and semiotic association disclosed the constructive mechanism of
cultural militarization, which underscored Geertz’s comment on common sense as “a cultural system, though not usually a very tightly integrated one . . . ; the conviction . . . is of its value and validity. Here, as elsewhere, things are what you make of them” (Geertz 1983, 76).

In addition to sweets, shells were also associated with playfulness and excitement for the local children. After the 1958 bombardment, the P.R.C. artillery shelled Quemoy on alternate days for twenty years. During the period, the major type of projectiles that the P.R.C. batteries fired was, instead of a lethal one, propaganda leaflet shells, designed to explode before landing to release the leaflets inside. Despite being non-lethal, these propaganda shells, due to the kinetic energy and weight they carried, also caused hundreds of casualties over the years. For adults, although these shells contingently brought them, sometimes considerable, extra income to relieve their economic predicaments, they were nonetheless deemed ominous and pernicious. By contrast, children at the time shared a more delightful perception. Foraging gun shells in the wild provoked a treasure-hunting excitement for children, and collecting the colorful leaflets with vivid illustrations was adventurous. In the article titled as “Things Accompanying My Childhood,” the author introduced the popular outdoor activities among the children (Quemoy Daily, 15 May 2005):

Except the game of tag, the most popular activities among kids were the “great adventure.” Plans of the adventure were, not less than, a dare of the nocturnal journey to air-raid shelters, a search for shrapnel to trade for maltose, and the gather of propaganda shells’ leaflets for awards, prizes, and whatnot from school teachers. Propaganda leaflets, as a form of psychological warfare, were considered threats to the defense of Quemoy. The military government mobilized school children through their teachers to gather these “mental contaminants,” and to turn them in for honor awards,
prizes, or bonus points. The strategy to contain the effect of propaganda accidentally made the leaflets into a competing item for the local children (Lin 2006, 81):

After a night bombardment of propaganda shells, everyone would hurry out in the morning to collect leaflets, and competed to see who could get the most. Later on, striving for winning, everyone got smarter: [We] would tear up leaflets into pieces to increase their number since we thought that paper carried by shells should naturally be fragmental [after explosion].

With their fringe benefits, shells in Quemoy carried complicated messages. Unlike the coeval adults who despised these projectiles, children in the 1960s and 1970s had a different point of view of shells, or even of shelling that could be a sign of the plentiful harvest of leaflets the following morning. As expressed in recent reminiscences, shells for them meant more than destruction but also self-achievement, sensual pleasures and entertainment. Yang, a native writer born in 1962, remembered that after the communist artillery ceased fire in 1978, his playmates and he distressed at the change jointly yelled at the night sky, “Commie! Why don’t you fire shells here anymore? 阿共啊，你為什麼不再打炮來” (1998, 86). Their childhood memories conveyed, on the contrary to common understanding, an interpretation that shelling on particular occasions could also be desirable. Without the twenty-year shelling, people growing up under the shellfire could not have taken it for granted, neither could they integrate the artillery warfare into their daily life, so as to make the most out of it. Based on their a priori engagement of being-in-the-battlefield, the locals cultivated a particular set of understandings which through the continuous social adaptation to the war condition in Quemoy seeped into local knowledge. Since the war preconditioned the local life, the local knowledge that provided interpretations for the people’s living situations stood for the outcome of their negotiations with militarization. An example of the changed understanding was the local people’s judgment upon the propriety of certain activities to be held on certain days.
Chinese almanacs in a form of lunar calendar conventionally indicated a list of appropriate and aversive events for each day. In Quemoy tradition, people usually referred to an almanac beforehand to decide an auspicious day for their planned activities, such as a wedding ceremony or a funeral. During the twenty-year artillery war, although Quemoy people persistently retained the traditional belief in, as well as the knowledge of, the distinction between auspicious or ominous days, their praxes became simplified (Dong and Huang 2007, 73-4):

In the twenty years, nearly each commoner in Quemoy would not forget what date the day was. Everyone firmly remembered what day the odd-number dates and the even-number dates were. . . . [For any kind of events], people would have to hold them on an even-number day, which was the most propitious day than any auspicious days indicated in an almanac. In those days, the [modern, solar] calendar dominated everyone’s life in the island.

Even though the distinction remained, people strategically adapted the traditional practice to the battlefield condition, and along with the conversion reinvented an updated understanding of the appropriateness of event dates. The necessity of negotiation with the belligerent condition, which the locals dwelling in, made their cultural practice a product of power struggle that revealed itself as (Bourdieu 1990, 16),

a social strategy . . . oriented towards the maximizing of material and symbolic profit; . . . a reproduction strategy, taking on its meaning in a system of strategies . . . and oriented towards realization of the same social function . . . .

As the local knowledge, derived form the particular system of strategies, was socially constructed and power-conditioned, this essential aspect of cultural militarization function as the most subtle and elusive device of social control for reproduction of the power structure until peace was restored.

3.4 Mystery Unraveled in De-militarization

After the tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait eased, and China’s acquisition of sophisticated weapons devalued the strategic significance of Quemoy, the
R.O.C. government discharged Quemoy from its military duty, and gradually reduced the number of garrisons since 1992. The local quest for new place identities began. For a society that possessed a large service industry for the temporary emigrants—conscripts performing military duties mostly from Taiwan—the best strategy to continue its monstrous service sector in the post-conflict era was to attract foreign tourists. Considering the lack of potential for manufacturing and commerce, people in Quemoy took advantage of the legacy as a military stronghold and developed heritage tourism based on its fortifications. At first, tourism was a great success. Attracted by the mysterious quality of a war zone, tourists from Taiwan swarmed into the former forbidden island. The familiar political iconographies, which often appeared in the media; historic sites predating most of those in Taiwan; pre-modern vernacular life patterns; and a pre-industrial environment fascinated Taiwanese tourists. However, poor amenities and unreasonably high prices made a tour to Quemoy a one-time-only proposition (Huang 2003). The climax of the tourist business took place when 531,683 people visited Quemoy in 1997, and thereafter the decline started. Responsive measures introduced to manage the stagnant situation generally fell into two categories: expansion of the target markets and diversification of tourist resources.

In 2001, when the R.O.C. government declared a new China policy known as Mini-three Links, which allowed the inhabitants in Quemoy and the P.R.C. citizens to visit each other by ferries. By the policy (Mini-three Link), the mainlanders became potential customers to the tourist industry in Quemoy. However, the mainland tourists did not contribute much to the tourist business in Quemoy at this point in time. Instead, the policy that allowed direct transportation between Quemoy and mainland ports turned the island into a gateway on the border. Taiwanese entrepreneurs and corporate executives
who owned or operated their overseas establishments in China travel to the country via Quemoy. Since Taiwanese government prohibited a direct flight between Taiwan and China, the policy made Quemoy a major transit port for Taiwanese business travelers. The traffic route to China remained a privilege of Quemoy until the Taiwanese government sanctioned direct flights to China in 2008. As the Mini-three Link went into effect in 2001, the number of visitors to Quemoy dramatically increased. The increase came directly from the passage of the Taiwanese businessmen (Yang Z. 2010). The majority of them were in a hurry: They took a domestic fight to Quemoy; hopped on a bus to the ferry station; and sailed to Amoy via the first ferry they could catch. The travel agency would usually plan a tight schedule for them, so that these businessmen could waste little time waiting for their connection. The enactment of Mini-three Links was not of much help to the tourist business in Quemoy, but a policy opened the door for Quemoy to pursue another identity—a gateway city to mainland China.

Since the 1997 decline, the travel agencies initiated a competition that in the end constituted a zero-sum outcome. The competitive agencies often had to offer a price lower than the tour budget to attract business. To cover the difference or just to earn a little profit, tours guides working for the agencies would take tourists to souvenir stores, which allied with travel agencies and paid guides and tour bus drivers commissions based on the number of tourists they brought in. Consequently, in the worst cases, tourists would involuntarily spend approximately one third of their tour shopping (Quemoy Daily, 15 Dec. 2006). For this reason, the package tour business reached the worst situation. In the winter of group tours, self-guided tours germinated, and the new pattern of tourism slowly took over the market. The rise of self-guided tours meant more than the burst of the tourist bubble. Travelers’ preliminary fantasy arose from the geographic impression of
the mythical forbidden land, and the excitement of chances to break former political and social taboos in a war zone. The transition from group tours to self-guided tours also signified the achievement of an advanced stage of tourism, which also met the requirements for sustaining in-depth tourism. The prerequisites—for example, the implementation of a bicycle trail system, the establishment of bed and breakfast business, and the installation of the interpretative materials—were often the work of Kinmen National Park.

Kinmen National Park (KNP) is a national bureau of the Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government established the national park in 1995 to preserve the unique landscapes, especially the military ones, in Quemoy. Its area covers approximately a quarter of the island, and as a matter of course, most places with cultural significance and natural spectacles are under its control. In other words, the central government acquired a great portion of the tourist resources in Quemoy. The involvement of KNP in tourism contributes greatly not only to the transition in tourist patterns but also the diversity of the tourist resources. In addition to the installation of the infrastructure for tourism, the most recognizable achievement of the national park was the promotion of the local traditional culture. Before 1995, tourist investments mainly concentrated on the military landscape and historic sites. The national park renovated traditional settlements within its territory, and chose a few representatives as eco-museums to showcase the classic layouts of southern Fukien villages. In these settlements, newly-paved grounds, interpretive boards, manicured landscaping, and street furniture not only beautified the folk villages but also signified the park’s intention to promote tourism. These renovation projects through beautification re-structured the outdoor spaces of these compact settlements so that they could accommodate the intrusive, inquisitive tourists into the
local everyday life. To create tourist attractions, the national park at times also restored public buildings in these folk villages, such as an old public school or a vintage village hall, and reused them as KNP’s regional offices or theme museums. In addition to revitalization of public spaces, KNP also encouraged private parties to submit proposals for grants to restore and then reuse old folk houses. The restored architecture commonly became family second home, sometimes a future retirement home. The rest became tourist facilities and amenities, such as bed and breakfasts, cafés, and again theme museums which entice visitors into the island’s past to experience the authentic Quemoy. Both the renovation of village grounds and the reuse of folk houses prompted the settlements to open themselves to visitors and diminished the former demarcations between inside and outside.

With the sociopolitical and economic changes following demilitarization and touristification, the former geographical coordinate system of Quemoy dissolved and the island seemingly had been engaging in another reversal since 1992. The rapid decrease in the number of soldiers caused the former economic base to collapse, and the eastern half with its former prosperous combat economy became a war-time relict. The businesses on the main streets in the villages are mostly closed with their iron curtains rolled down. After crowds of soldiers withdraw from Quemoy, bathhouses, pool rooms, laundries, and numerous service industries went out of business. Only a few service businesses which had local customers, such as barbershops and snack-bars tenaciously but barely hold on. The economic center has returned to southwest Quemoy where the native population concentrates, as in the past few centuries.

The ferry station as the portal of Quemoy for the Mini-three Links is located on the southwestern corner. Installation for tourist facilities and modern consumption
industries—convenience stores, theme restaurants, revitalized historic districts, and so on—commonly distributed in the southwestern half of the island. The right and left as well as the bustling side and the sluggish side reversed again after the 1949 reversal of the geographical coordinate system. The regressive turnover does not happen solely to the left-right but also the front-rear dispositions. When nature took over the majority of the seafront fortifications after abandonment or destruction, smuggling from P.R.C. to Quemoy became rampant on the northern and the eastern shore, especially in the waters near the abandoned fortifications. Desperate locals smuggle low-price Chinese produce and merchandise to Quemoy for their own daily consumption or for retail (Xi and Weng 2003). Based on the simple exchange of goods, the tie between Quemoy and cities on the rim of Xiamen Bay has grown stronger over time. This reconciliation encouraged an attempt to construct a “communal living sphere” between Quemoy and Amoy (Quemoy Daily 29 Jan. 2002). The former battlefront faces the current resource hinterland. To fulfill the objective of a “communal living sphere,” some Quemoyan, led by the county head during 2001-2009, denounced the China policy of the pro-independent administration in Taiwan. They considered the policy that emphasized the national security conservative and it neglected the local needs of Quemoy to reconcile with China (Quemoy Daily 15 May 2006). It furthermore tied their hands from pursuing a symbiosis between Quemoy and Amoy, and deprived Quemoy of a promising future. The county’s leader’s personal critique towards the Taipei administration spread like wildfire during his term of office (2001-2009), and provoked local resentment against the administration due to its border-crossing regulations (Nownews 30 Nov. 2005; Quemoy Daily 14 Mar. 2007). By portraying the Taipei administration as an unfit authority that was marginalizing Quemoy, the county government made the central government an obnoxious obstruction
that the islanders should fight in order to win autonomy in developing desirable China-Quemoy relations (Quemoy Daily 27 Apr. 2007; Quemoy Daily 14 June 2008). In the political climate, a new front of the insular society emerged. The front-rear, right-left and in-out reversed again as the irony simultaneously appeared.

The 2008 presidential election in Taiwan produced a pro-China administration, and brought significant influence to Quemoy. The new administration adopted a more open China policy. It sanctioned direct flights between Taiwan and China, and admitted Chinese sightseeing tourists to Taiwan. In addition, the regime revoked constraints of Mini-three Links so that all Taiwanese citizens could take advantage of the traffic route. These policies tremendously affected the tourist business in Quemoy, and marshaled tourist development into its third wave (2008-today; Figure 3.17). After 1992, the borders of Quemoy opened to Taiwanese tourists whose forays blew away the mysterious allure of Quemoy during the military rule era. As a journey of demystification, the military landscape in Quemoy was the major tourist attractions. Most military facilities were still in operation and thus unavailable to common tourists, which however lively displayed the sense of battlefield and satisfied the visitors’ expectations. When the first wave (1992-2000) concluded, the Chinese market was still inaccessible; the Taiwanese group tour market dried up; and the self-guided tour was just emerging. Also, after the military completed its first disarmament plan in 2000, the number of soldiers greatly decreased and the abandoned military facilities increased in Quemoy. With the departure of soldiers, the economic depression turned worse, and local ties with the mainland grew rapidly. The KNP had tentatively participated in the tourist development; embarked on renovating folk villages, historical architectures, and military facilities released from the military to multiply tourist attractions. The implementation of the Mini-three Link initiated the
Figure 3.17. Three Waves of Tourist Development in Quemoy. The implementation of Mini-three Links in 2001 CE enables Chinese visitors to enter Quemoy. Not until Taiwanese government granted Chinese tourists admission to Taiwan in 2008 CE, the number of Chinese tourists in Quemoy remained insignificant. [Data Source: Kinmen County Government and the Mainland Affair Council.]
second wave (2001-2007). Although the policy rejuvenated the number of visitors, throughout the second wave the increase in the visitor numbers mostly arose from the cross-border traffic. The business travelers passing through Quemoy in transit did not contribute to the local economy so the locals often contemptuously depreciated the Mini-three Link 小三通 by calling it “linking-not 通三小” (Quemoy Daily 14 Nov. 2003). In this situation, the county government actively devoted itself to the tourist development by holding cultural events, war memorials, and local festivals to attract tourists. In the meantime, the KNP’s continuous efforts to diversify tourist resources eventually paid off. The installation of tourist infrastructure and promotion of the local traditional culture successfully invited independent tourists to visit the traditional folk villages. Tourists’ arrival at folk villages exposed the formerly protected interior of combat villages, that after demilitarization the tourist planners purposely put in display to attract outsiders exploring the underground tunnels, the significant public buildings, and sceneries behind every turn on the narrow red brick alleys. With the combat villages turning inside-out and their spatial demarcations dissolving, the tourist silhouettes on the stone walls in traditional villages thus lifted another layer of mystique of Quemoy.

The journey of demystification reached a new climax after 2008. Since the Taiwanese government granted admission to Chinese tourists to sightsee in Taiwan, the number of Chinese tourists in Quemoy also increased. Quemoy became an important transitional port for both the Taiwanese businessmen and the Chinese tourists, who often spent a few days in Quemoy before carrying out their main itinerary in Taiwan. The military heritage in Quemoy is of great interest to them. However, all Quemoy travel agencies are specifically instructed not to take Chinese tourists to war museums or any politically sensitive places that may convey controversial interpretations of the past.
causing unnecessary confusion. Notwithstanding, some Chinese tourists will still visit these facilities on their own. For them, it is exactly the political sensitivity about the past conflicts that intrigues and attracts them to visit Quemoy. In contrast to the increasing number of tourists, the number of soldiers has decreased to approximate 5,000 since the implementation of the second disarmament plan in 2003. The number of soldiers dropped 90 percent (50,000 to 5,000) in twenty years; 50 percent (10,000 to 5,000) in five years. The rapid decrease soon exposed a shortage of manpower to maintain numerous military installations in the island, and consequently the military considered releasing installation to KNP or the county government for tourist use before abandoning them. Otherwise, the county government and KNP at times also request collaboration from the military to open certain military facilities to the general public. Through this approach, a few highly sensitive military facilities, such as the underground tunnel of the QDH, became tourist friendly and accessible. As the hardcore Quemoy unfolds before the world, the last curtain hiding the inner mystery of Quemoy thus arises.

Inasmuch as touristification comes hand in hand with demilitarization, their collaboration however introduces a dilemma: For former military facilities reused for tourism, the further the demilitarization is, the further Quemoy is from its image as a battlefield, and the less attractive it is for battlefield tourism. The current remedy for such irony is to reintroduce military simulacra to demilitarized facilities: soldier mannequins in the renovated military camps or reenactors to perform gun operations in an artillery tunnel (Quemoy Daily 16 Aug. 2008). The dilemma articulates Quemoy’s ambiguity and ambivalence in transition.

Quemoy’s geographical coordinate system, mainly its front-rear disposition, also shows the unsettlement in transition. With an unstable geopolitical relation in transition,
the front-rear disposition is swiveling back and forth. After the 2008 election put the pro-China partisans in power, their open policies in dealing with China eased the tension between the county government and the Taipei administration. Quemoy’s front against Taiwanese marginalization diminished, even though Quemoy as a remote island from Taiwan is subject to Taipei administration’s marginalization due to Taiwanese subjectivity and priority. With an open China policy allowing a closer relationship between Quemoyans and mainlanders, opportunities in the mainland became the latest social concerns in the border island. As shown in the back and forth swivel of the coordinate system, a collectively engaging goal of the insular society unlikely persists, so that a constant direction of the island’s front is momentarily unattainable. In fact, the current front of Quemoy may well face the sea and the mainland at the same time, as self-identification once even aroused a proposal for Quemoy independence (*Quemoy Daily* 25 Aug. 2007).\(^{26}\) Just as Iquan’s occupation of Quemoy four hundred years ago blurred the island’s identities between a pirate lair and an imperial base, Quemoy today revives the *both/and also* ambiguity. Both touristification and demilitarization are future directions with social consent, only that the two are ultimately at odds with each other: The battlefield tourism demands authentic military experience that demilitarization reduces. Their ambivalent collaboration brought an obscure identity of Quemoy as both a battlefield and a tourist island; a frontier and a gateway. In the postmodern juxtaposition with multivocality and multilocality, Quemoy’s *both/and also* identities shine through its terrain of babel to imbue the landscape rich with ironies.

\(^{26}\) Lou (2010) advocates Quemoiology for the purpose “to develop a cultural Quemoy nationalism, which through texts, turns imagination [of imagined community] into reality, through [re-narrating] historical narratives, evokes Quemoyans’ collective consciousness. In the process of development, [Quemoiology] sequentially embeds a latent seed of separatism, quietly awaiting for [favorable] changes of political situations in the future” (6).
CHAPTER 4  SUBVERTING THE CONFLICTS: LANDSCAPE IRONY IN DEMILITARIZATION

One often-told anecdote highlights the tourist attraction of Quemoy to the mainland Chinese and is set in a popular cruise departing from Amoy. Known as “watching Quemoy on the sea 海上看金門,” the boat takes Chinese tourists offshore to observe the “nationalist” islands and the coastal fortifications. The story goes that at the finale of the cruise, passengers keep urging their boat master to sail closer toward Quemoy despite their transgression over the borderline. “Just a little more,” they repeatedly appeal. The boat eventually arrives at a sandbar near the heavily guarded coast. One passenger looks at the beach with aspiration and murmurs (Huang 2004b): “If only I can step on it, how thrilling would that be!” The story breaks the local people’s confidence in the tourist appeal of Quemoy, and more importantly their strong belief that once the central government removes the barriers hindering the cross-border activities, prosperous tourism will revive Quemoy from economic depression (Quemoy Daily 6 Nov. 2011).

The attraction of Quemoy to the Chinese mainlanders stems from their curiosity about Quemoy as the nationalist territory and a battlefield of the recent wars (Chen 2009). For this reason, the tourist’s attention is especially drawn to the obsolete war apparatus—fortifications, military camps, and political propaganda facilities—of which their raison d’être is to deter and then to disperse the mainlanders from Quemoy. However, the military landscape in Quemoy has now become the most compelling tourist resource for the mainland Chinese. Contrary to their recently-gained popularity, the coastal defenses were formidable in the past. According to the rules of engagement before 1992, to deal with the situation as depicted in the story, the batteries and machine-gunners would have fired warning shots when the boat transgressed into the territorial waters (Xiao 2008).
Besides, in order to promptly respond to sudden occurrences, the major task for soldiers on their sentry duty was to closely watch the water channels between Quemoy and the mainland. Far from where the boat crew could clearly observe fortifications ashore, their transgression over the boundary would have prompted a response. The intensive defense mechanism made these fortifications grim repellents for mainland fishing boats, and prevented any possible tourist cruises in the dangerous waters. Today, like a switch of magnetic poles, demilitarization drastically changes the role of fortifications in the mainlanders’ perception from repellents to attractions. Without demilitarization, the mainlander tourists could not leisurely approach and appreciate the military structures nor could they yell at silhouettes of soldiers on guard therein (SkyBlue 2011). The polarized changes simultaneously stir a strong feeling of tempo-spatial displacement, as a Quemoy veteran remarked (Quemoy Daily 9 Aug. 2010),

> Everyday, forty to fifty tourist boats from Amoy touring “watching Quemoy on the sea” constantly sails to the front of the slogan wall, read as “Unify China with Three Principles of the People,” with full loads of tourists. Their zealous greetings to the garrisons on the island present another image of the peacetime. However, [witnessing these] one cannot help to feel a chaotic sentiment towards the tempo-spatial displacement.

As the selling point of the cruise, the propaganda wall supplies the final crescendo for the tour, and attracts mainlanders to spend their “several days’ wages” on shooting photos of the slogan. Observing that, a Quemoy veteran comments on the situation (Lin 2009, 138):

> It is unimaginable that the wall of psychological warfare contrarily creates a greatly profitable niche for the tourist business in the mainland China, which allows the Chinese communists to earn a monthly revenue of twenty to thirty million RMB. This is absurd!

The irony is thus perceivable to the locals by the logic that the anti-communist slogan not only is futile, but produces communists with a grand profit. This specific tour discloses multiple layers of irony. First, the polysemy of fortifications, like a sarcasm denoting opposite meanings (war apparatus or peace tokens), ignites a symbolic irony due to the
connotative contradiction. Second, the drastic change of the military landscapes from deterrence (as an active subject) to attraction (as a passive object) produces a historical irony in the tempo-spatial displacement. Last, the absurdity of the conflictual landscape reveals the counter-intentionality that the harmful devices turn to profit the enemies. The locals’ acknowledgement of the irony after demilitarization unravels the vanity of the past conflict, and destabilizes its significance to avail the progression of reconciliation. The discussion of the boat tour outlines a miniature of the post-conflict society, and reveals how the major social dynamics in Quemoy—touristification, demilitarization, and reconciliation—generally interlock with one another. Their interplay in a holistic view constitutes the dissolution and the ongoing reversal of the geographical coordinate system. This chapter examines how the change of the geographical coordinate system works in the ontological scale in terms of the landscape features, especially the military structures reinvented for tourist attractions.

4.1 Irony and Ironic Landscape

Irony emerges when the outer—literal—meaning introduces the inner, if not sarcastic, meaning (Fernandez and Huber 2001). The subject, instead of being understood by its literal meaning through the indexical mechanism, begets another meaning and begets another and begets etc., thereby carrying out a symbolic communication. In other words, the delivered irony, by accentuating the extraordinary voices of the mentioned subject, conveys its polysemic meanings to one who can simultaneously comprehend its multivocality. Irony in landscape does the same thing (Rodman 2003, 212). When the meaning of a three-foot-thick wall of a bunker departs from impregnability to the ferociousness of shelling, to the misery of civilian life, to the ruthlessness of wars, to the righteousness of peace, etc, the bunker per se draws its meaning from association. The
latest meaning through association justifies the locals’ present mindset of appeasement and renders the military structures a caveat to war in Quemoy; whereby the war apparatus turns into a trope against itself (Figure 4.1).

The contrast aggravates after the authorities’ quest for the new identity of Quemoy as a tourist island where military landscapes become everybody’s entertainment to increase revenue. Their exclusivity, now as their attractive traits, invites even the past enemies to discover their impregnability. The local ambition of tourism unfolds in the sparkling look of the newly renovated military facilities. Therefore, bunkers at thoroughfare intersections bear welcome signs. The bastion at the end of the pier bears decoration of popular cartoon characters. All these changes corroborate the irony in landscape and dismiss the sense of battlefield. The dismissal thereby uncovers a colossal irony that the development of battlefield tourism in fact destroys the battlefield rather than preserves it. The official remedy for such self-destruction is to re-introduce military features and performance to the demilitarized structures to reinforce the diluted image of

![Figure. 4.1. Semiotic Associations of Bunkers. The different social milieux in the wartime and the post-bellum period produce two sets of contradictory meanings of a bunker, while the latest meaning attached to bunkers oppose their indexical meaning.](image-url)
the battlefield. The reinvention of military relics and the contract reenactments thematically deliver a verisimilar battlefield—an eclectic mosaic “made up of historical accretions of partial legacies superimposed in multiple layers upon each other” (Harvey 2000, 77). As a work of the current generation, the nostalgic collage is more manipulatable for the demilitarized society and malleable for tourist consumption. Meanwhile, it pertinently accommodates the two contesting identities (i.e. tourist attractions and military structures) without self-depletion, since the consumption of reintroduced military features can bring no attrition. As reinvention proves to be an effective solution for the conflict between developing battlefield tourism and demilitarization, reenactments at the same time fetch tourists a time portal back to the “authentic” Cold-War island. As Urry once remarked, “the past is endlessly constructed in and through the present” (1995, 4), the development of battlefield simulation (and heritage tourism) in Quemoy turns the past into commodities. With the thematic reinvention and reenactment, the Disneyization (see Bryman 2004) of Quemoy enables the images sales to whoever pursues an authentic battlefield. The age of reconciliation then catalyzes simulacra production for tourist consumption. In addition to the irony thrown by the sharp contrast between symbolic meanings of military structures, the involvement of tourism in peacemaking hereinto complementarily enriches the irony in Quemoy.

Furthermore, understanding irony demands a context, a taken-for-granted structure to produce the contrast with which the inner meaning of the subjects can emerge. Irony depends on negotiations with conventional understanding, and sequentially destabilizes the structured system of dominance (Smith 1997). Considering the Quemoy case, when demilitarization tarnishes the military structures, their decay, incompleteness, and disjuncture affiliate them with stories that open a window of imagination to define these
ruins. Since the relics cannot axiomatically reveal themselves, spectators are invited to fill in the absence with narratives that complete the meanings of these structures with the viewers’ reflexivity: “Each spectator is forced to supply the missing pieces from his or her own imagination and a ruin therefore appears differently to everyone” (Woodward 2001, 15). The military structures thence migrate from a place of being effective, where effectiveness of offense and defense takes priority, to a place of being poetic, whose meaning is open, polyvalent and fluid in the viewers’ imaginations. “The very lineaments of the tangible past,” as Lowenthal argues, “should arouse a sense of uncertainty, the same presentations should provoke divergent insights. Otherwise the past is too static to be credible” (1975, 26). The military structures in Quemoy, as hinted by its geographical narratives, march into the past, or precisely into a timeless, poetic country where “Time is suspended, or reversed, or erased; it is hard to say which, but . . . as dusk fell it was the end of the world” (Woodward 2001, 39).

The atemporal disengagement of ruins from the daily bustle of ordinary life explains what exactly a reconstruction project imposed upon the historic heritages: It “fixes and freezes a particular image, short-circuiting the imagination” (Lowenthal 1975, 27) to create a modern simulation for tourism. Historic buildings in Quemoy suffer such a destiny. In contrast to the military structures dispatched to the past, the locals restore old buildings into the present. The restored buildings in the folk villages are valued for their aesthetic and authentic visages in the state of ruins, but lose both the cherished qualities after reprocessing. The refurbishing projects not only replace the evocative images of these relics with anachronistic verisimilitudes, but also deny the reasons for these buildings to be chosen for preservation. Reconstruction deprives of the aesthetic incompleteness of the historic relics, and alienates these restored works from the
incentives and goals for their reconstruction. Consequently, their poetics out of imaginations vaporize when these historic buildings reveal their full splendor. In Fernandez’s classification, such “successful failure,” analogized to Foucault’s concept of prison, is “the irony of structural reproduction,” upon which he further remarks “[i]t is this counter-intentionality, this contradictoriness of structural reproduction, that is so very ripe for irony” (2001, 91).

The irony in landscape underscores the polarized changes of the military landscapes from war apparatuses to tourist attractions, and accentuates the critical role that human agents play in defining a place by attaching different meanings to the landscapes (often displaced ones in Quemoy and therefore ironic). “Irony” thus properly addresses the landscape changes in Quemoy. However, this overall representation, despite a summary of the phenomena, provides no explanations to shed light on these ironic changes. What shines through the ironies in the landscape then requires further discussion.

The human perception of irony is uncanny that for most of the time the delivery of irony follows an alternative circuit of semiotic associations. In another words, irony is in the eye of the beholders, as the meaning of words is in the ear of the listeners. The perceived irony can rely on an over-simplified causality, an anachronistic comparison, or even the inconsequent incongruity as long as the juxtaposition of associated interpretations can cause a contrast great enough to unbalance the given, assumed interpretation. Irony thereby as an instrument of destabilization attains the subversive power from its results which introduces a sense of lightness to the discussed matters, and consequently shakes their significance. In this light, the meanings of the landscape changes in Quemoy should most likely reside in the very matters whose significance diminishes after ironies appear. Since the significance of the conflicts between the R.O.C.
and the P.R.C. suffers discredit most, irony is the mechanism of cultural demilitarization. Commenting on the issue, an official of the Quemoy county government professes, “the banter and the irony against war is nothing else but to profoundly embody peace” (Quemoy Daily 16 Feb. 2005). In this sense, ironic trivialization of past conflicts enables the locals to usher peace into the place, and simultaneously to shed Quemoy’s identity as a battlefield. The polarized changes in the landscape explicitly keynote the salience of a post-military society, where the past confrontation constructs a battle station for exclusion while the backfire in the aftermath urges reconciliation through the construction of an emerging tourist destination.

According to Smith, “as a new society takes place, or existing society takes a new place, it is the symbols of reference that suffer and work change” (1997, 87). The change in the military structures and the historic buildings in Quemoy reveals what the identity reformation—from a battlefield to a tourist and a gateway island—may bring about in the post-conflict society. Through the interplay of touristification, demilitarization, and reconciliation, irony in landscape emerges as the cultural mechanism of identity reformation. I discover four types of irony in the landscape in Quemoy. “When things seem misaligned, disproportionate, unexpected, and out of place,” spectators often witnesses the most common irony in the daily life, namely the immediate irony (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 1). The immediate irony, as known as intuitional irony, is often bound to the flash experiences of random happenings and therefore intuitive, ephemeral, and circumstantial. Although the type of irony shows in the landscape in Quemoy, the basic requirement to trigger the irony is common sense which however does not necessarily concern the identity reformation. For the reason, I will let alone the specific irony from the following discussion. The symbolic irony requires the sharp
contrast between the “inner” and “outer” meanings of the discussed matter in the form of a pun, which is why it demands symbolic communication as its premise. The semiotic referentiality and the semantic migration are by far socially constructed and, too, zeitgeist-conditioned. The meanings that the natives presently attach to their material settings can explain their specific treatments applied to the settings to possibly maximize their social utility. When the reinvention is greatly at odds with the conventional utility, the spatial incongruity for either practical uses poses questions of properness, and embodies symbolic irony. The bunker bearing welcome signs on the outskirts of the county seat speaks such irony.

From a diachronic contrast that oftentimes amplifies human futility on the certain social movements, historical irony unravels. Anthropologists consider the type of irony “having to do with contacts between people greatly unequal in power and wherewithal: people in the center and on the margins of history” (Fernandez 2001, 85). Obviously perception of the irony requires knowledge of the history. I will exemplify the irony by a historical issue of Quemoy. Since its earlier history, the contest between the seafarers and the land-dwellers has repetitively taken place in Quemoy, and echoes through the repetitive reversals of the insular coordinate system. During the contest, the maritime power, despite having its moments, has seldom gained the upper hand over the continental regimes, to which the official histories overtly evince predilection. The discourse normalizes the social condition of Quemoy to be affiliated to the continental regime despite its marginalization; otherwise the temporary, “anarchic” condition of Quemoy is, as official history often declares, destined to return “normal.” In this view, the reiterative struggles made to switch the direction of the coordinate system of Quemoy eventually end with meaningless futility. In the historical discourse, the activities of
seafarers have been largely dissipated or defamed in the history, until Iquan eventually
left a formidable mark for the maritime powers. Ironically, his successor, Koxinga,
identified himself with the continental regime, leading his army and pursuing a recovery
of the lost territory of Han Chinese from the Manchurian invaders. Due to his exploits in
the battles to recover the mainland China, the modern Chinese nationalists, who
empathized with and suffered similar predicament, highly praised the historical figure,
and made him, a half Japanese in fact, a hero of the Chinese nation. However, Quemoy
people have never restrained their dislike for the nationalist role model, who in their view
brought only war and misfortune to Quemoy (see Cai 2008; Quemoy Daily 22 Jun. 2003;

Even though the modern nationalists in a similar manner also imposed an
“eccentric” social condition on Quemoy to confront the mainland regime, the islanders
today in the pursuit of reconciliation have mixed feelings about the military rule (see
Huang 2003). They on one hand mourn their bereft days dedicated to and sacrificed for a
void cause, one that is meant to be futile against the wheel of history; while on the other
hand long for the return of the prosperous and vigorous old days based on the military
protection and patronage. With the ambivalent mindset, the Quemoy locals today when
looking back at their own past in which they strived at all cost for the anticommunist
cause helplessly perceive a tempo-spatial displacement and the mockery of fate. It is in
their Sisyphean efforts against all odds in the history and the displaced sentiments in the
pursuit of reconciliation that historical irony blossoms.

The last type of irony found in the landscape of Quemoy is the structural irony
which often appears in the “counterintentionality” and the “contradictoriness of structural
reproduction” (Fernandez 2001, 91). In fulfilling the identity reformulation of Quemoy
from a battlefield to a tourist island, the interplay between touristification and demilitarization discloses the necessity for reproduction of military simulacra, so as to embark on the demilitarized battlefield tourism. The excessive reproduction of military virtuality nullifies the local renouncement of the battlefield identity; yet insufficient military representations cannot sustain a sense of battlefield nor tourist attraction. Ultimately, the images of Quemoy must be always in between an authentic battlefield replica and a typical tourist island of sun, sand and sea. This constant landscape evolution means that the identity reformulation will never fully situate Quemoy into either identity. Moreover, as more tourists visit Quemoy for the battlefield image, the work to repudiate the battlefield identity will never end. Quemoy people must keep reproducing military replicas to trigger landscape irony, to repeat cultural demilitarization, and to purge the land full of military image. The structural impossibility of reformulating identity through the identity reformulation is therefore tragically ironic.

4.2 Developing Battlefield Tourism and Developing Peace

During the military rule (1949-1992), the military government in Quemoy had shown little interest in encouraging private sector economic development, nor had capitalists felt comfortable investing the warzone. As a result the economic activities in Quemoy were mainly the primary and service sector businesses before 1992. According to the county censuses between 1972 and 1994, the local labor force in industry was constantly under 15 percent. During the same period, the rate of governmental employees fluctuated around a quarter of the work force. Inasmuch as more than six out of ten persons in Quemoy were peasants, fishermen, or government employees during the time of military rule (Huang et al. 2010), the economic underdevelopment was obvious. The small number of industrial workers in Quemoy indicates a sluggish economy with a lack
of capital investment from the private sector. This economic condition left Quemoy a handful of choices to turn to when the combat economy eventually faded away. Tourism was among the few choices, perhaps the best, which however was presented as an economic solution. That said, its intricate entanglement with demilitarization and post-conflict reconciliation came later. Even though the locals commonly agreed about replacing the combat economy with tourism, at the beginning, battlefield tourism was not the core of the development plan (see Yang 1996), particularly since the military facilities were still highly sensitive and omnipresent. Besides, the forbidden, ubiquitous sights of military structures luxuriously catered to the tourists’ appetite for the sense of battlefield with voyeuristic pleasure at their convenience. Tourists breathed the sense of the battlefield regardless of which type of tourism the locals were undertaking.

In developing tourism, the conservative attitude of the QDH against the open-door policies became the major obstacle to the new Quemoy. After the abolishment of Martial Law, the county government restored its autonomy and was no longer subordinate to the QDH. Its new autonomous status enabled the county government to negotiate with the QDH to loosen its grasp on civil issues. One often-mentioned example was the installation of the streetlights. The military considered streetlights harmful to the defense of Quemoy, since lights exposed the military installations at night and therefore during the period of military rule the whole island was darkened after sunset. As the former county head during 1990 to 1991, Lee once commented (Lee 2003, 29-30),

We [people in Quemoy] often made comparison between the mainland and Quemoy, in the early days we said, “the base of Free China is the base of light, while the mainland is the dark continent”; however nowadays [ca. 1990] the situation reversed in the evening that “the mainland is the land with lights, and Quemoy is the dark island.” 我們常將大陸和金門作對比，早期常說：「自由基地是光明的基地，大陸是黑暗的大陸」；但現在到了夜晚反而顛倒過來，「大陸是光明的大陸，金門是黑暗的金門。」
For local development, Lee argued with the QDH authorities to break through the conservative policy, and install streetlights. He poignantly satirized in front of the QDH authorities (Lee 2003, 30),

If Quemoy does not allow streetlights, this [the prohibition] means that, Quemoy should not have daytime because after sunrise under the daylight all the military positions in Quemoy have already been under Chinese Communists’ surveillance. And so, the deprivation of lights from Quemoy at night shares the same logic as prohibiting one from seeing the Sun in the daytime. 如果金門不能有路燈，那就是表示金門不能有白天，因為天一亮，太陽一照，金門所有的據點都被中共看到了，所以晚上不能點燈和金門白天不能看到太陽是同樣的道理。

Lee’s successor, Chen (2003), still dealt with the same issue of streetlights during his term of office from 1992 to 2000. However, with the abolishment of Martial Law, he managed to convince the military to reluctantly agree to installing lights. While the civil government still had to haggle with the military over various trivial civic issues, mass tourism was a remote luxury. The attraction of tourism stood in opposition to the military which sought to exclude unnecessary personnel from the defense area. Besides, the tourists’ hedonic gaze upon the battlefield imbue it with lightness that “can make farce of any represented pretension” (Smith 1997, 86). According to Smith, pretension is “a claim to distinction, either from the phenomenal and ordering principles of the natural world, or from other humans” (Smith 1997, 83), the authority (and uppityness) of the QDH, as well as the characteristic military culture—such as the trained patriotism, the absolute hierarchy, and the formalistic rigidity—were all at risk in front of the tourist’s playful gaze. Under this circumstance, tourism was not only considered harmful to the military dispositions but also to the reproduction of Quemoy culture of militarization. Accounting for these disadvantages, the QDH clearly expressed its uncooperative stance on the tourist development at first (Lee 2003), but concomitant with the initiation of the national
disarmament plan in 1993, the military conceded and agreed to gradually lose its control over Quemoy (Kuo 2010).

When tourism eventually gained support from military leaders, their concession signified the initiation of demilitarization in Quemoy. Even though demilitarization was never a choice of the Quemoy people who could only passively cope with the national project, some of them did urge the removal of military rule and the abolishment of Martial Law, which in fact coincided with demilitarization. The abolishment actually ended the legal status of Quemoy as a battlefield and the necessity for large military deployment on the island. The democratization in the short term devastated the local economy despite the benefits in other social aspects, such as the return of the civil autonomy, release of military properties, and freedom. After its autonomy returned, Quemoy therefore had to stand on its own feet without support from the military, and consequently locals placed even greater expectations on tourist business. Apparently, demilitarization stimulates tourist development. The reduction of restricted military land opened access for tourism or other development. These restricted areas had been under strict control with only limited access for forty-three years, and the ecosystems had been well preserved and with little industrial disturbance. After disarmament, the natural environment, especially the crescent sandy beaches, offered an alternative military legacy and tourist capital for Quemoy. In addition, the grandiosity and the sublimity of military structures stemming from the long-term battlefield management also supplied extraordinary spectacles for tourists. Hence, even if Quemoy did not direct itself specifically toward battlefield tourism, demilitarization was still a necessity for general tourist development. In this light, demilitarization, democratization—i.e. demilitarization of the everyday life—and touristification in Quemoy went hand in hand together.
As a fledgling industry, tourism supported only a small portion of the local population, but economic stagnation affected all in the private sector, including peasants, fishermen, and the retail businessmen. For them, to survive after demilitarization often involved a change in economic activities. From 1992, due to the withdrawal of troops from the coastal defenses, smuggling activities between the mainland and Quemoy began to appear (Xi and Weng 2003). The P.R.C. authorities encouraged the smuggling activities which in their definition were legal “small-amount trade 小額貿易” (Weng 2002). With trade under way, civil reconciliation ensued. In response to the skyrocketing number of smuggling cases from twenty-seven in 1993 to 1,364 in 2001 (Xi and Weng 2003), the vigorous cross-border activities obliged the Taiwanese (R.O.C.) government to devise a policy to decriminalize the small-amount trade. The policy designed for this purpose was Mini-three Links, by which the direct postal, transportation, and trade links between Quemoy and the mainland China were allowed with few restrictions. With the policy in effect, economic interaction between Quemoy and Amoy emerged. If there is anything Quemoy people learned through these intense cross-border activities was that Quemoy must rely on the mainland China rather than Taiwan (Chen 2008). To reconcile with the mainland China is therefore the foremost priority of the local development, which is why the Quemoy county government has often taken on the position to challenge the China policy of the Taipei administration.

The reconciliation with China was also an urgent issue for the tourist development. From 1992, the local tourist business boomed by sales of group tours to Taiwanese, but soon reached its climax in five years. Even in the stage of decline, the tourism business had grown into the largest industry in Quemoy to an extent that the county head in 1998 clearly announced that “not a single developing project in Quemoy did not aim at tourist
development 金門的建設無不是針對觀光發展” (Yang Z. 2010, 418). Besides the country government, the KNP also contributed to the development from its inauguration in 1996. The KNP had painstakingly diversified tourist resources to include the traditional culture and natural landscapes, while at the same time inheriting restricted areas from the military to develop attractions of battlefield tourism. Nevertheless, the self-guided tourism that the KNP promoted was of little help to the withering tourist business. The economic mainstay of Quemoy demands group tours to rejuvenate, and the mainland tourists’ zeal for Quemoy, as shown in the cruise “watching Quemoy on the sea,” has readily pointed out to prospective customers. For the mainland tourists, the mysterious battlefield atmosphere of Quemoy is the major motivation for the tour in which the military landscapes, according to questionnaire statistics, are the most satisfactory attractions for the mainlanders (Chang 2010). Hence, to attract mainland tourists, Quemoy has to develop battlefield tourism on the premise that the reconciliation work with China carries on; whereby the porosity of borders with China can form and provide an intense cross-border exchange. Making peace and making a fortune; developing tourism and developing trade, to this point, are all tangled up together with demilitarization to forge the economic prospects of Quemoy.

In addition to an economic drive, the development of battlefield tourism also functions as an instrument for cultural demilitarization. Since the military landscapes are the most competitive tourism resources with product differentiation from other tourist islands, for the locals, making battlefield tourism the pillar of tourism merchandise appears to be a sound judgment and a wise marketing strategy. In carrying out battlefield tourism, the local practitioners—guides, bus drivers, interpreters—are the first to discover that their simple means to monetary reward actually create more than what they expect.
When they interpret the landscape change—transformation of war apparatus from places of exclusion to places of attraction, and war memorials from shrines of patriotism to tokens of peace—they are performing (acting out) the inscribed irony in landscape. In contrast to the ongoing tourist consumption, their interpretations about the past conflicts implicitly mock the meaninglessness of war outlined in the landscape change, while at the same time they celebrate the arrival of peace.

An often-said and well-known irony concerning the famous Quemoy knives should illustrate such an effect of tourism. The culinary knives are one of the special products in Quemoy and are popular memorabilia for visitors. The knives are famous for their allegedly high-quality steel forged from the propaganda shells bombarding Quemoy. Since military rule, conscripts before their return to Taiwan would often buy Quemoy knives as gifts or mementos. Such practice builds up the reputation of the knives among Chinese people around the world, and group tours in Quemoy today usually include a stop at the knife factory to let tourists watch the process. After Quemoy admitted mainland tourists, they were surprisingly zealous for the knives. In a newspaper article reporting popularity of the knives, a mainland tourist simply stated, “this [knife] is made from our shells. I think [it] has much historical significance” ([Nownews](Nownews) 14 Jul. 2006). As the mainland tourists attribute the historical significance of the knives to their source of materials, the knife-maker, Wu Zen-Dong 吳增棟, also commented on the subject ([Chinanews](Chinanews) 6 Dec. 2008),

sometimes, when I encounter the mainland tourists, I will make a joke and said, “by those shells you guys gave to me for free in the past, I make them into culinary knives now, and return back to you 遇到大陸遊客,我有時會跟他們開玩笑：當年你們送來的炮彈，現在我打成菜刀還給你們.”

The thought about mainlanders buying back their own shells at a high price amuses Quemoy people, even though they doubtless appreciate the priceless peace. By contrast,
knowing the diachronic exchange, mainland tourists tend to make a more serious response. They prefer to summarize Wu’s livelihood in a poetic idiom “melting swords into plowshares” 鑄劍為犁,” which metaphorically means “ending the war and starting the peacetime” (Chinanews 6 Dec. 2008; Want Daily 17 Mar. 2011). The culinary knives thus become a token of peace, cast in and by the presence of the mainland tourists, since their sightseeing in Quemoy axiomatically represents peace today (Luo 2010). For these mainlanders in the factory, bringing the Quemoy knives home means more than a simple gesture to remember about their trip in Quemoy but also one to figuratively undo the war by returning shells to the mainland. The return then is where the historic significance resides in their purchases. In the face of the interpretation of these knives, a Quemoy veteran, while recalling the absurd engagement of shelling on alternate days, sarcastically remarked (Quemoy Daily 29 Mar. 2012),

mainland tourists rush to buy the specialty that [our predecessors] bartered with their flesh and blood [under shellfire]. Isn’t this another irony and joke made by history? 陸客爭著購買這血肉之軀交換來的特產，這豈非又是歷史的諷刺和玩笑。

As the mainland tourists feel obliged to buy back the “war trophies” (Quemoy Daily 15 Sept. 2005), which cost lives of the garrisons and the civilians who once fought in Quemoy, to celebrate the newly reconciled peace that denies their cause for fighting, the former combatant finds irony: One that subverts the binary opposition in the past meanwhile serves cultural demilitarization today. As the antidote to the political pedagogy inculcated during the Cold War, the irony counteracts constructs of the enemy constructions, the political correctness, and the nationalist cult with inconsequential lightness. The light attitude that equates the past conflicts to a joke, as the one the knife master told, dissipates the wartime metanarratives tied to and propping up the belligerent condition.
Due to the symbolism of the knives and the purchases, battlefield tourism in this particular case brings forth heavy irony. Although irony in other cases may not be as prominent, they nonetheless can subvert other aspects of cultural militarization, such as the historical discourse about the war justification. With the discovery of the contingent functionality of battlefield tourism, the local society, craving peace and an economic boost, further strengthens its resolution to follow its economic course. Correspondingly, the county government of Quemoy employs tourist development to urge the central administration in Taipei to act according toward the local interests which fundamentally depend on reconciliation with China. In the circumstance, battlefield tourism not only spotlights the contrast in landscape change to foreground irony, but also accelerates the progress of reconciliation. The simple economic solution for Quemoy to this point has been tinged with much political intention.

4.3 Re-editing the Military Inscriptions upon the Landscape

The development of battlefield tourism and reconciliation assist each other reciprocally to form a new place identity other than a scene of military conflict. The incorporation of the two social dynamics shapes the landscape in Quemoy which can provide insights into identity reformulation. Military structures, as the material incarnation of the past, become the features inviting place identity reformulation. In turn, reinvention of the military structures reflects how the local people deal with the changing identity of their homeland, and more practically reveal how they ingeniously and simultaneously develop battlefield tourism and achieve demilitarization. In addition, although symbolic structures, such as war memorials and slogan walls, are non-combatant facilities, their articulation of the zeitgeist during the Cold-War era makes them especially significant to identity reformulation. Their use as attractions of battlefield
tourism represents refigured local understanding of the conflict in the past. As cultural geographers often see landscapes as human inscriptions in the environment, the changes occurring to these structures foreground an ongoing process of reediting the embedded militant texts in the landscape through the landscape management and treatment.

The management methods of military structures in Quemoy generally fall into three categories: abandonment, destruction, and reinvention. The first two are common practices applied to the military structures today, while reinvention occurs less frequently. Reinvention is exclusively applied to military structures designated for tourist facilities, and therefore cases of reinvention can provide more information about the interrelation between the landscape change and identity reformation. The three major treatments that the locals in Quemoy employ to reinvent military structures are disguise, remodeling, and rehabilitation. The three treatments are each designated for specific types of military structures converted to tourist facilities. Rehabilitation often occurs to the structures released from the QDH after demilitarization as prospective tourist attractions; remodeling the wartime tourist facilities and war memorials from the Cold War era; disguising the defenses occupying strategic positions with panoramic views. Following the implementation of these management methods, a great proportion of the military structures in Quemoy have disappeared, collapsed, and transformed; only a few of them under rehabilitation can retain their original features.

The abandoned military structures are most frequently dispersed in remote areas, such as seafronts and hillsides, on the periphery of the branch-shape defense system. After the withdrawal of troops, the QDH cannot afford to sustain the operation of all posts by the limited manpower. At one end of the defense hierarchy are the numerous guard posts. Too numerous to maintain following troop reductions, they have become the
primary structures suffering abandonment. Most beachfront posts are forgotten monuments of this sort (Figure 4.2). The QDH closes up these posts, but keeps some of them intact in case of war. Such management plan is termed as “sealing up during the ordinary time; opening up during the wartime 平封戰啟.” In fact, these abandoned military structures now are subject to decay. Since war is hardly possible in Quemoy, they simply disintegrate and drown in the rampant subtropical vegetation. Although the locals complain about the messy eyesores and public safety blind spots that these unused structures may have become, abandonment only troubles the locals except as a waste of potential battlefield tourism resources (Quemoy Daily 21 Sept. 2008).

By contrast, cases of destruction often take place when the unused military structures impede daily civilian practices or future prospects. In these cases, destruction may befall civil defense structures. These defense works in the civilian domain were often compromises of convenience for former military necessity. With the military priority fading, the locals desire to remove these obsolete and inconvenient defense works. Thereby bunkers at the village gateways are bulldozed (Chinatimes 30 Dec. 2009); trenches and moats surrounding the villages are filled up (Huang 2003). On some of these tracts recovered through destruction, the village installs pagodas, trails, plants, and street furniture to build a neighborhood park for public recreation (Figure 4.3). Otherwise, if the structures are located on private property, owners can simply remove them to facilitate their current land uses. The anti-parachute stakes in the fields represent this category (Figure 4.4). To defend against paratroopers, the military erected regiments of concrete stakes at an equal distance in open fields, and topped each of them with interlinking barbed wire. From a distance these stakes looked like vineyards, and therefore some international visitors when viewing the fields in Quemoy mistook them for grapes arbors.
Figure 4.2. Abandoned Military Structures. The hillside positions [A and B] are under the sealed-up management plan indicated by the warning signs of military reservations [highlighted by dotted lines] in front of them. In some of these abandoned military structures [see the cannon in C], the QDH discard obsolete weaponry and let them rust into junk *in situ*. [photo by the author]
Figure 4.3. Recreation Areas Built on Leveled Military Compounds. The military station outside the Anqian village was under construction and turned into a neighborhood park in 2008. The air-raid shelter [the bottom right] and the bunker in the grove [the middle left] survived the renovation. [photo by the author]

Figure 4.4. Remnants of Anti-parachute Stakes. Only a few arrays of the stakes remain today, and are all incomplete. Many in an array have been taken down, and the rest lost their spikes [A]. Even the array being closest to its original condition [B] is missing the barbwire web atop the stakes. [photo by the author in 2009]
(Dong and Huang 2007). Planting these stakes hampered farm work, and their dangerous design has only injured the resident farmers, who willingly remove these stakes when allowed. That is why these stakes appear only sporadically in the open fields today.

Another sort of destroyed landscape feature is what the locals consider a nuisance. The anti-communist slogan signs are the representative of this sort (Figure 4.5). Since the nationalist troops retreated to Quemoy, soldiers living among civilians in their villages made slogan signs on folk houses. The anticommmunist signs, such as “Eliminate the Evil Communists,” manifest an aspect of the psychological warfare to bolster morale and to instill determination (Zheng 2006). After the implementation of Mini-three Links, the locals considered these signs as obstruction of reconciliation and repellent to mainland tourists (Lihpao Daily 9 Jun. 2001):

> The islanders for their livelihood [tourism] continuously ask the Ministry of Defense to demolish these political slogans, such as ‘Repel Communism and Resist Russia,’ or ‘Kill Zhu [de] and Mao [Tse-tung],’ to avoid the awkwardness mainlanders may feel during their visit in Quemoy.

The demolition was soon brought to the public’s attention and suffered criticism. In an investigation report of the execution of cultural preservation in Quemoy, the investigation committee denounced the demolition, and explained its opinion on these slogans (Taiwan the Control Yuan 2001, 88-3):

> The psychological slogans were the wartime products as the anticommmunist and anti-Russian symbols in the past. However, in an alternative view, they are exactly what remind us of the importance of “peace” and point out the significance to avoid other wars. 反共精神標語是以前戰爭時代的產物，是反共抗俄的標誌，可是反過來看，它正提醒我們「和平」的重要，及避免再發生戰爭的重要意義。

The reading of these symbols of conflict ironically turned them into caveats to war and tokens of peace, so that preservation of these landscape features from demolition was urgent and just. As to the motivation and the planner of the demolition, the report indicated that “some governmental organs 有些機關” instructed the removal of slogans
Figure 4.5. Slogan Signs on Folk Houses. By the remnants [A], the incomplete slogan sign on the wall is read as “Clear Our Name; Recover Our Country 雪恥復國.” Its incompleteness however is simply a result of weathering that the reliefs fall off from the walls over time. In other cases [B], their anticommmunist messages beckon vandalism for reconciliation and cross-border activities. [Source: photo by the author]
as their gestures “to express goodwill 表現友善” (Taiwan the Control Yuan 2001, 88-3), or to avoid “bringing about a mutual uneasiness 彼此會產生尷尬” (Huang 2007, 156). However, for mainland tourists, these anticommunist slogans are not just about hollow threats or empty offenses from the past, but rather one of the most intriguing and battlefield-specific spectacles in their journey in Quemoy (Chinatimes 8 Jun. 2011):

The mainland tourists show intense interest in these remnants of the battlefield culture [slogan signs] from the time of armed confrontation across the Taiwan Strait . . . . Some will even ask the guide in private to tour these signs, taking photos in front of them for memory. Consequently, the threats and menaces in the past articulate “peace” today, and attract the past enemy whom these signs confronted to consume the exclusive culture of the former battlefield. The contradictory situations are exactly how the development of battlefield tourism adds to the irony in demilitarization, while the counter-intentionality and futility of the demolition brings forth another irony: In the end, these slogans have not eliminated any communists whose presence in Quemoy however led to the elimination of these slogans.

Concomitant with the withdrawal of troops from 1992, the re-empowered civil government led “a movement of full-scale destruction of battlefield relics 塗銷戰地遺跡的大動作” (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011). The government on one hand incited civilians to remove the miscellaneous military features in their surroundings; on the other squeezed to restore the antebellum landscape of Quemoy by erasing the military structures from the civilian domains (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011):

The QDH under the pressure of the county government and the county council destroyed bunkers, defense positions, and air-raid shelters to satisfy their policy of “returning properties to civilians.” 軍方也在縣府、議會壓力下，陸續敲毀碉堡、據點和防空洞，遂行所謂「還地於民」的政策
The re-editing of the syntax of everyday landscape was described as “an overwhelming mission of mass destruction” (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011). Smith provides a possible explanation for the magnitude of destruction: “as a new society takes place, or existing society takes a new place, it is the symbols of reference that suffer and work change” (1997, 87). In this view, destruction of military structures announces an undergoing process of power adjustment and transitional justice. In the attempts to persuade his countrymen into preserving the slogan reliefs on the exterior walls of their houses, Huang recalls some complaints he has encountered that may explain why some Quemoy locals feel the urge to erase these slogan signs (2007, 350):

A brand new house was taken for years, free of charge; now the military has no use of it. Why on earth cannot [I] just take off these words? Does even that [removal] break the law? 一棟新新的屋子被毫無條件強佔了幾年，現在軍方不用了，難道把這些字拿掉也不可以？也犯法嗎？

Why should [I] keep [the signs]? Are there subsidies for keeping? Or, compensation? 為什麼要留下來呢？留著有補助嗎？有賠償嗎？

After the abolishment of Martial Law restored the lawful status of citizens and autonomy of the civil government, the empowered populace and administration wield their newly attained power to “correct” the military wrongdoing, such as the property requisition. Some locals, like the complaining property owner, aggressively destroyed the military features due to the mindset of transitional justice that simultaneously bestowed them rights to control their surroundings and to claim monetary returns. Destruction of military structures matters, not for the sake of tourist development, reconciliation, or demilitarization—all of which oftentimes were only the nominal causes to justify sheer desire for destruction—but more as demonstrations of freedom emerging in the cleansing of stigmas of military repression.

Although military structures in the civilian domains often faced destruction and those in the remote areas are largely abandoned, the locals nonetheless reinvented some
of them for non-military use. Among them, those released to private citizens and surviving the destruction mostly integrate into the local daily life. Their civilian owners reused them as auxiliary spaces of everyday life in various ways—barns, garages, workshops, to name a few (Figure 4.6). Otherwise, military structures in the public domains, now under the stewardship of the county government or the KNP, will usually turn into tourist facilities. The transformation is completed through the three treatments. Among them, rehabilitation is the most aggressive one that may introduce the full-scale constructional intervention into the target structures, and is practically turns a military facility into an attraction for the battlefield tourism. Sites selected for rehabilitation stand out due to their potential as spectacles, and therefore are usually large in scale and unique in style to attract the tourist gaze. Rehabilitation subsequently demands more investment of resources than the other two treatments. By contrast, remodeling comprises only partial constructional intervention. It however emphasizes replacing interior interpretive materials about the past conflicts. The remodeled cases, like those of rehabilitation, are major attractions of the battlefield tourism in Quemoy. Unlike rehabilitated structures, remodeled ones are capable of enunciating a solid statement about the past conflicts through their spatiality of commemoration.

The disguise treatment scarcely involves architectural mediation in the original structures but commonly uses exterior camouflage to reinvent these structures. The disguised structures often serve as auxiliary and infrastructural features for both the battlefield tourism and the local public affairs, and often occupy strategic points—intersections of arteries, a centerpiece of vistas, gateways to villages. They are ideal positions for panoptic observation and vice versa focal points to be observed from their surroundings. Due to their particular locations, these structures sequentially become
Figure 4.6. Manifold Reuses of Military Structures Released to Private Citizens. The QDH gradually returned lands requisitioned for military reservations to their private owners since they carried out the disarmament plan. In a trip in 2006, my host, Chen, the owner of Mingyuan B&B, informed me of that, at the beginning, the QDH when retuning the lands did not take down the military structures therein but only vacated these buildings. Some property owners did not know what to do with these sturdy military buildings, and to have them torn down cost these owners a fortune. As they file complaints, the QDH decides to indiscriminately remove all structures before the land release. Some of these military structures bulldozed down were actually newly built at the time, and even some local witnesses considered the removal wasteful of useful structures. As a result, most military structures integrating into the civilian daily life today were transferred to the land owners in the first few years after the abolishment of Martial Law. Some locals put them to diverse uses, for example, a storage [A], a basement of their house [B], a auto-repair shop [C], and a barn [D]. [photo by the author]
appropriate carriers of outdoor advertising and public bulletin boards. The bunker at the
gateway of Jinchen Township 金城鎮—the most developed urban area in Quemoy—is a
representative of the disguised structures (Figure 4.7). At the main entrance of the town,
the bunker stands at the center of the traffic circle, literally welcoming travelers from the
east with the welcome sign on its wall. Nevertheless, the bunker was an anti-parachute
fort stationed with a handful of soldiers who in addition to the defense duties were also
responsible for the traffic control during the curfew hours. As a defense facility, the
bunker guarded the main entrance of the township from outsiders until the abolishment of
Martial Law. Before 2003, the military had withdrawn the soldiers stationed at the bunker,
and installed a flower bed circling its base that separated the structure from hand
engagement but maintained the eye contact. The structure, partially covered by the county
logos—a simplified gable of the traditional folk house—as ornaments, carried a bulletin
board with a neon dragon figure, “Quemoy County” in Chinese and English, and another
county logo atop. With these ornaments, the county government attempted to turn the
bunker into the centerpiece for the entrance into the county. Even so, the visitors could
clearly tell the origin of the structure as a bunker by its appearance. In 2008, the county
government repainted the bunker with a new coat of military camouflage, and upon the
painted surface installed seven golden characters read as “Welcome to Jinchen
Township.” The renewed appearance conveyed a mixed message, for on one hand the
military camouflage strengthened the military connotation; on the other the characters
turned the bunker into a welcoming sculpture. Although the renovation intended to
accomplish the development of battlefield tourism and reconciliation at the same time,
the resulting mixed message however rendered both meanings out of place. The
displacement then posed a question: Which one, a bunker or a welcome sign, is proper?
From 2004, the Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor Inc., a county controlled business, used the bulletin board for advertising; therefore the liquor bottle atop the bunker.

In 2008, a new China policy brought a surge of mainland tourists to Quemoy, and the local added the characters to the bunker to welcome visitors.

Figure 4.7. The Bunker at the Gateway of Jinchen. The serial photos show the bunker under disguise during 2003-2011. The transition reveals a tendency to cover up the military structure more and more permanently from public view. [photo by the author]
The locals answered the question in 2011 by another renewal of the structure in which horticultural decorations and photographs of local landscape covered up the entire structure. The renovation therefore concealed the original use of the structure from view. Even with the dramatic change of appearance, the welcome sign remained prominent on the structure. By disguise, the locals then erased the military structure from their everyday landscape.

Through this discussion, one general principle for reediting the post-conflict landscape seems clear: For military structures to continue their existence, they must not hinder the ongoing pursuit of the local society. For those that do, they soon face destruction like the slogan signs on the folk houses. For those do not, the locals disregard them like the military structures in remote areas. Otherwise, the locals expect that some of these structures can assist in the cause of tourist development after reinvention. Even in these cases, reinvention is not always compatible with the continuity of military structures. Reinvention thence appears to be an alternative way to conceal and to erase the structures from the landscape; whereby they can silently support tourist development without bringing up contradictories that the locals strive to avoid. The only treatment aiming to re-present the image of military structures in operation is rehabilitation, and its primary goal is to create attractions for battlefield tourism upon the authenticity of these reinvented military structures.

4.4 Mashan Observation Station: Transferring Meanings of a Bunker

Not all the rehabilitated military structures recently underwent the transition from a defense post to a sightseeing spot. Some military structures have functioned as tourist attractions since the time of military rule: the observation stations in Quemoy serve both functions. These stations opened a few windows for people to peep into the Red China
behind the Bamboo Curtain. From their construction, they inherited the availability and readiness for visual consumption. In an ordinary setting, the scenery of beaches, bunkers, and enemy soldiers viewed through binoculars meant nothing more than what they were in eyes of the observer. For soldiers, seeing these scenes meant performing everyday surveillance. However, the same scenery could carry distinct meanings to visitors from distant places for it crystallized the exotic, unusual, and mysterious image of the others’ side. The extraordinariness of the scenery, stemming from its distance from the Free World, made the image metaphorically more significant than what they appeared to be, and presented the imaginative geography of a communist reality. Seeing these scenes therefore sets off a hermeneutic journey for the visitors to validate their knowledge about the imagined realm in its authentic form.

The two ways of seeing articulated the everydayness and poetics of place. In contrast to the routine observations that soldiers carried out everyday, the tourists’ attempt to let the communist world reveal itself pinpointed a moment of truth that rendered the station a venue of authenticity and poetics. As the soldier’s everydayness concealed authenticity and poetics of place with the routine surveillance, the tourist poetics nonetheless made authenticity stand out to challenge the taken-for-granted understanding of the communist reality. In the everyday setting, the observer was the subject, the only actor that mattered in completing the daily errands, while in the poetic setting the observed became the leading role with which the truth might then reveal itself. After the development of battlefield tourism, the role of the observer and the observed reversed; the everydayness and poetics of place concomitantly moved along. Although the duality of the observation stations remained, the development had transferred the meaning of the military structures away from their original utility. When tourism
becomes the everyday practice in these stations, the authenticity what these stations concern the most will repose on their military past rather than the scenery in the lens.

On the northeastern corner of Quemoy at the tip of the Mashan 馬山 peninsula, Mashan observation station occupies the location with the shortest distance to the P.R.C. The station is 1,800 meters from the P.R.C. controlled island, Jiaoyu 角嶼, on the ebb, and the geographic proximity makes the strategic point a proper site for an observation station and a broadcast station, let alone a certain coastal defense post. The peninsula projecting into the waters is actually a tombolo where one of the four citadels of the Ming Empire was built in the fourteenth century to defend the island from pirates. Upon the same site, the nationalist troops constructed modern defense works and underground facilities when they retreated to Quemoy in 1949. After years of military construction of underground facilities and earthworks, the elevation of the tombolo rose to thirty-two meters above sea level, and earthworks enabled thick vegetation cover to grow on the barren rocky tombolo. When the construction of the observation station was completed in the 1981, the military named the place “Mashan,” which literally meant the “horse hill” in Chinese. Thence, Mashan became the foremost post against the Bamboo Curtain, and the northernmost sentry post in Mashan was known as “the first post of the world 天下第一哨.”

As a critical military post, the QDH deployed an infantry company in Mashan and the small islet on its east, Hoyu 后嶼, to guard the water course between them and the Mashan cove on their southeast. The observation station was only a portion of the Mashan military complex which was mainly a coastal defense post but also accommodated a broadcast station for psychological warfare. Normally, the observation station was a surveillance center for the enemy activities, but during the wartime it would
assist artillery units improve their accuracy by reporting where their projectiles landed. In addition to the military use, the observation station was also a showcase for politicians, journalists, and international guests. For these visitors, the military built a modern restroom with hand dryers that the soldiers in the Mashan nicknamed “a million dollar restroom” and believed to be “the highest class in Quemoy” in the early 1980s (Quemoy Daily 24 Jul. 2004). The main attraction of the Mashan complex was the observatory in which soldiers using binoculars could watch the military activities on the communist controlled islets (Figure 4.8). When tourists visited the observatory, soldiers would explain the scenery visible through binoculars, while demonstrating their comprehensive knowledge of the enemy islands.

The observatory and the restroom were on opposite ends of an underground tunnel (Figure 4.9). On the two pillars of the entrance was a couplet: “Manage the battlefield and train for combat strength, [so that] the whole army will defeat enemies and consolidate our territory 經營戰場培養戰力，全軍破敵永奠金甌.” The exit connected to a sunken square flanked with wall reliefs of battling soldiers on both sides, and the building on one side was a presentation room to introduce the complex to visitors. On the opposite to the tunnel entrance, a sunken path carved into the earth mound, and turned perpendicularly toward the gate of the military complex. On both sides of the path were two retaining walls; two lines of mature banyan trees, growing on the slopes behind the walls, covered the path from above. Seen from the gate, these trees formed a vista, and the centerpiece at its end was a slogan wall with four characters read as “Recovering My Rivers and Mountains 還我河山” (Figure 4.10). The entrance of the broadcast station was on one side of the sunken path, and there was also a couplet on both sides of the entrance: “Crumble the morale of the rebel army; amplify the heavenly voice of the great Han 弘揚
Figure 4.8. Interior of the Observatory

Figure 4.9. Entrance of the Observation Station.

Figure 4.10. The Vista, the Slogan Wall, and the Sunken Path

Figure 4.11. Entrance of the Broadcast Station.

Figure 4.12. The Mural of Armed Soldier

Figure 4.13. The Wall of Old Photos

[photos by the author in 2008, 2009]
In the past the station was another tourist attraction in the complex. From the entrance of the underground station, a tunnel led to offices and broadcast rooms, where the broadcasters announced propaganda with their soft voices. To broadcast the audio propaganda to the mainland seaboards, the garrison built two towers facing the mainland on the sea cliff, and installed a total of fifty-six loudspeakers on their façades. With these characteristic facilities and the foremost location of the Free World, the showcasing and symbolic attributes were inherent in the Mashan military complex.

In 2002, the QDH transferred the observation station to the KNP that reused the place as tourist attractions. As rehabilitation aims to re-present the image of the military structure, the KNP does not significantly alter the observation station. Today, tourists can follow the right fork from the complex gate to the sunken path, passing by the broadcast center to the entrance of the observation station, which is the only facility open to the general public. The left fork leads to the coastal posts and the soldiers’ quarters in the military reservation, and its gatekeepers’ post moves inward from the complex gate to the middle of the left fork. Tourists can linger in the open space behind the complex gate for photos or gathering. Also, military personnel maintain the broadcasts, but, instead of propaganda, it plays pop music for entertainment. Most changes noticeable after rehabilitation are cosmetic to highlight the sense of a military base: for example, adding a coat of military camouflage paint on the green retaining walls along the sunken path; or, decorating the tunnel entrance with a mural of a faceless, armed soldier guarding a costal sentry post beside a binocular (Figure 4.12). The decorative treatment also appears in the observatory. By a wall of monotone photographs of Chiang Kia-shek inspecting military facilities in Quemoy during the wartime, the KNP endows the space with a museum.
quality, and evokes a reminiscent association with the past (Figure 4.13). To constitute battlefield tourism, the KNP exaggerates the military motif by introducing military accretions to the original military settings. The faceless soldier guarding the tunnel entrance offers a chance of reflexivity for tourists, especially the veterans among them, to establish personal connections to the place through their memory and experience. With these additions enhancing the awareness of the military settings, the rehabilitation is thus conceived as remedies for the absence of soldiers, defenses, and conflicts, all of which in one word are demilitarization.

In addition, rehabilitation is also means to adapt the military structures to mass tourism. The overt demonstrations are the construction of the parking lot for tour buses adjacent to the complex gate and the public display of the Mashan map including the layout of the military complex. They are both amenities to create a tourist-friendly environment. Likewise, to create such an entrance, the KNP tore down the iron gate to allow a view into the military complex, and repaved the entrance to mold an entrance concourse with a direction sign of the interior facilities in the pavement. Without soldiers on guard, the exclusive military base now opens to the public, and the exposure attracts vendors to take on soldiers’ position, preying on people coming close to their stands. Moreover, the line of facilitation work can sometimes get subtle and discreet that one without prior knowledge of the place cannot tell the difference, such as erasing the two militant couplets from the entrances of the broadcast station and the observation station. From the alteration and accretion of the structures, two purposes of the rehabilitation emerge: first, to highlight the military sense of place and second, to facilitate mass tourism, and if conflict occurs, the first will be sacrificed for the second as obliteration of the two couplets. The spatial affinity to mainland tourists—that the locals consider as
their main market of mass tourism—therefore outweighs the articulation of spatial specificity of the military structures.

In addition to soldiers and couplets, another missing component from the landscape in Mashan is the thick vegetation on the coast after mine removal. To perform the mine clearance, the QDH clear-cut the vegetation in the minefields around the complex, and exposed its exteriors and all the seafront posts originally hidden in the woods. Due to its proximity to the mainland, Mashan happens to be the turnabout point and the finale of the famous cruise, “Watching Quemoy on the Sea.” During the Cold-War period, soldiers guarding the coastal sentry posts had to fire warning shots at vessels transgressing the midline of the waters, and if the vessels disregarded the warning soldiers had to fire shots to expel them. Otherwise, the soldiers on guard would face trials in a court-martial. After the abolishment of Martial Law, the withdrawal of troops weakened the coastal defense in Quemoy, and soldiers in the remaining coastal posts received instructions to hold their fire against transgression. Instead, they are encouraged to use alarm sirens or megaphone loudspeakers. Under the circumstances of demilitarization, the cruise boats carrying mainland tourists to Quemoy need not worry about transgression over the marine border. Unlike the situation in the famous story, these boats today would approach directly unto the Mashan seafront at a distance close enough for the tourists to start a quarrel with the soldiers in their sentry posts. Thence, the tour boats slowly cruise through the watercourse between Mashan and Hoyu for photo shoots, and then return to Amoy from the Mashan cove (Chang 2008). As nationalist garrisons are the major scenic attraction of the cruise, the clear-cutting for demining coincidentally facilitated the visual consumption for the mainland tourists. The observation station is now observed, and the observer and the observed also exchanged their places.
China is open to travelers from around the global to travel freely, and the scenery viewed from Mashan does not have the significance as before, no longer does it represent the communist world. The landscape in the binoculars displays nothing but everyday life in China. In contrast, as the Mashan station turns into a tourist attraction, it is the focal point of the tourist gaze whether from sea or land. Inasmuch as its attraction stems from the connection with the past conflict, the tourist locale means more than a cluster of former military structures, and stands a monument to the yesteryears. The historical association of the observation station renders it an evocative stimulus to nostalgia, and opens up the poetic dimension of the place. In the poetic setting, the garrison in Mashan is thus the past in the present. Thereby the rehabilitation introduces the camouflage paint, the soldier’s mural, and the wall of wartime photographs to strengthen the spatiality and to spur personal connection with the place.

From another standpoint, sightseeing naturally becomes the everyday practice after the touristic turn, and a part of the goal of rehabilitation is to facilitate mass tourism. To fulfill this goal, rehabilitation embeds a new set of underlying discourses through the spatial rearrangement that in the meantime encourages ritualized practice. For example, participants in the group tours will normally get off their buses in the parking lot; pass by the map of Mashan on the corner and the vendors’ booths across the street. They will gather in the entrance concourse to hear their guides’ interpretation or to take photographs of the stone tablet with inscriptions of Mashan. Another example is the course of the cruise boats that usually stop briefly near the Mashan station for photographs, and then sail into the cove before turning back to the Amoy docks. Soldiers on guard will not mistake the approaching boats as threats, for the routine of the cruises has rendered them taken-for-granted objects to the soldiers. Likewise, on the trip taken on the land, tour
guides and vendors also find a fixed vantage point to embark on their regular business, and tour guides will usually share a similar itinerary to lead their groups through the place. Aside from the human effect, the tourist pilgrimage is a combination of improvisational reenactments according to the spatial choreography embedded in the place through rehabilitation: The concourse suggests lingering; the tree vista and sunken path hints “keep walking”; and the slogan wall calls for a photo shoot. In other words, the institutionalization originates from the spatial orders that hint to visitors to perform certain acts in the designed environments. Since rehabilitation has inscribed the pilgrimage ritual on the sequent spaces, the amenities of mass tourism in Mashan thus embody the everydayness of the sightseeing spot. In the ordinary settings, the spatial practice in response to the embedded spatial orders articulates the meaning of place, and the everydayness of place depends on the users’ conformity to the spatial suggestions. Either challenging or neglecting the suggestions leads to improper conducts and makes the user out-of-place. As a result, in an everyday setting, the spatial practices create meaning rather than the spatial orders or the spaces. In this mode of understanding, the material settings in Mashan, namely the representation of the Cold-War past, are insignificant, but only the present tourist activities matter.

The role exchange of the Mashan observation station from the observer (signifier) to the observed (signified) reveals a change in its meaning: In the past, the station provided access to the social foci—life on the communist side—but now it is, or strictly speaking its past self is, meaningful as the social focus—the observed observation station, not just an everyday tourist spot. The semantic transformation results from the human attachment of historic significance to Mashan, while the attached significance in fact comes from, but is not limited to, the past use of Mashan as an access to the social focus. If so, the identity
change of Mashan can clarify its semantic change, as spatial practice defines identity and identity endows places with meanings. From an everyday military station/a poetic tourist spot to a poetic military station/an everyday tourist spot, the exchange of the everydayness and poetics of place between the place identities present few leads. The historical significance of the place comes from the soldiers’ everyday practice in the past, and yields poetics of place today based on its authenticity of a Cold-War apparatus. Due to the poetic evocation, Mashan metaphorically means more than a battle station from the moment of demilitarization, and symbolizes the nationalist ideologies, the anticommunist conflict, the military life, and associations with the Cold War. As a trope of the past, the station departs from an entity for combatant use to a symbol for cultural interpretations. As such, its meaning is constantly referential to itself as a signifier (e.g., a military relic today) pointing to another signifier (e.g., the observation station during the Cold War) to another (e.g. the life in the communist side in binoculars) to another. Mashan figuratively turns into a vessel accommodating different, given meanings that however are not concerned with its entity—Mashan as tourist amenities. The semantic transfer of Mashan thence declares a symbolic communication with an absence of essence in its meanings that dreadfully hinge upon one attached referent and another. Sequentially, the attached meanings in the present, such as the one of a war memorial, become the dominant definition of the place, and alienate other meanings of Mashan from the public. The usurpation of meanings is exactly the purpose to perform rehabilitation in the military relics, by which the locals may dispatch the conflicts to the past, and promote battlefield tourism.

During the Cold-War period, Mashan as “the first post of the world” was especially heavily garrisoned with crack troops, and the military only assigned its loyal champions
to command the position, who could constantly meet with and therefore establish relations with elites in the world, when they visited Mashan to watch the Red China. In another word, whoever commanded the post would have a promising future (Quemoy Daily 17 Apr. 2012). The arrangement constituted the specificity of Mashan that was full of pride, feeling of superiority, and responsibility. As a veteran recalled, the experience on sentry duty at the nearest post to China provoked a poetic, gallant feeling, “as if I alone can shoulder all the responsibility to protect our country and all its families” (Huang 2006). Due to the geographic proximity to P.R.C. territory, Mashan was commonly construed as a highly sensitive position under strict security control to prevent infiltration (Quemoy Daily 24 Mar. 2004). Subsequently, the military structure like a border sign in the landscape conveyed a crystal-clear message: “Keep Out, Red China Ahead!” For most people, propaganda demonized communists and guns in the beachfront validate the warning of border-crossing. However, for one looking for a way to the communist side, the geographic statement of Mashan offered a convenient indication of the ideal departing location. Given that, in 1979 the commander of the Mashan position swam to the P.R.C. islet from his post. Inasmuch as the short distance was the primary factor in favor of his trip, the “first post of the world” was simultaneously the most convenient spot for defection.

The dual meanings of Mashan are a direct product of the borderland effect that grants two opposite ways of viewing a place. The geographical characteristics of Quemoy repeatedly induce social constructs appearing as a pair in the history about who the locals are and what the place is. Therefore, no matter the Han or non-Han, a gang of maritime powers or obedient imperial subjects, and even nationalists or communists are dichotomous social constructions without essential meanings. What matters is practice,
especially those concerning struggle. For livelihood, e.g. plantation or overseas trade, the local social focus switches toward completely opposite directions a few times in history. The struggles for living thus constitute the several occasions of what I term “reversal of geographical coordinate system,” of which the embodiment in landscape presents polarized contrast to the former settings. The sharp contrast after the shift manifests the social engagement in a new paradigm revolving around another pair of dichotomous constructs that “strive to usurp each other’s meaning” (Smith 1997, 90). In spite of the paradigm shift, the contest between the previous pair however remains undetermined and inconclusive, but fades away from the center-stage of the social concerns. The role that Quemoy locals played in the anti-pirate war in the seventeenth century is still very much controversial today. In light of this, even though the binary constructs change, the underlying chassis causing the primary social issue and its corresponding categories is still the borderland effect. That said, studies of Quemoy tourism also consider the borderland effect as the key parameter of its tourist attraction (Chien 2004; Chang 2008). As tourists from China and Taiwan contest over the meanings of the military relics, the battlefield tourism arouses other dialectics of the identities of Quemoy and its people. Considering the management methods of military structures as embodiments of the landscape dialectics, it then reveals the local viewpoints on the identity issue. The reediting of the military landscape represents not only the local reinterpretation of the past, but also a crucial step to remold their homeland into a preferable image that articulates who they are and where they are. The reinterpretation and reconstruction are therefore both parts of efforts for the identity reformulation.

Mashan presents the semantic contrast of a place between the opposite viewpoints of nationalist and communist regimes, the landscape change after demilitarization in
Mashan, that delivers an “observed observation station,” reveals the contrast between the two paradigms of the Cold War and the current reconciliation. The irony, generated from the sharp contrast between meanings attached to places in Quemoy, is therefore two-fold: one regards the borderland characteristics while the other regards the paradigm shift. As the mechanism of cultural demilitarization, the latter irony keynotes the landscape change after the reversal of the geographical coordinate system. When the entertaining aspect of battlefield tourism continuously consumes the nationalist meanings of individual bunkers, the irony in landscape also downplays the dominant discourses in the militant society (e.g. patriotism, anticommunism, etc.). To express goodwill, the Quemoy locals have to continuously reinvent military relics, the authentic representation of the past, to produce simulacra for tourist consumption. By so doing, they then can continuously disarm the past through the reiterative creation of simulation for entertainment. Until another paradigm shift, the meaning of the Sisyphean task should constantly rest in the recurrent process instead of the repeated, futile result. In this light, the retention of the military structures for rehabilitation signifies the local practice to inscribe geographical articulation of reconciliation with China. By comparison, destruction and abandonment of military structures would be less effective in expressing their peacemaking intention. The maneuver not only dissipates the dilemma of developing battlefield tourism and demilitarization, but also makes them essential to each other. The three social dynamics in Quemoy merely come as a bundle.
In celebrating its ninetieth anniversary in 2005, Quemoy County issued a declaration and officially repudiated its past identity as a battlefield and the associated geographical marginality (Quemoy Daily 1 Jan. 2005):

Our determination and will to seek peace will never change. Kinmen [Quemoy] is the bridge of friendship over the two sides of the Strait, not a battlefield. Kinmen is no longer an offshore island but the center with an ocean and a continent as its hinterland. . . . Let us . . . built Kinmen into an [special] economic zone of peace . . . . We will endeavor to push Kinmen on to the global stage.

To accomplish the goal, the county government set its cardinal development policy to rely on “tourism as foundations of this county and [local] culture as representation of Quemoy 觀光立縣，文化金門” (Luo 2010, 472). By the policy, the county government intends “to switch the geographic impression of ‘battlefield Quemoy’ into the one of ‘cultural Quemoy’ 把「戰地金門」的形象扭轉為「文化金門」” (InfoTimes 20 Jun 2007). To mold the new impression, the authorities incorporated “the traditional Southern Fukien architecture and the military relics into the local culture 整合金門特有的閩南傳統建築及戰役史蹟，融入地方文化.” The effort will hopefully “enrich the tourist resources; animate the tourist industry; and promote the comprehensive development of Quemoy 豐富觀光資源，活絡旅遊相關產業，促進金門整體發展” (Luo 2010, 472). Through the policy, the promotion of the local culture fundamentally serves two purposes for Quemoy: first, to buttress heritage tourism, and second, to reformulate place identities. Except for the battlefield culture, the cultural heritage in Quemoy generally refers to the southern Fukien culture and the Chinese emigrant culture, of which the material representations are the traditional settlement and folk housing in the Southern Fukien style and the Sino-occidental hybrid architecture owned by overseas Quemoyan (Figure 5.1). In a tangible sense, to supplant the impression of the battlefield Quemoy by one of the cultural
Figure 5.1  Traditional Folk Villages in Quemoy. Although the traditional layouts of most villages remain, the Sino-occidental buildings and modern architectures have blended in their skylines. [Source: Google Map, photos by the author in 2008 and 2010]
Quemoy means to maneuver identity reformulation through obliteration of military structures and revitalization of the antebellum landscape. Provided the two approaches proceed smoothly, the geographic impression formed after 1949 should no longer represent Quemoy. However, the identity reformulation brings more complications than a declaration.

First of all, to obliterate all monumental military structures from the landscape is unfeasible. When military structures assist tourist development, the locals exempt them from annihilation (Quemoy Daily 12 Feb. 2012). Since military relics remain the most characteristic landscape of Quemoy, some of them have survived the demilitarization to serve as tourist attractions in the post-military era. In addition, these military structures after reinvention can mostly showcase the local intention of disarmament and reconciliation. For this reason, the post-conflict society continuously reuses these structures for peacemaking purpose. Consequently, reinvention of the military landscape often comprises cultural sanitization to pacify their militaristic connotation. The most illustrative exemplars of the sort of reinvention appear in the cases where remodeling enables reuse. War museums, memorials, and commemorative sites were once essential propaganda that aroused patriotism and anticommunism during wartime. Due to their capability to indoctrinate the meaning of anticommmunist struggles, these places have long been essential destinations on the battlefield pilgrimage, and over time have developed into iconic places of Quemoy. In the age of reconciliation, most of these iconographies however engage in a process of remodeling their interior exhibitions. Remodeled as they are, they become ideal places to propagandize the present reinterpretation of the past conflicts. For assistance in peacemaking, these monuments become an integral part of the tourist Quemoy, and are more valuable to the post-conflict society under reuse than
destruction. By reinterpreting meaning of landscape, the remodeled military structures then become the best instruments for demilitarization.

Provided the post-war society successfully nullifies the battlefield identity, to fulfill the identity reformulation nonetheless requires construction of the “cultural Quemoy.” In other words, the management of military landscapes—through destruction, abandonment, and reinvention—are merely half the work of identity reformulation, while the other half relies on historical preservation. Their collaboration signifies two-way traffic that while dispatching military structures to the past, the local society simultaneously brings the historic landscape to the present. The exchange of representative images of Quemoy generally sums up the mechanism of landscape change after demilitarization.

The construction of place image results in the ahistorical juxtaposition of multiple cultures in the landscape that consist mainly of three themes: the Cold War battlefield, the southern Fukien folk settlements, and the homeland of overseas Quemoyan. The reinvented and reconstructed spaces of these cultures scattered over the island lead tourists jumping from one time portal to another, and constitute a quixotic journey of the surreal, poetic Quemoy. The poetic effect of heritage tourism on tourists is especially conspicuous on group tours: As the tourists travel among historic sites, military relics, and scenic spots by bus during the day, hotels cater to most of their needs in the evening. Even when spontaneous excursions are possible, they have little chance to make in-depth observations on the local ordinary life. In consequence, their busy itinerary overloaded with Quemoy cultures inversely conceals the mundane Quemoy from them, and their Quemoy can thus be aloof from the day-to-day reality.27 Whereas the “cultural Quemoy”

27 In the summer of 2008, I attended a five-day workshop held by Taiwan Historica and the Quemoy County government in Quemoy. After several days of field trips and lectures, I overheard a Taiwanese participant commenting in the tour bus: There seemed to be no 7-Eleven convenient stores in Quemoy. At
pervades tourists’ ontological experience in their quest for the “authentic” image of the tourist destination, the reinterpretation of Quemoy is in effect working in the landscape to contest for the dominant place image, a Cold-Was battlefield. Consequently, the multiculturalism, as the outcome of the contest, reveals the underlying culture of postmodernity, which conjures the ahistorical juxtaposition of historic simulacra to serve as the local cultural commodity for mass tourism. Based on the landscape change in the post-conflict Quemoy, this chapter explores the construction of a homeland image for identity reformulation and its resulting cultural hybridity that bespeaks the overlapping, contesting, and polyvalent meanings of place.

5.1 The Other End: Preserving Historic Sites for Tourism

In comparison with Taiwan, Quemoy has a much longer history. For the reason, some of its historic sites have long been popular sightseeing spots for Taiwanese tourists since the Cold-War period. Until 2012, the county government has designated a total of twenty-three historic sites and 145 historic buildings to secure the resources of the heritage tourism. Due to the policy of tourist development, the number of designated historic sites increased 110 percent in the last twenty years in Quemoy. In addition, since the amendment of the Cultural Heritages Preservation Act enabled the registration of historic buildings in 2000, the number of historic buildings in Quemoy skyrocketed and amounts to 14 percent of the national total.28 Among these historic buildings, 71 percent

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28 Before the abolishment of Martial Law in 1992, the total of historic sites in Quemoy was twenty-one, among which six were designated on Nov. 23 1991, and thus could also be a part of the local efforts for the tourist development (Huang 2008). According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Culture, R.O.C., the total of registered historical building is 1,031 in 2012. The number of historic buildings in Quemoy is the second most among the twenty-two counties and cities in R.O.C., just a few less than the 163 buildings
(103 of 145) are residences including traditional folk houses and the Sino-occidental hybrid architectures. The intention to preserve the local vernacular culture is obvious. In addition to the designation of historic sites and buildings, the preservation movement further expands its horizon to protect houses that disqualify for historic designation in the two architectural styles. The ambitious expansion of coverage protects the integrality of traditional settlements (their layouts, skylines, etc.) when there is no strict military regulations to constrain the rampant housing development. For preservation purposes, the county government and the KNP both offer subsidies as financial incentives (with a maximum of two million Taiwan dollars, ca. $67,000 USD) for private owners to restore their old houses back to mint condition. Furthermore, the KNP also restores folk houses and historic buildings for their owners if they will let the KNP use the properties for thirty years. After restoration, the KNP subleases most of these properties to the private sector through public competitions, by which they then fulfill the goal to rehabilitate historic buildings. Since 1999, the KNP has acquired the utilization rights of seventy-seven buildings, and completely restored sixty-four until 2012. Among restored buildings, except for seven kept in the KNP as museums and on-site offices, private tenants operate bed-and-breakfasts in forty-nine of them and retail stores in five (Kinmen National Park n.d.). Whereas the majority of these fully-sponsored restoration projects become tourist amenities afterwards, their use suggests that a practical cause of historic preservation in

registered in the Taipei City.

29 According to the Quemoy County Autonomous Regulation of Preservation Incentives for Traditional Architectures 金門縣維護傳統建築風貌獎助自治條例 amended in 2006, the county government will subsidize a maximum of 1,600,000 TWD (ca. $53,000 USD) for restoration projects in the county but outside the national park areas. The KNP also decrees a similar regulation, the Implementation Guidelines of Preservation Incentives for Traditional Architectures 金門國家公園維護傳統建築風貌獎勵補助實施要點, which subsidizes a maximum of 2,000,000 TWD (ca. $67,000 USD) for the general restoration according to the latest version amended in 2011. Up to 2009, the KNP has subsidized 237 buildings (Kinmen National Park n.d.), and the county government has done the same for 347 buildings (Kinmen County Government n.d.).
Quemoy is to produce handmaids of cultural tourism. Under the influence of the development policy of the Quemoy County that promotes incorporation of tourism with reinvention of cultural landscape, a massive movement of historic preservation came into being. Consequently, the total number of buildings under preservation has exceeded 850 in Quemoy in 2012. With the movement flourishing, the cultural landscape of Quemoy thus retains a reminiscent tinge.

Through the preservation movement, the governmental agencies revive the image of antebellum Quemoy in the present landscape. According to the cultural policies of the county head (2001-2009), the historic preservation purports to “mold Quemoy into a multicultural museum island so as to constitute the burgeoning cultural industries” (Lee Zhu-Fong Election Campaign Headquarters 2005, 23). By retaining, restoring, and reusing buildings in the traditional Southern Fukien style and the Sino-occidental hybrid style, the preservation movement re-presents a historical Quemoy in a golden age that in fact has never existed in its history due to the anachronistic juxtaposition. The “museum island” policy attempts to deliver a “hyperreality,” in which “[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation of models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard 1988, 166). The products of “historic preservation” in this view are thus contemporary creation of hyperreal verisimilitudes. Since most landscape features under preservation belong to the local traditional culture, their general distribution in the whole island urges the formation of a nexus of eco-museums to turn Quemoy into a site of hyperreality. Toward this end, the chairman of the national council of cultural affairs suggests that the construction of “cultural Quemoy” should rely on a public-participatory process to establish a solid ground for community development. Furthermore, by
spontaneous public participation, the construction can bring out the local distinctiveness, and increase the local identification with the place (Chen 2004). In this view, the construction of “a multicultural museum island” attempts to produce a representative image of Quemoy, which communicates how the civil society in the post-conflict era prefers its homeland to be recognized by others, and how the locals consider that their ideal homeland should be. The preservation movement is thus an opportunity for the locals to realize their homeland reformation. In other words, historic preservation embodies locals’ intention to retrieve their homeland lost in militarization. Through the localization, they demonstrate their control of place and again leave the group impress in landscape. The place and identity reformulation motivate them to stride over the transition towards peacetime.

Practically, historic preservation produces attractions for heritage tourism and amenities with local specificity, such as the old-house bed-and-breakfasts. As declared by the core development policy of Quemoy County—tourism is the county’s foundation and culture is its representation, accordingly the heritage tourism and multiculturalism are two sides of the same coin. Culturally, the preservation of these traditional buildings arouses a renaissance of the immaterial cultures, by which the post-military society revisits the local conventions and reinterprets their meanings and values that strongly connected with the local group identities. Meanwhile, the cultural renaissance also stirs the production of knowledge forming a discursive field that establishes the connection between the local vernacular culture and the hegemonic culture in traditional China. The emphases on the genesis of the island, which starts by a group of Han elites from the Chinese cultural hearth in the northern plain, and on their role in the anti-pirate war, who as pious Confucianists were the loyal supporters of the empire, are both historic
discourses serving for the connection. Such historic discourses aim to consolidate the legitimacy of the local culture to portray it as the paradigmatic type of the Han Chinese tradition, which then transcends the insular time-space limitation, and is applicable to a broader geographical area and an eclectic ethnic group. The knowledge of the traditional settlements in Quemoy produced in the recent research is an example. To increase the cultural value of the folk settlements, a catchphrase repeatedly used by preservationists to stress their significance is a metaphor of Quemoy as “the gene pool of the Southern Fukien culture.” The metaphor comes from an architecture historian’s research published by the county government (Jiang 2002, 15):

The traditional settlements in Quemoy embody the harmonious relation among the “universe, earth, and humanity” in the Han people’s ideologies. In addition, their interior layouts articulate the social relations of the traditional patriarchy . . . . It is pertinent to say that they are the gene pool of the Southern Fukien culture and the Southern Fukien architectures. 金門的傳統聚落是漢民族「天、地、人」和諧思維的再現，內部的配置更反映了宗法倫理的社會關係……可說是閩南文化與閩南建築的基因庫……。

The (re)appraisal of the material culture attaches great significance to the folk villages, which then hold extra cultural value to inspire heritage tourism. While reconstruction of historic simulacra as tourist spots demands further research, production of knowledge reciprocally contribute to the discursive field. Ultimately, the cultural renaissance avails reconciliation. Whereas the maritime powers have only been capable of overwhelming empires in several, comparatively ephemeral time periods, Quemoy in its long history has usually been an inseparable part of the mainland China. Due to historical geopolitics, the cultural renaissance supplies an essential cognitive footing to justify the political cause of reconciliation by convention; thereby rekindling the local social and cultural connection with the mainland. After all, as the Quemoy County declared during the celebration of its ninetieth anniversary, to remove the battlefield identity for peacemaking is the collective
aspiration of the local people. For this purpose, the preservation movement is the local quest for new place identities, and leads to a rite of passage to re-inscribe the landscape impress of the post-war society. Whereas to create new often begets oblivion, the preservation movement begets the cultural renaissance which flourishes at the cost of the battlefield culture. In contrast to preservation applied to the traditional structures, destruction and desertion await military relics. Although the waning of battlefield culture signifies the achievements of demilitarization, more importantly it brings forth the cultural hybridity in the landscape mosaic of the post-conflict society.

Maoshan Tower 矛山塔 is one of the three pagodas built with the coastal fortifications and the walled city in the fourteenth century. In the folklore, the general ordered to build these pagodas for fengshui considerations (Tang 2006), but recent research propagates that it functions mainly as a navigational reference (Huang et al. 2003). Maoshan Tower stands atop a hill, currently known as Maoshan 矛山, rising from the rocky coast on the southwest corner of Quemoy. In a lithograph landscape of Quemoy in the 1630s from a viewpoint on the sea (Figure 5.2), the elaborate portrayal of Maoshan Tower suggests a clear, conspicuous view of the pagoda during seaborne navigation. Due to its prominence, Maoshan Tower over time became a local landmark, and for villagers in Shuitou 水頭, the settlement adjacent to Maoshan, the pagoda is the iconography of their village (Quemoy Daily 22 May 2004). In the 1930s, to report the local news to villagers working overseas, the elementary school in Shuitou issued a periodical, the Tower Hill Monthly 塔峰月刊, which used the image of Maoshan Tower on the cover of all issues (Huang et al. 2003). In 1961, the troops in Quemoy dismantled the pagoda because it provided a geographical prominent targeting reference for the communist artillery. Afterwards, the military built a faux radar station on the hilltop site as a decoy
Figure 5.2. Quemoy in the 1630s. The pagoda on the right is Maoshan Tower. The Fort Quemoy at the center is where the island gets its current name. [Source: Lee 2004b]
Right after the military released the island from its rule in 1992, the villagers in Shuitou immediately appealed to the county government for the reconstruction of Maoshan Tower. The villages provided a photo of the pagoda found in the old periodical as the model for reconstruction (Huang et al. 2003). After the reconstruction of Maoshan Tower was completed in 2004 (Figure 5.3), the county government erected a stele with inscriptions about the vicissitude of the pagoda. The inscription specifically points out that the purpose to re-erect the pagoda is “to fulfill the goal to construct—tourism as the county foundations; culture as Quemoy’s representation 以實現觀光立縣文化金門之目標.” Along with the return of the cultural landmark, the military facility on the hilltop thus ceased to represent the place, and since passed into oblivion.

In contrast, the villagers’ urgent aspiration to restore the symbolic landscape reveals their regret of its loss. On its destruction, a local preservationist sarcastically remarked, “This pagoda was built for the military purpose [as a part of the coastal defenses] but was also destroyed for the same 此塔因軍事需要而建，也因軍事因素而拆” (Huang et al. 2003, 35). Living under the military hegemony during the wartime, the oppressed villagers reluctantly abided by the defense considerations that the military insisted upon, which not only destroyed the pagoda but subsumed the area of Maoshan into military reserve. As a result, the military deployment segregated the villagers from the landscape feature central to their collective memory and identity. After the abolishment of Martial Law returned the control of place, the villagers immediately wielded the newly gained power to reshape the landscape. They intended to revert the surroundings to their homeland in the memories by removing the military landscape that was not in the
Figure 5.3. The Reconstructed Maoshan Tower and the Stele for it Dedication in 2004. [photos by the author]
antebellum landscape. In the discussion on the cultural repercussions of militarization, Huang confesses the mentality of iconoclasm (2011, 147):

With the resistance to and the desire to be released from [the military hegemony] . . . the Quemoy locals [after demilitarization] often reckoned that many unreasonable controls and restraints in the past were the most resentful objects that must be destroyed or even completely eradicated from the landscape in no other way can their anger vent sufficiently. 存在著欲求解脫與抗拒的心理……金門百姓，面對許多往日不合理的管制與約束，往往視其為深惡痛絕的對象，非加以破壞甚至連根拔起不足以洩憤

As the precondition of the historic reconstruction is the destruction of military structures, the trade-off in this case is an advanced version of demilitarization, which in addition to destruction reconstructs the cultural landscape central to the Shuitou villagers. Similarly, the reconstruction of monuments originated from the mentality of transitional justice that urges the locals to leave their cultural impress in their homeland. After Maoshan reopened to the public and the villagers witnessed the remnants of the Maoshan Tower, the ruins evoked memories about the pagoda in their daily life, and “stirred an intensive, historic nostalgia 勾起一股強烈的歷史情懷” that drove them to appeal for the reconstruction (Huang et al. 2003, 42). The appeal for reconstruction articulated their bonding with place, and the consequent recurrence of Maoshan Tower in the landscape demonstrated the exertion of control of place by the locals today. Thereby, the demilitarization and historic preservation in Quemoy represented a constituent process of homeland (re)construction.

5.2 Representations of Quemoy: Dialogue between Reinvention and Reconstruction

By reshaping landscape, the construction of new place images to replace the one of a battlefield engages the civic society into a dialectical process of place representation. The collaboration to cast a destination image of heritage tourism through reinvention of military relics and historic preservation discloses the dialogues among the cultural/tourist
Quemoy, the battlefield Quemoy, and the everyday Quemoy. The contest for the representative image indicates a shift in the local power structure in the post-military era. Whereas the wane of nationalism unveils the colonialis tinge of the modern military culture, the military past is now construed as a totalitarian imposition on Quemoy, sequentially making it the “the great tragedy of the epoch” (Huang 2004b). Following the development of democratization, the transplanted, hegemonic military culture of the nationalist army declined into an inferior status to other local(ized) cultures—of the Han in North China or of the European in Southeast Asia. The rising awareness of local cultures gradually suppressed the world of modern military culture (battlefield Quemoy), and increasingly appreciated the vernacular cultures (the cultural Quemoy). Aside from the fact that the alienation from the military past facilitated the pursuit of reconciliation with China, the local people in fact have an estranged relation with the Cold-War military landscape. As the military rigorously forbade civilian access to military reserves, inhabitants have long excluded these military enclaves from their daily life since the military squatted on these lands. With the return of the lands from the military to the local lifeworld, the civil society has embarked on relocating these former military sites in the post-military societal structure. Meanwhile, by reinterpreting their meanings, these military structures also partake in the reformulation of place image under negotiation, resistance, or selectively appropriation.

Through reediting the syntax of landscape, the municipal intention to create “cultural Quemoy” for tourist consumption and self-reinvention has brought about the dialogue among representations of place and the existing material settings of Quemoy. As shown in the case of Maoshan Tower, its reconstruction reveals the local eagerness to return the space to a heritage site; meanwhile conceal the former use of the place as a
military facility. The case of Maoshan Tower demonstrates the dialogue in two ways. First, it provides illustrations of how the "representation is created from a place and, in turn, contributes to the reproduction of that place" (Hanna 1996, 637). The effect of representation on "real" spaces unravels, especially when the county government actually relied on the photo of the pagoda in old periodicals as the model for the reconstruction. The repercussions of representations on the landscape encapsulate and reify the dialogue between the representation and reality. With the re-erection of Maoshan Tower, its representations, namely the periodical photos and the seventeen-century lithograph landscape, become cultural capital of the place. Second, although nostalgia is the major factor prompting reconstruction, concealment of military uses suggest a contest for the dominant representation of Quemoy. However triggered by the social memories, the reconstruction aims to constitute the tourist/cultural Quemoy, as indicated on the stela to celebrate re-erection of the pagoda. The reconstruction reveals that the social memory is actually less about the past, but "involves interpreting or remembering the past in ways relevant to the present" (DeLyser 2003, 886). Through the presentist lenses, the reproduction of place to resurrect the antebellum landscape discloses the dialectics between the cultural Quemoy and the current landscape under demilitarization.30

Politically, the contest for the representative image of the island often results in re-inscription of landscape, of which "the patterns of destruction [of monuments] offer

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30 After its completion, authenticity of the new pagoda was called into question. Some villagers of Shuitou overtly expressed their discontent with the "falsified reproduction." A councilwoman from the village displayed an old photo of the pagoda, and complained that "the current [re-erected] Maoshan Tower is too far from the original landscape現往的茅山塔與舊有景觀相差太多." In her view, the discrepancy stemmed from the county government’s disregard, and thus disrespect, for the local voices (Quemoy Daily 28 Nov. 2004). As indicated by her opinion, the authenticity of the reproduction actually hinges upon whether the county government asked villagers’ opinions. As their involvement stands for the villagers’ control of place, the disregard stimulates the issue of authenticity. To this point, the reconstruction has become a means for the villagers to bargain political leverage; which illustrates that the recurrence of the past actually has more to do with the present situation.
insight into how nations interpret highly contested political places and events” (Foote et al. 2000, 307). Furthermore, concomitant with the destruction, “new monuments were erected and damaged monuments restored if they celebrated the ideology of the new government” (Foote et al. 2000, 307). Based on their observations, it is clear that the re-inscription comprises a goal to reshape landscape toward the current social quests. The necessity of congruence with the dominant discourse may also explain why the re-inscription more often than not disadvantages the continuance of military structures, but prioritizes historic preservation in Quemoy. Cultural prejudice occurs alongside the discrimination. Lowenthal offers his insight to this process (1975, 31):

[Cultural prejudice] affects what is preserved, what is suffered to vanish, and what is deliberately destroyed. Features recalled with pride are apt to be safeguarded against erosion and vandalism; those that reflect shame may be ignored or expunged from the landscape.

Reminding of the military oppression, the military facilities in Quemoy are under threat of effacement also for their obstruction of reconciliation. The military remnants in the peacetime have become monuments, which from time to time conjure up bitter memories of yesteryear under military rule, about the strict control, the heavy levy, the property requisition, and the service in the militia. Such symbolism undoubtedly accelerates their destruction. Even so, the iconoclasm cannot bring all the military structures to extinction. Neither can the construction of cultural Quemoy syncretically expunge military landscapes. On the contrary, the pursuit of a new representation does not produce a hegemonic image to replace the battlefield Quemoy, but counter-intentionally results in an ambiguous image of the island with cultural hybridity. Hanna comments on this seeming contradiction: “It seems that the very process of representation that is necessary in the definition of place is the same process that replaces certain knowledge of what place is with unavoidable ambiguity” (1996, 633). As such, the attempt to supplant
battlefield Quemoy with cultural Quemoy dialectically produces a collage offering cultural diversity for heritage tourism.

As the mosaic representation unfolds, both a total demilitarization of the military landscape and a comprehensive reversion to the antebellum landscape are impractical and unfruitful. Some military structures, like Mashan Observation Station, have turned into battlefield tourism destinations through rehabilitation. By and large, despite their physical retention, the place identity of these former military structures has changed, and they subsist in a different manner from their initial purpose. The material and immaterial changes have disarmed their martial connotation. In other cases, when both the physical structures and their place identities remain intact, reinvention usually changes their meanings in the post-conflict era. The semantic transformation often happens to commemorative spaces.

During the Cold-War period, monuments, museums, or public artworks of anticommunism functioned as instruments for political warfare to uplift the social morale. Due to their national significance for patriotic propaganda, some of these symbolic structures assumed unique iconographies of Quemoy. These sites became sacred places for nationalists, bundled with the identity of Quemoy. Their images were basically what Quemoy was known for when landscape in the frontline was highly sensitive and confidential. These nationalist sanctuaries have since represented Quemoy. Today, although the local people resist the battlefield identity, they keep these structures undisturbed under demilitarization. In addition, the government continues to use these places as battlefield attractions. Nevertheless, changes have been made to assimilate these iconographies to the political weather of the post-conflict Quemoy. The most discernable adaptation to the zeitgeist occurs in the remodeled interior of the memorial halls and their
renewed interpretive materials. Through renovation, the museums now narrate old stories afresh in two tones that, in addition to celebrations of the military victory, the governance success, and the nationalist doctrines, the museums also comprise discourses from the civilian viewpoint and thematic displays on local subjects.

Politics of representation often emerge concomitant with shifts in the power structure. By referring to the evolving signifying system, the post-conflict society reinvents meanings of its monuments for the new age, and their redefinition subsequently follows reproduction of place. In a constructivist view, meanings of monuments in commemoration of the past stem from “how they are conceived in retrospect, and our conception of the past derives entirely from the condition and concerns of the present” (Boholm 1997, 266). Thereby, “negotiation, resistance, or selective appropriation” (Hanna 1996, 633) are dialectics between the present and the past, the cultural/tourist and the battlefield Quemoy. The dialectical process most obviously takes shape in the memorial halls, which convey the redefined meanings of the commemorated subjects through their remodeled interior and their renewed interpretive materials. By the treatment of remodeling, these nationalist scared grounds as well as iconographies of Quemoy survive the post-conflict iconoclasm, and integrate into the new power structure. The appropriation through reinterpretation suggests a “semantic flexibility that enabled it [a monument] to remain a focal point of commemorative activity” (Stangl 2003, 213). Due to the flexibility, the meaning of monuments becomes ambiguous and eclectic. Their change from a showcase of anticommunist achievements to a kaleidoscope with heterogeneous mnemonics of the wartime past for the locals reveals such flexibility. With reinterpretations, meaning of these memorials expands and becomes multivocal. Observing the spatial trait, Till (1999, 251) defines a memorial as
both a material object and a site of negotiation; it remains “entangled” with the ongoing creation of historical narratives, official visions, local memories and cultural productions.

Notwithstanding the flexibility, reinterpretations do not come into being unconstrained, nor are they completely presupposed by history. As each specific milieu strategically produces different interpretations of monuments for its time, they share an interlocked semantic relation between one another (Boholm 1997, 267):

> [t]radition and innovation should be understood as complementary and interdependent. . . . [traditions] modify and change through time as a result both of their internal dynamic and in response to external demands. The present is informed by the past and the past is reconstrued by the present.

As the interpretations call upon each other to compete for the dominant paradigm, the invention of interpretation is purported to conceal its immediate predecessor, which in the Quemoy case oftentimes refers to anticommunism. Nonetheless, the concealment of these inherited iconographies does not always rely on physical operation on the landscape. The cultural demilitarization for these iconographic structures can also proceed through selective appropriation, so that their recognizable and constituent image for battlefield tourism and self-identification may remain. With only partial modifications applied to these structures, their meanings, as the remodeled interior transpire, are anachronistically tangled up in between the present and the past. These cases of remodeling consequently become places that Foucault terms as “heterotopias” where “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault 1986, 24). The memorials, as heterotopias of time, juxtapose a constellation of phantsoms that each responsively evokes another, and all together form a Babel in the contest for the dominant representation of the past.
5.2.1 The Juguang Memorial: Desacralization of a Nationalist Shrine

The most renowned case of remodeling in Quemoy is the Juguang Memorial (莒光楼). (Figure 5.4) In 1952, the QDH mobilized both troops and civilians to construct this building to celebrate the military feats of the servicemen during the past few battles (Chang 2003). The commander of QDH, General Hu Lian 胡璉, asked a young soldier—the first “Combat Hero” of the Chinese Nationalist forces—to write down “Juguang Memorial” in calligraphy as the characters on the nameplate of the building. The gesture of writing on the building façade is said to dedicate the memorial to ordinary people as heroes (Chang 2003). The memorial is located in the southern outskirts of Jinchen against the Mt. Fonglian; nestled on a steep slope rising from the southern rim of the estuary of the Wujiang Creek. The straight avenue running down from its foundation forms a vista with the Juguang Memorial at the center. Its location and designed surroundings bring forth the building against its background as the visual focus for the vicinity. Additionally, an observer at the building has an unobstructed and far-reaching view and can skim over the influx, the sea, and the scattered isles dotted in between, and fix on the mainland on a clear day. The memorial is in a Chinese revival style mimicking bastions of the Forbidden City (Jiang 2002). The adoption of the Chinese “national style” to the memorial attempts “to erect a spiritual symbol of the battlefield Quemoy by the image of conventional, classic architecture 以正統的、古典的建築形象，豎立戰地金門的精神象徵” (Chang 2003, 41). On the hillside by the estuary, the prominent structure in the flamboyant style stands out from its monotone surroundings. By its geography and architectural style, the Juguang Memorial is able to draw attention from afar and hence stands as a prominent landmark. The name “Juguang,” translated as “the glory earned in recovering the lost land,” has predetermined the symbolim of the building as “a space to
The Juguang Memorial in the 1960s-1970s. As a nationalist shrine, the memorial was the locale for masses to perform rituals of the civic religion during the military rule. [Source: Lee 1996]

Figure 5.4. The Juguang Memorial in 2004. The memorial is located on the high ground adjacent to the estuary (a). The topography enables visitors a panorama of landscape below, and renders the memorial a landmark (b). The different spatial performances in front of the monument indicate its identity change after demilitarization. [photo by the author]
indoctrinate patriotism 愛國主義教化空間” (Jiang 2002, 153). By celebrating the ordinary people as patriotic war heroes, the memorial conveys the notion that everyone in the nation should look up to, and behave as the heroic role models. For this reason, the memorial in the frontline, where the patriotism runs high and is most in need, functions as a sacred shrine of nationalism, which over time turns into a token of all the ideologies relevant to the civil religion.

Due to the symbolism of the Juguang Memorial, the R.O.C. government in Taipei started a campaign baring the building’s name in 1964 to strengthen the resolution of the general public to recover the mainland China from communists. Thence, “Juguang” became a popular name among public organs nationwide (Yan and Chen 2007, 128-9):

Since the beginning of this campaign, all the works set to restore the regime of the R.O.C. in the mainland [turned and] centered on this campaign. Back then, crack forces were called Juguang Company; military heroes were called Juguang Model; and a [television] program of political indoctrination was called Juguang Corner. Even schools, buildings, roads, trains, and whatnot were all fashionably used “Juguang” as their names. 自此運動後，中華民國的復國工程無不以此為主軸。那時，績優部隊叫做莒光連隊，國軍英雄喚為莒光楷模，政治教學裡有莒光園地，就連學校、大樓、道路、火車等等，都時興以「莒光」為名。

With the name widespread, its image followed. The most influential application of the image was in the 1960s to a series of commemorative postage stamps with a total of 1.822 billion in circulation around the world (Huang 2003). Contingent to the political purpose of the campaign, the omnipresence of its name and image in Taiwan sequentially impressed an inseparable bond between Quemoy and the memorial on the public understanding. As the direct result of the campaign, the Juguang Memorial became the unique iconography of Quemoy, and reciprocally only in Quemoy, the nationalist frontline, could the Juguang Memorial maximize its significance. A Quemoy local, who has participated in construction of the memorial, related the memorial to his life, and sentimentally remarked after the recollection (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003),
Without the Juguang Memorial, the greatness of Quemoy, testified by the suffering and difficulties, cannot shine through. Likewise, without Quemoy, the extraordinary splendor of the Juguang Memorial would be dimmed with dust. 沒有莒光樓，金門顯不出艱辛苦難中的偉大；沒有金門同樣讓莒光樓發不出耀眼驚世的光芒.

Their interdependency made the memorial a nationalist sacred place and, for the Quemoy people, an honorable symbol of their homeland.

As a shrine of the civil religion, the interior of the memorial was a commemorative space to glorify the nationalist accomplishments both in the military and administrative aspects in Quemoy. There are three floors in the memorial, and each consists of different media to showcase the accomplishments: The lobby at the ground level is a convention and presentation space. Therein, presenters in the military costume would introduce visitors the military defense and the governmental accomplishments in Quemoy with a detailed model of Quemoy and slide shows or documentaries on the screen at the end of the lobby. Above the screen was a marble tablet inscribed with Chiang Kai-shek’s calligraphy of the famous anticomunist slogan: Lest We Forget [our exile] 毋忘在莒.

The second floor was an exhibition space displaying sundry materials related to political warfare, including elaboration of the psychological operations, the nationalist propaganda, and the communist counterparts. On the third floor, a series of war heroes’ portrayals and texts describing their feats were on display “to set the paradigmatic models 樹典型之榜樣” (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003). Along with these were photos of Chiang inspecting the military and the local establishments in this frontline. On the balcony of the floor, views of the mainland China often evoked nostalgia for Chinese in exile. The images of the benevolent war leader and the beloved homeland both incite the Chinese nationalists to devote themselves to the campaign of recovering the mainland. Although portions of the exhibition in the memorial had changed during the years, the displayed materials constantly served the purpose of political education. The memorial for its function and
fame, was oftentimes the first stop of the visitors’ itinerary in Quemoy. By a visit to the memorial, visitors would acquire the general understanding of the military stronghold. Therefore, when the county government decided to make tourism its economic mainstay, it remodeled the memorial to “strengthen its role as the first stop greeting visitors, and [to] enrich it into a ‘tourist service center’ 強化莒光樓作為金門迎賓第一站的角色，充實成為「旅遊服務中心」” (Jiang 2002, 127).

When I interviewed Ms. Song, an official in the Transportation and Tourism Bureau in Quemoy, about the renovation project of the Juguang Memorial in 2003, she repeatedly stressed that the memorial’s external structure was undisturbed during the renovation. It was mainly the interior displays and the outdoor landscaping had been altered. Her emphasis on the conservativeness of the treatment applied to the building suggested the local awareness of its symbolic significance, which may well insinuate into the local semiotic system. According to the local rumor, both the memorial and the Maoshan Tower were the communist batteries’ calibration references, which is why the military destroyed the latter (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003). However, due to its symbolic value, the memorial was untouched neither by the nationalist army nor by the pouring shells during the ferocious bombardments and the eccentric twenty-year-long shelling (Huang and Chen 2009). Against the nearly miraculous survival, it would be a sheer irony if

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Although another account indicates that “the wall of the Juguang Memorial has also been pocked with shell holes 莒光樓牆上也曾彈痕點點” (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003), the significance of the claim that the enemy fire has never hit the memorial resides in its resemblance to another legend. As the religious center of the Guningtou village, the Temple of Emperor Guan 關帝廟 is a landmark located right next to an artillery position, which was a major target of the enemy fire during the war. Villagers shared a legend about the temple to account for how it could soundly survive the furious bombardment: “According to the gun crew, they had seen a general in green robe, standing on the roof of the temple, wielding his blade [to protect the building]... 據砲兵傳述，他們曾看到一位綠袍將軍，站在廟宇頂上，揮舞著關刀” (Lee 2009, 27). As in the locals’ belief it actually takes a god to perform the miracle to protect the building from being hit, the claim that the same miracle happened to the shrine of the civil religion suggests its place in the local signifying system.
the renovation practically destroyed the memorial; however it did not, but merely gelded the “spiritual symbol of the battlefield Quemoy” (Chang 2003, 41).

In performing demilitarization, the county government removed the former political display that might provoke future inconvenience for the building to be the visitor center of Quemoy. For this purpose, the display of the political warfare disappeared, and so did the celebration of the war heroes’ feats on the third floor. Instead of presenting the political and military achievements of the nationalist regime, interpreters today play a twenty-minute film, titled as “Introduction to the Tourism in Quemoy 金門觀光簡介,” four times a day in the lobby. For visitors to attain a general understanding of Quemoy, according to Ms. Song, the display in the first floor presents a concise introduction of the local customs, cultural characteristics, and special products. Filling the lobby in between the movies was the melody of a ballad, titled as “Affection for Sweet Potatoes 蕃薯情,” in which the native songwriter used the plant, being the mainstay of Quemoyan for centuries, as a metaphor of the local people.32 His lyrics referred to the tenacious vitality of the plant to suggest the fortitude of Quemoyan, which sustained them through flames of war: “Even though shells penetrate my dreamland, they cut off no vines of sweet potatoes spreading over the hillsides 夢鄉穿砲彈,滿山的蕃薯藤切不斷” (Lee 1999). In addition, the exhibition in the second floor consists of two themes—the natural environment of Quemoy and the cult of the city god 城隍信仰. Special emphasis is put on its annual carnival, which is the most important religious activity in Quemoy, and the majority of islanders spontaneously participate in the celebration. The main exhibition on the third floor was dedicated to the modern patron saint of Quemoy, General Hu Lian,

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32 After its introduction to China in the sixteenth century, sweet potato soon became the major staple food for the southeastern Chinese. See Mann’s (2011) book for details regarding the introduction.
who received the title for his contribution to the island in his term of office. Furthermore, a brief review of the Cold-War history and the history of the memorial were also on display. By the modifications of exhibition, the remodeling deconsecrates the nationalist sacred place; instead produces a pacified museum with its theme centered on Quemoy.

Although most features constituting the nationalist shrine has gone with the lost cause of recovering the mainland China after the remodeling, the memorial retains a thing or two to substantiate itself as a renowned anticommunist symbol. Both the photos of Chiang taken in Quemoy and the tablet born his calligraphy are soundly in situ. Like the Mashan Observation Station, the memorial demands a dual identity to maintain its attractiveness as a historic landmark and its current function as a visitor center. However, the change of place identity seemingly endures with extra convenience for reinvention to take place. The new exhibition marches right in without complications of incompatibility. The reinvention is similar to reusing a glass milk bottle as a flower vase: There is nothing inappropriate about the recycling, but one can easily tell that the bottle is not made for flowers. However, what if a dairy filled the reused milk bottle, i.e. the flower vase, with chocolate milk, and repacked it as if it was naturally a bottle of chocolate milk? The renovated condition then partially conceals its past from us, through a socially constructed system, as the dairy (the institution) and the practice of recycling (the institutional practice) in this case. A situation like that is where a reinterpretation (chocolate milk) comes into play on request. The renovation of the August 23rd Battle Museum is just the case of selective appropriation through reinterpretation.

5.2.2 The August 23rd Battle Museum: Cultural Appropriation for Localization

In commemoration of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis on August 23rd 1958, the military built the museum on the thirtieth anniversary of the artillery war (Figure 5.5, 5.6).
The dedication, as inscribed on the stele on a museum wall, is to “carry forward the honorable war history of our nation’s military. 发揚國軍光榮戰史.” Thereby, “all we soldiers should learn from the models...; commit and devote to the great cause of recovering the mainland China under the Three People’s Principles [the nationalist ultimate doctrines] 凡我軍人當知見賢景法...矢志以三民主義統一中國大業奉獻奮鬥” (see He 1999, 78). For the objective, the military dedicated two walls, on both sides of the museum gate by inscribing the names of soldiers who died in the artillery war. In the outdoor plaza, the military displayed a fighter plane, a landing vessel, a few tanks, and howitzers that served in the battle. When visitors entered the museum, the “Blue Sky with a White Sun 青天白日” emblems of the Chinese nationalist regime occupied their view. Against a marble wall, two rows of military flags with the emblem flanked a portrait of Chiang who stood in front of the inscription, “Lest We Forget [our exile],” on a monolith on Mt. Taiwu. Hovering over the lobby, a large nationalist emblem seemingly bathed all entering visitors with its glory from the ceiling (Figure 5.7, 5.8). The emblem and flags were a common design of the nationalist commemorative spaces that also appeared in the martyr’s shrine in the valley of Mt. Taiwu, the Battle of Guningtou Museum, and the Hujingtou War Museum 湖井頭戰史館 in Leiyu. Inside the museum, the exhibition included “pieces of historic shots of the battle 一張張歷史性的戰爭鏡頭” regarding supply operations, tragic incidents, and feats of the great war leader (Quemoy Daily 24 May 2003). In addition, the display also contained (Huang 2003, 232)

various battle flags and ensigns of different corps, photos of the military commanders in all ranks in the battle, significant documents, all types of shells [projectiles], simulative models of the aerial, naval, and artillery battles, and so on. [The museum] is an archive of historical materials of the battle. 各軍種軍旗、戰役期間各級將領照片。重要文件、各型砲彈、還有海、空、砲戰場面的模擬模型等，是記錄該戰役的史料庫。
Figure 5.5 and 5.6. The August 23rd Battle Museum in 2004. The renovated museum retained its original architectural design. On the façade of its two wings, the military inscribed names of soldiers who fought and died in the battle to perpetuate the memory of their patriotism. [photos by the author]
Figure 5.7 and 5.8. Exhibition of the August 23rd Battle Museum before 1992. The lobby of the museum displayed a photo of Chiang Kai-Shek in the middle of two rows of battle flags. [5.7 Source: Lee 1996] Behind the lobby wall, the exhibitions conveyed three themes: (1) Chiang Kai-Shek’s involvement in the battle, (2) his son and successor, Chiang Ching-Kuo’s involvement in the battle, and (3) the process of the battle [5.8 Source: Jiang 2007]
During the military rule, the museum was only open to certain personnel with the QDH’s permission and with reservation (Quemoy Daily 2 Mar. 2004). As a military facility to uplift morale, the museum interpreted the past from the military and national perspective. Witnessing this, a local historian, Chang Huo-Mu 張火木, appealed to add the civilian side of the story into the museum displays. “The national battle history and the local civilian history should be treated with equal significance”; with a clarification, he continues, “[the latter] is exactly where the value of carrying forward the battlefield culture resides in” (Quemoy Daily 24 May 2003). Having said this, he implied that one should learn the true value of war commemoration from civilians’ miseries during the war. However, the museum neglected “the behind-the-scene distress of locals who died under rubble of their destroyed houses 地區民眾屋毀人亡背後心酸的故事” (Quemoy Daily 24 May 2003). In 2001, the QDH transferred the museum to the KNP, which soon updated the museum with exhibitions including civilian war memories.

After completing the renovation in 2003, the KNP opened the museum to the public on a daily basis. The outdoor weaponry display and the memorial walls generally remained the same, so did the structure’s architecture. The major change occurred to the interior exhibition. First of all, the battle flags and Chiang’s portrayal in the lobby disappeared, and in their place now is a wall with a light box showing images taken during the artillery war: villages destroyed into debris by shellfire, piles of materiel on the beach, and a close shot of the barrel of a M115 howitzer. Over the top of the light-box wall is a panoramic photo of the after-bombardment ruins of the Guningtou village. (Figure 5.9) Even with all the changes, the nationalist emblem sternly remains on the ceiling. The new exhibitions in the museum introduce three stages of the artillery war, including the pre-war situation, the progress of the war, and its aftermath. The displays of
Figure 5.9. The Entrance of the August 23rd Battle Museum in 2004. The realism in the renovation today conveys the grimness of war rather than the symbolism in the previous settings of civic religion. [photos by the author]
the pre-war stage explain the international condition between the communist bloc and the free world, as well as the domestic situation about how the two Chinas prepared themselves to conquer each other. The militarization of Quemoy such as the construction of infrastructure and underground facilities happened in this stage also appears in the exhibition. The next section pertaining to the progress of war emphasizes how the nationalist forces broke through the communist embargo by bombardments and thereby obtained their final triumph. The interpretive boards cover the civilian contribution to the tragic victory, for which the army conscripted local males to serve mainly as porters on the beach unloading arriving supplies from landing vessels under shellfire.

In the exhibition titled “Life during the War,” the museum remodels the room to mimic an earth tunnel where many islanders hid during forty-four days of the artillery war. The whole section occupying a third of the museum is dedicated to the civilian memories of the war. To portray the conditions, the exhibition shows the ferocity of bombardments by a model of a destroyed village, the civilian circumstances in a hand-dug bomb shelter, and through audio recording of psychological operations calling for surrender (Figure 5.10). Through these media, the exhibition intends “to return the locals and visiting veterans once serving in Quemoy back to the past time and space and to evoke their memories of those days 讓地區民眾和曾在金門當兵的遊客回到過去時空，喚起那一個年代的記憶” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). Furthermore, as the crescendo of the museum, the Shocking Theater 震撼劇場 leads visitors to a three-minute simulation of bombardments constituted by a documentary film played on surrounding screens and a quaking floor driven by machines underneath. The bodily experience of the flashes, thunders, and vibrations invites visitors to relive the local life under the long-lasting air strikes. The rest of the exhibition concerns the aftermath of the
Figure 5.10. Exhibition of “Life during the War.” Simulations of the underground caves that civilians dug under shellfire as air-raid shelters keynote the motif of this exhibition (A). In addition to the interpretive boards, the museum also displays shell fragments and a loudspeaker used to make propaganda calls (B). The audio records of these propaganda calls made from the both sides alternately resonate in the tunnel. Under the continuous bombardments, the battle completely destroyed a few villages, and the museum recreates the catastrophe by a model of the post-war Donglin village 東林 (C). [Source: photos A and B courtesy of Kinmen National Park; photo C by the author]
artillery war, including the exchange of fire on alternate days, the psychological warfare through airborne and waterborne propaganda, and the militarization of daily life through battlefield regulations. Also in the exhibition are displays of the exploits of specific troops during the war, and a glance at soldiers’ life outside their camps in the local villages. The section epitomizes the public life under military rule, and concludes the tour with the last exhibition, “Passing through the Historic Memories,” which proclaims the end of the anticommmunist struggles by putting it to the past and the hope that “the war never recurs and [Quemoyans’] descendents can enjoy peace forever 烽火兵戎不再，子孙永享安平” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003).

Through these renovated exhibitions, the KNP intends to “integrally present the true visage of the history and the fortitudinous strength of Quemoyans in their valiant involvement in the artillery war 完整呈現歷史原貌，以及金門百姓堅韌的生命力在砲戰中英勇的表現” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). For multiple purposes, the remodeled interior inevitably encompasses collective memories of the commoners and soldiers in Quemoy. While in the past the museum exhibits lingered on the national point of view of war history, the renewed materials today narrate the past in a hybrid fashion that constitutes both sides of the story. However, even if the eclecticism is the way to “present the true visage of the history,” the major concern in this case is not authenticity, but rather incorporation of the masses’ view into the reinterpretation of the past. In fact, when the KNP brags about its adoption of the late multimedia in the renovation project for their mutability, it also claims (Quemoy Daily 28 July 2002),

[The adoption] would hopefully fulfill the goal to comprehensively present the war history and moreover to enable [future] renewal of the contents [of museum] in correspondence to the change of the Cross-Strait [China-Taiwan] relations. 以期達到戰史完整呈現之目的，更可因應兩岸情勢轉變而更新其內容
As long as the “true visage of the history” in the museum is set to change following the future political weather, the current adoption of the masses’ viewpoint may well result from democratization, due to the museum’s transformation from a military facility to a tourist attraction for the general public. The case of remodeling manifests the dimension of social construction in representing the past, and how the present-day dominant group selectively appropriates the historic monument into its favor through reinterpretation.

From the first sight of their tour in the museum, visitors witness no pride, honor, or loyalty to the country that the former setting may seek to evoke, but rather the price of waging war that inflicts a calamity on the masses, arrested in the photos on the light boxes. The opening statement of the museum keynotes its current definition of the artillery war, and the viewpoint is substantiated by the simulation in “Life during the War” and “Shocking Theater.” The last exhibition eventually puts straight the antiwar purpose of the remodeling to steer visitors passing through the past, stuffed with insufferable experience of war. Due to the insinuation of this message, meaning of the commemorative space becomes complicated. On one hand, the antiwar utterance in the virtual tour turns the current interpretation of the battle in opposition to the former one, which was to uplift morale and provided a rationale for the museum to exist in the first place. As a mental instrument to sustain the anticommunist struggle and the nationalist cause to recover mainland China, the museum is currently renovated to do just the opposite—to promote reconciliation. However, the pacifying voice of the museum is simultaneously half-muffled by its dissidence. The reinterpretation of the past, on the other hand, alternately coexists with memorabilia inherited from the former settings and re-disposed to celebrate the military exploits and the national victory in the war. The incongruent sets of displays, although each may lead to distinct and opposite conclusions
of the artillery war, together form a heterogeneous remix, “blurred to become mutually constitutive as a new” (DeLyser 2003, 886).

Although the commemorated past in the museum is construed from two angles, the military and the masses’ sides of story stay consistent with each other in a general term that however is contrary with the P.R.C.’s side of story. For the reason, the P.R.C. administrations approve travel permits for mainlanders’ group tour to Quemoy under an unofficial condition: Their itineraries should not include war museums (Jiang 2007, 143).

The exhibitive politics of the war museums in Quemoy and even the rhetoric therein (such as the phrase, [Mao’s] “bandit” army, or accusations against its atrocities) indeed conflict with the historical discourses of the P.R.C. It is then understandable why the Chinese authorities constrain mainland tourists to visit the war museums. The blurring, double vision of the past in the remodeled museum can neither clearly utter the anticommunist advocacy, nor can it successfully avert the political offense to the P.R.C. authorities. By contrast, the Juguang Memorial, as a former nationalist shrine, is bustling with mainland tourists and did not provoke any bans from the P.R.C. authorities after remodeling. The different spatial reception stems from the applied methods of renovation, which also sheds light on the continuance of the place identity of the two former commemorative spaces: The museum persists in the identity but the memorial forsakes it. As the Juguang Memorial is turning into a visitor center, the spatial ambiguity caught in the becoming clouds its monumentality as a nationalist sanctuary. The reinvention therefore dilutes the dominant voice by arousing a Babel where sundry and piecemeal information on Quemoy confuses the visitors’ perception of place identity.

Otherwise, keeping the identity of a commemorative site, as the August 23rd Battle Museum does, despite conveying an inarticulate new message of peacemaking, is still a sterile product, boycotted by the mainland market. In its case, the remodeling is intended more for the domestic audience than the Others formerly inside the Bamboo Curtain.
Regardless of their contents, the renovations applied to both the Juguang Memorial and the August 23rd Battle Museum profoundly localized the two former shrines to nationalism. The localization of the iconographies into the local material cultures utters the local people’s intention to justify the historic significance of their participation in the national history. So while the purpose of renovation is to show “the fortitudinous strength of Quemoyan in their valiant involvement in the artillery war” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003), localization happens. It becomes a cultural instrument which appropriates the historical significance of the war to buttress the significance of the local history. To put it plainly, the localization enables Quemoyans to take credit for the military and political gains from the conflicts and the containment policy. With the nationalist shrines turned into a museum of Quemoy and anticommunism converted to the battlefield culture of Quemoy, the cultural appropriation manifests the dialogue between the battlefield Quemoy and the cultural/tourist Quemoy.

When the dialogue actualizes in the landscape, the localization of the nationalist monuments occurs with variations, for example, in the degrees of thoroughness or, as noted, the methods of renovation. The inconsistency or messiness of localization in practice essentializes its dialogic quality in reediting the landscape. Accounting for localization, an local architectural historian, Jiang, recognizes its variety, and comments that, in comparison, the Guningtou Battle Museum it is less localized for “a lack of interpretations from the masses’ angle” (Quemoy Daily 18 Apr. 2006). As such, the locals’ concerns for the monuments center on their localization that makes these commemorative spaces apt to present the collective past of Quemoyan from their point of view. As the blurred identity of these monuments is the outcome of
localization, the establishment of the local connections with these former national spaces through remodeling is a form of homeland reconstruction.

Similar to the appropriated monuments, the reconstructed historic sites and buildings are also manifestations of homeland reconstruction. Beyond the purpose of developing tourism, the policy of “cultural Quemoy” eventually lead to a restoration of the local material cultures, after demilitarization makes room for the reconstruction to take place. The localized landscape articulates the inhabitants’ understanding of how Quemoy ought to be like as the locals regain their control of place. Based on the dialogue between battlefield reinvention and historic reconstruction, localization blurs the demarcations between the battlefield Quemoy and the antebellum Quemoy; whereby it forms a new, hybrid image of Quemoy. Due to its eclecticism, most mainland tourists who are attracted to the stereotyped impression of battlefield Quemoy (Chen, Chen and Lee 2010) nonetheless find the “warfare relics and reserves” in the disarmed island satisfactory (Chen, Chen and Lee 2009, 277). The eclecticism meanwhile enables the locals to fulfill their aspiration for home reconstruction with the demonstrative localism that engineers rival cultural images against the battlefield Quemoy through historic preservation. As a result, the new, hybrid image of Quemoy is capable of conveying the local understanding of their homeland image, while meeting others’ expectation to the destination image of a battlefield. The juxtaposition of multicultural landscapes provides a likely solution for the conflict between demilitarization and tourism development; yet over time it wears off the distinction between the two representations of Quemoy. After the twenty-year development of tourism, the locals have appropriated the military heritage as an integral feature of Quemoy culture by reinvention. Besides, the most attractive tourist resources in Quemoy for Taiwanese tourists have changed from battlefield experience (Ou 2005) to
local traditional architecture/culture (Chang 2011). The change of attractions indicates that the identity reformulation in effect works in the landscape and Others’ recognition of Quemoy. As such, the cultural hybridity created by the identity reformulation serves both as a showcase of the ambiguous local identity and a false front for tourist consumption.

The fusion of cultures in the museums exemplifies the synecdoche of the landscape localization of the whole island. The KNP and the county government by enforcing the policy of cultural Quemoy intend to collaboratively build a museum island. The reinvented military landscape and the reconstructed historical landscape together constitute the major exhibitions of the eco-museum. The pre-industrial natural landscape and ecosystem conserved in military reserves over the island is often a backdrop for the cultural landscapes. As a result, there are three types of tourist attractions of the cultural Quemoy, and its two pillars, the military and historical heritages, are grounded on the natural spectacles. In contrast to the hyperreal verisimilitudes of historic reconstruction and military reinvention, the natural attractions are the earthiest type of the three. Instead of simulations of other time and space, the spectacles of borderland scenery, bird-watching, and crescent beaches are all natural blessings of Quemoy. As the tourism development demands the locals to erect a false front for visual attraction, it simultaneously segregates the everyday reality from most tourists.

Due to the underdevelopment of Quemoy, in spite of a satisfactory tourist destination, the locals often ironically refer to their homeland as “pretty mountains, pretty waters, and pretty boring [places] 好山、好水、好無聊” (Quemoy Daily 19 June 2011). The backwardness however facilitates the comprehensive preservation of pre-modern settlements and the large-scale reinvention of military relics, both of which require a land-use pattern of low-intensity development. That is to say, the repercussions of the
museum island confine Quemoy to somehow stay on the path of underdevelopment to maintain its attractiveness to tourists. By the allelopathic effect of heritage tourism, the elite in the new power structure of the post-conflict society can maintain the tourist industry as the mainstay of Quemoy, and pass down the genes of the cultural/tourist Quemoy. The institutionalization of the new identity through the hybrid cultural façade and its segregation from the backstage then continue to reproduce the pre-modern and pre-industrial place image.

5.3 The Everyday Poetics: Reusing Ruins as Leisure Spaces

The alienation of the reformulated representation of Quemoy from its day-to-day life has its reciprocal effects on both tourists and the locals. While the constructed image of the museum island constrains the tourist understanding of Quemoy, to a different degree it also distances the locals from the reinvented cultural image of their homeland. The cultural alienation increases when the elites attempt to repackage the local cultures as a high culture through reinvention. Gentrification of the underdeveloped island into a museum circumstantially gentrifies culture as the elites repack the local cultures to elevate its value and attractiveness of heritage tourism. The cultural reinventions attach new interpretations to the taken-for-granted material settings, and translate the life cultures to academic jargons that are unfamiliar to residents. On one hand, preservationists and architectural historians impose their disciplinary knowledge (typologies, iconographies, etc.) upon material settings of homes and folk villages. The governmental apparatus on the other hand circulates the academic terms and knowledge through publications, public lectures, and workshops to reproduce the discourse. Besides, the county government regularly holds training programs for local interpreters and tour guides (Quemoy Daily 3 Mar. 2004)
to consolidate interpreters’ knowledge of the history, culture, customs of Quemoy so that guests [especially the mainland tourists] can return full-handed from our treasure island [with rich cultural experience]. 充實解說員的金門歷史、文化及風土人情等知識，才能讓賓客入寶山而滿載回。

As such, the production and circulation of local knowledge achieves internal control and external exhibition. The “boosterism” owes its success to militarization that bequeaths the mobilizing mechanism and “strong community-rooted organizations” to propagandize the products of cultural industries (Yang and Hsing 2001, 78). These reinterpretations ostensibly add cultural richness to the constituent simulacra of the museum island and therefore the destination attractiveness of Quemoy in the tourist market. However, the cultural gentrification simultaneously displaces some locals from their homeland by the abstruse and abstract knowledge, where there comes the necessity to educate and discipline them about their own culture.

Due to the spontaneous segregation of tourist activities from the local everyday life, the everyday Quemoy and the cultural/tourist representation coexist like two parallel universes with only a few portals to communicate with each other. The gap between the commoditized cultural representation and the local everyday landscape is not usually noticeable until certain events nudged the two worlds to collide. The art festival, Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art, in 2004 was one of such occasions exposing the gap between the cultural Quemoy and the locals’ everyday Quemoy. In order “to rehabilitate the battlefield relics and to promote the tourist development in Quemoy 為了活化這些戦爭遺跡，為了促進金門觀光發展” (Quemoy Daily 30 Aug 2004), the county government held the art festival, and commissioned foreign artists to create artworks in the derelict military structures. The county commissioner Lee claimed the purpose of the art festival was “to stress the people’s aspirations to avoid war and to pursue peace 凸顯全民「遠離戰爭，迎向和平」的渴望.” Thereby, the artistic transformation of military
relics through the festival would “let Quemoy become a silent monument to record the memory of the Cold War 讓金門成為記錄冷戰記憶的一座無聲紀念碑” (Quemoy Daily 25 Feb. 2004). The art festival successfully attracted ca. 880,000 visitors around the world, and made the headlines of several major international media, including the New York Times, BBC, and NHK (Quemoy Daily 1 Mar. 2005). The festival received wide applause from art critics and the general publics; and thereby restaged Quemoy under the global spotlight for a reason other than war. The local media considered that the latter effect of the festival would assist Quemoy to “switch the place image from the former one about national defense and a battlefield to the current one prone to military relics and cultural tourism 地區從以往的國防、戰地印象，轉變為現今的戰地史蹟及文化觀光導向” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2005). Due to the effect of the festival on boosterism, the county head remarked that the locals should be proud of this successful event; however the comment was made in the context to argue against critiques on his Laputan governance of the county (Quemoy Daily 30 Nov. 2005).

From the preparatory stage, the event was under attack. The county government commissioned no native artists to create artworks for the festival, and was criticized for squandered money on famous foreign artists for vanity (Quemoy Daily 26 Feb. 2004). After the festival kicked off, the discontent turned sour when “most local folks’ common reception of the installation art in the bunker was that: ‘What the heck is this?’ 多數的鄉親在看完碉堡藝術裝置後，普遍的反應是：「這是什麼碗糕？」 (Quemoy Daily 13 Nov. 2004). The editorial comment then discreetly suggested, “perhaps, the most crucial factor, which determines whether an event will be well-received, resides in whether it is ‘easy to understand’ 或許，舉辦一場活動是否受歡迎，最大的要件在於是否「通俗」” (Quemoy Daily 13 Nov. 2004). Later on, the county-owned organs offered reflections on
the festival, and confessed that the artworks were teeming with “the abstract ideologies and abstruse, artistic vocabularies,” and evidently did not opt for “straightforward communication” \(\textit{Quemoy Daily} 23\ April\ 2004\). As a result, the lofty reinterpretations with the high cultural tone were inconceivable for common populace, and “provoked considerable repercussions among the local artists and commoners” \(\textit{Quemoy Daily} 23\ April\ 2004\). The highly praised event among the international community was however vexatious for local folks, and accounting for the aversion, a critic retrospectively commented \(\text{Lin\ 2004, 22}\),

> It is nonetheless an evident fact that the [foreign] artists did not have profound understanding of the event venues, the event theme, and most importantly the local people’s perceptions [on the subject] 藝術家與表現場域、表現主題乃至最重要 的，與當地人感受之間的互動在多數作品中並不深刻，則仍是顯而易見的事實

In this view, the indifference to the place specificity and the disregard of the locals as one audience of these artworks should be responsible for the discontent. By revealing the cause, the critic indirectly substantiated the gap between ordinary and cultural/tourist landscapes that the local elite created for cultural consumption and landscape pretension.

Through reinterpretation of cultural landscapes, the local elites orchestrated an historic reconstruction to produce a multicultural, tourist landscape that is situated in and interrelating with the ordinary landscape. Their creations contributed to the diversity of tourism resources as well as the cultural hybridity, and in some cases, the tourist development also produced recreational spots for the locals. As fringe benefits of the cultural gentrification, these reinvented landscapes, such as the Maoshan Tower, are polysemic for the contemporary generation. They are at the same time recreational spaces, military relics, and heritage sites. Their multicultural and multilayer material settings reflexively annunciate multiple voices to their user groups, and lead visitors to multiple locales contingent on their spatial perceptions. These places are therefore sightseeing
destinations for tourists and leisure locations for the locals. The duality is the spatial characteristics that smooth out possible cultural gaps between the locals and tourists. These places as landscape palimpsests thus become a collage—historic venues in the eyes of heritage tourists, military sites in the eyes of military enthusiasts, and scenic spots in the eyes of the inhabitants—so their images should at least partially satisfy each social group with distinct recreational purposes. These places are analogous to theater scenes, against which the play can either be imaginary in the spectators’ mind, traveling through time, or be as real as the natural scenery in the innocent eyes.

The Triangular Fort is located at the end of a projecting sandbar on the northwest coast of Quemoy, guarding the mouth of an inlet to Xiamen Bay (Figure 5.11). Until 1949, the mainland merchants had customarily sailed in junks into the inlet to trade with people in the Guningtou village for centuries (Lee 2009). The waters adjacent to the fort were the venue of a decisive naval battle, by which the allied force of the Netherlanders and the Qing Empire defeated the maritime power of Koxinga in 1663. The Qing Empire then scorched Quemoy, evicting all islanders, and turned it into a deserted island for twenty years. The local historian in Quemoy often terms the incident the “Guimao Tragedy 癸卯之變” when the empire hastily and forcefully expelled inhabitants from their homeland (Xu 2010).

The place, as a reminder of the awkward position of Quemoy in between the maritime and the land powers, again turned into a highly fortified spot during the military struggle between P.R.C. and R.O.C. In 1967 the QDH embanked the inlet for defense considerations, and turned it into a lagoon called Lake Cih 慈湖. In the intertidal zone outside the sea wall, the military implanted layers of anti-landing spikes made of segments of tipped railway rails rising obliquely from the seabed (Figure 5.12). On the
Figure 5.11. The Triangular Fort in 2008. The surroundings of the fort were still under demining, which cleared most vegetation on the sand bar. The decommissioned tanks in front of the fort dejectedly stood aside the artwork created for the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art. [photo by the author]

Figure 5.12. The Anti-landing Spikes outside the Cih Causeway. In the demilitarized today, the anti-landing spikes in the intertidal zone become ideal substrates for wild oysters to attach to. The skyline of the Xiamen city on the horizon is visible from the area on a clear day. The unobstructed view makes the area a favorite scenic spot. [photo by the author in 2008]
two ends of Cih Causeway, the military subsequently deployed garrisons to prevent enemy from breaching through the point inland behind. In the deployment, the position on the north end is the Triangular Fort, surrounded by layers of defenses and minefields that still restrict human activities. An interpretive board erected outside the fort explains the rational for the nationalist deployment of garrisons at the location. According to its text, the fort occupies a strategic position that could monitor “the movements on the opposite [mainland] coast; [could coordinate] naval defenses on Kinmen’s western coast”; and blockade the channel between Quemoy and Leiyu. The geographical characteristics promote the place repeatedly chosen as the venue of military activities. Due to the unobstructed visibility in the area that availed monitoring enemy activities in the past, the KNP constructed a rest area next to the bridgehead of the causeway in 1997. The area mainly consists of an overlook platform for visual enjoyment of the natural scenery. Mounted on the rail of the platform, a few interpretive boards illustrate the visible distant landscape, the nearby observable bird species, and the surrounding military relics. By their content, these interpretive media suggestively direct the tourist gazes upon the ocean view of the historic naval battlefield, the wetland and intertidal ecosystem, the modern military fortifications, and the skyline of Amoy city, P.R.C. The convergent constellation of the natural and cultural spectacles at the location thereby makes the place a popular spot for all social groups, who by popular votes accredit the “sunset on the Cih Causeway慈堤落日” as one of the “new ten scenic spots of Quemoy 金門新十景” in 2007 (United Daily News 11 Dec. 2007).

The material settings however did not originally obtain the eclectic attractiveness but evolved with recreational and tourist activities through the years. The rest area with a warning sign of minefields in the surroundings was initially a sightseeing spot for the
locals and self-guided tourists. By the ebb and flow, the local fishermen and women in dribs and drabs would also appear in the beach to forage seafood or to check on their fixed fishing nets during the day. Due to a lack of nightlife, the night scene of the glittering and blinking Amoy city with winds and waves in the ear popularized the place as a rendezvous after dark especially for youngsters and couples requiring privacy. However, the sense of place gradually deviated from the local and bucolic tinge, and turned brighter and richer along with sequences of events held in the place. The first public gathering was for a firework festival synchronized with its counterpart in the Amoy city in 2002. The event again took advantage of the cross-border visibility, which allowed viewers to perceive the collaboration between the two firework shows taking place across the waters. By the synchronic display, the county government attempted to convey a notion of reconciliation to “substitute shellfire for the fireworks” (Quemoy Daily 27 Feb 2002). The geographical characteristics enabling the past mutual surveillance became an advantage to commence a new type of engagement of peacemaking. Also, the ritual of cultural demilitarization visibly occurred again in this event. As shown in the case of the Mashan Observation Station, introduction of military simulacra to the heritage site of battlefield tourism spotlights the absence of necessary constituents of a battlefield—for example, soldiers and conflicts. Awareness of their absence from their verisimilar substitutes thereby polarizes the landscape change after demilitarization. When the catchphrase of the event juxtaposed fireworks and shellfire, it immediately pointed out the absence and the substitute employed in the ritual. Due to the similarity between the two types of explosives—their blasts, flares, and the acrid smell of gunsmoke—the pleasure brought by fireworks alleviated or even subverted the dangerous association of shellfire. For the declarative quality of the event, the county government
ritualized the fireworks to repeatedly demonstrate the goodwill of peacemaking and demilitarize the past by the contrast between two explosives in the performance.

The theatricality of the area intensified after the QDH released the fort to the KNP, which soon offered it as a venue of installation art for the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art in 2004. With two artists incorporating their works with the fort, tourists continuously made pilgrimages to the reinvented military structure that the military abandoned during the exhibition, and turned the fort thenceforward into a tourist attraction. After the art festival concluded, the fort identified as a reused military relic continued to attract self-guided tourists until the intensified bird-watching activities in the area induced a remodeling of its interior as a bird observation station in 2006. The well-conserved beachfront environment and the lagoon in the vicinity of the fort were ideal habitat for birds and water fowls. Lake Cih annually attracted approximately 8,000 great cormorants in the winter. The magnitude of the migratory birds constituted a natural wonder, which not only provided a recreational opportunity for the local populace but also foreign bird-watchers and naturalists. Through the ecotourism attractions, these visitors reinvigorated the stagnant tourist business in Quemoy’s harsh and gusty winter, when northern birds migrate to this subtropic southern island.33 Grasping the opportunity, the KNP and the county government collaboratively have held an annual event called the Great Cormorant Season since 2003, and with years of the celebration they successfully insinuated the “local natural speciality” in the military structure. Like the Juguang Tower, the fort also underwent a change in place identity after reinvention (e.g.

33 The locals pose two reasons to claim the exclusivity of the natural phenomena in Quemoy: First, the location of Quemoy in the middle of the curvy coastline of Southeast China made the island an essential midway stop for most migratory birds en route (Quemoy Daily 16 Oct. 2003). Second, the underdeveloped environment of former military reserves accidentally resulted in a well-conserved ecosystem (Quemoy Daily 23 Jul. 2004) that attracted migratory birds form other industrialized, disturbed environments, like the urbanized Amoy city (Quemoy Daily 26 Nov. 2006).
Figure 5.13. The Remodeled Interior of the Triangular Fort. The fort consists of three gun emplacements at the three corners, which enable bird-watching through their embrasures today. [Source: photo by the author in 2011; map adopted from the on-site interpretive board]

Figure 5.14. The Tank Display on the Sandy Ground. After the KNP completed demining the area in 2010, these tank introduced to the area reinforced the military image of the place. [photo by the author in 2011]
glass milk bottle/vase). The localization of the military structure contingently localized the natural spectacle by establishing its exclusivity in the region. The KNP remodeled the interior of the fort with interpretive boards introducing observable bird species in different habitats in the area. In the online newspaper introduced the Triangular Fort, the KNP staff explained the new use of the fort as a bird observation station (Figure 5.13; Kinmen National Park 2009):

The past gun embrasures designed with defense consideration [to hide the shooter] become the best viewing window for bird watchers today. As flames of war in the pervading gun smoke had gone, shutters replace triggers. The past rule of engagement [on the wall of embrasures], “hold the fire in three situations: Do not shoot if the target is not in range; not in sight; or not aimed,” become the guidelines of photographing birds today. 昔日防禦的軍事射口，今日成了鳥友最佳觀鳥窗，沒有煙硝瀰漫的戰火，快門取代了扳機，射口旁昔日射擊守則的「三不打」：「打不到不打、看不到不打、瞄不到不打」，今日成了賞鳥攝影守則

As the military structures often incorporated with their surroundings for protection and camouflage, their interior design also abided by the principles of defense and secrecy. Taking advantage of the spatial traits, translation of the fort into a wildlife observatory was functionally justified, since the design of fortifications indeed provided the secrecy necessary for a bird observatory. The conversion by spatial traits was not unfamiliar in the cases of reinvention in Quemoy, just as the exhibits of the battle museum had ironically turned the facility of anticommunist propaganda into a mouthpiece of pacifists after reinvention. The common spatial trait could thus justify the cultural appropriation. The reinterpretation of the rule of engagement as guidelines for photographing birds also demonstrated the appropriation. Despite divulging a mockery toward the rigid military culture, it seamlessly transferred the meaning of the fort into the post-conflict age.

After a few stages of demining, the tract of land between the platform and the fort became available for development, which promoted the union of the two spaces. The sandy ground covered with clusters of evening primrose provided space for recreational
activities, like kite-flying, which energized the area limited only to sightseeing before. To integrate the two leisure spaces, the KNP built a boardwalk along the driveway for their connection, and an array of concrete pedestals for tanks displayed on the sandy ground along the coastline. The emplacements of the six decommissioned M41 tanks, lined up with their guns pointing to the Amoy city, formed a visual continuum extending out from the Triangle Fort (Figure 5.14). Also, the line of tanks corresponded to layers of the anti-landing spikes at the beach on the other side of the overlook platform. Their corresponding deployment highlighted the image of battlefield in the area, and further forged the piecemeal landscape features into a whole and eclectic spot for recreation. In addition to the spatial integration, the re-introduction of military features, as also shown in the rehabilitation of the Mashan Observation Station, showcased the conflicts in the past, and resulted in a sharp contrast to the prosperous city skyline of Amoy at a distance. The tilted gun barrels of the tanks, quixotically pointing at the wheel of history that ground over the naval battle and the artillery war, and thus exemplified the diachronic irony belonging specifically to the borderland island.

As the eclectic backdrop evolving with and animated by recreational activities, the landscape of the Triangular Fort departed from its pragmatic everydayness of a facility for war. However, the change articulated its poetic dimension as a trope in the landscape. The symbolization of the site, such as the venue of a historic naval battle, was an attempt to fit the place into the newly formed signifying system of the cultural Quemoy. By popularizing the historic knowledge, the evocated geographical imagination, on one hand, increased the cultural value of the heritage site; on the other, diluted the place image that up to the point was connected exclusively to the military. Likewise, the contemporary art festival was another investment of cultural capital into the site for the evocation of artistic
imagination, and to disengage attention from military use of the fort. By attributing the ecological richness to the legacy of militarization, the portrayal of Quemoy as a unique bird habitat in the region localized the natural phenomena, and justified the reinvention of the structure as a bird observation station. The reuse then added another layer of disguise over the fort. Consequently, the more eclectic and polysemic the place had become after carnivals and reinvention, the further perception astrayed from the fort’s original *raison d'être*.

The people’s alienation from the conventional understanding of the fort indicates the achievements in its identity reformulation that induces the cultural heterogeneity to free the place from the monopoly of everydayness. As touring often involves otherness, recreation too involves activities other than mundane undertakings. The extraordinariness of leisure activities necessitates an out-of-place understanding of the material settings to spur people’s poetic performance in places for recreation. In this light, the development of poetic, leisure space from an everyday space is an attempt on an “enacted utopia.” For such creation, Foucault coins a term “heterotopia” (Foucault 1986, 24). He uses a mirror and the reflection in the mirror to account for the relations between the unreal utopia (the reflection in the mirror), the real Foucault in front of the mirror, and the reflexive Foucault inside the mirror. Although the utopia in the mirror, a virtual, counter space to the reality, does not exist, the mirror however does. As the reflexive Foucault appears in the mirrored virtual world where the real Foucault is absent, the real Foucault however is in the reality on a counter position to his reflection. By simultaneity, juxtaposition, and displacement produced by the mirror, Foucault intends to demonstrate the mirror, which eclectically subsumes all worlds, as the “enacted utopia” (Foucault 1986, 24):

> it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely
unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there.

As the world in the mirror is unreal, imaginary, and poetic, the reality is trivial, mundane, and everyday. The contrast, according to Foucault, however stems from individual perception, namely intra-subjectivity. For this reason, I prefer this other heterotopia, the backdrop scene of plays instead of the mirror, to analogize the landscape in the Triangular Fort and epitomize “heterotopias.” As Mitchell indicated, “[s]pace is the unchanging backdrop against which the life is played out” (2000, 215). By the backdrop conception, I aim to emphasize the collective theatricality that anthropocentrically (re)enacts the unreal utopia through human orchestrated performance. Although a scenographer can alternately and repeatedly use the same backdrop to situate different scenarios in a play, the reading of landscape is each time distinct for situations among different players. Their unique understandings can render the landscape as a working space for foraging for seafood, a scenic spot for sightseeing, or the both/and also. Due to the semiotic nuances, the everydayness and the poetics of place can be interchangeable, juxtaposing, contesting, or at least agreeing to disagree in place. The leisure spot around the Triangular Fort is therefore where the cultural/tourist Quemoy meets the everyday Quemoy, while their jumbled attunement delivers the everyday poetics of the heterotopia shared by locals and tourists.

Foucault has used variant real spaces to exemplify his concept of “heterotopia.” He considers that museums, “a place of all times that is itself outside of time,” and fairgrounds, “marvelous empty sites . . . teem once or twice a year” with extraordinary yet temporal crowds are both heterotopias of time (Foucault 1986, 26). The tourists, trapped in a snippet of time in each tourist spot, experience the representation of historic stages of Quemoy one by one, as a stroll through exhibition rooms in a museum.
Otherwise, they may have a quick taste of extraordinary happenings converging at the eclectic sites for a short duration, like scenes of dusk at the Triangular Fort. Since the tourist/cultural Quemoy are poetically outside of time, yet contingent to the temporality of the trip, the tourist experience of Quemoy coincides with Foucault’s examples of heterotopias. In his understanding, the modern destinations of heritage tourism are in fact the combination of the two heterotopias concerning time. Accordingly, the intention to create a museum island for heritage tourism in Quemoy unsurprisingly results in the unique social product of “the epoch of space” (Foucault 1986, 22). His emphasis on space is to reveal the characteristic phenomena of our epoch: the juxtaposition that transcends space and time. By the concept of heterotopias, he illustrates the phenomena (Foucault 1986, 25):

The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theater brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another . . . .

Unlike the temporal juxtaposition (i.e. simultaneity), the spatial juxtaposition stands out by multilocality, which, as Rodman (2003, 211) points out, “is a way of experiencing those [heterotopias] and other places.” Whereas place is socially constructed, actors can not only act out the embedded social relations, but also inscribe social relations on places. Multilocality thus can be construed as the juxtaposition of different social relations to a single place, which is thus polysemic for different actors. For this reason, the Triangular Fort can have overtly different meanings to military enthusiasts, preservationists, bird-watchers, fishers, and tourists. They may put on a different play deemed proper in situ to create a world for themselves to be. The intersubjective realities among members in the different social groups constitute heterotopias with multilocality and therefore multiculturality, which then indicates the essentiality of human performance to place
formation. As heterotopias are the human effort to enact utopia, the local people in Quemoy in retrieving their homeland from militarization created a chaotic babel in which they dwell. In light of heterotopias, the cultural mechanism driven by irony and simulacra signifies a dialogical process of localization that through negotiation and selective appropriation turns heterogeneous heritage into cultural capital exclusively of Quemoy. To cope with the marginalization after demilitarization, the society of the border island dispatches the military reality to the past, while bringing an imaginary past to the present through landscape planning. To structure a heterotopia as home is therefore realization of social strategy for the reversal of the coordinate system today. Even though the babel of landscape reinterpretation makes each voice illegible, the hybrid potpourri of homeland endures, but it endures as a boat, “a floating piece of space, a place without a place, . . . from port to port, from tack to tack” (Foucault 1986, 27) in “a continuous process of becoming” (Vološinov 1986, 81).
CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION: AMBIGUITY AS RESISTANCE STRATEGY

This study investigated the change in landscape spurred by a change in the power structure of post-conflict societies. Following geopolitical shifts, places shaped by conflicts often undergo identity reformulation to celebrate the departure of the past social orders and the arrival of the new ones. Reshaping the landscape is thus partial fulfillment and embodiment of the identity reformulation. In this study, I investigated how the identity reformulation changed the post-conflict landscape and what the cultural mechanism of the change signifies. I selected Quemoy, a Cold-War frontier that has been engaging in a transformation since 1992 as my study site and revealed the significance of the transformation, which by irony subverts the past dominant discourses, and fosters cultural hybridity as the social strategy to thrive in the post-conflict time.

In shedding its identity as a battlefield, Quemoy transformed itself into a heritage tourism site. The identity reformulation proceeded with the interplay of three major dynamics of the post-conflict society: demilitarization, reconciliation, and touristification. Their collaboration works in the landscape, which reciprocally articulates the formulating identity. In a holistic view, the landscape change represents a reversal of the coordinate system of Quemoy that its front and rear, left and right, inside and outside all switch directions. With the upside down and inside out, the former front of Quemoy dissipates to form the communal living sphere between Quemoy and Amoy, and the formerly well-protected and well-hidden inside now opens wide to attract tourists. With the decline of the combat economy, the left and right flip sides with the local economic center returning to the west, the side near Amoy. The switch of the geographical coordinate system thus bespeaks the reterritorialization and the resturcturing of social relations.
In a case-by-case perspective, the landscape change in Quemoy signifies the local effort of homeland reconstruction. Undertaking the change, the post-war society engages itself into an iconoclastic movement which destroys and abandons the majority of military structures in Quemoy. Otherwise, military relics that accommodate tourist development receive variant treatments for reinvention. “Disguise” as the most common and economic treatment covers up military structures to conceal their origins. Through this process, bunkers at traffic intersections formerly guarding against foreign entry now bear welcome signs inviting visitors to enter. The reinvention of military structures as tourist infrastructures thus shows historic irony in the landscape change. “Rehabilitation” recasts the military facilities into attractions of heritage tourism. Before opening these facilities to the public, the military deprives them of essential constituents, e.g. soldiers and weaponry. To counteract demilitarization, rehabilitation often selectively reintroduces military features back to the spots of battlefield tourism, and thereby reconstitutes their image in the Cold-War era for authenticity. The contradiction of the treatment that fulfills demilitarization through reintroduction of military simulation discloses structural irony. Last, “remodeling” is a treatment to paraphrase the meanings of monumental buildings so as to localize heritage sites serving as tourist attractions. Through reinterpretation, the localization selectively appropriates these sites, which become “topo-tropes” in the landscape, each with multiple meanings. In some cases, such as the August 23rd Battle Museum, the reinterpreted meaning directly contradicts the raison d'être of the museum. The juxtaposition of contradictory meanings thus reveals symbolic irony. By the lightness transpiring from the contrasts between these contesting meanings, the three types of irony subvert the significance of the past conflicts. Irony in landscape therefore serves as the initial mechanism of the landscape change in Quemoy.
The irony in landscape signifies the arrival of multiculturalism in lieu of the nationalist metanarrative from the past. The identity reformulation turns Quemoy into a heritage site and a museum island. For this purpose, the locals obliterated the majority of military facilities from the landscape, and re-presented the antebellum landscape for tourist development. The exchange of place image brings about the renaissance of traditional cultures and localization of landscape. The reshaping of landscape signifies locals’ recovery of control of place and their efforts toward homeland reconstruction. The resulting cultural hybridity forms a heterotopia with contesting representations and an ambiguous identity of the post-conflict society. As a result, the identity reformulation counter-intentionally frees Quemoy from a single place identity, and reasserts that the postmodern place is fluid, hybrid, and dialectical.

Whereas the post-conflict society, by irony, culturally demilitarizes its landscape, the constitution of heterotopias with cultural hybridity actualizes its resistance to the dominant paradigm of the either/or dichotomy. The change has incurred and is incurring reversals of the coordinate system of Quemoy for reterritorialization. In geographers’ accounts, heterotopias manifest a “geohistory of otherness” (Peet 1998, 225) “at work in the interstices of these geographies of control, a history of resistance that itself emerges in and against the dominant order as a set of ‘counter-sites’” (Mitchell 2000, 215). Seconding their clarification of heterotopias, the transnationalist “anti-essentializing concepts of subjectivity that emphasize plurality, mobility, hybridity, margins, and in-between spaces” also celebrate the multi-cultural formations “that continually challenge the marginalizing impulses of dominant cultures” (McEwan 2004, 506). The construction of heterotopias in this sense signifies the resistance of the border island community to reterritorialization with ambivalence. More importantly, it indicates “an
“emancipatory praxis” in search of “political solutions to the many forms of inequality and oppression, especially those associated with problems stemming from global restructuring” (Peet 1998, 225). As declared in the celebration of the ninetieth anniversary of Quemoy County, the county government aims to make Quemoy “no longer an offshore island but the center with an ocean and a continent as its hinterland” (Quemoy Daily 1 Jan. 2005). The boosterism based on cultural hybridity is then a strategy to avoid marginalization in the post-conflict era and the course of reterritorialization across the insular history. In this light, the cultural mechanism of landscape change, which by irony subverts the nationalist hegemony and by hybridity avoids reterritorialization, both aims to unshackle the border island community from binary oppositions. As such, the regulated improvisation for emancipation clandestinely operates under the disguise of hustle and bustle in tourist attractions.

6.1 The Cultural Becoming of a Border Island

Through a review of the geographical biography of Quemoy, I explored the geographical personality of the island that may contribute to understanding of the current changes in landscape. I discovered a repeated theme in the insular history that I term as a “reversal of the geographical coordinate system.” In brief, the small border island has repetitively faced dramatic change in relations with the land and maritime powers. A switch of geopolitical relations reverses the directions of social concerns of the marginal community toward the sea or the mainland. The inbetweeness of the border island articulates the marginality and the gateway characteristics of Quemoy. Due to its islandness, the limited environmental capacity of Quemoy promises the involvement of its people in the seaborne economic activities for their livelihood and overseas emigration to fend off overpopulation. Through foreign contacts in merchandise and personnel
exchange, the insular community developed a cultural diversity and hybridity in its position at a traffic intersection. As a land power, the traditional Chinese regimes deemed seafaring alternative, unorthodox, or even disturbing, and their responses to it were prone to imposing constraints. The imperial attitude toward the local way of life aroused conflicts of interests between Empire and the local people. In this context, the reiterative reversals represented the fervid articulation of either side’s position on the issue of maritime activities. By examining historical records of the region, I presented evidence to problematize the current discourses of the early history of Quemoy, arguing that the local persistence in the problematic discourses of history present a social strategy to maximize Quemoyans’ cultural capital relevant to their identities. Bogged in the either/or dichotomy, the islanders through history have built up their familiarity with the manipulation of identity politics. Their campaigns have been centered on their ethnicity as Han Chinese/sea nomads, their social status as obedient imperial subjects/rebellious sea rovers, and their current nationality of Chinese/Taiwanese. The conflicts spurred by the binary oppositions of the identities continuously leaves impresses on the landscape of Quemoy, while the both/and also juxtaposition bequeaths necessary ambiguity for the marginal society to thrive. Through the Sisyphean process of coordinate reversals, the alternation of conflict and ambiguity thus constitute the geographical personality of the marginal society on the border. With the identification of the characteristics, I then demonstrate how the repetitive process of landscape impress contributes to the place formation.

The latest reversal of the coordinate system happened in 1949 when the nationalist Chinese retreated to and successfully defended Quemoy. The nationalist construction of defenses in Quemoy inverted the insular front against communist troops on the brink of the mainland. Through the theory of the geographical coordinate system, I examined the
social change after the reversal, and drew conclusions on its manifestation in three
elements of Quemoy. First, by surveys of Quemoy’s landscape, I found that as a result of
the four-decade militarization, the characteristics of a military landscape emitting from
the insular defense system were rigid, hierarchical, and utilitarian. By the imposition of
the defensive system on the landscape, the military carefully charted the spatial
composition and demarcation. The geographical configuration with a clear center and
periphery, front and back, inside and outside constituted an anticommunist stronghold
prepared for a total war. Through the subsequent landscape manifestation, I then
demonstrated how humans shape landscape to facilitate what they jointly engage in, and
reciprocally how the landscape articulates the social intersubjectivity. Second, the
creation of biopower through social control institutionalizes the military disciplines in
everyday practice of the island residents whose bodies hence become the containers and
the enactors of military culture. The biopolitical production unfolds in the militarization
of everyday life in Quemoy where people lived abiding by military rule, and forced
militia duty. The pattern of ordinary life disciplines individuals of the marginal society,
and instills the nationalist metanarratives and anticommunism into the people. Last, the
belligerent condition produced local knowledge specifically of Quemoy as battlefield.
The knowledge provides understanding for unique situations in the battlefield, and
provides necessary “common sense” to sustain the life under shellfire. Reproduction of
the knowledge thus signifies the insinuation of military culture into the local semantic
system. In particular, I explored two occasions that produce alternative meanings of
shelling as desirables associating with joy and sweetness, and by the idiographic
understanding demonstrate how social adaptation to the war condition contributes to the
local knowledge. With discussions on the three social aspects, I theorized the social
changes of Quemoy arising after the reversal of the geographical coordinate system, and reveal the systematic configuration and capillaries of militarization.

6.2 The Cultural Mechanism of Landscape Change in Quemoy

As demilitarization and reconciliation are revoking the most recent reversal today, the coordinate system of Quemoy is reorienting. Due to the development of battlefield tourism, the former anticommunist stronghold is undergoing a drastic change from a disposition of expulsion to invitation. The juxtaposition of contradictory meanings of military structures produces pervasive irony in the landscape. Through observations of landscape change in Quemoy during the last decade (2003-2012), I examined the ironies in a landscape emerging from different management methods of military relics, and concluded three major types of irony: symbolic irony, historical irony, and structural irony. Their commonality resides in the power, once the lightness of irony transpires, to displace the historical significance of the nationalist metanarrative. By (re)production of irony in the landscape, the civil society subverts the former dominant paradigm of the military, and engages in cultural demilitarization. Coinciding with the production of irony, which erases the military legacy in Quemoy, a reformulation of identity mushrooms in the demilitarized landscape. The movement of historical preservation produces historical simulacra for the development of heritage tourism, which engulfs and localizes the military heritage to constitute a representation of Quemoy. The landscape change for the identity reformulation thereby concludes with the production of the tourist destination that announces the new identity of Quemoy to its visitors. Coming to the conclusion, I unravel the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy that is a continual dialectic between production of irony and heterotopias.
The movement of historical preservation creates a hyperreality, which simultaneously showcases the reformulated identity as a heritage site to a nonnative population. Although the image of a heritage site represents the desirable homeland of the local people, from my observations, the constructed destination image however alienates tourists from the local everyday reality. I discovered that the final product of identity reformulation is paradoxically a hyperreality of a romanticized Quemoy in an imaginary Golden Age. As such, I borrow the lens of Foucault’s heterotopias to look into the meaning of the cultural mechanism responsible for the reformulation. Foucault analogized heterotopias to a mirror, reflecting a desirable utopia. If Quemoyans’ nostalgic homeland, the collective imagined geography, is the utopia in the mirror, the reconstructed historic sites and the reinvented military structures are the mirror in the real world reflecting the image. Moreover, the mirror, as an enacted utopia in the world of ordinariness, captures in itself its surroundings that overlay the hyperreality. Their juxtaposition blurs the imagined and the everyday reality, and delivers an ambiguous, dialectical, and paradoxical place of the post-conflict battlefield. The polysemous multilocality of the post-conflict landscape thus reveals the embedded cultural hybridity constituted by fragments of a military base, a heritage site, and a border island. In light of the heterotopias, I substantiated that the cultural mechanism, driven by irony and simulacra, in fact constitute a dialogue of localization. Through negotiation and selective appropriation, the process transfers heterogeneous heritage into cultural capital exclusively of Quemoy. Facing the reorientation of the coordinate system, the border community dispatches the military reality to the past, while bringing an imaginary past to the present through landscape planning. Structuring a heterotopia as home is thus realization of social strategy against marginalization after demilitarization. As the
multicultural potpourri articulate the border island’s inbetweenness through history, its ambiguous identity emancipates the insular community from the oppressive, hegemonic either/or dichotomy. Significance of Quemoy’s identity reformation primarily resides in the negotiating process rather than its intended purpose to construct a dominant identity.

6.3 The Border Island Identity in Constant Negotiation

In this study, I review the development history of Quemoy in a general fashion of sequent occupance, discovering the geographical personality of the border island, which due to its key location at the mouth of Xiamen Bay, instead of the isolation often found as characteristics of small islands, stands out for its marginality. On the margin of land and the sea, Quemoy with the inbetweenness is a front of both Chinese regimes and maritime powers, of which their interplay directs the reversals of the coordinate system of Quemoy to their directions. I discover that social adaptation to an opposite geopolitical situations produces irony in the landscape, which in an immediate view nullifies the previous reversal while in a diachronic view reveals human futility in a Sisyphean process of territorialization in a border island. My findings of the repetitive reversal of the coordinate system of Quemoy therefore provide an angle of historical geography to probe into the issue of place formation of a border island.

By an investigation on the reinvented heritage sites, I reveal that the production of irony and heterotopias constitute the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy. My identification of the mechanism suffices a real case of irony working in landscape. In the discipline of cultural geography, the subject has insofar largely remained at the discussions on theories (e.g. Smith 1996; Smith 1997), or conceived places (e.g. Brigstocke 2011; Craine and Aitken 2004; Ridanpää 2007). While few studies (e.g. Gray 1996; Perera 2002; Smith 2002) explore irony in real places, they are often content with
the discovery of irony in landscape. By the case of Quemoy, I advance to demonstrate how the post-conflict society orchestrates irony in the landscape to subvert the past dominant discourses, and thereby substantiates the practical use of irony which suggests an unfamiliar realm long awaiting cultural geographers’ further expeditions.

With the discovery of the cultural mechanism of the landscape change in Quemoy, I reveal the underlying strategy of social change, by which the post-conflict society resists, and therefore frees itself from, dominant orders. Although essentialists today may argue that the cultural hybridity articulates the inconclusive geopolitical relations that retain the identity reformulation in a status of becoming, my discovery substantiates that the “ongoingness” is the end product of identity reformulation, for fluidity, hybridity, and ambivalence of heterotopias provide opportunities for the border island community to transcend the geographies of control. The awareness of irony and ambiguity in landscape can thus lead to deterritorialization which obliterates the border island from the charted, cyclic course of history to become “a place without a place” (Foucault 1986, 27). From the experiment of the underlying strategy emerges the structure of regulated improvisation that induces the expressive cultural practice of people long on the margin of history, as sea nomads, pirates, exiles, repeating the Sisyphean task to challenge territorialization. Like Sisyphus (Richardson 2003, 339),

[a]s he descends, he plans the route for the return up the mountain. He is man who knows his work. Each push back to the top comes from that knowledge. Each step arrives with it own purpose. And gods begin to have their doubts. Could it be that their punishment has been vanquished?

In this ascent, people in Quemoy benefitted by their previous footprints and conceived a new strategy to carry their world through the current predicaments, and in their every step of vanquishment comes the answer to the peril of reducing being to the hegemonic totality.
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APPENDIX  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUKUOTUN CULTURE

The discovery of Fukuotun culture has an anthropological significance to the hypothetical models of Austronesian dispersal and the location of their homeland. Identification of Austronesian has amazed anthropologists with the wide distribution of Austronesian over Oceania, island Southeast Asia, and the coastal region of the mainland Southeast Asia. On the other hand, they are also puzzled with, and therefore eager to locate, the origin of Austronesians. A hypothesis proposing the region from the southeast coast of China to the west coast of Taiwan as the homeland of Austronesians has received general acceptance among a group of anthropologists (Rolett, Jiao, and Lin 2002; Tsang 2001): Shulter and Marck first proposed Taiwan as the homeland of Proto-Austronesian culture in 1975. Peter Bellwood however suggested that the homeland of Austronesians should be on the southeast coast of China. The people first moved to Taiwan in ca. 4000-3500 BCE, and over time gradually dispersed elsewhere. Robert Blust from a linguistic stand of view agreed that Taiwan was the homeland of the Proto-Austronesian language, or at least very close to it. Barbara Thiel by a comparison of the archaeological materials between those of Taiwan and Luzon of Philippines again concluded Taiwan as the homeland. Darrel Tyron, after examining all precedent hypotheses, inferred the homeland as Southern China, wherefrom the people moved to Taiwan during 4000-3000 BCE. Although all these scholars tend to agree that the origin is located in the region from Taiwan to the southeast coast of China, their studies reach this conclusion with variant reasons and oftentimes chart different dispersing route or routes from one another. Nevertheless, even coming to disagreement on the exact location, those who consider Taiwan as the origin of Proto-Austronesian would also agree on the fact that Pre-Austronesian originate from the Southeast coast of China (Bellwood 2006, 65). After
all, the development of the proto-language could take place in either locations, but the Neolithic people in Taiwan should originally come from the mainland. The discovery of Fu-kuo-tun culture in 1969 thus provides a solid archeological evidence for the connection. Chang (1987), based on a comparative study on the artifact assemblages, claims that Fu-kuo-tun culture has a close relationship with Tapenken 大坌坑 culture—the earliest Neolithic culture in Taiwan (4000-2200 BCE). The geographical distribution of this archaeological culture includes the west coastal region of Taiwan and Pescadores (Penghu) archipelago. Chang (1987) hypothesizes Tapenkeng culture as the materialization of Austronesian culture between 5000-2000 years ago; with the argument, he then alleges (10-11):

If Fu-kuo-tun culture on the other side of the Taiwan Strait can be proved to be a part of Ta-pen-keng culture, I would then infer that the homeland of Austronesian can be pushed back [from Taiwan] to the southeast coast of China, largely concentrated on the coastal region ranging from the estuary of the Min River southward to the one of the Han River 韓江 on the east coast of Fukien and Canton.

According to the latest research on Fu-kuo-tun culture, Kuo, Liu, and Dai (2005) updates the chronology of Fu-kuo-tun culture to 6000-3800 BCE; whereby makes it coeval of Hemudu 河姆渡 culture in Zhejiang—the other earliest archaeological culture in the southeast coast of China (6000-4000 BCE). With this chronological status and close connection with Ta-pen-keng culture, Kuo, Liu, and Dai then asserts Fu-kuo-tun culture an ancestor type of the former. (Figure 2.3) The discovery of Fu-ku-tun culture therefore associates Austronesian with Quemoy, and renders Quemoy a possible start point of their dispersal. Acknowledging this, this study then coincidentally substantiates a migration route from Quemoy to Taiwan six-thousand years ago since the outset of Ta-peng-keng culture in Taiwan. And, in turn, the migration route then makes Quemoy a prehistoric gateway of the region of China.
VITA

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