The Louisiana Scalawags. (Volumes I and II).

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WETTA, Francis Joseph, 1942-
THE LOUISIANA SCALAWAGS (VOLUMES I AND II).
The Louisiana State University and
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History, United States.

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THE LOUISIANA SCALAWAGS

Volume I

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

Frank Joseph Wetta
B.S., Saint Louis University, 1964
M.A., Saint Louis University, 1965
December, 1977

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My grateful thanks are due to my major professor, Dr. T. Harry Williams, for his advice and helpful criticism.

My gratitude is also due to Professors F. Wayne Binning, Howard Nichols, E. Russ Williams, Terry Seip, and Richard Hume for their advice and generous sharing of research data.

I am especially grateful to Professor Richard Scorza, my friend and colleague at Galveston College, for reading and criticizing the handwritten manuscript.

I am deeply indebted to the members of my graduate committee, Professors John Loos, Anne Loveland, Gary Crump and Burl Noggle, who kindly read and criticized the typescript.

I wish to record my appreciation of the courtesy and helpfulness of Mrs. Joan Hyatt, the reference librarian at Galveston College.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Michael and Phyllis Ward who made my research trip to Washington, D.C. such an enjoyable one.

And finally, I should particularly note the patience and unfailing support of my wife Jean during the preparation of the dissertation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>THE SCALAWAG IMAGE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>THE ORIGINS OF THE LOUISIANA SCALAWAGS</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>THE SCALAWAG CONNECTION: WHIG OR UNIONIST?</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>FROM UNIONISM TO REPUBLICANISM: THE SCALAWAGS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN LOUISIANA</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VOLUME II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>BLOODY MONDAY: THE SCALAWAGS AND THE NEW ORLEANS RIOT OF JULY 30, 1866</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>THE SCALAWAGS AND RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION IN LOUISIANA</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>&quot;BULLDOZING&quot; THE SCALAWAGS: THE PERSECUTION AND OSTRACISM OF SOUTHERN WHITE REPUBLICANS IN LOUISIANA</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>AFTER THE DELUGE: THE LOUISIANA SCALAWAGS AND THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION YEARS</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                           | 378  |
VITA                                                  | 394  |
ABSTRACT

of
The Louisiana Scalawags
by
Frank Joseph Wetta

This investigation is a case study of Southern white Republicans—the scalawags—during Reconstruction. The term "scalawag" has been used to define native-born white Southerners who supported the Radical movement. In this study, which focuses on Louisiana, the word is broadened to encompass Northern-born and foreign-born whites who settled in the South before the Civil War. They were absorbed into Southern community life and became identified with the "Southern Establishment" through social, business, or political connections. Information concerning the lives and careers of these politicians came from a variety of sources: letters of application and recommendation contained in the records of the Treasury and Justice Departments; census returns; congressional reports, papers and documents; newspapers; school records; and manuscript collections. These sources indicate that in contrast to the image of the scalawags created by popular writers and those scholars influenced by the writings of historian William A. Dunning, the scalawags were often well-educated and prestigiously employed. They counted among their ranks...
physicians, journalists, educators, ministers, businessmen, dentists, soldiers, and civil servants. They were not poor, ignorant men seeking to rise above a hard-scrabble existence at the expense of the Southern aristocrats. They were not raw, unsettled men, men without form or fundament. Neither were the Louisiana scalawags political adolescents. When they came into the Republican movement, they brought with them experience gained on the municipal, parish, state, and federal levels.

This political experience was combined with a strong sense of nationalism. Their Republicanism was an extension of their wartime Unionism. Persistent Unionism rather than persistent Whiggery provides a clue to the ideological appeal that the radical movement held for the Louisiana scalawags. There is little evidence to show that ex-Whigs entered the Louisiana Republican party in any significant number.

The evidence also indicates that the scalawags were most active and influential during the early stages of Reconstruction. It was the Southern whites who took the lead in founding the Republican party in the state. After the bloody New Orleans riot of 1866, however, the power and the influence of the scalawags gradually declined as the carpetbaggers took control of the party.

The white Republicans, both carpetbaggers and scalawags, demonstrated distinct paternalistic or racist attitudes. Their support of black political equality did
not imply a belief in social equality. Yet, their support for the Federal Reconstruction policies and Radical-oriented Louisiana State Constitution of 1868, which significantly broadened the rights of black people, helped lay the foundations of racial democracy.

Only a tiny fraction of white Louisianians, however, were willing to follow the scalawags into the Republican party. Racism, terrorism, and social ostracism kept the number of Southern white Republicans small. The scalawags and the carpetbaggers made up the leadership of the party; the blacks made up the rank and file. Located primarily in New Orleans, the Republicans exercised little control outside that urban area and found few white supporters in the rural parishes.

This study also concludes that the scalawags were often tough, cynical, and unscrupulous spoilsmen, deeply involved in the self-destruction factional wars over control of the party and the spoils of office that eventually sapped the strength and destroyed the cohesion of Louisiana Republicanism.
CHAPTER I

THE SCALAWAG IMAGE

The Orthodox View

At the close of 1877 the Louisiana historian and politician Charles Etienne Gayarre reviewed the course of Southern Reconstruction. "All the honesty and intelligence of the country were driven out of sight into nooks, corners, and rat-holes," he wrote, "and the Southern States were delivered to the merciless legislation of ignorant negroes, acting blindly under the guidance of white leaders, the majority of whom will be eternally gibbeted in history under the appellations of carpet-baggers and scalawags."¹ For Gayarre, himself impoverished by the war, the natural order of things had been reversed--"the social body was inverted; the feet were up and the head down." To him the masters became the servants; the slaves became the masters. "There was such a bubbling up of scum to the surface of the boiling caldron," he lamented, "as had never been seen before, and Swift's fictitious story of the Yahoos became a reality."² Thus, in Gayarre's view, at the point of Federal bayonets the Southland became Yahoodom; and an orgy of corruption and misrule ensued.

²Ibid., 481.

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Gayarre, a Southern patrician, saw his world destroyed not by some great revolutionary impulse, but by a "kitchen uprising of impish dwarfs, of creeping things used to the chains of servitude, crouching under the flagellation of centuries and relying for their support on outside power."\(^3\)

Conditions had been particularly bad in South Carolina and Louisiana, he contended. "In these two states," Gayarre insisted, "there was such a topsy-turvy condition of things as to baffle description and defy belief."\(^4\) At the withdrawal of federal support for the Radical governments in the South, he prayed that the final "solution to the free-negro question" would be "left entirely to those who best understand the difficulties."\(^5\)

From Gayarre's perspective, America's experiment in racial democracy had been a tragic mistake. Abolition destroyed a benign institution, and the subsequent attempt to force equality in political and social affairs upon an unwilling South resulted in chaos—"a reign of insane power."\(^6\)

Gayarre's account of Reconstruction and its principal participants was an expression of what soon became the orthodox interpretation of life and politics during the

\(^3\)Ibid., 483.
\(^4\)Ibid.
\(^5\)Ibid., 496.
\(^6\)Ibid., 483.
postwar years in the South. A central character in the orthodox version is the villainous scalawag—the traitorous Southern white who joined with the ex-field hands and the Northern interlopers in a most unholy alliance.

The most detailed contemporary description of this political species from an unreconstructed Southern viewpoint appeared in the November 1874 edition of *The Southern Magazine*. The author, Herbert Barnes, flailed those white Southerners who cooperated with "Sambo," charging them with race-treason:

He [the scalawag] goes beyond the pale in the selection of his associates; voluntarily places himself on a level with beings of a vastly inferior order; would erase, if he could, all the natural distinctions which a wise Creator has established between the white man and the black, and would bury and conceal his own shame beneath the universal wreck of Southern society.7

Barnes depicted the scalawags as "poor white trash," "human vermine," Sabbath-breakers, debauchees, and persons who had treated the blacks with contempt and cruelty during the antebellum years. Although Barnes conceded that the scalawag ranks did include "a few men of liberal education, good moral training, and withal scions of respectable families," these well-bred scalawags abandoned their class, as well as their race, to unite with the carpetbaggers and blacks.8

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8Ibid., 304.
Barnes saw the scalawag element in its made drive for power as clinging to the blacks, oblivious "to all the horrors of negro domination." The scalawags were to him the guiding force in the creation of the Republican party in the South. "These people have all along existed as reckless and abandoned individuals," he wrote, "but it was not till the institution of Loyal Leagues and the enfranchisement of the blacks that, fired with the prospect of holding office, they became known as a class—with less morality than the negro, but more intelligence, and thus the duty of organizing the Republican party in the South devolved upon them." 

Following the creation of the party, however, the influence of the scalawags declined as the blacks gained power and self-confidence. Barnes described the scalawags as disappointed with their loss of influence and unwilling to accept the full implications of Radical political and social legislation. Hence, the scalawags had begun a migration back to the "white-man's party." Barnes professed a willingness to accept them provided they demonstrated the proper humility and were "deodorized." In his conclusion the author hoped that the history of that degenerate class of Southerners known as scalawags would

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9 Ibid., 306.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 107.
remain unwritten out of deference to the reputation, hopes, and traditions of the white race.12

The Alexandria (Louisiana) Caucasian of June 6, 1874, carried a scathing "Pen Picture of a Scalawag" on its front page that echoed the same attitudes as those expressed by Gayarre and Barnes. The editorial described the Southern white who joined the Republican ranks as "an artificial structure, two parts greed and one part unsensibility to shame." A traitor to his race and section, the scalawag had all "the sanguinary and ferocious instinct of a hyena." Bowing low before "the shrine of negro worship," the scalawag allied with the Radical "gang of unprincipled scamps, and their ignorant black followers" in their plunder of the defeated South. Although he might pretend to be "a gentleman and a patriot," the scalawag and his progeny to the third and fourth generations would carry the indelible mark of his apostasy. The editorialist concluded his attack with the prediction that "even beyond the grave memory of such a man would be held up to public execration."13 The Caucasian's prediction came close to the mark. Damnation of the scalawags would continue well into the twentieth century, and in words no less harsh than those uttered by the scalawags' enemies in the nineteenth century.

In essence these three bitter, racist diatribes contained all the elements of the traditional or orthodox view

12 Ibid.

13 Alexandria Caucasian, June 6, 1874.
of the Reconstruction years. Ignorant Negroes, vicious carpetbaggers, base scalawags—it was a theme echoed with few exceptions by professional historians and popular writers for the next sixty years.

The assault upon the character and political career of the scalawags begun by writers like Gayarre, Barnes, and the anonymous editorial writer in the Alexandria Caucasian continued with the appearance of the first professional studies of the era of Reconstruction. William Archibald Dunning of Columbia University and younger scholars of the so-called "Dunning School" were free with their criticisms of the carpetbag-Negro-scalawag regimes. None of them, however, made any real attempt to investigate either the social and economic background or the political motivations of the white Southerners who allied with the Republican party. Dunning, the first professional historian to study the Reconstruction era, defined the scalawags as "war-time Unionists animated by still undiminished hatred of ex-Confederates or 'reconstructed rebels.'" Dunning divided the latter group into two categories—those who surrendered to Radical policy as the only realistic alternative, and those who welcomed the new order "from a longing for the good things of office."14

At the beginning of Radical Reconstruction, he stated, a schism developed within the ranks of the white Republicans. Unwilling to accept black demands for more influence within the party, the scalawags quickly yielded leadership to the carpetbaggers and began a migration back into the Democratic ranks. "The net outcome of this movement," Dunning wrote, "was a sharpening of race lines in party division--a loss to the radicals of a considerable fraction of the initially small white element which they possessed."\(^{15}\)

Young scholars writing under the influence of Dunning produced a whole range of studies recounting the history of Reconstruction in individual states of the former Confederacy.\(^{16}\) Two historians, John Rose Ficklen and Ella Lonn, \(^{15}\)\textit{Ibid.}, 209-10. \(^{16}\) For a discussion of the Dunning students see Larry Kincaid, "Victims of Circumstance: An Interpretation of Changing Attitudes Towards Republican Policy Makers and Reconstruction," \textit{Journal of American History}, LVII (June 1970), 48-66. According to Kincaid, p. 50, the "Dunning School" of interpretation should be called the "New South School." "The interests and interpretations of its members," he stated, "seem to have been shaped largely by the emotional and psychological needs of the 'New South.' These sensitive and intelligent young historians were products of middle and upper-class families. Born "in the 1870's and 1880's, they grew up in a colonial society that was envious of northern power and prosperity, imitative of northern values, and painfully aware of the South's apparent backwardness and brutality." In an effort to justify their section's failure they focused their attention upon the period of Reconstruction. Studies produced by Southerners in the Dunning mold which appeared between 1898 and 1915 included: James W. Fertig, \textit{The Secession and Reconstruction in Tennessee} (Chicago, 1898); James W. Garner, \textit{Reconstruction in Mississippi} (New York, 1901); Edwin C. Wooley, \textit{The Reconstruction of Georgia} (New York, 1901); Hamilton J. Eckenrode, \textit{The Political History of Virginia During Reconstruction} (Baltimore, 1904); Walter L. Fleming, \textit{Civil War and Recon-}
concentrated on events in Louisiana. Both took a dismal view of the carpetbagger-scalawag-Negro regimes; both shared the pervasive racism of that generation. John Rose Ficklen (the son "of an old and sturdy family of Virginia" who was "colored by that indefinable tint of gentility that is the precious heritage of such an ancestry") wrote a history of Louisiana Reconstruction which covered events up through 1868. Published posthumously in 1910, the book was completely in line with the Dunning version of the story. The Northern-born Ella Lonn converted her University of Pennsylvania doctoral dissertation into a monograph which traced events from 1868 to their conclusion in 1877.

In the preface to his book Ficklen subscribed to the curious notion that the victors in the Reconstruction struggle were better able to write objective history than were the defeated. Thus Ficklen stated:


The story of Reconstruction in the South should be told by writers of the South, for to the South was given the final victory in this conflict; and it is beginning to be acknowledged by writers of the North that Reconstruction of the congressional type was a gigantic blunder—if not a political crime.\(^{19}\)

Although Ficklen demonstrated great empathy for the Southern conservatives, he failed to view the Radicals with any measure of sympathy let alone objectivity. Ficklen, a graduate of the University of Virginia and a professor of history and political science at Tulane University at the time of his death in 1907, provided a reasonably accurate but superficial recounting of political events. He made no attempt, for example, to study the social and political background of the carpetbaggers and scalawags. Nor did he attempt to analyze seriously their motives. Ficklen's carpetbaggers and scalawags were stereotypes—political adventurers, demagogues, and Southern defectors who incited the "darkies" into demanding social and political equality with their former masters. These outside agitators (the carpetbaggers) and Southern white collaborators (the scalawags) with the aid and encouragement of the Northern Radicals lifted "an inferior race...to a dizzy height of political power."\(^{20}\)

To counter this intolerable situation, Ficklen went on, the decent white people of Louisiana had to resort to terroristic methods to restore white supremacy. The Ku Klux

\(^{19}\text{Ibid.}, 7.\)

\(^{20}\text{Ibid.}, 179.\)
Klan and the Knights of the White Camellia grew out of the white citizens' "instinctive" revulsion to forced political equality for blacks and to its natural corollary—racial equality. The Southern whites were determined to "overthrow negro domination" in Louisiana and bring to an end this artificial and horrible situation. Ficklen even quoted approvingly Thomas Dixon's statement that the Klan "was a magnificent conception" that "deserved success." Ella Lonn continued where Ficklen ended. An assistant professor at Iowa's prestigious Grinnell College in 1917, she viewed the events after 1868 through the same lens which Ficklen had used to view the preceding period. As Vernon L. Wharton pointed out in his historiographical essay on Reconstruction, Lonn's "sympathies are easily recognizable and clearly expressed...." Her sympathetic attitude toward the conservative forces can be seen in her description of the Louisiana scalawags. She considered them a mischievous and dangerous element--men who pursued no occupation, but preyed on black and white alike, as gamblers and tenth-rate politicians, drinking and swaggering at the bar, always armed with knife and revolver, shooting negroes.

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 221.
24 The following five quotations in this paragraph are

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now and then for excitement." The notorious crew "was re-
cruited, largely, from the descendants of the old overseer
and negro-trader of ante-bellum days," she contended. The
importance of this group, Lonn reasoned, lay in the fact
that the scalawags had "just enough education to enable
them to dazzle the negro by a political harangue...."
Accordingly, the scalawags "were both disliked and feared
by the decent white people." The failure to crush these
disreputable politicians was the chief reason "Louisiana
had to endure such a drawn-out purgatory...." It should
be noted that Lonn, despite her claim in the preface that
she "preferred to state incontrovertible facts,"²⁵ offered
no documentation to support her unflattering portrait of
the Louisiana scalawags.

A central theme found in the Lonn and Ficklen accounts
was the manipulation of the ignorant freedmen by the more
intelligent, but unscrupulous white Republicans. Both
authors saw the blacks as the central element in the politi-
cal alliance. Lonn contended that the ex-rebels were quite
willing to accept a fair and reasonable peace, but to place
the decent white Southerners under the heel of Negro rule
was simply intolerable. No longer did the benevolent hand
of the slaveholder keep the blacks in line; now the carpet-
baggers and scalawags made "every effort...to encourage the

²⁵Ibid., iii.

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negroes to claim full equality with the whites—both political and social."\(^{26}\) As example, the white Radicals, according to Ficklen, distributed illustrated campaign documents that provided "easy catechisms" for the political education of "the darkies." Ficklen attacked Michal Vidal, a St. Landry scalawag, for enticing the Negroes with visions of an integrated promised land. "An orator named Vidal in one of the country parishes," Ficklen stated, "was heard declaring to a crowd of negroes that he was 'raised' in France, where social equality of races existed. He told the negresses present that in that country they would be received like white women. He added that as the negroes were in the majority in Louisiana, they should control everything."\(^{27}\) It is obvious from the context of the passage that Ficklen believed that this secondhand report correctly reflected the racial program envisioned by the Republican party in Louisiana.\(^{28}\)

Likewise, Lonn chastised the white Republicans for inflicting upon white Louisianians rule by the "especially vicious negroes" of the Gulf States region who "were on the average less intelligent than in most of the former slave States."\(^{29}\) According to Lonn, it took white talent to mold the turbulent mass of ex-slaves into a viable political

\(^{26}\)Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana, 214.

\(^{27}\)Ibid., 215.

\(^{28}\)Ibid.

\(^{29}\)Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 13.
force. The carpetbaggers and scalawags would provide the talent; the freedmen would provide the votes.

Both volumes concentrated essentially upon political developments; both were stinging indictments of the carpetbag-scalawag-Negro regimes. Based upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources, the Ficklen and Lonn studies reflected the authors' professional training. The studies, however, were seriously flawed by Ficklen's and Lonn's strong Democratic bias and anti-Negro prejudice. Nevertheless, these two volumes remained the standard treatments of Louisiana Reconstruction for fifty years.

In his "masterful summation" of the Dunning interpretation published in 1947, Georgia Professor E. Merton Coulter included in the scalawag ranks Southern Unionists, "bushwackers or deserters," as well as white Southerners who had a grievance against the ante-bellum ruling class; who felt social inferiority; who disliked the rigors of war; who opposed conscription, impressment, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the war; in fact, almost 'every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented.'

Coulter did admit parenthetically, however, that in the early stages of Reconstruction numerous "respectable, intelligent, realistic Southerners supported the Radicals... and drew the opprobrium of scalawag."  

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30 Ibid., 13-16.
31 Wharton, Writing Southern History, 295.
32 E. Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, Vol. VIII, Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter,
In a chapter entitled "Blackout of Honest Government" Coulter superciliously described the Radical governments in the South. In Coulter's view the Republican politicians (scalawags, carpetbaggers, and blacks) were almost entirely "untrained and untried" in political affairs.\

The governments which these callow politicians inaugurated were characterized not only by ignorance but widespread corruption as well. It was pestilence that "knew no limits either geographical or racial; native-born white Southerners became corrupt as carpetbaggers...."\

The Negro performance in the state legislatures was at once comic, "grotesque," and "puerile." It was the carpet-baggers and scalawags, brought to power by the black rank and file within the Republican party, who for the most part controlled the party and the states. "Most Negro office-holders," Coulter stated, "were more to be pitied than blamed," although a few were blatantly "dishonest, insolent magelomaniacs...." To Coulter, this limited participation by the blacks in the formerly all-white state governments was "the most spectacular and exotic development in government in the history of white civilization...."\


33 Ibid., 142.
34 Ibid., 141.
35 Ibid., 146.
36 Ibid., 141.
The real power, Coulter postulated, lay with the carpetbaggers and the scalawags. "Carpetbaggers were as little desirous of promoting Negroes into office in the South, Coulter wrote, "as their Northern colleagues were in their states; and scalawags, actuated by racial antipathies more than carpetbaggers, objected to Negroes holding any office. Both were quite desirous that Negroes vote--but not for Negroes."\(^{37}\) Coulter saw the Radical alliance as inherently unstable and doomed to ultimate failure. It would finally break apart under the pressure of internal disputes over competition for the spoils of office, from the steady opposition of the Democrats, and from the growing "sympathy in the North for the native Southerner...."\(^{38}\) But before the horror ended the white South would have to bear a decade of humiliation. Louisiana, for example, "went thro' a terrific crucifixion" and "a reign of irresponsible lawlessness unequaled in the history of civilized peoples."\(^{39}\)

Coulter was unimpressed by the early revisionist attempts to counter this traditional story of Reconstruction. "Modern scholarship," he claimed in his annotated bibliography, "has not been uniformly unbiased or careful in factual statements or interpretations."\(^{40}\)

\(^{37}\textit{Ibid.}, 142.\)
\(^{38}\textit{Ibid.}, 360.\)
\(^{39}\textit{Ibid.}, 352.\)
\(^{40}\textit{Ibid.}, 404.\)
Aware of the flaws in the studies by revisionist historians James S. Allen and W.E.B. DuBois, Coulter failed to see the flaws in his own book. Coulter argued unhistorically that there "could be no sensible departure from the well-known facts of the Reconstruction program as it was applied to the South." He claimed to have "sought to discover as far as possible what were the aspirations of Southern white Radicals and Negroes and what was their defense against charges made by traditional Southerners." But Coulter's view of Reconstruction and its chief villains, the Negroes, carpetbaggers and scalawags, did not depart markedly from the "well-known" facts. 41

Historians drawn to the orthodox version of Reconstruction seem like Coulter to be infected with historical blindness. In the 1959 edition of his widely-used textbook, 
Louisiana: The Pelican State, Edwin Adams Davis, a professor emeritus at Louisiana State University, put forth a Dunning interpretation of Louisiana Reconstruction as if a quarter century of revisionist writing did not exist. 42

"Carpetbaggers were persons from outside Louisiana who packed their belongings in a carpetbag and came to the state to win political power and make personal gains," he instructed his readers; "scalawags were Louisianians who joined the Radicals for reasons of personal profit." Davis

41 Ibid., XI, see especially 122-126, 140-142.

42 The following four quotations are from Edwin Adams Davis, Louisiana: The Pelican State (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 222-223.
described the Louisiana blacks as a mass of political simpletons who were led by their collective noses through the Reconstruction years by the more intelligent but unscrupulous carpetbaggers and scalawags. Thus, the black Republicans "should not be too seriously blamed for the part they played during the tragic period," Davis stated. He even justified the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camellia. "Loyal Louisianians had to operate outside the law to preserve order," he reasoned. In view of this lack of law and order in Louisiana, the Klan and other white secret societies "did much good until they came under the control of revengeful leaders and had to be disbanded."

The obvious bias and one-dimensional characterizations make this textbook description of the horrors of Reconstruction and the white counterrevolution read like a Democratic broadside of 1876. It is valuable, however, in that it reveals the remarkable staying power of the traditional interpretation of Reconstruction.

The Dunning version of Reconstruction prevailed among Northern and Southern historians well into the twentieth century. From Dunning to Coulter historians viewed Reconstruction as an abnormal, desperate, and tragic affair. They described the carpetbaggers, Negroes, and scalawags as a gang of political troglodytes who emerged from the ruins of the Civil War to victimize and brutalize the decent white people of the South.
Vernon L. Wharton provided this capsule version of the Dunning story and its impact upon modern memory:

By the 1930's, then, the orthodox story of southern Reconstruction was fully rounded out and accepted almost without question. Its villains, on the national scene, were identified as the congressional Radicals and the incompetent and deluded President Grant. The hero at the national level was Andrew Johnson. Within the South, the villains were carpetbaggers, scalawags (usually unidentified), and a great, faceless mass of ignorant, barbarous, and often ridiculous Negroes. The southern heroes were the whites who had suffered indignities with bravery and patience and restored the rule of virtue, intelligence, and property.43

It was not long, however, before voices of dissent were raised within the historical profession.

The Revisionist Counterpoint

Black writers were the first to issue a counterstatement to the Dunning interpretation. In 1903 W.E.B. DuBois, the black activist, historian, and sociologist, argued before the American Historical Association meeting in New York for a more balanced interpretation of the Reconstruction era. DuBois emphasized the positive and lasting achievements of the decade following the Civil War. This address was the first major challenge to what was becoming quickly the orthodox opinion of Reconstruction. John R. Lynch, a Mississippi black Republican, and Alrutheus A.

43Wharton, Writing Southern History, 307-308.
Taylor, a Negro historian, also launched skillful counter-attacks on the Dunning position in the 1920's.\textsuperscript{44}

DuBois continued the assault in 1935 in his massive polemic \textit{Black Reconstruction}. In this Marxist interpretation of Reconstruction, DuBois saw the Radical program as an attempt to build a proletarian democracy upon the ruins of the plantation South. This thesis, however, is at once confused and confusing. His treatment of the scalawags provides good evidence of this. According to DuBois, the poor whites of the South "conceived of an economic solidarity between white and black workers." The rednecks and crackers then joined with certain members of the planter class in the ranks of the scalawags.\textsuperscript{45} These men, he claimed, "saw a vision of democracy across racial lines, and...were willing to build up a labor party in opposition to capitalists and landlords."\textsuperscript{46}

This bold thesis lacked a solid substructure of historical evidence. What evidence DuBois did muster he drew from the very object of his attack—Dunning histories. In his description of Louisiana Reconstruction, for example,

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\textsuperscript{44}Wharton in \textit{Writing History} discusses the place of DuBois, Lynch, and Taylor in Reconstruction historiography, \textit{ibid.}, 308-309.
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\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 350.
\end{flushright}
DuBois drew extensively upon the works of Ficklen and Lonn. He cited Ella Lonn no less than nine times in the space of twelve pages, drawing verbatim whole blocks of text which, in effect, though certainly not in intent, argued against DuBois's own conception of Reconstruction. As Lonn described the scalawags as low-down whites, gamblers, ex-slave traders and overseers, drunks, demagogues, and tenth-rate politicians, so did DuBois.47

The membrane of polemics which covers the body of DuBois's history of Reconstruction fails to conceal these inconsistencies in his argument. The scalawags wiggle and kick as DuBois forces them into the mold of Marxist ideology. Are they visionaries or grafters or something in between? DuBois inadvertently identifies not a bold band of democrats but a diverse group made up of poor whites, opportunists, and, in the case of Louisiana, "small capitalists" who "aspired to become rich, and whose business it was to manipulate the labor vote, white and black."48

Seen in this light, the thesis of Black Reconstruction becomes confused and farfetched. For all his revisionist intentions, DuBois was on the whole neither better informed nor more objective than his orthodox protagonists. As Vernon L. Wharton pointed out, DuBois was "no deep student

47Ibid., 471.
48Ibid.
of Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{49} His provocative thesis, full of the sound fury of left-wing rhetoric, lacked substance and the workmanlike qualities that good history demands. It would take other more substantial and professionally crafted accounts to shake the foundations of Dunning orthodoxy.

The Marxist historian James Stewart Allen, like DuBois, emphasized the revolutionary nature of Reconstruction, but realized that in the South no black or white proletariat really existed. Allen did hold, however, that the poorer whites (principally the small farmers of the Southern uplands) joined with the Negroes and the small urban middle class in a triple entente against the Bourbon aristocracy and its allies.\textsuperscript{50}

The Marxist interpretation found few adherents. The revisionist historian T. Harry Williams raised serious doubts about even the existence of either a poor white-Negro coalition or a Southern white proletariat during Reconstruction. According to Williams, "the great mass of the whites were yeomen farmers who thought in terms of racial supremacy instead of class solidarity."\textsuperscript{51} He also maintained that "the overwhelming mass of the people--the

\textsuperscript{49} Wharton, Writing Southern History, 310.


yeomen farmers, middle-class whites, and poor whites—were fiercely opposed to Negro suffrage and to any condition of equality for the Negro." Drawing upon the theories of the social psychologist Kimball Young, Williams held that the Southern caste system effectively prevented the poorer whites from cooperating with the freedmen. Williams actually stood the Marxist interpretation on its head when he pointed out that the planter-business class in Louisiana, not the poor whites, were the ones who sought an alliance with the blacks. Concerned about the dangers to property which the Negro vote entailed, the planters and businessmen sought to ally with the blacks in order to control their votes in the interest of economical government—that is, low taxes. The planter-business interests tried to manage the Negro electorate first by supporting Negro candidates for office, then by openly joining the Republican party, and finally, by attempting to organize political organizations outside the Republican and Democratic parties. In Louisiana this plan—the "Louisiana Unification Movement"—found support among "the flower of the wealth and culture of New Orleans and South Louisiana." The movement finally failed for three reasons. First, the economic interests of the planters and the blacks were diametrically opposed. Second, the carpetbaggers were able to outbid the planters.

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.
in terms of racial equality. Third, the planters could not convince the "common whites" to join the movement.\footnote{For a more detailed treatment of this abortive alliance see T. Harry Williams, "The Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873," \textit{Journal of Southern History}, XI (August, 1945), 349-369. This is a seminal revisionist article.}

The proponents of "unification," however, cannot be identified properly as scalawags since the movement was anti-Republican in nature and sought to siphon black support from the Louisiana Radicals.

David Donald also examined the role of the planter-business class in Reconstruction. In his pivotal study of Reconstruction published in 1944, Donald found a large, clearly defined ex-Whig element within the scalawag ranks is Mississippi.\footnote{The following two quotations in this paragraph are taken from David Donald, "The Scalawag in Mississippi Reconstruction," \textit{Journal of Southern History}, X (November, 1944), 449-450.} Between 1870 and 1875 one-third of the Congressmen, two of the three supreme court justices, one governor and one-third of both houses of the state legislature were scalawags—white Southern Republicans. Almost all these officeholders, Donald claimed, were former Whigs. They "were wealthy men—large planters and the railroad and industrial promoters—who naturally turned to the party which in the state as in the nation was dominated by business interests." By 1873 perhaps as many as twenty-five to thirty percent of the white Mississippi voters had joined the conservative planters, businessmen and Negroes in the
Whig-based alliance. The plan envisioned benefits for both sides. The Negro would be given civil equality while the planter-business class would receive a lowering of land taxes, the rebuilding of levees, a convict lease system, and state aid for the rebuilding of railroads. Ultimately the union failed because the scalawags were unwilling to extend social equality to the Negroes and because the blacks felt that they had not received political offices in proportion to their voting strength. Donald concluded that in part the downfall of the Republican government occurred because "the greatest accession of Democratic strength came from the thousands of so-called scalawags--mostly former Whigs--who now denounced the Republican party and voted on the color-line." Thus, the Democratic victory depended upon the solidarity of the white Mississippians rather than upon force or intimidation of the blacks. In his 1961 revision of J. G. Randall's Civil War and Reconstruction, Donald expanded his thesis to include most of the Southern states. The argument, however, has not received universal acceptance. The importance of Donald's thesis lies not in that it provided the answer, but that it asked the question and led to further research by scholars.

55 David Donald and J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2nd ed. (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1961), 626-629. Thomas B. Alexander in a survey of persistent Whiggery in the period 1860-1877 found that by 1869 the ex-Whigs fell into four basic categories: 1) the "unconditional Unionists" who supported the Radicals during the early stages of Congressional Reconstruction, 2) planters and businessmen who aimed at control of Reconstruction for their own conservative ends, 3) those former Whigs who by 1869 or 1870...
In 1963 Allen W. Trelease launched a detailed and persuasive attack upon the persistent-Whig thesis. Through a careful quantitative analysis of the election of 1872, "the high-watermark of post-war Republicanism," Trelease discovered that the white Republican voters of 1872 were primarily small farmers. Only in Tennessee, North Carolina, and parts of Virginia did an identifiable ex-Whig element exist in the postwar period. "Elsewhere," Trelease wrote, "the converse was often true: most of the white Republicans of 1872 seem to have been Jacksonian Democrats before the war." The planter-business class joined the Democratic or Conservative party, while the population of the Appalachian highlands moved into the Republican camp.


Thus, the vast majority of native white Republicans were hill-country farmers, not the rich and well-born.

This did not mean that there existed a poor white-Negro coalition--DuBois's proletarian vision of democracy across racial lines. "In most areas," Trelease stated, "there were enough freedmen to constitute at least the illusion of a threat to white supremacy; thus few whites joined the Republican party to begin with and many of those who did dropped out early."57 The white Republicans, on the other hand, were located primarily in counties with the smallest Negro populations. The greatest proportion of white Republican voters were situated in northwest Arkansas, the mountain areas of east Tennessee, and western North Carolina. Regions of white Republican strength also included Texas, along the Rio Grande and the central part of the state, and the poor, isolated and hilly regions such as northern Alabama and Georgia. Across the South the white Republicans of these areas "cast perhaps ten per cent of all the votes recorded in 1872, about twenty per cent of those cast by white men, and about twenty per cent of those cast by Republicans."58 In these regions, Trelease found a direct correlation between mountain Unionism and postwar Republicanism. The ex-Whigs "provided only part of the Republican leadership before 1872 or thereabouts and

57Ibid., 458.
58Ibid., 465-466.
almost none of the votes." The people of the mountain areas saw the Republican party as an anti-planter-Radical-Unionist party whose appeal rested primarily upon such postwar issues as egalitarian political and social reforms, a protective tariff, and railroad construction subsidies.

John Vollmer Mering, on the other hand, denied even the premise of the persistent-Whiggery thesis. "An individual's earlier preference of the Whig party," Mering wrote, "was an important biographical dictum, but only an unreliable index to his later political allegiances." Mering also argued that the persistent-Whig thesis rested in part upon the extremely weak proposition that the Southern political divisions of the 1830's and 1840's remained essentially still unchanged during the late 1860's and 1870's. This thesis failed, according to Mering, to take into account that in the years following the collapse of the Whig party in 1852 its members went through a process of realignment. Former Whigs gravitated to the Know-Nothings, the Democrats, the Constitutional Unionists and the Republicans. But they did not remain Whigs in disguise. "Undoubtedly," Mering concluded, "these Whigs who outlived their party vividly remembered the political struggles of

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 468. Supporting evidence for the Trelease position is found in Otto H. Olsen, "Reconsidering the Scalawags," Civil War History, XII (December, 1966), 304-320.

ante-bellum days, just as aging Democrats must have done
also. Strong as such recollections may have been, however,
they were only one among many determinants of later politi-
cal decisions."62

In his definitive revisionist survey of Louisiana
Reconstruction, Joe Gray Taylor sidestepped the scalawag
issue by pointing out that some Southern white Republicans
in Louisiana seem to have come from the ranks of the defunct
Whig and Know-Nothing parties. He did not pursue the ques-
tion further, noting simply that "a study of the scalawags,
the native white Republicans in Louisiana, is badly
needed."63

In their persistent search for a common denominator,
historians like DuBois, Donald, or Trelease are (in a minor
way) like the "hedgehogs" described in Isaiah Berlin's
essay on Leo Tolstoy's view of history. The hedgehogs
"relate everything to a single central vision, one system
less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they
understand, think and feel--a single, universal, organizing
principle [Marxism, persistent Whiggery, class antagonism]
...." The "foxes," unlike those who persist in the search
for a single cause, "entertain ideas that are centrifugal
rather than centripetal, their thought is scattered or

62Ibid., 130-133.

63Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 137.
Hereinafter cited as Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed.
diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the essence of a variety of experiences...."64

Of course, Berlin is speaking in cosmic terms, but in its own narrow way the heated controversy surrounding the investigation of Reconstruction history has been a contest between the hedgehogs (DuBois, Donald, and Trelease) on one side and the foxes (scholars like Hodding Carter, Kenneth Stampp, Richard Hume, and Carl Degler) on the other. The latter have been unwilling to fit the scalawags into any rigid definition. These pluralists have avoided a single explanatory system by emphasizing the heterogeneous rather than the homogeneous nature of the subject. Thus, they stress the diversity of backgrounds and the variety of motives which compelled certain Southern whites into collaborating with the blacks and Northern newcomers in the Radical movement.

Hodding Carter, a liberal Southern newspaper editor, novelist, and historian, in his survey of Reconstruction, entitled The Angry Scar, identified not one but several different types of scalawags. The scalawags, he noted,

...were animated by a variety of motives and by combinations of them: by class hatred, by lust for power, by simple greed, by expediency or despair, by political opportunism; by honestly espoused, long-time loyalty to the Union; by a belief that they could aid their

Carter described certain representative types:

Some were corrupt, dissolute men [Franklin J. Moses of South Carolina]... Some were scalawags through conviction ['Parson' Brownlow of Tennessee]... Some were scalawags through class hatred or opportunism or both [W. W. Holden of North Carolina]... Some had the Midas touch [Joe Brown of Georgia]... Some were expedient or confused or hopeless [James Longstreet of Louisiana]... And some scalawags were coldly logical men of affairs [James Lusk Alcorn of Mississippi]...  

In terms of education, employment, and most other indices of social origin the scalawags were little different than their conservative enemies. "The scalawags of the South," this journalist-historian pointed out, "included former generals of the Confederacy and wartime Southern governors; planters and poor whites; one-time Whigs, ministers and businessmen, and lawyers; men of principle and men lacking principle." Carter's view is certainly impressionistic; but it is fair and sensible, and it emphasizes the complex matrix from which scalawagism emerged.

When Kenneth M. Stampp published his neo-revisionist synthesis of Reconstruction in 1965, he relegated most scalawags to one or more of the following categories: 1) Unionists who aimed to control their states through the
disenfranchisement of the ex-Confederates but who were reluctant to accept black suffrage. 2) A minority of the poor whites and yeomen farmers located in areas where the black population was small. 3) Businessmen and those living in eastern Tennessee, western Virginia and North Carolina, and northern Alabama who saw the possibilities of economic development of their resource-rich areas through such Republican policies as a national banking system, the protective tariff, and federal support for internal improvements. 4) Upper-class Whigs who saw the Republican party as the heir of Whig traditions and who aimed to control the black bloc votes in their own interest.68

Investigations of the white Radicals by Richard Hume also illustrate the diverse nature of the scalawag politicians. In his analysis of the membership of the "Black and Tan" constitutional conventions in ten Southern states, Hume noted that in North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Arkansas the typical Southern white convention delegate was a poor farmer, while in South Carolina, Alabama, and Texas the white Radical ranks included many business and professional men. In Louisiana, however, the evidence was so incomplete as to prevent any general conclusion about the social origins of the scalawag delegates.69


69Richard L. Hume, "The 'Black and Tan' Constitutional Conventions of 1867-1869 in Ten Former Confederate States:
A second study by Hume compares the white Radical and conservative factions in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina constitutional conventions. Here Hume discovered that the scalawags "were more often smaller farmers who had evidenced strong unionist sympathies" during the Civil War. The rank and file scalawags were not motivated by the Whig-Democratic struggles of the 1840's but "arose instead in response to Southern realities of the 1860's--the realities of secession, war, defeat, and reconstruction." Some were ex-Whigs; others were lifelong Democrats. They were very often wartime Unionists, but many of their conservative opponents had opposed the Confederate cause as well. Hume found it difficult to typecast the scalawags since the political alignments "were much more fluid than many historians have previously assumed." Those scalawags who joined the Radical coalition in the early stages of Reconstruction were, for the most part, small farmer-Unionists. Later, Southern whites who "were rather well-to-do" extended and strengthened the "core element" of small farmers. Thus, by the early 1870's the scalawags became "more numerous and less radical" than those who had previously assembled in the "black and tan" conventions in the period of 1867-1869. Drawing upon his statistical portrait of ninety-eight Southern white radicals, one finds that the typical scalawag was a forty-four and one-half-year-old.

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old farmer who in 1860 owned six slaves and was worth $4,500. Ten years later, however, he was worth $1,500. He could have been a former Whig but it was just as likely that he had been a Democrat in the ante-bellum period. The issues of the 1860's and 1870's were not the same as the issues of the 1840's and the typical scalawag recognized these realities. Finally, the farmer-Unionist welcomed the support of the wealthier Southern whites who contributed important support to the Republican movement in the 1870's. Thus, Hume's scalawags are a far more complex lot than the scalawags described by either David Donald or Allen Trelease.

The most comprehensive study of the scalawag movement is contained in Carl Degler's The Other South. In this book "about losers" the author places the scalawags within the broad context of white Southern dissent in the nineteenth century. Degler's approach, in some ways identical to Hodding Carter's, is to synthesize recent research. Degler too, like Carter and Stampp, emphasizes the variety of men and motives evident in scalawagism. With regard to the question of social origins, he eschews concern over the

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economic status of the scalawag. "A political party by its very nature," Degler reminds historians, "cannot be either effective or important if its membership is drawn only from the wealthy, who, by definition, are few in number."  

Thus, Degler looks at the role of the "nobodies" (poor whites or those new to the world of power and politics) and the elite (the ante-bellum leaders) who became scalawags. Degler also surveys the influence of a variety of motives—wartime Unionism, personal and economic motivations, the pressure of class antagonism, persistent Whiggery, the arbitrament of war, reformism, and opportunism. "The reasons why individual white Southerners became scalawags," he concludes, "obviously constitute a wide spectrum."  

The Image of the Scalawags in the Popular Mind  

Although revisionist scholars can proclaim a decisive victory in the battle of the monographs (the Dunning interpretation is now almost totally discredited), they have, nevertheless, lost the war for the popular mind. The modern memory of Reconstruction remains fixed upon an unquestioned set of beliefs. This condition is due primarily to the effective dramatization presented in popular his—


72 Ibid., 228.

tories, novels, and films which deal with the Civil War and Reconstruction. The story as told by the Dunningites had all the elements of good melodrama—excitement, sentimentality, histrionics, pathos, and easily defined characters. It was an historical soap opera told on a grand scale.

With such material to work with, the popularizers early seized upon the era of Reconstruction as a fertile ground for their talents. In fact, the lasting effect of the Dunning interpretation owed less to the influence of the early professional historians (the traditional view had actually already begun to form before the publication of Dunning's work on Reconstruction and "the Dunning School merely gave elaborate and expert documentation to a story already generally accepted.") than to the work of popular writers, novelists, and Hollywood filmmakers. Thomas Dixon, D. W. Griffith, Claude G. Bowers, Margaret Mitchell, and, most recently, Alistair Cooke, have dramatized and amplified the traditional story and its characters to such a degree that the work of the revisionists has gone unnoticed by the general public.

Thomas Dixon (one-time actor, graduate student in history and politics at The Johns Hopkins University, law student, North Carolina legislator, and Baptist minister) wrote three best-selling novels dealing with the history of Reconstruction and the Ku Klux Klan—The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's Burden (1902), The Clansman

Wharton, Writing Southern History, 298.
(1905), and The Traitor (1907). The Leopard's Spots, according to one authority on Dixon's literary career:

was at once the earliest and greatest of all Dixon's propaganda works. Into its writing went all the logic of the lawyer, the social criticism of the reformer, the zeal of the religious prophet and the actor's sense of dramatic incident and timing.  

But despite a certain verve evident in Dixon's prose, his story was filled with cardboard characters, the denizens of the fictional town of Hambright, North Carolina. The principal figures included Sallie Worth ("a daughter of the old-fashioned South"), Charles Gaston (the brave and handsome former Confederate colonel), Nelse (a comic but faithful "darkie"), Tom Camp (the "nigger" hating poor white), and Allan McLeod (a scalawag).

In a chapter entitled "The Birth of a Scalawag" Dixon introduced the readers to McLeod, a one-time Ku Klux Klan marauder who, upon his arrest by Federal troops, informs on his fellow Southerners and is rewarded for his treason with the job of United States Marshal for the District of Western North Carolina. This scalawag becomes an important and powerful figure in North Carolina politics. In time, the "McLeod Negro-Farmer Legislature" remolds the city charter for Hambright, "and under the new instrument a combination of Negroes and criminal whites" take possession.


76 Thomas Dixon, The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the
of the city government. As the story and Reconstruction come to an end, McLeod, "a Modern Villain," is run out of town by the courtly General Daniel Worth, Sallie's father. The cowardly scalawag then flees the South and goes to Boston where he marries a sixty-year-old dowager, a former missionary among the Negroes of Hambright. McLeod's post-Reconstruction career is a mixture of perverse triumph and poetic justice. He collects a dowry of half a million dollars and, as a reward for his services to the Republican party, is appointed ambassador to a South American banana republic.77

The story of the scalawag McLeod is only one part of Dixon's convoluted historical drama. Although today most readers would be repelled by its Victorian plot and characterizations, if not by its crude racism, the original audience responded enthusiastically to the novel.


77 Ibid., 173-177, 414-415, 459-460.
Nation as cultural history issued this judgment on the historical and artistic merits of Griffith's film:

It served the ugliest purposes of pseudo-art—giving people a reflection of their own prejudices, sentimental at best, vicious at worst, and a restatement of their easy explanations of the terrible complexities of their history as Americans. It demonstrated how easily and how successfully the art could pander to the sentimentality of the public; how effectively and profitably it could transfer melodrama from the stage and false values from the novel. 78

This is a harsh, but not unfair criticism.

The easy explanation of terrible complexities appeared again in 1929 when the Literary Guild of America published the most influential popular history of Reconstruction, The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln. 79 Written by Claude G. Bowers, an Indiana Democratic politician, diplomat, historian and biographer, this brilliantly crafted, though historically unsound, book presented the story of Reconstruction in colorful and lurid detail. Bowers' treatment of Reconstruction in Louisiana was representative of the tenor of his volume. Drawing heavily upon the work of Ella Lonn, Bowers cast a supercilious eye upon men and events in New Orleans. Mechanics Hall, the meeting place of the Radical legislature, is pictured as "a monkey house."

The blacks and their white allies in the state assembly

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78 Everett Carter, "Cultural History Written with Lightening: The Significance of 'The Birth of a Nation,'" American Quarterly, XII (Fall, 1960), 355.

inhabit a political "zoo" to which the better elements come to view with disgust and fascination the orgy of misrule. Corruption, drunkenness, and ignorance characterize the new government, which is, according to Bowers, typical of the Radical governments in the "land of jubilee." The Radical legislature is presided over by the Maryland-born scalawag Mortimorer Carr, "a shrewd, unscrupulous, audacious youth of twenty-six." Outside the chamber the "lobbies teem with laughing negroes from the plantations, [and] with whites of the pinch-faced, parasitic type...." 80

In the Literary Guild's monthly brochure for September 1929, Wings, Carl Van Doren, historian and member of the Guild's editorial board, praised The Tragic Era as combining "the art of the dramatist no less than the science of the historian." 81 At least in the first sense he was right, and the public responded warmly to the melodramatic story. The impact of the volume made its author, according to Kenneth Stampp, "the chief disseminator of the tradition picture of reconstruction...." 82

The common wisdom regarding Reconstruction, as reflected in the works of Dixon and Bowers, appeared again in Margaret Mitchell's Pulitzer Prize winning historical novel

80Ibid., 362-367.

81Carl Van Doren, "Why the Editorial Board Selected The Tragic Era," Wings, III (September, 1929), 4.

82Stampp, Era of Reconstruction, 4.
Gone With the Wind (published in 1936). A mixture of romance and realism, the story centers upon Scarlett O'Hara (a fascinating combination of one part liberated woman and one part Southern belle) and her life during and after the Civil War. Mitchell depicts the postwar years in Georgia as a desperate struggle to survive against great odds—against poverty and oppression, and "Southerners who had turned Republican very profitably—and the carpetbaggers, these Yankees who came South, like buzzards, after the surrender with all their worldly possessions in one carpetbag." The scalawags were "scum like that Hilton feller...and scoundrels like Jonas Wilkerson [character-actor Victor Jory played the role of the scalawag Wilkerson in the film version] and poor whites like the MacIntoshes...." The public, and many literary critics, applauded the book, responding enthusiastically to the engrossing story and the deft characterizations. Gone With the Wind, Stephen Vincent Benet wrote in the Saturday Review:

...is a long book and a copious one, crowded with character and incident, and bound together with one consistent thread, the strong greediness of Scarlett O'Hara who was bound to get her way, in spite of the hampering ideal of the Perfect Southern Gentlewoman and the ruin that follows men's wars.... [T]he tale of her adventures and her struggle makes as readable, full-bodied, and consistent a historical novel as we have had in some time—a novel which, in certain passages...rises to genuine heights.84

83 Margaret Mitchell, Gone With the Wind (New York: Macmillan Co., 1936), 344, 346.
84 Stephen Vincent Benet, review of Gone With the Wind,
When Producer David O. Selznick transformed Mitchell's romance of the Civil War and Reconstruction into a 220-minute Hollywood spectacular in 1939, again the public and the critics responded favorably. "Through stunning design, costume and peopling, his [Selznick's] film," Frank S. Nugent wrote in the New York Times, "has skillfully and absorbingly recreated Miss Mitchell's mural of the South in that bitter decade when secession, civil war and reconstruction ripped wide the graceful fabric of the plantation age and confronted the men and women who had adorned it with the stern alternative of meeting the new era or dying with the old."85 The powerful graphic image of Reconstruction so skillfully presented by novelists and the Hollywood dream factory continued to dominate the popular mind. The revisionists for all their monographs failed to crack the wall of orthodoxy.

This tenacious hold that the Dunning stereotype has upon the popular mind can be seen most recently in Alistair Cooke's successful television series America. In thirteen episodes Cooke, a British-American journalist, presented a personal and highly orthodox view of America's past. In the Emmy award-winning sixth episode, "A Firebell in the Night," Cooke sees the Old South through a veil of moonlight and magnolias and the era of Reconstruction is

85 Frank S. Nugent, review of Gone With the Wind, in New York Times, December 20, 1939.
presented in the traditional way with all the leading charac-
ters present—buzzard-like carpetbaggers, base scalawags
and corrupt black puppets.86

In 1973 Alfred A. Knopf published a coffee-table book
containing the transcript and some of the photographic stills
from the series. In his acknowledgements at the end of the
volume, Cooke attacks the historical profession for its
timid pedagogy and, revealingly, notes his reliance upon
the Columbia Encyclopedia of American History as "a wonder-
ful sheet anchor" for his survey of American history.87

But despite the often eccentric shallowness of Cooke's
interpretation and research, the series and the book provide
a stunning visual image. Again the revisionists had been
overwhelmed by a clever popularizer.

It should be noted, however, that novels written from
the revisionist viewpoint have appeared. Howard Fast
dramatized the Marxist-revisionist interpretation in his
vivid, passionate historical novel Freedom Road. In the
story the black hero, Gideon Jackson, a member of the
Charleston Radical convention, found support for his cause
among "the poor white trash...these despised scalawags, the
tall, lean, slow spoken, straw-haired men elected by that
shadow of the poor and landless men from the swamps and the

86 An insightful criticism of Episode 6 is James C.
Curtis' review of America, in The History Teacher, XII, No.
1 (November, 1973), 99-100.

87 Alistair Cooke, Alistair Cooke's America (New York:
lonely piney woods." But the alliance was short-lived. Through a combination of physical force and racist appeals, the counterrevolutionary Bourbons finally destroyed the promise of democracy in the South. The final fantastic scene is a bloody Gotterdammerung as the poor whites and their black comrades fight to the death against the Bourbons amid the ruins of a plantation house. But it was a novel of minor importance which rested, like DuBois's history, upon the shaky foundations of Marxist theory.

William Bradford Huie, an Alabama-born journalist, provides another revisionist portrait of the scalawag in his 1967 novel The Klansman. A central character in the story is the heroic Breck Stancill. Breck is a modern-day scalawag descended from a long line of nonconformists. In Huie's tale the Stancill family embodies the best elements of Southern life. Breck is the last of a line of Alabama aristocrats who defied the Southern system. His great-grandfather, Landers Stancill, for example, opposed secession and, although a slaveholder, openly advocated emancipation and equality for black people. "As an American," great-grandfather Stancill bravely announced, "I am not afraid of living in a community where Negroes enjoy every right granted to every man by the Constitution of the United States." The rednecks of Atoka County, however,

88 Howard Fast, Freedom Read (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944), 78.
lynched Landers for his outspoken views.89 Like his ances-
tor, Breck is a man of high moral courage, a man set apart
from his racist neighbors by his opposition to white
supremacy and the Alabama Democratic Party. From 1948
through 1960, Breck consistently voted for the Republican
presidential candidates (Thomas E. Dewey, Dwight Eisen-
hower, and Richard Nixon). In 1964 Breck refused to vote
since Wallace and Goldwater were the only candidates on
the ballot," and Wallace was supporting Goldwater." Breck
in 1964 publicly denounced Wallace as a "piss-ant." Thus,
Breck stood with his great-grandfather, Huie explains,
"against the visionless men who led the South to ruin."90

When Paramount Pictures translated Huie's novel into
a self-proclaimed "BLOCKBUSTER MOVIE," Richard Burton played
the defiant white aristocrat Breck Stancill. As part of
the promotion scheme for the film, Dell Publishing Company
reprinted the novel in a paperback edition. "Behind the
Honeysuckle charm," the editor claims on the back cover of
the Dell edition, lies "a Southern town--a human jungle of
love and lust, courage and terror."91

Both Fast and Huie write with energy and enthusiasm,
but whatever their merit as novelists, neither writer is a
very good historian. Their works are as much a distortion

89William Bradford Huie, The Klansman (New York:
90Ibid., 333.
91Huie, The Klansman (New York: Dell, 1974).
of history as the works of Dixon and Mitchell. Fast's historical novel of Reconstruction is seriously flawed by his left-wing proclivities. His characters are stereotypes of the left. He creates a world of his own Marxist fancy.

Allan Nevins, in a review of three of Fast's novels (Citizen Tom Paine, Freedom Road, and The American), noted that the characters in Fast's volumes all inhabit the same proletarian world:

A society full of class tyranny, economic exploitation and political corruption; a proletariat, dumb, yearning, struggling, that plainly waits for a great leader; a hero who rises to struggle against the entrenched forces of Mammon and the dead weight of middle-class complacency; a defeat that gloriously points the way to future victories--this is the general scheme that Mr. Fast uses.92

For Huie the Stancill family genealogy represents a family set apart from the mainstream of Southern white society. The scalawags in Huie's The Klansman personify the romantic aristocratic ideal of noblesse oblige. In their virtue and benevolent behavior they stand in stark contrast to the lesser whites about them--the corrupt sheriff, the vicious klansman, the semi-literate Baptist minister. Only the Negroes exhibit the same moral correctness as the Stancill family.

Like Dixon and Mitchell, Fast and Huie are talented writers whose books have attracted many readers. But it

seems clear that the revisionist view of Reconstruction in
general, and of the scalawags in particular, will not re-
place the traditional image so deeply ingrained in our
popular or folk history because neither revisionist
popularizers nor revisionist scholars have been able to
destroy the powerful melodramatic image of Reconstruction
and its participants created at the turn of the century
and so effectively preserved. Nevertheless, scholarship
demands that historians continue to seek an accurate image
of the scalawag.

Scholars now know that the period of Reconstruction is
not as simple a field of investigation as the Dunningites,
the popularizers, and the early revisionists imagined.
The scalawags provide a case in point. Taken together, the
findings of the Dunningites and revisionists have demon-
strated that the white Southerners who joined the Republi-
can party in those turbulent postwar years were a diverse
lot. Race-traitors or racial democrats, proletarians or
renegades, corruptionists or idealists, poor whites or
planters, yeomen farmers or businessmen, ex-Whigs or ex-
Jacksonian Democrats, or simply ambitious politicos—they
fit no single category. The Dunning scholars and popular
writers constructed a one-dimensional cartoon character.
On the other hand, the search for a common denominator
(persistent Whiggery or Jacksonian egalitarianism) has
been little more successful in revealing the true identity
of the elusive scalawag.
In his article on Mississippi scalawags, William C. Harris warned revisionist scholars away from forcing the Southern Republicans into any kind of rigid mold. Like Procrustes, the horrible giant of Greek mythology who mutilated his victims to fit one of his two iron beds, these scholars have hacked and sawed the scalawags to fit the iron bed of historical interpretation. According to Harris, both the Whig and Jacksonian Democratic schools of scalawag historiography have overemphasized past allegiances and past political issues. "Such issues might still be relevant to an analysis of Southern Republicanism," Harris states, "but they should be studied in the context of the peculiar problems created by war, defeat, and developments during reconstruction that were far more important in conditioning responses." He also suggests that research be directed toward identifying the lesser Republican leaders and the scalawag rank and file.  

In her able dissertation on the Alabama scalawags, Sarah Van Voorhis Woolfolk listed the basic questions to be answered regarding the identity and place of the scalawags in Reconstruction:

Were the natives poor novices in a world of power and politics? What role did they actually play in the course of...Reconstruction? Once defeated by the Democrats, did the scalawags immediately desert the Republican party? What were their attitudes on the major questions?

of their day, i.e., amnesty, pardon, and franchise; internal improvements, civil rights?94

Thus, one objective of the present study will be to identify not only the prominent scalawag leaders in Louisiana but as many of the lesser functionaries as possible. Besides answering the questions posed by Woolfolk, it will be necessary to look at the relationship between the Southern whites and their carpetbag and black allies within the Louisiana Republican party. Attention will also be concentrated on the earlier stages of Reconstruction in Louisiana. Because the scalawags seem to have been more important during the period prior to 1868, attention will be devoted to finding out why the scalawags lost ground to the carpetbaggers, who dominated Louisiana politics during Reconstruction. This investigation, focusing on Louisiana, will provide a case study of the role of the white Southern Republicans during the era of Reconstruction.

"The contest in the South has given rise to two new political epithets," Harper's Monthly noted in 1868. "Northern men who have gone thither are designated as 'Carpet-Baggers'; Southern men who side with the Republican party are called 'Scalliwags.'" The word scalliwag (or scalawag)\(^1\) has been used to define native-born white Southerners who supported the Republicans during Reconstruction. In this study, however, the term is also used to include Northern-born and foreign-born whites who settled in the South before the Civil War and who later joined the Radical movement. In the years before the war, these men were absorbed into Southern community life and

\(^1\)Quoted in Hans Sperber and Travis Truttschuh (eds.) American Political Terms: An Historical Dictionary (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), s.v. "scalawag." The genesis of the word "scalawag" is obscure. The term may have originally referred to a type of dwarf cattle raised in the Shetland Islands. As early as 1848 it served as a common epithet in western New York for a rogue or rascal. In 1854, the New York Tribune used it to describe worthless cattle: "The market is not a lively one and good beees do not sell for a price to justify feeders in making good beef. The truth is that the number of miserable 'scalawags' is so great that like the bad portion of the biped race, they tend to drag down all above themselves to their own level." By 1866 "scalawag" had acquired its more specialized Southern tenor: "Whenever a white man appeared to vote" in Alabama, the Washington Morning Chronicle informed its readers, "every one of these infuriated devils...sets up a yell, calling him 'white negro,' 'low trash,' 'scalawag,' 'mean white,' etc." Ibid.; Webster's
became identified with the "southern Establishment" through social, economic, and political ties. They were often lawyers, doctors, professional men, and businessmen. Louisiana especially attracted such ambitious men, men on the make, men who saw in the cosmopolitan city of New Orleans or the rich cotton and sugar lands of the rural parishes a land of new opportunity. The following biographical profiles are chosen to exemplify the geographical, educational, occupational, and political backgrounds of the Louisiana scalawags, native-born, Northern-born and foreign-born.

James G. Belden, physician.² Although his birthplace is unknown, Belden, a nephew of the famous American lexicographer Noah Webster, was a descendant of one of the first settlers of western New York state. A graduate of the New York College of Physicians and Surgeons, he practiced medicine in New Orleans for fourteen years prior to the Civil War. Belden was, according to the New York Times, a slaveholder and a Southerner by "feeling and adoption."³

Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1968) provides four alternative spellings for the word: scalawag, scallywag, scallawag, or skalawag. This author has chosen the first form since it is most widely used.


³New York Times, April 26, 1864.
But the Civil War, Willie Malvin Caskey states, "seems to have converted him to emancipation."  

William Jasper Blackburn, newspaper editor. Few Southern white Republicans in Louisiana were as outspoken and as consistent in their support of the Radical cause as this scalawag journalist. Born in Randolph County in northeastern Arkansas on July 24, 1820, he received his primary education both at home and in the local public schools. For two years (1838 and 1839) he studied at Jackson College in Columbia, Tennessee. When he returned to Arkansas in 1839, Blackburn became a printer in Batesville. He moved to Little Rock in 1845 and to Fort Smith in 1846 before settling in the town of Minden in the hill country of north Louisiana about 1848. Here he established the Minden Herald. Ten years later he moved to Homer, a trading center in Claiborne Parish. His second journal, the Homer Iliad, openly championed the Union during the secession crisis and during the war. With the advent of Reconstruction in Louisiana, Blackburn's little weekly

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4 Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 108.

paper (he estimated the circulation in 1868 at about 250 persons) stoutly defended the Radical movement. In 1867 Michael Hahn, a fellow scalawag, testified to Blackburn's Unionism in a letter recommending the editor for a position with the Internal Revenue Service: "W. Jasper Blackburn... was a true, fearless and talented advocate of the Unionist cause throughout the late rebellion and since the ending of the war has constantly and earnestly contended in his paper... for a reconstruction of the Southern state govern­ments." Thomas Jefferson Durant, a prominent scalawag attorney, also recommended Blackburn on the basis of his "able and fearless" devotion to the Union during the rebellion. The editor, Durant claimed, "was more than once placed in circumstances of great peril by reason of his devotion to the Union." Indeed, someone at the Treasury Department scribbled across the back of Durant's letter of recommendation—"Too radical to live."6

Thomas Green Davidson, school teacher, lawyer, civil servant, sugar planter, cotton planter, politician. 7 Davidson was the Democrat in the Republican woodpile. He became a Radical in practice if not in name, and he deserves to be included in the scalawag ranks. He was born in Jefferson County, Mississippi, of middle-income parents, Thomas J. Davidson and Mary Shank, on August 3, 1803, and was raised in that area of Louisiana known as the Florida Parishes (an area inhabited principally by white Anglo-Saxon Protestants). There he read law under the direction of Martin G. Penn (of Covington), "the most influential politician and [Democratic] political boss in St. Tammany Parish." 8 Following his apprenticeship, Davidson moved to Montpelier (St. Helena Parish) sometime before 1828. Here Davidson, in partnership with James M. Bradford, opened a law office "which changed him [Davidson] from a 'poor self-made' man into a man of wealth and political power." 9

By 1850 Davidson's financial condition was extremely sound. The census reported the value of his estate at $88,500 (including 61 slaves, 300 acres of land, livestock, and other property). In 1860 the estimated value of his estate had increased to $100,000 (including 91 slaves and

7This biographical sketch is based on E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson: Southern Statesman or Louisiana Scalawag?" Louisiana Studies (Spring, 1971), 15-21. Hereinafter cited as E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson."

8Ibid., 15.

9Ibid., 15-16.
600 acres of cotton-producing land). His biographer concluded, "Davidson could well afford the luxury of a full political life, and during the ante-bellum period it was quite apparent that he enjoyed his public involvement and did everything in his power to retain his position."

Davidson's prewar political career began in 1826. In 1833 he received from the Jackson administration an appointment as the register of the United States land office (located in Greenburg, St. Helena Parish). Davidson received this patronage because of the endorsement of three prominent Louisiana Democrats—Martin G. Penn, Judge Larry H. Moore, and Colonel William Breed. In 1833 Davidson also secured a seat in the Louisiana state legislature (he held this position from 1833 until 1846). For nine to ten years following his service in the legislature, Davidson concentrated on his law practice in the Florida Parishes. But he also remained politically active "...by making frequent appearances at barbecues on behalf of Democratic candidates in election years." Davidson came back into public office as a United States Congressman (March 4, 1855 to March 3, 1861).

The Whigs, however, were less than pleased with Davidson's success. James Moore attacked Davidson in a letter to T.C.W. Ellis, an old Davidson enemy: "How can

10 Ibid., 16.
11 Ibid., 17.
the South expect to be regarded with respect when she sends such crippled Satans to Congress to advance her interests and give character to Southern institutions and reputation to minds that budded and blossomed in the South? Is old Crutch [Davidson] a model specimen of a Southern Statesman? Do the Democrats suppose that the old tub of quack and trite vulgarisms will be heard in Congress where there are God-fearing honest men?"\(^{12}\)

But the role of Davidson within the Democratic party was also a subject of controversy. In 1857 Davidson opposed the party candidate for the judgeship of the Eighth Judicial District in favor of Martin G. Penn, now running as an independent against the regular candidate. When Davidson himself sought and won reelection despite heated opposition from many regular Democrats, including Governor Robert C. Wickliffe, he attributed his victory\(^ {13}\) to support by Senator John Slidell and Emile Le Sere (Slidell's chief lieutenant). Davidson's erratic behavior, however, caused him to be "the disruptive feature in the party until secession in 1861."\(^ {14}\)

On the national scene during the crisis decade of the 1850's, Davidson vigorously defended the South and its peculiar institution with "frequent dashes of humor, ready

\(^{12}\)Quoted in \textit{ibid.}, 18. Emphasis in the original.

\(^{13}\)\textit{Ibid.}, 19.

\(^{14}\)\textit{Ibid.}
repartee, and spontaneous eloquence." He attacked the new Republican party as a "tad-pole" organization of "ultra-Abolitionists." When the secession crisis began, Davidson, along with the other members of the state's congressional delegation, signed a joint letter to the Louisiana Secession Convention of 1861 urging an immediate withdrawal from the Union. Despite his support for the secession movement, he later claimed to have opposed secession actively. Davidson held no office under the rebel state government, and he gave only lukewarm support to the Confederacy.

As the Federal hold on Louisiana tightened, Davidson moved closer to the Unionist element in the state and eventually into the arms of the Republicans. The Louisiana Republicans would find the talents of this veteran, maverick Democrat extremely useful. Historian E. Russ Williams concludes that Davidson was "a devious and scheming individual with the capability of turning everything to his advantage...." 

Anthony Paul Dostie, dentist. Born in Saratoga County, New York, the son of a barber of French descent, he received his early education in the local public schools.  

15 Ibid.  
16 Quoted in ibid.  
17 Ibid., 17.  
18 This biographical profile is based on: Emily Hazen Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie or The Conflict in New Orleans

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At the age of nineteen, Dostie married a young woman from Cazenovia, New York, Eunice Hall; after her death six years later, Dostie never remarried. Young Dostie moved (c. 1840) to Amsterdam, New York, where he studied dentistry under J. C. Duell, a locally prominent doctor. Before he settled in New Orleans in 1852, Dostie traveled through the Midwest (he lived in Chicago, Illinois and Marshall, Michigan) and the South (he resided in Texas for six years). A successful dentist, Dostie was also active in two fraternal secret societies— the Odd Fellows and the Masons. Because of his firm Jacksonian persuasion and his outspoken commitment to the Union, he refused to take an oath of loyalty to the Confederacy. The rebel authorities in New Orleans then forced him to leave the city on August 21, 1861. On his way north Confederate officials imprisoned him briefly at Nashville, Tennessee. Dostie's wartime experience left him with a deep-seated bitterness toward the Louisiana rebels. In a letter to his mentor, Dr. Duell, Dostie complained that the Confederates had "wrecked" his dental practice and his property when they forced him to become a refugee. After a short stay in Chicago during his exile,
Dostie returned to New Orleans when the Federals seized control of the city in 1862. Upon his return Dostie launched a new career in politics.

Thomas Jefferson Durant, lawyer. "Tall, thin, sallow, cadaverous," this scalawag attorney played a vital role in the early stage of Louisiana Reconstruction. Born in Philadelphia on August 8, 1817, to John Waldo and Sarah Heyliger Durant, he received his primary education in the local common schools. He attended the University of Pennsylvania but moved to New Orleans in 1834 before completing his degree. Durant worked for a time in the post office, then studied law and opened a law office in New Orleans.

Early in his career he developed a keen interest in social reform and politics. Durant was especially attracted to the teachings of the eccentric French social critic and utopian philosopher Charles Fourier. Many of Fourier's ideas were patently absurd and bizarre (he contended, for example, that a powerful telescope would enable earthlings to observe a harmonious civilization existing on the planet

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Jupiter). But what impressed Durant and the other American Fourierites was not the crackpot dreams of this French utopian socialist but his critical insights into the problems of society and his ingenious plans for a new world order. A series of letters dating from November 1844 to June 1847 and preserved among the Durant papers at the New York Historical Society reveal his involvement with the utopian reform movement. "I have read [in French] Fourier's New Industrial World with care," he wrote on November 14, 1844, "and am thoroughly convinced of the truth of his views and principles." Durant adopted Fourierism, but with a certain critical remoteness. In a letter (dated June 4, 1847) to Robert Wilson, a fellow Fourierite from Franklin, Louisiana, for example, Durant criticized the impractical methods by which Fourier envisioned the advance of his system. It was naive, Durant suggested, to believe that lectures and sample phalansteries (a close-knit series of harmonious communities of approximately sixteen hundred to eighteen hundred people each) alone would convert the masses to the principles of Association.


23Durant to John D. Wilkins, November 14, 1844, Durant Papers, NYHS.

24Durant to Robert Wilson, June 4, 1847, ibid.
Two days later he wrote to Albert Brisbane, an energetic socialist instrumental in establishing over forty Fourierite communes in America, concerning the quixotic elements in Fourier's schemes. Durant rejected as nonsense the idea that, once the Fourierites established a single trial phalanx, the world would quickly become convinced of its benefits, and there would follow a chain reaction which would result in a brave new world of happy phalanxes. It was not Fourier's objects but the methods that Durant questioned. He saw Fourier's belief in an almost instantaneous new harmonious society as a sheer physical impossibility. Durant held that the cause of utopian socialism in the mold could best be advanced not through proselytizing and a simple-minded reliance upon imitation but through hard-headed practical reform and common sense. In the same latter, and in the same vein, he attacked the famous editor Horace Greeley (a Fourier disciple who advanced the cause in his New York Tribune) as a faddish crusader insistent upon identifying the movement "with one of the two political parties, with anti-renters, forced temperance, and many other peculiarities...." 

Durant also communicated with George Ripley (the Unitarian-Transcendentalist-Fourierite and guiding light of the Brook Farm experiment in communal living) and subscribed to the Harbinger, the Fourierite journal. "I feel deeply

25 Durant to Albert Brisbane, June 6, 1847, ibid.
concerned," he wrote to the editors at West Roxbury, Massa­
chusetts, on January 13, 1847, "in the propagation of the
doctrines you uphold and the success of the paper as the
only vehicle of them in this country." Yet in the same
letter he criticized the editors for allowing anti-renters
to publish articles in the journal, thereby leading "some
to imagine that the disciples of association reason in the
same way."26 His criticisms apparently had no direct in­
fluence upon Fourierite thought in America. His letters,
however, do suggest that he attempted to infuse an element
of realism into what was essentially an endearing but hope­
lessly naive system. If Durant ever saw the contradiction
in his desire for practical reform and Charles Fourier's
curious and impractical designs for the restructuring of
society, it was not evident from his surviving papers.

On the issue of slavery Durant also took an unorthodox
position. His views on the South's peculiar institution,
in fact, resemble closely the anti-slavery and free-labor
arguments of the future Republican party. In a letter to
John D. Wilkins in December, 1844, Durant declared that
"one of the great causes for the decline and retrogradation
of agriculture south of the Potomac" was that it was
"carried on almost exclusively by slave labor." He held,

26Durant to the editors of the Harbinger, January 13,
1847, ibid.
too, that free labor was "a necessary step in the progress of the race....".\textsuperscript{27} 

He wrote to Robert Dale Owen in 1847, that unless one or both of the two contending forces in the slavery controversy be utterly mad, a compromise had to be reached.\textsuperscript{28} When the Wilmot Proviso invited debate on slavery, Durant attacked the measure as premature and unnecessary. And he considered John C. Calhoun's pro-slavery resolutions as "incendiary in their character, and founded on a Constitution solecism."\textsuperscript{29} "You ask me should we or should we not attack slavery openly and strongly as one of the giant evils of civilization," he wrote in response to an inquiry from Albert Brisbane, "or had we better try and cultivate the South?" Durant's answer was an appeal for patience and moderation. "Have some confidence in the reformers of the South," he wrote, "believe that the Southern people are men and brothers, not altogether unmindful of the evils of their social institutions, not altogether ignorant of the condition of their circumstances by which they are surrounded." Yet, he continued, "I would have you speak freely of slavery as an evil affecting the white race even more than it does the black, but speaking of it I would not have you forget that you are an American citizen bound in honor

\textsuperscript{27}Durant to John D. Wilkins, December 8, 1844, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{28}Durant to Robert Dale Owen, February 10, 1847, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{29}Id. to \textit{id.}, June 1, 1847, \textit{ibid.}
by the Constitution by gentlemanly feeling not to insult, bound by common sense to know that no man can be cured of his error but by kind treatment." Durant also advised Brisbane to "Treat slavery as a Philosophical Philanthropist should treat all subjects. Slaveholders here do not hold slaves for the mere love of the system itself, but because they have not, or they are not yet convinced that they have a better mode of making labor effective, convince him that there is another and better mode, and you may be sure [the slaveholder] will adopt it...."\textsuperscript{30} He believed that others in the South shared his moderate views on slavery. In a letter (dated December 27, 1844) to Henry G. Langley, Durant stated that "the people here are highly sensitive; yet in New Orleans at least we are not in the main any more pro-slavery fanatics than the mass of northern people are anti-slavery fanatics."\textsuperscript{31}

But Durant was as interested in practical politics as he was in utopian socialism and the economics of slavery. He allied with the Democratic party. In early 1844 Durant was an active member of the Democratic state committee which managed the Louisiana campaign of presidential nominee James K. Polk. On the eve of the election, he wrote optimistically about the prospects for his party in Louisiana. "The political horizon," he claimed, "never looked more

\textsuperscript{30}Durant to Albert Brisbane, June 6, 1847, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{31}Durant to Henry G. Langley, December 27, 1844, \textit{ibid.}
clearly for the Democratic Party, than it does at the present, and our friends in the city [New Orleans] and around it were never in better spirits."32 Indeed, Durant and his political allies should have been optimistic. As Perry Howard, an authority on Louisiana political patterns, noted: "The year 1844 proved to be pivotal in the history of political parties in Louisiana, for it was in this year that the Democratic Party had wrested political power from the Whigs in a close and heated presidential election."33 As a member of the state campaign committee, Durant played an important role in the triumph of the Louisiana Democrats.

For the sources of his political philosophy Durant looked back to the old Democratic-Republicans. "I am glad to see you admire so much John Taylor of Caroline," he wrote to a friend late in 1844, "he and Jefferson are my political instructors."34

In 1846 Durant received the Democratic nomination for a seat in the state senate. On New Year's Day of that year he wrote to his mother concerning his future in politics. His election was a matter of doubt, Durant reported, but the fact of his nomination alone placed him "in a very excellent position with the Democratic Party...." He noted too that

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32 Durant to Joseph Walker, October 24, 1844, ibid.
34 Durant to John D. Wilkins, December 8, 1844, Durant Papers, NYHS.
his service to the party would be of great benefit to him in the future.35 His Jeffersonian idealism was apparently tempered with a measure of self-interest.

When the Democrats defeated the Whigs in the state election of 1846, Durant wrote to his mother concerning the campaign and his commitment to the Democrats. "It [the state contest] has resulted in the complete triumph for the Democratic party," he stated, "to which you know I have been ardently attached ever since I first comprehended a political principle. I was one of four candidates selected by our party in New Orleans to be supported for the State Senate, and was elected by a very handsome majority, exceeding the vote of the highest Whig candidate by Three Hundred and Fifty-One." Thus, at the age of twenty-nine Durant saw his life changing for the better, and he was pleased and flattered at his success. "I trust that this may be the first step in a more successful path than that which I have hereto trod in life," he continued, "for it really has been a hard one, calling for all the firmness and courage I possess to meet and overcome its difficulties."36 The future looked even more promising to the young lawyer-politician when later, as a reward for his service to the Democracy, President Polk appointed him a United States district attorney.

35 Durant to (Sarah Hyeliger Durant), January 1, 1846, ibid.
36 Id. to id., January 24, 1846, ibid.
His interest in politics extended outside of Louisiana. Thus, in 1847 Durant wrote to a friend in Mississippi for advice on that state's politics. Durant reasoned that the Whigs were about to nominate a "war candidate" for the office of governor, especially someone who had seen action in Mexico. Durant suggested that the Mississippi Democrats counter this move by nominating a war hero of their own. He suggested "the Colonel of the first Mississippi Regiment, Jefferson Davis...." Durant said that if Davis were a Louisianian, "no man in our state could make a stronger run."  

Thus, by the eve of the Civil War Thomas Jefferson Durant had become part of the "Southern Establishment." A prosperous lawyer, successful politician, and a slave-owner (despite his professed free labor ideology), he had a reputation for honesty and integrity. He was, no doubt, a man to be reckoned with in law and politics in Louisiana. Yet there was a side to Durant's ante-bellum career that clearly places him outside the mainstream of Southern thought. At a time when most Southern whites viewed social reform with alarm, Durant embraced Fourierism, one of the most colorful and oddest follies of the age. At a time when Southerners resented any criticism of their domestic institutions and strongly defended slavery as a positive good, Durant wrote openly in favor of free labor as a superior

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37Durant to J. J. MacCougham, February 16, 1847, *ibid.*
economic system. In a sense Durant was an anomaly whose
career in important ways ran counter to the common order of
Southern life. What effect this had upon his post-Civil War
career is uncertain. Perhaps his attraction to reform and
his free labor views conditioned him to welcome the dis-
ruption of Southern society and see opportunity in the
collapse of the old political order in Louisiana.

Durant's ardent and consistent Unionism also set him
apart from the majority of his fellow Louisianians. In
1860 he openly supported Abraham Lincoln for the Presidency
despite his own Democratic background and despite the fact
that in Louisiana Unionists supported Stephen Douglas or
John Bell and almost no one supported the "Black Republican"
candidate, Lincoln. During the short-lived Confederate
regime in New Orleans, Durant withdrew completely from pub-
lic life. But with the restoration of Federal control in
1862 Durant reappeared in the political arena as the head
of a movement designed to reorganize Louisiana as a free
state. Durant brought to the Free State and Radical move-
ments talent, wide political experience, and a keen sense
of the constitutional issues of the day.

Edward Henry Durell, lawyer. 38 No Louisiana scalawag
had a more impressive family tree. His grandfather,

38 This profile of E. H. Durell is based on the follow-
ing sources: H. W. Howard Knott, "Edward Henry Durell, DAB,
III (volume V of the original edition), 545-546; Appleton's
The Granite Monthly 4 (April, 1888), 115-129; and Edward C.
Billings, The Struggle Between the Civilization of Slavery

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Nicholas Durell, commanded a troop of Patriot cavalry during the Revolutionary War. His father, Daniel Meserve Durell, was graduated from Dartmouth in 1797 and served in the Tenth Congress (1807-1809) and in the New Hampshire House of Representatives for one year (1816). From 1816 until 1821 the elder Durell served as chief justice of the state district court of common pleas. Later, during the Andrew Jackson administration, he was the United States attorney for the district of New Hampshire (1830-1834). E. H. Durell's mother, Elizabeth Wentworth, belonged to a well-to-do, prominent New England family. A remarkable clan, the Wentworth family included Puritan leaders, Patriots and Tories, merchants and lawyers, governors and legislators, jurists and journalists. The family story reads like a history of New Hampshire itself.

E. H. Durell, the third son and sixth child of his parents, was born in the Wentworth ancestral mansion in Portsmouth on July 14, 1810. He attended Phillips Exeter Academy, and was graduated from Harvard in 1831. His contemporaries at Harvard included Wendell Phillips, Charles Sumner, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Following his graduation, Durell read law under his father's direction, then

moved to Pittsburg (which he renamed Grenada), Mississippi. The young lawyer finally settled in New Orleans in 1837.

Durell became active in a variety of community affairs. A city booster, he secured election as an alderman in 1854. During his tenure Durell devised various plans to improve the municipal tax system, city finances, and the public school system. He reorganized the faction-ridden and inefficient New Orleans fire department and introduced the first steam fire engine into service. He also worked to improve the city streets, sewer service, and drainage system. Perhaps his greatest success as a city father was to secure the adoption in 1856 of a new city charter. This reform document, which he composed, introduced a whole range of municipal improvements principally involving real estate laws and taxation.

Durell, a Democrat and an ardent and outspoken Unionist, refused to condone the secession movement. When William Lowndes Yancey made an inflammatory speech in New Orleans during the secession crisis, Durell openly denounced the "fire-eater" and was driven out of public life for the duration of rebel control as a Southern turncoat and Northern sympathizer.

When Durell reentered public life upon the return of Federal power, he brought to the Republican cause in Louisiana ability and wide experience. Although it would be an exaggeration to describe him as a statesman, Durell was still a man of uncommon talent and education. His
"commonplace book" (preserved in the manuscript collection of the New York Historical Society) reveals a man of wide interest. He claimed to have read over fourteen hundred books on a variety of subjects, including history, drama, law, literature, philosophy, science, and poetry. He could read German, French, and Latin. His "Catalogue of Books Read" shows that he was familiar with the biographies of Robert Burns, Oliver Cromwell, Lorenze de Medici, Lord Byron, John Milton, Jonathan Swift, Napoleon, John Dryden, and others. His own publications included New Orleans As I Found It, a wordy but informative travel guide to the Crescent City published in 1845. In 1854 he compiled a statistical pamphlet designed to encourage a close economic and political relationship between the South and the West. Educated, literate, and experienced, Durell, like most Southern white politicians who allied with the new Republican order, was not unfamiliar with power and public life. He was not a great man, but he brought to the Republican party in Louisiana a measure of talent and energy.

Benjamin Franklin Flanders, teacher, journalist, railroad executive, politician. This Southern Yankee was born in the town of Bristol in Grafton County in western

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39 This biographical profile of Flanders is based on the following sources: Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v., "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin"; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York: J. T. White, 1898–1965), s.v., Flanders, Benjamin Franklin." Hereinafter cited as National Cyclopaedia of American Biography: Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin"; Jewell's Crescent City Illustrated (1872), 39. Rufus Waples

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New Hampshire on January 26, 1816. He was graduated from Dartmouth in 1843, and moved to New Orleans one year later. Flanders then studied law under Charles M. Emerson, a fellow Dartmouth graduate, in New Orleans in 1843. He did not pursue a legal career, but became a teacher in the public schools (1844-1845). For a brief time, he published and edited the Tropic, a short-lived newspaper. From 1848 until about 1852, Flanders served as an alderman representing the third municipal district of New Orleans. In 1852 he returned to teaching. In that year Flanders also became the secretary and treasurer of the Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Company. He remained in that position until January of 1862.

When the Civil War broke out, Flanders' Unionist sentiments forced him to flee to the North until federal authority returned to the Crescent City. Flanders cooperated closely with the military government.

General Benjamin F. Butler appointed Flanders city treasurer for New Orleans (he held this office from July 20 to December 10, 1862). In 1863 Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase appointed Flanders the Supervising Special

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Agent of the Treasury Department for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. His collaboration with the military and federal authorities led to his involvement in Republican politics. When this Southern Yankee allied with the Louisiana Radicals, he brought with him experience in city, state, and federal politics that the Republicans would find extremely useful.

Michael Hahn, lawyer. He was short, dark complexioned with a broad, square face and dark, curly hair, and a limp so severe that he was forced to use a crutch. The facts concerning his birth and early childhood are obscure. He was born Georg Michael Decker, the son of a widow in the Bavarian village of Klingemunster. Shortly after the child's birth, Mrs. Hahn (nee Decker) emigrated with her five children to New York City. The family then moved to Texas and finally settled in New Orleans in the city's German community about 1840. One year later Hahn's mother died of yellow fever. Orphaned and thrown upon his own resources, young Hahn completed his elementary and high school education. At the age of nineteen he began reading law.

under the direction of Christian Reselius, one of the city's most prominent attorneys. Hahn also studied law at the University of Louisiana. Following his graduation from law school in April of 1851, Hahn entered quickly into the civic and political life of New Orleans. Elected at the age of twenty-two to the city school board, Hahn served for several years as either a school director or as president of the school system.

In politics the young, ambitious attorney allied with the Louisiana Democrats, following the leadership of Pierre Soule—the head of the anti-Slidell faction of the party. In 1856 Hahn and the other Soule Democrats opposed the nomination of James Buchanan for the presidency. During the 1860 presidential race Hahn served on the state committee which ran Stephen Douglas' campaign in Louisiana.

The secession crisis saw Hahn emerge as an outspoken Unionist. At a mass meeting held in Lafayette Square on May 8, 1860, Hahn made a strong anti-secessionist speech and offered a series of pro-Union resolutions. During the brief period of Confederate rule in New Orleans he refused to take the oath of allegiance to the rebel government. When Federal control returned, Hahn became a collaborationist. He organized Union associations and worked closely with the Union authorities in the city. Here again was a man not unfamiliar with public life or political infighting.
William Henry Hire, physician. Little is known of Hire's early life or early career. The records of the Royal College of Surgeons of England show that Hire came from the West Indian island of Bermuda to study medicine in London. Following his successful completion of the oral and written examinations in anatomy, pathology, and physiology, he became a fellow of the College on July 7, 1843.

Two years later Hire settled in New Orleans. Here he opened his medical practice and also worked as a chemist. According to his own account, Hire worked hard to combat the yellow fever epidemics that ravaged the city in 1845 and 1853. "I have fought vigorously on every battlefield against Bronze John...since 1845, and was brevetted on the field of battle in 1853 by being appointed City Physician on recommendation of the Board of Health," he claimed in a letter dated March 15, 1890.

When the war came, Hire remained loyal to the Union, and during the occupation under Generals Butler and Banks he served as secretary of the Board of Health and head surgeon at the Marine, St. James, and Barracks hospitals. His com-

41 Unless otherwise noted, this account of Hire's early life and career is based on the following sources: Secretary to the Librarian, Royal College of Surgeons of England, London to the author, January 13, 1976; New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 64-68; H. N. Frisbee to Benjamin Harrison, September 7, 1889, Applications for Assistant Treasurer and Mint Officers, New Orleans, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 14, Record Group 56 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Applications...New Orleans, Box 14.

42 Hire to William Windom, March 15, 1890, ibid.
mitment to Unionism led to his association with the Republican party in New Orleans. "He [Hire] has been a Consistent Republican," a testimonial addressed to President Chester A. Arthur stated in 1881, "and very active in party politics, was an original Union man and served his profession in charge of large hospitals under military appointment during the whole time the Army was in this City [New Orleans]." 43

James Longstreet, soldier. 44 When the Federal wooden frigates and gunboats under Admiral Farragut arrived at New Orleans on April 24, 1862, James Longstreet was half a continent away in command of a division of rebel troops on the lower peninsula of Virginia. The Confederate forces west of Richmond stood on the defensive and Longstreet's superior officer, Joseph E. Johnston, anticipating a strong Federal offensive, prepared to retreat from the Yorktown line. A major general as of October 2, 1861, Longstreet had a reputation for steady competence. Partially deaf, he appeared laconic to his companions and yet, until the tragic

43 Headquarters, General Council, Association of Union Veterans, New Orleans to Chester Arthur, November 16, 1881, ibid. See also C. H. Williams to Rutherford B. Hayes, June 5, 1880, ibid.; and Hire to Rutherford B. Hayes, June 9, 1880, ibid.

44 Unless otherwise indicated, the Longstreet sketch is based on the following sources: Donald Bridgman Sanger and Thomas Robson Hay, James Longstreet (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 8-20; Douglas Southall Freeman, "James Longstreet," DAB, VI (volume XI of the original edition), 391-393; and William B. Hesseltine, Confederate Leaders in the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 110-114.
death of three of his children in 1862 from scarlet fever, he was outgoing and sociable.

In his masterful study of the Confederate commanders in the eastern theater, Douglas Southall Freeman provides an insightful portrait of this future scalawag: "Blunt and roughly bantering, he is not ill-natured. If he is not brilliant, in strategy or in conversation, he is solid and systematic. Ambitious he is, also, but not disposed to pick quarrels. In height he is about 5 feet 10½ inches, age 40 [in 1861]. He is slightly deaf, but a dignified, impressive man known to his soldiers as 'Old Pete.' The secret of his power is his incredible nervous control. He never gets tired." 45 Michael Shaara, in his award-winning novel about the four days of Gettysburg, provides this impressionistic but revealing view of the general: "A large man, larger than Lee, full-bearded, blue-eyed, ominous, slow-talking, crude. He is one of the first of the new soldiers, the cold-eyed men who have sensed the birth of the new war of machines." 46

The son of James and Mary (Dent) Longstreet, he was the nephew of Augustus Baldwin Longstreet (1970-1870), the Georgia jurist, educator, and author noted for his humorous and realistic sketches of life in the Old Southwest and for


his fervent defense of state's rights. Born on January 8, 1821, in the Edgefield District of South Carolina, James Longstreet grew up near Augusta, Georgia, where his father worked a farm until his death in 1833. The widow then moved the family to Sommerville in Morgan County in northern Alabama. In 1838 Longstreet entered West Point where his classmates included the future Yankee generals Irvin McDowell, William Tecumseh Sherman, Henry W. Halleck, George H. Thomas, and U.S. Grant. When he was graduated in 1842, he ranked fifty-fourth in a class of sixty-two cadets. During the next four years the young infantry lieutenant served at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri; Natchitoches, Louisiana; and St. Augustine, Florida. During the Mexican War Longstreet fought under Zachary Taylor in northern Mexico, and under Winfield Scott during the march on Mexico City.

Like many other Southern-born officers, Longstreet (in 1861 a major in the paymaster department) resigned from the "old army" to serve the Confederacy. Commissioned a brigadier general on June 17, 1861, he acquired one of the most distinguished, active, and controversial war records in the Southern army. From First Manasses, to Yorktown, Williamsburg, Seven Pines, the Seven Days' Battles, Second Manasses, Antietam, Fredericksburg, the "Suffolk Campaign," Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Knoxville, the Wilderness, the defense of Richmond, and Appomattox Court House, he served the Southern cause. But as the structure
of the Confederacy began to collapse, and especially after the terrible defeat at Gettysburg, Longstreet's faith in the cause collapsed too. Despite the disillusionment, however, Longstreet remained loyal to the very end. When the time came to surrender Longstreet told R. E. Lee, "General, unless he [Grant] offers us honorable terms, come back and let us fight it out."\(^{47}\)

In the conclusion to his sketch of Longstreet in the Dictionary of American Biography, Freeman provides a balanced evaluation of Longstreet's Civil War career: "...his place in American military history is not difficult to fix. Essentially a combat officer, he did not possess the qualities necessary to successful independent command, and his skill in strategy was not great. His march was apt to be slow and he was too much prone to maneuver and await attack, but once battle was joined, he displayed a cheerful composure, a tactical understanding, and a skill in handling his troops that made him an almost ideal corps commander."\(^{48}\) But if his place in American military history is easy to fix, his place in American political history remains enshrouded in controversy. His war record should place him squarely among the pantheon of Confederate heroes like one of those giant figures hacked out of the


\(^{48}\)Freeman, "James Longstreet," DAB, 392-393.
northeast wall of Stone Mountain in Georgia. Southerners, however, never felt compelled to erect a monument to scalawags. And Longstreet's political metamorphosis from Confederate general to Republican collaborator sent many hard-line Southern conservatives into a state of apoplexy, and his reputation never quite recovered.

**John Theodore Ludeling, lawyer.** He was born on January 27, 1827, in New Orleans to John and Francoise Lorette de Salnave Ludeling. His maternal grandfather, a coffee planter in Spanish Santo Domingo, and most of the de Salnave family were murdered in January of 1801 during the slave uprising led by the Haitian liberator Toussaint L'Ouverture. His mother, then only three years of age, and his grandmother managed to escape to New Orleans. Francoise grew up in New Orleans and there married John Ludeling, a French immigrant. When Ludeling died, she remarried. Her new husband, Bernard Hemken, then moved the family to Monroe in the planter parish of Ouachita in north Louisiana.

At the age of twelve, John Theodore Ludeling enrolled (on July 18, 1839) in St. Louis University, a Jesuit school. John and his brother Frederick registered under their

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This sketch of Ludeling's life is based on the following sources: Melvin J. White, "John Theodore Ludeling," *DAB*, VI (volume XI of the original edition), 489-490; *Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the St. Louis University, Missouri, August 14, 1839* (St. Louis, Chambers & Knapp, 1839). Ludeling's name also appears in the university catalogue for the years 1840, 1840-1841, 1842, and 1843.
stepfather's name, Hemken. Ludeling followed the "classical" course of instruction. This program included mathematics, geography, English, history, Greek, Latin, and French. An able student, the young scholar ranked near the top in his class. In 1841 and 1842 his name appeared on a list of those who distinguished themselves in the annual examinations. It was not an altogether exceptional record perhaps, but one that indicated Ludeling's above average ability. He remained at the university until 1843 and left without completing the six-year baccalaureate program. When he returned to Louisiana he read law under Isaiah Garrett, a Monroe attorney. Following his admittance to the bar, Ludeling married Maria Copley, the daughter of Enoch Copley.

In politics Ludeling allied with the Republican party. According to Melvin J. White, in his biographical sketch of Ludeling in The Dictionary of American Biography, the Louisiana attorney "joined the Republican party soon after its organization and, although two brothers served in the army of the Confederacy, he remained a Union man."\(^{50}\)

\textbf{John Ray, lawyer.}\(^{51}\) This scalawag was born in Washington County, Missouri, on October 14, 1816. His grandfather, an associate of the frontier explorer Daniel Boone,

\(^{50}\)White, "John Theodore Ludeling," \textit{DAB}, 490.

\(^{51}\)The biographical profile of Ray is drawn from the following sources: E. Russ Williams, "John Ray, A Northeast Louisiana Scalawag," typewritten manuscript copy of unpublished article generously provided to this researcher by the author, 1-3; \textit{Appleton's Cyclopaedia}, s.v.," Ray, John."
had emigrated to Missouri and served in the state's first constitutional convention. Educated at Augusta College and Transylvania University, John Ray migrated to Ouachita Parish following his graduation from the university. In Monroe he read law and was admitted to the bar in 1839. Already a member of the Whig party when he came to Louisiana, Ray became involved in state politics. He served in the lower house of the state legislature (elected 1844) and the state senate (elected 1850). Twice Ray sought the position of lieutenant governor (as a Whig in 1854 and as a Know-Nothing in 1859), but failed to win the elections. His second defeat was at the hands of W. W. Farmer, a Democrat from Union Parish. In Ouachita Parish, Ray's home, the candidates tied (229 to 229), but the state totals gave the victory to Farmer (17,729 to 15,721). The election did not put an end to Ray's political ambitions. "But as would be amply demonstrated in his post-war career," E. Russ Williams states, "Ray's thirst for political participation and power remained unquenched."^2

Ray's Unionist sentiment is evident in his support of the Bell-Everett ticket in 1860, when he served as an elector for the Constitutional-Union party. Until 1863, when Monroe came again under United States control, Ray maintained a discreet support for the Federal cause. In 1863, however, he openly affirmed his loyalty to the Union. "Throughout the civil war Mr. Ray was a consistent Unionist,"

\[52\] E. Russ Williams, "John Ray," 1.
according to one source, "and at its close he favored the plan of reconstruction that was advocated by the Republican party."\(^{53}\) When Ray allied with the new Republican organization, he was a man well-trained and tried in the tough in-fighting of Louisiana state politics.

**James Govan Taliaferro**, lawyer, judge, planter.\(^{54}\) Born on September 28, 1798, in Amherst, Virginia, Taliaferro was the son of Zacharias Taliaferro, a lumberman, mill owner, and small planter, who migrated to Mississippi and then to Catahoula Parish in 1815. Young Taliaferro attended Transylvania College in Lexington, Kentucky, where he remained to study law following his graduation. Admitted to the bar in 1820, Taliaferro returned to Louisiana with his bride, Elizabeth Williamson of Lexington, and opened a law office in Harrisonburg, a village in central Louisiana.

Early in his career Taliaferro showed an interest in local and national politics. In 1824 and 1828 he supported John Quincy Adams for the presidency. Taliaferro's dedication to National Republican principles was so strong that he named one son John Quincy Adams Taliaferro and another


\(^{54}\) This profile of Taliaferro is based on the following sources: Wynoma Gillmore Mills, "James Govan Taliaferro, 1798-1876: Louisiana Unionist and Scalawag" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1968). Hereinafter cited as Mills, "Taliaferro"; *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, s.v., "Taliaferro, James Govan." See also James G. Taliaferro and Family Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. The political make-up of Catahoula Parish is described in Howard, *Political Tendencies*, 60, 61, 81, and 98.
son Daniel Webster Taliaferro. When the National Republican party evolved into the Whig party, Taliaferro continued to be an active party member in Catahoula Parish and on the national level. In 1840 Taliaferro enthusiastically supported Harrison's "Log Cabin and Hard Cider" campaign. In fact, Taliaferro was so confident of a Whig victory over Van Buren that he bet one thousand dollars with Ditto L. Nuttall. "The amount of the wager," wrote Wynona Gillmore Mills, a student of Taliaferro's career, "gives some indication of the financial status of Judge Taliaferro...."55

From 1834 until 1847 Taliaferro served as the parish judge of Catahoula. In 1859 and 1860 he won election as president of the Harrisonburg policy jury. At the 1852 Constitutional Convention Taliaferro opposed a plan to base representation on the total population. Although a Whig and a slaveholder himself, Taliaferro stood against the black-belt, White-planter scheme to count the slaves as population rather than property and thus increase the number of representatives from the planter parishes. Mills claimed that Taliaferro's controversial stand reveals his dedication to principle rather than expediency. Mill's study presents Taliaferro as a liberal statesman who "believed that equality and fairness in government should be based on republican principles rather than aristocratic principles." And his speeches, she contends, "reflect his

confidence in the voice of the people." Other evidence indicates, however, that Taliaferro may have been motivated as much by political expediency as by a devotion to the "voice of the people" and "republican principles." Although he was an ardent Whig, his political base was strongly Democratic. In 1828 and 1832 Catahoula Parish voted overwhelmingly for Andrew Jackson and the average presidential Democratic vote from 1836 to 1860 ran from 50 to 59.9 percent. The average gubernatorial Democratic vote reflected the same figures.

During the secession winter of 1861, Taliaferro came to the Baton Rouge secession convention as an outspoken and intense Unionist. Here again Taliaferro reflected the interests of his parish; in 1861 the vote for secession in Catahoula was less than forty percent.

In addition to his law practice, his planting interests and his political activities, Taliaferro also owned and edited the Harrisonburg Independent, a weekly journal published by his bachelor son John Quincy Adams Taliaferro. He continued to edit the newspaper until May of 1861 when he sold his interest.

Evidence indicates that Taliaferro was something of an intellectual, with an interest in classical studies, science, history, geology and Indian folklore. His personal library contained three hundred and forty volumes in addition to his collection of law books.

56 Ibid.
The census records of 1850 and 1860 reveal a man of considerable wealth. In 1850 he owned real estate valued at $10,000. In 1860 the value had increased to $87,000. His father owned four slaves in 1820. By 1860 Taliaferro owned twenty-seven slaves.

Thus, on the eve of Reconstruction Taliaferro was a man of some wealth and influence, a Unionist, a planter and a man of wide political experience. He, too, was not unfamiliar with the world of power and politics. "A man of Judge Taliaferro's education and professional training was a rare phenomenon in those days, especially in a small town like Harrisonburg," Mills concludes.57

*Michael Vidal*, newspaper editor.58 Born in the medieval fortress town of Carcassonne in southern France on October 1, 1824, Vidal attended college, then emigrated to Texas about 1845. Soon after the annexation of Texas, he moved to Louisiana, and there for two years he engaged in "literary and scientific pursuits."59 A sort of minor Toqueville, Vidal made a study of American political institutions and for several years toured on foot a large part of North America. If Vidal scribbled down his impressions


58This brief account of Vidal's pre-Civil War life is drawn from the following sources: Michael Vidal to Benjamin Perly, December, 1868, Michael Vidal Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Hereinafter cited as Vidal Papers, LSU; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, s.v., "Vidal, Michael."

of the new land, they have, unfortunately, been lost to history. During this period Vidal worked as an associate editor at various times for the New York Courrier-Des-Etats-Unis, the New York Messenger, the Quebec Journal, and the New Orleans Picayune.

As a journalist, a delegate to the Black and Tan Convention of 1867-68, and as a state and federal officeholder, Vidal would make a valuable contribution to the Radical movement in Louisiana.

Rufus Waples, lawyer. Born in Millsboro, Delaware, he was the descendent of Peter Waples who settled in that region about 1690. Waples received a common school education and attended Milton Academy in Delaware. He was graduated from Louisiana University in 1852 with a degree in law and began practice in New Orleans in 1853 with his brother Stephen H. Waples. In 1855 Waples formed a law partnership with James B. Eustis, a future United States Senator from Louisiana. Waples lived in New Orleans twelve years before the outbreak of the Civil War but remained a

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60 This account of Waples' pre-Civil War life is drawn from the following sources: Christian Roselius to Abraham Lincoln, August 5, 1864, Records Relating to the Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshalls, and Attorneys, 1853-1901, Louisiana, 1853-1869, General Records of the Department of Justice, Box 333, Record Group 60 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshalls, and Attorneys..., Box 333, Record Group 60; Who Was Who in America: Historical Volume, 1607-1896, Revised ed. (St. Louis, Mo., Von Hoffman Press and A. N. Marquis Co., 1967), s.v., "Waples, Rufus." Hereinafter cited as Who Was Who, 1607-1896; Ninth U. S. Census (1870), New Orleans, Tenth Ward.
firm Unionist. When the Confederates took control of Louisiana, Waples fled to Washington D.C., where he remained until the reestablishment of Federal authority. In May 1863 Lincoln appointed Waples United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana. He served in that office until October 30, 1865.

A close associate of men like Durant, Crane, and Flanders, Waples would play an important role in Unionist politics and in the creation of the Republican party in Louisiana.

James Madison Wells, planter. A native of Louisiana, Wells was born twelve miles north of Alexandria in the planter-dominated parish of Rapides on January 8, 1808. The family traces its origins in America to Samuel Levi Wells I, an Irish immigrant and civil engineer, who settled in Louisiana about 1760. On June 20, 1764, Wells' Creole wife (according to historian Walter McGhee Lowrey, she was a woman of "high social standing") gave birth to a son

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Samuel Levi Wells II, near Manchac in West Florida. Spanish judicial records show that the elder Wells owned a plantation in that region in 1780. Sometime later the family moved to south central Louisiana near Ville Platte. In 1785 the restless Wells clan resettled in the El Rapido territory (now Rapides Parish).

Samuel Levi Wells II worked as a civil engineer and surveyor of the Spanish government. His first wife, a Miss Bonner, gave birth to two boys, Willis and Randolph. The former son moved to Mississippi and the latter died at the battle of the Alamo. "Miss Bonner" died shortly after the birth of Willis and Randolph, and Samuel remarried in 1794. The second Mrs. Wells (Mary Elizabeth Calvit of Adams County, Mississippi) claimed to be the granddaughter of Frederick, the sixth Lord Baltimore. The newlyweds lived in Natchez for a brief time and then returned to Louisiana in 1795. By 1800 Wells had established a plantation home (New Hope) on the Bayou Rapides fifteen miles upstream from the Red River. Nine years later, following the death of his wife Mary, Wells moved his residence to Prospect Hill, a second plantation home near the town of Lecompte. Over the years Samuel Levi Wells II created a minor financial empire based upon sugar and indigo production and land survey commissions.

His wealth brought power and influence. Elected several times to the Orleans territorial legislature, Samuel Levi Wells II also served as a delegate from Rapides to the
first state constitutional convention, and as a member of the new Louisiana state legislature during the War of 1812.

When he died at the age of fifty-two at Prospect Hill, he left eight children and several plantations. Three of the sons became prominent in the Rapides area—Monfort Wells, Thomas Jefferson Wells, and James Madison Wells.

Orphaned at the age of eight, James Madison Wells lived with his aunt, Mrs. John Classon (nee Emily Clementine Wells). Young Wells attended primary school in Rapides and then, despite the family's strong Episcopalian orientation, he enrolled in St. Joseph's College, a Jesuit institution in Bardstown, Kentucky. Later he attended Alan Partridge's American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy in Middletown, Connecticut, and the Cincinnati School of Law in Ohio.

Wells also read law under the direction of the famous Ohio lawyer and journalist Charles Hammon. A strong nationalist and rabid abolitionist, Hammond possessed a razor-sharp legal mind. The combined influences of Alan Partridge and Charles Hammond must have had a profound impact upon the young Louisianian. The connection between Wells' later Unionist-Radical politics and his Northern education are direct and obvious. In his study of Wells' political career, Lowry noted that "the early influences of his life were driving young Wells away from his family's church, slaveholding planter ideas, and the doctrine of states rights held by most Southerners." Thus, when Wells
returned to Louisiana in 1830, "he had been away for several years of the most formative period of his life, all spent in an atmosphere distinct from that of his homeland."\textsuperscript{63}

Whatever his nationalist proclivities were at this stage, Wells did not forsake the powers or the pleasures of the planting life. Following his marriage to Mary Ann Scott, an Anglo-French belle of Rapides, on May 11, 1832, the young couple lived at Gravel Hill, Wells' plantation near Colfax. His other plantations in the same area included Kateland, Duroc, and Glencoe. He also purchased a plantation twelve miles south of Alexandria. In 1850 Wells bought a beautiful summer home as a present for his wife. Located in the pine hills south of Lecompte, Jessamine Hill became the family residence during the hot, humid summer months from 1850 until 1862. Near the resort was "Bear Wallow," Wells' huge private hunting preserve.

The census records of 1850 and 1860 provide evidence of the steady growth of Wells' fortune. In 1850 his real estate was valued at $15,000 but by 1860 the value of his real property had increased over ten times. By 1860 he owned $164,000 in real estate and $236,000 in personal property (including two hundred milk cows, evidence of a thriving dairy business). His slaves numbered ninety-five in 1860, placing Wells among the largest slaveholders in the South.

\textsuperscript{63}Quoted in ibid., 999.
Even before the rapid increase in his wealth, Wells acquired political power. In 1839 A. B. Roman, the Whig governor of Louisiana, appointed him sheriff of Rapides Parish. In 1841 Wells won election as a Whig to the state legislature. Although the Whig tradition remained strong within him, during the election of 1860 he supported the Northern Democrat, Stephen Douglas. "I voted for Mr. Douglas in the struggle to avert war," he claimed, "...not that I endorsed his doctrine [popular sovereignty]. He [Douglas] had struggled against Lincoln in Illinois, and having a great prominence in the West I thought that if we could elect such a man we could avert war; and for that reason I voted for him."64

When the planters of the South led their section into war, Wells actively opposed secession. At first, he used political tactics to delay appropriations for the defense of Rapides Parish. Later, Wells led a band of Unionist guerrillas which attacked Confederate wagon trains. When the pressure from the rebel forces in Rapides became too great, Wells periodically retreated to "Bear Wallow," where from thirty to one hundred and sixty Unionist sympathizers stood guard against Confederate counterattacks. Wells claimed that his band of "Jayhawkers" came from the poorer whites of the district. "I had the poorer people with me," he declared with obvious pride, "the people who had no

64 Ibid., 1003.
slaves. People who had been taxed largely to build up the levees upon lands that had been bought for ten bits, and which were made worth $100 to $125 an acre by the levees. Those were the men that were with me—men that had no negroes." 65

A prosperous planter-slaveholder, the possessor of rich agricultural lands, a connoisseur of fine race horses, a local magistrate possessed of a sense of noblesse oblige, he was, in short, the Complete Planter. Now he allied with the poor farmer-Unionist and made himself an outlaw in his own parish. His family and planter friends found his behavior outrageous. Many saw him as a traitor to his class and to his section.

Finally, as the rebel authorities moved in on his hideout, Wells fled to the Federal lines aboard the gunboat Choctaw on November 7, 1863. A pass signed by Federal General Nathaniel P. Banks ensured that Wells would find safety and hospitality with the Federal forces of occupation. When Wells arrived in New Orleans, he found the city in a state of ferment as the Federal authorities and their Unionist collaborators began the process of Reconstruction. Wells would play a decisive role in that process.

Except for the most prominent scalawag politicians, men like James Madison Wells for example, biographical information proved exceedingly difficult to uncover. The

65 Ibid., 1007.
evidence is scattered and fragmentary. Thus, information concerning the antebellum lives and careers of these Southern Republicans comes from a variety of sources, from bits and pieces of information contained in manuscript census returns; congressional papers; reports and documents; school records; newspapers; personal papers and manuscript collections; and letters of application and recommendation contained in the record groups of the Treasury and Justice Departments stored in the National Archives.66

The Geographic Origins of the Louisiana Scalawags

There were fifty scalawags whose birthplaces can be identified; twenty-one were native-born Louisianians; eleven were born in other Southern states; three were from border states; ten were Northern-born; and five were foreign-born. The native sons included three scalawags from Natchitoches Parish in the Central Pine Hill region of the state: Simeon Belden, a future speaker of the state house of representatives and attorney general;67 Alexander Breda (born December 19, 1837); and his brother J. Earnest Breda

66 For purposes of continuity and accuracy, some of the biographical data already presented in the profiles of the leading scalawags is repeated in the following sections dealing with the general geographical, educational, occupational, and political background of Louisiana scalawag politicians.

67 New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 28, 1872; Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, Fifth Ward. The geographic and political classification of Natchitoches Parish and all other parishes described in the section on geographic origins is based upon Howard, Political Tendencies, 3-17.
(born September 25, 1844). Two white Southern Republicans, William Cooley and Oscar Joffrion (born 1840) came from Point Coupee Parish in the South Louisiana planter section. Charles Delery was a native, it is believed, of St. Charles Parish (also located in the South Louisiana Planter section). James Madison Wells, one of the prominent figures in Louisiana Reconstruction politics, was born in the Central Louisiana planter parish of Rapides on January 8, 1808. Robert J. Caldwell was "a native born citizen of the State of Louisiana." Arnaud Commagere, one of the founders of the Republican party in Louisiana, has also been identified as a native Louisianian.

Eight of the twenty-one native Louisianians were born in the urban center of New Orleans: Benjamin Bloomfield,

68 Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 325-326.
69 New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 21, 1872.
70 Oscar Joffrion to Rutherford B. Hayes, December 7, 1878, Applications...Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 73, Record Group 56.
71 Monroe Quachita Telegraph, May 18, 1872.
73 Robert J. Caldwell to the Senate and House of Representatives, March 29, 1868, Papers of the (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Petitions & Memorials, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46. The petition is endorsed by John Ray. "The undersigned," Ray wrote, "has known Mr. Robert J. Caldwell since infancy..." ibid.
74 Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, Sixth Ward.
75 Petition to the Senate and House of Representatives

Eleven Louisiana scalawags were born in the South, but outside Louisiana. This number includes three white Republicans from Virginia: George W. Carter, Philip Pendelton, and scalawag jurist James Govan Taliaferro (born in Amherst County in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains on September 28, 1798). Two scalawags came from Mississippi: Napoleon Underwood and Thomas Green.

(1868), Papers of the (Senate) Select Committee on Reconstruction, Records of the United States Senate, Box 46, Record Group 46. The signers of this petition included W. Jasper Blackburn, Henry Clay Warmoth, George Kelse, G. M. Wickliffe, C. C. Antoine, and James Madison Wells.

76 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 135.
77 New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 28, 1872; Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, Seventh Ward.
78 White, "John Theodore Ludeling," DAB.
79 Michael Hahn to Schuyler Colfax, August 26, 1868, William Eaton Chandler Papers, LC.
80 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 171.
81 Ibid., 118.
83 Petition to President of the United States (Ulysses S. Grant), March 4, 1869, Applications...Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 73, Record Group 56.
84 Mills, "Taliaferro," 2.
Davidson. Davidson was born in the delta region of Missis­
sippi at Coles Creek, Jefferson County, on August 3, 1805.85  
W. Jasper Blackburn came from Arkansas where he was born on 
July 24, 1824, in Randolph County in the northeastern region 
of the state.86  William B. Phillips, a native Alabamian, 
came to Louisiana at the end of the Civil War.87  The most 
famous scalawag in Louisiana Reconstruction politics was 
James Longstreet, born in South Carolina on January 8, 
1821.88  The actual birthplace of Richard C. Downes could 
not be determined, but in a letter dated January 7, 1869, 
he claimed to be "by birth and residence a Southern 
man...."89  
The border states of Missouri and Delaware produced 
three active scalawags. John Ray migrated to Louisiana 
from Missouri twenty years after his birth in Washington 
County, Missouri, on October 14, 1816.90  His younger 
brother, Robert Ray, was born in Missouri in 1830 but  

86Appleton’s Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Blackburn, William 
Jasper."  
87U.S. Congress, House Use of the Army in Certain of 
the Southern States, Ex. Doc. 30, 44 Cong., 2 sess., 1877 
402-403. Hereinafter cited as Use of the Army.  
88Freeman, "James Longstreet," DAB.  
89Downes to J. S. Harris, January 7, 1869, (Senate) 
Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Record Group 46.  
90Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Ray, John."
migrated to Louisiana when he was seventeen years old. Rufus Waples (born August 11, 1825) came from the town of Millsboro on the Indian River in Sussex County, Delaware.

The next group of ten Louisiana scalawags was "Southern Yankees"—men of northern birth who made the South their home well before the Civil War, and who became associated with the "Southern Establishment" through politics, business, or professional affairs. Fletcher M. Green, in his essay on the role of the Yankee in the Old South, notes this large number of northern-born men (and women) who contributed to the society of the ante-bellum South. In 1850, for example, 9,461 of the 40,000 American-born whites living in New Orleans were of Northern origin. Although some Northerners came to the South only to return to their Northern homes, by 1860, 360,000 Northerners were still residing in the Southern states. "Those who remained," Green remarks, "made a place for themselves in various walks of life as farmers, overseers, and planters; common laborers, skilled artisans, inventors, and contractors; merchants, shippers, bankers, industrialists, and railroad magnates; professionals, such as tutors, college professors and presidents; lawyers, doctors, ministers, and scientists; journal-

92 Who Was Who, 1607-1896, s.v., "Waples, Rufus."
93 Fletcher M. Green, The Role of the Yankee in the Old South (Athens, Ga., University of Georgia Press, 1972), 5. Hereinafter cited as Green, Role of the Yankee.
ists and men of letters; and politicians, government officials, and diplomats.\textsuperscript{94} Green also notes that these Northern migrants seldom faced hostility from the natives and "were quickly assimilated and almost lost their identity."\textsuperscript{95}

The Northern-born scalawags of this study fit into Green's description. Four came from New York: William R. Crane, the "war-horse of the Republican Party" in Louisiana, was born in New York in 1811,\textsuperscript{96} as were Anthony Paul Dostie (born in Saratoga, New York, June 20, 1821),\textsuperscript{97} Chauncey Kellogg of Oneida County in upstate New York, and Josiah Fisk.\textsuperscript{98} New Hampshire nurtured two future scalawags: E. H. Durell, who was born in the seaport city of Portsmouth in Rockingham County in 1811,\textsuperscript{99} and Benjamin Franklin Flanders (born January 26, 1816) of Bristol, located in Grafton County in western New Hampshire.\textsuperscript{100} Thomas Jefferson Durant, another prominent scalawag, was born on August 8, 1817, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{101} A. W. Faulkner,

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., 5-6.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{96}New Orleans Tribune, May 30, 1867; Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, First Ward.
\textsuperscript{97}Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 13.
\textsuperscript{98}Two references to Fisk as a "scalawag" appear in Use of the Army, 224-225.
\textsuperscript{100}Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v., "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin."
\textsuperscript{101}Knott, "Thomas Jefferson Durant," \textit{DAB}, 543.
an associate of the carpetbagger Henry Clay Warmoth, came from Ohio but lived in the South (Mississippi and Louisiana) for eighteen years prior to the Civil War. James H. Veazie, in a letter to Secretary of the Treasury George S. Boutwell in 1869, claimed to be a Southern man by choice. "I am a native of Massachusetts," he stated, "but have lived thirty-two years in the South. I married here and here my children were born."

A final category includes Southerners of foreign birth. Like their Yankee counterparts, these men saw the South as a new frontier. They were similar to those Northerners described by Green: "...some were children [when they came]; and others, probably a majority, were young men and women who sought opportunity in a new land." Maximilian Ferdinand Bonzano was born in the city of Ehingen on the Danube River, in the kingdom of Wurttenberg, Germany, on March 22, 1821. He came to America with his father and mother in 1835. The family lived in east Texas for a time and then settled permanently in New Orleans.

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103 James H. Veazie to George S. Boutwell, April 8, 1863, Applications and Letters of Recommendation for Collectors of Internal Revenue, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 74, Record Group 56 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as Applications...Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 74, Record Group 56.
104 Green, Role of the Yankee, 5.
105 Goodspeed's Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana (Chicago: The Goodspeed Publishing Co., 1892),
Hahn, a central character in this account of Republican politics, was born in Klingemunster, Bavaria, on November 24, 1830, but immigrated to the South during his early childhood.106 Louis Dupleix (born September 29, 1820, to Yoes and Marguerite Lawalle Dupleix) came from the ancient seaport of Bordeaux in southwestern France to the United States in 1841. In 1843 he married Clemence Dugas, a native of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana.107 William Henry Hire, a British subject, came to New Orleans in 1845.108 Bartholomew Leahy Lynch, an active supporter of the Republican party in Louisiana, was born in Ireland, but came to the South fifteen years before the outbreak of the Civil War in America.109 Michel Vidal, the scalawag journalist, was born in France on October 1, 1824, immigrated to Texas in 1845, and later moved to Louisiana.110

The Educational Background of the Louisiana Scalawags

The Louisiana scalawags were, by the educational standards of the nineteenth century, an elite. In an age when


107 Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 342.

108 Hire to William Windom, April 2, 1889, Applications ...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

109 Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 108.

110 Biographical Directory of the American Congress, x.v., "Vidal, Michel."
more than three or four years of formal schooling was uncommon and a high school degree exceptional, thirty-six of the white Southern Republicans identified in this study had college or professional educations or, in some cases, both.

Five of the identifiable scalawags in this study, E. H. Durell, B. F. Flanders, Chauncey S. Kellogg, John Ray, and J. B. Taliaferro, possessed a college diploma and professional training. Edward H. Durell, as indicated earlier, attended Philips Exeter Academy, the prestigious private college preparatory school for boys in New Hampshire. In 1831 he was graduated from Harvard and then studied law under his father's direction. Benjamin Franklin Flanders attended New Hampton (New Hampshire) Academy and was graduated from Dartmouth College in 1842. He later studied law. Chauncey S. Kellogg was graduated from Hamilton College in New York in 1851 and then apparently studied law. John Ray received his formal education at Augusta College and Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky, where he received his diploma in 1835. Taliaferro remained at the university after graduation for advanced study.

112National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, s.v., "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin."
113Kellogg to W.H.H. Miller, November 27, 1889, Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.
114Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Ray, John."
Robert Ray was graduated from Georgetown University (the noted Catholic college founded by Bishop John Carroll in 1791) in 1854. In 1857 the Louisiana Supreme Court granted him a license to practice law.\textsuperscript{116} James Longstreet received an appointment to West Point in 1838, and was graduated with the class of 1842.\textsuperscript{117}

Those Louisiana scalawags who attended college without graduating, but who later received professional training, were Alexander Breda,\textsuperscript{118} Thomas Jefferson Durant,\textsuperscript{119} Charles Leaumont,\textsuperscript{120} and John T. Ludeling.\textsuperscript{121} Alexander Breda, a physician and surgeon in Natchitoches, received a common school education and then attended the Western Military Institute at Drennon Springs, Henry County, Kentucky. A yellow fever epidemic forced the Institute to close in 1853, and Breda returned home. Two years later, however, he began to study medicine under the direction of his father, Dr. John P. Breda—a native of France (born April 6, 1808) and a graduate of the Baltimore Medical College. Alexander Breda then studied medicine at the University of Louisiana where he was graduated in 1859. Thomas Jefferson Durant

\textsuperscript{116}Richland Beacon News, October 29, 1899.
\textsuperscript{117}Freeman, "James Longstreet," DAB, 391.
\textsuperscript{118}Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 325.
\textsuperscript{119}Knott, "Thomas Jefferson Durant," DAB, 543.
\textsuperscript{120}New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 28, 1872.
\textsuperscript{121}White, "John Theodore Ludeling," DAB, 489.
also received a common school education. He attended the University of Pennsylvania, but left without graduating. Sometime after 1834 Durant began to read law and was admitted to the Louisiana bar. Charles Leaumont, a scalawag judge in Orleans Parish, studied at Jefferson Academy in New Orleans. He later attended St. Louis University "but was withdrawn by his parents when about nineteen years of age on account of the ill-treatment he received at the hands of one of the professors of said university." Following his withdrawal from the university, young Leaumont attended a school run by Louis Duffan on Dauphine Street, "for the sole purpose of learning the French language, which he had nearly forgotten whilst in the University at St. Louis." He then read law under a Mr. LeGarden, and was admitted to practice in 1858. John Theodore Ludeling enrolled at St. Louis University on July 18, 1839, when he was twelve years old. Ludeling remained at St. Louis University until 1843 when he withdrew and returned to Monroe, Louisiana. There he studied law and was admitted to the bar. James Madison Wells, as stated earlier, attended elementary school in Rapides Parish and later enrolled in St. Joseph's College. He left before graduating, however, and attended Alan Partridge's innovative American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy in Middletown, Connecticut, and the

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Cincinnati School of Law in Ohio. He also read law under the noted Ohio jurist Charles Hammond.123

Two scalawags, Michel Vidal124 and R. F. Dauney, attended college in France. In testimony before a congressional committee in 1866, Dauney stated: "Before that [the Civil War] I had come from college at Paris. I never learned the English language well. I was raised in Paris."125 W. Jasper Blackburn studied two years at Jackson College in Columbia, Tennessee.126

Ten of the Louisiana scalawags received professional educations or training. James G. Belden was graduated from the New York College of Physicians and Surgeons.127 Simeon Belden studied law under the direction of "John B. Smith, a talented lawyer who was very fond of him...."128 M. F. Benzane was an apprentice chemist and pharmacist in a drug store for a time and then became a medical doctor following his residency at New Orleans Charity Hospital.129

Thomas Green Davidson taught school in the early 1820's and

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124Vidal to Benjamin Perley, December, 1968, Vidal Papers. LSU.
125New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 137.
126Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Blackburn, W. Jasper."
127New York Times, April 26, 1864.
129Goodspeed's Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, 303-304.
also studied law under Martin G. Penn.\textsuperscript{130} The controversial Radical Anthony Paul Dostie was educated in the local public schools in Saratoga County, New York, and about 1840 began to study dentistry under J. C. Duell.\textsuperscript{131} Michael Hahn received his primary education in the New Orleans public schools and was graduated from the University of Louisiana where he received a doctor of law degree in 1854.\textsuperscript{132} The English-educated William Henry Hire became a member of the Royal College of Surgeons of England on July 7, 1843.\textsuperscript{133} Scalawag jurist Rufus Waples received his early education in the common schools and Milton Academy in Delaware. In 1854 he was graduated from the University of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{134} Lastly, those whose professions indicated an advanced education or professional training include the scalawag lawyers Robert J. Caldwell,\textsuperscript{135} William R. Crane,\textsuperscript{136} Josiah

\textsuperscript{130}E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson," 15.

\textsuperscript{131}Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 15.

\textsuperscript{132}Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Hahn, Michael."

\textsuperscript{133}Secretary to the Librarian, Royal College of Surgeons of England, London to author, January 13, 1976, personal correspondence.

\textsuperscript{134}Who Was Who, 1607–1896, s.v., "Waples, Rufus."

\textsuperscript{135}Caldwell to the Senate and House of Representatives, March 29, 1869, Senate Committee on Political Disabilities, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46.

\textsuperscript{136}Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, First Ward.
The Occupational Backgrounds of the Louisiana Scalawags

The Louisiana scalawags were, by the standards of the nineteenth century (or the twentieth century for that matter), prestigiously employed. The white Southern Republican leadership in Louisiana included lawyers, planters, physicians, dentists, newspaper editors, businessmen, and bankers.

There were twenty-one lawyers identified among the seventy-two scalawags in this study: Simeon Belden, W.

137 Fisk, Ezra Hiestand, Wade H. Hough, G. S. Lacey, and James H. Veazie, and George Wickliffe, a dentist.

137 Use of the Army, 224.


139 John Ray et al. Petition to (House Select Committee on Reconstruction), June 23, 1868, Papers of the (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, Fortieth and Forty-First Congress, H. Dept. 40A-H21.10, Louisiana, Nos. 13550-13559 and unnumbered Box 8. Record Group 68 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, Box 8.

140 J. Calhoun, Thomas R. Brady et al. to Ulysses S. Grant, Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshals and Attorneys, Box 335, Record Group 60.

141 James H. Veazie to William Pitt Fessenden, March 2, 1869, Correspondence of William Pitt Fessenden, Vol. 7, LC.

142 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 149.

143 New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 28, 1872; Ninth U.S. Census (1870), Fifth Ward.

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144 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 466' Ninth U.S. Census (1870), Fifth Ward. This is James K. Belden and not to be confused with James G. Belden.

145 Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 325.

146 Caldwell to the Senate and House of Representatives, March 29, 1869, (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Tray No. 110, Record Group 56.

147 New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 21, 1872.

148 Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, First Ward.


151 Ninth U.S. Census (1870), New Orleans, Twelfth Ward; Use of the Army, 224.

152 Memorial Addresses, 9.

153 Veazie claimed to have twenty years of experience as a lawyer, see James H. Veazie to William Pitt Fessenden, March 2, 1869, Correspondence of William Fessenden, Vol. 7, LC.

154 John Ray et al. Petition June 28, 1868, (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, Box 8, Hough had twenty years of experience as an attorney, according to Ray, ibid.

155 Schmidt Ziegler et al. to Benjamin Harrison, Petition on behalf of Chauncey S. Kellogg, August, 1889, Applications...New Orleans, Record Group 56, Box 14, Lacey had thirty years experience in the state and federal courts as of 1875, ibid.

156 J. Calhoun, Thomas R. Brady et al. to Ulysses S. Grant, Petition on behalf of George S. Lacey, December 18, 1875, Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshals, and Attorneys, Box 335, Record Group 60.
Among those Louisiana scalawags who relied upon a single occupation other than law were three physicians, two dentists, two bankers, five merchants, two journalists, one farmer, one stockbroker, and one sea captain. James G. Belden practiced medicine in New Orleans for seventeen years prior to 1864. Alexander Breda opened his office in 1859 in Natchitoches and continued his medical practice as late as 1890. The physician William Henry Hire began the practice of medicine in 1845 in New Orleans.

The two dentists were George M. Wickliffe (of East Feliciana Parish) and A. P. Dostie (of Orleans Parish).

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157 New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 28, 1872; New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 255. In 1866 Lacey was a judge of the fifth district court of the city of New Orleans, ibid.

158 B. L. Lynch to N. P. Banks, February 2, 1869, (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, Box 8.

159 Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Ray, John."


161 Veazie to William Pitt Fessenden, March 2, 1869, Correspondence of William Pitt Fessenden, LC.

162 Who Was Who, 1607-1896, s.v., "Waples, Rufus."

163 New York Times, April 26, 1864.

164 Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 325.

165 Hire to William Windom, April 2, 1899, Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

166 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 149.
The latter scalawag enjoyed a lucrative dental practice in New Orleans from 1852 until the rebel takeover of the city in 1861.167

Two full-time journalists were identified among the seventy-two Louisiana scalawags in this study. W. Jasper Blackburn first edited the Minden Herald and then the Homer Iliad during the ante-bellum years in Louisiana.168 Michel Vidal worked as a journalist in New York, Canada, and New Orleans before the outbreak of the Civil War.169

The five merchants were Charles Delery, W. E. Maples, Frederick Otto, S. R. Snaer, and John S. Walton. Delery was a merchant in Monroe before the secession crisis.170 Maples worked as a cotton factor and a commission merchant in Shreveport in 1877.171 Frederick Otto "was doing business in Baton Rouge at the beginning of the rebellion ...."172 In 1866 S. R. Snaer, then twenty-two years old,

167 Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 17 and 28.

168 Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v., "Blackburn, William Jasper."

169 Vidal to Benjamin Perly, December, 1868, Vidal Papers, LSU.

170 Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, May 18, 1872.

171 Maples to John Sherman, April 13, 1877, Applications ...Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 74, Record Group 56.

172 Michael Hahn to George S. Boutwell, March 27, 1869, Applications...Assessors of Internal Revenue, Box 11, Record Group 56.
operated a "commission store" in partnership with his brother. 173

John S. Walton, "an old citizen" and businessman in New Orleans, became President of the Louisiana Savings Institution in 1869. 174 Joseph H. Oglesby, "an outspoken, square Republican," was President of the Louisiana National Bank in New Orleans as of March 27, 1870. 175

Other scalawags who relied upon a single occupation included a farmer in Rapides Parish (William B. Phillips), 176 and a New Orleans river pilot and ship captain (L. H. Panza). 177

The last group consists of Louisiana scalawags employed before, during, or after Reconstruction in a multiplicity of occupations, i.e., men who relied upon no single occupation for their livelihood. Maximilian Ferdinand Bonzano began work as a "roller boy" for the New Orleans Picayune. He later became an apprentice in a drug store where he studied chemistry and pharmacy. He then opened his own

173 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 171.

174 Erastus and Fanny Clark to Benjamin Franklin Flanders, July 21, 1862, Flanders Papers, LSU. "He [Walton] has been engaged in business more or less directly connected with shipping for nearly 30 years." ibid.; New Orleans Republican, March 27, 1870.

175 New Orleans Republican, March 27, 1870; Oglesby had also been involved in "the western produce commission business." See New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 316.

176 Use of the Army, 402.

177 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 247.
apothekeury and studied medicine at the same time. Following his graduation from medical school, Bonzano practiced medicine until President James K. Polk appointed him melter and refiner of the United States Mint in 1848. He remained in that position until the outbreak of the Civil War.\textsuperscript{178}

George W. Carter was a Methodist preacher and president of a woman's college in Oxford, Mississippi, and, at a later date, held a similar position in Texas.\textsuperscript{179} Thomas Green Davidson worked as a teacher, a lawyer, and a sugar and cotton planter.\textsuperscript{180} Benjamin Franklin Flanders was first employed as a teacher in the New Orleans public school system. In 1845 he had become the co-editor and proprietor of the New Orleans \textit{Tropic} and later assisted in organizing the New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Company and served as the secretary and treasurer of the railroad from 1852 to 1861. In 1864 Flanders became president of the First National Bank of New Orleans.\textsuperscript{181} James Longstreet, a professional soldier, became an insurance executive and a cotton factor after the Civil War.\textsuperscript{182} Louis Dupleix engaged in a variety of occupations (teaching, mer-

\textsuperscript{178}Goodspeed's \textit{Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana}, 303-304.

\textsuperscript{179}Warmoth, \textit{Stormy Days}, 109.

\textsuperscript{180}E. Russ Williams, Jr., "Tom Green Davidson," 15.

\textsuperscript{181}\textit{National Cyclopaedia of American Biography}, s.v. "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin."

\textsuperscript{182}Freeman, "James Longstreet," \textit{DAB}, 392.
chandising, and planting) during his six-year residency in Lafayette Parish. Following his removal to Natchitoches in 1848, he continued to be involved in merchandising and farming. About 1852, however, Dupleix became the editor of two newspapers—the Natchitoches Union and the Natchitoches Times. Sometime after 1855 or 1856, he returned to farming and then moved to New Orleans where he became a commission merchant.183 James Govan Taliaferro, although trained as a lawyer, was at various times a newspaper editor, a lumberman, a mill owner, and a planter.184 Planter-merchant Oscar Joffrion was an early and active Republican of Point Coupee Parish. "I am a property holder and planter of some magnitude in Pointe Coupee, also engaged in mercantile pursuits," he informed President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1878.185 John Theodore Ludeling was a lawyer and, after the war, a railroad promoter (the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Pacific Railroad).186

183Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 342.
184Mills, "Taliaferro," 3-9; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, s.v.; "Taliaferro, James Govan."
185Joffrion to Rutherford B. Hayes, December 4, 1878, Applications...Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 73, Record Group 56.
The Pre-Civil War Party Affiliations and Political Experiences of the Louisiana Scalawags

The Louisiana scalawags were not political adolescents. They were not men new to politics and public affairs. When these Southern whites joined the Republican party, they brought with them political experience gained on the local, state, and federal levels during the ante-bellum years.

Among the eighteen Louisiana scalawags whose pre-war party affiliation could be identified, eight were Whigs, seven were Democrats, one supported the Constitutional Union party in 1860, one was a Know-Nothing, and one scalawag (John Ray) belonged successively to the Whig, Know-Nothing, and Constitutional Union parties.

The ex-Whigs included J. G. Beauchamp, Alexander Breda, J. Earnest Breda, Chauncey Kellogg, John Ray, Robert Ray, James G. Taliaferro, James Madison Wells, and Louis Dupleix. In a letter to Henry Clay Warmoth (dated June 12, 1868), the young carpetbag editor Emerson Bently reported on the politics of J. G. Beauchamp, a St. Landry-based scalawag. "Beauchamp is an old-line Whig," he stated, "is...a Republican although not quite as Radical as some would desire. He has fought the Democratic party for many years; and it was the desire of many that he should have been placed on the last parish ticket, in order that his political talents might have given strength to the ticket; ...No members of the Radical party here would be offended if he should obtain an appointment, although his Taliaferro proclivities
may to some have a bad odor. Beauchamp would be a person of considerable executive ability."  

Dr. Alexander P. Breda, of Natchitoches Parish, according to the *Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana*, "was formerly an Old Line Whig, and voted with that party until 1856, and since 1868 he has been an ardent Republican."  

Breda's brother, J. Earnest Breda, according to the same source, "was formerly a Whig in his political views, but is now a staunch Republican."  

When Chauncey Kellogg applied for a position with the Treasury Department in 1889, the petition, endorsed by Henry Clay Warmoth and J.Q.A. Fellows among others, described Kellogg as "a Whig and Unionist before and during the war...and...a zealous Republican...."  

When John Ray moved to Ouachita Parish from Washington County, Missouri, in the 1830's, he already belonged to the Whig party. Active in local politics, Ray was elected in 1844 to the Louisiana State House of Representatives, and to the state senate in 1850, "where he served with minor distinction."  

In 1854 and 1859 the Louisiana
Whigs nominated Ray for lieutenant-governor, but he failed to be elected. The obituary notice in the Richland News Beacon (October 28, 1899) for Ray's brother, Robert, reported that Robert was before the Civil War a Whig "like his father and brothers...." James Govan Taliaferro joined the National Republican movement and supported John Quincy Adams in the elections of 1824 and 1828. Taliaferro remained in the movement when it became the Whig party. During the raucous campaign of 1840 he worked for the election of William Henry Harrison. As a Whig, Taliaferro was also active in local politics as a parish judge and as the president of the Catahoula Police Jury. James Madison Wells, elected to the Louisiana state legislature as a Whig in 1841, declared before a congressional committee ten years after the close of the Civil War, "I have always been a Whig." In 1860, however, he supported the Northern Democratic candidate Stephen Douglas. Louis Dupleix, an active Natchitoches Republican, and a former Whig, received an appointment as registrar of the United States Land Office at Natchitoches from President U.S. Grant in 1872.

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192 Ibid.
196 Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 342.
But Democrats were also attracted to the Republican movement in Louisiana. M. F. Bonzano, although he claimed to have no political interests before the war, received an appointment as the melter and refiner (a patronage plum) of the United States Mint at New Orleans from the Democratic President James K. Polk in 1848. Thomas Green Davidson, of St. Helena Parish, joined the Democrats in 1826. Active within the Jacksonian party, Davidson served as Registrar of Lands in the Greensburg Land Office (beginning in 1833), member of the state house of representatives (1833-1846), President of the Democratic State Convention in 1855, and member of Congress (March 4, 1855 to March 3, 1861). Although he allied with the Republicans in 1870, Davidson remained a Democrat. "Even though Davidson still professed to be a Democrat," historian E. Russ Williams writes, "most of the Democrats of his district discounted him a scalawag." To the Democrats of Louisiana, Davidson, a close ally of the carpetbagger Henry Clay Warmoth, was a Radical in Democratic clothing. Thomas Jefferson Durant was also an ante-bellum Democrat. In 1844 he worked on the Democratic state committee which managed Polk's presidential campaign, and in 1846 he was a successful Democratic candidate for the state senate. Later President Polk appointed Durant United States district attorney for Louisiana. "He

197 Goodspeed's Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, 304.

198 E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson," 22.
was now recognized as an outstanding figure in local... political circles," Howard H. W. Knott notes in his biographical sketch for the Dictionary of American Biography.\(^{199}\) E. H. Durell was another former Democrat who marched to a different (a Republican) drummer during Reconstruction. As a Democrat, Durell had been active in New Orleans city politics since 1837.\(^{200}\) During the 1850's Michael Hahn participated in politics as a member of the Pierre Soule wing of the Louisiana Democracy.\(^{201}\) E. L. Pierson, a life-long resident of Natchitoches, was an ante-bellum Democrat but changed his allegiance with the triumph of the Radicals after the war.\(^{202}\) The controversial A. P. Dostie also claimed to be a Jacksonian Democrat during the ante-bellum years.\(^{203}\)

Following the death of the Whig party in Louisiana, John Ray became a Know-Nothing and in 1859 he ran unsucces-

\(^{201}\) National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, s.v., "Hahn, Michael"; Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Hahn, Michael"; Memorial Addresses, 17. "In the days prior to the civil war he was in politics a Democrat and a follower of Stephen Douglas...." ibid.
\(^{203}\) "I have always been a Jacksonian Democrat," quoted in Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 61.
fully as a Know-Nothing for the lieutenant-governorship. A fellow Know-Nothing, R. F. Dauney (he was elected coroner for the city of New Orleans in 1847 and served as a clerk in the New Orleans Customs House in 1870) also belonged to the party in the 1850's. "I was a know-nothing," Dauney admitted defensively to a Congressional committee in 1866, "but I was no thug." The election of 1860 saw two future scalawags, Andrew Hero and the versatile John Ray, allied with the Constitutional Union Party. A pamphlet published in 1886 stated that Hero, then the chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee for the second congressional district in Louisiana, "never was a Democrat," so he did not desert his party at the close of the war. Hero, an editorial in 1886 claimed, "opposed the Bourbon Democrats before the war; he was against the irreconcilables during the war, and he had opposed them ever since the close of the war." In 1860 Hero had voted the Bell-Everett ticket and "was pronounced in declaring his attachment to the Union and the Constitution...."

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205 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 140.
206 Andrew Hero, Jr., Chairman, Republican Congressional Committee, Second Congressional District (n.p., n.d.), pamphlet contained in Applications...New Orleans, Record Group 56, Box 14. Hereinafter cited as Andrew Hero.
elector on the Bell-Everett ticket, "and canvassed northern Louisiana for those candidates...." 207

Seven other future scalawags, whose pre-war political affiliation could not be determined, were also active in local and state politics. This group includes Robert J. Caldwell (district attorney), 208 Richard E. Downes (judge and state representative), 209 George S. Lacey (New Orleans city attorney), 210 James Monroe Porter (state legislator in 1845), 211 and J. D. Watkins (district attorney). 212

J. D. Watkins, James Monroe Porter, George S. Lacey, and the other identifiable Louisiana scalawags were men with a stake in the community. They were not men new to

207 * * * Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Ray, John."

208 * * * Caldwell to The Senate and House of Representatives, March 29, 1869, (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46.

209 * * * Downes to J. H. Harris, January 7, 1869 (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Ky.-Miss., Sen. 41A-H 27, Record Group 46.

210 * * * J. Calhoun, Thomas R. Brady et al. to Ulysses S. Grant, December 18, 1875, Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshals, and Attorneys, Box 335, Record Group 60.

211 * * * Emerson Bently, Henry Clay Warmoth, G. Donato et al. to The President, Members of the Senate, the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives (Petition on behalf of James Monroe Porter) February 1869, Tray No. 110. Papers of the (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Record Group 46. "He further sheweth that in the month of November, 1845, he [Porter] was elected a member of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, and as such served two years." Ibid.

212 * * * J. G. Watkins to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, 1868, Papers of the (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, 40 and 41 Cong., unnumbered, HR 40A-P29, 21 Box 2. This petition for
world of power and politics. They were not raw, unsettled men, men without form or foundation. 213

Removal of Watkins' political disabilities was endorsed by James G. Taliaferro, Michael Hahn, and Rufus K. Howell. "Petitioner [Watkins] shows that before the war he acted as Dist. Atty. for several years commissioned by the State ...." Ibid.

213 The white Southern Republicans of this study were essentially no different from those men who have always controlled American government on the national, state, and local level. In fact "Government leaders are seldom recruited from the masses. This is true in the case of top cabinet officials and presidential advisors; of congressmen, governors, and state legislators; even of mayors and city councilmen. Government officials are recruited primarily from the well educated, prestigiously employed, successful and affluent upper and upper middle class ...." Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), 91; The Louisiana scalawags were much like the white Southern Republicans described by historian Joel Williamson in his study of Reconstruction in South Carolina: "A fair proportion of the scalawag leadership had been accepted in the elite social circle of their own communities before becoming Republicans." Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction 1861-1877 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 362.
CHAPTER III

THE SCALAWAG CONNECTION: WHIG OR UNIONIST?

The Whig Connection

Although David Donald and others have argued that persistent Whiggery was the foundation of white Republicanism in the South, there is little evidence that Whiggery was an important factor in Louisiana Republicanism. No significant Whig-Republican alliance existed during the era of Reconstruction. If there was any Whig connection at all, it was extremely weak. "Some Whigs became Republicans, at least for a time," Joe Gray Taylor states in his definitive survey of Reconstruction in Louisiana, "but the vast majority of them, apparently, held their noses and joined with the Democrats under the Conservative label. In fact, there is a strong probability that former Whigs became important Conservative leaders."¹

Even as late as 1876, the Republicans were still seeking to bring the old followers of Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and William Henry Harrison into the party. In a pamphlet published in March of 1876, J.R.G. Pitkin, a New Orleans scalawag and corresponding secretary of the Republican State Central Committee, issued a last, desperate call for the old Whigs of Louisiana to leave the Democrats

¹Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 71.

121

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"which whenever they [the Whigs] have affiliated therewith at all, they have usually been unable wholly to dismiss from mind a historic and honorable prejudice."²

Pitkin reminded the old line Whigs that the Republican party had inherited the Whig principles. "I respectfully invite your attention," he wrote, "to the Declaration of Principles emitted by the Republican State Central Committee of Louisiana, as the basis of the Republican organization. You will discover that it is simply a re-affirmation of tenets to some of which the party has adhered since as a Whig organization it re-adopted in 1856 its original title of National Republicans...."³ As evidence of the modern Republicans' Whig principles, Pitkin pointed to the federally-funded internal improvements program in Louisiana, especially "in relation to the Mississippi outlet and divers bayou improvements."⁴ The scalawag Pitkin also assured the old Whigs that the Republican party opposed any inflationary monetary policy that would "prejudice the industrial and commercial interests of the country." It must be obvious he continued, that "the Republican party seeks not to cripple business by retiring the greenback dollar but by gradual efforts to assure thereto the value of a hundred

²J.R.G. Pitkin, To The Whigs (Pamphlet published by the Republican State Central Committee, March 1, 1876), 1
³Ibid., 2.
⁴Ibid., 2-3.
cents and thus befriend business." With such arguments, Pitkin hoped to lure the former Whigs away from the "mongrel Democratic party, whose passion is disorder and whose highest principle is jealousy of color," and into the arms of the Louisiana Republicans.

He contended in a poker-faced bluff that this appeal to the Whigs was not being made from a position of weakness. "This suggestion," he stated, "is made not because the Republican party is numerically impotent to maintain its control, for the recent censes reveals a majority in its favor of about 20,000 voters--and the party is undeniably a unit in sentiment,--but because many citizens, weary of the dishonesty of the Democratic chiefs, have withdrawn the last vestiges of faith in them and will no longer accept the mandates of a caucus or forget the interests of the State to abet the aspirations of a corps of place-hunters." Pitkin admitted that the Republican party contained its quota of political adventurers and spoilsmen; but, he argued, this was all the more reason for the Whigs to join the Radicals. "It is to be deplored that some individual Republicans have by malversation cast reproach upon their sect and the good fame of the State," the scalawag conceded, "but let the Whigs of Louisiana come with

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5 Ibid., 3.
6 Ibid., 7.
7 Ibid.
their ancient fervor for reform into that sect or measurably cooperate with it as censors upon its members while those members are candidates, not simply after they shall have been elected." In addition to their honesty and proclivity for reform, the Whigs would also bring to the Republican party their talent and education. Pitkin argued: "Were the Whigs of the State...to contribute of their intelligence and seek with those less fortunate [the less-educated blacks] in the past than themselves, to supply the parochial trusts with more efficient servants, wherever such may be needed, there is reason to believe that better accord and administration might be assured." 

Pitkin went on to remind the Whigs that the Democracy remained their ancient enemy and that the Whig-Democrat alliance was an unnatural association. "It must be clear to the Whigs," he insisted, "that the Democracy is no less their enemy to-day than in years gone by; cherishes all its old prejudices against them and declares tacit armistice only while they choose to vote its ballots." 

The Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution, Pitkin reminded the Whigs, made blacks a part of the political system. The Whigs, he felt, would recognize the new realities of political life, and support and defend the

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 8.
10 Ibid.
Constitution: "It is submitted that the question of color having been adjudicated by the American people and the negro being the civil and political equal of the white by constitutional guarantee, it cannot be less honorable to a Whig than it was twenty years ago, to insist that the Constitution should be jealously maintained against all assaults upon it by its old enemy the Democracy."\textsuperscript{11}

From the text of this pamphlet, it is obvious that the Republicans in Louisiana still hoped as late as 1876 to lure the Whigs away from the Democrats. Federal aid for internal improvements, promises of fiscal responsibility, appeals to the Whigs' loyalty to the Constitution: this was the bait. But apparently few Whigs were willing to bite.

Three of the most prominent scalawags (John Ray, James Govan Taliaferro, and James Madison Wells) were former Whigs, but few other Louisiana Whigs followed their lead. Still, the hope remained that the old-line Whigs could be lured into the party. In 1889, twelve years after the end of Reconstruction, Chauncey S. Kellogg, a former Whig and active Republican during the Radical years, wrote to W.H.H. Miller, the Attorney General in Benjamin Harrison's Cabinet, concerning the revival of Republicanism in Louisiana and the possibility of attracting old Whigs to the party standard: "...this State will go Republican in

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}
1892," Kellogg informed Miller. "My convictions are based on the opinions expressed to me by leading businessmen of this City [New Orleans], and planters, including bankers, factors, wholesale merchants and manufacturers, who are at heart Republicans, but have not heretofore voted the Republican ticket. The old Whig doctrine of protection to American industries being the same as that advocated by the Republican Party, has aroused the old Whigs to return to their old faith." This persistent scalawag argued that the Whigs had never been happy as Democrats and that they were eager to join the Republicans under the right circumstances. "Why! Mr. Attorney General," Kellogg continued, "many citizens who were old Whigs, and several Democrats even, said to me 'President Harrison is an old Whig, and he is good enough for me.' Old Whigs would add: 'I never was a Democrat.' I venture the assertion that there cannot be found in the State of Louisiana to-day, one old Whig who will admit that he is, or ever was, a Democrat in principle. They are all proud of having been Whigs...although they have heretofore voted the Democratic ticket." Kellogg concluded his letter with the suggestion that blacks be excluded from officeholding and the leadership of the party. Only then, he contended, could whites be attracted to the party. Kellogg envisioned a new Republican coalition in Louisiana composed of white men of "irreproachable character," wartime Unionists, and former
Whigs. Thus, twenty-four years after the founding of the Louisiana Republican party, the organization was still trying to coax the Whigs into the party. Further evidence of this activity is found in a letter of May 1, 1889, from Cuthbert Bullitt, an old Unionist and conservative Louisiana Republican, to John W. Noble, the Secretary of the Interior, concerning the future of the party. "When I had the pleasure of seeing you in St. Louis," he stated, "I told you, candidly, that our party in New Orleans lacks respectability & I say so now, & to gain strength we must have good men in office." These men, Bullitt suggested, would come from the ranks of the former Whigs: "The old Whig element is still strong & eager to join our party, but not under the rule of Scalawags & Carpetbaggers."  

If, as Taylor points out, "The Old Whigs... found it distasteful to sleep in the same bed with Democrats," they apparently found it even more distasteful to sleep with scalawags, carpetbaggers, and Negroes. Although the marriage between the Whigs and the Democrats during the Reconstruction years was an unhappy one, it was far more satisfying from the Whig perspective, than the kind of political miscegenation proposed by the Louisiana Radicals.

12 Kellogg to W.H.H. Miller, April 8, 1899. Applications ...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.
13 Bullitt to John W. Noble, May 1, 1889. Applications ...New Orleans, Box 15, Record Group 56.
14 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 481.
The Pitkin pamphlet (written at the close of Reconstruction) and the letters from Kellogg and Bullitt (written at the time of the ascendancy of the Bourbon Redeemers) indicate that the Republican party, at least in Louisiana, never attracted a Whig constituency with any real success. More important as a factor in the transition to post-bellum Republicanism than the survival of Whig principles or the memories of the pre-war Whig-Democratic battles was the spirit of Unionism. This (along with simple ambition or opportunism) was the vital link between pre-war, wartime, and Reconstruction politics for the scalawags.

The Unionist Connection

"Tell everybody, proclaim it on the house tops, publish it from Dan to Beersheba," James G. Kilbourne pleaded in a letter dated June 8, 1865, "that nobody can take the oath here, that the military are [sic] waiting official instructions, and that as soon as the operation does commence they can take it just as well at home as here [Baton Rouge],... I ask this for my own protection for my office is constantly thronged with would be loyal citizens 'wanting to know you know' how it is to be done, and wanting me as I 'know em all' to introduce them to 'the General and see if...they can't take some kind of oath' to save their....[sic]. And then the sneaking hound must tell me how they opposed the war, and how (Solomons that they were) they 'knowed all the time just how it would turn out,' and then what they have done,
which generally amounts to, 'only this and nothing more'--they never done noth'n. This agreeable conversation [Kilbourne wrote] is occasionally varied with the inquiring 'Squire what do you thin is gwine to be done with the nigger.'" The writer ended his letter with this warning: "Keep these people [the amnesty seekers] away or I shall do them a mischief. Or if they must come warn them to keep away from me. I am armed, and am dangerous--have got a knife, a big stick, and a little nigger to collect brick-bats."\(^{15}\)

No doubt, as Kilbourne's letter implies, many professions of Unionist sympathy were entirely self-serving. As the Confederate cause collapsed, many who had been active adherents of the rebellion now proclaimed that they had never supported the rebels, or, at least, that they had never willingly given aid and comfort to the rebel cause. Scalawags like Robert J. Caldwell, R. F. Daunoy, Wade H. Hough, B. L. Lynch, James Monroe Porter, Robert Ray, and J. D. Watkins all insisted that, despite their Confederate records, they never really intended to aid the Confederacy. "Robert J. Caldwell," John Ray wrote in 1868, "is a worthy man and in 1860 & 1861 an ardent opponent of Secession and was in feeling [although he served as a private in the rebel army] a union man during the war and since has been

\(^{15}\)Kilbourne to James O. Fuqua June 8, 1865, James G. Kilbourne Correspondence, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University. Emphasis in the original.
an active Reconstructionist."\(^{16}\) Caldwell himself claimed that he entered the Confederate army "under the pressure of circumstances," but that he was "quiet during the war and since the Surrender...has been an ardent union man" who "favored Reconstruction under the Reconstruction Acts and aided in Reconstruction...." (The petition for the removal of Caldwell's "political disabilities" also carried the endorsement of Louisiana's carpetbag governor Henry Clay Warmoth.)\(^{17}\) R. F. Daunoy, thirty-six years old, Paris-educated New Orleans scalawag, admitted in 1866 to having served ninety days in the Confederate militia. "I did not want to go into it," he insisted, "I asked Governor [T.O.] Moore [the Confederate Governor of Louisiana] whether if I served ninety days he would release me; he said he would, and I went voluntarily without being sworn in; I was never mustered in, and never required to take any oath." With the federal seizure of New Orleans, however, Daunoy insisted upon being discharged. "As soon as the city was taken I applied to my captain to be relieved," he testified, "he [Daunoy's captain] said the confederate congress had passed a law declaring all under forty-five years of age to serve during the rest of the war. I told him if he did not give

\(^{16}\)Ray to The Senate and House of Representatives, endorsement appended to a petition for removal of political disabilities, Caldwell to The Senate and House of Representatives, March 29, 1869, Papers of the (Senate) Select Committee on Removal of Political Disabilities, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46.

\(^{17}\)Ibid.
me a discharge I would go over to the enemy on the first occasion." Daunoy claimed that his refusal to serve in the rebel army and his Unionist sympathies caused him to be labeled a turncoat by his fellow Southerners: "I came here [to New Orleans] and took the oath of allegiance, and now all that population here have turned their back upon me... and called me a 'damned traitor.'"

John Ray (in a petition to Congress dated June 23, 1868) testified on behalf of Wade H. Hough, a fellow scalawag. Hough, Ray stated in the document, "actively sympathized with the union men—[and]—after he left the [Confederate] army he did all he could to assist men to keep out of the army—and since the close of the war...he has been a strong union man [who] has zealously supported reconstruction under all the plans proposed by Congress." Michael Hahn also supported Hough and recommended that Congress remove his political disabilities: "He was a member of the Secession Convention of this State, but voted against and never signed, the ordinance of secession. Although drawn somewhat into the rebel service I am satisfied he never sympathised with the rebel cause."

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18 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 136.

19 Ray to (Congress) June 23, 1868, Papers of the (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, 40 & 41 Cong. HR 40A-H21.10, Applications for Removal of Political Disabilities, Louisiana, Nos. 13550-13559 and unnumbered, Box 8, Record Group 233 (National Archives).

20 Hahn to (Congress), 1868, ibid.
letter to President Grant dated August 20, 1871) admitted to his participation but claimed, nevertheless, to have been a strong Unionist from the start. "In 1860 I was a Union Man," he wrote, "and opposed with all my zeal & ability the Secession of my State from the Federal Union." Hough admitted his "unwilling participation in the Rebellion," but now claimed to have "accepted and advocated the adoption of the reconstruction measures of Congress adopted in 1867."

During the presidential campaign of 1868 Hough stated that he actively and at a great personal risk supported the candidacy of U. S. Grant. "I was the first man," he wrote to the President, "among the old citizens of the country of any political standing that openly & avowedly advocated your Election...."21

Irish-born scalawag Bartholomew Leahy Lynch claimed to have supported the rebellion only reluctantly. "I was a Lieutenant in the unarmed mob called the Louisiana State Militia after the secession of Louisiana," he admitted in a letter to Benjamin F. Butler in March of 1869, "and up to the occupation of New Orleans by the troops under your command, I was forced into that so called militia as a private but subsequently I voluntarily accepted a...commission from Gov. Moore for the purpose of getting out of the companionship and association of the miserable dregs of humanity

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21Hough to Ulysses S. Grant, August 20, 1871, Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshals, and Attorneys, Box 344, Record Group 60.
among whom I was thrown...." And, Lynch insisted, "I was then at heart as bitter an enemy of the rebellion as I have been ever since." This limited participation in the rebellion, Lynch stated in another petition, was the "sum and substance" of his "political sinning."

James Monroe Porter, a St. Landry scalawag, was a colonel of the parish militia by appointment of Governor Moore. Porter's petition for the removal of his political disabilities (referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 15, 1869) stated that Porter served as a colonel in the St. Landry Parish militia. He claimed that he had to serve in the militia "or go into the Confederate States Army." Porter also admitted to serving as a recruiting officer for the rebel army between May 26, 1861, and April 17, 1862. On the latter date, however, "he left the Parish of St. Landry with his family and servants and proceeded to the State of Texas." When Porter returned to Louisiana in the summer of 1862, he "was arrested by order of Capt. J. M. Taylor then enrolling officer, and was ordered into the regular Confederate States Army." Later Porter arranged to get a special assignment to a non-combat position as Deputy Marshal and Deputy Collector of Customs at Opelousas.

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23 Lynch to B. F. Butler, December 9, 1869, ibid.
He then obtained a "leave of absence and permission to go to Texas for his family and servants and left about the 1st November 1864 and returned 31st May 1865." 24

The obituary notice for Ouachita Parish scalawag Robert Ray in 1899 noted that Ray "became a soldier in the Third Louisiana [Confederate] Cavalry, Col. Harrison's regiment, but his heart was on the other side and he was not a very effective soldier." 25 Napoleon Underwood, a member of the 1868 Black and Tan Convention, was another Southerner whose heart, it seems was on the other side. In a letter to President Grant (dated April 6, 1869) Theodore E. Rovee, the Secretary of State of Louisiana, described Underwood's rebel service: "Mr. Underwood joined the 'Beauregard Honor Guards' and upon the passage of the fleet went with them (as did many other Union Men) to Camp Moore. Here in company with other Union Sympathisers, he deserted, fled to the woods and returned to his family and friends." From 1866 on Underwood, Rovee stated, "took up the cudgel in opposition to the Democratic party...." An ardent and active Unionist and Republican, he worked for the election

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24 Porter to The President & Members of the Senate & the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives of the U.S. of America in Congress Assembled, n.d., Senate 41A-H27, Petitions & Memorials, Papers of the Select Committee on the Removal of Political Disabilities, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46.

of Grant and Colfax in 1868 "in the face of the most violent opposition and at the peril of his life..."²⁶

John D. Watkins, a Claiborne Parish scalawag, also claimed to have served unwillingly the Confederate cause. In a petition to Congress (July 22, 1868) Watkins stated that "he both in public speeches and on all occasions in 1860 & 1861 opposed Secession and was a Union man." In the early part of 1861, he continued, he "made an effort to sell his property & remove to California a loyal State but could not effect a sale." To avoid direct service himself and "to avoid opposing the United States Government contrary to his views of right he furnished a substitute...," Watkins insisted. Later, however, Watkins became an enrolling officer for Ouachita Parish. In November 1864, he became the commander of a battalion of Confederate reserves; and in February 1865, he was ordered to act as Judge Advocate of the department of the military court west of the Mississippi. Despite all this, Watkins stated that he became unwillingly a rebel soldier. His acts, he said, "were controlled by circumstances," and he "never for one hour had any hope or desire for the defeat of the U.S. & the Success of the Confederacy." It should be noted that

²⁶Rovee to Ulysses S. Grant, April 1, 1869, Letters of Application and Recommendation, Internal Revenue, Assessors, Louisiana, 1st-3rd Districts, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 11, Record Group 56 (National Archives).
Watkins' petition bore the endorsements of Unionists James G. Taliaferro and Michael Hahn.27

It is difficult to gauge the sincerity of these statements and others like them. Many honest Union men served the rebel cause unwillingly and under pressure. Others suddenly became Unionist at the time of the Federal victory in 1865. Yet some scalawags admitted openly to having supported secession and the Confederacy and were accepted eagerly by the Republicans, evidence that there was, apparently, little need to exaggerate one's wartime Union sympathies. Dr. Alexander P. Breda "was [in 1862] filled with a natural desire to assist the Confederacy and enlisted in Company 'C', Second Louisiana Cavalry, under Co. W. G. Vincent...as a medical assistant." He later received a commission as assistant surgeon of the Seventh Louisiana Cavalry. Nevertheless, after 1868 Breda became "an ardent Republican."28 His brother J. Earnest Breda, also a scalawag, joined the Beazeale Battalion of the Natchitoches [Confederate] Rangers on August 9, 1862, and served throughout the war. Breda was without doubt a committed rebel.

"We must submit cheerfully to all the vicissitudes entailed on us by that terrible curse to humanity (the infamous

27Watkins to the Senate and House of Representatives, July 22, 1868, Papers of the (House) Select Committee on Reconstruction, 40 & 41 Cong., Various Louisiana Affairs, 41st Cong., unnumbered, HR 40A-F29.21, Box 2, Record Group 233.

28Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 325.
Yankee)," he wrote to his future wife Elcey Blanchard on July 25, 1864, "and bear a smile on our countenances as all persons who cherish truly Southern Principles should do while we conceal within the sufferings of the bitterest pangs of adversity we have chosen to suffer for our cause...."29

In November of 1864, Breda complained to Elcey that he was ill and would soon return home. "All of this [suffering]," he wrote, "I owe to our friends the Yankees whom I will never, never forgive as long as I live. I believe that if Lincoln is reelected, so that we must have war 4 years more or submit, submission is a thing that is impossible with true Southerners. Over the ashes of desolated home, and the wreck and ruin laid before them, Rebels do not tamely lick the hand that strikes them; but, driven back, exiled from the scenes of happy days they cherish their sufferings, their humiliations, their wrongs and labor for revenge with all the energy and powers of body and mind given them by their Creator and will it be to the end."30 Yet, in June of 1865 he took the amnesty oath and in time became "a staunch Republican,"31 despite the

29 J. Earnest Breda to Elize Blanchard, July 25, 1864, J. P. Breda and Family Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Hereinafter cited as Breda Papers, LSU. Emphasis in the original.

30 J. Earnest Breda to Eliza Blanchard, November 28, 1864, ibid. Emphasis in the original.

31Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 326.
social ostracism and threats of violence from the conservatives of Natchitoches.

George W. Carter, one of the most prominent Louisiana scalawags, organized a regiment of rebel cavalry and served as an officer in the unit. "The regiment," Henry Clay Warmoth claimed in his memoirs of the Civil War and Reconstruction years, "was especially armed...with revolvers and Bowie knives...."32

New Orleans scalawag Andrew Hero served with distinction in the famous Washington Artillery, a rebel unit composed of "wealthy and prominent" New Orleans citizens.33 Hero rose through the ranks from sargeant to major. Promoted for "gallant and meritorious service," he was seriously wounded during the Antietam campaign.34 In 1888, the Louisiana Standard described this former rebel and scalawag as a "brave and gallant ex-Confederate, loyal to the 'Lost Cause' who was no less true and loyal to the Republican party, whose faith he long ago espoused and to whose advancement he...devoted his whole energy and his well-known superior abilities."35 Hero supported the Unionist-Republican cause, taking the amnesty oath on September 9,
In a letter of recommendation (dated June 30, 1868) to Warmoth, Republican James Graham noted that Hero demonstrated "a praiseworthy desire to see the efforts of Congress to restore the State to her place in the Union carried into effect, and notably so as regards the Reconstruction Laws." This letter carried the endorsement of Thomas Jefferson Durant, a prominent Southern Unionist-Republican. The Confederate career of James Longstreet is, of course, well known and needs no elaboration here. Longstreet, one of Lee's greatest lieutenants, established a famous (and controversial) war record. At the close of the conflict, Longstreet cast his lot with the Republicans despite fierce cries of outrage from conservative Southerners.

Five Louisiana scalawags, however, served the Union cause during the rebellion. George W. Mader, a New Orleans resident, was forced "to participate in the rebellion for a short time...." With the occupation of the city by Federal troops, however, this galvanized Confederate joined the United States Signal Corps. Mader remained in the Federal service until June 29, 1865. "I rendered important service to the Army and Navy in the seige of Mobile," he claimed in a letter to carpetbagger William Pitt Kellogg, "and refer

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36 Oath of Eligibility, September 9, 1868, Andrew J. and George Hero Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Hereinafter cited as Hero Papers, LSU.

37 Graham to Henry Clay Warmoth, June 30, 1868, ibid.
you to the report of Maj. Genl. E.R.S. Canby then [commanding] the Army against Mobile." Mader also claimed to be "one of the first white men in this state [Louisiana] after the war who advocated the Reconstruction Laws of the United States and the principles of the Republican Party." In 1870 the New Orleans Republican reported that without Mader in its ranks "the Republican party would be a feeble organization...."39

Frederick Otto (a long-term resident of Baton Rouge) also served in the Union ranks during the war. "Mr. F. Otto," Major J. M. Magee, the commander of the Third Massachusetts Cavalry wrote to Captain G. B. Halsted at Port Hudson on November 4, 1863, "is a good loyal Union man. He went with my company all through the Teche Company, and when we came to Port Hudson he lay in the 'Rifle Pits.'" Otto, Magee informed Halsted, "is thoroughly posted as to the nature of the country and can give you some valuable information."40 In 1869 Michael Hahn recommended Otto for a position with the Treasury Department on the basis of his

38 Mader to William Pitt Kellogg, November 25, 1868, Papers of the (Senate) Select Committee on the Removal of Political Disabilities, Petitions & Memorials, 41A-H27, Tray No. 110, Record Group 46.

39 New Orleans Republican, March 22, 1870.

40 Magee to Captain G. B. Halsted, November 4, 1863, contained among the Letters of Application and Recommendation, Internal Revenue, Assessors, Louisiana, 1st-3rd Districts, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 11, Record Group 56. Emphasis in the original.
Unionism and his Republicanism. "He was doing business in Baton Rouge at the beginning of the rebellion," Hahn wrote, "but immediately on the arrival there of the Union army he abandoned his business, joined the army, served on the staff of one of our officers, [and] rendered important service from his knowledge of the country." Otto's loyalty and service to the Union earned him, Hahn wrote, the bitter hatred of the ex-rebels, and Otto now found it "impossible to regain a business standing among them." Hahn urged George Boutwell, the Secretary of the Treasury under Grant, to provide this Southern Unionist with a position in the Internal Revenue service. Otto, Hahn concluded, is "competent, honest and modest, a true Republican...."41

Virginia-born scalawag Philip Pendleton was an officer in the Volunteer Artillery of West Virginia. He "was in the field during [John] Pope's Retreat [Second Bull Run]... and during the Campaign in Maryland under [George B.] McCollan."42 In March, 1869, Pendleton wrote to President Grant regarding his war record. "At the breaking out of war," he claimed, "I promptly took sides with the National Government and served as a First Lieutenant through some of the severest battles of the war."43

41 Hahn to George S. Boutwell, March 27, 1868, ibid.

42 David H. (last name illegible) to Ulysses S. Grant (1869?), Letters of Application and Recommendation for Collectors of Internal Revenue, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 73, Record Group 56.

43 Pendleton to Ulysses S. Grant, March 4, 1869, ibid.
James Ready, an "active Union man and Republican,"
also actively supported the Federal cause during the war.
"I neither aided, abetted or assisted the Rebellion, in any
shape or form by sword, deed or action," he stated in a
letter to Boutwell (March 15, 1869), "and was the first to
volunteer to head a committee of twenty-seven original Union
Citizens of Louisiana to hoist the United States Flag over
the City Hall at New Orleans on the 7th day of June 1862.
Said Flag I afterwards carried to Washington and presented
it to the Revenue Department on the 2nd day of April 1866
...." Ready also claimed to have aided in the defense of
New Orleans in 1863. "During the seige of Port Hudson when
Genl. Banks was cut off from all communication with New
Orleans by a Rebel Raid which threatened to burn the city," he stated, "I raised a regiment consisting of nine hundred
of the best Colored citizens of New Orleans, armed, equipped
and marched them into the field ready for service...."

The most prominent scalawag to oppose openly and active­
ly the Confederates was James Madison Wells. As described
above, Wells led a band of Unionist guerrillas in Rapides
Parish during the early stages of the Civil War in Louisiana.

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44 A. P. Banks to George S. Boutwell, July 6, 1869, Letters of Application and Recommendation, Internal Revenue, Assessors, Louisiana, 1st-3rd Districts, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 11, Record Group 56.

45 Ready to George S. Boutwell, March 15, 1869, ibid.

46 Ibid. General William Hemsley Emory confirmed
Ready's account in a letter to President Andrew Johnson, on
April 10, 1866. Ibid.

In 1860, W. Jasper Blackburn, despite the "hissings and scoffs" of the people of Homer, supported Stephen Douglas for the presidency over the Southern pro-slavery-rights candidate John C. Breckinridge. Angered by his outspoken Unionism during the war, the rebels forced Blackburn to suspend publication of the Iliad. "My paper was suppressed," he testified in 1867, "and I had to take refuge in the woods."47 Ezra Hiestand, a New Orleans lawyer, was also an ardent Unionist who, despite the threat of rebel retaliation, collaborated with the Federals. He filled important judicial stations under the military government and was "one of the most out-spoken and fearless friends of the

47 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 421.
Union during the rebellion," according to T. R. Clay (a
delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1868).48
When Monroe, Louisiana, fell to the Federal forces under
Brigadier General John D. Stevenson, John Ray contacted one
of the Yankee officers and proclaimed his loyalty to the
Union. "This action endangered his life," E. Russ Williams
writes, "as Confederate sympathizers plotted to assassinate
him. He narrowly averted death when a local Catholic priest
warned him of the conspiracy against his life."49 Thomas
Hudnall of Morehouse Parish also found the life of a Union­
ist difficult. In an affidavit (dated September 4, 1868),
he testified to his troubles: "I was a strong Union man
during the late rebellion. I was much persecuted then on
account of my sentiments. I remember that once in 1862 ten
men on horseback rode up to my house and attempted to arrest
me; they would have shot me had they laid hands upon me."
Hudnall claimed that after this attempt to murder him, he
fled to Texas and did not return until 1866.50

Those men who withdrew from public affairs rather than
risk ostracism or violence because of the Unionist sympa­
thies included four of the most important Louisiana scalawags (Hahn, Durant, Durell, and Taliaferro). In 1860-1861
Michael Hahn campaigned against secession and refused to

48 Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshals and Attorneys,
Record Group 60, Box 334.


50 Use of the Army, 349.
take the Confederate oath of allegiance (required of notary publics). "At a time when a public exhibition of Union sentiment meant martyrdom," Amos E. Simpson and Vaughn B. Baker contend, "he kept silent but did not abandon his unionist views." Thomas Jefferson Durant supported the Republican ticket in 1860. "A conscientious and consistent Unionist," Durant "fought strenuously against secession, and when that became a reality he remained in New Orleans, but during the Confederate regime abstained from all political activity." Edward Henry Durell was another Unionist who retreated from public affairs during the Confederate era in New Orleans: "He was a pronounced Unionist, strenuously opposed the ordinance of secession, and on its adoption in 1860 retired for a time from public life." When New Orleans fell to the Federal forces, Durell became a collaborationist and worked closely with the military authorities. In 1862 he designed a plan, later adopted by the military government, to reorganize the municipal government in New Orleans and received an appointment as "president of the bureau of finance" for the city. In 1863, the military appointed Durell mayor of occupied New Orleans. Later that year, Lincoln made him a federal judge for the eastern district of Louisiana. In 1864, Durell went to Baltimore


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as a delegate to the Republican National Convention. The Unionism of scalawag James Govan Taliaferro is also well documented. On October 8, 1856, Taliaferro warned Louisianians of the dangers and illegality of secession in his newspaper the *Harrisonburg Independent*. "Secession," he argued, "can only exist as a revolutionary right. It can never exist as a peaceful remedy." Adherence to such a theory, Taliaferro prophesied, "would inevitably lead to war and bloodshed."55

The winter of 1861 saw Taliaferro still firmly in support of the Union. As a delegate from Catahoula Parish to the secession convention, Taliaferro openly opposed the secession resolution. He argued that on practical, as well as ideological, grounds secession was wrong. This is seen in Taliaferro's "Protest Against the Ordinance of Secession," originally delivered to the convention on January 26, 1861 and later published in the *New Orleans Daily Crescent*, and as a broadside. Taliaferro contended that: first, Southern rights could still be adequately protected under the Constitution of the United States; second, that the current situation did not justify such an extreme Southern reaction as secession; third, that the Border States would not join the secession movement; fourth, that little support

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54 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 32.
for secession existed outside the deep South; fifth, that secession was impractical, unconstitutional, and dangerous; sixth, that secession would endanger the very institutions (i.e., slavery) that it ought to preserve; seventh, that secession would forfeit Southern claims to the national public domain; eighth, that only the people (not the convention) had the right to undertake such a revolutionary action.  

His opposition to secession aroused such anger that Taliaferro had to cease publication of the [Harrisonburg Independent]. He was imprisoned briefly for several days in Alexandria in retaliation for his outspoken Unionist sentiment. His sons tried to convince their father to seek refuge within the Federal lines. The elder Taliaferro, however, remained at Harrisonburg for the duration. "Judge Taliaferro," Wynina Gillmore Mills writes, "had done everything to prevent Louisiana from leaving the Union, but failing, he accepted defeat and retired to his home to wait for the inevitable Confederate defeat."  

M. F. Bonzano, A. P. Dostie, Benjamin Franklin Flanders and Rufus Waples fled North when the Confederates took power. An officer in the United States Mint at the time of secession, Bonzano fled to New York City, along with the foreman of the

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57 A copy of the broadside in Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.
58 Quoted in Mills, "James Govan Taliaferro," 42.
59 Mills, "James Govan Taliaferro," 46.
Mint's coining department. Before leaving, Bonzano and his foreman destroyed "all the coining dies remaining on hand, thus preventing the possibility of their use" by the rebels.  

On June 7, 1862, Bonzano returned to New Orleans to reopen and repair the mint facilities. In that same month, Bonzano became a leader in the Unionist movement in New Orleans. The rebel authorities forced the outspoken A. P. Dostie to leave New Orleans on August 21, 1861, when he refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Confederate government. In a letter to Dr. J. C. Duell, Dostie expressed in no uncertain terms his devotion to the Union (although he did not choose to enlist in the Yankee army):

Two days afterward [April 21, 1861] I departed from what had been my beautiful and genial home, to come where I could once more see the old banner wave 'o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.' For six months it had been shut out of my sight. I felt during that time despondent and gloomy, and almost ashamed of being an American and not with the battling hosts of my country, helping to raise that sacred ensign upon the parapets from which it had been so causelessly and ignominiously torn. I was resolved, if need be, to enlist, but thanks to the inborn patriotism of the people, I found on arriving here, there was no lack or need of men. They have gone forth in plentiful numbers, unflagging in their determination to conquer back the Union, or die gloriously fighting for Freedom's hope. We will not despair, the sky is brightening, the rainbow of happiness will soon appear. A little while and it will be visible, welcomed by the gladdened hearts of a glorious nation.

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60 Bonzano to Salmon P. Chase, May 5, 1862, Applications New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

61 Goodspeed's Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, 304-305.
'May God save the Union, grant it may stand
The pride of our people, the boast of the land;
Still, still, 'mid the storm, may our banner float free,
Unrent and unriven, o'er earth and o'er sea.

'May God save the Union, still, still may it stand,
Upheld by the prayers of the patriot band;
To cement it our fathers ensanguined the sod,
To keep it we kneel to a merciful God.'

Dostie returned to New Orleans when the Federals reestablished their authority over the city. Dostie, Willie Malvin Caskey writes disdainfully, "like others of Union sentiments, had returned with his fellow soldiers of fortune—but not, it seems to practice dentistry."^3

When the Confederates seized power in New Orleans, Benjamin Franklin Flanders, who "like a large proportion of the prominent men in the South...[lived] there so long as to be generally considered a native," also chose to move North. "He is a Southern Loyalist," Rufus Waples claimed in 1877, "and was such throughout the late war, persecuted for his opinions in 1861...."^5 Flanders went to New York. He had been "driven out of the city New Orleans...by a body of Rebels styling themselves a Vigilance Committee, for his devotion to the Union. He made his way to Cairo [Illinois]

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^3 Caskey, Secession and Restoration of Louisiana, 108.
and Columbus [Ohio], barely saving his life, and returned with Butler...."66

At the outbreak of the rebellion, Rufus Waples fled to Washington, D.C., and, like Bonzano, Dostie, and Flanders, he returned to New Orleans when the United States army retook the city.67

The foregoing survey shows that most of the major scalawags in Louisiana and many of the lesser Republican functionaries, were Unionists during the secession crisis and the war. Thus, persistent Unionism rather than persistent Whiggery provides a clue to the ideological basis of the Republican party in Louisiana. These white Southerners were much like those scalawags in South Carolina identified by Joel Williamson: "The single quality found in the background of most native white Republican leaders was a spirit of Unionism deeper than that of their neighbors."68 This is especially evident when one looks at the period 1862-1865. During that time the scalawags played a leading role in the Unionist organizations and activities that led directly to the creation of the Republican party in Louisiana.

66Clipping from the New York Tribune (n.d.) contained in the Flanders Papers. LSU.

67Christian Roselius to Abraham Lincoln, August 5, 1864, Appointment of Federal Judges, Marshals, and Attorneys, Box 333, Record Group 60.

68Williamson, After Slavery, 360.
CHAPTER IV

FROM UNIONISM TO REPUBLICANISM: 
THE SCALAWAGS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN LOUISIANA

The Unionist Collaborators

"Soon after the capture of the City [New Orleans], a few noble men undertook to arouse and organize the Union sentiment," George S. Denison (a Yankee observer of Louisiana politics) wrote to Salmon P. Chase in November, 1862. "Among these were Mr. Flanders, Judge Heistand, Judge Howell...and others," including Thomas Jefferson Durant, whom Denison described as one of the best lawyers in the state.¹ Despite threats of violence and ostracism, Denison claimed, the New Orleans Unionists "persevered,—called meetings, made speeches—organized Union associations—Union home guards, etc. These men have borne the heat and burden of the day and have redeemed this City."²

Unionists like Durant, Flanders, Heistand, and A. P. Dostie would provide the leadership for the activities and organizations out of which the Republican party in Louisiana emerged. An important step in the mobilization of the

²Ibid.

151
Louisiana Unionists took place at the end of May, 1862, with the establishment (at the instigation of Major General Benjamin F. Butler, the commander of the Federal occupation troops in the city from May to December, 1862) of a Union Association. This organization aimed at creating a unified movement directed by the Executive Committee of the association. The committee would arrange for prominent pro-Union men to speak at regularly scheduled meetings. To become a member of the association, one had to take an oath: "I, ________, do solemnly swear [or affirm], that I will true and faithful allegiance bear to the United States of America, and shall support and maintain to the best of my abilities, the Union and the Constitution thereof. So Help Me God."\(^3\)

The association program began with a series of rallies at the Lyceum Hall, "for the purpose of stimulating and cultivating a spirit of Unionism under the protecting wings of the Union forces."\(^4\) During July, Unionist rallies were held weekly, and sometimes more frequently. Well-known Unionists appeared at the meetings. "These men were pointed to as so many living indexes of a latent Union sentiment in the state, which needed only encouragement to make itself seen and felt," historian Willie Malvin Caskey writes. "And as their numbers grew, and there were appar-

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\(^3\)Quoted in Caskey, *Secession and Restoration of Louisiana*, 55-56.

\(^4\)Caskey, *Secession and Restoration of Louisiana*, ibid.
ently a goodly number who identified themselves with the movement during the first few weeks, in like proportion did the press clamor for local power to be entrusted to the 'faithful.'"5

A. P. Dostie was one of the most prominent of the Union "faithful." "Among the arrivals by steamer was Dr. Dostie, an eminent dentist of this city, who was," the New Orleans True Delta of August 20, 1862, informed its subscribers, "compelled to leave last August, on account of his bold expressions of Union sentiment. Dr. Dostie has been welcomed by a large circle of friends. He is a fluent and earnest speaker, and we hope, will be heard by our Union citizens at their meetings."6 Indeed, Dostie would be heard. "I have come back after one year's absence from my loved home to die for the cause of liberty; if by such sacrifice it shall receive one impetus," he announced grandly upon his arrival in New Orleans on August 20, 1862.7

Dostie was typical, if perhaps more outspoken than most, of the Louisiana Unionists. An early and active supporter of Federal policy in New Orleans, Dostie worked closely with Major General Benjamin F. Butler. Dostie spoke,

5Ibid.

6New Orleans True Delta, August 20, 1862, quoted in Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 41.

7Quoted in Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 41-42. Reed's volume must be used with extreme caution. The book is eulogistic, and presents Dostie in only the most favorable light.
for example, to various Unionist assemblies, and he served, along with Hahn and Flanders, on Butler's reorganized New Orleans school board.

Butler sought, through the appointment of the Unionists, to exorcise pro-Confederate spirits in the New Orleans school system. Thus, the general hoped to bring about a political and educational reformation. "Dr. Dostie," Emily Hazen Reed (Dostie's biographer) claims, "was the animating soul in that reformation."\(^8\)

In March, 1863, the new Unionist school board adopted a series of resolutions which called for the teachers "to counteract the evil [i.e., rebel] tendencies of the time, and to infuse into the minds of their pupils ideas in relation to public affairs which will be equally consistent with true patriotism and sound morality...." The board also ordered the teachers "to make the singing of patriotic songs, and the reading of appropriate passages from the addresses of patriotic men, a part of the business of each day...."\(^9\)

The need for a Unionist indoctrination program seemed obvious. According to historian Fred H. Harrington: "Reared in Southern homes, taught by states' rights teachers, New Orleans youngsters recited the deeds of Stonewall Jackson and P.G.T. Beauregard, sang Confederate songs

\(^8\)Ibid., 46.  
\(^9\)Quoted in ibid., 46-48.
[including "Dixie," and the "Marseillaise"], [and] mocked men in Union uniform.¹⁰ Flag presentation ceremonies were an important part of the Unionist counter-propaganda program. The ceremony that was held in March of 1863 at the Madison School, an elementary school where a rebel demonstration had occurred, was typical. At the assembly the students sang the "Star-Spangled Banner," and a troop of little girls recited a patriotic address. "We dedicate to the Madison School this 'Star-Spangled Banner,'" they chanted, "the emblem of our own native land, as a tribute to patriotism. Long, long may it wave over our school dedicated to union, science and liberty:"¹¹

At this meeting Dostie appeared and delivered, on behalf of the school board, what could be considered a manifesto of the educational objectives of the Unionist reformers. The dentist spoke of the necessity of winning the "minds and hearts" of the young people of New Orleans. "As we cast our eyes over this great Republic...," he boomed, "and behold the causeless and furious civil war now desolating our once peaceful, happy and glorious land, filling, as it does the patriot's heart with terrible apprehensions for the future of this most sacred gift--self-government--to whom are we to look for hope of salvation, but to you


¹¹Quoted in Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 47.
this rising generation, educated as, we pray the Father of Nations may be, in the just and beneficient principles of Republicanism, of unity, peace and fraternity. Then our dear country will not know the Arnolds..., Calhouns, or Davises any more."\textsuperscript{12} Dostie went on to speak of the young George Washington ("remember he could not lie"), and of the essential duty of the public schools to instill Americanism in their young charges. "Had the youths of the rebellious portions of our country been the recipients of the blessings of this munificent institution," he informed the children, "'grim-visaged war,' with its concomitants—famine, pestilence and death, would not now be blighting our once happy and homogeneous people...."\textsuperscript{13}

At that point Dostie introduced "Little Mary Murrary," who presented the flag on behalf of the four hundred students at the school. "That beautiful emblem of our glory and power," Dostie intoned, pointing to the national ensign, "that a Washington triumphantly bore through the revolutionary struggles; that a Jackson won a halo of undying glory upon the Plains of Chalmette; that a Taylor so heroically bore aloft at Buena Vista; that a Scott reveled within the halls of Montezumas; that a Farragut carried by Forts Jackson and St. Phillip in a flame of lightning; that Butler, the indomitable, unfurled from the ramparts of our

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 48.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., 49. Emphasis in the original.
treason-bound emporium; that will victoriously float over Liberty's Dominions, when the 'Stars and Bars' will be buried in oblivion.'14

However, the attempt to convert the little rebels and their instructors to the principles of Unionism, met with stiff opposition. Principals and teachers were dismissed, and, at one point, one half of the school system's eight thousand students boycotted classes for a time in protest against the board's requirements that the pupils sing Unionist songs.15 In a report to the school board, Dostie told Hahn, Flanders, and the other members, that three hundred students had been expelled for their obstinateness in face of the board's demands. "I have informed the disobedient that the requirements were just," he stated, "and therefore, irrevocable, and if they persisted in their rebellion [which they did] they must be expelled from the schools."16 Thus, Dostie sought to make "treason odious in the public schools."17

Dostie was also active in the political reformation of the Episcopal church in New Orleans. As a warden of Christ Church, he was active in the organization of a Unionist-oriented congregation. The Federal authorities took a

14 Ibid., 49-50.
15 Harrington, Banks, 95.
16 Quoted in Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 50.
17 Ibid., 52.
special interest in this work, since the city's churches had been hotbeds of rebel agitation. "The ecclesiastical institutions of the South were a dangerous power in favor of despotism and rebellion," Dostie's biographer proclaims passionately. "It was necessary to strike the Church from its foundation by the earthquake of reform."¹⁸

But Dostie's effort to win the hearts and minds of the people of New Orleans extended to secular institutions as well. "Among the 'fanatical acts' of Dr. Dostie that evoked the thundering anathemas of the rebel multitude," Reed states, "was his noted performance at the Varieties Theater [a center for rebel demonstrations]."¹⁹ Dostie, in company with B. L. Lynch and some other Unionists, was determined to hold a pro-Union demonstration at the theater. On April 23, 1863, Dostie marched into the building carrying an American flag. The result was a near riot. Rebel sympathizers and Union people in the audience shouted at and threatened each other. Amid cries and general uproar, Dostie demanded that the orchestra play the "Star-Spangled Banner." Instantly, as if on cue, the Unionists in the audience were waving small flags and demanding that the anthem be played. The theater manager then appeared on the stage, complaining that the military authorities had prohibited the playing of "political airs." "That's a lie! We will have it anyhow,"

¹⁸Ibid., 55.
¹⁹Ibid., 59.
the Unionists shouted. At that point, some members of the audience began to climb up onto the stage, and someone pulled a pistol. To avoid further trouble, the theater's manager then yielded to the Unionist demands and ordered the band to play the anthem. But even this did not fully satisfy the Unionists. When Vining Bowers, an actor known for his pro-Confederate feelings, appeared on the stage, Dostie's people hissed and called him a "goddamned rebel." Enraged at the insults, the actor challenged one protester to a duel. The disturbance ended, however, when a Yankee major stepped forward with an order from the provost marshal officially commanding the management to have its musicians play "Hail Columbia," "Yankee Doodle," and the "Star-Spangled Banner." The timely appearance of the Union officer indicates that Dostie's demonstration was planned in concert with the military government. Dostie had made his point, but the rebel-minded elements in New Orleans were livid. They considered Dostie a "fanatic" and a dangerous "agitator," a reputation that has never been disputed by historians.

With the cooperation of Unionists like Dostie, the military authorities hoped to create a ground swell of support that would eventually lead to the reestablishment of civil government in the state.

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20 For a description of the Varieties Theater demonstration see ibid., 59-60; The New Orleans True Delta, April 24, 1863; and Harrington, Banks, 97.
The *Louisiana Congressional Election of December, 1862*

Butler initiated the first official phase in the restoration of civil government when he ordered that an election be held on December 12, 1862, for two congressmen to represent the First and Second Congressional Districts (the districts then within the zone of Federal occupation). 21 Butler's Union Association endorsed E. H. Durell (for the First District) and Benjamin F. Flanders (for the Second District). "The former," Caskey states, "was presented to the voters for his ability as a lawyer, his gentlemanly qualities, and his knowledge of the institutions and interests of Louisiana. The latter had always been a patriotic public spirited gentleman, and 'fully acquainted with' the citizens and their interests." 22 Despite the Union Association's endorsement of Durell, however, Michael Hahn entered the Second District race. Hahn, an ardent Unionist, had strong support within the German-speaking community of New Orleans. Three other "independent" Unionists also entered the race--John E. Bouligny (First District), Jacob Baker (Second District), and a conservative Unionist by the name of Greathouse (Second District). The complete returns were never published, but Flanders won an easy victory over Bouligny and Hahn defeated Durell, Baker, and Greathouse with a slight majority.


22 *Ibid.*, 64.
George Denison provided this evaluation of Flanders shortly before the election: "Mr. Flanders is the candidate of the Union Association. He did not want to run but it was urged upon him. Politically Mr. F. is an Abolitionist, but not of the blood-thirsty kind. I hope for his election. The whole real Union sentiment is in his favor. If he goes to Washington, he will let a little daylight into the darkened minds of Pro-slavery Democrats."23 "Mr. Hahn," Denison reported on December 4, 1862, "is elected by a good majority. He was an original and continuous Union man, and is understood to be unconditional in his loyalty. Durell was unfortunately the candidate of the Union Association—unfortunately, for he is not popular and many members voted for Hahn, against whom I know of no objections."24

Two months after the congressional election in Louisiana, the House of Representatives voted by a large margin to seat Flanders and Hahn. "The decision represented a moment of rare agreement between President and Congress on the technical questions of the reconstruction process," writes one student of Louisiana Reconstruction, "and also a moment of unusual glory for the Free State organization."25

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25 James Peyton McCrary, "Moderation in a Revolutionary World: Lincoln and the Failure of Reconstruction in..."
On February 17, 1863, Hahn delivered his first address before the United States Congress. "I shall be brief in what I have to say," he announced. "I shall deal in facts, not in figures of speech—in blunt, unfinished sentences, not in any attempts at oratorical display."26 (Hahn's speech was neither brief, free of oratorical display, or entirely accurate.)

Hahn claimed that the majority of the population of New Orleans, and of south Louisiana, "never voluntarily" aided the rebellion. The First and Second Louisiana Congressional Districts supported Bell or Douglas in 1860. He also claimed that southern Louisiana was not really a part of the mainstream of Southern economics or politics: "The northern [part of Louisiana] is the cotton portion of the State where some of the people imagine that 'cotton is king'; but in the first and second congressional districts the culture of sugar and of vegetables is the exclusive occupation of the agriculturists. And those people have always, in every election, and under the most trying circumstances, shown their fidelity to this Government."27


27Ibid., 2.
Secession, he claimed, was forced upon an unwilling state. This came about as a result of the "wicked acts and doings" of Governor Thomas O. Moore and a clique of aggressive rebels. Secession, he argued, came as an unrepresentative coup engineered by disloyal state officials: "The Governor and other officers of the State may abandon it, but the people...will cling to the Union as they have always done, and will continue to do, until all hope from the loyal portion of this Union has gone, and you refuse absolutely to have us in the Union." 28

Hahn also described the persecution of the Louisiana loyalists: "It is a notorious fact that the jails of New Orleans were crowded with loyal citizens of Louisiana who refused to approve the treasonable doings and submit to the authority of the rebel government." It was also "a notorious fact," he stated "that many of our loyal citizens were ruthlessly driven from their homes and families and sent to the North." 29 Hahn obviously sought to convince Congress that Louisiana was essentially loyal, that the vast majority of Louisianians opposed strongly the rebel cause. As proof of this, Hahn pointed to the fact that the population of New Orleans had received Butler's army with open arms, had voluntarily formed Union associations, and had now elected two Union men to sit in the House of Represent-

28Ibid., 3.
29Ibid.
As one scholar notes, "Hahn's chronicle bore little resemblance to accurate history, but the House was in a mood to be persuaded that Louisiana was worthy of trust."  

"The opponents of secession in New Orleans and, to a lesser degree, in the surrounding parishes had been fairly numerous," Joe Gray Taylor contends, "but practically all these 'Unionists,' once secession was an accomplished fact, had worked for the success of the Confederacy."  

Those who remained loyal were driven out of political life, forced into silence or exile. Those who remained loyal were a distinct minority. Thus, the Unionist movement, and later the Republican party, in Louisiana rested upon a narrow base. Hahn, who had lived in New Orleans all his adult life and who had an insider's view of state and local politics, must have known this. Obviously, his speech was designed to justify his seat in Congress and not to provide an accurate description of the extent of Union sympathy in Louisiana. Hahn also made no mention of the divisions within the Louisiana Unionist movement itself. 

These divisions began to develop quite early. In his history of the early stages of Reconstruction politics in Louisiana, Willie Malvin Caskey provides an interesting

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30 Ibid., 3-4.

31 McCrary, "Lincoln and the Failure of Reconstruction in Louisiana," 77.

32 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 13.
analysis of the content of the speeches of the Unionist organizers in New Orleans that reveals the differences of opinion among these Unionist Southerners. The speakers, he notes, boldly expressed their undying devotion to the Federal cause, and they condemned the rebels who had forced many Union men into exile or had compelled other Unionists into the ranks of the rebel army. In their speeches, the New Orleans Unionists claimed that secession had been forced upon an essentially loyalist Louisiana. "But the spirit of unanimity which the leaders showed in their wholesale condemnation of the secession movement and the prosecution of the war on the part of the Confederacy was not apparent in their discussions of methods of reconstruction and restoration," Caskey observes. These divisions, although they would remain largely dormant until 1864, were evident in 1862.

The Radical Unionists

Disagreement over the methods of reconstruction and restoration led to development of three major factions among the Unionist Southerners, radical, moderate, and conservative. The radicals (their leadership included Thomas Jefferson Durant, Benjamin Franklin Flanders, James Graham, Rufus Waples, William R. Crane, and James Ready) championed

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33Caskey, Secession and Restoration of Louisiana, 57.

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the rights of laboring men and favored the emancipation of the slaves. This group also advocated the confiscation of rebel property and the recruiting of blacks for service in the Union army. "Following Butler and Chase in national politics," Fred H. Harrington states, "the group opposed conciliation, favored war to the finish, wanted a full-fledged confiscation program, demanded all-out Negro recruiting, and inclinde toward extending suffrage to the colored man." "

Thomas Jefferson Durant personified the radical ideals. "The free state cause is gaining rapidly," John Hutchings, a Treasury employee, wrote to Secretary Chase in December, 1862. "Meetings are held in some parts of the city most every night. Mr. Durant & I addressed the working men's associations on Thursday evening of last week. There was a large attendance & we took the bold ground that slavery should be entirely abolished. Mr. Durant declared himself to be a radical abolitionist." In that same month Durant wrote to Stanislas Wrotnowski, a Polish immigrant and long-time Louisiana resident, concerning the need to turn public opinion against slavery. Southern antislavery men, he stated, must create "a current of opposition to the

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35 Ibid., 125.
36 Harrington, Banks, 100.
principle of slavery...." With slavery destroyed, he argued, "we put an end to rebellion and disloyalty." Yet, he had no illusions about the difficulty of their task: "We have a great deal of labor both physical and intellectual to perform, before this happy consummation can be accomplished, but we have been appointed to do the work, and we must go through with it."38

The Moderate Unionists

The moderate faction (led by Michael Hahn, A. P. Dostie, Benjamin F. Lynch, and others) "supported Lincoln, Seward, and the moderate Republicans in advocacy of caution and conciliation, in reluctance to push Negro rights and in opposition to confiscation...." This moderate element, historian Gerald M. Capers maintains in his study of occupied New Orleans, "opposed political and social equality for Negroes, to which white urban workers [whom the moderates claimed to represent] objected almost as much as small farmers in rural areas."39

In an address (delivered on November 14, 1863) to the Union Association of New Orleans, Hahn explained his middle-of-the-road position (he called it "Unconditional Unionism") on Reconstruction in general and the restoration to Louisiana of civil government, in particular. "I have not yielded

38 Durant to Wrotroski, December 14, 1863, Durant Papers, NYHS. Emphasis in the original.

39 Capers, Occupied City, 128.
in the slightest degree to the busy slanders of those who have unnecessarily and maliciously sought to injure me in this community, on one hand by denouncing me as a 'negro-worshiping abolitionist,' and on the other hand by stigmatizing me as a 'Copperhead.' "\(^{40}\) He claimed to stand between those two extremes. "I stand fully and squarely on the platform of Abraham Lincoln," Hahn declared. \(^{41}\) He admitted that he had supported Stephen Douglas in the presidential campaign of 1860, but he now saw "that a better man than Abraham Lincoln could not have been elected." \(^{42}\)

Hahn then shifted his attention to the divisions within the Unionist forces. He referred to the factions only obliquely, but his intention was clear enough. "I regret that before the rebel army has yet been entirely swept from our State, and while there is still so much necessity for harmony among the friends of the Union," he said, "you should allow your feelings and prejudices on minor questions to lead you so far astray as to resort to all manner of personal and political abuse, bickerings and divisions, calculated to seriously retard the progress of the Union cause." \(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) The speech was published in pamphlet form. See Michael Hahn, *What is Unconditional Unionism?* (New Orleans: Era Office, 1863), 4.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.
Slavery, he stated, must not be an issue: "My own position is this: I am 'for the Union with or without slavery, but prefer it without.' I am emphatically an unconditional Union man. I will not make it a condition of my Unionism that slavery should be abolished, nor that it shall be maintained. I go for the Union in either case, but prefer it without slavery."44

He next spoke on the method by which state government would be restored. Hahn said that he opposed the old pro-slavery, pro-planter state constitution of 1852. He favored calling a constitutional convention (a proposal also favored by the radicals) to rewrite the constitution. A new document, he thought, would destroy the power of the great planters, and establish a government that would be "fair and just to the small planters and farmers, the adventurous frontiersmen, the honest mechanics, hardy laborers, the enterprising manufacturers and merchants and the professional men...."45 This was only just, he declared. "Why should a man, because he owns a plantation and slaves, have greater political rights than other men who have no such profitable investments?"46

Hahn ended his speech with a discussion of the future of the black race in Louisiana. He encouraged the slave-

44Ibid., 5. Emphasis in the original.
46Ibid., 9.
holders to free their slaves voluntarily. "Let us apply ourselves to the duty of devising some new plan for the prosecution of the agricultural interests," he proposed. Hahn's "new plan" was a system almost identical to the infamous black codes soon to be put into force throughout the South. He called for the enactment of "stringent and effective vagrant laws" to force unwilling Negroes to work. "The contracts for hire can be made as to allow the planter to retain in his hands several months' wages until the grinding or picking season is over," Hahn proposed, "and in case the laborer should violate his contract a forfeiture of wages would be the consequence." If a new labor system could not be devised, Hahn proposed that "the negroes be sent to colonies abroad where they will cease to trouble us; and let the plantations be divided into small farms and cultivated by white labor." Even Abraham Lincoln, he reminded the audience, favored the resettlement of blacks outside the country. Hahn also reminded his fellow Unionists that he considered himself "a friend of the colored people," and an advocate of emancipation. But as to civil rights, he was totally opposed to the idea: "I cannot but regret and condemn the course which some of them [blacks]

47 Ibid., 10.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 11.
are now pursuing in this city. At a meeting held by them [blacks]...resolutions were passed demanding the right to vote with white men...." This Hahn could not accept. In the resolution, the blacks had claimed to be "natives of Louisiana," thus implying that they were more entitled to the suffrage than the German and Irish immigrants in the state. Hahn decried this as the "spirit of Know-Nothingism,"51 and defended the naturalized citizens. The Germans, he said, were literate (unlike the blacks) and "as a general thing do not make their crosses, but sign their names, and in beautiful penmanship at that."52 He conceded that the Irish, because of British oppression, lacked a "book education," but the Irish "vivacity, activity, wit and intelligence, is proverbial."53

Hahn concluded his remarks by pleading with Unionists to avoid factionalism and "to discard all personal controversies and irritating discussions calculated to divide Union men."54 In conclusion, he encouraged his fellow Unionists to avoid "party differences," to avoid "minor issues," and to unite in the cause of unconditional unionism.55

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 12.
55 Ibid.
This speech reveals a great deal about Michael Hahn's political persuasion and his ability to sense the direction of the political winds. Amos E. Simpson and Vaughn B. Baker (two Louisiana historians currently collecting material for a full biographical study of Hahn) claim that Hahn was "a quintessential nineteenth-century liberal." His "concern for economic freedom and growth, his sincere dedication to the principles of civil liberty, his interest in education, his commitment to rationalism as the basis for action and his dominating nationalism," these two historians maintain, "firmly establish him in the Western liberal tradition."\(^5\)

To be sure, Hahn had certain things in common with the democratic liberalism of the nineteenth century, but Simpson and Baker's estimate seems overly idealistic. Hahn was ambitious, clever, and adaptable, closer perhaps to the civic-booster tradition than classical liberalism. He was adept at political infighting and followed closely the political currents in Louisiana, as his pre-civil war political career clearly demonstrates. He became a Douglas Democrat during the secession crisis, and he claimed to be an uncompromising Unionist. Yet, during the brief period of Confederate control in New Orleans, he took the oath of office as a notary public. At the same time, "he purposely and carefully excluded therefrom all that portion requiring fidelity to the Confederate States."\(^7\) The judge who


\(^7\)The Political Career of Hon. Michael Hahn (New

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administered the oath was a friend of Hahn, and conveniently overlooked the deletion.

Hahn retained his position without technically taking the rebel oath. During the Federal occupation of New Orleans, he sided with the moderate Unionists; later he became a Radical Republican; and still later an anti-Grant-liberal Republican. He held various state and federal positions from 1862 until his death in 1885, a feat due, perhaps, more to his ability to maneuver than to his uncompromising idealism. Like many other scalawags, Hahn was a political animal. He enjoyed the rough and tumble politics of Louisiana and, perhaps, the material advantages of officeholding. Hahn was a go-along-get-along politician, more of a realist than an idealist.

In 1866, for example, he would deliver a long speech which directly contradicted his "Unconditional Unionism" speech of 1863. He attacked, in detail, the Louisiana black codes, and called for black suffrage.\textsuperscript{58} In fact, by 1866, not only Hahn, but Dostie and most of the other moderate Unionists had moved into the Radical ranks. This political maneuvering in Louisiana had a Byzantine quality to it. In 1862 and 1863, the radicals and moderates, and even the conservatives, had formed an uneasy coalition. By 1864 the three factions were in open opposition to each other.

\textsuperscript{58}For the text of the speech, see Michael Hahn, Ex-Governor Hahn on Louisiana Legislation Relating to Freedmen (Washington, D.C.: W. H. Moore, Printer, 1866), passim.
In that year, the moderates briefly gained control of the state government. By 1865, however, the moderates were driven out of power and into the arms of the radicals when the returning rebels and conservatives regained control under Andrew Johnson's scheme of Reconstruction. With the establishment of Radical Reconstruction in the state, many of the old moderate and radical Unionists (now Republicans) would be in office again. One had to be clever to survive in such a political arena--more clever than principled. If these men seem too opportunistic or cynical, it should also be noted that there was one idea, or ideal, that remained constant with both moderates and the radicals: devotion to the Union. Men like Hahn and Dostie could adopt one principle one year and another principle the next, but there is no reason to doubt their Unionism. Republicanism, in Louisiana at least, was seen by these men to be an extension of their Unionist beliefs. Issues like black suffrage, or a particular mode of Reconstruction, were usually secondary to them at this stage of Reconstruction. Radicals and moderates (Geral M. Capers refers to them as the "liberal wings" of the Unionist movement) were united in their opposition to the conservatives who seemed, in their view, hardly to be Unionists at all. And until 1864, these wings would present a "united front." 

59 Capers, Occupied City, 130.

60 McCrary, "Lincoln and the Failure of Reconstruction in Louisiana," 156. McCrary claims that Harrington and
The Conservative Unionists

The conservative faction (led by Christian Roselius, A. P. Field, J.Q.A. Fellows, Thomas Cottman, Jacob Barker, Julian Neville, Bradish Johnson, and E. E. Malhiot) sought "to retain the aristocratic constitution of 1852 intact, hoping at worst for compensated emancipation."\(^61\)

This group, according to Harrington, was "barely Unionist at all." Existing on the edge of the Unionist camp, these conservatives "consisted of Southern sympathizers who swore allegiance to the Lincoln government merely to protect their property. Many of these persons would not vote or otherwise participate in Union politics. Others went into the fray to aid the politicians least likely to destroy the institutions of pre-war Louisiana."\(^62\)

On May 1, 1863, a committee representing the planter interests met at the lush St. Charles Hotel in New Orleans. Hoping to persuade the Lincoln administration to restore the government upon the basis of the old pro-slavery, pro-planter state constitution of 1852, these conservative Unionists appointed three men, E. E. Malhiot, Bradish Johnson, and Thomas Cottman to go to Washington to appeal

Capers overemphasized the moderate-radical split before 1864. The weight of the evidence balances in favor of McCravy's thesis.

\(^61\)Capers, Occupied City, 125.

\(^62\)Harrington, Banks, 100.
directly to the President. When they arrived in the capitol, the delegation presented a letter which contended that the act of secession was illegal, and that the Constitution of 1852 remained in full force. They also requested that an election for state officers be held. The conservatives' proposal was not unexpected. Michael Hahn, in a letter written on June 6, 1863, had warned Lincoln of their design to effect a quick restoration favorable to the old power elite:

The Union people of this State (except, of course, office-holders) are all in favor of a reorganization of a loyal State government. The only question on which they are divided is as to whether a new Constitution should be made, or the old Constitution of 1852 adhered to. Those in favor of a Convention and a new Constitution are the more radical or free-soil Union men.... Others, whose interests are in slavery...are strongly opposed...and are satisfied with the Constitution of 1852, which unjustly gives the country parishes a very large preponderance over the City in the number of members of the legislature....

Although Lincoln too wanted restoration completed as quickly as possible, his firm rejection (dated June 19, 1863) of their request indicates that the President was unwilling to restore civil government without some concessions to the radicals and moderates. "Lincoln, who evidently refused to

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64 Ibid., V, 287.

65 Ibid., VI, 288-289.
be embarrassed by the official reception of this committee of Unionists planters," Caskey states, "received its petition...and answered in like manner, clearly demonstrating that he was in sympathy with the radical leaders of his party, and with them was taking more advanced ground."

Thus, the President replied:

Since receiving the letter, reliable information has reached me that a respectable portion of the Louisiana people, desire to amend their State constitution, and contemplate holding a convention for that object. This fact alone, as it seems to me, is a sufficient reason why the general government should not give the committal you seek, to the existing State constitution. I may add that, while I do not perceive how such committal could facilitate our military operations in Louisiana, I really apprehend it might be so used as to embarrass them.

As to an election to be held next November, there is abundant time, without any order, or proclamation from me just now. The people of Louisiana shall not lack an opportunity of a fair election for both Federal and State officers, by want of anything within my power to give them. Your Obt. Servt.

A. LINCOLN

Lincoln looked to the radicals and moderates to devise an alternative plan of restoration.

The Union Association Plan of Restoration

As President of the General Committee of the Union associations, the radical Durent played a leading role in the formulation of a counterplan for the restoration of civil government in Louisiana. (Other radical and moderate Unionists were active in the committee, including James

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66Caskey, Secession and Restoration of Louisiana, 76.
Graham, William Henry Hire, James Ready, Rufus Waples, A. P. Dostie, B. F. Flanders, and Michael Hahn. On May 23, 1863, Durant and James Graham (secretary of the committee) sent a letter to Brigadier General G. F. Shepley, then military governor of Louisiana. The letter presented a detailed scheme for the establishment of a new state government. This plan called for: first, a constitutional convention to rewrite the state constitution of 1852 (in the interest of the non-slaveholders); second, universal suffrage for all loyal white men in the selection of delegates to the convention; third, an oath of allegiance to the United States to be taken by each voter; fourth, a registration of loyal voters in Louisiana. Shepley responded favorably to the Unionist proposal. He agreed to order a registration of voters and to appoint commissioners to register voters in each parish. "This registration, I shall immediately order to be made of those voters who voluntarily come forward to register themselves," he informed Durant and Graham. "I invite the co-operation and assistance of your committee and of the associations they represent...." The process looked simple enough on paper, but

67 The activities of the General Committee are recorded in the Minute Book of the General Committee Union Associations of New Orleans and Jefferson, Louisiana, 1863, New York Historical Society. Hereinafter cited as Minute Book, NYHS.

68 Ibid., 14-17.

the actual registration quickly bogged down because of the Federal army's inability to clear Louisiana of rebel troops. "The military stalemate stymied the work of the free state movement, in turn, because," McCrary concludes, "the conquest of Confederate territory was, by definition, the first prerequisite of reconstruction." The problem was compounded when the military reestablished the parish police juries with conservatives filling the positions. And disagreements over the technicalities of the registration between Shepley and Durant also impeded the registration. 70

General Shepley and General Banks had encouraged Lincoln to believe that the registration process would go smoothly. "Gov. Shepley has informed me that Mr. Durant is now taking a registry [Durant had been appointed Attorney-General and Registrar of Voters on June 10, 1863], with a view to the election of a constitutional convention in Louisiana," Lincoln wrote to Banks on August 5, 1863. "This, to me, appears proper. If such convention were to ask my views, I could present little else than what I now say to you. I think the thing should be pushed forward...." 71

70 McCrary, "Lincoln and the Failure of Reconstruction in Louisiana," 140-141.

71 Lincoln to Banks, August 5, 1863, Works of Lincoln, VI, 364-365.
Lincoln told Banks that he wanted the convention to recognize the emancipation proclamation, to provide for the education of young blacks, and to devise "some practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other...."\textsuperscript{72} Lincoln desired a simple and flexible restoration in Louisiana, but he was to be sorely disappointed. In November, Lincoln complained to Banks that reconstruction had not moved an inch further in Louisiana. "Three months ago to-day [November 5] I wrote to you about Louisiana affairs, stating on the word of Gov. Shepley...that Mr. Durant was taking a registry of citizens, preparatory to the election of a constitutional convention for that State," Lincoln stated. "I sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Durant; and I now have his letter, written two months after...saying he is not taking such registry; and he does not let me know that he personally is expecting to do so. Mr. Flanders... is here now, and he says nothing has yet been done. This disappoints me bitterly."\textsuperscript{73}

He then commanded Banks to proceed immediately with the registration. "I wish him [General Shepley]--these gentlemen [Durant and Flanders] and others co-operating--without waiting for more territory, to go to work and give me a tangible nucleus which the remainder of the State may

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73}Lincoln to Banks, November 5, 1863, ibid., VII, 1.
rally around as fast as it can, and which I can at once recognize and sustain as the true State government."
Lincoln, however, reminded Banks that restoration must be based upon loyal men willing to support the emancipation proclamation.74

The State Election of February, 1864.

From June to November, 1863, little progress had been made toward the restoration of civil government in Louisiana, despite Lincoln's request that Shepley and Banks work closely with Durant's Union Association. Now the President demanded action. Banks, with Lincoln's permission, assumed direct control of Reconstruction in Louisiana (Shepley, Durant, and others participating in the registry were relieved of their duties). To speed up the process, Banks decided to hold state elections on February 22, 1864, and then, after the restoration of civil authority, to call a constitutional convention. Thus, the election would be held on the basis of the pro-planter constitution of 1852. Banks, however, did make one concession: the provisions in the constitution upholding slavery would be abolished. But reapportionment (which would favor the non-slaveholder) would be postponed until the convention.

The radical-moderate coalition now began to break apart. The radicals, following Durant's lead, worked against Banks' scheme to reorganize the state. For their part, the

74 Ibid.
moderates were also opposed to the plan, but reluctantly accepted the idea. In a petition (dated January 25, 1863), the moderates asked for a convention to be held before the scheduled February election. "But if you, General, should find it more consonant with the public interests to deny this earnest petition," the document stated, "rest assured that these same loyal voters will do their duty as best they may in carrying out the letter and spirit of your proclamation." The petition bore the signatures of James Ready, A. P. Dostie, and William Henry Hire.75

Durant summarized his objections in a long letter to Salmon P. Chase on the eve of the election. "The proclamation of General Banks of the 11th inst., ordering an election of State officials...under a constitution which 'states' was odious to the Friends of Freedom [i.e., those advocating black suffrage] and overthrown by the rebellion, necessarily throws things into confusion."76 Banks, he claimed, ignored the constitutional questions and proceeded at the general's own "will and pleasure and that by virtue of it he changes the constitution of 1852 to suit his own view; among other things to enable his soldiers to vote, who by the express terms of that constitution are excluded."77

75Ready, Dostie and Hire to Banks, January 25, 1863, N. P. Banks Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Hereinafter cited as Banks Papers, LC.

76Durant to Chase, February 21, 1864, Chase Papers, LC.

77Ibid.
Furthermore, Durant charged, "Banks declares that he will order an election of five members of Congress although the state is not divided into Districts and cannot be as there is no Legislature, and Congress has not acted. He declares that his Governor, when elected, shall appoint two U.S. Senators. He announces that he will fix the basis of representation in the convention to form a new constitution at his own will."\(^78\) For a man with Durant's well-developed sense of constitutional procedure, this course was unacceptable. Durant went on to describe Hahn (Banks' candidate for governor) as "a trickster and a trimming politician."\(^79\)

If Durant was uncompromisingly opposed to the Banks-Lincoln scheme, Michael Hahn was more than willing to cooperate. A letter from Hahn to Banks (dated October 3, 1863) reveals the close personal and political association between the scalawag and the general: "After a long trip on the [Mississippi] River, and after spending a few days in St. Louis and New York I arrived here [Washington, D.C.] this morning. While in N. Y. I made two attempts to see Mrs. Banks, but did not find her at home.... I left your letter for her...I had quite a lengthy interview with the President this morning and have just paid Mr. Chase a visit. The President concurs with us generally in our opinions, and will do all in his power to further our views. He

\(^{78}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{79}\text{Ibid.}\)
speaks of you in the most friendly spirit and has the utmost confidence in your ability, etc. I saw upon his table a number of photographic views of the interior defences of Port Hudson, and a map of Louisiana occupied a conspicuous place before him."80

The military, Durant charged correctly, was using its authority to promote Hahn's candidacy, and using the New Orleans Era to attack B. F. Flanders (the radical candidate for governor) and his supporters in "the most shameful and indecent manner."81 In Durant's view, the exercise of such power by a military commander was "entirely inconsistent with the principles of our Government...."82

The Lincoln administration, he maintained, "has fallen into the error of trying to hurry on civil reorganization at too rapid a rate. Congress should use more control of the whole matter and fix on an immutable basis the civil and political status of the population of African descent, before any state shall be readmitted into the Union."83 In conclusion, Durant denied that he and his followers were "fanatics," as the military-backed press had charged, and he warned Chase that, unless Congress acted quickly, the "reactionary...men who hate and fear the consequences of

80 Hahn to Banks, October 3, 1863, Box 44, Banks Papers, LC.

81 Durant to Chase, February 21, 1864, Chase Papers, LC.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.
this rebellion in the improvement and elevation of the colored man" would take control.84

The day after Durant wrote his letter to Chase, the moderates rode to victory on a military bandwagon. In fact, there was little doubt among the politically astute as to who would win the contest. Hahn won 6,183 votes, or 54 percent of the 11,411 votes cast. The conservative candidate, J.Q.A. Fellows, came in second (with 2,996 votes, or 26 percent of the total), and the radical choice, Benjamin Franklin Flanders ran a weak third (with 2,232 votes, or 20 percent of the total). James Madison Wells, who ran on both the radical and moderate tickets, was elected lieutenant governor. The other victors included Stanislas Wrotnowski (secretary of state), Bartholomew L. Lynch (attorney general), James G. Belden (state treasurer), and A. P. Dostie (state auditor).85 The active support given to the Hahn faction by the military, in addition to the defection of many radicals, and some conservatives, into the moderate camp, accounts for the triumph of the moderate wing in the state campaign of 1864.

Hahn and his followers were ecstatic over their victory. His grand inauguration ceremony on March 4, 1864, was a lavish spectacle. Public and private buildings were hung

84 Ibid.

85 The most complete analysis of the 1864 state elections is in McCrary, "Lincoln and the Failure of Reconstruction in Louisiana," 267, 273-275.
with gay bunting and even the ships and riverboats in the harbor were decorated for the festival. A large circular platform was erected for the dignitaries and more than fifty thousand chairs were arranged in a semicircle around it. The ceremony began with eight thousand school children singing "Hail Columbia." Then E. H. Durell administered the oath of office to Hahn. Following Hahn's inaugural address, an orchestra of five hundred musicians played the "Anvil Chorus" from "Il Trovatore," accompanied by fifty blacksmiths keeping time on their anvils, and fifty pieces of Yankee artillery booming in cadence. The featured speaker was General Banks, an indication of the real source of the moderates' strength.86

The first phase in Banks' plan of Reconstruction was now complete. The second phase involved the rewriting of the state constitution of 1852. The history of the constitutional convention of 1864 needs no elaboration here. Roger Shugg in his study, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana, has provided an analysis of the 1864 constitution. He sees it (and Joe Gray Taylor, in his revisionist survey of Reconstruction in Louisiana, concurs) as a victory for white farmers and laborers, who resented the favorable political position of the planters and who wanted and received the establishment of minimum wages and maximum hours.

86Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 97-98.
for laborers. And, although it outlawed slavery, the constitution was a defeat for the advocates of black suffrage (which most white non-slaveholders opposed but which Lincoln had urged Hahn to endorse). But the moderates were content. "The Convention thus called, ably and patriotically performed its great work and the people have cheerfully and nobly ratified it," Hahn observed optimistically in October, 1864. "Slavery can no more exist, nor can man ever again in Louisiana have or pretend to have property in man."88

The period of content, however, would be short-lived. When the voters ratified the constitution of 1864, they also voted into office a new state legislature. In January, 1865, the legislature appointed Hahn to fill one of Louisiana's vacant seats in the United States Senate. Hahn eagerly accepted the position. His acceptance would be the catalyst for a new political crisis in Louisiana.

James Madison Wells and the Conservative Reaction

"It appears to me," George S. Denison observed in May, 1865, "that a crisis has arrived in the political affairs of


88 Michael Hahn, Message of the Governor of the State of Louisiana, Delivered October 7, 1864 (New Orleans: W. R. Fish, State Printer, 1864).
The resignation of Governor Hahn, which initiated the "crisis," brought into power Lieutenant Governor James Madison Wells.

In the state elections of 1864, Wells had appeared on both the Radical and moderate Unionist tickets. General N. P. Banks maintained in a letter to Montgomery Blair that Wells "was one of the most violent of the Radicals, and was one of the Flanders party--by which he was nominated for Lieutenant Governor." Also, Banks wrote, "the friends of Mr. Lincoln who nominated Hahn took Wells upon the ticket...to pacify the more violent anti-slavery or Chase men."  

Although Wells later joined the radical ranks, no evidence exists to support Banks' contention that Wells was a radical at this time. In fact, the two Unionist factions chose Wells for just the opposite reason. As an uncom­promising Union man, a plantation owner, a well-known figure in central Louisiana, "and a courtly, aristocratic-looking man," Wells would add stature to the tickets. Wells served essentially as window dressing to provide both sides with "an aura of aristocratic Unionism...." Wells remained silent

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90 N. P. Banks to Montgomery Blair, May 6, 1865, Blair Family Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Hereinafter cited as Blair Family Papers, LC.
during the campaign, making no statements regarding the central issue of the election—black suffrage. 91

Both radicals and moderates would regret their support of Wells. He turned out to be, in their eyes, not a steady patriot but a political chameleon. Following his inauguration, Wells quickly ignored the small band of white Radicals as he sought to create a balance between the more numerous moderate Unionists and ex-Confederates. The Louisiana Radicals found themselves out of office, out of power, and out of sorts.

By June, 1865, however, even the moderates' position began to erode, as Wells abandoned his middle course to form a one-sided alliance with the ex-Confederates who, along with their fellow travelers, now made up a majority of the Louisiana electorate. 92 The failure of the Louisiana legislature to disfranchise ex-rebels, coupled with the numerous pardons granted to the wealthy planters by President Johnson, produced this revival of conservative power. 93 Keenly sensitive to the direction of the political winds, Wells initiated a "policy of conciliation" toward the planters and their allies. 94 This policy consisted of: 1) wholesale dismissal of Unionists and radicals from office

92Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 58-59.
93Ibid., 59.
and appointment of ex-Confederates and rebel sympathizers to state and local positions; 2) removal of the tax base for the support of black schools; and 3) official opposition to black suffrage.  

Wells acted out of a sense of political expediency and a certain empathy for the planter class. "The reason for this course and for this condition of things," Denison explained, "is that the Governor belonging entirely to what is known as the planting interest with whom he has been so long connected, and from whom he never has broken away... desired to form a party that should support him, and thus would to a great degree strengthen him and consolidate his power."  

The "policy of conciliation" sent a shock wave of fear and resentment through the Unionist camps. The radical New Orleans Tribune lashed out against Wells and his conservative allies in a bitter, passionate editorial: "We must despair of this generation for this generation had handed [sic] the whips and sold human flesh in the market, and they are corrupt. Let them die in peace. But for God and country's sake do not make of them Governors, Lieutenant Governors, Judges, Mayors, Sheriffs...and Senators...."  

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95Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 60-61.  
96George S. Denison to Hugh McCulloch, May 6, 1865, Denison Papers, LC.  
97New Orleans Tribune, June 4, 1865.
N. P. Banks charged that Wells upon becoming governor turned out to be "a Rebel of the boldest type." The new governor displaced prominent Unionist officials "and appointed in nearly every instance rank copperheads and Rebels—in two or three instances men whose names are borne on the Ordinance of Secession, and have steadily sympathized with the Rebellion to this day." 98

The dismissal of A. P. Dostie caused the loudest outcry from Wells' opponents. An outspoken scalawag, Dostie was a sure target for removal. Wells claimed that Dostie failed to furnish the official bond required of a State Auditor. Dostie countered with the argument that the charges against him were false and his removal illegal. 99 Shortly before noon on June 13, 1865, several policemen evicted Dostie from his office. Ever ready to make a speech, Dostie shouted as the police approached, "If I must go, I wish first to say a few words...." But before he could finish, two policemen advanced on him and forcibly removed him from the room. 100

If the radicals and moderates were outraged at the purge, the conservative forces in Louisiana were overjoyed. "Governor Wells is giving us unmistakable evidence of his intention to purify the ballot-box," the conservative leader

98 N. P. Banks to Montgomery Blair, May 6, 1865, Blair Family Papers, LC.
99 Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 194-198.
100 Ibid., 191.
John A. Rozier wrote, "to rid himself and the country of so many obscure and fifteenth-rate men who have swarmed in the public offices...."101

The Radicals and moderates fumed and fretted as the postwar reaction set in. In their view, ex-rebels and copperheads had seized control of Louisiana while the loyal men watched in near helpless desperation. The Tribune looked to the "small nucleus of faithful white Union men and the whole mass of colored people" to counter the resurgence of conservative power.102

The crisis of the summer of 1865 spurred this core of radical whites (scalawags and carpetbaggers) and their black associates into action. The opposition to the Wells-Confederate administration centered in the "Friends of Universal Suffrage." Organized in early 1865 to promote black suffrage and to secure repeal of the Louisiana black codes, this association became the chief vehicle for radical discontent.103 The leadership of the movement included

101 John A. Rozier to A. P. Field, June 16, 1865, in ibid., 203.
102 New Orleans Tribune, June 1, 1865.
several prominent scalawags: B. F. Flanders, Rufus Waples, W. R. Crane, and Thomas Jefferson Durant (the President of the "Central Executive Committee of the Friends of Universal Suffrage.")¹⁰⁴ These radicals recognized the critical nature of the situation. Moreover, they saw the issue of black suffrage as vital to their position. Without black votes, the white radicals would remain a powerless minority. The black leadership in New Orleans also realized that the key to political success lay in Negro suffrage. The Tribune reminded its readers that "the colored voters are all loyal, all unionists, all opposed to the reestablishment of slavery...." The black voters would unite in a solid bloc, the radical journal stated, and "their votes would weigh, as a single mass, on one scale of the balance."¹⁰⁵ Thomas Jefferson Durant saw black suffrage as "the only way to secure to all the fruits of our victory."¹⁰⁶ The struggle had shifted from the battlefield to the ballot box, and the radicals were prepared to fight it out if it took all summer.

The radicals were under no illusions about the difficulty of their task; the movement to enfranchise the Negroes faced determined opposition. "I think we are going to have great trouble during the next four years, & I see signs of

¹⁰⁵ New Orleans Tribune, June 23, 1865.
¹⁰⁶ Ibid., June 18, 1865.
it every day," Denison wrote. This Yankee observer anticipated "continual and bitter antagonisms between the Rebs on the one hand, and the Northern and Union men on the other." Although confident of ultimate victory, Denison predicted "a great struggle in regard to negro suffrage."107

In order to mobilize their forces more effectively, the radicals created the "Central Executive Committee of the Friends of Universal Suffrage." The formation of this committee on June 16, 1865, marked the transformation of a rather loosely organized pressure group into a tightly structured "instrument for political action."108

At the time of the creation of the Executive Committee, Durant announced that the organization stood on the "principle of equality of all men before the law." Also, Durant warned that the ex-rebels must not be allowed to control the reconstruction of Louisiana. To prevent such a catastrophe, Negroes must be given the franchise. "When they [the ex-Confederates] were concocting treason, and fighting against their country," Durant stated, "it was the black men who gave aid and assistance to the defenders of the Union." Durant looked to "Universal Suffrage" and the


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"just intervention of Congress" to save the day for the loyal men of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{109}

The \textit{Tribune} explained that the Executive Committee members "having charge of the organization of the Universal Suffrage party will have before them matters of the highest importance—the great and arduous duty of putting the political machine of the party in motion." The Committee, under Durant's direction, tried to unify the various radical elements in Louisiana by taking control of the finances of the organization, by acting as a committee of correspondence, and by supervising the expansion of the movement into the rural parishes. Through these actions the radicals hoped to construct a political counterforce to the Wells administration.\textsuperscript{110} The next step was the creation of a formal party apparatus.

\textbf{The Republican Convention of September, 1865}

The scalawags played the leading role in the founding of the Louisiana Republican party. Thomas Jefferson Durant, W. R. Crane, Benjamin Franklin Flanders, Dr. William Henry Hire, Rufus Waples, and Arnaud Commagene were prominent among the Southern whites who joined the blacks and carpetbag leaders (there were 111 delegates in all) in the series of meetings which marked the official birth of the party in Louisiana.

\textsuperscript{109}New Orleans \textit{Tribune}, June 18, 1865.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., June 23, 1865.

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At the first evening session, on September 25, 1865, the delegates unanimously selected Durant as president of the convention. Amid great cheering and applause, a committee escorted Durant to the front of Economy Hall. In his keynote address, Durant declared the central theme of the convention to be "universal liberty and universal suffrage." He then entered into a long, detailed explanation of the reasons why the radicals would ignore the November state elections. The contest, Durant pointed out, would have no validity since it would be held under the auspices of the "illegal" constitution of 1864. Durant urged the delegates to look only to the United States Congress for the restoration of civil government in Louisiana.\footnote{Proceedings of the Convention of the Republican Party, 14.}

The next night, W. R. Crane, convention treasurer and spokesman for the committee on resolutions, introduced a series of proposals which, in part, constituted the platform of the embryonic party. The Crane resolutions endorsed the state-suicide theory regarding the status of the conquered states and called for a program of racial justice.

The Crane resolutions declared that the Ordinance of Secession had "disrupted" the relationship between the Federal government and the people of Louisiana rendering them "incapable of exercising the privileges of citizens of the United States." Furthermore, the acts of Congress declaring the people of Louisiana to be in a state of insur-
rection automatically "unfitted them for the functions of a state in the Union." Declaring it unwise to admit immediately Louisiana to the Union, Crane urged that the state be placed on a probationary status, in a sort of legal limbo, during which time the state would be governed by a "preliminary system of local government...to endure so long as may be necessary, to test the fidelity of the people to the United States, and to accustom the inhabitants to exercise in harmony and peace the rights and duties of self-government.\footnote{112}{Ibid., 16.}

The heart of the Crane resolutions concerned the party's commitment to black rights. Crane protested against the state's black codes as a "system of serfdom, or forced labor" designed to turn the clock back on emancipation. The resolutions urged Congress to enfranchise the black man as a reward for his wartime service, and as a way of enabling him to protect his new found liberty through the ballot box. The ninth resolution reaffirmed the delegates' faith in the principles of human rights, as put forth in the Declaration of Independence, and called for the expansion of those principles so as to include "our loyal fellow-citizens of African descent." The tenth resolution established as the basis of the new party a commitment to "universal suffrage, liberty and the equality of all men before the law." Lastly, the delegates adopted a recommendation calling for the

\footnote{112}{Ibid., 16.}
holding of a national Republican convention whose members would be elected "without distinction of race or color."\(^{113}\)

At the session on Wednesday evening, B. F. Flanders, vice president and chairman of the committee which composed the "Address of the State Convention to the People of Louisiana," read to the assembly the first public statement of the new party. In the "Address" Flanders repeated the basic ideas set down in the Crane resolutions. Flanders stated that the people of Louisiana must accept the fact that slavery was dead, "swept away by the tempest of war," and "the people of African descent are now free and as free as all other men." Flanders reminded the ex-rebels that under Johnson's amnesty program they swore to uphold faithfully "all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion, with reference to the emancipation of slaves."\(^{114}\)

According to Flanders, the people of Louisiana were required to do more than uphold the narrow legal aspects of emancipation. Each voter was "bound in conscience and in honor to treat every man, white or black, as free; and to treat him as he would wish himself to be treated." Flanders reminded the people of Louisiana of the positive contributions of the free black population to the state in the antebellum period. "Whether as a soldier or a citizen," Flanders contended, "the free man of color has invariably

\(^{113}\)Ibid., 16-17.

\(^{114}\)Ibid., 18-19.
shown himself, in all the ennobling qualities of man, the
equal of his more favored fellow-citizen, nor has he ever
ceased to be a useful member of the State, when treated with
justice and equality; and that what those formerly free have
been, the newly emancipated class is prepared to be."
Flanders then urged the people of Louisiana not to hold the
black population responsible for the war or to "continue in
the delusion that 'a few fanatics in the North and South'
produced the great rebellion." The Civil War, Flanders
stated, came about because "the ideal of slavery was incompat­
ible with that of liberty." The war came because
"slavery was too arrogant to yield peacefully to its
inevitable fate."\textsuperscript{115}

Flanders attacked the Louisiana constitution of 1864
and the legality of the existing state government. The
Wells' administration had no validity as a true state
government, he claimed, but existed merely as an adjunct
of the Federal military authority in Louisiana.\textsuperscript{116} Flanders
ended with the recommendation that a territorial delegate
be elected "to present the views and feelings of the
republicans of Louisiana at Washington...."\textsuperscript{117}

The major controversy of the convention resulted from
Henry Clay Warmoth's proposal that the delegates immediately

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., 19-20.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., 21.
draft a new constitution, and submit it to the voters for approval. Evidently Warmoth's resolution found considerable support among the delegates, for when he concluded his remarks, the auditorium exploded with cheers, clapping, and the sound of stamping feet.\textsuperscript{118}

However, W. R. Crane and Rufus Waples spoke out in opposition to the Warmoth resolution and the motion was tabled. Waples, the scalawag delegate from New Orleans' fourth district, attacked the proposal in a long, rambling, convoluted discourse that the legal-minded Durant must have envied. Basing his position on points of international law, constitutional theory, and legal history, Waples sought to persuade the assembly to vote down the resolution. Waples also argued against the proposal on the basis of political expedience. The Southern Unionists, he stated, needed the continued protection of the Federal government. "If Louisiana is a State," he contended, the Unionists would "inevitably be subjected to taunts, persecutions, denial of free speech, and to all the embarrassments under which they labored at the beginning of the war." Waples pointed out that the rebel voters greatly outnumbered the loyal voters, and warned the delegates against any precipitous action that might "exchange their protection by the Federal Government for the vain protection" of the ex-rebels. As for the black population of Louisiana, Waples argued it was

\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Ibid.}
not necessary to write a new constitution in order to invest them with political rights. The black population, exclusive of women and minors, possessed the franchise, he argued, without further legislation since they were now included under the natural rights principle expressed in the Declaration of Independence. 119

In his speech Waples expressed a firm commitment to the idea of black suffrage. The "loyal colored population," as he termed them, must be allowed a voice in the formation of a new state government and participation in its subsequent administration. Waples listed ten reasons for investing the freedmen with voting rights: 1) it would "remove the prejudice existing against them"; 2) it would secure "peace and harmony among all classes"; 3) it would "ensure a majority against treason and against slavery"; 4) it would encourage the agricultural population, almost exclusively black, to remain in Louisiana; 5) "it would tend to improve and elevate the blacks, cultivate self-respect and laudable ambition, and thus render them more valuable citizens"; 6) it is obvious that the blacks "are educated to hate slavery, treason and rebellion, and may therefore be safely trusted with a voice upon the great questions growing out of the war"; 7) it is their "inalienable right under our theory of government"; 8) it would remove the charge of inconsistency made by foreign states-

119 Ibid., 22-24.
men...against our Republic; 9) "it would increase the whole number of voters, and thus render election frauds and corruptions more difficult"; 10) it would ensure that loyal men--blacks--would participate in elections "and would therefore be valuable to the Federal Government in maintaining its interests here." 120

Waples ended his discourse with the warning that Louisiana must remain in a territorial status under Federal control until "the whites shall have seen that the colored citizens are sober, industrious and eminently law-abiding; until their present vague hopes of restoring slavery in another form shall have been dissipated." Waples advised a slow, cautious return to civil authority was necessary to avoid a race war in Louisiana and to prevent the return of Confederate power. 121

The resolutions proposed by Crane, Flanders, and Waples constituted the platform of the new Republican party in Louisiana. On national issues, the state leaders adopted the principles laid down in the Baltimore platform of 1864. 122 The national platform that year, for example, called for the "utter and complete" extinction of slavery. 123

120 Ibid., 26.
121 Ibid., 27.
122 Ibid., 16.
The Louisiana Republicans, however, added other, more radical planks. The local party, led by the scalawags, demanded that: first, the people of Louisiana be considered "incapable of exercising the privileges of citizens of the United States"; second, the people of Louisiana be declared "enemies of the United States," and also be declared unfit "for the functions of a State in the Union until restored by the action of Congress"; third, Congress "at the earliest possible moment...establish, by act of Congress, a Republican Government in Louisiana"; fourth, the new loyal state government be established not by a military or executive officer, but by the President and Congress"; fifth, the Louisiana black codes be abolished; sixth, the vote be extended to blacks; seventh, "a preliminary system of local government...be established by Congress, to endure so long as may be necessary, to test the fidelity of the people"; eighth, all the principles of the Declaration of Independence be extended to "our loyal fellow-citizens of African descent"; ninth, the basis of the Louisiana Republican party be "universal suffrage, liberty and the equality of all men before the law"; tenth, the state organization not nominate candidates for the state elections of 1865; eleventh, the national party issue a call for a grand convention "organized on the basis of this Convention, one-half white and the other half colored, to adopt a national
platform on the basis of universal suffrage, and to consider the questions suggested by the foregoing resolutions." 124

The speeches and resolutions of Durant, Crane, Flanders, Waples, and the other delegates, emphasized the justice of recognizing the political rights of the freedmen. They said nothing directly about blacks having social or economic equality with whites. They spoke in terms of political equality, and of the essential justice of admitting blacks to the political system. The convention record reveals no commitment by the scalawags, or the carpetbaggers, to racial justice beyond voting rights and officeholding. Although enfranchising the Negro was an act of justice, the Louisiana scalawags were quite frank in pointing out the political expediency of black suffrage. The white radicals needed black support in their fight against the Wells-Conservative alliance. The white Republicans looked to Congress to postpone the reestablishment of civil government until they could forge an alliance of loyal whites and ex-slaves strong enough to counter the resurgence of Confederate power in Louisiana. Because the white Republicans were a distinct minority in Louisiana, the radical leaders looked to the black population to form the bone and gristle of the new party.

Although the role of the black delegates, and carpetbaggers like Warmoth, was not insignificant, it is clear

that it was Southern white men who set the tone and defined the issues at the convention. It was Southern white men who made all the major speeches, and who held most of the important offices and committee chairmanships. (Warmoth, for example, was elected the territorial delegate to Congress only after Durant refused to accept a unanimous nomination.) It was Southern white men who took the lead in forming the new black-white Radical coalition.

From 1862 to 1865 the same names appear over and over again: Durant, Flanders, Hahn, Dostie, Waples, Heistand, Hire...these were the men who collaborated with the Federal occupation force, who led the Unionist movement, and who finally established the Republican party in the state. But it was one thing to create a party on paper and quite another to lead it to success in the face of a sullen, hostile white population.
THE LOUISIANA SCALAWAGS

Volume II

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

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December, 1977

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CHAPTER V

BLOODY MONDAY: THE SCALAWAGS AND
THE NEW ORLEANS RIOT OF JULY 30, 1866

On March 30, 1866, a cartoon by Thomas Nast entitled "Amphitheatrum Johnsonianum—Massacre of the Innocents at New Orleans, July 30, 1866" appeared in Harper's Weekly, the popular pictorial family magazine. The cartoon depicted President Andrew Johnson sitting in a Roman coliseum directing the slaughter of defenseless blacks and whites. The shields of the "gladiators" were embossed with the letters "CSA" (Confederate States of America) and the words "Monroe Police" (a reference to the New Orleans police under the Democratic administration of Mayor John T. Monroe, a former Confederate); one of the black victims was shown waving an American flag.¹ With his masterful gift for caricature, Nast had presented the Radical interpretation of one of the turning points in Reconstruction politics—the New Orleans riot of 1866. The Radicals saw the riot as the premeditated act of ex-rebels intent upon destroying the native Republican movement in Louisiana.

The Democrats, on the other hand, blamed the Radicals for the riot. According to this interpretation, the New Orleans Radicals (principally scalawags) purposely insti-


206
gated violence in New Orleans in the hope that it would bring on federal military intervention and thus save the Radicals' deteriorating political position in Louisiana. Seen from the Democratic, pro-Southern perspective, "The riot was provoked by the incendiary speeches, revolutionary acts, and threatened violence" of the white Republican leaders in New Orleans. In that view, these men (encouraged by the Radicals in Congress) sought to "provoke an attack on the colored population, which was expected to be suppressed by the military before it had seriously endangered the white leaders.... This would afford an excuse for [a] congressional investigation resulting in congressional legislation favoring the ultimate design of the conspirators, viz., the destruction of the existing [i.e., Democratic] civil government in Louisiana."²

Although contemporary observers and historians alike have differed about the causes and details of the riot, there is no doubt that the events of that hot July day in New Orleans profoundly influenced the course of Reconstruction in general, and the fate of the Louisiana Radicals and their enemies in particular. The riot turned congressional and Northern public opinion against the conservative, lenient Reconstruction program of President Johnson, gave weight to demands for harsher policies toward the defeated

²Taken from the minority (Democratic) report of the congressional committee which investigated the riot. See New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 60.
South, and helped lead to the first impeachment of an Ameri­can President. An analysis of the role played by the Louisiana scalawags can provide fresh insight into the cause and course of that historic and deadly event.

The Scalawags and the Background of the New Orleans Riot

The constitutional convention of 1864, convened under the Lincoln-Banks' plan of Reconstruction for Louisiana, established a new state government. The state elections of 1865 made it clear that it would be a government of ex-rebels. By the spring of 1865 the former Confederates controlled both the state legislature and the New Orleans city government. This, plus Wells' policy of appointing supporters of planting interests to state offices, meant that if Congress recognized the 1864 state constitution and the new conservative regime then any hope of securing civil rights for blacks would be destroyed, and the Radicals in Louisiana would be doomed to political extinction. The only hope for the Radicals was to enfranchise the blacks and disfranchise the former Confederates.3 The Radicals, however, discovered a clever--perhaps too clever--way by which they hoped to accomplish these twin objectives. An unusual resolution passed by the drafters of the 1864 constitution provided that the president of the convention had the power

to reconvene the convention for any reason. Although the legality of this resolution was highly questionable, the Radicals hoped to use it to convocate a rump convention (packed with Radical delegates), rewrite the 1864 constitution to include black suffrage and rebel disfranchisement, and then have the new Radical-oriented document approved by Congress. It was a bold, audacious plan.

James Madison Wells was a key figure in the attempted coup. He had been willing to cooperate closely with the conservatives after succeeding to the governorship in 1864; and he had been elected governor in his own right in February, 1865, partly with Democratic support. Yet, Wells remained at heart an ardent Union man. Thus, he eventually found it impossible to work with former rebels whose loyalty to the United States was still suspect by the Union people in Louisiana. The Democratic-dominated legislature, for example, extended its power so as to almost completely dominate the state government, and even the governor's own appointees were forced out of office. The legislature filled the vacancies with Confederate sympathizers whom even the planter-oriented Wells could not stomach. By March, 1866, the break between Wells and the Democrats was complete. Wells now aligned himself openly with the Radicals.

4Ibid., 7-8.
5Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 81.
With Wells in the lead, the Radicals put their plan into operation. A complication occurred, however, when E. H. Durell, the former president of the convention, refused to cooperate with Wells and use his authority to reconvene the convention. Durell doubted the legality of the scheme. "Some say that the convention having formed a constitution, and that constitution having been submitted to the people, and they having ratified it, and one or two legislatures having been assembled under it, and one or two governors having been elected under it," Durell testified before the congressional committee investigating the riot in 1867, "that the resolution adjourning gave no power, under such circumstances, to reassemble it." But Durell also feared that violence would erupt if the new convention met. "In June last I called upon General [Philip] Sheridan [military governor of Texas and Louisiana] and told him I had been very much pressed to call the convention together," Durell stated. "I told him what I understood the convention intended to do. I told him that, from the condition of the public mind, I did not think the convention could be assembled and sessions carried on without a disturbance, and that there would be a riot." According to Durell, Sheridan replied that he would disperse any mob that threatened the delegates, but that he did not have enough troops to protect

6 *New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866*, 262.

white and black voters during a ratification election. Durell responded that unless troops protected the black voters they "would be shot down like dogs." 8

The Democrats of the city were determined to prevent the convention from meeting. Mayor John T. Monroe, a Democrat and passionate Confederate sympathizer, planned to arrest the members of the convention before they met. Monroe appealed to General Absalom Baird, the acting army commander in New Orleans, to aid him in preventing the assembly. Monroe claimed that the proposed assembly was "unlawful" and "calculated to disturb the peace and tranquility" and that it was his duty to prevent it from meeting. 9

Baird refused to cooperate with Monroe in his effort to forestall the meeting. The general saw the controversy as a purely civil political matter, one that should not involve the military. "If the assemblage in question has the legal right to remodel the State government, it should be protected in so doing; if it has not, then its labors must be looked upon simply as a harmless pleasantry to which no one ought to object," Baird reasoned. The convention controversy, he stated, was a matter for the civil courts to decide. 10 He would ensure law and order, but he would not act in concert

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8 Ibid., 263.
9 Ibid., 44.
10 Ibid., 442.
with the mayor to prevent the meeting.\textsuperscript{11} When Monroe later proposed to arrest the delegates after a grand jury indictment, Baird also refused to cooperate. The General was determined to protect the delegates unless he received orders to the contrary from the President.\textsuperscript{12}

Still intent upon preventing the convention, the Democrats appealed directly to Johnson. Lieutenant Governor Albert Voorhies wired the President, asking Johnson what Baird should do if the local authorities acted to prevent the assembly. Johnson sent an equivocating and confusing reply:

\begin{quote}
Sir: The military will be expected to sustain, not obstruct or interfere with, the proceedings of the courts.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

Voorhies showed Johnson's telegram to Baird. Bewildered by Johnson's stand (or lack of), Baird sent a telegram to Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. When Stanton failed to reply, Baird decided to stick by his decision to protect the delegates. "Stanton favored the convention and consequently approved of Baird's policy," Donald E. Reynolds, an authority on the riot states: "...the secretary, knowing Johnson's opposing views, did not want to risk crossing the President openly by formally endorsing Baird's resolution to protect the convention. His solution to the quandary was simply to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 442-443.
\item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid., 443.
\end{itemize}

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do nothing at all." For their part, the conventioneers were under the impression that Baird would protect them from Monroe's police. Baird, however, believed that the convention would convene at six p.m. It was a fatal error. When the delegates arrived at the Institute at noon on July 30 there were no troops present to prevent the ensuing massacre.

Not knowing about the misunderstanding, the Radicals proceeded boldly with their plan. On July 7 Wells appointed Rufus K. Howell president pro tem of the convention (replacing E. H. Durell). Howell then issued a formal call for the convention to reassemble on Monday, July 30.

On the night of Friday, July 27, the Radicals held a preliminary political rally in downtown New Orleans. The rally began at seven p.m. at the Mechanics' Institute. The principal speakers included Ezra Heistand, Michael Hahn, Rufus Waples, and A. P. Dostie. Heistand called the meeting to order, and Hahn was elected chairman. Then, a series of resolutions were adopted:

Resolved, That the thanks of the loyal men of Louisiana are due to Congress, for the firm stand taken by that Honorable Body, in the matter of reconstruction.
Resolved, That the military and naval authorities of the Nation are entitled to our gratitude for the security afforded to us.
Resolved, That we approve the call issued by the friends of the Republican Party

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 10-13.
to assemble in Philadelphia on the 1st Monday in September next, and we recommend, that on the 8th of August next, a Convention assemble in this city to select delegates to represent this State in the Philadelphia Convention.

Resolved, That until the doctrine of the political equality of citizens irrespective of color is recognized in this State there will be no permanent peace.

Resolved, That the 75,000 citizens of Louisiana qualified to vote, but disfranchised on account of color, 20,000 of whom risked their lives in her behalf in the war against the Rebellion may claim from her as a right that participation in the Government which citizenship confers.

Resolved, That we endorse the proposed reassembling of the Constitutional Convention of Louisiana, seeing in that movement a reasonable hope of the establishment in the State, of justice for all her citizens, irrespective of color, and also of the enforcement of that patriotic declaration of President Johnson, "That treason is a crime, and must be made odious, and that traitors must take a back seat in the work of reconstruction."

Resolved, That we commend the course pursued by Judge Howell and Governor Wells, who, regardless of threats, personal violence and unmoved by the ridicule, censure and attempt at intimidation of the rebel press of the city, rise to the heights of the occasion in the performance of acts of duty.17

Following the adoption of the resolutions, Hahn addressed the black audience inside the hall. He recalled the old days of slavery when blacks were oppressed by "the slave oligarchy."18 Under the former system, he reminded them, "colored men could not come together to deliberate over public affairs."19 He reminded them too of the slave

17 Reed, Life of A.P. Dostie, 292-293.
18 Quoted in ibid., 293.
19 Ibid.
codes which had forbidden black education.\textsuperscript{20} As an example he cited the fate of an elderly black man in New Orleans who was arrested for teaching black children. The teacher had died in prison. But, Hahn continued, the spirit of that martyr had been reborn in the black Republicans of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{21}

Now the black men had the upper hand and "the rebels are trembling in their shoes in consequence."\textsuperscript{22} Their fear, he noted, stemmed from the fact that the country was going "to be ruled by loyal men, both white and black."\textsuperscript{23} Hahn welcomed the new order, and welcomed too the rebel accusation that he was an abolitionist. "There was a time when the term 'Abolitionist' was considered a shame," he cried, "but I stand before you to-night, raised and educated as I have been in the South, and tell you that I glory in being an Abolitionist and a Radical."\textsuperscript{24} He next told his audience that no true Union man could be opposed to black suffrage. Finally, he told the assembled blacks that he "would rather every office in the State was in the hands of colored men than in the hands of unrepentent rebels." The scalawag ended his harangue with a remark that conservative whites must have

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 294.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
found particularly galling: "It is to you that the loyal men of the South must look, and when you separate to-night, make up your minds from this day forward you are as good as any white man in the State." The audience responded with great applause.25

Rufus Waples then rose and delivered a short legal defense of the plan to reconvoke the 1864 constitutional convention. "Congress recognizes the right for the people, in their primitive capacity, in those States destroyed by the rebels, to make their own organic law, and submit it to Congress, and leave it to Congress to decide whether it be consistent with the organic law of the republic."26 The loyal men of the state endorsed the Radical scheme, he noted, and it was ridiculous for the ex-rebels to talk of injustice being inflicted upon them. If the ex-Confederates did not like the new political order, they could leave the country, Waples stated.27 The blacks made better citizens than ex-rebels anyway, he noted, for the mass of blacks had "learned two important lessons--to hate slavery and to abhor treason."28

Outside the Institute, Heistand spoke to the blacks assembled in the street. "The decree of God has gone forth

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 294-295.
28 Ibid., 295.
that there shall be universal freedom and universal suffrage throughout the South," he declared. Dostie closed the outside meeting and, at his request, the blacks formed a torchlight procession. From the Institute, five thousand freedmen marched down Canal Street "to the sound of loyal music...making the air resound with cheer upon cheer, for universal suffrage, Congress, and the convention which [was] about to assemble to give them suffrage." 29

The convention assembled at noon on Monday, July 30, at the Mechanics' Institute. While the convention was getting underway, a parade of about two to three hundred blacks, marching to the tune of a fife and drum, was approaching the hall. When the black demonstrators crossed Canal Street, a white man pushed one of the blacks to the ground. The marcher retaliated, and the white pulled a pistol and fired. When the parade reached the Institute, the blacks began cheering. At this point, another argument broke out between one of the blacks and a white newsboy. One of the marchers apparently fired a shot as the young boy was being led away by a policeman. Then the police fired a volley into the black ranks and the riot began. The anti-Republican whites included not only policemen, but firemen, ex-rebel soldiers, and white thugs. Those blacks

29 Ibid., 297. It is interesting to note that Reed makes no mention of Dostie's speech within the Institute.
who could not escape fled into the Institute. The mob pursued them and besieged the building.  

The report of Albert Hartsuff, an assistant surgeon in the United States Army, provided the grim statistics of the riot. The dead numbered 38 and 146 were wounded. The report of the City Coroner detailed the nature of the wounds of the victims. The report mentioned, along with 155 others, Michael Hahn ("incised wound of head"), A. P. Dostie ("gun-shot wound of spine and sword-thrust of stomach"), and William Henry Hire ("pistol wound of hand and contused wound of side, severe"). Ten policemen were injured, none seriously, and one white rioter was killed. (This was E. H. Cenas, a medical student who inadvertently stepped in front of a policeman's pistol. "The pistol ball cut the carotid artery...."). The police arrested 261 blacks and 4 whites (all Radicals).

These are the essential facts concerning the background and course of the riot. Two important questions, however, are open to debate: Did the white Radicals purposely provoke the conservative whites into attacking? And, secondly, did the white Radicals act in collusion with the Radical leaders in Congress?

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31 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 17.
32 Ibid., 12.
A point of dispute among the press of the day (and among historians) was whether the delegates, especially A. P. Dostie, in effect invited violence by making incendiary remarks at the preliminary political rally held on July 27. The Conservative press of New Orleans agreed that they had.

The New Orleans Picayune, for example, argued that the conservative whites had been unnecessarily provoked. "The sensibilities of the people of this city have been very much excited by the revolutionary purposes on the part of Ex-Conventionists of 1864," the journal stated. "A meeting of the partisans of these men was held on Friday night, at which the most inflammatory language was employed to incite Negroes to acts of violence. They were told if any white man should interfere with them, 'kill him.' It has been well understood that arms have been distributed among them...."34 Similarly, the New Orleans Times claimed that the riot had been brought on by "The incendiary teachings of a pestilent gang of demagogues...."35 The Times also claimed that white Radicals had manipulated the blacks in the nefarious plot: "A band of poor, deluded negroes, urged on by unprincipled white men, have, unfortunately for themselves, been the principle [sic] sufferers. Armed with pistols, clubs and razors, they collected in great numbers around Mechanics' Institute, for the avowed purpose of

34New Orleans Picayune, July 31, 1866.

defending the revolutionary Jacobins who had raised the
banner of negro suffrage.... Left to themselves, the negroes
never would have joined in a treasonable scheme to overthrow
the State Government...." The journal concluded that "the
riot was commenced in every instance by negroes, spurred on
by white men...." 36

This conservative view of the riot, however, was not
limited to New Orleans' Democratic press. E. P. Brooks, New
Orleans correspondent for the New York Times, was in New
Orleans from July 1 until November 1, 1866, and was an eye-

witness to the riot. 37 Shortly after arriving in the city,
he reported that "There is plenty of immorality here" and
"loyalty is at a discount...." 38 On the other hand, Brooks
apparently was no advocate of black rights. He explained
that New Orleans contained "numberless native Americans of
'African scent' which forcibly reminded one of the existence
of our free institutions." 39 Moreover, Brooks disapproved
of the Radical plan to disfranchise the ex-Confederates. 40
And he agreed that the Radicals had exceeded the bounds of
propriety at the meeting. Although not making specific
reference to Dr. Dostie, Brooks reported that "I have heard

36 Ibid.

37 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 17.


39 Ibid., July 14, 1866.

40 Ibid., July 31, 1866.
Sumner, Stevens, and Wendell Phillips speak their political sentiments; but, never before did I hear Radicalism until this meeting [the July 27 rally] as it fell from the lips of Southern Union speakers. The minority (Democratic) report of the Congressional riot committee held that "the incendiary speeches, revolutionary acts and threatened violence of the conventionists" that night, led directly to and, indeed, were calculated to bring on military intervention, and, ultimately Radical rule.

Contemporary Democrats, and orthodox historians alike, point to the role played by A. P. Dostie. In the compilation of documents relating to Reconstruction selected and edited by Walter L. Fleming, he includes excerpts from a speech (under the heading "Speeches of a Radical Agitator") made by Dostie before a black audience on the evening of July 27. "I want the negroes to have the right of suffrage, and we will give them this right to vote." Dostie was reported to have cried, "There will be another meeting here to-morrow night, and on Monday I want you to come in your power. I want no cowards here. I want only brave men to come, who will stand by us, and we will stand by them.... We have three hundred thousand black men with white hearts. Also one hundred thousand good and true Union white men,

41 Ibid.
42 See the minority report, *New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866*, 60; and Ficklen, *History of Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 173.
who will fight for and beside the black race against the hell-hound rebels.... We are four hundred thousand to three hundred thousand, and can not only whip but exterminate the other party...." If the ex-Confederates dared interfere with the convention, Dostie allegedly threatened, "the streets of New Orleans will run with blood!" The speech was also cited by John Rose Ficklen and Claude G. Bowers in their orthodox histories.

The New Orleans Democratic press and the New York Times, however, presented only one side of the story. Richard L. Shelly, reporter for the New York Tribune, also witnessed the July 27 rally and the riot itself. Shelly spent considerable time with Brooks in New Orleans, and the two correspondents wrote and filed their dispatches on the riot at the same time. But unlike Brooks, Shelly "most heartily" sympathized with the objectives of the delegates. As for the July 27 rally, Shelly denied that Dostie and the other Radical leaders had created a volatile atmosphere. At the congressional hearings on the riot, he explained that he had stood only a few feet away from Dostie during

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44Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana, 161; Bowers, The Tragic Era, 128.

45New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 475, 476, 483, 485.
the rally. According to Shelly, Dostie merely told his audience to defend themselves if they were attacked. Other than that, there was nothing in his speech "calculated to excite animosity or hostile action."46

Two other friendly witnesses also observed the rally, John L. Anden, a former secretary to General N. P. Banks and the official shorthand reporter for the convention, testified to the peaceful nature of the July 27 rally:

There was a large meeting, and the speakers addressed the audience favoring negro suffrage, and telling them that the convention, which would meet on the following Monday, would give the right of suffrage to the colored people. The audience was chiefly composed of colored people. There were no violent proceedings at that meeting. I reported the speeches made in the hall, but those made outside of the building I did not report. The speakers inside made no call for the negroes to come armed to protect the convention, or anything of the kind. On the contrary, they were advised to be patient and keep quiet, and not urge the matter too strongly.47

In testimony before the congressional riot committee, Stephen F. Fish, a riot victim and nephew of W. R. Fish, a delegate to the rump convention, also denied that the speakers at the rally incited to violence. "The sentiment uttered at that meeting were radical; that cannot be disputed," he conceded, but no one, including Dostie, Hahn, or Waples, made inflammatory remarks.48 When asked specifi-

46 Ibid., 476.
47 Ibid., 15-16.
48 Ibid., 38.
cally to describe the character of Dostie's speech that evening, young Fish replied:

Towards the close of his speech he used this language. I will repeat one sentence almost word for word, and this was the language that looked most towards violence or incendiarism of any that I heard there. They were mostly negroes there. It was a procession formed of negroes. They had come to the meeting, and Dr. Dostie liked to make a demonstrative speech. He took pleasure in doing so. In his speech he called them brethren and so forth. Near the close of his speech he said: "Now, friends, go home peacefully, quietly; make no noise; disturb no person"; "but," said he, "I learn"--which was true, too--"that there are prowling bands of armed men out to waylay you. As you separate go home. If you are insulted by any of these bands of men, pay no attention to them; go home right by them without saying a word to them; but if they strike you, kill them." That was the substance of his last sentence, and nearly word for word. That was spoken from the steps of the City Hall, and that was the only language I heard in his speech that encouraged any violence at all, and that was in self-defence.49

The Scalawags and the Conspiracy Thesis

Exactly what was said on the night of July 27 probably never will be known. But whatever was the atmosphere created by Dostie, Waples, Hahn, and the other Radicals, a more fundamental charge is that the riot resulted from a conspiratorial scheme concocted between the white Radicals in Louisiana and their leaders in Congress to establish Republican rule in the state.

A New York Times editorial of August 1, 1866, espoused this conspiracy thesis. According to the Times, leading

49 Ibid., 38-39.
Radicals in Congress wanted the "illegal" convention to meet. Adjournment of the current congressional session could be delayed, and Congress could approve a constitution which enfranchised the blacks and took the vote away from ex-Conederates. Fortunately, the editorial maintained, the good sense of Congress had prevailed and Congress adjourned on time. However, the *Times* concluded that:

...the connection between the Radicals in Congress and the negro suffrage revolutionists in New Orleans does not admit of dispute. To them, jointly, belongs the responsibility of the loss of life that has occurred.... The poor negro is a catspaw in their hands, to be sacrificed if need be, in furtherance of the effort to entrench themselves in power.50

The Democratic minority report prepared by Benjamin M. Boyer of the Congressional committee which investigated the riot came to the same conclusion as the *Times*. "And if there be any members of the federal government who are indirectly responsible for the bloody result," the report read, "they are those members of the present Congress who ever they may be [a veiled reference to Thaddeus Stevens and the other Radicals on the Joint Committee on Recons truction] who encouraged these men by their counsels and promised to them their individual and official support."51

John Rose Ficklen (who referred to the event as the "So-called Riot of July 30, 1866") quoted approvingly the

50New York Times, August 1, 1866.
51New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 61.
minority report's conspiracy thesis in his orthodox history of Louisiana Reconstruction. Claude G. Bowers, in his entertaining but distorted history of Reconstruction, also adhered to the conspiracy thesis. "Had there been no convention, there would have been no massacre; and there would have been no convention without the encouragement of the Radical leaders in Washington," he concludes. The whole scheme, Bowers reasoned, was part of a "mad revolutionary project...."

The conspiracy theory rests largely upon an undocumented rumor to the effect that Benjamin F. Flanders had received a letter from two members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction encouraging him, and the other Louisiana Radicals, to proceed with the plan to reconvoke the 1864 convention. (The theory received more credence when the Congressional riot committee failed to call Flanders as a witness during the riot hearings.) Although no one testified to seeing the document itself, Eugene Tisdale (a Johnson supporter) claimed that prominent Radicals, including A. P. Dostie, told him about its existence: "I... had conversations with [R. King] Cutler and [John] Henderson, who told me that instructions had been received from two members of the Reconstruction [sic] Committee to assemble

52 Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana, 173.
53 Bowers, The Tragic Era, 128.
54 Ibid.
the convention at all hazards."\textsuperscript{55} When asked to reveal the exact contents of the mysterious letter, Tisdale replied, "It requested them to assemble the convention, and states: 'The great distance you are from us prevents us from telling exactly how to proceed. You will act your own judgment [sic]: do the best you can, and trust to consequences.' That was about the way it was read to me."\textsuperscript{56}

Each member of the Joint Committee, on the other hand, denied (under oath) that he had written the letter.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, when Rufus K. Howell had gone to Washington to ascertain the view of Republican congressmen about the advisability of calling the convention, he was disappointed. "I had the impression that there were Congressmen who had suggested this reassembling of the convention, and the submission of their work to Congress for its acceptance. This I did not find to be the case," he swore before the riot committee.\textsuperscript{58}

E. H. Durell, who had refused to recall the convention, also testified to the failure of Washington Radicals to support the Louisiana Radicals. Despite his doubts regarding the legality of the plan and the danger of a conservative reaction, Durell implied in his testimony before the

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866}, 259.
\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, 260.
\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, 486-504.
\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, 56.
riot committee that he would have recalled the delegates if the Radicals in Washington had given him their support.

On June 18, 1866, he telegraphed William Pitt Fessenden, Thaddeus Stevens, and George Boutwell asking their advice (really a plea for their backing). Durell provided the committee with a copy of the telegram:

By resolution of the Louisiana convention of sixty-four, ('64,) as president I am authorized to reconvoke said convention. If I do so and it amends the constitution of sixty-four, and gives suffrage to the black, and its action is ratified by the people, white and black, will said amended constitution be recognized by our Union friends in Congress as valid; and will the senators and representatives elected thereunder be admitted by Congress? I am unacquainted with the features of the two (2) enabling bills introduced by you. Shall I call this convention, and when; now or in the fall? If you think it desirable I will come to Washington to confer with you. Please telegraph reply, and write full advices. I am strongly pressed to issue the call, and desire your earliest answer immediately.59

The Washington Radicals apparently did not answer. "I spoke to Mr. Stevens when I was there [Washington, D.C.] in July last," Durell testified, "I asked him if he received my despatch. He said he did. I asked him why he had not made me a reply. He said they had nothing to say on the subject, and so said nothing."60

In his revisionist study of the riot, Donald E. Reynolds claims that the Congressional Radicals had no overriding motive to support the convention recall. "It must

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
be remembered that they [the Radicals] were at that time locked in a bitter struggle with President Johnson for control of reconstruction," he writes. "While they were in the ascendancy after the passage in June of the Fourteenth Amendment, they had by no means won the battle yet. The amendment still had to be ratified. The New Orleans riot and Johnson's disastrous 'swing around the circle' had not yet occurred to affect Northern public opinion. Victory in the all-important fall congressional elections was in the balance. Therefore, the Radicals were not likely to stake their chances of triumph upon a coup of such dubious legality as that which the Louisiana convention proposed."61 Joe Gray Taylor, in his extensive revisionist survey of Louisiana Reconstruction, concurs with Reynolds' position.62

Although no concrete evidence exists to link the Congressional Radicals with the recall scheme, as Reynolds points out, "There can be no doubt that the congressional Radicals would have preferred a Louisiana constitution which enfranchised Negroes and disenfranchised ex-Rebels. That Thaddeus Stevens and other Radicals gave some degree of encouragement to the conventionists also is indisputable. But it is highly unlikely that they conspired with the

62 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 111.
Louisiana Radicals or promised congressional support of their work."^63

The Scalawag View of the Riot

The scalawags who testified before the Congressional riot committee, and the military commission which investigated the affair, denied that the Radicals had incited violence at the Friday rally or that they had worked in concert with the Radicals in Congress. Their view of the riot, in fact, provides a fresh, if not entirely unprejudiced, account. The sworn testimony given by Ezra Heistand, Rufus King Cutler, Rufus Waples, William Henry Hire, James Madison Wells, Thomas Jefferson Durant, and A. P. Dostie should no longer be ignored by historians.

Ezra Heistand (fifty years old, a resident in Louisiana since 1829, and, in 1866, a judge in the New Orleans civil and criminal department) testified that he attended the Friday evening rally on July 27. Both blacks and whites were in attendance. The speakers included Michael Hahn, A. P. Dostie, and Heistand himself, who spoke from a rostrum in the street. "There were some intemperate remarks made by some of the speakers denunciatory of the rebels and their cause," Heistand admitted. "The blacks were also particularly informed that, being citizens of the United States, they had the right to stand upon their rights as freemen,

^Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot...Reconsidered," 17. Emphasis in the original.
and if attacked that day, the right to defend themselves."\textsuperscript{64} Dostie had said something to the effect that "it was time to show the rebels that they were not to enjoy power any longer, and that they ought to be hung," but Heistand was unsure of the exact words. Heistand contended that meeting was generally "as orderly as any public meeting usually is; there was no disturbance at all; there was cheering of speakers...but no disturbance."\textsuperscript{65} When the meeting adjourned, the delegates and their followers formed a procession of between two and three thousand and marched to the New Orleans city hall, "where several speeches were made...but nothing was said or done at either place" that could be considered inflammatory: "After the speeches were made at the City Hall the crowd dispersed [about 10:30 p.m.], and so far as I know from the reports of the newspapers of the next day, no disturbance took place during the night."\textsuperscript{66}

On Saturday, Heistand noted the tense and hostile atmosphere in the city: "The next morning in passing along the streets I could hear very denunciatory remarks made against the idea of a convention assembling, and also against the parties who had been at the meeting the previous night.... I heard one man, whose name I cannot give, say that it was determined to kill all of them rather than that

\textsuperscript{64}New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 1, 3.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., 1.

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the convention should meet."67 Sunday he observed "little knots of men talking excitedly," but the city was at least outwardly calm. On Monday, however, Heistand saw a large number of men in the streets "wearing a kind of blue badge or ribbon in the buttonhole of their coats."68 Some had pistols in their belts concealed under their coats. Then at twelve noon he heard what he interpreted to be a general signal--"an unusual alarm was run upon the fire-bells; the fire-bells being rung by electric telegraph, an alarm of twelve taps was struck."69 This was the same signal, Heistand informed the committee, that the Confederate authorities had used to summon the city militia in case of a federal attack. Heistand noticed that the police responded to the call as if the signal had been prearranged: "That portion of them which I saw were going from the stations of the second district towards Canal Street marching two and two, with the bands upon their hats marked with the words 'city police,' and the number of the wearer, so far as I could see, reversed. I stepped up pretty close to where they were passing and could plainly see the bands upon their hats, but could not read them, although under ordinary circumstances they were easily distinguished."70

67Ibid., 2.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
Later in the day, a former business partner of Heistand's informed the scalawag that the police were planning to kill him. "I was notified or requested...under no circumstances to go near the State-house, for if I did so I would certainly be murdered, stating that he had heard some of the policemen and others making inquiry for me, asking 'where is Heistand? We want to get at that God-dammed old son-of-a-bitch.'" On a streetcar that afternoon Heistand was approached by a young man who stood squarely before him and shouted, "What the hell is your hide worth today? By God, if you remain in this city until six o'clock to-morrow your hide won't hold shucks." Later, about five o'clock, Heistand was walking downtown when someone yelled, "There goes one of the scoundrels that ought to be killed." Heistand did not attend the convention. Under cross-examination by Congressman Shellsbarger, he was evasive: "I left my office about twelve o'clock for the purpose of going to the convention; crossed Canal Street, and went about half a block towards the convention, until I got to St. Charles Street; then, for some reason or other which I cannot explain, I went up St. Charles Street...and turned into an alley." It seems obvious that Heistand changed his mind about attending and hid

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 3.
in the alley for a time to avoid being attacked. Considering the threats leveled against him, Heistand's strategic retreat was the better part of valor, although he seemed reluctant to admit before the committee that he was afraid.

On July 15 he and other noted Unionists had been warned to leave the city. "The notices were upon pieces of paper about four inches wide, and addressed in each case to the individual by name." His notice, for example, read, "Judge Ezra Heistand: Beware! Ten days. Duly notified. Begone!"

The anonymous message "was signed with some cabalistic characters, and below were rough representations of a pistol, a bowie-knife, and a dagger...."75

Rufus King Cutler (forty-one, a Radical, and a resident of Louisiana for twenty-two years) also spoke to the black Radicals at the July 27 rally. "I firmly believed, and so said," he testified later, "that the time had arrived when we should so change our constitution as to extend negro and colored suffrage, that we should adopt the constitutional amendment, and that it behooved us now to disfranchise rebels. I spoke of President Johnson. I did not speak lightly of the gentleman, nor kindly."76 Later, as a delegate to the Monday assembly, Cutler observed directly the terrible events of that July Monday. About one p.m., he testified, he heard shots being fired outside...
the hall. "I stepped to the side window and saw policemen firing at colored people on Dryades Street, and ten or twelve negroes throwing brickbats at the policemen," he said. 77 "At about the same time many persons, both white and colored, ran upstairs into the vestibule, in the front part of the hall, exclaiming that the police were firing on the colored people in the street. A moment afterwards shots were fired from the streets through the windows into the hall on the Common Street side." After a brief pause more shots were fired. 78 The delegates tried to remain orderly, and offered no resistance. But the police continued with the attack. Above the din of firing, he heard someone shout, "We have the conventioners now—the damned Yankee sons of bitches—and will kill them all, damn them." 79

Cutler related that the delegates had tried to surrender by waving white handkerchiefs and by sticking an American flag with a white handkerchief on the end through a window. Nothing helped, and the police charged again into the hall. 80 Cutler fled upstairs to the third story. There he remained with several Radicals until four policemen discovered and arrested them. As he was being led out, he looked into the main assembly room: "The hall was all

77 Ibid., 28.
78 Ibid., 29.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
bloody and strewn with dead, and the chairs and railings were all broken to pieces, and there were bullet-holes all over the walls. I stayed perhaps a few seconds looking at it; the floor was covered with blood, and in walking downstairs the blood splashed under the soles of my boots."81

Rufus Waples (forty-one, and an active Radical) attended the Friday evening rally. "It was a political meeting," he informed the committee. "It was very well-tempered in the hall. I was not out of doors, and I cannot speak of the meeting outside. In the hall everything was well-behaved; no disturbance whatever and no unusual excitement."82 When asked if the speeches that evening were incendiary, Waples replied: "I heard no one...advise the negroes to come armed to the convention to defend it, and I did not understand at the time by the speeches, or by any previous conversation, that there would be any difficulty at all on Monday, and I certainly did not anticipate any when I was on my way to the convention at one o'clock on the day of the massacre. I was in conference with the radical Union men...and not one of them ever intimated to me that they were going there armed or that they expected any conflict."83 Waples did testify that the New Orleans police, most of whom were ex-Confederates, were hostile to

81 Ibid., 30.
82 Ibid., 23.
83 Ibid., 24.
the Radicals. He also knew many prominent ex-rebels who were quite outspoken in their hostility to the Union: "I heard them frequently speak of not being ashamed of having engaged in the rebellion. I heard them glory in it. I know they were in the habit of boasting over their victories and laurels won." 84

William Henry Hire also testified regarding the events of Friday evening (July 27). According to Hire, "Our friends spoke in the most radical way. I will state to you that I heard Dr. Dostie distinctly say, 'Now, my friends, go peaceably home; go orderly; do not disturb anybody; but if anybody disturbs you, kill him.'" 85 There was that evening, he continued, "a great deal of bold, rash talk by the members of the republican party; but I do not think any of us anticipated any serious difficulty, or we would have gone armed." Those present were told to act only if the ex-rebels attacked them. "I heard some discussion among ourselves that the Southern people had a great deal of braggadocios and it would not do to give way to them." 86

According to Hire, the riot began when a white man fired a shot at one of the black marchers at the corner of Baronne and Canal Streets. A policeman fired a second shot, and "Afterwards it became a general melee, and many men were

84 Ibid., 26.
85 Ibid., 66.
86 Ibid.
shot...."87 The white mob and the police, Hire maintained, appeared to work in concert. "There was an apparent understanding between those we call confederates and the police."88

On his way to the convention on Monday, Hire noticed that groups of "confederates" were assembling on the street corners: "I know many of these men, by name as well as by character, as unmistakably confederates, and I felt some hesitation in passing through them at the corner of Canal and Dryades Streets, but, being perhaps rather rash, I boldly walked through them. I could see that they were armed."89

Shortly after the meeting began, shots were fired by the police outside the building. The police and the white mob then forced the doors open and fired again. "I want to be particular in that statement, for everybody in that hall would know whether what I am stating is correct or not," Hire claimed. "It appeared to me that they discharged their four or six-shooters as rapidly as possible."90

The trapped Radicals stood in silent panic for an instant and then drove their tormentors back with chairs and pieces of railings, repeating this action four or five times during the next hour. At last the mob entered the hall.

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87Ibid., 67.
88Ibid.
89Ibid., 64.
90Ibid., 65.
What followed, Hire maintained, were acts of abject brutality. "At one time I saw a colored man kneel down and pray to go out; the only reply the policeman made was the click of a pistol, discharging a shot into his bowels. I saw men shot in this way by policemen several times."  

But the white delegates were also targets that day. Dostie said to Hire: "They will kill me; they are bound to kill me." A white conventionist by the name of Horton shouted: "Stop firing; we surrender; we make no resistance." At that moment a policeman shot Horton in the arm. Horton and several other white Radicals began waving their handkerchiefs in a pathetic effort to stop the killing. When Hire attempted to leave the hall, he was repeatedly clubbed by a policeman. "At the bottom of the steps, as I came into the street," Hire told the committee, "I was met by five or six parties, each of whom struck me, some with staves and others with pieces of chairs." Then a shot passed through his fingers and someone stabbed him in the chest near the heart. Hire described his torture in vivid detail: "I did not know when I was stabbed. I presume that when I was struck four or five blows I was stabbed at the same time, and that the reason why I was not seriously injured was that in trying

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91 Ibid., 65.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
to dodge the blow the knife glanced off, and went on the external rib. When I got to the corner of Common and Dryades, a young druggist whom I knew called out, 'Here is Dr. Hire, the great abolitionist'; upon which, a set was made on me from behind. I was driven into the gutter; when the policeman let go of me I fell with my head against the stones in the gutter...I was nauseated, sick, and weak from the loss of blood."95 At about two o'clock, a policeman took Hire to the station-house.96

James Madison Wells observed the riot in its early stages. On the morning of the riot Wells was in his office in the Mechanics' Institute. "While in my office," he testified, "a number of the members came in and were discussing the probability of a quorum and the possibility of their being arrested for there had been rumor that the sherriff intended to arrest them...."97 About 11 a.m. he left his office and went to see General Sheridan, who unknown to Wells was absent from the state. "When I returned," Wells said, "I found that the riot was increasing to a fearful extent, and a friend of mine...said, 'This is a terrible riot. I am apprehensive your son is killed, as he is a member of the convention. You had better leave the city and

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 66.
97 Ibid., 438.
Wells fled the hall and returned to his home in Jefferson City, a New Orleans suburb. Shortly afterward his son arrived and told him of the riot. Under questioning, Wells defended his action in recalling the convention. Inexplicably, Boyer, the only Democrat on the Congressional investigate committee, declined to cross-examine Wells.

Thomas Jefferson Durant also testified to the tense, anti-Unionist atmosphere in New Orleans during the weekend before the riot and to the events of Monday. In fact, Durant considered the situation so volatile that he refused to take part in the convention. "I was one of those who differed from those of our Union friends who thought the president of the convention...had the right to call it together." But Durant stated, "Whether he had the right or not, I thought it unwise, with the feeling existing at that time, inasmuch as it was supposed the convention intended to extend the right of suffrage to blacks. I thought it injudicious and dangerous." Ironically, Durant had been one of the most outspoken advocates of Negro suffrage in Louisiana.

The first warning that there would be trouble when the delegates assembled came to Durant by way of a French-speaking black. "He told me," Durant informed the committee,

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 440.
100 Ibid., 8.
"that he had occasion to rise very early in the morning, and that he was standing by a fence which separated his property from the street, and that a cab drove by, immediately opposite where he was standing, although concealed from his view by the fence, and some person in it addressed another on the sidewalk. The conversation indicated that there was a plot to attack the black people that day. One was soliciting the other to aid them. Just at this moment some noise or other cause interrupted them, and the cab drove off."\(^{101}\) Durant advised the man to inform General Baird of the conversation. The black replied that he had attempted to see the general, but he could not get access to him. Durant then told him to get in touch with General Sheridan. If necessary, Durant said he would arrange a meeting. Durant took the Negro's tale seriously, and he felt that it was an accurate reflection of the black community's concern. "The feelings of the black people had, of course, become deeply enlisted in the convention," the scalawag lawyer added, "and it was on that account that these men [the black leaders] came to consult me. I happened to be placed in such relations toward them as to be very usually consulted...\(^ {102}\)

Durant remained in his office the day of the riot. "While I was there, writing at my desk, I heard the first

\(^{101}\)Ibid.

\(^{102}\)Ibid.
symptoms of tumult— that particular sound which designates a mob..." he said.103 Rushing to a window, Durant observed about thirty policemen marching two by two "with revolvers in their hands."104 As they approached Carondelet Street, the officers "immediately commenced firing indiscriminately," according to Durant.105 "There were several negroes in the neighborhood," he continued, "and they shot and beat such as were there."106

Despite the firing, the street filled up with people, and the shots and commotion continued until late afternoon. About four o'clock Durant, peeking through his window, observed Michael Hahn "in the clutches of several policemen."107 He provided the committee with this description of Hahn's plight: "He is lame, one foot is shorter than the other, and of course walks with difficulty. He was handled with great violence. His clothing was ragged—torn by violence—his hat was off, and he was bleeding profusely, and covered with blood in a way that led me to suppose he was dying. The mob was shouting around him, and I thought they wanted to kill him."108

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.

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Durant observed other whites and blacks being attacked. He saw two carts loaded with dead and wounded pass by his window. Although he remained in his office, Durant became concerned that he too would be attacked. An informant, whose name Durant refused to divulge, warned him that he was marked by the Conservatives for vengeance. Frightened by the violence and threats, Durant arranged for a closed carriage to meet him in an alley behind his office. He then proceeded to his house, gathered some clothing, and made his way to a friend's plantation near Carrollton. There he boarded a steamer. He fled all the way to Washington, D.C., and never returned to New Orleans.\(^{109}\)

A. P. Dostie provided the most remarkable eyewitness account of the New Orleans riot—his deathbed deposition. This document has been preserved among the papers of the military commission which investigated the affair from August 10 to September 5, 1866.\(^{110}\) During the hearing, the board of inquiry, accompanied by a shorthand reporter, went to the Hotel Dieu. The commissioners asked Dostie to describe the disturbance at the Mechanics Institute. Dostie testified that he went there with "the most peaceful

\(^{109}\)Ibid., 8-9.

\(^{110}\)Proceedings of the Military Board of Investigation on the New Orleans Riots from August 10 to September 5, 1866; Exhibits, and correspondence relating to the riots, 1866-1867, Microfilm Roll 477, Office of the Adjutant General, Record Group 94 (National Archives).
intentions." Only twenty-seven delegates answered the toll call. "Undoubtedly," he stated, "in consequence of the fears of the members." A recess was called in order to round up the missing delegates. At that point, Dostie said, the police moved toward the Institute, breaking windows and firing into the building. He swore that to his knowledge the members of the convention were unarmed, and thus helpless before the attack. In Dostie's view, the firing was part of a plot to destroy the Radicals: "I saw that there was a deliberate massacre planned of our party; that those who were to be massacred in the most diabolical manner were Hahn, W. R. Fish [a carpetbagger], Shaw [unidentified], myself, and such men, and sure enough it proved so."

The delegates tried to barricade the door with chairs, hoping that the military would soon come to their rescue. "It was too late for that," Dostie continued, "they got complete possession of us. I wanted to be taken prisoner with Governor Hahn for the purpose of protecting him, for he was lame, and they refused that and dragged me away."

Dostie begged the policeman to protect him, to arrest him if necessary and take him to jail. When they came out of the building, however, the policeman turned the dentist

111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
over to two other officers: "I went along some distance and
a policeman just drew his pistol, and I do not know what
his name was. A dozen rushed at me. I was stabbed and
shot.... In the attack on me, I was told there was a man
dressed in white who jumped upon me and stabbed me in the
back."115 Other whites, he claimed, stabbed him with pen-
knives. Dostie then fell to the ground and pretended to be
dead. "They took me finally and put me in a wagon. I kept
my eyes closed," he stated.116 At the conclusion of his
deposition, Dostie described one of his tormentors: "He
had dark eyes, black eye-brows, black side whiskers, a
mustache not large, and black hair. His teeth were broken
.... He shot me behind the spinal column.... He was a man
above the medium size."117

Others collaborated Dostie's story. In testimony be-
fore the congressional committee in December 1866, J. B.
Jourdain (a thirty-four-year-old black witness) stated:
"I saw the crowd, after he was shot, get hold of him by the
legs and start off running with him. He was lying on the
banquette [sidewalk]. After he was brought out by the
policeman and shot, he was left lying on the banquette till
these men got hold of him. Then they commenced hurrahing.
They took him by the legs and dragged him from where they

115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
surrounded him. They were a parcel of firemen and young men that had white handkerchiefs about their necks.\textsuperscript{118}

William Hanksworth (a twenty-nine-year-old civil engineer, and New Orleans resident since 1852) also provided an eyewitness account of the attack on Dostie. "I saw a crowd about the Institute dragging something with them. I did not know what it was. I was told it was Dr. Dostie," he stated. "The crowd was harrahing and shouting...I saw a cart brought down and something thrown into it. I was told it was Dr. Dostie...I saw boys not more than ten or twelve years old running around Canal Street with revolvers cocked in their hands and raising a row."\textsuperscript{119}

Dostie died six days after the attack. The conservative New Orleans Times offered this suggestion for the proper disposal of the Radical's remains: "What to do with him? This is a practical age in which we live, and we must turn everything to account. There are a great many suffering negroes in the South, in spite of the Freedmen's Bureau, and the number of plantations demanding the hoe. Let Dostie's skin be forthwith stripped and sold to Barnum--the proceeds to go to the Freedmen's Bureau and negro newspapers, to be used by them for the benefit of negroes who have no taste for work. Dostie's body will make good soap. Let him be boiled down, preparatory to being distributed in bars to Yankee 'school

\textsuperscript{118}\textit{New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866}, 205.
\textsuperscript{119}\textit{Ibid.}, 177-178.
Delicious will be the kisses by those angular females from ebony cheeks, late latehered with sweet scented Dostie."¹²⁰ No doubt the newspaper's black humor was not lost upon the New Orleans police department. The Democratic New Orleans Daily Picayune echoed the sentiments, if not the tastelessness of the Times, in its report of Dostie's demise: "Thus ends the worldly career of a manimaniac [sic] upon a subject [black rights], who, in his heated infatuation has caused much strife and bloodshed. We draw the veil upon the past."¹²¹

Historians have found that veil difficult to lift. Probably no completely accurate account of the riot can ever be written. The testimony of the scalawags cannot be taken at face value. But when combined with the mass of evidence provided in the records of the Congressional committee which investigated the riot, the records of the military commission, and the articles published in the New York Times and the New York Tribune, and other sources, a more coherent picture takes shape.

The evidence indicates, for example, that the political rally held on the evening of July 27 did in fact create a volatile situation. Even if A. P. Dostie did not make the violent speech that the conservatives attributed to him, other sources reveal that the Radical orations that night

¹²⁰New Orleans Times, August 8, 1866.
¹²¹New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 6, 1866.
were certain, if not calculated, to incite violence. In a
city seething with pro-Confederate feeling and racial hatred,
a small group of white men—scalawags—stood before a black
audience and described a brave new world where black men
were as good as white men, a world where black men voted and
held public office. And the ex-rebels could love it or
leave it. No hard evidence exists to show that the scala-
wags schemed to create violence and thereby bring on mili-
tary and congressional rule; but the conservative critics
were right; the speeches made on the Friday before the riot
could hardly have failed to bring on a violent confrontation.

This, of course, does not justify the action of the
police and their white allies as the Democrats and Dunning-
oriented historians implied. The fact is that the conven-
tionists were attacked. Members of the press, for example,
offered strong evidence that the attack was premeditated.
On September 2, 1866, the New Orleans Tribune, a Radical
newspaper, published a letter from O. F. Breaux. Breaux
reported overhearing two men discussing a plan to "run the
Convention into a pool of blood." One of the men went on to
say "that there was a plot on foot to intimidate by assassi-
nations the people of color...."122

While the Tribune's report is suspect because of the
paper's Radical political orientation, the accounts of New
York correspondents support the thesis of a premeditated

122 New Orleans Tribune, September 2, 1866.
attack. Even Brooks reported to the New York Times:

> It is asked, was the riot preconcerted? It plainly was! There was no regularly organized premeditated attack at any one point or time, but there was a general understanding among all of the young bloods about town that a riot would occur...I heard for days before the occurrence just such talk in the hotels and restaurants, and on the streets.¹²³

In a similar vein, Shelly explained at the riot hearings "that there was a conspiracy upon the part of a great many to forcibly disperse that convention, and prevent the facts from being made known at the north...."¹²⁴

The correspondents for the Times and the Tribune likewise agreed that the New Orleans police led the attack on the conventionists, that it was, in effect, a police riot. Brooks filed a report based partly on unnamed sources, but mostly on direct observation. He reported that after the procession of blacks entered the Mechanics Institute, police entered the building. While the police claimed that they were merely trying to arrest black rioters, one of the police mounted a platform inside the building and drew a pistol. The conventioneers, a few of whom were armed, drove out the police, who then encountered a large group of blacks. A struggle ensued. Police reinforcements arrived, and aided by a white mob, attacked the Institute, "firing pistols at any one they could see inside the building." A gun battle took place between the police and those inside the Institute.

¹²³ New York Times, August 8, 1866.
¹²⁴ New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 478.
After the men inside the Institute ran out of ammunition, they tried to escape but were "either arrested or shot down." Brooks did not think that any blacks got away from the building alive. Although the police "behaved well toward the white prisoners, comparatively speaking," a policeman shot Dr. Dostie in the back and "after he fell, a crowd jumped on him and cut him horribly with knives."  

The police, according to Brooks' report, did not stop at shooting down the conventioneers and their black supporters. They obtained some wagons to carry off the dead. At the bottom of one wagon were two wounded men. "A policeman mounted the cart, and shoving his revolved down between the bodies on top, killed the poor fellows, with one shot for each."  

At the hearings on the disorders, Shelly testified that after the riot he met the chief of police at Moreau's restaurant. The chief admitted nervously that "outrages had been committed by his force." Although he told Shelly that he planned to have these men punished, they never were.

The conservative press of New Orleans presented the police in a far more favorable light. The New Orleans Times explained lamely that the police had done their best to prevent the mob from attacking those who were trying to escape.

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125 New York Times, August 1, 1866.
126 Ibid., August 8, 1866.
127 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 478.
from the Institute. "Only when a person attempted to escape
was he fired at...." Even the Times, however, admitted that
there was "testimony of some firing at prisoners by police-
men that was both wanton and, as it appeared, unnecessary."128
Similarly, the New Orleans grand jury concluded that, while
the police "behaved with humanity and "used no unnecessary
violence," there were "a few exceptions."129

Whether they intended it or not, the scalawags and
their conservative enemies had created a situation that would
completely alter the political order in Louisiana. The New
Orleans riot of July 30, 1866, was a major factor in the
coming of Radical Reconstruction not only in Louisiana, but
throughout the South. The New Orleans disturbance, coupled
with the riot in Memphis in May, 1866, the rejection of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Johnson state legislatures, and
the passage of the "black codes," turned Northern public
opinion against Johnson's plan of Reconstruction and paved
the way for more radical measures. Ironically, although the
riot marked the advent of Radical Reconstruction, it also
marked the high tide of scalawag influence in Louisiana.
A. P. Dostie, the most outspoken Louisiana Radical, was
dead, and Thomas Jefferson Durant, a scalawag with a keen
eye for constitutional issues, had fled the state. Many

128New Orleans Times, July 31, 1866, reprinted in the
New York Times, August 5, 1866.

New York Times, August 17, 1866.
scalawags would, of course, remain in Louisiana and in the Republican party, but now the Northern counterpart to the scalawags—the carpetbaggers—would come forward and assume the leadership of the Radical movement in Louisiana.
CHAPTER VI

THE SCALAWAGS AND RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION
IN LOUISIANA

The Scalawags and the Background for Radical Reconstruction

In August and September of 1866 Andrew Johnson made his controversial "Swing around the Circle," a speaking tour in defense of his Reconstruction policies. As historian Eric McKitrick points out, Johnson's behavior during the "swing" was undignified, and the tour turned out to be a political blunder of the worst sort.¹ On September 8 Johnson delivered an address from the balcony of the Southern Hotel in St. Louis, Missouri. It was a dismal performance, but typical of the series of disastrous speeches. According to the Missouri Democrat (actually a Republican newspaper) Johnson said in part:

Perhaps if you had a word or two on the subject of New Orleans, you might understand more about it than you do.

If you will take up the riot at New Orleans, and trace it back to the radical Congress...you will find that the riot at New Orleans was substantially planned.... You will also find that the convention did assemble in violation of the law...and every man engaged in that rebellion—in that convention...I say that he was a traitor to the Constitution of the United States, (cheers),

and hence you will find that another rebellion was conceived, having its origin in the radical Congress.²

Not content with attacking the "radical Congress," the President went on to pour invective upon individual senators and representatives:

I have been maligned, I have been called Judas--Judas Iscariot, and all that. Judas, Judas Iscariot, Judas! There was a Judas once, one of the twelve apostles. Oh! Yes, and these twelve apostles had a Christ.... If I have played the Judas, who has been my Christ that I have played the Judas with? Was it Thad Stevens? Was it Wendell Phillips? Was it Charles Sumner?... Are these the men that sit up and compare themselves with the Savior of men, and everybody that differs with them in opinion and try to stay and arrest their diabolical and nefarious policy, is to be denounced as a Judas?³

This speech, far from winning support for Johnson, helped turn the tide of Northern public opinion against his policies. "After what the police had done, and considering Sheridan's messages, and in view of the rebel antecedents of Louisiana civil authorities," McKitrick concludes, "Johnson's bellicere defense of those authorities had the worst possible effect on Northern public opinion."⁴ Johnson was, in effect, delivering the eulogy at his own political funeral.


³Ibid., 341. Italics in the original.

⁴McKitrick, Andrew Johnson, 427.
While Johnson was on the tour, scalawag Michael Hahn was making his own swing through the North. In an address delivered in Des Moines, Iowa, in early September, 1866, Hahn attacked the President, his Reconstruction program, and his ex-rebel supporters in Louisiana. In addition, Hahn made a strong plea for black suffrage. Andrew Johnson, Hahn stated, was directly responsible for the resurgence of Confederate power in Louisiana. At the end of the war the rebels had flocked back to the state and, with Johnson's pardons in their hands, seized control of the state government. "Johnson's policy emboldened them; and pardons were issued to them by the bushel."5 These ex-rebels, Hahn went on, "received favors from Johnson while loyal and deserving men were ostracized and made to take back seats."6 Johnson was at one time a strong Union man and an advocate of a harsh Reconstruction policy, but now the President "has forgot his old view of reconstruction which he advanced while he lived in Tennessee, or while running for Vice-President."7 "It was a grand theme for him at one time to denounce traitors," Hahn stated sarcastically, "but now this second Moses, found among the bulrushes of Tennessee, had changed his character and abandoned those who had found and taken him up."8 When James Madison Wells became governor

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5 Quoted in the New Orleans Tribune, September 11, 1866.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
of Louisiana, he had traveled to Washington where he consulted privately with the President. Wells returned "a great friend of Johnson, a supporter of his policy, and he immediately made favorable endorsements on all applications for pardons, appointed rebels to office, and encouraged them in every way to enter the service of the State, and treated them with most extraordinary kindness." Wells, himself an ardent Union man, had been brought under Johnson's "evil influence." Armed with Johnson's pardons and supported by Wells, the rebels "turned out of office all loyal men, and elected men on account of their persistent and conspicuous services in the rebel cause," Hahn continued. When they took control of the state legislature, the Confederates rebuilt the Mississippi River levees with public funds. Previously, the levees, which existed for the benefit of the rich planters, had been constructed with private monies. Yet ex-rebels refused to pay taxes for the support of black schools. Union men had faithfully paid such taxes. The rebel legislature also had the audacity to invite Mrs. Jefferson Davis to visit the state assembly and receive her with "great demonstration."

Hahn observed that many tributes had been paid to Andrew Johnson's "fearless and consistent loyalty." But in

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
Louisiana there had lived a man "infinitely his superior in patriotic fervor and devotion to his country." That man was A. P. Dostie. And only "one month ago, in the city of New Orleans, he was brutally murdered by the minions of" Andrew Johnson. Hahn assured his Iowa audience that Dostie's death would be avenged.

Hahn then returned to the question of Reconstruction policy. The ex-rebels must be disfranchised, he insisted. They cannot be trusted with the reins of power. Although they would claim to be loyal and "reconstructed," they would nevertheless remain in their hearts "unmitigated and unrepentant." The only way to ensure that this ex-rebel element would not come back into power was to give the vote to black men: "What the loyal men of the South desire as a remedy for all these evils...is impartial [i.e., Negro] suffrage." Black suffrage would strengthen the position of the Southern Unionists as well as fulfill a debt that the country owed to the black veterans of the Civil War. There would never be peace in the South, Hahn warned his audience, until black men voted.

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
The new black voters, Hahn contended, would oppose their old masters and support the white Unionists: "They are not well educated," he said, "but they know their friends...."18

To those who insisted that blacks were not qualified by intelligence or education to participate in the political system, Hahn countered with the argument that, although uneducated, the Southern Negroes were as well prepared to vote as white immigrants who came to America: "Of him [the immigrant] intellectual or educational qualification is not required. Then why demand it of the colored man...." Besides, the black man was far better qualified to vote than the wealthy white rebels who now held the franchise.19 "The negro has intelligence enough to serve his country and hate treason," Hahn said.20 Hahn ended with an appeal to the audience to support the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Let me say to you, it is a debt you owe to us as Union men at [sic] the South, and to yourselves, if you wish to have peace."21

Hahn's bitter, sarcastic attack on Johnson did provide a reasonably accurate assessment of the political situation in Louisiana. Johnson's policy in the state was a disaster. The ex-Confederates had, in collaboration with Wells, domi-

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.

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nated the state government to the detriment of Southern Unionists. He was correct too in his judgment that Southern Unionists needed black votes to counter the pro-Confederate reactionaries in Louisiana. It is interesting to note, however, that not once in the speech did Hahn mention the Republican party by name. He interpreted the contest in Louisiana solely in terms of loyalty versus disloyalty. Although the Republican party had been formally established in Louisiana for over a year, Hahn referred to its supporters as "unionists." Hahn's speech thus provides evidence of the appeal that the Republican party had in Louisiana to former wartime Unionists. Hahn, and most other Southern loyalists, saw the Republican party as an extension of their Unionism. The ex-rebels were despised not because they were Democrats, but because they were still at heart Confederates. Finally, the speech, so confident in tone, also reveals that Hahn sensed that the tide of public opinion was now running against Johnson and his ex-Confederate supporters.

Hahn was not the only Louisiana scalawag to attack Johnson's plan of Reconstruction. Between December 1866 and February 1867, approximately one hundred and eighty-nine witnesses testified before the committee appointed by Congress to investigate the New Orleans riot. Among those witnesses were eleven identifiable scalawags: James K. Belden, W. Jasper Blackburn, Rufus King Cutler, R. F. Dauncy, Thomas Jefferson Durant, Ezra Hiestand, William Henry Hire, Rufus K. Howell, B. L. Lynch, James Madison Wells, and
Rufus Waples. Their testimony echoed the views expressed by Hahn in the Des Moines speech regarding the condition of Southern loyalists, the need for military protection, and to the necessity of black suffrage and rebel disfranchisement.

The scalawags testified that the Southern Unionists in Louisiana were vilified and persecuted:

...a degree of bitterness exists now on the part of the rebel population of Louisiana against the loyal population which is scarcely to be described [James K. Belden].

In the city of New Orleans many societies have been formed by the rebels, such as the society among merchants not to employ a clerk in their business except he be of rebel sentiments. [Rufus King Cutler].

They scoff and scorn those of their neighbors who do hold social intercourse with [as they call them] Yankees. [Rufus King Cutler].

I was physician to the Screweman's Benevolent Association before the war; one of these men...went to Mayor Monroe for employment, stating he had a wife and six children to support. The Mayor said, "So you were the first man to join the Yankees, and you said you liked the old flag. I have no place for you." [William Henry Hire].

The feeling of enmity against the government and against southern loyalists is, in my

22 *New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866*, 466.
24 *Ibid*.
opinion, more intense than it has been the last twelve months, and, if possible, more intense than it was during the war [Rufus K. Howell].

I know young men who have been driven from their places of business. I know how it affects my business. It affects me very much, individually. I am a member of the bar, and it affects me very seriously [B. L. Lynch].

Rebel bitterness toward Southern Unionists and resistance to Reconstruction was so great that military occupation was an absolute necessity, they testified.

Without military support, I would not remain there [Louisiana], gentlemen, an hour—not one hour; and I think when I speak for myself I speak for all who would be able to get away [James K. Belden].

My impression is that it would be unsafe, if those whose duty it is to preserve order were not aided by the military forces of the United States [Thomas Jefferson Durant].

Along with military protection, the scalawags recommended black suffrage and rebel disfranchisement:

We have from thirty to thirty-five thousand negro and colored voters in [Louisiana], and about twenty-eight to thirty thousand white voters. We could have all the negro and colored men to vote with the Union men, and that, with the disfranchisement of the leading rebels, would give the ascendancy to the Unionists, and I think they could sustain themselves. I think that with a sufficient military force to enforce these provisions,

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26 Ibid., 50.
27 Ibid., 239.
28 Ibid., 467.
29 Ibid., 11.
we could establish a government...and we could sustain it after its establishment [Rufus King Cutler].

The right of suffrage should then be conferred upon all the people of the State, white and black, and upon such disloyal people as is thought might be trusted. As to what proportion that should be, I do not know. I think we should avoid having too large a proportion of dissatisfied men among us [Rufus Waples].

I am in favor of excluding the leaders who went into the rebellion, but not the soldiers who were forced into the confederate army [R. F. Daunoy].

I believe the extension of universal suffrage to the black race, and the disenfranchisement of those who aided and abetted the rebellion...would place the loyal people of the south in a majority... [James Madison Wells].

Thomas Jefferson Durant, then living in Washington, summed up the Unionist position succinctly. "In my opinion," he stated, "a territorial government should be established in Louisiana...supported by military force, and that it should be based on equal suffrage of all citizens without distinction of color; that it should be held in that subjection until it was clear that the citizens of the State were fit to carry on a State government...however long it might take."
Since the committee report was not published until after the Radical victories in the congressional elections of 1866, the effect of this testimony on public opinion was limited. Nevertheless, the statements of the witnesses, along with testimony taken by the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (January and May, 1866) and statements taken by the congressional committee on the Memphis race riot of 1866 (May 22 to June 6, 1866),\(^{35}\) presented a picture of the Southern states that served to undermine congressional support for Andrew Johnson. "The testimony showed that in the minds of many," historian Hans Trefousse writes, "there was some question about the security of Union men in the former Confederacy. It also raised the problem of the treatment of the freedmen, the continuancy of the ex-Confederates, the difficulties encountered in carrying out Johnson's plan, and the almost universal resistance to Negro suffrage. Finally, the witnesses brought to the attention of observers the existence of violence in the region to be reconstructed." This evidence, and earlier newspaper reports of outrages, had a great impact, Trefousse concludes. "It is not surprising that Congress became convinced that more stringent measures were needed to protect both black and white Republicans in the South and safeguard the gains of the Civil War. Radical

\(^{35}\) For an analysis of the testimony given at these hearings see Hans Trefousse, ed., \textit{Background For Radical Reconstruction} (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970, passim.)
Reconstruction involving black suffrage and military rule was the result.\textsuperscript{36}

Congress began the process of Radical Reconstruction with the passage of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867. This act divided the former rebel states into five military districts, each governed by a military officer. (Louisiana and Texas comprised the fifth district.) The military commanders had two essential duties—to protect lives and property and to supervise the election of delegates to a new state constitutional convention. Participation in the election of delegates and in the ratification elections was open to "male citizens...twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in [the state] for one year previous to the day of such election, except such as may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion...."\textsuperscript{37} The first Reconstruction act also required that the new state constitution provide for black suffrage.\textsuperscript{38} Three other acts passed in 1867 and 1868 strengthened Congressional control in the South.\textsuperscript{39}

General Philip Sheridan, an ardent Republican, commanded the fifth military district. Sheridan initiated the restoration process in Louisiana, with the removal of state

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, xvi.

\textsuperscript{37}Fleming, \textit{Documentary History of Reconstruction}, 402.

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Ibid.}, 403-419.
and local officeholders, including Governor James Madison Wells, on June 3, 1867. Although Wells had now allied himself with the Radicals, Sheridan resented his earlier collaboration with the Conservatives. When the General and the governor clashed over state patronage appointments, Sheridan removed Wells from office and replaced him with Benjamin Franklin Flanders. In a letter to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Sheridan justified his action:

I say now...that Governor Wells is a political trickster and a dishonest man. I have seen him...when I first came to this command, turn out all the Union men who had supported the government and put in their stead rebel soldiers, some of whom had not yet doffed their gray uniform. I have seen him again during the July riot of 1866, skulk away...instead of coming out as a manly representative of the state and join those who were preserving the peace. I have watched him since, and his conduct has been as sinuous as the mark left in dust by the movement of a snake.

Sheridan's other removals included such prominent Conservatives as Attorney General Andrew S. Herron, Mayor John T. Monroe, and the entire board of aldermen of New Orleans. Sheridan's new appointments included several blacks. In fact, the general enforced the Radical program with such enthusiasm that Johnson relieved Sheridan of his command in September 1867.

40 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 140.
41 Quoted in ibid.
42 Ibid., 140-141.
43 Ibid., 141.
On June 17, 1867, Sheridan issued an order for an election to be held on September 26 and 28 for delegates to the constitutional convention. According to the official count, 127,639 men were registered to vote in the election. Of this total 44,732 votes, or 35 percent of the total, were white and 82,907 votes, or 65 percent of the total, were black. The registration was carried out by registrars appointed by Sheridan. The general, however, found it difficult to find Unionists able or willing to serve as registrars. "Few of those appointed were distinguished enough before or after 1867 to be identifiable, but many, probably most, were not residents of the parishes where they un­tioned. Probably the majority were Union soldiers who had settled in Louisiana at the end of the war," Joe Gray Taylor writes. "None of them was black." The use of Union veterans (carpetbaggers) as registrars, of course, insured that the registration process was firmly in Radical hands. "Probably...the registrars discouraged native white regis­tration," Taylor notes. Taylor also lists racism and apathy as reasons for the low turnout of native white voters. Hence, the vast majority of those registered were black, and they voted overwhelmingly for holding the convention.

44 Ibid., 143.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 144.
The constitutional convention met at Mechanics' Institute from November 23, 1867, until March 9, 1868. The Conservative New Orleans Times perhaps reflected the supercilious attitude of most white Louisianians when it referred to the Radical congregation as the "Bones and Banjo Convention." 47

The Scalawags and the "Bones and Banjo" Constitutional Convention of 1867-1868

Eleven identifiable scalawags took part in the convention proceedings—Simeon Belden (Orleans Parish—Second District), W. Jasper Blackburn (Claiborne Parish), William R. Crane (Orleans Parish—First District), Peter Harper (St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes), John T. Ludeling (Caldwell and Ouachita Parishes), Charles Smith (Orleans Parish—First District), James G. Taliaferro (Catahoula Parish), Napoleon Underwood (St. James Parish), Michel Vidal (St. Landry Parish), Rufus Waples (Orleans Parish—Second District). The delegates selected Taliaferro, at that time an associate justice of the state supreme court, to be president of the convention. 48

An analysis of ten selected roll call votes reveals that the scalawag delegates frequently crossed ideological

47 See New Orleans Times, December 10, 1867, December 19, 1867, and February 26, 1868.

lines when voting on measures designed to aid the freedmen, to restrict the political and economic activities of the ex-rebels, or to strengthen the political and economic position of the pro-Reconstruction forces. Belden, Blackburn, Harper, Ludeling, Taliaferro, Underwood, and Vidal voted against an equal division of convention offices among black delegates and white delegates. Only Crane, Smith, Waples, and Wickliffe (who introduced the measure), among the scalawags, were recorded in favor of the pro-black measure. 49

Blackburn and Harper registered in favor of a racially segregated public school system. Belden, Crane, Taliaferro, Vidal, and Wickliffe, however, voted in favor of integrating the schools. 50 Crane, Harper, Ludeling, and Wickliffe voted against a measure that would require licensed establishments of a public character to serve individuals of both races. Belden and Vidal favored the proposal. 51 Belden, Crane, Harper, Underwood, and Vidal voted in favor of requiring public officials to take an oath affirming their belief in the equality of all men. But Blackburn, Ludeling, and Waples opposed the measure. 52 When a motion was made to insert the equality oath into the new constitution on


50 The measure passed (62 to 12), ibid.

51 The measure passed (58 to 16), ibid.

52 The measure passed (40 to 23), ibid.
January 28, 1868, Belden, Harper, Underwood, and Wickliffe supported the measure. Blackburn, Crane, Ludeling, and Waples voted against the motion. Rufus Waples favored a proposal designed to disfranchise Louisiana's illiterate voters after 1872; while Belden, Crane, Harper, Smith, Underwood, Vidal, and Wickliffe voted against it. A measure designed to restrict the voting rights of ex-rebels was supported by Blackburn, Harper, Vidal, Waples, and Wickliffe. But Belden, Crane, and Smith opposed the restriction despite its obvious benefit to the Republican movement. No scalawags were recorded in opposition to a constitutional article requiring that land sold under court orders be marketed in small plots. Crane, Smith, Vidal, Waples, and Wickliffe, however, supported the measure designed obviously to aid small landowners. Wickliffe and Smith were recorded in favor of a second article limiting the amount of land that could be purchased by individuals at sheriffs' sales. Crane and Waples opposed the measure.

Although the recorded votes indicate that the scalawags were not bound in a firm Radical alliance during the convention, the final vote for the adoption of the Radical-
oriented constitution shows clearly that the scalawag delegates favored the Radical document. Belden, Blackburn, Crane, Harper, Underwood, Vidal, Waples, and Wickliffe supported the adoption of the "Bones and Banjo" constitution. (Ludeling, Smith, and Taliaferro either abstained or were absent during the final vote.) In the final count, the scalawag delegates, despite individual objections to certain articles, supported what Joe Gray Taylor called "probably the most radical of any of the constitutions which resulted from the Reconstruction Acts."  

Issues like the integration of the public schools or rebel disfranchisement were not the only subjects of concern at the convention. While the delegates debated these issues, an intense, internal power struggle was going on among the Radicals themselves for control of the Republican movement in Louisiana. The contest involved two factions, one composed mostly of carpetbaggers and led by Henry Clay Warmoth on one side, and the "pure Radicals," led by Louis Charles Roudanez (an octoroon and publisher of the New Orleans Tribune), on the other.

The origin of the struggle dates back to April of 1867. At that time the carpetbaggers (most of whom were former

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58 Ibid.
59 The constitution was adopted by the delegates by a vote of 61 to 6. Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 151.
Union army officers) began to organize "Ben Butler Clubs." The Roudanez faction feared that the carpetbaggers would use the clubs to take over the state Republican party. Although the Warmoth faction included many blacks who regarded the carpetbag ascendency as the wave of the future, the "pure Radicals" feared that the clubs were part of a design to assume power at the expense of the freedmen and the Southern Unionists. The Roudanez faction also believed that the carpetbaggers' commitment to civil rights was shallow and that their advocacy of black suffrage was simply "a device to catapult themselves into political power." The "pure Radicals" had, moreover, a personal resentment of carpetbaggers, "many of whom had taken little or no part in the Radical movement of the past two years, but who now jockeyed for prominent roles in the reconstruction of the state."

At the Republican party state convention in June 1867, the two factions had clashed over control of the important Republican state central committee. Using the convention's committee on reorganization, the Warmoth faction successfully placed forty-six of their supporters (many of whom were recent arrivals in Louisiana and some who were not even official members of the party) on the seventy-nine member

61 Ibid., 26.
62 Ibid., 21.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 26.
state central committee. The "pure Radical" Tribune accused one of Warmoth's scalawag allies, Michel Vidal, of precipitating the coup. Vidal denied the charge, claiming that he, as the secretary of the committee on reorganization, had simply recorded the names of the new members of the central committee. He did not know, he insisted, whether they were "those of Blue noses of New Brunswick, or Black Republicans living in the upper districts of New Orleans." Roudanez was unconvinced. Vidal was not the only scalawag to side with the carpetbag faction. In April 1867, a rival Radical newspaper, the New Orleans Republican, began publication. The editor and manager was Bavarian-born scalawag Michael Hahn. The journal championed the carpetbag faction, and became the chief rival to Roudanez's Tribune.

The chief villain in the struggle to dominate the Radical movement in Roudanez's eyes was not Vidal or Hahn, but the young carpetbagger Henry Clay Warmoth. According to Roudanez, Warmoth had masterminded the takeover of the state central committee. The Radical journal also attacked three other carpetbaggers who, it claimed, were trying to seize the reins of power from the "pure Radicals," that is, those who had worked for and led the party since its founding. The Tribune named them as being Joseph Hale Sypher

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65 Ibid., 28.

66 Ibid., 26. Hahn would continue to edit the Republican for the next four years. See Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Hahn, Michael," and Memorial Addresses, 18.
(an ex-Union army officer), Lionel Sheldon (a close associate of Warmoth's and also a former Federal army officer), and Thomas W. Conway (a northern Methodist minister and a former Federal army chaplain from New York), who headed the Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana.  

Thus, the warring factions continued to fight when the Radical-dominated constitutional convention assembled in November of 1867. Convention President James G. Taliaferro and delegates William R. Crane, Charles Smith, and Rufus Waples led the pure Radicals at the convention. The issues were control of state printing, qualifications for office-holding, and the creation of a state board of registrars.  

The first test came when the Warmothites proposed that the New Orleans Republican be selected to print the official proceedings of the convention. The Roudanez faction immediately countered with a motion that the Tribune be favored with the patronage. The Warmoth faction lost by a narrow margin (46 to 45). Although defeated, their near victory foreboded the future successes of the carpetbag faction.

The debate over the qualifications for officeholding also aroused the two factions. The "Committee of the Executive" proposed that the age requirement for governor be

67Ibid., 27-31.
68Binning, "Carpetbaggers' Triumph," 32.
69Ibid.
lowered from thirty-five to twenty-five. It was no coincidence that the leader of the carpetbaggers, Henry Clay Warmoth, was twenty-five years of age. Thomas Isabelle, a Negro delegate and Roudanez ally, attempted to have the minimum age for governor set at twenty-eight. But this time the carpetbag faction scored a major victory: by a vote of 69 to 11 the convention adopted a provision that did away completely with the age requirement, requiring only that the governor be a qualified voter and at least a two-year resident of the state. 70

Near the close of the convention a third major confrontation occurred over the creation of a seven-member board of registrars to oversee voter registration and the state elections. Obviously both sides saw the board as a device to count their friends in and their enemies out. The Roudanez faction (including Crane, Smith, and Waples) and some conservative delegates, realizing that the Warmothites would control the board, opposed the measure. However, the article passed by a vote of 36 to 18. Waples then attempted to adjourn the convention sine die to prevent the convention from filling the board positions. But his motion failed, and the convention filled the positions with Warmoth backers. 71

70 Ibid. See also Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 153.

Thus, the factional squabbles that plagued the carpet-bag government later were evident even before the beginning of Radical control. While the Radicals fought among themselves, most white Louisianians stood expectantly on the sidelines.

Although the new Louisiana constitution was ratified by 57.6 percent of the registered voters, the election returns revealed little white support for the Radical document. The discovery of a rare military document ("Tabular Statement of the vote for and against the Constitution...."\(^{72}\)), makes possible a reasonably accurate estimate of the number of scalawags in Louisiana at the onset of Radical Reconstruction.\(^{73}\) The value of the report lies also in the fact that the document provides the votes for and against ratification by race in each parish (excluding Orleans and DeSoto).

The report reveals that a total of 114,891 registered voters took part in the election. Unfortunately, the votes in New Orleans and DeSoto parishes (30,844) were not recorded by race. But of the remaining 78,291 ballots, 49,759

\(^{72}\)"Tabular Statement of the vote for and against the Constitution at an election held in the State of Louisiana on the 17th and 18th days of April pursuant to special orders Nos. 55 and 63, Current Series, Headquarters, Fifth Military District," Louisiana Constitution Document No. 1718, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Hereinafter cited as "Tabular Statement." The ratification votes were counted and substantiated by three federal officers (L. P. Graham, G. Norman Lieber, and B. Johnson), ibid.

\(^{73}\)For a history of this document, see Donald W. Davis, "Ratification of the Constitution of 1868-Record of Voters," Louisiana History (Summer, 1965), 301-305.
black votes and 28,532 white votes were recorded. Of the total black votes, 88.2 percent were cast in favor of ratification. But only 5 percent of the white votes were recorded in favor of the Radical document.\textsuperscript{74}

In the Central Pine Hills region\textsuperscript{75} (Caldwell, Catahoula, Natchitoches, and Winn parishes) of the state, only 296 persons or 17.1 percent of the white voters, voted for the constitution. The voters in this region of piney woods and hills, subsistence farms, and poor whites, overwhelmingly opposed the new constitution (1435 out of 1731 white voters, or 83.9 percent).

The returns from the oak uplands region, known as the North Louisiana Hills (Bienville, Claiborne, Jackson, Sabine, and Union parishes), showed that 95.5 percent of the white voters, mostly yeomen slaveholders, cast their ballots against ratification. This area contained large numbers of migrants from Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Engaged in cotton and subsistence farming, only 4.5 percent (174 out of 3891) of these hill country yeomen were willing to support the Radical constitution.

The North Louisiana Planter parishes of Bossier, Caddo, Concordia, East and West Carroll, Madison, Morehouse,

\textsuperscript{74} This and all other references to the ratification vote are taken from the "Tabular Statement."

\textsuperscript{75} All regional classifications and descriptions used throughout this section are drawn from Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 3-17.
Ouachita, Rapides, and Tensas also demonstrated little Radical support. Of the 3910 white voters in this planter-dominated, alluvial-valley region, only 149 or 3.8 percent favored ratification. In 1860 this area contained the highest proportion of slaves of all the voter type regions. In Bossier Parish, for example, the slaves accounted for 70.4 percent of the population in 1860. Of the 1325 black voters in 1868, 987 (74.5 percent) voted in favor of ratification, while only 2 (.47 percent) out of the 424 white voters in this rural parish cast their ballots for ratification.

In Franklin Parish, located in the Macon Ridge area, the whites voted overwhelmingly against the new constitution. This planter-controlled parish contained a sizable number of family farms, but here too only a small minority of the voters (15.8 percent) were willing to cooperate with the blacks in the election.

In the Florida parishes (the planter-dominated, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, northeast cotton parishes of East Baton Rouge, East and West Feliciana, Livingston, St. Helena, and St. Tammany) the Republican cause also generated little support among the whites. Only 3 percent of the 4452 white voters, favored the "Bones and Banjo" document.

The plantation was the hub of the political, economic, and social life of the South Louisiana parishes of Ascension, Iberville, Pointe Coupé, St. Charles, St. James, St.
Here 3186 whites cast ballots. Of that number, only 236, or 7.4 percent, favored ratification.

Located in the lush South Louisiana Bayou country, the parishes of Assumption, Avoyelles, Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Martin, and Terrebonne contained both sugar cane planters and Acadian "peasant proprietors." Again, the whites in landslide proportions rejected the Radical constitution. Out of 5328 white ballots, only 231 or 4.3 percent were marked in favor of the Republicans. In St. Martin parish, for example, only 14 out of 1288 whites sided with the Radicals.

In only three parishes did more than 20 percent of the white voters support the Republicans. In Concordia, Caldwell, and Winn parishes, the support was 21.8, 33.5, and 22.3 percent, respectively. Two of these, Winn and Caldwell, were white farmer parishes, while Concordia was situated in the planter region of North Louisiana. In these three parishes only 211 voters supported the Radicals. In the forty-six parishes for which the registrars kept separate black and white tallies, only in Winn did the number favoring the constitution exceed one hundred. Here 113 whites out of 506 voted Republican.

The urban areas of Jefferson and Orleans contained 20 percent of the state's population. New Orleans was the focus and chief center of political activity in the Reconstruction

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era. A total of 30,707 black and white votes were cast in these two parishes alone. In Orleans, where the votes were not separated by race, the constitution narrowly passed with 50.8 percent of the vote. In Jefferson Parish, only 75 of 1653 whites voted for ratification (4.5 percent).

Finally, the returns for the parishes of Southwest Louisiana (Calcasieu, St. Landry, Vermillion, and Lafayette) reveal that an infinitesimal number (2.35 percent) supported the Republicans. In this prairie region of family-size farms, the white voters, as in all the other voter type areas, firmly and decisively rejected the new Radical constitution.

Although the "Tabular Statement" cannot provide a definite answer to the question of the level of Southern white support for the Republican party (it is impossible to tell, for example, if the whites who voted in favor of ratification were carpetbaggers or scalawags) with true mathematical precision, the document does, nevertheless, permit some cautious conclusions. First, the black votes were decisive in passing the constitution. Second, the vote reveals that no black-poor white alliance existed in Louisiana, at least in this critical election. Third, the rural parishes gave no significant support to the Louisiana Republicans. Discounting the urban parishes of Orleans and Jefferson, only 5.1 percent of the whites favored ratification and, of course, some of these were carpetbaggers. "If every white
man outside of New Orleans who voted for ratification became an active and zealous member of the Republican party," Louisiana historian Joe Gray Taylor surmises, "there still would be only fifteen hundred white Republicans in the country parishes." Taylor also contends that "it can be assumed from the vote on ratification that at this time [1868] there were probably fewer than a thousand so-called scalawags in Louisiana outside of New Orleans." The fourth indication is that even in the urban setting of Orleans and Jefferson (the chief centers of political activity), white support for the Republicans was slight. In Jefferson, only 75, or 4.5 percent, of the white voters favored the Republican program. And in Orleans, the constitution passed by only 1.6 percent of the vote (14,763 to 14,291). Undoubtedly, the negative votes were, for the most part, white votes.

The Scalawags and the Louisiana State Elections of April 1868

While the "Bones and Banjo" convention was still in progress, the Louisiana Republicans held a state nominating convention in preparation for the upcoming April state elections. Six prominent Radicals emerged as potential gubernatorial candidates—Francis E. Dumas (a black), George M. Wickliffe, W. Jasper Blackburn, James G. Taliaferro, P.B.S. Pinchback (a black), and the young carpetbagger, Henry Clay Warmoth. Pinchback pulled out of the race, explaining that

76 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 160.
the political climate was not yet right for a black governor. Dumas, however, remained in the contest. On the first ballot, Dumas received 41 votes, but failed to gain a majority. Warmoth ran a close second with 37 votes. None of the other candidates showed any strength (Wickliffe received 4 votes, Taliaferro 3, and Blackburn 3). On the next ballot Warmoth won a narrow victory (45 to 43) over his black opponent. Under pressure from Roudanez, Dumas refused the nomination for the lieutenant governorship, offered to him as a consolation prize. Oscar J. Dunn, another black Republican, agreed to run on the ticket with Warmoth. The other Radical candidates included Wickliffe (state auditor), Simeon Belden (attorney general), and Thomas Conway (superintendent of education).

Roudanez's pure-Radical faction, however, would not support the Warmoth ticket. These "bolters," as the Warmoth Republicans referred to them, decided to field their own slate of candidates. They nominated Taliaferro for governor and Dumas for lieutenant governor. Angered at Roudanez and Taliaferro's defection, the Warmoth-dominated Republican state central committee removed the state printing rights from the Tribune and awarded them to Hahn's New Orleans Republican. Deprived of the profit incurred from

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77 Mills, "Taliaferro," 56-57; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 156; Binning, "Carpetbaggers' Triumph," 34.

78 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 156; Binning, "Carpetbaggers' Triumph," 34.
state patronage, the Tribune went out of business in April, 1868. The committee then went even further and expelled several well-known "pure Radicals," including Charles Smith and William Crane, from the party ranks. Lacking the support of the regular party apparatus, the bolters had little hope of victory, even with the aid of the Democrats who now allied with the Roudanez-Taliaferro splinter group. The Democrats saw Taliaferro as the lesser of two evils, and too weak to run their own ticket, they formed an alliance with the Radical bolters. There was a certain irony in this since the Roudanez-Taliaferro group "was considerably more 'Radical' than the party led by Warmoth." 79 Apparently, the Democrats resented the carpetbagger more than the scalawag. Warmoth, the Daily Picayune informed its Conservative readers, "is an adventurer, who held a quasi-military title during the war, but was best known here as a provost judge, who filled his carpet bag with fines wrung from the poor people whom his spies and informers brought before his inquisitorial tribunal...." Taliaferro, on the other hand, was "an old citizen, who embraced the Union side when secession was triumphant in [Louisiana], and stood his ground throughout the war, and...never took a dollar which did not belong to him." 80 A second editorial also emphasized Taliaferro's honesty and Southern origins. Taliaferro, the


80 New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 2, 1868, quoted in Mills, "Taliaferro," 78.
journal stated, "is an old citizen, born South, and a resident of the state for thirty-years—altogether identified with it; was an honest and consistent Union man from the beginning to the end of the war, and therefore, not a mere changeling, hunting office; is a man of character and intelligence—a gentleman in his associations and habits...." Such Democratic support had little impact upon the election. The Warmoth ticket won in a landslide of black votes. Warmoth himself carried the state with 65,270 votes, or 63 percent, to Taliaferro's 38,118 votes, or 37 percent. The Radical Republicans also seized a majority of the seats in the state legislature.

The state elections of 1868 marked an important turning point in Louisiana Reconstruction. The Roudanez-Taliaferro faction was not only defeated, but destroyed as a viable political force in the state. "Hardly a single figure among the Roudanez-Taliaferro faction remained in the political life of the state," historian F. Wayne Binning remarks. Taliaferro, for instance, never held another elective office. Although appointed to the state supreme court by Warmoth, he was effectively in political limbo after 1868.

81 Ibid., April 10, 1868, quoted in ibid.
82 Mills, "Taliaferro," 82; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 156; Binning, "Carpetbaggers' Triumph," 38.
83 Binning, "Carpetbaggers' Triumph," 38.
The Scalawag and Factional Politics During the Carpetbag Years

Although 1868 marked the ascendancy of the carpet-baggers in Louisiana, several prominent scalawags, and other less well-known Southern white Republicans remained active in politics during the carpetbag administrations of Henry Clay Warmoth and William Pitt Kellogg as federal, state, parish, and municipal office-holders, and Republican state party officials. The Republican ranks included, after 1868, the following identifiable scalawags: Simeon Belden (elected state attorney general on the Warmoth ticket, 1868), W. Jasper Blackburn (United States congressman, Fortieth Congress, 1868-1869; state senator, 1874-1878), M. F. Bonzano (special agent in charge of the United States branch mint in New Orleans and superintendent of Federal lighthouse construction, 1870-1871; chairman of the Republican electoral college of Louisiana, 1872; Federal surveyor-general for the port of New Orleans, 1873-1874; superintendent of the United States branch mint in New Orleans, 1874-1875; assayer-in-charge of the United States assay...
office in New Orleans, 1874-1878; coiner, United States branch mint in New Orleans, 1868\(^8\), J. Earnest Breda (appointed state district attorney, 1873; elected Natchitoches parish judge, November 1874; elected state district judge, November 1876\(^8\)), Mortimer Carr (speaker of the state house of representatives, 1870-1871\(^8\)), George W. Carter (appointed Cameron parish judge by Warmoth in 1870; elected speaker of the state house of representatives, 1871; editor of the New Orleans National Republican, 1871\(^9\)), Valentine Chase (judge of St. Mary Parish, 1868\(^9\)), Armand Commagere (Internal Revenue collector for the eighth division of Louisiana, 1890\(^9\)), Thomas Green Davidson (state representative, Livingston Parish, 1870-1874\(^9\)), Richard C. Downes (elected Madison Parish Judge, 1868\(^9\)), Louis Dupleix

\(^8\)Goodspeed's Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, 305-306; Edward's New Orleans Directory (1870), ibid. (1871).

\(^8\)Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 326.

\(^9\)Annual Cyclopaedia (1870); Taylor, Louisiana Reconstucted, 212-213.

\(^9\)Warmouth, Stormy Days, 110, 118.


\(^9\)Edward's New Orleans Directory (1870), 746; Ninth U. S. Census (1870), Sixth Ward.


\(^9\)"I supported Governor Warmoth and the regular Republican ticket at the late Election [1868] and I was elected

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(appointed registrar, United States Land Office at Natchez by President Grant, 1872), E. H. Durell (United States district judge, 1863-1874), A. W. Faulkner (member from Caldwell Parish, state house of representatives, 1870; delegate to the Republican state convention, 1870), Benjamin Franklin Flanders (military governor of Louisiana, 1867 and 1868; mayor of New Orleans, 1870-1872; Assistant Treasurer of the United States at New Orleans, 1873-1882), James Graham (state auditor, 1872), Michael Hahn (editor, New Orleans Republican, 1867-1871; member of the state legislature, 1872-1876), Andrew Hero (notary public, 1866-1870; appointed City Notary, 1870), Ezra Hiestand

Parish Judge for this parish [Madison] by an almost unanimous vote at that time." Downes to J. S. Harris, January 7, 1869 (Senate) Select Committee on Political Disabilities, Ky-Miss., Sen. Y1A-H27, Record Group 46.

Dupleix held the registrar's position throughout the Reconstruction era. Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 342.

Lincoln appointed Durell judge of the eastern district of Louisiana in 1863. In 1866, Durell's jurisdiction was extended to cover the entire state. Knott, "Edward Henry Durell," DAB, III (volume V of the original edition), 545.


Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v. "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin."

Ninth U. S. Census (1870), New Orleans First Ward.

Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Hahn, Michael."

(appointed assistant New Orleans city attorney, 1868\textsuperscript{102}), William Henry Hire (New Orleans City Physician for the second and third districts, 1868; secretary and treasurer of Charity Hospital, 1870-1873\textsuperscript{103}), Rufus K. Howell (associate justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, April 3, 1865-January 9, 1877\textsuperscript{104}), Oscar Joffrion (president of the Pointe Coupee Parish Republican Executive Committee, 1868-1878; elected parish sheriff in 1872; member of the Republican electoral college for Louisiana, 1876\textsuperscript{105}), Charles Leaumont (judge of the fifth district state court for the parish of Orleans, c.1868-1872\textsuperscript{106}), James Longstreet (surveyor of customs for the port of New Orleans, 1869-1872; adjutant general of the state of Louisiana, 1870-1872; major general of the Louisiana state militia, 1872-1874; member of the state returning board, 1872-1874; member of the Federal levee commission of engineers, 1873-1876\textsuperscript{107}), John Theodore Ludeling (chief justice of the

\textsuperscript{102}Gardner's \textit{New Orleans Directory} (1868), 520.

\textsuperscript{103}Gardner's \textit{New Orleans Directory} (1868), 520; \textit{Edward's New Orleans Directory} (1870, 1871, 1872, 1873).

\textsuperscript{104}Henry Planche Dart, "The Celebration of the Centenary of the Supreme Court of Louisiana," \textit{Louisiana Historical Quarterly}, IV (January 1921), 120. Hereinafter cited as Dart, "Supreme [Court of Louisiana]."

\textsuperscript{105}Joffrion to Rutherford B. Hayes, December 4, 1878, Applications...Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 73, Record Group 56.

\textsuperscript{106}New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 28, 1872; Ninth U. S. Census (1870), Seventh Ward.

Louisiana Supreme Court, November 1, 1868-January 9, 1877\textsuperscript{108}), George W. Mader (United States Customs inspector, 1870\textsuperscript{109}), William G. Phillips (elected Rapides Parish judge, 1870\textsuperscript{110}), E. L. Pierson (appointed Natchitoches Parish judge by William Pitt Kellogg\textsuperscript{111}), J.R.G. Pitkin (state registrar of bankruptcy for the fourth district, 1868; United States marshal, 1876; secretary of the Republican state central committee, 1876\textsuperscript{112}), John Ray (state senator, 1868-1872; registrar of the state land office, 1873-1877\textsuperscript{113}), Robert Ray (Ouachita Parish Judge, 1868-1870; judge of the fourteenth state judicial district, 1870-1877\textsuperscript{114}), James Ready (assessor in the United States Internal Revenue Department first collection district of Louisiana, 1868\textsuperscript{115}), Charles

\textsuperscript{108} Dart, "Supreme Court [of Louisiana]," 120.

\textsuperscript{109} "We congratulate the Republicans of Louisiana on the reappointment of that sterling, consistent and influential Republican, Mr. George W. Mader, to the position of Inspector of Customs under Colonel [James F.] Casey. Mr. Mader, without whom the Republican party would be a feeble organization, resigned a similar position in the Customhouse early in January, and served with fidelity and marked ability as clerk of seven committees of the [State] House of Representatives until the session closed." New Orleans Republican, March 22, 1870.

\textsuperscript{110} Use of the Army, 401.

\textsuperscript{111} Speech of...Aaron A. Sargent, 19.

\textsuperscript{112} Gardner's New Orleans Directory (1868); Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 484.

\textsuperscript{113} Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Ray, John."

\textsuperscript{114} Richland Beacon News, October 28, 1899.

\textsuperscript{115} Gardner's New Orleans Directory (1868).
Smith (custom house employee, 1870\textsuperscript{116}), Eugene Staes (elected judge of the second recorder's court for the parish of Orleans by the city council of New Orleans, 1870; judge of the second municipal court of New Orleans, 1872-1876\textsuperscript{117}), James Govan Taliaferro (associate justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, July 1, 1866-November 3, 1876\textsuperscript{118}), James Veazie (New Orleans city attorney, 1871-1872\textsuperscript{119}), Michal Vidal (United States congressman, Fortieth Congress, 1868-1869; appointed a United States commissioner to Peru, 1869-1870; United States consul at Tripoli, 1870-1876\textsuperscript{120}), Rufus Waples (assistant city attorney of New Orleans for special cases, 1870-1872; director of New Orleans public schools; trustee of Straight University\textsuperscript{121}), James Madison Wells (delegate to the Liberal Republican national convention, 1872; member of the state returning board, 1874 and 1876\textsuperscript{122}).

\textsuperscript{116} Ninth U. S. Census (1870), Third Ward.

\textsuperscript{117} J. L. Dupont and Walter L. Cohen to H. D. Coleman, n.d. Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

\textsuperscript{118} Dart, "Supreme Court of Louisiana," 120.

\textsuperscript{119} Edward's New Orleans Directory (1871, 1872).

\textsuperscript{120} Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v. "Vidal, Michael"; Louis Clinton Nolan, "The Relations of the United States and Peru with Respect to the Claims," American Historical Review XVII (February, 1937), 30-66. Hereinafter cited as Nolan, "The Relations of the United States and Peru with Respect to the Claims."

\textsuperscript{121} Edward's New Orleans Directory (1871, 1872); Who Was Who, s.v. "Waples, Rufus."

and, George M. Wickliffe (state auditor of public accounts, 1868-1870\(^{123}\)).

Although it is not the purpose here to recount the long and complex history of Louisiana politics during the carpetbag era,\(^{124}\) it is necessary to define and highlight the role played by the scalawags. As noted above, the Southern white Republicans in Louisiana served in a variety of federal, state, parish, and party offices. Because of this, they were often drawn deeply into the factional struggles of the Republican party. The stories of George W. Wickliffe, George M. Carter, Thomas Green Davidson, and James Longstreet—the most prominent, or notorious, scalawags during this period—reveal the part played by Southern white Republicans in the sordid, frequently violent, and ultimately self-destructive political wars of the Louisiana Republican party.

Wickliffe was elected state auditor on the Warmoth ticket in 1868. Although he had once edited an "anti-abolition journal" before the Civil War, this dentist from Clinton, Louisiana,\(^{125}\) was one of the most ardent and controversial Radical Republicans in the state. Despite their


\(^{124}\) For a comprehensive and detailed study of the factional struggles in Louisiana from 1868 to 1876, see Taylor, *Louisiana Reconstructed*, 165-313 and 480-500.

initial alliance, Warmoth and Wickliffe became embroiled in a bitter political fight. In March of 1869, a grand jury, apparently at Warmoth's instigation, handed down fourteen indictments against the state auditor, including charges of extortion and the issuance of illegal warrants. Warmoth then ordered the Metropolitan Police, a state agency directly under the governor's control, to arrest Wickliffe, and take possession of the auditor's office and official records. Warmoth then appointed T. L. Delassie, a black, acting auditor.

Warmoth's motives for attacking Wickliffe are not entirely clear. He may, of course, have been genuinely concerned about corruption in the state auditor's office (but considering the high tolerance of corruption in Louisiana, this seems unlikely). Or, perhaps, in the governor's eyes, Wickliffe had crossed the fine line between honest and dishonest graft and had therefore become an embarrassment to the new Republican administration. Wickliffe, understandably, attributed Warmoth's action to the governor's desire to remove a political rival from power. Warmoth, according to Wickliffe, was a "desperate villain,"

126 Ewing, "Louisiana Impeachments," 688.

engaged in a "bold game" of political intrigue. And Wickliffe did not intend to give up without a struggle.

Wickliffe denied that Warmoth had the authority to remove him from office. The ousted auditor then boldly set up a new office directly across the street from the Mechanics' Institute, and announced that the auditor's department was reopened for business. Wickliffe also obtained an injunction from the seventh district state court prohibiting Delassie from performing the auditor's duties. Warmoth countered with an injunction of his own, signed by Judge Charles Leaumont, a scalawag, of the fifth district state court, forbidding Wickliffe from performing his official duties.

Wickliffe, however, was not content to let the courts decide the issue. In a letter to State Senator John S. Harris, the scalawag auditor asked Harris to supply incriminating evidence that could be used to undermine Warmoth politically. Wickliffe was especially interested in Warmoth's army record. (The governor, a former officer in the Union army, had been dishonorably discharged during the Civil War, but he was later restored to his command.)

"If you have not gotten hold of those records of his dis-

\[128\] Wickliffe to John Harris, April 14, 1869, Warmoth Papers.

\[129\] Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), 398.

missal," Wickliffe urged, "I wish you would...effect to get
them. You can get information from President Grant and also
Gen'l. Sheridan on this point. I want his record in this
matter very much." 131

Although Wickliffe would eventually lose in his poli-
tical war with Warmoth, he did score an initial victory when
a sympathetic jury refused to convict him on the first two
charges in the grand jury bills. The presiding judge then
dismissed the case, stating that the jury was so prejudiced
in the auditor's favor that there existed no possibility of
conviction. Attorney General Belden then dismissed the
remaining twelve charges on the grounds that an elected
official could not be tried by a jury until after his im-
peachment and removal from office. 132

Temporarily checked by the jury's failure to convict
Wickliffe, and by Belden's ruling, Warmoth allowed the
auditor to regain possession of the state records relating
to the public accounts. But when Wickliffe attempted to
move back into his office in Mechanics' Institute, Warmoth
had the police dump the auditor's records and office equip-
ment on the sidewalk outside the building. The governor
then, on January 5, 1870, issued a special message to the
Louisiana House of Representatives which asked the legis-

131 Wickliffe to Harris, April 14, 1869, Warmoth Papers.
132 Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), 398; Ewing, "Louisiana
Impeachments," 689.
lature to begin impeachment proceedings against Wickliffe.

The message read, in part:

It becomes my duty to communicate to your honorable body grave charges against George M. Wickliffe, Auditor of Public Accounts. His offenses against the constitution and laws of the State have seriously embarrassed the government and rendered it difficult to pay the interest on the State bonds. He has been guilty of numerous acts, involving extortion against individuals and against the charitable institutions of the State, also involving fraud against the commonwealth and collusion with evil disposed persons to defraud the same. He has extorted sums of money from the creditors of the State as a condition precedent to the issuance to them of the certificates of indebtedness of warrants to which they were entitled by law.133

Warmoth provided various examples of Wickliffe's malfeasance and then concluded with a hypocritical statement that must have brought smiles to the faces of the members of the state legislature. He was particularly mortified at the auditor's conduct, Warmoth said, because Wickliffe was a fellow Republican. "No party," Warmoth remarked, "is worthy [of] the confidence of the people, or can retain the same who will permit such conduct to pass uncensured and unpunished."134

The legislature responded to Warmoth's impeachment message by appointing a committee to investigate the charges. The House voted overwhelmingly to impeach Wickliffe (72 to

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133 Quoted in Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), 398.
134 Ibid.
2). The twenty-eight articles of impeachment included charges of soliciting and receiving kickbacks on state printing warrants (he refused, for example, to honor a claim from the Attakapas Register unless the editor paid him $300), and incompetence in managing the auditor's office. It is important to note that during the impeachment trial, Wickliffe's attorney did not deny that his client took bribes, but rather denied that the charges leveled against him were crimes under state law. During the course of the trial, Wickliffe, realizing that his cause was lost, attempted to resign and thus escape conviction and future disqualification from office. The auditor's move was declared invalid, however, and the Senate proceeded to convict him by a unanimous vote. While the trial was still in progress, a second grand jury handed down a new series of indictments involving forged state warrants. Out of office and facing these new charges, Wickliffe fled the state and disappeared from history. The complete extent of Wickliffe's wrongdoing is unknown, but one estimate puts the amount of money he stole at between $200,000 and $700,000.

135 Ibid. (1870), 456.
137 Ibid., 695-696.
138 Ibid., 695-697.
139 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 198; Ewing, "Louisiana Impeachments," 698.
Although Warmoth succeeded in destroying Wickliffe, this did not eliminate opposition to the young carpetbagger from within the party. Scalawag George W. Carter, for example, emerged as a leading anti-Warmoth partisan. Like Wickliffe, Carter was at first a Warmoth ally. "He was," Warmoth wrote in his memoirs, "...a man of exceptional education and polish, and was gifted with a remarkable ability to state and illustrate a proposition. He was a fine speaker, and I was attracted to him at once, and showed him various social courtesies. And later I appointed him to a lucrative office under the State administration." 140

Carter first met Warmoth in 1870, as the Republican party began to organize for the state elections of that year. According to Warmoth, Carter "said that he thought he would like to be a member of the new state legislature and asked me to use my influence to secure his nomination for a seat in the House of Representatives...." 141 Warmoth was unable to secure a nomination for Carter, but he did arrange to appoint him judge of Cameron Parish. "The Legislature during its session had passed an act to create the Parish of Cameron, taking a part of the large Parish of Calcasieu. I had not yet signed the bill [Warmoth explained] and had the right, under the Constitution, to hold it up until the first day of the next session of the

140 Warmoth, Stormy Days, 109.
141 Ibid., 109-110.
Legislature. I did not regard the territory composing this proposed Parish as having sufficient population to warrant its organization into a Parish. But I was so anxious to get my friend to help me carry on the government, that I conceived the idea of signing the bill and communicated my views to Colonel Carter, who entered into the spirit of the move at once."\textsuperscript{142} Warmoth signed the bill on March 16, 1870, and then appointed Carter parish judge with an annual salary of $2,000. He also provided Carter with blank commissions with which to fill the positions of sheriff, justice of the peace, police jurors, registrars of voters, and constables.\textsuperscript{143} "The reader will not be surprised [Warmoth wrote] that with all of this power Colonel Carter was able to fulfill his ambition and my wishes by being elected a member of the Louisiana House of Representatives from Cameron Parish. He was unanimously elected...."\textsuperscript{144}

When the new legislature assembled in January, 1871, Mortimer Carr, a scalawag, was elected Speaker of the House, with Warmoth's support. Shortly after his election, however, a faction composed of anti-Warmoth Republicans and Democrats forced Carr to resign and in his place elected Carter.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{142}Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{143}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145}Ibid., 111; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 212-213.
The new Speaker began immediately to reorganize the House committee assignments in favor of the anti-Warmoth faction.\textsuperscript{146} Carter, in fact, became the chief spokesman of the anti-Warmoth Republicans in the House of Representatives. "On November 6, 1871," Warmoth wrote, "the...Custom House faction established a newspaper called \textit{The National Republican} to lead the war upon me and my friends. It was edited by Speaker George W. Carter, and it certainly was a lively sheet."\textsuperscript{147}

As an additional reward for his aid, the new Speaker received a lucrative position in the United States Custom House.\textsuperscript{148} In his memoirs Warmoth claimed that Carter's defection to the opposition was motivated by sheer greed. When the new legislature convened, "it became known [Warmoth stated] that Speaker Carter was at the head of a ring, composed of Democrats and negro and white Republicans, which proposed to control all legislation which could stand a liberal 'blackmail.'" Warmoth, however, did not break openly with Carter until the latter became involved in a public scandal.\textsuperscript{149} Carter refused to approve a railroad construction bill until the Chattanooga Railroad Company


\textsuperscript{147}Warmoth, \textit{Stormy Days}, 118.

\textsuperscript{148}Taylor, \textit{Louisiana Reconstructed}, 213.

\textsuperscript{149}Warmoth, \textit{Stormy Days}, 111.
agreed to retain him as an attorney at a fee of ten thousand dollars. According to Warmoth, the revelation of the railroad scandal forced him to break with Carter. "The fact became a public scandal and the result," Warmoth wrote, "was a break between Speaker Carter and me, after a very plain interview in which the matters were fully and frankly discussed." Yet, Carter was perhaps no worse than the governor himself or other Gilded Age Louisiana politicians, for that matter.

The real reason for the break between Carter and Warmoth was not, it seems, Carter's corruption, but rather his defection to the growing anti-Warmoth element within the Republican party. This coalition included the black Lieutenant Governor Oscar J. Dunn; the members of the Republican State Central Committee (including United States Marshal Stephen B. Packard, a carpetbagger, and J.R.G. Pitkin, a scalawag); United States Collector of Customs James F. Casey, a carpetbagger, and his employees; and Postmaster C. R. Lowell and the postal employees in New Orleans.

The reasons for the formation of the coalition were varied. Some members, like Carter perhaps, were greedy for power and the spoils of office. Others were concerned about

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151 Warmoth, *Stormy Days*, 111.
152 Ibid., 196.

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the governor's appointment of Democrats to office. For their part, Dunn and his allies (both black and white) felt that Warmoth was cool towards black rights. Their suspicions were confirmed when Warmoth refused to support state civil rights bills in 1868 and 1870. By the spring of 1871 the opposition to Warmoth within his own party had grown enormously, and the anti-Warmoth forces were formidable and bold.

However, Warmoth was not without resources of his own. He controlled the Metropolitan Police, the state militia (commanded by James Longstreet), and the state's voter registration and election processes. He also had the support of almost all of the Republican parish office-holders. It was this enormous power, in fact, that cemented the anti-Warmoth coalition. Warmoth's "virtual dictatorship, stimulated the jealousy and enmity of his political friends who resented his almost unlimited powers."  

Thus, the Republican organization in Louisiana was a party at war with itself. The first major battle occurred when the anti-Warmoth forces attempted to seize complete control of the party apparatus in Louisiana and drive Warmoth and his partisans from the party ranks. The test of strength occurred when the Republicans assembled for the state party convention in 1871. Packard arranged for the

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155 Ibid., 163.
meeting to be held on August 8 at the Custom House. He also informed the local military commander that he expected trouble from "thugs and bruisers." To preserve order, the United States army provided a company of soldiers and two Gatling guns. Packard also appointed forty deputy marshals to help "prevent violence." When Warmoth and his followers arrived at the building, they faced a small army determined to bar them from the proceedings. Warmoth and 118 supporters (including scalawags Napoleon Underwood, A. W. Faulkner, and W. Jasper Blackburn) then gathered at Turner Hall. While the Warmoth Republicans convened at Turner Hall, his rivals held their "Gatling Gun Convention" at the Federal building.156

The Turner Hall Convention was the scene of much excitement as the Warmoth delegates and approximately four thousand supporters filled the auditorium on August 9. The highlight of the first evening was a long, bitter, often sarcastic attack by the governor upon his political enemies, including Packard, Casey, Lowell, Carter, and Pitkin.157 Warmoth claimed that Carter was a Democrat disguised in Republican clothing. According to the governor, Carter told the New Orleans Times, "that he [Carter] was not a Republican,

that he never had been a Republican, ... was now a Democrat, and that he was only pretending to be a Republican that he might divide the party, and give the State back to the white people, to whom it belonged."\textsuperscript{158} Warmoth also accused Speaker Carter, an ex-Confederate, of still harboring anti-Union and anti-Negro sentiments. The governor then inserted a bit of low comedy; he referred to Carter as a "man who was the pet and pride of the Methodist Episcopal Church South; a man who preached Christ... from the State of Virginia way down to the Rio Grande—a man who was the peculiar pride of the Methodist Church, especially of the female members."

The hall, it is recorded, erupted with laughter and cheers.\textsuperscript{159} Encouraged by the audience response, Warmoth continued the attack: "He says I have done some big things in this state—that I have made a big fortune; that I have created for the State of Louisiana a big debt, and I forget what other big things he charged me with."\textsuperscript{160} Warmoth wondered, in fact, how Carter knew that he had made a fortune while governor. "How did George W. Carter become familiar with my bank account? [Warmoth asked] Who of this audience can tell me how much money I had when I went into office, and how much money I have now? How did this apostate angel get his information?" Again, the hall roared with

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
laughter.161 Warmoth then pointed out that Carter, after one session of the legislature, had bought an expensive home in New Orleans, and had spent "in one night seventeen hundred dollars in a gambling house."162 For his part, Warmoth challenged Carter to present evidence to the legislature that while governor, he had taken bribes or prostituted his office for personal profit.163

Warmoth then proceeded to draw a parallel between Carter and Wickliffe: "While George W. Carter was at the head of the Texas Legion--while this light of the Methodist Episcopal Church South was waging a war in which, he himself says, he killed nobody--this other gentleman [Wickliffe] was on the banks of the Mississippi River cutting the throats of Union men who were non-combatants, and burning all the cotton he could lay his hands upon. This was the patriotic service that George W. Wickliffe was rendering the Confederacy."164 The governor ended his attack upon Carter by calling the Speaker of the House "a drunkard...a gambler...and a political bummer."165

Carter was not the only opponent to feel the sting of Warmoth's tirade. Pitkin was also included in the attack:

161Ibid.
162Ibid.
163Ibid.
164Ibid., 11-12.
165Ibid., 12.
"I will not tell you of Pitkin— that soft-mouthed poetical linguist...who is so fond of letters that it takes nearly the whole alphabet to make his name: 'J.-R.-G. Pitkin.' I won't tell you how he joined the confederate army, deserted from its ranks, joined the Union army, became frightened, and by the dexterous use of a piece of soap under his tongue, threw himself into fits and frothed himself into a discharge. Nor of the eloquent exposition he made of the McClellan Democracy in 1864, denouncing the war for the Union as unconstitutional and wrong, and ought to cease [sic]."\textsuperscript{166}

While Warmoth entertained the Turner Hall delegates with his scathing denunciations of the anti-Warmoth crowd, Carter was busy attacking Warmoth before the Republicans at the Custom House. Warmoth, Carter charged, "received bribes, stole the public money, and was the greatest living practical liar."\textsuperscript{167}

The Turner Hall delegates and those attending the "Gatling Gun Convention" both claimed to represent the true Republican party in Louisiana.\textsuperscript{168} Accordingly, each faction named its own Republican state committee and, as the rivals adjourned, each planned to drive their opponents from power. Since neither side was willing to compromise, let alone give in entirely, the result was that politics in Louisiana remained in a state of constant dissonance.

\textsuperscript{166}Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{167}Annual Cyclopaedia (1871), 473.

\textsuperscript{168}Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 217.
Again, Warmoth and Carter were the principal antagonists. The contest this time centered on control of the state legislature. The Carterites, with Democratic support, planned to take over the legislature and then impeach the governor.\textsuperscript{169} The sudden death of Lieutenant Governor O. J. Dunn, in November 1871, favored Warmoth's position. If Warmoth could secure the election of one of his supporters to fill the vacancy, the impeachment move would be aborted. But Warmoth had to act quickly, for Dunn's death left Carter, as Speaker of the House, the next in line for the succession. The governor discovered a simple yet clever answer to this problem. He called the senate into session to elect a new lieutenant governor, but he did not call the house (where impeachment charges would be introduced) into session. Warmoth's allies in the senate successfully, though narrowly, elected P.B.S. Pinchback, a black, to fill the vacancy.\textsuperscript{170} Warmoth had won the first skirmish, but the battle was far from over. Throughout January, 1872, the two factions engaged in an intense and sometimes violent struggle. Soon after the legislature convened, the anti-Warmoth forces succeeded in getting the legislature to pass a resolution expressing confidence in Carter.\textsuperscript{171} On the third day of the new legislative session, Carter left the

\textsuperscript{169}Ibid., 218.

\textsuperscript{170}Ibid., 219-221.

\textsuperscript{171}Ibid., 223.
Speaker's chair in an effort to defend himself against charges of corruption and, at the same time, to denounce Warmoth. As soon as Carter resumed his seat, a motion was made to declare the Speaker's chair vacant. Carter, however, ruled the motion out of order.\textsuperscript{172}

In the midst of the confusion and uproar, Mortimer Carr and a band of anti-Carter Republicans, advanced toward the Speaker in an attempt to oust him physically. Carter apparently anticipated this, and, at a prearranged signal, approximately twelve armed bodyguards emerged from behind the dais. At this point, the house adjourned. Carter had met the challenge, but it was obvious to all that his grip on the legislature was loosening.\textsuperscript{173}

In order to strengthen his position, Carter counterattacked during the next session of the legislature with charges of fraud against Carr and E. W. Dewees, the two main Warmoth lieutenants. While this motion was still pending, the anti-Warmoth Republicans again tried to unseat the Speaker, but, once again, Carter fought off the challenge. The charges against Carr and Dewees, however, were indefinitely postponed.\textsuperscript{174}

But the struggle was far from over. The Carterites struck again. This time, they planned to oust enough

\textsuperscript{172}Annual Cyclopaedia (1872), 471.
\textsuperscript{173}Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 223.
\textsuperscript{174}Annual Cyclopaedia (1872), 471.
Warmoth Republicans, through parliamentary maneuvering and, if necessary, by sheer brute force, to give the anti-Warmoth forces a majority in the legislature. On January 4 Carter and his allies prevented seven Warmoth legislators from taking their seats and admitted six Carter supporters in their place. The legislature also gave Carter the power to prevent the Metropolitan Police from entering the hall. To back up Carter, the Speaker was authorized to appoint as many sargeants-at-arms as necessary to "preserve order." 175

Meanwhile, Packard ordered the arrest of Warmoth and twenty-two state senators and representatives "on charges of violating the laws of Louisiana and the United States." 176 At that point, the remaining Warmoth legislators walked out of Mechanics' Institute leaving the Carter-dominated assembly without a quorum.

Clever and tough, Warmoth was, of course, fully capable of some political chicanery himself. After being released on bail, Warmoth issued a proclamation calling a special session of the legislature on the grounds that a conspiracy was afoot "to overthrow the government by unlawful and revolutionary means." 177 The governor, however, purposely failed to notify the Carterite faction of the extra session. Warmoth failed to get a quorum of the senate, but he was

175 Ibid.
176 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 223-224.
177 Annual Cyclopaedia (1872), 471.
able to assemble enough of his supporters to achieve a quorum of the house. The Speaker's chair was declared vacant and O. H. Brewster, a carpetbagger from Illinois, was elected to the position. The Warmoth legislature then re-seated the members expelled by the Carterites. To insure that the Mechanics' Institute remained under his control, the governor ordered the Metropolitan Police and a force of state militiamen to guard the state house against an assault by the Carter Republicans.  

When Carter learned of Warmoth's coup, he immediately ordered his followers to convene at the "Gem Saloon" on Royal Street. Carter claimed that this body represented the "legal House of Representatives." Warmoth, on the other hand, called the "Gem Saloon" legislature "revolutionary, unconstitutional, and illegal." Carter ignored Warmoth and, to achieve a quorum, ordered the arrest of those not attending his "Gem Saloon" meetings. Tempers were hot, and one Warmoth supporter was shot and killed resisting arrest. Although Carter and three of his supporters were arrested and charged with the killing, the charges were later dropped.  

Warmoth decided now to use force to destroy Carter. On January 7, a large body of Metropolitan Police (with

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178 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 223-224.
179 Annual Cyclopaedia (1872), 472.
180 Ibid.
Longstreet in command) seized the "Gem Saloon" and expelled the Carterite legislature. The Speaker retreated to the office of Marshal Packard, and later moved (with twenty followers) to the rooms of the New Orleans Cosmopolitan Club. Rallying his forces, Carter attempted three times to seize Mechanics' Institute. Each time, however, Federal troops intervened to preserve order and Carter's takeover failed. But Carter was unwilling to give in, and he planned one last, desperate effort. On January 20, Carter issued a proclamation in which he recounted the history of his contest with the governor. In the conclusion, Carter appealed to all citizens (black as well as white) to arm themselves and assemble under his command:

The question before our people is no longer a simple one of reform, the graver issue is presented by the revolutionary and treasonable acts of the Governor, and that is, whether they will quietly permit him to subvert the State Government and destroy the independence of the Legislative Department thereof, by the most violent and revolutionary acts. The premises considered, we earnestly invite the citizens, irrespective of rage or party, to organize and arm themselves...and report in force in the neighborhood of 307 Canal Street, where they will be provided with necessary commissions and sworn in as Assistant Sergeants-at-Arms.... I want a force so potent in numbers, and so representative of the community, as will preclude bloodshed and insure abstinence on the part of the Executive from further interference with the General Assembly.182

181 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 225.
182 Daily Picayune, January 21, 1872.
On January 22, Carter and several thousand "assistant sergeants-at-arms" marched on Mechanics' Institute. Once again, however, Federal troops, under orders from Washington to remain neutral but to allow no armed conflict in the city, blocked his way. Carter's position was now hopeless. His supporters, tired of the constant turmoil, and realizing that Warmoth could not be overthrown, began drifting over to the state house to make their peace with the governor. Soon Carter was a general without an army. His support evaporated quickly and Warmoth carried the day. Carter's supporters were admitted to Mechanics' Institute on the condition that they recognize the Warmoth legislature as the legal state assembly, and also recognize Brewster as Speaker of the House.183

The last that was heard of George W. Carter was a report in the Daily Picayune, dated February 20, 1872, which stated that Carter and a member of Warmoth's Metropolitan Police had crossed over to Mississippi and there fought a duel, with rifles, at sixty paces. Both missed.184 After that, Carter, like Wickliffe, disappeared from the pages of history.

Warmoth's victory over Carter was due in large measure to Thomas Green Davidson. Although he remained a Democrat throughout the Reconstruction period, Davidson worked closely

183 Annual Cyclopaedia (1872), 472-473.
184 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 227.
with the Republicans during the administrations of Warmoth, P.B.S. Pinchback (acting governor, 1873-1874), and William Pitt Kellogg. In 1868, like most other Louisiana Democrats, Davidson had supported the Taliaferro ticket. "I wish you to know that every old line Democrat that could register, voted for you," Davidson informed Taliaferro, "and those that could not got their friends to do it. I done [sic] what I never expected to do again, I went to every man...that had any influence with and got him to vote for you." During the state elections in 1870, Davidson allied himself with the Warmoth Radicals. His name, in fact, appeared on the Livingston Parish Republican ticket. Davidson worked hard for the party and his own election. He was, apparently, so eager for a Republican victory that he proposed buying black votes. "There are about ninety African votes in the lower part of St. Helena and on the Amite River in Livingston Parish that can be encouraged with a little money," he wrote to A. W. Walker during the campaign, "I think that [with] two hundred and fifty dollars I can get every one of these for the ticket." Walker replied that

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186Davidson to Taliaferro, April 25, 1868, Taliaferro Papers, LSU.
187"Parish of Livingston. Republican Ticket," Ellis Family Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Hereinafter cited as Ellis Papers, LSU.
188Davidson to Walker, October 23, 1870, ibid.
the money was not available, but he was confident that Davidson could carry the parish.\textsuperscript{189}

Davidson's conversion to Republicanism did not sit well with his neighbors and most fellow Democrats. "Tom Green Davidson demoralized as far as he could the old line Democrats," a critic wrote in November, 1870. "The money and patronage of the dominant party and our confidence in the whites who failed to do their duty, conspired to disappoint us.... My God! How can a Southern man become so destitute of principle as to endorse Republicanism by voting with these Devils...."\textsuperscript{190} Because of his association with Warmoth and his Republican friends, Davidson "became the most hated person in the Florida Parishes."\textsuperscript{191} But despite the antagonism of the hard-line Conservatives, Davidson remained a leader in the Louisiana Democracy. At least one Democratic journal felt that Davidson's alliance with Warmoth, although distasteful, nevertheless provided the Democratic party with "a measure of influence on the course of legislation."\textsuperscript{192} Davidson's power and influence rested on his close friendship with Warmoth, his virtual monopoly of patronage in the Florida Parishes, and his chairmanship of

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\textsuperscript{189}Walker to Davidson, October 28, 1870, \textit{ibid.}\textsuperscript{190}Charles E. Kemmon to Tom Ellis, November 11, 1870, \textit{ibid.}\textsuperscript{191}E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson," 21-22.\textsuperscript{192}East Feliciana \textit{Democrat}, March 1, 1871, quoted in E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson," 22.
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the powerful House Judiciary Committee, where all proposed legislation was subject to his review. Warming found Davidson's support invaluable during his struggle with the Carter-Custom House Republicans. Indeed, Davidson's support made it possible for Warmoth to maintain a majority in the state assembly. Later, as Warmoth's power and influence declined, Davidson shifted his support to the anti-Warmoth Republicans. Although he did not run for reelection in 1874 (he was then sixty-nine years old), Davidson remained a power in Livingston Parish and reentered politics in 1880.

James Longstreet was the most famous Louisiana scalawag, and the motives for his conversion to the Radical cause were the subject of much controversy in his own day. Early in 1867, the New Orleans Times asked eighteen prominent citizens to give their views regarding Reconstruction and military rule in the South. Longstreet responded with a plea for moderation, cooperation, and acceptance. He counseled his fellow Southerners to make the best of a bad situation. The South, he reminded the Times readers, had lost the war and like good soldiers, fairly defeated, they

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193 E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson," 23.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid., 24-25.
196 New Orleans Times, March 11, 17, 1867.
should accept the victor's terms. In a second letter, dated April 6, 1867, Longstreet spoke again with the "bluntness of a soldier," and urged reconstructed rebels to realize that the Confederacy was dead, and that the South was powerless. The only way to effect a quick, if not painless, restoration of civil rule, he stated, was to accept the conqueror's surrender terms. If some, including himself, had lost their political rights, it was, after all, the price one paid for a failed rebellion.

At first there was little criticism of Longstreet's views, but as the resistance to Reconstruction hardened among former rebels, the general's position found few adherents among white Southerners. When Longstreet expanded on his ideas in a letter reprinted in the New Orleans Republican on June 5 and 6, 1867, he faced a barrage of criticism. Longstreet argued that the war had decided some things permanently. The Confederacy was dead and the ideas that supported it were dead too. He told fellow Southerners "to abandon ideas that are obsolete and conform to the requirements of law." In response to Longstreet's letter, the Daily Picayune said that his argument was "too puerile and illogical to have effect on the course of any person...."

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197 Ibid., March 19, 1867.
198 Ibid., April 7, 1867.
199 New Orleans Republican, June 5, 6, 1867.
200 New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 9, 1867.
In response to a critical editorial in the New Orleans Times, Longstreet defended his views again. His letter, he stated, "was expressive of a desire to relieve my 'late confederates in arms' of the unnatural condition in which they have been placed by the progress of revolution."\(^{201}\) Political resistance, the general continued, was futile: "I am well satisfied that order cannot be organized out of confusion as long as the conflicting interests of two parties [Republican and Democratic] are to be subserved. The war was made upon Republican issues, and it seems to me fair and just that the settlement should be made accordingly.... If I understand the object of politics, [he continued] it is to relieve the distress of the people and to provide for their future comfort." Longstreet insisted that he was not a politician. "I should not presume to interfere with politics [he concluded].... But these are unusual times, and call for practical advice."\(^{202}\) But to white Southerners, a people more often attracted to the romance than the realism of political issues, Longstreet's "practical advice" was unacceptable. Many now saw Lee's old lieutenant as a traitor to his people. But the Conservatives were not the only ones critical of Longstreet. The Radical New Orleans Tribune rejected the general's offer of alliance. The Republican ranks, the newspaper stated, should not be open


\(^{202}\) Ibid.
to former rebels who intended to use the Radical movement to soften the peace terms in the interest of the ex-rebels:
"A Rebel seeking the relief of his comrades is just another friend of the [Southern] oligarchy, trying to save the oligarchy from its doom." 203

Other evidence indicates that Longstreet was neither a traitor to his people nor a Janus-faced schemer seeking to save the "Southern Establishment." Historian William L. Richter contends that Longstreet was a sincere moderate who sought a middle course in a period "of rapid, uncertain and unwelcome transition." 204 Nevertheless, white Southerners in New Orleans shunned him as a political and social leper, and, as a result, his businesses—cotton merchandising and insurance (the Great Southern and Western Fire, Marine and Accident Insurance Company of New Orleans)—failed. 205

At this point President Ulysses S. Grant appointed Longstreet surveyor of customs of the port of New Orleans. Grant and Longstreet were close friends and the appointment can be interpreted as a magnanimous gesture on Grant's part. 206 Yet, Grant may have had simple political reasons

203 New Orleans Tribune, June 9, 1867.


205 Ibid., New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 31, 1866.

206 Hesseltine, Confederate Leaders, 113.
as well for appointing Longstreet to the post. "There does not seem to have been anything accidental or impulsive about this act," Donald Bridgman Sanger and Thomas Robson Hay state in their biography of Longstreet. "Rather, all signs indicate that it was deliberately planned. Under the circumstances, Longstreet could stay in New Orleans only if he had both position and income; by appointing Longstreet surveyor, Grant was placing both a friend and a political ally and supporter in an important spot." In return, Longstreet served the Republican cause faithfully during the carpetbag era. The carpetbaggers were, in fact, his "principal associates, to whom he looked for support and preferment." Throughout this period, "his activity was entirely political, as he supported first Warmoth and then Kellogg as the head of the party and state political machine." As previously noted, Longstreet, at the head of the state militia and Warmoth's police, prevented the Carter forces from wrenching power away from the governor in January, 1872. When Warmoth's control over Louisiana politics began to weaken, however, Longstreet defected to the Kellogg wing of the party. As a member of the state returning board, in November, 1872, Longstreet supported William Pitt Kellogg, the Custom-House candidate for

207 Sanger and Hay, Longstreet, 345.
208 Ibid., 347.
governor, and helped count out John McEnery, the Warmoth-
backed candidate. Longstreet's service did not go unrewarded. Shortly after the election, he received an
appointment to the state levee commission for a four-year
term at six thousand dollars per year. Throughout the
remaining years of "carpetbag rule," Longstreet supported
the Radicals until he, along with the other Louisiana
Republicans, were ousted from power in 1876.

The Reconstruction political experiences of scalawags
like Wickliffe, Carter, Davidson, and Longstreet illustrate
the diverse roles played by Southern white Republicans in
the factional struggles of the Louisiana Republican move-
ment. They illustrate too the sordid and corrupt nature of
politics during the carpetbag era. Traditional-minded his-
torians like John Rose Ficklen and Ella Lonn were correct;
the Radical regimes in Louisiana were riddled with corrup-
tion. But, after all, this was the Gilded Age, and the
Wickliffes and Carters were perhaps no worse than their
counterparts in Tammany Hall. And, as historian Joe Gray
Taylor points out, "Louisiana government has never been
simon-pure, and the Republican years were not much worse

209 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 241-252; Pitre,

210 Sanger and Hay, James Longstreet, 365.

211 Longstreet's role in the so-called "Battle of Liberty Place" will be discussed in the next chapter.
than those to follow." Finally, the participation of these four scalawags in these factional contests also illustrates a central weakness in the Republican party. Crippled after years of constant internecine warfare, the Republicans could no longer resist the pressure of the Conservative whites--determined now to "bulldoze" their black, carpet-bagger, and scalawag enemies from power.

\footnote{212Taylor, \textit{Louisiana Reconstructed}, 201.}
"BULLDOZING" THE SCALAWAGS: THE PERSECUTION
AND OSTRACISM OF SOUTHERN WHITE
REPUBLICANS IN LOUISIANA

"I am safe to say," scalawag Thomas Hudnall testified in October, 1868, "that there is not a single white man whose sympathies are with the republican party who can be able to live in the parish of Morehouse."

Hudnall knew from personal experience the dangers that awaited white men who joined the Radical movement in that rural, hill-country parish.

He reported that in August of 1868, Tom Daily, a local Republican, was murdered on the highway near Girod Station. "I am reliably informed," Hudnall stated, "that the body of Daily was terribly mangled; he had received nearly forty loads of shot, and that no one dared to remove it for a whole day, and it remained there until his...brother came with a man by the name of Doltrey, who helped to put it in a coffin.... I saw the coffin which Doltrey and Daily's brother were carrying on a wagon to the ridge to have it buried. Bloodmutter was leaking from the coffin and under the wagon." Sometime after the burial, a gang of thirty horsemen went to Doltrey's house about midnight. "Some of them dismounted, broke in the house, searched for Doltrey,

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See Hudnall's affidavit in Use of the Army, 351.

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loudly cursing him, saying," Hudnall testified, "that he was a damned black son of a bitch, living with negroes and voting for them." Doltrey escaped and came to Hudnall. "I advised him," Hudnall stated, "to leave the country; he did so. I believe that he is either at New Orleans or St. Louis."  

Soon after Daily's murder, and Doltrey's hasty departure, Hudnall himself received a visit from the local Ku Klux Klan. On the night of August 19, 1868, Hudnall claimed, a party of mounted men, armed and with their faces blackened, rode up to his brother-in-law's house where he was spending the night. When they called out Hudnall's name, his sister Mrs. C. R. Balfour, went to the door and asked them why they had come at night and in disguise to see her brother. Their leader, a man named Haddock answered: "Madam, we do not come to hurt anybody; we only wish to see Mr. Hudnall and have a private chat with him."  

Unconvinced, the sister asked, "Have you gentlemen come here to murder my poor old brother [Hudnall was then fifty-one years old]?" "No," Haddock repeated, "but we must have a private chat with him." Meanwhile, Hudnall had been hiding in an upstairs bedroom. His sister then went to him and begged him to speak to Haddock. Reluctantly, Hudnall went to the front  

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2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., 350.  
4 Ibid.
door and asked Haddock what he wanted. Again, he repeated, "Come out, we want to have a private chat with you." Hudnall prudently refused.⁵

At that point the riders edged their horses closer to the porch. Impatient and angry, Haddock shouted that unless Hudnall came out they would drag him out. Again, Hudnall refused. "Attention, K.K.'s [Ku Kluxers]...be ready to hold some of these horses," Haddock ordered as he dismounted. The sister, now joined by her husband, begged the klansmen to leave.⁶ "They paid no attention to these entreaties," Hudnall stated, "and we heard then the click of the pistols' triggers they were cocking."⁷ Mr. Balfour asked what crime Hudnall had committed. "They said," Hudnall reported, "that I had refused to join the democrat party after having voted the radical ticket. Haddock added that I had voted the damned negro ticket."⁸ Realizing that it was useless to argue with the gang, Hudnall retreated from the doorway and seized a double-barreled shotgun, and his sister drew a knife from her blouse. She then dared Haddock to try and take her brother from the house. "I am the wife of C. R. Balfour," she stated with grim determination, "this house is all mine...it is now nearly day; if you are to take my

⁵Ibid.
⁶Ibid.
⁷Ibid.
⁸Ibid., 350-351.
brother and you too [addressing Haddock], I want you to come foremost, you bully...as I am now ready to die by my brother's side."9 Apparently demoralized by the woman's boldness, the klansmen, who were now standing on the porch, stepped back and held a conference. Haddock then came forward and addressed Mrs. Balfour: "You may take it to yourself that you saved your brother's life; we will now give him five days to leave this country." Hudnall left Morehouse Parish the next morning and did not stop until he reached the safety of New Orleans.10

Such coercion would eventually reduce the Republican party in the rural parishes to a state of political paralysis. Nightriders harassed without mercy those few white Louisianians (and their Negro and carpetbag friends) willing to serve in the Republican ranks or hold public office. Hudnall's encounter with the Morehouse Klan was typical of the experience of many Louisiana Republicans purged from public life.

Scalawag Josiah Fisk also testified to the perils facing Southern white Republicans in rural Louisiana. In an affidavit, dated October 22, 1868, Fisk, a New Orleans lawyer, stated that he traveled to St. Mary Parish to advise the Republican sheriff, a Colonel Pope, on certain legal matters. Pope warned Fisk in advance that "the people had

9Ibid., 351.
10Ibid.
become hostile, and had resolved that no republican should hold office or have a house in the parish...."
11 Pope also advised Fisk not to bring his family or let anyone know that he was acquainted with the sheriff until he had found a room to rent. Otherwise, he would be unable to secure lodging. When Fisk arrived in Franklin, one landlord informed him that he only rented to Democrats. "I ask you plainly are you a democrat or a republican?" the landlord inquired. Fisk replied that he was Republican. "Then you cannot have my house at any price," the owner stated firmly.12 Fisk later approached a widow who rented rooms to travelers. "But if he was a republican," Fisk reported her as saying, "she would not dare to let him have the house for fear the democrats would either kill her or burn her house."13

After Fisk eventually found accommodations, securing a place to sleep proved to be his least pressing problem. "He was informed," according to his affidavit," that the democrats were pledged to kill or drive away every republican officer in the parish, and, at the request of Colonel Pope, he never but once appeared in the streets with him, and on that occasion they had to separate on account of the

11 See Fisk's affidavit in ibid., 225.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.

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crowd gathering, hooting, and yelling, 'Here comes Pope, the carpet-bagger, and his scalawag lawyer.'"14

Later, on the evening of October 17, a black man warned Fisk that a group of Democrats planned to murder him. "These men belonged to the Seymour Knights [a political club]," Fisk testified. "They put on their uniforms and commenced to parade the streets." Fisk watched them for a time through his window, and when they marched away, he left town in the opposite direction. Fisk escaped by crossing Bayou Teche, wading through the swamp to Grand Lake, and then paddling a skiff to Brasher City. Fisk waited through the night outside the town. The next morning someone warned him that the local Democrats had stationed pickets on the outskirts of the town. Fisk then remained in hiding until a detachment of Federal troops arrived.15

On his way back to New Orleans, however, Fisk encountered one of the Democrats who had been waiting for him near a bridge outside of Brasher City. "You old scalawag," the man yelled, "...I will get you yet." At that point, the man pulled a pistol and exclaimed, "I will give you hell now." But Fisk spurred his horse and was quickly out of range when the man fired.16

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 224-225.
16 Ibid., 225.
When he arrived safely in New Orleans, Fisk learned of the murder of Pope and parish judge Valentine Chase, a scalawag. Pope and Chase were attacked at a local inn. "Colonel Pope and Judge Chase were together, on the gallery in front of Pope's room," Fisk stated, "...the murderers came along under the gallery softly until they reached the stairs, up which they rushed and fired several balls into Colonel Pope before he had a chance to rise, when Colonel Pope jumped for his room, into which he fell dead. Judge Chase struggled with them on the gallery and stairs, they stabbing and shooting all the time; finally he fell dead near the banks of the bayou." Fisk added that the black Republicans in St. Mary Parish had now gone into hiding. "All the leading colored men," he stated in the affidavit, "have had to take to the swamps, being there still, not daring to return home until there is some surety of their being protected by the military."  

Although the expression would not be commonly used in Louisiana until the close of Reconstruction, Daily, Doltrey, Hudnall, Pope, Chase, and Fisk had been effectively "bulldozed." To bulldoze meant simply to use violence and intimidation to coerce Republicans, Negro and white. The object was to purge them from office or prevent them from

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17 Ibid.; see also Warmoth, Stormy Days, 69.
18 Use of the Army, 224.
voting the Republican ticket.\textsuperscript{19} It was a brutal but an effective process. The evidence is overwhelming that, throughout the Reconstruction era, Republicans in Louisiana were subjected to both random and organized abuse, to intimidation and to physical attack.\textsuperscript{20} The Republicans were never able to devise counter-measures. They remained to the end largely helpless victims of their enemies.

Only a strong state militia or a Federal force could have provided a defense against the bulldozers. The Louisiana legislature did authorize the establishment of a half white and half Negro militia force of five thousand men, but "Warmoth was most reluctant to equip, or even to organize, the militia. Louisiana troops half white and half black would almost surely be divided among themselves, and the white element would probably be unreliable for the defense of a Republican regime."\textsuperscript{21}

For some Southern white Radicals, the arming of black men to suppress white men evoked the specter of a race war. "I am confident," John T. Ludeling told Warmoth in September, 1870, "that the organization of the Militia...would lead to trouble, by arraying the whites and colored citizens against each other--but as it now is (and it would be


\textsuperscript{21}Taylor, \textit{Louisiana Reconstructed}, 177.
fortunate if no other companies were organized) the organiza-
tion cannot be regarded as having anything to do with
party or politics; and order is much more likely to be main-
tained."\textsuperscript{22} Warmoth's failure to create a viable militia
system and the Federal government's failure to dispatch ade-
quate numbers of soldiers to suppress terrorism in the
rural parishes meant that the Radical regimes never effec-
tively controlled the countryside.\textsuperscript{23} Helpless before the
wholesale violence and intimidation, the Republican party in
the country parishes became disorganized and demoralized.

"In this place [Minden, Louisiana] yesterday the election
was held, and conducted without violence owing, I presume,
to the fact that no opposition was offered," scalawag John
L. Lewis stated. "The white Republicans as well as the
freedman were afraid to vote as they really desired--having
had intimidations before the election, that they should suf-
fer if they did not vote the Democratic ticket. There were
but two Republican tickets voted at this box--I voted one

\textsuperscript{22}Ludeling to Warmoth, September 7, 1870, Warmoth
Papers. Earlier, however, Ludeling had been authorized by
Warmoth to purchase arms for the militia. Willing to co-
operate at that time, Ludeling advised Warmoth regarding the
purchase of the weapons: "The letter of Credit which you
gave me with which to buy the arms to arm 500 mounted men
calls for 'Spenser Rifles.' Now the Rifle is an infantry
arm and quite too heavy cavalry. I conclude then that you
wish me to buy the 'Carbine' instead of the 'Rifle.' Am I
right?.... While on this point allow me to suggest that
from the best information I can get here, I have come to
the conclusion that the 'Winchester' repeating arms are the
best now manufactured," Ludeling to Warmoth, May 3, 1870,
ibid. Emphasis in the original.

\textsuperscript{23}See Taylor, \textit{Louisiana Reconstructed}, 312-313.
openly.... I had been told that no 'Radical' ticket should be voted...."\(^{24}\)

Lewis also complained bitterly that the local authorities were doing nothing to protect Claiborne Parish Republicans. "In Homer, a white man was tied, stripped, and whipped, day before yesterday," Lewis wrote to Governor Warmoth on July 10, 1868, "not a word said or anything done to bring the guilty to punishment. The same night Hon. W. Jasper Blackburn's printing office...was broken open, type, press, and everything broken, scattered, and destroyed. I address you as our governor, and ask you to give us officers not in fear of or sympathy with the miserable and cowardly clans that have committed these outrages...."\(^{25}\)

One white Republican reported that in Shreveport only twelve whites dared to support the Radical ticket. "All we lacked was numbers in our force.... All the white citizens were a unit against us but were not satisfied at having overwhelming numbers and fighting us fairly on the political issues but resorted to all possible kinds of frauds--threats and violence." The result was that "no man of our party could go into the country to hold a political meeting without running the risk of being bushwacked and assassinated...." "This is not a healthy locality for Radical politicians," this man wrote with studied understatement.

\(^{24}\) Lewis to Warmoth, November 4, 1868, Warmoth Papers.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., July 10, 1868 in Use of the Army, 267.
He added: "Do not publish any part of this we have about as much as we want to do to dodge the bullets of the Thugs in this place now without stirring them up with a sharp pole."  

Radical E. B. Goodwin described succinctly the effect of violence and intimidation in Lafayette Parish: "I regret to say that in this Parish true, earnest working Republicans, 'are like angels...few and far between.'"  

Terrorist activities became bolder at the Conservative forces grew in confidence and power. Although they were never tightly organized, the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camellia harassed Louisiana Republicans from the beginning of Radical Reconstruction. Even more effective was the White League, a loosely-structured, paramilitary, and anti-Radical organization, that appeared in 1874. Organized into trained units, armed with surplus rifles and navy revolvers, and recruited, in part, from battle-seasoned Confederate veterans, the White League Forces in New Orleans posed a serious threat to the Republican administration of carpetbag governor William Pitt Kellogg. Then, in September, 1874, the White League rose up in open rebellion in the streets of New Orleans. The Conservatives had smuggled arms into the city by railroad and steamboat. Metropolitan Policemen had, in

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26 W. L. Muefitt?) to Warmoth, April 29, 1868, Warmoth Papers. Emphasis in the original.

27 Goodwin to Stephen B. Packard, September 17, 1871, ibid.

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fact, seized seventy-two rifles on September 8. But the flow of weapons continued unabated. On September 12, the steamboat Mississippi docked with a cargo containing a large quantity of weapons. When it became known that the police intended to confiscate the arms, the White League officers ordered their followers to assemble for a mass rally at the corner of St. Charles and Canal Street. The result was the "Battle of Liberty Place," September 14, 1874.

When Longstreet, commander of the state militia, learned that the White League intended to prevent the police from seizing the weapons, he mobilized his forces. Longstreet's command consisted of 500 Metropolitans, 100 other policemen, and 3,000 black militiamen. In addition, he had one Gatling gun and a battery of artillery.

Longstreet's troops advanced to Canal Street. The Gatling gun and artillery units then opened fire. According to Longstreet's report, the insurgent line, numbering about 8,400 men, began to waver until one of the Metropolitan captains suddenly withdrew his company from its position in the Republican line and defected to the enemy. "This movement," Longstreet reported, "together with the accurate fire of sharpshooters from windows and roof tops in all directions had a very demoralizing influence upon the other infantry company, which fell back under severe fire and

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28 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 291.
29 Ibid., 291-293.
left the artillery exposed and unprotected.\textsuperscript{30} The commander of the Metropolitan Police, A. S. Badger, later testified that the White Leaguers were positioned behind cotton bales and that these protected them from the Republican artillery and machine gun fire. With the White League marksmen picking off the exposed gun crews, the Metropolitans and the black militia began to retire in confusion. The retreat soon turned into a rout. Some of Longstreet's men fled back to the Custom House, confident that the enemy would not attack a Federal building, and others reassembled at Jackson Square. Longstreet's men were forced, however, to abandon the Mechanics' Institute (the official state house) to the enemy.\textsuperscript{31} The defeat must have been particularly humiliating for James Longstreet. One of Robert E. Lee's finest officers found himself at the head of an unreliable little army of blacks, carpetbaggers, and scalawags, defeated by a force of ex-rebels.\textsuperscript{32}

Two days after the encounter General W. H. Emory, the federal commander at Jefferson Barracks, arrived and restored Kellogg to power.\textsuperscript{33} That the Kellogg regime did not collapse immediately in the fall of 1874 was due to the con-


\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, 126-127.

\textsuperscript{32}According to one account of the affair, Longstreet was wounded and taken prisoner by the White League. See Sanger and Hay, \textit{James Longstreet}, 370-371.

\textsuperscript{33}Taylor, \textit{Louisiana Reconstructed}, 295.
tinued presence of Federal troops. Although the rural parishes remained largely unpolic ed, in New Orleans at least the Radicals still retained control of the state government. But it was obvious that, without the continued support of Washington, the carpetbag government in Louisiana would fall into the hands of the White League and its sympathizers like a ripe pear. The Conservative troops remained organized and now drilled openly in New Orleans, waiting for the final departure of the Union soldiers.34

The Radical defeat in New Orleans further weakened the party structure in the rural areas.35 Now the Conservatives became even more aggressive. "I must say," a Republican wrote to Stephen B. Packard from Bienville Parish, "...that I never have seen the republicans in this parish so completely run off the track as the White Leaguers has [sic] them now. I doubt very much our standing any hand in the coming election; they have made two or three of our most prominent republicans leave the parish. The white and colored republicans are so intimidated, or have been, that they are not registering."36 In a confidential letter dated October, 1874, the president and the secretary of the Vermillion Parish Republican executive committee appealed to Stephen B. Packard to dispatch Union soldiers

34Ibid., 296.
35Ibid., 295.
36L. C. James to Packard, October 10, 1874, in Use of the Army, 370.
to Abbeville. "The immediate presence here of a body of Federal troops," they stated, "...would give confidence not only to the colored men, but many white creoles, who are republicans at heart--men who during the war hid themselves in the sea-marsh rather than serve in the confederate army, and today are well aware that their only salvation is with the republican party."  

That same month, Richard Talbot, a Napoleonville Republican and secretary of the Assumption Parish executive committee, asked Packard to send twenty-five United States cavalrymen to bolster the Radical cause in this area. "On election-day every colored man in the parish would come to the polls and vote the straight ticket," he claimed, "while a large number of 'poor whites' who have fed on the rations sent from the North, and are even now unwilling to register or to vote, would be strengthened in their resolution to remain at home, or else come forward and vote the republican ticket." But it all depended upon the presence of Union troopers. Such was the fragile base upon which the Republican cause rested in these two rural parishes. 

Physical intimidation was not the only weapon employed by the Conservative whites. Social ostracism accompanied terrorism. Conservative whites refused white Radicals a place in community life, striving, often successfully, to

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37 J. A. Brookshire and Carl G. Schneider to Packard, October 30, 1874, reprinted in ibid., 302-303.

38 Richard Talbot to Packard, October 15, 1874, ibid.

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freeze them out of white society. When Ouachita Parish Scalawag John Ray voted for an equal rights bill in the state assembly in 1868, for instance, the New Orleans Daily Picayune lashed out in a particularly vicious, racist editorial headlined "DOOM FOR THE TRAITOR": "Men and women of Louisiana, in whose veins courses the pure blood of the race which has always ruled that of Africa, what must you think of the conduct of this degenerate white man? This man who has a white wife and children, who has been the associate of white men and women, received into their homes, feasted at their boards, sheltered under their roofs, who does not come to us from Vermont, Massachusetts, or Michigan, with their perverted theories, against God's eternal decree of separation of the white and black races...." Ray, the Conservative journal continued, "had the shameless hardihood to vote that hereafter the negro, reeking with fetid odors, hideous in face, brutal in manner, rude in speech, shall be the social equal of the proud and sensitive whites of Louisiana...." Now, the journal warned, white women and children "are to find negro men, and women, and children at the hotels, theatres, and on the railroad trains, received on equal footing with themselves, crowding them at tables, or in steamboat cabins, and compelling them to inhale their sickening stench or listen to their vulgar

39 New Orleans Daily Picayune, September 20, 1868.
40 Ibid.
The editorial concluded with a demand that Ray be ostracized from white society: "Let him go forth, and return to his outraged white neighbors to receive his social doom. If the 'slow and moving finger of scorn' be not henceforth his log among white people, a great social criminal will escape merited punishment." appeal for white Louisianians to put social pressure on their white Radical neighbors multiplied with the founding of the White League. "We infinitely prefer the negro to the carpetbagger and renegade [scalawag]," the Alexandria Caucasian, a White League journal, editorialized in April, 1874, "and if we must make a choice between the ignorance of the one and the rascality of the other, give us, by all means ignorance, and instruct it into some sort of semblance of knowledge and reason. Give us his Satanic Majesty and all the imps of hell in preference to the sneaking, whining, sleek-haired, cowardly, impecunious, lying, deceitful, and thievish carpetbagger, and his town companion, the miscegenation-loving, would-be negro and no less corrupt scalawag." In 1874, the Natchitoches Vindicator warned the Louisiana scalawags that the time had come for them to leave the Radical movement or be excluded forever from white society:

Ibid.

Ibid.

Alexandria (Louisiana) Caucasian, April 18, 1874.
"We advise our native white fellow citizens of Louisiana, who have arrayed themselves against their white brothers, to retrace their steps while there is still time left to do so."

But it was not enough for the scalawags simply to desert the Republicans, they must also actively aid the Conservative forces. "When a war of races is imminent—and we tell them that it is imminent—they should be found but on one side battling with the caucasian race; words of sympathy will not do. The people will be satisfied with nothing short of acts, plain and unmistakeable. They have yet time to redeem themselves." The scalawag, the journal stated, had no alternative but to join the white ranks. The conservatives were determined to win, and the struggle would be "quick, sharp, and decisive." Finally, the editorial addressed its Conservative readers: "Let us never cease to make war upon them, both in their official and private capacities; dis­countenance any person who meets them as gentlemen on the street. Shut your doors and your hearts to them; let them be outcasts to every feeling of mercy you may have, so that living they may only encumber the earth, and dying descend to hell covered with the curses of every virtuous man in Louisiana." 44

The White Leaguers of St. Mary Parish pledged themselves to ostracize all white Republicans. "We regard it the sacred and political duty of every member of this Club

to discountenance and socially proscribe all white men who united themselves with the radical party...." Conservative whites were encouraged to compile "a black list or book of remembrance, in every parish, wherein should be inscribed the names of those white men, who, in this emergency prove recreant to the duties and instincts of race and cast their lot with the African. The infamous record should be as conspicuous, for all time to come as the pictures of notorious criminals in the rogues galleries of large cities. These men must not be forgotten. Let their names be written in the Black List...that they and all who descend from their loins to the fourth generation may be Pariahs, forever cast out from all association with the Caucasian race. Let all who adhere to the negro party...be reckoned as negroes and treated as such."  

The White League Club of Sandy Creek, Louisiana, vowed to "consider it beneath our moral and social dignity to associate with any white man who refuses to enroll his name among those who have openly declared themselves to be white men with principles favoring a white man's government." The members of the Baton Rouge chapter organized a committee to report "the names of all white men, who through indifference to the future welfare of the white race of Louisiana have failed to register [to vote]; and that a list of those names

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be kept for publication after the election, together with the names of all white men who voted the radical ticket."

Violence, intimidation, and social ostracism delivered a fatal blow to Louisiana Republicans who were already weakened by internal factional strife. Many Radicals lived under the most intense pressure, fearful of a night visit by the White League or some equally dangerous gang of Conservative terrorists. Terrorism and ostracism affected not only Republican voters and parish officials, but the families of individual Radicals as well. "Let me tell you frankly," Elcey Breda wrote her husband Earnest (a Natchitoches scalawag) in April of 1873, "that I would...rather see you poor as a church mouse than in the position you have, for you have made yourself enemies and your friends have abandoned you,...give up all these political ideas, leave the Radicals. I do not say for this [sic] that you must turn liberal, no, remain quiet and Earnest you will see that your friends will return to you, and for me Earnest I will love you more and more each day...."

Breda did not heed her appeal. He wrote to his wife, mentioning that he had encountered some of his neighbors on the riverboat Royal George near Grand Ecore. "Suddath and Murphy are the only two who spoke to me...[while] Russell, Charles and others acted as if they did not know me, and I

46 Ibid., 20.

47 Elcey Breda to J. Earnest Breda, April 11, 1873, Breda Papers, LSU.
did the same thing to them, the poor low flung trash, I won­
der if they expect to make anything by that, enough of the
contemptible things [he sneered] for they are not worth
mentioning."\textsuperscript{48}

Apparently hoping to receive patronage, Breda remained
active in the party despite the ostracism of his former
friends. Following the state elections of November, 1874,
he visited with the party leaders in New Orleans. "I have
made many acquaintances and have met with my usual good
fortune, that is becoming a favorate of all whom I meet
and converse with," he wrote confidently to his wife, "and
have received the expressions of heartfelt congradulations
[\textit{sic}] from the highest officials of the state on my suc­
cesses and the ability shown while District Attorney, and
expressions of assurance as to my future career in the
Judiciary. It is true we are beset by enemies and surroun­
ded by dangerous elements, but it gladdens and strengthens
our hearts to meet men in sympathy of feelings and of like
opinions who have the fortitude to think as freemen, and
the courage to battle for their rights. \textit{[E. L.] Pierson
[a fellow scalawag] and I were the heroes of North Western
Louisiana...}" He concluded with a promise to return home
soon, but, he cautioned, "do not let any stranger know this
and I will turn up \textit{all right} when you least expect it."\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{48}J. Earnest Breda to Elcey Breda, November 14, 1874, \textit{ibid.} Emphasis in the original.

\textsuperscript{49}\textit{Ibid.}, November 25, 1875, \textit{ibid.} Emphasis in original.
Eventually, however, the Conservatives forced Breda to flee Natchitoches in 1876. The Vindicator noted his flight with considerable glee. "Quite an amusing spectacle was presented to our people Tuesday last, and the mirth of the affair has its point well made," the White League organ stated. "As soon as the troops departed...Breda...and other hitherto 'bold and outspoken Republicans,' took flight with them." The Radical "Hegira," the paper reasoned, marked "the return of order and prosperity" to Louisiana.50

In 1878, one year after the collapse of Republican rule in Louisiana, Breda, now in hiding in Shreveport, wrote to his wife. "Let no stranger know of our moves," he warned, "let them find out for themselves. After we will be in New Orleans then it is all right."51 Breda's die-hard devotion to the Republican party was exceptional. Even before the end of Reconstruction in Louisiana in 1877, most Southern white Republicans had either left public life or, in some cases had left the state. A few, like Breda, clung desperately to their offices despite the fact that their Radical comrades had been bulldozed and the state returned to Conservative control.

50 Quoted in Bill Tunnard to J. Earnest Breda, November 21, 1876, ibid.
51 J. Earnest Breda to Elcey Breda, November 30, 1878, ibid.
CHAPTER VIII

AFTER THE DELUGE: THE LOUISIANA SCALAWAGS AND THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION YEARS

In 1877, during the wild Mardi Gras celebration, the floats of Momus, God of Laughter and Ridicule, poked rau­cous fun at the Republicans, including President Grant and the local carpetbaggers and scalawags. The Democrats, it seems, were not content with a political victory alone, but insisted on the last laugh as well.

The Republican party and the scalawags, however, did not suddenly disappear from the political scene. Some remained in politics—braving once again the random abuse and violence that had hung over them during the hectic days of carpetbag government, barely tolerated by their neigh­bors, or perhaps, accepted with genuine liking now that the Radicals no longer posed a serious threat to Conservative control in Louisiana. Some found the security of positions with the Federal government. Some left the state to retire in peace or to set about building a new life. And some simply withdrew from public life, and from history.

Among the scalawags who remained in Louisiana and con­tinued to hold elective office was Michael Hahn. Although

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he remained a Republican in name, Hahn withdrew from the Radical camp after 1871 and worked closely with the Liberal Republicans and Democrats. This, in part, explains his survival as an officeholder after 1877. As mentioned previously, Hahn edited the New Orleans Republican until 1871. He then moved to his sugar plantation in St. Charles Parish, where he founded the village of Hahnville. He became a school director of the parish in 1872 and in that same year served as president of the Louisiana State educational convention. Hahn was also elected to the state legislature from three successive terms in 1872, 1874, and 1876. While a member of the state assembly, he was chairman of the judiciary committee, and served briefly as speaker of the House. In August 1876 he was appointed registrar of voters. Hahn was, apparently, one of the few elected officials who was able to avoid the controversy surrounding the election that year. In 1878, President Hayes appointed Hahn superintendent of the United States mint at New Orleans, a position which he held until January 1879. In November 1879, Hahn secured election as a state district judge (his jurisdiction comprised the parishes of Jefferson, St. Charles and St. John).

Still a faithful Republican in 1880, Hahn founded the New Orleans Ledger, a partisan journal aimed at promoting the local and national party candidates. Four years later he was re-elected district judge, apparently without opposition. In October 1884, Hahn was elected as a Republican
to Congress from Louisiana's second district, one of the state's strongest Democratic areas. Hahn died suddenly of a massive stroke at Willard's Hotel in Washington on March 15, 1886. He was fifty-six years old—still prosperous, still in office, and still a Republican.

Thomas Green Davidson did not seek re-election to the state assembly in 1874. From that time until 1880 his political activities were restricted to local affairs in Livingston Parish. In 1880, however, Davidson, now seventy-five years old, ran successfully for the state house of representatives. "It appeared," E. Russ Williams writes, "that they [his constituents] chose to remember him for the service of his earlier career and to overlook the confusion of the dark days of war and reconstruction." Three years later, on September 1, 1883, Davidson died while still in office at Springfield, Louisiana.

Chauncey Kellogg, a lawyer and a persistent Republican, worked to rebuild the party in Louisiana in the 1870's and the 1880's. One Louisianian, Ambrose Snow, asked United States Senator Frank Hiscock (Republican, New York) to assist Kellogg in securing a position with the mint in New Orleans. "There being no republican Senator from Louisiana

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2Memorial Addresses, 7, 10, 18; Simpson and Hay, "Michael Hahn," 230; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, s.v., "Hahn, Michael."

3E. Russ Williams, "Tom Green Davidson," 25; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v., "Davidson, Thomas Green."
and only one republican congressman [Michael Hahn]," Snow wrote, "it seems to Mr. Kellogg's friends that it will not be out of place for republicans from other states who know of his high character and fitness to make recommendations as may aid the President in making good appointments." 4

Theodore Fontelieu of New Iberia continued to work for the Republican party as late as 1889. "He is a native born Republican," G.R.M. Neuman wrote from Abbeville that year, "true to the core and deserves consideration at the hands of the party." (Fontelieu had recently applied for a position with the United States mint at New Orleans.) "He was shot several times...on the stand while making a speech in 1884.... This outrage on him was repeated in 86 and in the Spring and Fall of 88. He was elected Dist. Judge in 79--84 and 88 and counted out each time...", Neuman declared. 5

Oscar Joffrion continued to lead the Pointe Coupee Republicans after 1876. In 1878, in fact, he claimed that the Republican party was alive and well in his parish. "I will take occasion to state," he wrote to President Hayes in December 1878, "that at every election--even the late [state] contest of 1878--my Party has achieved a victory in my Parish

4Snow to Hiscock (1880?), Applications...New Orleans, Record Group 56, Box 14. For other recommendations, and evidence of Kellogg's Republicanism see Kellogg file, Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

5Neuman to William Windom, Secretary of the Treasury, March 22, 1889, Applications...New Orleans, Box 13, Record Group 56; Fontelieu supplied letters of recommendation from William Pitt Kellogg and Henry Clay Warmoth. See Fontelieu file, Applications...New Orleans, Box 13, Record Group 56.
and always by large majorities. While the Rep Party has become disorganized and mismanaged in nearly every Republican Parish the Parish of Point Coupee has again been true to her past record as is evidenced by the victory again this year. Although violence and intimidation were practiced.

This Parish has been classed as one of the 'bulldozed.' These results ought to command the attention of your Excellency."

In 1872 Eugene Staes became judge of the second municipal court of New Orleans, an "office he held up to the downfall of the Republican party" in Louisiana. Staes, however, remained an active Republican, and in 1888 he ran, unsuccessfully, for the state senate from the second senatorial district. "Although defeated," A. A. Braver, president of New Orleans' ninth ward Republican club, wrote to Benjamin Harrison in recommending Staes for a position with the New Orleans mint in 1899, "he ran ahead of the republican ticket by several hundred votes." And, Braver added, Staes "was one of the few Louisianians who have not abandoned the republican party and principles at the downfall and gone over to the Democratic party." He also informed the President that Henry Clay Warmoth, J.R.G.

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6 Joffrion to Hayes, December 4, 1878, Applications... Collectors of Internal Revenue, Box 73, Record Group 56. Emphasis in original.
Pitkin, P.B.S. Pinchback, and Andrew Hero endorsed Staes' application.7

"Major [Andrew] Hero is a sugar planter and a notory public, and has been voting the Republican ticket for the last twenty years, openly, boldly, and fearlessly," one of Hero's supporters wrote in 1889.8 Hero, an ex-Confederate, remained an active Republican in New Orleans as an unsuccessful candidate for lieutenant governor and for a seat in the United States Congress in the 1880's.9 Various letters recommending Hero for a position with the United States mint in New Orleans, written in 1889, emphasized the need to reward such old-line white Republicans as Hero for their years of service to the party. A Texas Republican, W. B. Merchant, argued, for example, that not only would a patronage position benefit Hero, but his appointment would be a step towards the rebuilding of the Republican party in the South: "While I have no confidence in the pretenses of the Southern Democrats...giving colored people any fair chance in political matters I am of the opinion that a white Republican party can be built up in Louisiana that will at some future time be able to demand and force a free ballot and fair count." This Republican looked to Hero

7A. A. Braver to Harrison, June 1, 1899, Applications...New Orleans, Box 15, Record Group 56.

8H. Dudley Coleman to Benjamin Harrison, May 31, 1889, Application...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

9E. J. Barrett to Benjamin Harrison (1889?), Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56; Andrew Hero, passim.
and men like him to "organize a strong party of both white, and colored Republicans in the Commonwealth of Louisiana."10

One important reason for the continued existence of the Republican party in Louisiana was its control over Federal patronage.11 James Madison Wells was fortunate in securing a Federal appointment. He had served on the state Returning Board in 1874 and 1876. During the 1874 canvass, Wells and the other Republican board members threw out enough disputed returns (i.e., Democratic votes) to ensure a Radical majority in the state assembly.12 The Democrats, of course, responded with a great howl of discontent since they considered the board's proceedings a fraud. There were, in fact, at least two attempted assassinations of Wells in 1874 as a result of the decision.13

Wells' service to the party did not go unrewarded. In May 1875, he received an appointment as Surveyor of Customs for the port of New Orleans. Apparently, the position was

10 Merchant to Benjamin Harrison, February 14, 1889, Applications...New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56. Hero's son, Andrew Hero, Jr., attended Tulane, Columbia University, and was graduated from West Point in 1891. He served in the United States Army for forty years and retired in 1930 with the rank of major general. See Who Was Who, 1607-1896, s.v., "Hero, Andrew, Jr."


not extremely lucrative, but it did enable him to begin to recoup his finances, which had declined since the war. It even became possible for him to send his daughters to boarding school in Virginia.14

The election of 1876 brought Wells back into the public eye. Once again the Republicans and the Democrats were locked in a bitter dispute; once again the Republican-dominated board proceeded to count its friends in and its Democratic enemies out; and once again, the Democrats fumed with outrage. At the conclusion of its deliberations, the board announced that Republican Stephen B. Packard had been elected governor and Rutherford B. Hayes had carried the state.15

During the Congressional investigations of the Returning Board, following the disputed election, Wells defended himself against a variety of allegations, including charges that he had personally falsified the returns from Vernon Parish and that he had solicited bribes totalling one million dollars. The evidence and testimony were so contradictory that the truth regarding Wells’ role in the election will probably never be completely clear. As one student of Wells’ political career states, “The tremendous mass of testimony taken by Congressional committees, Senate

14Ibid., 1099.

committees, and that uncovered by newspapers was successful in showing that the Louisiana Returning Board did change the results of the election as delivered to them by election supervisors. The testimony did not show, however, that the Board had changed the results illegally. The tremendous power, granted by its creating act, was wielded by Wells [as the president of the board] and his companions according to their consciences. They firmly believed that their actions were justified. Wells himself never admitted that his decisions were wrong.  

Of course, there was little reason for Wells to admit he was wrong: any admission of guilt would have left him open to prosecution.

In June 1877, in fact, an Orleans Parish grand jury indicted Wells and the other board members for perjury, forgery, and altering the returns of several parishes. Wells appealed to President Hayes and Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman to save him, but there was little the Washington Republicans could do since the indictments were a purely state matter. Wells at one point even hid in the Custom House to avoid arrest. He contemplated fleeing the state, but in February 1878, he surrendered to a local sheriff and returned to New Orleans. Incarcerated briefly in the parish jail, Wells secured his release on $10,000 bail. Although one member of the board was convicted and 


17 Ibid., 1108.
sentenced to two years at hard labor, the state supreme court later overturned the verdict. In Wells' case, which had not yet come to trial, all charges were dismissed.\textsuperscript{18}

Safe now from future prosecution, Wells continued working at the Custom House until he retired in 1880 to his plantation at Lecompte in Rapides Parish. After his retirement, he withdrew completely from public life. He died on February 28, 1899, at the age of ninety-one.\textsuperscript{19}

Louis Dupleix was one of the few rural Republican officeholders to survive the Democratic purge in 1877. Appointed registrar of the United States land office at Natchitoches by President Grant in 1872, he continued in that position during the administrations of Presidents Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur. Out of office during Cleveland's tenure, Dupleix was reappointed to the land office position by Benjamin Harrison in May 1900.\textsuperscript{20}

From 1873 until 1882, Benjamin Franklin Flanders served as United States treasurer at New Orleans. In 1888 he was the unsuccessful Republican candidate for state treasurer. Despite his failure to return to active politics, the postwar years seem to have been good to Flanders.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, 111-1113.


\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana}, 242.
On March 13, 1896, he died on his country estate, "Ben Alva," near Youngsville, Lafayette Parish.  

Maximilian Ferdinand Bonzano was coiner of the United States mint at New Orleans during Hahn's brief tenure as superintendent. He later worked as melter and refiner for the mint until his retirement in 1883. That same year he received the Republican nomination for state treasurer, but he was defeated by a Democrat, E. A. Burke.

Apparently, Bonzano's career in government service was not unprofitable. In 1878, he purchased a mansion outside of New Orleans. The "Hermitage," as he called it, had been the headquarters of Andrew Jackson during the battle of New Orleans. It also received local fame for having been the temporary residence of the Marquis de Lafayette during his visit to New Orleans in 1825. Bonzano equipped the mansion with a chemical laboratory and an extensive scientific and classical library. The building included "the latest inventions of the day [1892], the phonograph, the type-writer, the self registering thermometer, telegraphic connections with the city and other marvels of comfort and ingenuity."  

Robert Ray served as judge of the Fourth judicial district of Louisiana until the Democratic takeover in 1877.

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21 Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v., "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin." According to The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Flanders remained as United States treasurer at New Orleans until 1885, ibid., s.v. "Flanders, Benjamin Franklin."

22 Goods speed's Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, 306.
He then returned to his law practice. Ray, however, did not desert the party. In 1888 he ran for Attorney General of Louisiana but failed to win the election. Later, as reward for his continued loyalty to the party, Benjamin Harrison appointed him postmaster at Monroe, Louisiana. Ray died in October 1899, at the age of sixty-nine.²³

John Ray apparently did not return to Ouachita Parish following the collapse of the Radical regime. In 1876, B. H. Dinkgrave, a leading Ouachita Republican, was assassinated, and Ray felt that it was too dangerous to return there. "I am satisfied that there was a feeling too much nugatory to attempt to control votes there by any argument whatever," he testified later before a Congressional committee, "and besides some of my friends...advise me that if I filled these appointments [Ray had been scheduled to stump the parish for the Republican ticket in 1876] I might subject myself to personal violence."²⁴ Ray, like many of his fellow Republicans had been "bulldozed." Yet he did serve as legal counsel to the Returning Board during the disputed electoral count of 1876. As a reward for his service to the party John Sherman, then Secretary of the Treasury, appointed Ray special prosecuting attorney for the "Whiskey Ring" cases in Louisiana in 1878.²⁵ His other legal

²⁵Ibid., 25.
activities involved cases dealing with Louisiana's claims to certain Gulf Coast swamp lands, and the claims of French citizens in New Orleans for damages arising out of the Federal occupation of the city during the Civil War.  

During his last years, Ray built up a thriving legal practice in New Orleans. He died on March 4, 1888.

Napoleon Underwood's reward for service to the party was somewhat less prestigious. A former delegate to the "Bones and Banjo" constitutional convention, Underwood wound up as a night watchman at the New Orleans Custom House.

Thomas Jefferson Durant fled Louisiana following the New Orleans riot of 1866. Although he never returned to the state, he continued to correspond with Louisiana's Republican leaders, especially Benjamin Franklin Flanders and Henry Clay Warmoth. His letters dealt with a variety of subject, including Congressional Reconstruction policy.

26Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v., "Ray, John."
27Ibid.
28Thomas Anderson to Secretary of the Treasury, April 30, 1878, Custom House Nominations, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 116, Record Group 56 (National Archives).
29"The statesmanship of Mr. Lincoln was to let things drift,...no plans, and let events carry him forward; for the Executive this may have been wise; but our Congress has for two sessions been doing the same thing...'and' Mr. Johnson is steering the ship right towards the rocks...." Durant wanted Congress to take the initiative and establish a firm policy towards the South. Durant to Flanders, February 10, 1867, Flanders Papers, LSU; See also Durant to Warmoth, February 12, 1867, Warmoth Papers; Durant to Warmoth, April 9, 1867,
the Louisiana constitutional convention of 1867-1868, the congressional hearings on the New Orleans riot of 1866, federal patronage, and Republican factional politics. Durant remained a popular figure with many Louisiana Republicans. In December of 1867, for example, the New Orleans Tribune had advocated the nomination of Durant for federal patronage, and Republican factional politics. Durant remained a popular figure with many Louisiana Republicans. In December of 1867, for example, the New Orleans Tribune had advocated the nomination of Durant for

30 In a long, detailed letter, Durant advised Flanders on international law and constitutional history and theory as they applied to the writing of the new constitution. Durant to Flanders, November 18, 1867, Flanders Papers, LSU.

31 Flanders supplied Wells with certain documents discovered in the city comptroller's office relative to the riot. "They show," Durant stated, "the callous inhumanity as well as the blood-thirty clutches of the men.... Wells and Johnson handed the loyal people over to. I sought Shallaburger but he had gone back to Ohio.... Hon. T. D. Eliot and also W. D. Kelly have promised to dine with me today, and I intend to show these documents to them after dinner." Durant to Flanders, December 7, 1867, ibid.

32 Durant recommended, for example, that Blanc F. Joubert, a black, be appointed to a position in the New Orleans Custom House. "Justice as well as sound policy demands that in the appointment to office under the United States Government the newly enfranchised citizens should be adequately represented." Durant to Benjamin F. Butler, March 12, 1869, Applications and Letters of Recommendation for Assessors of Internal Revenue, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, Box 11, Record Group 56 (National Archives). The recommendation also carries the endorsement of J. S. Harris and J. Hale Sypher, ibid.

33 Durant was fearful that divisions within the Radical party would lead to a Conservative resurgence. Thus, he urged that the Warmoth and Roudanex factions find some middle ground for agreement. A split in the Republican ranks, he reasoned, "can only be avoided by compromise which when as in the present case principles are identical, implies nothing dishonorable and I hope nothing impossible." Durant to Warmoth, March 28, 1868, Warmoth Papers.
governor, and in 1868 James Graham supported Durant for one of Louisiana's seats in the United States Senate. Yet Durant showed no interest in returning to Louisiana and he remained in Washington tending to his busy and lucrative legal practice. Durant appeared as counsel in approximately one hundred and fifty-four cases before the United States Court and the United States Court of Claims. The majority of these cases dealt with Louisiana affairs. He appeared, in fact, as an associate counsel before the Supreme Court in the landmark Slaughter-House Cases. But Durant played

34 New Orleans Tribune, December 10, 1867.

35 Graham to Oscar J. Dunn, June 24, 1868, Taliaferro Papers, LSU. This was an open letter addressed to Dunn and distributed as a broadside.


37 In 1869, the Louisiana legislature granted a monopoly of the meat-processing in New Orleans to the "Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company." The effect of the law was to force one thousand butchers out of work. The butchers and other firms affected by the new ordinance then attacked the validity of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Eventually, however, the Court ruled in favor of the Crescent City Company by a majority of five to four. The significance of the slaughterhouse cases, however, went far beyond the matter of deciding who would be allowed to process meat in New Orleans. "The importance of the case can hardly be overestimated. By distinguishing between state citizenship and national citizenship, and by emphasizing that the rights and privileges of federal citizenship do not include the protection of ordinary civil liberties such as freedom of speech and press, religion [and making a living], etc., but only the privileges which one enjoys by virtue of his federal citizenship, the Court adverted, for the time being at least, the revolution in our constitutional system apparently intended by the framers of the amendment and reserved to the states the responsibility for protecting civil rights generally." Robert F. Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions, 14th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), 185. See also Paul A. Freund, gen. ed., History of the
a relatively minor role in this litigation and his briefs had little or no effect on the court's final decision.\footnote{The briefs filed by Thomas J. Durant for Crescent City were undistinguished. The slaughter house statute, he said, was a measure of police, and concededly the police power resided in the States: he cited the language of old cases where the Court had discussed what States might do without encroaching upon the Commerce Clause. But this ignored that the Fourteenth Amendment had been something new; it had imposed a federal standard upon those very measures that belonged to the States. The Amendment, he asserted, had 'no other meaning than to place the blacks on an equal footing of political and civil equality with the whites.' 'The contemporaneous discussions and debates at the time of the amendment show that no other object was in view, nor can it be made to embrace any other without sacrificing the spirit.' He did not elaborate.\cite{Fairman, History of the Supreme Court}}

Durant, however, did play a major role in another important Supreme Court case, \textit{Walker v. Sauvinet} (1876). In this instance, Durant and his legal partner, C. W. Horner, defeated the right of a bartender, Walker, to refuse service to a black man, Charles S. Sauvinet. In their brief, Durant and Horner argued that the Louisiana statutes of 1869 and 1871, which enforced the Radical constitutional provision that all persons, regardless of race, have equal rights upon any public conveyance and in all places of business of a public nature, were unconstitutional. "These acts," they argued, "have in direction intention to compel all persons engaged in business to sell their commodities whenever called upon to do, and whether willing or not. Such

compulsion is an abridgment of the right of a citizen, who has the natural right to sell or keep his commodities as best suits his own purposes; and this compulsion is a violation of the XIVth Amendment to the constitution." In effect, Durant argued that Walker had the right to refuse service to anyone. In a split decision the Court ruled against Durant's client, basing its decision not on his right to discriminate but rather on a technical matter involving his right to a trial by jury. Ironically, Sauvinet's lawyer was J.Q.A. Fellows, an old-line Conservative. Durant, on the other hand, had been one of the most outspoken advocates of black rights in Louisiana. Durant was, apparently, like most ambitious lawyers, able to argue either side of a case with equal sincerity.

In 1881, Durant received an appointment as counsel for the United States before the Spanish and American Claims Commission. "The sad-faced and thin-featured New Orleans Unionist," as the Boston Daily Advertiser described Durant, died one year later on February 3, 1882.

39Quoted in ibid., 1376.

40Like the Slaughter-House Cases, Walker v. Sauvinet proved to be a turning point in constitutional history. "It held that trial by jury in suits in State courts was not a privilege of the United States citizenship such as the States were forbidden to abridge." Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, 1375. Emphasis in original. Interestingly, once again the Court ignored the major points of Durant's brief in coming to a decision.

W. Jasper Blackburn also left Louisiana at the close of Reconstruction and returned to his native Arkansas. During the 1880's and 1890's Blackburn published two newspapers, the Little Rock Republican and Blackburn's Free South. Although he remained an active supporter of the Republican party, Blackburn complained that white Republicans in the South were ignored by Washington. "It was well known," he editorialized in 1899, "that a Republican negro of the South is always in far more favor with the National Republican Government, and with the leading organized influences here at home, than a native white Republican. And as a striking illustration of which, a dead negro was recently appointed to a Federal office here in Little Rock for which a 'live' native white Republican was not noticed any more than a 'yellow dog!'" Blackburn's bitter outburst was perhaps motivated by his own inability to secure Federal patronage. In June 1889, two months previous to the publication of the editorial, Cyrus Bussey, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, responded to a request from Blackburn for a position with the Internal Revenue department. "If I was not overwhelmed with requests for office from almost every man I have ever known [he declared] I might exercise some influence but am rendered powerless in consequence of


43Little Rock Republican, August 24, 1889.
the great number that have asked me for my interest in their behalf." But, Bussey added, "I would be very glad to say any word in your favor knowing as I do the grand stand you took in the dark days of the War in behalf of the Union." Blackburn continued publishing the Free South until 1892. He died on November 10, 1899, and was buried in Mount Holly Cemetery in Little Rock. 

James Longstreet hoped to remain in New Orleans following the collapse of the Kellogg regime. "It seems more than probably that the Federal offices here will change very soon," he wrote to an old friend close to the Hayes administration. "I beg therefore you will intercede in my behalf. I would like the appointment of Collector of Customs for this Port." The appointment of white Southern Republicans to Federal positions, Longstreet reasoned, would "soon enable us to Southernise the party and regain its lost morale and strength here." Longstreet, no doubt, was as much interested in his own financial future as he was with the future of Southern Republicanism. He did not secure the position, however, and he settled in Gainesville.

44Bussey to Blackburn, June 20, 1889, Benjamin Harrison Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, Series 2, Reel 65, Louisiana State University.

45Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v. "Blackburn, William Jasper."

46Longstreet to General Benjamin Alvord, March 17, 1877, quoted in Sanger and Hay, James Longstreet, 378.
Georgia, in April of 1877. The general did not give up hope that the Republicans in Washington would remember him. He wanted, in fact, to be the United States marshal for Georgia. "Although but recently returned to Georgia I and my family have been more closely identified with Georgia and Georgia interests than any other state," he wrote to President Hayes in 1877. "I grew up in the State, but, from a short time prior to my going to West Point, for my military education, to the return to the State, about eighteen months ago, I have not been located any great length of time in any State. My record as a faithful officer of government is on file at Washington. I refer you to the endorsement of friends who have urged me to this step for political views in this connection...."

Longstreet was not forgotten by his party. From 1880 to 1881 he served as United States minister to Turkey; from 1881 to 1894 he was United States marshal for the state of Georgia; and from 1897 until his death on January 2, 1904, he was a United States railroad commissioner. His last years were also devoted to writing his memoirs, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), and articles on the Civil War.

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47 Longstreet had settled his family in Gainesville sometime in 1876, ibid., 377.

48 Longstreet to Hayes, April 26, 1877, quoted in ibid., 379.

Edward Henry Durell left Louisiana under a cloud of controversy in 1874. Two years previously Durell, then Federal circuit judge for the district of Louisiana, had issued an injunction forbidding Warmoth and his Democratic allies from seizing the state government during the heated state elections of 1872. The judge's order effectively made William Pitt Kellogg, Warmoth's carpetbag rival, governor of Louisiana. The order brought on a storm of outrage, and led to an investigation by the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives. The majority report concluded that Durell had exceeded his authority as a federal judge when he intervened in a purely state affair. The majority of the committee, all Republicans, also concluded that Durell was corrupt in his handling of certain bankruptcy cases brought before his court. The committee therefore recommended that Durell "be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office." The scalawag judge, however, resigned before the House could vote on the charges, and the impeachment proceedings were stopped.

50 For the details of the controversy see Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 244-245; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 193-198.

51 House Repts., 43 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 732, 1-13. The impeachment proceedings were not, it seems, entirely politically motivated. Durell had exceeded his authority in supporting the Kellogg-oriented returning board, and he had also appointed a close friend, E. E. Norton, as an official assignee in bankruptcy. Norton, it was alleged, charged exorbitant fees for his services. See ibid., 1-4.

52 Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, 837.
Following his resignation, Durell retired, or rather retreated, to New York State. But he did not completely sever his ties with the Louisiana Republicans. "I assure you I have not forgotten the great service you have rendered the Republican party of Louisiana," William Pitt Kellogg wrote to Durell in May, 1875, "nor am I unmindful of the sacrifices you made in that belief." Durell lived briefly in Newburgh, and then settled in Schoharie, New York, where he married and spent his remaining years working on a manuscript entitled "History of Seventeen Years; From 1860 to the Retiring of the Federal Army from Louisiana and South Carolina." The study, which dealt largely with slavery and the Radical years, remained unfinished at his death in March of 1887.

In 1878, Rufus Waples, one of the founding fathers of the Louisiana Republican party and one of the most active Radicals, moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan. He died there in 1902.

Many scalawags remained in Louisiana but apparently withdrew completely from public life. State supreme court chief justice John T. Ludeling, for instance, remained on the bench until the Democrats ousted him in January, 1877.

53 Kellogg to Durell, May 12, 1875. Durell Papers, NYHS.
54 Knott, "Edward Henry Durell," DAB, 546; Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, s.v. "Durell, Edward Henry,"; Fortier, Louisiana, II, 341. See also Durell Papers, NYHS.
55 Who Was Who, 1607-1896, s.v. "Waples, Rufus."
He returned to Monroe in Ouachita Parish, but did not entirely give up hope that his service to the Republican party during the Reconstruction era would produce some reward. "I would like to have your influence and recommendation," he wrote to his old friend Henry Clay Warmoth in 1881, "to get the appointment as Minister to Mexico, Italy, or Spain. I believe I have the ability to serve the country well in either of these positions; and I am rusting here. I do not want anything in Louisiana. Will you help me?"\(^{56}\) Despite his failure to become a diplomat, Ludeling's law practice in Monroe apparently prospered. He died at "Killeden," his plantation estate outside Monroe, on January 21, 1891.\(^{57}\)

In 1889, H. N. Frisbie, a New Orleans attorney, recommended scalawag William Henry Hire for the position of coiner of the New Orleans mint. Frisbie recounted Hire's steady devotion to the party: "Therefore Mr. President [Benjamin Harrison], if your policy is to recognize and reward Union men in the South, where it costs something, and where Union Soldiers frequently remark they find their services were on the wrong side of the war 'and' if it is the purpose of your Administration to recognize long tried faithful, honest Republicans and who are such from principle alone, then if such is the case, I ask you to" appoint Hire coiner of the New Orleans mint. "And by so doing," he con-

\(^{56}\) Ludeling to Warmoth, January 31, 1881, Warmoth Papers. Emphasis in original.

\(^{57}\) White, "John Theodore Ludeling," 490.
eluded, "you will please more Republicans and Union people than you can suppose to be interested in your Southern policy." 58 Hire did not receive the appointment and he lived his remaining years in obscurity.

Michel Vidal edited the St. Landry Progress, a pro-Warmoth journal, until Emerson Bently, a young Ohio-born carpetbagger, leased the newspaper in early 1868. Vidal then moved to New Orleans where, with the aid of Bently's sixteen-year-old brother, Lincoln, he began publication of a second journal, The Assumption (Parish) Progress. 59 In 1869, Vidal received an appointment as United States commissioner to Peru. Vidal's duties involved the adjustment of claims on the part of the United States citizens against Peru resulting from the Peruvian-Spanish War of 1866-1871. 60 From April, 1870 until October, 1876, Vidal served as the United States consul at Tripoli. 61 Nothing is known of Vidal's life after 1876, and he seems to have "dropped out of public life." 62

58 Frisbie to Harrison, September 7, 1889, Applications ... New Orleans, Box 14, Record Group 56.

59 Emerson Bently to Warmoth, June 12, 1868, Warmoth Papers.


61 Biographical Directory of the American Congress, s.v. "Vidal, Michel."

62 Fortier, Louisiana, II, 573.
Edward Henry Durell, Michel Vidal, W. Jasper Blackburn, Thomas Jefferson Durant, Benjamin Franklin Flanders, Michael Hahn, A. P. Dostie...the Louisiana scalawags are little more than footnotes in history. There were no great men among them. They were, for the most part, middle-level politicians and party functionaries; yet the sum of their biographies can provide some insight into the part played by Southern white Republicans in one of the most fascinating and critical periods in American history—Reconstruction.

Swedish social economist Gunnar Myrdal, in his classic study of American race relations, says this about the role of the scalawags in Southern Reconstruction: "the 'scalawags' were mainly poor and ignorant native Southerners who saw a chance in the South's defeat to effect something of a revolution against the relatively few wealthy aristocrats. But many of them had honestly and consistently wanted the abolition of slavery, and not a few of them were the Southern inheritors of the great Jeffersonian and especially, Jacksonian, traditions. Some of them had consistently favored the Union cause throughout the Civil War.
when it was extremely unpopular to do so."¹ Myrdal is only partly right.

First, the evidence indicates that the Louisiana scalawags were neither poor nor ignorant. These Southern white Republicans were often well-educated and well-placed professionally. They counted among their ranks men with college educations and professional training—lawyers, physicians, journalists, school teachers, ministers, businessmen, bankers, dentists, planters, soldiers, and civil servants. They were not poor whites who saw in the disruptive decade after the Civil War a chance to rise above a hardscrabble existence at the expense of the Southern aristocrats. They were, more often than not, likely to be men of education, reputation, and prestige during the antebellum years.

Second, the Louisiana scalawags were not political adolescents. They were frequently men with experience in governing and politics. When they came into the Republican movement, they brought with them political experience gained on the local, state, and federal levels. The scalawag ranks included former judges, district attorneys, city attorneys, school board members, parish officeholders, state legislators, and one former United States congressman. They were experienced in party politics as former Democrats, Whigs,

Know-Nothings, and Constitutional-Unionists. Most had a head for politics and a politician's temperament.

Third, the Louisiana scalawags were often motivated by a strong sense of nationalism. Their Republicanism, in fact, can be seen as an extension of their wartime Unionism. Michael Hahn, A. P. Dostie, Benjamin Franklin Flanders, James G. Taliaferro, and James Madison Wells, for example, were all outspoken Unionists. The early letters of Durant, for instance, reflect the pro-Union and free-labor arguments that formed, in part, the basis of the ideology of the Republican party before the Civil War. During the occupation of New Orleans, from 1862 until 1865, the local scalawags worked with the Federal commanders to stimulate pro-Union feeling in the city. "It is the Union that we are fighting for," Michael Hahn declared in a speech delivered at a review of the first New Orleans Volunteer Infantry in 1864,"--the Union as it was when this accursed war was inaugurated by Southern treason." Long after the war white Southern Republicans continued to refer to themselves as Unionists. Thus, persistent Unionism, rather than persistent Whiggery provides a clue to the motivation of the scalawags. There is little evidence to show that

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3New Orleans Era, September 20, 1865.
ex-Whigs entered the Republican ranks in any significant number.

Fourth, the Louisiana scalawags were often men of fairly wide experience. Some had been educated in the North, others were European immigrants. This "cosmopolitanism" provides a clue to their nationalist-unionist principles. Cosmopolitanism broke the mold of Southern provincialism, providing some scalawags, at least, with a broader world-view than their Southern-born and raised contemporaries. Although a hotbed of secessionist sympathies, New Orleans—the focus of Republic political activity during the Reconstruction years—was also an international city, a melting pot "unlike...any other Southern city."4 This atmosphere, perhaps, inspired some scalawags to break away from the mainstream of Southern politics and ally themselves with the new Radical movement.

Fifth, the Louisiana scalawags were most active and influential during the early stages of Reconstruction. It was the scalawags, in fact, who took the lead in founding the Republican party in Louisiana. After the bloody New Orleans riot of 1866, the power and influence of the scalawags gradually declined and gave way to the Northern newcomers, the carpetbaggers, who took the lead in party affairs and held most of the important state, federal, and party offices after 1868.

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Sixth, if the Louisiana scalawags were not overtly prejudiced against Negroes, they often seemed paternalistic at best. The evidence indicates that the scalawag leaders considered the black people of Louisiana as little more than pawns in the struggle with the Conservatives—little more than votes to be counted on election day. Black suffrage was seen as a necessary foundation of Republican strength. Their support for political equality did not necessarily imply a belief in social equality. When asked by a Congressional committee member whether he thought "that the Negro ought to be made equal with the white man," W. Jasper Blackburn, one of Louisiana's most consistent Radicals, replied, "I do, in their political rights; but sir, I am a southern man; I have never been in the north yet, and I will say that there are certain equalities that I do not believe in." R. F. Daunoy, a fellow Radical, swore at the same hearings that he had absolutely no prejudice against blacks. "While I was in the college of Louis Philippe [in Paris]," he stated proudly, "there was right alongside of me a great big black negro." In January, 1865, New Orleans' black population held a massive rally celebrating the abolition of slavery in Missouri and Tennessee. E. H. Durell, Ezra Hiestand, A. P. Dostie, and Michael Hahn joined in the celebration. "Gov. Hahn's residence on

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5 New Orleans Riots of July 30, 1866, 423.
6 Ibid., 138.

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Coliseum Square, was the scene of one of the happiest incidents of the day," one newspaper reported, "for there the colored people testified how much they loved and respected him [Hahn] for his long continued and arduous labors on behalf of emancipation and civil liberty. The Governor and his guests—among whom were Hon. Judge Durell, Judge Hiesta...and one or two others...adjourned to the parlor and prepared to receive their visitors." Soon a procession of Negroes, preceded by a military band, "filed in until the parlor was densely crowded, and the halls and portico were well filled." A black leader then addressed Hahn, thanking him for his devotion to the cause of black liberty. "Mr. Craig, another leader of the colored people, followed, who stated that he had known the Governor from boyhood and knew him always to be a friend of freedom." In response, Hahn thanked the delegation, but he warned them against any "rash and inconsiderate action" in demanding civil liberties. Louisiana's "colored population" had many great obstacles and deep-rooted prejudices to overcome," he stated, and he reminded the blacks that "the Universe is the patrimony of patient men." Only with great reluctance did he later advocate black suffrage. He claimed that although ignorant and uneducated, the Negroes were, nevertheless, qualified to vote because of their devotion

7Quoted in Michael Hahn, Pamphlets, untitled newspaper clipping, January 25, 1865, Louisiana State University Rare Book Room.
to the Union. Hahn apparently ignored the fact that New
Orleans' black leaders were unusually well-educated, wealthy,
and politically sophisticated. Hahn did not realize, or
did not want to admit, that large numbers of free blacks in
New Orleans, at least, constituted "the most sophisticated
and exclusive black community in America." Shortly before
the New Orleans Riot of 1866, A. P. Dostie, Hahn's fellow
Radical, had praised the courage and patriotic devotion of
Louisiana's Negroes. These people were, Dostie asserted,
"black men with white hearts."10

Throughout Reconstruction the scalawags and carpet-
baggers were, almost without exception, "unwilling to make
any concessions towards social equality." Nevertheless,
by supporting the Louisiana state constitution of 1868 and
black suffrage, the scalawags significantly broadened the
rights of black people. "There are scalawags among us
today," a White Citizens Council member in Mississippi
stated in 1958, "just as there were in Reconstruction days--
people who live among us and thrive upon us, but who are

8See David R. Rankin, "The Origins of the Black Leader-
ship in New Orleans During Reconstruction," Journal Of
Southern History, XI, No. 3 (August 1974), 417-440. The
typical black politician, according to Rankin, was "at the
outbreak of the Civil War a young man of unusual ancestry,
uncommon wealth, and exceptional ability." Ibid., 440.

9Ibid.

10Quoted in Chapter V above, 234.

11Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 438.
willing to sell us out to the mongrelizers." The statement is as historically wrong as it is racist. There is little evidence to show that scalawags of 1868 were integrationists, although the scalawags of 1958 certainly were. Yet, despite their racist or paternalistic attitudes towards the Negro, the scalawags of 1868 did at least help lay the foundations of racial democracy.

Seventh, the Louisiana scalawags were deeply involved in the self-destructive factional wars over control of the party and the spoils of office that eventually sapped the strength and destroyed the cohesion of Louisiana Republicanism. They often displayed a talent for political infighting—a talent which seriously undermined their own party and helped prepare the way for the triumph of the Conservatives.

Eighth, the Louisiana scalawags were typical Gilded Age and Louisiana politicians—often tough, cynical, and unscrupulous spoilsmen. George Carter did not exaggerate much when he called Henry Clay Warmoth "the Boss Tweed of Louisiana," for Louisiana politics was not unlike that of New York's Tammany Hall and the notorious Tweed Ring. Scalawag politicians like George Carter, George Wickliffe, John Ray, and John T. Ludeling were not above outright stealing,

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12 Quoted in Hodding Carter III, The South Strikes Back (Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1959), 143.

13 Quoted in Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 92.
extortion, graft, or shady business deals. The scalawags were honored guests at what Vernon Louis Partington called "the great barbecue." They were not unlike the Tweeds, Belknaps, and Babcocks of the North. "Political bitterness is not so intense here [New Orleans] as a few weeks ago," W. Jasper Blackburn wrote in an editorial published in the Homer Iliad in March, 1870, "leading men of both parties are constantly freely conferring together--some for the good of the land, and others doubtless for the special consummation of some individual enterprise of class legislation. There is so much of this juggling going on--much more than the unsophisticated honest masses have any idea of." "Nor is it confined," he informed his readers, "to State legislation; it is so in Congress. It is well understood at Washington that no great enterprise involving heavy appropriations can be consummated and no fat office obtained, without the payment of heavy sums--in other words, and in plain English, without bribery." Nor was corruption

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14 John Ray and Ludeling, for example, were involved in a fraudulent railroad construction scheme. The United States Supreme Court in ruling on a case involving the railroad, held that there had been a deliberate attempt by Ludeling and Ray to defraud the original owners and creditors of the railroad. See E. Dale Odom, "The Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas: The Fortunes of a Scalawag Railroad," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XII (December, 1973), 284 and passim.


16 Homer Iliad, March, 1870, editorial reprinted in the
something new to Louisiana politics. Perhaps the New Orleans Republican summed up the matter of corruption in Louisiana during Reconstruction best when it replied to an attack from the New Orleans Bee (a Democratic journal) by stating that "Corruption existed before the war, as now, and the same amount of crime and rampant lawlessness bid defiance to the administration of the laws. It did not require the Radicals to introduce corrupt practices as something new, for if the charges that were made by the political parties that existed here in antebellum times, against one another were true—and we are cognizant of the truth of some of them—a very melancholy condition of society existed here prior to the advent of Radicalism." \footnote{17 New Orleans Republican, March 12, 1870.}

Finally, the Louisiana scalawags were few in number. The evidence indicates that only a tiny fraction of white Louisianians allied with the Republican movement during the era of Reconstruction. Only a small fragment of the white voters favored the ratification of the Radical-oriented constitution of 1868. And there is no indication that the number of Southern white Republican voters increased after 1868. Racism certainly prevented many from voting with their black neighbors. And certainly terrorism and social ostracism reduced the number of scalawags even further. It was black Republican voters and Federal

\footnote{17 New Orleans Republican, March 12, 1870.}
troopers that kept the Radical party in power in Louisiana. The scalawags and carpetbaggers made up the leadership of the Republican party in Louisiana; the blacks made up the rank and file. Located primarily in New Orleans, Republican leaders exercised little control in the countryside. They were, in effect, a frail cockboat of white elitists bobbing precariously on a sea of black votes.
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Date of Examination:

August 24, 1976