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News framing, pre-existing schemas and public opinion on international trade and individual investment intentions

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NEWS FRAMING, PRE-EXISTING SCHEMAS
AND PUBLIC OPINION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT INTENTIONS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

In

Theanship School of Mass Communication

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..... | ii |
| ABSTRACT..... | v |
| CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.1 Public Opinion on International Trade..... | 1 |
| 1.2 News Coverage of International Trade..... | 3 |
| 1.3 Importance of the Study..... | 5 |
| CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW..... | 10 |
| 2.1 Framing Mechanism and Framing Effects..... | 10 |
| 2.2 Negativity Biases and Individual Behavior..... | 14 |
| 2.3 Negativity Biases and Framing Effects..... | 18 |
| 2.4 Pre-existing Schemas and Framing Effects..... | 21 |
| 2.5 Public Opinions on International Trade..... | 25 |
| 2.6 Hypotheses and Research Question..... | 28 |
| CHAPTER 3. METHOD..... | 31 |
| 3.1 Research Design..... | 31 |
| 3.2 Experiment Participants and Demographic Characters..... | 31 |
| 3.3 Stimulus Material..... | 33 |
| 3.4 Measures of Variables..... | 34 |
| 3.5 Control Variables..... | 35 |
| CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS..... | 38 |
| 4.1 Findings for Hypotheses..... | 38 |
| 4.2 Finds for Research Question..... | 47 |
| CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION..... | 58 |
| 5.1 Attitudes toward Specific Trade Deals and International Trade..... | 59 |
| 5.2 Behavioral Intentions..... | 64 |
| CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH..... | 75 |
| REFERENCES..... | 80 |
| APPENDIX A. COMPLEMENTARY DATA..... | 91 |
| APPENDIX B. PRETEST AND POSTTEST..... | 93 |
| APPENDIX C. FRAMING ARTICLES..... | 103 |
| VITA..... | 109 |

ABSTRACT

Considerable research has been devoted to detailing how news framing structures public opinion. As a major rhetoric device to present information to the public, framing has the capacity of enlightening the public on the costs and benefits of particular policy choices. However, few studies have examined media framing of international trade and its impact on public opinion, and no study to date has connected how framing of international agreements might affect individual investment attentions. This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining individual responses to pro-trade versus anti-trade and gain versus lose frames. It further extends existing literature by considering the impact of framing on individual investment intentions suggesting that framing has effects beyond opinion and may impact actual behaviors.

Even though the frames in communication do influence individual preference choices concerning foreign trade policies, these policy options are also subject to powerful influence of individual pre-existing schemas about international trade. These predispositions could help not only redistribute the scarce resource of attention and construe incoming stimuli, but also orientate public opinion on foreign trade policies and even influence individual behavioral responses.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Public Opinion on International Trade

The United States has been a major stakeholder and initiator in the global system and has been actively engaged in world economic liberalization (Crane, 2008). Succeeding in passing the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, the U.S. government is pushing now for congressional approval of the Colombia Agreement, which, according to President Bush, is of great importance to the U.S. economic interests (Weisman, 2008). Unfortunately, the American public demonstrates less enthusiasm for international trade than the politically and economically influential do. Individual Americans seem to worry more about the negative outcomes of foreign trade and regard economic globalization more as a losing battle against cheap labor in developing countries (Porter, 2008). For example, *CNN* conducted a survey in June 2008, and 51 percent of the respondents saw foreign trade as a threat to the U.S. economy. This figure increased by six percentage points relative to a similar question asked in Oct. 2007. In a *Los Angeles Times* survey in May 2008, half of the respondents believed that free international trade had hurt the U.S. economy, whereas merely 26 percent people believed free international trade had helped the U.S. economy. Similar results could also be found in surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center and NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (See Table 1).

Table 1. Public Opinion on International Trade/Global Economy¹

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| CNN 6//08 10/07 | What do you think foreign trade means for America? Do you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports or a threat to the economy from foreign imports? | Growth (%) 41 46 | Threat (%) 51 45 | Others (%) 6 7 | Unsure (%) 3 2 |
| LA Times 5/08 11-12/07 | Generally speaking, do you believe that free international trade has helped or hurt the economy? | Helped 26 27 | Hurt 50 44 | No Gap 10 16 | Unsure 14 13 |
| Pew Research 4/08 | In general, do you think that free trade agreements – like NAFTA, and the policies of the WTO – have been a good thing or a bad thing for the U.S. | Good 35 | Bad 48 | | Unsure 17 |

¹ All the data come from PollingReport.com, available at www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm.

(Continued)

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|------|-----|-------|--------|
| NBC/Wall Street | Do you think the fact that the American economy has become increasingly global is good because it has opened up new markets for American products and resulted in more jobs, or bad because it has subjected American companies and employees to unfair competition and cheap labor? | Good | Bad | Equal | Unsure |
| 3/08 | | 25 | 58 | 12 | 5 |
| 12/07 | | 28 | 58 | 11 | 3 |
| NBC/Wall Street | Foreign trade has been good for the U.S. economy, because demand for U.S. products abroad has resulted in economic growth and jobs for Americans here at home or foreign trade has been bad for the U.S. economy, because cheap imports from abroad have hurt wages and cost jobs here at home. | Good | Bad | both | Unsure |
| 4/00 | | 34 | 48 | 12 | 6 |
| 12/98 | | 32 | 58 | 6 | 4 |
| Pew Research | In general, do you think that free trade with other countries is good or bad for the United States? | Good | Bad | | Unsure |
| | | 64 | 27 | | 9 |
| 2/00 | Do you think U.S. participation in the WTO is good or bad for the United States? | 62 | 22 | | 16 |
| AP | Thinking of the last 12 months, have you, someone in your family or someone else you know personally lost their job because that job was outsourced to another country or not? | Yes | No | | Unsure |
| 5/04 | | 20 | 79 | | 1 |

The recessionary economy may be one of the reasons that lead to these highly negative sentiments toward international trade among the American public. However, these strong sentiments could not be attributed totally to the economic recession, because some surveys were conducted in 2000 when the American economy did not encounter as much turmoil as today, and less than 20 percent of the respondents acknowledged in 2004 that they had direct experience of job loss or heard of anybody laid off due to job outsourcing (See Table 1). The question wordings emphasizing different aspects of international trade may be also part of the reasons (Hiscox, 2006). For example, when public opinion on free trade and U.S. participation in the WTO was required, the majority of the respondents endorsed the America's role in economic globalization (64% and 62%). In contrast, when the logically equivalent question was posed with an emphasis placed on the impact on jobs and wages, the majority of the respondents believed international trade had hurt the U.S. economy. These variations in public opinion on foreign trade due to different question wordings suggest that attitudes toward international trade are not set, and in fact are dependent upon how the question is framed. This then raises the possibility that media framing might lead the public to certain attitudes.

1.2 News Coverage of International Trade

A systematic and comprehensive content analysis of news coverage of international trade in the mainstream news media in the past decade is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief and synthesized description of how news media report international trade in the past half year may shed light on whether the news coverage of international trade relates to the public opinion on foreign trade policies. The selected mainstream news media for this study was *the New York Times*. Choosing the *New York Times* as a representative of the U.S. mainstream news media was due to its prominence and influence among government officials and the other politically and economically influential in the U.S., especially regarding its coverage of international events and agenda-setting influence on other media institutions (Gitlin, 2003). The data for content analysis were searched from Section A of the *New York Times* in the Lexis-Nexis database, with subject focusing on international trade. As a result, 35 such news stories were found.

Table 2. News Stories and Editorials in Section A of the New York Times (2-8/2008)

| News | | Editorial | |
|-------------|----|-----------|--------------------------------|
| Page 1 | 6 | 2 | Risk (Anti-trade) ² |
| Other Pages | 20 | 7 | Neutral |
| Total | 26 | 9 | 35 |

Some of the news stories under analysis covered international trade in a broader manner, extending the discussion beyond the impact of foreign trade on benefits for American consumers or the national interests of the United States. Among the stories are:

--“After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade,” in which the developed countries and big developing countries were blaming each other for inhibiting the overall agreements of the Doha Talks by sticking to their own interests (Castle & Landler, 2008);

--“German Milk Goes from Cow to Drain in Dairy Strike,” which showed that German framers dumped 60 percent of the country’s milk production to boycott a new

² The criterion for determining whether an editorial is pro-trade or risk (anti-trade) is whether international trade (free trade) is regarded as beneficial to the U.S. economy or other national interests. Some editorials may advocate international trade for its benefits to poor developing countries. But benefits to other countries may not necessarily do good to the United States or may even harm the U.S. interests; hence, editorials suggesting this kind of opinion are regarded as neutral.

decision the European Union made on production quotas (Kulish, 2008); and

--“President Fails to Budge OPEC on Production,” which uncovered the disagreement on the soaring oil prices between OPEC and the United States (Mouawad, 2008).

For those news stories concentrating on international trade’s impact on the U.S. national interests, protectionist concerns or risks posed to American people prevailed among the coverage. Senators Obama and Clinton’s voices seemed to be prevalent in these news stories. For example, when talking about a pending pact with South Korea, Senator Obama was quoted saying: “You can’t get beef into Japan and Korea, even though, obviously, we have the highest safety standards of anybody, but they don’t want to have that competition from U.S. producers. If South Korea is selling hundreds of thousands of cars to the United States and we can only sell less than 5,000 in South Korea, something is wrong” (Rohter, 2008). Another reason the Democrats opposed this deal was the fear that the pact would cost jobs and do further damage to the U.S. automaking industry (Weismar, 2008A). As for Colombian Trade Deal, the benefit lied in its capacity to open one more market for American exports. However, critics have worried about the side effects of the trade deal on job loss due to easier outsourcing to Colombia, even though President Bush has tried to sell the deal for its potential consolidation on the freedom and peace in the region (Weisman, 2008B). Even the NAFTA was under attack because more could have been done to protect American workers and the environment (Cooper & Broder, 2008).

With respect to editorials, there were two dedicated explicitly to advocating the protectionist policies and attacking international trade (free trade) for leaving the country’s economy and workers in a fragile status. One of the editorials argued that high degree of global economic interdependence might cause easier manipulation over a country’s political and economic goals by irrational foreign governments. This editorial disregarded the assumption that profitable international trade would prevent wars (Krugman, 2008). The

other editorial criticized modern free traders in the U.S. for highlighting only bright lines of international trade without paying any attention to job loss, trade deficits or depreciation of dollars and suggested that unbridled free trade was not in the national interests of the United States (Lighthizer, 2008). Another editorial did not deny international trade had brought to the United States such benefits as foreign markets and cheap foreign commodities. But it criticized the U.S. government for doing less for the most vulnerable and suggested that a complete social welfare network may be more effective than protectionist policies (Porter, 2008). Overall this review suggests that the news coverage of international trade tends to stress potential risks while neglecting the benefits to the overall well-being of the country. What impact does this pattern of news coverage have on individual perceptions of international trade?

1.3 Significance of the Study

As John Zaller (1992) has observed, the information that reaches the public can never be a panorama of all that has happened, but instead is a highly stereotyped and oversimplified account of what politicians and public affairs and media practitioners deem as important. On one hand, these media elites are actively engaged in selling their preferred points of view on the platform set up by the news media (Lippmann, 1922). On the other hand, the public relies heavily on these media practitioners for presentation of events beyond their direct experience and to fuel construction of the “pictures in their heads” (p18). One rhetoric device these media practitioners regularly use to convey information is through framing (Shen, 2004b). Framing is a process through which an issue could be depicted in an advantageous way by telling people what is relevant and important, and consequently influence public opinion (Nelson & Oxley, 1997). Unlike the psychological term framing which is defined as the “influence on judgment resulting from the way information is presented” (Gilovich et al., 2006, p.397), framing here is defined in a broader manner, as normally referred to in the fields of mass communication and political science. According to Tankard et al.(1991), a

frame is “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (p.3). Such amplification of certain elements instead of others focuses individual attention on these elements when they make sense of public controversies (Iyengar, 1987). As a result, with few alternatives to choose from, individuals could easily endorse such message frames, and these framing effects may be most obvious at those events that are “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” (Lippmann, 1922, p.18).

Individual Americans might have bits of information about international trade. But for most Americans, international trade is beyond their direct experience. International trade is such a complicated issue that even those Americans who have access to most relevant information have been fighting with one another on the merits of international trade. For instance, in 2005, the House of Representatives had a heated discussion over the controversial Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and narrowly passed the bill by a margin of two votes, even though CAFTA is expected to realize an additional \$1.5 billion in export sales (Coyne, 2005). Relative to those political elites, individual Americans have much less information about international trade. Consequently, how trade agreements are framed and how those questions are worded in surveys will sway public opinion about trade preferences (Hiscox, 2006). Relative to individuals receiving a pro-trade frame or no frame at all, individuals exposed to an anti-trade frame preferred trade restriction (Hiscox, 2006). This claim was supported by some other scholars who found that the majority of survey respondents favored protectionist trade policies (Mayda & Rodric, 2005; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). Contrary to these studies, Hiscox (2006) found that respondents who favored increasing cooperation with other countries reached 61 percent. Nevertheless, the framing effects still prevailed, with respondents administered under anti-trade frame more inclined to support protectionist trade policies.

This controversy over trade attitudes could not be attributed simply to the manipulation of the news media through framing, but could also reflect the values and beliefs embedded in people's minds when they decipher incoming information and consequently make judgments. According to Zaller (1992), "every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it" (p.6). In face of controversial issues, individual Americans may take into consideration a wide array of relevant values and beliefs so as to make rational choices (Feldman & Zaller, 1992). This is also true with the public opinion on foreign policy, which is subject to heavy influence of domain-specific postures or knowledge structures (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1986, 1987). Such pre-existing values and beliefs, i.e. individual schemas, may even maximize or minimize the level of framing effects, and this moderating effect is apparently more obvious when the message frames concur with individuals' pre-existing schemas (Entman, 1993), activating mental movement in the same direction (Shen, 2004b).

This study extends the research of message framing to the arena of economics and explores whether news coverage of international trade programs, by focusing on pro-trade versus anti-trade characters as well as loss vs. gain frames (negativity bias), has any effect on public input into specific foreign trade policy and consequently influence their investment intentions. Public opinion on foreign policy was once deemed as valueless (Almond, 1950). Although political scientists have been challenging this conventional wisdom and have found that public foreign policy preferences are quite constant and rational, supervised by domain-specific postures or core values (Achen, 1975; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987), the capacity of individual Americans to make rational choices is still under doubt due to the phenomenal susceptibility of the public to frames in communication (Lippmann, 1922; Zaller, 1992).

Many studies have concentrated on framing effects, but few have focused attention on the framing effects of news coverage of international trade programs on public preferences for foreign trade policies. Even less have dealt with individual investment intentions and

whether these volitions are influenced by news reports about international cooperation. What makes the situation even more complicated is that media frames seldom appear in isolation in the news coverage of international trade, but rather work together to influence how individuals interpret information (Shah et al., 2004). Furthermore, these framing effects may not function independently but be limited or mediated by pre-existing beliefs about international trade. All these may contribute to the varying levels of cognitive and attitudinal responses in individuals.

The importance of this topic also lies in the fact that economic news has become an inseparable part of American life. Economic activities, whether domestic or international transactions, have become of greater concern to American people (Coolidge, 1925). In order to keep well informed and make rational choices concerning stock investment or equity owning, individuals have to rely on the news media, their major source of information (Lippman, 1922), for analysis of economic policies and interpretation of listed companies' business and financial performance. With the increase of the national desire for economic news, more and more media begin catering to this need; and the 1990s witnessed a rapid growth in economic news coverage. During that decade, the amount of space dedicated to economic news jumped from 7 percent to 15 percent, making news in this genre the fastest expanding sector in news media institutions (Roush, 2006). Nevertheless, compared to this sharp increase in the desire for economic news, academic research has not increased proportionately. This is especially true in the area of international trade, which has increasing influence on individual Americans' routine life, economic well-being and even career success.

This study conducts a 2 X 2 survey-based experiment to test the framing effects of business news, which is framed as either anti-trade or pro-trade, and gain or loss. Preexisting belief systems of the experiment participants about free trade are investigated to see whether and to what extent these belief systems play a role in directing people's understanding of

economic information. In addition, the experiment participants' attitudinal responses and behavioral intentions to the stimuli are also investigated for analysis.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Framing Mechanism and Framing Effects

Framing is extremely powerful in swaying public opinion, because it has the ability to endorse certain aspects of an issue to the negligence of others (Lawrence, 2000). According to Entman (1993) “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52). If framing could influence how audiences think about an issue, it does so by “invoking interpretive schemas that influence the interpretation of incoming information, but not by making aspects of the issue more salient” (Scheufele, 2000, p.309). In other words, frames shape public opinions by “stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame” (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p.569).

Relative to inaccessible information, accessible information are more likely to influence decision-making (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). But this accessibility model provides merely a partial explanation to the mechanism of framing effects, because not all accessible considerations are treated equally in the process of opinion formation or judgment making. (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). According to van der Plight and Eiser (1984), an opinion toward an issue is composed of different considerations or attributes about this issue and weights accorded to each of these considerations. Frames shape public opinion not through changing the attributes or considerations of the issue but rather through magnifying the psychological importance of certain aspects of the issue (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997). In Nelson et al.’s (1997) words, “Frames tell people how to weight the often conflicting considerations that enter into everyday political deliberations” (p.226). They (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997) demonstrated the notion of framing effects in a simple equation: $A = \sum$

$V_i W_i$, where an attitude toward an issue was the summation of all attributes (considerations) assigned with different weights.

The study of framing traces back to attribution theory, which concerns how people explain behaviors of others and themselves (Heider & Simmel, 1944). As Heider and Simmel (1944) put it, attribution links an observed action to a person who implements the action and the need motivating such an action. Lippmann suggested that the world was so complicated and so hard to understand that people had to rely on simpler models such as causal relations to make sense of world events (Lippmann, 1922). News frames just offer such a kind of shortcut, bridging the gap between the socially and culturally complicated and unfamiliar and daily interactions people are good at (Friedland & Zhong, 1996).

Generally, people attribute a happening in their living environment to either personal causes or impersonal causes (societal environment factor) (Heider, 1959). Goffman (1974) endorsed this two-factor argument, but he named the two factors natural frame and societal frame. He explained that “natural frames help to interpret events originating from natural and non-intentional causes, while societal frames help to locate, perceive, identify and label actions and events that stem from intentional human action” (p.21). Iyengar (1991) extended the attribution theory to explanation of how individuals made sense of public issues. He found that attribution of causal and treatment responsibility had great effects on public opinion about political issues (Iyengar, 1991). Such causal beliefs were so deeply rooted in human’s minds that individuals often based their understanding of public issues unconsciously on these causal explanations (Iyengar, 1991).

To clarify complicated events in simpler manner and to cater to individual inclination of categorizing incoming information, the mass media purposefully frame public issues (Tuchman, 1978). Framing public issues in distinct ways would suggest different underlying causal and treatment responsibilities, thus insinuating potential remedies for the problems (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Iyengar (1987) further contended that framing the same

issue differently would call upon different reference points, thus legitimating completely different strategies for decision making. Sometimes, even a semantic or terminological change involving one or two words in describing an issue may also cause this different choice of strategies (Kim et al., 2002).

According to Iyengar (1991), an issue could be framed in either an episodic or thematic form. He explained that episodic newscasts treated a public issue as a concrete but isolated event, attributing the problem to internal predispositions of victims, whereas thematic newscasts described the issue in a broader manner, linking the controversy to larger societal or contextual backdrops, thus charging impersonal factors for causing the problem and with the responsibility to mend it (Iyengar, 1991). For example, different responsibility explanations may result from whether a terrorist attack or a poverty issue is encoded as an insular phenomenon or an outcome of larger social interactions (Iyengar, 1987). Thus, the ways how a situation is framed by the news media could furnish different reference points, producing different perceptions of and treatment solutions to the issue in individuals (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

Consistent with these studies on framing effects, Shen (2004a) found that news frames had a powerful effect on audiences' interpretation of and attitudes toward an issue. For instance, people's attitudes toward welfare reform were heavily associated with the media frames they exposed to. Likewise, a free-speech frame depicting a KKK rally in terms of civil liberty might activate a different tolerance level in audiences from describing it as a violence inducement, with demonstrators shouting slogans and burning symbols under police surveillance (Nelson, Calwson & Oxley, 1997). Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggested that strategic news could cue in a strategy-based schema in audiences and activate strategic information, leading to attribution of a politician's actions to his/her desire to win an election. In contrast, issue-oriented news coverage might activate issue-relevant information and shape candidates as problem solvers without personal needs. Fu (2005) endorsed such an argument.

He found that strategic news frames were often used to describe President Roh as a party leader and this strategy severely harmed his image, whereas President Kim enjoyed the image of a government leader with the help of issue frames.

Nelson and Kinder (1996) upheld the notion that news frames shaped public opinion through limiting the considerations people might take into account. For example, news stories emphasizing social groups would squeeze out other important arguments through emphatically channeling in group-relevant schemas. Even though the group sentiment is not unusual in the American public, people are still susceptible to how an issue is framed (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). In other words, if the moral qualifications of welfare policy receivers are under suspicion, the group sentiment intensifies. By contrast, when the beneficiaries are out of the radar of the news media, the group sentiment diminishes (Nelson & Kinder, 1996).

Nelson and Oxley (1999) studied framing effects on a land development project. They found that relative to participants in an environmental framing condition, those exposed to an economic frame documented a more favorable attitude for the proposed project. In contrast, participants receiving the environmental frame disfavored the development project and worried about environmental degradation. In the same vein, participants exposed to the economic frame outweighed the economic consequences of the project than the environmental consideration in their judgment of the project (Nelson & Oxley, 1999).

With respect to the framing effects on international trade, Hiscox (2006) found that individuals exposed to either an anti-trade frame or combination of an anti-trade frame and a pro-trade frame were more likely to favor trade restriction by a margin of 19 percent and 20 percent respectively, compared to those administered under a pro-trade frame or no frame at all. Inoue and Patterson (2007) suggested that how the U.S. media framed Japan's economic activities in relation to the U.S. economy shaped Americans' perceptions of Japan. Specifically, when Japan was framed as an economic threat to the U.S. economy, the negative sentiments toward Japan intensified.

However, public issues of great importance are often controversial and complicated, and rarely could an audience watch a media presentation of public debates in a single-frame construct. To uphold journalistic tenets like objectivity and neutrality, the media institutions often encapsulated a set of competing frames in one story. For example, news coverage of abortion was often subject to both pro-life and pro-choice frames (Beck et al., 1995). In the meantime, people, when contemplating about an issue, may take into account more than one considerations to decipher causal responsibility and determine appropriate solutions (Nelson & Kinder, 1996).

Even though there are some studies exploring the framing effects on foreign trade policy preferences, less research has examined the framing effects of economic news stories on public opinion about international trade, let alone to say the effects of domain-specific pre-existing schemas on public involvement with foreign trade. To date, no research has examined the influence of multiple news frames on public opinion on foreign trade. In reality, rarely is a public issue of controversy one-dimensional and media frames often work in conjunction with each other in the news coverage of international trade (Shah et al., 2004). Hence, audiences may be more susceptible to multiple frames, especially when they know little about an issue (Nelson, 1999).

2.2 Negativity Biases (Loss vs. Gain Frame) and Individual Behavior

Negativity bias indicates that in most situations, “negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in combinations, and generally efficacious than positive events” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p.297). In other words, one unit of stimuli input in a negative motivational system would generate more output than the same amount of input in a positive motivational system (Cacioppo et al., 1997). Hence, people or organisms may demonstrate stronger reaction in psychological and behavioral responses to negative stimuli than positive ones of similar values (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Taylor, 1991).

According to Soroka (2006), studies in psychology offer insights for these varying responses to positive vs. negative information. Cognitive weighting theory suggests that information that is novel or rarely available tends to grab more attention, because it seems to offer more information (Fiske, 1980). Even if a piece of negative information needs not to be extremely negative, the less frequency in occurrence may guarantee disproportionate consideration than otherwise (Reyes et al, 1980). Similarly, impression formation theory suggests that relative to positive personality traits, negative traits seem to have a more powerful effect on individuals' impression formation (Singh & Teoh, 2000; Wyer, 1970). For instance, if one gains a positive seven on a kindness rating and a negative seven on an honesty rating, the combination of the two does not make an overall impression of the person at zero but drags one's overall image to a negative three in the likeability scale (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).

Research in economics also sheds light on this asymmetric scenario. Prospect theory postulates that people subject evaluation of prospective economic outcomes to a neutral reference point. Outcomes above the point are rated positively as gains and outcomes below are negatively associated and treated as losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For a person, shift of the reference point would modify the connotation of the outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). As such, an outcome being treated as either a loss or a gain may depend heavily on the location of the reference point (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990).

Another argument might shed further light on this asymmetric response to negative information. Shah et al. (2004) suggested that framing a problem in a loss condition could force people to think more deeply about the issue. In reality, negative events are more likely to be regarded as a signal of danger and to mobilize all resources of an organism (Taylor, 1991). As a result, more weight would be accorded to the information that is critical to the survival of the organism. Therefore, negative information is often regarded as more important and valuable than positive information (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001).

The status quo is normally regarded as a reference point for evaluating incoming information. However, an expectation that deviates from the status quo is often adopted in reality as a lever for judging information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, people expect to get their monthly payments in full amounts. An additional tax cut in a certain month would be regarded not as a reduced gain but as a sure loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In many domains, people tend to put their psychological anchors in the positive side of their evaluation scales (Slowronski & Carlston, 1989). Losing an object one just owned would result in totally different psychological response from having the same object one has never possessed before (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Actually, that people have a tendency to anchor their reference point in the positive side of their judgment scale continuum is implicit in the impression formation theory, cognitive weighting theory and prospect theory. Soroka (2006) attributed this to the optimistic nature in people about the future. Compared to a person who locates his/her expectation at a neutral position, a rating of negative four would have greater influence on a person with an expectation of positive two (Sherif & Sherif, 1976). This also explains why an economic indicator, like GDP, which meets merely the expectation of the society, would have no effects on the performance of stock markets. But if this indicator increases by 1.5 percent, falling short of the market expectation at 3 percent, it would push the stock markets downside.

People respond differently to a loss frame as against a gain frame. According to the prospect theory, a loss may generate more serious reaction in a person than a gain of equal value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). To put it in Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) words, "the displeasure associated with losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated with winning the same amount" (p.454). Furthermore, the value function for a loss condition does not equal the value function for a gain condition; moving the reference point will affect a person's choice options (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.286) used an example to demonstrate this phenomenon:

Imagine a person who is involved in a business venture, has already lost \$2000 and is now facing a choice between a sure gain of \$1000 and an even chance to win \$2000 or nothing. If he has not yet adapted to his losses, he is likely to code the problem as a choice between $(-\$2000, .50)$ and $(-\$1000)$ rather than as a choice between $(\$2000, .50)$ and $(\$1000)$.

Whether the businessman has adapted to the losses and set up a new reference point would definitely lead to different choice options, with the later option more rational and the former more risky (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

With respect to individual behavioral responses, risk taking is more likely to occur when choices involve losses, whereas risk-aversion is more popular when choices are framed as gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). Bowman et al. (1999) found that downward economic trend seemed to have a much more powerful effect on consumption than economy growth. As for investment, bad economic information is highly correlated with a firm's determination to invest. To put it another way, if a firm anticipates a recessionary economy, the probability of its reinvestment may drop. Even if it continues investing, the investment level would descend. In contrast, expectation of a good economic return does not guarantee a corresponding increase in a firm's investment (Svensson, 2000). This asymmetric response to negative vs. positive economic information also influences individual investment strategies in stock markets, with bad news more likely to keep investors from selling losers (expecting their stocks could appreciate in the future), while good news to motivate them to sell winners (Odean, 1998; Shefrin & Statman, 1985).

This asymmetric response does not apply similarly to all individuals. Barber & Odean (2001) argued that men conducted more transactions than women in stock markets, because men seemed to be more confident than women in the field of finance. When dealing with their own money under the loss frame, subjects of old generation tend to take more risks than younger subjects (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). This is also true of individuals' political behaviors. People who trust the government may give a weight to the same negative information twice as much as the weight distrusters of the government assign to the same

information (Lau, 1985). In the same vein, the same negative information may have more effects on those who care about president's job performance than those who do not (Lau, 1985).

2.3 Negativity Biases and Framing Effects

The study of negativity bias is heavily associated with the news media, and framing effects in particular. Such scholars in political sciences as Chong and Druckman (2007) divided the framing effects into two subcategories: emphasis framing effect and equivalency framing effect (Chong, Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001). Emphasis framing effect refers to the effect resulting from stressing certain considerations instead of others (Druckman, 2001). Under the condition of negativity bias, it refers to media's inclination to pay more attention to negative news rather than positive one.

Across a variety of domains in human activities, negative information is regarded as more informative and subsequently accorded more weight (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). However, news media have been a frequent target for criticism in their asymmetric responses to negative information. Scholars like Bagdikian (1987) criticized that news media seemed overenthusiastic about events involving conflict or crisis (Patterson, 1997; Shoemaker et al., 1991), and violent crime in particular (Altheide, 1997). For instance, a scientific research that discovered potential cancer risk from a certain radiation would be more likely to appear under the radar of the news media than another study indicating no signal of cancer (Koren & Klein, 1991). However, the most criticized concerning news media's negativity bias is their coverage of economic news, i.e., they are often criticized for their propensity to amplify negative economic indexes but neglect economic growth signals (Harrington, 1989). A typical instance is that the U.S. news media were blamed for costing former President George Bush reelection due to media's trivializing positive economic symbols.

Negative economic information has been heavily documented with powerful effects on such political behavior as voting for a president or congressional candidates (Aragones, 1997;

Goidel & Langley, 1995; Kernell, 1977). Simply put, American voters are more likely to attribute recessed U.S. economy to bad performance of the U.S. presidents and the congress but rarely award reelection trophy to them for economic growth (Bloom & Price, 1975; Claggett, 1986). Some other scholars do not totally agree with this argument, stressing that voters give incumbents either reward or punishment based on national economic situations. However, they seem to give more weight to negative economic signals than positive economic indexes (Headrick & Lanoue, 1991). For instance, those who disapproved of president's job performance were more likely to show up at the voting stands in congressional elections than those who endorsed president's performance (Kernell, 1977).

International trade could be framed either in an anti-trade (risk) or pro-trade manner, with anti-trade framing more likely to arouse trade restriction sentiments in audiences (Hiscox, 2006). By the same token, the increasing coverage by the U.S media of Japanese economic activities as a threat to the U.S economy in the 1990s abruptly turned the positive attitudes in Americans toward Japan into negative sentiments (Inoue & Patterson, 2007).

Scholars like Haller and Norpoth (1997) and Soroka (2006) give several explanations to the phenomenon that news media tend to highlight negative information. First, no matter what social and cultural functions the news media serve, they are ultimately businesses. Therefore, it is of no surprise that they pay more attention to negative information so as to attract viewers and meet the bottom-line requirements (Haller & Norpoth, 1997). Second, journalists, with no exception to other people, have asymmetric interest in negative information, which is viewed as more eye-catching and valuable (Soroka, 2006). Third, the news media are entrusted with a responsibility to fulfill the social and cultural function in a democracy: to identify social problems and place every aspect of the public sphere under scrutiny (Soroka, 2006). Consequently, as Soroka (2006) concluded, "negative media coverage increases with signs of economic deterioration, but does not consistently decrease with signs of economic improvement" (p.379).

The second subcategory of framing effects is equivalency framing effect, which is closely related to the negativity bias theory. Consistent with emphasis framing effect, the equivalency framing effect also stresses certain consideration but depicts the attribute either in a positive or a negative light, with its value logically equivalent to the opposite attribute that is not mentioned (Druckman, 2004). For example, half glass of water could be framed as either half empty or half full (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). This semantic difference might prompt individuals to change their policy preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007). For example, a policy could be framed either in a positive manner as having the capacity of generating a 95% employment rate or in a negative manner as capable of resulting in a 5% unemployment rate, and people seem to prefer the first option (Druckman, 2004).

Commodity attributes are a major research target of the equivalency framing effect. The literature on these attribute-framing effects claims that consumers respond more favorably toward positive frames than negative frames (Levin et al., 1998). Attribute framing effects indicate that negative attribute frames may stimulate unfavorable associations in memory, whereas positive attribute frames evoke favorable encodings (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). When ground beef is described in a negative light as 25 percent fat, consumers are less enthusiastic about the product and rate it as worse tasting than when it is labeled as 75 percent lean (Levin, 1987). This negative vs. positive equivalency framing effect prevails even when consumers actually taste the products (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). In another study, Levin and colleagues (1985) argued that subjects' willingness to gamble depended on whether gambles were framed as losses or gains. Consistent with the prospect theory that individuals are loss averse when gain choices are stressed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), people prefer to use credit cards when credit card processing expense is depicted as a rebate for consumers using cash (gain) rather than an extra charge for credit card users (a loss) (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). However, not all research approves of such equivalency framing effect. Male (Fagley & Miller, 1997) and people who strongly involve with an issue and those who possess firm

preexisting political schemas (Levin et al., 1998) are found to be more likely to immune from such arbitrary informational presentation. Even the well-known Asian disease experiment witnesses no effects under a different contextual background (See Schwarz, 1996).

This paper would delve into both the emphasis framing effect and the equivalency framing effect. Emphasis framing effect would be investigated through describing an international cooperation project through either stressing pro-trade considerations or highlighting anti-trade attributes. Equivalency framing effect would be examined through depicting an unemployment situation either in a positive light or a negative light but with equivalent job cuts. The purpose was to investigate whether the framing effects prevailed in the news coverage of international cooperation and had any influence on people's perceptions about trade issues.

2.4 Preexisting Schemas and Framing Effects

Preexisting schemas refers to prototypes or knowledge structures, where related information is stored together in an organized manner (Smith & Zarate, 1990). These preexisting schemas could affect a person's judgment by allocating attention to important elements and influencing interpretation and memory of incoming information (Gilovich et. al., 2006). People do not classify or interpret incoming information randomly but rely heavily on these pre-existing and long-standing schemas (Kim et al., 2002). According to Gilovich et al. (2006), there are two routes simultaneously involved in understanding of the world. One is a bottom-up process and the other is a top-down process. The bottom-up process is responsible for receiving outside information, while the top-down process actively filtrates and construes incoming stimuli with the help of preexisting schemas. Message frames in the news media could concur with people's preexisting schemas; however, the weights granted to these issue frames might not necessarily be the same (Huang, 1996).

Even though people rely heavily on the news media for information and subject their interpretation and decision making to the framing references furnished by the media, they

have the capacity of “reviewing and rejecting activated knowledge as irrelevant to the judgment they are called on to make” (Price et al., 1997b, p.502). According to Gamson (1992), framing references in media discourse are merely one of the resources people resort to upon making judgment; popular wisdom and prior knowledge are other resources people rely heavily on for understanding of the world. Attention is a scarce resource and could not spread evenly upon many things; people subconsciously allocate their attention to the most important elements on a given situation with the help of prior knowledge stored in their minds (Gilovich et al., 2006). Therefore, the preexisting knowledge stored in the brain could affect interpretation of incoming information (Chong & Druckman, 2007), and the more ambiguous or unfamiliar a situation is, the more marked impact the preexisting schemas would have on public opinion (Trope, 1986).

Chong and Druckman (2007) suggested that people’s policy preferences were subject to the influence of their preexisting schemas. Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) found that people’s political knowledge over gun control played an important role in directing people’s endorsement of Concealed Handgun Law. Unlike Republicans and Independents, who were influenced by their preexisting schemas of both individual rights and public safety, Democrats were more likely to base their judgment on the public safety principle. By the same token, the probability of voting for certain candidates would be determined significantly by the association between respondents’ preferences for freedom or equality and their perceptions of candidates’ endorsement of which specific political principle (Barker, 2005). Lau and Schlesinger (2005) argued that the preexisting schemas that individuals deemed relevant in a given situation would be used as a lever to shape public opinion about a certain issue and the proposed remedies, and these cognitive schemas were most often the wildly accepted social norms.

Explanation of this phenomenon could go to studies in social psychology. It was found that activation of prior knowledge for interpretation of incoming information depended

critically on the similarity of the incoming information to prior knowledge (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). This character-matching process ensured that a given stimuli be encoded with a similar pre-existing schema, economizing the resources needed for understanding an issue (Andersen et al., 1995).

Similarly, the public opinion on foreign policy is subject to the influence of prior knowledge about foreign affairs. As Shapiro and Page suggested, the public respond to the changing international environment in ways “they perceived to be in their own interest or in the interest of the nation, based upon common sense, shared values, and common standards of judgment” (Shapiro & Page, 1998, p.214). These public foreign policy preferences have been widely agreed as rational and consistent (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Shapiro & Page, 1998; Ajuilar, Fordham, & Lynch, 2001). The fluctuations and changes in the public opinion about foreign affairs found in previous studies were uncovered to be attributed to unrepresentative surveys (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978), misleading foreign policy preference indicators (Caspary, 1970), or changing international environment (Shapiro & Page, 1988).

By general consensus, the public foreign policy preferences does not structure along a unidimensional continuum (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Chittick, Billingsley, & Travis, 1995), but there have been no agreements as to the number of belief systems that underlie public involvement with international interactions. Some scholars suggested a two-dimension model (Ajuilar, Fordham, & Lynch, 2001; Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Maggiotto & Wittkopf, 1981); others preferred a three-dimension configuration, and even some proposed a four-dimension system (Richman, Malone, & Nolle, 1997) and a five-dimension pattern (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999). This discrepancy may be ascribed either to the different survey question items designed to tap foreign policy preferences (Zha & Goidel, 2006) or to the changing implication of the same question items under different international environment (Chittick, Billingsley, & Travis, 1995).

Hurwitz and Peffley (1986, 1987) suggested that the generic criteria that supervised individual Americans' domestic political evaluations might not exert the same function involving the public's foreign policy preferences, and attention should be placed on generic criteria that worked at foreign policy domain. This argument was echoed by other scholars like Lau and Schlesinger (2005), who proposed that people's understanding of public policies might be constrained by such social practices as culturally-rooted norms or cognitive schemas that helped attribute causal and treatment responsibility and allocate the limited social resources. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990) further argued that these foreign-policy generic criteria functioned in a hierarchical manner, in which these criteria oversaw the more specific foreign policy postures in different sub-domains, which in turn superintended specific foreign policies. For example, they found that such foreign policy postures as militarism and containment had great influence on individuals' specific foreign policy attitudes concerning defense spending, nuclear policy, military involvement and contra funding. These foreign policy postures were subordinate to the knowledge structures such as images of other countries, which were then under the guidance of such core values as patriotism, moral traditionalism, partisanship and ideology (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990).

Nevertheless, the set of preexisting schemas individuals have developed differs from person to person. The preexisting schemas people bring into interpretation of incoming stimuli may be different due to varied personal experience (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). The same message contents with no wording difference could not guarantee generation of identical understandings of the same issue (Kelly, 1995). Shen (2004a) pointed out, "individual issue schemas could enhance or limit framing effects as news frames become consistent or inconsistent with issue schemas" (p.411). He buttressed his argument with the finding that individuals were more likely to be influenced by the message frames that matched rather than deviated from their prior knowledge (Shen, 2004b). Parallel to Shen's argument, Nelson and colleagues (1997) found that mediating effects were much stronger

among those people who were familiar with the framing contents. Likewise, Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) suggested that framing effects had powerful impact on audiences, especially when the issue frames were consistent with people's political predispositions or when people lacked relevant knowledge about the issue. By the same token, framing effects could also be minimized due to strong resistance of firmly-held predispositions against inconsistent information (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

2.5 Public Opinions on International Trade

Attitudes toward international trade include both economic and political dimensions, although the majority of past literature diverts academic attention to economic perspectives. Normally, the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) and Richardo-Viner (RV) frameworks are regarded as the most important models that explained individuals' preferences over international trade policies, because international trade might affect individuals' economic welfare through changing the value of different factors (the main factors that are put into production are labor, land, and cash investment) (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). The RV model assumes that all or at least some factors could not move freely from sector to sector; therefore, the factor values depend heavily on the industry of employment. As a result, international trade benefits all factors particularly relevant to export industries and hurts all factors involving import industries (Beaulieu, 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). On the contrary, the HO model assumes that factors could move freely from sector to sector; hence, international trade benefits a country's abundant factors (skilled workers and professionals in the United States) and hurts its scarce factors (unskilled workers) (Beaulieu, 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a).

Based on U.S. factor endowment, the skilled labor among which is abundant (Leamer, 1985), the HO model suggests that support for international trade comes mainly from these skilled workers, whereas less-skilled workers might prefer international trade barriers. On the contrary, the RV model anticipates support of international trade coming mainly from workers making a living in comparative-advantage industry sectors and opposition from

those serving in comparative-disadvantage sectors. Eugene Beaulieu (2002) endorsed this claim, arguing that preferences for trade policies might be influenced by both models. However, there have been more empirical evidences to support the hypothesis that individuals' skill levels shape trade-policy preferences, and the hypothesis that employment industries influence policy preferences seems to be less popular (Daniels & von de Ruhr, 2003; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) echoed this argument, claiming that in general, people with high skills were more likely to support international trade, and this association appeared more obvious in richer countries than in poorer countries due to comparative advantage of factor endowment. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) confirmed that within a country, individuals with more income preferred international cooperation with other countries, whereas those at the bottom of the social-economic status perceived international trade as detrimental to their economic welfare.

Normally, education is used as a proxy measure of individual skill (Daniels & von de Ruhr, 2005; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001b). Scheve and Slaughter (2001a & 2001b) investigated the appropriateness of either education years or occupation wages as a proxy measure for individual skill and found that one could replace the other. Hiscox (2006) suggested that education levels strongly affected a person's perception of international trade, with the well-educated or the highly skilled more supportive of international trade agreements. Even though it is generally agreed that education has powerful effects on people's trade policy preferences, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) argued that this effect was realized not through incremental accumulation of skills within the whole process of education, but through the social, cultural, and economic enlightenment associated with college education. Otherwise, they should have found noticeable difference in trade policy preferences between those who were currently working and those who were out of job or were in retirement.

Religious belief and political ideology also play an important role in directing public opinion on foreign trade policies. Because religiosity, an important ethical element, has

powerful effects on not only the civic life of the people, but also their political activities (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2003; Lam, 2006; McCleary & Barro, 2003), research exploring individuals' international trade policy preferences should not neglect its influence. Lam (2006) suggested that religiosity did have the ability to shape people's attitudes toward international trade, especially among wealthier individuals and those with higher education. He ascribed this to the economic well-being of the well educated and more skilled, who might give priority to other considerations instead of economic redistribution of international trade benefits. Daniels and Ruhr (2003, 2005) found that members of the three largest U. S. denominations: Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists, were less likely to endorse economic globalization. Mehanna (2002) found that people in countries with Protestantism dominating religious beliefs tended to be more positive and tolerant of international trade than people from Catholic or Muslim countries. The variations in religious beliefs may not only contribute to the different levels of anti-globalization attitudes across countries but also explain the varied economic globalization preferences within each country (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2001). These religious beliefs are so ingrained in the American society that it is not hard to find evidence to show churches' influence on American's foreign policy preferences, especially when issues with extremely moral value are involved (Religion, 2006).

Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found that there was a significantly negative relationship between national interests and trade preferences. The national interests in the form of patriotism and chauvinism are strongly associated with protectionist attitudes, and this further implies that economic elements are not the only factor that shapes public opinion on foreign trade (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2001). According to a published encyclopedia, patriotism denotes "positive and supportive attitudes to a fatherland by individuals and groups. It covers such attitudes as pride in its achievements and culture, the desire to preserve its character and the basis of the culture, and identification with other members of the nation." Nonetheless, chauvinism is "the extreme and often blind admiration of one's country or proud belief that

one's country is politically, morally, and militarily better than all others.³” Theoretically, nationalism (patriotism) is regarded to be positively associated with international cooperation, and chauvinism is often viewed as one factor to hinder globalization (Shulman, 2002). But, they were all found to relate weakly but negatively to economic liberalization support in Shulman's study (2002).

International trade preferences are also significantly associated with people's ideology, with those who have strong association with the political right in ideology being more likely to denounce economic globalization for deteriorating both the living and moral standards (Steger, 2002). A strong association also exists between gender and international trade policy preferences, with women more inclined to favor protectionist policies (Nelson et al., 1996; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2001). Women who identify more strongly with Democratic Party and union members are found to be more likely to oppose trade globalization (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). Moreover, partisanship seems to be another predictor of trade preferences, with Republicans more likely to support protectionism than Democrats and Independents (Hiscox, 2006).

2.6 Hypotheses and Research Question

Before research questions and hypotheses predicting relationships between message frames, pre-existing schemas and people's behavioral intentions are put forth, one more issue needs to be addressed. This study addresses attitudes toward international trade and individual investment intentions, rather than the actual investment behaviors. There is no denying that attitudes toward an issue or behavioral intentions could be a useful predictor of people's actual behaviors. For instance, negative attitudes toward a president's job performance may usher people to cast vote in congressional elections (Kernell, 1977), or consumers' intentions to purchase is one of the two major factors that influence discretionary purchase (Curtin, 1982). Nevertheless, the attitudes or the intentions to purchase are

³ See Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, published by Longman Group Ltd. in 1978.

necessary, but not sufficient as a determinant of behaviors. The other critical factor that equally determines consumers' discretionary purchase is their ability to purchase (Curtin, 1982). Scholars like Festinger (1964), Wicker (1969) and many others have demonstrated an often weak relationship between attitudes or intentions and behaviors.

Ajzen (1971), however, has suggested that a powerful association between intentions and behaviors may be possible, only in specific situations. This relationship would not hold under normal conditions, where a lot of intervening factors, for instance, new information, may influence attitudes toward an issue or individual behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1974). Apart from people's attitudes or intentions that could orientate their behaviors, such factors as motivations, social norms and situational happenings may also have powerful effects on people's behaviors (Ehrlich, 1969; Triandis, 1971). For example, church attendance may be heavily influenced by situational happenings (Wicker, 1971), and the purchasing of industrial or durable goods may be more susceptible to the influence of such situational occurrences as price variation, promotion activities or introduction of new products (Sheth, 1973). Ajzen (1996) put forth the theory of planned behavior to explain the consistency between attitudes, intentions and behaviors. He suggested that overt behaviors are not only oriented by people's attitudes and social norms, for example, whether the persons would sense the approval of their actions from others, but also heavily guided by their confidence in their ability to take the action. Furthermore, if the attitudes toward an issue or the behavioral intentions are induced by firsthand experiences, such attitudes or behavioral intentions may be more valuable in predicting people's subsequent actions. However, in this study, the highlight is placed merely on people's attitudes toward international trade and their investment intentions without purposefully predicting people's actual behaviors.

Based on the literatures that have been reviewed, the following hypotheses and research questions are formed for investigation:

H1: Respondents exposed to a pro-trade news frame will be more supportive of specific trade deals and, more generally, of international trade.

H2: Respondents exposed to the 'loss' frame will be less supportive of the specific trade deals and, more generally, of international trade.

H3: Pro-trade schematic respondents will be more supportive of the specific trade deals than anti-trade schematic respondents.

H4: The effects of framing will be mediated by pre-existing attitudes toward free trade. Specifically, when exposed to economic news with pro-trade frame, pro-trade schematic respondents will be more likely to think the specific trade deals will help the United States. Likewise, when exposed to economic news with anti-trade frame, anti-trade schematic respondents will be more likely to think the specific trade deals will hurt the United States.

To date, no research has been found to contribute to the relationships among message frames in economic news, pre-existing schemas about trade and individual investment intentions, the following research question concerning individuals' investment decisions in the forms of stock investment and relevant product purchasing is put forward for investigation:

RQ: Do frames in communication and pre-existing schemas about free trade influence individual Americans' investment intentions? Specifically, will message frames in economic news coverage of international trade and individuals' pre-existing schemas about free trade have powerful effects on people's intentions to buy Chrysler and Hershey stocks and products?

CHAPTER 3

METHOD

3.1 Research Design

The proposed hypotheses and research question were tested using a survey-based experiment with a 2 X 2 between-subject factorial design. The two manipulated factors were trade frames (pro-trade vs. anti-trade) and positive/negative frames (gains vs. losses). Two hundred sixty adults were recruited from LSU, churches and other public places to voluntarily participate in the study. They were offered a chance to win an 80GB iPod. Experiment participants first filled out a survey embedded with a series of open-ended questions measuring individuals' preexisting attitudes toward free trade (See Lau, 1989; Shen, 2004b). Responses to these questions were content analyzed and subsequently summed up to form individuals' pre-existing schemas about free trade. The merit of this technique lies in the fact that by letting respondents respond to open-ended questions, respondents need not constrain their opinion to narrowly suggested answers (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). In addition, researchers could also figure out in this way how respondents weigh each consideration (See Lau, 1989; Shen, 2004b) and whether their sentiments toward those considerations are negative or positive. After a pretest survey, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four framing conditions. In the course of the experiment, each subject read two news articles on international trade projects, and they were told that the news articles they read were photocopies of major newspaper articles. In order to avoid the possible order effect of the two news stories on respondents' perceptions of the two international trade deals, the news stories were counter-balanced. Then, respondents were asked to read the articles at their normal speed. After they finished reading the articles, they each completed a posttest instrument and then were debriefed and thanked.

3.2 Experimental Participants and Demographic Characters

Two hundred and sixty volunteers participated in the experiment. Among them were 36

LSU undergraduate students. Twelve of the participants came from a church. About 20 volunteers were recruited from LSU campus on a day when a football game was held. Another 24 participants were parents of kids from either a public school or a private school. Four more participated in the experiment in a mall. The remaining 164 were mainly recruited from public libraries and bookstores in Baton Rouge.

The average age for the participants was 36.7, with the youngest participant 17 years old and the eldest 84. More than half of the participants were female, reaching 141, accounting for 54.2 percent, and the remaining 119 participants were male, about 46 percent. Two hundred forty-five of the participants identified their race. Among them, 165 were white, accounting for 63.5 percent. Sixty two were African Americans, about 23.8 percent. Eight of the participants identified themselves as Hispanic and another 8 labeled themselves Asian, 3.1 percent respectively. As for their educational background, 48 percent of the respondents received high education, 39.2 percent gained some college education or were currently studying in college, whereas the remaining 12.3 percent had no high education background. Of all the participants, 62.7 percent had jobs or ran their own businesses, while the remaining 37.3 percent were students, laidoff workers and retired people. One hundred and one participants labeled themselves as Republican, about 39 percent. Eighty seven participants categorized themselves as Independents, accounting to 33.5 percent. The remaining 72 were Democrats, about 28 percent.

The questionnaire also contained several other control variables that could contribute to subjects' attitudes toward international trade deals, such as political ideology, measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1(very conservative) to 7 (very liberal). The mean value of ideology for the respondents was 3.57 and its standard deviation 1.51. Income was measured in categorical scale (See Table 3).

Table 3. Demographic Characteristics of Samples

| Age | Range | Number | Percentage |
|-----|----------|--------|------------|
| | Under 21 | 36 | 13.9% |

(Continued)

| | | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|-----|-------|
| | 21-30 | 79 | 30.4% |
| | 31-40 | 48 | 18.5% |
| | 41-50 | 41 | 15.8% |
| | 51-60 | 32 | 12.3% |
| | Above 60 | 23 | 8.8% |
| Household Income: | Under \$10,000 | 19 | 7.3% |
| | \$10,000-29,999 | 34 | 13.1% |
| | \$30,000-49,999 | 31 | 11.9% |
| | \$50,000-69,999 | 28 | 11.1% |
| | \$70,000-89,999 | 36 | 13.9% |
| | \$90,000-109,999 | 35 | 13.5% |
| | \$110,000+ | 49 | 18.9% |
| | Missing | 27 | 10.4% |
| Education | High School Incomplete | 4 | 1.5% |
| | High School Grad | 15 | 5.8% |
| | Technical Training | 13 | 5.0% |
| | Some College | 102 | 39.2% |
| | College Grad | 75 | 28.8% |
| | Post-Graduate | 51 | 19.6% |

3.3 Stimulus Material

Two international trade projects were chosen for this study. One was Chrysler's decision to cooperate with Chinese automaker Chery to produce mini-cars for the North American and European markets. The other concerned Hershey's decision to transfer some of its production capacity to Mexico. These two issues have been widely discussed and covered by the major news media in the US and Canada, such as *the New York Times*, *the International Herald Tribune*, *the Washington Post*, *the Associated Press State & Local Wire*, *Detroit Free Press*, *Patriot News*, *the Gazette* and *the Morning and Post*. All four articles provided the same background information on current economic and financial burdens of each American company involved in the cooperation and potential benefits of the trade deals. The pro-trade or anti-trade frame was combined with either a gain or a loss frame respectively, thus forming four different framing conditions.

Similar to prior research (Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Shen & Edwards, 2005), all four articles constituted several paragraphs offering background information on the cooperative projects. Two more paragraphs were left for experimental conditions, with one appropriated for either an anti-trade or pro-trade frame and the other designed to establish either a loss or a

gain frame. The length and writing style were similar in all four articles to alleviate possible confounding variables.

3.4 Measurement of Variables

Pre-existing Schemas about Free International Trade. The key questions in this study concerned whether individuals' pre-existing schemas about free trade would play an important role in directing individual responses to international trade projects, and whether the schemas may mediate frames in communication. In order to identify respondents' preexisting schemas about free trade, respondents were asked an open-ended question about free trade. Participants were asked to provide their first four considerations that popped into their minds when they thought of free trade. Respondents were weighted such that the first response counted as four points, the second three points, the third two points, and the last response one point (See Lau 1989; Shen, 2004b). Moreover, each response was coded positive, negative or neutral according to whether that response was supportive of free trade, unsupportive of free trade, or stood somewhere in between. In order to facilitate identification of the direction of each response, two other open-ended questions were given as such: "Is there anything specific that makes you like free trade and what are they?" and "Is there anything specific that makes you dislike free trade and what are they?" If a respondent's all four responses were supportive of free trade, he/she got ten points; if his/her responses were all against free trade, he/she got negative ten; if his/her first two responses were against free trade and the remaining two were for free trade, his/her score was negative four. In general, the final score for each respondent was the summation of every response, which ranged from -10 to +10. To assure reliability in coding the direction of these responses, a second independent coder also coded participants' responses to the open-ended questions. Intercoder reliability was .86 with Scott's *pi*. There were 260 people participating in this experiment. Among them, 82 were anti-trade schematic, accounting to 31.5 percent; 50 of them were neutral; and the remaining 128 pro-trade schematic, reaching 49.2 percent.

Issue Attitudes and Investment Intentions. After reading the news stories, participants were asked about their attitudes and investment intention regarding each specific project. The first question asked “Would you say this specific trade deal is likely to hurt the United States or help the United States?” Responses were coded such that 1 indicated that the agreement would hurt the United States a great deal and 7 indicated the deal would help the United States a great deal. The second question asked whether, if given the opportunity, they would invest in these companies engaged in international trade deals in the forms of buying the stocks or products. The questions were anchored by 1 for not at all likely and 7 for very likely. Respondents were also asked about whether they thought international trade in generally had helped or hurt the United States. Responses ranged from 1 indicating that international trade had hurt the United States a great deal to 7 which indicated that international trade had helped the United States a great deal. Of all 251 respondents who answered this question, 115 indicated that international trade had helped the United States, amounting to 45.8%. Seventy one claimed they were neutral, about 28 percent and the remaining 65 people thought international trade had hurt the United States, reaching 25.9 percent. The items on international trade are similar to those used in prior studies (See ICPSR4137 Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy).

3.5 Control Variables

In addition to the above-labeled measures, the questionnaire contained several other variables that could also be the sources of subjects’ attitudes toward and investment intention about these international trade projects.

Nationalism and Chauvinism. Because patriotism and chauvinism were significantly related to protectionist attitudes in virtually all countries, techniques to identify nationalism and chauvinism utilized by O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) were adopted in this study. In order to investigate whether patriotism and chauvinism had any influence on individuals’ foreign trade policy preferences, and whether they functioned in the same or opposite directions,

questions concerning individuals' attitudes toward their own country, their country's interest, customs and traditions, were included in the pretest. The same items adopted in ISSP National Identity Survey were used in the pretest. The same principal components analysis of participants' responses as what O'Rourke and Sinnott did (2001) was conducted in this study and yielded two identical factors. As shown in Table 4, the first factor concerned individual Americans' sense of love of and pride in one's own country and thus was labeled Nationalism. The second factor identified a narrow or extreme sense of superiority of one's own country over foreign countries and consequently was labeled Chauvinism.

Table 4: Factor Analysis of Nationalism and Chauvinism Items

| Statements | Factor 1 | Factor 2 |
|--|----------|----------|
| Generally speaking, the United States is a better country than most other countries. | .884 | .042 |
| The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the United States. | .817 | .167 |
| I would rather be an American citizen than of any other country in the world. | .833 | -.005 |
| It is impossible for people who do not share U.S. customs and traditions to become fully American. | -.124 | .679 |
| People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. | .131 | .736 |
| The United States should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations. | .399 | .603 |
| It is important to have been born in the United States to be fully American. | .063 | .742 |
| Percent variance (%) | 33.4 | 27.8 |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Scores of Nationalism or Chauvinism were calculated by adding responses across the relevant subsets of items identified in the factor analysis. Nationalism thus ranged from 3 to 21, with the mean value reaching 15.3 and standard deviation 4.21, while Chauvinism ran from 4 to 28, with the mean value being 11.8 and standard deviation 5.06. Because Nationalism and Chauvinism were both multidimensional constructs and their natures were hard to capture with a single question item, hence, it seemed more sensible to use multiple question items to investigate the essence of their underlying natures (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2001). According to the mean score of each factor, this subject pool seemed to be more inclined to Nationalism than Chauvinism. The correlation of the two factor reached .238 ($p = .000$).

Religiosity. Religiosity is regarded as an important factor in driving individuals' attitudes toward international trade (Mockabee et al., 2001). Normally, religious attendance has been regularly used as a proxy measure of religiosity, and individuals who have profound religious beliefs tend to go to churches more often than those who have less religious beliefs. However, this variable seems to capture more of the characteristics of religious participation rather than the essence of real religious beliefs. Furthermore, the less frequency in religious-service attendance does not necessarily indicate that these people have less faith in religion than those regular church goers. Scholars like Barkan (2006), Mockabee et al. (2001), and Williams (1994) solved this problem by treating religiosity as a multidimensional concept constituting both subjective and behavioral dimensions. They suggested that a specific index could come into use by encapsulating both the behavioral and subjective dimensions into one scale. In other words, a scale of religiosity could be built by adding weighted behavioral dimensions and subjective factors together. Nevertheless, Mockabee et al. (2001) found that a weighted scale does not outweigh an uncorrected scale in predicting religiosity, and a standard scale with summation of both subjective factor (religious guidance) and such behavioral dimensions as attendance, prayer, and scripture reading might work fine under all conditions. Guided with this principle, four questions were asked in the pretest for the purpose of forming a religiosity index stressing religious service attendance, scripture reading, prayer and religious guidance. This religiosity scale ranged from 4 to 20, with the mean score of the respondents located at 13.3 and standard deviation being 4.19 (Cronbach's alpha .82). Because the mean score of the respondents in terms of this religiosity scale was 13.3, higher than the mid-point of 12, this subject pool seemed to possess more religious beliefs.

CHAPTER 4.

FINDINGS

4.1 Findings for Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis suggests that respondents exposed to a pro-trade news frame will be more supportive of specific trade deals and, in general, of international trade. The descriptive statistics showed that the mean score with respect to evaluation of the automaking-cooperation for respondents reading the news story with an anti-trade frame was 3.59, while the mean value for their counterparts reading the same news story but with a pro-trade frame was 4.03, rendering a difference of .44 (See Figure 1). A *t* test was conducted for preliminary investigation about whether the gap as large as .44 was significantly different from zero, without considering other covariants that could be sources of the difference. The statistical results showed that a gap as this large was significantly different from zero ($t = 2.289$, $d.f. = 258$, $p = .023$, see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Mean Values for Evaluating Car Deal between Anti and Pro-trade Frames

A hierarchical regression was then run to test this hypothesis, as well as to demonstrate the overall relationships between respondents' evaluations of the car deal and each predictor variables. In model one, such demographic characteristics as age, gender, education, employment and union membership, which past studies have identified as influential

determinants of individual Americans' attitudinal responses toward international trade were put into the regression for consideration. In model two, general orientation factors that may lead to variation in individual Americans' perception about international trade—nationalism, chauvinism, party, ideology and religion were added to the regression. Anti/pro-trade frame and loss/gain frame, the experimental stimuli, joined in the regression in model three, and respondents' pre-existing schemas about free trade and their predispositions about international trade were added to the regression in model four.

Table 5. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Car Deal
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .129 | .114 | .104 | .090 |
| Gender | -.086 | -.091 | -.100 | -.121* |
| Education | -.037 | -.030 | -.033 | -.016 |
| Employment | -.224*** | -.224*** | -.220*** | -.154** |
| Union | .161* | .162* | .147* | .119* |
| Nationalism | | .001 | .00 | -.025 |
| Chauvinism | | .037 | .025 | .077 |
| Party | | .007 | .012 | .016 |
| Ideology | | -.074 | -.070 | -.051 |
| Religion | | -.024 | -.017 | .028 |
| Anti/Pro-Trade Frame | | | -.100 | -.114* |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.056 | -.065 |
| Pre-existing Free Trade Schemas | | | | .204*** |
| International Trade Attitude | | | | .306*** |
| Interaction: Anti/pro * Free Trade Schema | | | | |
| R ² Change | .101*** | .007 | .012 | .160*** |
| * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 | | | | |

The statistical results showed that the experimental stimulus: anti/pro-trade frame, when first added into the regression in model three, did not demonstrate any influence on respondents' evaluations of the car deal ($t = -1.582$, $d.f. = 12$, $p = .115$), even when both the demographic predictor variables and general orientation variables were kept in statistical control. But when respondents' pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade were added into the regression in model four, that is, when the influence of these two

pre-existing schemas on the relationship between respondents' evaluations of the card deal and the experimental stimuli anti/pro-trade frame was partialled out, the effects of message frame showed up. Respondents reading the automaking news story with an anti-trade frame were indeed less supportive of this specific trade deal than those exposed to a pro-trade news frame ($t = -1.983$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .049$). Keeping all other factors in control, respondents exposed to the anti-trade news frame rated the automaking project about .114 Beta points lower than those respondents reading the same news story but with a pro-trade news frame (See Table 5). The general orientation predictors had no effects on people's perception of this international trade cooperation. Employment and union membership were the demographic predictor variables that orientated people's perception of the car deal, and their effects continued from model one through model four. Respondents with jobs seemed to evaluate the car deal less positively than respondents without jobs ($t = -2.606$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .010$), whereas nonunion members seemed to be more enthusiastic about the trade deal than union members ($t = 2.025$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .044$). Gender seemed to demonstrate its influence on people's perception about the car deal when pre-existing schemas were added to the regression in model four for investigation, with men less likely to endorse such an international cooperation ($t = -2.073$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .039$).




Figure 2: Mean Values for Evaluating Chocolate Deal between Anti and Pro-trade Frames

Similarly, the mean score with respect to evaluation of the chocolate deal for respondents reading an anti-trade frame news story was 3.35, while the mean value for those respondents reading the same news story but with a pro-trade frame rises to 3.77, generating a difference of .42 (See Figure 2). The preliminary statistical analysis using a *t* test without considering the influence from other predictor variables showed that a gap as large as .42 was significantly different from zero ($t = -2.314$, $d.f. = 258$, $p = .021$).

Table 6. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Chocolate Deal
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .154* | .152* | .146* | .129* |
| Gender | -.069 | -.079 | -.086 | -.103 |
| Education | -.033 | -.023 | -.025 | -.005 |
| Employment | -.149* | -.146* | -.140* | -.079 |
| Union | .116 | .106 | .092 | .063 |
| Nationalism | | -.022 | -.021 | -.048 |
| Chauvinism | | .052 | .041 | .100 |
| Party | | -.085 | -.083 | -.078 |
| Ideology | | .005 | .012 | .033 |
| Religion | | .034 | .024 | .017 |
| Anti/Pro Trade | | | -.108 | -.123* |
| Loss/Gain | | | -.006 | -.013 |
| Pre-existing Free Trade Schemas | | | | .236*** |
| International Trade Attitude | | | | .262*** |
| Interaction: Anti/Pro * Free Trade Schema | | | | |
| R ² Change | .058* | .010 | .011 | .149*** |
| * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ | | | | |

A similar hierarchical regression was also conducted to test this hypothesis. When the experimental stimulus anti/pro-trade frame was first put into the regression, without statistically controlling for the influence from the pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade, there was no relationship between respondents' evaluations of the chocolate deal and the anti/pro-trade frame. After adjusting all other covariants, especially respondents' free-trade schemas and international trade predispositions, respondents reading the chocolate news story with an anti-trade frame were less supportive of the chocolate deal

than those respondents receiving a pro-trade news frame ($t = -2.070$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .040$). In other words, when keeping other factors in control, respondents exposed to the anti-trade news frame rated the chocolate project about .123 Beta points lower than those respondents reading the same news story but with a pro-trade news frame (see Table 6). Age was the single demographic variable that could help predict respondents' evaluations of the chocolate deal, with one-year increase in age leading to .129 Beta points higher in the evaluation of the chocolate deal ($t = 1.979$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .049$). Employment demonstrated indirect effects on respondents' evaluations of this trade deal.

As for the second part of the first hypothesis that the pro/anti-trade frames may have effects on respondents' attitudes toward international trade in general, the descriptive statistics demonstrated that the mean score concerning the evaluation of international trade in general for respondents exposed to a pro-trade news frame was 4.45, while the average value for those exposed to the anti-trade frame was 4.27, merely .18 apart. A t test without statistically controlling all other covariants showed that the gap as large as .18 was not significant from zero ($t = -.904$, $d.f. = 249$, $p = .367$).




Figure 3: Mean Values for Evaluating International Trade between Anti and Pro-trade Frames

A similar hierarchical regression was performed to investigate whether this relationship existed while statistically keeping all other variables in control. The statistical results showed

that respondents exposed to the anti-trade news frame were not more likely to think international trade had hurt the United States than respondents exposed to the pro-trade news frame ($t = -.587$, $d.f. = 14$, $p = .558$; see Table 7). Therefore, the first hypothesis was supported under the condition of the two specific trade deals, but rejected in terms of the attitudes toward international trade in general.

Table 7. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward International Trade
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .062 | .085 | .083 | .068 |
| Gender | .001 | .003 | .001 | -.034 |
| Education | .093 | .096 | .095 | .102 |
| Employment | -.112 | -.107 | -.106 | .008 |
| Union | .071 | .075 | .072 | .040 |
| Nationalism | | -.037 | -.037 | -.075 |
| Chauvinism | | -.011 | -.013 | .046 |
| Party | | .021 | .023 | .020 |
| Ideology | | .010 | .010 | .034 |
| Religion | | -.094 | -.094 | -.033 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.014 | -.032 |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.017 | -.028 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .212*** |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .492*** |
| R ² Change | .033 | .013 | .000 | .320*** |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |




Figure 4: Mean Values for Evaluating Car Deal between Loss and Gain Frames

Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis predicts that respondents exposed to the loss frame will be less supportive of the specific trade deals and, more generally, of international trade.

The descriptive statistics showed that the mean score in terms of the car deal evaluation for respondents reading the news story in the loss condition was 3.67, while the average value for respondents reading the same news story but in the gain situation was 3.95, resulting in a difference of .28 (See Figure 4). The preliminary statistics using a *t* test without statistically controlling all other covariants showed that a gap as large as .28 was not significantly different from zero ($t = -1.477, d.f. = 258, p = .141$).

As for the Chocolate deal, the descriptive statistics showed that the mean score in terms of people's chocolate deal evaluation for respondents reading the news story in the loss condition was 3.51, while the average score for respondents reading the same news story but in the gain situation was 3.61, resulting in a difference of .10 (See Figure 5). The preliminary statistics using a *t* test without keeping constant all other predictor variables showed that a gap of .10 was not significantly different from zero ($t = -.542, d.f. = 258, p = .588$).




Figure 5: Mean Values for Evaluating Chocolate Deal between Loss and Gain Frames

A hierarchical regression was then run to investigate whether the loss/gain frame had any effect on people's perception of the two specific trade deals under the condition with all other variables kept constant. The statistical results (see Table 5 and Table 6) showed that relative to the respondents reading a gain-frame news story about the automaking cooperation, respondents reading the same news story but in a loss conduction did not evaluate the car deal

significantly lower ($t = -1.151, d.f. = 14, p = .251$). This no-effect scenario also held true for the chocolate outsourcing. Respondents administered under the loss frame did not bear more negative feeling toward the trade deal than their counterparts who read the news story framed in a gain condition. ($t = -.224, d.f. = 14, p = .823$). As to respondents' attitudes toward international trade in general, the loss/gain frame variation seemed to have no effect either ($t = -.520, d.f. = 14, p = .604$, see Table 7). Hence, this research hypothesis was rejected.

Hypothesis 3. H3 predicts that pre-existing schemas about free trade will play a powerful impact on respondents' perception about these two trade deals. Specifically, pro-trade schematic respondents will be more supportive of the specific trade deals than anti-trade schematic respondents. A simple Linear regression was conducted to check preliminarily the relationship between respondents' pre-existing schemas about free trade and their respective evaluation of the car deal and chocolate deal. The statistical results showed that people's pre-existing schemas about free trade, even under the condition that all other covariants were not controlled statistically, had powerful effects on their perception of both the trade deals ($t = 5.091, d.f. = 1, p = .000$ for car deal; $t = 5.141, d.f. = 1, p = .000$ for chocolate deal). Model four in both hierarchical regressions (see Table 5 and Table 6) displayed these relationships when the influence of all other covariants was partialled out. No matter which trade deal it involved, the car cooperation or the chocolate outsourcing, pro-trade schematic respondents were indeed more likely to endorse these two international trade deals than anti-trade schematic respondents ($t = 3.359, d.f. = 14, p = .001$; $t = 3.750, d.f. = 14, p = .000$). As respondents increased their free-trade pre-existing schema level by one point, they would rate the automaking deal .204 and the chocolate deal .236 Beta points higher. Thus hypothesis 3 was supported (see Table 5 and Table 6).

Hypothesis 4. H4 predicts that the effects of framing will be mediated by respondents' pre-existing schemas of free trade. In other words, when exposed to economic news with a pro-trade frame, pro-trade schematic respondents will be more likely to think the two specific

trade deals will help the United States. In the same vein, when exposed to economic news with an anti-trade frame, anti-trade schematic respondents will be less likely to think the two specific trade deals will help the United States. Multiple-line charts were used to help investigate whether the hypothetical interaction effect existed in both cases. The charts seemed to suggest that no such effects existed in either of the two trade deals (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).




Figure 6 Mediating Effect of Pre-existing Free-trade Schema on Anti/Pro-trade Frames for Car Deal




Figure 7 Mediating effect of Pre-existing Free-trade Schemas on Anti/Pro-trade Frames for Chocolate Deal

A new predictor variable pre-existing free-trade schema*anti/pro-trade frame was added into the original hierarchical regressions for respondents' perception of both the car deal and chocolate deal as model five, and the statistical results showed that the hypothetical

mediating relationship between pre-existing free-trade schema and anti/pro-trade frame did not exist for both the case ($t = .624$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .533$ for car deal; $t = -.341$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .733$ for chocolate deal; Check Table A and Table B in Appendix A for complete regression results). Hence, this hypothesis was rejected.

4.2 Findings for Research Question

The research question aims to examine whether message frames as well as pre-existing schemas about free trade have any effect on individual investment intentions, specifically their intentions to buy stocks or products of the companies involved in the trade deals. Attention was first paid to people's intentions to purchase Chrysler cars and Hershey chocolate bars.

Chrysler Car Purchasing Intention. Will different message frames and pre-existing schemas influence respondents' willingness to buy Chrysler cars? The descriptive statistics showed that respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame scored averagely at 3.08 in terms of their intention to purchase Chrysler cars, while the average score for respondents in the pro-trade frame reached 4.22, leaving a gap of 1.14 points. The car-purchasing intention gap between respondents exposed to the loss frame and corresponding counterparts receiving a gain frame was even larger: 2.54, with the mean score for loss-frame readers located at 2.38 and the average value for gain-frame readers at 4.92. A preliminary analysis with t test was performed without considering the influence of all other predictor variables, and the statistical results showed that the anti/pro-trade frame did not have any effect on respondents' Chrysler car purchasing intentions ($t = -.877$, $d.f. = 258$, $p = .381$); but the loss/gain frame had marginal effect on individuals' Chrysler-car purchasing intentions ($t = -1.967$, $d.f. = 258$, $p = .051$).

A hierarchical regression was then performed to investigate whether the message frames had any powerful effects on respondents' Chrysler car purchasing intentions when all other

covariants were kept statistically in constant. The regression results showed that respondents who read the news story about Chrysler-Chery cooperation with an anti-trade frame were indeed less likely to express their intentions to purchase Chrysler cars ($t = -2.192$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .030$). The car purchasing intentions seemed to be similarly influenced by the loss/gain frame variation. Respondents who read the loss-frame news story were less likely to have the intention to purchase Chrysler cars compared to those who read the same news story but with a gain frame ($t = -2.084$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .038$; See Table 8). Nevertheless, the pre-existing schemas about free-trade seemed to have no effects on respondents' intention to buy Chrysler cars ($t = .1242$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .216$). Neither did respondents' pre-existing attitudes about international trade ($t = .515$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .607$). Nevertheless, relative to respondents with less annual income, respondents with more annual income seemed to have less intention to purchase Chrysler cars ($t = -2.201$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .029$). What is more, respondents highly attached to Democratic ideology were more likely to express their intention to purchase Chrysler cars ($t = 3.466$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .001$; See Table 8). Education seemed to have an indirect effect on people's intention to purchase Chrysler cars.

Table 8. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Chrysler Car
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .017 | .015 | -.005 | -.012 |
| Gender | -.106 | -.100 | -.118 | -.119 |
| Education | -.142* | -.118 | -.122 | -.115 |
| Income | -.153* | -.138 | -.158* | -.157* |
| Employment | .095 | .080 | .099 | .111 |
| Union | .058 | .046 | .022 | .014 |
| Nationalism | | .126 | .127 | .120 |
| Chauvinism | | .113 | .094 | .113 |
| Party | | -.120 | -.109 | -.107 |
| Ideology | | .306* | .299*** | .302*** |
| Religion | | .050 | .046 | .058 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.138* | -.145* |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.136* | -.136* |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .086 |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .036 |
| R ² Change | .064* | .063* | .034* | .010 |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |

Hershey Chocolate Bar Purchasing Intentions. With respect to the intention to buy Hershey chocolate bars, descriptive statistics showed that respondents exposed to the pro-trade frame scored at a average value of 4.91, while respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame scored .30 lower, at a mean value of 4.61. Respondents exposed to the loss frame had a mean score of 4.77 in terms of their intention to purchase Hershey chocolate bars, while the average value in terms of chocolate-bar purchasing intentions for respondents exposed to a gain frame was 4.67. A preliminary statistical analysis with *t* test was performed to check whether the anti/pro-trade frame and the loss/gain frame had any influence on respondents' chocolate bar purchasing intentions, without considering the influence from all other covariants. The results showed that neither the message frame (anti/pro-trade frame and loss/gain frame) had any effect on respondents' intention to purchase Hershey chocolate bars ($t = -1.343$, $d.f. = 254$, $p = .180$ for the anti/pro-trade frame; $t = .051$, $d.f. = 254$, $p = .960$ for the loss/gain frame)

A hierarchical regression was conducted and the statistical results demonstrated further that neither the anti/pro-trade frame nor the loss/gain frame could add any knowledge to the prediction of people's intentions to purchase Hershey chocolate bars when statistically controlling all the covariants in the regression ($t = -1.439$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .152$ for the anti/pro-trade frame; $t = -.386$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .700$ for the loss/gain frame). Similarly, the pre-existing schemas about free trade had no effect on people's chocolate bar purchasing intentions ($t = 1.705$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .090$). However, gender seemed to have powerful effects on people's intentions to purchase Hershey chocolate bars, with women more likely to harbor the intention to buy the chocolate bars ($t = 2.497$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .013$). Interestingly, people who had favorable attitudes toward international trade expressed more intense willingness to purchase chocolate bars than those who disfavored international trade ($t = 2.379$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .018$; See Table 9).

Table 9. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Hershey Chocolate Bars
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .047 | .053 | .046 | .034 |
| Gender | -.130 | -.150* | -.159* | -.176* |
| Education | .013 | .025 | .023 | .031 |
| Income | .130 | -.005 | -.013 | -.012 |
| Employment | -.101 | -.097 | -.085 | -.045 |
| Union | .088 | .085 | .073 | .060 |
| Nationalism | | .096 | .097 | .081 |
| Chauvinism | | .040 | .034 | .062 |
| Party | | -.050 | -.050 | -.050 |
| Ideology | | .048 | .051 | .059 |
| Religion | | -.075 | -.070 | -.028 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.082 | -.099 |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.021 | -.026 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .123 |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .170* |
| R ² Change | .041 | .017 | .007 | .053** |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |

Chrysler Stock Purchasing Intentions. With respect to respondents' intentions to buy Chrysler stocks, the descriptive statistics showed that the average value of intentions to purchase Chrysler stocks for respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame was 3.03, while the mean score for respondents exposed to the pro-trade frame was 3.70, leaving a difference of .67. Meanwhile, the average value in terms of Chrysler-stock purchasing intention for respondents exposed to the loss frame was 3.31, while the average score for respondents reading the news story with a gain frame was 3.42, generating a gap of .11. To generate a preliminary idea whether these two gaps were significantly different from zero, a *t* test was performed without putting all the covariants into consideration. The statistical results showed that respondents reading the car cooperation news story with the anti-trade frame were less likely to harbor the intention of investing in Chrysler stocks ($t = -2.788$, $d.f. = 251$, $p = .006$). However, respondents reading the car cooperation news story with the loss frame did not possess significantly different intention from their counterparts reading the same news story but with a gain frame in terms of investing in Chrysler-stock investment ($t = -.426$, $d.f. = 351$, $p = .670$).

Table 10. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Chrysler Stocks
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | -.035 | -.057 | -.071 | -.080 |
| Gender | -.020 | -.018 | -.042 | -.069 |
| Education | .018 | .022 | .019 | .024 |
| Income | -.020 | -.017 | -.040 | -.036 |
| Employment | -.151* | -.160* | -.130 | -.079 |
| Union | .003 | .005 | -.027 | -.042 |
| Nationalism | | .129 | .132 | .111 |
| Chauvinism | | .033 | .011 | .033 |
| Party | | -.013 | -.014 | -.014 |
| Ideology | | .087 | .097 | .103 |
| Religion | | .072 | .082 | .121 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.200** | -.216** |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.066 | -.071 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .087 |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .250*** |
| R ² Change | .029 | .021 | .039* | .078*** |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |

A hierarchical regression was performed with all other relevant variables kept constant. The statistical results showed that respondents exposed to the pro-trade news frame were more willing to buy Chrysler stocks than respondents exposed to the anti-trade news frame ($t = 3.20$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .002$). However, respondents reading the news story with the gain frame did not harbor stronger intentions to purchase Chrysler stocks than respondents reading the same news story but with the loss frame ($t = -1.081$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .281$). Those pro-trade schematic respondents did not distinguish themselves from anti-trade schematic respondents with respect to their intention to buy Chrysler stocks ($t = 1.237$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .218$; see Table 10). Nevertheless, respondents' attitudes towards international trade did have a significant effect on their Chrysler stock purchasing intentions, with one point increase in people's feeling about international trade leading to an increase of .250 Beta points in terms of people's intentions to purchase Chrysler stocks ($t = 3.577$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .0005$; see Table 10). The demographic variable employment seemed to have indirect effects on respondents' intentions to purchase Chrysler stocks.

Hershey Stock Purchasing Intentions. The mean value of Hershey-stock purchasing intention for respondents administered under the anti-trade frame was 3.28, .34 lower than that for the respondents administered under the pro-trade frame (3.62). The mean value gap in terms of respondents' Hershey stock purchasing intentions between respondents exposed to the gain frame (3.50) and their counterparts exposed to the loss frame (3.39) was even smaller, merely .11 points. A *t* test without considering all the covariants offered a preliminary understanding of the relationship between the message frames and people's Hershey stock purchasing intentions, and the statistical results showed that neither the anti/pro-trade frame nor the loss/gain frame had any effects on people's intentions to purchase Hershey stocks ($t = -1.399$, $d.f. = 252$, $p = .163$ for the anti/pro-trade frame; $t = -.453$, $d.f. = 252$, $p = .651$ for the loss/gain frame).

Table 11. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Hershey Stocks
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | -.008 | -.008 | -.014 | -.031 |
| Gender | .004 | -.006 | -.016 | -.019 |
| Education | -.072 | -.065 | -.069 | -.057 |
| Income | .005 | -.022 | -.031 | -.031 |
| Employment | -.116 | -.115 | -.106 | -.079 |
| Union | -.011 | -.010 | -.021 | -.037 |
| Nationalism | | .051 | .005 | .043 |
| Chauvinism | | .021 | .013 | .048 |
| Party | | -.002 | -.002 | .000 |
| Ideology | | -.012 | -.010 | .002 |
| Religion | | -.042 | -.045 | -.016 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.056 | -.071 |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | .059 | -.060 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .162* |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .093 |
| R ² Change | .021 | .005 | .006 | .041* |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |

A hierarchical regression was performed to see whether these mean value gaps were significantly different from zero with all the covariants kept in statistical control. The statistical results showed that neither the anti/pro-trade news frame nor the loss/gain frame had any effects on respondents' intentions to buy Hershey stocks ($t = -1.002$, $d.f. = 15$, p

= .317 for anti/pro-trade frame; $t = -.862$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .390$ for loss/gain frame). However, respondents' pre-existing schemas about free trade seemed to have certain effects on their Hershey-stock purchasing intentions, with one point increase in the pre-existing schema index leading to an increase of .162 Beta points regarding their intentions to purchase Hershey stocks ($t = 2.19$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .030$; see Table 11).

Chinese Automaking Stock Purchasing Intentions. With respect to the intension to purchase Chinese automobile stocks, the average value for respondents exposed to the news story with the pro-trade frame reached 4.10, while the average value for respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame was 3.55, .55 points apart. However, the mean value gap with respect to their intention to purchase Chinese automaking stocks between respondents reading a news story with the loss frame (3.77) and their counterparts reading the same news story but with a gain frame (3.89) was not that big, merely .12 points. A preliminary t test analysis without partialing out the influence from all the covariants showed that the anti/pro-trade frame did have powerful effects on respondents' intentions to purchase Chinese automaking stocks ($t = -2.231$, $d.f. = 243$, $p = .027$). But the loss/gain frame had no effects on their intentions to invest in Chinese autmakaing industries.

A hierarchical regression results confirmed that when the influence from allother covariants were considered, respondents administered under the pro-trade frame were more likely to have the intention to purchase Chinese automobile stocks, compared to respondents exposed to the news story with the anti-trade frame ($t = 2.499$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .013$; see Table 12). Nevertheless, there was no difference in terms of Chinese automaking-stock purchasing intention between respondents reading the news story with the gain frame and those reading the same news story but with the loss frame ($t = -1.033$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .303$). Likewise, pre-existing free-trade schemas did not have any effect on people's Chinese stock purchasing intention ($t = 1.259$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .210$). However, those people with higher education were less likely to purchase Chinese automaking stocks. ($t = -1.980$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .049$), and those

people with favorable feeling toward international trade preferred to purchase Chinese automaking stocks ($t = 2.276$, $d.f. = 15$, $p = .024$; see Table 12).

Table 12. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Chinese Automaking Stocks (in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | -.058 | -.058 | -.072 | -.077 |
| Gender | -.048 | -.060 | -.082 | -.093 |
| Education | -.126 | -.130 | -.137 | -.149* |
| Income | -.083 | -.110 | -.131 | -.125 |
| Employment | -.021 | -.013 | .014 | .055 |
| Union | .056 | .058 | .038 | .027 |
| Nationalism | | .002 | .008 | -.007 |
| Chauvinism | | -.047 | -.062 | -.037 |
| Party | | .027 | .024 | .022 |
| Ideology | | -.148 | -.142 | -.138 |
| Religion | | -.054 | -.052 | -.024 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.161 | -.175* |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.069 | -.071 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .092 |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .165* |
| R ² Change | .047 | .015 | .028 | .040* |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |

Given the chance that respondents have already purchased Chrysler or Hershey stocks, what will happen to their investment strategies after reading the two news stories? In order to check the consequences, respondents were asked “Now assuming you had Chrysler stock, what would you be most likely to do: **keep the stocks**, **buy additional stock**, or **sell the stocks**?” Since the answers were categorical, the first two alternative answers were lumped together as 1 and the third answer **sell the stocks** was recoded as 0.

Intentions to Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks. Descriptive statistics results showed that the mean value in terms of the intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks for respondents reading the automaking news story with the pro-trade frame was .732, while the mean value for respondents reading the news story but with the anti-trade frame was .568. The preliminary statistical analysis with cross-tabulation suggested that the anti/pro-trade frame did have an effect on people’s willingness to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (See Table 13).

Table 13. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks * Anti/Pro-trade Frames

| Keep or Sell Stocks | Anti-trade | Pro-trade | Total |
|---------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| 0 (Sell Stocks) | 54 (43.2%) | 34 (26.8%) | 88 (34.9%) |
| 1 (Keep Stocks) | 71 (56.8%) | 93 (73.2%) | 164 (65.1%) |
| Total | 125 (100%) | 127 (100%) | 252 (100%) |

$X^2 = 7.481, d.f. = 1, p = .006$

The average value with respect to people's intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks for respondents reading the automaking news story with the loss frame was .612, while the mean value for respondents reading the news story but with the gain frame was .691. The preliminary statistical analysis with cross-tabulation demonstrated that the loss/gain frame did not have any effect on people's willingness to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (See Table 14).

Table 14. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks * Loss/Gain Frame

| Keep or Sell Stocks | Anti-trade | Pro-trade | Total |
|---------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| 0 (Sell Stocks) | 38 (30.9%) | 50 (38.8%) | 88 (34.9%) |
| 1 (Keep Stocks) | 85 (69.1%) | 79 (61.2%) | 164 (65.1%) |
| Total | 123 (100%) | 129 (100%) | 252 (100%) |

$X^2 = 1.714, d.f. = 1, p = .190$

Since the dependent variable was categorical, a hierarchical Logistic regression was conducted. The statistical results further confirmed that the loss/gain frame did not have any effect on individual Americans' intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (Wald = .469, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .808$; See Table 15). However, the pro-trade/anti-trade frame did have a significant effect on people's intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (Wald = 10.708, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .001$), with respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame being less likely than respondents exposed to the pro-trade frame to keep Chrysler stocks by the odds of 65 percent. But the pre-existing schemas about free trade had merely marginal effects on people's willingness to keep or sell the stocks (Wald = 3.514, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .061$; See Table 15).

Table 15. Hierarchical Logit Regression of Subject Intentions to Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks (in B/Wald)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|-----------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .001 | -.004 | -.007 | -.010 |
| Gender | -.196 | -.213 | -.321 | -.344 |
| Education | .047 | .054 | .060 | .078 |
| Income | .014 | .011 | .001 | .003 |

(Continued)

| | | | | |
|--|-------|-------|---------------|------------------|
| Employment | .127 | .103 | .242 | .353 |
| Union | .367 | .466 | .150 | .018 |
| Nationalism | | .046 | .045 | .042 |
| Chauvinism | | .014 | .005 | .018 |
| Party | | .071 | .075 | .074 |
| Ideology | | -.129 | -.136 | -.128 |
| Religion | | .023 | .031 | .043 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.974**/9.511 | -1.058***/10.708 |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.234 | -.213/.469 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .059/3.541 |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .078/.522 |
| Chi Square Change | 1.502 | 5.211 | 10.346** | 5.450 |
| *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | | | | |

Intentions to Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks. With the help of descriptive statistics, it is found that the average value concerning people's intention to keep or sell Hershey stocks for respondents reading the Hershey outsourcing news story with the pro-trade frame was .754, while the average value for respondents reading the same story but with the anti-trade frame was .706. The preliminary statistical analysis with crosstabulation showed that the anti/pro-trade frame did not generate any effect on people's willingness to keep or sell Hershey stocks (See Table 16)

Table 16. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks * Anti/Pro-trade Frame

| Keep or Sell Stocks | Anti-trade | Pro-trade | Total |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 0 (Sell Stocks) | 37 (29.4%) | 31 (24.6%) | 68 (27%) |
| 1 (Keep Stocks) | 89 (70.6%) | 95 (75.4%) | 184 (73%) |
| Total | 126 (100%) | 126 (100%) | 252 (100%) |

$X^2 = .725$, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .394$

Table 17. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks * Loss/Gain Frame

| Keep or Sell Stocks | Anti-trade | Pro-trade | Total |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 0 (Sell Stocks) | 32 (25.6%) | 36 (28.3%) | 68 (27%) |
| 1 (Keep Stocks) | 93 (74.4%) | 91 (71.7%) | 164 (73%) |
| Total | 126 (100%) | 126 (100%) | 252 (100%) |

$X^2 = .241$, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .623$

Similarly, the average value with respect to people's intention to keep or sell Hershey stocks for respondents reading the Hershey outsourcing news story with the gain frame was .744, while the mean value for respondents reading the same story but with the loss frame was .717. The preliminary statistical analysis with crosstabulation demonstrated that the loss/gain frame did not have any effect either on individual Americans' willingness to

keep or sell Hershey stocks (See Table 17).

A hierarchical Logistic regression was conducted to examine whether the message frames had any effect on individual Americans' intention to keep or sell Hershey stocks, with all other relevant variables kept in control. The statistical results showed that neither the anti/pro-trade frame nor the loss/gain frame had any effect on individual Americans' intention to keep/sell Chrysler stocks (Wald = .190, *d.f.* = 1, *p* = .663 for anti/pro-trade frame; Wald = .020, *d.f.* = 1, *p* = .888 for loss/gain frame). Furthermore, the pre-existing schemas of free trade had no effect on people's willingness to keep or sell Hershey stocks either (Wald = 2.761, *d.f.* = 1, *p* = .097). But respondents' attitudes toward international trade seemed to have certain effect on their intention to keep or sell the stocks (Wald = 3.848, *d.f.* = 1, *p* = .050; See Table 18), with each unit increment in respondents' international trade attitudes increasing the odds of willingness to keep the stocks by 25 percent.

Table 18. Hierarchical Logit Regression of Subject Intention to Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks (in B/Wald)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| Age | .007 | .007 | .007 | .006 |
| Gender | -.102 | -.109 | -.116 | -.151 |
| Education | -.002 | -.001 | -.002 | .016 |
| Income | .077 | .073 | .073 | .077 |
| Employment | -.339 | -.334 | -.325 | -.176 |
| Union | .365 | .435 | .401 | ..275 |
| Nationalism | | .007 | .007 | -.001 |
| Chauvinism | | -.008 | -.009 | .002 |
| Party | | .056 | .058 | .061 |
| Ideology | | -.057 | -.058 | -.062 |
| Religion | | -.025 | -.025 | -.014 |
| Anti/Pro-trade Frame | | | -.092 | -.147 |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.062 | -.047 |
| Pre-existing Schemas of Free Trade | | | | .056 |
| International Trade Attitudes | | | | .222* |
| Chi Square Change | 6.068 | .537 | .114 | 9.755** |
| * <i>p</i> < .05 ** <i>p</i> < .01 *** <i>p</i> < .001 | | | | |

CHAPTER 5.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This study aims to investigate whether the popular framing effects prevail in news media coverage of international trade projects. In other words, could economic news reports, by slanting international trade deals with pro-trade versus anti-trade positions, in combination with depicting them as a loss versus a gain, have a significant impact on individual Americans' attitudinal responses and behavioral intentions when they make evaluation of international trade projects? In addition, the study proposes that individuals' pre-existing schemas about free trade also play a significant role in directing people's attitudinal orientation toward international trade deals. Furthermore, the pre-existing schemas may also have a mediating effect on individual Americans' perception of international cooperation.

The results showed that when keeping in constant other relevant variables that may influence people's foreign trade policy preferences, pro/anti-trade frames did have powerful effects on people's perception of specific trade deals, but with no impact on their general image of international trade. No matter what it concerned, the specific trade deals or the general image of international trade, neither the loss frame nor the gain frame had any impact on people's foreign trade policy preferences. However, pre-existing schemas about free trade played a decisive role in directing individual Americans' foreign policy preferences about both the specific trade deals and the broad image of international trade, but with no mediating effects. What's more, individual Americans' pre-existing attitudes toward international trade were also found to have huge impact on respondents' foreign trade policy preferences.

With respect to people's individual investment strategies, pro/anti-trade frames had influence on people's investment intension in four of the seven scenarios, while people's pre-existing attitudes toward international trade also influenced four scenarios but two of them were in different situation. People's pre-existing schemas about free trade had certain effect on people's investment intension of Hershey stocks, while the loss/gain frames merely

influenced people's intention to purchase Chrysler cars (See Table 19).

Table 19. Relationships between Independent Variables in Interest and Dependent Variables

| Independent In Interest | Pro/anti-trade frame | Loss/gain frame | Free-trade Schemas | International Trade Schemas |
|---|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Dependent | | | | |
| Car Deal | * | | *** | *** |
| Chocolate Deal | * | | *** | *** |
| International Trade | | | *** | *** |
| Buy Car | * | * | | |
| Buy Chocolate | | | | * |
| Buy Chrysler Stocks | ** | | | *** |
| Buy Chinese Stocks | * | | | * |
| Keep Chrysler Stocks | *** | | | |
| Buy Hershey Stocks | | | * | |
| Keep Hershey Stocks | | | | * |
| * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ | | | | |

As Shapiro and Page's (1998) have suggested, American people evaluate a foreign policy according to whether they think the policy is beneficial to his/her own interest or the interests of the nation, based on widely-accepted social values, judgment standards and common sense. Concurring with their suggestion, this study finds that individual Americans' foreign trade policy preferences are quite stable and rational. Its stability lies in the fact that individual Americans mainly subject their foreign trade policy preferences to their pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade, the systematized knowledge stores in the domain of international trade. To deem rational the public opinion on foreign trade policy is due to the fact that people use information they get from the news media to adjust their evaluation of foreign trade policies whenever they think the information is relevant. Furthermore, they seem to be immune from the variations in arbitrary information presentation. The individual Americans' rationality also demonstrates in their choices of investment strategies, which seems to be merely affected by those factors relevant to how they evaluate the functionality of a specific product or the profitability of a concrete stock.

5.1 Attitudes toward Specific Trade Deals and International Trade

The findings suggest that emphasis framing effects actually exist in the news coverage of international cooperation. Framing an international cooperation as pro-trade could generate different attitudinal responses toward the project from framing it as anti-trade (risk). This

finding concurs with a previous study on a domestic economic project that people exposed to an economic frame would be more likely to support the development project and regard it as more important than people reading the news story with a frame that stresses conservation of natural resources (Nelson and Oxley, 1999). Even such popular issues that average Americans are familiar with as poverty and racial inequality are subject to manipulation of frames in communication (Zaller, 1992), let alone to say specific international cooperation or agreements, the full record of which could hardly reaches the public. Under such condition, the news media focusing on economic news coverage become the major sources, to which individual Americans have to resort for relevant information about merits and costs of multinational projects, because these events might influence their investment return, personal life and even career success. Although people may take into account some competing values and beliefs in face of a controversial international cooperation project (Feldman & Zaller, 1992), the frames in communication could narrow the range of arguments people may take into serious consideration. As Fiske (1992) has pointed out, individuals are cognitive misers, who seldom search for full but depend heavily on shortcuts to make judgment. When individual Americans are required of their opinions on whether to endorse a cross-nation project they have limited information of, message frames subconsciously furnish such a kind of shortcut or cue that tells people which consideration is relevant and important, thus suggesting what is the possible attribution of the issue and how it should be weighted or treated by insinuating evaluative criteria and treatment alternatives (Entman, 1993).

Even though the pro-trade/anti-trade news frame has a powerful effect on individual cognitive and attitudinal responses to international trade projects, this does not necessarily indicate that average people are the victims of media elite manipulation. The framing effects should not be exaggerated to the extent that they be treated in an isolated manner as if they would play the most important or solely decisive role in directing people's foreign trade policy preferences. Upon making judgment, people would consciously and elaborately judge

frames in communication based on relevant constructs embedded in their minds (Druckman, 2001). Even under the specific condition that people focus their attention on something else, the interpretation of incoming stimuli are still subject to automatic guidance of pre-existing schemas in relevant domains (Gilovich et. al., 2006; Wyer, 2003).

Individuals rely heavily on their pre-existing schemas in the domain of international trade to facilitate their evaluation of merits and drawbacks of trade deals. Among all relevant constructs that people may take into account about foreign trade are predispositions about international trade and free trade, which contribute significantly to the public foreign policy preferences over international cooperation. In light of this, it is likely that those who have favorable pre-existing feelings toward free trade are more likely to give higher rating of the two specific trade deals than those who possess anti-trade schemas. By the same token, respondents who think the international trade has helped the U.S. are also more likely to have positive attitudes towards these two specific trade deals than their counterparts who think the international trade has hurt the U.S. economy. Even if people are offered a message frame that contradicts their predispositions, they may reject it or rate it lower than their counterparts who possess opposite schemas. For instance, when exposed to the pro-trade frame, the anti-trade schematic respondents rated the car deal significantly lower than their counterparts with a pro-trade schema ($t = 2.008$, $d.f. = 13$, $p = .047$, See Table C in Appendix A). This indicates that the framing effects are not as manipulative as they are supposed to be and they are limited by other important considerations. Furthermore, the attitude-directing effects of people's predispositions about both international trade and free trade are stronger than the framing effects in this study. Their Beta values, for example, in the automaking case are .304, .238 and .120 respectively. This indicates that if a person's predisposition about international trade shifts from 1 to 2, his/her attitude toward the car deal will change by .304. By the same token, if one shifts his/her free trade schematic value from -10 to -9, one will increase his/her feeling toward the car deal by .238 point, larger than the variation of .120

caused by the shift from the anti-trade frame to the pro-trade frame.

In general, when making judgment about an international trade project, individual Americans may base their appraisal of the deal not only on the information the news media furnish, but also heavily on their predispositions about international trade and free trade. Normally, pro-trade schematic respondents endorse free trade for its theoretical fairness, possible mutual benefits for cooperative parties and rational usage of world resources. Consequently, they are more optimistic about economic cooperation around the world and certainly will support international cooperative programs that increase economic globalization. Similarly, if a respondent thinks current international trade is beneficial to the U.S. economy, he/she would be more likely to endorse any cooperation of the kind. This is consistent with the study in cognitive psychology about judgment making, which suggests that the more experience a person possesses in certain fields, the more one will rely on those experiences to make further decision (Anderson, 2005). The result also concurs with Zaller's suggestion (1992) that the incoming information is merely the building block of a picture in people's minds about an issue and the final opinion orientation is heavily dependent on their pre-existing schemas. Hence, these pre-existing schemas about international trade are playing a much more decisive role in guiding people's evaluation of specific trade deals.

But contrary to Shen's suggestion that respondents show more "related mental activities" (Shen, 2004b, p133) when the news frames are consistent with their pre-existing schemas, this study does not find any mediating effect of free-trade pre-existing schemas on framing. There is no systematic explanation as to why mediating effects do not work in this study but appear in some other research (Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Zaller, 1992). One factor that may contribute to this difference is that there is information divide between survey participants, with some having more knowledge about the topics in question, such as aid to Contras in Zaller's study (1992) and mayoral control of schools in Price and Na's research (2000). In contrast, contextual information of the trade deals was offered to participants in this study,

minimizing knowledge gap about the issues. Therefore, the better understanding of the issues with the help of background information leaves almost no room for indirect influence to function in this study. Future research could direct its focus on the hidden mechanism why mediating effects exist under certain conditions but rather others.

As Miller and Fagley (1991) suggested, the equivalency framing effect does not occur as regularly as it is thought to be, but appears merely in specific situation. Consistent with their argument, the loss and gain frames are found to have no effect in almost all scenarios. This finding contradicts with the traditional wisdom that negative information tends to have more influence on individuals' attitudinal and behavioral responses (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Shah et al, 2004; Taylor, 1991). Druckman (2001) ascribed the less frequency of equivalency framing effect to such contextual cues individuals may get from the news media or party affiliation, which help prevent people from being manipulated by arbitrary information presentation. In this study, contextual information about the number of jobs originally planned to cut is supplied to the participants, for instance say 2,000 jobs; hence, depicting a trade issue as a loss of 1,000 jobs does not make any difference from framing it as gaining 1,000 jobs back. Under this condition, people may base their foreign trade policy preferences more on systematic information such as domain-specific pre-existing schemas and contextual cues than on variations in semantic wordings either in positive light or negative light, thus assisting in competent decision making (Druckman, 2001). Another alternative explanation may be that the loss/gain message frame in this study, which was submerged in the large amount of information, was not easily picked up by respondents. The same scenario, if condensed into one or two sentences in a survey with the focus placed merely on the loss/gain frame, might lead to varied responses. A matter logically the same in quality and quantity but expressed in different amounts in either a positive or negative light might also generate different results, such as winning back 30% of the jobs vs. still losing 70% of the jobs.

The emphasis framing effects over specific international trade deals in the form of pro-trade vs. anti-trade in this study do not spill over to individual Americans' perceptions of international trade in general. Those exposed to a pro-trade frame do not have significantly different opinion about international trade from their counterparts exposed to an anti-trade frame. This result is not surprising since as we have already known that people mainly base their international trade policy preferences on their pre-existing schemas. In other words, how a person views international trade depends heavily on what predispositions he/she possesses. If one possesses positive attitudes toward free trade and international trade in general, one may be more likely to think the international trade has helped the U.S. economy. This does not suggest that the newly incoming information is useless; but its effect is offset to the minimum by the pre-existing schemas about international trade and free trade. As Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) have observed, "Opinions are based on a broad spectrum of previously acquired information, with new bits of information having a diminished efficacy to affect opinion (p.529)." Since the target of public input into foreign policy here is the overall image of international trade, the effect of one or two pieces of isolated cases will be minimized or offset by the overall attitudes toward international trade.

5.2 Behavioral Intentions

There are two criteria that lead people's foreign policy evaluation: whether they think the policy is beneficial to his/her own interest or the interests of the nation (Shapiro and Page, 1998). Sometimes, people give priority to the interests of the nation at making such decisions as whether to endorse an incumbent president. They make their choice predominantly based on the economic situation of the country rather than their personal economic welfare (Goidel & Langley, 1995; Kernell, 1977). Attitudinal responses to international cooperation seem to belong to this category, where individual Americans see less direct economic or emotional involvement. However, investment intention, whatever forms it may take on: stock investment or product purchasing, is more closely related to an individual's personal interest

and under the control of their volitions. Thus, one's own interest will be more readily activated to guide the decision-making.

Chrysler Car Purchasing Intention. Respondents' car purchasing intentions are constrained only by emphasis framing effect and equivalency framing effect, with people's pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade having no impact at all. Car purchasing is a personal economic activity and may take into account such elements as price, family income, social status of the family, a brand reputation, quality concern, gas consumption rate and so on. It is reasonable for people to focus on these elements while neglect the broad image of whether free trade is good and whether international trade has helped the U.S. economy, because these schemas normally have no direct relationship with individuals' car-purchasing intentions. However, the automaking industry is such an important industry in the U.S. economy that outsourcing of automaking industry may indirectly influence some individual Americans' emotional responses such as national pride and confidence.

This study finds that respondents reading the news story with a pro-trade message frame are more willing to purchase Chrysler cars than their counterparts exposed to an antitrade-frame news story. As is well known that emphasis framing effect could focus respondents' attention on certain aspects of a reality to the exclusion of others (Entman, 1993) and consequently suggest the relevance or importance of these aspects (Nelson et al., 1997), the message frames have the capacity to influence individuals' assessment of an international cooperation project. Framing it as pro-trade would narrow people's attention on such factors as cost reduction, job creation, capacity to make profits, possible dividend increase, increased market niche and future cooperation potential. The subsequent positive attitudes toward the project, accompanied with information about lower costs and quality management, may prompt respondents to have higher expectation of the product quality and price reduction. Even though the cooperation with Chinese Chery may not noticeably improve product quality,

the price elasticity of demand for cars is much larger, and a merely 10 to 15 percent discount due to cost reduction will be extremely attractive and could impact some consumers' intention to buy a Chrysler car. To invest about \$20,000 on a car is not a trivial decision for a family. The price is certainly one of the critical factors that determine the final choice of would-be car buyers, especially among those in the lower echelon of socioeconomic status, because consumers' ability to purchase is one of the two major factors that influence discretionary purchase (Curtin, 1982). A pro-trade news story furnishing such information may facilitate people's intention formation and suggest this choice, with the same quality but a much lower price, is rational. As a result, respondents administered under a pro-trade frame are more likely to have the intention to purchase Chrysler cars than those reading a news story with an anti-trade frame. Likewise, an anti-trade frame may suggest that a Chrysler car may not be a good choice both technically and emotionally. As to the respondents who have never thought of buying a 'Chrysler,' anti-trade frame may suggest considerations would-be car buyers may not have taken into prior consideration, thus offering them one more reason to disfavor a 'Chrysler' and legitimate their original preferences.

In this study, the equivalency framing effect does not exist in almost all scenarios but the case of Chrysler-car purchasing intension. With the contextual cue that Chrysler has planned to cut a certain number of jobs, people can make competent judgment by avoiding the arbitrary information presentation. However, the statistical result shows that respondents who read the news story with a loss frame are less likely to have the intention to buy Chrysler cars than their counterparts reading a gain-frame news story. Does this suggest that people are easily manipulated by the equivalency framing effect, or is this a special case? Besides those factors mentioned above that will influence a family's decision in purchasing a car, there is one more element that should not be neglected: consumers have a lot of substitutions to switch to, for example, Honda, Toyota, Benz, BMW, and even Ford and Chevy. The original intention for a person to purchase a Chrysler car may not be strong enough or there are few

people with firm determination to purchase a 'Chrysler.' According to the negativity bias theory, a gain frame focusing on winning back 1,000 jobs may not generate the same response in respondents from a loss frame that highlights losing 1,000 jobs. Even though the data at hand could not tell whether a loss frame has the capacity of changing respondents' purchasing intention from willingness to purchase a Chrysler car to unwillingness, one thing is certain that the loss frame of the same value leads to a sharp drop of people's purchasing intention (2.38) from the neutral point (4), much larger than the gap (.95) between the mean value of respondents exposed to the gain frame and the neutral point. Probably, a loss frame may reinforce the intention of those respondents who have no interest in Chrysler cars and make them more determined on their prior decisions. As mentioned beforehand that car purchasing intention is subject to many factors, the loss frame may offer these people another excuse to shun from a 'Chrysler:' punishing Chrysler for cutting jobs or outsourcing through boycotting its products.

Hershey Chocolate Bar Purchasing Intention. Unlike automaking industry, which enjoys a more prestigious status in the American economy and concerns more aspects of the society, chocolate industry may capture less attention in individual Americans. Meanwhile, the elasticity of demand for chocolate is so stiff that price change in chocolate may have little effect on people's purchasing intention, let alone to say the price reduction range for chocolate is narrow. Therefore, people's purchasing intention may not be influenced by the news stories as the case of Chrysler car deal has demonstrated. The statistical results show that the only element that influences people's purchasing intention is their pre-existing schema about international trade, with both the framing effects and free-trade pre-existing schemas generating no impact.

Even though the outsourcing of some chocolate assembly lines to Mexico could reduce Hershey's production costs, however, the lower production cost is not the major factor that influences customers' purchasing intention of chocolate. This trade deal could reduce with no

doubt the production costs but has nothing to do with chocolate flavor improvement, which may be more important for chocolate consumption, thus generating no motivation for customers to buy more chocolate. Meanwhile, the elasticity of demand for chocolate is so stiff that price changes in chocolate may have little effect on people's purchasing intention, let alone to say there is not much room for Hershey to maneuver its prices. Therefore, framing the deal as pro-trade does not make any difference from framing it as anti-trade to both the customers who prefer chocolate and those who have no interest in it. As mentioned above, chocolate industry does not parallel in importance to the automaking industry. Moving out of the country some assembly lines would not harm the national pride in people as much as the Chrysler deal does. Consistent with Druckman's (2001) suggestion that equivalency framing effect rarely occurs but merely in specific occasion, this study does not find any equivalency framing effect in the chocolate deal.

According to the statistical results, respondents who think that international trade has helped the U.S. economy may be more likely to express their intention to purchase Hershey chocolate than those who have unfavorable attitudes toward international trade. Unlike a car, which would cost customers around \$20,000, the price for a chocolate bar is merely several dollars, placing no economic burden for those people who support current international trade practices. Meanwhile, there seems to be less emotional arousal in this deal than in the car deal. Hence, as for those who support current international trade practices, outsourcing chocolate manufacturing capacity out of the country, an industry that occupies merely a tiny bit of the national economy and is not associated with the most innovative and high-tech factors, is nothing but an active and rational method to improve the manufacturing capacity and cut the production costs. In their minds, this kind of cooperation may contribute to both the national economy and individual consumers. As such, pre-existing schemas about the international trade do have a powerful impact on respondents' purchasing intention of chocolate bars.

Intention to Purchase Chrysler Stocks and Chinese Automaking Stocks. According to the statistical results, respondents exposed to the pro-trade news frame about the automaking cooperation are more likely to purchase Chrysler stocks than those exposed to the anti-trade frame. Stock investment is somewhat different from goods purchasing. When purchasing a commodity, customers take into account merely their needs, the price of a commodity and quality of the commodity without thinking too much of others or the broad situation of the national economy. It is really personal. On the contrary, the quality and price of a commodity can still be two important factors stockholders need to think of, but they may think of them from a different perspective. They will consider whether the quality and price are competitive enough to lead to the increase in demands for the products so that the company could make profits and ultimately they would make profits. Even though a lot of factors will influence a person's stock investment decision, the most important is whether one thinks a specific trade deal will be worthy of investment, or whether it is capable of generating economic return. As Gibbons (2008) suggested, predictable, sustainable growth is one of the crucial reasons a value investor prefer a certain stock rather than another. Any information supplied by the news media about the running and management of a company would influence people's prediction of a company's profitability. The news story with the trade deal framed as pro-trade focusing on cost reduction and potential sales increase due to introduction of new car models would easily lead to prediction that the deal is promising. Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand for cars is larger, and the cost reduction in Chrysler cars may have more effects on consumers' car-purchasing intention. Therefore, the combination of a competitive price and a new niche market would suggest potential sales increase. What's more, simply linking to the dynamic Chinese auto market is a sure proof that Chrysler stock is a good investment. So, it is not surprising that respondents reading the pro-trade frame news story would have more intention to buy Chrysler stocks than respondents receiving an anti-trade frame news story.

The overall condition associated with international cooperation is another factor stock investors may pay attention to. In other word, how they think of international trade in general would influence their prediction of the fate of industries associated with international cooperation. For example, if their pre-existing schemas about international trade are positive or their past experience of stock investment associated with industries involving international cooperation is affirmative, let's say WalMart, they would be more likely to deem that the cooperation like Chrysler-Chery cooperation will be a good investment choice. This confidence in the overall situation of international trade, accompanied with the concrete information offered by the news media about this specific deal: lower sale price, ever-growing niche market and expanding Chinese automobile market, and the special characteristic of automobile industry—large elasticity of demand, would prompt investors to make a higher evaluation of investment in Chrysler stocks. Furthermore, the overall condition of international trade also concerns an investor's long-term goals. That is to say, if the overall situation is promising, there is more possibility that an investor may make money both in the short run and long run. Therefore, the respondents who are confident in international trade would be more likely to express their interest in Chrysler stocks than those who think the international trade has hurt the United States.

The same explanation could also go to the phenomena that respondents exposed to the pro-trade frame and respondents who think international trade has helped the U.S. economy may be more likely to purchase Chinese automaking stocks. There is only one predictor that distinguishes people's intention to buy Chrysler stocks and Chinese automaking stocks: people with higher education are less likely to have the intention to buy Chinese stocks. Perhaps the more education a person receives, the more careful one will be about investment strategies. Even though Chinese automating stocks are attractive due to its huge market potential, more education may prevent a person from conducting harsh investment in a stock market one has neither knowledge nor control of.

This study finds no relationship between the loss/gain frame and automobile stock purchasing intention, nor could people's free-trade pre-existing schemas help predict their automobile stock purchasing intention. These results are not surprising since framing an employment situation as winning 1,000 jobs back or still losing 1,000 jobs has nothing to do with people's stock investment strategies, let alone to say they are logically the same but presented in different arbitrary wordings. By the same token, pre-existing schemas about free trade is an index to investigate people's preference for an ideal economic globalization pattern, which does not exist and has no influence on stock performance. Therefore, it is understandable that people pay less attention to free-trade pre-existing schemas when they focus on stock investment strategies, especially when stock investors could get contextual cues from the news media.

Intention to Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks. The statistical results show that pro/anti-trade frame is the only factor that helps predict people's intention of whether to keep or sell Chrysler stocks. Given the situation that respondents have already had Chrysler stocks, which strategy would they adopt: sell the stocks or keep the stocks after they read the news story? It is found that respondents reading the news with a pro-trade frame are more likely to continue keeping the stocks or buy additional stocks than respondents exposed to an anti-trade news story. Here the question shifts from whether the respondents would purchase the stocks so as to make profits to whether they should sell the winners or wait for the winners to bring more profits. The explanation for people's intention to purchase Chrysler stocks also fits here. Framing it as pro-trade would associate the deal with confidence in Chrysler's future profitability and encourage people to keep the stocks for more profits. The conventional wisdom suggests that people sell the winners upon receiving good news, but that occurs mostly under the condition of uncertainty (Shefrin & Statman, 1984). If investors have concrete evidence about the sustainable profitability of a stock, they may continue keeping it or even buy more. However, the pre-existing schemas about international trade that

has influence on people's intention to purchase Chrysler stocks do not show up in this scenario. The possible reason may be that the most important factor influencing a person's stock investment is the concrete information about a company's sustainable growth. When investors' stocks have already appreciated and made profits, the importance of the overall situation of international trade or how investors view international trade in general diminishes in assisting decision making, because investors could sell the winners and realize the profits. This choice of realizing profits makes them pay less attention to the overall situation of the international trade but highly concentrate on concrete evidence of a company's profit-making capacity.

Intention to Purchase Hershey Stocks. The framing effect that shows up in Chrysler stocks does not exist in the Chocolate project. This difference may be attributed to the different idiosyncrasies of these two specific products. It is well known that the price elasticity of demand for cars is much larger than that for chocolate bars. The outsourcing of chocolate production may help Hershey reduce its production costs, but this move could hardly affect chocolate sales. Even though chocolate bars are not daily necessities, their consumption pattern parallels somewhat that of necessary expenditures, which are mainly regulated by need and the force of habit (Curtin, 1982). Meanwhile, the price range of chocolate bars is so narrow that there is not much room for the company to reduce its price. For stock investors, what matters the most is the predictable and sustainable growth inherent in the nature of a stock (Gibbons, 2008). There is no doubt that Hershey movement would reduce production costs, but it seems more like a one-time action without any further sustainable-growth potential. Therefore, depicting outsourcing of chocolate production assembly lines to Mexico as pro-trade may not have any huge effect on respondents' assessment of the investment return, compared to framing it as anti-trade. Hence, people's investment intention in the form of purchasing Hershey stocks is hardly associated with the emphasis framing effect.

The only factor that could help predict people's Hershey stock purchasing intention is their pre-existing schemas about free trade. The respondents who have positive attitudes toward free trade are more likely to purchase Hershey stocks than those who do not endorse free trade. There is no concrete explanation for this scenario. Perhaps those who endorse free trade think free trade is the only remedy for continuous cost reduction and sale boost based on the principle of comparative advantage. Therefore, pro-trade schematic respondents are more likely to support international cooperation and are more confident that their investment in such projects would be worth every penny of it.

Intention to Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks. Given the chance that respondents have already purchased Hershey stocks, which investment strategy will they use: sell the stocks or keep them? The statistical results show that the only factor that influences people's investment strategy in this scenario is their pre-existing schemas about international trade. In other words, respondents who think the international trade has helped the U.S. economy may be more likely to keep the Hershey stocks they have already purchased. Since the protrade-frame news story about Hershey does not offer any information on Hershey's future profit-making capacity, framing it as pro-trade or anti-trade seems to have no influence on investors' strategy choice. Only those people who believe international trade benefits the U.S. economy may be more confident in Hershey's future growth. There may be one explanation for this phenomenon: even though Hershey is not an "attention-grabbing" stock in the stock market, its outsourcing part of the assembly lines to Mexico, a move to reduce production costs and make the company more competitive, would ensure the profitability of the company in the long run and maintain its dividend constant for quite a long time. Hershey stocks may not be a good choice for speculators who want to make huge economic return in a short period of time or for those investors who always pay attention to the stocks that are in the limelight of the media, whereas they behave more like bonds and could be a perfect target for long-term investment. The respondents who believe international trade has helped the U.S.

economy may be more inclined to concentrating on the long-term performance of a specific stock. Therefore, they are more likely to keep a stock like Hershey.

CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

International trade is such a complicated phenomenon that constitutes many different economic and financial activities. What has been conducted here is merely a tip of the iceberg. Even though the public opinion on foreign policy in general has been found to be quite stable (Chittick, Billingsley, & Travis, 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley 1986, 1987), no research has contributed specifically to the public preferences of foreign trade policies. This study casts light on this field and adds to the literature about the public involvement with foreign policy. The findings suggest that individual Americans' foreign trade policy preferences are quite rational and competent. People subject their international trade policy preferences not only to the information furnished by the news media, but also to their predispositions about free trade and international trade.

Emphasis framing effects do exist to influence people's perception about an international cooperation program. If the news media depict such an item as pro-trade and list the considerations that focus solely on the positive sides, respondents may be more likely to endorse the project. If the news media frame it as anti-trade and merely highlight certain attributes that link to the negative sides of the project, respondents may be more likely to oppose it. This effect of frames in communication influencing the public foreign policy preferences causes suspicion in some politicians and scholars about the public's competence in making rational political decisions and their capacity to immune from elite manipulation (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Zaller, 1992). But, this worry seems to go a bit far-fetched, because emphasis framing effect seems to be exaggerated without considering other factors that may limit framing effects or play even a more important role in directing people's foreign policy preferences.

Even though the frames in communication do influence people's preference choices, these choices are also subject to the influence of people's predispositions. In other words,

frames in communication will be evaluated by people's pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade. Upon confronting inconsistent information, individual Americans have the capacity to minimize these framing effects to the lowest level with the help of predispositions in specific domains and thus make rational choices given their past experiences and information at hand. This process of message-frame encoding is not through an automatic and subconscious manner, but subjects to deliberate and conscious contemplation (Druckman, 2001). Public opinion about foreign policy may be easily manipulated at the initial stage of an issue when the public has little knowledge of it (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Nevertheless, this process could be viewed in a positive light. Chong and Druckman (2007) preferred to treat it as a learning process, through which people could become more sophisticated, experienced and resistant to similar manipulation at later times. Even though people may know little about specific international trade projects and have to rely on the news media and elite debates for information, their past experiences about international trade may equip them with sufficient intelligence and rationality to make reasonable choices. The more experienced they are in international trade, or the more complicated their knowledge structures become about international trade, the more they would base their foreign trade policy evaluations on their predispositions, and the more the message frames will be under the scrutiny of these predispositions. Furthermore, rarely could an individual in reality successfully constrain himself/herself merely to the presentation of their preferred arguments about an issue. In regular contact with inconsistent information, they may already have formed counterarguments to those message frames they feel uncomfortable with when they are called upon to give opinions. Even if it is possible that a person may successfully restrain his/her exposure to one-side mediated arguments, he/she could hardly be immune from the influence of their families, relatives and coworkers. Some of the acquaintances might share the same political predispositions with them, but others may possess different political opinions. In this situation, she/he may have contemplated or even

argued about both sides of the issues and this argumentation and contemplation may leave the person more persistent with his/her predispositions.

In this study, the public's rationality in dealing with foreign trade policies also demonstrates in their immunity from the influence of equivalency framing effect. Even though a matter described as a loss frame may arouse more attitudinal and behavioral responses in a person than a gain frame of the same valence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), people could resort to contextual cues so as to avoid manipulation of arbitrary information presentations, which are logically equivalent. The most important of all is that people not merely base their foreign trade policy preferences on both the information the news media furnish and their predispositions in international trade domain, they use them selectively but rationally. When judging specific trade programs, they resort to both their predispositions and the mediated news information; when making evaluation about international trade in general, they minimize the influence of the mediated information but rely heavily on predispositions; when making decision upon stock investment strategies or commodity purchasing, they adopt different combinations of mediated information and predispositions so as to maximize their economic returns.

As is suggested by the respondents' different choice combinations of mediated information and their domain-specific predispositions, the public foreign policy involvement is rather rational. Even though the presentation of their foreign policy preferences in terms of specific policy choice sometimes is not constant, the ultimate goals have never changed: they base their foreign policy evaluation on these two criteria—whether they think the policy is beneficial to his/her own interest or the interest of the nation (Shapiro and Page, 1998). The change in policy alternatives may be mainly due to varied foreign policy objectives and changing international environment (Shapiro & Page, 1988). Consistent with Chong and Druckman's (2007) argument that “stability of opinions per se is therefore a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations” (p.120), the findings in this study

also suggest that constancy may not be a better criterion to examine the intelligence or rationality of public opinion on foreign policy. Something dealing directly with rationality is needed to restore the essence of public opinion on foreign policy.

Even though public opinion on foreign trade policy could be powerfully influenced by people's domain-specific pre-existing schemas, which may be either positive or negative, the influence of the news media on their policy preferences, or the role in the news media to help foster a more informed and intelligent constituency could not be neglected, since the news media are a major source of people's political socialization (Garrazone & Atkin, 1986). Given the available information, the public know how to make rational choices for themselves (Shapiro & Page, 1988). Therefore, it would be wiser for the media practitioners to put forth both the merits and costs of international trade projects and let the public have the final say, or at least let them get informed of relevant information at an earlier stage. In this way, summon of public support for international trade may not be as difficult as otherwise. Meanwhile, the news media may contribute to better understanding of international trade in the public by digging deeper into how those trade benefits go to American people instead of bragging merely on increased exports or total sales growth, which may have little or no direct influence on individual Americans' routine life, especially for those who have sacrificed for the national interests. If the gap in international trade endorsement between European countries and the US does attribute partially to a stronger safety net provided by the European countries (Porter, 2008), one more specific duty the U.S. media may undertake is to put the government's trade benefit redistribution under surveillance. This may be more effective than exhaling international trade benefits in economic prosperity but treating international trade as a scapegoat at economic recession.

Since this study merely addresses the public input into the foreign policy involving outsourcing, much is unknown about other aspects of international trade. Future research may address such topics as foreign investment in the U.S., where different countries may have a

different mediating effect on people's perception of the cooperative project. In reality, there is seldom occasion that a case involving employment could be framed as a loss or gain merely based on semantic or terminological difference. Situations like gaining 70% of the jobs back vs. still losing 30% of the jobs may be put into experimental investigation to see the existence of equivalency framing effect. As for the generalization of the study, the sample may pose certain difficulty since the majority of the respondents are Louisiana residents. It is suggested that future research concerning public input into the foreign trade policy could use a national sample. The last but not the least, public opinion on foreign trade policy is seldom formed based on an isolated piece of information but subjects to the influence of competing considerations or public debates, future research may integrate this consideration into study, with the hope that respondents exposed to both frames or attending public discussion may be immune from both the emphasis framing effect and equivalency framing effect.

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APPENDIX A: COMPLEMENTARY DATA

Table A. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Car Deal
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas | Model 5 Interaction |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Age | .129 | .114 | .104 | .090 | .086 |
| Gender | -.086 | -.091 | -.100 | -.121* | -.122* |
| Education | -.037 | -.030 | -.033 | -.016 | -.016 |
| Employment | -.224*** | -.224*** | -.220*** | -.154** | -.157** |
| Union | .161* | .162* | .147* | .119* | .119* |
| Nationalism | | .001 | .00 | -.025 | -.021 |
| Chauvinism | | .037 | .025 | .077 | .078 |
| Party | | .007 | .012 | .016 | .012 |
| Ideology | | -.074 | -.070 | -.051 | -.049 |
| Religion | | -.024 | -.017 | .028 | .028 |
| Anti/Pro-Trade Frame | | | -.100 | -.114* | -.120* |
| Loss/Gain Frame | | | -.056 | -.065 | -.065 |
| Pre-existing Free Trade Schemas | | | | .204*** | .167 |
| International Trade Attitude | | | | .306*** | .304*** |
| Interaction: Anti/pro * Free Trade Schema | | | | | .052 |
| R ² Change | .101*** | .007 | .012 | .160*** | .001 |
| * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 | | | | | |

Table B. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Chocolate Deal
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)

| Predictor | Model 1 Demographics | Model 2 Orientations | Model 3 Experiment | Model 4 Pre-existing Schemas | Model 5 Interaction |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Age | .154* | .152* | .146* | .129* | .131* |
| Gender | -.069 | -.079 | -.086 | -.103 | -.103 |
| Education | -.033 | -.023 | -.025 | -.005 | -.005 |
| Employment | -.149* | -.146* | -.140* | -.079 | -.078 |
| Union | .116 | .106 | .092 | .063 | .063 |
| Nationalism | | -.022 | -.021 | -.048 | -.050 |
| Chauvinism | | .052 | .041 | .100 | .100 |
| Party | | -.085 | -.083 | -.078 | -.077 |
| Ideology | | .005 | .012 | .033 | .032 |
| Religion | | .034 | .024 | .017 | .017 |
| Pro/Anti Trade | | | -.108 | -.123* | -.119* |
| Loss/Gain | | | -.006 | -.013 | -.013 |
| Pre-existing Free Trade Schemas | | | | .236*** | .257** |
| International Trade Attitude | | | | .262*** | .263*** |
| Interaction: Anti/Pro * Free Trade Schema | | | | | -.030 |
| R ² Change | .058* | .010 | .011 | .149*** | .000 |
| * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 | | | | | |

Table C. Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Car Deal for respondents Administered under Pro-trade Frame

| Predictor | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | | Sig. |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------|------|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | t | |
| Intercept | 2.345 | 1.352 | | 1.734 | .086 |
| Lose Dummy | -.114 | .259 | -.039 | -.441 | .660 |
| Nationalism | -.027 | .034 | -.077 | -.797 | .472 |
| Chauvinism | .027 | .029 | .094 | .947 | .346 |
| Age | .009 | .010 | .092 | .904 | .368 |
| Nonunion Dummy | .449* | .869 | .047 | .517 | .606 |
| Party | -.046 | .102 | -.051 | -.454 | .651 |
| Ideology | -.044 | .110 | -.047 | -.399 | .691 |
| Education | -.045 | .101 | -.042 | -.441 | .660 |
| Work Dummy | -.439 | .275 | -.144 | -1.596 | .113 |
| Religiosity | .043 | .034 | .123 | 1.279 | .204 |
| Male Dummy | -.353* | .288 | -.119 | -1.223 | .224 |
| Pre-existing Schemas | .054** | .027 | .190 | 2.008 | .047 |
| Inter-trade attitude | .322*** | .064 | .304 | 5.057 | .003 |
| R ² | .218 | | | | |
| * p < .05 | ** p < .01 | *** p < .001 | | | |

APPENDIX B: PRETEST AND POSTTEST

Pretest

1-1. Please write down anything (the first **four**) that pop up into your mind when you think of free trade.

- 1) _____
- 2) _____
- 3) _____
- 4) _____

1-2. Please give your answers to the following questions concerning your like or dislike of free trade.

A. Is there anything specific that makes you like free trade and what are they?

- 1) _____
- 2) _____
- 3) _____
- 4) _____

B. Is there anything specific that makes you dislike free trade and what are they?

- 1) _____
- 2) _____
- 3) _____
- 4) _____

2. Using a 7-point scale where **1** indicates **strongly disagree** and **7** indicates **strongly agree**, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

| Statements | Strongly Disagree | | | | | | | Strongly Agree | |
|--|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | |
| Generally speaking, the United States is a better country than most other countries. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | |
| The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the United States. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | |
| I would rather be an American citizen than of any other country in the world. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | |
| It is impossible for people who do not share U.S. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| customs and traditions to become fully American. | | | | | | | |
| People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| The United States should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| It is important to have been born in the United States to be fully American. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| I am optimistic about the future of America. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| I am optimistic about my personal future. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| It's still possible for most people to achieve the American Dream. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| I have more job opportunities than I thought I would have | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

3. Using a 7-point scale, please indicate whether you think international trade has generally helped or hurt the United States. Here **1** indicates you believe international trade has **hurt the United States a great deal** and **7** indicates international trade has **helped the United States a great deal**.

Hurt the US a great deal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Help the US a great deal

4. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by international trade. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think international trade **hurts** or **helps** in the particular area.

| | Hurt A Great Deal | | | | | Help A Great Deal | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------------|---|
| The US economy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| American companies | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Consumers like you | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Creating jobs in the US | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| The environment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Job security for American workers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Your own standard of living | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

5. Please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or unfavorable opinion toward each of the following countries. Here **1** indicates **the least favorable** opinion possible and **7** indicates **the most favorable** opinion possible.

| Country | The least Unfavorable Favorable | | | | | The most | |
|---------|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|----------|---|
| Iran | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Spain | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Britain | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| China | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Mexico | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

6. Using the same scale, please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or unfavorable opinion toward the following industries.

| Industry | The Least Unfavorable Favorable | | | | | The Most | |
|----------|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|----------|--|
| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Automobile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Chocolate | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Computer hardware | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

7. Thinking about the 2008 presidential elections, would you be **more** or **less likely** to support a candidate if you knew the candidate supported free international trade?

Less Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Most Likely

8. Please give your answers to the following questions concerning your religion.

A). Apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals, how often do you attend religious services? _____

- 1) Never
- 2) A few times a year
- 3) Once or twice a month
- 4) Almost every week
- 5) Every week

B). How often do you pray outside of religious services? _____

- 1) Never
- 2) Once a week or less
- 3) A few times a week
- 4) Once a day
- 5) Several times a day

C). How often do you read Scripture outside of religious services? _____

- 1) Never
- 2) Once a week or less
- 3) A few times a week
- 4) Once a day
- 5) Several times a day

D). How much guidance do you think your religion provides for your day-to-day living?

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 A great deal

E). What is your religious preference? _____⁴

⁴ Adopted from PEW Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2006 News Interest Index Final Questionnaire.

1) Protestant (include Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Pentecostal, Jehovah's Witness, Church of Christ, etc.)

2) Roman Catholic

3) Jewish

4) Mormon (include Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)

5) Orthodox Church (Greek or Russian)

6) Islam/Muslim

7) Other religion _____

8) No religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic

9) Don't know/Refused

9. In general, do you think of yourself as _____

1) Very conservative

2) Conservative

3) Slightly conservative

4) Moderate, middle of the road

5) Slightly liberal

6) Liberal

7) Very liberal

10. What is the last grade or class that you completed in school? _____

1) None, or grade 1-8

2) High school incomplete (Grades 9-11)

3) High school graduate (Grade 12 or GED certificate)

4) Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school

5) Some college, no 4-year degree (including associate degree)

6) College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree)

7) Master's degree

8) Professional degree (e.g. MBA, MD, JD, DDS, LLB)

9) Doctorate degree

11. Your Gender: Male_____ Female_____

12. Your age: _____

13. Are you a Union member: Yes_____ No_____

14. In general, do you think of yourself as _____
- 1) Strong Republican
 - 2) Not strong Republican
 - 3) Leans Republican
 - 4) Undecided/independent/other
 - 5) Leans Democrat
 - 6) Not strong Democrat
 - 7) Strong Democrat
15. Which group below does your annual household income before taxes fall? _____
- 1) Less than \$10000
 - 2) \$10,000 -- \$19,999
 - 3) \$20,000 -- \$29,999
 - 4) \$30,000 -- \$39,999
 - 5) \$40,000 -- \$49,999
 - 6) \$50,000 -- \$59,999
 - 7) \$60,000 -- \$69,999
 - 8) \$70,000 -- \$79,999
 - 9) \$80,000 -- \$89,999
 - 10) \$90,000 -- \$99,999
 - 11) \$100,000 --\$109,999
 - 12) \$110,000 --\$119,999
 - 13) \$120,000 --\$129,999
 - 14) \$130,000 --\$139,999
 - 15) \$140,000 --\$149,999
 - 16) \$150,000 --\$159,999
 - 17) \$160,000 and up
16. What is your employment status? _____
- 1) I work as a paid employee
 - 2) I am self-employed
 - 3) I am an owner/partner in small business, professional practice, farm
 - 4) I am unemployed/ temporarily laidoff, but looking for work
 - 5) I am retired/disabled

- 6) I am students
- 7) Others, please specify_____

- 17. What is your race? _____

Posttest

(Questions asked right after reading the automaker news story)

1. Would you say this specific trade deal is likely to hurt the United States or help the United States? Please indicate your overall opinion using a 7-point scale with **1** representing **hurt the United States a great deal** and **7** **help the United States a great deal**.

Hurt the US a great deal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Help the US a great deal

2. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by this specific trade deal. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think this specific trade deal is likely to **hurt** or **help** in the particular area.

| | Hurt A Great Deal Deal | | | | | | Help A Great |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|
| The US economy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| American companies | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Consumers like you | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Creating jobs in the US | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| The environment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Job security for American workers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Your own standard of living | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

3. Assume that you have the opportunity to buy stock in Chrysler Corp. how likely would you be to buy Chrysler stock? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with **1** representing **not at all likely** and **7** **very likely**.

Not at all Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Likely

4. Now assuming you had Chrysler stock, what would you be most likely to do: **keep the stocks**, **buy additional stock**, or **sell the stocks**?

A. Keep the stocks _____

B. Buy additional stocks _____

C. Sell the stocks _____

Why do you make such a decision?_____

5. If you needed to purchase a new car in the next year, would you be likely to consider buying a Chrysler? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with **1** representing **not at all likely** and **7** **very likely**.

Not at all Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Likely

6. If you had the opportunity to buy stocks of any Chinese listed company, would you

be likely to consider buying the stocks of a Chinese automaker? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intension, with **1** representing **not at all likely** and **7** **very likely**.

Not at all Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Likely

(Questions asked right after reading the candymaker news story)

7. Would you say this specific trade deal is likely to hurt the United States or help the United States? Please indicate your overall opinion using a 7-point scale with **1** representing **hurt the United States a great deal** and **7** **help the United States a great deal**.

Hurt the US a great deal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Help the US a great deal

8. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by this specific trade deal. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think this specific trade deal is likely to **hurt** or **help** in the particular area.

| | Hurt A Great Deal Deal | | | | | | Help A Great |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|
| The US economy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| American companies | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Consumers like you | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Creating jobs in the US | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| The environment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Job security for American workers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Your own standard of living | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

9. Assume that you have the opportunity to buy stock in Hershey Corp. how likely would you be to buy Hershey stock? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with **1** representing **not at all likely** and **7** **very likely**.

Not at all Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Likely

10. Now assuming you had Hershey stock, what would you be most likely to do: **keep the stocks**, **buy additional stock**, or **sell the stocks**?

A. Keep the stocks _____

B. Keep the stocks and buy additional stocks _____

C. Sell the stocks _____

Why do you make such a decision? _____

11. If you were buying chocolate, would you be likely to buy Hershey's chocolate bars? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with **1** representing **not at all likely** and **7** **very likely**.

Not at all Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Likely

12. Thinking about the 2008 presidential elections, would you be **likely** to support a candidate if you knew the candidate supported free international trade?

Less Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Most Likely

13. Using a 7-point scale, please indicate whether you think international trade has generally helped or hurt the United States. Here **1** indicates you believe international trade has **hurt the United States a great deal** and **7** indicates international trade has **helped the United States a great deal**.

Hurt the US a great deal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Help the US a great deal

14. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by international trade. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think international trade **hurts** or **helps** in the particular area.

| | Hurt A Great Deal | | | | | Help A Great Deal | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------------|---|
| The US economy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| American companies | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Consumers like you | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Creating jobs in the US | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| The environment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Job security for American workers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Your own standard of living | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

15. Please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or unfavorable opinion toward each of the following countries. Here **1** indicates **the least favorable** opinion possible and **7** indicates **the most favorable** opinion possible.

| Country | The least Unfavorable | | | | | The most Favorable | |
|---------|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|---|
| Iran | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Spain | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Britain | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| China | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Mexico | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

16. Using the same scale, please indicate whether you generally have a **favorable or unfavorable** opinion toward the following industries.

| Industry | The least Unfavorable | | | | | The most Favorable | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|---|
| Automobile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Chocolate | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Computer hardware | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

17. Using a 7-point scale where **1** indicates **strongly disagree** and **7** indicates **strongly agree**, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

| Statements | Strongly Disagree | | | | | Strongly Agree | |
|---|----------------------|---|---|---|---|-------------------|---|
| The future of this country is optimistic. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Your own personal future is optimistic. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| It's still possible for most people in this country to achieve the American Dream. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| You have more job opportunities than you thought you'd have | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

18. Please write down the first **four** things that pop up into your mind when you think of free trade.

- a) _____
- b) _____
- c) _____
- d) _____

APPENDIX C: FRAMING ARTICLES

Stimuli Story 1

1. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as job concerns (**Pro-trade & Gain Frames**)

Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
July 12, 2007 Thursday

Chrysler Group announced Tuesday that it is moving ahead with plans to have Chinese automaker Chery build a subcompact car for the European North American markets. Partnership with a Chinese automaker could bring a bonanza of benefits including lower manufacturing costs, competitive prices, and booming market demand. The deal will bring Chrysler into one of the hottest segments it currently does not compete in. "Non-equity partnership allows us to do something we have been unable to do on our own: launch a line of quickly and inexpensively built mini-cars in the extremely price-sensitive small-car market," said Chrysler Chief Executive Tom LaSorda. "That is a critical part of our recovery plan."

The supervisory board of Chrysler has approved the framework of a limited partnership with Chery, and its decision to sell most of Chrysler to private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management will not affect its businesses in China. However the deal is still pending final approval from the Chinese government. Since chief executive Dieter Zetsche made public May 14 that DaimlerChrysler will cooperate with Chery, its stock has gained 25% to \$90.96 a share.

As Autodata reports, the market for smaller cars is growing rapidly, up 59% last year while the overall car market was up just 1.5%. However, only 25% of vehicles Chrysler produced in 2006 were cars, with the remaining 75% being pick-up trucks, all-terrain vehicles or minivans. Sales of these vehicles have fallen, due to higher fuel prices and environmental concerns in the United States, resulting in Chrysler suffering huge losses.

A Chrysler representative said that Chrysler cannot afford to build small cars in the United States, where labor and other costs are too high to make a profit. But in China, labor rates can be as low as \$1 or \$2 an hour, and building a modern auto plant can cost half as much as in the USA. "I don't think Chrysler has much choice. None of the domestic companies can afford to locally produce their own vehicle for this pretty important segment," said Tom Libby, senior director of industry analysis for the J.D. Power Network of J. D. Power and Company. "The problem for all of them is that this segment is quite important and it provides an entry way into the next segment up," he said.

Chery is an aggressive company which is representative of China's booming automobile industry. Last year, new vehicle sales in China soared 25.13% to 7.22 million units, allowing the country to overtake Japan as the world's second largest market for new vehicles. Sources from the Chinese automobile industry said car sales in China will grow 15% to hit 8 million units this year.

Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost \$1.5 billion in 2006 and had planned to cut 6,000 jobs in the next three years. "In accordance with the growing demand for automobiles in the Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., such partnership would help us gain back 3000 of those jobs," said Chrysler Group spokesman Mike Aberlich.

2. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as job concerns (**Pro-trade & Loss Frames**)

Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
July 12, 2007 Thursday

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Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost \$1.5 billion in 2006 and planned to cut 6,000 jobs in the next three years. "Considering the growing demand for automobiles in the Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., we would still have to cut 3,000 of those jobs, even under the partnership with Chinese Chery," said Chrysler Group spokesman Mike Aberlich.

3. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as job concerns (**Anti-trade & Gain Frames**)

Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

July 12, 2007 Thursday

Chrysler Group announced Tuesday that it is moving ahead with plans to have Chinese automaker Chery build a subcompact car for the European North American markets. Partnership with a Chinese automaker could pose certain problems including job security for employees and automobile quality concerns. Chery is known for emphasizing low price parts, sometimes at the expense of quality. The deal will open the gate for future partnership expansions to include a variety of vehicles, not just small car. In turn, industry experts say the partnership could lead to increased imports and job exports. Moreover, the thought of losing

America's automotive prowess to China is unnerving. "It's very clear that this country has an immense stake in the continuation of the domestic auto industry," said Sander Levin, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee. "I'm in favor of that and whatever steps it takes."

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4. **Headline:** Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as job concerns (**Anti-trade & Loss Frames**)

Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

July 12, 2007 Thursday

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Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost \$1.5 billion in 2006 and planned to cut 6,000 jobs in the next three years. "Considering the growing demand for automobiles in the Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., we would still have to cut 3,000 of those jobs, even under the partnership with Chinese Chery," said Chrysler Group spokesman Mike Aberlich.

Stimuli Story 2

1. Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations (**Pro-trade & Loss Frames**)

Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer
July 24, 2007 Tuesday

The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, reduce Hershey's existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The realignment is expected to yield savings of \$170 million to \$190 million a year by 2010, due to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term target for sales growth of 3 % to 4%. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.

Since the July 15 announcement of the restructuring, the company's share price has risen almost 6%.

Richard H. Lenny, Hershey CEO said the restructuring plan will enable the company to increase its North American leadership and develop "a truly global footprint for Hershey's iconic brands." "We are confident that we'll be back on track," Lenny said, "we are excited about our business prospects for 2007 and beyond." Some analysts praised the move. Andrew Lazao of Lehman Brothers wrote: "Bottom-line, this plan would trim costs, improve profit margins and provide Hershey with far more marketing firepower, behind which to invest in

its core brands... as well as new platforms,” such as premium and dark chocolate.

As part of the plan, Hershey will eliminate a third of its production lines in the United States, and plans to cut 3,000 jobs. This will make the proportion of Hershey’s manufacturing done in the U.S. and Canada shrink from 90% currently to 80%, said Hershey Spokesman Kirk Saville. However, since the realignment includes expansion of some plants and more investment in advertising and sales sectors, the net job cut in the U.S. will drop to 1,500 over the next three years.

2. **Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations. (Pro-trade & Gain Frames)**

Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer
July 24, 2007 Tuesday

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3. **Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations (Anti-trade & Loss Frames)**

Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer
July 24, 2007 Tuesday

The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, reduce Hershey’s existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The realignment is expected to yield savings of \$170 million to \$190 million a year by 2010, due to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term target for sales growth of 3% to 4 %. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.

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David Lawrence, president of the Smiths Falls & District Chamber of Commerce, said “we’re really disappointed as a community.” The closing is a “major blow” to Smiths Falls, he said. “Not just an economic blow, but the whole image of who we are.” Hershey invested a substantial amount of money in the plant seven years ago. David said the plant has been profitable, and no specific reasons were given for the closing. Dennis Bomberger, a union leader express outrage: “Moving their operation to Mexico to save money is nothing but a bald-faced lie. The truth is they only wish to further line their pockets at the expense of American workers.”

As part of the plan, Hershey will eliminate a third of its production lines in the United States, and plans to cut 3,000 jobs. This will make the proportion of Hershey’s manufacturing done in the U.S. and Canada shrink from 90% currently to 80%, said Hershey Spokesman Kirk Saville. However, since the realignment includes expansion of some plants and more investment in advertising and sales sectors, the net job cut in the U.S. will drop to 1,500 over the next three years.

4. Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations (**Anti-trade & Gain Frames**)

Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer

July 24, 2007 Tuesday

The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, reduce Hershey’s existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The realignment is expected to yield savings of \$170 million to \$190 million a year by 2010, due to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term target for sales growth of 3% to 4%. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.

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VITA

Wei Zha was born in Nanjing, China, In March 1966, to Honglan He and Yongxi Zha. He graduated from Nanjing Foreign Language School in 1984 and received a Bachelor degree in arts, majoring in English literature in 1988, from Shanghai International Studies University. While working as an assistant professor in China Southeast University, teaching English and international trade, he pursued his second Bachelor degree in economics in 1996. That same year, he transferred to China Nanjing Television Station, working as a producer for a daily 10-minute English news program. While he was busy engaged in anchoring, interviewing and editing for the news program, he spent his spare time taking courses in American studies and economics in Johns Hopkins Nanjing Center from 1998 to 1999. Some of his news programs won him awards not only in the local level, but also in the national level, and the news “Operation Smile” won him the third prize in Caihong Awards, the top national award in foreign publicity in China.

In 2002, Wei Zha moved to Fort Worth, Texas, to pursue his study in journalism and gained his master degree in 2004 from Texas Christian University. He began his doctoral study from 2004 under the guidance of Dr. Robert Kirby Goidel, Director of Public Policy Research. He holds membership in AEJMC (Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication) and ICA (International Communication Association). He and his wife, Nan Zheng, have two children, Zeyu George Zha and Zehua Edward Zha. They all live in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.