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Who Speaks and Who Listens? Genre, Gender, and Memory in Holocaust Discourses

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WHO SPEAKS AND WHO LISTENS?
GENRE, GENDER, AND MEMORY
IN HOLOCAUST DISCOURSES

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
In partial fulfillment of the
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Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of English

by
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This dissertation is dedicated
to Laura Hillman
and to all the survivors and victims of the Holocaust.
You will always be remembered.
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To my mother and to Barry who never gave up on me and especially my mother, who was always there.

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Abstract

The Holocaust discourses examined in *Who Speaks and Who Listens? Genre, Gender and Memory in Holocaust Discourses* perform writing that does something through the presentation of meaningful content and its interaction with the process of the writing act. These discourses are utterances necessarily wedged between the past and the future—between the fear that the traumatic past of the Holocaust recedes too much and the concern with what might become of this past for the generations that follow. The theory of performative memorialization describes how multiple discourses of the Holocaust engage with each other and with the audiences that receive and respond to their testimonies. This dissertation promotes the notion of history and memory as reconstructions that interact through the collaborative tension of process and content to reveal various performative gaps or intrusions, which open spaces for audiences’ responsive understanding, enacting a unique chain of communication that creates a dialogic of history and memory.

By studying how these memories of the witnesses are translated into discourse provides knowledge about how memory functions. It provides knowledge about the fallibility of memory, history, and representation, through an examination of the process of writing. Through the application of performative memorialization, this dissertation shows how discourses of the Holocaust are unique because they are increasingly multimodal, and how multimodality maintains the historical and pedagogical relevance of the Holocaust into the present, while also exhibiting the pedagogical implications of examining Holocaust discourses as texts of memorialization.
Introduction: Writing as Action

In the process of creating the composition, the work of art, the painting, the film, you’re creating the culture. You’re rewriting the culture, which is very much an activist kind of thing. Gloria Anzaldúa

This dissertation begins with and focuses on writing as a communicative practice that has the power to create action in the world. Composition is an “activist kind of thing,” because ideas are communicated to create dialogues, which can open spaces for change. Composition and feminist theorist Gloria Anzaldúa, for example, believes in what she calls the *mestiza* consciousness’s “tolerance for ambiguity,” a method of thinking that shifts “out of habitual formations [. . .] toward a more whole perspective, one that includes rather than excludes” (*Borderlands* 101). In the composition classroom we can teach students to create the dialogues which open the spaces for change by showing them multiple ways of thinking and multiple ways of knowing through the process of writing. The shifts required for this kind of learning involve movements—in thought, in response, in perspective-- and these movements do not have to be monumental. Simply opening the spaces creates the opportunity for change and action when students learn and experience the process of writing about what they learn. Students change as a result of interactive learning because in that dialogue the spaces are opened for response. Students realize: “I learn that I have something to say, I learn that I can say it, and I learn how to say it.” This is the process of composition. What Anzaldúa has learned through writing is that “if I can compose this text, and if I can compose my identity, then I can also compose reality out there” (Lunsford 18). Writing creates action because we, as communicators, compose reality, make meaning, and effect change. We speak. We respond. We take responsibility to engage with the world.
We can “expect students to be active and engaged,” as Composition theorist David Bartholomae suggests, but we must also realize that this engagement involves “working against the inevitable presence of conventional language; it is not a matter of inventing a language that is new” (“Inventing” 448). Participation in composition mimics participation in the world—change comes slowly. Writing is the process of engaging within the convention of language. The parameters of this convention can be crossed, blurred, reinvented, or untouched, but there is always some action within that work. This dissertation is committed to this form of action, crossing borders in genre, language, and knowledge in order to understand how meaning is made. We must all work within and against language, understanding that language cannot be made “new” but that new meanings can be made—and these meanings create dialogues of change. According to Composition theorist Patricia Bizzell, students learn to write better when they become aware of specific discourse communities and their conventions. In other words, they can learn the writing process as “form,” but they must also learn the content of that process—the conventions of specific discourse communities (230-1).

Writing that creates action composes and rewrites culture as listening and responding to the world in dialogues. Writing as action can create social change, but perhaps not in the sense that most people conceive of activism and social change. Composition theorist Ellen Cushman notes that “activism” will not lead to “social change” if change is defined only as “collective action, or sweeping social upheavals” (377). For Cushman, social change should also be defined as “the ways in which people use language and literacy to challenge and alter the circumstances of daily life [. . .] social change can take place in daily interactions when the regular flow of events is objectified, reflected upon, and altered” (377). Reflection and thought emanate from the composition classroom in the daily interactions we have with students. The “regular flow” is
disrupted when we speak and write critically about issues, topics, solutions—gaps are created and new meanings are made. To speak and write we must engage, and it is this active interaction that creates change. Much like Cushman claims the power of literacy to create social change, Performance Studies theorist Della Pollock espouses performative writing, as “an important, dangerous, and difficult intervention into routine representations of social/performative life” (75). Through these gaps, interventions, and disruptions students can learn to engage and use language and literacy to effect change.

Teaching writing as action, therefore, endorses a pedagogy of response and responsibility. Some early composition scholars, like James Berlin, have advocated a critical pedagogy that encourages students to resist and interrogate discourses (Rhetorics 1996). Paulo Freire claims that pedagogy can be emancipatory in using “dialogic and problem-posing education,” and bell hooks says that a “liberatory feminist movement aims to transform society,” although for her this transformation can only occur through revolutionary feminist pedagogy (22, Talking 50-1). Some critics, however, refuse the approach of Berlin et al, claiming that such politics of resistance have no place in the composition classroom. Composition theorist Joseph Hardin notes Susan Miller as one critic who claims critical pedagogy infantilizes students by assuming their lack of cultural knowledge while simultaneously endorsing the teacher’s critical stance (3). This dissertation contends, conversely, that when writing is taught as action the political focus is deemphasized and Hardin’s definition of critical pedagogy as “teaching resistance” in order to open a multitude of spaces is accentuated. In these spaces, students learn to “resist uncritical acceptance of cultural representations and institutional practices by interrogating rhetoric to uncover its motives and values,” and they learn that they can “produce text that uses rhetoric and convention to give voice to their own values and positions” (7). The
action of writing comes through this resistance to convention—the negotiation Cushman sees as social change. Writing as action comes as a result of voicing and negotiating positions and values—and taking responsibility for those voices and positions in the world. Composition is creation and performance: composing identity, composing culture, composing change, composing action.

Getting students to engage in the composition process in order to voice their positions, however, is a common obstacle that teachers face in the classroom. The concept of multimodality in Rhetoric and Composition seems to offer an approach by which we might ensure, or at least maximize student engagement. Multimodality tries to understand the various ways we make meaning or literacies. Although Janet Emig claimed that “verbal language represents the most available medium for composing” and that the “uniqueness of writing” needs to be established, we live in an increasingly digital and visual world, and multimodality explains how students learn from and engage with various modes, including writing (331). Multimodality theorizes literacies not just literacy. The meanings we make are multiple, layered, and complex, and come from a variety of forms—or modes—and practices. Rhetoric and Composition theorists Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen describe four strata, or domains, where meaning can be made: discourse, design, production, and distribution. Discourse refers to “socially constructed knowledges” that have arisen from specific social contexts (4). Design falls in between “content and expression.” Not only do designs realize discourses in that socially constructed context, but they also realize “the communication situation which changes socially constructed knowledge

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1 I use the term “discourse” in the sense that Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen employ it. Discourse is a “knowledge of practices” (or how things are done) together with evaluations of the purposes of these practices, as well as a knowledge that is “linked to and activated in the context of specific communicative practices” (114). What this means according to Kress and Leeuwen is that people “at different times draw on different discourses about the same practice or practices, choosing the one they see as most adequate to their own interests in the given context” (114).
into social (inter-) action [emphasis added]” (5). This can also apply to designs which may not have a clear subject matter, such as architecture. Such design reveals views about how and why people or things exist in space and then “gives shape to this discourse” in the form of a building. Design can be realized in the building itself, as well as in interactive computer programs for instance (6). While design is a mode and production is a medium, the two are often inseparable. Kress and Leeuwen use the example of the musician who designs and performs music. But there is also music designed by a composer and played by someone else. In this latter case, when design and production separate, design “becomes a means for controlling the actions of others”; the producer does not make meaning, but merely executes a predetermined meaning (7). The same can be said of distribution: it does not make meaning by itself but acts as a support for the meaning making activity.

The strata where meaning can be made apply not only to producers, but additionally to the audience who interprets. Communication, according to Kress and Leeuwen, has only taken place “when there is both articulation and interpretation” (8).² Such interpreters must be aware of all strata: discourse, design, production, and distribution. What interpreters bring to interpretation depends on “their place in the social and cultural world, and also with the content [emphasis added]” (8). This dissertation argues that the act of writing is important in meaning-making as a process as Pollock noted, but to focus solely on the process of writing risks neglecting the importance of content. Content in this dissertation expands Bizzell’s idea of content as the conventions of specific discourse communities to include what a particular discourse community writes about. This dissertation argues that process and content work in collaborative tension to create a complex dialogic in the meaning-making process. Communication occurs with the

² This idea of articulation and interpretation will be expanded using Bakhtin’s concept of a “whole utterance” to define a dialogic of communication in Holocaust texts in Chapter One.
articulation and interpretation of several modes and practices to create layers of meaning. Although Kress and Leeuwen lament the monomodal privilege given to writing, multimodality can nevertheless be successfully applied in the writing classroom where students make meaning through their participation as articulators and interpreters of a variety of texts, both written and non-written. Multimodality creates layers of meaning through various modes and practices, and writing or producing forms of communication, together with the content and context of that communication, produces action in the classroom.

Action in the classroom attends to the language theories of Michel Foucault who states that power hierarchies make subjects and “suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (Afterword 212). A writing pedagogy of resistance makes students aware that they are being acted upon by discourses of power, but a writing pedagogy of resistance and action adds the awareness that they can act in response. Utilized in the classroom, multimodality provides a system and a means through which students act in the process of articulation and interpretation of discourse, design, production, and distribution.

Questions concerning the efficacy of multimodality in producing the action through writing that I claim, and thus the applicability of approaching the composition classroom with this theory in mind, are best answered through an analysis of the concept in action. This dissertation proposes to examine a specific discourse community writing about the Holocaust to illuminate the process of how one community produces action in audiences through the use of multimodal forms of discourse. Discourses by survivors of the Holocaust during and after the

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3 From this point, “Holocaust discourses” in this dissertation will refer to personal stories recorded by Jewish survivors or their family members (second generation survivors). All the texts examined in this dissertation are stories of personal experience from either one or multiple perspectives, but the focus is on how the memory of eyewitness experience is translated into discourse that creates action. This dissertation will also focus primarily on the writing of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and second generation Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Diary writer Anne Frank, who was murdered in Bergen-Belsen, is the notable exception.
Second World War are an example of the theory of multimodality at work. The articulations of this event by those who suffered in this atrocity and the interpretations by audiences create the multiple and layered meanings of communication which I claim are a dialogic or a multi-layered communication process\(^4\) between author, object, audience, history, and memory. I call this complex process “performative memorialization.” Performative memorialization is a multimodal principle that can be applied across different discourses concerning trauma to show how action is created. I have explained action in terms of writing as action and this action, with regard to the Holocaust, means to testify and bear witness to the event, its survivors, and the victims. This action, however, is also being witness to the process of bearing witness. After establishing the parameters of the theory of performative memorialization in Chapter One, I will apply it in Chapter Two to the diaries of Anne Frank and Victor Klemperer (1952, 1999), in Chapter Three to the memoirs of Elie Wiesel and Laura Hillman (1960, 2005), in Chapter Four to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Jewish Museum Berlin (1994, 2001), and in Chapter Five to the hybrid texts of Art Spiegelman and Ruth Klüger (1986/1991, 2001).

Because multimodality combines modes of communication and layers of communicative practices, the multimodal principles at work in performative memorialization are an ideal entry into the complexities of the genres of the Holocaust and the communication chains they create.

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\(^4\)The term “dialogic” comes from M.M. Bakhtin and will be further explained in Chapter One in terms of audience.
over time. Locating various genres of Holocaust discourse along this chain, this dissertation theorizes, through performative memorialization, how these discourses have evolved. Multimodality happens when “common semiotic principles operate in and across different modes,” therefore, images can encode emotion and music can encode action (Kress and Leeuwen 2). Multimodal literacies can result from applying performative memorialization (a semiotic principle) to different Holocaust texts (modes). This means that these texts do not provide just one level of meaning for audiences, but that several, layered meanings are created by authors and audiences-- meanings that are emotional, visual, and intellectual, concrete and abstract, and historical and personal-- and these meanings are a result of the variety of modes and practices. Applying performative memorialization requires defining, in terms of the Holocaust, the multimodal strata where meanings are made: discourse, design, production, and distribution. Discourse for this dissertation means the discourses by survivors and second generation survivors about their experiences and how these engage with audiences. Design applies to the actual writing process about the Holocaust and to other modes, such as the design of museum spaces discussed in Chapter Four of this project. The latter two categories of strata-- production and distribution—are not as easily applied to Holocaust discourses because this dissertation departs from Kress and Leeuwen to argue that production and distribution are not always non-creative. In the dialogic of communication that exists in performative memorialization, for example, the production of a new edition of Elie Wiesel’s Night does not mean that this text controls the action of others because it is separated from the “design” or the “book.” On the contrary, using my theory, this new edition creates new dialogues by being taught in classrooms or by being discussed and promoted when Oprah Winfrey featured the text in her Book Club and on her television show (Wyatt “Oprah’s” 1). For the most part, distribution and production will
not be discussed at length in this dissertation because I have limited the scope of the discussion to articulators of discourse and design and their interpreters; however, the production aspects of new editions that I describe above are addressed briefly and the collaborative nature of building and designing museums requires that vestiges of production and distribution appear in my discussion of museums in Chapter Four.\(^5\)

The focus in this dissertation is primarily on the producers and the interpreters of the strata of Holocaust discourse and design, with some attention to the strata of distribution and production as they relate to region and culture. This dissertation argues that the meaning made about the Holocaust is not monomodal but multimodal—and this is one reason why communication about the Holocaust remains vital and present. More than other texts, Holocaust discourses, as texts of memorialization, have pedagogical implications. In order to performatively memorialize an event, one has to learn about it and recontextualize it in the present. This activity is accomplished through the special interaction between author and audience that I contend is present in these discourses, and that can be facilitated through performative memorialization and teaching. According to Pedagogy and Testimony theorists Roger Simon and Claudia Eppert et al, although much attention has been given to practices of remembrance and uses of the past, “little concern has been given to the notions of teaching and learning inherent in the presumptions and organization of different forms of remembrance. Indeed, the centrality of questions of pedagogy to notions of remembrance is often missed”

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\(^5\) The strata of production and distribution do not factor as greatly into the argument of this dissertation because publishers and distributors have a different level of creative input than writers and designers do. For instance, the publishers of Laura Hillman’s memoir added the subtitle “A Memoir of a Schindler’s List Survivor.” She did not want this title (personal interview). Similarly, Anne Frank’s father edited her diary for its first publication, and the “full” diary with her side notes was only published recently. An examination of production and distribution for these texts would be instructive but lengthy, and thus may become volume two of this project at a later date.
As difficult as it is to describe how one may teach effectively, because there are many different ways to do so, it is difficult to teach about this event through one medium only. Thus, these Holocaust discourses are effectively taught through multiple modes. Performative memorialization, a semiotic principle exemplifying multimodality, and a tool that can be used effectively in the classroom, thus, has significant pedagogical import for the composition classroom.

Discussion about the Holocaust has not always been multimodal, nor has it always been vital or present in American society. The “Holocaust,” as I noted above, is a contested term, but it is also one that has become “familiar”; after the war, the term simply did not exist (Witness 21). Historian Raul Hilberg’s *The Destruction of the European Jews* went years without a publisher. Survivor Primo Levi’s memoir was rejected by publishers until 1947 and was only published in a very small edition of 2,500 copies. “Auschwitz” was listed in the 1969 American Heritage Dictionary as the German word for “Oświęcim,” and there “are no entries for Majdanek or Treblinka. Dachau, Belsen, and Buchenwald are sites of German concentration camps (defined as work camps)” (21).

In 2002 in contrast, “studying the Holocaust is recommended or mandated in public schools in at least seventeen states, prominent in all entertainment media, [and] the theme of many museums” (21). I present this information to underscore the fact that the widespread discussions now surrounding the Holocaust were not always that way. This is the trajectory of “our knowledge” of this event as Americans. “Our knowledge” or “our common knowledge” about this event evolves and this dissertation argues that discourses of the Holocaust also evolve in response, seeking to recontextualize this history for new audiences so that it remains vital and

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6 In response to testimony about trauma, Simon and Eppert et al advocate a “pedagogical witnessing,” a “communicative act,” which melds hope and remembrance (294).
present. By this I mean something akin to what Holocaust scholar George Steiner describes when he states that books about the Holocaust should never be called literature, should never be under review: “not unless ‘review’ signifies, as perhaps it should in these instances, a ‘seeing again,’ over and over” (qtd. in Waxman 498). As Holocaust scholar Zoë Waxman explains, Steiner does not advocate a complete lack of response, but wants “careful” response and responses that avoid “superfluous comment of empty words, and recognize the difficulty of representation” (499).

This dissertation recognizes the difficulty of representation in Holocaust discourses. This dissertation “reviews” to locate patterns of representation in order to provide insights (always partial and temporary) into the process of bearing witness to the Holocaust. This dissertation claims that Holocaust discourses are writing that performs action. As Memory scholars Ana Douglass and Thomas Vogler note, when the survivors are gone, what we will have will be the “discourse of witness” that is an “idea in the mind produced by texts and images, not a memory of lived experience” (45). The ways in which we make meaning from these discourses are important to examine because “only certain events have the power to interpellate witnesses; in ordinary life we look at things or watch the passing scene, but we witness an accident or a crime, incidents that seem to demand action and reaction, decision or judgment, where exactly what happened or how it happened are matters of extreme urgency [emphasis added]” (Witness 22). Events of such complexity will always be under construction (22). By illuminating these processes this dissertation will make these constructions conscious acts of witness that “demand action,” rather than “passing scenes” of trauma. It is through multiple modes of discourse and modes of communicative practices that authors and audiences make layers of meaning.

I argue that there is an important particularity about the forms, contents, processes, and evolutions of Holocaust discourses in their dialogic quality that continues to make this past
relevant in the present. My theory of performative memorialization aims to clarify how this complex process creates this relevance, and performative memorialization can serve as a tool to clarify how other discourses of trauma create or could create similar relevance. I have described the import of this dissertation to the field of Rhetoric and Composition, delineating the process of how writing creates action, and I have also described the parameters of multimodal theory within this field as they apply to my theory of performative memorialization. Chapter One explains the distinct elements of performative memorialization and how this theory will be applied to an isolated community of survivors and second generation survivors of the Holocaust representing their experiences through discourse. In Chapters Two through Five, I apply this theory to the discourse to show how writing performs action.
Chapter One: The Role of Performative Memorialization in Making Meaning of Discourse to Create Action

Somebody had asked me, "What is the most important commandment in the Bible?" and I said, "Thou shalt not stand idly by." So she packed up her office and went to Macedonia— I met her there [. . .] We cannot free all the prisoners in the world or save all the victims of AIDS, but we can at least show them that we are with them.
Elie Wiesel

This dissertation theorizes that the action produced by writing and modes of discourse dealing with the Holocaust is the result of a complex process I term the “performative memorialization” of traumatic experience. This theory provides the tools with which we can examine discourses related to traumatic events to discover how they create action in the world. Such a theory could be applied, therefore, to an event like 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina which are other traumatic, shared, cultural events that have been memorialized and remembered in particular modes. I theorize performative memorialization as action in terms of shared cultural experiences that are traumatic. This theory may also apply to shared cultural events that are not traumatic, but the texts I work with here outline this theory only in relation to traumatic events shared and memorialized by a large number of people. Performative memorialization is a multifaceted theory whose diverse elements work together to create social action. This dissertation will focus on these diverse elements, examining how discourses of the Holocaust evolve as genres, how they become a chain of communication as documents that bear witness through a dialogic of history and memory, how genre and gender both construct and are constructed by these discourses, and finally how language serves a performative function within these discourses.

The interaction of history and memory serves as an appropriate point to commence an understanding of the process by which Holocaust discourse produces action, because Holocaust discourse is fundamentally about how individuals reconcile personal memory with an event
experienced in the past. Making meaning from the Holocaust involves learning and knowledge that is interactive and layered. As I noted in my Introduction, multimodality creates an atmosphere for such learning to occur and involves layers of meaning and meaning-making activity. Performative memorialization enacts this learning as audiences bear witness to the content and process of memorialization. Holocaust scholar James Young has noted that, “documenting an event suggests both establishing it as a fact and teaching about it,” and it is through the teaching and transmission of events that meaning is found (Writing 19). This is the sense in which I mean that memorialization can be performative. It is not simply documenting and then teaching; it is a deeper process in which audiences play a crucial role.

When Young advocates finding “meaning” in the Holocaust, implying a universal meaning, and warns that scholars of the Holocaust should be concerned with the “possible consequences of interpretation” for survivors and their families, he suggests understanding the past, not making new meaning from it (Writing 4). What he does not address, however, is the issue of audience, for whom meanings are individual, layered, and complex. I argue that discourses of the Holocaust effectively create action in the world precisely because they address this evolving social context of audience directly. How this learning takes places or becomes active depends not only upon contexts, but also upon the variety of multimodal forms in which these discourses appear.

I theorize that Holocaust discourses engage with audiences and with each other in order to promote multiple ways of “seeing” and “knowing” that allow audiences to bear witness to these authors’ process of bearing witness. This interactive communication creates the kinds of social action between writer and audience that I described in my Introduction as critical to the field of Rhetoric and Composition. As a series of texts that exist on a chain of communication
over time, Holocaust discourses have appeared as recurring genres such as autobiographical, oral and written testimonies, but these genres have also expanded into visual, spatial, and hybridic genres.


[Diaries ..........................................................]

[Yizker Bikher, Diaries, Memoirs............................................]

[Television and Film......................................................]

[Museums and Hybrids.........................]

**Figure 1: The Evolution of Holocaust Discourses on the Chain of Communication.**

A discussion of these genres, especially how they engage heretofore unexamined issues of gender, extends and illuminates this chain of communication, adding new layers of meaning--what survivor Charlotte Delbo calls “knowing” (261). This communication contains the possibility of witnessing, which then “mak[es] more witnesses by informing others of events,” creating the possibility of a longer chain of communication over time (Young *Writing* 18). This dissertation applies performative memorialization disparately to Holocaust diaries, memoirs, museums, and hybrid texts to see how constructions of genre and gender and performative language function in these texts and how they evolve as chains of communication with audiences over time.

1.1 Rationale for Text Selection

The types of discourses I have chosen and the order in which they appear in this project are purposeful. This dissertation examines texts that bear witness to the personal memories and histories of the Holocaust. As I noted in my Introduction, for the parameters of this dissertation, I define Holocaust discourses as the various texts produced by survivors or their children (second
generation survivors) that tell personal stories of experiences during the Holocaust. It should also be noted that discourse is the preferred term I use in this dissertation in order to delineate the strong presence of subjectivity. Historian Hayden White argues that in “discourse” there is a “person who maintains the discourse” (3). In contrast, when I discuss museums, “narrative” will appear to delineate narrative in White’s sense as a chronological record where “no one speaks” (3).

Because the theoretical lens of performative memorialization utilizes theories of genre, gender, and the performative, and relies on audience to create action, the specific texts in each chapter were chosen for comparative purposes to examine constructions of genre and gender, social and historical contexts, and cultural contexts. The texts in each chapter also represent one text that has been influential in constructing for American audiences the “common knowledge” I mentioned above, and one text that is relatively new to American audiences. In order to apply performative memorialization properly, these issues must be compared and contrasted with an influential text and an obscure text, not only applied to texts that are known to have an effect on American audiences. A well-known text like Anne Frank’s The Diary of a Young Girl can be expected to have particular ways of connecting with audiences. Finally, due to the Nazi practices of religious and ethnic genocide, this dissertation focuses on female and male Jewish authors, who are survivors or relatives of survivors (second generation survivors) because these authors constitute a large number of the Holocaust victims who have written or spoken about their experiences, thus the chain of communication that is to be examined is extended.

Holocaust discourses represent a variety of “traditional” genre categories. In order to understand how these discourses have evolved into a chain of communication with audiences

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7 See Marianne Hirsch’s notion of “postmemory” as it relates to relatives of survivors becoming second-generation survivors in *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory* (1997).
and demonstrate the blurring of categories these genres eventually evince, requires starting at the “beginning” when these texts first appeared and their categories began to be defined. Thus Chapter Two, my first chapter of analysis, examines the diaries of Anne Frank and Victor Klemperer (The Diary of a Young Girl 1952, I Will Bear Witness: a Diary of the Nazi Years: 1935-1941 and I Will Bear Witness: a Diary of the Nazi Years: 1942-1945 1998, 1999). Diaries were the first texts to document personal experience during the years leading up to and during the Holocaust. Diaries are distinctive because they were written in close proximity to the Holocaust without knowledge of the event historically. Diaries provide a unique example of performative memorialization because they reveal how each writer’s identity shifts between the public and private realms and exhibits degrees of self-reflexivity in response to the historical events they witnessed. These performative shifts create gaps in the texts that, as I will explain, allow audiences to respond. Subjectivity and representation and constructions of genre and gender are essential issues to consider in these texts.

Chapter Three examines the memoirs of Elie Wiesel and Laura Hillman (Night 1960, I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree: a Memoir of a Schindler’s List Survivor 2005). Memoirs were also some of the first texts to document personal experience, but memoirs are distinctive because they document this event with the distance that allows for more personal reflection and more access to the historical details surrounding the event. Memoirs provide a unique example of performative memorialization because they reveal how each writer deliberately chooses which experiences to represent and how to represent them. Representing these memories as gendered brings audiences’ attention to their choices; audiences are made aware of the construction of gender as an active process. Issues of subjectivity and representation, as they relate to genre and gender are more clearly related. While diaries contain this authorial decision-making process as well,
memoirs reveal a text that “tells a story,” with a chronological background narrative that attends strongly to the history and the story as something that has a beginning and an end. Because memoirs bear witness to the event and the victims and testify to the survival of the author, they are separated from diaries. The evolution of these texts in relation to one another and to the texts that follow shows a progression in that the elements of both memoirs and diaries continue to appear in later genres. Diaries and memoirs also continue to be discovered and published, and some memoirs are just being written.  

Chapter Four examines the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (1994) and the Jewish Museum Berlin (2001). Museums about the Holocaust are unique texts that bear witness to the Holocaust as a spatial experience. The creation of Holocaust museums follows the genres of diary and memoir (by several decades) as another way to bear witness to the Holocaust. Authors and audiences interact on a larger scale and from a variety of perspectives. Museums provide a unique example of performative memorialization because they reveal the issues at work in both diaries and memoirs (identity and representation) and they add the issues of how architectural spaces interact with the narrative of the exhibit (personal memories and history) and how this interaction engages visitors. Museums exhibit a higher degree of performative memorialization because the inclusion of several modes of discourse interacts with issues of identity, representation, genre, and gender to create not only awareness and active response, but also physical action and reaction within the space.

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*Suite Francaise* is a memoir/novel about one woman’s experiences during the war recently discovered and published in France by Irene Nemirovsky, a Ukrainian Jewish writer who had emigrated to France in 1903. She was prolific as a writer until being deported to Auschwitz and killed there by the Nazis. Her daughter did not discover her five-part novel about the war until the 1990s and it was later “published in France to great acclaim in 2004” (“More” 1). Laura Hillman’s memoir was written 20 years ago and published in 2005. Ruth Klüger’s memoir was published in English in 2001. I discuss the latter two texts in this dissertation.
Chapter Five examines Holocaust discourses I call hybrid texts because they include elements of all the preceding genres together: diary, memoir, and biography in addition to addressing all the issues of identity, representation, genre, and gender with extreme self-reflexivity to create action and participation in audiences. I examine Art Spiegelman’s *Maus: a Survivor’s Tale, Volume I: My Father Bleeds History* (1986) and *Maus: a Survivor’s Tale, Volume II: And Here My Troubles Began* (1991), and Ruth Klüger’s *Still Alive: a Holocaust Girlhood Remembered* (2001). This chapter follows museums because although the two texts I examine in this chapter exhibit similar degrees of performative memorialization in the manner of museums and display multimodal forms, they return to the self-reflexivity—the subjectivity of discourse—that was present in the earlier genres in a way museums do not. Self-reflexivity is another way that authors bring attention to the construction of their texts and create gaps for audience response, and the authors of these hybrids enhance audience awareness of the writing process and engage in direct dialogue with audiences, demanding participation in their construction of narrative, genre, and gender to create action.

Another reason these texts were chosen is related to the particular audience with whom these texts interact. In this dissertation “audience” will be primarily audiences in the United States. The growing interest in the Holocaust for Americans noted in the Introduction, and the increasing appearance of discourses about the Holocaust, is evidence that discussion about this event is happening right now. Discussions about this event in the present build upon the “common knowledge” about the Holocaust that American audiences possess. It is my contention that influential texts like Elie Wiesel’s *Night* and Anne Frank’s *The Diary of a Young Girl* inform new knowledge that is created around the Holocaust for Americans because these texts are ubiquitous in any discussion of the Holocaust. It is also my contention that many authors
writing about the Holocaust in the present dialogue with these texts for this reason. To explore how this discourse creates action through the application of performative memorialization, it is necessary to see this theory at work in relatively obscure texts (for American audiences) as well as in these well-known texts. For this reason, this analysis strives to explore some of these sources of “common knowledge” about the Holocaust for Americans (ubiquitous texts) and contrast them with more obscure texts (for American audiences) written from an Austro-German perspective. Analyzing texts written by German-Jewish or Austrian-Jewish authors provides a unique perspective which complicates the categories of individuals who experienced this event. As Holocaust scholar Pascale Bos argues, “the (Austro-)German-Jewish experience [of the Holocaust] is a very specific trauma” that has not been fully explored (German-Jewish 6). For Americans, the Austro-German-Jewish experience is less familiar because German individuals are often categorized as perpetrators, and Jewish individuals are often categorized as victims. Reading personal stories from combined cultural and national perspectives begins to complicate this tendency toward simplistic categorization. Thus, this dissertation focuses on texts by such authors that were written in English or German and translated into English.

By using texts by Jewish authors that are ubiquitous for American audiences and inform their knowledge of the Holocaust, like Anne Frank’s diary and Elie Wiesel’s memoir, I consider the implications of these texts as authoritative sources about the Holocaust for us. Both Frank

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9 The increasing appearance of discourses about the Holocaust in Germany, and to a lesser degree in Austria, means that discussion about this event is happening and continues to happen. The discussion in Germany, however, as in America, is not without its complications. For more on the evolution of Germany’s memorialization of the Holocaust see Caroline Wiedner’s book The Claims of Memory: Representations of the Holocaust in Contemporary Germany and France (1999). For more on national responses to the Holocaust from an Austrian and German perspective, see Pascale Bos’s book German-Jewish Literature in the Wake of the Holocaust: Grete Weil, Ruth Klüger, and the Politics of Address (2005).

10 Bos (2005) argues that the assimilation of Jews into German and Austrian society was strong in the decades leading up to the war. They had “an extensive history of living in Germany and Austria as independent, autonomous subjects,” and some post-Holocaust writing that “backshadows” German Jews so that “they can only be seen as victims, as people who did not have (or did not exert) agency” seems to want to erase that fact (9). Because German Jews were independent and autonomous in pre-war German society, the break in this relationship between Jews and Germans and Austrians that occurred with the Nazis was, thus, perceived as especially severe by these individuals.
and Wiesel appear prominently, for instance, in museums about the Holocaust in Washington D.C. and in Berlin, as I discuss in Chapter Four. Do they reinforce our constructed categories about this history in their repeated appearance? With this contrast, simplified categories of either Jewish or German are complicated for American audiences and engage audiences to complicate their historical notions of themselves as well. I suggest that these works found an audience (and thus, a publisher) because the historical and social contexts around the Holocaust have changed and continue to change in the United States. As more texts and perspectives come to light “our” knowledge broadens. History is continuously recontextualized. But we still rely on these ubiquitous texts as authoritative references. I theorize that genres of the Holocaust continue to evolve in response to changing contexts, audiences, and purposes, hybridizing in the quest to recontextualize history and prevent its foreclosure.

This call to action in performative memorialization, where audiences are asked to participate in the making of meaning with authors who bear witness, is also affected by the contexts surrounding the design of these texts. Diarists record their personal reaction to the history they witness. Memoirists reflect on and represent their personally witnessed history. Both genres are concerned with providing history and providing perspectives, and the presence of performative language (which I will discuss in the following sections) and multiple subjectivities reflects this. As these texts evolve, these personalized histories appear within larger histories (museums) and increasingly contest “history” and “memory” as stable terms (hybrids). The later texts also contain increasingly performative aspects and dialogue with earlier texts, as well as with audiences in the present and the future. This kind of dialogic builds the chain of communication of Holocaust discourses over time that I will discuss more fully later in this chapter.
My interdisciplinary and multimodal theory of performative memorialization gives us the tools to see how discourse creates action. The survivors and second generation survivors who articulate their experiences for audiences bear witness to the event. But non-survivors must become listeners and bear witness to these survivors’ stories in order for communication to occur. According to Genre theorists Aviva Freedman and Peter Medway, for an utterance to be comprehended as action, the context must be understood as “participants” understand it (6). The theory I outline below is applied to an isolated community of writers of Holocaust discourses to discover this context for Holocaust survivors, but it could be applied to other communities of writers writing about shared, traumatic events as well. In addition, the theories in this dissertation apply to student writing because of the focus on how the process of writing creates action and the way in which writers have a responsibility to witness and take action in the world.

1.2 The Elements of Performative Memorialization

According to Sociolinguist James Gee, rhetorical analysis must have a point; namely, it should explain how and why language works the way it does when put into action, and it should contribute to important issues in a particular field (An Introduction 8). He posits that language is action and affiliation (1). This dissertation contributes to the knowledge of how and why writing and discourse create social action by examining an isolated discourse community of writers. Much like Gee introduces “one approach [. . .] to the analysis of language as it is used to enact activities, perspectives, and identities,” this dissertation uses one approach, performative memorialization, to analyze how memory is translated into a discourse that enacts activities, perspectives, and identities that bear witness (4). Gee calls the building blocks of a research

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11 Utterances as related to speech acts will be explicated in the subsequent section.
method the “tools of inquiry” (5). Performative memorialization serves as this tool and aims to describe and explain what is important in Holocaust discourses to describe how they create action. Methods are “social and communal through and through” and method and theory cannot be separated (5-6); therefore, my theory and my method shall appear within the same chapter.

When using any method to analyze language, terms need to be defined. In analyzing the texts produced by one discourse community as I outlined above, the term “Holocaust discourses” shall be used to delineate texts by Jewish Holocaust survivors and second-generation survivors. “Discourse” shall be used in the sense of Kress and Leeuwen’s notion of discourse as “socially constructed knowledges of (some aspect of) reality. By socially constructed [they] mean that [these knowledges] have been developed in specific social contexts, and in ways which are appropriate to the interests of social actors in these contexts” (4). In other words, what performative memorialization provides is a multimodal tool to discover how we make layers of meaning to create action in the world. Since this dissertation is concerned with how Holocaust texts have continued to engage particularly with audiences over time, explaining performative memorialization as a multimodal concept is helpful because multimodality explains how students learn from various modes, including writing.

Performative memorialization explains how this meaning-making activity by authors and audiences of Holocaust discourses creates action. As I stated in my Introduction, writing that

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12 Discourse analyst Barbara Johnstone calls these tools a “heuristic for analysis,” which involve the clear demarcation of research questions based within these contextual concerns in order to perform thorough and informed discourse analysis. Although no study can be objective, such a heuristic helps ensure that the analyst does not simply find what “she plans to find out” when examining language–in-use (27).


14 Gee’s idea of “discourse” (little d) and “Discourse” (big D) could also apply here (7). Little discourse is “language-in-use” which is used to “enact activities and identities. Big Discourse refers to non-language ‘stuff’” where Discourse involves many Discourses, “which influence each other in positive and negative ways, and which sometimes breed with each other to create new hybrids” (7).
creates social action is an important aspect of the field of Rhetoric and Composition. Within the field of Rhetoric and Composition this action can result from interaction with multimodal forms. Performative memorialization theorizes not only that these forms exist as different genres (or modes) of Holocaust discourses that communicate over time, but also that these modes communicate in particular ways that can be explicated in the analysis of specific texts through the multi-focused lens of genre, gender, and performativity—disciplines which all include some aspect of social action—the focus of this dissertation. But it must be noted as well that performative memorialization, although it theorizes all these aspects, because it is a multimodal semiotic principle, it is applied differently to different discourses. Performative memorialization is, thus, employed differently in each of the chapters in this dissertation and each genre examined in this dissertation demonstrates a progressive stage of this theory.

1.3 Genre as Social Action

The theory of performative memorialization reveals how discourses of the Holocaust are an example of writing that does something. The theory of genre as social action is the first theoretical lens of performative memorialization that I will explicate in order to analyze this series of multimodal texts and practices and their interaction with contexts and audiences. This dissertation bases its discussion of genre as social action on Genre theorist Carolyn Miller’s groundbreaking concept of genre as a form that responds to recurring social processes and departs from it with the additional focus on the act and process of writing genre. Performative memorialization, utilizing the idea that genre creates social action, theorizes that understanding how one discourse community utilizes genre—as one aspect of how they represent experience—creates knowledge that can be applied to understand other communities representing traumatic experience. The authors I examine in this dissertation utilize various genres to write about the
Holocaust, but in this process of writing about trauma, they also blur the boundaries of those genres. Further, these authors blur the boundaries of the public and private realms of diary and memoir (Chapters Two and Three) or of content and multiple genres in museums and hybrids (Chapters Four and Five). This dissertation posits that the presence of multiple genres and voices within texts creates movement that opens spaces for reader response. Hybridity in these texts is performative—that is, blurring boundaries (to different degrees in each text) creates a unique writer/audience relationship that creates action. Writers and readers of Holocaust discourses create action in the act of this meaning-making process.

Our recent understanding about genre comes from theorists as disparate as M.A.K. Halliday, John Swales, Jacques Derrida, James Moffett, Tzvetan Todorov, Charles Bazerman, Carolyn Miller, Charles Cooper, and M. M. Bakhtin. Cooper defines “genres” as “types of writing produced every day in our culture, types of writing that make possible certain kinds of learning and social interaction” (293). Although I claim that the genres in this dissertation do create certain kinds of learning, because Holocaust is writing about a specific trauma, it is not produced everyday. This dissertation relies on the genre theories of primarily Miller, Moffett, Amy Devitt, Bazerman, Aviva Freedman, and Peter Medway, to expand Miller’s original theory of genre as social action and to explain how specific action from a specific discourse community writing about the Holocaust responds to, and constructs meaning through, a unique dialogic of author, audience, content, process, and context.

And this is not necessarily a conscious activity but one that can be seen variously as we analyze these texts. See the next section of this Chapter for my discussion of the “performative.”

See Swales in Genre Analysis for more on genre and discourse communities.

I utilize Bakhtin’s discussion of speech genres and the dialogic to discuss audience later in this section in “Performance as Social Action.” I utilize Moffett as way to discuss the “continua of subject matter and writer-reader relations” in this section as well. I find his schema based on “the immediacy or remoteness of subject matter and the intimacy or distance between writer and readers between the subject” helpful in explaining how survivors of the Holocaust perform writing that interacts with readers (Cooper 306, 305).
Miller claims that rhetorical genres have often been understood as “similar in form or strategy, situations, or audiences,” but there are subtle differences that problematize this definition. Despite the tendency of genre criticism toward “reductionism, rules, and formalism,” Miller argues that “classification is necessary to language and learning” and thus, she sought a “rhetorically sound” definition of genre that incorporated the “social and historical aspects of rhetoric” that others did not (151). According to Miller, action includes both substance and form. When particular outcomes in specific situations result from substance and form, genre “becomes pragmatic, fully rhetorical, a point of connection between intention and effect, and an aspect of social action (153). The substance and form that Miller discusses are redefined in this dissertation as process and content. For discourses of the Holocaust, it is not only the form that is important, but the process of creating that form, and how this process interacts with the content to create a dialogic of history and memory, bringing audiences actively into the meaning-making process.

Through the application of performative memorialization, we can see how newer Holocaust discourses engage with texts that preceded them in the chain of communication to respond to what audiences might already “know.” These texts create action as a result of the continuous meaning making activity of interpretation performed by audiences. In other words, the dialogic of history and memory created in the interaction of Holocaust discourses with audiences is based upon the action that results from the construction of representation. The rhetorical situation is an important element of this construction of representation. As Miller

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19 For this formulation, Miller used the accepted theories of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson.
20 This is different than Frye’s radical present with schematic rhetorical situations, and different than Black’s rhetorical transaction which emphasized audience effects (Miller 153).
21 Amy Devitt agrees with this notion of intertextual communication stating that writers’ responses are necessarily guided by past responses and to recurring situations: “Genre, thus, depends heavily on the intertextuality of discourse” (576). Bazerman also posits intertextuality as an important aspect of genre (2004).
22 Miller claims that the “center of [human] action is a process of interpretation” (156).
theorizes, “if genre represents action, it involves situation and motive” (152). Situations are “social constructs” according to Miller, and “knowledge is useful only insofar as it can be brought to bear upon new experience: the new is made familiar through the recognition of relevant similarities,” which become new “types” (156-7). In Holocaust discourses, new “types” are created from the interaction between process and content. Knowledge about the Holocaust is brought into the present by “types” that make themselves relevant by becoming “familiar” to audiences. I theorize that history can be “recontextualized” in the present, in part, through these new types.

Such audience response to genres and to situational contexts is an interaction that is reciprocal and dynamic according to genre theorist Amy Devitt. Devitt agrees with Miller that because genre responds to and constructs situations, it is action (578). Thus, the writer “who shifts genre in the middle of a text causes confusion for the reader” because the writer’s purpose and the reader’s role are not clear from the situation as it is presented (578). Bazerman also claims that “any missing or weakly instantiated feature of the genre may weaken the generic force” (“Systems” 89). While both Devitt and Bazerman claim that shifts in genre can cause misunderstandings for audiences, this dissertation claims that the audience’s confusion with regard to Holocaust genres is actually productive. As I will shortly demonstrate, the gaps created from shifts in genre or multiple genres, as well as shifts in subjectivity, modes, and perspectives, create action by opening up a space for audience response. When the audience understands the genres used by one discourse community, they can better understand that discourse community’s

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23 Situation and motive are Kenneth Burke’s terms (152). Using Kohrs and Jamieson again, Miller adds that the character of rhetorical “response” to “situational” demands is equal to a fusion of “substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics” (152). This aspect reflects Bitzer’s definition of the rhetorical situation as a “complex of persons, events, objects, and relations” to reveal an “exigence” that can be allayed through mediation of discourse” (152). Miller claims that Bitzer pointed the way to genre study by stating that similar situations occur, prompting similar responses (152). She reconceptualizes Burke and Bitzer’s rhetorical situation.
communication (582). The meaning making process should be seen then as not only interpretative, but also interactive.

This interaction between writer and reader and subject led Moffett to classify genres in *Teaching the Universe of Discourse* (1968) and later reclassify these genres in his work with Cooper (1996). De facto genres can be combined as Cooper notes in redefining Moffett’s classifications, for instance when he claims that “book-length autobiographies are multigeneric or multiepisodic, necessarily so, because they are conceived and written episodically” (Cooper 307). The kinds of emphases on historical and social contexts that characterize recent discussions of genre affirm the “fluid and dynamic character of genre” and the fact that genre evolves (Freedman and Medway 3). JoAnne Yates and Bazerman traced shifts in genre in response to changes in business management or scientific knowledge (1988, 1989). Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has discussed “blurred genres” (1983). According to Freedman and Medway, such theories make genre classification systems irrelevant. But what these theorists do not note is the schema Moffett uses to classify “de facto” genres as moving from private to public writing (126-140). Moffett’s schema, first theorized in 1968 and reworked in 1986 in collaboration with Cooper, discusses a “continua of subject matter and writer-reader relations” with a schema based on “the immediacy or remoteness of subject matter and the intimacy or distance between writers and readers between the subject” (Cooper 305-6). Bazerman’s concept of “systems of genre” is also helpful to understand the progression of genre. Bazerman sees these systems of genre as “interrelated genres that interact with each other in specific settings” and the genres that follow are limited “because the success conditions of the actions of each require various states of affairs

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24 Moffett later reclassifies “de facto genres in order to emphasize ‘how kinds of writing correspond to kinds of thinking’: notation (taking down), recollection (looking back), investigation (looking into), imagination (thinking up), and cognition (thinking over and thinking through),” which align loosely with his earlier delineations (Cooper 306).
to exist,” but if these subsequent genres are successful, they “will have consequences for other genres and speech acts to follow” (“Systems” 98).

Part of my theory of performative memorialization is that genres of the Holocaust are a unique chain of communication, progressing from the private communication realm to the public, and that genres interact with each other along this chain, similar to how Bazerman sees systems of genres functioning. In addition, performative memorialization sees genres of the Holocaust as multimodal forms that expand discourse and design into the strata of production and distribution to embody various communicative practices within “typified communicative circumstances” to create “meaningful social performance” in which the meanings made are multiple and layered (“Textual” 384). Moffett, in locating kinds of discourse as genres that have varying, communicative purposes that move from private to public, predicts the multimodal concepts of discourse, design, production, and distribution. His schema is the forerunner to aspects of multimodality in performative memorialization, evident in the evolution of progressively blurred genres of Holocaust discourses that become increasingly public and audience-oriented.

The genres of Holocaust discourse display this genre blurring, evolving from diary and memoir to museums and finally into the extremely hybridized forms like Maus and Still Alive which I examine in Chapter Five. It is not as if the blurring of genres is new, as Clifford Geertz notes, but their increasing presence suggests “an alteration of the principles of mapping. Something is happening to the way we think about the way we think” (“Blurred” 20). The blurring of genres that I observe in Holocaust discourses is thus, not confusing as Devitt claims, nor does it prevent these authors from achieving their ends as Bazerman claims (“Systems” 98), but is, in fact, evidence that “how we think about how we think” about the Holocaust evolves.
Because such complex, hybridic texts are produced suggests, either implicitly (diaries and memoirs) or explicitly (museums and hybrids), that multi-generic texts and hybrids perform writing. When I say that performative memorialization is an activity that “performs” in every Holocaust genre, this means that each Holocaust genre that I examine exhibits some characteristics of hybridization, which not only creates movement in the texts to highlight the process of genre construction, but is also performative. Using performative memorialization as my multimodal framework means that it will be applied differently to different texts. I apply it in Chapters Two through Five to a series of Holocaust genres to argue that hybrid genres are inherently performative, and as a result, that Holocaust discourses embody “writing that does something” as forms of communication that create action in the world.

With this in mind, what I suggest in this dissertation is that new definitions of genre can be applied to discourses of the Holocaust. Theorists such as Miller (1984) and Freedman (1994) have defined genre as a constructed form that responds to recurring social situations. This kind of descriptive way to delineate genre moves away from previously prescriptive definitions (Freedman 3). Because of the social contexts that surround the act of bearing witness, representing the traumatic memory of the Holocaust as discourse creates unique, hybridic genres. I agree with genre theorists who have noted the tendency of genres to blur over time. Where I depart from this theory is in its application to Holocaust discourses to argue for this blurring and hybridization as a way to create action. The hybridity of these texts creates movement and draws audiences’ attention to the construction of genre. But this is only one aspect of performative memorialization. These movements in genre interact with constructions of gender, the second theoretical lens of performative memorialization, to bring audiences’ attention to and participation in these constructions to create writing as action.
1.4 Gender as Social Action

As with genre, there are aspects of gender studies that also focus on social action. Much like genre construction is the result of social processes, so too is gender the result of social processes and constructions (Butler 1990, 2004). Representations of gender depend upon language, and when a “rhetorical act is transcribed and printed, it becomes an artifact” (Foss 7). Memory is mutable and when it is transcribed as an artifact, it is also, inevitably, constructed. Such constructions are based in language, which according to Judith Butler, Sara Mills, Margaret Gibbons, and Julia Kristeva, is always gendered. Memories of the Holocaust are also mutable and inevitably constructed in the process of becoming an artifact.

Both the modes and practices which constitute the layered meaning-making activities that are involved in the construction of such artifacts of memory must be considered in order to understand how it is possible to apply performative memorialization to Holocaust discourses as a multimodal theory. Kress and Leeuwen’s multimodal communicative practices can be defined in Gender Studies as “discursive practices” that rely on the post-structuralist positioning theory of Wetherell and Edley (1998) (Weatherall 143). When we consider gender as a discursive practice, therefore, we can view individuals “as ‘positioned’ as masculine or feminine within gender discourses” (143). Positioning, in terms of gender and discourse, does not reveal the author so much as it reveals the social contexts surrounding the production of their discourse. This is an important distinction to understand what I mean by “gendered moments” in the following analysis chapters of Holocaust discourses. In applying the “social constructionist perspective” to Laura Hillman’s text in Chapter Three for instance, “language and discourse are the meaning systems that produce (rather than reflect) gender as an important and salient social category” (85). This view also sees gender “as an ideological-symbolic aspect of language and talk that
potentially constitutes identity” (85), which I argue is an important aspect to the construction of Holocaust representations of memory. Many of the authors I examine in this dissertation reveal gendered moments as important to the construction of their identity. These constructions of gender, much like constructions of genre, constitute another specific, multimodal communicative practice.

The term “practice” can also be ethnomethodological, much like Carolyn Miller has theorized genre to be, in which the “practice” of gender “consists of the routine, ongoing activities of everyday social interaction that accomplish [it]” (Weatherall 143). Gender is thus, like genre, something not inherently present, but something that is constructed and reconstructed. Similar to how the movement of multiple or blurred genres create gaps by upsetting readers’ generic expectations, constructions of gender create movement and gaps for audience participation and response.

Because of their tendency toward movement, these discursive constructions of gendered identity are, much like hybrid genres, active (in a performative sense, as I will discuss in the next section). According to the theories of Foucault, subjectivity is a product of discourse:

[a] sense of self emerges not from an inner core but out of a complex of historical, cultural, and political processes and practices. Identities are ascribed through positions in discourses. Individuals are seen to be located in and opting for a variety of different positions depending on the social, historical, political, and economic aspects of their situations. [emphasis added] (Weatherall 142)

Thus, gender has no fixed meaning – rather gender is a social process—created and renegotiated through social structures (which can be rather fixed). Although Feminist Autobiography theorist Estelle Jelinek has said that men write in a “self-aggrandizing” style and women in a “self-effacing” style, Holocaust scholar Catherin Bernard claims “that there is a great difference between being a self-aggrandizing male voice and utilizing that voice” (16). Gender and
Performance theorist Judith Butler would agree that gender is not a being but a “doing” (*Undoing 1*).25 This project agrees with Bernard and goes further to rely on Butler and Foucault to emphasize that “doing” gender and creating subjectivity are activities continually constructed in the process of discourse. Bernard claims that looking at women and the Holocaust, like feminist autobiography, can reveal the “masculine bias and introduce[ing] the particularities of the feminine survival experience” (16). Susan Groag Bell and Marilyn Yalom claim that gender is less present in masculine texts because of assumption of the masculine as universal (16). In contrast, this project seeks to depart from these positions to theorize that “gendered moments” occur in the texts of both women and men writing about the Holocaust.

In order to properly examine these discursive constructions of gender, we must understand how memories of women/men have been reframed and reshaped and understand not only the meanings assigned to the “voice” of masculinity and femininity, but the meaning of these voices in terms of public and private spheres. Public and private spheres change over time – as do the way men and women position themselves within these spheres according to Gender theorist Selma Leydesdorff (9). I seek to locate these gendered moments of positioning to show how some authors construct gendered identities that engage audiences and how some later authors are more aware of these constructions (and their effect on audiences) than those who preceded them. The authors I examine in this dissertation produce gendered identities, as well as the shifting, performative subjectivities I discuss below, through the process of the writing act.

As I have suggested about the evolution of Holocaust discourses in genre with its increasing

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25 Catherine Bernard quotes Holocaust scholar Marlene Heinemann as noting that: “‘No one has explored whether women and men write the same or differently about other camp inmates when they write their Holocaust memoirs,’” and suggests that “women’s Holocaust memoirs would pose interesting challenges to feminist analyses of narrativity.” Where Jelinek claims differences in the way women and men write, “Heinemann observes a tone of heroism and self-aggrandizement in the Holocaust narratives of both men and women, through especially the small gestures of resistance to deny apathy and complicity” (16).
hybridity and self-reflexivity, to alert audiences to constructions of gender also causes breaks in the process of discourse (or the chronology of narrative) for audiences. In the gap created by these breaks, as I shall exhibit, audiences can create and negotiate gender identities in and through this writing act in response.

Gendered discourses of the Holocaust, much as I explained with genre, also evolve in their representations. Because life writing is so clearly linked to the personal experience of history, we see, for instance, gender constructions most clearly in diaries and memoirs (Chapters Two, Three, and Five) and gender becomes more visible. In contrast, gender construction is less clear in museums (Chapter Four), where representations attempt to show many lives within a larger historical framework. The unique and complex person clearly seen in autobiography (memoir) is less complex and less visible in a museum space. In a museum space, gender, though seemingly more visible through the multiple visual modes of photographs and video, is presented in ways that are less complicated than in the texts. Gendered moments are fewer, but certainly present, in museums where narratives seek generalized cohesion despite the various perspectives. By using the lens of gender in performative memorialization, this dissertation focuses on the gendered moments that appear in some of these discourses. These gendered moments reveal the multimodal practices of gender construction that, along with genre construction, bring audiences actively into the process of the writing act. Gendered moments also reveal shifting subjectivities, language, and movements in time that are performative to bring audiences actively into the content of the writing act—the social act of process and content working in concert.

1.5 Performance as Social Action

As with the first two sections on genre and gender, the idea of social action is an important element of performance theory, the third theoretical lens through which performative
memorialization is applied. In discussing the interdependence of orality and literature in collective memory, Performance theorist Joseph Roach delineates theater and spectatorship from performance. Performance includes a wide range of behaviors and “what Michel de Certeau calls ‘the practice of everyday life,’ in which the role of spectator expands into that of participant” (46). This practice of spectator becoming participant has expanded “into an open-ended category marked ‘performative’” and a theory of the performative that is “a cultural factor, critical paradigm, and political intervention” (46). Performance theorist Della Pollock references Marianna Torgovnick when she claims that, “writing that takes up the performativity in language is meant to make a difference” (95). Genres of the Holocaust memorialize by bearing witness, and through this bearing witness they “seek to make a difference.” As the use of the term “performative” in the term “performative memorialization” suggests, this dissertation argues that these genres of the Holocaust, as an evolving chain of communication, are a unique form of memorialization that is not only ongoing, but a “cultural factor, a critical paradigm, and a political intervention” (Roach 46). The element of the performative as social action, together with genre and gender, extends this memorialization activity beyond the social process of composing and construction to active intervention. As I stated in the Introduction, writing as action comes as a result of voicing and negotiating positions and values—and taking responsibility for those voices and positions in the world. Composition is creation and performance: composing identity, composing culture, composing change, composing action. This dissertation argues, therefore, that performance is intimately related to Rhetoric and Composition in the way that each allows a negotiation of positions and leads to active participation in a process. Further, this dissertation argues that through the multimodal theory of
performative memorialization, the interaction of genre and gender in Holocaust discourses and the performative quality of language create social action—writing that does something.

Performance theorist Richard Schechner describes Performance Studies, as a field, as “intergeneric, interdisciplinary, intercultural—and therefore inherently unstable [. . .] it is inherently ‘in between’” (360). Performance Studies addresses what he calls a “postcolonial world where cultures are colliding, interfering with each other and energetically hybridizing” and exists as an “unfinished, open, multivocal, and self-contradictory” field (360-1). Considered in this way, the Holocaust discourses I examine exhibit similarly undefined parameters, especially as they evolve. But while they may be unfinished and open, they are less self-contradictory as a whole because their purpose (to bear witness) remains constant. Schechner notes further that, “while any event, action, item, or behavior may be examined ‘as’ performance, the performative engages performance in places and situations not traditionally marked as ‘performing arts’ [emphasis added]” (361-2). Thus, it is additionally appropriate to apply the notion of the performative to Holocaust discourses.

Discussing Holocaust texts within the framework of performative memorialization requires an explanation of the “performative” as it will be applied specifically in this dissertation in terms of textual elements and audience. The temporal jumps or fragmented narratives typical of postmodern writing in a “post-colonial world” do not allow the reader to simply absorb information. Readers must engage with texts in order to understand them. To call the reader into the story is to elicit an active rather than a passive participation. Performance theorists such as Della Pollock, Henry Sayre, and Judith Butler have called the techniques writers use to engage audience “performative.” I claim that these Holocaust discourses performatively engage readers to respond.
The idea of particularized audience response is not new to the field of Holocaust Studies. Many scholars have described how readers subjectively re-experience the suffering of the Holocaust at an emotional level. Holocaust scholars Marianne Hirsch and Dominick LaCapra have noted aspects of working through Holocaust trauma in this way, where an emotional response can be productive. Hirsch uses the term “postmemory” to discuss the re-lived trauma experienced by children of survivors (also called second generation survivors): the experiences of their parents “are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right” (219). LaCapra’s primary discussion involves historians’ deep reactions to studies in trauma. He notes that “being responsive to the traumatic experience of others [. . .] implies not the appropriation of their experience but what I would call empathetic unsettlement” (Writing History 41). Feminist film theorist Kaja Silverman terms such response “heteropathic identification” in which the response is not simply a sympathetic pity but “comes with respect for the other and the realization that the experience of the other is not one’s own” (qtd. in LaCapra 40). In each of these cases, such response is not limited to children of survivors or historians but can be applied, as Hirsh notes, to any reader. Readers of performative Holocaust texts, as I define the texts I examine in this dissertation, on the other hand, can move beyond this kind of identification or emotional response as a passive spectator to become an active participant bearing witness to the authors’ process of bearing witness.

Although “performative” writing cannot be defined according to Schechner, despite the descriptions above, it can be mapped. Performance theorist Della Pollock establishes several qualities that can “map directions/directives for performative writing without foreclosing” and in this way it both “yield[s] entry into the discourses of performative writing” and reveals “its own

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26 Identification, as Cultural feminist theorist Jean Wyatt notes, can also be partial to avoid what Deborah McDowell calls “cultural essentialism” which creates a tendency to see the person who is a subject rather as an object or an “other” (“Hazards” 105).
insufficiencies and instabilities” (79-80). Pollock identifies “writing as doing” where the meaning in writing becomes less important than the meaning inherent in the “continuous/dis/continuous act of writing.” Performative writing is thus, “a way of describing what good writing does” (75). Postmodern conceptions of text and the performative emphasize subversion and transgression through language play and new constructions of language (Patraka Spectacular 7). Indeed, Pollock stresses the need to eliminate references to the “old world” to write “into a new one,” much as Butler suggests creating new realities (Pollock 75). In addition to these qualities Holocaust scholar Vivian M. Patraka has made clear that delineating the performative in relation to Holocaust texts requires particular attention to history. This additional quality is not present in most definitions of the performative.

For Holocaust texts, writing history and references to the old world are intimately connected to the act of writing itself. According to Judith Butler’s notion of the performative, what is “reiterative and performative [it] constitutes a reality that is in some sense new” (Patraka Spectacular 6). To say this reality is “recontextualized” and “displaced” rather than made new indicates a better sense of the movement that I claim is present in all the genres I examine to different degrees because of performative elements (Hirsch “Surviving” 218). Patraka accounts for the “real” that is the history of the Holocaust (absent from Butler’s definition) by redefining Elin Diamond’s sense of performance and the performative in a Holocaust performative as the “doing” and “the thing gone” (7). In this dissertation I define performative Holocaust writing as “writing as doing” and as the meaning made about the Holocaust (the thing gone) through a dialogic.

This dissertation additionally expands Pollock’s qualities of the performative by drawing attention to the importance of content in the process of making meaning. Although Pollock sees

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27 Hirsch discusses this “recontextualization” in “Surviving Images” in reference only to Maus.
good writing as writing that does something, her space of performative textuality privileges that process over content. For the performative to work in Holocaust discourses, process depends precisely on content. Recontextualizing Holocaust memory for a new generation requires constant reference to what has come before (content as historical fact) in addition to forms that challenge boundaries through the process of their production. Hirsch claims that a certain level of desensitization can occur, especially in the presence of hordes of violent images that bombard and interpellate the modern subject daily. In actuality, Hirsch argues, if this repetition is displaced and recontextualized (by post memorial authors such as Spiegelman) it can become a “mostly helpful vehicle of working through a traumatic past” for the author and his/her audience (218). When Adrian Dannatt, who has written on architecture and the United States Holocaust Museum, says there can be too little and too much remembrance and memorialization, he reframes recontextualized history to say: “In the contemplation of the death camps, we must be strangers; and if we are not strangers, if the names of the killers and the places of the killing and the numbers of the killed fall easily from our tongues, then we are not remembering to remember, but remembering to forget” (qtd. in Ellsworth 15). To simply say reality is made new because of performative language would be a mistaken proposition. But to performatively recontextualize history, to become “strangers” again to this event, is increasingly important to authors, not only as “working though” traumatic events, but as a way to create action in audiences.

I utilize several of Pollock’s terms to map directions in performative Holocaust writing without necessarily foreclosing the ways in which we can see this performative writing. For Pollock, several aspects of the performative must be at work for writing to perform action,
including the evocative, the subjective, and the citational. Evocative performative writing “operates metaphorically to render absence present” by connecting the reader to what is other (not present) in the text “by re-marking” it (Pollock 80). It does not aim to report about a “verifiable event” but strives to “create what is self-evidently a version of what was” (80). In reference to the Holocaust, this indicates marking the representation of the Holocaust as a representation: real events and absences that cannot be recovered. But the evocative in performative Holocaust writing does aim to report (to some degree) on a verifiable event.

Subjective performative writing does not refer to conventional mirror-reflections of autobiography as a “coherent self across time,” but rather as a “contiguous [. . .] relation between the writer and his/her subject(s), subject-selves, and/or reader(s)” (86). It is not simply the self in plural that is performative, but the movement forward and between selves to form multiple perspectives and relations. Citational performative writing is writing that is “rewriting, as the repetition of given discursive forms” to reveal “the fragility of identity, history, and culture constituted in rites of textual recurrence.” Because identity cannot escape its construction, performative elements can exert “counterpressure” where the repetition is a “repetition with a difference” (92). Repetitive elements in performative Holocaust writing exert counterpressure precisely through the process of their recontextualization.

Much as Patraka reconceives Butler’s notion of the performative to account for history, I necessarily redefine the parameters surrounding Pollock’s aspects of performative writing. First, although Holocaust texts exhibit these performative aspects, Pollock’s writing as “doing” should

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28 While I locate specific places where the evocative, subjective, and citational appear in these discourses in this dissertation, it should be noted that these discourses are, in general, performatively consequential as well. In other words, Holocaust discourses exhibit consequential writing that “subsumes the constative into the performative, articulating language generally as an operational means of action and effects” (95). Pollock references J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962).

29 Pollock cites Homi Bhabha in The Location of Culture as part this explanation of the citational.
not overshadow the meaning of writing—it is not a process over content issue when discussing Holocaust discourses. Process and content exist in collaborative strength; the tensions of these two aspects work in concert equally. This tension—the movement I argue is present in these Holocaust discourses in hybridity, gender construction, performativity, and dialogic elements—creates the action of Holocaust texts.

The texts I examine in this dissertation all display elements of performative writing. In Chapters Two and Three, the diaries and memoirs I have chosen reveal performative subjectivity and citation. In Chapters Four and Five the museums and hybrids I have chosen reveal performative subjectivity, citation, and evocation. While the examination of these texts through the lens of genre revealed the process of textual production, the use of performative subjectivity, citation, and evocation highlight content. Thus, genre, gender, and the performative work together to reveal the process and content of memorialization—how these texts perform a dialogic of history and memory through the meaning-making process of writing.

1.6 Audience as Social Action

Sometimes I am asked if I know ‘the response to Auschwitz’; I answer that not only do I not know it, but that I don’t even know if a tragedy of this magnitude has a response. What I do know is that there is “response” in responsibility. When we speak of this era of evil and darkness, so close and yet so distant, “responsibility” is the key word. Elie Wiesel

Audience, as the fourth and final aspect of performative memorialization, is the link that ties the above elements together as social action. Genre, gender, and the performative rely on audiences to generate the social aspect of the dialogic of history and memory. I described how these three elements create movement in my discussion above and also claimed that audiences respond to the spaces opened by these movements. This section will describe the process of how audiences respond in these spaces and how this is an active process. As I noted above, engaging
with texts on an emotional level does not necessarily elicit active response. Bearing witness to and participating in these authors’ process of bearing witness, however, can produce action.

According to Performance theorist Erin Striff, performances succeed when they draw in the crowds. In spaces like museums, which have thousands of visitors every year, a “crowd” is quantifiable on a daily basis. But any performance including text, visuals, and space is “deeply concerned with audience response and participation” and desires that response move from a “passive decoding” to praxis: “a context in which meanings are not so much communicated as created, questioned, and negotiated” (8). In terms of Holocaust discourses and how memorialization is performative, the audience is integral in discovering how meaning can be made from any discourse. The experience—of reading, of seeing, of doing—creates the meaning, in addition to the passive reception of personal stories and historical materials. Content engages with process to make what is theoretical, practical and applicable. To apply performative memorialization to Holocaust discourses allows authors, audiences, discourses, and contexts to create a dialogic of history and memory to create action.

This dissertation argues that Holocaust discourses, texts composed by survivors or second or second generation survivors, comprise a series of related discourses along a chain of communication that demands that interpreters (readers) bear witness to the event. But what this dissertation also argues is that, in fact, what audiences more accurately bear witness to is both the content of this history and the process of representing this event as the memory of experience. This is the dialogic of history and memory, and an examination of how these techniques have evolved and will evolve over time is an integral part of this ongoing process. The dialogic of history and memory does not become closed or less important as time passes. Rather, the responsibility to continue to open this dialogic becomes greater, not only to examine the
discourses but also the changes occurring within them and how this can interact with audiences to create action.

This conception of audiences as knowing and responding to history through an engagement with Holocaust discourses is, thus, another aspect of the social action of performative memorialization. Patraka has noted that the Holocaust performative has a built in “accountability” where play is limited (8). Audiences are accountable to know history as they respond to representations of Holocaust memory. I argue in this dissertation that the movement created by constructions of genre and hybridity, constructions of gender and subjectivity, and performative language engages the author, the subject, and history in a dialogic in which audience engagement is crucial for this communication occur. The idea of audience as integral to communication is something linguist M.M. Bakhtin discusses in his theories of speech genres. As I outlined in my Introduction, multimodality depends on both articulations (authors) and interpretations (audiences) for communication to occur as well. Utilizing Bakhtin’s and Kress’s notion that audiences are necessary for communication to occur, I argue that in performative memorialization responsive, active audiences are necessary for the communication of performative Holocaust memorialization to occur.

The concept of audience in performative memorialization specifically employs Bakhtin’s discussion of the importance of audience manifestation in speech genres. Bakhtin refers to the communication between speaker and audience as a “responsive understanding,” which is integral in attaining a “finalized wholeness of the utterance” (“The Problem” 76). For “responsive understanding” to occur for a particularized audience requires a level of participation I claim is

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30 According to Patraka, the two positions “(of reverentiality and play) comment upon each other: it is postmodernism that sees the deadness of that reverential gesture toward the Holocaust, but it is the Holocaust (and its goneness) that marks the point at which discursive play becomes a screen to keep the dead at a distance” (Spectacular 8).
elicited by the author and her/his subject through the movement of constructions of genre and gender and performative language and subjectivity to create action. Through these actions, authors bring audiences’ awareness to the construction of the text as a process with gaps that act as performative destabilizations. The reader is required to translate the competing messages of process (genre, gender, and subjectivity) and content (history and memory as citational and evocative, as well as multiple and fluid) in order to make meaning of the text. In the act of making meaning, in response to the act of writing, the author, subject, text, and audience perform a complex dialogic of interaction I call the dialogic of history and memory.

This dialogic of history and memory is the whole communication that can occur as audiences negotiate the movements and gaps I argue are present in these Holocaust texts. Bakhtin’s “responsive understanding” – in speech or in writing— involves “dialogic overtones” that reflect conversational speech. A speaker, regardless of whether in conversation or in a novel, cannot speak into a void. Every utterance depends upon what came before it and what will come after it (91). These types of stable utterances, or “speech genres,” exist along a chain communication that exists on a continuum of time (60). In Bakhtin’s terms, communication—oral or written—does not exist merely between and for two people. He proposes his dialogic as a quadrant of communicating participants. But Bakhtin’s responsive understanding is not a finished “whole.” It is rather, a moment along a continuum. Each utterance is a “link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances,” a chain that does not involve simply a speaker and a respondent communicating in sequential time (69). This chain of communication moves backwards and forwards and involves the speaker (author), the addressee (particular audiences), the object of discussion (history and text), and the superaddressee (the audience for whom

31 The gaps that I claim appear in these texts have been delineated alternately by Rhetoric and Holocaust scholars Michael Bernard–Donals and Richard Glejzer as “a series of breaks [. . .] in which the act of witnessing itself becomes apparent only at points of trauma” (Between 5).
responsive understanding is presumed) [emphases added] (xviii). The communication also evolves: the speaker is also, at times, a respondent, and the addressee often becomes a speaker.\(^{32}\) Holocaust discourses speak to each other, to audiences, and to the past, present, and future as a chain of related discourses.

Thus, much as genres can be responsive to recurring social situations, an utterance is a unit of speech that is individual “but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances” (60). According to Bakhtin: “Understanding can only be attained through a dialogue between speech subjects, where the wholeness of an utterance is determined by the complex relationship of a referentially semantic theme, authorial intent, and generic finalization” (76).\(^{33}\) The writer of any Holocaust text carries the weight of this history at all times. Thus, genre selection and individual utterance are original but also predetermined, to a certain extent, by what has come before. The individuality of utterances within them, however, still can be revealed and “more flexibly and precisely […] reflect the unrepeatable situation of communication” (80).

The utterances contained in Holocaust discourses create a chain of communication – between author and subject through memory, and event and audience through history. This is the dialogic of history and memory. Holocaust discourses converse not only within themselves but with other discourses of the Holocaust—not only retroactively but also in a forward motion—knowing that other texts necessarily must follow. That is, every utterance is related to another

\(^{32}\) Frank Farmer, in *Saying and Silence*, argues that “silence and word together constitute, for Bakhtin, a special logosphere, a unified and continuous structure of significance” and that responsive understanding can be a silent one, which Farmer claims “reinforces [Bakhtin’s] viewpoint (however undeveloped) that certain silences can assume the function and status of the utterance (4).

\(^{33}\) Similar to performative writing, the elements of Bakhtin’s diagram of a whole utterance: theme, plan, and genre, work in conjunction with one another. Semantic finalization in creative works is relative in that it does not expect to exhaust all themes; rather, it expects a certain degree of finalization within the parameters it has delineated. These parameters are delineated by the author. The author, or speaker, chooses the subject, its boundaries, and also the generic form that subject assumes. Such subjectivity, which I claim in Holocaust discourses is performative, is then applied to the choice of genre which is manipulated and individualized.
and the “experience of each individual is shaped and developed in continuous and constant interaction with others’ individual utterances” (89). This is true of utterances that came before, “authoritative utterances” which are “cited, imitated, or followed,” but also true of utterances that succeed them (88). I claim that the author of a Holocaust discourse is, therefore, in a dialogue with the object and all the responsive understandings that came before and will come after. The constructions of genre and gender and the performative aspect I claim are at work in these texts create utterances on a chain of communication, but they are utterances that continue to undergo constructions of meaning making by audiences who have an “accountability” to know history.

Holocaust texts produce movement through these activities to create gaps in representation between memory and history, process and content, and the written and the visual. Holocaust texts create a dialogic of history and memory by conversing in and through narrative, through evocation and citations, through generic hybridity and performative subjectivity, and these texts create the movement of multiple perspectives, families and other victims, and Holocaust imagery in a dialogic. The audience’s apprehension and understanding of these movements involves complex translation work in tracing the movement of layered representation in the past and the present and pinpointing history and memory along the chain of communication, and thus, elicits active engagement.

This active participation of the reader is especially important in texts of remembrance, as Hirsch and others have shown above. Pollock’s performative writing also includes distinct references to audience, but in Holocaust texts these aspects of audience are inadequate.

34 Holocaust and Rhetoric scholar Richard Glejzer has observed such a chain of communication in Maus (discussed here in Chapter Five) where the Lacanian “seeing” chain is retroactive, but even though the seeing is retroactive, it does not account for the speaker/respondent on this chain in the future (130).

35 Pollock discusses the ideas of performative writing as nervous and consequential. The nervous attends to the “contesting” of “social texts” to which one may be “indentured” (91). The consequential assumes “negotiation” where the reader becomes a “co-writer” of the text (95). In terms of the consequential, a co-writer could be considered similar to the reader being brought into the story as Hirsch has suggested. With regard to traumatic
Although several aspects of performative writing, as she defines it, do explicate some of the ways in which Holocaust discourses elicit performative memorialization, in terms of audience, the performative is inapplicable as a whole because Holocaust discourses are texts based in a factual, historical context. The audience does not simply co-write texts and respond to the “play” of language in order to recreate each text for themselves as I noted above. Cathy Caruth, a noted scholar on trauma, comes closer to melding the performative, the traumatic, and audience response. She has stated that writing cannot create an awakening in the author but can create a chain of communication in which awakening is created in the reader, from whom action and change can emanate (“Traumatic” 102-3).

It is my contention that the reason that Holocaust texts continue to appear in various forms that echo and build upon past forms is a direct response to audience and historical context. Words give memory a form, as Holocaust scholar David Patterson notes, because memory is about “meaning that is yet to be revealed,” memory is transformed when it becomes the word, it becomes “the opening of a horizon of time” (14). This horizon of time is the chain of communication where the past interacts with the present and the future. By creating multiple gaps for audience response and by providing multiple perspectives, Holocaust discourses resist expectations that what is narrated will repeat what has already been seen or told, but they also represent a related chain of discourse, a discourse that speaks not only to audiences but to other discourses on the chain as well. This is why it is crucial to look at these texts especially in relation to each other. To keep the memories of the Holocaust present for the generations that have followed, Holocaust texts have recontextualized the memories and histories of this event.
through increasingly multimodal representations that interact with audiences who bear witness to the event and the writing act.

The gaps that result from interruptions of constructions of genre, gender, and the performative, reveal a process which makes this traumatic moment available to the audience who listens. The act of witnessing by writers who write also applies to the audience who bears witness to this process and interprets these representations. This dissertation expands on this concept to apply Bakhtinian notions of responsive understanding. These authors, “relinquish the floor,” through constructions of genre, gender, and the performative, to allow for audiences’ responsive understanding (Bakhtin 71). The gaps in the texts open a space for audience response. Audiences also respond by taking the responsibility to bear witness to the process of survivors bearing witness to their experiences, and participate in a dialogic of history and memory and interpret multimodal layers of meaning from these representations to create action. The evolution of Holocaust texts reveals increasing evidence of performative memorialization that elicits higher levels of audience participation in the meaning-making process. This is the social action created by the texts and by audiences in a dialogic specific to Holocaust discourses. In order to enter into any discussion of Holocaust discourses and how performative memorialization functions in them, however, it is imperative to have some knowledge of the field of Holocaust Studies and some knowledge of the larger discourse community within which these authors write. The texts I examine in this dissertation belong to a very specific discourse community which has produced a large amount of discourse, upon which a large amount of scholarship is based. The following section situates the analysis I have outlined above within this larger field in order to explicate the progression and production of Holocaust discourses as multimodal modes and communicative practices that create action.
1.7 Performative Memorialization: Locations in the Discourse Community of Holocaust Discourses

As I have outlined above in terms of audience, this dissertation claims that within Holocaust discourses, there is a special chain of communication between the author, other Holocaust discourses, the event, and the audience. My scholarly interest in applying performative memorialization to a discourse community writing about the Holocaust is a desire to explore how these memories are represented in various forms of discourse and how such discourses are recontextualized with each new generation. What was contextualized historically for one generation is not necessarily contextualized in the same way for the next. As the generations grow farther away from this event, the responsibility remains to bear witness to the event, to come to it as “strangers” again as I noted above. The communication of one who bears witness has been termed “testimony” by various scholars (Felman and Laub 1998, Langer 1991 et al), but this dissertation will refer to this communication as discourse that “bears witness.” An exploration of the process of bearing witness to trauma can bring understanding about how the process of memorializing can be active. Understanding these processes can elucidate the process of writing in the composition classroom as well, to help students become aware that they, as active agents who compose, not only have a voice, but also have a responsibility to use that voice and listen and respond to the voices of others.

The appropriateness of conceptualizing this communication as discourse that bears witness is due to the very nature of the communications itself. This discourse community of survivors and second-generation survivors has chosen to represent their experiences in various forms and from various perspectives. They have also chosen to represent these experiences for various reasons, but one of the primary reasons has been to bear witness. While some question if
the Holocaust can be communicated at all, the number of books about this event exemplify how many writers see the necessity to attempt such communication and how the event has had multiple resonances for many different audiences. Who are these articulators of books and museums? These people are historians, sociologists, psychologists, and many are survivors as well. This project focuses on survivors and second-generation survivors who come from various backgrounds or may be writers by profession; in all cases they have been compelled to bear witness to their experiences through discourse. In analyzing a variety of texts, this dissertation is concerned with how memory is represented through the process of bearing witness and how these representations create response and action.

Why might this communication be seen as a necessity? While there was an initial silence about the Holocaust following the Second World War, as was noted in the Introduction, a resurgent interest about the Holocaust has emerged in the last thirty years, especially in the United States (Cole 2000, Finkelstein 2000, Novick 1999, Young 1988). Such resurgent interest is attributed to a myriad of issues including: the persistence of Holocaust denial (Vick 1), the preservation of the State of Israel’s existence and sovereignty, the tendency toward historical amnesia that goes hand-in-hand with nationalism (Wajnyrb 79), the growing generational and temporal gap between survivors and non-survivors, and finally the increasing loss of survivor

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36 Many scholars and critics say there is no historical analogy to Treblinka. Claude Lanzmann, director of the film Shoah, says that a “refusal of understanding” is the only ethical attitude to take “(Witness and Memory 25). There is also the claim that “the Holocaust cannot be represented or rationally apprehended” (25). Others, like Gillian Rose, argue against this uniqueness, and say that if Auschwitz is an “unrepresentable rupture in history,” this denies the social conditions that made it possible (29). Roger Gottlieb states that to approach the Holocaust with a shroud trivializes it. (29). Others, like Arthur Cohen, believe that investing so many cultural resources into this event causes us to ignore others (29).

37 But Friedlander notes that this “silence did not exist within the survivor community,” it was maintained in relation to the outside world – imposed by shame—to tell a story that must seem unbelievable. (“Trauma, Transference, and ‘Working Through’ in Writing the History of the Shoah.” 48.)
populations who can speak about this event as eyewitnesses. Evidence of this surge of interest is revealed in the appearance of new Holocaust memoirs, the recovery and translation of memoirs and diaries, the building of museums and memorials, and the burgeoning scholarship on this topic.

For many Jewish writers, bearing witness in general has its origin in the Talmud, where “once an unjust event is known, it must by law be reported” (Young Writing 18). According to Shoshana Felman, a literary and Holocaust scholar, bearing witness is part of the mantra “never to forget” an event whose goal was to “eliminat[e] its own witness” (Felman and Laub xvii). Because many survivors discuss feeling as if they had died with their comrades in the camps, writing about their experiences is something they must do as a memorial and gives a voice to those that perished. Their writing becomes an act of bearing witness to what they saw and experienced, and an act of bearing witness to what their comrades experienced. As Felman notes, “by virtue of the fact that the testimony is addressed to others, the witness, from within the solitude of his own stance, is the vehicle of an occurrence, a reality, a stance or a dimension beyond himself” (3). This act of writing/representing experience is a social act that includes not only these survivors and the victims who perished, but also the audience who listens (5). Authors

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38 For Holocaust scholar Peter Novick, the American Jewish community led this surge in interest. He claims the dissemination of information is inevitable because of the influence of the Jewish community in media, but denies any allegiance with Jewish conspiracy theory (xv). The surge is intentional while the resulting dissemination is spontaneous. This is unlike Norman Finkelstein’s view that such intention was a means to support the State of Israel. Finkelstein notes the pro-Israel lobby after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war as part of his evidence. Novick looks at domestic affairs as well as foreign—seeing an importance in “ethnic exceptionalism” and the “growing importance of the story of victimization” (xv). Finkelstein’s is a Zionist narrative, Novick’s is an ethnic Jewish-American narrative. Tim Cole agrees with portions of these arguments but his main point is this: the United States (especially as seen in the Holocaust Museum) wants to sell, not a Jewish narrative, but a nationalistic one.

39 Testimony is most commonly associated with oral histories, but because the Holocaust discourses discussed in this project seek to connect with an audience-- they are “addressed to others”—they can be considered testimony. This dissertation, in examining transmissions of personal Holocaust history, is concerned with the many forms testimony, in this dissertation “discourses that bear witness,” can take and why these forms grow and evolve in response to specific social contexts.
(articulators), through this social interaction, engage with their texts, with other texts, with history, with memory, and with audiences.

Part of the paradox and difficulty of the Holocaust is that “the post-war role of the survivor as witness and concept of the Holocaust demands that they also represent” those victims who did not survive, knowing that they are unable to do so (Waxman 496). The Holocaust is not a unified event” as Holocaust scholar Zoë Waxman states. It is “impossible to conflate different survivor stories into a universal Holocaust experience because no such experience exists” (496). Memory scholars Ana Douglass and Thomas contend that: “survivors of large-scale traumatic events become by extension witnesses for those absent and unable to bear witness themselves” (38). Many survivors like Primo Levi believe their purpose is to “counteract false belief and prove something to be true” (Waxman 496). Individual experiences are subjective and survivors also “have to contend with the contingencies and inevitable limitations of memory” (497). Survivors are aware that they cannot present narratives that are completely factual, but according to Waxman, they do believe “they can be true to the essence of the suffering” (497). Some testimonies have been discovered to be more fabricated than factual, but this does not mean that witness testimony loses its value, quite the contrary. What this means is that witness testimony “demands special modes of attention and interpretation. What survivors are witnesses to is their own suffering, in the past as victims and in the now of telling as survivors” (Witness 34). In response to testimonies of trauma, Simon and Eppert have advocated “a pedagogical witness of one’s practices of reading, viewing, and listening which make evident how witnessing may become an event in which an Other’s time may disrupt my own”(289). Pedagogical witness

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40 This attention to the factual influences the representations constructed by authors such as Hillman, Klüger, and Spiegelman, who foreground their own “historical” research within their personal narratives.

41 I, Rigoberta Menchú (1984) a memoir by Guatemalan revolutionary and Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood (1996) a Holocaust memoir by Binjamin Wilkomirski have both been discredited as “true” eyewitness accounts by scholars. Wilkomirski’s memoir was almost entirely fabricated (Witness 34).
advocates the teaching of hope and remembrance where the past comes to the learner from the outside as a teacher. There is a distance between the speaker and the listeners that facilitates learning rather than reducing that distance to increase identification, a practice of empathy that Feminist Cultural theorist Jean Wyatt claims risks “reducing the other to same as me” (100). Although Simon and Eppert, in discussing the teaching of testimony, define memorialization as a conservative practice that simply confirms “communal narrative and symbols” through identification, performative memorialization, in contrast, sees memorialization as an active process, a communicative, multimodal practice, that creates a dialogic of history and memory to bring the past into a relation with the present through the action created by genre, gender, and performativity (288). Audiences interpret and respond to acts of bearing witness-- to the process of the survivor’s writing act-- that bears witness to their experience, other victims, and the event in the present as a constructed representation of the past, and learn from the multimodal forms in which they appear.

We are reminded, therefore, in realizing this gap between the event and its representation that the experience of the Holocaust, though it was witnessed, can never be recreated. History and memory come to us as partial knowledge, and as postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak has pointed out, no voice/subjectivity comes to us unmediated. It is through the incorporation of personal history into what was once seen as “objective” history that a fuller picture is created (Gender and Memory 12). This dissertation aims to locate where such gaps occur in these reconstructed representations of history and memory, and how these gaps engage audiences in a dialogic of history and memory along a chain of communication. Performative memorialization reveals these gaps as results of the process of constructing genre and gender and as a result of the

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42 This gap between “fact” and representation is the similar to the gap Bernard-Donals noted between witness and testimony (Witness and Testimony 2001).
content of performative language and subjectivities, resulting in multimodal learning that recontextualizes the past in the present.

1.8 The Discourse Community: Locations within Holocaust Studies

As in the field of Composition and Rhetoric, issues of genre and gender have also been a focus in the field of Holocaust Studies. There have been several studies which examine a series of Holocaust genres. Holocaust scholar James Young’s 1988 *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust* was one of the first of these texts examining several Holocaust genres to “explore [the] plurality of meanings in the Holocaust these texts generate and the actions that issue from these meanings outside the text” (4). This dissertation examines a similar chain of Holocaust genres in order to explore plurality, but seeks to elucidate specifically how the plurality of meanings is generated by texts through the construction of genre. Because these texts are active components in a continuing conversation about this event, it is crucial to examine them in relation to historical and social contexts and the consequently evolving audiences. When and where were these discourses written, published, and translated? How do these factors affect audience responses? This dissertation addresses these questions while it also examines how issues of genre and gender construction together create writing as action.

Felman has claimed testimony as a “performative speech act” that accomplishes action in the sense that Austin and Searle saw oral speech acts as illocutionary and perlocutionary forces (5, Bazerman “Systems” 89). Young sees the act of writing as important: if “narrative cannot document events in perfect factuality, it can document the actuality of writer and text – the writer and his link to events may thus be reified not in the writer’s words, but in the writing activity that brought the words to the page—strategy, style, all are commentary on the writing act itself”

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43 The performative in Holocaust Studies is a very new avenue of study. Patraka’s work in this area in terms of the United States Holocaust Museum is groundbreaking. For more on her work see *Spectacular Suffering: Theatre, Fascism, and the Holocaust* (1999).
While Felman’s conception of a speech act claims it as a “discursive practice” and Young’s work focuses on the act of writing such testimony, Genre theorist Bazerman, redefines the speech act as a short, oral form to claim that “long, complex written documents” can be speech acts as well. Further, he adds that if “the text is distinctly identifiable as of a single genre, it can gain a unified force, for it is now labeled as of a single kind instantiating a recognizable social action” (“Systems” 89). This dissertation expands these positions to examine specifically how discourses by survivors and second generation survivors foreground the writing act and engage audiences in constructions of genre, gender, and performativity to create writing that does something. The genre these authors choose is important because I argue that each Holocaust genre I examine in this dissertation, although it acts with Bazerman’s unified generic force, because it is an exceptional genre of trauma, it also pushes against the boundaries of that “single” genre. Although, like Devitt, Bazerman claims that disappointing expectations of generic form “may weaken the generic force,” this dissertation argues that upsetting reader expectations is a way for these authors to actively engage audiences (89). The use of specific genres, the subjectivity of the author, and the particular topics represented in these texts are unique commentary on the writing act itself. This dissertation’s discussion of the writing act in terms of performative memorialization, how writing performs social action, relies on audience interactions. These interactions are not automatically established by context, rather, “from the perspective of a single participant, sense-making may be multilayered, heterogeneous, and opportunistic, using any clue at hand to make meaning” (Bazerman “Textual” 384). What readers already “know” about genres of the Holocaust, therefore, will be integral in their individual meaning-making processes.
Genres are important to look at it because the “historical actuality” and the form it is delivered in “may be intertwined” (Young Writing 5). The medium through which this actuality is transmitted helps to construct its meaning; it is to know “what happened and how it is represented” (5). 44 According to Robert Scholes, we do not imitate the world, we construct versions of it. (17). 45 Young states that autobiography has an authentic (though tenuous) empirical connection between text/writing/experience, whereas narrative fabricates its authenticity. Writing an autobiography is to claim an experience as one’s own (24). The power of testimony is its eyewitness element. Journalists like Jan Karski, who observed and reported in the Warsaw ghetto, knew this; army generals like Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose troops liberated Dachau, knew this. This is why discourses that bear witness to this event through their representations of memory remain a crucial aspect of this history. This relationship between representations of memory and history within these texts of witness is dialogical, as I explained above. The authors who bear witness do so within specific genres, and each genre, as social action, responds to its surrounding social contexts, contributing to the chain of communication between these discourses and with audiences over time. This dissertation focuses on genres of the Holocaust, but it focuses on how these genres evolve and interact with each other and audiences in terms of the construction of genre and gender and performative language.

Young’s text remained the only such study for many years. 46 Since that time, several memorials have been built (but not extensively studied) and several studies on Holocaust genre have appeared in the last ten years as well. Only recently have Holocaust scholars like Felman

44 Ruth Wajnryb in The Silence notes this as well in agreeing with Young.
45 This seems disconcerting when considering history. For many years for instance, Elie Wiesel’s Night was categorized as a novel, even though he called it documentary testimony. Since Night has been re-released and discussed by Oprah’s Book Club, the publisher has re-classified the book as a memoir according to history scholar Dagmar Barnouw.
46 In 1988, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum had not yet been built, but Young notes that further research could examine memorial museums more in-depth, a project he completed in 1993 called The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning.
and Dori Laub (1992), Peter Novick (1999), Caroline Wiedmer (1999), Tim Cole (2001), and Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer (2001) also examined several Holocaust genres in one study. Much like this dissertation, Wiedmer and Cole focus on how audience response is dictated by nationality. Wiedmer focuses on German and French responses to texts (with the exception of her discussion of second-generation texts from elsewhere such as Art Spiegelman’s *Maus*), and Cole focuses on audiences in the United States and Israel. This project focuses on a specific audience (American) as well, but the goal is not to illuminate the political ramifications of memorialization, but rather to explore the discursive processes of this memorialization as active through an exploration of the dialogic history and memory as they relate to genre, gender, and the performative. Cole focuses on memory in terms of its commodification, critiquing the “simple lessons” offered by discourses such as *Schindler’s List* (5). Cole calls such knowledge the “myth of the Holocaust” rather than the “historical event that has become known as the Holocaust.” Such mythical discourses try to teach “simple lessons” about a complicated past and stress “Jewish passivity” (xi). Such representations have been critiqued by Wiedmer, and Holocaust scholar Vivian Patraka has also critiqued the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum for stressing such representations. Novick, in contrast to Cole, suggests that in the 1960s Elie Wiesel “the survivor” replaced Anne Frank “the victim” as the symbol of the Holocaust in the United States (Novick xi). Novick’s observation is useful for this dissertation as support for my claim that texts like Frank’s and Wiesel’s do supply “common knowledge” for American audiences. This dissertation, however, focuses on how Holocaust discourse remains

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47 Wiedmer explores the political aspects of memorialization as the focus. She wants to answer questions about the evolution of a France and Germany’s memorial politics, its current memorial work, and the degree of its memorial tolerance. She notes Germany’s particular difficulties with narrative fetishism which show an “inability to mourn” and discusses the American scholar Daniel Goldhagen’s book *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* at length, a book that claims that Germany was predisposed to serving Hitler and fascism because historically they had little experience with democracy and had a long history of anti-Semitism (202-208).

48 See my discussion of museums in Chapter Four.
relevant to American audiences by creating action. The discourses examined in this dissertation resist tendencies toward simple lessons or narrow representations of Jewish victims through the presentation of complex individual experiences. These are the multiple perspectives clarified by using performative memorialization as a tool to examine the discursive process of how memory becomes representation and discourse.

Much like genre, gender has been a focus in Holocaust Studies as well, though its position in the field has a history of marginalization that genre studies do not. While Holocaust scholars working with genre, like Young, emphasize the importance of particularizing these discourses that bear witness: “each victim ‘saw’—i.e. understood and witnessed – his predicament differently, depending on his own historical past, religious paradigms, and ideological explanations” (Writing 26), particularizing in terms of gender has remained a contested paradigm of study. This dissertation examines what Young does not point out: that these worldviews that particularize are also, always and already, gendered. Feminist Holocaust scholar Marlene Heinemann agreed that in the 1980s Holocaust literature was still focused primarily on men, and while there is something to be learned from the Holocaust, universalizing the experience through a male point of view simply ignores “scholarship about the significance of gender in history and literature” (3).

Although Women and the Holocaust is now an established field according to Holocaust scholar Ann Hardman, it is still a “marginalized subsection of that field, as the validity of exploring the relationship between gender and the Holocaust continues to be disputed by certain

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49 Although the film Schindler’s List is fictional, and the discourses examined in this project are not, this film, as well as other well-known Holocaust discourses, do factor peripherally into my discussion of audience because they create a “common knowledge” and awareness of the Holocaust for American audiences. And while this knowledge may not always be the most accurate, its existence nevertheless contributes to the chain of communication. Discourses that appear later, such as Laura Hillman’s memoir in Chapter Three and Ruth Klüger’s memoir discussed in Chapter Five, reference people like Schindler (directly and indirectly) who was made “familiar” to Americans through the film Schindler’s List. The chain of communication in relation to other Holocaust texts is complex and dialogic.
There have been many reasons for the gender gap in Holocaust Studies: the fear that specifically gendered studies may “undercut[s] the centrality of ethnicity as the primary identity marker in Nazi consciousness” (Zelizer 247), that it does “an injustice [. . .] to both men and women as Jews,” makes “the Holocaust secondary to feminism” (Ofer 1), or most dangerously according to Rittner and Roth, “invites revisionism” (Baumel xii). While the possibility that demarcating the victims by gender could lead to a dilution of the tragedy as a Jewish tragedy continues to be a valid concern, research in this area has “shifted to its broader implications: the role of gender in shaping the lives, and not only the deaths, of Jewish men and women during the Holocaust” (Baumel xii).  

Hardman claims that such criticism of gender studies was limited to the 1990s, but then women and the Holocaust created new controversy. Female scholars of the Holocaust were “defensible” only if they did work in other “mainstream” areas according to some critics (4). Michael Berenbaum, the former director of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for instance, “rejected Joan Ringelheim’s attempts (in her role as Education Director) to incorporate gender into the museum’s permanent exhibition” (4). The issue of women and the Holocaust is still contested in some circles.

The study of women and the Holocaust is similar to other areas of feminist studies in that it contains waves that include discovery and analysis. According to Hardman’s study, the first wave of studies of women and the Holocaust focused on glorifying the particularity in coping strategies and relationships and biological differences affecting persecution. The second wave focused on affirming the differences. Gender differences in experiences of the Holocaust were

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50 Holocaust scholars Lenore Weitzman and Dalia Ofer note that even survivors like Ruth Bondy were resistant to studies of women and the Holocaust, not wanting to “‘divid[e] the Holocaust and its suffering by gender’” (13). But, because Bondy wanted to include a history of women in Theresienstadt, she agreed and found usefulness and new insights in asking such gender-specific questions. Weitzman and Ofer point out that it is also important that “women’s experiences not be discussed exclusively in terms of motherhood or sexuality” (16), because it marginalizes women. It is rather, important to “pay attention to the particularity of gendered wounding that both sexes experienced” (16).
the focus of research in the 1970s when Joan Ringelheim, Sybil Milton, and Myrna Goldenberg explored whether there was “anything distinctive about women’s experiences” (Hardman 1). The 1980s saw an increased market in women’s Holocaust memoirs in the 1980s, and there “was a steady increase in historiographical and literary interpretations of women’s experiences,” which were realized in an influential anthology, *Different Voices*, in 1993 (1). Such collections and articles of primary source material represent the first stage of feminist scholarship: the recovery of texts. The second stage of feminist scholarship involves the analysis of such texts. Texts that have broadened historical contexts through gendered research are works such as: *Gender and Destiny: Women Writers and the Holocaust* (1986), *Women in the Holocaust* (1998), *Double Jeopardy: Gender and the Holocaust* (1998), *Women’s Holocaust Writing: Memory and

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53 *Gender and Destiny: Women Writers and the Holocaust* (1986) by Marlene E. Heinemann is one of the earliest works on gender and the Holocaust, highlighting gender issues in the memoirs of women. Heinemann works with female-centered themes (menstruation, maternity, and sexual abuse), characterization (survivor, victim, hero), inmate relations (privileged and unprivileged, selfish and cooperative), and authenticity. Heinemann, like Young, refers to the genre of autobiography as important for audiences to see the story as authentic.

54 Dalia Ofer’s and Lenore Weitzmann’s *Women and the Holocaust* in 1998 was the first “original scholarship” to receive “mainstream critical acclaim” according to Hardman (1).

55 Judith Tydor Baumel works on gender in fictional and nonfictional representations using the feminist theoretical framework of identity as it is conceptualized by Chodorow and Gilligan. Baumel utilizes gender studies, intertwined with examinations of Jewish history, the Second World War, and the Holocaust. She examines, for instance, how women assimilated into the “male sphere” of the battlefield (xii). Baumel discusses gender and identity from before the war to the present (sometimes using a comparative method), and uses “gender” as describing “the relationship between the sexes” (xiii). While my project also focuses on texts over a long period of time-- postwar to the present- it focuses more on the consequences of the social construction of gender and its representation in nonfiction discourses.
Imagination (1999), Women and the Holocaust: Narrative and Representation (1999), Shaping Losses: Cultural Memory and the Holocaust (2001), and The Social Inheritance of the Holocaust: Gender, Culture, and Memory (2002). The issue of discovery is important because it is not that women weren’t writing; they simply were not published. According to Holocaust scholars Catherine Bernard and Anna Hardman, Holocaust autobiography, like feminist autobiography, first sought to make women’s experiences visible (16). The movement from discovery to analysis in Holocaust Studies echoes movement that occurred in feminist studies much earlier. Because of the resistance to studies of women and the Holocaust, this movement occurred in Holocaust Studies about twenty years later than in other fields.

By the year 2000, in contrast, “despite resistance,” claims Hardman, “there is now a well-established area of research dubbed ‘Women and the Holocaust,’ which reflects a growing interdisciplinary field concerned with women’s experiences,” and the development of gender studies has also developed an interpretive shift that redefines this area of research as Gender and the Holocaust (4). New studies incorporate studies of gender and the visual as in Barbie Zelizer’s

Lillian Kremer highlights gender roles and reactions to the Holocaust in mainly fictional representations of the Holocaust by authors who were there and authors without any firsthand experience. This is a comparative, gendered analysis of themes: pregnancy, survival techniques in the camps, resistance, separations, and techniques situated in time and place.

The articles in this multidisciplinary anthology address direct questions about memory, narration, and gender. The comparative is employed here to ask if women and men do these things differently. As noted above, this project seeks not to pinpoint differences in women’s and men’s writings about the Holocaust. Rather, I seek to find similarities and differences that can reveal gendered moments in this history that are individual and depend on each unique social context.

Shaping Losses is a series of essays edited Epstein and Lefkovitz that highlights gender from historical, theological, and literary perspectives respectively. This anthology seeks to become a speech of silence, “the verbal analogue to the ghosts” and is concerned with how personal memory becomes cultural memory and the implications of such movements.

Holocaust scholars Elizabeth Baer and Myrna Goldenberg contend that the reaction to gender studies in Holocaust Studies follows the trajectory of gender studies in any field—scholars bristle at bringing women into discussions typically discussed, or universalized, from the male perspective (see their Introduction to Experience and Expression: Women, the Nazis, and the Holocaust).
“Gender and Atrocity: Women in Holocaust Photographs” (2001). Although Gender and the Holocaust is a “well-established” field, it is still marginalized. Further studies in this area thus, continue to be crucial.

Gender in the context of this dissertation, as I outlined above in the section “Gender as Social Action,” will refer to the positioning of authors as feminine or masculine or how “the social and cultural [. . .] roles and positions of men and women in society” are constructed in discourse (Weitzman 2). Hardman uses Ronit Lentin’s argument that “catastrophes, no matter what their origins, are always gendered in moulding historically-specific social constructions of masculinities and femininities in the light of these very catastrophes” (5). While studies such as Weitzman and Ofer’s concentrate on how constructed roles and positions affected women in historical events, this dissertation addresses social constructions of gendered roles and positions in discourse and how they affect the writers’ responses and choices within genre in bearing witness after the Holocaust. As Feminist Memory scholar Selma Leydesdorff suggests, “rather than misread memory studies to suggest the fundamental differences between feminine and masculine memory,” we should assume an “overlapping spectrum of individually different memory forms within a very particular cultural context” (3-4). This dissertation goes beyond this female versus male binary to examine where gendered moments occur across genres as positions of femininity and masculinity. This dissertation posits that constructions of gender, like genre, are built, like Foucault’s subjectivity, through the discursive process.

The only study to employ both genre and gender analysis is Anna Reading’s The Social Inheritance of the Holocaust: Gender, Culture, and Memory. Reading, a Media Studies scholar,

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60 Zelizer focuses on how gender is represented in photographs of the liberation of the camps. Zelizer’s thesis is that constructed gender roles are falsely re-created in these photographs, taken by mainly male soldiers. Zelizer references Vera Brittain (1957), who asked: didn’t women have their war as well? Zelizer would like to suggest they did, but that visual records do not accurately reveal this (268).
examines historiographies, autobiographies, documentary and feature films, memorial sites and museums, and closes with interviews with museum-goers and young people about their conception of inherited memory and its transmission. Her aim is to “explore the complex relationships and heterogeneous processes by which the Holocaust is being handed down through different media texts and cultural mediations in ways that are gendered” (xi). Reading brings several disciplines to bear on this study of the process of how memory is being “handed down.” Reading also seeks to incorporate feminist studies into her work, as well as reiterate the significance of gender when teaching the Holocaust. Reading’s focus is on how collective memory is created and gendered.

Although Reading looks at several genres with regard to gender, she is concerned with the transmission of memory over time, much of it oral. My dissertation, however, incorporates not only feminist theory, but also performative, rhetorical, autobiographical, and composition and discourse theories in order to examine the process of discourse. This dissertation is concerned with the gendered representations of memory as they become translated into discourse, and how these representations speak, not only to the world at large (her communicative chain of mediations), but how they have evolved specifically in response to audiences and how they speak to each other in a performative, Bakhtinian chain of communication that becomes a dialogic of history and memory.

This dissertation examines constructions of genre and gender in representations of Holocaust memory, and how this affects larger audiences over a period of time. Much of the research in Holocaust Studies has focused on either genre or gender. As I noted briefly above, despite research on various genres of the Holocaust, these studies continue to lack an
It is my contention that these studies lack examinations of gender because they have looked more at the general content and reception of Holocaust discourses in political terms, and less at the ways in which these discourses vary as a result of the influence of the construction of gender on language. Hardman claims that analyses of gender and the Holocaust are often at the expense of the mode or the genre (16). This dissertation addresses these persistent gaps in scholarship. Because this dissertation examines both genre and gender in Holocaust discourses and how this writing can be performative, a combination heretofore unexplored, it makes a unique contribution to the field of Holocaust Studies and to studies of trauma and memory.

1.9 Conclusion

The discourses in this project embody language that becomes action in the world—through bearing witness and engaging audiences to bear witness to their discursive process. Rhetoric and Holocaust scholars Bernard-Donals and Glejzer have argued that “the disaster of the Shoah [. . .] is located at the junction of the compulsion to speak and the failure of speech” (xi). They argue that there is a difference between the moment of witness and testimony—the two cannot be conflated (xii). Witnessing is seeing and testimony is speaking. The gap between the two is “the movement into discourse” and must be marked, especially in pedagogical terms (xv). For Bernard-Donals and Glejzer, to combat the “inherent failures of testimony” one can create a “pedagogy of trauma” where the teacher sees that students become witnesses to the witnessing in Holocaust discourses through examinations of gaps. The effect of this secondhand witnessing is not “knowledge” but a mark of the traumatic. Accepting this failure of knowledge

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61 Holocaust scholar James Young for instance claimed in 1988 in his work on genres of the Holocaust that new research “might investigate how time and place combine with other structurally mediating factors like language and political orientation to shape the representations of these experiences by different writers,” and while he is concerned with the politics of memory and the subjectivity of the author, he fails to include gender as a “structurally mediating factor” (33).
and the possibility that even learning about the Holocaust may not prevent another from occurring is what these authors want us to understand.

Unlike Bernard-Donals and Glejzer or Felman and Laub, this dissertation does not call for a “new” pedagogy to teach trauma, but it does similarly mark a process, and the processes inherent in bearing witness. Audiences bear witness to the process that these writers engage in as they translate memory into discourse to bear witness to this event. Genre and gender are social constructions. Through the tools of performative memorialization, the process of translating memory into discourse can be marked as a traumatic moment that is constructed by the social contexts of genre and gender, and engages audiences to participate performatively in the process of construction. Knowledge is partial, but through the examination of these discourses and how they interact in particular ways with audiences, we see that complex layers of meaning can be made. This dissertation claims that the multimodal quality of these discourses increases the capacity for audiences to learn through multiple modes and practices, because such modes and practices encourage complex and layered meaning-making activities. The multimodal theory of performative memorialization posits that teaching and learning will occur to various degrees in response to various modes and practices. Because these Holocaust discourses are “writing” that creates action, writing that evolves in response to changing social contexts and an audience, it remains a vital and relevant topic for American audiences.

This dissertation claims that the representation of a traumatic event depends upon the translation of history and memory into discourse—discourse that is constructed through genre and gender, and discourse that can be performative. History and memory exist in the Holocaust discourses I examine in this dissertation in a unique dialogic. As I have noted earlier in this chapter, however, survivors who write about their experiences in diaries and memoirs, and others
who translate these experiences into discourse in museums and hybrids can only create representations of this event as they bear witness to their experience of the event and to its victims. Audiences can only bear witness to these representations, not to the actual event itself. This dissertation argues that authors perform writing as action as they bear witness and audiences perform action as they bear witness to this process. The chain of communication is dialogic and ongoing.

Through the application of performative memorialization, this dissertation contributes to theoretical scholarship by outlining a methodology that is a unique combination of perspectives—a methodology that can be used as a tool to discover how memory becomes discourse and how discourse acts in the world. By examining a series of Holocaust discourses with the tools of performative memorialization we can see how this discourse performs and how it creates action. Writing creates action because writers compose reality, make meaning, and effect change by taking responsibility to engage with the world. In the composition classroom we can teach students to create the dialogues which open the spaces for change by showing them multiple ways of thinking and multiple ways of knowing through the process of writing. By utilizing a variety of modes and practices, students can create layers of meaning, multimodal layers of knowing, multiple ways of acting in the world.

The following chapter discusses performative memorialization in diaries of Anne Frank and Victor Klemperer. In this chapter, issues of genre, gender, and the performative are foregrounded through an examination of issues of identity and representation. In these discourses, the authors display shifting, gendered subjectivities that are performative, and they also reveal a tendency to blur generic boundaries as a response to the history that happens around them. As the Nazi policies become increasingly restrictive, and deportations and extermination policies
become a reality, Frank and Klemperer, blur their private and public identities as they begin to write their “private” diaries as documents of bearing witness for a public audience bearing witness in the future.
Chapter Two: Diaries: The Performance of Multiple Subjectivities and the Construction of Genre in Victor Klemperer’s *I Will Bear Witness: a Diary of the Nazi Years 1933-1941, 1942-1945 (Volumes I and II)* and Anne Frank’s *Anne Frank: the Diary of a Young Girl*

What is real, what is happening? This is how we experience history.
Victor Klemperer

2.1 Introduction

As noted in Chapter One, each of the following chapters compares a more ubiquitous Holocaust discourse for American audiences with one less well-known in order to pinpoint how Holocaust memory becomes discourse, how memory and history are placed in a dialogic, how this dialogic speaks to audiences, and how constructions of gender and genre play a significant role in a complex process I call the “performative memorialization” of traumatic experience. In this chapter I contrast two diaries: Anne Frank’s *Anne Frank: the Diary of a Young Girl* and Victor Klemperer’s *I Will Bear Witness: a Diary of the Nazi Years 1933-1941, 1942-1945 (Volumes I and II)*. This evaluation will underscore the means through which memory becomes representation and the manner in which audiences interact with these representations in the process of initiating action through writing. In order to apply the theory of performative memorialization, as I outlined in Chapter One, we must keep in mind that as a multimodal theory, performative memorialization is applied differently to different texts. Therefore, each mode and communicative practice I examine in this dissertation elucidates some or all of the aspects of this multimodal theory.

Multimodality theorizes literacies not just literacy. The meanings we make are multiple, layered, and complex, and come from a variety of forms—or modes—and practices. Thus, in applying performative memorialization, the meanings that audiences make arise from the multiple modes and practices with which they engage. With regard to diaries, audiences will
make meanings about subjectivity and representation that are different, for example, than those that are made from memoirs. Because each mode and communicative practice is different, and performative memorialization is applied to each mode and practice differently, the meaning-making process is complex and ongoing—a dialogic is created to produce action.

In this chapter on diaries, issues of subjectivity and representation in terms of genre and gender are primary foci to see how these diaries create social action. In addition, because performative memorialization theorizes an evolution of Holocaust texts in response to social and historical contexts, much like Bazerman’s systems of genres (1992) and Miller’s genre as social action (1984), we will see that the elements of performative memorialization are less pronounced in early texts and more pronounced in later texts because the context surrounding the reception of Holocaust texts in the United States has changed and these texts progressively change in response.

2.2 Rationale for Text Selection

The main factor that drives the choice of these particular diaries for examination in comparison to one another concerns the role these diaries play in the construction of audience knowledge about the Holocaust. Anne Frank’s diary is ubiquitous for American audiences because it remains continuously in print and continues to be taught in schools. Because of its pervasive authority in the American consciousness, it has been influential in shaping a large portion of “our” knowledge about the Holocaust. “Our” knowledge contains the constructed knowledge with which American audiences approach history. The American tendency in historical narratives of the Second World War, for instance, is to cast ourselves as liberator (as you will see clearly in Chapter Four, which discusses the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum) and, at the same time, to cast other nationalities or ethnicities in equally simplistic categories.

Anne Frank did not survive the war. The Secret Annex, where Anne Frank and her family and the Van Daan family hid, was penetrated on August 4, 1944 by the Gestapo. The informer was paid the equivalent of $1.40 per person. All residents of the Annex were taken to Auschwitz, and Anne and her sister Margot were later transported to Bergen Belsen where Anne died of typhus, “peacefully” according to a witness (Afterword 1967, 280). Her father, Otto, survived and became the editor of her diaries. Frank’s father circulated copies of her diary among family members after the war. This activity is similar to that of yizker-bikher, or collective memory books (never published for mass readership), which I describe below. A Dutch university professor later persuaded Otto to publish the diary “with only slight excisions” made by Otto. Het Achterhuis (The Secret Annexe) was published in Amsterdam in June 1947. In 1950 it was published in Germany with a first printing of 4,500 copies and “many booksellers were actually afraid to show it in their windows, but the book caught on rapidly, and sales of the pocket edition published by S. Fischer Verlag totaled 900,000” (281). The diary was published in France in 1950 and in England and the United States in 1952 as Anne Frank: the Diary of a Young Girl (281).

Frank’s diary is so well-known by American audiences, in part because its production and distribution have manifested into various modes such as plays and television programs. Twenty years after its first publication, the book had been translated into thirty-one languages and published in thirty countries. Additionally, two subsequent editions have been published which add to the version most audiences are familiar with, using material from the original
unedited version of her diary that was excised by Frank’s father. In this dissertation I am not concerned with these later editions, though they do serve as further evidence of Frank’s extensive editing (as I will discuss later in this chapter). I am concerned with what is known as the “c” version of her diary—the edition where her father combined elements of her unedited and edited diaries, shortened the content, and published this abridgement as the diary *Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl*. Despite the knowledge that this “c” edition does not represent the unedited “voice” of Anne herself, this edition remains the most widely read and influential version for American audiences. As the Bantam edition notes, this diary was made into a play in 1955. It was made into a film in 1959 and adapted for television in 1967. This is evidence of the diary’s ubiquity and this modal production has continued. *Anne Frank: the Diary of a Young Girl* is presently being adapted into an opera in Los Angeles (2007), using excerpts from and performance by Laura Hillman, whose text, *I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree: a Memoir of a Schindler’s List Survivor*, I discuss in Chapter Three.

In contrast, Victor Klemperer survived the war. In February 1945 Klemperer was one of 198 registered Jews left in Dresden, Germany (Preface I vii). Klemperer’s diary *I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, Volumes I and II*, archived in a library in Dresden, in the former East Germany, was not published in English until 1998-99. In the preface to the diary, the translator Martin Chalmers claims that it was not published in East Germany before 1989.

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62 Anne Frank’s diary is referred to as versions *a*, *b*, and *c*. Version *a* is her unedited diary and version *b* is her second, edited diary. The edition most people know is a conglomeration of material taken from versions *a* and *b* by her father—shortened—and made into version *c*: *The Diary of a Young Girl (Definitive Edition v-vi)*. *The Critical Edition* was published in 1986 and was prepared by the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, which received Anne Frank’s papers from the family estate after Otto Frank had passed away. The third edition, *The Definitive Edition*, which is a longer version of the *c* diary with more passages from versions *a* and *b*, was published in 1991.

63 For example, this “c” version was the only copy available on the shelf at Barnes and Noble in 2006.

64 When it played in Germany it was received with silence, but this Bantam edition also claims this was the literary event that broke the silence of guilt and shame in Germany (1967, 282). This is big claim to make. Other scholars have claimed that the silence in Germany has never really broken (Bos 2005).
because of anti-Communist sentiments in the diary, \((I \text{xvii})\). Even though Klemperer became a Communist and lived in East Germany until his death, he continued to set himself at odds with several political factions, as he had done in his writing since he was a young man. Chalmers suggests that the West’s disdain for Klemperer’s communist background and the East’s criticism that he was not materialist enough, were responsible for the neglect of Klemperer’s work after his death in 1960 \((I \text{xviii})\). The German edition of his diaries was published in 1995 without much reaction, but it has since become a huge success in Germany.\(^{65}\)

Much like Frank’s diary for the American public, “for the German reading public at large [Klemperer’s diary] has become one of the key works through which the Third Reich and the murder of the Jews is understood” \((I \text{xix})\). Versions of his diary have appeared on German radio, CD, and in theater and television. Because Klemperer’s diary has become for Germans what Frank’s diary is for Americans, an authoritative source of “common knowledge” about this period, these two diaries work well in contrast.\(^{66}\) Additionally, because his work is relatively unknown to audiences in the United States, Klemperer’s diary can be effectively contrasted with Frank’s as we apply performative memorialization to see how “common knowledge” and cultural contexts affect how writing creates social action.

The various modes in which these diaries have subsequently appeared serve as evidence of the multimodal theory of performative memorialization. Although Frank’s and Klemperer’s

\(^{65}\) The German edition of the diaries \textit{Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten}, is an abridgement by the editor of the original German manuscript. Chalmers made further abridgements in this English version “to reduce the size of the work and make it accessible to a wide readership” (xx). Three kinds of cuts were made: repetitions (not all but some), incidents before this time period, and his extensive notes for his book on Nazi language (xx). It is interesting that the diary needed to be shortened further to make it “accessible” for English-speaking audiences.

\(^{66}\) Jewish Studies scholar Steven Aschheim notes that the popularity of Victor Klemperer’s diaries, like the popularity of Anne Frank’s diaries, “derives from the fact that they remain within the bounds of the comprehensible [. . .] They provide a distraction from the greater, total horror” (because they end before deportation and extermination) (71-2). Aschheim also notes that Klemperer’s diaries could be popular with German audiences because they show “at least some good Germans and a happy ending” (72). This is the kind of reaction I will show Ruth Klüger struggling against in Chapter Five of this dissertation.
diaries are not multimodal in and of themselves, the production and distribution of these texts since their publication is multimodal. What I mean by this is that the production and distribution of these diaries has become increasingly multimodal as they have been developed (by other articulators) into a variety of genres in the years following their original publication. The variety of modes produced and distributed in relation to one genre (as one unified speech act) is further evidence that multimodality continues to create audience interaction with known texts and can increase learning by recontextualizing these texts for new audiences to create action. For the parameters of this dissertation, however, as I outlined in Chapter One, I will focus primarily on the first two strata of multimodality: discourse and design, in order to illuminate how these discourses create a dialogic of history and memory. Shifting subjectivities and genre boundaries in these original diaries are discussed below to show how these early texts display crucial elements of performative memorialization—even as they are written as history is happening, diaries seek to create action.

The decision to begin this dissertation with the textual analysis of two works that can be categorized as fitting into the genre of diary stems from the seminal nature of this genre in the discourse of the Holocaust. Diaries are the first texts to record memories of the Holocaust from a personal perspective. Some of these diaries were not discovered and not published until long after the war had ended. Diaries are similar to yizker-bikher, or memory books, which were compiled directly after the war.

67 Some of the first published works about the Holocaust are called yizker-bikher. According to Holocaust scholar Geoffrey Hartman, these were examples of “collective authorship” and were compiled of various surviving documents from the community, historical narratives, eyewitness accounts, as well as sketches and personal reflections (31). Most of these were written in Yiddish and “describe salient aspects of the life of both small and very large Jewish communities in Poland.” There are “at least six hundred such books” from the Jews of Eastern Europe (31). Most yizker, “were compiled in response to the Holocaust” and can be seen as the “equivalent in words to communal tombstones” (31). Such books could also be classified as first-person written accounts, but they were not single-authored, were not published on a large scale, and were not intended for mass audiences.
had experienced it and preserve these memories for their families. They were not intended for
general public reading and diaries written during World War Two began this way as well.

This chapter examines two diaries that began as private writing and became public
writing with the “redefined” mission to bear witness. Young notes that the closer writers (diarists especially) came to “the ghettos and death camps, the more likely they were to redefine their aesthetic mission as one of testifying to the crimes against them and their people” (17). Young notes that the authors shift to “redefine” their mission, but he does not explore this shift. This chapter will explore this shift in redefined purposes. Thus, diaries must be examined first in this dissertation because they are the first and only texts to evince this shift in purpose. The multimodal theory of performative memorialization suggests that Holocaust discourses evolve as a particularized chain of communication over time. Diaries are the first in a chain of discourses to consciously create texts that would bear witness to the event as it happened. In the next chapter, memoirs, for instance, will assume this purpose and address bearing witness with different concerns and foci. Each mode of discourse employs a different communicative practice, and as a result, complex, layered meaning-making can occur in audiences.

Holocaust diaries can be seen generally falling into one of two types. Many were written over the years, from as early as the rise of the Nazi Party in the 1930s, to as late as the outset of the war itself. Regardless of the starting point these diaries worked to chronicle all the events leading up the mass murder of the Jews and provided the daily, personal experiences of their writers. Their intended audience was therefore private. In contrast, many other diaries were begun in direct response to the atrocities their authors were witnessing, as was the case for Jewish leader Adam Czerniakow, who kept a diary to chronicle what he saw in the Warsaw ghetto as documentary evidence. This project examines diaries from writers who wrote before

many of these events, such as the creation of ghettos and the implementation of mass deportations, came to pass. The diarists in this chapter began writing in order to record their personal response to history as it happened. The progression from writing for a private audience (themselves) changes as the historical situation becomes more oppressive, and the diaries hybridize from private, personal writing to public, documentary reportage. This dissertation claims that these two diaries are examples, not only of redefined purposes and audiences, but also, as a result of these redefined purposes and audiences, examples of how generic forms blur in response to the oppressive social contexts surrounding Frank’s and Klemperer’s writing act.

The proximity these diaries retain to the event of the Holocaust is what makes examining them first in a series of Holocaust discourses so important for this study of performative memorialization. For Klemperer and Frank, their diaries began as a way to internally process experience and testify to the self, but their function evolves as testimony to the larger event. The fact that both of these diary writers write without the knowledge of “what happens” in this war and what was discovered after the Nazis were defeated provides a first hand perspective that makes much of their writing eerily prescient. It is important that what they choose to represent—what they see as important—is not informed by the historical knowledge that memoir writers possess who write after the war. What Frank and Klemperer represent is different because it attends to detail without knowledge of the larger context of what happened in history. These writers record the experiences they think are important as history happens. Their unique social context thus, influences what they choose to represent and their constructions of these representations.

Because diaries record a day-by-day or month-to-month record of events as they happen, they create an unusual perspective not found in any other Holocaust genre, and it is partially this
format that distinguishes the genre of diary. Other distinguishing features that make diaries
unique, according to Martin Chalmers, the translator of Klemperer’s diary, are that diaries “were
not written with publication in mind and were never reworked” (Preface I xix). Holocaust
scholar Young agrees that because the Holocaust diary was written “from within the whirlwind”
it can be perceived as more factual by audiences who overlook the mediation present in any
reconstruction of memory, no matter how close in proximity to the event (Writing 25). What is
unusual about Frank’s and Klemperer’s texts; however, is that they are diaries written with this
immediacy and, yet, both authors clearly reflect on their writing and revise their diaries,
implicitly addressing such audience preconceptions. In addition, both authors considered, at
some point in their writing, that this day-to-day record would be useful not only for its detailed
record-keeping about their personal lives or as notes for a memoir, but as a record of this larger
history. Although Young claims this documentary purpose for all diarists (Writing 26), I claim
that some diarists, like Frank and Klemperer, shift their purpose from private to public, and this
parallels their shifts in private and public subjectivities and affiliations. The movement in these
shifts creates gaps in the texts in which audiences can enact responsive understanding, Bakhtin’s
idea of speakers and listeners changing places in communication, to create a dialogic of history
and memory.

Before turning to the textual analysis, one potential criticism of my dissertation’s
distinction between the genre of diary and the focus of my next chapter, memoirs, must be

69 Young places Holocaust diaries and memoirs within the Jewish scriptural tradition of sifrutha’edut, the “literature
of testimony” (Writing 20). While I do not intend to examine these texts in terms of their biblical prototypes, what
Young has outlined is the conflicting parameters that arise from these testimonial writing acts. They are
representations of facts that include interpretations by the authors and by the audiences, and to make these
“authentic” texts stand as “indisputable” evidence causes confusion for audiences: “that is, by imputing to an
ontologically authentic text an indisputably authoritative factuality, the reader confuses the kinds of privilege a
survivor’s testimony necessarily demands.” For “even though a survivor’s testimony is ‘privileged’ insofar as it is
authentic, the factuality of his literary testimony is not necessarily so privileged” (22).

70 Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer have explicated these gaps as the gap between witness and testimony in
addressed. Some critics might argue that the two modes of communication are virtually indistinguishable and, therefore, would not warrant separate treatment. I defend this differentiation on the grounds that the proximity of the writer to the object affects how that writing appears. Diary and memoir authors both testify to the event. For Young, this function is more important than their proximity to the event (Writing 20). In contrast, Trauma theorist Cathy Caruth claims that proximity prevents witnesses from processing what they see until some time has passed (Trauma 4). In this dissertation, I am interested in how proximity influences how these writers construct their diaries as a dialogic of history and memory. The function of these texts remains crucial – to bear witness. But, much as I outlined with Pollock’s performative in terms of process and content, these elements of proximity and function work together. In Chapter One I stated that content and process are inseparable in Holocaust discourses and this is true for diaries. Additionally, for diaries in particular, proximity and purpose exist in a unique relation. Because of diary writers’ immersion in history as it happens, their purposes and audiences begin to shift within the texts in response to the shifting historical context—they begin to focus on a public who might respond and take action. For audiences reading the diaries after the fact, the dialogic shifts because they “know” the history these diarists could not yet know.

The diaries of Frank and Klemperer work well together in this chapter because they are both written by Jewish authors who do not represent their identification with the Jewish religious tradition as a strong one. Klemperer was raised in a liberal Jewish household and converted to Protestantism as an adult. According to the Frank’s diary, the Frank family was Jewish, and although they celebrated holidays and the Sabbath, they were largely secularized. This is significant because these authors’ shifts between private and public identities and purposes reflect this identification. Both of these diarists considered themselves complex individuals
outside the traditions of religion, but this complex, private subjectivity conflicted with how the public Nazi state narrowly defined them. For this reason, the shifting, performative subjectivities present in these texts are quite pronounced.

Without the “established” outward historical framework that memoir writers work within, Frank and Klemperer rely on constructing their inner subjectivities within a shifting historical framework. Their identities fluctuate within this framework with the movement between private and public selves. Both also shift religious and gendered identities in response to the conflicting ways they define themselves privately and how they are defined publicly (by the government and others). This movement is further reflected in their shifts in purpose and audience, underscoring the blurring of their constructed genres. These shifts and movements, in identity and audience and purpose, bring audiences’ attention to how both authors’ representations interact with and respond to constructions of both genre and gender and create action in audiences.

2.3 Victor Klemperer’s Performative Subjectivities: German and Jewish, Private and Public

Frank and Klemperer wrote their diaries in close proximity to the actual event and, because of the shifting historical setting, their writing self shifts, as do their audiences and purposes, in response to this context. The writing self or selves are revealed through self-reflexive passages which illuminate the writing act for audiences as that same act transforms the audiences and purposes of these authors. Frank’s and Klemperer’s diaries reveal reflexive constructions of self that open spaces for audience response, illustrating the responsive understanding discussed in Chapter One. Bakhtin describes responsive understanding as a dialogic in which speakers “relinquish the floor” to allow other speakers to respond. This dialogic can occur in the gaps created in these texts from the shifts in subjectivity, purpose, and audience to create active communication that includes, not only the author and reader, but also
other participants in the present, the past, and the future. In the following sections, I will show how both Frank and Klemperer are self-reflexive about themselves and about the writing act, and how there is movement forward and between their multiple selves, as bystander and victim and as public and private. Additionally, Klemperer’s, and to a lesser degree Frank’s, writing is performative in the evocation of other voices and perspectives to complicate categories of bystander, victim, and perpetrator.\footnote{See Raul Hilberg’s \textit{Perpetrators Victims, Bystanders} (1992) on these particular categories. Hilberg’s work as a historian was some of the first and most detailed to come out about the Holocaust.}

Frank and Klemperer ask the audience to respond to their particular story, as well as to the “bigger picture” of history that surrounds it. For audiences who will read these diaries, this call to action will come—in inevitably—too late. But, the call to action remains. There is a demand for the audience to read and think about these events, to contemplate its lost voices through the performativity of their subjective language and the “immediacy” of their language—they are recording events as they happen, both authors possessing an uncanny awareness of audience. They translate what happens now into what will be “history” for their future audience within the context of their personal, inner lives. For instance, when Klemperer notes in an entry about the days leading up to the Nazi-sponsored, statewide pogrom now known as \textit{Kristallnacht}, he bears witness not only to his experience, but to the process of recording it: “I do not need to describe the historic events of the following days, the acts of violence, our depression. Only report the immediately personal, what concretely affected us” (I 274).

Klemperer and Frank display movement between selves in their shifting perspectives as bystander and victim and in their duality between private and public selves. As writers whose identities shift in response to a shifting historical and social framework, their shifts in purpose and audience also reflect a response to shifting contexts. What first complicates Klemperer’s
identity in his diary is the fact that he was raised Jewish and became a baptized Protestant as an adult. As a professor of Romance languages and philosophy, Klemperer believes he knows the history of Jewish persecution in Europe, and in the initial stages of Nazi rule, he uses his knowledge of Jewish history to comment disparagingly on the German-Jewish responses to Nazi repression. As early as October 1933, he and his wife, Eva, find Jewish behavior “repugnant” because “they are beginning to submit inwardly and to regard the new ghetto situation atavistically as a legal condition that has to be accepted” (I 35). In April 1934, Klemperer records a conversation with his sister, Grete. She sees herself and the situation as only Jewish and cannot believe her brother does not. She knows that the Nazis are basing their objectives on old hatreds and a history of European anti-Semitism. Klemperer knows this history too, but because he identifies as solely German and not Jewish-German, her attitude results in this pronouncement about his sister: “She has become un-German, inwardly degraded and quite resigned. That no doubt is how things stand with very many Jews” (I 63). The language he uses here clearly indicates that the Jew in Germany for him is still an “other” with whom he does not identify. In December of 1934 in a political discussion he notes that: “what is most repulsive to

72 Several scholars have written that the destruction of European Jewry was a conflation of perpetration and reaction based in centuries of historical and religious conflict. Raul Hilberg, a well-respected historian of the Holocaust describes three anti-Jewish policies that appeared in the fourth century after Christ: “conversion, expulsion, and annihilation. The second appeared as an alternative to the first, and the third emerged as an alternative to the second” He concludes that in relation to the Holocaust as Jewish persecution, “the German Nazis, then, did not discard the past; they built upon it. They did not begin a development; they completed it” (The Destruction 7-8). Further Hilberg claims that in addition to this history of persecution, a history of Jewish response also plays a role. One response is called “anticipatory compliance,” where the Jewish citizen gives in to a particular demand but does so on his own terms. Jewish Councils during the Nazi years attempted this type of anticipatory behavior for years. And “relief, rescue and salvage were old Jewish institutions” (21-22). Thus, in terms of diary writing and Jewish response to persecution from a religious paradigm, Frank and Klemperer, as secular and converted respectively, respond differently. Frank, as Young notes, does not refer back to all of Jewry or see her calamity as uniquely Jewish. Rather, she identifies as an oppressed member of humankind (Writing 28). Klemperer, in another example, does not respond with “anticipatory compliance” to attempts by the Nazis to take his house. He waits for each new decree, many of them require stacks of paperwork and personal visits to the mayor, but in each case, the Nazis’ request that he give his property up voluntarily is something he refuses to do and is further counseled by his wife not to do (I 331). Additionally Young notes historian David Roskies, who claims that the Jewish response and understanding was in many respects “paradigmatic” and relied on historical precedent: “By thus lulling their victims into analogy, as it were, by re-creating all previous persecutions, the Nazis were actually able to screen from view the difference of the present persecution until it was too late” (Writing 94).
me is the specific Jewish pessimism with its self-satisfied composure, the ghetto spirit
reawakened" (I 103). This early writing comes from the perspective of a man who knows about
these historical responses but does not identify intellectually or emotionally as a Jew. He
identifies himself repeatedly over 1,000 pages of diary as “German” above all else. Nevertheless,
it is precisely because Klemperer identifies himself so much with being German, that Hitler, the
Nazis, and the apathetic German public shock him, more than they do people like his sister. As
Hitler takes power Klemperer notes with frustration: “The people hardly notice this complete
coup d’état, it all takes place in silence” (I 80).

Because of his privileges as a spouse in a mixed marriage, however, Klemperer sees
himself as complicit as the German public, witnessing the coup d’état in silence outwardly,
speaking out only inwardly in the diary. He writes: “the majority of the [German] people is
content, a small group accepts Hitler as a lesser evil [. . .] all are afraid for their livelihood, their
life, all are such cowards,” but he asks in parentheses, “(Can I reproach them with it? During my
last year in my post I swore an oath to Hitler, I have remained in the country—I am no better
than my Aryan fellow creatures)” (I 163). How Klemperer sees himself is different than how
those in power (the Nazis) see him. Klemperer identifies as Protestant since his conversion, but
more importantly to him, “I am German forever, German ‘nationalist’ [, . , ] The Nazis are un-
German” (I 129). Although he records the “pogrom atmosphere” growing daily, he insists he is
not simply an assimilated German-Jew. He is German. As defined by the Nazi state, however, he
is Jewish and, therefore, the object of intense persecution.
The multiple nature of Klemperer’s identity appears in these entries. Although he is defined by the state as a Jew, Klemperer feels German and aligns himself with bystanders. According to performance theorist Della Pollock, subjective performative writing does not refer to conventional mirror-reflections of autobiography [or diary] as a “coherent self across time,” but rather as a “contiguous [. . .] relation between the writer and his/her subject(s), subject-selves, and/or reader(s)” (86). It is not only multiple selves that make subjectivity performative, but also the movement forward and between selves. By placing himself as part of those German masses, Klemperer shifts the reader’s perspectives. The audience of the diary expects this man, as a survivor of the Holocaust, to be aligned with Jewish victims, and yet he repeatedly asserts his strong affiliation with being German. As a part of recording evidence of the criminal acts of the Nazis, he not only notes bystanders, but also those who collaborate with the Nazis: “(In your Memoirs do not forget those who made it easy for themselves and those who were cautious on both sides!” (I 218). But, by his earlier descriptions of himself, he could be considered such a German bystander who is cautious enough to simply go along with the Nazis. These conflicting perspectives are disturbing and create movement and discordance for the reader. The movements show the shifting selves not only as multiple, but also forward and between Klemperer’s identities as German citizen/bystander and German-Jewish citizen/victim. These shifts are movements that create gaps in the text, bringing attention to the fact that this diary reflects a man with multiple and fragmented selves—performative subjectivities that are as under construction as the diary genre they reside within.

Aschheim has also noted these multiple identities in Klemperer in his chapter “Victor Klemperer and the Shock of Multiple Identities.” Aschheim notes Klemperer’s alignment with primarily a German identity. Later in his chapter he allows that “circumstances forced [Klemperer] into some kind of identification” with the Jews. And though Aschheim allows that there “were moments of apparent transformation,” where Klemperer seemed to identify as Jewish, they were only temporary (85-90). Aschheim analyzes Klemperer’s diaries from the Weimar period into the 1960s and thus makes broader conclusions about the development of Klemperer’s identity as a German and a Jew. This dissertation examines only the diaries between 1933 and 1945 and how his identity reflects the shifts in the social/historical context in which he found himself in this specific period.
Though Klemperer has previously stated that he feels very German, in July of 1937, as a result of continually witnessing German lethargy, stupidity, and open prejudice (I 214), he concludes: “Hitler really does embody the soul of the German people, that he really stands for ‘Germany’ and that he will consequently maintain himself and justifiably maintain himself. Whereby I have not only outwardly lost my Fatherland. And even if the government should change one day: my inner sense of belonging is gone” (I 233-4). Klemperer records the outer circumstances and makes broad statements about what is happening to the nation, but he also records his interior responses, feeling betrayed, the loss of belonging, that indicate that his subjectivity as German and as Jewish are in flux. Klemperer reveals shifts within himself—forward and between selves. He resists the Nazi definition of him as a Jew, but as he witnesses how badly Germans behave, he identifies increasingly less often as German.

Klemperer reveals his shifting subjectivity even more clearly when he describes the local department store being “Aryanized” in October 1937. He states: “Contempt and disgust and deepest mistrust with respect to Germany can never leave me now. And yet in 1933 I was so convinced of my Germanness” (I 239). By December 1939 he portrays the German nation, as a whole, as callous and apathetic: “I believe the pogroms of November ’38 made less impression on the nation than cutting the bar of chocolate for Christmas” (I 324). The masses of Germans, with whom he identified as a bystander in the early 1930s, are now becoming the “other,” with whom he does not identify. It seems the whole nation has changed utterly before his eyes. It is important for Klemperer to record this painstakingly detailed history and what it implies to him about the seemingly instantaneous transformation of a nation he loved. As he writes, this paradox expands: as he records history in personal detail, the German nation seems oblivious to it.
As their friends emigrate, stores are “Aryanized,” and the star and identity cards are
instituted for Jews, Klemperer and his wife Eva feel increasingly “homeless” and “completely
isolated” (I 253, 263). By December 1938, he records that their “spirits have sunk further, and
since new Jewish laws come out nearly every—no, really every day, so our nerves have gone to
the dogs” (I 280). They feel alone and hopeless, but still he registers his opinion of the rhetoric of
the politicians and reasserts his identity indirectly: “Until 1933 and for at least a good century
before that, the German Jews were entirely German and nothing else” (I 291). He is German and
he is Jewish – the two are now inseparable.

Yet his increasing isolation and the conflicting categorizations make even this dual
identity tenuous. While the Nazis classify him as a non-German Jew, he still receives his German
World War One veteran’s pension from the government (greatly reduced). The American-Jewish
community does not support him because it supports only orthodox Jews. The Jewish
Community, representing the National Association of Jews locally, sees him as a baptized Jew
and not worth their charitable efforts. They require his donation and have no sympathy when he
pleads hardship: “sell your house” they tell him, knowing that he is only allowed to own it at this
late date because he is in a mixed marriage. Victor laments, “These people have no time for a
baptized Jew,” especially when he gives one third of his tax to the Confession Church (I 379).
The Protestant Confession Church eventually deserts him as well in September 1941; taking
payments from a “Jew” would make it look as if the church supported Jews (I 431).

Klemperer is identified as, and identifies with, very conflicting categories. In response to
these developments Klemperer relates being alternately calm and depressed in April of 1941. He
has expressed his disgust with the Germans and now he moves a step closer to a Jewish identity:
“Once I would have said: I do not judge as a Jew [. . .] Now: Yes, I judge as a Jew, because as
such I am particularly affected by the Jewish business in Hitlerism, and because it is central to
the whole structure,” a sentiment expressed by his sister several years earlier, which he had
disparaged (I 382). This is an example of how Klemperer’s subjectivity is shifting in response to
the historical context—he identifies less as German (bystander) and increasingly as Jewish (but
not as clearly as a Jewish victim). This passage also shows Klemperer’s self-reflexivity. He has
reevaluated himself in terms of what he once felt.

Klemperer examines and re-examines himself in this way quite often, bringing the
reader’s attention to his construction of self. In another example, while he is in jail for a short
period, he re-examines his impression of himself as a glorious husband in “love and faithfulness”
(I 410). He realizes that he did put his work first and took his wife for granted and he feels
ashamed: “I reproached myself forcefully for my egoism” (I 411). As the outer circumstances
continue to deteriorate, his construction of self is seen as more malleable—similar to the
language he writes. In prison he decides: “we know nothing at all except what we have
experienced ourselves” (I 394). This calls the reader’s attention to the fact that they did not
experience this, and they cannot know it. But it also highlights that even Klemperer cannot know
what others are experiencing at the same time he experiences something, regardless of how
similar that experience might be. It is clear that one perspective cannot possibly stand for the
many, nor can one aspect of Klemperer stand for his entire person. This is the movement forward
and between selves that reflects a performative subjectivity and complicates the identity of
Victor Klemperer for audiences. Because of this movement between German and Jewish
identities, he cannot be seen by American audiences as a passive Jewish victim. By questioning
his own identity and affiliation and by breaking into his entries with these musings, Klemperer
invites readers, in those created gaps, to take action and to question their own identities and affiliations as well.

Later, as Klemperer spends almost all his time with other Jews isolated in the state decreed Jewish houses, he realizes how little he knows about holidays, funerals, and other Jewish traditions. In contrast to earlier entries, he now notes in September 1942 that the transport goes out a day after Yom Kippur (II147). He is marking time and historical events by the Jewish calendar, which he did not do before. In January 1943, Kaddish is said at a funeral and he is embarrassed that he does not know he is supposed to face east (II185). Klemperer’s identity is shifting from the early diary entries where he felt disgust with “predictable” Jewish behavior. By April 1943, as the last transports have taken every Jew from Dresden except those in mixed marriages, Klemperer states that he is depressed and, “I share the depression with the whole of Jewry” (II 211). As his affiliations shift, the imperative to bear witness to these events in writing becomes stronger. Although he is aware that he could die if he gets caught writing, “I cannot stop writing,” he states, “I cannot give up hope” (II 212). His writing is sustenance as his identity is completely submerged within the Jewish population—“the whole of Jewry.” His shifting subjectivities continue to perform. The gaps these movements create open spaces that interrupt the “performance of the present,” and allow moments for the audience to respond (Bhabha 7).

2.4 Anne Frank’s Performative Subjectivities: Gendered as Private and Public

The rhetorical gaps noted in Klemperer’s work are not as present in Frank’s text. Although her subjectivities shift, in moving toward a stronger spiritual affiliation with Judaism for instance, the shifts we see in her writing often reflect a child growing into maturity. An audience expects these shifts as being part of a Bildungsroman tradition of coming of age stories. This expectation prevents the discordance of the gaps and breaks in the diary that would demand
response from readers, allowing them to remain more passive. Frank’s diary, however, does exhibit some of the shifts in national and religious affiliation that Klemperer’s does. Although Frank did not convert like Klemperer, her upbringing in Germany was also as an assimilated Jew. Frank, therefore, identifies as Jewish more than Klemperer does, but like Klemperer, in occupied Holland she feels more like a bystander than a victim. The shifts in religious identification, or from bystander to victim, do create gaps in the diary, but they are subtle.

Frank’s identification with Judaism shifts toward a stronger affiliation in the diary, much as Klemperer’s does, but these shifts are more subtle because she identified with Judaism more as a secular Jew than Klemperer does as Protestant convert. At the beginning of the diary, Frank watches round-ups of Jews from the window in the Annex and notes that: “all join in the march of death” (54). Much like Klemperer, she feels like a bystander, but she feels more guilty than Klemperer because she identifies as Jewish: “I feel wicked sleeping in a warm bed, while my dearest friends have been knocked down or have fallen into a gutter somewhere out in the cold night [. . .] delivered into the hands of the cruelest brutes that walk the earth. And all because they are Jews!” (54).

At the beginning of 1943 she describes the situation as “terrible outside. Day and night more of those poor miserable people are being dragged off, with nothing but a rucksack and a little money” (63). She feels a solidarity with Jewish people who are victims and that causes her guilt in both cases, but she does not align herself with them as victims. After reading about a

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74 There has been much discussion surrounding the religious identity of Anne Frank. Some scholars have criticized the lack of emphasis on her Jewishness in the edited “c” version of the diary. According to Holocaust scholar Pacale Bos, one must understand the “assimilated nature of the Frank family and their relationship to Judaism” (352). Seen in this context, her diary can be better understood, neither as a universal legacy devoid of Jewishness nor as a portrait of primarily religious persecution, but as a text that merges these identities. Autobiography theorist Victoria Stewart notes Tony Kushner and Tim Cole as two critics who find that the lack of Jewish context makes Frank’s diary easily generalized, and she and Kushner and Cole suggest that “reinstating this context” could alleviate this criticism (Women’s 88). Stewart looks at all the editions of Frank’s diary in her analyses, which illuminate interesting nuances on some of the points I make about representations of the self, however; for the purposes of performative memorialization, I examine only the first edition (90).
Dutch Bishop’s letter to churchgoers, Frank writes: “‘Give help, be generous, and do not dismay! Is what they cry from the pulpit, just like that. Will it help? It won’t help the people of our religion’” (67). Here she writes about religion with the possessive “our,” showing another shift in identity from bystander to victim. Frank identifies as a Jew (our religion) and does not identify with their present status as victims (those people). Much as Klemperer fluctuates between identifications as a bystander and a victim, Frank fluctuates between bystander and victim perspectives. Frank is beginning to see her situation in relation to other Jews. Her personal world is expanding to include the fate and history of others. Later she writes, “To our great horror and regret we hear that the attitude of a great many people towards us Jews has changed. We hear that there is anti-Semitism now in circles that never thought of it before [emphasis added]” (238). In these passages, Frank reveals another shift in identification. She now aligns herself completely with “us Jews,” as Klemperer did with the “whole of Jewry.” Both Frank and Klemperer resist this forced “othering” of Nazism that defines them as Jewish, and therefore, as less human. Both experience movement forward and between selves in witnessing the “other” and becoming the “other” and display shifting, performative subjectivities.

What appears more pronounced in this diary, however, are the shifts in Frank’s gendered subjectivity. These shifts in gendered subjectivity that move from private to public create discordant gaps similar to those found in Klemperer’s work, and these gaps enable active audience response. In contrast to Klemperer’s strong self-reflexivity as a writer, Frank grows into her identity as a writer as she becomes concerned with the more public audience and purpose I describe below. What we see in the beginning of Frank’s diary is primarily the record of her inner self. This self is revealed to be more aware of and influenced by gender constructions than Klemperer’s inner self. Frank’s early entries are filled with the emotions of a
typical, budding teenager. She writes about boys, about school, and about her future. At thirteen she is already somewhat socialized into constructed gender roles. She recalls having to write an essay in school as punishment for talking too much in class where she argues that “talking is a feminine characteristic,” (that for which she is being punished) but immediately subverts this punishment by saying that although she would do her “best to keep it under control,” she will “never be cured” (7). As if “talking” were something to be cured. Despite her inclination to behave in a manner outside of what is expected of her as a girl, Frank is socialized to be a girl “typical” of her time. She will go to school, but her goal should be to get married and have a family. In her writing, Frank shows that she knows this public, constructed role as “girl” should match the private self. What is interesting about Frank is that she separates the two roles, but she is not outwardly compliant. She imagines that her inner self is the “good” Anne—not in the sense that society wants her to be good; rather, being “good” is being true to herself. She writes continually about how her outer behavior does not reflect how she feels inside—she resists that lack of separation of self imposed on her by society by writing herself privately differently than how her self is perceived publicly.

She talks at length about this dual personality (266-267). She is good, pure, and deep privately and giddy, exuberant, and superficial publicly. She writes: “You can’t imagine how often I’ve already tried to push this [giddy] Anne away, to cripple her, to hide her, because after all, she’s only half of what’s called Anne: but it doesn’t work and I know, too, why it doesn’t work. I’m awfully scared that everyone who knows me as I always am will discover that I have another side, a finer and better side. I’m afraid they’ll laugh at me” (266). The “good” Anne does not appear with the group, “but almost always predominates when we’re alone. I know exactly how I’d like to be, how I am too … inside. But, alas, I’m only like that for myself. And perhaps
that’s why, no, I’m sure it’s the reason why I say I’ve got a happy nature within” (267). While Frank separates the self in the private and the public realm, Klemperer, in contrast, has experienced no similar split between private and public selves--how he is expected to behave and how he wants to behave-- until the Nazi time. This contrast reveals the difference between these diaries in their representations of socially constructed gender roles.

But as Frank fluctuates between the proscribed identities provided by her gender (into which she does not fit), and those now proscribed by the state (which do not allow her to have more than one national or religious affiliation), she also comes more strongly into her identity as a writer. In April of 1944, Frank writes that she wants to continue to become independent and have opinions and justice: “let me be myself and then I am satisfied. I know that I’m a woman, a woman with inward strength and plenty of courage. If God lets me live, I shall attain more than Mummy ever has done, I shall not remain insignificant, I shall work in the world and for mankind!” (208). She reflects on her work, showing a strong awareness of the writing act, and states: “Anyone who doesn’t write doesn’t know how wonderful it is [. . .] And if I haven’t any talent for writing books or newspaper articles, well, then I can always write for myself” (197). She goes on to say: “I want to get on; I can’t imagine that I would have to lead the same sort of life as Mummy and Mrs. Van Daan and all the women who do their work and are then forgotten. I must have something besides a husband and children, something that I can devote myself to!” (197). Frank sees her writing at this point as a powerful entity that is an integral part of her subjectivity, and that subjectivity rejects the gendered societal role that is expected of her.

But Frank also has the doubt as a writer that Klemperer has: “sometimes I very much doubt whether in the future anyone will be interested in all my tosh. ‘The unbosomings of an ugly duckling’ will be the title of all this nonsense. My diary really won’t be much use to Messrs.
Bolkestein or Gerbrandy (209). Coming into a strong identity as a writer, however, allows Frank to consider her writing as a powerful act with a public purpose and audience in mind. In this way, both she and Klemperer blur the boundaries of the diary genre and upset audiences’ expectations of this genre. The audience, in the space between these blurred boundaries, is persuaded to consider the dialogic of history and memory at work in these diaries—as personal records and as writing that bears witness to the events of history.

2.5 The Construction of Genre: Shifts in Audience and Purpose from Private to Public

I have shown that both authors shift identities in response to the conflicting ways they define themselves privately and how they are defined publicly (by the government and others). These identities expose the interaction of the performative and gender. There are also shifts between private and public reflected in their purpose and audience that underscore the blurring of their constructed genres. These shifts and movements in audience and purpose, as they did with subjectivity, bring audiences’ attention to how both authors’ representations interact with audiences to create action.

Concurrent to the shift both diary writers experience in their subjectivities is a shift in purpose for why they are writing. Klemperer’s diary translator, Chalmers, claims that diaries are unique because “were not written with publication in mind and were never reworked” (Preface I xix), and Young suggests that the immediacy of diaries make them seem more factual and authentic to audiences (Writing 25). Autobiography theorist Victoria Stewart finds that the characteristic of Frank’s diary as “forward looking” produces “tension with what might more usually be considered characteristics of a diary as a private account of inner feelings” (Women’s 85). By making clear their desire to publish their diaries and by bringing attention to instances where they revise, however, both Frank and Klemperer blur the boundaries of the diary genre
and display an awareness of their writing as an action aimed at particular audiences. This upturning of audiences’ generic expectations reminds us of Bazerman’s systems of genre where “without a shared sense of genre others would not know what kind of thing we were doing” (“Systems” 100). What I claim for these Holocaust diaries is that they do reside within the general expectations for diaries, such that audiences know what these authors are doing. But as Frank and Klemperer blur the boundaries of this genre, they open spaces in the texts, gaps where the subjectivity of the diary is interrupted, gaps where the diary becomes more public than private, and audiences are made aware of the very real dialogic of memory and history at work in these diaries and can respond to it.

Both Frank and Klemperer begin with the idea that the diary would be private, for personal use. In the beginning, Frank uses her diary as a friend to talk to; Klemperer writes his diary as notes for a memoir he planned to write later. As the war situation gets worse, however, their writing displays notable shifts in purpose and audience. For Frank, this public audience is not tangible until she hears the request on the radio from the Dutch Minister Bolkestein for diary and letters as important records of war experiences. From this date on, Frank reworks her diary many times, and she also talks more about her identity as a writer and as a woman. Frank has a sense of self, and a sense of the importance of her writing even at her young age, and contrary to the expectations of the diary genre, she expresses a desire to publish it. For Klemperer, as the Nazi’s noose around the Jews gets tighter and tighter, he begins to think of the diary less in terms of notes for his memoir and more as personal and evidentiary testimony to historical events.

Jewish Studies scholar Steven Aschheim claims that Klemperer’s experience as a scholar

75 Autobiography theorist Victoria Stewart also notes the importance of Frank’s revision, “not only because it adds an element of retrospection to a supposedly spontaneous text, but also because it gives the diary a self-consciously testimonial aspect. Frank expresses a desire to bear witness, and this forward looking, and indeed onward looking, aspect of the text is in tension with what might more usually be considered the characteristics of a diary as a private account of inner feelings” (Women’s 85).
provided him the ego and the discipline to write, and this, together with the “realization that his testimony and experience—if he and/or it survived—would be of crucial historical importance,” made it possible for him to compose such a detailed document (73). Contrary to the expectations of the diary genre, Klemperer also revises his diary and by November 1942 clearly indicates a desire to publish it (II 168).

For example, there are instances when Klemperer notes that he has gone back over pages to add to them. At the end of 1934 Klemperer summarizes the year in his final entry and admits to looking back at the summary of the previous year in order to make concluding comments that parallel the actual entries (I 104) Also, in some of his final entries, he notes that Eva has criticized him for leaving out a more detailed description of a date that stands as a turning point for them, and he revises according to their subsequent conversation. In these later cases, there was less worry about being caught with the pages and killed for them because the Klemperers were wandering refugees after the bombing of Dresden, and less subject to Nazi-run, local bureaucracies.

Whereas in the beginning of the diary, Klemperer makes note of his writing process and revises to provide accurate notes for a longer work about his life called *Curriculum Vitae*, later in the diary, as his audience and purpose have shifted to a more public focus, Klemperer displays a new awareness of the writing process and his new, more public audience. His writing is now concerned with recording every detail accurately to avoid contradictions in dates or events that might confuse an audience in the future looking at this document as evidence that bears witness.

Klemperer records a conversation with his friend Herr Stühler:

“I shall bear witness.” – “The things you write down, everybody knows, and the big things, Kiev, Minsk etc., you know nothing about.” – “It’s not the big things that are important to me, but the everyday life of tyranny, which gets forgotten. A thousand mosquito bites are worse than a blow to the head. I observe, note down the mosquito
bites…” Stühler, a little later: “I once read that fear of something is worse than the event itself. How I dreaded the house search. And when the Gestapo came, I was quite cold and defiant. And how our food tasted afterward! All the good things, which we had hidden and they had not found.” – “You see, I’m going to note than down!” (II 308)

These details will be important for their evidentiary function—to bear witness to the Klemperers’ experiences and the experiences of the people they knew for the posterity of historical record. In this passage Klemperer is noting his writing process in the present, but he also addresses his process in the future. He records a new law forbidding Jews the use of the carriage of a tram. There is discussion about this in their group to which he adds, “I shall note the outcome” (II 384). As the diary continues, Klemperer continues to address his writing process more overtly, seeming to have his future audiences more firmly in mind. After describing the food that was prepared poorly for them by a German peasant after the war had ended for instance, Klemperer addresses an implied “you” which he has not done previously: “I know it all sounds funny, one could also say presumptuous [to complain about food], after everything we had to put up with before,” bringing audiences directly to the realization of this diary as a construction, as a writing act (II 478).

Like Klemperer, Frank also begins a diary directed at a private audience (she addresses letters to “Kitty”) and because she is young, the diary is filled with the naturally self-centered writing of a young girl. And like Klemper, Frank shifts her purpose and audience later in the diary from a personal record to a more public one. Stewart has also noted this tension in Frank, “between the diary as personal record and as a self-conscious attempt at producing an historical document” (Women’s 91). Although Frank is not a professional writer like the university professor Klemperer, she notes in an entry dated May 11, 1944, that her greatest wish is to become a journalist or a famous writer: “I want to publish a book entitled Het Achterhuis after the war. Whether I succeed or not, I cannot say, but my diary will be a great help” (233). This
kind of statement reveals her shift in audience and purpose as she sees her work being important as a historical document for the future. Much like Klemperer, Frank’s diary also shows evidence of being edited, especially later in the diary with her new audience in mind.

Similar to Klemperer, the awareness of the writing act as an action aimed at particular audiences is present in Frank’s diary as well. Frank shows evidence of revising her diary which is contrary to generic expectations; in some cases, the revision is not her own. In either case, evidence of revision brings audiences’ attention to the fact that this diary is a constructed genre. In one example from the “c” version of the diary, the editing has come after her death because Frank makes reference to a section in her diary that has clearly been edited—the section to which she refers is simply not there. Frank describes the Van Daans, the second family that hides with them in the Secret Annex. Frank writes that she fights constantly with Mrs. Van Daan. Frank writes about her lack of clothing, and what her father has allowed her to wear for the winter, and then writes, seemingly abruptly:

I had just written something about Mrs. Van Daan when she came. Slap! I closed the book. “Hey, Anne, can’t I just have a look?”
“I’m afraid not.”
“Just the last page then?”
“No, I’m sorry.”
Naturally it gave me frightful shock, because there was an unflattering description of her on this particular page.
Yours Anne. (29)

This “c” version of the diary we read, however, contains no unflattering description of Mrs. Van Daan on this page or the page previous or following it. Frank is obviously referring back to writing that has been edited out by her father, who found some of her negative descriptions of Mrs. Van Daan inappropriate. The reader is confronted with a break in perspective, even if they were unaware that the work had been edited.
Frank also re-reads and edits her diary much like Klemperer. On January 2, 1944 she writes:

This morning when I had nothing to do I turned over some of the pages of my diary and several times I came across letters dealing with the subject “Mummy” in such a hotheaded way that I was quite shocked, and asked myself: “Anne, is it really you who mentioned hate? Oh Anne, how could you!” I remained sitting with the open page in my hand and thought about it and how it came about that I should have been so brimful of rage [. . .] my conscience isn’t clear as long as I leave you with these accusations, without being able to explain, on looking back, how it happened. (127)

Frank’s memory functions in her representations as she reflects on herself in the past within the present, much like Klemperer does, and, as we will see, Ruth Klüger does in her memoir in Chapter Five. The revisions and self-reflexive commentary present in the diaries of both Frank and Klemperer suggest a diary genre more layered and complex than what scholars like Young have described. These gaps in perspectives created by revision bring audiences’ attention to the construction of the genre of diary and the construction of this testimony as representation.

As the revision brings attention to the construction of the diary genre and blurs its boundaries, so too does the shift in audience from private to public. When Frank receives her diary shortly before going into hiding, she is excited to have a “friend” to write to. But Frank is aware of the possibility of larger audiences already by the third entry in the diary and comments on her act of writing—her desire to write: “It’s an odd idea for someone like me to keep a diary; not only because I have never done so before, but because it seems to me that neither I—or for that matter anyone else—will be interested in the unbosomings of a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl. Still, what does it matter? I want to write” (2). Frank comes to the conclusion that audience does not matter because her purpose of wanting to write is set. Her desire to write creates a sense of inner self that will get stronger with time as her writing becomes more oriented to a public audience.
For Frank, the turning point that changes her audience and purpose comes rather suddenly. On March 29, 1944 Frank writes:

Bolkestein, an M.P., was speaking on the Dutch News from London, and he said that they ought to make a collection of diaries and letters after the war. Of course they all made a rush at my diary immediately. Just imagine how interesting it would be if I were to publish a romance of “The Secret Annexe.” The title alone would be enough to make people think it was a detective story.

But, seriously, it would seem quite funny ten years after the war if we Jews were to tell how we lived and what we ate and talked about here. Although I tell you a lot, still even so, you only know very little of our lives. (191-2)

From this point her diary becomes aimed at a public audience and becomes much more focused on the description of events outside the Annex. As Stewart notes the diary is, “as a piece of Holocaust testimony, and always partial and deficient historical document, [but] both these functions need acknowledging” (Women’s 109). Like memory, “history” is also a construction of representation, and Frank, even at her young age, wishes to contribute historical elements and does so differently than Klemperer. Frank describes the availability of food getting worse and the Dutch sabotage increasing against the Germans. She writes more on politics. Russians are at the Polish border. Hungary is occupied by German troops: “there are still a million Jews there, so they too will have had it now” (193). Frank does not record the names of people or specific events in detail as an evidentiary record like Klemperer does, but with this public audience in mind, her writing reveals a new concern for the broad strokes of history, while Klemperer’s writing is increasingly concerned with those personal details that “history” is likely to miss.

On June 6, 1944 Frank writes about the coastal invasion we now know as D-Day. She spends two long pages on these broader strokes of history. She says that the best part of the invasion is to feel that they have friends coming: “we have been oppressed by those terrible Germans for so long, they have had their knives so at our throats, that the thought of friends and delivery fills us with confidence! Now, it doesn’t concern the Jews any more; no, it concerns
Holland and all occupied Europe” (245). With a new, theoretical audience (those who read these letters after the war), Frank sees a purpose in her work. She sees her writing as having some effect on the future. Much like Klemperer, as her audience and purpose become more public, Frank sees her writing in dialogue with writing that will come after. She writes: “I want to go on living even after my death! And therefore I am grateful to God for giving me this gift, this possibility of developing myself and of writing, or expressing all that is in me,” which implies that her writing will go on living after her death (197). For a modern audience these wishful statements are particularly haunting because although she was murdered, her words have lived beyond her death to affect millions of people.

It is evident from her text that Frank’s audience and purpose clearly shifted in response to the possibility of publication. For Klemperer, however, the shift to a public audience and purpose happened much earlier, perhaps because he was a mature, professional writer, who realized quickly the historical import of the events he was witnessing. As early as August 1934, the diary notes intended for his memoir begin to evince another, wider purpose: “It is not my intention here to register individual historical facts,” writes Klemperer, “Only this feeling of holding one’s breath” (I 79). In May 1941, although life for Klemperer has become much more dangerous, he continues to write and feels the purpose in doing so more strongly: “For the sake of my Curriculum, I must make notes even now, I must, no matter how dangerous it is. That is my professional courage. Certainly I also put other people at risk. But there is nothing else I can do” (I 387). He documents his memories of the history he witnesses and records these details as evidence of how it feels to be there as history is happening. As a professional writer, Klemperer understands the power of his writing to create action.
As more news filters through to the Klemperers about Auschwitz, about women as well as men being killed in concentration camps, about more deportations in Poland, Klemperer’s diary entries increase in frequency. By March of 1942 he is writing almost every day. These entries relay urgency to readers, who turn the pages with the foreknowledge of what really happened at this time, disbelieving that so much of this activity could have gone unnoticed by the German public. In May of 1942, even more anti-Jewish decrees are instituted. Klemperer sees the chokehold getting tighter and the Nazi intention to wear them down: “as many individuals as possible are to be driven to suicide” (II 53). Klemperer, however, refuses to give up. He states later, “But I shall go on writing. That is my heroism. I will bear witness, precise witness!” (II 61). With the increasingly repressive conditions, his focus has now firmly shifted to recording notes, not only for the memoir but also to bear witness to the history he is experiencing by detailing the substantial buildup of persecution: “I constantly think about the Curriculum, about ‘bearing witness’” and “I shall risk continuing with the diary. I shall bear witness until the very end” (II 70, 75). He sees history happening and sees that his writing will have some bearing on that history. It will be evidence of his experience, it will be evidence of the daily persecutions, and it will become a voice for those who do not survive. The purpose for his writing has been redefined: “This manuscript is my duty and my last fulfillment [emphasis added]” he writes in June of 1942, and that duty is to bear witness (II 85). Klemperer writes clearly now for the future.

As the situation worsens, he is trying to record everything. It is impossible to do so—any audience knows this, but the fact that he writes daily not only transmits this urgency he feels to audiences, but it also indicates a compression in time between witnessing and recording. That is, it seems that less time elapses between what he saw and what he wrote and, for audiences of the
diary genre, as Young believes, the authenticity of the diary as an eyewitness account increases. The change in frequency of diary entries, however, more clearly indicates a fluctuating relationship in the dialogic of memory and history. Klemperer intends his utterances to dialogue with audiences in the future. His diary exists on the chain of communication that records Jewish memory and history, in the past, in this history happening now, and in the future he may or may not live to see.

Klemperer also shows awareness of his audience (and a strong performative, self-reflexive tendency as he has shown throughout the diary), when he addresses audiences indirectly with discussions of how he writes memory and history. He refers often to the fallibility of memory, which undercuts the “truth” of his documentation on the one hand, but in his self-reflexive questioning, he also invites readers to be aware of the paradoxes and engage with him in the process of making meaning from memory. To abandon writing because of the fallibility of memory is not an option. Memory, in reference to trauma especially, has a tendency to want to block out what is painful. Klemperer knows this. He records the suicides of friends: “Suicide, attempted suicide: nothing more commonplace. Tomorrow the case will be supplanted by another case. In my memory too” (II 113). He reminds audiences that he does not remember everything, but returns them also to the historical details of these circumstances: he and his friends and neighbors are being broken down physically and mentally by this persecution, and what makes it worse than simply brutality is that: “There is nothing spontaneous about it, everything is methodically organized and regulated, it is ‘cultivated’ cruelty, and it happens hypocritically and mendaciously in the name of culture. No one is murdered here” (II 121).

Continuing with this self-reflexive writing, Klemperer comments on the fallibility of history as well. He states in March of 1942: “There is as little a science of history (at most we
know *what* happened, not *how* it came to pass) as there is a science of aesthetics. – [. . .] One can always only *interpret* subjectively, not know objectively” (II 25). With this statement, he outlines what he may see as the difference between the diary and *Curriculum Vitae*. His diary is about what happened. His memoir could recall the past and theorize how it came to pass, but neither he, nor anyone else, will ever know it objectively. As he reads Arthur Rosenberg’s *Origins of the German Republic* (1928), he remarks: “*Que sais-je?* I know nothing about the past, because I wasn’t there; and I know nothing about the present, because I was there” (II 30). Ironically, for readers in the present the meticulous detail that Klemperer provides does reveal a little of how this history came to pass in his life, in his friends’ lives, in one neighborhood in Dresden. History and memory are blurred categories for Klemperer and in these passages he reveals how history and memory can exist in a dialogic. They inform each other as they fluctuate and contradict each other. His writing reflects an awareness of this movement as a process, and his repeated references to such issues make this dialogic process transparent to readers as well.

Klemperer blurs the boundary of diary further. In *Volume II* of the diaries, there is a new turn in how Klemperer sees himself and views his writing. He sees Germany and history turning a corner from which it will never return. One very disturbing aspect of this diary (especially if the reader has gotten through the first 500 pages) is Klemperer’s prescience about how catastrophic this chain of events is and will be for the future. Any reader of the diary after the war, already “knows” what Klemperer does not yet know about history. The dull dread and relentless recording of this diary is nothing like a history book, nor is it an easily read personal diary—it is a mixture of the two. The genre of diary shifts with the genre of history—it is a hybridic response to the social context he faces. I am not claiming that it was Klemperer’s intention to hybridize the diary. What is apparent in analyzing this writing, nonetheless, is that
the genre of Holocaust diary upturns generic expectations as it turns from private to public writing. It performs actions within the parameters of its genre that audiences do not expect. It blurs the boundaries of genre and, in so doing, creates gaps that allow for audience response. The shifting movements of subjectivity, audience, and purpose react to the shifting historical context—the boundaries of genre cannot contain these shifts, a fact that authors like Spiegelman and Klüger, as I will show in Chapter Five, attend to more consciously in the creation of their hybrid forms to create active audience response.

2.6 Complicating Categories: The Performative Evocation of Additional Voices

Returning to the rationale presented at the opening of this chapter, I noted that Frank’s work has been extremely influential in shaping American audiences’ conceptions of the Holocaust. Unfortunately, this knowledge is too often cast in simplistic categories. While both authors open gaps for audience response through performative subjectivities and constructions of gender and genre, Klemperer’s identification as both German and Jewish additionally blurs the boundaries of victim and bystander more strongly than Frank’s work. This added dimension thus complicates the simplistic categorization of the Holocaust Americans tend towards because Klemperer describes complex individuals that exceed narrow categorizations.

To reveal each personal experience as individual and complex complicates the categories of experience and is also a part of the performative memorialization of traumatic experience. Providing multiple perspectives also creates movement in texts and causes breaks in point of view. As I noted above, these discordances are performative “intrusions” that break into the reader’s performance of the present (Sayre 94). Klemperer provides not only discordant perspectives from his point of view, but also provides the discordant perspectives of several classes of people around him. In addition to his shifting subjectivities, these perspectives provide
a unique insight into the multiple stories not only of victims, but of bystanders and perpetrators as well--which has the effect of complicating categories of “how people behaved in the war” for the American reader. Although I have described how Klemperer sees himself as a bystander at times, in his description of bystanders at other points he clearly does not include himself. He finds the brevity of Nazi propaganda before the election for example, “a gamble on stupidity and primitiveness. The country lets yesterday be drowned out” (I 82-3).

Klemperer also makes interesting distinctions about people and their loyalties and, for a reader who knows only a framework of this history, the categories seem more perplexing than a simple binary delineation of evil or good, perpetrator or victim. Jewish Studies scholar Aschheim agrees that Klemperer is “particularly keen at noting the built-in ambivalences, the difficulties in judgment,” when it comes to such categories (74). Klemperer describes his mortgage lender for instance as a man who is a “member of the Nazi party since ’29, formerly in the Stahlhelm, anti-Semitic as regards the immigrant Eastern Jews, is nonetheless a vehement opponent of the government, not only of its Jewish policy” (I 191) This is similar to the way that Ruth Klüger, an Austrian-Jewish survivor, delineates several types of Austrians (see my Chapter Five). In addition, Klemperer describes Estreicher, the Jewish landlord of the Jewish house they will move into as: “worse than any real Nazi” (I 334). This one reason why I think these particular German and Austrian texts are interesting. They complicate the categories of their “own” people as perpetrators and victims, but they also complicate other categories of collaborators (like the Dutch in Frank’s diary) and bystanders (like Germans or Americans) from another point of view, questioning, for instance, nationalistic classifications of Americans as “liberators.” Most readers prefer not to make such detailed distinctions.76 Generalizing is easier to absorb and hastens

76 Chalmers, in the preface to Klemperer’s diary for instance, states that Klemperer’s nuanced and individualized descriptions of various people exist in the face of widely published texts like Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing
closure. To delineate history in binaries of good and bad, or victim and perpetrator, creates simplified categories that can be filed away as finished history and forgotten. In Klemperer’s diary, his insightful critiques of the government and his complex portraits of the German public, juxtaposed with the daily details of Nazi tyranny, provide a disturbingly clear picture of one man’s experience, as one complex individual’s experience among millions.

Frank does not complicate these categories as deeply. When she writes about the murder of Dutch saboteurs by the Nazis, she says: “These outrages are described as ‘fatal accidents.’ Nice people, the Germans! To think that I was one of them too! No, Hitler took away our nationality long ago. In fact, Germans and Jews are the greatest enemies in the world” (39-40). Unlike Klemperer, who has been a German citizen for sixty-five years, Frank and her family left Germany to live in Holland when she was a child. She does not identify with being German. Klemperer sees the nuances in affiliations while Frank tends, in such examples, toward either/or categorizations, which could be a symptom of her age.

Frank’s diary also shows brief complications of categories when she describes her relationship to the Dutch with an understanding for bystanders’ perspectives. Frank describes one instance where Miep, the Dutch woman who hides them, admits she did not help a woman on the stairs of the Gestapo. Frank writes that Miep “did not dare take her in; no one would undergo such a risk” (39), showing sympathy with Miep’s position and, through this sympathy, an allegiance with Holland. But as the war continues and Jewish persecution increases, Frank’s experiences cause her to lose faith in her allegiance with the Dutch. When they almost get

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*Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, which claims an “all-pervasive” anti-Semitism in Germany that wanted extermination. He sees Goldhagen’s book as “symptomatic of a tendency to search for simple, unambiguous, single-cause explanations for the mass murder of Jews by Nazi Germany” (Preface I xvi). This dissertation serves, in contrast, as a complex study of representations of personal and collective experiences.

77 See Saul Friedlander for more on the dangers of premature foreclosure on Holocaust history.

78 Pacale Bos in “Reconsidering Anne Frank” notes that Frank’s lack of description of Dutch collaborators actually makes it seem as if they were mostly helpers like the protectors of the Annex, when, in fact, Holland had the highest
caught for being downstairs from the Annex, their Dutch protectors reproach them for being careless and Frank writes:

If we bear all this suffering and if there are still Jews left, when it is over, then Jews instead of being doomed, will be held up as an example. Who knows, it might even be our religion from which the world and all peoples learn good, and for that reason and that reason only do we have to suffer now. We can never become just Netherlanders, or just English, or representatives of any country for that matter, we will always remain Jews, but we want to, too. (207)

Frank accepts her fate here as God’s will but portrays herself as a victim who will be rewarded for her suffering. For American audiences, such musings create easy delineations between “good” and “bad.” Frank has made the Germans, as a whole, a nasty people, and Jews as victims to be seen, perhaps not as passive, but as accepting of their fate because of their religious beliefs. If Frank’s text influences, “our knowledge” of this event, failing to complicate these categories—to see Dutch as primarily betrayers and all Germans as evil, may reflect the similar tendency of American audiences to cast themselves simplistically as liberators, when history itself has complicated this category to show Americans to be bystanders and collaborators, and even perpetrators as well.

The details describing complex individuals that we see in Klemperer’s text, on the other hand, complicate the ease of blanket condemnations. In Klemperer’s diary there are Germans who seem completely oblivious about what is happening. He meets a civil servant, for instance, who knows nothing about the Jewish decrees. In contrast, he relates that Eva talks to a Russian soldier who tells of murdered Jews in Kiev and children’s heads being smashed against walls. The implication is that someone else in Germany besides Eva must have been told these same stories.

percentage of collaborators with the Nazis and a “substantial rate of betrayal of Jews in hiding” despite “no tradition of antisemitism in the Netherlands” (353).
In addition to recording examples of Nazi propaganda and manipulation, he records the voices of the “Voces populi”—the opinions of the average citizen, as well as the names of those he comes into contact with (I 334). He is very focused on recording as many voices and names as he can in the diary as a method of bearing witness as documentary evidence. Eva even warns him about recording names in detail: “Eva said I must not mention *any name*, must not put anyone at risk. Right—but how could I keep a precise record without names?” (II 398). By recording names and voices in this way, although his perspective dominates, Klemperer provides other perspectives, other opinions, and charts the changing reactions of people, both Jewish and non-Jewish, pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi. Such information provides the details of this history that many readers may not know. The details provide multiple perspectives that complicate this history and its categories, bringing new information from his personal perspective to recontextualize the larger history within his personal experience.

2.7 Conclusion

Klemperer’s writing is particularly performative because he engages with the larger context that surrounds his personal experience and that exists as a dialogic of history and memory on a vast continuum of time. History tells the story of one or a few, but there are millions of perspectives, millions of memories— all valid. Klemperer’s story is not the only story, but it is still an important story to tell. In both Frank and Klemperer, the juxtaposition of the larger history with the details of their experience and memory, along with shifting subjectivities, create movement and gaps that perform action in the act and process of writing. The words that record this movement are passed on, “not in the meaning of the words alone, but in their repeated utterance, in their performance: a performance that [. . .] takes place in the movement of the repetition and the gap” of these words as they reverberate into the past, the present, and the
future (Caruth “Traumatic” 104). With these reverberating movements, spaces are created for audiences’ responsive understanding. A message can be received by audiences along a chain of communication—creating action in writing that bears witness and creates readers who bear witness to this process.

This dissertation proposes that all the authors I examine are self-reflexive to a degree and aware of their words’ impact on readers.79 Each writes to bear witness and calls audiences to act, regardless of genre or proximity. My theory of performative memorialization will show that the authors I examine exhibit self-reflexivity about their writing and self awareness of audience in a number of genres—including diary, and that the call to action is elicited because these authors perform writing. In this chapter, I have shown how both Frank and Klemperer are self-reflexive about themselves and about the writing act, and how there is performative movement forward and between their multiple selves. Additionally, I have shown how Klemperer’s, and to a lesser degree Frank’s, writing is performative in the evocation of other voices and perspectives to complicate categories of bystander, victim, and perpetrator.80 These early texts display crucial elements of performative memorialization and the gaps created by these intrusions create action in audiences.

Diary writers, because of their close proximity, sought to tell people what was happening at that time to effect change. Young claims this imperative was stronger because they were closer to the event (Writing 17). This dissertation, however, suggests that the imperative to bear witness is equally great for authors who bear witness after the fact and into the present. These

79 Young, in contrast, discusses the “shared characteristics” of diaries and the first eyewitness reports coming out of Poland, which he called “technically ‘memoirs’” (28) and states that such transmissions are direct calls to action; that they are based, in fact, “on the premise that written testimony leads to action” (29). He claims such reports are unlike the typical memoir because they are more “self-reflexive and aware of their words’ immediate impact on readers” (29). This dissertation claims self-reflexivity for all the examined authors.

80 See Raul Hilberg’s Perpetrators Victims, Bystanders (1992) on these particular categories. Hilberg’s work as a historian was some of the first and most detailed to come out about the Holocaust.
authors seek to retell and recontextualize this history to effect change and create action in
audiences in an era that continues to see an increase in ethnic cleansings and genocides
worldwide. I theorize that these Holocaust discourses evolve in relation to one another and in
relation to the changing audiences and contexts that receive/shape them.

Whereas Frank and Klemperer attend to the details of this history without knowing its
larger context, in the following chapter on memoirs, the authors write from a more distanced
vantage point. With this distance from the event for instance, memoir authors write for a wider
audience and to bear witness from the outset. I will show that because this public audience is
already assumed, performative intrusions appear differently in memoirs. There are intrusions
which disturb the audiences’ generic expectations as in diaries, but in Holocaust memoirs these
intrusions result not only from generic expectations, but also from specific representational
choices, most clearly seen in the construction of gendered identities and performative responses
to audiences in varying social and historical contexts. I will show that these gendered identities
and these representational choices make audiences aware of the construction of this
representation of history and memory, not as history “happens” as in diaries, but in retrospect,
after this history has been experienced and these memories remembered. Issues of subjectivity
and representation, as they relate to genre and gender are more clearly related in memoirs than
they were in diaries. As gendered identities in these texts reveal the constructed-ness of the text,
they also reveal the constructed-ness of gender, which opens up a space for audiences to respond
to what they know: gender constructions as masculine and feminine, in the context of a
dehumanizing experience.

As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, performative memorialization theorizes in
part, that Holocaust discourses exist along an evolving chain of communication that responds to
 evolving audiences within specific social contexts. Thus, the elements of performative memorialization are less pronounced in early texts and more pronounced in later texts because the context surrounding the reception of Holocaust texts in the United States has changed and these texts progressively change in response. Diaries show less of an awareness of such audiences because of their proximity to the event. Memoirs, as the next discourse on the chain of communication, because they are written in retrospect, show a greater awareness of audiences and contexts, and the two memoir authors I examine increasingly produce writing acts that seek to create social action in their audiences.
Chapter Three: Memoirs: Performative, Gendered Subjectivities in Laura Hillman’s *I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree: a Memoir of a Schindler’s List Survivor* and Elie Wiesel’s *Night*

The tendency for a given subject-position to overwhelm the self and become a total identity becomes pronounced in trauma, and a victim’s recovery may itself depend on the attempt to reconstruct the self as more than a victim.

Dominick LaCapra

3.1 Introduction

Chapter Two explored Holocaust diaries as the first forms of communication to document, at close proximity to the event, the personal experiences and the proceedings leading up to the Holocaust. Like diaries, memoirs also emerged in the early years after the war as texts intended to document personal experience. The crucial distinction between these two forms of discourse is that memoirs offer a testimony of the Holocaust from a distanced vantage point that allows for more personal reflection. This distance results in a writing act that is produced with conscious choices by the author about what is to be represented. Memoirs are further distinguishable from diaries because they are written with the knowledge that the Holocaust happened and have more access to the historical details surrounding the event. Unlike diaries, Holocaust memoirs are set within this historical framework and respond to these facts and with the knowledge of the enormity of this event. Both diaries and memoirs bear witness to the event and the experiences of authors and other victims, but in contrast to diaries, memoirs also bear witness to all that we “know” now historically, in addition to bearing witness to the survival of the author. Elemental to the genre of Holocaust memoir, therefore, is its expression of a story about experiencing horror and surviving it.

In terms of this dissertation Holocaust memoirs provide a unique example of performative memorialization because they reveal how each writer deliberately chooses which experiences to represent and the manner in which these experiences will be represented. While
diaries contain an authorial decision-making process revealed through revision and self-reflexive reflections on the writing act as I pointed out in Chapter Two, memoirs reveal a text that relates a personal experience within the frame of a chronological, historical background narrative, and a story of one person’s experience of survival that has an episodic “beginning” and “end.” Audiences approach memoirs with the expectations that they will encounter these generic elements of narrative story with episodic beginnings and ends, and in the Holocaust memoir, this story often “ends” with the liberation of the camps. Holocaust memoirs, however, immediately upset these generic expectations by bearing witness not only to the experience and survival of the author, but also to the experiences of other victims, who may not have survived. In the case of the memoirs I examine in this chapter, generic expectations are also upset when the chronology of the story, told in retrospect, is disturbed by “intrusions” in the text that disrupt the performance of the present for the audience (Sayre 94). We saw such disruptions in diaries in the performative, shifting subjectivities of the authors as they responded to shifting historical contexts and shifts in private and public audiences. In memoirs, however, a public audience is already assumed and intrusions in the text, or gaps, are created in different manners. The intrusions which disturb the audiences’ generic expectations generally occur through representational choices made by the author. In Holocaust memoirs these choices are most clearly seen in the construction of gendered identities and performative responses to specific social and historical contexts. Strongly gendered identities and carefully chosen representations that respond to specified contexts make audiences aware of the construction of this representation of history and memory, not as history “happens” as in diaries, but in retrospect, after this history has been experienced and these memories remembered.
By representing many of their memories in terms of gender, memoir authors bring audiences’ attention to their choices to present the content in this way; audiences are made aware of the construction of gender as an active process. Issues of subjectivity and representation, as they relate to genre and gender are more clearly related. As gendered identities in these texts reveal the constructed-ness of the text, they also reveal the constructed-ness of gender, which opens up a space for audiences to respond to what they know: gender constructions as masculine and feminine, in the context of a dehumanizing experience. In these strongly gendered constructions, memoir authors often depict a protagonist who acts in response to acts of persecution. Indeed, according to Holocaust scholar Dominick LaCapra, the “victim’s recovery may itself depend on the attempt to reconstruct the self as more than a victim” (Representing 12). In addition to the author’s ability to “work through” a traumatic past, such representations also complicate the category of “victims” as passive. “Our knowledge,” as Americans, tends to simplify this category of victim, perhaps because the event still seems too unbelievable. We tell ourselves, “I wouldn’t have let that happen to me,” or we have seen too many repetitive images of emaciated, nameless, androgynous-looking survivors without knowledge of the complex contexts that surround the event or person. Regardless of the reason for this simplification, the construction of strongly gendered identities within these memoirs about the Holocaust complicates the category of victim for American audiences. What is unique about these memoirs is that the authors additionally construct themselves within this history as gendered—and the spaces opened by these constructions are spaces where audiences can actively respond to a particularized, complex individual who has suffered, instead of essentializing these authors as nameless “others,” androgynous victims to whom they have no responsibility to respond.
The second means by which these memoirs reveal performative intrusions is through the authors’ representational choices as they relate to specific social and historical contexts. Each memoir author I examine here includes carefully chosen representations which are addressed (indirectly) to the audiences at the time of their respective publications. Holocaust discourses are “writing” that creates action, in part, because they change in response to evolving social contexts and audiences to remain vital. Because of the fallibility of memory, survivors are aware that they cannot present narratives that are completely factual, according to Holocaust scholar Waxman, but they do believe “they can be true to the essence of the suffering” (497) and these survivors are witnesses to their own suffering, “in the past as victims, and in the now of telling as survivors” (Witness 34). Through the tools of performative memorialization, the process of translating memory into discourse can be marked as a traumatic moment that is constructed by the social contexts of genre and gender, and engages audiences to participate performatively in the process of construction-- audiences bear witness to this process of the survivor’s writing act that bears witness to their experience, other victims, and the event.

This dissertation claims that the multimodal quality of these memoir discourses increases the capacity for audiences to learn through multiple modes and practices, because such modes and practices encourage complex and layered meaning-making activities. The multimodal theory of performative memorialization posits that teaching and learning will occur to various degrees in response to various modes and practices. The meaning that audiences make from diaries will be different than the meanings they make from memoirs. What we will see in this chapter as well is that the memoir genre, although it remains essentially the same in terms of purpose, becomes increasingly multimodal in response to new social/historical contexts.

81 This attention to the factual influences the representations constructed by memoir authors such as Hillman, Klüger, and Spiegelman (Chapter Five), who foreground their own “historical” research within their personal narratives.
This chapter contrasts Laura Hillman’s *I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree: a Memoir of a Schindler’s List Survivor* (2005) and Elie Wiesel’s *Night* (1960), two memoirs from Jewish survivors who were teenagers in Nazi concentration camps. Like diaries, issues of subjectivity and representation remain at the forefront of this examination of memoir authors who bear witness to their experience, the event, and other victims. Chapter one discussed "subjectivity" in Foucault’s terms, as the product of discourse. The first chapter also discussed gender as the product of discourse. Since both are the products of discourse it can be seen that subjectivity is thus, gendered. According to Feminist Autobiography theorist Tess Coslett, subjectivity is also “produced in discourse and/or performance” through the act of writing autobiography (10). The memoirs of Hillman and Wiesel perform this act of writing the self through the representation of constructed, gendered identities as a response to the dehumanizing experience of the Holocaust. The particularized, gendered responses they present underscore the uniqueness of each individual experience and engage audiences in their constructions in the manner described above.

Both memoirs examined are additionally performative as they engage with the particular social/historical contexts under which they were produced. Hillman’s memoir reveals evidence of performative evocation and citation that reveal multimodal qualities that aim to teach audiences. These elements are not as present in the first edition of Wiesel’s text because of the different historical contexts in which each text was originally produced. Because it was published late in the chain of communication generated by Holocaust discourses, Hillman’s 2005 text responds to material that has come before it and to audiences that are distanced from the actual event. As one of the original texts from which this chain of communication originated, Wiesel’s original publication naturally responds to a different social/historical context and thus displays a different set of representations in response to this different context. *Night* was written,
in part, because Wiesel felt a duty to tell his story because few had done so in the early years after the war. Subsequent editions of Wiesel’s *Night*, however, demonstrate some of this inter-textual dialogic apparent in Hillman’s later text. Both authors continue to be actively involved in public speaking about their experiences, and all these dialogues increase the multimodality of these texts-- they increasingly seek to teach audiences about this event and create action in these audiences.

3.2 Rationale for Text Selection

In terms of genre, the memoir is the most frequent form of Holocaust discourse. The production of memoirs has been the result of a variety of choices at various times. Some memoirs were written directly after the war but were not published until a few years later. Survivor Primo Levi’s memoir was written and sought a publisher for a few years before it was published in 1947. Some memoirs were written and published much later. Charlotte Delbo for instance, wrote her memoir in 1946 and did not publish it until 1972 (the English translation was published in 1995). As with diaries, some memoirs are still being discovered, like the memoir/novel by Irene Nemirovsky I noted in Chapter One that was recently published in 2005. Finally, some memoirs are just now being written. Ruth Klüger, who I discuss in Chapter Five, wrote her memoir in German in 1992.

The initial period of publication in the 1940s and 1950s was followed by a period in which survivors were relatively silent about their experiences. Holocaust scholar Sidra Erzahi sees this initial period as an event that remained “only a small ripple in the public consciousness” (21). That is, a wider dialogue about the topic was not instituted at that time. Erzahi outlines five

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82 Much fiction has been written about experiences of the Holocaust as well, but typically “fictional” and literary forms such as novels or poetry are not considered in this dissertation because I am interested in how history and memory exist in a dialogic for audiences in discourses that seek to tell a “true” story. The relationship between author and audience is very different in discourses announced as “fictional.”

83 I provide here only a few notable examples within a list of memoirs that numbers in the hundreds.
primary motives for survivors to write about their experience: a desire for revenge, the need to bear witness, to commemorate the dead, to absolve the self of passivity or complicity, and to warn humanity (By Words 21). The need to bear witness has been noted as the most compelling motive (See Erzahi, Young, Bernard-Donals, Felman and Laub). As I noted in Chapter One, the activity of bearing witness requires an audience who listens. Autobiography theorist Cosslett agrees with Holocaust scholars that: “Intersubjectivity is clearly central to this kind of personal story” (9). In the years directly after the war, as I explained above, this audience was not always present.

As I also noted in Chapter One, however, there was a resurgence of interest in the Holocaust in the United States that was triggered by a variety of events. In the 1970s, according to Holocaust scholar Marianne Hirsch, there was an increase in Holocaust courses taught at the university level, which coincided with the release of the television series Holocaust (watched by 120 million people), and in 1978 Jimmy Carter created a Commission on the Holocaust that resulted in the building of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. (Teaching, 6). My first chapter also notes other events that may have triggered this resurgence such as the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and persistent Holocaust denial.

The contrast of Hillman’s memoir, I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree, with Wiesel’s Night falls along lines similar to the reasons I outlined in Chapters One and Two. In examining how knowledge concerning the memorialization of the Holocaust is constructed for American audiences, I am concerned with looking at texts that are authoritative sources of “our”

84 The President’s Commission on the Holocaust was established by Jimmy Carter on November 1, 1978. It was commissioned to decide on an American memorial to commemorate the Holocaust. The Commission consisted of survivors, lay people, clergy, scholars, and congressmen. And an educational foundation and a world genocide Committee on Conscience were also instituted at this time among several other dictates not listed here (Commission).
85 See my Chapter One for a fuller discussion of these reasons and the scholars who discuss them.
knowledge about the Holocaust. As I described Frank’s diary, Wiesel’s *Night* has become ubiquitous for Americans. Like Frank’s diary, it has gone through several printings and has been published widely in many languages. There is a new translation of *Night* that was published in 2006. For the purposes of this dissertation, as with the diary of Anne Frank, I will use the original edition, the more roughly translated version (according to Wiesel)\(^86\) published in 1960 to discuss because this edition has been in wide publication in the United States and is the edition with which Americans are most familiar. Additionally, Wiesel continues to write and speak prolifically on the subject of the Holocaust and genocide, making his very presence, for many Americans, synonymous with these discussions. Wiesel had a large role in the creation of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and a visitor will find several quotes of his within its walls.\(^87\) The recent inclusion of *Night* on Oprah Winfrey’s Book List created a resurgence of interest in this text as well.

Hillman’s work compliments *Night* because it is also a memoir about a teenager who survives Auschwitz. Hillman’s memoir was only recently published in 2005, but in a personal interview, she explained to me that the memoir was written over twenty years ago. She had simply waited until after her husband’s death to publish it as a memorial to him and to those who were murdered in the war. Like Klemperer’s diary, Hillman’s memoir is a more “obscure”

\(^{86}\) In the preface to the newest edition translated by his wife, Wiesel notes passages that were in the Yiddish version of the text, but never made it into any of the translations. The head of the “prestigious Éditions de Minuit,” the publishing house in France that first published *Night*, “edited and further cut the French version,” and Wiesel remembers accepting the “decision because I worried that some things might be superfluous. Substance alone mattered. I was more afraid of having said too much than too little” (2006 x). This commentary underscores the societal climate in which Wiesel first published *Night*. There was not a wide listening audience for a Holocaust memoir, especially in France, and he was afraid to say too much.

\(^{87}\) Primo Levi’s memoir would seem to be a good choice of an “authoritative” text for some of these reasons as well, but his book and his persona are not as ubiquitous as Wiesel’s for the American public. Levi tended to be more reclusive and recently passed away. Additionally, some of his writing has only recently been translated into English.
composition for American audiences in contrast to the more familiar *Night*. The fact that Hillman’s original memoir title was altered by her publishing company serves as additional commentary on how this relative “obscurity” is assumed to affect American audiences.

Hillman’s original title was simply, *I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree*, a title that reflects the promise that her future husband made to her in the camps if they both survived. The publishing company insisted that “A Memoir of a Schindler’s List Survivor” be added to the title. This fact is true—she was on Schindler’s list; but this fact was not important enough for her to include in her title. The publisher assumes American audiences will be able to “locate” this memoir as a Holocaust memoir because of the Schindler reference. Although Hillman emigrated from Europe to the United States and has resided here since 1948, because she was born Jewish in northern Germany, her memoir provides a perspective similar to Klemperer’s—a perspective of this experience from the lesser known (for Americans) German-Jewish perspective. This perspective complicates “our” knowledge about this event from memoirs like *Night* that seem “universal,” providing an alternate cultural and gendered representation of what seem like similar experiences.

Hillman’s and Wiesel’s memoirs reveal performative subjectivities, not shifting subjectivities, but strongly gendered subjectivities in response to dehumanizing experiences. These representations, as I claim above, create gaps in the text that allow for audience response. Through the use of “typical” gendered constructions of femininity and masculinity, audiences must negotiate their own gendered identities through these representations and complicate their perceptions of victim. These two memoir writers display not only constructed, gendered

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88 This initial obscurity, however, is in rapid transition. Hillman has spent the last two years on a book tour, speaking about the book and about the Holocaust. Her book appears in the bookstore at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and as of 2007, her book is being adapted into an opera in Los Angeles.

89 The facts about publishing that I note for both memoirs and diaries underscore the importance of the multimodal strata of production and distribution, which I will not have the opportunity to discuss at length in this project.
identities in their representations that are precisely placed into the history of what happened but, as we shall see, they further upset audience expectations of the genre of memoir through performative evocation and citation in their writing that address the particular social and historical contexts in which these texts first appear. Hillman and Wiesel, although they write with the foreknowledge of what happened in the Holocaust, do not have knowledge about what will happen in the future. Hillman and Wiesel bear witness to what happened by writing their personal stories, but they also respond to what will happen by dialoguing with stories and histories that have preceded them and with audiences in the present and in the future—audiences who will become witnesses to their process of bearing witness.

3.3 Laura Hillman’s Performative Subjectivity: The Construction of Gender

More generally, the process of coming critically to terms with the past requires perspective on subject positions and the ability to resist the total consumption of the self by a given identity that threatens to prevent any form of renewal. Dominick LaCapra

As I noted in the preceding chapter, it is important to complicate the categories of behavior associated with this event in order to keep the dialogue about this history complex, open, and ongoing for American audiences who tend to simplify these categories and relegate the past as extraneous to the present. In this chapter, I address how “‘doing gender’” in memoirs complicates the tendency to universalize or simplify by “the embedding of gender-typical behaviour in a social context” (Wodak 13). Much as I have delineated subjectivity and gender as products of discourse, Gender theorist Ruth Wodak notes that, “gender is continually realized in interactional form” and it is in these interactions that patriarchal inequality is produced and reproduced (13). This is assumed most often to apply to women within a patriarchal system, which is why I begin with Hillman, but in an extremely repressive, patriarchal system like Nazi Germany, where the scapegoating of Jews was utilized as one way to retain power, this
inequality was reinforced for both Jewish women and men.\(^9\) Therefore, this chapter locates
gendered responses to dehumanizing experiences as moments that bring audiences’ attention to
the construction of gender as a process to combat the simplified categorization of Jews as
victims. By dealing with issues of gender construction, indeed by defining themselves through
such constructions, Hillman and Wiesel reveal conscious choices about how they remember
themselves in this historical picture. By revealing strongly gendered subjectivities in response to
dehumanizing experiences, Hillman and Wiesel complicate audiences’ simplified perceptions of
androgynous victims, and open spaces for response, in and through, “familiar” or “typical”
constructions of gender.

The Nazi satellite system of deportation, ghettos, work camps, and death camps had a
primary goal: to dehumanize and eventually destroy all Jews. Hillman and Wiesel retain a strong
sense of self, but each responds particularly to Nazi persecution. In testifying to the ways the
Nazis attempted this, Hillman and Wiesel recount similar experiences that reflect particularized
responses constructed as “feminine” or “masculine” in opposition to dehumanizing experiences.
Although there are many aspects to this, I will examine three ways the Nazis tried to enforce this
dehumanization: language, nakedness, and the shaving of hair.

Hillman was born in northwest Germany, in the small town of Aurich. The experience
she describes in *Lilac Tree* as a German-Jewish victim is unusual because she spent years in
several different sites within the Nazi system. Her experience is also influenced by the fact that
in the region of her birth, *Niedersachsen*, only *Hochdeutsch* is spoken. *Hochdeutsch* is also

\(^9\) Wodak addresses the gains made from seeing the constructed-ness of the sexes as Judith Butler does, but adds that
this ignores the fact that “in our societies, biological sex is still used as a powerful categorization device” (12). This
is similar to what many scholars of women and the Holocaust aimed to show: that biological differences resulted in
abuse by the Nazis that targeted, for instance, pregnant women for immediate execution. I am indebted to this line of
research and agree that biological differences still dictate inequality in some respects. In this project, however, I
focus on how representations of memory reflect constructions of gender and, as a result, reflect the constructed-ness
of the *process* of discourse.
known as High German, the German that is taught in school and spoken without dialect. It is perhaps not unusual then, that Hillman pays attention to issues that have to do with the German language in her work. As Klemperer observed with great detail, the Nazis relied on euphemistic manipulations of language to “soften” their policies for the public. Jews were propagandized as vermin, for instance, to make the inhumane treatment they received seem less atrocious to the German public.

Hillman describes this manipulation of language as crucial to the success of the Nazis. Nazi language was anti-Semitic to propagandize, euphemistic to deceive, and degrading to dehumanize. The Nazis used informal German to degrade prisoners. German has a formal “you” Sie, and an informal “you” du. The delineation in their usage is proscribed by age and level of intimacy. Du is used with children or with people one is close to (for instance family). To use the du in talking to prisoners was derogatory because the speech between the prisoners and guards was far from familiar, and by German language standards, this type of speech is considered very rude.

Hillman also describes the words of Untersturmführer Liebholt as they disembark in Wieliczka, Poland to work in the salt mines. He shouts at them: “‘the sight of you offends me. You smell like swine.’ He went on with his ravings,” she notes vaguely, “but I stopped listening. He was trying to break our morale-- what was left of it anyway” (151). She does not list many of the words he or the other soldiers use, though she spoke fluent German. Mostly, she simply refers to the language en masse as “vulgar,” “insulting,” or “ravings.” She doesn’t describe the language in detail, she classifies it. Reclaiming degrading language as her own classification of “vulgar” allows her to ignore it-- not internalize it. Thus, whereas readers might be inclined to

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91 The term anti-Semitic is used to underscore not only the anti-Jewish bias, but the extreme racial aspects to Nazi propaganda.
see the prisoners as victims, Hillman reconstructs this scene making rhetorical choices that reflect a strong sense of self in resistance, a “typically” feminine self who is offended by vulgar language.

Much as language was designed to objectify the body and dehumanize the prisoners, nakedness was also used to humiliate. Again, Hillman represents herself in these experiences as constructed strongly as “feminine.” For women, nakedness in front of family, let alone strangers was a horrifying prospect. In the assembly place for deportees Hillman describes her first experience: “I peeled off layer after layer of clothing with the greatest speed and stood naked, for the first time in my life, among strangers: I felt violated” (45). Then she endures a body crevice search having “never been so disgraced” (45). Later, when she has been transported to another camp, Plaszow, she describes joining a “line of naked women being inspected by white-gloved officers: move sideways …bend down …turn around, they shouted as they touched our naked bodies with their riding whips,” Hillman records this without much emotion attached (170). Unlike her first encounters with nakedness and shame, she now worries more about the pain. Although the nakedness here is seemingly even more violating than before, being inspected like cattle, it no longer affects her. Yet, after several months of such attempts at humiliation, much like the vulgar language, Hillman does not internalize the experience. Later, when she describes being naked in Auschwitz, she simply writes of herself and her friend Eva: “Together we ran naked and wet through the cold night” (196). She blocks out the outward degradation to nourish her inward self; she remains concerned with her friend Eva’s fate and worries about her paramour Dick. Much like Klemperer uses writing to exert control in situations where he feels helpless Hillman uses her writing to exert control on the representation of her self in this past

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92 Many female prisoners have described a similar humiliation in their memoirs (see Hardman). Holocaust scholar Anna Hardman claims that such “humiliation, though not classified by these women as sexual assault, can be brutalization that is biologically determined” (7).
situation. Her body is forced to be an object but she retains a sense of self by exerting control in areas she commands: she can be a good friend and a good girl in love. Hillman represents a self in her memoir that resists these dehumanizing attacks through constructions of a strong “feminine” identity.

Like her experience with language and nakedness, Hillman describes her first encounter with shaving as traumatic. She describes the feeling of the razor against her flesh as her head and pubic area are shaved:

A barber, a prisoner in a striped uniform, worked with great speed cutting my hair right down to my scalp. When the dull clippers grazed my skin again and again, I flinched. But he was stronger and rougher; there was no way to escape his grip. I was passed on to another barber who shaved off my pubic hair while I stood on a stool before him. The razor cut into my flesh sending a stream of blood down my legs. (196)

A temporary loss of self has occurred as a result of losing her hair, the outward evidence of her “femininity.” Considered by the Nazis as less than human, all prisoners in Auschwitz were alike. They were not allowed the outward expression of femininity, and there were only a few acknowledgments of biological sex in the camps, such as segregation and chemicals in the food that were rumored to have many purposes.93 It is here in Auschwitz that she admits feeling a desire to die for the first time. Hillman describes an Appell (the daily prisoner count): “At last the count began. Thousands of women lined the square, all resembling one another in a nameless, faceless way. I saw myself in them. The thought of ending my own life crossed my mind” (199). For a woman, whose visibility is often linked to her body and outward appearance, invisibility—looking like everyone else—creates a deep wound to the feminine self, who, in this time period, is primarily expected, as Anne Frank also described, to be pretty enough to fulfill their societal goal: to marry and have a family.

93 Hillman thinks there were chemicals present in the food that were meant to cause sterilization. Klüger notes that this assumption just showed that some women, because of their class, had never experienced months of hunger before. Theorist Anna Hardman cites others survivors who had different theories about these chemicals.
Hillman describes her time in Auschwitz and the awful things she witnesses: selections, children’s transports going straight to the gas chambers, narrowly escaping a selection herself. With these observations the tone of her writing is grim. Life is getting worse. But in the case of the dehumanizing experience of shaving, Hillman represents a gendered subjectivity that responds not as a victim, but as a woman who reclaims her sense of hope and agency with the reappearance of physical attributes “typically” feminine. “In time,” she states, “my hair grew back. It wasn’t as though I had a full head of hair again, but a little bit of stubble began to grow and there were even a few curls. Every time my hand went up to touch the curls, I smiled. Having hair would make me look and feel like a girl again” (211). Her experiences continue to be abject but the fact that growing her hair back gives her a sense of “being a girl again,” indicates that camp life was beginning to make her feel unlike a girl. With the extreme situations Hillman depicts, there is a sense of agency in representing her subjectivity as strongly gendered. To do so also brings audiences’ attention to the fact that she is not a genderless, dehumanized victim. She is a woman who acts in response. Audiences can respond to the gaps opened by these “typically” gendered representations.

The dehumanizing activities practiced in the camps aimed to take away selfhood by attacking outwardly constructed gender characteristics of femininity: shaving hair, enforcing public nakedness, using degrading language. But they also attempted to attack inwardly constructed gender characteristics of femininity: separating families and sterilizing women. Considering Hillman’s text through the lens of the discourse model I described in Chapter One, we recall that gender as a discursive practice views individuals “as ‘positioned’ as masculine or feminine within gender discourses” (Weatherall 143). Positioning does not reveal the author so much as it reveals the social contexts surrounding the production of their discourse. In Hillman’s
text, the positioning is consciously represented in her memoir in “gendered moments.” To apply
the social constructionist view to Hillman, we see that language produces gender rather than
reflects it. Thus, Hillman can produce a strongly gendered self through the process of her writing
act to constitute a subjectivity that is performative and creates gaps for audience response. Just as
the movement of multiple genres as constructed creates gaps, constructions of gender create
movement and gaps for audience participation and response. Constructions of gender, much like
constructions of genre, constitute another specific, multimodal communicative practice which
facilitates layered meaning-making by the audience. In these examples from Hillman’s text,
Hillman can be said to represent herself as an agent rather than a victim, by engaging in
constructed discourses of “femininity.” This is an important construction of her identity as
strongly gendered in response to dehumanizing experiences through the act of writing her
autobiography.

3.4 Elie Wiesel’s Performative Subjectivity: The Construction of Gender

In the concentration and death camps, where dehumanizing practices were applied to
males as well, this self constructed as gendered can also be seen in Wiesel’s Night where his
representations of himself, in response to similar experiences as Hillman, construct a strong
“masculine” identity. Wiesel, in contrast to Hillman, experiences only Auschwitz and its
satellites and for a shorter period than Hillman-- though no less brutal. Because Wiesel lived in
Hungary, his family was ghettoized and deported to the concentration camps in a matter of
months. He was twelve when these experiences began. Like Hillman, in representing his
traumatic experience, Wiesel chooses to represent a strong, gendered identity in response to
dehumanizing experiences. In representing a strong, “masculine” subjectivity, Wiesel subverts
American audiences’ tendency to simplify the “victim” as passive.
Wiesel, like Hillman, also learns to resist Nazi techniques to dehumanize him with language. When he and many other prisoners are marched out of the camps later in the book, the SS who want them to increase their pace shout, “faster, you swine, you filthy sons of bitches” (81). Wiesel describes the cold and the endless running noting that, “If one of us stopped for a second, a sharp shot finished off another filthy son of a bitch” (81). Here he uses the very same term the SS used to describe his own position or any other prisoner’s subject position. In the constructed hierarchy of language, the universal “human” is often male. By reclaiming this terminology and using it to describe someone other than himself, Wiesel combats his loss of power by taking control over discourse. If he uses such terms, he has control over them. Much like Hillman’s categorization of degrading language, Wiesel reclaims language (temporarily) and remakes his identity through the act of writing his autobiography. In choosing to describe this particular incident, he recasts Wiesel the victim as Wiesel the agent.

Outward constructions of gender, such as hair, also apply to men. For deeply observant Jews (as Wiesel considered himself) to retain a beard and side locks is a form of religious piety (2006, 3). Although the Nazis consciously attacked these customs by shaving Jewish men, Wiesel’s gender identity as it is related to hair may not be as fixed as Hillman’s because of his age. Wiesel, though very pious, would not have faced this particular humiliation because he was too young to grow a beard. He states matter-of-factly: “they took our hair off with clippers, and shaved off all the hair on our bodies” (33). Examinations which include shaving, as Hardman notes, can be examples of the “brutalization particular to women’s bodies” (Hardman 7). Wiesel’s representation of this event might seem to support this.

But Wiesel describes the experience further: “it was no longer possible to grasp anything. The instincts of self-preservation, of self-defense, of pride, had deserted us” (34). They run
naked through the night into the clothing barracks. It is only later after reporting on these events, that Wiesel makes a conclusion about how it feels. Dehumanization has a cumulative, gendered effect: “Within a few seconds, we had ceased to be men” (34). Such a statement follows his realization that they had lost their sense of self-defense and pride: valued traits constructed as “masculine.” Some may claim that this statement means simply that they had ceased to be human. But in either case what he loses makes him feel less like a man, which means he is invisible and powerless. As with language, the “universal” human identity is often constructed as male.

Like Hillman, Wiesel chooses to subvert the dehumanizing context of the camp through representations of self that create agency through an identity constructed as “masculine”: strong and rebellious. The societal system of patriarchy that fails women on a regular basis gives men, conversely, a sense of entitlement, a sense of whose loss is harsh. The system of religion fails Wiesel in this way particularly because of his age. After many months of dehumanizing camp life, Wiesel, once a pious boy who identified deeply with Judaism, has lost his attachment to religion. As a thirteen year old, rebellion would be common, and he has not had enough time to question and re-solidify his allegiance to the religious system in which he grew up. Holocaust scholar Anna Horowitz agrees that the “narrative presents Eliezer’s theological struggle—his crisis of faith” (“Boyhood” 213). Instead of using religious piety to combat dehumanization, Wiesel represents himself with constructions of masculinity that focus on physical strength and rebellion.

At the beginning of Night, Wiesel and his father are in Auschwitz. Wiesel retains disbelief about what happens here. He talks with his father:

But I told him that I did not believe they could burn people in our age, that humanity would never tolerate it . . .”
“Humanity? Humanity is not concerned with us. Today anything is allowed. Anything is possible, even these crematories . . .”

His voice was choking.

“Father,” I said, “if that is so, I don’t want to wait here. I’m going to run to the electric wire. That would be better than slow agony in the flames.”

He did not want to answer. He was weeping. His body was shaken convulsively. Around us, everyone was weeping. Someone began to recite the Kaddish, the prayer for the dead. I do not know if it has ever happened before, in the long history of the Jews, that people have ever recited the prayer for the dead for themselves.

“Yitgadal veyitkadach, shmé raba . . . May His Name be blessed and magnified …” whispered my father.

For the first time, I felt revolt rise up in me. Why should I bless His name? The Eternal, Lord of the Universe, the All-Powerful and Terrible, was silent. What had I to thank Him for?” (30-31)

But in the end, as he nears the flames on his first night in the camp, Wiesel does say the Kaddish. His response to impending death is revolt against God, but piety overcomes him on this night. This is a struggle he reveals at other points in his memoir. Similarly, on Rosh Hashanah (1944), 10,000 men attend a service in the camp. Wiesel does not attend.

Wiesel again represents a “masculine” identity that is not humble in the face of the divine, but is, rather, stronger than God. “I had ceased to plead. I was no longer capable of lamentation. On the contrary, I felt very strong. I was the accuser, God the accused” (65). And yet he feels terribly alone as a result. Later, on Yom Kippur he refuses to fast; his father has forbidden it anyway, but Wiesel also sees it as an act of protest against God. Here he also gains no satisfaction from strength and rebellion; he simply feels “a great void” (66).

Likewise on a death march evacuating the camp, he tries again to construct a strong physical identity. Their limbs are frozen. They are thirsty and cold. But they were “masters of nature, masters of the world. We had forgotten everything—death, fatigue, our natural needs. Stronger than cold or hunger, stronger than the shots and the desire to die, condemned and
wandering, mere numbers, we were the only men on earth” (83). This, however, configures no power for him. Two sentences later, he writes: “We were exhausted. We were without strength, without illusions” (83). Later, when he wishes for himself to remain a good son to his father, unlike the Rabbi’s son who deserts his father, “a prayer rose in [his] heart, to that God in whom I no longer believed. My God, Lord of the Universe, give me strength never to do what Rabbi Eliahou’s son has done” (87). Wiesel observes that a “loss of faith can lead to disabling despair and death,” and reconnecting to the powerful language of religion, in contrast, allows him to feel power within (Horowitz “Boyhood” 213).

Wiesel’s struggle between rebellion and submission create shifts in the text that create spaces. The audiences’ categorization of Wiesel as simplified victim must also shift in response. He is a complex individual whose responses continue to shift. Portraying himself as “masculine” and rebellious, constructs a “typical” masculine identity for some readers, and portraying himself as “masculine” and religious, constructs another “typical” masculine identity for other readers. Thus, he can be seen as resisting and submitting, and yet still exercising choice and agency in response to dehumanization. The representations in both these texts of strongly gendered identities in response to dehumanizing experiences act as performative intrusions that allow a space for audience response.

3.5 Performative Subjectivity: Particularized Constructions of Gender in Hillman

One thing that Wiesel cannot address in terms of gender, and which Hillman does address, is experience particular to women. As I discussed in the section above, by not

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94 Horowitz also notes that: “The degeneration of the relationship between father and son—Eliezer’s frayed trust in the older man’s authority and protection, discerning his father’s increasing impotence, and finally outliving the elder Wiesel—parallels the progress of Eliezer’s relationship with God, drawing on traditional Jewish Godlanguage, depicting God as Father” (“Boyhood” 213).
allowing the degradation of her outward appearance destroy her sense of inner self, Hillman rejects the sexism inherent in attacks on such outward constructions of her as a female. If “good girls” do not listen to vulgar language or show their naked bodies, and have long hair, then her captors attempt to degrade her seem successful. Instead, she re-categorizes the language, ignores the nakedness, and concentrates on how her hair grows back—she will not be seen as inferior. The issue of sexuality and male power, however, for women are always at stake as well. Feminist theorist Sara Mills states that “sexism forces subjects into an acceptance of the status quo and of prevalent views of women as inferior and sexually available to men, with men as superior” (44). Here too, Hillman constructs herself as a “good girl,” despite the sexually related abuse she encounters.

In choosing to additionally represent detailed incidents related to sexuality, Hillman reflects a perspective not present in Wiesel’s narrative. Hardman notes that women’s Holocaust memoirs acknowledge their vulnerability as sexual beings and to becoming pregnant, and the specifically gendered persecution of these women as female and Jewish, is a state which has been termed by Holocaust scholar Myrna Goldenberg as “double vulnerability” (2003) and by Holocaust and Jewish Studies scholar Judith Tydor Baumel as “double jeopardy” (1998) (6).

Hillman represents the sexual aspect of her identity in several instances, and constructs herself as being unavailable to any man sexually. On the day after her brother, Wolfgang, is taken from their home in the ghetto in Lublin, Poland, Hannelore decides to seek out a young man in the Judenrat (Jewish ghetto police) Eugen Heiman, for information about her brother. In this example, she discusses the unwanted advances of a Jewish man. She knows him: “he always flirted, but I was too shy to respond.” He tells her that Wolfgang has been deported to Majdanek. She knows what this means: “Majdanek! I cried out. ‘Oh my God what will I tell Mama?’” He
replies, “He didn’t have to go if you would have paid attention to me. A girl as pretty as you should take advantage of her looks. You kept ignoring me every time I came near you. I might have been able to save your brother” (66-7). Heiman boldly claims the power of deciding who will go and who will stay in the deportations and coldly suggests that her sexual desirability be used as a bargaining chip to save her youngest brother, Selly: “Your younger brother doesn’t have to wind up like that if you decide to be nice to me,” he tells her (67). Her reaction is to protect herself and her purity first. She writes: “I ran out of the office in disgust. You swine, I thought. How dare you talk to me that way! I am only seventeen, and you want me to be a bad girl and fool around with you. Never!” (67). Hillman constructs her femininity as strongly virginal against this exertion of masculine power. She refuses to be controlled by his language or his behavior; how dare he talk that way! She has a strong enough sense of self to know who she wants to be—a good girl who doesn’t fool around before marriage. Her sexually identity is developed enough that she will not be parted from the chastity that is expected of her. Heiman eventually apologizes to her and helps her hide when the ghetto is liquidated. Language constructs her as a victim and therefore, powerless in the Nazi hierarchy. Language, as she shows here, also constructs her as powerless in the patriarchal hierarchy. She resists both constructions and chooses to represent a gendered identity that resists victimization.

But there is another instance where this resistance is not easily achieved, and she is subjected to a violent demonstration of male superiority: her rape by a German soldier. In representing this event, Hillman reveals abuse that has been directed mostly at women. The rape of Jewish women by Germans was illegal but, nevertheless, occurred often. In this section of her book, Hillman describes German Captain Schlesinger as being kind and impressed with her German speaking skills. Because Hillman is focused on escaping this camp, Krásník, and the
Captain has offered to take her outside its walls, she convinces herself that because of his name, “the captain might be a Jew in disguise” and “that he was trying to help me survive” (94, 96). She follows him out the gates of Krásnik, “feeling apprehensive but excited.” Her writing describes being apprehensive more than excited. When she slows down, staring at the normalcy in which non-Jews live in Krásnik, the Captain tells her to hurry and “it wasn’t what he said but how he said it that gave me a fright” (97). In describing traumatic experiences, as I have described above, Hillman usually refrains from detail and the language in her memoir is generally plain. In describing this event, however, she uses sensory detail: “He threw himself on me, ripping my clothes off. His gun and the buckle of his belt pressed into my belly. I heard a zipper being undone and pleaded for him to stop. He breathed heavily and smelled like an animal in heat, paying no attention to my cries,” and then she stops at the most painful point: “he did what he set out to do” (99). Her memory of this incident is clear by her details and sensory description, and the description spans several pages. In her reconstructed text, the act of rape need only be implied at the end. She assumes her audience knows what happened. By refraining from describing the final, degrading act of rape, Hillman retains control over the construction of her gendered self as a “good girl.”

In describing this incident, she berates herself for not having been more alert: “how could I have been so blind?” The implication is that she still had some control. Yet, the fact was-- to resist this form of violence almost certainly meant death. Neither rape nor death is a “choice.” Hillman constructs herself in this incident as resisting this male dominance by not describing the act itself, only her sensory memories of its context. These details from her memory serve as evidence of the crime, but they do not force her to re-live the memory of that act in language. Such representational choices reveal a strong gendered self that resists victimization and
complicates the audiences’ categorization of victims as passive, much as the representational choices described below reveal both these authors’ particular awareness of audience and social/historical context.

3.6 Representational Choices in Response to Social/Historical Contexts as Performative

Memoirs provide a unique example of performative memorialization because they reveal how each writer deliberately chooses which experiences to represent and how to represent them. I have already discussed how the representational choice to depict strongly gendered subjectivities in both these texts served to bring audiences’ attention to the construction of gender in order to create spaces for audience response and to complicate categories. Similar to gender, the way in which these authors’ representational choices specifically respond to their individual social/historical contexts also acts as a performative intrusion that reveals the constructed-ness of these texts.

One example of this appears in both texts: the use of the term “Auschwitz.” In *Night* the word “Auschwitz” describes a place that for the character has no meaning beyond initial dread. Because Wiesel’s memoir was published in 1960, part of his task is to describe what life was like in a place like Auschwitz, with which audiences were not yet familiar. In contrast, Hillman opens her book with an excerpt about going to “Auschwitz.” There is no explanation of the term in the prologue. She simply writes: “It is Auschwitz,” assuming that audiences know what this place is, and uses her presence there to dramatize for her readers that they will be reading about a terrible experience (1). Publishing a memoir in 2005, Hillman assumes that most American readers will know that Auschwitz is an awful place.

Hillman’s choices about which events to represent also reflect the unique social/historical context in which her memoir appears. When I spoke with Hillman in 2004, she related that she
wrote not only to bear witness to and memorialize her husband and other victims, but also to teach young people. Her experiences as an educator in Southern California revealed that young American students did not know very much about this event in detail. The choices she makes about which stories to tell reveal this context. She writes for an American audience that may be familiar with this event in general, but not in much detail. Hillman, therefore, spends a considerable amount of time on the events leading up to the Holocaust, focusing on the gradual buildup of the Nazis to the Final Solution (much like Klemperer did)—a comprehensive time frame many American readers do not know. In addition, because she lived in Germany, her life was negatively impacted by the Nazis long before Wiesel’s. This is another aspect of the German-Jewish experience about which Americans may have little knowledge. When they think about Germany before the war, they may picture ecstatic crowds saluting Hitler, not German-Jewish citizens already suffering extreme persecution. The first line of Hillman’s book makes clear that audiences should be aware of this gap in their knowledge: “Since Hitler had come to power, it was dangerous for Jews to walk on public streets” (3).

The events Hillman chooses to represent in the beginning of the text are testament to this gradual buildup of persecution. Chapter one opens with a scene where she walks with two girlfriends in Berlin, “In spite of the risk we walked along a tree-lined avenue in a suburb of Berlin, the ever-present yellow Stars of David sewn to our jackets” (3). Because of anti-Semitism in the small German town, Aurich, in which she grew up, and the Nazi decrees that prohibited Jewish children from attending public schools, she is sent to a Jewish boarding school in Berlin. While walking with their stars deliberately hidden, she and her friends are stopped by Nazi youth, threatened after their stars are discovered, but eventually escape. With this one story and her references—without any formal terminology, Hillman informs the audience about one of the
Nuremberg Laws. These laws were created in 1933, long before the invasion of Poland in 1939 and were enforced gradually and methodically. In two short pages, she refers to prohibitions for Jews as a result of the laws from public school attendance, non-Jewish store patronage, and public infrastructure usage. Within the first ten pages, Hillman has explained Kristallnacht, the Gestapo, and deportation. Not only does Hillman educate her reader as to these details of Nazi persecution, to stop and explain to a reader what exactly Kristallnacht was, takes them out of the past tense of the story as a memoir about what happened in the past. Such examples do not only appear at the beginning of the memoir—they appear throughout. Later, when she describes deportation and arriving at one of the camps, she describes how Nazi guards called prisoners out of the cattle cars in which they had traveled for days: “Alles raus.” Hillman explains that the German term “alles” means “everything out, suggesting we were merchandise, not human beings” (49). Hillman does not simply report what happened in this example and relate the dialogue as it happened. Hillmans adds the definition of the German term “alles” for the benefit of her audience. By taking the reader out of the story briefly to define a term, Hillman breaks the chronology of the story. These breaks are indirect audience addresses that jar the reader out of complacent, passive reading. These representational choices reveal how the performative movement in Hillman’s text creates gaps for the audience to respond.

Hillman also explains terms and events that are gendered as particular to the female experience. She describes processes that predominantly affected women such as chemicals in the food to end menstruation and sterilization experiments—details about a female’s distinct experience that “most readers” probably don’t know. When she mentions “Ravensbrück” for example, she doesn’t expect the reader to know or to look up unfamiliar terms – she explains that it is a women’s concentration camp. Most readers probably do not know that there were camps
specifically for women. And most readers are also probably unaware that there were hundreds of
Nazi camps. Hillman’s progressive description of each camp as she arrives underscores this lack
of knowledge audiences possess—especially in contrast to the particularized use of “Auschwitz”
at the beginning of the memoir. Hillman’s representational choices reveal her awareness of
audience. She expects them to know some things about this event but also expects that
knowledge to lack detail, especially details that speak to gendered experiences.

Wiesel’s choices about which events to represent also reflect the unique social/historical
context in which his memoir appears. Wiesel’s memoir was written in Yiddish in the 1950s, a
language clearly directed at his peers (Lamont 93). Night was not translated and published into
English until 1960, fifteen years after the war. Wiesel has stated that his book was written ten
years after the war with a specific purpose in mind: “My principle goal, really, was to reach the
survivors, my peers. Why? Because in the beginning they didn’t talk. They didn’t talk because
nobody wanted to hear them. And I wanted to show them, ‘Look, it’s possible to talk, and even if
it isn’t, we must talk’” (Conversations 165). Wiesel’s representations thus, show his awareness
of audience. Wiesel calls his book a testament to what went on during this time.95 He wrote to his
peers—he wanted this memoir to encourage others to write about their experiences—experiences
that may have seemed unbelievable when told for the first time in detail. The horror does seem
unbelievable; therefore, in Night Wiesel adopts the tone of an emotionless reporter. Wiesel
expects the reader to know the history since they are not far removed from it. In writing to his
peers, he shows that one can write without revealing too much emotion. The important thing is to

95 History scholar Dagmar Barnouw claims that Night has been classified consistently by its publisher as a novel
despite Wiesel’s claims. Barnouw also states that after its inclusion on Oprah’s Book List, the publisher reclassified
Night as a memoir because Oprah had included the book as an example of a “true story.” This dissertation sees Night
as Wiesel sees it—as a true story in memoir form (with the flaws and fallibility of memory) that bears witness.
tell the story as it was – to provide eyewitness testimony. He stated later that, “I was duty-bound to give meaning to my survival […] I knew the story had to be told” (qtd. in Brown 25).

Because his memoir was published closer to the end of the war, Wiesel focuses on what his audiences of that time may not know. He concentrates not on the graphic details that have been filmed by soldiers, but on the personal story so few survivors have told at this point. Wiesel’s writing reports, mostly objectively, the events that surround him. His representational choices depict a short period in the months before deportation. In his small town in Hungary, Sighet, Nazification was rapid. Germans declared that “Jews no longer had the right” to keep valuables in the house. Within three days of this, “there was a new decree: every Jew must wear the yellow star” (8). And within days of this, new decrees: “we were no longer allowed to go into restaurants or cafes, to travel on the railway, to attend the synagogue, to go out in the street after six o’clock. And then came the ghetto” (9). He details deportation, but his journey was relatively short. His primary focus is on daily camp life and the physical and mental anguish that plagued concentration camp prisoners. To report on the Holocaust directly challenges the reader to listen and respond to the experience disturbingly, but unemotionally detailed. The history has been written about but the personal experiences are less familiar. Wiesel is aware even at that early stage that bearing witness needs an audience who listens. The reader in his generation—beyond his survivor peers—should feel guilty for having stood by and done nothing. Readers today are addressed in the new edition of Night where Wiesel writes: “For the survivor who chooses to testify, it is clear: his duty is to bear witness for the dead and the living” (Preface 2006 xv).

Wiesel’s representational choices reflect an awareness of audience in a specific social/historical context. Within these unemotional representations, Wiesel reveals moments

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96 But as I note in Chapter One, even the knowledge of the history was partial and lacked detail for decades after the war. Historian Raul Hilberg’s book The Destruction of the European Jews (1985) was one of the first comprehensive histories on this topic.
where he registers emotion, and in these breaks, gaps are created for more active audience response. In one example, Wiesel, like Hillman, understands the dehumanizing point of Nazi behavior, calling their brutality in Auschwitz “bestial” (32). Wiesel does not record his emotional responses when describing traumatic moments. The language used to describe his representations, rather, changes subtly to reveal his interior responses. Wiesel reports on what he sees in the past tense, one thing happens, and another. And yet, when it comes to describing being chosen for work in Buna, a satellite camp of Auschwitz, Wiesel additionally employs comparative description: “They pointed a finger, as though choosing cattle or merchandise” (47). This echoes Hillman’s feeling with the exact same word: merchandise. Minutes later when a German employee comes to meet them, Wiesel again employs a descriptive analogy, reporting that he paid us “about as much attention as a dealer might who was just receiving a delivery of old rags” (47). That Wiesel is affected by this degrading behavior is revealed because his writing changes. Although he refrains from recording an emotional response, he temporarily vacates his role as objective reporter to comment on how it might feel.

But even as both Hillman and Wiesel show an awareness of their audience through their representational choices, there is also a deeper awareness of the importance of active audience response that Hillman, writing later, reveals. As I noted in Chapter One, in performative memorialization, the active participation of the reader plays an important role if this writing is to create social action. The way in which this dissertation locates how Holocaust writing creates action is through the interaction of genre, gender, and the performative with audiences. Audiences are asked to step into and out of the story at various points, bringing their attention to the details of the past, but highlighting the present, which implies that readers are responsible for considering these details about the past in the present as well.
Hillman’s initial disruption of the memoir genre at the beginning of her text is one example of how her story of the past addresses the present. According to Genre theorist James Moffett’s categorizations of “de facto” genres and his reworking of this schema as “the immediacy or remoteness of subject matter and the intimacy or distance between writers and readers between the subject” (Cooper 305-6), or Cooper’s claim that genres can be combined, delineating book-length autobiographies, for instance, as “multigenic or multiepisodic” (Cooper 307), these memoirs blur the boundaries between memoir and autobiography. The fact of this blurring, as I pointed out in Chapter One, however, is not as important as its effect. In both Hillman and Wiesel, this blurring upsets readers’ generic expectations of memoir; they expect a story that is told with some chronology and from one person’s perspective. By bearing witness not only to their experiences, but to others’ as well, memoirs, like diaries, upset readers’ generic expectations. Hillman’s memoir additionally upsets readers’ generic expectations through the initial use of the present tense in her narration of the past.

Wiesel’s text is told from the first person perspective and narrated in the past tense. This is what audiences expect from a “typical” memoir. Holocaust scholar Heinemann has noted that using a first person narrator aids in the creation of “authenticity” (118). Hillman also tells her story from a first person perspective and tells her story in the past tense with one important contrast. In the short prologue that opens the memoir, Hillman uses the present tense to narrate a flashback. Thus, not only does she drop her reader abruptly into the “middle” of the story, she also narrates this episode as if it is happening right now. Verb tense, according to Moffett reveals

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97 Moffett delineates the genres of detached autobiography and memoir. In the former, the narrator is the protagonist and narrates experience with little attention to the self in the present. The speaker and the subject are split into first and third person (132). In a memoir, the narrator tells the story as if it happened to someone else, although s/he may have been a participant. S/he has access to information as “confidant, eyewitness, and membership in a community” (134). There is a “resonance between speaker and spoken-about, first and third persons” (134). Hillman’s and Wiesel’s memoirs clearly incorporate aspects of both of these genres, as one example of genre blurring.
an important “relation of speaker to events.” In writing in the present tense, “events are unrolling before [the speaker’s] eyes—ongoing—they are being coded for the first time by someone who is attending them [. . .] in the same plane of reality as the act-ors” (Teaching 62). Writing in this tense, Moffett claims, “is calculated to affect a spectator in much the same way a real-life drama does when he is confronted with it” (63). This kind of writing can be called “drama” and he claims “it is made up of action” (63). From the very first page of this memoir, by writing this prologue in the present tense, Hillman’s memoir confronts readers: “I recall the shouts of joy that filled the barrack at Plaszow. But the terrible place where I now stand is not that hoped-for refuge. It is Auschwitz” (1). Hillman’s memoir is expected to report on what happened, but by beginning her text in the present tense, it is as if she is “attending to it for the first time” and she calls readers into this drama happening now—it is a call to action. Hillman closes the distance between writer and reader by using present tense about “then” to open a space in “now.” With this prologue, Hillman informs readers about the past by attending to it as if it is dramatically present. Audiences cannot safely relegate this event to the past, as something that happened then. It happens—this experience of Auschwitz, this persecution—right now. This technique is performative, and creates gaps for readers to respond because it blurs the generic boundaries of memoirs that narrate the past as if it is past. Hillman returns to this convention, however, and in this shift, returning to the “beginning” of the story and narrating in the past tense, she brings readers’ attention to the construction of her story as a process in which they have become participants.

In performative memorialization, Bakhtin’s responsive understanding is realized within the performative gaps created in these texts. In the gaps Hillman creates in I Will Plant You a Lilac Tree through the constructions of genre and gender, and as she indirectly addresses
audiences, Hillman “relinquishes the floor” to allow for the audience to respond—to take an active role in learning about her unique experience, as well as to attend to the absent voices and histories she evokes and cites. In this dialogic, Hillman creates an utterance that depends upon what came before and what will come after (Bakhtin 91). These utterances exist along a chain of communication (60). I claim not only that this chain of communication exists, but that it becomes increasingly multimodal in its evolution.

As I noted in Chapter One, Pollock’s terms can map what performative writing does. Evocative performative writing can “render absence present” through re-marking and does not attempt to report on a real event, but rather attempts to “create what is self-evidently a version of what was” (80). Evocative Holocaust writing does report on a verifiable event but marks the representation of the Holocaust as a representation: real events and absences that cannot be recovered. Citational performative writing is writing that is “rewriting, as the repetition of given discursive forms” to reveal “the fragility of identity, history, and culture” (92). Because identity cannot escape its construction, performative elements can exert “counterpressure” where the repetition is a “repetition with a difference” (92). Repetitive elements in performative Holocaust writing bring attention to these constructions and dialogue with them along a chain of communication through the process of their recontextualization.98

Hillman, for instance uses physical artifacts like family photographs and copies of documents like Schindler’s list. In addition, she evokes other family members and victims of this event with the use of her photographs. Hirsch analyzes the photograph as a trace of the absent figure, “leftovers, the fragmentary sources,” evidence of an unrecoverable loss (“Mourning” 417). But Holocaust photographs, “as much as their subjects, are themselves stubborn survivors of the intended destruction of an entire culture, its people as well as all their records, documents,

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98 Pollock cites Homi Bhabha in The Location of Culture as part of this explanation of the citational.
and cultural artifacts” (417). These visual inserts into the text serve as stubborn evidence of the destruction. They are also reminders that Hillman’s story is one of many—multiple histories within her family and families like hers are evoked with these photographs. The fragment of Schindler’s list that Hillman includes also serves as evidence of what has been lost. The fragment shows other names beyond hers and future husband and re-marks those absences, and its inclusion serves as historical evidence, after the fact, that Hillman performatively cites and which stands as physical, historical evidence that supplements her memory.

Hillman opens the memoir with a flashback about learning that she had been put on Schindler’s list while she was in Auschwitz. This flashback foregrounds Schindler’s list as something audiences will know—most likely based upon seeing the film by Steven Spielberg. The preface is designed to position the reader with a confidence in already having a certain amount of knowledge. Her readers, especially a young adult audience, are removed in time from this event. They feel detached from it. This is why she presents what they “know” (Auschwitz and Schindler) in the beginning, in order to gradually fill in the gaps of what they do not know (Ravensbrück and sterilization) to recontextualize this history in the present. By dialoguing with other discourses in this way, Hillman exerts performative citation that reveals the chain of communication as an ongoing, constructed dialogic. Hillman’s memoir exhibits a performative dialogic because she dialogues with other discourses in order to make her history “relatable” to audiences familiar with repetitive elements of the larger history.

While Wiesel’s original text does not include such multiple modes within the text itself, it exhibits multimodality, nevertheless, in response to the changing social contexts. The 2006 edition of Night was published in conjunction with Oprah Winfrey’s inclusion of Night on her book list. In addition, Winfrey and Wiesel traveled to Auschwitz together and this trip was
recorded on film. Excerpts of Night appear in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Night is discussed in an interview with Winfrey on television in 2004. These are new modes and communicative practices that performatively increase audience interaction in the making of multiple layers of meaning with regard to Night. Although Wiesel’s book was originally published in 1960, with this new edition, Wiesel can add commentary that responds to the historical contexts that followed the original publication. In his 2006 preface to Night, he addresses new audiences in the present, much like Hillman does, creating a complex dialogic of history and memory, and (re)-placing his text firmly along the evolving chain of communication of Holocaust discourses.

3.7 Conclusion

As I have shown in this chapter, Holocaust memoirs, unlike diaries, are set within a historical framework and respond to facts about the enormity of this event. Both diaries and memoirs bear witness to the event and the experiences of authors and other victims, but in contrast to diaries, memoirs also bear witness to all that we “know” now historically, in addition to bearing witness to the survival of the author. In this chapter, Holocaust memoirs have provided a unique example of performative memorialization because they reveal how each writer deliberately chooses which experiences to represent and how to represent them. These authors, through representations that attend to gender and specific social/historical contexts, create intrusions or performative gaps in the texts that disturb audiences’ passive reception of the past and open up space for active response. Strongly gendered identities and carefully chosen representations that respond to specified contexts make audiences aware of the construction of this representation of history and memory, and audiences can actively respond to a
particularized, complex individual who has suffered, instead of essentializing these authors as nameless “others” and victims to whom they have no responsibility to respond.

Performative memorialization reveals these gaps as a result of the process of constructing genre and gender and as a result of the content of performative language and subjectivities, resulting in multimodal learning that recontextualizes the past in the present. In Chapter Four, I will discuss museums which, unlike diaries and memoirs, contain multiple modes and communicative practices within the single mode of “public museum” as discourse. The multiple modes of discourse in the two museums I examine in the following chapter encourage spaces for active audience response and active learning about this event. These multimodal museums reveal a high level of performative memorialization through the unique interaction of museum space with the narrative of the museum exhibit in the next phase of the evolving dialogic of history and memory in Holocaust discourses. There are also sections in these museums, however, which fail to complicate the historical narrative or the categories of behavior, and therefore fail to completely engage the visitor participation, response, and social action.
Chapter Four: Museums: The Jewish Museum Berlin and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum -- the Interaction of Space and Narrative in Performative Memorialization

Our mission is [...] to call attention to the high cost of intolerance. Part of the mission statement of the Jewish Museum Berlin

4.1 Introduction

The analyses of diaries and memoirs in the previous chapters have illustrated the ways in which constructions of genre, gender, and performativity each interact uniquely with audiences in a dialogic of history and memory as performative memorialization. In this dialogic, diaries and memoirs, which have single authors and single readers, were also shown to have larger, assumed audiences with whom they dialogue. Diaries and memoirs published over time additionally dialogue with other Holocaust discourses along a chain of communication. Moving from diaries to memoirs on the chain of communication of Holocaust discourses in Chapters Two and Three, we now move to the discourses of museums in this chapter, where the parameters of discourse must be redefined to account for the multiple modes of discourse, the multiple articulators of these multimodal discourses, and audiences’ interaction with spatial and narrative discourse acting in conjunction with one another.

Applying performative memorialization to the multimedia spaces of the Jewish Museum Berlin: Two Millennia of German Jewish History (JMB) in Berlin, Germany and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington D.C., United States reveals how these museums create action in audiences by bearing witness to and teaching about Holocaust history through the interaction of architectural space and narrative exhibits. The application of performative memorialization further exposes the manner in which the multiple perspectives in the museum setting both create and discourage a dialogic of memory and history, as well as how
audiences construct meanings in response to these complex interactions. I have argued that performative memorialization becomes more pronounced within discourses that appear later, because these works seek to recontextualize the history of the Holocaust for new audiences. Aspects of performative memorialization that I have already discussed in terms of diaries and memoirs, such as constructions of genre and gender appear in the discourse of museums as well. Other aspects of this performative memorialization that we have only seen briefly in Klemperer’s and Hillman’s texts: the evocative and the citational, move to the forefront, while other aspects, such as subjectivity, recede.

In order to discuss museums as modes of communication, they must first be understood as modes of communication. All the texts in this dissertation are considered “discourses.” Discourse has been defined throughout this dissertation through the theories of Rhetoric and Composition scholars Kress and Leeuwen as “socially constructed knowledges” that have arisen from specific social contexts (4). This dissertation has further delineated such discourses as the products of survivors or second-generation survivors writing about their personal experiences. Additionally, the idea of discourse to this point in the discussion has been aligned with Hayden White’s conception of discourse as possessing a strong subjectivity. There is a “person who maintains the discourse” (3). However, some discourses might alternately display a strong “narrativity,” where a sense of objectivity replaces subjectivity and there is “no longer a ‘narrator.’ The events are chronologically recorded as they appear on the horizon of the story. Here no one speaks. The events seem to tell themselves” (3). Whereas it is clear that diaries and memoirs fall within the parameters of “discourse,” in Kress and Leeuwen’s sense, characterized by strong subjectivity, museums reside more clearly in the realm of discourse exhibiting strong narrativity.
In this chapter “narrativity” is applicable in discussing Holocaust museum as discourses because the exhibits in these museums are mostly chronological and lack a clear narrator of this chronology. The un-authored section titles and the information cards in the museum exhibitions direct how the representations in these spaces are to be received by the audience. This makes a museum similar to a written text in that the overarching “story” is controlled by a single “voice.” In museums, however, this voice does not comment self-reflexively on its process (either directly as in diaries and hybrids, or indirectly as in memoirs), and this lack of reflexivity encourages a predetermined, single-directed meaning, rather than multi-layered meanings open to audience interpretation. In the case of Holocaust museums, personal testimonies are an important aspect of this conglomerate of historical evidence, making a certain level of subjectivity present, but the overarching narrative is what really guides the visitor through the museum. That movement of the spectator is mostly chronological and non-interactive. The number of stories told in museums automatically multiplies perspectives in a way that can never be the case for diaries or memoirs, but these perspectives, though multiple, are not always presented as complex or complicated, and therefore, do not interact as performatively with audiences. The two museums I examine here, however, are unusual because the architectural spaces reveal a distinct performative subjectivity that interacts with the narrator-less chronology. The interaction of the narrative exhibit with the architectural space in these museums adds complex layers of multimodality, in addition to the multimodal forms within the exhibits themselves that increase the layers of meaning that can be made by their visitors.

Narrative appears in museums because museums are often designed by an architect and produced by someone else. When design and production separate, Kress and Leeuwen claim that design “becomes a means for controlling the actions of others”; the producer does not make
meaning, but merely executes a predetermined meaning (7). The same can be said of
distribution: it does not make meaning by itself, but acts as a support for the meaning-making
activity. This kind of single, predetermined meaning appears in museum exhibits that are
chronologically and “objectively” narrated because the visitor is directed to accept the narrative
as it is presented rather than interpret it in all of its complex facets. The nature of most museums
is that they are structured with this predetermined, narrative meaning in mind. I will argue,
however, that the additional presence of the subjectivity of the architect in the museum space can
intervene to create gaps in the narrative exhibits where wider, more complex meanings can be
made. This subjectivity, together with the interaction of space, exhibit, and spectator, create a
performative dialogic where meaning-making activities that are not predetermined can occur.

Subjectivity intervenes into the narrative of these museums in two ways: through the
voices/stories of individual survivors and through the presence of the architect as the “author” of
the space. The presence of survivor testimony creates this subjectivity in the USHMM. The
presence of the architect as articulator creates this subjectivity in the JMB. Despite this presence,
subjectivity is not as self-evident in a museum as it was in diaries or memoirs because individual
authors could more effectively show their readers the constructed-ness of their texts as
representations. Because of Holocaust museums’ desire to narrate history and provide evidence
of that history, their process of representation is much less transparent to audiences. As
postcolonial, feminist theorist Gayatri Spivak has pointed out, no voice/subjectivity comes to us
unmediated. It is through the incorporation of personal history into what was once seen as
“objective” history that a fuller picture is created (Gender and Memory 12). This process of
incorporating personal history into “objective” history creates a complex relationship in
Holocaust museums.
Thus, subjectivity can appear through the articulations of architectural space. Architectural space, in contrast to narrative, can be single-authored. In the JMB, Daniel Libeskind, as the architect of the space, also acts as an author who articulates his intent and makes the process of design visible to audiences. The performative memorialization that occurs in these museums is a result of the interaction of the personal and the objective in the narrative exhibit and the interaction of the architectural space and narrative with audiences to create a dialogic of history and memory.

How audiences participate in a museum space is also different from how they participate with a book, and this difference affects how audiences can create action in response to the museum. Museum Studies scholar Eilean Hooper-Greenhill claims that research on audiences and mass communication, newly framed in cultural studies, rejects the simplistic mass audience model that assumed audiences were simply passive (7). Research concluded that, “media messages [...] could not tell people how to think, but could set an agenda as to what to think about. This in itself is not insignificant, but it swings the focus back again to the audience, away from the text. A focus on the text alone does not tell us how audiences use it” (7-8). This role of the audience in making meaning renders it important to locate not only the content and process of how history and memory become a dialogic in Holocaust museums, but also to trace how this process attempts to create action in its audiences through its particular representations--multimodal representations that influence what audiences think about. Museums create this response differently than written texts do because although they both address “mass” audiences, texts have an intimacy between author and reader that museums do not. But museum visitors also

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99 According to Hooper-Greenhill, there was a move to a Marxist model using semiotic analyses of texts and films and sometimes museums, which theorized that ideologies are reproduced within these arenas, but when the audience interpellation theories of Althusser were tested on actual audiences, for instance, they turned out to be false (7).
100 Most of this research was done with television.
experience memorialization and meaning-making as a group—and it is the interactive behavior of the group in a museum space that becomes performative.

The interaction of a physical exhibition space with its spectators is naturally performative because the notion of “action” is physically enacted or “dramatized” by spectators with their movement through the space, their reception of the artifacts and representations of history and memory, as well as their interaction with other spectators within that space. A distinction between space and place is important, according to Holocaust scholar Vivian M. Patraka, because museums tend to vacillate between space and place in the process of memorializing, where “place” has an inherent narrativity that entails mostly passive apprehension, and “space” allows for the re-negotiation of narrative through multiple interpretations and multiple perspectives on the part of the spectator and that activity is performative (“Spectacular” 139-41).

This dissertation also sees museums vacillating in this manner, but I argue that this movement results from the interaction of a narrative exhibit with a performative space; that is, the movement that occurs in these spaces (to varying degrees) is a dialogic of history and memory enacted in a “objective” narrative and a “subjective” space with audiences who participate in this interactive and multimodal process.

Although these movements are more readily apparent in a museum as physical actions by the spectator, the representations themselves within the museum space are seen less as constructions of memory and history as a process and more as artifacts of “real” history as a nonnegotiable product. Thus, despite the multiple perspectives and layers, museums tend to be more monologic than dialogic in terms of memory and history existing together as the process and content of representation. Performative gaps that open spaces for audience response are reduced. But the audiences within museum spaces perform a process of witness that is tangible in
other ways. Museums are less self-reflexive but more interactive. This is the paradox that makes museums fall appropriately between my chapters on diaries and memoirs (self-reflexive but not highly interactive) and hybrids (self-reflexive and highly interactive).

This interactivity is a result of multimodality. As I outlined in Chapter One, audiences can effectively learn through multimodal techniques because multiple modes and communicative practices encourage meanings that are complex and layered. I argue that Holocaust discourses exhibit increasingly multimodal techniques in their general evolution from personal diary to memoir to public memorial spaces to hybrid genres (discussed in Chapter Five). As we moved from diary to memoir, we saw performative memorialization applied disparately to disparate modes. The same will be true of museums, but because museums, as one mode, also exhibit a wide range of multimodality within this single mode of discourse, there is space created for increased learning and engagement with audiences.\(^{101}\)

These museum spaces, more obviously than any other discourse I examine, create a space for multiple perspectives to emerge within the larger history. These museums are designed to present multiple histories. The juxtaposed modes of presentation in both museums: film, artifacts, text, photographs, interactive sections, and audio provide narrative movement in presenting these memories and histories. These spaces are interactive recontextualizations of history which dialogue with various voices in a Bakhtinian dialogic with several participants, including audiences, along a chain of communication. Both museums contain multiple perspectives from which more complex layers of meaning can emerge through audience

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\(^{101}\) As a dialogic of history and memory, bearing witness \textit{as} a museum space and \textit{in} a museum space, however, involves several layers of mediation and participation beyond the event, the memory of the event, the one who remembers, and the one who listens. In museums there are also the architect, committees, witnesses, and spectators, who design, decide, narrate, and view the museum. In terms of multimodality, architects can be said to be articulators of discourse and design, but not necessarily producers or distributors.
interactions and interpretations, but in the USHMM, the directed narrative, at the same time, limits these interpretations.

The process and content made visible for audiences by authors in Chapters Two and Three are split to different degrees in museums. The JMB contains extensive comments from architect Daniel Libeskind throughout the exhibits about the building process and goals of the museum. The narrative in the JMB is, additionally, not strictly chronological. It is rather fragmented; beginning with the Holocaust, it goes back in history two millennia, and finishes with the future. This movement in time within the exhibition narrative creates greater performative destabilization and reminds audiences that a layered and complex conversation is at work. This museum strives not to be one constructed representation of history; rather, it evolves elements of its purpose and design according to audience response and claims that it is, “no dusty historical institution” (75). By constantly recreating its museum space and providing interactive methods of engaging with this history, the JMB resists visitor expectations that what is narrated in their texts will repeat what has already been seen or told.

The lack of transparency in terms of process in the USHMM in contrast, limits how much the audience can bear witness to the process of how this mode (museum space) bears witness. While visitors can bear witness to the content through individual testimonies in the museum-- the content-- they cannot simultaneously bear witness to the process. The structure of the building, although it is complex and invites multiple interpretations, is not explained within the museum walls, as it is in the JMB. The architect, James Ingo Freedman does not provide commentary on his building within the exhibit, but there are moments when the space nevertheless creates active responses in the visitors as they move through the space in their process of witnessing. Neither the rationale of building design nor its location on the national mall in Washington D.C., as a
monument to a European event that is of national importance to Americans, is readily apparent in the permanent exhibition, although the secondary literature about the museum states that these two aspects are an important part of the overall goals.\textsuperscript{102}

The sites of the two museums I examine here, Berlin, Germany for the JMB and Washington D.C., United States for the USHMM, as well as the museums themselves, like the texts I have described in Chapters Two and Three, are appropriately contrasted in this chapter because the USHMM is a familiar “text” upon which a great deal of “our knowledge” about the Holocaust as Americans is based. The JMB, in contrast, is a relatively obscure “text” for American audiences, like Klemperer’s diary and Hillman’s memoir, and provides an alternate cultural perspective as well as a complication of categories. While there were a variety of diaries and memoirs that I could have discussed, there are only a few Holocaust museums in existence. The USHMM and the JMB, both residing in the capitol cities of their respective countries, represent major, national, memorial museums.

As I have shown in the diary and memoir chapters, and will show in this chapter on museums (and in the final chapter on hybrids), the complex, shifting nature of perspectives and the “incoherence” of a narrative is the source of its power to inspire action. The breaks, gaps, and fragmentations are precisely what enable audiences to act in response to the dialogic of memory and history. What I have argued throughout this dissertation is that constructions of genre, gender, and performativity create breaks that bring audiences’ attention to the process of constructing memory as representations of the past. Meaning is created through the movement in discourse which creates gaps for audiences to respond—relinquishing the floor for other speakers to reply to discourse creates a dialogic. The breaks in these two museums arise from the

performative subjectivity of the architecture that encourages multiple meanings and from specific interactions of this architecture with the narrative exhibits. Such breaks in chronology, in terms of the narrative itself and in terms of the actual paths on which and in which spectators interact, increase the likelihood of active audience response through responsive understanding and multimodal learning and, thus increase performative memorialization.

4.2 Locating Museums in the Chain of Communication of Holocaust Discourses

Understanding museums as modes of discourse allows us to locate them on the chain of communication of Holocaust discourses. Museums follow diaries and memoirs on this evolving chain because the building of such memorials began to be discussed two to three decades after the first diary or memoir appeared. As I argued for the memoir of Laura Hillman, discourses that appear over time begin to address new audiences and evolving social contexts. For Holocaust museums, the imperative to bear witness remains, and like Hillman’s text, museums seek to recontextualize history for newer audiences. As museums recontextualize this history for mass audiences, the action that can be created in audiences must be conceptualized differently. For this reason, the pedagogical imperative for museums stands strongly beside the imperative to bear witness. I argue that the pedagogical goal of these museums is achieved more readily through the multimodality employed in these Holocaust museums.

The building of a museum to commemorate the Holocaust in the United States was one of the directives stipulated by the members of President Carter’s Commission on the Holocaust created in 1978. As I noted in the memoir chapter, this Commission was created in the period of resurgent interest in the Holocaust in the United States. The President later wrote about the Commission’s report that:

Of all the issues addressed by the Commission, none was as perplexing or as urgent as the need to insure that such a totally inhuman assault as the Holocaust--or any partial
version thereof—never recurs. The Commission was burdened by the knowledge that 35 years of post-Holocaust history testify to how little has been learned. Only a conscious, concerted attempt to learn from past errors can prevent recurrence to any racial, religious, ethnic, or national group. A memorial unresponsive to the future would also violate the memory of the past [emphasis added]. (USHMM “Excerpts”)

Thus, from the very beginning, the USHMM has had a pedagogical purpose. It intends to teach visitors about the past so that they might learn from “past errors.” The museum’s mission statement declares that:

The Museum’s primary mission is to advance and disseminate knowledge about this unprecedented tragedy; to preserve the memory of those who suffered; and to encourage its visitors to reflect upon the moral and spiritual questions raised by the events of the Holocaust as well as their own responsibilities as citizens of a democracy. (USHMM “Mission Statement”)

With this mission statement the pedagogical purpose to disseminate knowledge is reinforced, as well as the purpose to bear witness and engage visitors in active response. The USHMM also uses a variety of modes within its exhibits that include historical documents, survivor testimonies (which the JMB does not have in their exhibit, but does have in their learning center), videos, photographs, artifacts, archives, and reading rooms.

In contrast to the USHMM, which had a relatively new national mandate, the JMB reopened a museum that had existed in pre-Second World War Germany. The first Jewish Museum in Berlin opened on January 24, 1933 on Oranienberger Strasse. It was closed and its holdings confiscated during the 1938 pogrom (now known as Kristallnacht). The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 resulted in the museum’s original location falling on the Eastern side of Berlin, so West Berlin set up a new initiative for the museum.103 The new JMB was first planned as an extension to the Berlin Museum, located in the Baroque Kollegienhaus, to which it moved in 1969 to mark the 300 year anniversary of the Jewish community in Berlin. In 1975 the

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103 At this time there was also a split between West and East German Jewish communities (See Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory 125-6).
Gesellschaft fuer ein Jüdisches Museum Berlin (Society for the Jewish Museum Berlin) was founded. In 1989 architect Daniel Libeskind won the competition launched to find a designer for the new space. The first stone was laid in 1992\(^{104}\) and the building was completed in 1998. The questions about the purposes and achievements of this new museum, nevertheless, lingered: Would a museum about the history of Jewish Germans be built more for “national unity” with the price being “ritualized memory politics defined by amnesia?” (Wiedmer 124). Or would it show Germany’s willingness to intersect this Jewish history within its own, to “bring it painfully near to the very heart of the trauma of the twentieth century?” (124).

The permanent exhibition has been open since autumn of 2001 (JMB, Rafael Roth Learning Center). The JMB notes that their information concept is “more knowledge for everyone,” and their Annual Report for 2001-2002 states that it is the museum’s “concern to make this information available to the widest possible public and to provide each of our diverse target audiences with an appropriate means of accessing it. To this purpose, we employ a whole spectrum of media” (55). This spectrum of media includes exhibits, archives, collections, reading room, interactive stations (the USHMM does not have many\(^ {105}\), and special areas for children.

The contrasting purposes of these two museums begin to situate how they interact with audiences as memorial sites. Holocaust scholars Patraka and Young have noted that any Holocaust museum dialogues with the country in which it resides and with the “positioning of that country in Holocaust events” (Young The Texture 141). Geographical site is important for these reasons but also because geography dictates the visitor population. These Holocaust

\(^{104}\) Caroline Wiedmer notes the date as November 9, 1992. This date was also the date the Berlin wall came down, and is the date of Kristallnacht in 1938. It is not surprising that Germany has been accused of revisionist history, even notable historians have been accused. According to Wiedmer, the first stone was laid for the JMB on this date after a worldwide protest ensued when Germany, after it had already chosen Libeskind’s design for the new museum, suggested it be put on hold so Germany could vie for the 2000 Olympic Games (127-8).

\(^{105}\) The few interactive stations in the USHMM were not functioning when I visited in 2006.
museums are designed by a community of people with very particular goals to achieve with audiences that are often localized. The USHMM’s name indicates that it is a museum about the Holocaust. The USHMM has a “context of survival, of a ‘living memorial’ by the living (as framers, funders, and visitors) that those in the devastated landscape of Europe can never possess” according to Patraka (“Spectacular” 142). In contrast, the JMB represents “Two Millennia of German-Jewish History” and is a history museum, where the history of the Holocaust is a strong presence. The context of “survival,” as Patraka perceives, is absent in a location like Berlin, but with the focus of this museum on the catastrophic break of the Holocaust in a long history, it reminds visitors of the past and suggests how the future can be different-- it has a stronger focus on the meaning to be made from history and about the consequences of intolerance within the German national context.

According to the USHMM committee’s chairperson, Harvey Meyerhoff, the USHMM belongs on the Mall in Washington D.C. as “a reminder of the dark side of humankind’s civilized works.” Because it is on the mall, the USHMM also represents an American dimension of the Holocaust: American soldiers liberating the camps, as well as this country’s restrictions on immigration and refusal to bomb the death camps (Young The Texture 338). These meanings intended by the museums’ committee are one predetermined layer. The exhibits within the museum, for the most part, do not contradict this narrative. The building is another layer and the museum’s architect, Freed, says that a building that houses memory should be “‘sufficiently ambiguous and open ended so that others can inhabit the space, can imbue the forms with their own memory’” (qtd. in Young 339). To leave the building and its location “undirected,” creates active meaning-making by visitors. Nonetheless, this ambiguous space houses a very directed
and chronological narrative of history and memory, a paradox that prevents an active dialogic from fully occurring, as I will discuss in the following sections.

The JMB, in contrast, began with an overall purpose, but this purpose has been supplemented in response to critiques from scholars and the general public. Before its official opening in September 2001, for instance, the JMB defined its core mission as follows:

The Jewish Museum Berlin is a great visitor attraction in Berlin that reveals the stories of German Jewish culture and history through the themes of achievement, persecution, presence and absence, survival, and regeneration. It is housed in the first great architectural treasure of the third millennium. (“Annual Report” 23)

Six months later, in April 2002, the JMB reevaluated this mission according to the visitor comments they received and the criticism from academic and intellectual circles. Visitors claimed it was hard to find their way around the museum, and so the museum incorporated the red lines and markers you see in some of the figures as guides. Criticism from academic circles noted the lack of representation of the tension between Germans and German-Jews.

Consequently, the following addendum was added to the mission statement:

Our mission is to focus on the history and the culture of the Jews, in, and originating from, German-speaking lands. The museum does this so as to make the two millennia of German-Jewish experience relevant for the present and future populations of Germany; to emphasize the benefits of harmonious interaction between various ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic groups; and to call attention to the high cost of intolerance. (24)

This revised mission statement reflects not only a stronger commitment to confronting intolerance and its consequences in the German context, but it also makes clear the forward-looking perspective of this museum. This museum reflects two thousand years of German Jewish history-- which includes the Holocaust, but it is also reflects the desire to make “German Jewish experience relevant for the present and the future populations of Germany [emphasis added]” (24). The museum projects itself and its mission in the present and into the future. The conversation is designed to remain open. Dr. Christina Weiss, State Minister for Cultural and
Media Affairs and Chair of the Board of Trustees of the JMB between 2001 and 2004 says as much in her remarks to accompany the museum opening:

We know that Jewish culture in Germany will never again be what it was before the Holocaust. For that very reason, the Jewish Museum Berlin must look to the future in fulfilling its mission. It must inspire debate, offer a forum for discussion and exhibit diverse perspectives, so that it sharpens its visitor’s appreciation of the imperative to form a society that takes a stand and yet distinguishes itself through tolerance. (18)

The original date for the opening of the museum was to be September 11, 2001. The opening was postponed after the attacks on the World Trade Center, and in his remarks at the delayed opening, Museum Director Michael Blumenthal noted that the museum’s “message of the high cost of intolerance is today more relevant than ever” (20). Purposes like interactive learning about the high cost of intolerance are ongoing, but other purposes and missions are appended in response to critique. There is a dialogic that influences the “objective” narrative of this museum.

4.3 Architectural Space in the JMB: Daniel Libeskind’s Performative Design and Commentary

The JMB has stated that it is “not a Holocaust museum” and is dedicated to showing two thousand years of Jewish history (75). The JMB begins with the Holocaust, moves to the history of Jews in Europe and in Germany, and finishes in the present, with some address to the future. Beginning with the Holocaust has caused some to criticize this museum as ostensibly dedicated to Jewish history, but overtly more dedicated to memorializing the Holocaust. The Holocaust permeates the museum, in part because Daniel Libeskind, born in postwar Lodz, Poland to survivor parents and architect of the museum106 employs rich metaphor to his building that he says does and should reflect this event. The building addresses how the Holocaust must be considered when considering Jewish history and Germany.107 Or maybe even more importantly--

106 See Caroline Wiedmer The Claims of Memory (138).
107 Libeskind has also been criticized for not truly representing a “German” perspective because he was born in Poland, but Wiedmer claims that his building is more effective because the voids represent a personal loss for him,
because the extensive Holocaust section is subterranean-- it figures metaphorically as an undercurrent to everything that happens in Germany and especially in Berlin. This placement and metaphor address German audiences directly: the Holocaust must be confronted to understand history as an interrelated continuum-- this undercurrent of their history cannot be erased or ignored. This is an important factor because as the Annual Report states, over 75% of the museum’s visitors come from the Berlin locale and greater Germany (46). Ironically, the way the JMB begins—with “the middle” of Jewish-German history-- is the museum’s first address to the present. The time frame of the narrative shifts by not starting at the “beginning.” Audiences cannot simply absorb this information as chronological history. The chronology is fractured and allows performative gaps for active audience response.

The architectural and design elements of the JMB are arrestingly intricate. Thus, it is not surprising that when the empty museum space was opened to the public, 350,000 people visited the space.108 As Figure 2 illustrates, the outside of the building is covered with corrugated metal, interspersed with metal framed windows. From above, the museum building looks like a jagged lightning bolt. Libeskind’s performative, subjective signature, shifting forward and between the spaces, therefore, is present throughout the building. The subjective presence of Libeskind, in the design of the space and in the commentary he provides throughout the museum, is an important refractory aspect of the multiple perspectives presented in the museum exhibits.
Figure 2: The outside of the JMB with view of cobblestone work on the ground.
Not only do the exhibits tell the stories of many people, the design of the building, because of its deconstructive quality, is open to several interpretations and creates multiple spaces for audiences to make meaning.

The ground outside the museum, for instance, appears to be cobblestone from the visitor’s ground perspective (see Figure 2). It is also an intricately designed relief that can only be seen in its entirety from the roof of the building. The museum describes the relief as a “net-like pattern of black, grey, and white stones, whose irregular shapes resemble fibers and splinters” (JMB, RRLC). The design of this relief comes from the etchings of Gisèle Celan-Lestrange and the title, “les Filets, encore,” translates as “The Nets, Again.” The meaning to be made about this relief by the visitor is open, in part, because it is physically impossible to see every perspective from one vantage point. It is clear that several perspectives and interpretations are possible. The spectator must act-- must physically move to alter their vantage point and see another perspective. This is the potential of multimodal spaces to teach. The action created is physical and intellectual, altering perspectives and making layered meanings. Indeed, the architectural style of the museum has been called deconstructionist because “it challenges our thoughts and perceptions and is open to manifold interpretations” (JMB, RRLC).

Once inside, this architectural deconstruction continues. The lines of the walls are constantly interrupted by oddly placed windows of varying sizes (see Figure 2). These windows serve several purposes. First, they limit the visitor’s view of the outside. The horizon can be seen (i.e the visitor can see the skyline of Berlin) but it is fractured and broken-- as is the history of Berlin with the destruction of the Jewish community. Several interpretations are possible, but even the positioning of the windows “follows a precise matrix” (JMB website). Daniel Libeskind researched the “addresses of prominent Jewish and German citizens on a map of pre-war Berlin
and joined the points to form an ‘irrational and invisible matrix’ on which he based the language of form, the geometry and shape of the building” (JMB website).

The building is designed around an empty space Libeskind calls a void. On the floor at the bottom of this central void are a pile of metal pieces with faces. This work is called “Schalechet” or “Fallen Leaves” by Menashe Kadishman. These faces evoke the victims of persecution that are commemorated inside the museum and evoke those who remain unnamed. Fallen leaves imply death, but they can also signal that with new seasons life can be renewed. Showing the history of the Jews in Berlin and in Europe is an important part of this renewal. The possible meanings are multiple and negotiable by visitors, and thus, performative.

Another part of the intricate design of this building is what the JMB calls “Between the Lines.” An imaginary straight line runs through the entire length of the interior which is called “the Axis of the Void.” According to Libeskind, “this line, signifying emptiness, even intersects the exhibition floors with their objects, pictures, and visitors. It stands for radical annihilation, for those things that elude representation.” Libeskind describes his structure as a building “between the lines,” meaning it constantly moves between things that can be shown and others that have vanished or been destroyed” (JMB, RRLC). This imaginary line is part of the building – the walls are built around it, but it is also an “other” – something which stands apart from the rest. This line symbolizes the destruction but also the continuity and connection of this history. The voids, on the other hand, symbolize a death which can never be exhibited when it comes to Jewish Berlin history because it has been reduced to ashes. This method of representation marks an absent presence, much the way that family photographs do in Hillman’s memoir, or the naming of friends and acquaintances does in Klemperer’s diary. Libeskind’s commentary throughout the museum creates a subjective performativity, as his design elements evoke and re-
mark absent presences. Even for the visitor who might not pay attention to Libeskind’s “intended” meanings behind the void, each void, by cutting through the building spaces in which visitors physically move, evokes something that is not there, yet permeates the space at the same time. Each visitor who comes across this void as they wander through the museum will re-mark this absence.

The architectural spaces orienting the void are also crossings-- bridges to the future. And yet the JMB states about the entrance to the museum that: “Libeskind provides no visible connection between past, present, and future. Instead, he challenges visitors to find this themselves” (JMB, RRLC). Indeed, Holocaust scholar Caroline Wiedmer claims that Libeskind has proposed a “parallel discourse of history, a discourse of suffusion that renders traditional historical narrative obsolete” (132). This idea is integral to the notion of deconstructive architecture and museum space-- and to the performative subjectivity of Libeskind’s building.

The space is open to several interpretations and therefore projects and creates several perspectives. Each of these perspectives is shaped performatively by each visitor into layers of meaning. The connections and crossings are there, but so too are the voids. The meaning of these juxtapositions and the situations experienced in the museum are dependent upon the visitor who makes them. Each visitor’s interaction with the space and the exhibit creates movement and change. Although Libeskind does not provide this “clear link” between past, present, and future, these links can be made by visitors who perceive this history openly and critically. The interpretations and meanings thus, extend this dialogic of space, architect, visitor and the narrative of history and memory.
All of these architectural elements, outside and inside, shape the visitor’s apprehension of the space, from the moment they enter the exhibit by going down a flight of stairs. This “first” floor of the museum is actually subterranean, deep underwater. The visitor cannot enter the museum any other way. In this manner, the museum suggests that the visitor cannot understand Jewish history in Berlin without some knowledge of the Holocaust; but perhaps even more importantly, it suggests that coming face to face with the history of the Holocaust and the destruction of a community cannot be avoided. In this way the JMB addresses its particular audience indirectly, much as Hillman does. As I noted above, over 75% of the visitors to the JMB come from Berlin and surrounding areas and from greater Germany (“Annual Report” 46). To design the entrance in this way confronts audiences, mainly German, who tend to resist talking about this past, in order to lessen their personal involvement with this history, or to continue to separate the actions of the government from any action of the people. The sole entry demands that visitors see this history as they walk through it and participate with its representation. As we will see, the JMB’s exhibits and building design continue to challenge visitors to take personal responsibility for the past, the present, and the future. Indeed, it is the mission of the museum.

Once the visitor has descended the stairs, she is surrounded with white walls and black slate floors that slope upward. The information sign informs the visitor that you are at “the Axis of Continuity” and “you are now underground.” The physical sense of being underground is reinforced by the building itself. The point at which the visitor stands is a crossroads (see Figure 3). The Axis of Exile and the Axis of the Holocaust (not pictured) cut across this Axis of

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109 Before the visitor can enter at this point, they and their bags must go through a high powered metal detector. From here, they can pay their entrance fee. The metal detectors are present at both museums, which remind visitors why they are needed. A fire alarm went off when I visited the JMB in the summer of 2007 (which turned out to be a false alarm), and six police cars were in front of the museum in less than five minutes. There is a history of violence in the “place” that is Berlin.
Figure 3: The Axis of Exile and the Axis of Continuity.
Continuity and lead to the Garden of Exile and the Holocaust Tower. The Axis of Exile leads to a glass door and the Axis of the Holocaust leads to a black door. This path of exile, entitled “The Escape – 1933-1941,” records the escape of 276,000 German Jews from Nazi Germany. As this path moves toward the Garden of Exile at the end of the hall it widens from its starting point. In contrast, the path to the Holocaust Tower narrows at the end. These are examples of how the building interacts performatively with the contents of the exhibit to reflect metaphorical meanings that physically and intellectually affect the visitor. On the path of exile there is literally a “light at the end of a tunnel,” but the use of a glass door also implies unseen obstacles. The garden is outside the building (see Figure 4). To go outside, the visitor must open a large, uneven, and heavy door. The ground is slanted down as the visitor steps outside. Libeskind asks us to “think about the disorientation exile brings,” once again evoking the bodily reactions of those who might have endured exile and marking their absence. The garden is visible from the street. Any citizen or visitor in Berlin can see and walk into this space as they pass by. The possibility of this random “seeing” and “acting” indicates how integral strangers are to the success of an exile, who stands alone among those who are “at home” in a place. The garden contains forty-nine pillars of concrete. Each pillar is filled with earth in which willow oaks grow. Forty-eight columns contain the earth of Berlin and stand for 1948 and the formation of Israel. The forty-ninth column is filled with earth from Jerusalem and stands for Berlin itself. The columns are vertical on a slanted ground. This space is designed to mimic seasickness and makes standing upright somewhat difficult.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{110} There are many ways architects theorize space, the postmodern, and performance in the crossing of discourses. According to theorists Michael Dear and Greg Wassmundorf, “postmodern architecture was disturbingly divorced from any broad philosophical underpinnings,” and for this reason, it failed to catch on. In contrast, Architecture scholar Mary McLeod states that although few agree on what postmodern architecture is, one objective unites the various concerns: “the search for architectural communication and the desire to make architecture a vehicle of cultural expression” (4). McLeod notes that postmodern architecture, and this includes deconstructionist movements
As I walked in this space, a JMB tour guide\textsuperscript{111} was giving a tour to some German teenagers. Before she told them anything, she suggested they walk around by themselves for two minutes or so to experience the disorientation of the design. This is precisely what Libeskind had in mind when he designed this museum space. There are written design rationales within the museum, but they are not realized until the visitor interacts with them, and it is important that they are “realized” differently—the interpretations depend on the individual visitor. In this case, as well, a category into which Libeskind could easily fall, have “transformative power” and “inscribe areas for potential social action [emphasis added]” (5). The kind of performance that Libeskind displays in this building, from his extensive research and complex axes, could be described as Architecture scholar Alan Balfour has described a metaphor for the performance of architecture for architects: the architect “faithfully reconstructing the form of the temple from Greece in the hope that somehow, if done just right, our age might be given the wisdom of the ancients [emphasis added]” (2).

\textsuperscript{111} These guides are called museum “hosts” and are an integral part of the expressed purposes of the museum and its exhibits; audience satisfaction and education are both high priorities. The hosts aid visitors in finding their way, explain information that may be confusing, and provide general assistance. In addition, they are trained to give tours to a variety of audiences (all tours are age, group, or theme-specific). Education plays a large role in the JMB from the RRLC with computer databases for all visitors, to these on-site tours, to exhibits and presentations given off site.
the students experience the feeling of disorientation and then learn why it occurs. This is incidentally, an example of the multimodality I see at work in this museum in its use of several modes to enhance the learning of the visitor. Using multimodality as a pedagogical tool suggests aspects of what Simon and Eppert et al described as “pedagogical witnessing,” where knowing and understanding are “social rather than solitary,” and the social communicative act “re-cites” what “happened to others at/in a different space/time,” as well as revisits what one has “learned of and within the disturbances and disruptions inherent in comprehending the substance and significance of these events” (293-4). This combination of experiential and intellectual learning creates a space for the visitor to perform as a maker of memory as they learn about history and memory. The tour guide says exiles literally lose the ground beneath them, and this experience is learned through an intellectual and a physical disturbance.  

Returning inside, the visitor retraces their path along the Axis of Exile. High on the walls along this walkway on both sides are the names of cities to which exiled Jews escaped, citing places that provided refuge. On the left side of this hallway is another display about emigration. It includes photographs of people, Ausweise (traveling documents), suitcases, watches, and jewelry. The suitcase is noted to be filled with “objects of memory,” but the wall itself is filled with such objects. The listing of cities and the family names along with these objects cite the actual places and names of exiles and makes this history personal. There are citations of numbers: 276,000, and names: the Simon family. The JMB places these objects sparingly in this section and, because they are called objects of memory, they mark an absence but do not attempt to stand for it. This is one way the JMB brings attention to the construction of memory: through objects, stories, and facts that foreground memory. Memory exists within the history, both of

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112 Holocaust scholar Dan Stone agrees that: “Libeskind’s museum not only shows how architecture can discomfort, it reveals the absence that characterizes the post-Holocaust world” (523).
which are also metaphorically present in the building design. Visitors reflect on memory and history to make meaning with the space, the contents, and the objects.

Once again at a crossroads, the visitor turns to face the Axis of the Holocaust (see Figure 5). On the left wall of this hallway are the names of the concentration and death camps. Much as the Axis of Exile, names and places are cited here and remind the visitor of these places as physical spaces of destruction. The right side of the hall contains pictures of people behind darkened glass, dark backgrounds, names, and letters. The repetition of the names of the dead juxtaposed with information and objects about what they did (musician or doctor for instance) bears witness to their lives. Although Holocaust scholar Patraka claims that the USHMM has a “context of survival” that no European museum can possess, this contextualization of people and their lives before the war complicates the category of victim in a way the USHMM does not achieve. The visitor sees, not dehumanized victims, but the real people who were brutally murdered. The juxtaposition of the lives and the deaths forces the visitor make layers of meaning and acknowledge both.

The citation of numbers, much like the citation of names, reminds the visitor of the human toll. The Axis of the Holocaust lists numbers: at least 6,000,000 million of the victims of the Holocaust were Jews, 200,000 were German Jews, which brings the larger history back to the regional history to localize their lives but also their deaths. This was not an event that happened elsewhere. Opposite these figures is a display about the Kindemann family of Berlin. Some survived. This brings this history again one step closer to the viewer. It is the Jews of Europe, then the Jews of Germany, and this Jewish family from Berlin. The history encircles personal

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113 This is the way I traced the paths, chronologically from exile to Holocaust, but the visitor is free to trace any path they wish in this exhibit. The Rachel Roth Learning Center is also located in this section, a center in which the visitor can access historical information, archival information, etc. at this point—not at the end of the museum as many learning centers are set up. There are also two computers that link visitors to the Steven Spielberg Shoah survivor testimonies in this learning center.
Figure 5: The hallway leading to the Holocaust Tower.
stories and moves the visitor geographically to its center: Berlin. They will have to identify with these places as sites of destruction and as their home community.

At the end of this hall is the Holocaust Tower. The tower is an empty, vertical void constructed with concrete that commemorates Holocaust victims (see also Figure 4 for an outside view). A museum employee opens the heavy door through which visitors enter the tower and closes it behind you. Once the door is closed sounds are muted. The Tower is cold even though it is summer. It is even colder in the winter. It contains no heating or cooling system. The tower footprint is polygonal, the lines uneven and chaotic. There are straight lines, but these edges of the tower corner into darkness. There is a tiny sliver of light at the ceiling. There is a ladder next to the door, but it is out of reach for any occupant and leads, in fact, to nowhere. There are ten holes along the side wall. Libeskind says about the tower: “Inside this place we are cut off from the everyday life of the city outside and from a view of that city. We can hear sounds and see light but we cannot reach the outside world. So it was for those confined before and during deportation and in the camps themselves” (JMB). Once again, the building design performatively evokes physical, intellectual, and emotional reactions from the visitor. Much as Klemperer recorded detail after detail to give his reader the “feeling’ of being there, the Holocaust Tower is a representation of memory and feeling-- not a recreation. It is meant to evoke the feelings that victims might have felt during these times-- all unique and all different. Each visitor will experience being “trapped” inside a concrete tower differently. This design speaks to the museum’s constructed-ness. The museum, as a process of construction of representations of history and memory, is made transparent to the visitor and they are invited to participate in this construction of meaning. The aim is not to re-create it but to mark it in a way that purposefully
affects a visitor. They cannot leave these spaces physically untouched. Their engagement is demanded.  

4.4 Architectural Space in the USHMM: Implicitly Performative Spaces

Unlike Libeskind’s explicitly performative design and in-museum commentary, the USHMM’s architectural space has an implicit performativity. There is no in-museum commentary from the architect about the space. The architect, Ingo Freed, has said, however that a building that houses memory should be “‘sufficiently ambiguous and open ended so that others can inhabit the space, can imbue the forms with their own memory’” (qtd. in Young 339). By not “forcing what he called ‘one reading’ on the visitors, Freed hoped to leave the symbols inclusive and inviting to all. ‘We wanted an evocation of the incomplete’” (339). The design of the building was originally rejected by the Commission on the Holocaust because of its enormous size. The project was resubmitted successfully a second time. Freed argued for retaining the size of the Hall of Remembrance (which follows the end of the permanent exhibit), but the commission insisted that that “he bring it into line with the rest of the Mall’s monuments” (339-40). Young discusses these architectural decisions and processes as layers of meaning, however; because these layers are not explicit within the museum, the performative subjectivity that could be present, as it is with Libeskind’s design, is absent. The performativity of the space can be inferred implicitly; nevertheless, the exhibits are the main focus. The presence of an explicit performative subjectivity could contrast the narrativity of the museum’s directed, chronological exhibit for a greater degree of performative memorialization.

Thus, the architectural space does interact with the exhibits, but only at certain junctures. For instance the museum is designed to begin on the fourth floor and moves progressively down

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114 But they can also not enter the Tower at all, which allows for individual constructions of meaning from the space.
115 I did not receive permission to use any photographs or diagrams of the USHMM.
as the exhibit chronicles the history leading up to the Holocaust. This design is deconstructive because it is open to various interpretations. In most of the museum, however, the space is secondary to the exhibit. Patraka claims the production of space produces “subjectivity for the spectator” (153). Patraka’s subjective implies a transformation of the spectator from passive receiver into subject who acts as a result of movement through the museum space. I argue that this subjectivity in the spectator shifts in the USHMM within the museum space primarily as the exhibit and the building interact (and also to some extent forward and between perspectives as bystander and liberator, which I discuss in the following section) to create action.

The architectural space of the USHMM does not interact with visitors as performatively as the space of the JMB overall, although there are implicit metaphors present in the USHMM. The narrative of the museum dominates because the strict chronological exhibit encourages a predetermined meaning, a single meaning rather than multi-layered meanings and commentary on the process of the production of representations. Very performative moments emerge in the USHMM, nonetheless, where the space interacts with the exhibit, much as it does in the JMB, to reinforce the contents through the experiential process of performing witness within that space—a process that physically and intellectually “disturbs” the visitor. In one section of the museum, a half circle is set apart from the main exhibit and focuses on the Evian Conference of 1938. Visitors must leave the direct path and separate from the larger group to view this. There is a quote from Hitler where he asked the world to take these “criminals” (Jews), but no country did. The minor subheading for this section, “A Useless Conference,” describes how little any country did to help fleeing Jews. This is one instance where information is provided that could shift visitors’ identifications (which I will discuss more at length below) with the United States as a
nation who behaved “bravely and proudly” and this shift is performatively reinforced by the building design.

This corner is set off from the narrow hall that leads to the next area of the museum. As the narrative of the exhibit describes the persecution getting worse and the possibilities of escape lessening, the visitor is also closed in together with other visitors, trying to get through to the next section. The visitor can break off into this corner, but will find no “relief.” It is a corner with no way out, much like the door at the end of the Axis of the Holocaust. Like the JMB in this instance, the USHMM building design evokes a physical feeling in the visitor that underscores what the visitor apprehends intellectually. The United States is clearly implicated here as a nation which did not help the Jews, in contrast to the opening of the museum exhibit that depicts scenes of the liberation of the camps. The subjectivities of the spectator could shift. The last frame in this corner is a New York Times cartoon (July 3, 1938) about the Evian Conference, which shows a man at crossroads shaped like a swastika. “Will he escape?” the caption asks. Viewers experiencing this section in the present know already, that in most cases, he will not escape.

Another example of where the exhibit and the building work together to create performative memorialization is at a bridge crossing between sections. On one side of the wall are the names of towns (in the original Yiddish) that were destroyed. The plaque says: “This wall preserves these Yiddish place names.” As I stand there, I hear three different people say “doesn’t it make you sick?” It is a strange repetition. The location of this bridge between a section about

116 Art Spiegelman’s Maus echoes this image when his parents face a similar swastika-shaped crossroad as they try to escape, and this highlights the way that layering and the processing of memory work across discourses. In another section of the museum, they have placed part of the crematoria from Mauthausen with a large, blown-up photo of Sonderkommandos burning the bodies in pits. The photo is taken from the State Museum of Auschwitz in Poland. On the floor are twisted metal frames, which the caption explains are twisted because they were used as open air pyres to burn bodies. As another example of how discourses communicate across time, a hand-drawn version of this photo in reverse appears in Maus. See Chapter Five in this dissertation.
Jews being turned away in America and a section about mostly apathetic American responses may cause this response from visitors involuntarily. As they have been confronted and will be confronted with their country’s complicity, they pause on this bridge to consider how many towns, and the residents within them, were destroyed. This bridge is metal, encased in glass, and suspended over the other floors. The visitor is suspended over those in the reception area. They can see the sky and the intersecting metal beams and brick walls-- the world of the present seeps into this glass space of the past. Abstract places in the past become space to be interpreted and negotiated in the present.

Another way that the USHMM employs architectural space occurs in the sections of the museum that are designed to be “re-creations” of the victim’s physical experience. The section on the ghettos is paved with actual stones from Chlodna Street inside the Warsaw ghetto. A rusted milk-can that held historical information from Emanuel Ringelbaum about the ghetto stands behind a wooden rail. There are films here about the ghettos, a casting from the Warsaw ghetto wall, artifacts from the ghetto, and big screens with revolving pictures. There is information posted about the Warsaw ghetto and the Jewish Councils. There are letters and diary fragments (which document names and deaths). A rail car used for deportations was imported from Europe and placed within the exhibit. There is a film about deportations. There are suitcases piled outside the car and the visitor can walk through the rail car to the next section of the exhibit which introduces the railcar platforms where selektions took place, retracing the steps of the concentration camp prisoner’s experience when they entered Auschwitz. SS soldiers decided at the moment of the prisoners’ arrival, based on age, gender, and physical appearance, whether they would live or die. The collection of artifacts or objects, in comparison to the sparseness of the artifacts in the JMB, reinforces the sense of the USHMM being framed within a
“context of survival.” The collection of so many artifacts also serves as evidence of this history—a history made tangible for visitors in a country that has no tangible, geographical connection to the event. The masses of objects, however, are also simply masses. There is no personal story attached to them, although there are names. The “objective” narrative of the museum takes over in sections like this. The subjective nature of the architecture recedes, as well as the subjectivity of these victims. The individuality, complexity, and gender of the victims are subsumed in the narrative.

The museum returns in other sections, however, to spaces where the subjectivity of the victims is present and is reinforced by the architectural design. After visitors walk through the rail car, they walk through a recreated Arbeit macht Frei gate. There are benches to the right in front of a glass enclosure. Behind these benches, between the bench and the glass, is a rough stone floor. This is a casting of the path from the Treblinka killing center to nearby forced labor camps (the Nazis used stones from cemetery headstones). To place this path off the main walkway is, again, purposeful. As the visitor sits to rest on benches, they are confronted with these stones which represent so much pain and suffering. These benches are directly in front of the glass room called “Voices of Auschwitz,” where visitors can listen to verbal testimonies of survivors. Here the USHMM creates a performative space of survivor subjectivity, as well as a performative space for collective witnessing on the part of the visitor in another mode—listening. In this room people sit together and listen. Rarely do they look at each other. Some cry. Many read the books that contain the written transcripts of the voices. The placard outside states: “The Audio theater presents the spoken memories of Auschwitz survivors.” There are seventeen voices, eight men and nine women. Patraka sees this space as “a site for a community of witness among strangers because we are confronted with the presence of other spectators, other bodies,
with whom we must cooperate. Thus, a Holocaust museum becomes a performance space when different activities are performed simultaneously, producing different subjectivities and different aims within the incoherence of that space” (“Spectacular” 157). In this space the performance of cooperative witness is multimodal; visitors respond to a variety of modes to make layers of complex meaning—they learn critically and effectively through these actions.

In the theater, unlike in the previous section I described, gender and individuality are very present, making this space more performative in that it complicates the category of victim. The women talk about shaving and nakedness, much like Hillman does. They talk about the crematoria, about seeing and still not believing, as Hillman, Wiesel, Vladek Spiegelman and Ruth Klüger (Chapter Five) relate. This area highlights the way that the layering of meaning and the processing of memory work across discourses. Witness testimony demands “special modes of attention and interpretation. What survivors are witness to is their own suffering, in the past as victims and in the now of telling as survivors” (Witness 34). At this moment in the USHMM, visitors can bear witness to the process of witnessing.

But many critics see “the existence of institutions like Holocaust museums serv[ing] the function of providing easy knowledge-- easy because it confirms received ideas and fulfills anticipated emotional experience” (Witness 49). Holocaust scholar Andreas Huyssen calls this the “musealization” of memory. This event, these objects are made to be more of an attraction for visitors that “entertain” rather than teach or disrupt. Memory scholars Douglass and Vogler go so far as to claim: “The USHMM can be seen as engaged in a different kind of tidying up, with the largest collection of ‘authentic’ Holocaust artifacts or relics in the world” (51-2). This collection of artifacts is a series of representations more than a “tidying up” of history in many cases. Although the spaces that are opened which could cause performative disruptions for
visitors are not constant, they are present. This museum constructs a representation of history, and when it makes this process transparent for visitors, they can engage in active, multimodal meaning-making about this history.

4.5 Inside the JMB: the Interactive Exhibits as Performative and Gendered

As I noted in the beginning of this chapter, learning and teaching are two primary purposes for these museums. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, interactive and multimodal learning is one way to accomplish this learning and teaching. In the prior section, I attended to how the architectural spaces interact with the exhibits and the visitors to open spaces for active meaning-making. The exhibits above the subterranean floor of the museum also reveal a great deal of performativity with strong attention to multiple perspectives, interactive exhibits, and complicated categories that highlight individuality and gender. Although these elements working together make the JMB highly performative, as a chronological museum exhibit, it also inevitably outlines a “predetermined” meaning. The level of interactivity and narrative movements in time within the exhibit, in which the visitor is less directed, however, allow for a variety of audience response, layered and recreated with each individual action within that space. The interaction in these exhibits is not based as much in the physical reactions of the visitors to the space, as it is in the underground section, but with their physical actions within that space.

From the subterranean level the visitor must ascend six flights of stairs to the exhibit of Jewish history that goes back 2,000 years in time. The sign in the aboveground exhibit: “Two Millennia of Jewish History,” contrasts what the visitor just witnessed below taking place within twelve years.117 This is a radical shift in perspectives and in time. Like in Hillman’s text, where

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117 According to cultural reporter Julia Klein, the JMB’s “exhibition narrative often seems to lack focus and depth,” but that may be because although the museum “does touch on anti-Semitism, centuries of discriminatory laws and taxes, and, finally, the Holocaust, it never tries to explain how dislike could have degenerated into mass murder,” which is a task historians should attempt (2). The lack of focus for Klein, therefore, is a refusal to close this history
she placed the reader into the present with her verb tense, the visitor is taken out of the “chronology” of history and placed into a time period, creating a performative break, a gap for audience response. This exhibit has more multimodal aspects to it than the exhibit below ground. In this opening section, for instance, there is film about the ancient history of the Jews in Europe, a wish-tree where visitors can write a wish and hang it on the tree, a small stairway that children can use to climb the tree, and a cabinet with spices and cloths used in ancient trading. There are a multitude of modes presented and the visitor can interact with these modes to create complex meanings. The visitor can see a film with the group (mass media) or interact with displays individually (interpersonal). The visitor is allowed to touch all of these items, making history not an untouchable past, but a tangible presence. The tree asks for visitor interaction in making a wish. The visitor makes their contribution to this tree, which stands in a section about the Middle Ages, in the present, shifting performatively through this narrative space.

Each exhibit section has a title. One, called “Harmony and Hatred,” details the first serious persecution of the Jews in 1096, followed by another peak in the fourteenth century during the Plague. As in the first section, every subsequent section also contains a series of variously interactive exhibits. One interesting object that re-occurs occasionally throughout the museum is a small tower with drawers. The drawers do not stay open by themselves. The visitor, who must be curious enough to seek what is inside the drawers, is required to pull open the drawer and hold it to read the information contained therein. The first tower the visitor encounters lists the anti-Semitic claims made by their persecutors: blood libel, host desecration, poisoning of wells, and Judas’s kiss. These drawers mostly contain specific, citational examples of severe anti-Semitism. They are repeated, but with different examples and different contexts. It

with an “explanation” of how it happened. The reasons for the Holocaust are too complicated for one explanation. Leaving it unresolved in the museum forces visitors, rather to contemplate the “why” and “how” for themselves instead of being passively informed.
is purposeful that such examples are not freely displayed. The visitor must seek to learn. By placing this information in drawers that must be physically held open, it can be a metaphor for the necessity of action in fighting anti-Semitism. The visitor can be ignorant of these situations by simply looking the other way, or by trying one drawer and letting it close. It takes physical effort and a commitment to learn, just as it takes commitment to fight anti-Semitism. As these towers appear variously within the museum, they remind visitors that this process is ongoing.

In another example of the interactive, multimodal learning in the museum exhibits one section discusses learning as the “greatest good” in the Jewish tradition. There is a video screen that visitors breathe on and the Hebrew text appears on the right column. Explanatory text appears on the left explaining the Mishnah and various Rabbis’ work. You can listen to the oldest documents being read in Yiddish. You can spell “Ashkenaz” in Hebrew letters. In all of these cases, what you do, makes something else happen. What you do sets off a chain of other events.

The interactivity of these exhibits, and the movement in narrative between the past, present, and future create spaces for audience response. Similarly, the exhibits attend to the lives of individuals within this history. Historical figures are shown as complex and gendered. Toward the end of this portion of the exhibit on the Middle Ages is a display called “Ein Frauen Leben” (A Woman’s Life). It looks at the life of Glikl bas Judah Leib, who was born in Hamburg in 1646 or 1647. Her memoirs are the oldest surviving autobiography of a Jewish woman of the early modern period. Leib recorded her life over thirty years as a business woman and mother who raised twelve children. This display, focusing on a remarkable woman, as it also focuses on remarkable men, recognizes the important historical contributions of females and males together.
In this museum, the discourses of gender in German Jewish history differ from discourses of gender in history generally. Gender is not marginalized or gathered under the umbrella of “universality.” In the JMB, both in the underground and aboveground exhibits, gender is incorporated throughout the exhibits. Importantly, the women are shown in the context of what they do in terms of work and societal contributions, as are the men. By placing women and men’s stories equally throughout this museum, in the context of Jewish history and Jewish-German history, including the Holocaust, the museum recognizes the complexity of the experience of the Jewish people and therefore highlights women’s roles as well as men’s.

Additionally, the next placard asks: “An Exceptional Woman?” and states: “Glikl never questioned the role that traditional Judaism expected women to play.” She was a mother before she was a businesswoman. This kind of framing plays on the modern audience’s tendency to see strong woman and accomplished women as the exception rather than the rule. By framing Glikl in this way, the JMB puts forth the notion that although there were restrictions on a woman’s role, she could excel within this role as a unique individual. Set alongside this exhibit on Glikl is the “Wheel of Life” (see Figure 6). The wheel has quotes from women about childbirth and mothering, the mikveh (ritual bath), and women in school. This is further evidence that women were mothers and traditional role bearers but also scholars and business associates-- widening the audience’s perception of women at this time. This section also gives voices to actual women, and the visitor must interactively turn the wheel of life in order to read the individual quotes. As we saw in the chapter on memoirs, there is an element of “looking back” at history that reinforces its constructed-ness. Although the museum tries to avoid the universal and highlight
Figure 6: The Wheel of Life.
the individual, having separate sections like Leib’s devoted only to women, reinforces the constructed gender roles of the particular time period. Women’s roles have often been constructed as separate spheres (Kerber 2002).

In addition to showing the complexities of gender roles with exhibits and interactive sections that invite the visitor to act within both roles, the JMB complicates the categories visitors may hold to, as I have earlier argued Americans often do, about the behavior of Jews and Germans during the Second World War. All these complications serve to open spaces for audience response in layered meaning-making. “World War I and Weimar,” displays the 1919 constitution that gave emancipation to Jews, a landmark that was crushed in 1933 with the rise of the Nazis.

Before the JMB explains Nazi persecution at any length, they ask an important question, which like many sections before in this museum, is aimed at audience preconceptions and stereotypes—especially German audiences. The JMB notes the Jewish reaction to Nazi persecution: “Did Jews passively accept? No.” A new section begins with a timeline on black boards: “Persecution, Resistance, Extermination 1933-1945.” It is important that resistance appears second in this title and reminds the visitor that resistance was an important part of this history. First it is shown that several help associations were created to fight this persecution. Then there is a focus on emigration and resistance. This focus shows evidence of action—directly confronting this preconception of passive victims, just as the depiction of women and men confronts audience preconceptions about gender.

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118 Patraka notes a conversation with some resistance fighters who were survivors and visiting the USHMM. The attention to resistance fighters in that museum was quite lacking in their opinion. There is one clear section in the ghettos and toward the end of the war where the USHMM highlights resistance. In the ghetto section, the resistance is filmed by Nazis, who burned the Warsaw ghetto to the ground in retaliation for this resistance. The notion of resistance is undercut by this framing. The JMB, in contrast, highlights resistance as continuous (“Spectacular” 146-8).
The next section moves to 1933 and begins with a metal tree called an “Emancipation Tree” with forms in German and English on which visitors can write an answer to the question: “What do equal rights mean to you?” and hang their answers on the tree. Much like the wish tree, this action on the part of the visitor shifts the narrative time frame of the exhibit. The juxtaposition of emancipation with legalized persecution confronts the visitor. The visitor is called to act—to critically think about equal rights—before the persecution begins. This is an important movement of the past into the present. The visitor is called to act at a critical time in history in the present. This movement creates the gap for responsive understanding, and creates a witness to the process of constructing this history as bearing witness.

Simple banners hang from the ceiling in the next section with dates, numbers, and names of those deported and killed, which forces the visitor to focus on these details—to bear witness to these people and to these deaths. The numbers and names on the banner evoke the presence of those lost and performatively re-mark them as it scrolls continually and repetitively. There are no graphic pictures to distract the visitor with the “spectacle” of horror. At the table in this room there is a Gedenk (Memorial) book table. These books list the names of German Jews. This is another form of witnessing, citation, and evocation through the repetition of these names in different modes—names scrolling visually and names printed in a book. The victims are not pictured, recalling Michael Kimmelman’s question at the opening of Jewish Heritage in New York: does depicting Jews as corpses “remember them as they would have wanted to be remembered, or as the Nazis would have them remembered?” (40). To list the names instead, suggests a memorialization more like Derrida’s “spectrality.” As Douglass and Vogler quote Hannah Arendt from Men in Dark Times: “as long as the meaning of the events remain alive [. . .] ‘mastering the past’ can take the form of recurrent narration [emphasis added]” (45). As the
visitor reads these names and the *Gedenk* books that are located on side tables, the visitor has the opportunity to “accept the role of reader or hearer” and “to accept a responsibility and obligation, to take one’s place in a series of readers whose attention keeps the witness alive” (*Witness* 45). With this repetition, with these multiple modes, and with this active participation, visitors bear witness to the chain of communication in Holocaust discourses. These names evoke those who died, as they also evoke those who lived (as they saw in the below ground exhibit). The visitor, in interacting with these modes and performative citations and evocations, is given the opportunity to make layered meanings, to bear witness to the individuals who suffered. The museum presents this information in many modes so that it is not only repeated, but in that repetition, the visitors can see how these representations can be constructed in many ways—and in this way draws attention to its constructed-ness as a process.

One particular section, “How to remember?” demonstrates a unique self-reflexivity (as we saw in the diary writers about the process of writing, and in memoir writers about the process of representing memory) about the process of representation in the JMB that is not present in the USHMM. In a museum about memory and history, the JMB pauses to reflect on how this process is constructed. To include a section about the process of making memory and history into a narrative of discourse calls attention to the museum as a representation of history and memory not a re-creation. Saying that “reconciliation did not acknowledge atrocities,” highlights the criticisms of Germany for not coming to terms with its past. This is directed at German audiences who might have preconceptions that because Germany is “reconciled” with the world on a political level the atrocities of the past are behind them. This section confronts visitors by showing that to remember memory and history is to engage in an ongoing dialogue. Closure is not the goal. We find another interactive station at this point called “Memory and
Responsibility.” The juxtaposition of these two words reflects what the JMB attempts to do throughout the museum. The interaction of history happening now with the history that happened then continues in a dialogic.

Because of its geographical location at one of the centers of Jewish destruction and a main European site for Nazi leadership and persecution policies, the JMB may have a hard time avoiding being a museum to an exoticized other. But in the case of the JMB, they address this by including information about the present and by implicating the visitor in a very particular way. The visitor could be party to such an “othered” reading, but the museum’s architectural design and exhibit interweave the history of the Holocaust within the history of Jewish-Germans in Berlin. The museum presents them not as “other” or endangered, but as a constant presence—a complex, individual presence that influences the present. Each visitor must take responsibility to witness this history. The JMB cannot be a museum “of the living” like the USHMM, but it can be a museum of the future of the Jews in Germany by creating witnesses to the process of bearing witness, witnesses who participate in the ongoing dialogic of history and memory and act to make meaning in themselves, in the community, and in the world.

4.6 Inside the USHMM: Performative Gaps in the Complication of Categories.

In contrast to the JMB, the USHMM’s exhibit begins on the uppermost floor. This fourth floor is titled: Nazi Assault 1933-39, the third floor: Final Solution 1940-45, and the second floor: Last Chapter. The first floor contains the reception area and the revolving non-permanent exhibitions. Each visitor must sign up for an appointment time and, after waiting, is directed to elevators as a group. This is the first example of how this exhibit is very directed by its creators. The preset time slots are in response to the overwhelming number of visitors this museum

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119 As I noted earlier in this chapter, Patraka has noted that this does not happen for the USHMM because it is on United States soil away from the actual sites of destruction.
received since it opened in 1994. In the foyer in front of the elevator, each visitor is asked to take an identity card with a victim’s name and personal history during the war. You can choose an identity card based on male or female. The visitor is thanked at the elevator doors by a museum employee who tells them that they will be accompanied throughout the exhibit by “someone who was there” in the form of this identity card. The original goal of the identity cards at the USHMM, according to designer Ralph Applebaum, was to have complete identification with the victims-- visitors take their journey (Witness 46). The visitor can contemplate not only how many people were involved, but can also make a personal connection with the history itself.

To print their fate on the card from the beginning, however, takes away the level of identification the USHMM seeks. The visitor, with this foreknowledge, comes to that victim’s history as they come to the larger history: with a preconceived notion of how things happened. To move this aspect of the exhibit into performative memorialization would require a more active role on the part of the visitor. For instance, the visitor would be required to include their address at the end of the exhibit to learn about this victim’s fate. This action would mean they took responsibility for creating and receiving this knowledge, and the arrival of this information at their home would break their present with the past. As these cards appear, in contrast, allows visitors to avoid confrontation with this history, as is evident when you see the identity cards in nearby trashcans outside (Gourevitch “Behold” 11).

The second encounter for the visitor is on the elevator ride to the fourth floor. First of all, the visitor is physically rising above, and as they do, the voice of an American soldier comes through a speaker and talks about liberating the camps. The exhibit begins with a wall-sized photo entitled “Americans encounter the camps” in Ohrdruf and a film at Dachau. On the wall is the now famous quote from Eisenhower about “what I saw beggars description [. . .] and I

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120 As I have noted elsewhere, identification itself can become problematic.
wanted to say that I saw it firsthand to counter those who might claim this never happened.” This series of encounters clearly positions the visitor from an American perspective. The quote from Eisenhower clarifies one of the purposes of this museum: to have testimonies serve as evidence for those who might deny this event in the future. The museum begins, as the JMB does, by placing visitors into the middle of this history or rather, at the “end,” as if to remind the visitor to keep this part in mind when you see what you are about to see. This is the only disruption of the chronology of the exhibit. (This could be considered self-reflexive discourse in the exhibit as well, but as with the architecture, it is implicit). As the JMB begins with that which is most familiar to its visitors, the Holocaust, the USHMM begins this history at the point with which Americans are most familiar: the liberation of the camps. This causes visitors to immediately identify, not with the victim on the card in their hand, but with the liberators. The victim has no voice at this point; the liberators do. The performative movement that I claim creates gaps for audiences to respond begins here with the shifts in perspectives and thus, in the spectator subjectivity, but these may not be the shifts that allow audiences to make layered meanings or complicate their preconceived categories about victims or liberators.

Patraka claims that the USHMM “must engage U.S. viewers with an ethical narrative of national identity in direct relation to the Holocaust [emphasis added]” (143), or else they become an “other” much as I discussed with Frank and Klemperer’s shifting subjectivity in the diary chapter. Patraka claims national identification relates to the promotion of democratic ideals as the response to these kinds of events. But there are moments in the museum where this

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121 I argue that opening the USHMM from the perspective of liberators quickly negates identification with the victim’s I.D. card. I also argue that the museum avoids explicit critique of Americans as bystanders, but there are performative moments in the museum where these categories are complicated. Cultural critic Philip Gourevitch agrees that “opening the show from this vantage point will also comfort Americans by identifying them immediately as heroes. An odd spin, this: clutching their I.D. cards, museumgoers are asked to identify simultaneously with the victims and their saviors. Placing the American liberation of the camps in the foreground of the exhibition also nudges to the background the third role visitors are being asked to consider: that of the bystanders who participate in history by an acquiescent failure to act” (“Behold” 6).
perspective, the democratic ideal, is complicated. One such section details to what extent the United States government ignored the plight of the Jews from the early years and well into the years of deportation and extermination (as I had briefly mentioned above). By placing the government’s willful ignorance in this section, Patraka claims that the museum, “constructs a localized historical contradiction to its own ideological claims about how democracies respond to genocides, thereby complicating the narrative of our national identity” (144). It is my contention that the sole inclusion of this section does not complicate this identity enough. In order to complicate this identity, to create breaks for audiences, as I have claimed with diaries and memoirs, the breaks must continue to appear. But Patraka adds this key point: “Ideally this contradiction opens a space of possibility for the spectator to consider how representative democracy operates in the present with regard to genocides elsewhere, rather than entirely soliciting a sense of disillusion, betrayal, and despair about the past [emphasis added]” (144).

This idea of opening spaces of possibility is reminiscent of the gaps for audience response that I have noted throughout this project. Patraka claims that a discourse about the past, placed performatively in the present, will elicit critical thoughts about how the government behaves right now. This implicit narrative (democracy fails genocide in the present) contrasted with the explicit narrative of national identity (democracy succeeded in combating genocide in the past) could be performative because the contrasting narrative is not a reaction expected by museum designers. The visitor must bring this information with them in order to understand this contrast. The identification of the visitor with national identity may prevent “othering” from happening as Patraka notes, but visitors still have a tendency to identify more with the “strong”

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122 Patraka returns to this later to discuss the crucial subtext of the museum’s placement on the National Mall across from the Treasury. The Treasury secretary is the man who received one of the letters about the camps and ignored it.

123 In a course I taught about the Holocaust, when my students saw some of the anti-Semitic propaganda coming out of the U.S. at that time, they dismissed it as the work of a radical few.
liberator than the “weak” victim or the “evil” perpetrator. This tendency does not complicate perspectives, and it fails to truly interrogate a superficial American identity and how deeply democracy fails genocide both then and now.

What performative memorialization elicits, however, is more akin to a level of participation that allows visitors to connect with this history not as identification (because they were not there and history cannot be recreated) but as a dialogic of discourse that connects to other, larger discourses surrounding this history. Like the space of the museum building itself, this contradictory space could be opened and complicated for visitors who realize this contradiction exists-- it is implicit.

For example, each section of explanatory text in the museum has a “major” and a “minor” heading. One section is called “Propaganda and Nazi Laws” (major) and “Tools of Persuasion” (minor). The major sections explain what visitors may already know: the Nuremberg Laws and the propaganda films, but the minor sections go into more detail, complicating the issues with more information visitors might not know, much like Hillman does in her memoir. The same is true for the section “The Science of Race” (major) and “Forced Sterilization” (minor). It notes here that before Germany, America led the world in compulsory sterilization. Like the JMB, these examples show material presented directly to their target audiences. The liberator perspective is the glorified one, but these issues about sterilization and the persecution of Communists are juxtaposed within this narrative. The audience could see how small the distance is between “us” and “them,” and the categories of liberator as “good” and German as “bad” could be complicated with this knowledge, but there is no interaction or break in the narrative that would encourage this.
By using headings, the information goes from general to specific. Much like a newspaper is designed to do, this allows the visitor to get the important general history, and if they wish to read further, they can learn in more detail. This is the explicit presentation of information that I mentioned previously. Like the implicit narrative of the building’s location, these details contradict the larger, guiding narrative of “the power of democracy” to fight genocide. In this instance, because this contradiction is placed within the exhibit and the visitor is expected to order this information as it appears, they do not create performative responses in the audience. Clearly, according to the placement of these texts, to be a complicit bystander is never as “bad” as being the perpetrator. This lessens the possibility for the audience to realize the larger implications of this history: perpetrators depend upon bystanders to achieve their aims. There are many layers of responsibility for what happens in history.

One example is the section early in the museum exhibit on Technology and Persecution. Hollerith machines (there is one on display) were crucial tools that made it possible for Germany to create national registers in three years. Hollerith machines were used in the 1939 census and to collect data throughout the war. DEHOMAG (Deutsche Hollerith Machinen Gesellschaft), the creator of the machine, has been a subsidiary of IBM since 1922. IBM is clearly an American company and the relationship is apparent. In addition, if visitors come with current historical information, this section implicates Americans as a country that stood by during apartheid as well, because it has been made public that similar machines, made and supplied by IBM, were used to make a national registry in South Africa to designate people as black, colored, or white. This was in 1948, only three years after the Holocaust. This section comes shortly before the Evian Conference section I discussed above. An “American Responses” section later in the museum includes a five minute video. The video states bluntly: Americans had ample and mostly
accurate information about the plight of Jews, but did nothing. The modes of discourse are multiple, showing museum headlines about the Germany’s actions against Jews, and speeches by government officials that lessened the crisis (which should strike a chord in the present for Americans). The video can be viewed privately on twenty different screens or on a communal viewing screen. The American visitor can bear witness collectively or individually to their own country’s lack of response to this crisis. The clarity of the fact of American complicity in this event resonates here. American visitors are “disturbed” by the reference to corporate complicity with IBM, and then to government complicity with the Evian conference, and then to the general public’s complicity with newspaper headlines. It is up to the visitor to make these connections and these interpretations, and only then will their identifications shift performatively.124

In a later section on the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Nazis there is a minor subheading: “Racial Warfare” against Communism. A video plays here of the people in this region being rounded up and working. There are also now, for the first time, videos hidden below a wall, so that they cannot be seen by children. The videos show graphic scenes of Mobile Killing Units. This is another reminder to American audience that Nazis were also violently against Communism. They killed Communists for their differences in political ideology. In these examples it is possible to see analogies. These examples focus on the consequences of “social structures and social practices,” which could cause us to look to look at Nazi Germany’s fight against Communism as analogous to our fight against Communism, and therefore, “risk losing our complacent feelings of safety in being different from them” (Witness 30).125

124 These examples suggesting American complicity appear throughout the museum. I can only highlight a few here. 125 But these instances come more often in terms of the Communist context I noted (and Patraka notes). In the case of the persecution of the Jews, no social system or practice is invoked which would enable us to “understand” the Nazis and how they could rise to power. To “invok[ing] mystery, destiny, or some unnameable and unthinkable causality” for the destruction of the Jews prevents us from any identification with perpetrators (Witness 30) and does not interrogate, to any extent, the American identity as historically prejudiced or violent.
Such analogies could cause breaks in the chronology of the narrative, if the viewer makes these connections. The opportunity for multiple layers of meaning to be made is present through the juxtaposition of material. In another section, this juxtaposition is more than implicit. The museum ends, as it began, with liberation.126 The liberation of the camps is now “seen” from American, British, and Soviet perspectives in film and photographs. But the very last section, after what seemed to be an opening and closing frame of liberation, contains interesting, final juxtapositions. The last hall focuses on children. It has artifacts, photos, information about Kindertransports.127 The opposite wall is called “killers.” It contains biographies of Adolf Eichmann and Nazi criminals as well as information about the Nuremberg trials. Farther down are drawings from children in Theresienstadt camp and opposite this is a section called the “Guilt of Bystanders.” The visitor can easily make connections between these seemingly incongruent topics because of their juxtaposition. Like the JMB’s placement of the Holocaust section first, this section juxtaposing perpetrators and bystanders opposite innocence of children, confronts the visitor at the very end—challenges them to complicate the categories of perpetrator and bystander in comparison to the “true” innocence of children.

The section ends with the quote from German Pastor Martin Niemoeller:

First they came for the Communists, but I was not a Communist so I did not speak out. Then they came for the Socialists and the Trade Unionists, but I was neither, so I did not speak out. Then they came for the Jews, but I was not a Jew so I did not speak out. And when they came for me, there was no one left to speak out for me. (Jewish Virtual)

Bystanders are complicit. Even when one thinks something that happens to another person does not affect them—it does eventually. To act in response to this situation could have changed the

126 Patraka calls this framing, as well as the survivor testimony at the end that shows one woman (victim) who actually married a soldier (liberator) “a crucial strategy of the whole museum, with Jews and Jewish history (the feminized victim) married to American democracy (the masculinized liberator)” (“Spectacular” 13).

127 These were special transports that rescued Jewish children and sent them to various countries, such as Britain, to live with foster families.
outcome. It highlights not only what was done (perpetrators) but what was not done (bystanders). People did not pay attention to the news. They did not say anything when their neighbors disappeared. The visitor, especially the American visitor often guilty of such inaction, is challenged to be different. Although the museum has not explicitly presented these complications throughout the museum, the museum finishes with a very explicit complication.  

This hall ends with a room where visitors can listen collectively to survivor testimonies. Many people are crying here. It ends with a quote from Wiesel: “For the dead and the living we must bear witness.” The end of the exhibit opens onto the Hall of Remembrance that contains an eternal flame. It is a six-sided room with glass at each corner. The visitor can finally see “outside” again, but only in fragments. The present is fragmented by what they have seen in the past, a present framed by the patriotic monuments on the Mall.

4.7 Conclusion

There are several perspectives in these museums that are representations of memory and witness, but also representations that reflect the museum creators and their social and national contexts. It must be remembered that “everything one sees in a museum is a production by somebody” (Patraka “Spectacular” 153). This is why museums provide such a clear example of multimodality. Through their multimodality they seek to teach their audiences. In terms of the performative I have been discussing throughout these chapters, “a Holocaust museum, in particular, can be a performance environment where we are asked to change from spectator/bystander to witness, where we are asked to make our specific memory into historic memory [emphasis added]” (153). The passive spectator/bystander becomes witness-- by

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128 Patraka asked: who would come to a museum that “position[s] spectators as complicitous bystanders?” (“Spectacular” 13). And the JMB similarly predicted: “the museum seemed certain to fail if it seemed to accuse visitors or depress them. A balance had to be struck between making visitors feel comfortable and downplaying the difficulties of the history” (“Annual Report” 41).
performing “the remembering” that is occurring in the action of “seeing” and experiencing the museum. But, there is also a contradictory presentation that does not encourage performance from the spectator. In the USHMM, because the narrative represented is so infused with national identity, it does not demand that visitors complicate the category of victim or question their own national identity in any way. In contrast, the JMB challenges audiences to confront their national identity as it figures in historical contexts in the past, present, and future. Both museums, however, through the interaction of architectural space and exhibits that often contain conflicting or fragmented narratives, exhibit performative memorialization that creates a dialogic of history and memory, within themselves, with audiences, with witnesses, and with other Holocaust discourses, highlighting how the processing of memory works across discourses.

In diaries and memoirs the performative movement between subjectivities and constructions of genre and gender were indicated with language. In the USHMM, the narrative time frame is chronological and directed, but when the architectural space reinforces the exhibition contents, and the categories of liberator and bystander are complicated, the USHMM displays performative movement. The shifting subjectivities interacting with the architectural space in the USHMM open spaces for audience response, but the guided narrative makes the process of the construction of representation much less transparent, and therefore reduces these gaps for responsive understanding. In the JMB the fragmented narrative time frame between past and present and future interacts continuously with the subjectivity of the architectural space to create performative movement. The shifting narrative time frame in the JMB, that is occasionally self-reflexive, and the performative architectural space that is subjective make the process of the construction of representation in this museum space more transparent for visitors and opens performative spaces for responsive understanding. As I have demonstrated, the dialogic of
history and memory and process and content is present in both these museums, but to differing degrees. All of these elements, with the addition of continuous shifts between past, present and future (Hillman did this initially), forecasts the hybrid texts I examine in the next chapter which meld this movement of narrative time frame with extreme self-reflexivity to reveal conscious constructions of genre and gender that interact with audiences to display performative memorialization in all its facets and create social action in audiences.

In this dissertation, I claim that authors of Holocaust discourses elicit “action” from audiences by making the process of representing memory and history transparent, and by inviting this audience to actively make meaning from the multiple modes and communicative practices. To take the reader out of their time and place and drop them into the past causes breaks in the narrative that allow for response. As I noted in the chapters on diaries and memoirs, the subjectivity of the author is under “construction” so the reader has to participate in the making of meaning about who this person is and becomes as a result of the events that happen to them. This active response negotiates the audiences’ position within that past and recognizes that memory and memorial productions are socially constructed processes in which they participate in the present. They can accept or resist. This is what museums can do as well. This is what texts like *Maus* and *Still Alive* in Chapter Five do. In addition, these discourses have another purpose: to bear witness to the event. By calling readers into the meaning-making process, authors create witnesses who have the ability to act. Action in witnesses comes from shifting perspectives, broadening knowledge, and complicating categories, all of which are elicited in the discourses I examine in this dissertation (but not necessarily in all Holocaust discourses). We will see that the authors in Chapter Five do not present representations of Holocaust as unmediated, as the “objective” narrative of museums tended to do. Spiegelman’s and Klüger’s texts are, in fact, the
most precise examples of all the elements of performative memorialization at work. Their texts are self-reflexive and interactive. They are the most aware of any other author in this project of the process of the writing act. Through performative memorialization, their texts about the past constantly interrupt the narrative of this past and the performance of the present.
Chapter Five: Hybrids: Creating Multimodal Literacies of the Holocaust -- Performative Memorialization in Art Spiegelman’s *Maus: a Survivor’s Tale* and Ruth Klüger’s *Still Alive: a Holocaust Girlhood Remembered*

Today, I am not sure that what I wrote is true. 
I am certain it is truthful. 
Charlotte Delbo

5.1 Introduction

Throughout this dissertation, I have claimed authors of Holocaust discourses elicit “action” from audiences by making the process of representing memory and history transparent, and by inviting this audience to actively make meaning from their multiple modes and communicative practices. In Chapters Two and Three on diaries and memoirs, the subjectivity of the author reveals performative shifts, and these texts also, at times, complicate categories of behavior for audiences who tend to simplify these categories and prevent an active dialogic from occurring. Through these shifts, these authors demonstrate how their process of representation is an ongoing construction that responds to shifts in contexts and audiences, but also responds to other discourses on the chain of communication of Holocaust discourses. The audience participates in the act of making complex meanings and this active response negotiates the audiences’ position within that past, and recognizes that memory and memorial productions are socially constructed processes in which they participate in the present. I have shown in the last chapter that museums demonstrate these shifts as well, in complicated categories within narrative, interactive exhibits, and the interaction of space with this narrative. The multimodality of museums can result in effective teaching about this event because multimodality “disturbs” visitors both intellectually and physically. To take the reader out of their time and place and drop

129 Portions of the first part of this chapter on *Maus* are reprinted by permission of *The Midwest Modern Language Association Journal*. See Appendices.
them into the past, or leaving the past for the future causes breaks in the narrative that allow for the audience’s responsive understanding.

In addition, these discourses have another purpose: to bear witness to the event. By calling readers into the meaning-making process, authors create witnesses to their act of bearing witness, and these witnesses have the ability to act in the present. Action in witnesses results from shifting perspectives, broadening knowledge, and complicating categories, in addition to shifting constructions of genre and gender. All of these aspects are elicited, to varying degrees, in the discourses I examine in this dissertation. This dissertation has also shown in the previous chapters that performative memorialization, as a multimodal theory, can be applied disparately to different discourses, but that the aspects of this theory, as discourses increase in multimodality, become more prevalent. As I discussed with museums, all of the aspects of performative memorialization are present in these multimodal spaces, but the museums do not always display high degrees of performative memorialization when the reader or visitor is allowed to passively receive rather than act. This chapter, on the other hand examines what I call hybrids, texts that strongly blur genres as diaries and memoirs began to do, and texts that display the performative self-reflexivity that was more absent in museums, to invite the reader into their constructions of genre, gender, and the performative.

In this chapter I examine Art Spiegelman’s *Maus: a Survivor’s Tale Volumes I and II* (1986, 1991) and Ruth Klüger’s *Still Alive: a Holocaust Girlhood Remembered* (2001). I will show that the authors of hybrid texts in this chapter, in contrast to the museums’ tendency to narrate “objectively,” and to a greater degree than diary or memoir authors, do not offer representations of Holocaust as unmediated. On the contrary, these authors interrogate the process of representation almost constantly and make audiences aware that this process is highly
mediated. Spiegelman’s and Klüger’s texts, as examples of published works that appear later on the chain of communication, are the most precise examples of all the elements of the theory of performative memorialization at work. This is why they are appropriately contrasted in the final chapter of this dissertation. Their texts are self-reflexive and interactive. They make this self-reflexivity more explicit to audiences than the other authors, and through this explicit self-reflexivity, they make readers highly aware of the process and content of the writing act. Through performative memorialization, their texts about the past constantly interrupt the narrative of this past and the performance of the present.

As the diary and memoir writers did occasionally, hybrid authors call audiences’ attention to the social constructions of genre and gender almost persistently. In addition, these authors use particular techniques, like the juxtaposition of narrative past and present and the performative citation of other Holocaust texts in their stories, as I have also shown appearing in Hillman’s text and the Holocaust museums to varying degrees, to bring audiences’ attention to the ways in which their texts are constructed. Narrative juxtapositions of past and present occur when the story moves from a chronological story in the past and jumps suddenly into the present without warning from the author. Performative citations occur when these authors reference other Holocaust texts in their own text, which also causes breaks in the story. These breaks cause readers to focus on this construction as authors ask audiences to engage in this construction to make meanings as a dialogic of history and memory. These layers of meaning are the multiple literacies that result from multimodal forms. We have seen these literacies enacted in all the

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130 According to Pollock, citational performative writing is writing that is “rewriting, as the repetition of given discursive forms” to reveal “the fragility of identity, history, and culture constituted in rites of textual recurrence.” Because identity cannot escape its construction, performative elements can exert “counterpressure” where the repetition is a “repetition with a difference” (92). Repetitive elements of performative citation in Holocaust writing exert counterpressure precisely through the process of their recontextualization. Pollock cites Bhabha in *The Location of Culture* as part of this explanation of the citational.
discourses I have analyzed thus far. In these two hybrid texts, because they contain multiple modes and multiple communicative practices within one text, multimodality and multiple perspectives teach audiences in the same way as museums. Through extreme self-reflexivity and direct audience address, in addition, these authors confront readers directly and performatively, more so than any text we have seen previously, with a call to act. Through these activities, Spiegelman and Klüger perform writing—writing that acts as witness but also creates a reader who bears witness to their process through multimodal learning.

As I explained in Chapter One and in the previous chapters on diaries, memories, and museums, performative writing makes language itself perform by movement which calls attention to the production of the text in order to challenge the boundaries of what Performance theorist Della Pollock calls “regressive reiterations” of textuality. But for the performative to work in Holocaust texts like *Maus* and *Still Alive*, I have stated that Holocaust memory must be recontextualized rather than made “new.” Recontextualizing requires constant reference to what has come before (content as historical fact) and requires forms that challenge boundaries through the process of their production. In diaries and memoirs, these forms occasionally blurred the boundaries of genre and upset audiences’ generic expectations to create intrusions. In the JMB and the USHMM, space and narrative interacted to create disturbances. In *Maus* and *Still Alive*, the movement of narrative time frames between past and present and the authors’ use of direct audience address highlight the process of textual production. The use of performative citation as inter-textual references highlights content. This temporal movement and inter-textuality illuminate how performative writing reflects meaningful content through the meaning-making

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131 Della Pollock locates “textuality,” where “all discourse is encompassed within a multilayered, reflexive/reproductive ‘text,’” as the space between writing as defined by Theodore Adorno, who claimed a “fading aesthetic margin” in which boundaries of genre had anticipated essentially the “collapse of both referential and normative meaning systems” in postwar literature, and Julia Kristeva, who saw writing as “its own object/subject, which unduly un/writes itself […] sometimes in abject horror” (“Performing Writing” 74).
process of writing, a process on which these authors provide regular commentary through self-reflexive meta-discourse—to talk to audiences directly about how they write.

In Holocaust texts, especially these hybrid texts where this self-reflexivity calls readers actively into the process, audiences does not “co-write” texts or respond to the “play” of language to recreate each text for themselves as they would in other postmodern, performative works. There is an inherent responsibility for readers of Holocaust texts to know and respond to history. As I noted in Chapter One, this active audience response is based in the theories of Bakhtin’s dialogic as a quadrant of communicating participants in “responsive understanding.”

A speaker cannot speak into a void; every utterance depends upon what came before it and what will come after it. For responsive understanding to occur for a particularized audience requires active participation which I claim is elicited by these two authors through several narrative techniques, two of which I will discuss here: the movement between past and present in the background historical narrative and direct audience address.

The juxtaposed time frames of past and present provide movement in *Maus* and *Still Alive* that creates performative destabilization. This movement reminds the audience that a complex conversation is at work-- not simply a dialogue of various voices or a dialogue between

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132 For Patraka the Holocaust performative has a built in “accountability” where play is limited. The two positions “(of reverentiality and play) comment upon each other: it is postmodernism that sees the deadness of that reverential gesture toward the Holocaust, but it is the Holocaust (and its goneness) that marks the point at which discursive play becomes a screen to keep the dead at a distance” (*Spectacular Suffering* 8).

133 Glejzer notes in “Maus and the Epistemology of Witness” that the “seeing’ in *Maus* is “not a content, not a knowledge that we hope to transmit as a whole” (130). Likewise, Bakhtin’s responsive understanding is not a finished “whole”; rather, it is a moment along a continuum. Each utterance is a “link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances,” a chain that does not involve simply a speaker and a respondent communicating in sequential time (69). This chain of communication moves backwards and forwards and involves the speaker (*author*), the addressee (*particular audiences*), the object of discussion (*history and text*), and the superadressee (the audience for whom responsive understanding is presumed) [My emphases are in italics] (xviii). And the communication evolves: the speaker is also, at times, a respondent, and the addressee often becomes a speaker.

134 Caruth cites Lacan in noting that “words are passed on [. . .] not in the meaning of the words alone, but in their repeated utterance, in their performance: a performance that, in Lacan’s text, takes place in the *movement* [my emphasis] of the repetition and the gap” between the words and their translation (104). This repetitive movement, together with the performative quality of language, creates action.
author and reader-- but the Bakhtinian dialogic with several participants, including audiences, along a chain of communication. This destabilization consequently allows the authors to exist in and resist Pollock’s “textuality” and creates a space for multiple perspectives to emerge within their personal histories. By providing these multiple perspectives, Spiegelman and Klüger resist expectations that what is narrated in their texts will repeat what has already been seen or told.

5.2 *Maus*: Performativity and the Construction of Genre

In order to make meanings, we seek ways to differentiate one thing from another, using analogy, temporal markers, or by delineating boundaries. According to Sociologist Clifford Geertz, thought and memory naturally categorize, often generically. It is not insignificant that the genres of the Holocaust have evolved (in some cases) from narrative and autobiography to more hybridized forms like *Maus* and *Still Alive*. Art Spiegelman’s *Maus*, the two volume story of Vladek Spiegelman’s survival of the Holocaust told through his son’s interpretation of their interviews, is an extreme case of hybridization, combining narrative, autobiography, biography, cartoon, film, and photography into a polyphonic genre. Bernard-Donals and Glejzer have also called *Maus* a “historical document, a second-generation memoir, and a metafictional analysis of the problems of representation” (*Between 66–7*). These are among the many genres present in *Maus*, however; I will discuss the aforementioned six genres to argue that hybrid genres are inherently performative. My aim is not to identify the multitude of genres at work in *Maus*; rather, I will chart the movement of such genres through Spiegelman’s complex visual and textual narration and how this movement creates a performative dialogic. In examining how *Maus* resists the boundaries of genre, we see that it is able to elicit an evolving dialogue with the

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135 In discussing the manner of construction in interpretive explanation, Geertz notes that, “[i]nquiry is directed toward cases or sets of cases, and toward the particular features that mark them off; but its aims are as far-reaching as those of mechanics or physiology: to distinguish the materials of human experience” (Clifford Geertz, “Blurred Genres” 22).
past and present of Holocaust memory by addressing multiple audiences and multiple histories. *Maus* consists of layered genres and representations—multiple genres are woven into the two layers of discourse: visual and textual—as a dialogic of history and memory. Through these generic movements and representational shifts, *Maus* speaks to re-visioned memory intertwined with history for a performative, evocative Holocaust absence made temporarily present. These complexities allow the audience to interpret the layered meanings that become multimodal literacies.

The multiple genres present in *Maus* create a performative destabilization through movement. Spiegelman goes beyond the blurring of genres that we saw in diaries and memoirs. Instead, Spiegelman, through the layering of genres, as well as the layering of voices, makes the focus of *Maus* both process (writing as doing) and content (history) as ways to make meaning from Holocaust memory. Such performative movement in the juxtaposition of multiple genres and perspectives reminds us that in representing the Holocaust, a complex conversation is at work, a Bakhtinian dialogic with several participants, including audiences, along a chain of communication.

Returning continually to the idea of multiple layers of genres and representations as they interact with the author and history is the basic paradigm within which the performative elements of performative memorialization are enacted in the genres and narratives in *Maus*. Recalling the explanations of these performative elements in Chapter One, evocative performative writing “operates metaphorically to render absence present” by connecting the reader to what is other (not present) in the text “by re-marking” it, as we saw in Klemperer, Hillman, and museums (Pollock 80). Evocative writing does not aim to report about a “verifiable event” but strives to “create what is self-evidently a version of what was” (80). In reference to the Holocaust, this
indicates marking the representation of the Holocaust as a representation: real events and absences that cannot be recovered. But the evocative in performative Holocaust writing does aim to report (to some degree) on a verifiable event. Subjective performative writing does not refer to conventional mirror-reflections of autobiography as a “coherent self across time,” but rather as a “contiguous [. . .] relation between the writer and his/her subject(s), subject-selves, and/or reader(s),” as we saw in diaries and memoirs and, to some extent, in museums (86). It is not simply the self in plural that is performative, but the movement forward and between selves to form multiple perspectives and relations. Citational performative writing is writing that is “rewriting, as the repetition of given discursive forms” to reveal “the fragility of identity, history, and culture constituted in rites of textual recurrence.” Because identity cannot escape its construction, performative elements can exert “counterpressure” where the repetition is a “repetition with a difference” (92). Repetitive elements in performative Holocaust writing, the citation of other Holocaust discourses as we saw in Hillman and in museums, exert counterpressure precisely through the process of their recontextualization.

Before discussing how Maus embodies and recontextualizes Holocaust discourse through its visual elements, and arguing that these visual elements are performative, it is essential to note that the Holocaust was one of the first atrocities to be extensively recorded on film and in photography. These visual images have imprinted themselves upon collective, visual memories of this history. The audience of a book like Maus, like the audience of a Holocaust museum, therefore, is likely to have such knowledge of the past. This knowledge is an elemental aspect of performative memorialization; process and content make meaning through writing that is evocative, subjective, and citational, and depend upon on this level of previous knowledge in the audience in order to exist in/resist reiterations of textuality.
Spiegelman uses multiple genres and techniques of representation to evoke and subjectify particularized memory and history. Through his movements, he both exists in and resists Pollock’s “textuality” and creates a space for multiple perspectives to emerge. In speaking to the audience’s familiarity, Spiegelman resists expectations that what he narrates will repeat what has already been seen, and yet exists in the textual re-presentation of familiar history.

The genres in the visual narrative in *Maus*, for example, incorporate elements of cartoon, photography, and film, all of which display a degree of the subjective, the evocative, and the citational. Subjectively, Spiegelman is a cartoonist by trade, not a historian. The use of cartoon as his primary visual genre reflects Spiegelman the author. Sequential cartoon art typically utilizes panel size to control rhythm in the text according to Will Eisner (Iadonisi 52). And according to theorist Rick Iadonisi in his discussion of *Maus* as collaborative autobiography, regulated frame size and single camera angles indicate a story flowing along at one pace (52). Interruptions in this pattern, Iadonisi claims, are purposeful in order to bring the reader’s attention to particular drawings or points in the story. Figure 7 is a good example of this type of unregulated frame size; it incorporates closed frames, open frames, and superimposed frames (*Maus I* 61). Subjectively, the cartoon art genre is Spiegelman’s forte; he controls frame size and rhythm according to generic parameters and in opposition to such restraints. But he also incorporates other visual elements that reflect the citational and evocative nature of *Maus*.

The sequential cartoon genre tends toward citation. It is usually presented in a multi-frame horizontal, still format. The cartoon stills are contained by one page or strip, often telling a longer, serialized story. Serial cartoons actively engage the audience, who expects that each
Figure 7: Panel from *Maus I*. 

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*IN LUBLIN, THEY TOOK US TO BIG TENTS.*

*EVENTUALLY CAME SOME PEOPLE TO SEE US FROM THE JEWISH AUTHORITIES.*

*WHY ARE WE BEING KEPT HERE? IT'S A VERY BAD SITUATION... JUST BEFORE YOU ARRIVED, THERE WAS ANOTHER GROUP OF RELEASED WAR PRISONERS.*

*AND THERE WE SAT.*

*...TWO DAYS AGO THE NAZIS MARCHED THEM TO A FOREST.*

*I THOUGHT YOU WERE RELEASED AS A PRISONER OF WAR! EXACTLY SO...* 

*AND THEY SHOT ALL OF THEM—THEY KILLED 600 PEOPLE!* 

*I INTERNATIONAL LAWS PROTECTED US A LITTLE AS POLISH WAR PRISONERS. BUT A JEW OF THE REICH ANYONE COULD KILL IN THE STREETS!* 

*WE WERE THE NEXT PARTY!*
volume, though it stands alone, must not contradict other volumes that came before or those that come after. As a citational form, cartoon repeats its discursive forms, but also rewrites itself within these forms; it repeats characters, frames, and drawing styles for instance, but represents these within new narrative frames and singular drawings. Thus, the cartoon genre looks back to previous “volumes” to create new volumes. *Maus* cites other Holocaust texts, and in certain instances, *Maus II* even cites *Maus I*. The performative element of citation in *Maus* puts Holocaust material that was previously represented into a new context, while telling a previously untold story—his father’s—as well. *Maus* repeats, in some respects, what came before, but with a difference.

Visually, *Maus* utilizes elements of photographic technique as well. In contrast to the cartoon, which employs several still frames at once, photography produces one still frame at a time. Some traditional cartoon format is retained in *Maus* with bubbles enclosing speech and rectangular signposts indicating narrative. But even with the use of such generic markers, Spiegelman does not narrate the story sequentially. The visual narrative of the past often competes with the present, as does the textual narrative. One way movement is achieved is through these temporal jumps. Spiegelman presents “a ‘time frame’ of the past as well as the present,” but with a “complete halt,” at the end of the page, as Holocaust theorist Michael Levine notes, he “evokes the freeze-frame or photographic still, equivalent in narrative terms to reading the entire page as one synchronic unit” (321). In this way, Spiegelman’s temporal jumps evoke elements of photographic techniques but do not reproduce them. He discusses a verifiable event as a representation but seeks, “self-evidently,” to create his version of these events. Multiple evocations of visual documentation speak directly to the larger history without trying to reproduce it, and thus, recontextualize and individualize this history.
In addition to the use of photographic techniques, Spiegelman cites actual photographs in *Maus*, as Hirsch has noted.¹³⁶ Not only does Spiegelman draw versions of well-known photographs such as the *Arbeit macht Frei* gate in Auschwitz, he also draws versions of lesser-known photographs such as the clandestine photos taken of *Sonderkommandos* burning bodies (*Maus I* 157, *Maus II* 72). Spiegelman also uses his drawings to cite multiple perspectives, evoking events that have been photographed by several people in several places. Figure 7 is also an example of this kind of citational performance. Spiegelman cites the reportage of a mass execution witnessed by Jewish authorities and related to Vladek and other prisoners of war (*Maus I* 61) and evokes the photographic images of other mass executions by *Einsatzgruppen* that were photographed in places like Vilna and Riga before the Final Solution was implemented.¹³⁷

*Maus* is also citational in terms of its relation to film production and evocative in its reference to film imagery. Film is produced on a single filmstrip, where frames are seen in rapid, active succession, incorporating several visual elements in each frame. In *Maus*, every frame of the cartoon series is likewise complexly layered with visual and narrative meanings. But as a cartoon, these frames are viewed at a slower speed than film, more like slow motion—a technique in film that is meant to highlight particular activities or scenes (Bordwell and Thompson 197). Certain frames, such as in Figure 7, can be read horizontally or vertically, unlike typical cartoons, but similar to canted camera angles and moving camera shots in film.

¹³⁷ Such photographs, for general reference, can be found in *The Holocaust Chronicle: a History in Words and Pictures*. (Lincolnwood, Illinois: Publications International, Ltd., 2003): photos from an execution in Palmiry Forest outside Warsaw (238), bodies in ditches near Lvov (244), awaiting execution near Balti, Romania and Vilna Lithuania (246), and the largest execution of 33,000 Jews at Babi Yar near Kiev (251) are contained in this reference work. Spiegelman does not draw Figure 7 to reproduce any of these photos. Rather, his drawing is a composite of elements of all of them, suggesting the multiple perspectives inherent in the collective history as he recounts his father’s memories of his particularized history.
Another example of the use of filmic elements is found in Figure 8 (Maus I, 26).

Although Iadonisi uses these pages to illustrate a verbal wrestling match between Artie and his father as they collaborate on Vladek’s biography, he claims that while Spiegelman zooms in and out, the panels in the present are “generally uniform in size” and “the camera angle’ generally remains unchanged” (52). This observation neglects, however, the formidable skill and precision with which Spiegelman performs his art. The frames in Figure 8 are, in fact, subtly varied in both size and camera angle. Frame is never a neutral border; it provides a certain vantage point, which defines the image for us (Bordwell and Thompson 208). In Figure 8 the drawings begin with a high angle, medium long shot, in which we are looking down on Artie and Vladek. This moves to a straight on medium close up, to a low angle, medium close up, to an extreme close up—all drawn from varying angles of Artie’s perspective (Maus I 26). And as Bordwell notes, although framings such as these can reflect meaning in the text, they often do not—underscoring the layers of ambiguity present in Spiegelman’s techniques. (218-19). Hence, the text of Maus performs constantly, retaining the participation of the audience on many levels through the creation of multiple spectator perspectives---at one time (an activity we have not see in previous texts in this dissertation) --a movement that keeps readers off-balance, even uncomfortable. In addition, his citation of other historical perspectives in film and photography evokes the presence of other victims and other histories. This suggests to the reader that Vladek’s history is one among many, but also outstanding enough to fill a singular biography. Spiegelman’s incorporation of several media techniques layered onto and intersecting with one another performs visually and multimodally to bring the past into the present without allowing either to eclipse the other.
Figure 8: Panel from *Maus I.*
In terms of the text and its story, Spiegelman uses layers of genre as well, utilizing elements of biography and autobiography that again, reveal elements of the subjective, the citational, and the evocative. Specific uses of language in Spiegelman’s narrative reveal the layering of the biographical and the autobiographical voice but also evoke other voices.138 In referring to Auschwitz as “Mauschwitz” on the title page of Chapter One in Maus II for instance, Spiegelman particularizes the term by linking it directly to his drawings--- undercutting the way in which this term, Auschwitz, is used metonymically to stand for the Holocaust in general (9).139 In Maus I, however, Spiegelman quotes his father using the term Auschwitz as he enters the camp at the end of this volume. Spiegelman uses both his father’s version and his own version of narrative details. And by highlighting how one term, Auschwitz, inevitably obscures other like terms (without lessening its impact alone), Spiegelman evokes the unnamed death camps like Treblinka, Chelmno, and Sobibor, and the voices of those victims as well.

Additionally, both Maus I and Maus II open with a narrative depicting Spiegelman as a major participant. This subjectively places Artie in a major role in this retelling of his father’s story. In many scenes where Artie engages with his father in the present, he draws himself in the background and his father in the foreground. In these instances, Spiegelman shifts subjectivities as the teller and receiver of the story, and he also shifts “literal” subjectivities on the page through the visual movements in frame. On page 12 of Maus I for instance, Spiegelman draws


139 In contrast to this, several authors have discussed the powerful way in which metonymy works in Holocaust texts to suggest absence and gaps. Bernard-Donals and Glejzer discuss Maus in Between Witness and Testimony, and Michael Rothberg discusses Ruth Klüger’s work in “Between the Extreme and the Everyday: Ruth Klüger’s Traumatic Realism,” A/B Auto/Biography Studies, 1999 Summer 14 (1), 93-107. I suggest here that the repetition of these metonymical tropes can induce expectations in the audience that, in turn, create passive reading. Spiegelman uses recontextualized repetition to disturb the telling of the tale. This allows the audience to respond.
his father in the foreground as he rides a stationary bicycle. The extreme close-up focuses on the
tattoo on his father’s arm. The close up frame and the foregrounded figure of Vladek emphasize
how much Vladek’s past bleeds into Artie’s present, but Artie never fades completely into the
background. And, the tattoo looms over Artie’s head—Auschwitz remains central to their
strained relationship—typical for many second generation survivors.\footnote{See Hirsch’s “postmemory” in “Surviving Images” 2001 and Family Frames 1997.}

A scene in *Maus II* exemplifies the layers of biography and autobiography within visual
genres that subjectify, cite, and evoke Holocaust history and memory in the textual narrative. At
the top of page 54 in *Maus II*, Artie and Vladek discuss Vladek’s march from the barracks to
work. In the first frame, Spiegelman draws the marching workers with an orchestra in the
background. In the next frame in a frontal perspective, he and his father walk together in the
present. The third frame shows the marching workers farther along, with the orchestra now
obscured behind the men. The fourth frame is a view of them walking, now drawn from behind.
Visually this conversation is opened by Spiegelman and closed by Vladek. This reveals much
about their relationship; but the first frame is revealing for other reasons.

Even though Vladek has not described an orchestra, Spiegelman has drawn it into the
first frame, referencing and privileging “well-documented” history and his own research.
Spiegelman shifts subjectivities as biographer and historian. In the third frame, directly under the
first frame, the orchestra is obscured, giving credence to Vladek’s perspective. Spiegelman
himself explained that these frames were an example of how he and his father collaborated on
this biography: “there’s a wrestling match in terms of the deposition—how to portray it,” he
states (Iadonisi 52). These two frames are juxtaposed, are the same size, and contain the same
basic elements. In drawing these frames next to the frames of Vladek and Artie talking, each pair
of frames speak without overshadowing the other pair of frames (although the frames of the past
are larger), reflecting the collective dialogic of history and memory that exists alongside the personal dialogic of history and memory; they inform each other. Much like the linguistic versions of Auschwitz described above, such manipulations create a narrative “truth” and subjectivity from several perspectives. Spiegelman is revealing the process of constructing his writing act. Consequently, meaning can be made from several perspectives, Artie is telling his father’s story as well as his own, and these perspectives are layered and multimodal.

When dialogues and heteroglossic voices are present within a text, they act as “destablizers” of the autobiographical self according to Egan writing on autobiography and *Maus*. Egan points out that such destabilization need not only be written, for “not only is dialogue frequently oral, in origin at least [as it is in Art’s text], but the exercise of interaction and the foregrounding of the processes of mutual recognition also invite dialogue in generic terms, among genres, within genres, and from genres beyond the traditional autobiographical canon” (13). Such destabilization is similar to performative subjectivities in that it creates movement. The juxtaposition of multiple genres and narratives, and the foregrounded presence of process and content in the meaning-making process, indicate an important conversation, a dialogic with several participants, including audiences, along a chain of communication.

5.3 Gaps in the Narrative of *Maus* and Responsive Understanding

This conception of a responsive audience(s), as knowing and responding to history through an engagement with Holocaust discourses, is the second aspect of performative memorialization that I have discussed throughout this dissertation. The movement of genres and personal stories engages the author, the subject, and history, but active audience engagement is crucial for this whole dialogic communication of author, subject, history, and audience to occur. For responsive understanding to occur for a particularized audience requires a level of
participation I claim is elicited by the author and his subject not only through the movement of
genre and subjectivity (in the narrative retelling and recording), but also through gaps created by
temporal jumps, authorial self-reflexivity, and direct audience address. This, together with the
performative quality of the language, that which evokes, cites, and subjectifies, creates action.
The reader is required to translate the competing messages of process (author and subjectivity)
and content (history and memory as citational and evocative) in order to make meaning of this
text. In the act of making meaning, in response to the act of writing, the author, subject, text, and
audience perform a complex dialogic of interaction.

Recalling the discussion of responsive understanding in Chapter One, we recall that
Bakhtin iterates responsive understanding —in speech or in writing— as involving “dialogic
overtones” that reflect conversational speech. A speaker, regardless of whether in conversation
or in a novel, cannot speak into a void. Every utterance depends upon what came before it and
what will come after it (91). These types of stable utterances, or “speech genres,” exist along a
chain communication that exists on a continuum of time (60). 141

The links between object, subject, and composition, however, are not isolated. These
utterances are always already located on a chain of speech communication. Glejzer observes the
Lacanian “seeing” chain as retroactive in reference to Maus, but even though the seeing is
retroactive, it does not account for the speaker/respondent on this chain in the future. 142 That is,
every utterance is related to another and the “experience of each individual is shaped and
developed in continuous and constant interaction with others’ individual utterances” (Bakhtin

141 Speech genres are regulated—we must be able to predict certain patterns in order to communicate. The same is
true for generic conventions in literature. For even when several genres are mastered, the individuality of utterances
within them can be revealed and “more flexibly and precisely […] reflect the unrepeatable situation of
communication” (Bakhtin “Speech Genres” 80). In Holocaust texts this involves a particular attention to history.
The writer of any Holocaust text carries the weight of this history at all times. Thus, genre selection and individual
utterance are original but also predetermined, to a certain extent, by what has come before, as Bazerman has
suggested in “Systems of Genre.”
142 See “Maus and the Epistemology of Witness.”
This is true of utterances that came before, “authoritative utterances” which are “cited, imitated, or followed,” but also true of utterances that succeed them (88). The author is therefore in a dialogue with the object and all the responsive understandings that came before and will come after.

The utterances contained in *Maus* create a chain of communication – between author and subject: memory, and event and audience: history. It converses not only within itself, but with other discourses of the Holocaust—not only retroactively but also in a forward motion—knowing that other texts necessarily must follow. Thus, *Maus* creates a dialogic of history and memory by conversing in and through this story by subjectifying, evoking, and citing: Spiegelman’s mother and father, other victims, Holocaust imagery, documented history, and visual Holocaust documentation techniques, and creates a dialogic by speaking and responding to audiences.

For responsive understanding to occur for a particularized audience requires active participation, a participation I claim is elicited by the author and his subject through the movement of genre transitions, temporal jumps, authorial self-reflexivity, and direct audience address. This, together with the performative quality of the language, creates action. Spiegelman creates movement through repetitive citation, subjectification, and evocation, a movement which not only creates this gap between words and their translation, but also creates a gap in representation between the written and the visual, one of the aspects of this text that make it hybridic. It has the visual aspects that museums have, photographs and film quality, but it also has the strong subjectivity of a diary or memoir. The audience’s apprehension and understanding of these unique movements in *Maus* involves complex translation work in tracing the movement
of layered representation in the past and the present and pinpointing history and memory along the chain of communication, and thus, elicits active engagement.

An example of performative memorialization engaging the reader completely in this dialogic of history and memory on one page is in Figure 9 (*Maus II* 51). Artie often interrupts Vladek’s story with a question about his mother, Anja. Here, Artie interrupts Vladek saying, “Tell me about mom. Were you in touch with her in Auschwitz,” evoking her name through repetition (51). The evocation of Anja’s name teases out a little more of her story each time Artie asks his father about her and marks and re-marks her absence. The inclusion of her photograph and Richieu’s in other sections of *Maus* indicate other histories-- other perspectives that Spiegelman must dialogue with; in this way he enacts further links in this chain of communication. In this case, it is a dialogue with the past –the past that includes but cannot contain those who are absent.

On this page Vladek also describes how Auschwitz was split into two camps: Auschwitz I (where he was) and Auschwitz II Birkenau (where Anja was). Spiegelman draws Vladek’s description of the physical layout of Auschwitz on one page. The bird’s eye view map drawing is citational, echoing actual schematic diagrams and aerial photographs of the camps. But this repetition is performatively different because the map is drawn as a cartoon. Spiegelman’s subjective relationship to his parents’ history is also laid out graphically on the page. The conversation Artie has with Vladek is drawn in individual and unconnected frames that border the larger drawing onto which they are superimposed: a drawing of the layout of Auschwitz I and Auschwitz II Birkenau. These frames indicate that the story itself still seems fragmented to Artie. Each frame stands by itself. The fact that the individual frames do not entirely enclose the larger, centered drawing, indicate that Vladek’s telling of the story when it includes Anja, is incomplete;
Figure 9: Panel from *Maus II*. 
it does not make Artie’s subjective history whole, but rather, fragments it further by creating more questions, and therefore, more gaps in this history. The horizontal and vertical frames at the bottom right corner could both be logical continuations of the frames above, textually and visually, indicating the movement and instability inherent in this retelling. This page, as a synchronic unit, is not linear and it is not closed. Yet, the corner frames, both mentioning Anja, serve as anchors which hold the story together visually. It is an allowance for Anja’s untold perspective, which reminds the audience that there is an absent perspective here—there are millions of absent, unrecoverable perspectives. Subjectively there is a movement forward and between selves, forming multiple perspectives and relations. Thus a performative dialogic is created which indicates other participants, speakers from the past and respondents in the future (beyond Artie himself), in a conversation that remains open and prevents forgetting or foreclosure.

These references to Anja are “disturbances” in the narrative and their power lies in their status as “fragments of a history we cannot take in,” or the evocative, thought-provoking nature of the unknown (qtd. in Charlson 111). I have called these disturbances variously intrusions or gaps, which constitute the naturally imperfect performance of any communication and the breaks in story. These interruptions can also be seen as the boundaries of individual utterances, boundaries which are determined “by a change of speaking subjects.” The speaker chooses to “relinquish the floor” to allow for others’ responsive understanding (Bakhtin 71). These intrusions appear in all the discourses I examine in this dissertation. In *Maus* in particular as a hybrid text, these intrusions-- these evocative, subjective, and citational references-- indicate the other histories Spiegelman converses with. Such fragments speak as whole utterances in the Bakhtinian sense as the chain of communication between Artie, his father, his mother, and their
immediate family history; and yet, the utterance, at the same time, communicates only a moment in time along a continuum, a moment that echoes with the void of Richieu’s unspoken voice, as well as the unspoken voices of Vladek’s and Anja’s families, their families, and their families’ families. Each interruption, in turn, opens a space to allow the audience to respond. Maus, in this sense, creates a recontextualized communication, an “‘in-between’ space, that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present,” a space that halts regressive reiterations of textuality (Bhabha 7).

5.4 Gaps in the Narrative of Still Alive and Responsive Understanding

The second hybrid genre (or semiotic mode) I examine to reveal the layered meanings within multimodal Holocaust texts as multimodal literacies is Still Alive: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered, an autobiography/memoir by Ruth Klüger about surviving the concentration camps as a child. As I explained above with regard to Maus, for the performative to work in a Holocaust texts like Still Alive, Holocaust memory must be recontextualized or “displaced” rather than made “new.” 143 Recontextualizing requires constant reference to what has come before (content as historical fact) and requires multimodal forms that challenge the boundaries of textuality through the process of their production. In Still Alive, as in Maus, the movement of narrative time (this is the background “narrative” of history) between the past and the present and the use of direct audience address highlights the process of textual production: how Klüger constructs her text. The use of performative citation highlights content: how Klüger references other texts. This narrative movement of time and this inter-textuality illuminate how performative writing reflects meaningful content through the meaning-making process of writing.

As in Maus, the past and present are juxtaposed to provide narrative movement in Still Alive to create performative destabilization. This means that by upsetting the chronological

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143 Marianne Hirsch in “Surviving Images” 218.
narrative, Klüger draws attention to the creation of the story—the movement of time reminds the audience that writing is an act of construction—a process. This movement also reminds the audience that a complex dialogic is enacted. This destabilization allows the authors to exist in and resist Pollock’s “textuality” and create a space for multiple perspectives to emerge within their personal histories. By providing these multiple perspectives, Klüger resists expectations that what is narrated in her texts will repeat what has already been seen or told, and increases multimodal literacies in her audiences.

In contrast to Spiegelman, Klüger is telling her own story in Still Alive. The movement between past and present in her writing does not create gaps or disturbances in the same way. Klüger’s subjectivity is the main focus in this Holocaust memoir because she is its subject and its author. The movement here is created through a juxtaposition of past and present and a juxtaposition of selves. The movement between selves happens in Klüger’s interior conversations. Giving the reader such an intimate glimpse into her psyche creates a distinct and jarring movement between “subject, subject-selves and/or readers,” a movement which Pollock has distinguished as aligned with performative subjectivity (86). It is not simply the self in plural that is performative, but the movement forward and between selves to form multiple perspectives and relations. The reader is caught off-guard when faced with these multiple perspectives—from the same person. The genre of autobiography has trained readers to expect chronology, or at least a contiguous insider point-of-view. Klüger upsets these reader expectations. The line between her subject-self in the past (as one who survived the Holocaust) and her subject-self in the present (who continues to survive the memories of the Holocaust) is blurred.

The past and present frequently appear side by side in Klüger’s narrative, though not visually as they do in Spiegelman’s. In her story, her recollections of the past are often framed
through her perspective as a child. She then juxtaposes this perspective with her perspective as an adult in the present in order to re-evaluate the past through this new frame. In doing so, she validates both perspectives. Her memory and her subjectivity are not static, but are dynamic. Through this multi-layered writing, “she refuses to dichotomize her presentation of self—to privilege any part of her identity—and demands that all facets be recognized and valued” (Foss, Foss, and Griffin 114). By bringing attention to these multiple perspectives, Klüger reifies her position as a feminist rhetor and highlights her multimodal communicative practices.

At one point in the present for instance, Klüger states that as a child she felt at the mercy of her parents’ decisions. Their decision to stay in Vienna and not emigrate before the war was one she disagreed with: “‘what were they thinking of?’ I ask with self-righteous hindsight” (21). She asked her parents then and she asks again now. “I know I would have left, I say now, with the feel of disaster still and forever in my bones” (21). But through the use of the term “self-righteous,” she reveals her understanding now, as an adult, of the complexities of such a decision not to leave, even though she still disagrees with that decision today. Several pages later, she returns to ponder this question as she recalls another moment in her childhood when she did have the power to make a decision about her fate. While sitting in a movie theater, some Nazi youth enter and sit next to her. The Nuremberg laws made movie attendance illegal for Jewish children and she knew it was dangerous to stay. She asks herself the same question now: “Why didn’t I get up and walk out?” and admits: “and perhaps there is a family resemblance between that question and why I stayed glued to my seat” (46). Klüger both separates herself from her parents and attaches to them, as she does with all the people who did not leave Vienna. Through the shifts between a child’s and an adult’s point of view and shifts in narrative, historical time, Klüger shows how she changes over time—the dialogic of memory and history is fluid and
malleable. Klüger creates performative movement that shifts her own and her readers’ perspectives. By providing these competing perspectives, she privileges none.

Like Spiegelman’s references to Anja, Klüger’s memories as a child, revised by her adult perspective, evoke the presence of her parents and function as narrative disturbances, or performative “intrusions.” We recall from earlier in the chapter that such interruptions can also be seen as the boundaries of individual utterances, where speakers choose to “relinquish the floor” to allow for others’ responsive understanding (Bakhtin 71). In Still Alive, these intrusions—these subject selves—work similarly. She is evoking the perspectives of her absent parents, other absent families. Such fragments speak as whole utterances in the Bakhtinian sense as the chain of communication between Ruth with her father and mother, and their immediate family histories. At the same time, the utterances communicate only a moment in time along a continuum, a moment that echoes with the void of unspoken voices. Unlike Hillman, who uses the time shift into the present only in the beginning of her story, Klüger shifts between past and present persistently as Spiegelman does. The disturbance created for the reader cannot be dismissed as the “story” returns to the past, as the reader might expect. The reader, in fact, must fluctuate constantly between past and present, attending to this representation as a process in which they must actively engage.

In addition to the intrusion of subject selves, Klüger creates gaps in the construction of her “true” story that bring readers’ attention to her difficulty reconciling memory and historical facts: “the difficulty lies in the bad fit between facts and feelings,” she states (33). Her memory and what she knows from history or study sometimes create an imaginary memory, as in the case of her father’s death. She has been told that he died in the gas chambers at Auschwitz. She says: “I only know his fate, I don’t recall it” (33). With the limited information she has been given
about her father’s death from her mother and other relatives, she has imagined for many years how he might have died in this way. She pictures him crawling on top of the other dying humans to try to escape the gas. This imagined memory does not fit, however, with the father she remembers, the man who was so gentle, he was known as the man who “had no elbows” (39). She cannot imagine he died in this way. Thus, there is a gap between “knowledge and memory” (33). By bringing attention to this gap and her inability to bridge it, Klüger allows readers inside the writing process—and the competing pull of memory and history in this process, much as Klemperer did in his diaries.

In her struggle to find out more about her father (in life and death) she notes “her ongoing reaction” and how she feels “it’s an ongoing story.” She then relates an incident which proves “how ongoing these stories, these deaths, really are” (39). A French historian emails her after reading her book in French and says that her father’s transport was number seventy-three out of seventy-nine and it was 900 men who “didn’t go to Auschwitz, but to Lithuania and Estonia, and who knows how they were murdered” (40). Her imagined memories now come into conflict with what is established as “true” by historians. This information should make her relieved, and yet pain comes with reconciling this new “imagined” memory. Her memorialization of her father, her memories of him, “her mental furniture,” must be rearranged in her mind: “it feels as if I am running through my house in the dark, bumping into things. How did he die then? I know so little about who he was, and now I don’t even know this final, inalterable fact” (40).

For Klüger, memory is like a neatly ordered room in which you feel familiar. There may be dark corners, but you know how to avoid them, and the furniture there is used and worn—you will not bump into anything in the night. But when information comes along which alters those memories, the neatly ordered furniture must be rearranged. It is always a painful task, but one
that must be done. She insists on doing it and expects her audience to do the same, even though she knows they will resist (as Vladek does). Having an arranged room is familiar and asking questions will alter this. Although she asks precise questions and teaches her students to do the same, most people “want to be left in peace” (17). In this way, Klüger confronts audiences much like Klemperer and Hillman did—complicating the categories of behavior, rearranging the furniture. In the example of her father, the repetition of his name performatively evokes his absent presence, as well as those who surrounded him: family, clients, other victims. Klüger wants the audience to know that her memory, supplemented by historical facts still being discovered, serves a documentary purpose. It is an ongoing process—a dialogic of history and memory, content and process.

For Spiegelman, the discoveries he makes in his own research meld with his father’s memory to create a dialogic, as we saw in the orchestra scene, but they also create conflict between Artie and his father. For Klüger, such discoveries not only give her new perspectives on herself, as I discussed earlier, but give her a more detailed and nuanced perspective on her experience, a perspective she shares with the audience. Memories change with the perspectives and the knowledge that age and time inevitably brings. Klüger confidently relates this. Klüger wants to learn more than she “knows” from experience. She understands that she can and sometimes must supplement her memory with history books—without taking anything away from the validity and power of such memories.

In contrast to her description of her imagined memories of her father, she discusses her memories of personal experience and places these alongside the imagined memories as a dialogic with history in the ongoing process of bearing witness to this event. By adding new information, new contexts, she shows the audience her process and invites them to perform the
recontextualization of memory with her. Klüger moves quickly to remind audiences that while some memory may be “imagined,” or rearranged as in her memories of her father, what happened to him and to others—the historical fact of their experiences and murder—is not. She remembers, for instance, that: “In August 1943 a group of children came to Theresienstadt, I didn’t see them, and hardly anyone did. They were supposed to continue on a special transport to Switzerland.” Later in her research, she tries to “find out more about this children’s transport—it’s not difficult, everything is documented” (85). She also describes surviving a second selection at Auschwitz. At that time it felt extraordinary, and she says that now, “I have read a lot about the selections since that time, and all reports insist that the first decision was always the final one, that no prisoner who had been sent to one side, and thus condemned to death, ever made it to the other side. All right, I am the proverbial exception” (106). In these examples, she bears witness to what she saw and experienced and documents this with historical evidence compiled after the fact. The narrative of her traumatic experience is a dialogic of history and memory, but it also refers to other histories and experiences as a form of performative citation, which I will discuss later. Suffice to say that for Klüger, this activity of citation reminds readers that some of what is repeated in her book may have been seen or read elsewhere, but here it is repeated in order to recontextualize history within the personal story of Ruth Klüger.

In *Maus*, Spiegelman uses his father’s memories to supplement history, and as a second-generation survivor, he seems to trust history more. For Klüger, history supplements her memory because she was there, but she insists on researching history just as Spiegelman does. Each author, because of their varied subjectivities highlights how history and memory are in a constant dialogic, and how varied perspectives emerge in this ongoing conversation in which the audience participates. History and memory are in a dialogic, but the references Klüger includes here make
it clear that there are other voices; there are other victims who have talked about selections, other people who have written about children in the camps. Each experience, including Klüger’s, is unique.

5.5 Still Alive: Performativity and the Construction of Genre and Gender: Creating Action

Having closely examined how each text creates gaps for responsive understanding, and examining how Maus creates action, I will examine more specifically the notion of action in Still Alive. Each time Klüger draws readers’ attention performatively to her process, she creates an interruption that opens a space to allow the audience to respond. Still Alive, in this sense, creates a recontextualized communication, an “’in-between’ space, that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present” to challenge the boundaries of textuality (Bhabha 7). Klüger creates these interruptions with the juxtaposition of past and present within her narrative selves and in illustrating how history and memory exist in a dialogic. In other words, Klüger creates movement by bringing attention to how she is producing her text as a complex construction of historical memory and bringing attention to the layered meanings of memory and history (process and content). Through these multiple communicative practices, Klüger asks readers to perform the construction of the text with her—to act in the meaning-making process.

As a further part of act of making meaning, Klüger creates interruptions through direct audience address and performative citation (inter-textual references). Klüger demands a response from her audience, but not the surface response that is easiest. Describing how her mother adopted Susi in the camps, Klüger writes: “we saved each other.” Predicting her audience’s first impulse—to be uplifted by the “victim” finding solace in others, she dryly states in the very next sentence: “Dear reader: don’t wax sentimental” (123).
An incident I described earlier serves as another example of how Klüger’s direct audience address creates gaps in the narrative. Klüger survives a second selection at Auschwitz, sneaking into a second line after being condemned to death in the first. Klüger describes the line moving toward an SS man, who, “Judging from photos, [he] may have been the infamous Dr. Mengele” (again referencing later research she has done to supplement her memory) (107). As she comes to the front of the line, the clerk, a woman of about twenty, asks her age; thirteen, Klüger replies. “Fixing me intently, she whispered, ‘Tell him you are fifteen’” (107). As Klüger arrives at the front of the line, she relates what transpires:

“She seems small,” the master over life and death remarked. He sounded almost friendly, as if evaluating cows and calves. “But she is strong,” the woman said, look at the muscles in her legs. She can work.” She didn’t know me, so why did she do it? He agreed-- why not?” She made note of my number, and I had won an extension on my life. (108)

Klüger will live another day. After relating this story, Klüger addresses the audience directly:

“But don’t just look at the scene. Focus on it, zero in on it, and consider what happened. There were two of them: the man who had power he could exert on a random object [. . .] And she is the other. I think his action was arbitrary, hers voluntary” (108). Klüger writes: “Her [the guard’s] decision broke the chain of knowable causes [. . .] It was moral freedom at its purest. I saw it, I experienced it, I benefited from it, and I repeat it because there is nothing to add. Listen to me, don’t take it apart, absorb it as I am telling it and remember it” (108-9).

She continues directing her speech at the audience and predicts that “you” will object and claim there no true altruism, and she says, if that is the case, “freedom itself is a mere illusion as well” (109). Klüger addresses these comments now to “you.” “You” is the American audience. They will read this story, she thinks, and disbelieve. This was not a kind act but a coincidence—luck, they will think. Nazis were evil. Klüger forces the audience to face the inaccuracy of such
simplified categories of good and evil in that direct address: This was goodness. Listen to me! Absorb it! You, who value “freedom” so much, believe that free will can exist in a place where so much evil reigned. So, believe this incident. Maybe it was because of “the perverse environment of Auschwitz” that “absolute goodness was a possibility,” says Klüger. “I am witness” (109). Klüger demands action and response. Listen! Absorb! Rearrange your furniture—I bear witness to it. She directs her audience to reflect deeply on their behavior. How is their behavior constructed? How does this constructed behavior influence their response?

Thus, she addresses the audience directly: how are they coming to history? And questions their willingness to respond or even their ability to do so. As she recounts the story of her, her mother, and Susie escaping a second capture after leaving one of the camps, she realizes that describing this event closely following the section in the book about the camps could create reactions in readers that she does not want. She writes:

Now comes the problem of the survivor story, as of all such stories: we start writing because we want to tell about the great catastrophe. But since by definition the survivor is alive, the reader inevitable tends to separate, or deduct this one life, which she has come to know, from the millions who remain anonymous. You feel, even if you don’t think it: well, there is a happy ending after all. Without meaning to, I find that I have written an escape story, not only in the literal but in the pejorative sense of the word. So how can I keep my readers from feeling good [. . .]? (137-8)

She assumes this effect because the genre of a survivor story connotes a “happy ending” in that the protagonist survived and now writes their story. She wants audiences to resist this. She performatively draws readers’ attention to the genre of a survivor story as a constructed representation and demands that readers participate in its construction by confronting them with their expectations. For the audience of Klüger’s memoir the gaps not only create an opportunity for active response, they also create an opportunity to question. Klüger does not ask audiences to question her (she’s clearly doing that herself) but to question themselves and the passivity
inherent in their expectations. By highlighting the multiple perspectives that result from her performative subjectivity, and by addressing audiences in this way, Klüger creates multiple modes of production and multiple modes of reception. In this way, we can see how multimodal literacies – multilayered meanings and practices – are realized in Klüger’s complex text.

Klüger also interrupts her text with performative citations. She has informed readers, for instance, that her father is a doctor. After the Nuremberg laws were introduced in Vienna, Jewish doctors were no longer allowed to have non-Jewish patients, and eventually lost the right to practice at all. One former patient denounces her father for an abortion that he had performed. The Klügers hired a lawyer. Klüger’s mother described him as “belong[ing] to the party, but not really a Nazi,” he just liked their money. “In other words,” Klüger states, he was “an opportunist, not necessarily an Oskar Schindler” (35). I will note at this point that Klüger’s text was written in German (1992) and English (2001) by Klüger (not translated). Still Alive was written specifically for American audiences. Although this story is in the German version, this final line is not. In the English version, Klüger is purposefully making her description of the Nazi lawyer relatable to an American audience, as Hillman did with her memoir. The audience may know about Oskar Schindler from the book by Tom Kenneally called Schindler’s List. Or they will understand this “Nazi” because they will recognize Liam Neeson playing Oskar Schindler as the main character in Stephen Spielberg film, Schindler’s List. The comparison brings several other discourses to bear upon this story about her father. His history and her family’s history about other histories, other stories. Such citations may not be directly related but will make this history “relatable” to an audience. The citation also disrupts the time frame and location of the story and brings readers’ attention to the construction of the story, much as direct audience address does. Klüger
continues to demand that readers perform the act of genre construction with her to create multiple perspectives as multiple forms of knowledge, or literacies.

As Klüger and Spiegelman bring the audience into the construction of genre, they also bring the audience into the social construction of gender. The techniques I described earlier apply to genre as a social construction—something that is not inherent but that is created by and in response to the social process. Gender is constructed in this way as well. Spiegelman does not address gender explicitly in addressing his audience, but he addresses socially constructed stereotypes. In certain scenes, he shows how he thinks audiences will respond. After talking to his father’s second wife, Mala, about how controlling Vladek is about money, he wonders, “It’s something that worries me about the book I’m doing about him…In some ways he’s just like the racist caricature of the miserly old Jew… Hah! You can say that again! [Mala says]. I mean, I’m just trying to portray my father accurately!… Even for himself he won’t spend any money [Mala says] [. . .] I wish I got Mom’s story while she was alive. She was more sensitive…it would give the book some balance” (Maus I 131-2) 144 His meta-discourse bears witness through the process of discourse and confronts audiences directly with social constructions. While Spiegelman deals mainly with general, socially constructed stereotypes, he does mention the perspective of his mother as “balancing” suggesting the gendered nature of experience as multiple rather than universal.

Klüger, on the other hand, addresses the presence of such stereotypical reactions as social constructions but focuses specifically on issues of gender. In contrast to Hillman’s and Wiesel’s texts, in which the audience participated in the construction of “typically” gendered roles and protagonists to combat dehumanization and the “othering” of the androgynous victim, by directly confronting audiences with their passive reception of gender stereotypes, Klüger asks audiences

144 The ellipses without brackets in this section reflect the text exactly as it appears in the dialogue boxes.
to bear witness through their misconceptions of gender constructions. Much like she asks audiences to perform the construction of genre with her, she asks them to perform and confront their constructions of gender as well.

In one example, she relates her experience in the camp called Christianstadt (a subdivision of Gross Rosen). She states that the female guards “addressed us in a normal, if somewhat strident, tone and used the polite form of address for grown-ups. It is hard to convey to English speakers,” she adds, “the difference in respect or disrespect that is inherent in a switch from the formal to the intimate form of address. In the camps the prisoners were du, thou, and now this sudden return to a normality, a reminder of civilization” (115). Klüger makes the point that to delineate “guards” as female and male allows the differentiation of behavior to be seen as constructed as male and female. The female guards she encountered were pointedly unlike the guards described elsewhere without any specific reference to gender.

Further, Klüger tells the reader that, although they may know that there were female guards who guarded women prisoners, the term “SS women” is inaccurate. She says bluntly: “It’s a misnomer, since there were no women in the SS. The SS was strictly a men’s club. Everybody knows this, and yet the term remains in use, as if to make sure women get half the blame for an organization that was never theirs” (115). Women are invisible until they become visible for blame – why? Klüger implies that socially, women and men are not equal. When blame is meted equally in this case, it does not match the social reality. The term “Nazi” for instance (as she shows elsewhere in the book) is one that must be applied individually (as she applies “Nazi” differently to a helpful lawyer and an SS guard, much as Klemperer applied the term disparately), and therefore, it also changes its parameters when applied to women (and
men). In other words, these are consequences and implications of experience, representation, and history that are gendered—unique and complex.

Klüger says pointedly: Women did evil “but the Nazi evil was male, not female,” and claims that whenever she says things like this she meets with “bitter objections” (115). People want to tell her that Nazi women were just as evil, they just didn’t get a chance to commit as many crimes. People want to remind her of women cheering for Hitler ecstatically and about Ilse Koch with her lampshades of human skin. She says in reply, “it seems that we always pull the same names out of the hat when it comes to women, while the names of the men who committed atrocities are legion” (115). In using the term “we” she implies that issues of gender apply to everyone (including her). She wishes not to exonerate the women involved in the atrocities, but wonders, “how are we ever going to understand what happens when a civilization comes apart at the seams, as it did in Germany, if we fail to see the most glaring distinctions, such as the gender gap?” (115-6). For Klüger, any attempt we make to try to understand how and why these atrocities occurred will be unsuccessful if we do not include gender. And she talks to audiences directly as a whole using the “we” – we are part of the social construction of gender. We cannot turn a blind eye to its existence if we hope to change things.

She makes the “we” of this statement meaningful in places where she describes moments where she lacks self worth. When she is living in New York City after the war, she ascribes her depressions to questioning her value as a woman. Of course, she can owe this to Nazi propaganda, “but at a time when women were constantly put in their supposed place, it was natural for a young refugee to question her own value. In my family,” she states, “the women had survived, not the men. And that meant that the more valuable human beings had lost their lives (185). In these moments she shares with the reader her own tendency to internalize gender
constructions that value women as less than men. She shows her vulnerability to social constructions of gender and in this action makes the construction of gender visible to herself and to her readers.

While Klüger’s and Spiegelman texts exemplify the elements of performative memorialization I described above, there are gendered moments where the application of performative memorialization changes in terms of audience. The Bakhtinian dialogic of history and memory still applies, but it has different effects in specifically gendered moments in the texts. The responsive understanding I describe above can be inferred more readily in *Maus* because Spiegelman always provides someone to whom he talks and therefore, shows an audience who is listening. Klüger’s style, in contrast, shows her awareness of socially constructed gender hierarchies. Klüger has already experienced resistance to her story, often because she is a woman. She writes for instance: “Occasionally I tell a few stories of my own, if someone asks. But that rarely happens. Wars, and hence the memories of wars, are owned by the male species” (18). And yet she tells her story now. As a part of gendered story telling, Klüger can admit that she has not told her story to very many people, and the reason is that people do not want to listen. This is similar to what Vladek says to Artie when he asks about his father’s experience in Auschwitz. Vladek says, “It would take many books my life, and no one wants anyway to hear such stories” (*Maus I* 12). Both Vladek and Klüger feel that audiences would rather not hear their stories, much as Wiesel did decades ago, but Klüger adds another dimension: she feels that they don’t want to hear her story partly because the social construction of gender tells them that war stories should come mostly from men.

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145 Halasek noted the lack of attention to gender references in Bakhtin in her 1992 article “Feminism and Bakhtin: Dialogic Reading in the Academy.”
As a result, Klüger does not illustrate a consistent listening audience through recurrent conversations with main characters as Spiegelman does. She even underscores the lack of such a listener by describing her encounters with people who are far from responsive. She writes about her harrowing experience in the cattle cars. As a child, she witnesses someone urinating on her mother and adults losing control mentally and physically in the heat, thirst, and crushing lack of space and air. She compares this with an experience visiting friends in Germany after writing this book. They discuss claustrophobia, in the Chunnel, in elevators (92). Klüger notes that her experience of claustrophobia in the cattle cars comes back to her but she doesn’t “contribute it, because if I had, I would have effectively shut up the rest of the company” (93). She would like to tell her stories, but no one wants to hear this and be bothered or uncomfortable (93). And thus, she states: “my childhood falls into a black hole” (93). She cannot validate her childhood experiences because of her inability to communicate them to her audience. No conversation can occur.

By overemphasizing this unresponsive audience, Klüger subverts the gendered assumption that what she has to say is less important than what a man could say. For her reading audience, therefore, Klüger feels the need to try to erase those boundaries between herself and her unwilling audience. She knows the audience is unwilling to engage or listen. To some young Germans who have said concentration camps should be saved as memorial sites, she writes:

Absolutely nothing good came out of the concentration camps, I hear myself saying, with my voice rising, and he expects catharsis, purgation, the sort of thing you go to the theater for? They were the most useless, pointless establishments imaginable. That is the one thing to remember about them if you know nothing else. No one agrees and no one contradicts me. Who wants to get into an argument with the old bag who’s got that number on her arm? (65)

She has silenced them when she did not mean to. She addresses the communication of this event across time, describing the “wall between the generations” as having always been there, but here,
in Germany “the wall is barbed wire. Old, rusty barbed wire” (65). People know what it means for an old woman to have a tattoo, but they do not want to listen to any story that might force them to look at details and rearrange their historical knowledge or preconceptions. Klüger says this about Germans, but she says “Americans fit this pattern too” (73). Klüger’s writing style is projected at this kind of audience. She will provide, through her writing, an example of how one can approach these histories and these memories. By revealing her interior dialogue (noted above), there is a transparency to Klüger’s writing process and to her remembering process. By giving examples of unresponsive listeners, she opens a space for other listeners—her reading audience—to be responsive and perform the act of bearing witness to her experiences and her process of recording them.

Both Klüger and Spiegelman create a wider dialogic by moving between past and present, talking directly to audiences, and highlighting inter-textual references, but the differences in citation and audience address in Still Alive highlight gendered moments. In creating this dialogic, these authors create writing that performs action, they are highly self-reflexive in their writing act and highly interactive with audiences. The conversation remains open and demands response from the audience, from other authors—a multi-layered, multimodal response that acknowledges responsibility for the past, the present, and the future.

5.6 Conclusion

The chain of speech communication in Maus and Still Alive is a fusion of the performative and a whole utterance, allowing the heteroglossia of gender and genre to enter a continually shifting dialogic of time (history) and context (memory) with the reader. The text speaks, the author speaks, the survivor speaks, history speaks— and the audience and the history that follows reply. Within the pages of these texts, this activity is re-enacted, and through this
movement, Spiegelman and Klüger avoid resolution, exist in and resist Pollock’s “textuality,” creating a space for multiple perspectives to emerge. This is not to say that *Maus* or *Still Alive* become static texts, and thus regressive or abject—quite the contrary. By positioning themselves along a continuum of time, *Maus* and *Still Alive* become a living part of Holocaust history. They react to past, present, and future, positioning themselves in between but not definitively. The movement in the texts creates fluid boundaries in history, challenges textuality and creates a layered, performative dialogic within these hybrid genres. *Maus* and *Still Alive* speak reflexively to themselves and to audiences and authoritative utterances as well—eliciting through these complex movements the complete performative memorialization I have described. And, as a dialogic between memory and history-- it is also a conversation that remains open-- demands a response from audiences, from other authors like Hillman and Wiesel, from authors who may still write, from Spiegelman and Klüger themselves—a response that acknowledges responsibility, for the past and for the future along the chain of evolving communication of Holocaust discourses.
Conclusion

It is necessary to resist the tendency of recent Holocaust scholarship to universalize or collectivize Holocaust testimony, and instead to revive the particular by uncovering the multiple layers within testimony. It is only by exploring the social and historical context of Holocaust testimony that we can appreciate the sheer diversity of witnesses’ experiences.

Zoë Waxman

Yet even as we disagree as to the forms a feminist pedagogy [in composition] might take, the goals of that pedagogy remain remarkably similar. They seek to elicit in students a critical awareness of that which was once invisible—to provoke in students through reading, thinking, writing, and talk a sense of agency, a sense of possibility.

Gail E. Hawisher

Despite, or perhaps because of, all that has been written about the Holocaust numerous critics argue the worth of that effort. Some critics, like Cultural critic Arthur Cohen, see the focus on Holocaust discourses as a poor investment of cultural resources that causes us to ignore other traumatic events. In contrast, many say there is no historical analogy to Treblinka; there is nothing to which death camps can be compared; therefore over-analyzing the event is a concern. For filmmaker Claude Lanzmann a “refusal of understanding’ is the only ethical attitude to take and there are claims that “the Holocaust cannot be represented or rationally apprehended” (25). Holocaust scholar Geoffrey Hartman insists that the Holocaust is unique because Nazi extermination “focused on Jews” (27). Jewish Studies scholar Jacob Neusner in The Aftermath of the Holocaust has observed the unique position the Holocaust holds as strictly an American phenomena following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Witness 24).

Memory scholars Ana Douglass and Thomas Vogler counter that: “The view that the Holocaust is unique and without parallel in human history is closer to a doctrine or a dogma than to a reasoned discursive position” (25). I contend that each event—the unrepresentable totality of the event—and each memory and testimony of that event are unique. Thus, for those who argue that an examination of the Holocaust should not include gender, such as Lawrence Langer, or
Roma (Sinti), or homosexuals because it lessens all the victims, I argue that particularizing the Holocaust with these disparate and similar memories of experience adds to knowledge about how the events unfolded, and furthermore, adds to knowledge about how these texts can speak to each other and to audiences about this event. For those, such as Efraim Sicher, who argue that “memory and remembrance” get lost in the postmodern world and “take us even further from a direct memory of the past into a museum culture and a confused free-for-all that universalizes or appropriates the Holocaust for lessons of varying questionability,” I argue that we continue to learn about trauma, its effects, and its memorializations, even those we find questionable, through continued study and discussion of what is particular and individual about the Holocaust, and this learning is ongoing, complex, and layered, much like the multimodal Holocaust discourses themselves (11).

The discourses examined in this dissertation are all representations of memory—memories of an event of great historical significance. The discourses perform writing that does something through the presentation of meaningful content and its interaction with the process of the writing act. These discourses are utterances necessarily wedged between the past and the future—between the fear that the traumatic past of the Holocaust recedes too much and the concern with what might become of this past for the generations that follow. This is true even of the diary writers writing while the event was still happening. But as Douglass and Vogler note, when the survivors are gone, we will have only the “discourse of witness” which is an “idea in the mind produced by texts and images, not a memory of lived experience” (45). This dissertation and the theory of performative memorialization I have described, look ahead to this future. To discover how multiple discourses of the Holocaust engage with each other and with the audiences that receive and respond to their testimonies, will be an important tool with which
we can understand how we memorialize and communicate traumatic events and continue to recontextualize such events without trivializing or universalizing them.

This dissertation adds to the knowledge of how events of the Holocaust unfolded and how discourses about this event speak to audiences and to each other. In realizing this gap between the event and its representation, it is clear that though it was witnessed, it can never be recreated—this is the challenge of memorialization. History and memory come to us as partial knowledge; the “whole” story will never be complete. This dissertation has promoted the notion of history and memory as reconstructions that interact through the collaborative tension of process and content to reveal various performative gaps or intrusions, which open spaces for audiences’ responsive understanding. Response is the responsibility assumed by the listener of one who bears witness. Through the application of the multimodal theory of performative memorialization, this dissertation has located and analyzed these gaps and how they engage audiences in their construction to create action. In addition, I have argued that Holocaust discourses evolve in response to historical and social contexts, and that there is special chain of communication between the author, object, event, and audience; these texts communicate not only with audiences to create action, but with other Holocaust discourses that have preceded or may follow them, enacting a unique chain of communication that creates a dialogic of history and memory.

By studying how these memories of the witnesses are translated into discourse provides knowledge about how memory functions. It provides knowledge about the fallibility of memory, history, and representation. If I were to say that this project chooses discourses of the Holocaust as its object of study because it is a unique event, I would have to agree with Douglass and Vogler in saying that, “there is a secular argument for something in the instrumental modality of
the Holocaust that makes it unique, and uniquely modern as an event [emphasis added]” (27). This dissertation shows, through the application of performative memorialization, how discourses of the Holocaust are unique because they are increasingly multimodal, and how multimodality maintains the historical and pedagogical relevance of the Holocaust into the present. Audiences will continue to learn about the Holocaust through discourses that performatively memorialize. My theory is especially applicable precisely because there are so many discourses about the Holocaust. Performative memorialization is a tool with which we can examine discourses of trauma to see how these texts memorialize, and how they create action in their audiences. This is an important theoretical tool that could be applicable to other discourses of trauma. We have already seen, for instance, similar modes and communicative practices appearing in discourses about 9/11: letters, on-site memorials, books and films, as well as dozens of interviews and a planned memorial structure at the site, and these discourse are likely to create their own chain of evolving discourse. Hurricane Katrina has also inspired dozens of nonfiction books, fiction collections, and an archive of testimony (Langley 3).

This dissertation has also exhibited the pedagogical implications of examining Holocaust discourses as texts of memorialization. As I have argued, in order to performatively memorialize an event, one has to learn about it and recontextualize it in the present. Multimodal literacies can result from applying performative memorialization (a semiotic principle) to different Holocaust texts (modes). This means that these texts do not provide only one level of meaning for audiences, but that several, layered meanings are created by authors and audiences—meanings that are emotional, visual, and intellectual, concrete and abstract, and historical and personal—and these meanings are a result of the variety of modes and practices. A complex dialogic of meaning-making is the result of the collaborative tension of process and content working
together. Effective communication occurs with the articulation and interpretation of several modes and practices to create layers of meaning. This activity is accomplished through the special interaction between author and audience that I argue is present in these discourses, and that can be facilitated through performative memorialization and teaching. Pedagogy and Testimony theorists Simon and Eppert remind us that, “little concern has been given to the notions of teaching and learning inherent in the presumptions and organization of different forms of remembrance. Indeed, the centrality of questions of pedagogy to notions of remembrance is often missed” (286). This dissertation has addressed that gap in scholarship. It has always been difficult to describe how one may teach effectively, because there are many different ways to do so. Similarly, it is difficult to teach about this event through one medium only because so many representations exist. Multimodality can facilitate this complex learning process. Holocaust discourses are effectively taught through multiple modes, and thus, performative memorialization as a semiotic principle exemplifying multimodality has significant pedagogical import for the composition classroom as well.

The examination of discourse, memory, and representation as multimodal modes and communicative practices within a specific discourse community allows us insight into the process of communication itself, opening a window into the composition classroom. The writing classroom is a reflection of this multiplicity. We have diverse students that come to us with very different skills. We ask them to perform multiple tasks, and understand and write with varied communicative practices. Multimodality illuminates the resources available to and put into action by modern students, as well as provides an understanding of how these processes function. This understanding can help us create effective learning in the classroom through layered, complex meaning-making practices. Multimodality can be successfully applied in the writing
classroom where students make meaning through their participation as articulators and interpreters of a variety of texts, both written and non-written. Multimodality creates layers of meaning through various modes and practices, and this writing, or communication production, together with the content and context of that communication, produces action in the classroom.

This dissertation delineates how the process of writing creates action, and describes the parameters of multimodal theory within this field as they apply to my theory of performative memorialization and to a specific discourse community of writers. Through my analysis of these concepts in action, I have demonstrated the efficacy of multimodality as creating action in audiences, and have therefore, demonstrated the applicability of approaching the composition classroom with this theory in mind. Writing is action: “In the process of creating the composition, the work of art, the painting, the film, you’re creating the culture. You’re rewriting the culture, which is very much an activist kind of thing” (Lunsford 25). I have asserted that a writing pedagogy of resistance makes students aware that they are being acted upon by discourses of power, but a writing pedagogy of resistance and action adds the awareness that they can act in response. Utilized in the classroom, multimodality provides a system and a means through which students act in the process of articulation and interpretation of discourse, design, production, and distribution. This dissertation strives to open spaces, create dialogues, and cross borders, to create action in the world.
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Appendix: Letter of Permission to Use Copyrighted Material

From: kathleen-diffley@uiowa.edu
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Dear Ms. Costello,

It's a pleasure to say you have the M/MLA's ready permission to reprint your essay forthcoming in the *M/MLA Journal*:

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Meanwhile, thanks for your patience as quite a few other requests together with a site visit for convention 2009 tumbled my way. Rest easy that I'm happy to help in any way I can.

Always cordially,
kathleen

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Lisa A. Costello was born in Torrance, California in 1968. She completed her bachelor’s and master’s degrees at California State University, Long Beach. She will receive her doctoral degree in August 2007 from Louisiana State University. Dr. Costello’s work with the Holocaust will continue to be a focus of her scholarship, as will work in rhetoric, composition, and feminist studies. Dr. Costello is proficient in German, is learning Hebrew, and will seek instruction in Yiddish. She expresses continued commitment to languages, travel, and internationalism, as well as interdisciplinary scholarship and academics. Dr. Costello will join the department of Writing and Linguistics at Georgia Southern University in Statesboro, Georgia in the fall of 2007.