An Experimental Investigation of Fishbein and Ajzen's Model of Behavioral Prediction, Their Principles of Change, and the Effect of the Use of Evidence in a Persuasive Communication.

Priscilla Pauline Kilcrease

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AND THE EFFECT OF THE USE OF EVIDENCE IN A PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech

by

Priscilla P. Kilcrease
B.A., Midwestern State University, 1971
M.A., Midwestern State University, 1973
August, 1977
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ABSTRACT

The purposes of this study were to test Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen's model of behavioral prediction, to compare their principles of change (i.e., manipulating primary beliefs) with a traditional approach to changing attitudes and behavior (i.e., manipulating source, message, and receiver variables) and, finally, to assess the persuasive efficacy of the use of evidence in an influence attempt. In order to assess these relationships, a specific behavioral situation was created in which undergraduate speech students were given the opportunity to sign up for and participate in a "speech workshop," in which participants were required to deliver a brief speech to the group.

The manipulation, designed to change subjects' intentions to sign up for and participate in the workshop, consisted of four derivations of a basic persuasive message based on eight primary beliefs obtained in a pilot study. The messages differed only in the topic of communication, i.e., "signing up for the workshop" versus "speaking at every opportunity" and in the inclusion or non-inclusion of evidence.

The subjects for this study were 125 undergraduate students enrolled in basic public speaking courses at Southeastern Louisiana University. On the first day of class, the subjects were given information about the speech workshop, and their attitudes toward speaking were assessed. One week prior to the experimental treatment, subjects were given a questionnaire designed to assess 1) their intentions to sign up for the workshop, 2) their attitudes toward signing up, 3) their normative beliefs about their perceptions of what relevant others ex-
pected them to do with respect to signing up and 4) their motivation to comply with these expectations.

On the treatment day, subjects were assigned either to one of the four message conditions or to a no message control group. Immediately after hearing the message each subject completed two questionnaires, the first of which was identical to the pretest questionnaire and the second of which assessed subjects' agreement or disagreement with and evaluation of the belief statements in the messages. They were also given a "sign up" sheet for the workshop.

Findings indicated that the Fishbein and Ajzen model could predict this kind of single act communication behavior. Hypotheses concerning their principles of change as well as hypotheses concerning the persuasive efficacy of evidence were not confirmed, however.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Significance of the Study

Traditional theories of rhetoric, in the person-to-group persuasive communication paradigm, emphasize the importance of documented supporting materials, commonly called evidence, in the production of attitude and subsequent behavior change (McCroskey, 1969). Working out of this theoretical base, persuasion theorists have traditionally emphasized evidence and its importance in the persuasive communication (Gray and Braden, 1963; Brembeck and Howell, 1952; Monroe and Ehninger, 1967; Minnick, 1968; Jeffrey and Peterson, 1971; Eisenberg and Ilardo, 1972; McCroskey, 1972; and Samovar and Mills, 1973). In order to test this notion and working primarily out of the theoretical base provided by the Yale approach to persuasion and communication (i.e., the manipulation of source, message, and receiver variables in order to obtain attitude change), researchers have failed to find consistent results as to the persuasive efficacy of evidence.

Although not specifically related to using evidence to change attitude and behavior, Fishbein (1967a; 1967c; 1972) and Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have proposed a theory of behavior which purports to be able to explain the contradictory findings in the evidence literature. They criticize the Yale research paradigm and propose a new approach to persuasion. If Fishbein and Ajzen's theory is correct, then a study of
that theory might illuminate some of the problems with the existing
evidence research and answer some of the questions raised by the incon-
sistent findings in the area. Furthermore, it might provide new in-
sight into the persuasive process. With these ideas in mind, the
present investigation had four purposes: to test Fishbein and Ajzen's
model of behavioral prediction; to determine if a persuasive message
formulated in accord with their basic principles of change was success-
ful in changing intention to participate in and sign up for a speech
workshop; to compare Fishbein and Ajzen's principles of change with the
Yale approach to changing attitudes and behavior; and, finally, to
examine the effect of the use of evidence in a persuasive communication.

The remainder of Chapter 1 is devoted to summaries of previous
research on evidence and theoretical approaches to persuasion, espe-
cially the Yale approach and Fishbein and Ajzen's approach, and a state-
ment of the problem. Chapter 2 includes a discussion of a pilot re-
search study and of the methodology of the present study. Chapter 3
contains the results of the study and a discussion of the findings.

**Summaries of Previous Research**

**Evidence**

From twenty-one major studies designed to assess the effect of
evidence on persuasion, no consistent pattern of attitude change has
been uncovered. Two studies found that inclusion of evidence increased
the amount of attitude change produced by the message; two found a trend
in this direction, five found no significant effect on attitude change
attributable to evidence, and the twelve studies conducted by McCroskey
and his associates found an interaction effect.
Statistically significant results favoring inclusion of evidence in a speech designed to achieve attitude change were obtained by Cathcart (1955) and Bettinghaus (1953), the two earliest reported studies. Bettinghaus found that the clear identification of certain material as evidence contributed to persuasiveness. Cathcart examined the relative effects of various methods of presenting evidence (no evidence, evidence, evidence and documentation, and evidence, documentation and qualification of source) and found that all three evidence speeches produced significantly more attitude change than the no evidence speech. Studies by Gilkinson, Paulson and Sikkink (1954) and Ostermeier (1966) demonstrated trends favoring the citation of authority in support of claims, however, neither of the studies met the normal criterion levels for statistical significance. These four studies seem to indicate that evidence is a significant variable in producing attitude change. Later studies reveal different results, however.

Five studies found no significant effect on attitude change attributable to evidence. Dresser's (1963) research on the use of "satisfactory" and "unsatisfactory" evidence revealed no significant relationship between evidence and attitude change. As with Dresser's study, other attempts to find a significant relationship have failed. Moreover, these studies have examined a host of matters including use of statistical evidence (Costley, 1958); authoritative quotations and pictures (Wagner, 1958); augmentation of the number of citations (Anderson, 1958); increase in the amount of commentary designed to establish the qualifications of cited authorities (Anderson, 1958); or the number of irrelevant or internally inconsistent pieces of evidence (Dresser, 1963). Even in situations such as formal debates and political campaigns,
which supposedly place a premium on the skilled use of evidence, the manner of handling such material is known typically to fall short of acceptable standards (Anderson and Mortensen, 1967; Dresser, 1964; McKee, 1959; Mortensen, 1968a, 1968b).

McCroskey, in a series of twelve studies (McCroskey, 1966a, 1967a, 1967b, 1969; McCroskey and Dunham, 1966; Holtzman, 1966; and Arnold and McCroskey, 1967), attempted to reconcile the inconsistent findings in the evidence/attitude change area. He reasoned that evidence assumes importance mainly as it interacts with other factors in a communication situation—particularly source credibility, manner of presentation, and "newness" of the evidence to the audience. He found that the inclusion of evidence had a significant effect on attitude change when the speaker was low-to-moderate in credibility, the evidence was new to the audience, and the speech was delivered well.

The experimental literature on evidence, then, reveals no consistent effect of evidence on persuasion. The theoretical base out of which this evidence research grew was that of the Yale Communication Research Program. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (1975) have criticized this approach and postulated another approach to persuasion. These two approaches will be examined in more detail.

Theoretical Approaches

Yale Communication Research Program: Hovland, et al.—Much of the impetus to controlled research on communication and persuasion came from the Yale Communication Research Program under the direction of Carl I. Hovland (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953; Hovland, 1957; Hovland and Janis, 1959; Hovland and Rosenberg, 1960; Sherif and Hovland, 1961). As
defined by Hovland and his associates, communication is "the process by which an individual (the communicator) transmits stimuli (usually verbal) to modify the behavior of other individuals (the audience)" (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Therefore in their attempt to identify the variables which influence the effectiveness of a persuasive communication, Hovland, et al., viewed their research task as the investigation of who says what to whom with what effect.

From this definition of communication have emerged the three major independent variables which are believed to influence effective communication, i.e., source (who), message (what), and receiver (to whom) variables. Also basic to the theory underlying this research is the assumption that the effect of a given communication depends on the extent to which it is attended, comprehended, and accepted. These are the internal processes, according to researchers in this tradition, which mediate one of four observable communication effects, i.e., "opinion" change, "reception" change, "affect" change and/or "action" change, all of which traditionally have been subsumed under one general dependent variable called "attitude change." Thus, according to this approach, the effects of source (who), message (says what), and audience (to whom) factors on attitude change (with what effect) are assumed to be mediated by attention, comprehension, and acceptance. The traditional assumption has been that a manipulation of any one of these independent variables will influence the effectiveness of the communication.

For example, in order to study the effects of the source of a communication, investigators in this tradition have manipulated various characteristics of the communicator, such as his expertise, status, trustworthiness, etc., and assessed the effect of the various condi-
tions on attitude change. Receiver variables or individual differences have been dealt with in terms of general persuasibility, initial opinions, intelligence, self-esteem, cognitive complexity, and various other personality traits. Investigators have also manipulated message characteristics in attempts to study the effects of different types of communications. One-sided messages have been compared with two-sided messages (Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield, 1949), emotional messages have been compared with logical messages (Knower, 1935; Becker, 1963; Clevenger and Knapprath, 1966; Cohen, 1957; Hartman, 1936; Hovland, et al., 1953), high fear appeals with low fear appeals (Janis and Feshbach, 1953; Secord and Backman, 1964; Powell, 1965; Leventhal and Niles, 1964; McGuire, 1968a), and the order of arguments in the message has been varied (Lund, 1925; Knower, 1936; Janis and Feierabend, 1957; Anderson, 1959; Cromwell, 1950; Insko, 1964; Wilson and Insko, 1968).

The evidence research previously reviewed fits into the message factors category. The approach has been to manipulate the amount or type of evidence in order to determine its effect on attitude change. Underlying this approach, again, is the assumption that evidence in some way affects the internal mediating processes of attention, comprehension, and acceptance, and these, in turn, affect the dependent variable or attitude change. Traditional persuasion theorists have assumed that evidence is an important factor in persuasion. If comprehension is, indeed, a mediator of attitude change as Hovland, et al., assume it to be, then one might intuitively expect that including evidence in a persuasive communication might facilitate comprehension and acceptance of the message, and therefore produce more attitude change than a persuasive communication with no evidence. In order to assess this assumption, a
researcher working out of this theory would choose some target object, for example, abortion. He would write a persuasive communication about the object in which, for example, including or not including evidence would be the manipulation. Next, he would assess the amount of attitude change toward the target object, and, finally, he would compare the amount of attitude change among conditions. Because the traditional assumption has been that evidence is important in the persuasive process, researchers generally expect to find the evidence condition to be more persuasive than the no-evidence condition.

The majority of researchers in communication and persuasion have viewed the persuasive process in just this way. And yet in all three areas of research—attempts to assess the effects of source, message, and receiver variables on attitude change toward some target object—there are inconsistent findings. Furthermore, these studies have revealed either a low correlation or no correlation between attitude change toward the target object and behavior change with respect to the target object. In a recent review of over thirty studies directed at investigating the attitude/behavior relationship, Wicker (1969) concluded that, "Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will be closely related to actions" (p. 65). Consistent with Wicker, McGuire (1969) stated that, "Attitude research has long indicated that the person's verbal report of his attitude has a rather low correlation with his actual behavior toward the object of the attitude" (p. 156). Similarly, other investigators have answered the questions of whether attitudes predict behavior and whether change in attitudes leads to changes in behavior in
the negative, largely as a result of the inconsistent findings in attitude research and the lack of a behavior/attitude relationship.

However, many researchers interested in communication and persuasion have worked out of this learning theory based approach to persuasion, i.e., they have examined the effects of variations in source, message, or receiver on one or more destination variables. Again, this approach has not proved very fruitful. The idea that source, message, and receiver variables might not be the indirect antecedents of attitude change has not been questioned until recently. Furthermore, the major dependent variable in most studies has been some measure of "attitude change" with respect to some target object, which could mean anything from a change in a belief about the object, to a change in an attitude toward the object, to a change in intention to perform some behavior with respect to the object. Relatively little attention has been paid to changes in actual behaviors, and those studies which have examined attitude toward the target object and behavior with respect to that object, again, have revealed low or no correlation between the two dependent variables (Wicker, 1969; McGuire, 1969).

**Fishbein and Ajzen's Theory of Behavior**—Recently Fishbein (1967a; 1967b; 1967c; 1972) and Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have proposed a behavior theory based model of behavioral prediction. Although Fishbein's theory, based on Dulaney's (1968) theory of propositional control, does not relate specifically to the use of evidence to change attitudes and behavior, the theory purports to be able to account for the contradictory findings in the evidence literature, as well as being able to explain the apparent attitude/behavior dichotomy. Before re-
vealing Fishbein's explanation of these phenomena, however, it is first necessary to examine the basic assumptions and constructs upon which the theory is based.

According to Fishbein, the confusion and ambiguity surrounding the attitude/behavior relationship is primarily a result of investigators' inability to agree on an explicit definition of attitude (cf. McGuire, 1969; Elizur, 1970; Kiesler, Collins and Miller, 1969). In reviews of the attitude concept (e.g., Campbell, 1963; Greenwald, 1968), this diversity of proposed definitions has been made explicit. Although some reviewers have attempted to provide an integration of these different definitions (e.g., Allport, 1935; Nelson, 1939), more recently they have tended to acknowledge "the diversity of attitude definitions and [to despair] of finding consensus or justification for one definition as opposed to others" (Greenwald, 1968, p. 361.)

Furthermore, as McGuire (1969) pointed out, attitude measurement procedures vary widely across studies. Indeed, most investigators merely intuitively select the particular measurement procedure that seems to fit the purposes of their particular studies. Support for this argument comes from Fishbein and Ajzen (1972). In a review of research published between 1968 and 1970, these investigators found more than five hundred different operations designed to measure attitude. Included in these operations are standard attitude scales (e.g., Likert, Guttman, Thurstone, and semantic differential scales); single statements of feelings, opinions, knowledge, or intentions; observations of one or more overt behaviors; and physiological measures. Single-response measures illustrate most clearly the wide range of operations that have been employed (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). In all these measures, atti-
tudes, opinions, values, intentions, or other "attitudinal" concepts are inferred from observations of a single act.

Support for the idea that reliance on intuitive selection of attitude measurement procedures which seem to fit the purpose of a study may and probably will lead to conflicting results and different conclusions concerning the relations between attitude and other variables comes directly from the plethora of inconsistent findings reported by experimenters in this area. Furthermore, the intuitive selection of attitude measures which fit the particular study under investigation is a direct result of the fact that no adequate conceptual definition of attitude has been accepted by all researchers. An explicit definition of attitude appears to be a minimal prerequisite, then, for the development of valid measurement procedures.

According to current views in philosophy of science, the meaning of a concept should be defined in terms of its relations to other constructs in a theoretical network (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). However, as Kiesler, Collins and Miller (1969) have pointed out, "all too often social psychologists have tried to make their definition of attitude both a [conceptual] definition and a theory of the concept" (p. 4). For example, most researchers would probably agree that attitude can be described as "a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object" (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, p. 15). Agreement on this description of attitude, however, does not eliminate the existing disagreements among attitude investigators. On the contrary, this definition of attitude merely serves to obscure the disagreements by providing a description with multiple interpretations.
The conceptual distinctions which Fishbein and Ajzen make among their four basic constructs seem to offer some hope for resolving the problems previously discussed. The foundation for their conceptual framework is provided by the distinction they make among beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen argue that if the attitude area is ever to be understood adequately, then the distinction must be made among these four constructs.

One distinction that has been repeatedly proposed is the trilogy of affect, which refers to a person's feelings toward and evaluation of some object, person, issue or event; cognition, which denotes a person's knowledge, opinions, beliefs and thoughts about the object; and conation, which refers to a person's behavioral intentions and his actions with respect to or in the presence of the object. A distinction needs to be made between behavioral intentions and actual behavior, however, since, when dealing with attitudes, one is concerned with predispositions to behave rather than with the behavior itself. Thus a classification consisting of four broad categories may be made: cognition (opinions, beliefs), affect (feelings, evaluations), conation (behavioral intentions), and behavior (observed overt acts). Fishbein and Ajzen use the term "belief" to refer to the cognitive category, "attitude" to refer to the affective category, "intentions" to refer to the conative category, and "behavior" to refer to the behavioral category. Again, the foundation of their conceptual framework is provided by the distinction they make among beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. The major concern of the framework, however, is with the relations between these variables. Therefore, the four constructs proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen will be examined in terms of defining these constructs.
and showing how they are related one to the other. While reading this discussion, one should keep in mind that underlying their conceptual framework and basic to their theory is the idea that man is a logical, rational, information-processing animal who uses the information at his disposal to make judgments, form evaluations and arrive at decisions.

Beliefs represent the information a person has about an object and are the fundamental building blocks in Fishbein and Ajzen's conceptual structure. Specifically, a belief links an object to some attribute. For example, the belief "Russia is a totalitarian state" links the object "Russia" to the attribute "totalitarian state." The object of a belief may be a person, a group of people, an institution, a behavior, a policy, an event, etc., and the associated attribute may be any object, trait, property, quality, characteristic, outcome, or event. People learn or form beliefs about an object by direct observation, by receiving information from outside sources, and by way of various inference processes.

Furthermore, with respect to any object-attribute association, people may differ in their belief strengths, i.e., they may differ in terms of the perceived likelihood that the object has (or is associated with) the attribute in question. Therefore, belief may be measured by a procedure which places the subject along a dimension of subjective probability involving an object and some related attribute. The totality of a person's beliefs about an object and the subjective probability with which he holds that object-attribute link serve as the informational base that ultimately determines his attitudes, intentions, and behaviors.

Attitude, on the other hand, refers to a person's favorable
or unfavorable evaluation of an object-attribute link. This assumption—that the major distinguishing characteristic of the attitude concept is its evaluative or affective nature—is consistent with most theories of attitude. As with beliefs, an information-processing approach is viewed as underlying the formation of attitudes. Specifically, a person's attitude toward an object is based on his salient beliefs about that object and his evaluation of those beliefs. Since most people hold both positive and negative beliefs about an object, an attitude is viewed as corresponding to the total affect associated with their beliefs. Thus, a person's attitude toward some object is related to the set of his beliefs about the object but not necessarily to any specific belief. For example, if a person holds the belief that Russia is a totalitarian state and his evaluation of totalitarianism is negative, i.e., totalitarianism is not good, and if his evaluation of the majority of attributes he has associated with Russia are negative, then that person's attitude toward Russia should also be negative. This concept of attitude is expressed mathematically in Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) formula:

$$A_o = \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i e_i$$

where,

- $A_o = \text{attitude toward the object}$,
- $b_i = \text{beliefs about the object}$,
- $e_i = \text{the subjective evaluation of those beliefs}$, and
- $n = \text{the number of beliefs}$.

It can thus be seen that a person's attitude toward some object ($A_o$) is determined by the sum of his beliefs that the object has certain attributes ($b_i$) multiplied by his evaluation ($e_i$) of those attributes. Peak
(1955), Rosenberg (1956), Fishbein (1963) and others have provided empirical support for this concept of attitude. Specifically, attitude was found to be highly correlated with the sum of beliefs, each multiplied by its respective evaluation aspect. Attitude, therefore, should be measured by a procedure which locates the subject on a bipolar affective or evaluative dimension for each belief he holds for a given object.

Fishbein and Ajzen's third construct, behavioral intention, refers to a person's intentions to perform various behaviors. According to their theory, an individual's intention to perform any behavior in a given situation is a joint function of his attitude toward performing the act (Aact) and of his beliefs about what he is expected to do in that situation, i.e., his normative beliefs (NB). These normative beliefs are, in turn, multiplied by the individual's motivation to comply with the norms (Mc). The two major components (Aact and NB[Mc]) are weighted for their importance in the prediction of behavioral intentions, as can be seen in the following algebraic expression developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975):

\[ BI = [Aact]w_0 + [NB(Mc)]w_1 \]

where,

- \( BI \) = behavioral intention,
- \( Aact \) = attitude toward performing a given behavior in a given situation,
- \( NB \) = normative beliefs,
- \( Mc \) = motivation to comply with the norms, and
- \( w_0 \) & \( w_1 \) = empirically determined weights.

The Aact component of this model can be more fully understood by
reconsidering the general attitude construct discussed previously. It will be remembered that a person's attitude toward an object is equal to the sum of his beliefs about that object multiplied by his evaluation of those beliefs, or:

\[ A_o = \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i e_i \]

A person's attitude toward performing a specific behavior is determined by these same components, or:

\[ A_{act} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i e_i \]

where,

- \( A_{act} \) = the person's attitude toward performing a particular behavior,
- \( b_i \) = the belief about the consequences of performing the particular behavior in a given situation, i.e., the probability or improbability that the performance of behavior \( X \) will lead to some consequence \( Y_i \),
- \( e_i \) = the evaluative aspect of \( b_i \), i.e., the subject's evaluation of \( Y_i \), and
- \( n \) = the number of beliefs.

Thus a person's attitude toward performing a specific behavior (\( A_{act} \)) is equal to the sum of his beliefs about the consequences of performing that act (\( b_i \)) multiplied by his evaluation of those consequences (\( e_i \)).

Thus, according to Fishbein and Ajzen's model, one may predict BI if he knows the person's attitude toward performing that behavior (\( A_{act} \)), his normative social beliefs with respect to that behavior (\( NB \)), his motivation to comply with what he perceives others expect him to do with respect to that behavior (\( Mc \)), and the importance each component plays in determining his decision to do the specific behavior (\( w_o \) and
These empirically determined weights ($w_0$ and $w_1$) deserve a special word of attention. According to Fishbein and Ajzen, if the two major components $[A_{act}]$ and $[N(B(Mc))]$ are known, then one can accurately predict $BI$. However, in any given situation for any given behavior, one or the other of these components may be more important in determining what the person's intentions are with respect to a given behavior: i.e., in one situation a person's intentions may be determined primarily by his attitude toward performing the behavior in question; in another situation, however, whether a person intends to perform a given behavior may be primarily determined by what he perceives relevant others think he should do. Thus in any attempt to predict intent, the investigator must first determine which of the two components is more important to the individual in that particular situation in determining his intent to perform or not perform a particular behavior. This may be done by using the multiple regression statistic.

A number of studies based on the intentional model described above have been conducted (Fishbein, 1966; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1969, 1970, 1972; Fishbein, et al., 1970; Ajzen, 1971; Hornik, 1970; DeVries and Ajzen, 1971; Carlson, 1968; McArdle, 1972; Darroch, 1971; Glassman, 1971; Jaccard and Davidson, 1972). These studies have attempted to predict a variety of intentions, including intentions to cooperate or compete, to buy certain products, to sign up for an alcoholic treatment program, to perform various leisure-time activities, to use certain types of contraceptives, to cheat on exams, and to engage in premarital sexual intercourse. The evidence strongly supports the intentional model by showing that the two predictors, $A_{act}$ and $N(B(Mc))$, offer high multiple correlations with behavioral intentions, with the average mul-
tiple correlation over all these studies being .746 (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975).

The fourth and final construct to which Fishbein and Ajzen refer is behavior. Specifically, they are interested in overt behaviors that are studied in their own right, i.e., obtaining a measure of overt behavior because one is interested in that particular behavior and is trying to understand its determinants. One might assert that most previous attitude studies have been concerned with overt behavior, since they generally obtain either a written (questionnaire) or verbal response. These responses are, after all, observable acts of the subject. These behavioral responses differ from Fishbein and Ajzen's concept of behavior, however, because such responses traditionally are not treated as records of behavior but are used, instead, to infer beliefs, attitudes, or intentions.

One of the most important assumptions of Fishbein and Ajzen's theory is that the effects of the Aact and NB(Me) components on overt behavior are held to be mediated by BI. The prediction of behavioral intentions is, therefore, a necessary as well as sufficient condition for the prediction of overt behavior. This relationship is expressed algebraically (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) as follows:

\[ B - BI = [A_{act}]w_0 + [NB(Me)]w_1 \]

where,

- \( B = \text{overt behavior} \)
- \( BI = \text{behavioral intention} \)
- \( A_{act} = \text{attitude toward performing a given behavior in a given situation} \)
- \( NB = \text{social normative beliefs} \)
Mc = motivation to comply with social normative beliefs, and
\[ w_0 \text{ and } w_1 = \text{empirically determined weights.} \]

According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), most social behavior is volitional. Therefore, barring unforeseen events, a person should perform those behaviors he intends to perform, thus a high correlation is assumed to exist between BI and actual behavior. The studies cited previously in support of the BI component also support the high correlation between B and BI. Such an intimate relationship between BI and B, of course, will not hold unconditionally. A number of factors determine the BI-B relationship, and in order to obtain a high correlation between the two, certain conditions must be met. First, the behavior must be under the volitional control of the subject. If it is not, then no matter what the subject's intentions are, there is a possibility that he may not be able to carry them out. Second, the time lapse between the measure of BI and B should be as short as possible. A person may intend to perform a specific behavior. However, if a large amount of time elapses between his statement of intent to perform the behavior and the time the actual behavior is to be done, then other intervening events could possibly change his intentions. Finally, measures of Aact, NB(Mc), and behavioral intent must be obtained at the same level of specificity. In other words, the more specific the measure of intention is to the behavior that is to be predicted, the higher the intention-behavior correlation will be. This last condition is of major importance in explaining the low correlation traditionally found in attitude/behavior research. Therefore, specificity of measurement will be considered in more detail in the next section of this paper.

The theoretical framework presented by Fishbein and Ajzen makes
a systematic theoretical analysis of attitude research possible. Again, the foundation for their conceptual framework is provided by the distinction made among beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviors. The major concern of the conceptual framework, however, is with the relations between these variables.

Comparison of Theoretical Approaches

A review of literature on evidence and its persuasive efficacy revealed inconsistent findings. Based on Fishbein and Ajzen's theory, these inconsistent findings are due primarily to two problems—the model of change used (i.e., manipulating source, message, or receiver variables and expecting to get attitude or behavior change) and failure to identify specifically and/or differentiate the dependent variable under consideration. The latter problem will be dealt with first.

As was previously explained in the discussion of the theoretical base of the Yale Research Program, traditional attitude researchers have paid very little attention to the dependent variables under consideration. Generally they purport to measure "attitude change" after having manipulated some independent variable. In reality, however, the variable which they are measuring may range, in terms of Fishbein and Ajzen's theoretical constructs, anywhere from belief change, to attitude change, to intention change, to behavior change. Due to the lack of measurement specificity of the dependent variable under consideration, Fishbein and Ajzen postulate that a researcher probably will not obtain a high correlation between attitude and behavior, nor should he expect one.

Furthermore, performance of a specific behavior may or may not
be related to the attitude object under consideration. A subject's attitude toward an object will be related only to the total behavioral pattern of the subject rather than to any specific behavior with respect to the attitude object. In other words, while multiple act behaviors may be predicted by knowing a subject's attitude toward an object, single act behaviors may not.

Fishbein and Ajzen do not say, however, that specific behaviors cannot be predicted. To the contrary, these theorists maintain that prediction of single act criteria is not only possible but relatively easy. If one wants to know whether an individual will perform a given behavior, Fishbein and Ajzen maintain that the "simplest and probably most efficient thing one can do is to ask the individual whether he intends to perform the behavior" (Fishbein, 1973, p. 14).

Herein lies one of the problems with traditional studies of the attitude/behavior relationship. As was indicated previously, almost all of the studies dealing with this relationship have been conducted using the following procedure: on the basis of the general attitude toward some object, investigators have attempted to predict a very specific behavioral criterion. It is not surprising, then, that in these studies a lack of correlation between attitudinal and the behavioral measures was found, nor do these studies say very much about the attitude/behavior relationship. Thus one can arrive at the conclusion that traditional attitude measures should not be expected to predict single act criteria. However, when the predictor is appropriate to the criterion, behavioral prediction of single acts is not only possible—it is quite likely. Furthermore, prediction of single act criteria can be accurately done by using Fishbein's model of behavioral intent, the
algebraic expression of which is written as follows:

\[ B - BI = [A_{act}]w_0 + [NB(Mc)]w_1 \]

In this model, the predictor variables (A_{act}, or the person's attitude toward performing a specific act, and NB(Mc), or his beliefs about what relevant others think he should do with regard to performing this specific act and his motivation to comply) are, indeed, appropriate to the criterion variable (BI, or the person's intention to perform that specific act). It is important to note that the model identifies three kinds of variables that function as the basic determinants of behavior: A_{act}, NB(Mc) and the weights of these predictors. Any additional variable is held to influence BI only indirectly by influencing one or more of these determinants. Thus, situational variables, personality characteristics, and, indeed, a person's attitude toward some target object will influence a person's behavioral intentions (and thus his behavior) if, and only if, they are related to A_{act}, to NB(Mc), or if they influence the relative weights that are placed on these predictors.

The inconsistent findings in the evidence area, then, may be accounted for, at least partially, on the basis of the above discussion. Since the research on the persuasive efficacy of evidence was done using the Yale approach, primarily, i.e. formulating a persuasive communication about some target object and then assessing the effects of that message on a rather ambiguous, general dependent variable called "attitude change," then perhaps this research needs to be re-examined in light of the proposed theory.

The inconsistent findings in the evidence area may also be due to a second major problem identified by Fishbein and Ajzen—the strategy of change used. The traditional strategy of change utilized in the
The majority of attitude studies has been based on the concepts of who (source) says what (message) to whom (receiver) and with what effect (destination or dependent variable). These three types of variables—source, message, and receiver—have been manipulated in many different ways in order to determine their effects on the influence process. The studies in persuasion and communication based on this notion have revealed very few consistent findings. Fishbein and Ajzen have set forth some basic principles of change which they believe can account for these inconsistent findings.

Throughout their theory, Fishbein and Ajzen made it clear that the notion of belief occupies a central role in their conceptual structure. A person's belief about an object was described as the perceived probabilistic relation between that object and some attribute. Furthermore, they attempted to show that the formation of one belief may lead to the development of other inferential beliefs, that a person's attitude is determined by his salient beliefs about the attitude object, and that beliefs about a given behavior and about the expectations of relevant others vis-à-vis that behavior determine a person's intention to perform that behavior and thus also influence the overt behavior itself.

This conceptualization makes it clear that an influence attempt, in the final analysis, must always be directed at one or more of the individual's beliefs. Furthermore, beliefs may be directly influenced in one of two ways: through active participation, i.e., a person is placed in a situation where he can personally observe that an object has a given attribute; or through a persuasive communication, i.e., the person may be told by an outside source that the object has the attribute in question. The persuasive communication strategy of change is the one
Fishbein and Ajzen identify several different types of beliefs which are central to the influence process. Beliefs which serve as the fundamental determinants of the dependent variable, whether that dependent variable be belief change, opinion change, or intent change, are termed "primary beliefs." Furthermore, the primary beliefs which serve as the fundamental determinants of a dependent variable vary across dependent variables. In other words, the primary beliefs which determine an individual's attitude toward birth control, in general, differ from the primary beliefs which determine an individual's intention to take birth control pills. For example, when the dependent variable is the attitude toward an object, beliefs about that object's attributes or characteristics are some of the primary beliefs at which an influence attempt may be directed. When the dependent variable is attitude toward a behavior, primary beliefs associate the behavior with attributes such as costs or consequences. In any persuasive communication, any object-attribute association to which an individual is exposed may be viewed as an "informational item." The individual's belief directly corresponding to an informational item is termed a "proximal belief," i.e., the receiver's initial (pre-exposure) subjective probability concerning this object-attribute link. In developing the influence attempt or the persuasive communication, the researcher attempts to select those informational items which he believes serve as primary beliefs themselves or are related to the primary beliefs. These informational items in the communication are called "target beliefs." An influence attempt may have an effect on "external beliefs," that is, on beliefs that do not correspond to any of the informational items provided by the communica-
tion. Changes in external beliefs resulting from an influence attempt are termed "impact effects." Like direct effects on proximal beliefs, these indirect impact effects will influence the dependent variable only if the external beliefs affected serve as primary beliefs or if they are related to the primary beliefs.

To summarize the discussion thus far, an influence attempt is designed to change some dependent variable, whether it is a belief, an attitude, an intention or a behavior. The influence attempt should be directed at certain target beliefs that are assumed to be the primary determinants of the dependent variable in question. Clearly, changing target beliefs will influence the dependent variable only when this assumption is met. To produce the desired changes in his target beliefs, the investigator somehow exposes his subjects to a set of informational items. Resulting changes in the receiver's proximal beliefs may initiate a chain of effects, ultimately leading to a change in the dependent variable. From these considerations, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have developed four principles of change:

1. The effects of an influence attempt on change in a dependent variable depend on its effects on the primary beliefs underlying that variable.

2. The effects of an influence attempt on change in a dependent variable are ultimately the result of changes in proximal beliefs and of impact effects.

3. The effects of an influence attempt on change in beliefs, attitudes, intention, and behaviors depend, in that order, on an increasing number of intervening processes.

4. An experimental manipulation can affect amount of change in a dependent variable only to the extent that it influences amount of change in proximal and external beliefs (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, pp. 406-409).

This last principle of change is basic to an understanding of
the inconsistent findings in the evidence area. Fishbein and Ajzen argue that in order for an influence attempt to be successful the information to which subjects are exposed must produce changes in their beliefs. Most traditional studies of change, however, not only expose subjects to some information but also manipulate one or more independent variables and measure the effects of the manipulation on the amount of change in the dependent variable. For example, in a study of persuasive communication, subjects might receive a message that is ultimately designed to change their attitudes toward family planning. In one condition the message might include "good" evidence, as traditionally defined, whereas in a second condition the same message might include "bad" evidence. The purpose of the experiment would be to show that with different types of evidence, the same message will produce different amounts of attitude change. According to Fishbein and Ajzen, manipulations of this sort—in terms of source, message, and receiver variables—merely serve to facilitate or inhibit change in a dependent variable. They are not, however, sufficient conditions in and of themselves to obtain the desired change. Once again, an influence attempt, according to their theory, can only be successful to the extent that it changes, at the very least, the specific proximal or external beliefs which underlie the dependent variable in question. The crucial question for the researcher thus becomes a question of identifying the factors which are responsible for change in the proximal beliefs.

Fishbein and Ajzen argue that changes in proximal beliefs, and thus corresponding changes in the dependent variable, are determined primarily by the acceptance of source beliefs. Within Fishbein and Ajzen's model of the persuasive process, "acceptance" is viewed as being
equivalent to belief strength. That is, a person's acceptance of a belief is indicated by his subjective probability that the object-attribute relation in question is true. For example, consider the persuasive communication comprising such a statement as, "There is an eighty percent chance that the President is seriously ill." The source probability in this case is .80. The subject's acceptance of this source belief refers to his agreement with the source belief. Complete acceptance of a source belief occurs when the receiver's post-exposure probability corresponds exactly to the source probability. In the example above, complete acceptance could be shown to have occurred if the subject indicated a subjective probability of .80 that, "The President is seriously ill." Thus acceptance may be viewed as being equivalent to belief strength and, hence, must be measured that way. Furthermore, acceptance of a source belief does not necessarily indicate a change in the proximal belief. For example, a person may exhibit complete acceptance of a source belief with a subjective probability of 1.0. However, if prior to exposure he already held the same belief with a probability of 1.0, then no change would be expected.

The probability that a source belief will be accepted is a function of two major factors: discrepancy between source and proximal beliefs and overall facilitation. Other things being equal, probability of acceptance decreases with discrepancy and increases with facilitation. The discrepancy between the probability implied by the source belief, i.e., the source probability ($p_s$), and the receiver's proximal probability ($p_r$) influences the probability that a source belief will be accepted. Specifically, the greater this discrepancy, the lower should be the probability of acceptance. Although the exact nature of the rela-
tion between acceptance and discrepancy is unknown, Fishbein and Ajzen tentatively assume an inverse linear relation in order to clarify this concept. This relation has been expressed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) as follows:

\[ p(a) = 1 - D \]

where,

- \( p(a) \) is the probability of acceptance, and
- \( D \) is the absolute discrepancy between source and proximal probabilities.

For example, consider a person whose subjective probability is .70 that "heavy drinkers have serious marital problems." The probability that he would accept a source belief of .75 that "heavy drinkers have serious marital problems" can be computed as follows: since \( D = |p_s - p_r| \), then \( p(a) = 1 - (p_s - p_r) = 1 - .05 = .95 \). In comparison, for a receiver with an initial proximal belief of .40, the probability of acceptance would be \( 1 - .35 = .65 \). The idea that amount of discrepancy influences acceptance of a message is not a new one (cf. Sherif and Hovland, 1961).

Facilitating (or inhibiting) factors also influence probability of acceptance of source beliefs. Specifically, Fishbein and Ajzen assert that as the overall level of facilitation increases, assuming other factors are equal, so does the probability of acceptance. These facilitating (or inhibiting) factors have traditionally been classified as source, message, and receiver variables. Whereas traditional theorists have assumed that a manipulation of one of these factors will be a sufficient condition for a change in the dependent variable, Fishbein and Ajzen maintain that these factors are not influential in and of themselves, and that their effects on dependent variable change must be
viewed in terms of the effect they have on beliefs. Specifically, these factors can have one or both of two effects: they can influence the person's confidence in his own belief, that is, in his proximal probability; and they can influence the person's judgment that the source probability is correct. Furthermore, there is no simple relationship between discrepancy and facilitating factors. Therefore, Fishbein and Ajzen maintain, in direct contradiction to traditional attitude theorists, that a manipulation of a facilitating factor cannot be expected to have a simple systematic effect on probability of acceptance.

It follows, then, that the effects of a given message factor on persuasion, such as evidence, cannot be unambiguously attributed to that factor alone. Instead, they may be due to differences in information given to the receivers. Since it has been this relationship that has been examined in traditional attitude research, i.e., the effect of manipulating a facilitating factor (source, message, or receiver variables) on the dependent variable, it is not surprising that the literature in communication and persuasion reveals few consistent findings concerning the effects of any given manipulation on "attitude change."

Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen suggest that these inconsistent findings are unavoidable unless more attention is paid to the nature of the dependent variable being studied, to the assumptions that link the message with the dependent measure of persuasion, to acceptance of source beliefs and change in proximal beliefs, and to the impact effects of the persuasive communication on external beliefs.
Statement of the Problem

The major dependent variable in the present investigation was whether the subjects, students enrolled in beginning speech courses, would sign up to participate in a speech workshop. A second behavior, actual attendance at the workshop, was also of interest. The study had four purposes: to test the model of behavioral prediction; to determine if a persuasive message formulated in accord with Fishbein and Ajzen's basic principles of change would be successful in changing intention to participate in and sign up for the speech workshop; to compare Fishbein's principles of change with the Yale approach to changing attitudes and behavior; and, finally, to examine the effect of the use of evidence in a persuasive communication.

The theoretical model identified three kinds of variables that function as the basic determinants of behavior: attitudes toward performance of the behavior; normative beliefs; and the weights of these predictors. A person's attitude toward an object (Ao) will influence BI (and thus behavior) if, and only if, it is related to Aact, to NB(Mc), or if it influences the relative weights that are placed on these predictors. Therefore, the following hypotheses were made with respect to the model of behavioral prediction:

\[ H_1: \] There should be a high positive correlation between B (signing up for the workshop) and BI (intention to sign up for the workshop).

\[ H_2: \] There should be a high positive multiple correlation between the two predictor components of the model (attitude toward signing up for the workshop [Aact] and normative social beliefs about whether relevant others think they should sign up for the workshop [NB] multiplied by their motivation to comply with these expectations [Mc]) and behavioral intention to sign up for the workshop and thus actual sign up behavior.
H₃: Attitude toward speaking (Ao) will be significantly correlated neither to Aact nor to NB(Me).

H₄: Since attitude toward speaking (Ao) will correlate with BI, and thus B, only to the extent that it is correlated with one of the two components, then Ao will not be significantly correlated to either BI or B.

The second purpose of this study was to determine whether a persuasive message formulated in accord with Fishbein and Ajzen's basic principles of change was successful in changing subjects' behavioral intentions to participate in a speech workshop. Therefore, a persuasive message was developed (see Appendix G) which was aimed at changing the primary beliefs subjects held with regard to participating in this workshop, i.e., those attributes (costs and consequences) which subjects linked with this behavior (participating in the speech workshop).* The topic of the communication, therefore, was "signing up for the workshop." This persuasive communication was called the "Aact" message, and the following hypothesis was made:

H₅: Subjects exposed to the Aact message will experience significant behavioral intent change while the no-message group will not.

The third purpose of the present study was to compare Fishbein's principles of change with the Yale approach to changing attitudes and behavior. Again, the major dependent variable under consideration was whether the subjects signed up to participate in the speech workshop. Consistent with the Yale research, one approach that might be used by researchers to increase sign up behavior would consist of the following: 1) first, there would be a communication associating speaking with posi-

*These primary beliefs were obtained in a pilot study which was conducted previously. See Chapter Two.
tive consequences (e.g., developing self confidence, being more highly regarded by ones peers, becoming a better speaker, etc.) and 2) at the end of the communication there would be one or more recommendations for action, such as "you should speak as often as possible" and/or "you should go to the speech workshop." With the preceding approach one must assume that changing the subject's attitude toward speaking (Ao) will motivate the subjects to sign up to participate in the workshop. Fishbein, on the other hand, assumes that if the goal is to persuade subjects to sign up for a speaking workshop, then the most efficient procedure is to work directly on their attitudes toward signing by associating signing up with positive consequences.

In order to compare Fishbein's model of change with the Yale model of change, the previously discussed Aact message whose topic was "participating in the speech workshop" was compared with another message which was developed in accord with the Yale approach (see Appendix G). This message was called the Ao (attitude toward the object) message and its topic of communication was "speaking at every opportunity." Thus, the two messages, Aact and Ao, differed only in the topic of communication. On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis was made:

H₆: The Aact message will be significantly more persuasive than the Ao message.

The fourth and final purpose of this study was to determine what effect the use of evidence has in a persuasive communication. In order to determine this effect, two additional speeches were formulated by adding evidence to the Aact and Ao speeches; these two new speeches were designated the "Aactₑ" and "Aoₑ" messages (see Appendix G). The opera-
tional definition of evidence was based on McCroskey's definition of that material which is traditionally called evidence, i.e., "third-order data" or opinions of others and facts attested to by others (McCroskey, 1972, pp. 100-103). Therefore, the Aact<sub>e</sub> and the Ao<sub>e</sub> messages differed from the Aact and Ao messages, respectively, only in terms of whether the belief statements in the messages (which were identical) were attributed to sources outside the speaker. Using an analysis of variance design, the amount of BI change attributable to Aact versus Ao was examined, as was the amount of BI change attributable to the evidence versus no evidence condition. Therefore, the following hypothesis was made:

\[ H_7: \text{The amount of BI change attributable to Aact as opposed to Ao will be significantly greater than the amount of BI change attributable to evidence versus no evidence.} \]

The experimental procedure for testing these hypotheses as well as the pilot research, will be discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 2

METHODOLOGY

Pilot Research

As Fishbein and Ajzen indicated in their basic guidelines for change, in order for an influence attempt to be effective, it must produce changes in the salient primary beliefs which underlie the specific dependent variable under consideration. Since the dependent variable of concern to the present study was beginning speech students' sign up behavior to participate in a speech workshop, of immediate concern to the present study was the identification of the primary beliefs which underlay the specific determinants of intention to sign up.

In their discussion of the procedure which should be used to obtain primary beliefs for a given dependent variable, Fishbein and Ajzen suggested that, under most circumstances, a small number of beliefs (five to nine) serve as the determinants of any given dependent variable. This notion is consistent with previous research on attention span, apprehension, and information processing (Miller, 1956; Woodworth and Schlosberg, 1954; Mandler, 1967). Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen maintained that a person's beliefs about a given action (Aact component) can be elicited in a free-response format by asking him to list the consequences or outcomes of performing the behavior in question. Similarly, a person's beliefs about social norms (NB[Mc] component) can be elicited in a free response format by asking the subject to list the people or
sets of people whose opinion(s) would influence his decision to perform the behavior in question. It has been argued elsewhere (Fishbein, 1967a; Kaplan and Fishbein, 1969) that salient beliefs are elicited first, and consistent with the considerations above, beliefs elicited beyond the first nine or ten are probably not salient for the individual. Therefore, as a general rule of thumb, Fishbein and Ajzen recommended that the first five to nine beliefs elicited be used. They continued to say that to determine modal salient beliefs for a given population, a representative sample of the population could be asked their beliefs about their attitudes toward the behavior and their normative beliefs about the behavior. The most frequently elicited beliefs can be considered the modal salient beliefs for the population (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, pp. 218-219.). Consistent with these recommendations and with previous research (Fishbein, 1963; Kaplan and Fishbein, 1969; Jaccard and Davidson, 1972), a free elicitation procedure was used to determine the modal salient beliefs for Aact and NB(Mc).

Because the subjects tested in the present study were undergraduate students enrolled in beginning public speaking classes, subjects for the pilot research were also drawn from undergraduate public speaking classes. Specifically, the sample included forty students enrolled in Speech 2060 (Public Speaking) at Louisiana State University and fifty-eight students enrolled in Speech 211 (Introduction to Public Speaking) at Southeastern Louisiana University. Subjects from both schools were used in order to get as valid a list of modal salient be-
liefs as possible.* The experimental situation was described to the subjects (see Appendix A). Following this description the first of two questionnaires was distributed. The first questionnaire was designed to elicit primary beliefs salient to the Aact component (see Appendix A). Specifically students were asked to, "List as many consequences/outcomes (costs and rewards) as you can of participating in this workshop." On the second page of the questionnaire, subjects were asked to evaluate the consequences they had listed, and on the third page, belief strength was assessed on a probable/improbable scale for each consequence.

Primary beliefs underlying the Aact component for each subject were computed in the following manner. If the belief strength with which a subject held the behavior consequence link he had listed on page one of the questionnaire were marked "slightly probable" to "highly probable" by the subject, then the belief was considered salient and included on a tally sheet. The tally sheet was divided into "positive consequences" and "negative consequences" and beliefs were placed in these columns based on the subject's evaluation of the consequences, i.e., whether he marked the consequence "good" or "bad" on the evaluation scale. After each belief for every subject had been computed and

*It should be noted that these primary beliefs were elicited from the pilot subjects about seven weeks into the spring semester, 1977. The experimental sample was treated after having been in class the equivalent of three weeks for a regular term. However, when the present investigator actually conducted the study, the same free elicitation procedure was conducted on a selected number of subjects from the actual experimental sample in an effort to validate the modal salient beliefs obtained in the pilot research. These subjects were eliminated from the experimental sample and were asked to assist in the experiment. The list of modal salient beliefs obtained in the pilot sample was essentially the same as the list from the actual experimental sample.
placed on the tally sheet, the most frequently elicited positive and negative beliefs were obtained. These results are shown in Table I. Since negative consequences "b" through "e" all seemed to pertain to communication apprehension, or "stage fright," they were viewed as one belief, i.e., "Participating in this workshop will increase my stage fright." Therefore, the final list of modal salient beliefs for the Aact component consisted of eight items, six positive consequences and two negative consequences. The messages (see Appendix G) which were discussed in the Statement of the Problem were based on these eight primary beliefs.

The relevant referents for the NB(Mc) component were computed in the following manner. For each referent listed by a subject, if that referent were marked as being "slightly important" to "extremely important" in determining his decision to go to the workshop, and if the subject marked "slightly want to comply" to "very much want to comply" with that same referent, then the referent was included on a tally sheet. The most frequently elicited relevant referents are listed in Table II. These relevant referents were used to assess the normative component of the model of behavioral prediction (see Appendix A).

**TABLE II**

Pilot Study—Relevant Referents Underlying the NB(Mc) Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Instructor</th>
<th>c. Close Friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Classmates</td>
<td>d. Husband/Wife or Boyfriend/Girlfriend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE I

Pilot Study—Primary Beliefs Underlying the Aact Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Consequences</th>
<th>Negative Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participating in this workshop will:</td>
<td>Participating in this workshop will:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Improve my relationship with my instructor</td>
<td>a. Take up my time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Make me a better public speaker</td>
<td>b. Make me nervous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Allow me to meet new people</td>
<td>c. Make me embarrassed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Give me an advantage over students who don't attend</td>
<td>d. Make me feel foolish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Allow me to get more public speaking experience</td>
<td>e. Hurt my ego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Make my instructor think I am interested in the course and concerned about my performance in the class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subjects

The subjects were 125 undergraduate students enrolled in beginning public speaking courses (Speech 211--Introduction to Public Speaking) at Southeastern Louisiana University during the summer semester, 1977. These subjects represented the entire population of students taking beginning public speaking during that semester. The experimental period extended over the first three weeks of the University semester and involved four stages: pretest; treatment; posttest; and the actual speech workshop.

Stage I: Pretesting

Step A

On the first day of class, subjects were given written information about a speech workshop (see Appendix C) sponsored by the Department of Speech. This information sheet specified the time and date of the "Speech 211 Workshop" which reportedly was being held to allow students to evaluate their speaking ability with that of students in other sections of the course. Attendance was said to be voluntary, and students were informed that whether they elected to attend or not would affect their grades in the class in no way. If the student elected to attend, however, he would be requested to give a sixty-second speech of self-introduction to the group. The information sheet also stated that the instructors of the classes would be present at the workshop. The instructors of the classes, who served as confederates (see Appendix B), also administered a general questionnaire disguised as a normal, first-day classroom procedure, included in which was a measure of the sub-
jects' attitudes toward speaking (Ao). (See Appendix D.)

**Step B**

One week later, the instructors administered another questionnaire under the guise of trying to determine the number of possible participants at the workshop. This questionnaire was actually a pretest measure of the following:

1. Subjects' behavioral intentions (BI) with respect to signing up for the workshop. (See Appendix E, question 1.)

2. Subjects' attitudes toward signing up for the workshop (Aact), toward speaking (Ao), and toward not signing up for the workshop (Aactn-s). (See Appendix E, questions 2-4.)

3. Subjects' normative beliefs for each referent (NB) with respect to the act of signing and with respect to speaking. (See Appendix E, questions 5-12.)

4. Subjects' motivation to comply (Mc) with their perception of what significant others think they should do. (See Appendix E, questions 13-16.)

**Stage II: Treatment**

Six days after the pretest, on the day preceding the scheduled workshop, subjects were randomly assigned to one of five conditions consisting of four experimental groups and one control group. At this point, the control subjects were given the posttest and sign up instruments, that is, they proceeded directly to Stage III. Each of the four experimental groups, however, heard one of the following oral persuasive messages presented by a live speaker: 1) the Aact message; 2) the Aact message; 3) the Ao message; or 4) the Ao message. (See Appendix G.) Each speech contained the same eight modal salient beliefs determined from the pilot research. The Aact messages differed from the Ao messages in the topic of communication, i.e., "speaking at every opportu-
nity" versus "signing up for the speech workshop." The evidence mes-
sages differed from the no evidence messages only in that the belief
statements in them were attributed to sources outside the speaker her-
self. The speaker was a female doctoral candidate in speech, with ex-
tensive public speaking and teaching experience and the author of this
work. Having been introduced in the information sheet as a faculty mem-
ber from another university and director of the workshop, she delivered
the memorized messages in as uniform a manner as possible.

Stage III: Posttesting

Immediately after hearing the speech, subjects in each condition
were asked to fill out a two-part Opinion Questionnaire and a two-part
Belief Inventory.

Two-part Opinion Questionnaire

Part I of this instrument was identical to the pretest and
measured the following:

1. Subjects' behavioral intentions (BI) with respect to signing
   up for the workshop. (See Appendix F, question 1.)

2. Subjects' attitudes toward signing, speaking, and not sign-
   ing. (See Appendix F, questions 2-4.)

3. Subjects' normative beliefs for each referent (NB) with
   respect to signing and with respect to speaking. (See
   Appendix F, questions 5-12.)

4. Subjects' motivation to comply (Mc) with their perceptions
   of what significant others think they should do. (See
   Appendix F, questions 13-16.)

Part II of this instrument was the sign up sheet for partici-
pating in the workshop. (See Appendix F.) Subjects were told that, al-
though participating in the workshop was voluntary and not a course re-
quirement, the sign up sheet was a commitment and that the names would be checked at the workshop.

Two-part Belief Inventory

Part I of this instrument assessed the B₁ component, i.e., it was used to determine the extent to which subjects agreed or disagreed with the source statements (behavior-consequence links) made in the messages. (See Appendix F.) Part II assessed the A₁ component, i.e., the subjects' evaluations of the behavior consequence links made in the messages. (See Appendix F.)

Stage IV: "Speech 211 Workshop"

The workshop was conducted as scheduled. Those who attended were asked to sign a roll, thus actual participation was considered behavior 2. The experimenter conducted the workshop, which began with a complete debriefing of the subjects. Following a question period, the workshop was conducted as advertised. Instructors debriefed non-attendees in their classes on the following day. Participants in the workshop reported that the pretest, treatment, and posttest had been unobtrusive. At no point did they know that they were participating in an experiment. Furthermore, those who attended felt that the workshop had been a beneficial experience.
In the model of behavioral intent, both predictor variables, i.e., Aact and NB(Mc), taken together should be significant predictors of the criterion variable, i.e., BI. In many instances, however, one of the two components may be a better predictor of BI. In such instances, persuasive attempts must be directed at the component which is the better predictor. Therefore, immediately following the pretest, the multiple linear regression statistic was used to determine whether Aact or NB(Mc) were, indeed, significant predictors of BI and, second, to determine which, if either, was the better predictor. The findings indicated that both Aact and NB(Mc) were significant predictors of BI at the .0001 level ($F = 11.00$). However the Aact component was the better of the two predictors, significant at the .0001 level ($F = 16.27$, beta weight = .37), while NB(Mc) was significant at the .0184 level ($F = 5.72$, beta weight = .02). The persuasive messages, therefore, were directed at the Aact component.

Each hypothesis in the study was tested statistically using an IBM 370/158 and employing the SAS'76 correlational, analysis of variance, and general linear models procedures. Furthermore, although no hypotheses were made with respect to the second behavior ($B_2$), actual attendance at the workshop, a measure was obtained for this variable, and several additional statistical tests were run using this variable.
Where appropriate, these results have been included. Before discussing the findings, specific results for each hypothesis will be noted.

Results

Hypothesis 1: There should be a high positive correlation between B and BI. The hypothesis was confirmed. Using point biserial correlation, the findings revealed a positive correlation between the pretest measure of BI and B significant at the .0001 level (\( r = .40 \)) and between the posttest measure of BI and B significant at the .0001 level (\( r = .70 \)). The results of these and other correlational statistics are shown in Table III.

Hypothesis 2: There should be a high multiple correlation between the two predictor components of the model, Aact and NB(Mc), and BI. This hypothesis was confirmed. The findings revealed that pretest Aact and NB(Mc) were positively correlated with pretest BI, significant at the .0001 level (\( R = .40 \)). Furthermore, posttest BI was significantly correlated with posttest Aact and NB(Mc) at the .0165 level (\( R = .265 \)).

Hypothesis 3: Attitude toward speaking (Ao) will not be significantly correlated to Aact nor to NB(Mc). This hypothesis was not confirmed. Using Pearson's \( r \), the findings revealed that Ao was significantly correlated with pretest Aact at the .0066 level (\( r = .25182 \)) and with pretest NB(Mc) at the .0008 level (\( r = .30784 \)). While Ao was not significantly correlated with posttest Aact (\( r = .14359 \)), it was significantly correlated with posttest NB(Mc) at the .0226 level (\( r = .2252 \)).

Hypothesis 4: Ao will not be significantly correlated to BI or to B. This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Using Pearson's \( r \), the
### TABLE III

Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pretest Aact</th>
<th>Pretest NB(Mc)</th>
<th>Posttest Aact</th>
<th>Posttest NB(Mc)</th>
<th>Posttest BI</th>
<th>Behavior(^+) (sign up)</th>
<th>Behav.2(^+) (attend.)</th>
<th>Aact—Not Signing</th>
<th>Ao</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pretest Aact</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.48*</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.84*</td>
<td>.25*</td>
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<td>.25*</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
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<td>.34*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.53*</td>
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<td>.22*</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>.32*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.67*</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.90*</td>
<td>.14</td>
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<td>.21*</td>
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<td>Posttest NB(Mc)</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.21*</td>
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<td>.21*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Posttest BI</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.53*</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.50*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>B(^+) (sign up)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>B2(^+) (attending)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.30*</td>
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</table>

\(^+\)Point Biserial Correlation

*P < .01

**P approaching significance
findings indicated a significant correlation at the .0006 level between 
Ao and pretest BI ($r = .31662$) and a significant correlation at the 
.0069 level ($r = .25072$) between Ao and posttest BI. However, the point 
biserial correlation between Ao and B was not significant ($r = .0611$). 
Just as the point biserial was not significant for the sign up behavior 
(B), neither was it significant for actual attendance at the workshop 
(B2) ($r = .0492$).

Hypothesis 5: Subjects exposed to the Aact message will exper­
ience significant BI change while the no message group will not. This 
hypothesis was confirmed. Using analysis of variance, the findings 
revealed a significant difference in change in BI between groups re­
ceiving the Aact message and the no message group, that is, the amount 
of BI change attributable to Aact was significant at the .0009 level 
($F = 11.97$).

Since hypotheses 6 and 7 were tested in the same procedure, the 
findings will be discussed together.

Hypothesis 6: The Aact message will be significantly more per­
suasive than the Ao message. This hypothesis was not confirmed.

Hypothesis 7: The amount of BI change attributable to Aact as 
opposed to Ao will be significantly greater than the amount of BI change 
attributable to evidence versus no evidence. This hypothesis was not 
confirmed. Using analysis of variance, the findings revealed that: 
1) the Aact messages were not significantly more persuasive than the Ao 
messages ($F = 2.48$); 2) the evidence messages were not significantly 
more persuasive than the no evidence messages ($F = 1.18$); and 3) the 
amount of change in BI due to Aact as opposed to Ao was not signifi­
cantly different from the amount of change in BI due to evidence versus
Discussion

In considering the foregoing results, the reader should keep two things in mind. First, because the experimental sample consisted of undergraduate speech students, the generalizability of the findings must be restricted, even though the age range of the sample was from seventeen to fifty-five years of age. Second, in considering the hypotheses which were confirmed, one should keep in mind the large number of subjects in the sample (N = 115) and the effect this had upon the extremely high levels of confidence obtained.

The two hypotheses specifically concerning the theory itself were confirmed. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Fishbein and Ajzen maintained that by knowing a person's behavioral intentions, one could accurately predict specific, single act behaviors. They further asserted that if one knew a person's attitude toward performing the behavior as well as his normative social beliefs about what relevant others expected him to do with respect to that behavior, then one could predict the behavioral intentions of that person. The present investigation lends support to these notions as evidenced by the pre- and posttest correlations between B and BI, as well as by the pre- and posttest correlations between Aact, NB(Mc), and BI. Furthermore, the findings revealed that for this specific behavior--signing up for a speech workshop--the Aact component was the better predictor of intention. This finding suggests that if one wants to encourage people to participate in person-to-group speaking situations, perhaps he should concentrate on the person's attitude toward the behavior rather than on
**TABLE IV**

Analysis of Variance on Change in Behavioral Intention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>d.f.</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>249.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA x ENE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>1.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>238.59</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < .01

ANA - Attitude toward the Act (Aact) versus attitude toward the Object (Ao)

ENE - Evidence versus no evidence
his normative social beliefs. The implications of this finding for teachers of public speaking deserve further attention and research.

The confirmation of Hypotheses 1 and 2 has additional implications for the so-called "attitude/behavior dichotomy." Because of the inconsistent findings in the attitude literature and because no consistent relationship between attitude and behavior has emerged from previous research, several investigators (e.g., Wicker, 1969; McGuire, 1969) have questioned the traditionally assumed relationship between attitude and behavior. The findings of the present investigation lend support to the assumed relationship between attitude and behavior, if certain of Fishbein and Ajzen's assumptions are met, e.g., that the independent and dependent variables are measured at the same level of specificity, that the time lapse between measurement of B and BI is not so long that other variables might intervene, etc.

A note should be added to this discussion of the findings concerning the theory in general. First, although the relationship was not hypothesized, the correlation between attitude toward performing the behavior and attitude toward not performing the behavior, according to Fishbein and Ajzen, should be highly correlated. The findings of the present investigation also lend support to this notion. Using Pearson's $r$, the results revealed that attitude toward signing up for the workshop (Aact) and attitude toward not signing up (Aactn-s) were correlated significantly at the .0001 level ($r = .83782$). The second consideration involves the relationship between B (signing up for the workshop) and B2 (attendance at the workshop). While thirty-six people signed up, only nineteen people actually attended the workshop.

An explanation of the findings for Hypotheses 3 through 7 can
best be done by considering these hypotheses together. In general, the predicted relationships for these hypotheses were not confirmed. Subjects' attitudes toward the object (Ao)—speaking at every opportunity—were significantly correlated with the model's two components, Aact and NB(Mc) pretest, and NB(Mc) posttest as well as with the predictor variable BI. Furthermore, while Hypothesis 5 was confirmed, i.e., that the subjects who heard the Aact messages would experience significant BI change while the no message group would not, it is of prime importance to note that the subjects who heard the Ao messages also experienced significant BI change compared to the no message group (P < .0256, F = 5.20), although not as much as the subjects who heard the Aact messages. Furthermore, the analysis of variance procedure revealed that the amount of intent change attributable to the Aact messages as opposed to the Ao messages was not significant, nor was the amount of intent change attributable to the evidence/no evidence speeches. In other words, all four speeches produced a significant amount of intent change. These findings can be explained, at least partially, in terms of the theory.

Fishbein and Ajzen maintained that Ao would be related to BI only to the extent that it was related to one of the model's two components. As was stated previously, in the present investigation subjects' attitudes toward speaking at every opportunity (Ao) were significantly correlated with Aact, with NB(Mc) and with BI. The implication of these correlations for the four treatment messages and the significant amount of change which all four produced in BI is important. Fishbein and Ajzen would probably maintain that since Ao was correlated with the two predictor components as well as with BI then, at least for this behavior, the primary beliefs which underlie Ao quite probably are
the same primary beliefs which underlie Aact. Therefore, significant change in BI would be expected for all four messages. It is conceivable that this finding may give insight into some of the apparent inconsistencies in previous research. Where this research found significant relationships between Ao and B, it may have been because the same beliefs underlay both Ao and Aact. Where previous research found no relationship between Ao and B, it may have been because the beliefs which underlay Ao and Aact were different.

Suggestions for Further Research

The findings of the present investigation lend support to Fishbein and Ajzen's model of prediction for single-act behaviors. However, more empirical research is needed before a complete statement can be made about the theory itself. Also deserving of more attention is the idea that the Aact component was more important, for this type of speaking behavior. These findings should be of interest to teachers of public speaking. Furthermore the relationship between the two related behaviors, B and B₂, was an interesting one. Only one-half of the subjects who performed the first behavior actually attended the workshop. Although a relationship between B and B₂ was not hypothesized, nor was it examined statistically in this study, it would be revealing to examine this type of relationship. In this case, the sign up behavior was not a very good predictor of actual attendance.

Obviously the relationship between amount of change of intent and Aact versus Ao messages as well as between evidence versus no evidence messages needs to be re-examined in a study in which Ao is not significantly correlated with the components of the model. No state-
ment may be made as to the persuasive efficacy of the use of evidence in terms of this study, however, this concept needs to be re-examined in order to determine, first, if Fishbein and Ajzen's principles of change are accurate and, secondly, to determine if the manipulation of a message variable such as evidence can have a systematic effect on attitude and subsequent behavior change.
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APPENDIX A

PILOT RESEARCH

Instructions to Subjects in the Pilot Research

Subjects were urged to be as thoughtful and honest as possible. They were asked to imagine themselves as they were on the first day of class and to put themselves into a hypothetical situation. Specifically they were told:

Imagine that on the first day of your speech class your instructor gave you an information sheet about a speech workshop, for all beginning speech students, which would be held in approximately three weeks at a specified date, time and place. The primary purposes of the workshop, according to the information sheet, would be to give you a chance to evaluate yourselves in terms of other beginning speech students and to give you some outside advice and help with your speaking problems. The information sheet also tells you that the workshop will be informal and that the instructors of all the beginning speech classes will be there, although no credit will be given, nor will participation or failure to participate affect your grade in this class. Approximately ten days later, your instructor asks you if you will participate in the workshop. Now, based on this information, decide whether you would or would not participate in the workshop.

After the subjects had had time to make their decisions, the first ques-
tionnaire, designed to assess the primary beliefs underlying the Aact component, was distributed. Subjects were told:

Based on the decision you made, complete the following questionnaire in terms of the reasons underlying that decision, that is, if you decided to participate, what were your reasons for doing so, and vice versa. You do not have to list as many reasons as there are numbers listed. We are interested only in your honest beliefs about the consequences (costs and rewards you perceive) of participating in this workshop. Assume that the phrase "Participating in this workshop will . . . " precedes each consequence that you list.

After subjects had completed this sheet, two other pages, designed to assess their attitudes toward the workshop and their levels of belief strength, were distributed. The meaning and the mechanics of filling out each scale were explained. Subjects then proceeded to evaluate each consequence they had listed as well as to indicate how strongly they believed each of the consequences was actually associated with the behavior.

Upon completion of the Aact questionnaire, subjects were given the first page of the questionnaire designed to assess the relevant referents for the NB(Mc) component. Subjects were asked to list those people, if any, whose opinions would influence their decisions to participate or not participate. When the subjects had finished this page, three other pages were given to them along with the following instructions:

Now that you have listed those people whose opinions might influence your decision to participate or not to participate,
we would like some additional information. On page two, please indicate whether you think the people you listed believe you ought to go to this workshop. On page three indicate how important each person's opinion is to you, and on the fourth sheet indicate how motivated you are to do what these people want you to do.

Upon completion of the two questionnaires, the subjects were thanked for their cooperation, and the study was described to those who were interested.
Assessment of Primary Beliefs for the Aact Component

List as many consequences/outcomes (costs and rewards) as you can of participating in this workshop.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.
For each consequence you listed, indicate your evaluation of that consequence on the appropriate scale below by placing a check mark (✓) in the position which most closely reflects your evaluation of that consequence. For example, consequence number 1 will be rated on the scale numbered "1"; consequence number 2 will be rated on the scale numbered "2"; etc.

1. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
2. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
3. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
4. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
5. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
6. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
7. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
8. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
9. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
10. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
11. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
12. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
13. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
14. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
15. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
16. good __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:bad
For each consequence you listed, indicate how strongly you believe (that is, how probable you think it is) that each of the consequences you listed is, indeed, a consequence of participating in this workshop. Rate consequence number 1 on the first scale (number 1); consequence number 2 on the second scale (number 2); and so on. Place a check (√) in the position which most closely reflects the strength with which you hold this belief.

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<tr>
<th>Consequence</th>
<th>Scale 1</th>
<th>Scale 2</th>
<th>Scale 3</th>
<th>Scale 4</th>
<th>Scale 5</th>
<th>Scale 6</th>
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<th>Scale 14</th>
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<th>Scale 16</th>
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Assessment of Relevant Referents for the NB(Mc) Component

List as many people or sets of people (relevant referents) as you can whose opinion(s) would influence your decision as to whether you would participate in this workshop or not.

1.

2.

3.

4.

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11.

12.

13.
For each person or set of persons named, indicate what you think they think you should do with regard to participating in this workshop by placing a check (√) in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings. Number 1 on the list of people should correspond to scale number 1 on this questionnaire. For example:

_________ expects me to participate in this workshop.
(whomever you listed as no. 1)

probable:____:____:____:____:____:√:____:____:____ improbable

1. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

2. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

3. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

4. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

5. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

6. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

7. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

8. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

9. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

10. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

11. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

12. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable

13. probable:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____ improbable
For each person or set of persons, indicate how **important** that person or set of persons is (are) in determining your decision to participate in this workshop by placing a check (✓) in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings. Number 1 on the previous questionnaire should correspond to scale number 1 on this questionnaire.

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For each person or set of persons named, indicate how much you want to comply with their expectations about your participating in this workshop by placing a check (✓) in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings. Number 1 on the list of people should correspond to scale number 1 on this questionnaire. For example:

How much do you want to do what expects you
to do? (whomever you listed as no. 1)

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APPENDIX B

GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION FOR CONFEDERATES (INSTRUCTORS)

Guidelines

I. With respect to the general methodology, there are two vital elements which relate to the participation of the confederates (instructors):

A. Uniformity of information— in response to students' inevitable questions about the workshop, the instructors must give the same information; and,

B. Authenticity of the situation— excepting the experimenter and the confederates, everyone involved must think that the workshop and its attendant measures are real, and the experimental nature of the project must be concealed.

II. With respect to the specific information which confederates will give:

A. Generally, be vague but interested— as the cover story suggests, we (the instructors) are interested in the results of the workshop, but we are more or less waiting to find out exactly how it will be conducted.

B. Regarding questions about the workshop itself, it will be:

1. Informal;
2. Voluntary;
3. Without grades or instructors' critiques;
4. Attended by instructors and 211 students; and,
5. Not a factor in the grading of the course.

C. The speech which every attendee will give will be:

1. A sixty-second speech of self-introduction;
2. Presented in front of the entire group;
3. Done with or without notes and a podium, as the student wishes;
4. Similar to or possibly the same as the introductory speech done in class; and,
5. Possibly worthy of an extra practice or two.
III. With respect to your participation, I am extremely grateful and will try to minimize your trouble in every way possible. I will be at school for each of the early questionnaire days and will take care of getting the instruments to you and picking them up after each class, or in whatever manner you prefer. The treatment day will be moderately confusing, but I hope to make it as easy on everyone as I can. Thanks a lot.
Confederate Information Form

I. The purpose of the study is to predict, according to Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of behavior, whether, depending upon certain receiver and message criteria:

A. Beginning speech students will intend to perform a certain public speaking behavior; and, whether

B. Those intentions can be changed by an oral persuasive message.

II. The experiment will consist of four general stages:

A. Stage One--preliminary instruments:

1. A basic information sheet about the workshop handed out by instructors to all 211 students during the first days of class. Instructors should answer students' questions generally, according to the accompanying guidelines; and,

2. Receiver criteria survey administered to all students, beginning on the first or second day of class. Instructors will explain that these instruments are routinely administered to beginning speech students as part of the course.

3. Both of these preliminary instruments should be given to late registrants, etc., in order to maximize the eventual number of subjects in the study.

B. Stage Two--experimental pretest:

1. A brief questionnaire relating to subjects' intentions to participate in the workshop; and,

2. A brief questionnaire relating to subjects' attitudes toward speaking in general.

C. Stage Three--treatment day:

1. Instructors will conduct class as usual, but will not hear speeches.

2. In four shifts, class members will be taken to another room, where they will hear a persuasive message and indicate whether they will participate in the workshop. Students will not return to the classroom but will be dismissed after the treatment.

3. The fifth shift of the treatment will be administered in the classroom.

D. Stage Four--the workshop. Experimenters will debrief and thank subjects. The workshop will be conducted as described.
APPENDIX C

SUBJECT INFORMATION SHEET

Because students in basic public speaking classes often want to know how their speaking compares, not only to their fellow classmates' but to members of other sections as well, several college and universities have conducted "speech workshops"—informal meetings in which students get to see how their colleagues' speaking compares to their own. These voluntary, ungraded sessions have proved successful in many schools.

To see if SLU speech students would benefit from this kind of program, the Department of Speech and Theatre will sponsor a "Speech 211 Workshop" to be held at 2:00 P.M. on Thursday, June 16, in room 141 of the Humanities Building.

Those who come to the workshop will deliver a brief (sixty-seconds) speech of self introduction similar to the first speech you will do in class during the first week. Although the 211 teachers (Dr. Welford, Dr. Woodard, and Mrs. Borden) will be attending the workshop, whether you do or do not wish to come and speak will not affect your grade in the class.

An instructor from the Speech Department at Louisiana State University, who has directed similar programs at other universities, will organize and conduct the workshop. She will be passing around a sign up sheet in your class prior to the workshop.
APPENDIX D

STUDENT INFORMATION AND ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

Student Information Questionnaire

In order to obtain an overall profile on the students taking Speech 211, I would like for you to provide the following information about yourself:

Name: ________________________________________________________________

Social Security Number: ________________________________________________

Sex (check one): Male ____ Female ____

Age: ________________________________________________________________

College Classification (circle one):

Freshman  Sophomore  Junior  Senior  Graduate

Previous Experience in Speaking (circle one):

High School: None 1/2 a year 1 year 2 years more than two years

College: None 1/2 a year 1 year 2 years more than two years
Student Attitude Questionnaire

I would like to know what the concepts "speaking" and "being a good public speaker" mean to you personally. Therefore, I want you to judge and rate these two terms on a set of twelve descriptive scales listed on the following two pages. Here is how you use the scales:

If you feel that "speaking," for example, is very closely related or extremely related to one end of the scale, you should place your check as shown below:

fair ______________________________________ unfair
extremely quite slightly neutral slightly quite extremely

A few of the scales given on the following two pages may not seem to really apply or relate to what is being rated. For example, you may not think of "speaking" as being something which could be called either fair or unfair. If you really feel that a particular scale does not relate at all to what is being judged, mark the middle or neutral position. However, in most cases after thinking a second or two, you will be able to see that what is being judged does relate at least slightly or vaguely either to one side or the other of the scale.

Important points to remember:

1. Place your check in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries:

   __________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:________:

   THIS  NOT THIS

2. Be sure you check every scale for both concepts. Don't omit any.

3. Never put more than one check on a scale.
safe: dangerous

hopeless: hopeful

tasty: distasteful

good: bad

foolish: wise

dirty: clean

strong: weak

important: unimportant

painful: pleasurable

useful: useless

attracting: repelling

right: wrong
Being a Good Public Speaker


APPENDIX E

PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE

In order 1) to determine the probable attendance at the Speech Workshop and 2) to assess your attitudes in general about the Workshop, we would appreciate your filling out the following survey. Please answer every question by placing an "X" in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings.

1. How likely is it that you will sign up for the Speech Workshop?

   extremely   quite       slightly    undecided   slightly       quite       extremely
   unlikely    unlikely    unlikely    likely      likely       likely      likely

2. Do you think that signing up for the Speech Workshop is:

   ____________ : ____________ : ____________ : ____________ : ____________ : ____________
   an extremely bad thing to do  a bad thing to do  a slightly undecided about whether "signing up" is good or bad  a slightly good thing to do  a good thing to do  an extremely good thing to do

3. Do you think that speaking is:

   ____________ : ____________ : ____________ : ____________ : ____________ : ____________
   an extremely bad thing to do  a bad thing to do  a slightly undecided about whether "speaking" is good or bad  a slightly good thing to do  a good thing to do  an extremely good thing to do
4. Do you think that not signing up for the Speech Workshop is:

- an extremely bad thing
- a slightly undecided about whether "not signing up" is good or bad
- a slightly good thing
- an extremely good thing

5. My instructor thinks that I:

- definitely should
- probably should not
- probably should
- definitely should not

OR

My instructor doesn't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.

6. My instructor thinks that I:

- definitely should not
- probably should not
- probably should
- definitely should

OR

My instructor doesn't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.
7. My classmates think that I ______ : ______ : ______ : ______ speak when given the opportunity.
   definitely probably probably definitely
   should not should not should should

OR

My classmates don't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.

   definitely probably probably definitely
   should not should not should should

OR

My classmates don't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.

9. My close friends think that I ______ : ______ : ______ : ______ speak when given the opportunity.
   definitely probably probably definitely
   should not should not should should

OR

My close friends don't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.
10. My close friends think that I ______: ______: ______: ______ sign up for the Speech Workshop.

   definitely probably probably definitely
   should not should not should should

   OR

   My close friends don't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.

boyfriend/girlfriend

11. My husband/wife thinks that I ______: ______: ______: ______ speak when given the opportunity.

   definitely probably probably definitely
   should not should not should should

   OR

   boyfriend/girlfriend
   My husband/wife doesn't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.

boyfriend/girlfriend

12. My husband/wife thinks that I ______: ______: ______: ______ sign up for the Speech Workshop.

   definitely probably probably definitely
   should not should not should should

   OR

   boyfriend/girlfriend
   My husband/wife doesn't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.
13. Doing what your instructor thinks you should do is:

extremely bad : quite bad : slightly bad : undecided : slightly good : quite good : extremely good

14. Doing what your classmates think you should do is:

extremely bad : quite bad : slightly bad : undecided : slightly good : quite good : extremely good

15. Doing what your close friends think you should do is:

extremely bad : quite bad : slightly bad : undecided : slightly good : quite good : extremely good

16. Doing what your boyfriend/girlfriend or husband/wife thinks you should do is:

extremely bad : quite bad : slightly bad : undecided : slightly good : quite good : extremely good
APPENDIX F

POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE

Survey and Opinion Questionnaire

In order 1) to determine the probable attendance at the Speech Workshop and 2) to assess your attitudes in general about the Workshop, we would appreciate your filling out the following survey. Please answer every question by placing an "X" in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings.

1. How likely is it that you will sign up for the Speech Workshop?

          extremely  quite  slightly  undecided  slightly  quite  extremely
          unlikely  unlikely  unlikely  likely  likely  likely

2. Do you think that signing up for the Speech Workshop is:

          an extremely  a bad thing  a slightly  undecided about whether  a slightly  a good thing  an extremely
          bad thing  to do  bad thing  "signing up" is good or  good thing  to do  good thing
          to do  to do  bad  bad  to do  to do

3. Do you think that speaking is:

          an extremely  a bad thing  a slightly  undecided about whether  a slightly  a good thing  an extremely
          bad thing  to do  bad thing  "speaking" is good or  good thing  to do  good thing
          to do  to do  bad  bad  to do  to do
4. Do you think that **not** signing up for the Speech Workshop is:

an extremely a bad thing a slightly undecided about whether a slightly a good thing an extremely
bad thing to do bad thing "not signing up" is bad thing good thing
to do to do to do good or bad to do
to do to do to do
to do to do

5. My instructor thinks that I **definitely** probably probably **definitely**

**should not** **should not** **should** should

OR

My instructor doesn't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.

6. My instructor thinks that I **definitely** probably probably **definitely**

**should not** **should not** **should** should

OR

My instructor doesn't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.
7. My classmates think that I ______________ speak when given the opportunity.

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<th>probably</th>
<th>definitely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>should not</td>
<td>should not</td>
<td>should</td>
<td>should</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OR

My classmates don't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.

8. My classmates think that I ______________ sign up for the Speech Workshop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>definitely</th>
<th>probably</th>
<th>probably</th>
<th>definitely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>should not</td>
<td>should not</td>
<td>should</td>
<td>should</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OR

My classmates don't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.

9. My close friends think that I ______________ speak when given the opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>definitely</th>
<th>probably</th>
<th>probably</th>
<th>definitely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>should not</td>
<td>should not</td>
<td>should</td>
<td>should</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OR

My close friends don't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.
10. My close friends think that I __________:__________:________:__________ sign up for the Speech Workshop. 
definitely probably probably definitely should not should not should should 

OR 

My close friends don't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.

11. My husband/wife thinks that I __________:__________:________:__________ speak when given the opportunity. 
definitely probably probably definitely should not should not should should 

OR 

My husband/wife doesn't care whether I speak when given the opportunity or not.

12. My husband/wife thinks that I __________:__________:________:__________ sign up for the Speech Workshop. 
definitely probably probably definitely should not should not should should 

OR 

My husband/wife doesn't care whether I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not.
13. Doing what your instructor thinks you should do is:

extremely bad  quite bad  slightly bad  undecided  slightly good  quite good  extremely good

14. Doing what your classmates think you should do is:

extremely bad  quite bad  slightly bad  undecided  slightly good  quite good  extremely good

15. Doing what your close friends think you should do is:

extremely bad  quite bad  slightly bad  undecided  slightly good  quite good  extremely good

16. Doing what your boyfriend/girlfriend or husband/wife thinks you should do is:

extremely bad  quite bad  slightly bad  undecided  slightly good  quite good  extremely good
SIGN UP SHEET FOR THE SPEECH 211 WORKSHOP

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1977
ROOM 141
2:00 P.M.

I, ____________________________________________, DO or DO NOT (circle one)

PRINT NAME

want to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
Assessment of the Bi Component

Place an "X" in the space which most closely reflects the amount of agreement or disagreement you feel for each statement listed. Be sure to answer every question.

1. Speaking at every opportunity will lead to my meeting new people.

   I myself  I myself  Undecided  I myself  I myself
   strongly   disagree            agree   strongly
   disagree

2. Speaking at every opportunity will make my instructor think that I am interested in the course and concerned about my performance in the class.

   I myself  I myself  Undecided  I myself  I myself
   strongly   disagree            agree   strongly
   disagree

3. Speaking at every opportunity will lead to a better relationship between my instructor and myself.

   I myself  I myself  Undecided  I myself  I myself
   strongly   disagree            agree   strongly
   disagree

4. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will give me more public speaking experience.

   I myself  I myself  Undecided  I myself  I myself
   strongly   disagree            agree   strongly
   disagree

5. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will give me an advantage over students in my class who do not sign up.

   I myself  I myself  Undecided  I myself  I myself
   strongly   disagree            agree   strongly
   disagree

6. The benefits gained by signing up for the Speech Workshop will outweigh the time spent in preparing for and participating in the Workshop.

   I myself  I myself  Undecided  I myself  I myself
   strongly   disagree            agree   strongly
   disagree
7. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will make my instructor think that I am interested in the course and concerned about my performance in the class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Speaking at every opportunity will give me more public speaking experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Speaking at every opportunity will give me an advantage over students in my class who do not speak at every opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly</td>
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<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will lead to my meeting new people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will lead to a better relationship between my instructor and myself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. The benefits gained by speaking at every opportunity will outweigh the time spent in preparing for and participating in speaking opportunities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will make me a better public speaker.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Speaking at every opportunity will reduce my stage fright.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Speaking at every opportunity will make me a better public speaker.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will reduce my stage fright.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I myself</th>
<th>I myself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessment of the Ai Component

Place an "X" in the space which best describes how you personally feel about each statement. Be sure to answer every question.

1. Meeting new people is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good

2. Having a better relationship with my instructor is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good

3. Reducing my stage fright is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good

4. Giving up my free time in order to gain the benefits of a speaking experience is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good

5. Being a better public speaker is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good

6. Having an advantage over the other students in the class is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good

7. Gaining more public speaking experience is:

   extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
   bad bad bad good good good
8. Having my instructor view me as being interested in the course and concerned about my performance in the class is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>extremely</th>
<th>quite</th>
<th>slightly</th>
<th>undecided</th>
<th>slightly</th>
<th>quite</th>
<th>extremely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX G

PERSUASIVE MESSAGES

Aact Message

I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you a little about signing up for the Workshop. I realize that signing up for this Workshop will take up some of your free time, however, I think that after you hear about some of the beneficial aspects of this Workshop, you'll agree that the rewards of participating will far outweigh any costs.

I believe that signing up for this Workshop will help you be a better public speaker and thus help you in your 211 class. Your relationship with your instructor should improve, your stage fright should be reduced, and, finally, signing up for the Workshop will give you an opportunity to meet some new people. Let me be more specific.

First, and perhaps most important, signing up for this Workshop should make you a better speaker. There's nothing like getting some practical speaking experience in an informal, relaxed situation where you can look at yourself objectively and compare yourself to other Speech 211 students. Remember, though, there won't be any grades or critiques—absolutely no pressure. This Workshop is designed to be an enjoyable speaking experience.

Second, I believe that those of you who sign up for the Workshop will do better in your 211 class. As a result of signing up for the
Workshop and participating in it, you will probably be able to make your speeches for your 211 class better. You might get some new ideas for speeches or some helpful hints and suggestions from the other speakers who participate. As a result, signing up for the Workshop will certainly give you an advantage over the students in your class who do not sign up.

Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will improve if you sign up for the Workshop. I'm sure you already know that all the 211 instructors will be there. They can't help but think that you are interested in the course and concerned about your performance in the class when they see you participating.

The fourth benefit of signing up for the Speech Workshop is a major one for a lot of students. Since the Workshop will be an informal, relaxed situation, your stage fright should be reduced. Thus, you should feel less nervous and more confident about your speaking ability.

Finally, by signing up for the Speech Workshop, you'll have the opportunity to meet some new people. All of the 211 classes will be represented.

So, all things considered, the Workshop will be a learning experience as well as an enjoyable time for all. Therefore, I urge you to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
Ao Message

I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you a little about speaking when the opportunity arises. The usual reason students give for not participating in speaking opportunities is that they will take up some of their free time. However, I think that after you hear some of the beneficial aspects of speaking whenever the opportunity arises, you'll agree that the rewards of speaking far outweigh any costs.

I believe that speaking at every opportunity will help you be a better public speaker and thus help you in your 211 class. Your relationship with your instructor should improve if you speak as often as possible, and your stage fright should be reduced. Also, if you take advantage of speaking opportunities you will meet new people. Let me be more specific.

First, and perhaps most important, speaking at every opportunity should make you a better speaker. There's nothing like getting some practical speaking experience in order to look at yourself objectively and to compare yourself with other speakers. Furthermore, in speaking situations outside the classroom, the pressure is off—there are no grades or critiques to worry about. Therefore, I think you can see that speaking at every opportunity can be an enjoyable experience.

Second, I think that by seizing every opportunity to speak, you will do better in your 211 class. This is a good way to get some new ideas for speeches or some helpful hints and suggestions from other speakers. These new ideas and helpful hints, in turn, should help you
make your speeches for this class better. Thus, you certainly will have an advantage over the students in your class who do not speak at every opportunity.

Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will improve if you speak when given the opportunity. Your instructor can't help but think that you are interested in the course and concerned about your performance in the class if you participate in speaking opportunities.

The fourth benefit of speaking at every opportunity is a major one for a lot of students. With every speaking experience, stage fright should be reduced. And, if you speak every time you have the opportunity, you should feel less nervous and more confident about your speaking ability.

Finally, by speaking at every opportunity, you'll have the opportunity to meet some new people.

So, all things considered, speaking at every opportunity is a learning experience and can be an enjoyable one. Therefore, I urge you to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you a little about signing up for the Workshop. I realize that signing up for this Workshop will take up some of your free time, however, I think that after you hear about some of the beneficial aspects of this Workshop, you'll agree that the rewards of participating will far outweigh any costs.

Previous participants in the Workshop have reported that those who sign up become better speakers and receive advice which helps them in their 211 classes. These same participants reported improved relationships with instructors, a reduction in stage fright, and an opportunity to meet some new people. Let me be more specific.

First, and perhaps most important, according to studies conducted by communication researchers, signing up for this Workshop should make you a better speaker. These researchers have found that the best way to get practical speaking experience is in informal, relaxed situations like the Speech Workshop in which you have the opportunity to look at yourself objectively and compare yourself to other Speech 211 students. Remember, though, there won't be any grades or critiques--absolutely no pressure. This Workshop is designed to be an enjoyable speaking experience.

Second, former students have reported that signing up for the Speech Workshop will help you do better in your 211 class. As a result of signing up for the Workshop and participating in it, you should be able to make your speeches for your 211 class better, according to these
previous participants. Another benefit reported by these students is that you will get some new ideas for speeches or some helpful hints and suggestions from the other speakers who participate. As a result, signing up for the Workshop certainly will give you an advantage over the students in your class who do not sign up.

Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will improve if you go to the Workshop. I’m sure you already know that they will be there. Instructors have repeatedly told me that they view those students who sign up as being interested in the course and concerned about their performance in the class.

The fourth benefit of signing up for the Speech Workshop is a major one for a lot of students. According to James C. McCroskey, a well-known authority in the field of communication apprehension, stage fright is reduced a little every time a student participates in a speaking situation. Since this Workshop will be an informal, relaxed situation, McCroskey's findings about the reduction of stage fright should be particularly true. You should feel less nervous and more confident about your speaking ability.

Finally, by signing up for the Speech Workshop, you'll get to meet some new people. All of the 211 classes will be represented.

So, all things considered, the Workshop will be a learning experience as well as an enjoyable time for all. Therefore, I urge you to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
AoE Message

I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you a little about speaking when the opportunity arises. The usual reason students give for not participating in speaking opportunities is that they will take up some of their free time. However, I think that after you hear some of the beneficial aspects of speaking whenever the opportunity arises, you'll agree that the rewards of speaking far outweigh any costs.

Former students have reported that those students who take advantage of every speaking opportunity become better public speakers and receive advice which helps them in their 211 classes. These same students also reported improved relationships with instructors, a reduction in stage fright, and an opportunity to meet some new people. Let me be more specific.

First, and perhaps most important, according to studies conducted by communication researchers, speaking at every opportunity should make you a better speaker. These researchers have found that the best way to get practical speaking experience is to participate—every time you have the opportunity. Thus, you have a chance to look at yourself objectively and to compare yourself with other speakers. Furthermore, in speaking situations outside the classroom, the pressure is off—there are no grades or critiques to worry about. Therefore, I think you can see that speaking at every opportunity can be an enjoyable experience.

Second, former students have reported that speaking at every opportunity helped them do better in their 211 classes. Therefore, if you, too, speak when given the opportunity, you should be able to make
your speeches for this class better. Another benefit reported by these students is that you will get some new ideas for speeches or some helpful hints and suggestions from other speakers. As a result, you certainly will have an advantage over the other students in your class who do not speak at every opportunity.

Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will improve if you speak when given the opportunity. Instructors have repeatedly told me that they view those students who speak at every opportunity as being interested in the course and concerned about their performance in the class.

The fourth benefit of speaking at every opportunity is a major one for a lot of students. According to James C. McCroskey, a well-known authority in the field of communication apprehension, stage fright is reduced a little every time a student participates in a speaking situation. Since speaking events outside the classroom are generally more informal and relaxed, McCroskey’s findings should be particularly true. You should feel less nervous and more confident about your speaking ability.

Finally, by speaking at every opportunity, you'll get to meet some new people.

So, all things considered, speaking at every opportunity is a learning experience and can be an enjoyable one. Therefore, I urge you to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
Priscilla Pauline Kilcrease was born in Olney, Texas, on December 17, 1948, the daughter of Merrel B. and Mildred P. Kilcrease. She graduated from Olney High School in 1967. In 1971 she received the Bachelor of Arts degree, magna cum laude, in English from Midwestern State University, Wichita Falls, Texas. In the fall of 1971 she entered the graduate school of Midwestern State University and was granted the Master of Arts degree in speech in May, 1973. She presently is employed by the Louisiana Board of Regents and is a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in speech.
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Priscilla P. Kilcrease

Major Field: Speech

Title of Thesis: An Experimental Investigation of Fishbein and Ajzen's Model of Behavioral Prediction, Their Principles of Change, and the Effect of the Use of Evidence in a Persuasive Communication

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination: 7-19-77