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Ethnic composition and the dynamics of Civil War: a subnational analysis of India and Pakistan

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ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND THE DYNAMICS OF CIVIL WAR:
A SUBNATIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Louisiana State University
Agricultural and Mechanical College
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Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Caroline L. Payne
B.A., Berea College, 2005
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2008
August 2010
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Gary and Tenia Payne, to whom I owe absolutely everything. They have sacrificed in every way possible to ensure me every opportunity to follow my dreams. I can only hope that in fulfilling my dreams that I have fulfilled part of theirs as well.
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First, I would like to thank David Sobek who has been more than just a committee chair— he has been, and will continue to be, a wonderful mentor and friend. David constantly reminds me that it is possible to be an excellent scholar, teacher, and person. I was also lucky enough to have a committee that was completed by three other inspiring individuals: Leonard Ray, Bill Clark, and Joe Clare, who were all a constant source of support and encouragement. They each pushed me to produce the best dissertation possible and prepared me for that task over the course of my graduate career.

Though the afore-mentioned individuals were all critical to my time here, I simply could not have made it through the stressful days and nights without the best friends, both near and far, that anyone could ask for. Those friends who were near— Natasha Bingham, Nathan Price, Justin Ulrich, Jeremy Wells, Dr. Kaitlyn Sill, PJ Graham, and Jay Ducote— never failed to make grad school, and life in general, a truly amazing experience. In particular, without Natasha’s unfailing support and cherry coke and the wonderful and spontaneous trips with Jay, life would not have been nearly as amazing as it has been during my time in Baton Rouge. And those friends from afar: Christie Poteet and Billy Wooten who, over the course of our friendships, introduced me to myself. For that, I am eternally grateful.

I would also like to thank Berea College, an institution that is unlike any other, for providing me with an undergraduate education that was rooted in assuming an active part in the world around me and in bettering the lives of others regardless of their ethnicity, race, religion, gender, or place of origin. Abdul Rifai, John Heyrman, and Michael Berheide were especially integral in opening a door to the rest of the world, a door which led me to where I am today.

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composition of India, and for that I am extremely grateful. Finally, audiences at my presentation of this project at the Peace Science Society (International) meeting in November, 2009 and at the International Studies Association meeting in February, 2010 provided me vital feedback, which no doubt allowed me to make much needed improvements; Monica Toft and Idean Salehyan were especially helpful.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family for their unfailing love and faith in me. It has been unbelievably difficult to miss out on Sunday lunches, birthday celebrations, summer picnics, and just the wonderfully ordinary days at home. But despite my absence, their love and support has not wavered. No one could ask for more.
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ABSTRACT

Scholars, policymakers, and the media present a conflicting picture of the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict. In order to clear up the confusion and better establish this relationship, I argue that it is necessary to: (1) distinguish between different types of ethnic composition; (2) conceptualize and measure ethnic composition as not only a static phenomenon but a dynamic one in which population changes alter group security calculations and therefore their decision making; (3) consider the unique mobilization capacity of ethnic groups; and (4) examine the effect of ethnic composition at the subnational level of analysis. In doing so, this dissertation attempts to determine the overall effect of ethnicity on conflict, whether countries that organize their subnational political boundaries along ethnic lines decrease the risk of civil conflict, or alternatively, whether this strategy actually increases the risk of civil unrest, particularly in the form of violent secessionist movements.

Through a quantitative, subnational analysis of India and Pakistan, I conclude that the relationship between ethnic composition and civil conflict is quite complex. I find partial support for the proposition that fractionalization has no effect on conflict, but most interestingly, conclude that ethnic dominance actually decreases the risk of conflict onset. Specifically, combining a federal institutional structure with territorial boundaries along ethnic lines to ensure a dominant ethnic group serves to substantially decrease the risk of civil conflict as well as the specific threat of secessionist opposition movements. Finally, I conclude that despite the specific ethnic composition of a particular subnational area, large changes in the relative size of ethnic groups create a situation of uncertainty and insecurity, thereby increasing the risk of conflict onset.
Countries have witnessed domestic upheaval since their inceptions, and many have been host to one of the most devastating forms of violence: civil conflict. In the most basic sense, these civil conflicts are similar. They are similar in that the fighting and those engaged in the fighting are confined to one country, and that the conflict is between a recognized government and at least one opposition force. Often, however, the similarities end there. The issues at the heart of the conflict are radically different in Sri Lanka and Colombia; the weaponry and tactics used in Afghanistan and Peru could not be more diverse; and the composition of opposition forces in the most recent Eritrean civil war and in Turkey are extremely different. In short, civil conflicts run the gamut in terms of the issues they seek to rectify (if any at all), they are fought in different ways using different means, and members of the opposition often vary in their composition across conflicts.

Perhaps one of the most interesting differences can be found when examining the role of ethnicity. Some civil conflicts are fought along ethnic lines — that is, the underlying issues and motivation for actions are closely related to ethnicity whether it be economic stratification or access to the political system — while others regard ethnicity as a completely irrelevant phenomena. Ethnicity can also be important for opposition group formation — sometimes because those affected by a particular issue are members of the same group and sometimes simply because a leader’s own ethnic group is the most readily available and easiest pool to recruit from. Thus, some civil conflicts utilize ethnic group membership as a means of recruitment while others do not.

It is in opposition group formation that we most obviously see the possibility for ethnic cooperation rather than conflict. A prominent example of the latter comes from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front

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1 This argument is not limited to ethnic groups; it could be equally as true for religious groups, racial groups, native tribes, etc.
(EPLF) which rejected the ethnically-based organization pattern of their predecessor, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The EPLF subsequently found success in their efforts to gain independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990’s. A similar example comes from a country which has been habitually plagued with tensions between various ethnic groups: Burma. There is currently, and has been, an active coalition between various ethnic groups in Burma in an effort to depose the sitting regime. This coalition includes the Shan Democratic Union, the National Coalition of the Union of Burma, the National Democratic Front, the Democratic Alliance of Burma, the Ethnic Nationalities Council, and the Committee Representing Political Parties. These groups consist of members of the Shan peoples, the members of the Karen ethnic group, the Arakanese, the Kachins (also known as the Jinghpaw), the Karenni, the Lahu, and the Palaung people.

The irrelevance of ethnicity in the EPLF’s organization and overall strategy, particularly juxtaposed with the opposite in the ELF, speaks loudly to the potential role of ethnicity in civil war, as does the ability of Burma’s ethnic groups, which have previously engaged in conflict against one another, to cooperate. These examples point to the fact that ethnicity might not always be prevalent in every civil war but rather where it is most beneficial. This view — that ethnicity and acting on ethnic differences is a choice — is consistent with an instrumental view of ethnicity. Furthermore, these examples demonstrate the ability of ethnically different groups to cooperate in the pursuit of a common goal. The question becomes, then, is ethnic harmony and cooperation the exception or is it the rule? And is there a way to produce the outcome we desire through specific policies and/or institutional arrangements? The conclusions regarding these questions prove important beyond the time and space in which this project is set. Although the findings that

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2 It should be noted that Burma is also subdivided into subnational units (states) according to ethnic boundaries. The tumultuous experience of Burma, however, is not directly comparable to that of India due to the drastically different regime types. Additionally, Burma has a much larger ethnic majority at the country level. Perhaps most importantly, that majority has continuously dominated politics of the country, unlike the ethnically inclusive National Congress Party in India.

3 The instrumental view of ethnicity is in direct contrast to the primordial view. As will soon become obvious, much of this dissertation advocates an instrumental view of ethnicity.
are derived and the conclusions drawn are obviously directly applicable to India and Pakistan, I argue in Chapter 6 that these findings should be considered in regard to other salient cases as well.

1.1 Conflict or Cooperation?

Headlines for nearly twenty years have heralded the destructive potential of ethnic fragmentation, thus promoting a view that is contradictory to what we have seen in Ethiopia and Burma and one in which ethnic cooperation is the rare exception to the proverbial rule. The most extreme headlines make sweeping claims such as, “Africa-at-Large; Ethnicity as the Bane of Africa.” Others are slightly more tempered in their language but still definitively assign the blame for violence on ethnicity: “Ethnic Clashes Leave 70 Dead in Nigeria,” and “Ethnic Violence Spectre on Assam” are but two of the numerous found when performing only a cursory search. And finally, substantially fewer recognize ethnicity as not inherently dangerous but rather as only problematic under certain circumstances: “Uganda; Politicised Ethnicity is Dangerous for Our Nation” [Emphasis Added]. These four headlines are important to note for two reasons. First, these headlines, and thousands more like them, inform the opinion of millions of people and even policy makers in some situations. Second, these headlines are rarely, if ever, countered with a more moderate position; after all, it is provocative headlines that sell papers.

Picking up a newspaper or turning on the television continually gives us glimpses into violent ethnic situations across the globe; since the breakdown of the Soviet Union along national lines, journal articles and books have also indicated a predilection of multi-ethnic societies to breakdown and decay; and the multitude of crises which are characteristic of the “troubled heart of Africa” are routinely attributed to the presence of multiple ethnic groups, or nations, residing within the same territorial state. And so, though opinions on the subject are diverse, the popular press is not alone in its portrayal of the effect of ethnic diversity on violence. Some academics would also have us believe that the necessary end in a multi-national state is treacherous—one assuredly filled with bloodshed and violence. It would seem nearly impossible to
have peace without a true nation-state configuration. This view is explicated by prominent World Bank scholar Paul Collier (2001a):

The most serious charge leveled against ethnic differentiation is that it is the prime cause of violent civil conflict. The evidence seems to bear this out. The developing countries are more ethnically diverse than the OECD societies, and they suffer a much higher incidence of civil war. Among developing countries, Africa is more ethnically diverse than other regions and it has the highest incidence of civil war, a phenomenon often interpreted as the post-colonial re-emergence of ancestral ethnic hatreds.

While Africa has certainly hosted its share of civil wars in the post-colonial period, it would be irresponsible to attribute these incidents to ethnic diversity alone, as Collier notes. Similarly, it would serve us best to consider civil wars occurring around the globe in addition to the multitude which plague a substantial portion of this particular continent. Consideration of a larger sample and more causal factors are at the heart of the host of theories which exist concerning the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict—some of which lend credence to the above quote and some that summarily reject it. For instance, Jean Hatzfeld’s (2003: 209-210) observation from field work in Rwanda following the genocide stands in stark contrast to the afore-mentioned statement of Collier:

Black Africa is a formidable medley of willingly assumed ethnic identities of a diversity equaled only by the spirit of tolerance that keeps them in equilibrium. And when a seemingly ethnic disturbance breaks out, the conflict is usually in fact chiefly regional (north against south; interior plateau versus the coast), religious (Christian versus Muslims), economic (about the appropriation of mines), or social (residential neighborhoods against the business district); the ethnic group is not the true source of violence and misunderstanding but only a mode of defensive assembly.

1.2 Perceptions and Policies

Thus, the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict is far from settled—though not for lack of trying. This relationship has long been of interest—particularly in the post-colonial world—but the breakup of the Soviet Union was especially significant in generating the largest wave of literature

\[4\] I use the terms ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic fractionalization, and multi-nationalism interchangeably from this point forward.
addressing this topic. Perhaps most notable and indicative of the view that characterized the time came from U.S. Senator Daniel Moynihan. In the wake of the systemic change which followed the Cold War, Moynihan published his now famous *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* in which he makes the controversial claim that, “Nation states no longer seem inclined to go to war with one another, but ethnic groups fight *all the time*” [Emphasis Added]. Moynihan’s book and this opinion are not alone. While the Senator’s book certainly received more attention, perhaps because of its international focus, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* precedes it and makes remarkably similar claims. He too warns of the dangers of multiculturalism, positing that the national character of the U.S. is likely to be compromised if racial and ethnic identities are taken too far. Though most would argue the sentiment is overkill, Schlesinger proposes that the path of Yugoslavia is most assuredly the path that America too faces if we continue down the road of dominant ethnic (and racial) politics. This sentiment is far from dead; much more recently, Samuel Huntington (2004) explicates a fear that the new multicultural America (with specific reference to Hispanic immigrants) compromises the true essence of the American way— the social, political, and economic systems which have been so integral to the success of this country thus far.

And so, the concern over multi-nationalism is not limited to what most consider a distant, developing world or to past generations; it is not limited to the bloody civil wars of Nigeria and Sri Lanka, or the protests and violence of China and Turkey. This concern spans the globe, though albeit in different forms and for different reasons. This concern, and sometimes outright fear, influences popular sentiment, scholarly investigations and recommendations, and even international, country and subnational level policy decisions— decisions which have very real consequences for human beings the world over.

Examples of these influences abound in the scholarly literature, but the most extreme recommendation, stemming from a fear of ethnic fractionalization, consists of massive population
movements. Chaim Kaufmann (1996, 1998), building on the foundations of security-dilemma theory, proposes ethnic partition as the only viable solution to civil conflict. Building on the work of Horowitz (1985) and Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1995), Kaufmann argues that the causes of ethnic civil wars are irrelevant for how they are to be solved. Due to the hyper-nationalist mobilization rhetoric and the atrocities committed in conflict, ethnic identities are hardened and make cross-ethnic appeals and ethnic cooperation almost impossible (Kaufmann 1996: 137). As a result, “intermingled population settlement patterns create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic ‘cleansing,’ and prevent de-escalation unless the groups are separated” [emphasis added] (Kaufmann 1996: 137). Essentially, security dilemmas are responsible for civil conflict, ethnic fractionalization inherently creates a security dilemma, and therefore so long as ethnic fractionalization is preserved then the security dilemma, and thus conflict, will exist. If ethnic groups are separated into defensible enclaves, however, then war is no longer mandatory. This stream of literature went largely untested, with the exception of a few case studies, until Sambanis’ (2000) large-N quantitative analysis which finds no support for the effectiveness of partition; more specifically, Sambanis concludes that ethnic partition does not decrease the probability of new civil war violence. Consequently, rather than separate ethnic groups into “defensible enclaves” as Kaufmann suggests, Sambanis proposes ethnic groups be combined under equitable and, importantly, credible governments.

Policy decisions, often based on the recommendations of scholars such as Kaufmann and Sambanis or the situation as portrayed in the news media, are also influenced by this view that ethnic fractionalization is unavoidably linked to civil conflict. We especially see the influence of the fear of the destructive potential

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5 Horowitz himself had a fairly strong assertion: “If it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogenous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogenous state, even if this necessitates population transfers. Separating the antagonists— partition— is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated.” As an aside, given the territorial concentration of ethnic groups in India, this is certainly an option policy makers could have chosen.
of ethnic heterogeneity in post-colonial India’s establishment of subnational political boundaries. At the time of independence, there was considerable debate over the creation of subnational units, or states. Several powerful people, along with large populations throughout the country, called for states to be divided according to mother tongue, or language.

While language is not necessarily of great importance in some countries, in others, such as India, it is. Language is an outward signal of one’s ethnic group, or at the very least it is a signal of a particular distinguishable group of which one is a member. Language is a signal within the group that one belongs and that one has accepted this belonging; it is also a means by which the past is transferred to present generations, and therefore the means by which the group’s common myths, symbols, practices, etc. are perpetuated. Therefore, language is a powerful thing. In India, it is perhaps more powerful than in other places. The theme of asserting the distinctiveness of Assamese language and their culture, as well as their plight for autonomy, is “almost as old as the British conquest of Assam” (Baruah 1999: 71). The Assamese mother tongue is so valued that the period in which the British declared Bengali the official language of Assam “spurned the earliest assertion of Assamese cultural pride… Assamese narratives dating into the nineteenth century [long after Assamese was again made the official language in 1873] still refer to the period when Bengali was the official language as the ‘dark’ period for the Assamese language, literature and culture” (Baruah 1000: 71). And so recognizing the importance of various mother tongues across India, a difficult decision was made to organize states with respect to these critical linguistic boundaries.

Decision-makers, more specifically the States Reorganization Commission, were hesitant to align state boundaries with either of these identity forms. However, it was eventually decided that ethno-linguistic conflict was an unwanted potential reality and that extremely heterogeneous states might bring this reality to fruition, particularly given the significance of mother tongues, as we see in the example of Assam’s “dark period.” And so, the States Reorganization Commission eventually conceded and the Indian
states were created to correspond as closely as possible to mother tongues so that each group would have a relatively homogenous homeland of sorts. It would seem that this effort has been relatively successful when one considers the low number of civil conflicts despite such high levels of heterogeneity, country-wide. And although it is impossible to observe what the outcome would have been given an alternative decision regarding state boundaries, the fact remains that the ethno-linguistic divide has proven far less divisive than the religious divide\(^6\) — despite the obvious historical importance of mother tongue. Thus, in many ways, India’s linguistic reorganization of states is a less extreme version of Kaufmann’s recommendation and is certainly related to Sambanis’ proposal for equitable, credible governments, only India achieved such an end through an ethno-federalist organization of states rather than a strong and representative national government.

1.3 The State of the Question: Ethnicity and Civil Conflict

A notable amount of scholarly literature finds evidence to the contrary: that there is in fact a positive relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the propensity of civil conflict (e.g., Ellingsen 2000; Henderson and Singer 2000; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Urdal 2008). Despite the early predilection toward primordial theories of ethnicity and violence (such as those which perhaps influenced the decision of India’s Reorganization Commission) which affirm a necessarily positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and violence, a number of scholars have begun to question such assertions. If we take a serious look at the world in which we live, it quickly becomes apparent that peace is far more prevalent than conflict overall. The same observation holds in regard to ethnicity, at least ethnic fractionalization, as well; even a cursory examination of the numerous ethnic groups coexisting within state boundaries demonstrates the rarity of conflict in ethnically heterogeneous areas (e.g., Bates 1999; Collier and Hoeffler

\(^6\) It should be noted that during the reorganization of states, there was another faction that wanted the same but with regard to religion; the Reorganization Committee did not, however, succumb to these pressures.
1998, 2000; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Sambanis 2001). Given the divergence of findings, as shown in Table 1.1, we must ask ourselves if there is enough evidence to support such drastic measures as Kaufmann proposes. Or even to rely on less extreme policy measures such as the one pursued by India with its 1956 States Reorganization Act?

In order to adequately address these questions, we must consider other means by which ethnicity can influence the likelihood of conflict. After all, ethnic fractionalization is not the only potentially important configuration of ethnic groups. Both ethnic dominance and the changing relative size of ethnic groups affect individuals’ and groups’ decisions to challenge the government. Previous scholarly work generally concludes that ethnic dominance proves influential in determining whether or not a country will have a civil conflict or not; countries with ethnically dominant groups tend to be more prone to conflict than those that do not have a dominant ethnic group (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000; Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), with these results being far more robust than those of heterogeneity. Thus, if we recall Kaufmann’s proposal to create ethnically dominant states, would this really generate the solution he expects? And has India’s creation of ethnically dominant subnational units produced a dangerous situation rather than avoiding one?

Ethnic populations are far from stagnant. In fact, due to geographic location of India and its colonial past (India being one country situated in the middle of two other countries to which it used to be politically and socially joined as well), immigration has been extremely important in altering the ethnic composition of the country as a whole, not to mention some very specific states. Additionally, because India has chosen to organize its states in a manner which created de facto ethnic homelands (determined by mother tongue),

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7 This could include either the source of/motivation for the conflict being ethnicity (consistent with primordial theories), or it could be the mere mobilization based on ethnicity. As will be discussed differently, these are two very different claims.
Table 1.1: Summary of Findings Regarding Ethnicity and Civil Conflict Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization</th>
<th>Ethnic Dominance*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collier &amp; Hoeffler (1998; 2000)</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier, Hoeffler, &amp; Soderbom (1999)</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellingsen (2000)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson &amp; Singer (2000)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson(2000)</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier (2001a)</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegre et al. (2001)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambanis (2001)</td>
<td>_</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynal-Querol (2002)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier &amp; Hoeffler (2003)</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearon &amp; Laitin (2003)</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier &amp; Hoeffler (2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegre &amp; Sambanis (2006)</td>
<td>+ (low-intensity only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdal (2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Various population cut-offs are employed which constitute ethnic dominance.
subnational population movements to one’s “homeland” occurs, as do drastic changes to ethnic populations through the process of creating new states. Finally, changes in fertility rates can significantly alter the population of an area; India has undergone a decrease in fertility rates over the last few decades (albeit small when compared to a country such as China).

When ethnic populations change, particularly in relation to other ethnic groups, perceptions of group power (for the changing ethnic group as well as other groups) are altered. Ethnic groups which are growing in relative power to what was formerly the clearly dominant group are considered legitimate competition for controlling the state, and therefore a threat to the current balance of power. Fear and insecurity over the future arise and can lead to conflict (e.g. Peterson 2002). Previously dominant groups will engage in conflict in an effort to demonstrate, and exercise, their continued superiority and power; while the rising group(s) engage in conflict as a means to acquire their just desserts, given their new population standing. This would suggest that regardless of the efforts at organizing states along ethnic lines, conflict can still occur in the face of changing relative ethnic populations—something that cannot be prevented.

In order to engage these various debates concerning the effect of ethnicity, I address three primary questions in this dissertation. First, what is the true relationship between ethnicity (fractionalization, dominance, and change in the relative size of ethnic groups) and civil conflict? Second, given these findings, is there a means by which countries can avoid conflict? More specifically, can countries legislate their way out of conflict through the redistricting of their primary subnational units (i.e. states, provinces, etc.) along ethnic lines (through the reliance on an ethno-federalist system)? And third, does this type of territorial

---

There have been 16 new states created in India since the States Reorganization Act took effect in 1956. Some of these states were created by breaking up other states into smaller territorial units in order to provide ethno-linguistic groups with their own state, and some were created as a result of the status of union territories being changed to states.
organization schema predispose countries to secessionist movements by over-empowering one group within a state, thus mitigating the positive impacts and its original intention?

These questions are addressed within the context of India and Pakistan. India is the most ethnically diverse country since the fall of the Soviet Union and its first-level subnational units are, in fact, organized along ethno-linguistic lines. In the initial years following India’s independence, significant debates occurred concerning the organization of its subnational units. Specifically, ethnic and religious groups lobbied the States Reorganization Committee to organize states along their respective demographic divisions; the Reorganization Committee considered both proposals in hopes that their final decision would be most conducive to peaceful domestic relations. Ultimately, the Reorganization Committee agreed to an ethno-federalist configuration but did not give in to the demands of the Muslim religious minority. India is one of the few ethno-federalist countries in the world, and as such, deserves the attention of scholars studying the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict since, after all, one of the primary goals of this particular type of system is to render this relationship more pacific. Pakistan stands as an ideal comparison because of its similar ethnic groups and colonial history, its different religious composition, the means by which subnational boundaries were determined, and the lack of asymmetric ethno-federalism. Thus, while I primarily focus on India, the experience of Pakistan is used as a source of comparison in order to disentangle the necessary and sufficient causal factors and therefore better inform policy recommendations. A subnational analysis further improves our ability to determine the necessary and sufficient causal factors which characterize the relationship between ethnicity and conflict; this will be discussed in further detail in Section 1.3.

1.4 Civil Conflict

Before moving on, I will discuss the reason this study focuses on the effect of ethnicity on civil conflict rather than its effect on a variety of other forms of internal violence. First, civil wars are now the
dominant form of conflict worldwide and on average last six times longer than interstate wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). Consequently, they are responsible for massive loss of life, property, and infrastructure; their destabilizing natures have typically destructive consequences well beyond the immediate time and place in which they occur.

Civil conflicts have given way to successful political revolutions: Cuba, Iran, China, Russia, and the list goes on; the results of these important and ‘successful’ revolutions are debatable given the regimes’ records in the post-conflict periods. Civil conflicts have also spiraled into some of the worst violence this century has seen: genocides in Rwanda and Burundi, Africa’s “world war” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, unknown numbers of people that were disappeared in Argentina’s Dirty War, a decades-long war in Colombia with drugs at its epicenter, and egregious human rights violations in all conflicts. Unacceptable numbers of people have been negatively impacted as the result of civil conflict: an estimated 25 million have died as a result of civil conflict (Hironaka 2005: 2) and another 67 million have been displaced in the post-WWII period (Collier and Sambanis 2005: xiii).

In addition to the deaths which are a direct result of conflict (those which lose their lives because of the violence which occurs during the civil war), numerous human rights violations occur — including the indirect deaths of an unknowable amount of human beings that occur over the course of the conflict and long after the guns have stopped firing and the machetes have stopped cutting.9 The destruction of infrastructure and the disruption of social services often lead to high mortality rates for years after the official end of the conflict (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003). The inherent nature of civil wars also means additional physical integrity violations such as rape, beating, abduction and forced disappearance, and forced labor. Furthermore, economic rights are directly and immediately violated by an unsafe work environment (oftentimes, routine employment ceases to exist during conflict because of the dangerous

9 For an in-depth discussion of these consequences, see Ghobarah, Huth, Russett’s (2003) “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops.”
associated with it) and through the stealing and pillaging that rebel and government soldiers often engage in as a supplement to the official pay they receive for their services; this significantly limits civilians' ability to generate new income and takes away possessions which could be used to purchase necessary goods and services in what usually becomes a very resource-scarce environment. Economic rights are also violated in the period following civil conflict due to the deterrent effect that conflict has on potential investors and, therefore, jobs.\(^\text{10}\)

Famine, malnutrition, and disease are also constants during and after conflicts and are a result of destroyed infrastructure (particularly hospitals, food distribution centers, etc.), the transient life of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the close living conditions in refugee and IDP camps that often become long-term places of residence (Kalipini and Oppong 1998; Salehyan & Gledistch 2006; Toole 1997). Furthermore, refugees, who are displaced due to fear of physical integrity rights violations and an inability to fulfill their economic and social rights, are often carriers of conflict. Where refugees go, so goes conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006); thus, the potential for a contagion effect might be realized. The most notorious example of this phenomenon is the spillover of the Rwandan conflict into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which ultimately led to one of the deadliest violent events in human history.

The worst possible outcome of civil conflict is the loss of an entire generation of productive members of societies. This is the inevitable result of the longest and harshest civil wars, such as the two conflicts which plagued Sierra Leone from 1991 until 2002. Extensive periods of conflict that shut down schools, health centers, and general social services leave the future generations ill-prepared to take on the challenges which are necessary to rebuild following a war. Therefore, not only are these countries viewed as unstable investment environments due to fears over the reoccurrence of conflict but also because of a

\(^{10}\) As discussed shortly, economic growth is decreased by an average of 2.2% each year of conflict (Collier, Huth, and Bennett 2003). Also, for a discussion of how refugees spread civil war and therefore disrupt other economies through decreased investment, see Salehyan & Gledistch (2006).
lack of human capital—the human capital which is a necessary component of a reliable, skilled workforce and core of managers (Blanton and Blanton 2006, 2007).

Finally, civil wars are, arguably, the most destructive forms of conflict because of their relatively long duration and also because both the conflict and rebuilding processes are contained to one country. As briefly mentioned, civil wars last much longer than interstate wars do. In fact, a civil war, on average, lasts six times longer than an interstate war does (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). Therefore, the immediate period in which normal operations are prohibited is much more extensive than in an interstate war. The aggregate economic effect of civil war is stunning. For every year of conflict, the average rate of economic growth decreases by 2.2%. Given that the average civil war lasts 7 years, this depresses economic growth by 15% (Collier et al. 2003). More generally, the negative effects of civil conflict are concentrated within one specific territorial area because, after all, civil wars are fought entirely on one landscape. Therefore, civil wars are much more destructive than are interstate wars (Collier 1999).

In addition to the destruction wrought during the conflict, countries that experience civil war are often left almost, if not totally, alone to clean up the mess. Leaving reconstruction efforts to the country which has experienced the war is quite a financial and political strain. The typical lack of an outside victor(s) to help in the rebuilding process, as we saw in Germany following World War II, does not bode well for a quick and/or complete reconstruction due to a simple inability to finance and orchestrate these efforts. Thus, all of the costs—both during and after the war—are borne by a country that is likely already not in a position to bear them. As a result, civil war recurrence (and all the negatives that come along with it) is a fairly likely end.11 The obvious negative outcomes of this particular form of violence render it a critical topic of analysis.

11 A country that experiences civil war is far more likely to play host to another in the near future. In fact, at the end of one civil war, a country has a 44% risk of returning to conflict within five years (Collier et al. 2003).
1.5 Clearing up the Confusion: Ethnicity and Civil Conflict

Contemporary scholars working within the civil conflict research agenda have found evidence of relationships between the prevalence of conflict and various political, economic, and social factors. Some relationships are, of course, more robust than others. Of the most robust are the effects of regime type, regime transitions and economic development or liberalization. Also found to influence the occurrence of conflict is: state capacity, population composition, terrain and, lootable resources. As previously mentioned, empirical research which focuses on the effect of ethnicity on conflict is far more contentious. One body of literature indicates that there is a positive relationship between fractionalization and the occurrence of civil war (Henderson and Singer 2000; Sambanis 2001). While others find quite the opposite: fractionalization actually decreases the probability of onset as it increases the coordination costs involved in initiating and sustaining a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 1999). Still more yet conclude that ethnic fractionalization has absolutely no effect on the likelihood of civil conflict (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Henderson 2000). The results concerning ethnic dominance are much more consistent. Ethnic dominance is positively related to the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; and Reynal-Querol 2002). It should be noted that a variety of definitions of ethnic dominance are utilized in these studies; some consider a

\[\text{In brief, the following scholarly works should be consulted for more in-depth discussions of each of these causal factors. Regime type and regime change: Buhaug (2006); Carey (2010); Goldstone et al. (2010); Hegre et al. (2001); Hegre & Sambanis (2006); Sambanis (2000). Economic development and economic liberalization: Barbieri & Reuveny (2005); Bussmann & Schneider (2007); Collier and Hoeffler (2002); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer (2010); Hegre (2003), Hegre and Sambanis (2006); Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004).}
\]

\]
country to be ethnically dominant if one ethno-linguistic group constitutes at least 45% of the population, while others use a 60% threshold, or a 45% to 90% requirement. These contradictory results concerning ethnic fractionalization, the inconsistent results concerning ethnic dominance, and reliance on stagnant measures of ethnicity leave us with a notable hole in our knowledge concerning the causes of civil conflict.

I attribute these mixed and inconsistent results to a lack of attention to the unique mobilization potential of ethnic groups, the level of analysis at which these studies are typically cast, and insufficient attention to the opportunities generated by particular patterns of ethnic group distribution, as well as changes in this distribution.\textsuperscript{14} I will first detail the deficiencies of these previous approaches and then explain how I correct for these in my own analysis; more details concerning the conceptualization and operationalization of concepts are explored in Chapters 2 through 3, and the data utilized is discussed in Chapter 4.

First, most contemporary theories of conflict fail to take into account the unique mobilization capacity possessed by ethnic groups, particularly in relation to other groups in society which are not bound together by a common ethnicity. Individuals belonging to ethnic groups\textsuperscript{15} have distinctive ties to one another that makes mobilizing them easier than a group of individuals who are not ethnically bounded. More specifically, ethnic ties can force cooperation through the pressure of social stigma. Additionally, common ethnic identity can be drawn upon by leaders in order to promise future rewards, thus mitigating the immediate need for selective material incentives to overcome the problem of collective action; ethnic groups have critical trust networks which make recruits take the promise of future rewards seriously (Weinstein 2007). By incorporating these mobilization opportunities, the theory presented concerning the

\textsuperscript{14} The inattention to changing population dynamics, especially at the subnational level of analysis, this is likely due to the limited availability to researchers not operating from within the country of interest.

\textsuperscript{15} “Ethnic groups” refer to the general phenomena of groups which are bound by ethnicity. Thus, in this regard, I am not referring to any specific ethnic group or presenting an argument that one ethnic group has a unique mobilization capacity relative to another ethnic group.
relationship between ethnic populations and conflict is much more cogent than those that do not consider conflict onset from this perspective.

Second, quantitative models of civil conflicts most often utilize the country as the spatial unit of analysis. While this has yielded invaluable results, there remains a more refined level at which theories of civil war can be tested: the subnational unit. Examining civil conflicts at a more proximate spatial unit of analysis is more than simply a matter of statistical refinement: it is more closely matching our tests to both theory and the reality upon which those theories are based. Civil wars do not summarily erupt across the entire country, nor do they equally affect all areas of it (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Urdal 2008). Rather, conflict is isolated to very specific geographic locations. In addition, these subnational units within the same country are host to different ethnic groups, different size religious communities, various levels of economic development, and governments and opposition groups have access to different natural resources. Studying civil conflict at the country level of analysis does not permit the incorporation of these factors into the analysis whereas a subnational analysis does.

To better illustrate these points, let us take India for example. India is the most ethnically diverse country in the world—at least since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As is seen in Table 1.2, India’s ethno-linguistic diversity score (which ranges from “0”, where a society is perfectly homogenous to “1,” where a country is completely heterogeneous) is .89. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization scores for the Indian states, on the other hand, range from .06 to .94, thus presenting a drastically different story in terms of ethnic diversity for the subnational units of India. Likewise, while India has no dominant ethnic group overall, all but four of the states have a dominant ethnic group.

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16 In general, I use ‘subnational unit’ to refer to the politically recognized subnational unit that is most proximate to the state territorial unit within each state of interest. This unit is the state for India and the province for Pakistan.

17 I consider a state to have a dominant ethnic group if one linguistic group comprises at least 45% of the total state population.
To effectively complete the illustration, we must also consider the conflict incidence of India (see Table 1.3): in the period of 1956 until 2002, India experienced 21 low-level conflicts\(^\text{18}\) and three high-level civil conflicts.\(^\text{19}\) While this may not mean much outside the context of all possible conflict events, the significance of such data will become evident in the findings, as presented later. What is obvious is the critical relationship between specific subnational units and conflict; of the 28 Indian states, nine experienced a low-level civil conflict and only two were host to a major civil war. Thus, when studying the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict at the country level of analysis, we observe an extremely ethnically diverse country with no dominant ethnic group experiencing 21 low-level civil conflicts and three civil wars. However, if we examine the situation at the subnational level of analysis, we observe only nine of 28 Indian states experiencing conflict—all of which exhibit a wide range of ethno-linguistic fractionalization scores and all except one (Nagaland) which is considered to be home to a dominant ethnic group.\(^\text{20}\)

Furthermore, a heavy reliance on static demographic indicators proves problematic as well. Due to the difficulty associated with obtaining such data, especially at the subnational level, many researchers utilize ethno-linguistic data from only one point in time. Populations are prone to movement, subnational territorial boundaries are altered, and fertility rates change over time. In the case of an ethno-federalist state, populations are perhaps even more prone to movement in an effort to join their group in the de facto homeland or at the very least to avoid being a significant minority in a state dominated by another ethnic group. Therefore, ethno-linguistic data is especially important to collect over time, as it is subject to substantial change—at least if we think this change can matter.

\(^{18}\) A low level civil conflict is considered to be one which resulted in 25 to 999 battle deaths (as per the ACLED/PRIO coding scheme).

\(^{19}\) A high-level civil conflict (also called a civil war throughout the dissertation) is considered to be one with at least 1,000 battle deaths (as per the ACLED/PRIO coding scheme).

\(^{20}\) The ethno-linguistic fractionalization scores for the nine states experiencing conflict are: Punjab .15; Andhra Pradesh .29; Orissa .31; Bihar .43; Tripura .48; Jammu and Kashmir .63; Assam .68; Manipur .68; Nagaland .94.
Table 1.2: Ethnic Composition of India and Indian States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State or Union Territory</th>
<th>Principle Language Group(s)</th>
<th>Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization</th>
<th>Dominant Language Group (45%+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>Hindi (39.9%) Bengali (8.22%)</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>Telugu Urdu</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>No Principal Language</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>Assamese</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chhattisgarh</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>Konkani Marathi</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>Hindi Pahari</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>Kashmiri Dogri Hindi</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jharkhand</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka (Mysore)</td>
<td>Kannada</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>Manipuri</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>Khasi Garo</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>Mizo</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>No Principal Language</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>Oriya</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>Hindi Rajasthani</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>Nepali</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu (Madras)</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal)</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State or Union Territory</td>
<td>Conflict Incident(s) 25Deaths+</td>
<td>Major War</td>
<td>Opposition Group(s) with Secessionist Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>Mizoram</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>1967-1972</td>
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<td>Rajasthan</td>
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<td>Sikkim</td>
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<td>Tamil Nadu (Madras)</td>
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<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<td>Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal)</td>
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<td>West Bengal</td>
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It quickly becomes obvious why a country-level analysis, or even a subnational analysis which relies on stagnant measures of ethnicity, might obfuscate some important relationships. Therefore, in order to best explain the relationship between ethnicity and civil war, I focus my analysis on the subnational level and collect ethnic data at multiple time points.

1.6 A Study of India and Pakistan

As just discussed, India is an extremely diverse country— in fact, the most ethnically diverse country on the planet, and therefore, it provides us with an exceptional case for study. It is the world’s largest democracy, but unlike other democracies still remains economically impoverished. Given previous findings concerning the relationship between regime type and civil conflict, as well as the relationship between economic development and conflict, India is one of the most interesting country to examine.

India is a land rich with history. India, along with modern day Pakistan and Bangladesh were ruled by the United Kingdom from the 19th Century until their independence in 1947. At the time of independence, exceptionally violent communal conflicts led to the division of the subcontinent into two countries: East/West Pakistan and India. The 1971 civil war resulted in the independence of East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, from West Pakistan, now known simply as Pakistan.

Today, India is a secular, democratic republic with a parliamentary system of government. It comprises 28 states and 7 union territories. The states and union territories differ in two main respects: their size and their method of governance. Union territories tend to be much smaller than states (the average size of an Indian state is 141,432 square kilometers while the average size of an Indian union territory is only 9,211 square kilometers), and Indian union territories are governed slightly differently than are Indian states: in states, the Governor acts as a representative of the President and is the head of the executive branch at this subnational level, but union territories are administered by the President of the
India through an Administrator, rather than a Governor, which is appointed by the President. Put simply, states function more independently of the federal government than union territories.

Most importantly, India is an asymmetrical ethno-federal union. In short, this means that: (1) the boundaries of India’s first-level subnational units (states) were formed on the basis of ethnicity; (2) India operates under a federal form of government in which both the central and state governments are sovereign authorities as is demonstrated through their dual use of power; (3) and the degree and type of power is not the same for all states.²¹

Ethno-linguistic diversity has been highly influential on the politics of India. Following independence, a substantial number of ethnic groups sought separate states while others were content to settle for equal status within the existing territorial boundaries, or more autonomy, while remaining a part of the country (Rudolph 2003). Due to post-colonial pressures for ethno-linguistic groups to be organized into their own states, Nehru’s government appointed the State Reorganization Commission and later implemented their recommendations to reorganize the country’s states along ethno-linguistic lines. This produced states where particular ethno-linguistic groups constituted a majority of the total population. However, every state could not be neatly divided along these lines; Bombay comprised both Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking communities, Punjab included both Sikhs and Hindus that each spoke Punjabi but worshiped at separate temples, and the Northeast (long known as simply Assam) consisted of multiple ethno-linguistic groups for which the committee’s recommendation was not plausibly applicable (Rudolph 2003: 97).

The committee’s decision to generate ethno-linguistically dominant states was made with considerable reservation and was not immediately accepted, as there was substantial fear that such an

²¹ States comprising the northeastern part of the country (also known as the “Seven Sisters”) are those which are permitted to exercise more autonomous power than the other Indian states.
arrangement might create more problems than it solved. For that matter, even after the decision was made, there remained much concern over this arrangement. Nehru once stated:

> When we talk loudly of our nationalism, each person’s idea of nationalism is his own brand of nationalism. It may be Assamese nationalism, it may be Bengali, it may be Gujrati, Uttar Pradesh, Punjabi or Madrasi. Each one has his own particular brand in mind. He may use the word nationalism of India but in his mind, he is thinking of that nationalism in terms of his own brand of it. When two brands of nationalism come into conflict, there is trouble.

Some would say that Nehru was correct: that nationalism has in fact proven problematic for India. Problematic, in this context, is used primarily in reference to the pressures the Indian government has experienced for the creation of new states for minority ethno-linguistic groups, particularly in the northeastern part of the country — the area most difficult to organize along ethnic lines. In the northeastern region of the country, the area once known as Assam now includes seven states (often referred to as the Seven Sisters): Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, and Mizoram; of these, the first four states have experienced at least a low-level civil conflict — partially as a result of autonomous movements resulting in the creation of new states. The northeastern region of India is not alone; there have been alterations to territorial boundaries elsewhere in order to create new states or union territories in the 54 years since the States Reorganization Act. The conflicts taking place within these regions have been over autonomy (to be given their own territorial state within India) for other ethno-linguistic minorities, with a few of the opposition groups calling for outright secession. This challenge continues: there is currently a contentious debate going on concerning the creation of the state of

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22 The name of Assam was officially changed to “Asom” in 2006, but it is still most often referred to as Assam.
23 See Maps 1 and 2 for a better look at the region in question.
24 These states are host to a large proportion of immigrants, which are primarily from other Indian states and Bangladesh; the constant population changes have been a source of contention.
25 There are also sometimes disputes between the states themselves (perhaps the most notable is that between Manipur and Nagaland). This will be addressed in a future study.
Telangana, which will be carved out of Andhra Pradesh. The process of creating this new state began in December of 2009.

Ethnicity is not the only source of controversy in India’s history. Perhaps partially due to the effective creation of ethnically-based states and the decision to avoid a similar path in the case of religion, religious violence has occupied much of this country’s history. There are six main religions practiced in India (Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism), but Hinduism and Islam have been most influential for Indian politics. Since gaining independence from the British in 1947, conflict along religious lines has been fairly routine (see Wilkinson 2004), and therefore the source of a unilateral focus of scholars of India. India’s refusal to create a dominant Muslim state has received both condemnation and praise, especially in the face of this continued bloody battle. By considering the effect of ethnicity on conflict, I move beyond this unilateral focus on religion and examine the effect of another salient dimension of identity—on which has surely been of concern to India and one which certainly faces a significant number of countries around the world.

While Pakistan shares a colonial history with India (and Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan), it has had drastically different experiences since independence. The lack of experienced administrators (most remained in India) and an early war of independence from East Pakistan threatened the stability of the state early on. In addition, persistent conflict with India over the Kashmir region and the treatment of Muslims which remained in India have led to uneven development and penetration of the country; the Pakistan government’s ability and/or willingness to make its presence felt in the majority of the country (primarily that which is not critical to the Kashmir conflict) is lacking.

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26 The area which the proposed state of Telangana will come from includes Hyderabad which is the capital of Andhra Pradesh.
27 The effect of the War of Terror potentially has the ability to change this, given that the threat is in the areas which the Pakistani government has traditionally largely ignored.
Pakistan is less religiously and ethnically diverse than India. More than 95% of the population is Muslim. As shown in Table 1.4, the average ethnic fractionalization score for Pakistan is only 0.53 (Fearon 2003), and there is no dominant ethnic group, although the Punjabi are close with right at 44% of the total population. Despite being more heterogeneous than India, Pakistan has also experienced controversy over ethnic identity. Specifically, the politically dominant Urdu-speaking Mujahirs (Muslim immigrants who came to Pakistan from India because of the territorial split at independence) have attempted to erase ethnic affiliations and promote a unified Pakistani identity by setting educational language policies which favor Urdu and also declaring it the national language, despite its clear minority status (Ayres 2003). Urdu speakers are favored in government positions and economic and social mobility is largely dependent on the ability to speak Urdu; discriminatory policies have especially negatively affected the Balochi and Sindhi peoples, which are concentrated in the conflict-prone provinces of Balochistan and Sindh. (For a list of Pakistani civil conflicts, see Table 1.5.)

Table 1.4: Ethnic Composition of Pakistan and Pakistani Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Principle Language Group(s)</th>
<th>Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization</th>
<th>Dominant Language Group (45%+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Punjabi (44%) Bengali (8.22%)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Frontier</td>
<td>Pushto</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ethnolinguistic data and ethnic dominance data based on last year in Pakistan dataset (2005)
Table 1.5: Civil Conflict in Pakistan, 1972 to 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Conflict Incident(s) 25Deaths+</th>
<th>Major War</th>
<th>Opposition Group(s) with Secessionist Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>1975-1977</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Along these lines, Pakistan is substantially smaller than India and only constitutes four provinces and four smaller territories under the direction of the central government, none of which were officially organized along ethnic lines. Despite officially being a federal democracy, this country is, in actuality, a centralized and often authoritarian state. Provincial government is limited, and the power within the central government is highly concentrated in the hands of the Urdu minority. Civilian rule has frequently been interrupted by military takeovers, thus leading to a substantial erosion of democratic institutions over time. Consequently, given their similar colonial history, yet differing means of determining territorial boundaries and institutional arrangements, Pakistan is a natural comparison to India. Specifically, the inclusion of Pakistan allows me to test the implication of different political institutions and territorial arrangements.

1.7 Some Key Concepts

This study focuses on the likelihood of civil conflict, with particular attention to the ethnic composition of the first-level subnational units. Some of the terms which are essential to understanding the relationship of interest are often misunderstood. As such, I will discuss each of the essential terms in turn.

First, I differentiate between a state and a nation. The terms “state” and “nation,” are often conflated. However, there are specific uses of these terms which are, in fact, mutually exclusive. States refer to territorially bounded units governed by a legitimate, recognized sovereign authority; the root of the
modern state system is the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Nations, on the other hand, are groups of people who are tied together by a common ancestry, history (or historical myths), culture, values, religion, language, and/or a territorial homeland; nations have existed as long as peoples have and were not created through any formal political agreement. Thus, states are political entities within which one or various groups of people reside, and nations are groups of people who feel tied together but do not have their own sovereign territory (Weiner 1973: 318). As such, nations often span state boundaries; and so, one state can, and often does, encompass many nations. The rare nation-state is one in which the boundaries of state and nation are synonymous. Because India has a federal form of government, and their first level subnational units are referred to as “states,” I will most often use the term “country” rather than “state” or “federal state” when referencing India or Pakistan. Within this context, “state” refers to India’s first-level subnational unit, unless otherwise specified.

Related to the nation is “ethnicity” and “ethnic group.” Though this is discussed in extensive detail in the following chapter, I briefly present a basic concept of ethnicity which is central for the understanding of any discussion from this point forward. An ethnic group is a group of people who feel that they belong to a particular group based on a shared ancestry, history (or historical myths), culture, values, religion, and/or language. While ethnic groups and nations are nearly synonymous (some consider them completely synonymous), the primary difference is that nations are viewed as having claim to a territorial homeland, while ethnic groups do not necessary make the same claim. What is most important is to recognize what an ethnic group is and, alternatively, to recognize that states are not nations and nations are not states. Further, details concerning the link between ethnicity and linguistic affiliation, or mother tongues, are further detailed in Chapter 2. For now, suffice it to say, that “ethnic group” and “ethno-linguistic group” are used interchangeably in the context of India.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that this dissertation is a study of civil conflict, not of ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, there is far too little attention paid to the distinction between the two. I am examining the causes of civil conflict—one of which is ethnic composition—with specific attention paid to mobilization capacity. This is drastically different than studying the causes of ethnic civil conflict because they are inherently different phenomenon. Regrettably, the popular press and even academics have often conflated the two.

The very phrase “ethnic conflict” misguides us. It has become a shorthand way to speak about any and all violent confrontations between groups of people living in the same country. Some of these conflicts involve ethnic or cultural identity, but most are about getting more power, land, or other resources. They do not result from ethnic diversity; thinking they do sends us off in pursuit of the wrong policies, tolerating rulers who incite riots and suppress ethnic differences (Bowen 1996: 3) [Emphasis Added].

Thus, as Bowen points out, a substantial portion of any domestic conflict is wrongly labeled an ethnic conflict. Though this particular scholar focuses on conflicts between groups of people residing in the same country (thus, inter-communal conflict), this label is also mistakenly applied to conflicts between an opposition group and the government (thus, civil conflict).28 In both situations, “ethnic conflict” assumes that ethnicity is the underlying cause of the conflict. Given previous conclusions to the contrary, and at the very least the general confusion concerning the relationship between ethnicity and conflict, this is a dangerous a priori assumption to make. Thus, this dissertation speaks more to the civil conflict literature than the ethnic conflict literature and should be understood as such.

1.8 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation attempts to determine if countries that organize their subnational political boundaries along ethnic lines prevent (or at least decrease) the risk of civil conflict; or alternatively, if this strategy actually increases the risk of civil unrest or the rise of violent secessionist movements. Scholarly

28 This distinction is far from a trivial point as it is of vast importance for our theories, findings, and any policy recommendations which follow. Sambanis (2001) finds that ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflicts have different causes.
work examining the effect of ethnic composition — primarily fractionalization and dominance — on civil conflict has produced conflicting results. I attribute these contradictory findings to a lack of attention to the unique mobilization potential of ethnic groups, the opportunities generated by particular patterns of ethnic group distribution, and the country level of analysis that is typically employed in quantitative studies of civil conflict.

First, an ethnic group is a population of individuals that already have a unique set of ties to one another; a shared history, language, culture, etc. provides the group with a cohesive pool of individuals from which to draw recruits for opposition movements. Extending to Weinstein’s (2007) conceptualization of social endowments, I argue that ethnicity is conducive to opposition group formation, so much so that it substantially decreases the need to rely on economic endowments and even less effective social endowments in order to overcome collective action problems (via promises of future rewards which are accepted within the context of the existing trust network of the ethnic group), thereby making mobilization less costly and therefore more likely.

Second, the relative distribution of ethnic groups residing within given political boundaries substantially influences the level and type of opportunity available for mobilization. Highly fractionalized subnational units provide little opportunity for an opposition group to mount a sufficient challenge due to limits on their ability to recruit an opposition large enough for a reasonable chance of success. Likewise, ethnic minorities have little to no opportunity in an area with an ethnically dominant group because almost any effort would be futile against such a large opposition. States or provinces where ethnic groups are at parity should be home to groups that perceive themselves as able to overtake the other group. And last, subnational units with dominant ethnic groups which constitute a minority in the rest of the country are more able to secede — if they so choose. After all, willingness to rebel varies across the various populations distributions; this is discussed in extensive detail in Chapter 3.
Finally, I argue that only an analysis cast at the subnational level is sufficient to truly understand the effect of ethnicity on civil conflict and to test these hypotheses. Civil wars do not summarily erupt across entire countries, but rather are typically isolated to particular areas (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Urdal 2008). Additionally, ethnic groups are often concentrated in specific geographic areas and/or within particular political territories (i.e. states or provinces). The location of groups within political boundaries is sometimes fortuitous (as is the case in Pakistan) while occasionally these subnational boundaries are drawn with the ethnic differences of the population in mind (as is the case with India), and with the goal of reducing conflict. Undoubtedly, the spatial distribution of groups affects conflict (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Toft 2003) in terms of prevalence and form. Country-level measures of ethnic diversity fail to adequately reflect the diversity of these particular areas in which the conflict occurs. For instance, a civil war might start in an area of the country without an ethnic minority even present, yet if one includes in their analysis the ELF score for a country that is overall very diverse, then the conflict may be wrongly attributed to ethnic fractionalization. Due to the spatially-orientated nature of these groups and the concentration of civil conflicts in particular areas, the true effect of ethnicity can only be understood from a more specific level than is found in traditional country-level studies.

Thus, I utilize large-N, quantitative analyses to determine the effect of ethnic fractionalization, dominance, and the change in the relative sizes of ethnic groups on the onset of civil war, as well as the type of conflict (secessionist or not) which occurs within a country. Due to the extensive time and effort necessary to collect subnational data, I begin this project by testing hypotheses in two countries which have divergent forms of subnational organization and have experienced varying levels of conflict between the mid-Twentieth Century and the present: India and Pakistan. These two countries comprise subnational political units which exhibit various patterns of ethnic distribution and composition; as such, my findings have both theoretical and substantive policy implications, which may be extended to other cases of interest.
These findings, presented and discussed in Chapter 5, indicate that when examining the individual impact of different types of ethnic composition, when moving beyond stagnant measures of ethnicity, and when examining this relationship at an appropriate level of analysis, the effect of ethnicity on the onset and type of conflict becomes clearer. I find that ethnic fractionalization proves insignificant in its relationship with conflict onset in the case of India. In terms of ethnic dominance, the results contradict previous findings and confirm a need to consider the differential effects of dominance dependent upon domestic political institutions. Particularly, India’s democratic, federal form of government makes the increases the negative impact of dominant relative to that of Pakistan. The most interesting results concerning onset come with regard to changing population dynamics. Indian states with larger changes in terms of the relative size of ethnic groups are far more prone to civil conflict than are those that have little to no change. This finding lends support to the school of thought that argues ethnic groups are most easily mobilized for conflict when they are threatened; changing population dynamics likely dredge up fear and uncertainty over a group’s future position and makes the risk of conflict participation well worth the costs.

The findings regarding the relationship between ethnicity and secessionist opposition goals also prove worthy of discussion. While the creation of ethnically dominant states might decrease the risk of conflict, it could also simultaneously increase the risk that those conflicts which do occur will be secessionist in nature. My findings indicate, however, that this expectation is misguided. It would seem that the Indian states with the largest dominant ethnic groups are the least likely to secede from India proper. Again, this is likely contingent on the federal system in place; more particularly, it is asymmetrical federalism, which permits the northeastern states more autonomy, which makes this outcome likely. Given the highly autonomous nature of Indian states, and even more so for the “Seven Sisters,” there is really no need for populations to take the risks and costs of secession. Given the fact that one ethnic group dominates state politics (as a result of the ethno-federalist design present in the States Reorganization Act of 1956) and that
state functions extremely independently of the national government, the dominant ethnic group controls the allocation of economic, political, and social resources. As such, the very costly act of secession — for which the future gains are unknown and uncertain — is rarely an attractive option; a cost-benefit calculus does not often support such a decision if we assume the actors involved are in fact rational.

Results concerning Pakistan are more preliminary, yet informative. Contrary to my expectations, ethnic fractionalization has a positive effect on civil conflict onset in the case of Pakistan. However, given the high degree of correlation between state capacity and ethnic heterogeneity in the Pakistani provinces, I argue that these results should be interpreted with caution until accurate measures of state capacity can be integrated into this model; for now, I believe the model suffers from omitted variable bias. Also contrary to my hypothesis, but consistent with the findings for India, is the fact that the presence of an ethnically dominant group decreases the likelihood of a civil conflict. The effects of ethnic dominance seem to hold across two very different political institutions, but the relative effects are stronger in India, an ethno-federal, democratic state. Due to limited observations and a lack of variation in the dependent variable, I am unable to estimate models of secession for Pakistan.

Finally, these findings permit me to draw a number of salient conclusions of both theoretical and practical importance. First, in terms of theoretical importance, it is necessary to study the effect of ethnicity at a more spatially proximate level of analysis than the country level. Subnational political boundaries should be taken into account, as they significantly affect demographics, opportunity structures, and consequently the location of conflicts. And second, in terms of practical importance, and perhaps most importantly, these findings should be extended to other cases of interest. More specifically, countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Russia are home to geographically-concentrated ethnic groups which have consistently made requests for more autonomous regions defined in terms of ethnic identity. In general, the effect of ethnic dominance has a suppressant effect on conflict onset, but the effect is relatively larger when paired with the
ethno-federal institutional arrangements in the democratic country of India. The relative success seen in India should at least be considered by legislators in these other countries. Specifically, India has been fairly successful at avoiding secession, a fear often cited as a reason to avoid such a subnational organization of states.

Thus, the recommendations of scholars such as Kauffman should be taken with extreme caution. Though the more ethnically dominant states within the Indian Federal Union do prove to be host to the least amount of civil conflict, the single largest determinant of conflict is still change in the relative size of ethnic groups. Population movements are hardly avoidable, whether within a country or between countries. In fact, as we see in terms of the Northeastern region of India, much of the problematic population movements that have taken place there were from outside India. Therefore, the serious recommendations of Kauffman should not be taken lightly; these policy recommendations certainly do not come with assurances and they certainly do come with extreme human costs and the introduction of possible interstate wars as well. These theoretical and policy implications and recommendations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 2
ETHNICITY

Although there have been vast improvements made in terms of our understanding of the dynamics of civil conflict, there is one phenomenon in particular that deserves more scholarly attention: ethnicity. The relationship between ethnicity and conflict, or politics in general for that matter, is one of much debate and contention. In order to better understand the true nature of the former, I first examine the relevant literature concerning each of the phenomena: ethnicity (Chapter 2) and civil conflict with specific attention to the role of ethnic composition (Chapter 3). In these discussions, I address relevant conceptualizations and measurements of the phenomena. The theories and hypotheses generated in Chapter 3 are based on the previous literature and conceptualizations of the ethnicity as discussed in Chapter 2. The quantitative measurements discussed within this chapter will serve as a basis for the measurements that are put forth and developed in Chapter 4.

The role of ethnicity in a variety of processes has long been debated. Ethnic heterogeneity, in particular, has often been connected to various outcomes. Some argue that ethnic heterogeneity is a persistent problem inhibiting the success of democracy (Dahl 1971), while others argue that the diversity it brings with it can, in fact, be positive for democracy (Laitin 2007) or at least for the nonmajoritarian type of democracy (Lijphart 1977). Similarly, ethnic heterogeneity (more specifically ethnolinguistic fragmentation) is significantly related to bad government which is then responsible for lower per capita income (La Porta et al. 1998), or more directly, heterogeneous societies are simply more prone to worse economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) and low public goods provision (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1997). Geertz (1973) makes the claim the ethnic heterogeneity has been a constant source of tension in postcolonial states since the end of World War II. Finally, most important for this study, which will be greatly extended on in Chapter 3, are the various linkages between ethnic
fractionalization (or heterogeneity) and civil conflict (e.g., Collier 2001a; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000, 2004; Emminghaus et al. 1998; Fearon 2003b; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1996; Ignatieff 1993; Laitin 2007; Moynihan 1994; Posen 1993; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Weinstein 2007). In short, the frequent view (despite limited evidence) is that “ethnic groups lie in wait for one another, nourishing age-old hatreds and restrained only by powerful states. Remove the lid, and the cauldron boils over” (Bowen 1996: 3).

Though most informative, a scholarly study is not necessary to point to the potential salience of ethnicity for everyday life. Contemporary routine and non-routine politics alike point to a number of probable outcomes of ethnicity. The confirmation hearings of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a struggle for an exclusively “European” rather than a British identity, and the controversial role of North African and Hispanic immigrant populations in France and the United States, respectively, all serve as some very familiar examples for Western audiences. What might be less familiar, yet just as important and also often linked to “ethnic politics” are: Kurdish separatist movements in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran; the Biafran civil war in Nigeria; separatist attempts by the Arakan, Chin, Karen, Kachin, Shan, and Wa peoples in Burma; Tamil rebels attempts to establish a state separate from Sri Lanka proper; the infamous and bloody conflicts in Kosovo and Rwanda; various Naga separatist movements in Northeast India; and a Balochi insurgency in the Balochistan province of Pakistan in which many rebels have called for their own independent state provide some of the most prominent and violent examples.

In each of these particular situations, minorities claim that they are pursuing their own statehood in order to avoid discrimination based on their ethnic status. These attempts at separation have led to many deadly domestic conflicts, and they are some of the most extreme (for lack of a better adjective) examples of a connection between ethnicity and politics; however, they are not the only examples. Ethnicity may also manifest itself in peaceful movements when ethnic identification is not too strong and “dysfunctional,” in the
words of Paul Collier (2001a). These more peaceful movements might take the form of a group’s demand for increased or equal rights, in initially peaceful movements which later turn violent, or in both non-violence and violent opposition movements which do not seek secession but rather their own autonomous region or subnational unit within the country. Some, actually most, ethnic groups present no problem for state stability as they function normally within the current political system. But despite the perfectly routine non-violent interactions which constitute the norm of ethnic relations, it is the more violent ethnic movements which serve as the motivation for the rather extreme policy recommendations of scholars such as Chaim Kaufman (who argues for ethnic participation and population transfers in order to produce truly homogenous nation-states), and in the view promulgated by the mass media which in turn often informs public opinion on the matter.

In the face of these situations where ethnicity is clearly salient and such serious policy prescriptions, the question becomes, then, what is the exact relationship between ethnicity and violent civil conflict? Is this relationship dependent on context? Specifically, what is it about particular places which predispose them to the development of violent opposition groups, specifically as a result of a particular ethnic configuration? 30

In order to answer these, and more, questions, I address what ethnicity is in this chapter, and then build on those definitions and discuss the implications of the present discussion for the mobilization of opposition groups. To ensure the best understanding of this phenomenon, I first present the conceptualization of ethnicity utilized for the purposes for this project within the context of previous work on ethnicity, and then I proceed to a discussion of ethnicity within the larger identity framework. Finally, I discuss the short-comings of any observer-oriented approach and then conclude with a discussion of the

30 While there are a variety of ethnic configurations, the three which are discussed here (and explored further in later chapters) are: ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic dominant, and change in the relative sizes of ethnic groups.
means by which I apply the previously discussed definition of ethnicity; this then serves as the criteria by which I identify ethnic groups for the purposes of this particular project.

Implicit in this and other chapters is the argument that ethnic groups are more easily mobilized than individuals who do not belong to the same ethnic group. Individuals’ realities are largely shaped by the group to which they belong. Attachment to these social constructs influence peoples’ perceptions, goals, and the means they rely on to achieve these goals. The ethnic group, regardless of origin, serves as a ready-made force for mobilization.

2.1 Defining and Establishing Ethnicity

The sorting and measuring of different ethnic groups in terms of their sheer numbers, as well as the number of one ethnic group relative to others, cannot commence until we have identified the members of each group. Additionally, until we understand what ethnicity is, we cannot know if and how it affects the decisions of individuals and potential opposition groups; as a result, we cannot understand the effect of ethnicity if we do not have an accurate conceptualization of ethnicity a priori. A better understanding of what ethnicity is, if and how ethnic groups are defined by those which constitute the group itself and/or by outside observers, how membership within a group is obtained, and the functions ethnic groups serve are essential to a better understanding of the effects of ethnicity.

Definitions of ethnicity range from classic works such as those of John Stuart Mill to contemporary scholars such as David Laitin, and they provide a foundation for existing work. In order to present a comprehensive understanding of what ethnicity is, I will first explore a number of definitions from various sources. Some of these definitions are far less complex than others, and some, of course, are far better or

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31 Paul Collier (2007) makes a similar claim, though without extension or substantiation. He states that “intra-ethnic affinity may form a cost-effective basis for political organization.” This is consistent with part of a very critical argument presented in this dissertation. Also, it should be noted that this argument can be applied to a number of identity forms depending on the situation; most likely, though, is a unique mobilization potential for religious and racial groups.
worse than others. Regardless, all definitions put forth help us to better understand this critical phenomenon.

Ethnicity has perhaps been studied the most in depth within the field of sociology. In fact, a large portion of the political science literature adapts sociological views of ethnicity — at least tangentially. Sociologist Daniel Bell (1996) labels an ethnic group as, “a community of memory,” while Patterson (1983: 32) sums up his characterization into this: “Ethnicity is, quintessentially, a way of being.” These are far from tangible definitions from which operationalization of the concept is easily achieved. However, these are essential conceptualizations to consider, as ethnicity is at its heart, an intangible. In fact, the term “ethnicity” was created to capture a cultural construct, and in “contradistinction to race, which is often seen in biological terms” (Scott and Marshall 2005: 197). Therefore, it is most important to recognize that ethnicity is an elusive concept to study and any measure of ethnicity will be a proxy only.

Sociological definitions of ethnicity also focus on the very important relational aspect of ethnicity. The *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* (Scott and Marshall 2005), describes an ethnic group as, “Individuals who consider themselves, or are considered by others, to share common characteristics that differentiate them from the other collectivities in a society, and from which they develop their distinctive cultural behavior.” In this regard, ethnic groups are defined both by what they are and what they are not; they are defined by the characteristics they commonly display, but these characteristics must be recognized as distinctive from those exhibited by other individuals.

These distinctions, or “cultural markers of difference,” are the basis of group boundaries, which will always be coupled with mechanisms to maintain them (Nash 1996: 24). These mechanisms exist both within the group and outside of the group. Essentially, both members of the ethnic group as well as non-members must recognize the identity markers, which constitute the boundary, and consciously agree that these markers in fact constitute ethnicity and therefore denote ethnic boundaries (Enloe 1996).
Thus, the intangibility of ethnicity is problematic in applying this definition. However, consistent with this discussion of ethnicity being defined by the characteristics, or markers, which members of the ethnic group recognize as distinctive, or even as recognized by others as unique to the group, there are tangible outcomes of ethnicity that are observable and therefore serve as proxy measures of ethnicity. These tangible, observable characteristics, which are the basis of group boundaries are often referred to as “index features” due to their individual nature, as well as the signals that they send in combination—or as a complete index. By their very nature, index features are observable, but they also must be understood within the social context and will then be appropriately reacted to; these index features serve as outward signals of the less socially apparent aspects of ethnicity such as kinship or shared views of history (Nash 1996: 24). This is particularly important since ethnicity is, after all, about a cluster of attributes (or index features)—some of which can be readily observed and some, many in fact, which cannot be. I will therefore discuss some basic elements of the index features of ethnicity which are found (either in totality or in part) in classic and contemporary scholarship, and which may be identified by outsider observers for the purposes of study. Most ethnicities share some of these index features, while very few of them actually share all of them; thus, the clusters of attributes will differ from place to place and from group to group.

To begin with, a fairly general definition, and one of the most utilized in political science, portrays ethnic groups as simply groups of people with a shared belief of common ancestry and/or shared cultural features (Fearon 2003a: 200). Such a broad definition permits a general understanding of the phenomena, but extension on what common ancestry and shared cultural features actually constitute is necessary, as this in no way allows an ethnic group to be distinguished from other groups—no more than a “community of memory” (Bell 1996) or a “way of being” (Patterson 1983). First, a sense of common ancestry is not easily

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32 Index features, therefore, serve as signals of one’s ethnicity. These signals are transmitted to other group members, non-group members, and are especially helpful for non-group members who are labeling and studying said group.
observable; these beliefs are often expressed through oral histories and as such are extremely difficult to identify absent an ethnographic approach. Additionally, while “shared cultural features,” in general, are perhaps observable (assuming they in fact distinguish members of the group from similar non-group members), then we are still left asking what cultural features these might be, as there are a myriad available, ranging from dress to tribal rituals or dance.  

Thus, ethnicity is often assigned according to observable (though to different degrees) characteristics such as: an existing name for a group; language or dialect spoken; distinct religious practices, or a shared religion more generally; residence in a particular geographic territory; demonstration of a commitment to particular values or norms; dress in a particular way; a shared history of ancestors and/or origins, or at least a shared a sense of fictive/metaphoric kinship; an economic specialization; physical appearance; have particular forms of leadership; or are perceived to be “racially” or biologically different (Eltringham 2004: 9-10) [Emphasis Added]. Smith (1993: 50) concurs that members of the same ethnic group should, at least, have a group name and an express a belief in a common ancestry, shared historical memories, shared cultural attributes, and an attachment to a territory which served as the group’s historical homeland. To reiterate, some of these characteristics are more easily observed than others, and therefore, we are often left to rely on those features, specifically dress, public cultural practices, physical features, and language.” These stand for and imply [the] differences in blood, substance, and cult” of ethnicity (Nash 1996: 26).

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33 Given the heavy reliance on language data in the political science field, we must assume that there is often little interest in identifying these features. Rather, most are content with relying on one manifestation of ethnic identification: in this case, language.

34 It should be noted that while members of an ethnic group generally practice the same religion, not all members of a religious community constitute one ethnic group. Ethnicity and religion are far from synonymous, but they often coincide. This also gets to the point of the multidimensional nature of identity, which is addressed in more detail later. For now, suffice it to say that multiple ethnic groups residing in the same area will share the same religious practices but they remain distinct ethnic groups.

35 Again, whether that belief is objectively correct or not is again irrelevant. Rather, it is the perception of, or the belief in, a common ancestry that is important.
2.2 Group Definition, Peoplehood, and Trust Networks

These observables are utilized by scholars for the purpose of study but also by members of society to comprehend their identity, especially in relation to others. Observable characteristics more readily allow in-group and out-group formation and encourage group attachment. As will be discussed in more detail later, an ethnic group feels a common solidarity with the other members of the group (Smith 1993). It would seem that a feeling of solidarity is complimentary to both primordial and instrumental views of ethnicity and conflict; solidarity might serve to create “out-groups” which are so different that they require elimination or are viewed as a threat (i.e. the primordial school of thought); or solidarity might help serve as a source of mobilization through stronger trust networks and accountability patterns.

Interestingly, the formation of out-groups through the use of signals or “markers” such as language, are observed in children as young as three, so this is not exclusive to adults; social psychologists have found that children often define in-groups and out-groups on the basis of both race and ethnicity, and in the case of the latter, linguistic difference is often a factor (Van Ausdale and Feagin 1996). Children, once having conceptualized themselves as a member of a particular identity group through a process of interaction with other diverse children, were persistently attached to that identity and showed distress at the prospect of giving it up (Van Ausdale and Feagin 1996). Thus, identity bonds are strong and heavily influence individuals’ actions from a very early age.

Identity moves beyond the individual and describes the relationship to a larger group. Gordon (1964) notes that there are three institutions of ethnicity — race, religion, and national origin — that have a common social-psychological reference in that they, through historical circumstances, create a sense of peoplehood. Gordon’s discussion is notable for two reasons. First, it points to the need to recognize race and ethnicity as distinct concepts. Race and ethnicity should not be confused, though this is a common mistake. The most simplistic distinction to make between the two is that ‘race’ refers to a biological
difference while ‘ethnicity’ refers to a common appearance of ancestry (Banton 1997: 14). And more to that end, the presence of a common appearance is not sufficient to generate cultural differences; some biological differences are unknown to individuals who self-assign themselves to groups and therefore do not enter into the calculations when forming groups (Banton 1997). Thus, a race can comprise various ethnic groups but an ethnic group cannot comprise various races because of the physical appearance criterion. Race as yet another form of identity, and the implications of this, are discussed later.

For now, and more importantly, is the second point of significance, which is Gordon’s emphasis on a “sense of peoplehood.” This sense of peoplehood is often the emotional ties which are thought to bind individuals within an ethnic group together and can serve as the motivation for large numbers of people from the same group to act in a similar manner. Murshed (2002: 390) casually remarks that “ethnicity, whether based on language, religion, or other distinctions, is often a superior basis for collective action in poorer countries than other social divisions such as class.” I describe this as a casual remark because the statement goes without further explanation or justification as to why this might be the case. In the following discussion, which is continued further in Chapter 3 in regard to civil conflict, I attempt to develop a more extensive explanation of the relationship between ethnicity and mobilization potential. Preliminary work on social identity theory establishes intergroup behavior patterns and attributes positive utility to the well being of ethnic group members and negative utility to non-members (e.g., Tajfel, et al. 1971). In other words, ethnic group membership provides exclusive and desirable benefits to those which belong to the group and which are not available to non-group members. Later work by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) concludes that where populations are heterogeneous, individual’s utility from joining a particular group is positively related to the share of the members of the group which are of the individual’s own type with the reverse effect being true of group members which do not share their identity. Put simply, the benefits received by individuals are related to being part of a group, particularly in a heterogeneous area. This
conceptualization of ethnicity presents us with a scenario in which ethnically similar individuals will have the same interests, and receive similar benefits, and therefore act in accordance when those interests are threatened.

Kinship groups, in general, are extremely efficient at imposing norms and expectations. First, rules and norms are well-known due to the fact that group members are most often so members for life, and second, because there are high levels of the observability of group members’ behavior; such high levels of information concerning behavior can only lead to increased enforcement of group expectations and norms (within the group itself), making it difficult for members to deviate from what the group expects one to do (Posner 1980). Therefore, in a situation in which the potential opposition group is not an ethnic group, defection from the group is much more likely than if the group is an ethnic group due to information availability and enforcement.

Thus, norms and agreements may be enforced through in-group policing and ethnicity is a means by which coordination problems can be overcome, thus increasing mobilization capacity. Along these lines is Weinstein’s (2007) theory of social endowments which links this latter view to a situation of increased mobilization opportunity. Weinstein (2007) argues that groups overcome the collective action problem by utilizing either economic endowments (i.e. material incentives) or social endowments. These social endowments are non-material incentives which come from existing trust networks based on things such as shared ethnicity, race, religion, etc. Weinstein goes on to demonstrate how these social endowments operate across a variety of civil wars; in so doing, he illustrates the feelings of solidarity, and even what he terms “moral commitments,” which underlie the social endowments and make mobilization possible. Essentially, the trust that comes from such solidarity makes it likely for individuals to join the group even in the absence of immediate selective (material) incentives due to a belief that future payment will come.

36 For an applicable discussion of in-group policing, see Fearon and Laitin (1996).
Given an underlying agreement on norms and acceptable behavior, coupled with high in-group policing, one member of the ethnic group is much more likely to act based on the promise of a future selective incentive rather than requiring an immediate payment before joining an opposition movement. When individuals are asked to mobilize by non-group members however, there is no common sense of norms or the promise of enforcement mechanisms if the member reneges on his promises.

The trust and commitment which exists within ethnic groups is developed through an intricate process which is critical to the development of individuals’ ethnic identity. Patterson (1983) argues that individuals, fearing isolation, choose to associate themselves with a wider group to which they are inalienably committed; all individuals of the ethnic group fear this isolation and thus experience and resolve the “crisis” together. How is the crisis resolved? Members first declare that they are in fact a member of the particular group (both to the group, the outside world, and most importantly to the “contradistinctive” others); they then reinforce the declaration with an obvious and supreme commitment to the group, making it clear the commitment is the least likely he or she will abandon. Individuals of the group experience, declare, and also have to commit themselves to the group with a style that is normally framed around the language of kinship.

Once an individual has committed to a group, the retraction of such a claim is difficult. There is in-group monitoring and significant social stigma attached to denouncing one’s group, as well as an internal process by which people find it hard to reevaluate their group membership. First, in-group policing is prominent within ethnic groups. Both reciprocity and punishment for defection or contradicting the group is more easily enforced within groups by the group members themselves. Evidence of such acts is prevalent in literature on contract enforcement. La Ferrara (2003) shows that even in the absence of legal mechanisms for contract enforcement, self-enforcing takes place. Increased trade and economic benefits result, as more opportunities are available; Grief (1993) argues that even in Medieval times, the coalitions formed by
traders were consistent with ethnic lines because monitoring agents were available. “Ethnic groups are frequently marked by highly developed systems of social networks that allow for cheap and rapid transmission of information about individuals and their past histories,” (Fearon and Laitin 1996) thus making accountability a prominent fixture in ethnic groups. We often see this in-group policing play out and actually prevent inter-group violence from spiraling out of control; Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that a process of “group-policing” by which members of one ethnic group ignores the infractions of individuals belonging to other ethnic groups because there is an explicit understanding that each ethnic group will sanction its own members for their infractions. As such, in-group policing is a common and prevalent characteristic of ethnic groups which increases group cohesiveness and the ability to mobilize.

Second, there is also a personal check, so to speak, on one’s commitment to the ethnic group; this perspective is prominent in the psychology and social psychology literatures concerning cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is theorized to be responsible for preventing individuals from reversing a decision they have made or position they have previously established due to an aversion to inherent contradictions. Specifically, the prospect of being wrong, or having made a bad decision, generates such anxiety in people that it is simply easier to rationalize the bad or wrong decision rather than contemplate the good or correct alternative. Thus, individuals rarely diverge from a decision once that decision has been made in an effort to avoid the associated anxiety. Along these lines, once individuals have committed to being a member of an ethnic group (even if this commitment is often not a cognizant choice but rather one of birthright) they are extremely reticent to retract that decision.

Beyond psychological benefits, the tangible benefits of belonging to an ethnic group are many, and serve as an incentive to maintain such an identity, as well as to act in accordance with group expectations so that one’s membership in the community is accepted. Posner’s (1980) exposition on kinship groups (of which one type is the ethnic group, often imagined according to Anderson (1983), presents the group as
being critical to the provision of group-level insurance or defense. In many instances, to exist without the group is to exist without a safety net (particularly important in difficult times and where the government cannot adequately provide for individuals) and without — or at least with fewer — provisions for defense. Essentially, the fate of the group depends upon the individuals it comprises, and the fate of individual depends on the fate of the group (Nash 1996).

Thus, the process of becoming, and remaining, a member of an ethnic group is extremely relevant for the mobilization of ethnic groups against others or against the state, and will be further addressed within this context in Chapter 3. For now, suffice it to say that ethnic group members will be more likely to join an opposition movement undertaken by other group members to obtain approval from the group to which they are so inextricably tied and/or because they trust that they will eventually receive the selective incentives promised to them for their participation in the movement. A common ancestry (real or imagined), in-group and out-group formation, a sense of peoplehood, and trust networks all serve as the basis for an argument which I consistently make throughout this dissertation: ethnic groups are distinctively suited for the mobilization of an opposition force. A nation, or an ethnic group, is “the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men’s loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society” (Emerson 1960: 95-95). Likewise, John Stuart Mill, in Representative Government (1861: Chapter 16), asserts: “A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others — which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people…” Notice that Mill claims that due to

It is critical to note that Mill’s use of the world “nationality” is in many ways inconsistent with our often contemporary conception of the phenomenon. The sources of nationality, according to Mill, are common sympathies, race, descent, language, religion, and a collective history. These should lead us to conclude that it is a nation, not a post-Westphalia state, to which he is referring; and in this regard, his definition of “nation” is, like many others, what this manuscript refers to as an “ethnic group.”
common sympathies, which do not exist between members of said group and other groups, individuals will cooperate with members of their group more readily than with other non-group members. Since individuals understand themselves in relation to other individuals, then it is relatively easy for an in-group, out-group reality to emerge. The presence of in-groups and out-groups, combined with the already salient common bonds which tie ethnic communities together—a better understanding of, and trust in, motives, pre-established social networks, and a greater ability to communicate—are critical to understanding the unique mobilization potential of ethnic groups.

Despite the unique mobilization capacity of ethnic groups, evident in Emerson’s and Mill’s discussions, there are many reasons to believe that one’s ethnic group is not always the identity form which influences individuals’ decisions. In other words, when the chips are down, ethnicity will not always command men’s loyalty, but rather, this is dependent on the context. As is discussed in the next section, the multidimensionality of both identity and ethnicity proves problematic for such a simplistic assumption.

2.3 The Multidimensionality of Identity and Ethnicity

Identity, or how one comprehends or understands one’s self, is multidimensional. An individual’s identity might include their sex, gender, country of origin, religion, state (or province) or geographic region of origin, race, ethnicity, or any combination of these. Ethnicity is but one form of identity, and as such is best conceptualized within the larger context of identity. Obviously, ethnicity is of primary interest in this study, however, other forms of identity—both by themselves and in combination with other identity forms—are relevant in that they too affect individual’s decisions and actions, specifically their decision to join an opposition movement.

38 For that matter, some individuals might not identify with any group or confuse their ethnic group membership with their race. This is true of African Americans in the U.S. without any knowledge of familial ties before slavery, or white Americans without ties to anything but their race or country.
To illustrate—when someone inquires about your identity, you might respond that you identify yourself by your ethnicity: you may express that you are Latino, or Hindu, or Kurdish. Or, alternatively, you might respond with another level of identity such as black, white, Muslim, Christian, female, male, Appalachian, Southern, a New Yorker, a Californian, South African, Brazilian, rich, and/or poor. Thus, it is possible to identify not only according to one’s ethnicity, but also by other identity forms. These identity forms are not mutually exclusive and will oftentimes be combined. In fact, it is rare for an individual to identify themselves by only one identity form, though one form is often held in higher regard than another (though which identity form is most important can change depending upon time and space) and can therefore more important for the decision-making process. This latter part is extremely critical to note and will be discussed later in regards to the saliency of ethnicity. Because of its vast implications, I will often refer to this multidimensional aspect of identity.

To complicate matters further, some individuals might identify with more than one ethnic group, thus making not only identity multidimensional but ethnicity as well. Though this has been explored to a lesser degree than other elements of ethnicity, Baker (1985), in a study of ethnic minorities in Britain, concluded that when given the opportunity to choose all ethnic groups which an individual might belong to (out of a list of 10) a substantial number of survey respondents often chose multiple ethnic identities. In particular, more than 50% of participants who identified as “West Indian” also expressed that they belonged to at least one more ethnic group. The existence of multiple ethnic identities is likely related to a person’s parental lineage (i.e. parents from two separate ethnic groups) or them being more transient between areas in which they are perceived as, and even perceives themselves, as two different ethnicities due to different contextual factors. It is unlikely that a person always simultaneously, or at least equally, identifies with more than one ethnic group at a time. However, it should be kept in mind that one’s ethnicity might change

39 Please note that this is far from an exhaustive list of potential identities. This is merely to illustrate a point.
depending upon the situation and context, which further emphasizes the constructed nature of ethnicity present in instrumental accounts of the phenomena (e.g. Laitin 2007).

The evidence generated through the previous cited experimental research is not alone. Additional research comes from the work of Daniel Posner. Posner engages in an in-depth analysis of Zambian politics in order to explain why one identity form — the tribe — is at times the superior identity form around which individuals mobilize for action while another form — the language group — is just as salient for mobilization at other times. He concludes that domestic institutions influence this process in two ways: first by influencing the saliency of a particular aspect of ethnicity (tribe or language), and second by determining the most efficient ethnic form to identify with in order to maximize expected benefits and minimize expected costs. Underlying Posner’s discussion is the notion that individuals can either simultaneously or exclusively identify with either the tribe or the language group (each equated with ethnicity) at any given time, thus illustrating the multidimensional nature of ethnicity itself. Additionally, Posner’s conclusions support an instrumental view of ethnicity and reinforce the importance of actors outside the ethnic group in influencing the importance of ethnicity. On a final note, even Horowitz, often identified as an ardent primordialist, acknowledges that ethnic boundaries are malleable, particularly when ethnic groups are left disadvantaged due to fragmentation an in response to the political context (Horowitz 1985). Consistent with the instrumental account of ethnicity, individuals alter their ethnic group boundaries (Laitin 2007), or even, as just argued, their entire ethnic identity in order to maximize one’s benefits and minimize the costs in relation to a particular goal.

2.4 The Saliency of Ethnicity

The explanation of the saliency of ethnicity is situated within the argument that ethnicity is but one form of identity and that by the very nature of a multidimensional identity, ethnicity is not constantly salient. What explains when and where ethnicity becomes salient, as opposed to another identity form? In
other words, why is ethnicity obvious and/or salient in one situation, whereas it is not in another? Identity, and thus ethnicity as one form of identity, is often conditioned by the situation. Situations which makes ethnicity obvious and salient for both members of the particular ethnic groups as well as ethnic others range from the introduction of another ethnic group to an outside force delineating economic, political, and or social strata along pre-determined or manufactured ethnic lines. Regardless, in these situations, ethnicity is created and defined in relation to other individuals. “Members of any ethnic group share features of a common culture, but they are unaware of their distinctiveness until they encounter others of a different culture” [Emphasis Added] (Banton 1997: 105). What is the source of this encounter? Ethnicity can emerge, “through the interaction between different peoples; it is the product of conquest, colonization, and immigration” (Oommen 1988: 335). In other words, the languages, beliefs, and practices of an ethnic group are not recognized as anything other than reality until that group comes into contact with the ethnic other—a group which does not exhibit their same language, beliefs, or practices. During this process of confronting a group unlike their own, the distinctiveness of their own group becomes obvious, and in this process, ethnicity is not only discovered but also becomes salient, though to different degrees.

Thus, even when ethnic differences are pronounced due to a relational situation (or an interaction with non-members of their ethnic group), ethnicity is not always salient. The degree to which ethnicity is salient is the product of additional factors. What does this mean? Ethnic differences matter for some day to day interactions—including routine and non-routing politics—and do not in others. Therefore, ethnicity is generally constructed from the bottom up, but made salient from the top down.

Once recognized and understood as a distinct form of identity, ethnicity is not constantly, but rather situationally salient. In other words, ethnicity does not always influence individuals’ perceptions of

40 While individuals might recognize that they are tied to members of the group, they will not recognize the actual group itself in the absence of an ethnic-other. The out-group is essential for the definition of the in-group, for without an out-group there can be no in-group by definition.
their “self” and therefore it does not influence their interests and resulting actions. So even when realized,
etnicity is not always important for everyday interactions and decisions. Most often, the distinctiveness of
one ethnic group from others in society becomes important when the ethnic affiliation is critical for the
distribution of resources, rights, or social acceptance. As can be seen in an example from Pakistan, this is of
particular importance when the resources, rights, and social acceptance associated with one ethnic affiliation
diffs from (more specifically, when it is inferior to) another ethnic group because in purely relational
terms, ethnicity is, “a social identity based on symbolic cultural differences. Whether such cultural
differences are imaginary or real is irrelevant. What matters is that these perceived cultural differences play
a part in an individual’s evaluation of his/her identity and actions in relation to others from within or
outside his/her ethnic group” (Igware 1995:3). In Pakistan, the Balochi populations often times identify
with their tribe more than their language (or ethnic) group, but in the presence of high levels of immigrant
populations who have higher levels of access to natural resources (in particular, natural gas) and the
economic rewards which they generate, their ethnic Balochi identity has come to play a much larger role in
their decision to mobilize against government forces.

“Who I am depends on who I am opposed to — whether symbolically or competitively — and on
who is drawing the line of difference between us” [Emphasis Added] (Wallman 1983: 69). The latter “who,”
often times outsiders, frequently move beyond determining the identity of an ethnic group and rather rely
on existing ethnic boundaries along which they emphasize differences; they then assign different levels of
value to different groups through the attachment of particular rights, roles, etc. Recall the example of the
Balochi in Pakistan who are disadvantaged, usually at the advantage of the Punjabi and the mohajirs
(settlers). 41 A more in-depth look at India provides us with a similar example. The British heavily influenced
ethnic group self-definition in India. British colonizers believed some ethnic groups were better suited to

41 For a more in-depth discussion of the strong relationship between language and access to power in Pakistan more generally, see Ayres (2003)
particular activities than others; they believed Punjabi-speaking Sikhs and Marathi-speaking Marathas to be superior soldiers and the Bengali-speaking residents of Bengal to be good civil servants, therefore the military and civil service positions were made available along these ethnic lines (in addition to caste and religion) (Choudhry 2009). Similarly, the Tamils and Sinhalese of Sri Lanka (previously Ceylon) long resided in peace (despite their one difference: language) until British rule during which the colonizers created and favored an English-speaking elite which were rarely members of the majority Sinhalese and Buddhist communities (Bowen 1996); post-colonial times have been largely shaped by a scorned majority in power. These are but two important examples of outside powers imposing the saliency of ethnicity by attaching tangible rewards to ethnic status.42

As these examples show, once ethnicity is recognized as a distinguishing characteristic, social, political, and economic status can be assigned to that identity form; as a result, ethnicity will then become important for the decisions and actions of individuals which belong to those groups. Even if one’s ethnic identity is always recognized, it will not be a significant influence on their interactions with the government until that identity form is made important. In other words, if ethnic group status does not matter for everyday relations — if it does not influence whether you get to vote, determine the jobs you are eligible for, open particular educational doors or allow for special social services or status — then members of that ethnic group will not condition their actions toward the government based on their ethnic affiliation. Instead, peoples’ actions will be determined by the way in which other identity forms are treated by said government. White women in the United States did not march for equal rights for whites but rather for the rights of women. As a member of the racial majority, white women’s racial identity mattered far less than did their gender, the identity form through which they were discriminated against. Or more relevant to this

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42 These examples are far from alone. Similar activities can be seen in the Lebanon (Maronites), Egypt (Copts), Dutch East Indies (Moluccans), and Burma (Karens). For a more in-depth discussion of this process, see Bowen (1996).
project, tribal identity in Pakistan is always in competition with ethnicity for the most salient identity form. However, the violence in the Balochistan province of Pakistan that is directed toward the central government comes from the Balochi ethnic group, not the tribal groups; rather, there are actually inter-communal conflicts between the various tribes which comprise the Balochi ethnic group ("Assessment for Baluchis in Pakistan"). While the tribes could be rebelling against the Pakistani central government, they are not because the source of the discrimination is their ethnic group rather than their tribe.

The salience of ethnicity can vary across both individuals and ethnic groups; the variance in ethnic salience across individuals is at least partially attributable to the saliency of ethnicity for the ethnic group as a whole. "A group is ethnic only to the degree that, on the one hand, it actualizes through social intercourse ethnic consciousness, and on the other hand, to the extent that its activities ritualize validating myths and symbols" (Patterson 1983: 31). Some groups may be "more ethnic" than other groups. For one ethnic group, their interactions could be loose, their reliance on common and unique symbols low, and their call to make decisions and act according to the common ethnic identity rare; for another ethnic group, their interactions could be constant and exclusive, their reliance on their own common symbols and history frequent, and their every decision and act is in accordance with the notion of their common identity. These are, of course, prototypical, or ideal types (the absolute endpoints on a spectrum, if you will) with most ethnic groups falling somewhere in between. The point being, though, that collective actions and individual decisions alike are dependent upon the group’s own view of itself.

Thus, to reiterate a very critical point, the natural conclusion that we must draw from the fact that identity is multidimensional and situational, therefore, is that the saliency of ethnic identity is constantly changing—it is dependent on time, place, and circumstance. Thus, ethnic identity does not always count, nor is ethnic origin "inevitably the one difference which makes a difference" (Wallman 1983: 77). Take for instance, the changing extent to which ethnicity was salient in Bosnia; in parts of the country, "Many people
lived alongside others of a different ethnic origin for generations with very little consciousness of this difference. Then hostilities broke out elsewhere and spread to their localities” (Banton 1997: 1). This author suggests that the saliency of ethnic differences were a result of, rather than the cause of, hostilities. Likewise in Rwanda, ethnic counterparts lived alongside one another for centuries before the arrival of the Belgians; in fact, prior to colonialism, anthropologists considered both Hutus and Tutsis to be of the Banyarwanda tribe (Sadowski 1998). Moreover, there were long stretches of peace between the two groups even after the Belgians left— not before, of course, they made ethnicity salient by favoring only one group (the Tutsi) in political, social, and economic realms and ensuring this stratification by mandating all Rwandans carry Identity Cards which clearly indicated if they were Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa. The importance of these ethnic differences was far from constant over the course of Rwandan history, and even now in the post-genocide era, Tutsis and Hutus live alongside one another, sit on the same church pews, and in general peacefully interact.

As a result of the multidimensional and situational saliency of identity and ethnicity, both concepts are difficult to tackle. Not only is the process of defining each no small task, but understanding the role that each plays in individuals’ decision-making processes is extremely complicated. However, by keeping in mind that identity is multidimensional, situational, and that it is, as a result, differentially salient, we can improve our theories, and hopefully, even our understanding of what ethnicity is and what its effect on civil conflict is. Before presenting the hypothesis concerning this relationship (in Chapter 3) or detailing how these hypotheses will be tested (in Chapter 4), I will first discuss the many difficulties associated with establishing peoples’ ethnicity, which is, of course, central to this project.

2.5 Difficulties in Establishing Ethnicity

Complications with studying ethnicity first arise due to observer-oriented and large-N studies. I will briefly detail these complications in order to situate this project within the realm of possible approaches
which will be attempted in future research; as will become evident through this discussion, these future extensions will go further towards correcting problems associated with past research on the relationship between ethnicity and conflict.

It is extremely difficult for outside observers to accurately identify individuals’ ethnicity and therefore the members of a given ethnic group. This difficulty comes in the fact that, as previously discussed, ethnic groups are bound by unique combinations of particular characteristics (or index features), which are previously discussed. Some ethnic groups might exhibit similar physical characteristics (such as height, muscle composition, or a particular carry), speak the same language, and hold similar jobs. Other ethnic groups might be physically indistinguishable from non-group members but instead are bound through a similar understanding of their ancestry, dress in notable garments or jewelry (for example, the Kayan women of Burma who wear brass neck rings to elongate their necks or the traditional Gamosa of Assam), and engage in the same distinctive cultural practices or rituals (such as the extended, ritualistic marriage tradition of the Punjabi that involves at least five pre-wedding ceremonies in addition to the actual wedding, or the Sindhi ceremony of Akiko performed for all male children between the ages of 3 months and 1 year). Ultimately, it is the sum total of a unique configuration of certain index features which identify a particular ethnic group, where the configurations of these index features vary across groups. Thus, while a shared history, dress, and specific dietary habits might tie one ethnic group together, another might be defined through a shared history, cultural rituals, and a distinct conceptualization of gender roles. What logically follows, then, is that there is no one uniform way by which all ethnic groups can be recognized.

This difficulty is reflected in the practice of censuses changing the ethnic groups featured in them from one census to the next. When studying ethnic groups in the United States, should researchers use the most recent categories utilized by the census or earlier ones (Nobles 2000)? Another manifestation of this confusion is the confusion of race and ethnicity by collapsing them into one category. For instance, in the
1991 United Kingdom Census, the options are “White,” “Black-Caribbean,” “Black-African,” Black-Other,” “Indian,” “Pakistani,” Bangladeshi,” “Chinese,” and “Other” (Banton 1997). Recognizing that this is a bit like the game, “Which of these are not like the other ones,” first four categories are separated from the latter four but still remain within the same box and category of “ethnicity.” The latest United States’ Census (2010) has tried to eliminate some of the confusion for ethnicity by simply asking if the respondent is of a particular Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin. And some countries, such as India and Pakistan, do not even ask for a respondent’s ethnicity. Thus, determining what constitutes ethnicity is far from easy, and utilizing a simplistic and uniform means by which all groups can be identified is erroneous.

Furthermore, even if it is possible to determine a particular means by which we can identify a particular ethnic group through characteristics relevant to it, the ability to observe those characteristics is often difficult for those who are not members of that particular group. While some characteristics, those often referred to as “surface characteristics,” are more easily identified, others are not. For instance, it is fairly easy to recognize members of the Kayan people of Burma, at least the women, by the numerous rings worn in an effort to elongate their necks. The Hutus in Rwanda, on the other hand, exhibit no noticeable physical characteristics which would enable an observer to identify them as such. Problems such as these serve as the motivation for anthropologists, sociologists, and communication studies scholars to adopt an ethnographic approach. Thus, studying ethnic groups in a cross-national context, or even as a removed outsider, is difficult due to the fact that what constitutes an ethnic group in one country might not constitute an ethnic group in another. James Fearon (2003b), a prominent scholar of ethnicity within the

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41 As we will see shortly, “mother tongue” serves this function.

44 In a related note to much of the discussion which follows, ethnographers often use language as a means of defining group boundaries and thus the scope of their studies. As is obvious in the coming pages, the utilization of language to determine ethnic group boundaries ultimately has its positives and negatives, but is ultimately the approach I adopt.
political science tradition, makes an elucidating statement when explaining the development of his own ethnic group dataset:

Anyone with primordialist leanings should be quickly disabused of them by undertaking to code “ethnic groups” in many different countries. It rapidly becomes clear that one must make all manner of borderline-arbitrary decisions, and that in many cases there simply does not seem to be a single right answer to the question “what are the ethnic groups in this country?”

The identification of ethnicity is so difficult that sometimes, particularly when ethnicity is not salient or has not been transferred through socialization yet (so, at a young age), that members of an ethnic group might not even recognize that they are in fact members of that group. This might be quite frequent in a place like the United States where peoples of all ethnic backgrounds reside, oftentimes undistinguished from the next, as ethnicity is not particularly salient for their everyday interactions (this more aptly applies to ethnic majorities rather than minorities). More interestingly, and likely more telling, comes from a place and time in which ethnicity and violence are infamously linked: the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Author Jean Hatzfeld (2003: 122) recounts a story in which a young boy did not even know his own ethnicity:

I know the case of a Hutu boy who fled into the marshes with the Tutsis. After two or three weeks they pointed out to him that he was a Hutu and so could be saved. He left the marshes and was not attacked. He had spent so much time with Tutsis in his early childhood that he was a bit mixed up. His mind no longer knew how to draw the proper line between the ethnic groups.

Thus, in this situation, the young boy had not been socialized to distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis—certainly not to the point that one’s life depended upon that very distinction. His view simply reflected the normal peaceful relations and integrated communities of Hutu and Tutsi preceding the genocide. While this certainly was not the case for all Hutus and Tutsis, significant evidence suggests that it was for the majority. Given the lack of obvious physical distinctions, or overt social behavior, the young boy easily concluded that

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45 Fearon’s comment is situated around primordials because they believe the boundaries of ethnic groups are rigid and unchanging, thus making it much simpler to identify an ethnic group relative to a instrumentalist who believes boundaries are ever-changing and dynamic.
he too would be hunted in the marshes like all those people that had surrounded him in life. This serves as an example, albeit extreme, of the difficulties posed when identifying an individual’s ethnic affiliation; while most individuals know their own ethnicity, particularly when it is so salient, it is an arduous process by which outsiders can identify them as well.

In sum, the very nature of identity and ethnicity — their multidimensionality, the relative nature of ethnicity, and its situationally salient character — presents unique challenges for researchers. Both the identification of an ethnic group’s members and determining if that particular identity form (ethnicity) is salient for a group’s or individual’s decision-making process are not small feat.

As a result, individual-level data obtained through surveys is the most appropriate means by which the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict can be understood. More specifically, surveys which ask respondents to self-identify with an ethnic group (or ethnic groups while ranking the order of their attachments) and then ask a series of questions to determine the strength of their ethnic attachment and its effect on their decision making given particular situations would be best. This would not only allow a better identification of individuals based on their own perception of their ethnic group, but it would also allow us to study the effect of the cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages of ethnicity, religion, income, etc., as the individual would be the level of analysis.

Unfortunately, this type of data is simply not currently available for India and Pakistan, nor for many other countries which are underdeveloped and/or embroiled in conflict, for that matter. However, given the unique role of language in the politics and histories of these countries, it is still possible to engage

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46 As will soon become obvious, the study at hand utilizes aggregated census results which are in fact based on self-reported mother tongue (as a proxy for ethnicity). In this regard, I am at least correcting for some of the problems typically associated with this type of work. However, because the data is aggregated, it is impossible to determine the effect of cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages, among other very important things.

47 For a sample of the type of questions which would work best for this type of study, please see the various rounds of Afrobarometer Surveys which inquire about individuals' likelihood of becoming involved in non-violent or violent action against their government given a variety of situations.
in a theoretically and substantially significant work as an outsider. The next section details the approach used to do just this, as well as a justification for this approach.

2.6 Identifying Ethnic Groups through Language

With all of these difficulties and complications in mind, what is the most accurate way to identify members of an ethnic group, particularly as an objective, outside observer? The most often utilized is language. Scholars since Karl Deutsch (1954) have debated the usefulness of utilizing language as a proxy for culture, ethnicity, and/or the nation. A common language is often essential to the existence and identification of an ethnic group; language differences themselves are not the sources of ethnic tensions (e.g. Seiler 1989), but rather, they are a manifestations of the presence of unique communities with their own beliefs, norms, and interests. “A different language, or a series of public utterances far from the norms of communication, may mark off an ethnic group as does dress,” thus serving as an internal reminder of difference (Nash 1996: 26) as well as being a readily observable characteristic or identity marker.

Integral to Nash’s discussion is the fact that language goes beyond serving as an easy means by which we can categorize individuals into distinct groups but is also a critical internal reminder of difference. This internal reminder is present in both group and non-group members and persists even after the usefulness of a particular language does. Even when a language which outlives its functional, communicative purpose, it often remains symbolically important for group identity; the Irish language (Gaelic) is a perfect example of this (Edwards 1996: 227). Language is, therefore, an extremely powerful symbol of identity. In the words of Assamese opposition movement, Axom Xahitya Xobha, “My mother language—my eternal love.”

Beyond its symbolic uses, language obviously serves a functional purpose for groups as well. In order to communicate a shared history, and pass on the justification for cultural norms, or even perform routine functions which are essential to both individual and group survival, a shared language is necessary. So while language is an essential means of communication, it goes beyond this and is a marker of identity.
and a cultural institution (Laitin 1977; Lucy 1999). The study of language as an identity marker around which people group as well as an essential means of communication has a long history. Contemporary linguistic research treats language as essential to identity, society, and everything in between. “A sense of selfhood and society is not only expressed via a particular language but is also interwoven with that language” because language is, after all, associated with “sanctity, with kindship, and with one’s innermost feelings and aspirations” (Fishman 2001: 445; Fishman 1997).

Extensive efforts have been made in various countries which are illustrative of both, as well as the power of language policies, which are a direct reflection of these views. One of the more prominent instances is found in the former Soviet Union with Russification efforts. Russification was partially attempted through making Russian the official language of instruction, government, and business throughout various non-Russian republics (Monden and Smits 2005); essentially, Soviet policy endeavored to make Russian the “language of interethnic communication” a priority (Karklins 1986: 218). The presence of such language policies emphasizes the importance of language in defining the identities of sub-communities within any country; it is widely believed that an ability to manipulate language can alter their ethnic affiliation and as a result alter their behavior and interactions with non-ethnic others. The homogenization of language serves the purpose of easing inter-group communication but also of integrating communities, of increasing the chance of interaction and thus the chance of understanding. At the same time, however, the homogenization of language through the enforcement of a dominant language (as was the case with Russification) often serves to establish, and then reinforce, existing power relationships.

Each point is also readily evident in the case of Pakistan’s Sind province. After independence, Sindh offered Karachi to the federal government to use as the new capital; upon accepting, the federal government declared the city a federal territory. Adding insult to injury, Urdu had been declared the national language, despite the fact it was the least spoken and the language of the mohajirs (settlers), thus
forcing the Sindh (and all other) populations residing in Pakistan, and particularly the capital, to learn Urdu in order to survive.

From the Sindhi point of view, these developments created a painful inequality: To obtain government jobs, Sindhis would have to learn a “foreign” language. At the same time, the newly arrived “foreigners” (i.e. Mohajirs) did not have to learn Sindhi to go about their daily lives in urban Sind, where most of them lived. There was no compelling reason for Mohajirs to integrate with Sindhis—a situation that struck the latter as highly discriminatory (Ayres 2003: 64).

Language policies such as that in Pakistan are obviously not aimed at integration but rather at reconstituting power relationships between the center and what comes to be considered a residual ethnic group. Without getting lost in an extensive discussion of the purposes of language policy, it should be noted that the mere existence of such policies is evidence of language being a marker identity and a means by which individuals can be associated with a particular group (specifically ethnic in the situations presented here) as well as the belief that these groups are not fixed, unchanging entities.

More relevant to this project, and consistent with opportunity theories of conflict, is the practical function which language serves. Specifically, a common language allows for mobilization of an opposition group. Convincing a sufficient number of people to join a movement, which is necessary to mount what a leader considers to be an effective resistance, the ability to communicate with potential recruits, is necessary. While an ideal measure of ethnicity would come from an individual-level survey that taps into the various levels of identity, as well as their respective levels of saliency, the presence of such systematic data is simply not wide-spread, and certainly does not exist for India and Pakistan. As such, I am left with relying on the best possible alternative measure of ethnicity: language.

Language is an observable characteristic that readily distinguishes members of different groups, and as such can be used by not only scholars but policy makers as well. It is often used by those in power to differentiate groups that they favor from those that they do not; and the promotion of, or discrimination against, an ethnic group is often accomplished through language policies. In this regard, language can be
highly correlated to a group’s power. In this regard, “power is that quality which enables the users of a language to obtain more means of gratification than the speakers of other languages,” and forms of gratification may be tangible goods such as houses, cars, good food, etc., or they may be intangible goods like pleasure, ego boosting, or self-esteem (Rahman 2002: 38-42).

And so, consistent with an extensive amount of political science scholarship, I operate under the assumption that language is a manifestation of ethnicity. Or, perhaps if we take a strict constructivist view point, language is used as a symbol around which a community is constructed or imagined (Anderson 1983). This does not mean that language and ethnicity are synonymous, or that they are mutually exclusive; language communities will exist that consider themselves to be different ethnic groups. However, given the focus on mobilization capacity in this paper, and the importance of language in Indian and Pakistani sub-group identity, this would seem to be the best option possible.

Contrary to previous scholarship, this method of proxying ethnicity should not be understood as a blanket prescription for identifying ethnicity in all places and in all times because language is not always consistent with the boundaries of ethnic groups. As previously mentioned, not all ethnic groups have their own unique language, either because some other characteristic has traditionally distinguished from other ethnic groups which speak the same language. Thus, the language one speaks does not consistently represent the same thing across geographic space and time. To better understand, recall the previous example of the Rwandan child who was unaware of his own ethnicity — so unaware that he fled the Hutu militias who

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48 Though my critique here is primarily limited to the application of the same proxy for ethnicity across space (due to relatively stable ethnic identification patterns in post-Colonial India), there are some arguments concerning the applicability of these same proxies across time. For an area-specific application of such a critique, see Stahl (1991).

49 It should be noted, however, that using language to proxy ethnic group affiliation does have one benefit: mother tongue is independent of the mobilization process. In other words, often times ethnic affiliation is activated due to the mobilization of peoples during times of political instability and conflict. Therefore, it is difficult to tell, in the midst or following a conflict, if individuals’ ethnic identities are the source or were the cause of the conflict. Utilizing data on mother tongue largely avoids this problem. See Laitin (2000) for a more detailed discussion of this argument.
were hunting the Tutsis hiding beside him in the marshes only to later be told that he had no reason to flee because he was, in fact, Hutu. Identifying himself as Hutu rather than Tutsi was not easy; these groups exhibit very similar physical characteristics, have comparable cultural practices, live in integrated neighborhoods, and speak the same language — all of which are obvious to a child. What was not obvious to a child was the fact that Tutsi and Hutu rarely practiced intermarriage and that the economic activities of the two groups most often differed. These differences, however, were not always present and instead are attributable to Belgian colonial practices. In fact, before colonization, some Africans did in fact identify with Hutu or Tutsi but these labels were far from the main sources of everyday identity; “tribal or ethnic identity was rarely important in everyday life and could change as people moved…” and “Conflicts were more often within tribal categories than between them as people fought over sources of water, farmland, or grazing rights” (Bowen 1996: 6) rather than between Hutus and Tutsis.

This is not a cautionary tale of evil colonial powers but rather an illustration of two points. First, as previously discussed, a Hutu child could not even recognize himself as such because ethnicity is not always obvious. When insiders find it difficult to determine their own ethnicity, outside observers will undoubtedly have problems doing so as well. Second, if one were to utilize language as the only indication of ethnicity, as most studies of ethnicity and conflict do, Tutsis and Hutus would be treated as one ethnic group. This might not seem problematic as I have implicitly argued that this was possibly the case. However, if we consider the role of the Belgians in introducing ethnicity, or at the very least making ethnicity salient, to Rwandans, then we must accept that even if ethnicity has not always existed in its present form it is now a very real phenomena and should be treated as such. Once the Belgians assigned

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50 Which are only two of the hundreds of other ethnic groups disbursed across the continent.
51 Thus is not to say that inter-communal violence between the groups never existed before the well known genocide which took place in 1994.
ethnic identity cards and determined economic, social, and political status by said imposed ethnic affiliation, two groups that spoke the same language became two different ethnic groups.

Rwanda is not alone. Another prominent example, which serves as evidence of this point, comes from a country which has been viewed as one plagued by ethnic violence: the former Yugoslavia. Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats, all which speak the same language, have lived amongst one another (usually in relative peace), and with rising rates of intermarriage (Bowen 1996); despite this, they are obviously distinct groups (most exclusively along religious lines, though there is some overlap in membership) but share certain key common features which might lead an outside observer utilizing language as the only marker of ethnicity to erroneous conclusions. The existence of distinct ethnic groups which speak the same language is quite frequent, and while members of linguistic groups can feel a certain kinship with one another, it is not always the same as the type of bonds which are present in ethnic groups (recall the previous discussion of ethnic group norms and accountability).

Despite the evidence presented through reference to only two cases (which are certainly but a small number which conform to this logic), most previous cross-national studies of ethnicity use the same ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure (ELF), which is based on language data from the 1964 *Atlas Narodov Mira*. Not only is the primary reliance on language data to proxy ethnic affiliation for every country problematic, but so is the use of only one source of collection since the *Atlas* admittedly provides ethnic population estimates only. Moreover, the fact that all data come from one point in time is perhaps the

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52 Some scholars have chosen to construct their own list of ethnic groups from which ethno-linguistic fractionalization scores are calculated. These efforts are notable, yet most are highly correlated (around .80) with the oft-critiqued *Atlas Narodov Mira* (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).

53 With the exceptional alteration based on some notion of race and quite often national origin (Fearon 2003).

54 For a detailed critique of this data source, see Posner (2004). Most interestingly is Posner’s “grouping” critique, in which he claims that the *Atlas* frequently groups multiple distinct ethnic groups under one umbrella group. Among various examples of situations in which this is problematic is the case of
most troubling. As already established, ethnic groups, as a social construct, frequently change in terms of their boundaries; ethnic groups contract and expand, as well as amalgamate and divide (Laitin and Posner 2001). Thus, reliance on data from a singular point in time does not take these ethnic group revisions into account. We can all likely agree that substantial population changes have occurred in almost fifty years since this data collection was concluded. This problem is amplified by the way the original information was gathered for *Atlas Narodov Mira*; individuals did not self-report their ethnic affiliation, but rather group population estimates were based on ethnographic studies. If individuals are allowed to self-report their ethnicity through such mechanisms as a census, then they themselves can provide integral information concerning changing ethnic affiliations. The various problems associated with stagnant measures of ethnicity are further detailed in Chapter 4, and I consistently argue that my correction for these problems is certainly a strength of this study.

Despite its deficiencies as a uniform, cross-national measure of ethnicity, language is of particular importance in the countries of India and Pakistan (though perhaps to a more limited degree), and thus serves as a legitimate proxy for ethnicity in this situation. More generally, “South and Southeast Asian cultures... are highly concerned with language; they have been concerned with language, with the transmission of culture through language, and with the codification and regulation of language from earliest times” (Schiffman 2001: 432). Very early texts are dependent on the concern of language and its control; this concern has remained throughout the history of South Asia, and as such a “long-standing tradition of linguistic culture” has developed (Schiffman 2001: 432). Language is, and has long been, very much a source of ethnic identification and power. Due to the variance of identity levels, specifically ethnicity, across countries, “it is natural and perhaps necessary that the ‘right list’ of ethnic groups for a country

the Tutsis and Hutus being considered one ethnic group in Rwanda and one ethnic group in Burundi—both of which have storied histories of created ethnic divisions between these two groups.  

55 Recall from Chapter 1, the “dark” period in Assamese history when Bengali was made the official language.
depend on what people in the country identify as the most socially relevant ethnic groupings” (Fearon 2003b: 6). Thus, in the case of India, mother tongue (one’s original language) the organization of their subnational units (states), in their Constitution, and it plays a very important role in everyday life.

In regards to state organization, the goal of the States Reorganization Committee was to maximize the number of the speakers of a particular language in one state, thereby effectively creating majorities within each state— or at least attempting to. This explicit effort to group peoples based on their linguistic abilities was in response to intense pressures by those groups to remain in a cohesive political unit. This organization, while officially linguistic, is also referred to as ethnic because the lines of ethnicity and language are synonymous in India. And consistent with these ethnic, or ethno-linguistic lines, India has continued to re-draw state boundaries to reflect these boundaries and the calls of ethnic groups to do just this; in the first 15 years alone following Indian independence, 11 new states were created based on ethno-linguistic boundaries (Varshney 2002).

Mother tongue plays a significant role in the Indian Constitution as well. Rights are often guaranteed to speakers of certain languages, and other protections are afforded minority-language speakers throughout the Union. Most languages are assigned Schedule Eight protection status in the Constitution, and accordingly receive such rights as that of education in their mother tongue and to live a life free of fear of discrimination based on their language; minority languages receive similar protections, though not to the same degree as the dominant, Schedule Eight languages of their state. Varshney (2002) attributes much of India’s success as a country to its protection of ethnic minorities through constitutional protections such as these.

56 Because language has played such a large role in Indian politics of the reliance on language data as a proxy for ethnicity does have its problems. As Laitin (2000) points out, people are often very bad reporters of their own language for a variety of reasons including: some lie (to political authorities, especially when political decisions are made based on language), some are unaware of their language in different contexts, and some might under report their capacity for the high status language and under report their capacity for the lower status language.
Perhaps most importantly, the significance of language goes well beyond the formal governmental institutions; it plays a significant role in everyday life. In fact, “more often than not, mother tongue becomes more a political idea than a linguistic construct or concept” (Mallikarjun 2001). These languages are even sometimes elevated to an almost divine state; for instance, students in government-funded Tamil Nadu schools sing a praise of “Mother Tamil” in school activities, and similar activities take place in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka schools, just to name a few (Mallikarjun 2001). Therefore, these mother tongues are a source of social identity. As a result, they are used not only to unite individuals, but they also serve as an expression of solidarity for the political entity in which they reside (Mallikarjun 2001), because, after all, these federal states were created with language in mind. Thus, language in India is not only a critical form of identity, but it is also a source of solidarity and potential mobilization.

Language has a storied history in Pakistan as well, although not to the same extent as that of India. Most importantly, language is also heavily associated with ethnic identity in Pakistan as well, thus justifying the use of linguistic data as a proxy for ethnicity. Rahman (2006) goes so far as to argue that language policies in Pakistan has increased ethnic conflict in the country, while those studying India have found that their language policies have, perhaps, done exactly the opposite.

Language has also played a consistent role in everyday life. Linguistics has played an especially crucial role for the Sindhi people, eventually leading to language riots in January of 1971 and July of 1972 (see Ahmed 1992). The language Sindhi enjoyed regional hegemony throughout the time of the British Raj, through literature and general widespread presence colloquially and administratively, as Sind had been a separate province during the Raj (Ayres 2003). This widespread linguistic hegemony was a partial product of the Sindhi language movement in the 1930s, which ended with Sind separating from the Bombay presidency in 1936 (Ayres 2003). As Ayres (2003: 63) goes on to argue: “This institutionalization of a Sindhi ethnic identity linked directly to a language was therefore in place even before partition. Partition would trigger
Sindhi ethnic mobilization for two reasons: cultural insensitivity and economic subjugation.” Thus, language and ethnicity have long been tied in Pakistan, just as in India, and this link has continued even in the post-independence era.

Pakistan has taken a divergent path from India in one very important way: in terms of their protection of “minority” (i.e. non-Urdu) languages. Urdu is the primary language of significant economic opportunities in urban areas and as such is justified as the premier language of educational instruction (Rahman 2006). Though Urdu is the language of the minority Mohajirs (immigrants, primarily from India due to partition), it has received “national language” status. Urdu is, above all, a symbol of a unified Pakistani identity (Rahman 1996), and that “In this symbolic role, it serves the political purpose of resisting ethnicity, which otherwise would break the federation” (Rahman 2006). Despite the higher status of Urdu as the national language, provinces are allowed to use their own provincial languages if desired (consistent with Part II, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan); though the language of instruction remains Urdu (Rahman 2006). General resistance to the Mohajirs rule took place in all provinces (though to the greatest degree in Sind), with the mobilization of people (particularly the intelligentsia) as a pressure group was achieved through these languages, thus making the respective languages of each province a powerful ethnic symbol (Rahman 1996).

Therefore, the proxy utilized for ethnicity for the purposes of this study is language, as language and ethnicity have been inextricably linked throughout the histories of India and Pakistan. As is extended on in Chapter 4, this data is gathered from Indian and Pakistani census reports over multiple time point, thus correcting for many previous problems regarding stagnant estimates of ethnic group populations. A list of the principle ethno-linguistic groups for each country, by subnational unit, is found in Table 1.2 and Table 1.4.
CHAPTER 3
A PERPLEXING RELATIONSHIP: ETHNICITY AND CIVIL CONFLICT

The act of citizens utilizing violence as a means of political recourse has long captivated the attention of audiences the world over; this phenomenon did not come about with the much discussed French Revolution, and it has not come to an end with the long-running “African World War” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rebellion has long been a staple of state-society relations, producing both positive and negative consequences, as we discussed in Chapter 1. It is for these reasons that we are called to better understand it.

Scholars have, by and large, moved away from a primordial view of ethnicity and its relationship to conflict. Despite this shift, there is still considerable debate concerning ethnicity’s true effect for this salient phenomenon. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, systematic research has continued to produce contradictory findings. Obviously, the effect of ethnicity on a state’s propensity for violent internal conflict is of much debate. It is really of no surprise that the effect of ethnicity on violence has eluded general consensus given the varying definitions of both ethnicity and civil conflict, the conflation of ethnic fractionalization and dominance, and the modestly discussed change in relative ethnic population size. In addition, the existence of two bodies of scholarly research— one which establishes a negative relationship and one that affirms a positive relationship between these two phenomena— is a product of a variety of other factors including: (1) general inattention to the unique mobilization capacity of ethnic groups; (2) the level of analysis utilized; (3) insufficient attention to opportunities that are generated by particular patterns of ethnic group distribution and changes in this distribution; and (4) accounting for domestic institutions such as federalism (and asymmetric federalism). Overall, a need to better specify causal relationships via appropriate application of theory and the testing of the hypotheses generated at the correct level of analysis allows me to begin a critical first step towards clearing up the previous scholarly confusion concerning the effect of
ethnicity on violence. All of these critiques were taken into account during the formulation of the theories and hypotheses which follow.

### 3.1 Ethnicity and Civil Conflict

Armed conflicts have recently threatened the future of a series of multinational and multi-ethnic states. In some of them an ethnic dimension has been paramount, as in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda and Burundi; elsewhere the ethnic dimension has overlapped with political or religious dimensions, as in the Sudan, Kashmir, Tibet, and Chiapas in Mexico… Ethnic differences do not cause conflict, but conflict can make people much more conscious of ethnic differences if the conflicts follow the lines of ethnic division” (Banton 1997: 1). [Emphasis Added]

Some scholarly works are in concert, and some are at odds, with Banton’s claim. As previously mentioned, findings concerning the relationship between ethnicity and conflict are quite diverse and often contradictory. Some work views ethnicity as the primer for civil war, while others view it as one of many cleavages along which conflict may manifest itself. Some view it as dangerous only in combination with other cleavages, while others believe it and it alone are sufficient to generate violence. Some scholarly literature view ethnicity as linked to conflict only in the presence of an ethnically dominance group, while others views the link as ever-present. And some view a conflictual relationship between ethnically diverse peoples as a necessary outcome while others see it as an exceptional event.

In addition, the proposed so-called “fixes” for these presumed relationships differ, depending on what the expected outcome of such a fix is. Some literature proposes ethnic separation consistent with country territorial lines (e.g. Kaufmann 1996, 1998), while others prescribe a strong central government (e.g., Laitin 2007) or federalist systems as means of maintaining peace in heterogeneous countries (e.g., Adeney 2007; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1999). There exists concern for all solutions. The former solution, as proposed by Kaufmann, introduces questions concerning the human effects that massive populations movements. In addition, there are natural practical concerns which arise from such a drastic proposal, as well as to how effective it might truly be given the fact that if ethnic hatreds are truly intense enough to
demand ethnic partition then should we not just expect ethnic civil conflict to become international conflict? While the latter solution seems much more practical, it also does not come without its potential problems as well. Namely, does the organization of ethnic groups into their own somewhat autonomous units predispose them to efforts at secession? Given the fact that an ethno-federalist institutional arrangement as we see in India, creates ethnically dominant units, it is plausible that this increases the perceived probability of succeeding in secession attempts, and it could also decrease many of the mobilization costs given the close proximity of a group that is already naturally bounded, thus increasing the opportunity to secede. However, does the nature of federalism mitigate the motivation for secession?

Though much attention has been paid to the effect of ethnicity to the onset of conflict, the shape which this conflict takes (secessionist or not) has been of less concern. To understand the extent of various opinions on these matters, I will briefly describe the state of the extant literature on these topics. Chapter 2 explored the basis of ethnicity, as well as the methods by which members of ethnic groups might be identified and all the existing problems which are encountered when making such an identification. Similarly, the previous section presents an argument concerning an explicit link between the inherent nature of ethnicity and mobilization. This section, and the majority of the rest of this chapter, seeks to systematically integrate theories of ethnicity, theories of conflict, and theories of domestic political institutions; hypotheses are, therefore, produced and discussed within the context of the multiple theories which together, and only together, lead to the derivation of these particular hypotheses.

Before moving on to these hypotheses, though, I briefly discuss the near obsession that scholars of ethnicity and conflict have on the number of members of each particular ethnic group. Put most simply, there is power in numbers. Numbers—in this case ethnic populations—matter for a whole host of things, but, most importantly, numbers matter for control of the means of power and, therefore, the distribution of resources. Horowitz (1985: 194-196) states that “Numbers are an indicator of whose country it is.” And
because numbers are important, the means by which those numbers are established are, naturally, important as well. Horowitz, in the same discussion, goes on to note that because of this, “it is clear that a census needs to be ‘won.’ …the election is a census, and the census is an election.” An election is important in that it determines who controls the legitimate means of power, but a census is important because it indicates who is capable of controlling alternative means of power or taking over legitimate power in the future.

We see this importance in the violence occurring alongside the census that occurs in particular countries. A contemporary example comes from the most recent attempts to take the Nigerian census. As the continent’s most populous country, the Nigerian government attempted the first census in 15 years in 2006. These efforts saw deaths and many injuries. One article notes that in one incident alone five people were killed and dozens injured. “…some communities are hoping to use the census to record their claims to land or property. In southwestern Ondo state, fighting broke out between the Ijaw and Ikale communities over ownership of the village of Taribo.” Nigerian officials have attempted to avoid this violence the best they could be excluding questions of ethnicity and religion from the census questionnaire; these efforts were undertaken to “avoid the rigging and fighting by rival interest groups that discredited previous censuses” (Reuters 2006).

The same type of violence is seen in both Indian censuses and elections. Some of the worst ethnic violence in India took place in the state of Assam in 1983 when opposition forces utilized violence to prevent voter turnout and send a message to the Indian government: that message was a protest to the rising number of non-Assamese immigrants, particularly from Bangladesh.57 Violence in Assam in the early 1980’s also prevented census takers from collecting information for the 1981 census. Both situations, electoral violence and the violence which prevented the census, were not only a protest of immigrant populations but

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57 This also serves as a good example of the consequence of large ethnic population changes, which is discussed in more detail in Section 3.7.
means by which native Assamese were able to stall new populations from having access to power—either through representation or official number. We see then, that numbers matter. Not only do they matter for governmental planning purposes, but they are also viewed as signals by which groups (specifically ethnic groups for my purposes) might evaluate their power. After all, the larger the group, the more ability they have to control both routine and non-routine politics. Most importantly, numbers are a way for groups to understand their power relative to other groups—both in the present and in the future—and to subsequently evaluate their options for action; the type of collective action utilized as well as the disruption it may create is, first and foremost, a product of numbers (DeNardo 1985).

3.2 Federalism and Ethnofederalism

In order to better understand the relationship between ethnic composition and conflict, it is necessary to take into account a particular domestic institution which has the ability to shape the relationship between ethnic groups and the government: federalism, and more generally, the decentralization of power. While other institutions are relevant for this interaction, I conceptualize this relationship as being contingent on federalism because it is the “most typical and drastic method of dividing power” (Lijphart 1999: 185). Roeder and Rothchild (2005) argue that the most effective institutional solution to ensure sustained peace after a civil conflict is not power sharing but rather, consistent with Lijphart, the division of power. At the heart of civil conflict is an opposition group challenging the central government, presumably as a means to access or destroy the existing power structure; the division and allocation of power, then, is contingent on federal institutions which thereby influence willingness and opportunity for conflict.

Riker (1975: 101) defines federalism as a “political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.” The division of government is
central to the argument put forth here, as it limits the power of the majority and ensures the protection of the minorities. Roeder and Rothchild (2005) refer to this divided-power strategy as the “multiple-majorities strategy,” which is highly indicative of its effect.

The power division strategy has a pacifying effect through a number of different channels. The division of power can work through the simple process of incorporating more groups and individuals into the power structure. So, first, more groups have a vested interest in government, thus increasing the cost of challenging it (for those groups involved). Second, when power is divided between levels, multiple minorities are empowered, thus increasing, “the likelihood that members of ethnic minorities will be parts of political majorities on some issues and many members of any ethnic majority will be members of political minorities on some issues” (Roeder and Rothchild 2005: 17). By ensuring that one group will not be a constant and consistent majority, no one group can act without thought to the consequences of their actions; though they may be able to act without the cooperation of others in the policy arena at one level of decisionmaking, this is not true of all arenas. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” is considerably more effective when the “others” will assuredly be in the position to, in fact, do unto you. Thus, while one group might be able to dominate politics within their state, they will be yet another minority when it comes to country level politics and vice versa, therefore changing their strategic decisionmaking. Third, the division of power works through the mere fact that some policy areas are under the domain of the subnational unit while others are under the control of the national government. Madison emphasized in the importance of issue separation in the Federalist Papers; he clearly believed that some decisions, such as those regarding religion, should not be made by the federal government (Roeder and Rothchild 2005: 17). Similarly, some issues are better resolved at a particular level of government, both as a matter of function and role. As we see in most federal democracies, states are uniquely suited to make decisions pertaining to certain matters while the federal government can more appropriately handle others.
For these reasons, and more, Daniel Elazar (1994) presents federalism as the alternative to ethnic nationalism and authoritarian regimes, as well as the best way to achieve peace; his argument is based on the premise that the polity is territorially-based rather than ethnically.

Ethnofederalism is a variant of federalism and generates costs and benefits specific to ethnic groups; it is also directly contrary to Elazar’s (1994) non-ethnic conceptualization of federalism. Specifically, ethnofederalism is “a federal political system in which territorial governance units are explicitly designated as ethnic homelands” (Hale 2001: 1) or at the very least where territorial control is linked to ethnicity (Cornell 2002: 246). Cornell (2002: 245) argues that, “Especially in defined geographical areas where minorities are compactly settled, the creation of a separate state is a feasible goal and territorial control becomes a chief issue of conflict” [Emphasis Added]. With the case for ethnofederalism being mixed, with success in places like India and Russia but drastic failure in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR, Hale (2001, 2002, 2004) argues that the source of these breakdowns is the establishment of a single “core ethnic region” in which a dominant ethnic group that possess clear superiority in population overall. In other words, ethnofederalism does not always reinforce dangerous ethnic cleavages and encourage conflict and secession (e.g., Cornell 2002), but rather permits groups to reside peacefully within one union unless there is a dominant ethnic region capable of rivaling the power of the central government and dominating country level politics. Therefore, while concentrated settlement patterns of ethnic groups — settlements patterns which are emphasized and reinforced through their development into official subnational units of governance — makes secessionist feasible, only ethnofederal systems with a core ethnic region are motivated to act upon the opportunity.

More specifically, Hale (2002: 5) defines a core ethnic region as containing, “either an outright majority of the population or makes up at least 20 percent more of the whole country’s population than does the second largest region.” While Hale points out that 20 percent is somewhat arbitrary, the point is that there is a core region (the territorial administrative unit) which is “clearly” dominant.
Ethnofederalism, therefore, has the ability to not only protect ethnic minorities from the
dominance of ethnic majorities at the highest level of politics, but to also favors those minorities at the
subnational level, thus permitting the maximization of their interests at a critical level of politics. In
addition, as previously discussed, some decisions which might require divergent solutions across states are
better made at the subnational unit, thus leaving less opportunity for conflict over a uniform decision made
by a dominant country level majority (if there is one). “…full ethnofederations tend to include at least one
additional important player: regional [subnational] institutions representing dominant ethnic groups that are
not simply instruments of the central government with its broader interest but that are independently
pressuring the central government with its narrow regional interests” (Hale 2002: 5).

In the case of India, states are given the power over critical areas of policy such as: public order,
policy, education, local government, roads and transportation, agriculture, land and land revenue, forests
and fisheries, industry and trade, state Public Service Commissions, and courts (with the exception of the
Supreme Court) (Muni 1996). In addition, states have concurrent power (with national government) over
important policy areas such as economic and social planning criminal laws and their administration, and
courts and civil procedures (Muni 1996). Therefore, an ethnic minority such as the Malayalam people
cannot exercise substantial power at the highest level of politics in India. However, they constitute a
dominant majority (more than 90% of the population) in Kerala, thereby giving them access to, and control
of, a critical power structure.

Through such mechanisms, ethnofederalism allows countries which could potentially be prone to
conflict and secessionist attempts by ethnic groups to have the best of both worlds, so to speak. It has the
potential to satisfy the demands of ethnic groups for autonomy, reduce opportunities for a central

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59 Education is particularly important as this is where language policies often matter the most, as we
can see when comparing India and Pakistan. In India, Schedule Eight of the Constitution protects linguistic
minorities through permitting instruction of school-age children in their mother tongue while in Pakistan
the minority language of Urdu is most often the (greatly opposed) medium of instruction.
government to exploit the minority regions, and allow for a countrywide identity as everyone remains united within the same country (Hale 2001: 1-2). Combining theories of ethnic composition with theories of federalism and ethnofederalism, then, produces some different hypothesis for India (an ethnofederal country) and Pakistan (which is neither federal nor ethnofederal in nature). The interaction between ethnic composition and these institutions are discussed in the following three sections, as they serve the basis of the hypotheses formulated. A summation of hypothesis is found in Table 3.1.

3.3 Ethnic Fractionalization and Civil Conflict

Explanations of the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the onset of civil conflict are rooted in two very different theoretical approaches to conflict. Initial theories of conflict, which were based on primordial notions of ethnicity, rely on a grievance model of conflict. More recent literature, however, is consistent with opportunity and resource mobilization theories. Each theory, grievance and opportunity, makes radically different predictions about the role of ethnicity in the civil conflict process. Most generally, grievance theories use ethnicity as an explanation for an unacceptable level of dissatisfaction within society, in this case with its basis in ethnic differentiation. Alternatively, opportunity theories use ethnicity to explain the relative costs and benefits associated with rebellion.

The first research into rebellion was fairly enamored with the alternative grievance arguments.60 Fearon and Laitin (2003) characterize this view of ethnicity (which is also found in the prominent works of: Emminghaus et al. 1998; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1996; Ignatieff 1993; Moynihan 1994; Posen 1993; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; and Smith 1986) as one that stresses the role of “long-standing, ‘deep’ nature of ethnic differences and suggest that these make domestic peace difficult.” In this regard, a primordial view of ethnicity (one based on ancient, deep seeded hatred) makes the likelihood that two different ethnic groups can coexist within the same state boundaries nearly impossible because of the extensive and divisive

60 Grievance theories of mobilization and conflict, generally, are based on the preliminary work by James Davies (1962) and Ted Gurr (1968; 1970).
grievances which exist between them. Marrying general grievance theories of conflict with a primordial view of ethnicity led to the belief that dissatisfaction over government performance of provisions (relative to citizens’ expectations) will produce increased competition over resources, particularly with ethnic-others. Most generally, the exclusion of ethnic groups from social, political, and economic realms serve as the basis of grievance-oriented explanations of conflict where ethnicity is concerned.

Fearon (2003b) provides a convincing case against any primordial notion of ethnicity. Fearon’s strong rejection of primordial ethnic theory comes largely out of his attempt to classify ethnic groups in a cross-national context; he argues that even the identification of ethnic groups based on an a priori conceptualization of ethnicity across countries is simply not possible. Consistent with Laitin’s work (especially his 2007 book), Fearon concludes that because ethnic group boundaries are constantly evolving and changing, their true nature is not objective and entrenched, thus rejecting primordialism.

Civil conflict scholars whose work is situated within an opportunity framework work on this same premise—that a primordial view of ethnicity is inherently flawed. Rather than proposing a positive relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict onset, they believe the exact opposite is, in fact, true. This opportunity approach to civil conflict onset focuses on the feasibility of conflict (more specifically, an opposition movement) within a general cost-benefit framework. Benefits associated with rebellion can be incurred during conflict or after conflict, in the event that the opposition group succeeds; these benefits are often hypothesized to be economic, but they can also include access to political power or an increased position in the social strata. The costs associated with rebellion, for the group, are both literal (cold, hard cash is needed) and military (armies are, after all, extremely costly to maintain). The potential costs for individual rebels are danger to life and limb, as well as lost income as a result of giving up one’s normal economic activities for the cause, and leaving family members behind to protect and care for themselves. The formation and mobilization of a rebel group is contingent on a cost-benefit analysis. “In
most circumstances, the establishment of a rebel army would be both prohibitively expensive and extremely dangerous regardless of its agenda. The relatively rare circumstances in which rebellion is materially feasible are therefore likely to constitute an important part of any explanation of civil war" (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006: 5). Many notable scholars have begun working within this framework (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Miguel et al. 2004).

Of these, Laitin (2007) has compiled a very convincing case against this primordial view of ethnicity and its compulsory link to civil conflict. Working from the findings of the previously-cited scholars, and utilizing a “tipping game,” Laitin models national, or ethnic, identity as a product of language use; he concludes that national identity is a choice that is achieved through group coordination and with the end goal of maximizing the utility of the group. The consequence of this line of thought is that ethnicity is not rooted in historical realities but rather susceptible to change; entrenched, ancient hatreds are therefore not possible because ethnic identity is a strategic choice, not an inescapable reality to which inter-group turmoil is forever perpetuated. What follows from this, then, is that ethnic diversity (fractionalization) does not increase the likelihood of civil conflict onset; furthermore, on the basis of individual-level data, Laitin (2007) concludes that ethnic hatred is not positively associated with conflict either.

Some research finds that ethnic fractionalization actually decreases the probability of civil conflict rather than simply not increasing it (Collier 2001a; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000, 2004) and is, thus, consistent with the opportunity school of thought. Perhaps most notable is Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who conclude that, consistent with previous discussions of opportunity theory, ethnic fractionalization decreases the probability of civil war onset due to the opportunity costs involved in the recruitment phase; highly fractionalized societies make it difficult for one particular group to mobilize a sufficient opposition movement against the government. Thus, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contend, heterogeneity could also
simply produce situations where coordination costs are too high for a coherent, organized rebel group to flourish. Thus, the most fractionalized societies will actually have a decrease probability of conflict.

This being said, contemporary scholarship is not without its supporters of this same relationship, though it rarely assumes a primordial view of ethnicity as an explanation of such a relationship. Specifically, Ellingsen (2000), Henderson and Singer (2000), and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and conflict. In the absence of primordial theories of ethnicity, this positive relationship is a bit of a conundrum—particularly given other findings to the contrary. As discussed in Chapter 2, I attribute these mixed findings to inconsistent and inferior conceptualizations of ethnicity and ethnic groups, as well as the uniform application of language as a proxy of ethnicity across all societies; the data collected is, in many cases, also unreliable. Furthermore, as extended on in Chapter 4, I argue that these results are attributable to studying this relationship at a country level of analysis rather than a subnational level.

Given my previous exploration of ethnicity (Chapter 2), as well as the findings concerning changes in ethnic groups (e.g., Laitin 2007), the first hypothesis put forth is consistent with the opportunity school of thought. Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization can indicate the presence of multiple smaller ethnic groups. Entrepreneurs in smaller ethnic groups have a smaller recruitment pool to choose from, therefore indicating a decreased likelihood of success as an opposition group and depressing recruitment. As a result of lower viability in fractionalized societies, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization decrease the risk of civil conflict onset.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) This hypothesis should be understood to apply to both countries in my sample: India and Pakistan.
I assume that as ethnic heterogeneity increases the \textit{recruitment} coordination costs associated with mobilization of a viable opposition group increase, due to the difficulty of overcoming these coordination costs across ethnic groups. This line of argument is derived from both the general work within this opportunity framework, but also more specifically from the work of Jeremy Weinstein (2007). Olson’s collective action problem is at the basis of an opportunity approach to conflict onset. Given the high individual costs that being in an opposition group generates, along with the collective nature of benefits that result in the event that the opposition group succeeds (much less if they do not), it would seem that the traditional collective action problem directly applies. Thus, the biggest problem that opposition group leaders face is that of collective action.

Recall from Chapter 2 that Weinstein argues that groups overcome this collective action problem by utilizing either economic endowments or social endowments. Economic endowments are, of course, material goods such as money, natural resources, etc., which can be used as tangible selective incentives for those who are taking part in the movement. Social endowments, on the other hand, are non-material incentives that come from existing trust networks based on things such as shared ethnicity, race, religion, etc. Weinstein illustrates the feelings of solidarity, and what he refers to as “moral commitments.” This solidarity and moral commitments underlie social endowments and make mobilization possible; the trust that comes from such solidarity makes it likely for individuals to join the group even in the absence of \textit{immediate} selective (material) incentives because they believe future payment will come. In addition, the in-group policing which occurs within ethnic groups, and means of enforcement which are available, serve as further guarantee that participants will receive their promised selective incentives. In highly fractionalized societies, ethnic groups are smaller, and therefore the ability to mobilize an opposition group \textit{large enough} to have a chance in achieving their goals is diminished. Not only must participants receive selective incentives to join a movement, but they must also believe that there is a reasonable chance of success in order to help
ensure the delivery of those future rewards as well as the recruits’ safety. Therefore, ethnic ties can enable an opposition group to recruit more participants initially and puts them in a unique position in terms of viability.

Additionally, ethnic fractionalization might also decrease the onset of conflict through an alternative channel. Democratic countries, or subnational units within democratic countries, in which the ethnic population distribution is highly fractionalized will be less likely to have an opposition challenge for two main reasons. First, the group in power will be less likely to repress because their hold on power is more tenuous than if they were obviously the dominant group; fear that the opposition would in turn utilize repression against them once they are in power decreases the current government’s repertoire. Second, an opposition group might similarly be less likely to challenge the sitting regime for fear of a similar challenge once they (the opposition) legitimately obtain power. This will likely be true of non-democratic systems as well, though to a lesser extend due to the absence of routine mechanisms of leadership replacement.

3.4 Ethnic Dominance and Civil Conflict

Fractionalization is not the only potential configuration of ethnic groups in a society—or, more importantly, within a particular subnational unit. The presence of a dominant ethnic group will generate different inter-group dynamics and coordination costs than fractionalization will. As a result, while fractionalization decreases the propensity for civil conflict, ethnic dominance in fact increases the risk (Collier 2001a; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The latter finding concerning dominance appears to be fairly robust in extant research (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; and Reynal-Querol 2002).  

While the majority of scholarly work typically finds that dominance has a positive impact on the probability of conflict, these findings must still be qualified. First, much of the work on ethnic dominance is somewhat atheoretical—or at least the operationalization of dominance is. Ethnic dominance is operationalized in a variety of ways across the various studies which have been discussed. Some scholars consider societies which are comprised of one ethnic group constituting at least 45% of the population to be
This positive relationship may be explained through a variety of causal mechanisms. First, ethnic dominance may increase the ability of those in power to engage in what Vanhanen (1999) deems “ethnic nepotism,” which is simply favoring one’s own ethnic group in the political, economic, and/or social arenas, particularly as a result of members of the dominant group holding positions of power. When one ethnic group is dominant relative to other ethnic groups in society, then their ability to control the country and/or their subnational government is increased; this is true of democratic and non-democratic regimes, though, of course, power is achieved through different mechanisms, and to different degrees because numbers are influence.

Consistent with grievance theories of conflict (though not paired with primordial notions of ethnicity), ethnic nepotism can increase the gap between expectations and realizations (e.g., Davies 1962; Gurr 1968, 1970), for members of other ethnic groups who are not in control of the apparatus of power. Because resources are finite and ethnic nepotism consists of behavior which disproportionately directs resources (political, economic, and social) to one ethnic group, then the resources available to other groups is, by necessity, decreased. In the presence of decreased resources, particularly relative to those provided to other groups, the gap between expectations and realizations is increased. Ethnic nepotism affects this gap in two different ways. First, individuals base their expectations of government provisions on their own expectations which are formulated based on personal past experiences (Gurr 1970). Thus, increases in ethnic nepotism over time will widen the gap between their expectations and realization. Second, and perhaps most importantly, expectations are also formulated in an “other-regarding” manner (Gurr 1970), by which members of the non-dominant ethnic groups’ expectations will be based upon their observation of the realizations of the dominant ethnic group (the other); the more ethnic nepotism taking place, the higher an ethnically dominant country. Others yet rely on higher cut-offs such as 50%, 60%. Some argue that an ethnically dominant country is one in which one ethnic group constitutes between 45% and 90% of the total population. Therefore, while scholarship consistently finds that ethnic dominance increases the probability of civil conflict, the criteria they utilize for ethnic dominance are inconsistent.
the other-regarding expectation, and therefore the larger the gap between expectation and realization for excluded groups. This gap should be accompanied by an increase in the probability of rebellion by the excluded group. In short, ethnic nepotism, which is made possible because of ethnic dominance, generate irregular grievances which arguably contribute to the incentive, or willingness, to mobilize for rebellion (Vanhanen 1999).

Beyond an inequality in the distributed resources, the presence of an ethnically dominant group might also be understood as a threat to the very existence of a minority group, particularly if previous tensions have existed or if that dominant group takes advantage of its position. When one ethnic group is dominant, according to their population, there exists the possibility that the majority will exploit the minority. While this is not necessarily always the case, the mere presence of the ability to do so is important. The threat of potential victimization could be enough to engender substantial fear in the majority—fear that translations into an opposition movement to prevent such repression. More likely, the probability of conflict increases because “Dominance… may well produce [actual] victimization” (Collier 2001a). Indeed, it would seem that Collier’s proposition that dominance is plays a significant role in generating conflict is correct given his empirical findings which indicate ethnic dominance doubles the likelihood of civil conflict.

While informative, the majority of previous studies of ethnicity and conflict have been largely cross-national examinations, and so, they rarely take into account specific domestic institutions which might act as intermediaries between ethnic population dynamics and conflict. Specifically, the presence of federalism, and more specifically ethnofederalism, should be taken into account. Arend Lijphart has long argued that federalism has a pacifying effect, even in the presence of extensive differences. What is it about federalism that mitigates conflict? The work of Mill (1861: Ch. 15), Elazar (1968, 1987), Lake and Rothchild (1996) Lijphart (1999, 2004), and Adeney (2007) suggests that a federal arrangement has the
ability to protect ethnic groups which are territorially based, especially in the event that the ethnic group’s interests might differ from other groups in society. Ethnofederalism has the benefit of allowing ethnic groups that would be minorities in national politics to be the majority in fairly autonomous subnational units; thus, they have substantial influence over the political, economic, and social matters directly pertaining to then.

Even Horowitz (1985) acknowledges the power of federalism to prevent conflict along ethnic lines— and especially in the case of homogenous, or for our purposes at least dominant subnational units. Horowitz argues that by organizing territorial political boundaries within federal states in such a way that previously groups ethnic groups remain the substantial majority in a particular state then conflict can be avoided; instead, any conflict that occurs will be along sub-ethnic channels. Horowitz presents some convincing evidence from Nigeria and India in which their reliance on ethnofederalism has replaced large-scale inter-ethnic conflict into, typically, less extensive and violence intra-ethnic conflict (usually tribal, caste-based, etc.). Essentially, a decentralized federal system allows a reduction of conflict at the center by extending the power to have substantial control over their own subnational territory. Centralized systems will be more prone to extensive ethnic conflict because the cleavages which are present extend into every inch of society; alternatively, for countries in which power is decentralized and ethnic groups are grouped in particular areas, disputes can remain localized. Additionally, in ethnically centralized systems, “The center is not a neutral arbiter for conflicts originating elsewhere. On the contrary, the center is itself a focal point of competition. To the extent that contending groups succeed in controlling it, the center becomes an actor as much as an arbiter in ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 1985: 40). Systems in which the central government is controlled by one ethnic group and that control is felt throughout the country, the central government becomes the focus of conflict. However, in decentralized systems— particularly when that decentralization corresponds to the decentralization of ethnic groups— conflicts can be dealt with locally;
furthermore, there is more than one locus of power through which groups can exercise power and exclusion is much less possible. Moreover, the decentralization of ethnic groups and power allows the central government latitude to make decisions which affect one group without antagonizing other groups (Horowitz 1985).

India is the epitome of a decentralized, federal system. And in fact, as has been previously mentioned, the subnational territorial and political lines along which power is allocated are consistent with ethnic boundaries making its institutional structure one of an ethno-federal nature. Because linguistic boundaries were utilized to determine political boundaries within this federal system, nearly all of India’s 28 states are host to a dominant ethnic group. Though previous research would suggest that ethnic dominance in India should prove harmful for stability, I hypothesize the exact opposite:

Hypothesis 2: In India, ethnic dominance will be associated with a decreased likelihood of civil conflict onset.

I hypothesize a negative relationship between ethnic dominance and conflict onset in India as a result of the pacifying effect of the domestic institutions—specifically, ethnofederalism—will mitigate the negative effects typically associated with dominance. In fact, because Indian states are comprised of such large dominant ethnic groups, I believe that the need (or even willingness) to utilize repression against minorities is not necessary. These large dominant ethnic groups have total control over the apparatus of power; they can control state politics, which, in many ways is more important than even national level politics due to high degrees of autonomy. In addition, ethnic minorities are so small that there is little to no likelihood that even if grievances are present (or, consistent with greed theories of conflict, an economic target for that
matter) an opposition group could succeed. As a result, recruiting a substantial opposition group would be highly improbable.

Pakistan is also, officially, also a federal system. In practice, though, it is quite the opposite. Pakistani provinces have little independence, with the federal government operating in a very centralized manner. Each aspect of these institutional terms has far-reaching implications for the relationship between ethnic groups and the relevant power structures. And while ethnic groups are also concentrated within particular provinces, immigration and population shifts due to changing capital locations and government bases makes their subnational units much less homogenous than those which were intentionally made so in India. There is no explicit effort in Pakistani effort to create ethno-linguistically dominant states. As a result, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3: In Pakistan, ethnic dominance will be associated with an increased likelihood of civil conflict onset.

Because Pakistan does not have the strong federal institutional arrangements of India, I expect that their experience will be commensurate to what see in aggregate, cross-national studies. Dominant Pakistani ethnic groups are able and willing to victimize minorities in an effort to “get their just desserts.”

While ethnic dominance might have a pacifying effect on the overall level of conflict within a federalist system, it could also have some adverse effects on the actual type of conflict which does take place. Previous scholarship has hinted that federal subnational districting consistent with ethnic lines might increase the risk of secession (McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Nordlinger 1972; O’Leary, McGarry, and Salih 2005; Rubin 2006; Vile 1982). Because ethnic groups are organized into cohesive, fairly autonomous governing units, will the temptation to secede and completely govern themselves be too strong?
Both Pakistan and India, having been ruled by the British and then divided along predominant religious lines, each have the potential to be states which are prone to secession. Nehru himself acknowledged the tension between the strong ethnic nationalism which pervaded his country, particularly when compared to the general lack of an Indian political nationalism. This ethnic nationalism, which could likely lead to secession, was of particular concern when rendering the final decision as to whether Indian states would be used as de facto ethnic homelands. Mill (1861: Ch. 16) asserts:

> When nations, thus divided, are under a despotic government which is a stranger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling greater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of nationality, assigns no privilege to either nation, and chooses its instruments indifferently from all; in the course of a few generations, identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the different races come to feel towards each other as fellow-countrymen; particularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country. But if the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion has been effected, the opportunity has gone by for effecting it. From that time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government (as in the case of an Italian province under a French or German yoke), there is not only an obvious propriety, but, if either freedom or concord is cared for, a necessity, for breaking the connection altogether [Emphasis Added].

Mill’s discussion brings up a number of interesting points. First, reflecting the concern of Nehru, is the notion of competing nationalisms. Essentially, Mill argues that if there is a limited period in which those sub-nationalisms can be transformed into an overarching nationalism in which society chooses to consider itself as one united body. We can deduce, then, that if efforts are made to strengthen ethnic nationalism—say through the creation of states, or geographically separate units, based on ethnicity—that an overall nationalism, or loyalty to the country as a whole, will suffer as a result and predispose the country to secessionist movements based on the superior ethnic nationalism. Consequently, federalism is a means by which subnational identities can be protected from tyranny of the majority, but it can also be dangerous as well (Baruah 1999; Stepan 1997).
Recent scholarship reveals similar concerns. McGarry and O’Leary (1993), O’Leary, McGarry, and Salih (2005), Rubin (2006), Nordlinger (1972), and Vile (1982) are all doubtful of federalism, particularly in ethnically charged and divided situations. These scholars also indicate a predilection of these types of systems to secessionist opposition movements rather than being able to successfully regulate and accommodate ethnic differences. “Within constituent units mobilization around ethnic criteria can manifest itself against the center if a different ethnic group dominates the center” (Adeney 2007:16). This is true of the situation we see in Pakistan but not in India where the Congress Party is a multi-ethnic party.\(^{63}\)

And so, a federal institutional structure combined with dominant ethnic groups within the subnational units can have a number of impacts on motivations for secession. The most obvious is a lack of cohesive nationality. Instead, a stronger loyalty to the subnational unit, or to your group which resides within the unit, might serve as a motivation to break away from the whole. The ability to do so, of course, is dependent on a variety of factors. Most important for the purposes of this paper, though, is the size of an ethnic group. In subnational units where a dominant group exists, that dominant group is the most likely to have the power necessary to secede. Consequently, scholarship on ethnofederalism argues that it dangerous for political stability, leading to secessionist attempts and the eventual breakup of most ethnofederal countries like the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (e.g., Brubaker, 1996; Bunce 1998, 1999; Crawford 1998; Lapidus 1992; Roeder 1991, 1999; Smith 1992).

The power to secede and the willingness to secede, however, are two very different things. In the case of India, because subnational units have been drawn according to ethnolinguistic lines, some sources of conflict have already been mitigated; and so, while these states are characterized by ethnic nationalism,

\(^{63}\) In fact, Lijphart (1996) argues that India is a de facto consociational democracy, possessing all four characteristics required by his criteria. He asserts that the Congress Party acts as an ethnically inclusive grand coalition, due to the fact that it gives religious and linguistic minorities cultural autonomy and ensures that minorities are proportionally represented socially, politically, and economically. Wilkinson (2000) strongly disagrees.
these are typically not excessive amounts of ethnic nationalism. Ethnic groups feel a sense of satisfaction because, given the high levels of autonomy, particularly in the most troublesome area of the country, the “Seven Sisters,” a very critical part of government and power is in their hands. “One of the strongest forces for devolution is the expectation that government offices in lower-level units will be composed differently from central bureaucracies. The assumption may simply be that, if nature takes its course, the composition of the state civil service will generally resemble the ethnic composition of the region or state” (Horowitz 1985: 622). In this case, the government of the state itself is reflective of a dominant group, thus acting as the “convenience” that Mill speaks of. In addition, the absence of a core ethnic region capable of dominating the rest significantly decreases the potential for ethnic repression and further allows the exercise of independent state (subnational) power (e.g., Hale 2001, 2002) and decreasing the need for secession.

Or, perhaps it is better to conceptualize in terms of costs and benefits. Attempts at secession, and even secession itself once successful, brings with it unknown costs. While these costs are unknown, they are likely perceived as very high given the high degree of difficulty taken to establish and run a legitimate, sovereign country. However, the benefits of being part of a functional union are known, and in the case of India, they are very high because of the autonomous nature of the Indian states. Secession is not nearly as attractive given this particular cost-benefit calculus. Thus, despite the previous discussions of how ethnic dominance, particularly in a federal system, can predispose a country to movements of secession, I hypothesize the following in regard to this specific case:

Hypothesis 4: In India, ethnic dominance decreases the likelihood of secessionist rebel goals.

Pakistan, due to different de facto institutions, must be considered separately. Pakistan, while united under a federal system is, in practice, a highly centralized system. The federal government exercises
substantial control over the Pakistani provinces, and does so in a manner which has generated much criticism from various ethnic groups. The Balochi minority, who has consistently attempted secession, constitute a dominant majority in the Balochistan province. They have also consistently been ignored, repressed, and taken advantage of by the central government. They are territorially aligned (the majority of Baluchis reside in Balochistan) and ethnically similar. The Pakistani center does allow the provinces any autonomy, and as a result, they do not provide the benefits which go along with it as we see in India. According the Mushtaq (2009), “the exclusive design of power structure and relatively centralized governance has marginalized and alienated certain communities in Pakistan.” More specifically, this marginalization and alienation has typically been achieved through the irresponsible and unfair policies which favor Mohajirs and Punjabis, as they are in the positions of authority, over particular ethnic groups—particularly the Balochi and the Sindh (Adeney 2007). Thus, ethnic groups, even dominant ethnic groups, have no official subnational unit to which they can take refuge in Pakistan. To put it in the words of Horowitz (1985: 626), there are no “abundant opportunities,” which they would forfeit in the event of secession. The cost benefit calculus for an attempt at secession, therefore, is radically different in Pakistan than in India, and leads me to hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 5: In Pakistan, ethnic dominance increases the likelihood of secessionist rebel goals.

These hypotheses concerning the effect of ethnic dominance on the onset and type of civil conflict are based on not only theories of ethnic dominance, but also on the effect of domestic institutions. Although the hypotheses for India and Pakistan are radically different, these should not be misunderstood as signals that the relationships between ethnicity and onset, or secession, are specific to each given country. Rather, there is an underlying logic, based on population distribution and domestic institutions, which may be applied to
any situation. What differs in the two cases presented here is not the logic underlying the effect of ethnic
dominance but rather the situations to which the logic is applied.

3.5 Changes in the Relative Size of Ethnic Groups and Civil Conflict

Finally, a limited amount of literature also engages the effect of relative changes in the size of ethnic
groups on the likelihood of civil conflict. Peterson (2002) concludes that of fear, hatred, rage, and
resentment that the latter is most critical in ethnic conflicts; he argues that resentment is the result of a
previously dominant group declining in terms of their population and power relative to another group; this
decline in the so-called pecking order generates resentment and serves as the root of ethnic conflict.

Peterson’s study is not directly applicable to the one at hand due to his selection of cases on the dependent
variable. As you will recall, the study at hand assumes an opportunity approach and treats ethnicity as a
predictive variable in all situations of potential conflict. However, Peterson’s focus on changing status as a
dominant ethnic power serves as an appropriate basis for the current discussion.

As previously discussed, numbers mean power, and power is obviously important. Ethnically
dominant groups, at least in decentralized federal systems like India, have the ability to control state-level
politics, and therefore are highly integral in the distribution of political, economic, and even social power.
Lake and Rothchild (1996: 44) go so far as to argue that the competition for resources such as, “property
rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development
allocations” is typically at the heart of ethnic conflict because the state controls access to scarce resources. A
substantial decline in their populations might leave a previously dominant group in a situation in which they
are no longer in this advantageous position. It is obvious, then, how even the perception of potentially
losing power might lead this dominant group to engage in conflict in an effort to prevent such a transition.
This theory, obviously, closely parallels that of Power Transition Theory in traditional International
Relations theory (e.g., Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980).
Major power transitions rarely take place. However, less extensive, yet extremely significant, changes in the relative size of ethnic groups do take place. Changing ethnic population dynamics can matter for more than a dominant ethnic majority. In fact, where numbers mean power, a group should seek to at least maintain those numbers so that they can maintain their current level of power. A situation in which ethnic population changes are anticipated—particularly relative to other groups—will, as a result, generate high levels of fear and anxiety over the group’s position; and consistent with Peterson (2002), the resentment which results from such power shifts can serve as the basis of mobilization and therefore conflict. Lake and Rothchild (1996), while summarily dismissing the primordial origins of ethnic conflict, argue that this conflict is the result of collective fears of the future. “As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain with them the potential for tremendous violence” (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Thus, often, fear and uncertainty are products of an altered population distribution (Horowitz 1985, 2001; Lake and Rothchild 2001; Toft 2007), the result of which is an increased probability of conflict.

Significant changes to ethnic populations alter the ethnic balance and introduce a higher degree of uncertainty into ethnic relations. Uncertainty, and the lack of credible commitments given new demographic patterns, occur in the face of ethnic power shifts; previously agreed upon norms and contracts (formal and informal) come into question, insecurity ensues, and as a result, the declining power might choose to fight today in an attempt to hold on to those old, favorable power arrangements (Fearon 1993). 64 Essentially, ethnic demographic changes introduce situations of uncertainly which increase the opportunities for misunderstanding between groups and therefore the likelihood of conflict. 65

64 See also Fearon’s (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War” for a general understanding of commitment problems.
65 These arguments are similar to those explicated by Barry Posen (1993) which focus on ethnic conflict as the result of a security dilemma.
These fears and anxieties are especially dangerous because they are conducive to manipulation by self-interested individuals, or conflict entrepreneurs (Igwa 1993; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Again, it is critical to note that while the manipulation of elites plays a role in the mobilization of individuals for a common cause — in this case conflict — it is primarily possible due to underlying population dynamics. More specifically, without the threat of a dominant ethnic group, the ability of political elites to mobilize enough individuals for a task as risky as rebellion is far less likely. The “passive masses can be stirred to violence by the oratorical skills of charismatic leaders” or through the use of selective, material incentives (Toft 2003: 9); one ethnic group being overcome by another ethnic group — at least in terms of population — provides movement leaders legitimate sources of fear to draw upon when recruiting an opposition force.

And so, I argue that while domination is important, even the presence of groups that are generally larger and more powerful than you can generate similar anxieties due to fear over a loss of relative power and status. In these situations, these anxieties and fears are augmented during times of substantial population shifts — particularly in terms of the relative size of ethnic groups — and increases the probability of conflict. The hypothesis generated is based on the relative changes in the distribution of ethnic groups in Indian states and Pakistani provinces. More specifically, the ratio of one ethnic group to the others in a subnational unit will affect the likelihood ethnic violence will occur. The following hypothesis applies to both India and Pakistan, as neither have a completely homogenous subnational unit, and therefore units will deal with the possibility of changes in the relative size of various ethnic groups:

Hypothesis 6: Higher levels of change in the relative size of the largest ethnic groups will increase the likelihood of civil conflict onset.
Changes in the relative size of ethnic groups will also affect the type of opposition movement which develops. More specifically, changes in the relative size of ethnic groups will increase the probability of rebellion in an attempt to secede. Significant changes in the relative size and power of ethnic groups will generate insecurity over the future. This insecurity will be enough so that the previously discussed costs of secession are mitigated relative to the benefits. Even the positive forces of federalism will not be enough to prevent secessionist attempts under such conditions. The only means by which a group’s position of power (relative to others) can be maintained, or even improved, is in the event of secession and the formation of their own sovereign territory. Therefore, I offer the final hypothesis:

H7: Higher levels of change in the relative size of the largest ethnic groups will increase the likelihood of secessionist rebel goals.

In conclusion, the distribution of ethnic groups across subnational units, as well as the size of those groups, are both relevant for the onset and type of conflict. The effects of ethnic dominance are conditioned by domestic institutions—particularly federalism and levels of centralization. Ethnic fractionalization produces similar effects in terms of conflict onset in both India and Pakistan because federal institutions can do nothing to mitigate the decreased mobilization opportunity that high levels of fractionalization produce. And finally, due to the high levels of fear and insecurity generated from changes in the relative size of ethnic groups, domestic institutions are not posited to significantly influence the relationship. The means by which these hypotheses are tested is extended upon in the next chapter, with results from a series of quantitative models testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 5.
Table 3.1: Hypotheses

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>India &amp; Pakistan</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>H1: Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization decrease the risk of civil conflict onset.</td>
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<th>Ethnic Dominance</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>H2: Ethnic dominance will be associated with a decreased likelihood of civil conflict onset.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
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<td>H3: Ethnic dominance will be associated with an increased likelihood of civil conflict onset.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>H4: In India, ethnic dominance decreases the likelihood of secessionist rebel goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
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<td>H5: In Pakistan, ethnic dominance increases the likelihood of secessionist rebel goals.</td>
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<th>Relative Ethnic Population Changes</th>
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<td><strong>India &amp; Pakistan</strong></td>
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<td>H6: Higher levels of change in the relative size of the largest ethnic groups will increase the likelihood of civil conflict onset.</td>
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the previously discussed hypotheses, I utilize a large-n quantitative analysis. This analysis is utilized in two countries with a shared and similar past, yet likely highly divergent futures: India and Pakistan. The selection of these particular countries for such a difficult task was partially driven by theory and partially by practicality.

On the theory side, India provides perhaps the most interesting situation in terms of ethnicity and conflict due to the fact that it is, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the most heterogeneous country on the planet. India is also widely recognized as the largest democracy in the world, but it is simultaneously extremely poor. It is the quintessential poor democracy. Polity IV consistently ranks India as a “9” with the only exceptions being considered a “7” in 1975 and 1976 and an “8” from 1977 until 1994. Between 1956 and the present, the average GDP per capita was $294, and the average infant mortality rate was 91 (per 1,000 live births). Extant research points to negative relationship between economic development and civil conflict, as well as a curvilinear relationship between regime type and conflict, where democracies and autocracies are the least prone to this type of violence. India, therefore, proves an interesting case for more reasons than its high level of diversity. In order to maximize empirical leverage, and extend my ability to generalize from the results derived, it was necessary to compare India to at least one other country. Due to their shared past but very different solutions to ethnic diversity (India being a highly decentralized country with its subnational boundaries determined by ethnicity and Pakistan being a highly centralized system that habitually attempts to suppress ethnic differences), Pakistan is the natural comparison. Institutional differences, which are key to the theory and hypotheses put forth, make Pakistan and India interesting companions in this type of analysis.

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66 This is on the polity scale which ranges from -10 (autocratic) to 10 (democratic).
67 All references to GDP per capita are expressed in constant $2000 U.S. dollars.
In terms of practicality, both India and Pakistan routinely administer country-wide surveys and report results at the subnational unit of analysis. Therefore, the data necessary to perform this type of analysis is accessible. Although practicality should not be a criterion for case selection, in reality it sometimes must be.

Within these states, I engage in a subnational analysis of the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict. Therefore, in India, the unit of observation is the state-year and in Pakistan it is the province-year. I am interested in the effect of three different ethnic configurations: ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and the change in the relative size of ethnic groups. In terms of civil conflict, I examine the latter two ethnic factors in relation to both the onset and type of civil conflict.

I first discuss the level of analysis employed; as the standard level of analysis utilized in this line of research is the country-level, I justify my diversion from said level. I then present the general research design employed. Within this discussion, I present the dependent, independent and control variables as well as the methods of analysis.

4.1 A Subnational Approach to Civil Conflict

The majority of scholarly studies concerning civil conflict are cast at the country level of analysis, which in many regards seems appropriate. After all, civil conflicts take place within a particular country and the combatants involved both originate from the country, one of which is the actual government. A new stream of conflict literature, however, has begun to diverge from this traditional country approach in an effort to produce more precise results. This divergence from the traditional has led to a trend in studying relationships at subnational levels of analysis; while some studies utilize the first level administrative units within countries (i.e. states, provinces, territories rather than cities, towns, or districts which are, depending on the context, second or third level administrative units), others utilize geo-referencing systems to generate “exact” coordinates for phenomena of interest.
While some might argue that this trend is simply the result of better technology and better access to more fine-grained data, there is also a strong theoretical reason to adopt such an approach. First, approaches which are cast at a lower level of analysis allow us to examine some processes better than those at the country level. For instance, Urdal (2008: 591) posits that while state-level characteristics illuminate which countries are more likely to experience conflict, they do not address “how and why conflicts arise in certain local areas and not in others.” Civil wars do not summarily erupt and/or simultaneously occur across an entire country. In reality, civil conflicts are usually limited to a very specific geographic area (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Urdal 2008). These geographic areas—or more specifically, the subnational units—which play host to the conflict are usually sufficiently different in their population makeup, resources, level of development, etc. from that of the country when considered as a whole, and it is these differences which produce variant conflict outcomes across units. Individuals’ decisions to join others in an opposition movement are conditioned by factors at both country and subnational levels, therefore making the individual-level analysis the most appropriate level; however, data limitations prevent us from engaging in such a fine-grained approach at this time.

To illustrate the importance of such a distinction between the country and subnational levels of analyses, recall the discussion from Chapter 1 which demonstrates that while India’s ethnolinguistic fractionalization score for the entire country is .89, the scores of the states which India comprises range from .06 to .94. Thus, India is certainly a highly fractionalized country. However, civil conflict in India has been limited to nine of the 28 states. It would be erroneous to attribute a conflict to one of those nine states if, in fact, they were a relatively homogenous country. This happens to be exactly the case of Punjab, which has been host to two minor conflicts and one major civil conflict; the average ethnolinguistic fractionalization score for Punjab is only .15. Similarly, if we conclude that ethnic dominance predisposes a
country to civil conflict, then we should not expect that particular outcome in India since there is no dominant ethnic group present—at least not when we consider the ethnic population composition of the entire country. However, if we cast our study at the subnational level, then our conclusions drastically change, given that 24 of India’s 28 states have a dominant ethnic group.

This effect is not limited to ethnic composition. To further explain the utility of a subnational approach in general, let us consider the availability of natural resources. These resources, which rebel groups might target for personal gain or to maintain the viability of their movement, differ across states. In the case of India, the presence of petroleum reserves (one of the most targeted natural resource to provide rebel groups with desired funds) is fairly rare and isolated to a few states. And, as a result of resource availability of India’s states is quite variable. In a country-level analysis, the presence of natural resources might be attributed to rebellion. However, this level of analysis might lead to false conclusions by obscuring where petroleum reserves are relative to where the actual rebellion occurs; in other words, it might lead us to attribute a rebellion in Nagaland or Kerala to greed or movement viability even though that particular state has no petroleum deposits to target.

Consequently, a study cast at the subnational level of analysis is much more equipped to reflect all of these relevant factors in a much more dynamic fashion than a study cast at the country level. And so I, like Henrik Urdal, focus on the local determinants of conflict, but I put forth that studies of the relationship between ethnicity and conflict at the country-level not only prevent the understanding of where conflicts take place but that they are erroneous from the beginning; their erroneous nature is due to the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, which is not reflected in traditional measures of ethnicity, such as the ethno-linguistic fractionalization score and even a simple dichotomous variable indicating the presence of a

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68 This is, of course, a simplification of the causes of conflict. This statement is only meant to emphasize the impact of ethnicity on the propensity for civil conflict.

69 For the purposes of this illustration, “dominant” is defined as one ethnic group comprising at least 45% of the total state population.
dominant ethnic group, because they are calculated based on the number and population of ethnic groups residing across the entire country. Therefore, though I agree that subnational analyses better enable us to understand the location of conflicts within countries better, I also argue that country level analyses do not, under certain circumstances, even allow us to understand under what conditions certain countries experience conflict. This is especially evident in the previous example of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and its effect when studied at the country level as opposed to the subnational level. This is not to say that studies cast at the country level of analysis are useless, for they have led us to many valuable conclusions concerning regime type, state capacity, economic development, etc. Rather, I am arguing that some factors such as ethnicity are best understood through the more refined approach that is possible through a study cast at a more immediate level of analysis.

Thus, examining the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict at the country level of analysis is likely to lead to erroneous conclusions regarding causality. In fact, not only will a country-level analysis prevent an understanding of which particular regions of a country are prone to conflict, but it also prevents an understanding of the effect of ethnicity on the onset of civil conflict within the country in general. Many of the inconsistencies which arise between case studies and large-N country-level studies are at least partially attributable to the afore-mentioned deficiencies of a country-level approach (Urdal 2008).

To address the more practical side of this approach, the subnational divisions utilized come from cross-referencing a variety of reputable and authoritative resources including but not limited to: State Department publications, official Indian and Pakistani government websites, and census publications specific to each country of interest. The list compiled of subnational, first-level administrative, units from my initial assessment of these sources was then compared to Gwillim Law’s (1999) list of administrative divisions. Law’s extensive research on basic administrative and population information for all country’s subnational units since 1900 has culminated in a noteworthy and reliable project which allowed me to incorporate territorial changes (i.e. creation of new subnational units, altered subnational boundaries, etc.) into the
dataset in the year in which the change occurred; information concerning these changes was verified by referencing each subnational unit’s website (for example, the website of the Assamese government details the changes to the Assam region, along with type and extent of territorial change and the date which those changes occurred), thus assuring accurate territorial information.

4.2 Data and Methods

In order to test the relationship between ethnic composition and civil conflict, I employ separate quantitative analyses for India and Pakistan. As just discussed, these analyses are subnational in nature and therefore better allow us to observe these dynamic relationships. I examine the effects of three types of ethnic composition: fractionalization, dominance, and change in the relative size of ethnic groups.

The years under observation for India are 1956 until 2002. In Pakistan, the analysis is limited to 1972 until 2005 due to the war of independence which Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) fought against West Pakistan in 1971. Although this is likely the most interesting of the civil conflicts to take place in Pakistan, it is not possible to include those years in the same analysis as census collection and aggregation was quite different during the years which East and West Pakistan constituted one country; specifically, before the split between the two parts of the country, West Pakistan was formally organized into simply West Pakistan and the Federal Capital territory. Additionally, the special circumstances of a country which was, literally, split and separated by another country in between presents unique circumstances for study, and as such probably should not be compared to situations which are obviously very different.

I begin with an analysis of the effect of each of these independent variables on civil conflict onset. Given that the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic regression is utilized to assess these relationships. Second, I consider the effect of dominance and the change in the relative size of ethnic groups

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70 West Pakistan officially split into the provinces of Balochistan, Northwest Frontier, Punjab, Sind, and the centrally administered area of Islamabad on July 1, 1970. The secession of East Pakistan came just a little later over a year later in December of 1971 (the date which West Pakistan officially recognized the split).
on the type of opposition movement which arises; more specifically, I am interested in whether ethnic dominance or large changes in the relative size of ethnic group predisposes a country to secessionist opposition movements. Again, the dependent variable is dichotomous, and so I use a logistic regression for these models as well. All models are estimated while clustering on the subnational unit and with robust standard errors. The India models are estimated with peace years and cubic splines are included; due to limitations in the number of observations, the Pakistan models cannot be estimated using peace years and cubic splines and instead are estimated by lagging the dependent variable.

It is necessary to discuss the variables which are critical to each of these analyses before any findings can be discussed. I first detail the two dependent variables, and then proceed to present the three independent variables of interest and any relevant control variables. While I present the justification, coding, and source of these variables in the following sections, this information, in abbreviated form, can also be found in Table 7 for ease of later reference.

4.2.1 Dependent Variables

Civil Conflict Onset

In order to best understand this important, yet relatively ill-understood, relationship, we must first determine what a civil conflict is because to understand the causes of a phenomenon we must first identify what that phenomenon is. This is particularly true of civil conflict, as it is not the only form of contentious, or non-routine, politics and as a result may be easily confused for other distinguishable events.

The key elements in any definition of civil war or civil conflict is that it is: (1) fought within one state, (2) between at least two parties of the state, one of which is a recognized government, (3) there is effective resistance by both parties, and (4) the violence occurring in battle exceeds some specified (usually death) threshold within a given period of time. There is little debate concerning the first two criteria but much contention over the latter. More specifically, there are a number of definitions of civil war and civil conflict which employ different thresholds for battle deaths. Characteristics of datasets which acknowledge
a different between civil conflict and civil war, the criteria for civil conflicts feature lower death thresholds than the criteria of civil war.

The oldest and most established data source on civil wars is J. David Singer’s Correlates of War Project (http://www.correlatesofwar.org). The Correlates of War (COW) defines a civil war as on that is:

- fought within state borders between a government and non-government forces… the central government should be actively involved in the military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths during the civil war. In order to constitute effective resistance, both sides must have been initially organized for violence conflict, or the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains. (Small and Singer 1982)

The unit of observation in this COW dataset is the year, therefore the battle death criteria is applied in each given year; any year in which battle related deaths are fewer than 1,000, no civil war is considered to have occurred. Additionally, five percent of fatalities must be inflicted by the weaker party so that other, usually top-down, forms of political violence such as genocide or massacres are not mistaken for civil war; and the parties to conflict must be a government and a non-government, domestic organization so that an interstate war is not mistaken for a civil war. While most agree with these other criteria utilized by COW, many find the 1,000 battle death threshold to be too constraining. Furthermore, this is truly only a dataset which records civil wars, rather than a similar but less destructive form of violence, low-level civil conflict.

In response to such critiques, the International Peace Institute, Oslo’s (PRIO) Center for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) chronicles civil violence which takes place within a given year but does not produce at least 1,000 battle related deaths. The definition of conflict adopted by this organization presents conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Harbom, Strand, and Nygard 2009). This definition differs from that of COW’s in two main ways. First, it specifies that the conflict may either be over the government or territory (not relevant to the present study), and second, it specifies a lower threshold in order to take into account conflict below a
high-level civil war. This increases our empirical leverage and allows us to consider other forms of violence which are equally as significant for the numerous countries which experience them.

Thus, for the purposes of this project, it is important to note that the form of violence I am studying is internal to a country and that we are considering low-level civil conflict (25+ deaths per year) rather than just high-level civil wars (1,000+ deaths per year) only. This analysis is restricted to civil conflict for two reasons. First, utilizing a death threshold of 25 battle deaths rather than 1,000, I am able to capture a theoretically salient phenomenon. Although the higher threshold indicates a more severe conflict, there are many important conflicts with less than 1,000 battle deaths per year. In general, 1,000 battle deaths could be viewed as a somewhat arbitrary cutoff, particularly given that it applies a uniform criterion to a non-uniform set of cases; conflicts with fewer battle deaths are particularly significant in countries with smaller populations (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004) but are not included when utilizing this higher threshold. By utilizing a lower threshold, more politically relevant conflict events are included in the analysis. Second, the cases under examination (India and Pakistan) are primarily host to low-level conflicts. In fact, in the case of India and Pakistan, there is only one high level conflict and the variables of interest perfectly predict the outcome, therefore rendering the models ineffective. Finally, while the initial conflict is included in my sample due to its meeting the afore-mentioned criteria, I am not only interested in it as a civil conflict within India or Pakistan but within a particular subnational unit of these countries.

So, as mentioned in Chapter 1, all civil conflicts are, in the most basic sense, similar. They are similar in that the fighting, and those engaged in the fighting, are confined to one country. They are similar in that the conflict takes place between a recognized government and at least one domestic opposition group. And they are similar in that they produce a particular amount of death and, therefore, societal destruction. So, while the goals of civil conflict might be diverse, the methods varied, and the outcomes sundry, there are a
few critical similarities that allow us to define a civil conflict as just that. It is this traditional definition which I apply, while examining the subnational unit at which the conflicts take place; the temporal unit of analysis is the year. So, the civil conflict onset variable is a dichotomous variable coded “1” where there is an initial battle fought and “0” in all periods without the first battle of a civil war where the battle death threshold is not met; subsequent ongoing years of conflict are dropped from the analysis. In this case, onsets are coded for the Indian federal state or the Pakistani province in the year in which they occur. Onset data for India comes from Urdal (2008), while I have coded civil conflict onsets in the case of Pakistan. Data for both were generated by first relying on the PRIO list of civil conflicts and then gathering information on the location of these conflicts from various major newspapers and relevant UN and NGO reports.

Secessionist Opposition Movements

The second dependent variable is the type of opposition movement. The coding of this variable was accomplished by referencing major world newspapers, UN and NGO reports, and opposition databases for explicit mentions of the goals of the particular opposition groups (identified by PRIO) which were active in each civil conflict. Where opposition groups had explicitly mentioned goals consistent with secession (not to be confused with movements for autonomous subnational units within the country), they were coded “1.” Otherwise, groups without secessionist goals were assigned a “0.” Because civil conflicts are rarely simple, there was, in many cases, more than one rebel group operating in a given civil war. In these situations, if even one rebel group had secessionist goals, they were coded “1.” For instance, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the All Bodo Student’s Union (ABSU) were simultaneously operating within Assam during the late 1980’s. The ULFA has been fighting for an independent Assam

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71 It might also be necessary to discuss what a civil conflict is not. A civil conflict is not a non-violent or even a violent protest; it may begin as a protest, but these are inherently different things. A civil conflict is also not genocide or a revolution; it may produce either or both of these things, but they should be treated as the independent phenomena that they are.

72 Autonomous opposition movements are quite frequent in India where ethnic minorities have been very successful at being granted their own autonomous states within the Indian Union.
while the ABSU (and various groups which succeeded it) has fought for the rights of Bodoland. The ABSU and subsequent movements have indicated that they would settle for a separate Bodo state, but the ULFA were calling for complete separation to form an independent, sovereign country:

In 1987 came the launch of a more violence movement for the separation of all Assam lands north of the Brahmaputra, to form a separate state called Bodoland. The Bodo tribesmen who answered a student call to arms used bows and arrows as well as guns to back their demand, and killed scores of security force members. Last year saw the reactivation of a dormant movement to withdraw the whole state from India the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) (Brown 1990).

Thus, the goals of groups are often very diverse. However, the presence of even one group calling for independence is a significant event and should be noted as such.

It is important to note that I am not interested in whether groups actually succeed in their endeavors, but rather simply if these were their goals to begin with, as this is the outcome hypothesized in Chapter 3. The Indian opposition groups with explicit secessionist demands operating during the time period of this study are: Naga Nationalist Council (Assam); United Liberation Front of Assam (Assam); various Kashmiri insurgents (Kashmir); People’s Liberation Army (Manipur); Naga Nationalist Council (Nagaland); Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland Isaac-Muivah Faction (Nagaland); various Sikh insurgents (Punjab); and Tripura National Volunteers (Tripura). Of these opposition groups, only the Kashmiri insurgents, Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland, and the Sikh insurgents are not associated with a particular ethno-linguistic group. The only secessionist opposition group operating in Pakistani conflicts over the time period of observation is the Balochi separatists.

### 4.2.2 Independent Variables

The primary independent variables of interest are three types of ethnic composition: ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and changes in the relative size of ethnic groups on civil conflict onset as well as the type of opposition movement which arises. As previously argued, it is essential to distinguish between these different types of ethnic because they each affect opportunity and willingness differently.
Though initial theories of conflict depended on primordial grievance-based views, subsequent research has proven the deficiencies of such an approach because measures of ethnic fractionalization simply do not fully represent ethnic cleavages (e.g., Reilly 2000/2001; Fearon 2003a). To illustrate, take an example from Fearon (2003a: 208) in which he presents a scenario where there are two countries (E and F) which each have 3 minority groups. Country E’s 3 groups each comprise 33% of the population. In country F, however, the population for the three groups is 55%, 30% and 15%. Their fractionalization scores are not dramatically different, though; they are 0.67 and .059, respectively. “…the fractionalization scores for countries E and F are not that different, even though one might expect their ethnic politics to differ markedly given that there is an absolute majority in F but not in E. He concludes, “As a one-dimensional measure, F cannot fully capture differences in ethnic structures that are intuitively significant” (Fearon 2003a: 209). As such, it is important to move beyond a conceptualization of ethnicity which primarily focuses on ethnic fractionalization as the source of any conflict which pits one ethnic group against another. Identifying ethnicity is not easy matter; furthermore, establishing legitimate ways to capture each of these different types of ethnic composition are equally as challenging. Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the means by which ethnicity is defined and therefore how ethnic groups are identified and their members counted.

All measures of ethnic composition are based on language (specifically mother tongue) data gathered from Indian and Pakistani census reports. For India, all demographic data, including language data, was compiled from the 1971, 1981, and 2001 censuses. For Pakistan, language data was compiled from the 1981 and 1998 censuses; for the purposes of generating the most complete dataset, additional demographic data was gathered for the years after 2000 from the Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS), and various surveys administered by the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics.73 The years for which data could not be

73 Please note that Pakistani language data was not as consistently available as Indian language data. Namely, the Pakistan census of 1972 did not include a question pertaining to language (mother tongue) in
obtained were filled in through a process of interpolation. Mother-tongue data serves, at least in these two countries, as adequate proxies for ethnicity given their unique histories in which language has consistently been linked to ethnicity—both by members of ethnic groups and by their respective governments, though obviously more so in the case of India given that the States Reorganization Act of 1956 actually organized Indian states along these ethno-linguistic lines in an attempt to prevent future conflict. In general, language is a useful proxy for ethnicity because a common language is necessary for the continued existence of a distinctive ethnic group which can communicate its history and customs, and it is also serves the functional purpose of contributing to the development and mobilization of opposition groups.

Ethnic Fractionalization

When making claims about the effect of ethnicity on conflict, the focus of scholarly and policy circles—as well as the mass media—tends to be the degree of fractionalization. Traditional explanations of violence focused on a positive relationship between fractionalization and conflict onset. However, I hypothesize, consist with later opportunity theories of civil war, that high levels of ethnic fractionalization might serve to decrease the propensity of conflict due to high coordination costs.

The term “ethnic fractionalization” simply refers to the extent of ethnic heterogeneity in a given state. This measure takes into account the number of ethnic groups, as well as the number of particular individuals belonging to an ethnic group, within a specific area. In this case, I am utilizing the most common measure of the phenomena, which is actually ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF); this measure treats ethnic groups as being synonymous with language groups. As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, this might not be true in every case, and particularly for every country, but it is a fairly accurate reflection of ethnic groups in India Pakistan and is the most viable operationalization available.

an effort to promulgate the view that there is only one nationality in Pakistan which is united by the bond of the national language, Urdu, which only about 7% of the population claim as their native language (Rahman 1995).
The calculation for this variable is based on the Herfindahl concentration formula:

$$ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2$$

where $s_i$ represents the share of group $i$ out of the total $n$ groups. This permits the calculation of the probability that two randomly selected people (out of a country’s entire population) will be from different ethno-linguistic groups; the higher the probability, the more ethnically diverse the country. The final variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates a perfectly homogenous society, and 1 indicates a perfectly heterogeneous society.

**Ethnic Dominance**

As discussed, ethnic dominance also has the potential to influence conflict dynamics. The overwhelming presence of one particular ethnic group might indicate an obvious control over resources and decrease the ability of an opposition force to mobilize (at least mobilize a group of sufficient size to be viable). Alternatively, the presence of a dominant group might increase the grievances in society therefore increasing the probability of conflict. Ethnic dominance has consistently been found to increase the probability of conflict. However, once domestic institutions are taken into account—particularly the absence or presence of a strong federalist system—this relationship should vary. Specifically, I hypothesize that in the presence of a strong federal system, as is the case with India, that ethnic dominance will actually decrease the likelihood of a civil conflict onset. However, in the absence of this institutional feature, as in Pakistan, the effect of dominance will remain positive in terms of its overall effect on conflict onset.

Ethnic dominance indicates a situation in which there is a clearly dominant ethnic group in a given area—a group which has the ability to leverage the most control over politics, economics, and the social organizations in society. Typically, ethnic dominance is coded as a simple dichotomous variable; either there is an ethnically dominant group (coded 1) or there is not (coded 0). However, although previous results concerning ethnic dominance are far more consistent than those concerning ethnic fractionalization,
the operationalization of dominance vary across studies; it varies because a number of alternative cut-offs are used when determining ethnic dominance. A substantial amount of the work which examines the effect of ethnic dominance seems relatively atheoretical in regard to why a particular dominance cut-off criterion is established. These existing criteria range include the following population requirements for an ethnic group to be deemed dominant: 45%+, 50%+, 60%+, or if the population falls between 45% and 90%.

Conceivably, any of these compositions of population could be considered an ethnically dominant society. As a result, I explore the effect of a number of the previously mentioned criteria for ethnic dominance. In order to tease out which ethnic population compositions are driving previous results concerning ethnicity (whether it is a 45% dominant society, or a 60%, and so on), I also examine the effect of various ranges of the size of the largest ethnic group. In all tests, though, the data come from the Indian and Pakistani Census which are collected at the state and provincial levels, respectively.

Changes in the Relative Size of Ethnic Groups

By collecting mother tongue data for more than one time point, I am able to observe the effect of changing ethnic populations. By this, I simply mean that I am able to examine how changes in the relative sizes of ethnic groups influence the onset of conflict and the goals of opposition groups. There are various reasons to expect that changes in the relative size of ethnic groups will affect conflict. Arguments put forth by Peterson (2002), Lake and Rothchild (1996), Horowitz (1985, 2001), and Toft (2007) lead me to hypothesize that the larger the changes in the relative size of ethnic groups, the more likely are both conflict onset and opposition groups with secessionist goals. These hypotheses are based on explanations concerning increased fear and uncertainty, and decreased information during times of large population shifts.

The measure of relative ethnic population changes takes into account the sizes of each ethnic group in relation to the other, as well as the size of the population changes which take place; thus the overall magnitude of the changing ethnic population dynamics is observed. This measure is based on a distribution of power measure. More specifically, I replicate the MOVE variable as proposed by Singer, Bremer, and
Stuckey (1972) and used by Edward Mansfield (1994) but with regard to change in ethnic group populations (which is indicative of their potential power) rather than major powers in the international system. I measure $EMOVE$ as follows:

$$EMOVE_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_t} \left| S_{it} - S_{it-10} \right|}{2(1-S_{im})}$$

In this equation, $S_{it}$ is the proportion of the aggregate population constituted by the largest ethnic group $i$ in time $t$, and $m$ is the ethnic group which has the smallest population—that has the smallest amount of population power.

Therefore, $EMOVE$ reflects the number of percentage power (or population) shares that have been exchanged between and among the ethnic groups in a given time period. Because there are so many ethno-linguistic groups in India, and because opposition by an ethnic group which only constitutes an almost insignificant amount of the population is unlikely, this variable is calculated for the five largest ethnic groups in each state or province; thus, $N_t$ is always “5.” Relative population changes amongst those groups (which are by far the majority of the population, particularly given India’s attempt to create homogenous states) are likely to be responsible for nearly, if not all, of the conflict—if such a relationship actually exists. And so, the $EMOVE$ variable actually reflects the number of percentage power shares exchanged between and among the five largest ethnic groups in any given state. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents no relative population changes and 1 represents complete relative population change.

4.2.3 Control Variables

In order to avoid erroneous conclusions, I include a variety of control variables in each model. The coding of these variables and their data sources are included below. Additionally, an abbreviated presentation of this information, along with the expected effect of the variable, is included in Table 7.
Religion

Religion is also an important component to consider in the onset of civil conflict—particularly in India. In some instances, religion is understood as a key component in ethnicity. In fact, religion is often used interchangeably with the term “ethnicity,” and particularly so in India, given the fact that the majority of civil conflict in this country has revolved around religion. However, associating religion with ethnicity and presenting them as the same phenomena are two very different things, and the latter is certainly problematic. While religion is often a salient cleavage in society, and there is usually a religious component to ethnic identity, they are not interchangeable. The members of an ethnic group usually share a religion, however, the members of a religious group do not share the same ethnicity. In the case of India, Hindu is the dominant religion, but there are numerous ethnic groups which all identify with the Hindu faith. In Pakistan, the dominant religion is Islam, but a number of distinct ethnic groups exist within this larger faith community. So, conflict revolving around religion is not the same as a conflict which revolved around ethnicity, and vice versa.

Because ethnicity and religion are not synonymous but the fact that religion is a salient identity marker, it must be controlled for as a potential factor in civil conflict. India in general, and Indian states in particular, are more religiously diverse than are Pakistan or the Pakistani provinces. As such, the means by which I control for the effect of religion differ in the alternative country models. For India, I consider the effect of religious heterogeneity. This variable is calculated in the same manner as the ethnic fractionalization variable, and comes from Wilkinson (2004) who collected Indian census data. Additionally, heterogeneity should not be of much consequence for opposition group goals—at least not compared to the specific ethnic makeup of the country. In particular, given tensions between Hindu and Muslim populations in India and the means by which India and Pakistan were divided (according to religion), I expect that areas with a non-Hindu majority will be more likely to have opposition groups seeking secession. These data come from Wilkinson (2004).
In the case of Pakistan, religious heterogeneity is of little interest, given the significantly small non-Muslim population. However, because the size of the Muslim populations differ across provinces and time (the Muslim population ranges from 91% to nearly 100%), I consider the percent Muslim in each Pakistani province. This data was gathered from the 1972, 1981, and 1996 Pakistani censuses.

**Distance from Capital**

Distance from the country’s capital is, of course, going to affect the dynamics of civil war because the capital is the center of power (Buhaug and Gates 2002). Those areas closest to the capital can be more easily controlled by military forces as they are more quickly dispersed to the region, coordination costs of deploying are significantly less, and the probability of a dissatisfied populace is less because the state’s ability to penetrate can diminish with space. Therefore, similar to Buhaug and Gates (2002), I control for the distance between the country’s capital and the center of the subnational unit.

These data are generated using Google Earth tools which permit relatively simple calculation of the distance between any two places in a given country. To get the most precise measurement possible, I calculate this measure as the distance between power centers: in other words, the distance between the country capital and the capital of each subnational, or administrative, unit. For example, the distance from the capital to the state of Gujarat is calculated as the kilometers between New Delhi and Gandhinagar. Where subnational capitals changed over time, this change was reflected in the point of calculation for the year in which those changes took effect.  

**Petroleum Reserves**

At the aggregate level, a fair amount of evidence exists that the presence of lootable resources increases the viability, and possibly greed, of rebel groups (Campbell 2002; Collier and Hoefllier 1998, 2002, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Keen 1998; Lujala et al. 2005; Ross 2004; de Soysa 2002). As a

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74 Due to its location, Bihar has both a summer and a winter capital. Given the yearly format of the data, I average the distance between New Delhi and the altering state capitals of Patna (winter) and Ranchi (summer).
group’s viability increases, so does the probability of a civil war onset. Similarly, the presence of loitable resources in a particular geographic unit might increase the odds of that unit hosting a civil conflict. Consistent with contemporary research, these increased odds might be the product of capitalizing on atypical opportunity in order to ensure viability for the group, or as a way to simply generate extra rents; if it is the latter, we might also expect those rebel groups to desire secession as an ensured way to control the economic rents which result from the resources of that subnational unit.

Oil, in particular, has been found to influence the likelihood of conflict. When disaggregating the effects of various types of primary commodity exports—those often targeted by rebel groups—oil is found to be a significant driving factor in this relationship (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2004; de Soysa 2002). In order to account for these effects, I include measures of petroleum reserves in each subnational unit. Given the high degree of difficulty associated with the actual extraction of petroleum, I consider the influence of those reserves which are actually in production. Therefore, subnational units with petroleum ongoing extraction efforts are coded “1” while all others are coded “0.” The data come from PRIO’s Geographical and Resource Datasets (Thieme, Rod, and Lujala 2007). The “Petroleum Dataset” contains information on all the known oil and gas deposits in the world; each deposit is assigned a geo-coordinate so that the subnational unit they exist within is easily determined. Due to extraction capabilities and the difficulty associating off-shore deposits with a particular subnational unit, I include the on-shore deposits only.

Due to data reliability, I do not consider the effect of the total number of wells in production but rather simply if at least one exists. Though not ideal, it is the most viable solution at this point, given data availability. Only 9 of the 28 Indian states are host to onshore petroleum reserves. However, all four Pakistani provinces have petroleum reserves. Due to the constant presence of petroleum production wells across Pakistan during the time under observation, this variable is included in models considering the
relationship between ethnicity and conflict onset or type for India only; it simply does not make sense to utilize a constant to predict a variable.

**Youth Bulges and Sex Ratio**

Also consistent with an opportunity approach, the ratio of men to women, particularly young men, in a given state or province is important to include in any model of conflict. Urdal (2008) argues that disproportionate sex ratios particularly important in the presence of youth bulges, as this is indicative of a large, male population. Young men are typically the primary recruiting target of rebel groups, and thus the presence of a disproportionate amount of males presents potential rebel groups with a larger opposition force. Therefore, as Hudson and den Boer (2004) argue, substantial surpluses of young men are a considerable security risk; they even go so far as to cite India as being susceptible to such a risk given high male to female ratios in particular states. While this may seem particularly likely in India, as Urdal (2006, 2008) confirms, the cross-national evidence of the relationship between large male youth populations and the onset of civil war is to the contrary (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Youth Bulge is defined as the portion of the population which consists of 15 to 24 year olds. Sex ratio is defined as the number of males per female in each state or province. The Indian data come from Urdal (2008), which is based on Indian census data. Data for Pakistan come from Pakistani censuses and the Pakistan Demographic Survey; data were interpolated for missing data points and then calculations for sex ratio and youth bulges were generated. Consistent with previously cited theory and studies, the variables are then interacted to determine their true effect.

**Population**

Various population configurations and changes to those configurations might result in an increased or decreased propensity for conflict. Most particularly, the density of populations and the growth of populations, particularly urban populations, have been found to significantly affect the likelihood of civil conflict.
In general, the effect of population pressures is assumed to be the effect of population density. Population density can affect both mobilization opportunity and repression opportunity. Rebel groups operating in areas with high population density have a larger pool of recruits to access at a lower cost (given the smaller area). At the same time, though, government forces have a larger portion of the population within a smaller area, and therefore, when they choose to exercise control over the population, the costs are lower and control is easier.

Given the opportunities presented to both actors, it is not surprising that the findings concerning population density are contradictory. Population density has been found to slightly increase the likelihood of civil conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen 2001; de Soysa 2002), but on the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) conclude that population density has no significant effect on the likelihood of civil war (1,000 battle deaths) onset. It is likely that relatively quick, low-level opposition movements benefit from lower mobilization costs in dense areas but that the advantage is transferred to the government in the case of more extensive movements which must be sustained for a longer period of time. This would certainly explain the divergent results discussed above. Regardless, it is necessary to control for the effect of population density as measured by the number of people per square kilometer. The Indian data come from Urdal (2008), and the Pakistani data come from Pakistani censuses (1972, 1981, and 1998) and the Pakistan Demographic Survey (2001 and 2003); data points for the uncovered years were interpolated.

Alternatively, urban population growth has the potential to increase the likelihood of conflict for a variety of reasons.\footnote{Despite a theoretically sound argument linking urban population growth to conflict, evidence also exists to the contrary (for example, Urdal 2005, 2008; Homer-Dixon 1999). This is likely due to the fact that urban population growth matters in combination with other factors.} First, large-scale population growth in urban areas due to industrialization and development might initially prove a problem in terms of resource availability. In particular, urbanization might make scarce the essential commodities such as fresh water (Klare 2001), or perhaps more importantly, the economic and social means to deal with this increased population (Goldstone 2002). The
Iranian Revolution of 1979 exemplifies this argument best. Preceding the revolution, rapid levels of urbanization was accompanied by rural populations moving to urban centers in order to receive some of the material benefits associated with a better standard of living. However, combined with the Shah’s high military spending, the economy did not keep pace with increasing urban populations; additionally, there was little effort to offset the negatives associated with moving to an over-populated urban center without any means to support oneself. Thus, in the absence of adequate economic and social mechanisms (unemployment benefits, affordable and sufficient housing, etc.), grievances increased dramatically and an opportunity was created for opponents of the regime to fill the void, thus increasing the likelihood of conflict.\footnote{While the Iranian Revolution was certainly not this simply, the rapid increase in urban populations did play a significant role.}

Therefore, it is important to take into account the effect of urban population growth. Urban population growth data for India come from Urdal (2008) who collected the data from various Indian censuses. For Pakistan, urban population data were collected for each province from the 1972, 1981, and 1998 censuses and from the Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS) for 2001 and 2003. Data points were interpolated for the in-between years, and then urban population change measures were created from year to year.

**Inequality**

Inequality has long been thought to contribute to the likelihood of conflict. Initial theories of conflict were couched in grievance terms and largely relied on inequality data to test their arguments (e.g., Davies 1962; Gurr 1968, 1970). These scholars have posited that inequality is indicative of the gap between the realizations and expectations of individuals; in the presence of a significant gap between what one expects to receive and what one actually received (economically, politically, or socially), individuals will be more likely to join together in an effort to generate change, satisfy their demands, and thus bring their
expectations and realizations into equilibrium. Grievance theories would have us believe that the greater the inequality, the higher the probability of civil conflict.

Due to different types of data available for India and Pakistan, the measures of inequality differ across models. In the case of India, I include individual measures of *urban inequality* and *rural inequality*. Inequality is measured by income distribution or, more specifically, the GINI coefficient where higher values indicate greater levels of inequality. The data come from Urdal (2008) and originated from a World Bank project on poverty in India (Ozler, Datt, and Ravaillon 1996). Data availability is more limited for Pakistan—particularly when it comes to income and inequality. As a result, I rely on a proxy for an overall level of *inequality*. Literacy is arguably an outcome of economic development and the distribution of resources across society. Therefore, I rely on literacy rate data from the three previously discussed Pakistani censuses. Specifically, I gathered data on urban and rural literacy rates, calculated the difference, and then use this to represent the inequality which exists between urban centers and the periphery. In the case of Pakistan, this is especially relevant, given the long history of conflict between the urban and rural. While this is not directly comparable to inequality in India, it is important to consider, nonetheless.

**Conflict in Neighboring State or Province**

Finally, given the transient nature of rebel groups, conflict often spreads across boundaries. While little has been done to examine the diffusion of conflict *within* countries, there is substantial research which looks at the proliferation of conflict *across* countries. The latter literature generally links the flow of conflict to refugee movements, shared ethnic groups across country boundaries, and a search for superior funding opportunities. We might expect that the same considerations would take place at the intra-state level, and that opposition groups might move the conflict based on a search for resources to fund them, the cover of mountains or forests, or a search for more recruits. Therefore, I control for the presence of an ongoing conflict in a neighboring state or province. This is a simple dichotomous variable coded “1” in a year in
which subnational unit A shares a land border with subnational unit B which is experiencing a civil conflict (25+ battle deaths); all others are coded “0.”

### 4.3 Model Specifications

Due to different types and levels of data availability, as well as unique situations in each country, the relationship between ethnicity and conflict are considered separately. As such, there are four primary sets of analyses considered here: the onset of civil conflict in India; the onset of civil conflict in Pakistan; the opposition goals of rebel groups in India; and the opposition goals of rebel groups in Pakistan. Although I run a variety of models in order to test for robustness, the full models analyzed are as follows:

#### India

(I) \[ \text{Onset} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EFRAC} + \beta_2 \text{RFRAC} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_5 \text{SRAT} + \beta_6 \text{BULGE} + \beta_7 \text{SRAT*BULGE} + \beta_8 \text{UINEQ} + \beta_9 \text{RINEQ} + \beta_{10} \text{PGROW} + \beta_{11} \text{DENS} + \beta_{12} \text{NCON} + \beta_{13} \text{ONSET}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]

(III) \[ \text{Onset} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EDOM} + \beta_2 \text{EFRAC} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_5 \text{SRAT} + \beta_6 \text{BULGE} + \beta_7 \text{SRAT*BULGE} + \beta_8 \text{UINEQ} + \beta_9 \text{RINEQ} + \beta_{10} \text{PGROW} + \beta_{11} \text{DENS} + \beta_{12} \text{NCON} + \beta_{13} \text{ONSET}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]

(V) \[ \text{Onset} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EMOVE} + \beta_2 \text{EFRAC} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_5 \text{SRAT} + \beta_6 \text{BULGE} + \beta_7 \text{SRAT*BULGE} + \beta_8 \text{UINEQ} + \beta_9 \text{RINEQ} + \beta_{10} \text{PGROW} + \beta_{11} \text{DENS} + \beta_{12} \text{NCON} + \beta_{13} \text{ONSET}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]

(VII) \[ \text{Type} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EDOM} + \beta_2 \text{NHINDU} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_{12} \text{TYPE}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]

(IX) \[ \text{Type} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EMOVE} + \beta_2 \text{NHINDU} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_{12} \text{TYPE}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]

#### Pakistan

(II) \[ \text{Onset} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EFRAC} + \beta_2 \text{RFRAC} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_5 \text{SRAT} + \beta_6 \text{BULGE} + \beta_7 \text{SRAT*BULGE} + \beta_8 \text{UINEQ} + \beta_9 \text{RINEQ} + \beta_{10} \text{PGROW} + \beta_{11} \text{DENS} + \beta_{12} \text{NCON} + \beta_{13} \text{ONSET}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]

(IV) \[ \text{Onset} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{EDOM} + \beta_2 \text{EFRAC} + \beta_3 \text{DIST} + \beta_4 \text{PET} + \beta_5 \text{SRAT} + \beta_6 \text{BULGE} + \beta_7 \text{SRAT*BULGE} + \beta_8 \text{UINEQ} + \beta_9 \text{RINEQ} + \beta_{10} \text{PGROW} + \beta_{11} \text{DENS} + \beta_{12} \text{NCON} + \beta_{13} \text{ONSET}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \]
\[ \beta_{SRAT*}BULGE + \beta_{UINEQ} + \beta_{RINEQ} + \beta_{PGROW} + \beta_{DENS} + \beta_{NCON} + \beta_{ONSET(t-1)} + \varepsilon \]

(VI) \[ \text{Onset} = \alpha + \beta_1 EMOVE + \beta_2 RFRAC + \beta_3 DIST + \beta_4 PET + \beta_5 SRAT + \beta_6 BULGE + \beta_7 SRAT*BULGE + \beta_8 UINEQ + \beta_9 RINEQ + \beta_{10} PGROW + \beta_{11} DENS + \beta_{12} NCON + \beta_{13} ONSET(t-1) + \varepsilon \]

(VIII) \[ \text{Type} = \alpha + \beta_1 EDOM + \beta_2 MUSLIM + \beta_3 DIST + \beta_4 PET + \beta_5 TYPE(t-1) + \varepsilon \]

(X) \[ \text{Type} = \alpha + \beta_1 EMOVE + \beta_2 MUSLIM + \beta_3 DIST + \beta_4 PET + \beta_5 TYPE(t-1) + \varepsilon \]

where EFRAC = Ethnic Fractionalization; EDOM = Ethnic Dominance; EMOVE = Ethnic Movement; RFRAC = Religion Fractionalization; NHINDU = Non-Hindu Majority; MUSLIM = Percent Muslim Population; DIST = Distance between Power Centers; PET = Active Petroleum Reserves; SRAT = Sex Ratio; BULGE = Youth Bulge (population ages 15 to 24); INEQ = Inequality between Urban and Rural; UINEQ = Urban Inequality; RINEQ = Rural Inequality; PGROW = Urban Population Growth; DENS = Population Density; and NCON = Conflict in Neighboring Area.

In sum, I am examining the effect of ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and changes in relative size of ethnic groups first on civil conflict and then on the type of opposition movement which emerges within the conflict. The results from each of these models are presented and discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS

The relationship between ethnicity and conflict is quite complex. This complexity is evident in the many contradictory conclusions offered in contemporary academic literature, as well as the way in which some of this literature conflicts with the picture painted by the popular press. In order to best establish the true nature of this relationship, I engage in a subnational analysis of India and Pakistan, distinguish between three types of ethnic composition, and offer hypotheses for the effect of these three types of ethnic composition on conflict that are consistent with a mobilization approach. Chapter 2 includes a detailed justification of the particular conceptualization of ethnicity adopted for the purposes of this project, along with explanations of the difference between ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and changes in the relative size of ethnic groups. In Chapter 3, I go on to derive different hypotheses for the different types of ethnic composition given their individual properties as well as how they interact with the domestic, institutional factors of India and Pakistan. Finally, I describe the data and methods employed to evaluate the hypotheses that are explicated in Chapter 3.

In this chapter, I present my findings. I first discuss the effect of ethnicity on civil conflict onset. Models I and II feature results for a logistic regression analysis of the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and conflict in India and Pakistan, respectively. In short, neither Model I nor Model II provide evidence for hypothesis 1, although for different reasons; contrary to my expectations, ethnic fractionalization does not have an impact on the likelihood of conflict onset in India, but there is a positive relationship between the two in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{77} Models III and IV illustrate the relationship between ethnic dominance and the onset of conflict. Results from Model III are consistent with hypothesis 2 and indicate that ethnic dominance decreases the probability of conflict onset in India, but Model IV produces results

\textsuperscript{77} As is discussed in more detail in section 3.11, this is possibly due to the fact that the most heterogeneous provinces are also the least penetrated by the central government. Consequently, these findings could be an artifact of an omitted variable.
which are contrary to hypotheses 3 as the presence of an ethnically dominant group in Pakistan proves to have a negative effect on the likelihood of civil conflict. Model V examines the effect of changes in the relative size of ethnic groups on civil conflict onset in India, and consistent with hypothesis 6, the larger the change in the relative size of ethnic groups, the more likely a civil conflict will start.

After a discussion of factors which affect the onset of civil conflict in India and Pakistan, I address effect of ethnicity on opposition groups with secessionist goals. Models VII and IX examine the relationship between ethnic dominance and relative ethnic population changes, respectively, on opposition goals. While Model VII confirms that higher levels of ethnic dominance are associated with a decreased likelihood of a secessionist opposition movement in India (hypothesis 4), Model IX does not confirm support for a positive relationship between higher levels of change in the relative size of ethnic groups and secessionist movements (hypothesis 7). Overall, I find support for hypotheses 2 and 4; no support for hypotheses 3 and 7; and partial support for hypotheses 1 and 6. Because of a naturally small sample size, quantitative models for Pakistan are limited. Due to data limitations which arise over such problems, I am unable to estimate Models VI, VIII, and X, and therefore cannot completely evaluate hypotheses 5, 6, and 7; I supplement this lack of quantitative analyses with more descriptive and qualitative evidence.

5.1 Civil Conflict Onset

The onset of civil conflict is of particular interest to scholars of international relations and comparative politics for the many reasons discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. In this section, I discuss the effect of three types of ethnic composition: ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and change in the relative size of ethnic groups. This discussion is based on a series of quantitative models (Tables 8, 9, and 10), which analyze these effects at the subnational level of analysis in India and Pakistan. Because the dependent variable — onset — is binary, the method of analyses utilized is a logistic regression; all models are clustered
on the subnational unit and estimated with robust standard errors. Given that the magnitude of coefficients cannot be directly interpreted from these logistic regressions, discussions of change in predicted probabilities and graphs of the relationship between significant independent variables and the probability of conflict onset are included.

5.1.1 Ethnic Fractionalization and Onset

Initial literature concerning the causes of civil conflict indicated that most domestic violence was the result of ancient, primordial hatreds which necessarily exist between different ethnic groups. Although this is often still the approach adopted by mass media, the majority of contemporary, scholarly evidence finds this position illegitimate based on an absence of evidence of a primordial basis of ethnicity. Given this non-primordial view of ethnicity itself, there exists a core group of scholars who assert that ethnic heterogeneity should have no significant impact on the likelihood of conflict—neither positive nor negative. These scholars most often believe that an ethnically diverse society is no more or less likely to experience conflict than an ethnically homogenous one. Put simply, this view takes the absence of evidence of a primordial basis of ethnicity to also mean that ethnicity cannot be associated with the onset of conflict. Contrary to this view, a third group of scholars, those who view ethnicity in instrumental terms and take an opportunity approach to conflict, argue that ethnic heterogeneity should actually lead to a decreased propensity for civil conflict because of difficulties associated with generating a sufficient opposition force.

Hypothesis 1 is based on the latter: an opportunity approach to conflict onset. This hypothesis is evaluated for India and Pakistan in Models I and II, respectively. As is evidenced in Table 8, I find no support for hypothesis 1, though the hypothesis is rejected for different reasons based on separate India and Pakistan models. However, due to the limited observations, Pakistan models could not accurately be estimated when including this information. As for the India models, the effect of all variable of interest (ethnic composition) remained the same in terms of significance and direction, but the results for other variables changed inconsistently. It should also be noted that in the cases of both India and Pakistan, models of conflict incidence (beginning year of conflict and each ongoing year) are consistent with the onset models presented here.
Pakistan models. Model I demonstrates that ethnic heterogeneity has no significant effect on the onset of civil conflict when examined at the subnational level of analysis in India. Contrary to some previous findings, ethnic heterogeneity neither increases nor decreases an Indian state’s chance of experiencing a civil conflict. Therefore, contrary to the primordial theory of ethnicity, ethnically diverse populations can reside within the same area and not feel the need to challenge the government in an attempt to garner more power or resource. Recall that this is a theory of civil conflict, not inter-communal conflict. Therefore, these results do not speak to the effect of ethnically heterogeneous populations to live peacefully as neighbors or colleagues. Rather, it indicates that where state governments are not controlled by an ethnic majority (assuming a distribution of political power that reflects the distribution of population power), this does not increase the chances that a group will be able to mobilize an opposition to challenge that government.

Alternatively, ethnically diverse states are not characterized by an increased level of conflict which might be perpetrated in order to “strong-arm” more power and/or resources relative to other ethnic groups.

This finding does not mean, however, that there is a negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity, as I hypothesized. The coefficients in Model I are insignificant, which indicates that ethnic heterogeneity does not depress mobilization potential either. It should be noted that while these results could be a reflection of reality, they could also be a product of the sample. In particular, as previously mentioned, the Indian states were created with the express intention of avoiding ethno-linguistic heterogeneity—largely because of a fear of the conflict which administrators were afraid would result. A cursory look at the ethno-linguistic fractionalization scores of each state show that the majority of states have relatively low ELF scores, though the data is far from completely skewed.

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This applies only to states with relatively stable ethnic populations, as will be discussed in more detail later.
Table 5.1: Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Civil Conflict Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I India</th>
<th>Model II Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
<td>5.07 (4.19)</td>
<td>95.08* (49.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Heterogeneity</td>
<td>5.82 (5.7)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslim</td>
<td>-- (1.89)</td>
<td>-2.10 (--1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Capital</td>
<td>.0002 (.0009)</td>
<td>-.012 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-.003 (.004)</td>
<td>.026*** (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Reserves</td>
<td>2.04 (1.47)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge</td>
<td>-25.42 (24.9)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>19.76 (15.83)</td>
<td>.563 (.479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge*Sex Ratio</td>
<td>2086.77* (1153.2)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Inequality</td>
<td>.042 (.083)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Inequality</td>
<td>-.015 (214)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population Growth</td>
<td>-.106 (.108)</td>
<td>-6.52e-10 (.02e-09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in Neighboring State/Province</td>
<td>1.27 (1.28)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.29 (8.40)</td>
<td>74.75 (101.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations | 492 | 131
Log Likelihood         | -29.12 | -9.17
Pseudo R²              | .29 | .35

All tests are two-tailed tests, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: All models are estimated with robust standard errors and they are clustered on the subnational unit.

As is obvious from Model II in table 8, hypothesis 1 must also be rejected in the case of Pakistan, although not because the relationship is insignificant. In the case of Pakistan, it seems— at least at first glance— that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization actually increase the probability of conflict onset. In
fact, as Figure 5.1 shows, there is a strong positive relationship between heterogeneity and conflict onset. The effect cannot be interpreted where the confidence intervals cross 0; keeping this in mind, this simple bivariate plot of the relationship between heterogeneity and the probability of conflict onset shows that by moving from an ethnic fractionalization score of just over .4 to a score right at .9 increases the probability of a civil conflict onset by about 7 percent. While this is not that substantial in absolute terms, it certainly is in relative terms.

![Predicted probability of armed conflict onset](image)

Figure 5.1: Ethnic Fractionalization and Conflict Onset, Pakistan

This being said, I am hesitant to take this as undisputable evidence against hypothesis 1. First, the sample size is fairly small, and as a result, findings could be driven by a substantially small number of outliers. Second, given that there are only three civil conflict onsets that are isolated to two of the four Pakistani provinces, the possibility of ethnic fractionalization being correlated with another omitted variable is fairly high. In particular, I suspect that the degree of state penetration into the two provinces which have played host to civil conflict and exhibit the highest levels of fractionalization—Balochistan and Sindh—is
also largely responsible for the violence. Pakistan, in general, is a low functioning state in terms of its ability and/or willingness to perform vital tasks of the federal government throughout the country. The ability of Pakistan to control major areas of the question has long been questioned. Perhaps most indicative of this inability is the existence of non-provincial territories widely known for their “Wild West” atmosphere. The rugged and porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has presented numerous challenges for Coalition forces in the Afghanistan offensive since its initiation in 2001; although the inability of the Pakistani government to control the border had long been a problem, it finally attracted the attention of international audiences once the military offensive began and has only become more salient since.

Balochistan and Sindh are the most removed provinces from the capital of Islamabad in terms of absolute distance. As you can see from the map of Pakistan (Appendix 3), Islamabad is located in the Northeastern portion of the country while Sindh province is the most Southwest Province and Sindh is the most southeast; it is 1141 kilometers from Islamabad to the capital of Balochistan (Quetta) and 1476 kilometers from Islamabad to the capital of Sindh (Karachi). In addition, Balochistan is the largest province in terms of area, with the outermost areas far outside the normal reach of the Pakistani federal government. As a result of low government penetration into the Pakistani periphery, Balochistan has especially become known for its connections with the Taliban-Al Qaeda. Quetta, and especially the northern areas of Balochistan have become known for their link to the terrorist group. This division of Al Qaeda, operating openly from the provincial capital of Quetta and known as the “Quetta Shura,” conducts attacks inside Balochistan and Afghanistan, according the General Stanley McChrystal (Balochistan Assessment- 2010).

The status of this province as a terrorist stronghold is evidence of the lack of central government presence in the area.

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80 For a good illustration of this problem pre- and post-9/11, read Asne Seierstad’s (2003) The Bookseller of Kabul.
81 As opposed to only 187 kilometers between the capital of the country and the capital of North-West Frontier Province (Peshawar) and 376 kilometers between Islamabad and the capital of Punjab (Lahore).
Therefore, although Pakistan is a highly centralized system in practice, it is necessary to note that it is low functioning in terms of the ability and/or willingness of the government to penetrate the periphery. Perhaps this is due to limited means, or it is a result of concentration on the conflict with India over Kashmir, which is farthest from Sindh and Balochistan than the other provinces. As of the year 2000, there were four Pakistani air force bases (as the air force is central in the conflict with India) in both Sindh and Balochistan for a total of eight bases, while there were fourteen air force bases in the other two provinces combined (Federation of American Scientists). While this may not seem completely disproportionate, it is when you consider that the total area which each province constitutes: the area of Balochistan is 347190 square kilometers; Sindh is 140914 square kilometers; Punjab is 205344 square kilometers, and North West Frontier Province is 74521 square kilometers. Therefore, the total area of the two conflict-prone areas is 488104 while the total area for the remaining two provinces is 279865. Despite this, the much smaller area had almost twice as many air force bases in their territory in 2000, largely as a result of the approximation of the constant source of threat in Kashmir. As Charles Tilly (1990; 1991) famously argued, the state made war and war made the state; if we combine Tilly’s arguments with that of Herbst (2000), it could simply be that until relatively recently — when Pakistan became key to the War on Terror — there was not a significant threat which necessitated that the central government turn their attention to Sindh or Balochistan.

As a result, the lack of state penetration is highly correlated with ethnic heterogeneity in these two provinces and could potentially be responsible for an increases probability of civil conflict. Though it is impossible to definitely establish this relationship at this point, future research will incorporate measures of state capacity and state penetration into the quantitative models in order to correct for this potential deficiency. For now, suffice it to say that in the absence of a theoretical link between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict — not to mention any statements by the Balochi separatists to indicate their goals has anything
to do with ethnic hatred—it seems premature to accept the quantitative results found in Model II and graphically depicted in Figure 5.1.

5.1.2 Ethnic Dominance and Onset

The results concerning dominance perhaps present more questions than they answer. As expected (hypothesis 2), the presence of an ethnically dominant group proves significant in Model III (a) of Table 9. Using 45% and 45% to 90%\(^\text{82}\) criteria, ethnic dominance appears to suppress conflict onset in India. Results from Model III (b) indicate that when using the 60% criterion, however, the dominance variable is insignificant, though barely. It would seem that based on these results, it is really the states where dominant ethnic groups comprise 45% to 60% of the population that are driving this negative relationship. Perhaps an ethnic group is dominant enough when they constitute between 45% and 60% of the population to maintain control but still not secure enough in their position to be able to engage in extreme forms of repression; once the group becomes exceptionally dominant, however, they are able to engage in more repression and perhaps generate more minority grievances.

The actual effect of ethnic dominance on the probability of a conflict onset is fairly substantial. The probability of a conflict onset in a state without an ethnically dominant group is roughly 30%, while the probability of the same event is only 10% in a state with a dominant group. To better illustrate, let us consider the historically relevant choice that India made in 1956 with the States Reorganization Act. Had Nehru and others not succumbed to the pressures of ethno-linguistic groups throughout the country and not organized state boundaries along these ethno-linguistic boundaries, we might have since witnessed much more conflict in India; in fact, for each state that might not have been home to a dominant ethnic groups, we would expect three times as much conflict as in those with a dominant group.

\(^{82}\) The 45% and 45% to 90% models produce such similar results that only the former is presented in Table 9.
Table 5.2: Effect of Ethnic Dominance on Civil Conflict Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model III (a)</th>
<th>Model III (b)</th>
<th>Model IV (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominance 45%</td>
<td>-3.49***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-4374.8***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(113.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance 60%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.626</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Heterogeneity</td>
<td>7.66*</td>
<td>8.10*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.99)</td>
<td>(4.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslim</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-14.79***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Capital</td>
<td>.0009</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>12.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Reserves</td>
<td>2.60*</td>
<td>2.52*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge</td>
<td>-29.98*</td>
<td>-21.15</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.42)</td>
<td>(21.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>25.35</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.78)</td>
<td>(17.43)</td>
<td>(.594)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge*Sex Ratio</td>
<td>2354.57*</td>
<td>2094.21*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1402.31)</td>
<td>(1314.64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Inequality</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Inequality</td>
<td>-.264**</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.179)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population Growth</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>.00001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.102)</td>
<td>(3.67e-07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in Neighboring State</td>
<td>.854</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>-4.33</td>
<td>-13222.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.40)</td>
<td>(7.66)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of Observations   | 492           | 492           | 131          |
| Pseudo R²                | .31           | .27           | .41          |

All tests are two-tailed tests, *p<.05, *p <.01, *p<.001***

Note: All models are estimated with robust standard errors and they are clustered on the subnational unit.

Though causal mechanisms are often hard to directly derive from quantitative models, it would seem that, consistent with the theoretical relationships put forth in Chapter 3, the presence of an ethnically dominant group makes it appear as though other ethnic groups have little to no chance of significantly
affecting policies, where they are not of the same opinion as the dominant group. This is particularly true given that India is a federal democracy, and in such majorities — especially extreme majorities — rule politics at the state level. Similarly, due to decentralized, federal institutions, dominant ethnic groups benefit from the ability to control state politics; the Northeastern “Seven Sisters,” which have been most conflict-prone due to geographic location and the related issue of immigration, are given even more autonomy (i.e. asymmetrical federalism) to ensure the ability of states to significantly govern themselves and address any distinctive needs or interests. In addition, politics at the country level in India are controlled by the Congress Party, which is for all effective purposes a coalition party characterized by ethnic inclusion.

As a result, dominant majorities within states, which are minorities at the country level, are left with few grievances (due to little to no discrimination) and the ability, in many ways, to control their own destiny. Therefore, even though ethnic groups possess a unique ability to mobilize for opposition actions, the ethnically-dominant states of India discourage such action. For minorities within the state, the likelihood of success is simply due to small chance of success against such a dominant majority, and as a result the ability to recruit for opposition forces is greatly diminished. And for the dominant ethnic groups in these states, there is simply no reason to take on the risks of conflict given the high level of satisfaction which results from the autonomy which characterizes an ethno-federalist system. It would seem that this effect is strengthened the larger the dominant group is, particularly relative to the second largest group. Figures 4, 5, and 6, which are found in Appendix 7, provide some initial support for this position.

Model IV provides evidence that is contrary to hypothesis 3 but consistent with the previously discussed findings for the India models. The presence of an ethnically dominant group in Pakistani provinces also proves to have a negative effect on civil conflict onset. Again, ethnic dominance is based on a 45%
The probability of conflict onset is reduced from around 6% when there is no dominant ethnic group to roughly 3% in the presence of a dominant group. Although the confidence intervals cross the threshold of significance at each point of interest, it should be kept in mind that this is a graph of a simple bivariate relationship; as is obvious from Table 9, when all other variables are controlled for, the relationship is significant. To compare, this is a reduction in conflict of about 50% in Pakistan and about 66% in India. Therefore, while the findings are contrary to hypothesis 3, the effect of dominance remains larger in India — likely because of the added effect of federal institutional features. Therefore the theoretical relationship between ethnic dominance and conflict onset, as conditioned by the presence of federal institutions, should still be considered; it is merely necessary to not understand the power of ethnic dominance on its own.

Along these lines, it is necessary to address how dominance has any negative effect on conflict onset in Pakistan. As previously discussed, Pakistan is what most would call a low-functioning state. Specifically, it lacks the ability and/or willingness to penetrate all areas of the country; there are many areas in which the power of the central government is not felt. To extend on the evidence offered in the previous section, Balochistan and Sindh have largely been neglected — particularly relative to Punjab, and in some ways even the North West Frontier Province. For instance, from a practical standpoint, roads are essential to a central government’s ability to penetrate a particular area. A central government which is able and willing to make its presence felt throughout the country will build sufficient roads in order to make the transportation of goods and services into those areas, as well as in an effort to perform basic tasks like census and tax collection. The amount of roads, therefore, is indicative of the degree of central government penetration.

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81 I am only able to estimate models of ethnic dominance at this particular cut-off for Pakistan because when using the 60% cut-off, the independent variable perfectly predicts failure (0) on the dependent variable.

84 A good literary commentary on the penetration of the Pakistan central government into various areas of the country is found in Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin’s *Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace… One School at a Time* (2007).
into various areas. In the case of Pakistan, Punjab, by far, is home to the most roads with 71,010 kilometers, or 27% of the roads in the country; Balochistan is next with 31,005 kilometers, or 12% of the roads; finally, Sindh and North West Frontier Province each have about 4% of the total roads (Bureau of Statistics 2009). Of these roads, almost all of those in Punjab are of the “high” quality type, the majority of roads in North West Frontier province are high quality, but significantly less than half of the roads in Balochistan are of this same quality (Bureau of Statistics 2009). Statistics on educational facilities (especially secondary and college level) reflect that same pattern of stratification, or differing degrees of penetration. Thus, overall, Punjab (and of course the federal capital territory of Islamabad) is the primary focus of the Pakistani central government, with the other provinces experiencing significantly less penetration. As a result, dominant ethnic groups still have a large degree of control over their provincial lives— as we would see in a federalist system— and therefore exhibit similar effects as those in India, though to a more limited degree due to a lack of federal institutions.

This evidence is offered to make the following point: there is simply little reason for an ethnically dominant group in a peripheral province to initiate a conflict with the central government because, for the most part, the central government is absent from their lives. In a situation reminiscent of anarchy, a dominant group is able to determine their own actions in the present and likely in the foreseeable future. Minorities, on the other hand, still have a dominant majority to contend with, thus discouraging rebellion through the low probability of success and therefore low movement viability.

So, in sum, both the properties of ethnic dominance and the presence of federal institutions in combination with ethnic dominance prove to have a suppressant effect on civil conflict. In both India and Pakistan models, it is clear that the presence of an ethnically dominant group decreases the onsets of civil conflict.

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85 Recall that Pakistan is comprised of more than just the four provinces, and this is why the previously reported statistics do not total 100%, as roads are located in other parts of the country. In fact, the fact that other non-provincial areas exist and census statistics are only collected for one of them (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) speaks to the fact that the central government’s penetration is limited; census data is not gathered for these other areas due to an inability to do so.
conflict. In the case of India, this effect is relatively larger—likely due to the impact of federal institutions, and perhaps even more so the reliance on asymmetrical federalism for the troublesome “Seven Sisters.” The policy implications of this are vast. It would seem that countries hoping to mitigate civil conflict (of any kind, not necessarily ethnic) can do so by creating ethnically dominant subnational units. If these states are already moving down the road to democracy, they can combine this territorial policy with a choice to adopt federal, and perhaps even asymmetrical federal, institutions.

5.1.3 Changes in Relative Size of Ethnic Groups and Onset

Results from Model V, found in Table 1.10, prove interesting as well. This model examines the effect of changes in the relative size of ethnic groups within a state on the probability of conflict onset. Though hypothesis 6 is formulated in terms of India and Pakistan, I am only able to estimate a model for India, due to Pakistani data limitations; after generating ten-year lags necessary to calculate a measure of ethnic population change, there is no variance on the dependent variable in the case of Pakistan when considering this variable’s effect. However, the evidence from India is extremely telling, and, based on my theory, I expect there to be no differing effects in the case of Pakistan in the event that I could estimate the model.

It would seem that large changes in the relative size of ethnic groups (at least the five largest) within a state over a ten year period significantly increase the likelihood of that state experiencing a civil conflict. Given the democratic and federal nature of India, these results should not be a surprise. The criteria by which Indian states were created naturally advantaged one ethno-linguistic group over the others (except in the case of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland). Moreover, power is largely tied to the size of one’s ethnic population in these states; the ability to influence politics increases with the size of the group. Therefore, when there are large changes in terms of relative ethnic population sizes, insecurity and fear over your group’s future potential to influence politics and the redistribution of resources develops. Put more simply, when your ethnic group is now smaller relative to another ethnic group, you will begin to fear that the
Table 5.3: Effect of Relative Changes in Ethnic Populations on the Onset of Civil Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model V</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Population Movement</td>
<td>211.63** (83.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Heterogeneity</td>
<td>4.61 (7.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Capital</td>
<td>.00008 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-.009* (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Reserves</td>
<td>1.42 (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge</td>
<td>-9.17 (87.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>-42.86 (29.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge*Sex Ratio</td>
<td>1172.16 (781.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Inequality</td>
<td>-.27 (.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Inequality</td>
<td>.004 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population Growth</td>
<td>.016 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in Neighboring State</td>
<td>2.69** (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.25 (9.17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 404
Log Likelihood -19.70
Pseudo R² .44

All tests are two-tailed tests, *p< .05, *p < .01, *p<.001***
Note: All models are estimated with robust standard errors and they are clustered on the subnational unit

power you currently have will decrease given the new population makeup, especially in a federal democracy; the state which was promised to “your group” also begins to look less and less like yours. And
so, the larger the relative population changes, the more likely conflict to occur. Figure 5.2 illustrates the substantive effect of this process. Recall that larger values on the independent variable indicate a greater degree of change in terms of ethnic group size. Therefore, the larger the degree of change in the relative size of ethnic groups the more likely a conflict onset to occur. The magnitude of this effect is rather considerable. The probability of a conflict onset at the maximum value of relative ethnic population changes in my dataset is nearly three times higher than the probability at the minimum value in the dataset. While the absolute increase in the probability of conflict onset is not as substantive as the effect of ethnic dominance, the relative effect is. These effects are, however, in divergent directions. Consequently, the benefits garnered by having an ethnically dominant group in a subnational unit can be somewhat mitigated by ethnic population shifts. As at least some population shifts are unavoidable due to changing birthrates, as well as immigration and emigration. It is fortunate, then, that the absolute effect of ethnic dominance seems
to be substantively larger. However, this does point to the fact that even if we were to turn to the radical proposal of Chaim Kauffman it would be impossible to ensure a stagnant population and the benefits which he claims would necessarily follow.

These findings are consistent with the argument put forth in Chapter 3. Specifically, the position advocated by Peterson (2002) is that resentment over a previously dominant group declining in power relative to another group is largely responsible for conflict. The size of an ethnic group relative to other groups is important because numbers matter when it comes to the allocation of property rights, jobs, education, language rights, etc. (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 44). When population changes occur, insecurity over the allocation of those resources and services increases, thereby also escalating the probability of conflict. Essentially, population changes are accompanied by fear and uncertainty which more easily lead to the onset of civil conflict (Horowitz 1985, 2001; Lake and Rothchild 2001; Toft 2007).

Nowhere else is this more obvious than the Northeastern states of India known as the “Seven Sisters.” These states have undergone drastic population changes due to economic immigration, largely from Bangladesh. This is similar to the situation that the Southwestern United States is in with Mexican immigrants. The Seven Sisters are more prone to conflict than the rest of the country, but perhaps less so than if the central government had not adopted asymmetrical federal institutional arrangements for this region in an attempt to prevent said conflict.

5.1.4 Onset Control Variables

For the most part, control variables across all onset models behave as we might expect. What is most striking across all models is the effect of religion. In the case of India, religious fractionalization, or heterogeneity, seems to generally have a positive effect on the onset of civil conflict; The relationship is positive across all models and significant in Models III (a) and III (b). These findings are consistent with Wilkinson’s (2008) seminal book on religion and conflict in India, in which he found that religiously fractionalized states are far more likely to have a civil conflict. Someone with a basic knowledge of Indian
history should not be surprised by these findings. Whereas ethnic conflict in India is not often discussed, religious conflict certainly is. The Hindu-Muslim divide is well known and often discussed. A constant battle by the Muslim minority to influence and state and country-level politics has produced a number of violent conflicts.

Interestingly, it is quite possible that a decision to avoid ethnic conflict, coupled with a strong federal system, has predisposed India to this fate. At the time of independence, there was considerable debate over the creation of states. Several powerful people, along with large masses of populations throughout the country, called for states to be divided according to mother tongue. There was another faction which wanted the same but with regard to religion. Decision-makers, more specifically the States Reorganization Commission, were hesitant to align state boundaries with either of these identity forms. However, it was eventually decided that ethno-linguistic was an unwanted potential reality and that extremely heterogeneous states might bring this reality to fruition. And so, the States Reorganization Commission eventually conceded and the Indian states were created to correspond as closely as possible to mother tongues so that each group would have a relatively homogenous homeland of sorts. It would seem that this effort has been relatively successful when one considers the low number of civil conflicts despite such high levels of heterogeneity, country-wide. Although it is impossible to observe what the outcome would have been given an alternative decision regarding state boundaries, the fact remains that the ethno-linguistic divide has proven far less divisive than the religious divide—despite the obvious importance of mother tongue, which was discussed in Chapter 2.

Measures of religious fractionalization are not that useful in the case of Pakistan since the population is so overwhelmingly Muslim, but religion remains an important component of identity and social interaction and therefore must be included. Consequently, I measures of the percentage of the total population which are Muslim was included. As we would expect, this variable is negative and significant in one of the two Pakistan onset models (Model IV), and is close to significant in the other model. Simply put,
the larger the Muslim population in a given province, the lower the chance of a civil conflict onset. We should take this finding to indicate that areas with more adherents to the Muslim faith had fewer opportunities to engage in a conflict with non-Muslim others. In the face of such dominant Muslim populations, religious minorities will not rebel due to little to no chance of success, and, likewise, the dominant Muslim population is not threatened by such a small minority.

There are also several opportunity variables which, on average, behave as we would expect. First, the distance between power centers, or from the country capital to the capital of the subnational unit, is significant and positive in one of the two Pakistan models. This finding is indicative of the ability of government forces to prevent and repress rebellions if they are closer to the power center. This is especially true in a country like Pakistan—one in which the central government’s penetration is diminished with distance. First, it is important to note that in the case of Pakistan, the effect of distance is likely very strong due to the fact that such an imperfect variable is still significant. An ideal measure would not calculate the difference between the two power centers but rather between the country capital and the specific location of the conflict onset. This is especially evident in the case of Balochistan where many areas of the province are nearly as far from the Quetta as Islamabad is. The lack of such a measure is perhaps responsible for the inconsistent findings across Models II and IV. Second, the absence of a significant relationship in the India models should not be understood as an undermining of the findings for Pakistan. India and Pakistan are almost incomparable in this regard due to the vast discrepancy between their degrees of penetration and control; a high functioning, decentralized state apparatus renders the effect of distance from New Delhi nearly irrelevant.

The effect of population density and urban population growth has been heavily debated. First, on the one hand, high levels of population density might indicate an increased opportunity for large amounts of people to interact and then mobilize against the government; but on the other hand, it could also represent an opportunity for that government to more easily repress, given that the majority of participants will be
contained to a small area. Unfortunately, this study does more to contribute to the debate in the sense that I too find contradictory results. The effect of population density is insignificant all but one India model, Model V. The Pakistan models produce puzzling results as well; the relationship is positive and significant in Model II but negative and significant in Model IV. It could be that the effect of population density produces opposite effects depending upon the proximity of Pakistani provinces to the capital; population density could advantage opposition forces in remote areas while it advantages the government in those areas close to the capital by decreasing the area necessary for government control—areas which are easily accessed by the government only, though. Unfortunately, splitting the sample to test this proposition is not possible due to such a limited sample size, but evidence concerning the isolation of conflicts to the more remote provinces of Balochistan and Sindh would indicate this is likely.

Second, urban population growth is also debatable. Large levels of population growth can potentially put a strain on available goods and services therefore increasing grievances, or at the very least increasing the opportunity for opposition group leaders to fulfill the role of the government and therefore increasing recruitment. Alternatively, urban population growth could be indicative of a higher degree of development and the increased standard of living which accompanies it, thereby having the opposite effect. The evidence offered here is still contradictory. The variable is positive and significant in the Pakistan ethnic dominance model, and insignificant in all other Pakistan and India models. These puzzling results could simply be a product of the fact that relatively few areas of India or Pakistan are considered urban, therefore the importance of urban population growth is limited.

Other variables which approximate opportunity for conflict come from Urdal’s (2008) subnational analysis of India. These results generally conform to his results and demonstrate support for an opportunity theory of conflict. States which have a large teenage male population, or a larger rebel recruitment pool, are more likely to have a civil conflict. When all constituent parts are interpreted, the overall effect of the interaction between youth bulges and sex ratio is positive and significant in all India models, except one,
where tested; in the one model where the variable proved insignificant, it was only barely so. When faced with the decision concerning variable inclusion in the Pakistan models, sex ratio was the opportunity variable included; due to a limited number of observations, not all variables could be used. Sex ratio is not, however, significant in the Pakistan models, likely because it is only significant in the combination with youth bulges.

Perhaps most interesting of the control variables, the presence of petroleum reserves proves to increase the likelihood of a civil conflict in a state; these results are rather robust, as they stand up across two of the four India models presented.86 While petroleum rents benefit the entire country of India, the states in which they are located benefit substantially more than do the other states. In addition, Indian state governments have a considerable degree of discretion in terms of spending the rents associated with these petroleum reserves. Therefore, these governments are particularly attractive to rebel groups; controlling a government in a state with petroleum reserves allows a group access to far more financial benefits than would controlling the government in a state without them. However, given that these results are not significant in all models, this deserves further examination.87

Somewhat unexpectedly, the findings for the conflict in neighboring state and inequality variables are, for the most part, insignificant. Civil conflicts often have spillover effects—at least in terms of international borders. The effect of conflict in a neighboring state is only significantly positive in Model V. Given the intentional concentration of ethnically-similar peoples in each state, there are fewer social ties which might otherwise attract conflict participants as we see in the interstate contagion of conflict. Additionally, due to a highly independent federal system in the case of India, the issues which plague one state might not plague

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86 As previously mentioned, there is no variance on this variable in the case of Pakistan, and so it was excluded from those models.

87 Interestingly, models of conflict incidence (not included for the sake of space) demonstrate that the presence of petroleum reserves has a positive and significant effect across all India models. Therefore, while petroleum reserves might not prove to robustly influence the onset of conflict, it does seem to be a factor in the perpetuation of conflict, likely due to issues of viability.
one which is contiguous to it. The significant result in Model V could perhaps be attributed to the fact that higher levels of change in the relative size of ethnic groups could be due to conflict in the neighboring state. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, disentangling the sources of population change will be addressed in future research in order to better specify this relationship. In Pakistan, the low level of integration between provinces as well as the de facto concentration of ethnic groups could have the same effect, thereby making the effect of conflict in neighboring provinces irrelevant for onset in other provinces.

As for the inequality variables that are included in the India models only (again due to limited observations in the case of Pakistan), they too prove insignificant with the exception of Model III where it is negative and significant. Given previous findings of aggregate studies couched in grievance terms, this is not overly surprising. Davies’ and Gurr’s original grievance arguments are based on individual responses to individual feelings of relative deprivation. Therefore, an aggregate approach is not necessarily an appropriate means to test these hypotheses and therefore is responsible for unlikely and/or inconsistent results.

5.2 Type of Opposition Goals

The onset of civil conflict is not the only phenomena of interest here. Specifically, I consider if decisions made by the Indian government following independence—namely, the redistributing of territorial boundaries along ethno-linguistic lines and the implementation of federal institutions—have inadvertently pre-disposed the country to a particular type of conflict: secession. In other words, are the positive effects of ethnic dominance for the onset of civil conflict mitigated by its effect on propensity for secession? As discussed in Chapter 3, previous scholarship indicates that this is especially risky in the presence of federal subnational districting along ethnic lines (e.g., McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Nordlinger 1972; O’Leary, McGarry, and Salih 2005; Rubin 2006; Vile 1982) due to concentrating an ethnic group’s power in one specific location, thus making secession viable.

However, viability must also be accompanied by willingness, and in the case of India, I posit that the willingness to secede will not be present given the high degree of autonomy afforded states by a
decentralized, federal system. In the region which has shown the most promise for conflict, this is especially true, as the Seven Sisters are given even more autonomy than the rest of the country—largely in an attempt to prevent violence and secession. So, the question becomes, was the States Reorganization Committee right in their decision, or did Nehru’s fears of ethnic nationalism prevail and potentially lead to secession? Does dominance not only decrease the probability of conflict onset but also attempts at secession when combined with ethno-federal institutions?

Each conflict was coded as one in which the opposition group(s) sought secession or not. Once again, a logistic regression is used due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable; I cluster on the subnational unit and estimate models with robust standard errors. Due to a small sample size and little to no variance on the dependent variable in the case of Pakistan, I am only able to examine this relationship in the context of India. In the case of India, I find support for hypothesis 6 but not for hypothesis 7. Results are found in Tables 11 and 12.

5.2.1 Ethnic Dominance and Opposition Goals

The first secession model considers the effect of ethnic dominance on the presence of an opposition group with secessionist goals. Model VII (a) considers the effect of ethnic dominance at a 45% cut-off while Model VII (b) examines the effect of dominance at the 60% cut-off. The first model indicates that ethnic dominance at 45% does not significantly influence attempts at secession. On the other hand, ethnic dominance at 60% does significantly affect secessionist opposition goals, and consistent with hypothesis 4, this effect is negative. Therefore, the presence of a dominant ethnic group not only decreases the probability of conflict onset but also the probability of secessionist opposition goals. Substantively, the effect of ethnic dominance is quite large. The probability of an opposition group seeking secession in a state without a dominant ethnic group is five times more than in an Indian state with a dominant ethnic group. Dominant ethnic groups are in a position to secede if they are so willing. However, in the case of India, there is such a high degree of autonomy for the states that secession is not as appealing as it might be.
otherwise. Recall all of the policy issues that Indian states have decision making power over. Perhaps most

| Table 5.4: Effect of Ethnic Dominance on Secessionist Goals |
|-------------|-------------|
|                | Model VII (a) | Model VII (b) |
|                | India        | India        |
| Dominance 45%  | -.901        | --           |
|                | (.835)       |              |
| Dominance 60%  | --           | -1.55*       |
|                |              | (.869)       |
| Non-Hindu Majority | 1.79          | 1.13         |
|                | (1.20)       | (1.45)       |
| Distance from Capital | .001         | .0005        |
|                | (.0007)      | (.0006)      |
| Population Density | -.001       | -.001        |
|                | (.003)       | (.003)       |
| Petroleum Reserves | 1.88**     | 1.62*        |
|                | (.811)       | (.825)       |
| Constant       | -3.36*       | -2.75*       |
|                | (1.66)       | (1.16)       |
| N              | 973          | 973          |
| Log Likelihood | -261.16      | -252.12      |
| Pseudo R²      | .18          | .21          |

All tests are two-tailed tests, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Note: All models are estimated with robust standard errors and they are clustered on the subnational unit.

crucially in terms of ethnicity, those controlling the state apparatus have the ability to determine education policy, of which language policy is a significant portion. Dominant ethnic groups can control their fate, so to speak, and are sure of the benefits — both ethnic and otherwise — associated with their status within India. After all, states also have substantial control over financial policy. When considering secession, the benefits are unknown and the costs are likely high. Therefore, it is more cost efficient to remain a part of the Indian Union. Only a few opposition groups have found the potential costs of secession to be worth it, with most of them being in the removed Northeastern portion of the Indian state. Challenges facing these states have been quite different than those facing other Indian states.
5.2.2 Changes in Relative Size of Ethnic Groups

While the potential costs of secession might be too high when one’s ethnic group is the dominant group and has certain control over their present and future, there is also a question of insecurity and uncertainty due to changing ethnic population dynamics. Figure 5.2 illustrates the positive relationship between changes in the relative size of ethnic groups and the onset of conflict. I hypothesized that this was the result of increased uncertainty over their ability to control politics. Likewise, I expected that the insecurity, and later resentment, generated by large ethnic population changes would also increase the probability of secessionist attempts.

As seen in Model IX, contrary to this expectation (hypothesis 7), I find that change in the relative sizes of the five largest ethnic groups in a subnational unit does not increase the likelihood of secessionist opposition goals. It would seem that even the insecurity generated by ethnic population changes is not enough to make the costs of secession bearable—at least in the case of India. Given that ethnic minorities receive higher degrees of protection in India, the fact that there is always a chance for an ethnic group to once again become dominant or even to be granted its own autonomous state within the Union, and the presence of an ethnically inclusive Congress Party at the highest level of government, the costs of staying in the Union are far less than the potential costs of forming a separate, sovereign country.

Attempts to estimate models of opposition groups with goals of autonomy failed because there was no variance on the dependent variable. Where there have been substantial changes in the relative size of ethnic groups, there was invariably at least one opposition group participating in the conflict with the explicit goal of autonomy. India has a long history of giving in to autonomous demands, thus making this far from surprising. The Northeastern region of the country which was, at one time, simply Assam is the best illustration of this. Also, the Indian government has recently (as of December, 2009) initiated the process necessary to split a state of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh. Given the prevalence of the Indian government
Table 5.5: Effect of Relative Changes in Ethnic Populations on Secessionist Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model IX India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Population</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>(2.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hindu Majority</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Capital</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Reserves</td>
<td>2.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N Log Likelihood   -46.72  
Pseudo R²    .16  

All tests are two-tailed tests, *p<.05, *p<.01, *p<.001***  
Note: All models are estimated with robust standard errors and they are clustered on the subnational unit.

giving in to autonomous demands, it is likely that most opposition groups would rather fight for the much more real goal of autonomy rather than secession.

5.2.3 Control Variables

The control variables for the three secession models are somewhat puzzling, primarily given the fact that they are largely insignificant. In none of the models is the presence of a non-Hindu majority significant. However, given that even non-Hindu populations have substantial protections under the Indian Constitution, and there is sufficient enforcement through an independent judiciary, this is not overly surprising. After all, when there is a means to rectify the situation constitutionally, there is little motivation to attempt secession — an act with unknown, yet likely high, costs. Population density is also insignificant
in all models of secession, similar to the previously discussed onset models. It would seem that population density does not advantage opposition groups and enable them to make secessionist demands.

Consistent with the onset models of conflict, the distance between power centers (country and state capitals) is not significant in any of the secession models either. To reiterate, the power of the Indian states is sufficient enough that the power of the government, overall, is not diminished across space. Given the degree of penetration, federal and state governments have the ability to deter and suppress secessionist opposition movements.

Petroleum reserves are a significant and positive indicator of secession in all three models. This finding certainly deserves further study, as it is impossible to tell from these results if this relationship is the product of greedy rebel groups that want to have more control over the petroleum reserves or if it is seen as a source of viability for a future, independent state. The presence of petroleum reserves can ensure future benefits, which are certainly needed in the face of the likely costs of seceding and establishing an independent country.

5.3 Summary of Findings

A subnational analysis of India produces a variety of interesting findings— particularly in regards to the relationship between various types of ethnic composition, as well as changes in composition, and the onset of civil conflict. Despite a rather bleak and bloody picture painted by the mass media, which is reflected in some academic scholarship, I find that ethnically heterogeneous societies in high functioning, ethno-federal democracies like India are not necessarily destined to devolve into violent civil conflict. Results are still highly preliminary for Pakistan, which is radically different than India on all of the aforementioned institutional characteristics. Once accurate measures of state capacity are included, I suspect that the positive effect between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict onset will disappear; documents chronicling opposition group views and goals lead me to conclude that primordial ethnic hatred is not responsible for the conflict that we do see in Pakistan.
Additionally, subnational units that have a dominant ethnic group will be less prone to civil conflict—no matter what the institutions of the country. This effect is relatively larger, however, in the ethno-federal democracy of India. This ethnic dominance does not predispose the country to secessionist opposition attempts. In fact, it decreases the probability of such goals. Thus there is seemingly no downside to this type of territorial organization coupled with federal institutions. So, it would seem that by an ethnically diverse, federal democracy could prevent civil conflict by organizing its subnational units primarily along to ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{88}

Finally, the thing which leaders and policy makers should watch out for is substantial shifts in ethnic populations within subnational units. More specifically, where there is a large change in the relative size of ethnic groups, the likelihood of playing host to civil violence is high. The uncertainty and insecurity which are products of such population shifts allow opposition groups to mobilize in an attempt to prevent the unknown—-to prevent that which they fear.

\textsuperscript{88} This will likely not mean linguistic lines in all countries; the saliency of language and its relationship to ethnicity is important here.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

Civil conflict, which is now the dominant form of conflict worldwide, has a number of immediate and long term consequences—consequences for citizens and consequences for a country as a whole. It is these consequences that we as scholars of civil conflict hope to prevent through a better comprehension of its causes. Thus far, scholarly work has allowed us to better understand these conflict, and as such, which countries are, in general, more predisposed to them. However, despite the considerable progress which has been made, our understanding of the phenomena is still lacking. In particular, the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict have eluded definitive answer—or for that matter, even consistent answer. Oddly enough, despite the inconsistent evidence, we frequently find a picture of this relationship which indicates a primordial need to harm our ethnic other; this need is, according to a few waning scholars and a significant portion of the media, the source of most (if not all) conflict.

In order to establish the true relationship between ethnicity and the onset of civil conflict, and thus implicitly test the strength of the popular primordial theories of conflict, I undertake a subnational analysis of India and Pakistan. In this analysis, I distinguish between three primary types of ethnic composition (ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and the change in relative size of ethnic groups), which could affect the onset of conflict, while paying particular attention to the unique opportunities for mobilization that are generated by particular patterns of ethnic group distribution and changes in this distribution. Engaging in such an analysis at the subnational level has enabled me to better understand how factors which vary significantly within a country affect civil conflict—a phenomenon that is limited to a very specific geographic area—and therefore better establish causal relationships. While this is a relatively new level at which civil conflict is studied, I also improve upon existing literature by focusing on the unique ability of ethnic groups to mobilize, and by paying attention to dynamic, rather than stagnant, power relationships.
In addition, I simultaneously examine the ability to best manage these relationships between ethnic groups and the government which have the potential to generate violence. I do so within the context of India, the most ethnically diverse country in the world, and one which has remarkably avoided extensive domestic conflict. In particular, I am interested in if the Indian government’s decision to establish their subnational boundaries along ethno-linguistic lines has contributed to this low level of conflict while also avoiding any potential negative consequences as a result— namely attempts at secession by opposition groups within the Union.

6.1 Summary of Findings

Analyses of both the various India and Pakistan models produce a number of noteworthy findings. First, I find that ethnically heterogeneity is not necessarily associated with significantly increased levels of conflict. In particular, the findings from the India models show an insignificant relationship. However, it seems as though the relationship is significant and negative in the case of Pakistan. Given high degrees of correlation between heterogeneity and state capacity (or lack thereof) which is not modeled, I must stress that the latter findings should be interpreted with caution. At this point, I conclude that societies in high functioning, ethno-federal democracies like India are not necessarily destined to devolve into violent civil conflict due to ethnic diversity.

Second, the relationship between ethnic dominance and conflict onset is robustly significant and positive. I conclude that subnational territorial units with a dominant ethnic group are less prone to civil conflict— whether the country is an ethnofederal democracy or not. This effect is relatively larger, however, in the ethno-federal democracy of India, which is likely a result of the control that all significantly sized ethnic groups have over a critical level of politics. As such, ethnic groups that constitute a substantial portion of the population at the state level but not at the country level are allowed high levels of access to the political system that they would not have in a highly centralized, non-federal system. This finding certainly generates some “what ifs,” given the Indian government’s decision to organize territorial
boundaries along ethno-linguist lines and not religious lines. One must consider if this same effect could translate to the Muslim religious minority community within India.

At the same time, ethnic dominance does not have the potential negative consequences feared by many who study ethnofederal institutions; I find that India is not predisposed to secessionist opposition attempts. In fact, the presence of an ethnically dominant group in an Indian state significantly decreases the probability of opposition groups with secessionist goals. I posit that this is a product of ensured benefits if the state remains part of the union and the unknown, yet likely high, costs of secession. Though models of autonomy (where groups simply want their own state within the union rather than their own sovereign, independent country) were not able to be estimated, this in itself is extremely telling of the situation within India. Initial attempts to model the relationships between dominance and active opposition groups seeking autonomy were unsuccessful because the outcome was completely determined; in other words, in each case where there was at least one violent autonomous movement, there was a dominant ethnic group. These movements have generally been successful. A look at the division of Assam into various states and the current movements to create the new state of Telengana out of Andhra Pradesh serve as primary examples. Thus, while the models which are estimated show no downside to this type of territorial organization coupled with federal institutions, a closer examination of India politics leads me to believe that movements for autonomy (to which the Indian government nearly always concedes) are a potential consequence. So, it would seem that an ethnically diverse, federal democracy could substantially decrease civil conflict by organizing its subnational units primarily along ethnic lines, although the ability to extrapolate to other countries has yet to be fully established.

And third, a high degree of change in the relative size of ethnic groups has a large positive effect on the onset of conflict. Large relative population changes generate increased levels of uncertainty and insecurity over the ethnic groups’ current and future places socially, politically, and economically result in an increased chance of conflict. Therefore, when trying to prevent conflict, the thing which leaders and
policy makers should be extremely cognizant of is a substantial ethnic population shift within a given territory. Unfortunately, this is the area which leaders have the least control over.

6.2 Policy Implications

What are the best means by which to deal with the more than ninety percent of multiethnic states that constitute the international system? Is it to follow the slippery-slope of national self-determination with its basis in the work of John Stuart Mill (1861: Chapter 16) who advises:

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.

He goes on to reject the possibility of “free institutions” in a country made up of different nationalities where people are artificially tied together — in a country made up of a people who lack a “fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages.” 89

Based on the findings of this dissertation, are we to go with scholars such as Mill or Kaufman, or the ideas of self-determination, and allow all ethnic groups to create their own countries? Or are we to take a more measured and manageable approach such as the one adopted by the Indian Union? First, I am relatively doubtful of the popular sentiment expressed in the media and popular press that ethnically diverse societies are necessarily predisposed to conflict due to ancient, primordial hatreds. Additionally, given our inability to generate completely homogenous political units, policy makers should move past any solution which attempts to establish sovereign, ethnically pure countries and look to different ways to reduce conflict.

89 Though Mill rejects the multinational state on theoretical grounds, he does understand the potential practical constraints on this choice.
Based on both India and Pakistan results, it is possible to substantially decrease the amount of civil conflict through the creation of ethnically dominant subnational units.\textsuperscript{90} Further, in order to most effectively suppress conflict, federal democratic institutions should be employed. By allowing ethnic groups to control institutions which are critical to their present and future, the willingness to mobilize in opposition to government forces — in a secessionist opposition or otherwise — is diminished. It also ensures the existence of cross-cutting cleavages as an ethnic group which is dominant in its own state politics must work with other ethnic groups at the country level in order to achieve their goals.

Finally, the area which policy makers have the least amount of control over is the changes in the relative size of ethnic groups. These changes have a substantial effect on civil conflict onset, and therefore certainly deserve the attention of policy makers. Controversial policies concerning the sources of population change — birthrates, economic immigration, political immigration — or the collection of information concerning these changes must be considered. I offer no specific policy advice as this time because future research must first determine the individual and specific effects of each type of relative population changes.

\textbf{6.3 Limitations and Future Research}

Although this analysis produces some interesting and telling results, it is not without its limitations. The primary limitation is that of generalizability. This initial study has adopted a very time-consuming subnational approach. While I have argued that this level of analysis gives me more empirical leverage and produces more accurate results, it is not without its costs—primarily limits on how many cases a researcher can conceivably study at one time. Consequently, the current analysis only includes two countries and so the ability to generalize to other cases is limited.

\textsuperscript{90} Although my analysis does not directly test this proposition, Hale’s (2001, 2001, 2004) proposition that avoiding an ethnically dominant core unit as the best way to avoid the potential negative effects of ethnofederalism seems confirmed in the case of India.
That being said, my own future efforts to expand this study to more countries that are diverse in terms of their geographic location, regime type, domestic institutional structure, and history will help alleviate this concern. Also, it is my hope that this serves as a starting point for others interested in the very important, yet relatively ill-understood, relationship between ethnicity and conflict to undertake such analyses. Movement of the field towards this subnational approach when studying the effect of natural resources and other population variables (youth bulges, sex ratio, etc.) hopefully serve as an indication of just this.

In addition to the overall goal of increasing generalizability, I hope to strengthen this analysis in few other ways through more in depth future research. First, in order to better understand the relationship between ethnicity and autonomous movements, I plan on engaging in an analysis which is focused on India’s Seven Sisters region. In addition, since this region is the most conflict prone in general (aside from Jammu and Kashmir), a complimentary qualitative analysis for this area would prove helpful in better establishing causal mechanisms.

On a related note, I also plan to focus on the individual effects of ethnic population change. Some work by Monica Toft (2007) indicates that the source of ethnic population shifts is important in onset of civil conflict. A quantitative analysis which incorporates birthrate and immigration data will substantially add to this project. Also, the afore-mentioned regional analysis of the Seven Sisters region should produce some interesting results, as this is the region most prone to immigration. In fact, much of the tension in this region is simply attributed to the pressures of economic immigrants. Also in terms of general modeling improvement, I hope to include measures of state capacity, alternative means by which ethnic groups can process their demands (political parties, interest groups), and also examine the effect of ethnic composition on lower level conflict events such as riots, strikes, protests, etc.
Finally, an individual-level analysis\textsuperscript{91} would allow the observation of cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages and their effects and greatly improve this work. A survey with questions similar to the Afrobarometer could not only examine the existence of such cleavages, but the past actions and future willingness of individuals to participate in different types of routine and non-routine politics based on these cleaves. It is my hope that my future research will allow me to create and administer such surveys which would correct for problems associated with non-individual level analyses.

Overall, these findings are somewhat preliminary. However, maintaining clear distinctions between different types of ethnic composition (ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic dominance, and changes in the relative size of ethnic populations) allows a more detailed interpretation of results, as theoretical relationships are more clearly explicated. Also, moving beyond the use of stagnant measures of ethnicity, as well as examining the effect of ethnicity at a subnational level of analysis, permits better hypothesis testing and more valid inferences concerning the effect of ethnicity on the onset of civil conflict. These improvements lend themselves to a more accurate analysis of an important relationship. Future analyses will correct for the afore-mentioned limitations with the ultimate goal of producing more generalizable results.

\textsuperscript{91}While census data is collected at the individual level, it is aggregated before publication, and therefore individual level analyses are not possible based on this information alone.
REFERENCES


“Africa-at-Large; Ethnicity as the Bane of Africa.” *Africa News from This Day* (Lagos), May 25, 2000.


“Uganda; Politicized Ethnicity is Dangerous for Our Nation.” *Africa News from The Monitor (Kampala).* September 16, 2009.


APPENDIX 2: INDIAN STATES AND UNION TERRITORIES IN ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State or Union Territory</th>
<th>Start</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andaman and Nicobar Islands</td>
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<td>2002</td>
</tr>
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<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2002</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chhattisgarh*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadra and Nagar Haveli</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daman and Dui</td>
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*Only Indian states are included in analysis
APPENDIX 3: MAP OF PAKISTAN

Source: www.hrw.org
### APPENDIX 4: PAKISTANI PROVINCES IN ANALYSIS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
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<td>Punjab</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>Sindh</td>
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### APPENDIX 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS, INDIA

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<th>Maximum</th>
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<td>0.319</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45.724</td>
<td>28.669</td>
<td>7.640</td>
<td>168.400</td>
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## APPENDIX 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS, PAKISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
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<td>Civil Conflict</td>
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<td>.494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge</td>
<td>136</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.446</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX 7: ETHNIC GROUP SIZE AND CONFLICT ONSET

Figure 3: Effect of the Size of the Largest Ethnic Group on Conflict Onset

Figure 4: Effect of the Size of the Second Largest Ethnic Group on Conflict Onset
Figure 5: Effect of the Difference in Size between Two Largest Ethnic Groups on Conflict Onset
VITA

Caroline L. Payne was born and raised in Mountain City, Tennessee. Following her graduation from Johnson County High School in 2001, Caroline attended Berea College in Berea, Kentucky. She then graduated *cum laude* from Berea College in 2005 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science and communication studies. Caroline began her studies in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University in the fall of 2005. She was awarded her Master of Arts degree from LSU in 2008, and she will complete her Doctor of Philosophy degree in August of 2010. Following graduation, Caroline will begin a tenure-track position at Lycoming College in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, where she will teach international relations and comparative politics.