Factors driving Turkish foreign policy

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FACTORS DRIVING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Evaluation of Turkish foreign policy events suggests that both external and domestic factors have affected its determination. While a consistent pattern in foreign policy has been observed since Ottoman times, the 20th century has led to substantial challenges. Long-established Turkish foreign policy, based exclusively on external factors, was reshaped to include domestic factors as well. With the new Republic in 1923, the process of reshaping foreign policy, based on Western values, has started. The end of the Cold War started a new era in which domestic factors gained predominance. The aim of this study is to evaluate the factors that have driven Turkish foreign policy and the changes thereto in three different time periods. The most important change is primarily the shift from external factors to domestic factors, especially after the Cold War. However, the period before the end of Cold War is further subdivided into two distinct periods—before and after the Second World War. Balanced neutrality in the pre-World War II period shaped Turkish foreign policy. After the war, with the change in the balance of power in the international system, the U.S.S.R. appeared as a serious threat. The Western Alliance was in the center of Turkish foreign policy. Domestic factors became evident with the 1960 coup d’état, which led to a new constitution to allow different political groups to become active. It was the end of the Cold War which put domestic factors in a predominant position. Ethnic and religious politics posed the biggest challenge for Turkey. Based on the recent events in the international system, Turkish foreign policy is again at a turning point in which domestic factors are not only predominant, but may in fact be the driving force behind foreign policy making.
INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics is a fundamental factor in determination of Turkish foreign policy since Ottoman times (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000). According to Gallois (1990) and Boniface (2000), “geopolitics is the study of the relationships between the implementation of power policies internationally and the geographical context in which they occur.” According to Hale (2000), geopolitics is the link (in terms of continuity and consistency) between Ottoman and Turkish foreign policy. “While its geographical situation increases Turkey’s international weight, it also raises the prospect of an attack by any of the great powers with ambitions in these regions” (Hale, 2000).

Turkey is located both in Europe and in Asia, a trait shared only with Russia. Geographically, it is a Balkan, Black Sea and Mediterranean state. The Balkan and Black Sea regions are vital for strategic relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially through its ethnic, religious and cultural ties. The Mediterranean region is imperative for relations with the Arab world, Israel and Europe. While Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, considering its historical ties to the region (Mango, 1996; Aydin, 2004; Hale, 2002; Kirisci, 1997), it is also a bridge between the Middle East and Europe as well as Central Asia. Accordingly, the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) carry significant strategic importance. Turkey’s proximity to the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans both illustrates its geopolitical importance and contributes to the diversity of Turkish foreign policy. Its location in the tumultuous Middle Eastern region creates significant security concerns.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire followed a foreign policy agenda based on ‘the exploitation of balance of power’ between major European powers. With the advance of foreign

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1 As reported by Gagné (2007)
affairs institutions in the 19th century, Ottoman Empire sought ‘flexible alliances’ based on the strategic needs at the time (Okman, 2004). The new republic in 1923 led to a period of transformation from old Ottoman values to new Turkish Republic values. The Ottoman foreign policy based exclusively on external factors (for security and development) was reshaped into a policy in which accounted for domestic factors along with external factors. The emergence of the U.S.S.R. after the Second World War as a threat to the Western alliance allowed Turkey to form permanent alliances with the Western powers. Accordingly, Turkey prioritized external factors in its foreign policy making over domestic concerns during the Cold War. In this period, membership to NATO, the U.S. alliance and possible European Union membership were at the center of Turkish foreign policy making. Re prioritization of domestic factors occurred after the end of Cold War, especially with Turkey losing much of its appeal for Western powers as an ally against a less powerful Russia.

Turkish domestic turbulence had its roots in ethnic and religious diversity within the country. Islamic politics started to be more active and influential with Prime Minister Turgut Özal (1983-1991, President from 1991-1993) and even more so with Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1996-1997). Ethnic based political parties also emerged, especially with HADEP, which allied with a leftist party (SODEP) for the general elections in 1996. In 2002, AKP won a majority of the parliamentary seats and formed its own government. With the elections in 2007, AKP had 47 percent of the votes, a significant victory for any political party, and especially for a party with Islamic roots. Even though AKP followed a pro-Western foreign policy, its leaders

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2 Systemic changes were accomplished in education, economy and military. Secularism was accepted following the abolition of caliphate. Women were allowed to participate in electoral process. Arabic alphabet was replaced with Latin alphabet.

3 Halkin Demokrasi partisi (People’s Democracy Party) was based on Kurdish ethnicity.

4 Sosyal Demokrat Parti (Social Democrat Party)

5 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
were known to be against the Western alliance. It is interesting to note that Turkey is the only Muslim country with a democratic political system based upon secular principles. It is also a member of NATO, as well as the Council of Europe and the Islamic Conference. Although Turkey is mainly a Middle Eastern country (97 percent of its land is located in Asia), it has been actively seeking a membership to European Union and its predecessors for the past forty years.

The influence of domestic factors on Turkish foreign policy gained importance after the end of Cold War, especially after Islam started to gain influence in the Turkish political arena. Economic factors (especially after the financial crises of 1995 and 2001), military factors (especially after the PKK\(^6\) and the hostility of Turkey’s neighbors and some of its allies through support for terrorism and instability in Turkey), ethnic factors (especially after PKK and HADEP) and religious factors (especially after RP\(^7\) and AKP) became the driving force behind Turkish foreign policy.

Its geopolitical potential places Turkey, once again, at a focal point in light of the recent power struggle in the region. Russia is becoming more influential over energy resources in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as other energy routes. Turkey is also becoming an important alternative for energy routes. Western concerns arose due to European dependence on Russian controlled energy. With its historic stand in the region, Turkey is bound to play a crucial role in international relations. While external factors have become more influential in Turkish foreign policy, this time domestic factors (especially ethnicity and religion) cannot be ignored. An established level of democracy, active diversified multiparty politics, well

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\(^6\) Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Isci Partisi, which is a terrorist organization, as recognized by 36 countries: Australia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Canada, European Union, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Syria and United States.

\(^7\) Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
established private news broadcasting networks (which were entirely state-owned until 1991) and decreased military influence over politics are just some of the many structural changes that Turkey has undergone with its post-Cold War transformation, making it hard for policy makers to follow Cold War foreign policy.

Turkey learned several lessons during and after the Cold War about its Western alliance. Despite international opposition, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus (1974) was clear evidence for its inability to ignore domestic public pressure, even when the foreign policy is exclusively based on external factors. After the Cold War, the lack of Western support, delays in the European Union membership discussions and economic consequences of the two Gulf Wars also met with public criticism. Increased terrorist activity was blamed in part on the lack of international support. A growing number of countries supporting Armenian accusations of alleged atrocities during the First World War also created a loss of public confidence for Western allies.

In addition to international uncertainty, the unique Turkish cultural mosaic brings its own complications for Turkey. Its domestic identity crisis further complicates its position in the international system. Considering the increasing power of Islamists in politics, domestic debates over its identity as ‘Western’ versus ‘Eastern’ are more heated than ever (Aydin, 2004). While this may appear to be a domestic issue for Turkey, the outcome of the debate may in fact result in possible changes in all Islamic states. The failure or success of moderate Islam has the potential to affect political developments in other Middle Eastern countries as well. Such debate also has the potential to risk historic alliances in the region in favor of other alternatives.

Lesser (2000) argues that most of the studies tend to evaluate Turkish foreign policy based exclusively on either domestic or external factors. However, he argues that a strict distinction
between these two categories, in terms of their effects on Turkish foreign policy, appears to be superficial. Throughout its republican history, the assumption of an interaction between domestic and external factors has been quite effective in the determination of Turkish foreign policy. Especially after the Cold War, a clear evaluation requires taking both factors into account. The aim of this study is to evaluate the factors that drive Turkish foreign policy and the changes thereto over three different time periods. The most important change is primarily from external factors to domestic factors, especially after Cold War. However, the period before the end of Cold War is evaluated in two periods; before and after WWII.

Before the evaluation of Turkish foreign policy after WWII, Ottoman foreign policy in the late 19th century, and Turkish foreign policy during the first decades of the Turkish Republic must be examined, in order to understand the tenets of Turkish foreign policy in its historical depth. An analysis of foreign policy events is provided in the third chapter, which is presented in a chronological order with special emphasis on some major events that greatly affected Turkish foreign policy and caused serious shifts in the international system as well. In the conclusion, a brief summary is provided, and changes in Turkish foreign policy making in light of recent changes in international system are discussed, along with policy suggestions.
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE WORLD WAR II

Turkey is considered as a ‘middle power’ in international system, as one of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire (Hale, 2000). Power is defined as “the ability to oblige other states to take action which they would not otherwise have taken and to resist pressure to do so from other states” (Hale, 2000). A state’s power in the international system is measured as a combination of its economic capabilities and its military muscle. Based on this definition, states in the international system are categorized as great, middle and small powers. Middle powers are defined as states which have the potential to show resistance to pressure from great powers and to exert influence on neighboring small powers. They lack the power to affect international politics on a global scale. When middle powers face a security problem from a major power, they either depend on alliances or try to exploit the balance of power between great powers.

Middle and small powers are greatly affected by the structure of the international system (Hale, 2000). It is argued that both the Ottoman Empire after the 18th century and its successor Turkey shaped their foreign policy decisions based on this premise (Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2003). The Ottoman Empire preferred to cooperate with European powers in order to defend its territory against external threats. This strategy involved “playing one great power (European) against another for survival” (Aydin, 2003). Its successor, Turkey, adopted a similar policy before and during the Cold War and allied itself with the West. In this respect, the external factors were predominant in Turkish foreign policy making as well as 19th century Ottoman foreign policy.

An evaluation of Turkish foreign policy in its historical depth reveals distinct patterns since Ottoman times. Okman (2004) defines ‘responsiveness to structural attributes’ as the general conceptual framework of the Turkish foreign policy. ‘Exploitation of balance of power’ among major European powers was the primary basis for Ottoman foreign policy during its decline in
the 19th century. Major European powers, either on their own or as a group, tried to prevent other European states from entering into an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. As a response, the Ottomans successfully played European worries against each other. Based on strategic needs of the time, the Ottoman Empire sought for ‘flexible alliances’, especially with the development of established foreign affairs institutions throughout 19th century (Okman, 2004).

During this period, Great Britain and Russia were placed at the two extremes; an ally and an enemy. The decline of the empire was slowed down; however, it failed to produce the necessary mechanisms which would have allowed it to adapt to changes in the international system. The treaty of Paris (1856) recognized the Ottoman Empire as a European power, the result of European efforts to have the empire as an ally rather than an enemy. ‘Being recognized as a part of Europe’ became one of the perpetual aims of Turkish foreign policy since the Treaty of Paris 8. With the Treaty of Paris, European powers agreed to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and promised its acceptance into the European Concert once the Empire undertook reforms for the rights of its non-Muslim population 9.

The first decades of the 20th century witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this period, the Ottomans adjusted their foreign policy from a ‘flexible alliances’ strategy to ‘permanent alliances’. There were several reasons for this shift. By the late 19th century, hegemonic powers of Europe had started losing power. Great Britain tried to establish permanent alliances, and began to follow appeasement policies in order to balance the rising powers of Europe and to secure its hegemonic status. These policies paved the way for arms races between inter-bloc rivalries. Thus, it became difficult to exploit the balance of power for the Ottoman

8 In this respect, there are significant similarities between the Treaty of Paris and Copenhagen Criteria (of EU).
9 In a striking resemblance, Copenhagen Criteria projected Turkey’s accession to EU if Turkey improved the rights of its Kurdish population along with other political and economic reforms (Okman, 2004).
Empire. Eventually, the Ottoman Empire shifted its foreign policy toward establishing permanent alliances. The Ottoman alliance with Germany ended with the First World War. For the first time since the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire joined a war among major powers without any provocation or threat to its security (Okman, 2004).

At the end of WWI, the Sèvres Treaty (1920) was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers. Accordingly, the Ottoman Empire relinquished its Arab territories to Britain and France. Eastern Anatolia was divided for Armenia and Kurdistan. Smyrna (İzmir) and all remaining European territories, except for the Turkish straits10, were given to Greece. Britain, France and Italy were allowed to create zones of influence in Anatolia. A small part of Anatolian territory was left for the Turks, but under severe restrictions. The Ottomans accepted these severe conditions of the Sèvres Treaty. Meanwhile, a nationalist movement was born in Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Kemalist movement marks the first time that domestic unrest has led to foreign policy change, not for the Ottoman government but for the Turkish people. As a result, Turks fought the Independence War against the Allied powers.

The Turkish victory replaced the Sèvres Treaty with the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. However, the Sèvres Treaty has left long term impacts, known as ‘Sèvres–phobia’ or ‘Sèvres Syndrome’, in both the Turkish psyche and in Turkish foreign policy (Mufti, 1998; Aydin, 2004; Jung, 2003; Murinson, 2004). Suspicions about European intentions regarding Turkey’s integrity and sovereignty continue to be effective in shaping the public response, even today (Jung, 2003, Larrabee and Lesser, 2003, Aydin, 2004, Gundogdu, 2001).

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10 Turkish straits were to be governed by international administration, formed by the Allies.
Figure 1: Treaty of Sevres (1920)

During the interwar period, and especially between 1920 and 1931, there was a power vacuum in Europe. Immediately after WWI, political idealism was promoted as a panacea for all of the problems of world politics. Ideas of the self-determination of nations and peaceful solutions of problems by international institutions (namely the League of Nations) resonated in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. All efforts proved to be futile in creating a peaceful world order, since major powers were still trying to follow realist policies under the banner of idealism. Carr (1936) explains this failure as the fundamental incompatibility of realities of the world and ideals of politicians. He explains the failure of the League of Nations as a natural consequence of this incompatibility. The victors of WWI assumed that ‘what was good for them was also good for
the defeated powers of the war’ (Germany, Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary Empire). Thus, they tried to create a world order that would serve their interests.

During this period, Turkey began its transformation from a defeated and broken empire to a unified nation with a new political and economic structure. Certain main principles were accepted in the National Pact (Misak-i Millî) on January 28, 1920; 1) ‘one and indivisible Turkish nation regardless of religious, ethnic and linguistic differences’ and 2) ‘national unity’. These principles constituted the foundations of Turkish foreign policy for subsequent decades (Rochtus, 2004; Okman, 2004; Icduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004). Based on these principles, Turkish foreign policy was shaped around “the full independence and territorial integrity of the republic” (Larrabee and Lesser 2003). After the Independence War (1919-1922), the Lausanne Treaty was signed (24th July, 192311), the Sèvres Treaty was abolished and, most importantly, the ‘Republic of Turkey’ was born as an independent state.

In the early years of the Republic, domestic factors started to influence foreign policy decisions. Kemalist ideals advocated the modernization and westernization of the society, and they were highly prioritized. To achieve such goals, Turkey followed “a policy of neutrality with a general outlook and antirevisionist stand” (Okman, 2004; Jung 2005). It aimed to resolve problems from Ottoman times and to establish itself as a respectable member of the international system. Problems with Greece were peacefully resolved; the Christian population living in Anatolia was exchanged for the Muslim population living in Greece. The Mosul and Kirkuk disputes with Great Britain were also peacefully settled in 1926. The ‘Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship’ was signed with the U.S.S.R. in 1925. The new Republic avoided initiating any problems with its neighbors that would impede its modernization and westernization plans at

11 http://www.reference.com/browse/columbia/LausanneTr
home. In this period, “foreign policy could take second place to internal reconstruction” (Hale, 2000; Okman, 2004).

Starting in the 1930s, Turkish foreign policy moved from “its introverted stand and gained an extraverted position to the fullest extent” (Okman, 2004). While firmly protecting its neutral and antirevisionist position, Turkey moved forward to become a member of international society. Turkey became a member of the League of Nations in 1932. With the Treaty of Montreux in 1936\(^\text{12}\), the problems over Turkish Straits were also peacefully resolved. In accordance with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were demilitarized and opened to unrestricted passage of military and civilian ships. The International Straits Commission of the League of Nations was assigned as the supervising authority. The rights to control and militarize the Turkish Straits were granted to the Turkish Republic with the Treaty of Montreux.

Before the end of the WWII, it became evident that Turkey would not be able to continue with its independent and non-aligned foreign policy, based on ‘balanced neutrality’, in the face of increasing Soviet military presence and territorial demands. On March 19\(^\text{th}\), 1945 the Soviets formally denounced the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression with Turkey. On June 7\(^\text{th}\) 1945, the Soviet government demanded Soviet bases in the Turkish Straits and a revision of Soviet-Turkish border, which would allow the return of the Kars/Ardahan provinces (of Turkey) to the Soviets. The Turkish government refused Soviet demands. Meanwhile, Britain backed Turkey’s decision and the British government declared that the 1939 Treaty of Alliance was still effective. However, after the devastating effects of the WWII, Britain was in no shape to come to Turkey’s rescue in case of a Soviet attack. The Soviet threat inevitably prioritized external factors, once again, in Turkish foreign policy making. The security and continuity of the nation

was primarily dependent on ‘permanent international alliances’; domestic factors had to come second.

Initially, the United States did not show any particular interest in Turkey’s security. This was due to the misperception that the U.S. and other Western Allies could continue to work with the Soviets after the war (Aydin, 2003; Hale, 2000). When Soviet demands became viable threats about a possible Soviet occupation of Turkey (or Turkey becoming another Soviet satellite state), U.S. policies rapidly changed. Soviet aggression in Iranian Azerbaijan also contributed to this policy change in U.S. administration. As a sign of changing attitudes, on April 6th, 1946 the USS Missouri arrived in Istanbul with the official agenda of bringing the remains of Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Ertegün, who had died during the war, to Washington. This visit was viewed as a significant gesture from the U.S. to show its support for Turkey. On August 7th, 1946 the Soviets reiterated their demands for the Turkish Straits. U.S. and Britain supported Turkey’s refusal of Soviet demands. With the increasing U.S. support for Turkey, before the end of October, the Soviet government withdrew their demands about the Turkish straits and territory. Meanwhile, Britain withdrew from guardianship in the Middle East in February 1947 and U.S. took over the post with the Truman Doctrine (Hale, 2000; Isyar, 2005; Bolukbasi, 1999).
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR

A bipolar balance of power prevailed in the international system after the war. As a response to structural changes in international system, Turkish foreign policy was reshaped. Aydin (2000) notes that “In such a structure, as Aron’s paradigm states, a policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible at all for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geographical important area”. In an effort to modernize the Turkish society and the state, Turkish governments followed policies to balance domestic and external realities (Karpat, 1975). With the U.S.S.R. becoming an increasing threat to its integrity and security, Turkey turned to the West to establish a ‘permanent alliance’. Okman (2004) argues that “such a decisive shift also signifies Turkey’s continuous sensitivity towards systemic-structural alterations,” since Turkey’s alignment with the West was a result of perceived Soviet threat (Aydin, 2000).

Close military, political and economic cooperation with the West became a fundamental principle in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold war period (Bagci and Bal, 2004; Aydin, 2000). Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries were secondary to Turkey’s relations with the West (especially the U.S.). Any Turkish attempt to improve cooperation in the region (i.e. the Baghdad Pact) met with Arab states’ suspicion. Turkey was considered not as a trustworthy partner, but rather a Western spy in the midst of Muslim countries. Also, Turkey’s closer ties with the Balkans, based on ethnic and religious affinities, (i.e. in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria), took a back seat in the determination of Turkey’s Balkans policy. As long as these populations remained within the borders of the U.S.S.R. satellite states, Turkey’s attempts to improve its relations remained limited.
Beginning of the Cold War and Rapprochement with the West: 1945 - 1962

Turkey remained a one-party system from its independence in 1923 until 1946. The governing party was Republican People’s Party - RPP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) which was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues. As a result of the change in the balance of power after WWII, Turkey joined the Western alliance and realized the importance of a democratic and multi-party political system for its Western allies’ continued support. The first multi-party election was held in 1946. In the 1950 general elections, the Democrat Party has won 52.3 percent of the vote and election results led to the first change in the governing party since 1923 (Alkan, 1998). The process of democratization was in line with Turkey’s closer alliance with the Western powers.

In terms of its relations with the U.S., Turkey was included in the Truman Doctrine (1947) and received U.S. financial support, which continued with the Marshall Plan (1948). The level of economic assistance with the Truman Doctrine was about $22.2 million. This figure increased to $236 million in 1949 and, later in 1950, it peaked at $510 million. With the Marshall Plan, U.S. military aid to Turkey also commenced. However, the level of military aid was considerably higher than the economic aid. For the first year of the Plan, Turkey received $497 million in military aid compared to about $24 million in economic aid.

In 1948, Turkey joined the OECC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation; later OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) as one of the founding participants. The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) was signed in 1949 in order to sustain the containment of the Soviets. At this point, the U.S. considered Turkey’s membership (along with

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13 The economic and military aid figures are in constant 2006 US Dollars. The source of the data is the “US Overseas Loans & Grants (Greenbook)” which is available at [http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/](http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/). The constant US Dollar is used to account for the effect of inflation since 1947.
Greece) as a strain on NATO’s resources and more responsibility than they could carry. Also, NATO was initially considered as a defense organization for Northern Atlantic countries. Turkey was located outside of this geographic definition and was not considered a proper candidate (Brown, 2008). While Turkey’s application to the Council of Europe was accepted in August 1949, its application for NATO (alongside with Greece) was declined in 1950. Turkey remained intent on NATO membership, since Turkish governments considered it vital for Turkey’s security.

Meanwhile, the Turkish economy had experienced a period of growth with increased private investments, along with the mechanization of agricultural production. Due to the Korean War, agricultural products also enjoyed favorable prices (Alkan, 1998). However, DP governments failed to produce economic policies to sustain economic growth in the long-term. With the decline in agricultural prices after the Korean War, the positive trend of Turkish economy reversed. The Turkish government viewed the Korean War as an opportunity to signify Turkey’s importance for the U.S. Cold War plans, and to secure U.S. economic aid. Between 1950 and 1953, U.S. economic aid was about $400 million a year and the military aid was about $1 billion a year.

The Korean War changed U.S. perceptions about a Soviet threat. Evidently, the U.S.S.R. was willing to use its satellite states to expand its sphere of influence. It also proved that Turkey would be an asset rather than a liability for NATO. Through the Eisenhower Doctrine, the U.S. reevaluated Turkey’s geopolitical position (Brown, 2008). Accordingly, Europe became a bottleneck with the Soviets at the wide end. Flanks were crucial in order to stop a possible Soviet attack on Europe. With its location in the southern flank, Turkey’s strategic importance once again became evident.
With its new role in the Cold War, Turkey (along with Greece) was granted NATO membership in 1952, after its participation in the Korean War (Israeli, 2001; Lippe, 2000; Criss and Bilgin, 1997). Hence, Turkey guaranteed its alliance with the West and the accompanying military and economic benefits (Brown, 2008; Hale, 2000; Isyar, 2005; Aydin, 2004). In 1954, U.S. military aid to Turkey reached its highest level ever.

**Relations with Middle East and the Balkans between 1945 and 1962**

Middle East

Geopolitical and cultural duality has always been a determining factor in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. Islam, as a major common denominator, has brought affinities in relations. On the other hand, four hundred years of Ottoman rule left a negative image on Arab minds as ‘the suppressor of Arab nationalism” (Jung, 2005) and had long term impact on Turkish–Arab relations. Arab cooperation with the British during WWI was construed as a betrayal by the Turks (Jung, 2005; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Aras and Koni, 2002). Suspicion and distrust prevailed in relations and as a result, many regional initiatives (i.e. Baghdad Pact) failed. With the new Turkish Republic, the transformation of the society based on Kemalist principles reinforced already negative Arab perceptions. Arab states also believed that Turkey had abandoned its Ottoman-Islamic heritage (Aydin, 2003; Jung 2005).

Territorial problems over Mosul and Hatay (Alexandretta) contributed to already tense relations. In 1925, oil-rich Mosul, a former Ottoman Vilayet, was annexed by British mandate Iraq. Meanwhile, French mandate Hatay (Alexandretta) was ceded to Turkey, following a referendum in 1939. Still, these provinces continued to be a source of tension in Turkish–Arab relations. Arabs considered Mosul as a remnant of Turkish/Ottoman expansionist policies. Turks similarly perceived Syrian claims over Hatay (Alexandretta) as Arab expansionism (Bengio and
Ozcan, 2001). The Turkish–Israeli relations further complicated Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel (March 28th, 1949), and to establish diplomatic relations in 1950 by sending its charge d’affairs. Middle Eastern states often considered the recognition of Israel by Turkey to be treason (Israeli, 2001; Inbar, 2005).

Until WWII, Turkey had followed a foreign policy based on the principles of non-intervention and non-involvement in its relations with the Muslim states in the Middle East (Hale, 1992; Robins, 1991). Turkish foreign policy, at the time, was a result of Turkey’s new Western orientation based on Kemalist principles. Accordingly, Turkey had no intention to involve itself in the domestic problems of Muslim countries. The new Turkish state aimed to create a modernized and westernized society based on a secular worldview. It chose to disregard Ottoman heritage in its relations with Muslim states (Evered, 2002; Martin, 2000).

In the Cold War period, Turkey’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries was shaped by its alliance with the West and its fear of communist expansion in the region. Turkey’s close ties with the West, its recognition of Israel, and its memberships to the Western security and cooperation organizations (such as NATO and the Council of Europe) led Arabs to consider Turkey as ‘a spy among them’. Still, Turkey made efforts for closer cooperation in its relations with the Middle East as a Western ally in the region.

In 1954, Britain signed an agreement with Egypt declaring its withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone. Instead of a direct presence, Britain planned to build up an alternative alignment in order to defend western interests in the region. Accordingly, the idea of a Middle East Defense Organization came up in early 1950s. Arab states viewed it as a Turkish-assisted new instrument of Western imperialism, and opposed the project.
In 1954, a military assistance agreement was signed between Iraq and the U.S., which consequently produced the Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq (February 24th, 1955) for mutual defense and security. Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran also joined this pact. The Baghdad Pact further infuriated Arab states, and the rift in Turkish-Arab relations grew. Egypt voiced the Arab opposition and accused Iraq of ‘betraying Muslim brethren and establishing alignment with Zionists’ (Hale, 1992; Hale, 2000; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Bishku, 2006). Egyptian reactions to any western development in the region, and Nasser’s strong pro-Soviet and anti-Western rhetoric reinforced suspicions on the Turkish side about the Soviet influence and communist expansion. Turkish concerns about the communist expansion in the region led to deployment of thousands of its troops to the Syrian border when the communist party came to power in Syria in 1957 (Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Evriviades, 1998).

The Suez Crisis erupted in 1956. Britain, France and Israel occupied Egypt. Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel under increasing pressure from its Arab neighbors, especially Iraq. Members of the Baghdad Pact met in Tehran and called for an immediate end to the occupation in Egypt. A coup d’état ousted the pro-western regime in Iraq in 1958 and substantially damaged the Baghdad Pact, effectively ending with Iraq’s withdrawal from the alliance in 1959 (Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Evriviades, 1998; Hale, 2000).

In 1959, a new alliance was formed between Great Britain, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran: the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which mainly functioned as an organization to guarantee U.S. military and financial aid to the region (Hale, 2000). Geographical distance and the lack of serious disputes between the members made this organization long-lived in comparison to the Baghdad Pact. CENTO maintained its unity until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
According to Hale (2000), Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East was “misconceived and counter-productive”; the Baghdad Pact was a result of such policy. While Turkey was taking initiatives to strengthen its alliance with the West, Arab states had no desire to develop such ties. Consequently, Turkey’s efforts were met with suspicion by Arab states, and negative perceptions about Turkey’s intentions were intensified. Any attempt to increase the level of cooperation was doomed to fail.

Balkans

The new Turkish state’s (1923) foreign policy towards its Balkan neighbors was based on the idea of ‘unchanging borders’. After many destructive wars\(^{14}\) in the region, Turkey was experienced enough to realize the conflict prone nature of the ethnic composition in the Balkans (Turan and Barlas, 1999). Accordingly, Turkey followed a foreign policy encouraging stability in the region, and carefully avoided involvement in any ethnic or religious tensions. Considering the long Ottoman presence in the Balkans, and resulting ethnic and religious ties, Turkey had to avoid any message that could be perceived as expansionist.

The Cold War period divided the Balkans along ideological lines, which prevented Turkey from seeking closer relations. While Greece and Turkey joined in the Western alliance, Yugoslavia and Albania remained non-aligned, and Romania and Bulgaria became satellite states of U.S.S.R. As a result, ethnic and religious issues, with a high potential for conflict, were frozen in time. In this sense, “the bipolar world system brought peace to the Balkans” (Turan and Barlas, 1999). Turkey was enabled to follow policies encouraging stability and cooperation. The Balkan Defense Pact (1954) between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece was a major step in the

\(^{14}\) Turkish – Russian War (1877–1878), Balkan Wars (1912–1913)
direction of broader cooperation for the security in the region. However, the increasing impact of
the U.S.S.R. on Yugoslavia prevented this cooperation from flourishing.

The Cyprus Problem

With its strategic importance and close proximity to Turkey, Cyprus has always been an
important item on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. A sizeable Turkish population on the island
creates solidarity between Turkey and Cyprus. Its proximity\textsuperscript{15} to Turkish soil creates a security
concern for Turkey in case of an annexation of the island by Greece (Suvarierol, 2003; Turan
and Barlas, 1999; Adamson, 2001). Apart from these factual circumstances, Cyprus is considered
as a “milli dava” (national cause) for both sides of the Aegean Sea (Suvarierol, 2003).

Historically, Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule since 1571. As a condition of the Cyprus
Convention in 1878, it was placed under British control in return for British support of the
Ottoman Empire in the Ottoman–Russian war. Great Britain announced the annexation of the
island at the beginning of WWI. After WWI, neither Greece nor Turkey attempted to change the
status quo, although neither country was pleased with it. Turkey’s anxiety about Cyprus
coincided with the escalation of the idea of Enosis\textsuperscript{16} among the Greek population of Cyprus and
Greece.

By the mid-1950s, ethnic conflicts resurfaced between the Turkish and Greek populations of
Cyprus. EOKA\textsuperscript{17} initiated a series of attacks on the Turkish-Cypriot population living on the
island. With the escalation of violence, Britain invited all parties to the London Conference to
resolve the conflict, but participants failed to produce a viable solution. At the onset of the
conflict, both the Turkish government and Cypriot Turks favored the continuance of the British

\textsuperscript{15} Cyprus is located about 40 nautical miles away from Turkish shores.
\textsuperscript{16} Uniting Cyprus with the motherland Greece
\textsuperscript{17} Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, armed Greek-Cypriot forces
whose aim is to achieve Enosis.
Tension continued to mount between the Greeks and the Turks until 1959, when the British government announced that Britain didn’t need Cyprus as a military base in the Mediterranean. Following the British announcement, Greece and Turkey agreed to form a united Cyprus under one constitution and one flag (rather than Enosis or partitioning the island). Zurich and London conferences led the way for a constitution based on two sides with equal rights and subsequently Republic of Cyprus was found in August 1960 (Kalaitzaki, 2005; Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2000; Adamson, 2001).

The Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Britain, Turkey and Greece, was added to the Cypriot constitution. As a result, Britain, Turkey and Greece became guarantor states for the security and independence of Cyprus. The fourth article of the treaty provided each guarantor state with the right to consult with each other in case of any violation of provisions. Moreover, it gave each guarantor state the right to unilaterally take action if a concerted intervention was not possible. Each guarantor state had a limited right to take action with the aim of reestablishing the state of affairs on the island according to the Treaty of Guarantee and the constitution of Cyprus. The treaty and its application by signatory states became problematic in ensuing decades, however. Following its establishment in 1960, Cyprus became a source of tension in Greek-Turkish relations (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2000; Adamson, 2001; Suvarierol, 2003; Kalaitzaki, 2005).
Cypriot Greeks and the Greek government continued to press for the reunification of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis plan). Though all parties avoided an open fight, in 1963 Cypriot president Makarios came up with a plan of constitutional amendment to strip Cypriot Turks of their constitutional rights. Armed struggle erupted between the Turkish and Greek population on the island (Ladbury and King, 1982; Goktepe, 2005). Cypriot Turks turned to Turkey for help as their default protector, and Turkey turned to the support of its allies in finding a viable solution on the island. Great Britain called for a conference in London with other guarantor states. However, this effort proved to be futile.

While NATO-led peacekeeping efforts were rejected by Makarios administration, both Cypriot Greek and Greek administrations found ample support for their case at UN. For instance, only Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, Pakistan and Albania voted in favor of Turkey while 26 Muslim countries abstained from the voting on U.N. resolution 2077 concerning Cyprus, on December 18th, 1965 (Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Jung, 2005). Turkish efforts to obtain any support failed, even from its immediate Muslim neighbors. The lack of support was due to Turkey’s unconditional loyalty to the West. Over the years, Turkey had held alliance with the West as the ultimate and unconditional goal, while ignoring criticism from countries of the non-aligned movement, the Middle East and the Communist bloc. (Jung, 2005; Yavuz and Khan, 1992).

Cyprus gradually became one of the determinants of Turkish foreign policy during Cold War period. Turkey was willing and ready to take military action for Cyprus in both the 1964 and 1974 crises, which meant an open military conflict between Turkey and Greece—both NATO members. In spite of U.S. efforts to prevent such a conflict in the Southern flank of NATO, Turkey refused to back down from its claims over Cyprus and eventually intervened
militarily in 1974. In response to the Turkish intervention, the U.S. imposed an economic embargo to Turkey until 1978 (Lesser, 2000).

During the Cold War period, Turkish foreign policy was based primarily on external factors; with Cyprus as a clear exception. While Cyprus held strategic importance for Turkey, the military intervention was strongly opposed by the West. Considering the fact that the Western alliance was central to Turkish foreign policy making, with this act Turkey violated its own foreign policy. In addition to the threat facing the strategically important island of Cyprus, Turkey feared for its own survival. Above all, domestic pressure was building over ethnic ties with Cypriot-Turks. On December 23rd, 1963, the Turkish Major Doctor Nihat İlhan’s wife and three children were slaughtered by EOKA, in their bathtub at their home in Kumsal, Lefkoşa. The devastating impact of this news was the trigger for unstoppable unrest in Turkey, and all over Anatolia. The subsequent crisis in 1964 was a direct result of such domestic pressure. Because of the events on the island during 1964-1974, the Turkish public was convinced of impending genocide by the Greeks, and the impact of such events built tremendous pressure on subsequent Turkish governments.

The 1974 crisis made it clear for Turkey that its Western alliance came at a substantial cost. Turkey failed to sustain any support for its case from any non-aligned or Muslim country within the U.N. The Cyprus War signified a shift in Turkish foreign policy towards greater consideration of domestic factors (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000; Adamson, 2001; Suvarierol, 2003; Kalaitzaki, 2005).

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Second Episode of the Cold War: Changing Balances in the International Arena and Turkish Foreign Policy in 1960 – 1990

In the first episode of the Cold War, between 1945 and early 1960s, Turkish foreign policy was fundamentally shaped as a reaction to external threats against its security and integrity. NATO membership allowed Turkey to continue its domestic efforts for transformation of the society since its security and integrity was protected. Turkey’s security concerns coincided with the U.S. in terms of struggle with the U.S.S.R. within the Cold War context. U.S. considered Turkey as a useful ally for the containment of U.S.S.R., and included Turkey in the Marshall Plan (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2000).

During 1960s the bipolar balance of power between the two superpowers experienced a détente period, which also meant the relaxation of a Soviet threat to Turkey. On one hand, the decreased threat provided Turkey with leeway to pursue more active policies in its region. On the other hand, Soviet threat had served as the foundation of Turkey’s leverage in relations with the West. As long as Turkey was a useful tool for Western interests against the Soviets, economic and military aid continued to flow. As Cold War tensions relaxed between the superpowers through the détente process, Turkey gradually lost its strategic utility for the United States. The détente process provided Turkey with an opportunity to improve its relations with both the communist bloc and the non-aligned movement. Since the early years of the Cold war, countries of the communist bloc and the non-aligned movement had opposed Turkey’s close ties with the West (Aydin, 2000; Hale, 2000). The détente process allowed for new powers to emerge as global powers. The rise of France and China signaled the emergence of a multi-polar system rather than a bipolar one. Such a change in international system increased the interdependence and interaction between countries both politically and economically (Aydin, 2000).
An important domestic development should be briefly noted in terms of its effects on Turkish foreign policy through its impact on domestic politics. The Turkish military ousted the civilian government as a result of a coup d’état on 27 May, 1960. The military regime did not seek fundamental change in Turkish foreign policy. Along with Turkey’s Western alliance, they were in favor of improved relations with the Middle East and non-aligned movement (Aydin, 2000). However, the 1960 coup d’état had more substantial effects on foreign policy through its effects on domestic politics. The new constitution of 1961 established the foundation of plural society, and as a result, new interest groups appeared on the domestic scene. A new constitution guaranteed freedom of speech, belief and association. New electoral rules created opportunities for the representation of small parties. For the first time in Turkish politics, a socialist political party, Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TİP) was established in 1961. With the 1961 constitution, the influence of domestic factors became crucial to Turkish foreign policy making.

Along with leftist movements, other political movements, both nationalist and religious, also resurfaced. Prior to the 1960 coup d’état, nationalistic and religious parties were not allowed. The new electoral system further encouraged these movements to organize as political parties, since they were now allowed to have representation at the Parliament. These developments also paved the way for shaky coalition governments, resulting in political chaos in the 1970s, since it was harder to form a majority government under the new rules. Polarization also limited the ability of coalition governments to follow a coherent foreign policy agenda, since no political party had enough electoral support to implement their own political (domestic or foreign) agenda. It is argued that this inadequacy was one reason why Turkey felt isolated and inactive in the international system during the 1970s (Aydin, 2004). Furthermore, Hale (2000) notes that “as
a result, Turkish foreign policy became a prisoner of chronic domestic instability and economic crisis, making effective planning very hard to achieve or implement”.

A Deteriorating Relationship with the U.S: The Jupiter Missile Crisis and the Johnson Letter

In 1959, the Menderes-led Democrat Party government signed an agreement which allowed the U.S. administration to install Jupiter missiles with medium range nuclear warheads in Turkey. These missiles became outdated even before their installation, but the Turkish government considered this as an opportunity to display the strength of its alliance with the U.S. Under mounting Soviet protests, however, the U.S. administration cancelled the installation, and met with Turkish refusal to withdraw from the agreement. Turkish government emphasized the importance of the missiles for Turkey’s security, at least until they were replaced with Polaris submarines. It is argued that Khrushchev’s decision to install the Soviet missiles in Cuba was retribution for the U.S.-Turkish missile cooperation (Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2004). Consequently, in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted, and Jupiter missiles in Turkey became a bargaining chip for the Soviets. Reciprocal removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Soviet missiles from Cuba was proposed by the Soviets. Although U.S. administration refused to confirm such a deal, the Kennedy administration unilaterally removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963.

The missile crisis was a wake-up call for Turkish government. It was the first time since the beginning of the Cold War that Turkey had felt the change in the balance of power. As the tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relaxed, Turkey’s strategic importance was reduced. Turkey was acting under the misconception that it was indispensable in the struggle against the U.S.S.R. Turkey also suddenly realized that the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil could threaten its security even more than their absence. Additionally, the U.S. administration’s unilateral decision to remove the missiles meant that U.S. would disregard Turkey’s security in a
time of crisis if necessary. The missile crisis led to a relaxation period in Turkish-Soviet relations. After the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles, a Turkish delegation composed of parliament members visited Moscow for the first time since 1932 (Hale, 2000).

By June 1964, as circumstances were deteriorating for Cypriot Turks, under increasing pressure from public and without any international support for its case, the Turkish government decided to intervene militarily under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The fourth article of the treaty provided the right to each guarantor state to unilaterally take action if cooperative action is not possible, with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs according to the Treaty of Guarantee (Aydin, 2000; Hale, 2000; Goktepe, 2005; Isyar, 2005). Before any official announcement of the plans, the Turkish government was informed by U.S. President Johnson that there was no consensus between NATO allies concerning their obligations to guarantee Turkey’s security against U.S.S.R. if Turkish government causes a Soviet intervention. President Johnson also noted that if the Turkish government intervened under present circumstances, American weaponry could not be used in operations. The Turkish government noted the wide divergence of the views of Turkey and the U.S. as to the nature and basic principles of NATO (Aydin, 2004).

After the missile crisis, the Cyprus issue made it clear to Turkey that unconditional allegiance to the West could be costly for its own security. NATO support could be conditional upon political events, and Turkey could not rely on NATO in a time of crisis. The Cyprus crisis increased negative public sentiments towards the U.S. The Leftist Turkish Workers Party - TWP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - TİP) organized protest meetings across the country (Hale, 2000). In 1964, U.S. military aid to Turkey was also decreased to $637 million, compared to $971 million in the previous year.
In the 1964 Cyprus crisis, U.S. administration assumed that being NATO members, Turkey and Greece had to solve this problem peacefully. Thus, the U.S. administration underestimated Turkish autonomy and the role of Cyprus’ government in a possible solution. The U.S. administration also failed to understand that Cyprus was a more important issue for both Turkey and Greece than the NATO alliance, hence backing off was not a viable option in a stalemate situation (Kalaitzaki, 2005). With the crises in 1963 and 1964 and the subsequent Cyprus War in 1974, domestic factors started to play a bigger role in Turkish foreign policy making.

After the Dust Settled: Relations with U.S., Greece and U.S.S.R.

In order to break the isolation in the international system, Turkey decided to adopt a multi-faceted foreign policy, which projected improved relations with the Middle East, the communist bloc and the non-aligned movement (Criss and Bilgin, 1997; Aydin, 2000; Israeli, 2001; Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2004). Also, NATO replaced its policy of massive retaliation with a flexible response strategy in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. This was a clear signal for Turkey that necessary steps should be taken to adjust its own foreign policy. According to ‘massive retaliation policy’, previously adopted by NATO, any nuclear attack from U.S.S.R. would be met by an automatic massive nuclear response from NATO. With the ‘flexible response strategy’, an attack from the Soviets would not necessitate an automatic response (Aydin, 2000; Hale, 2000).

The first results of this policy shift were apparent in Turkish–Soviet relations. The Soviet government had previously sought to improve bilateral relations after Stalin’s death. Thus, Turkey’s efforts were welcomed by the Soviet administration. Economic relations between the two countries experienced a swift rise. In 1967, Turkey received a 200 million U.S. Dollar credit from the U.S.S.R. for seven industrial projects (Hale, 2000). Turkey’s trade with the Communist bloc improved as well. Their share in Turkish trade balance increased from 7 percent in 1964 to
13 percent in 1967 (Aydin, 2000). However, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and increasing Soviet Naval activity in the Mediterranean revived Turkey’s concerns for its security despite of flourishing relations.

Meanwhile, Greek armed forces staged a coup d’état and ousted civilian Greek government. It damaged the dialogue between Turkey and Greece for a possible solution for Cyprus. Turkish and Greek delegations met at the Turkish-Greek border to negotiate the future of Cyprus on 9-10 September, 1967. The Greek delegation refused any solution not involving Enosis. Thus, negotiations failed to produce any consensus. In November 1967, the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked two Turkish Cypriot villages, killing several people. The incident sparked an immediate public reaction in Turkey. Protest meetings were held, and volunteers organized brigades in order to fight alongside Turkish Cypriots. U Thant, the general secretary of the U.N. at the time, noted that ‘Greece and Turkey are now on the brink of war’ (Goktepe, 2005). The Turkish Parliament approved the government’s request for taking military action, if necessary. In the 1967 crisis, Britain insisted on peaceful talks between parties and refused any involvement in military action. The U.S., on the other hand, tried to prevent a war between the two NATO allies. The U.S. administration sent a special envoy and was actively involved in negotiations. Finally, Turkish and Greek governments reached an agreement. Greece agreed to disband the Greek Cypriot National Guard and withdraw Greek troops exceeding the limits of the 1960 Treaty. The result was hailed as a victory for the Turks (Hale, 2000; Atasoy, 2003; Adamson, 2001; Isyar, 2005; Aydin, 2000; Goktepe, 2005).

Improving Turkish-U.S.S.R. relations were also instrumental to this favorable outcome. The U.S.S.R. withdrew its support from Greek Cypriots and the Greek government, and instead backed Turkey in 1967 crisis. The anti-communist attitude of the Greek military junta also
affected the Soviet decision to back Turkey (Atasoy, 2003; Goktepe, 2005; Isyar, 2005). Under the circumstances, the U.S. administration wished to avoid a situation where the main beneficiary would be the U.S.S.R., and backed the Turkish demands in negotiations.

In the late 1960s the cultivation of opium also became a source of tension in U.S.–Turkish relations. In order to control the heroin traffic, the U.S. administration asked the Turkish government to adopt tougher laws against illegal trafficking. All opium production was banned in Turkey due to its humanitarian obligations in 1971. However, when the U.S. administration subsequently asked India to increase its opium production, anti-American sentiments reached their peak in Turkey (Aydin, 2000; Isyar, 2005).

On March 12th, 1971, as a result of increasing ideological polarization and resulting conflicts, the Turkish military gave an ultimatum without ousting the civilian government from power. While political chaos continued, following caretaker governments continued to enforce the ban on opium production until 1974. A new coalition government after 1974 general election revoked the ban on opium.

Meanwhile, the military junta in Greece announced that they would unite Cyprus with Greece, effective immediately. Britain, with its continuing need for a military base in Mediterranean, enforced parties to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. As one of the de facto parties, U.S. administration was dealing with Watergate scandal at home and Arab–Israeli conflict abroad (the 1973 war). Belated diplomatic talks between U.K.-U.S.-Greece and Turkey failed to bring about a peaceful solution. On July 20th, 1974 Turkish armed forces were deployed to the island under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee19. On July 23th, the military junta collapsed in Greece, and diplomatic talks resumed between parties. A stalemate in negotiations

increased the tensions. Turkish armed forces intervened a second time on August 14th, 1974. The American Congress decided to impose an arms embargo against Turkey. In 1974, U.S. economic assistance was $19 million ($86 million in 1973) and military assistance was $671.5 million ($904 million in 1973). U.S. military aid continued to decrease along with the economic aid. However, while there was no economic aid for 1976 and 1977, the military aid never went below $335 million. The independence of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was announced in 1975 (Isyar, 2005; Aydin, 2004). Turkey froze the military activities of American bases in Turkey, except for NATO use. American intelligence activities over southern parts of the U.S.S.R. were affected. Arms embargo was partially lifted in 1975, and was fully lifted in 1978 (Isyar, 2005; Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2000).

In an effort to bring diversity to foreign policy agenda, Turkey signed a ‘Declaration of Principles of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation’ with Bulgaria in 1975. Turkey’s trade with Bulgaria increased approximately 400 percent. Turkish–Romanian relations also witnessed a period of revival (Bishku, 2003).

1980 Military Intervention

Some domestic, but mostly external factors forced Turkey to follow a pro-American foreign policy and to be cautious towards the U.S.S.R. In 1979, the Islamic Iranian Revolution ousted the pro-American Shah regime in Iran, and the U.S.S.R. militarily intervened in Afghanistan to support the Communist government of Afghanistan in its fight with Islamist Mujahedeen. Statements from fundamentalist Iranian government about the export of their Islamic regime throughout the region created concerns for Turkey about a possible Islamic spillover into its borders.
Domestically, mounting economic and social problems, along with political instability resulted in military intervention on September 12th, 1980. Turkey remained under a military regime until 1983. Unlike the 1960 coup d’état, the 1980 military intervention banned all political activities and prevented any development toward a civil society. Military intervention in Turkey drew the most severe criticism from European countries. As a candidate for E.U. membership, a tradition of military involvement in domestic politics and related allegations of human rights violations worsened Turkey’s image in the European public. Aydin (2004) argues that “the crucial factor in this connection has been Turkey’s receptivity towards external, i.e. European pressures due to the existence of its political, economic, military and ideological links with Europe. While these links enabled Europeans to pressure Turkey on certain aspects of her internal politics, especially over her human rights record and democratization process, Turkey’s own identification with Europe made her more susceptible and responsive to such pressures”.

The 1980 coup d’état also contributed to the revival of Islamist movements in Turkey. With the 1961 constitution, Islamists started to form political parties in Turkey. With the rise of Islamist movements around the world, Islamists also gradually increased their influence in Turkish political scene. The coalition government between NSP (National Salvation Party) and RPP (Republican People’s Party) in 1974 marked the first time that Islamists came to power.

The military regime between 1980 and 1983 encouraged Islamic organizations and movements in its struggle with the leftist movements. Thirty-five imam-hatip20 schools and several private Quran institutions were opened during this time. Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution made religious education compulsory for elementary, middle and high school students. In 1983, the Motherland Party – MP (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP) won the first general

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20 High-schools for Islamic clergy.
elections since the 1980 coup d’état. Many executives of the party were known for their political Islamist attitude, including its leader Turgut Özal.

Both the 1980 coup d’état and the Motherland Party – MP (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP) governments signaled a dramatic shift in domestic politics. Subsequently, the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy increased. In this sense, the Turgut Özal period (1983 – 1991) should be briefly noted. Turgut Özal was an ultra pro-American politician with strong religious tendencies. He was willing to come across with constitutional institutions in order to implement even more pro-American policies. It is argued that until the Özal period, foreign policy decision making had always displayed a monolithic structure in Turkey with close cooperation between decision makers. State officials acted as a monolithic front, ‘speaking with one voice, holding one view, and having one set of goals’ (Tayfur and Goymen, 2002). For the first time, conflicts between state officials came to the surface and caused a disturbance during both Özal’s premiership and his presidency. Chief of Staff Full General Necip Torumtay resigned from his office due to his disagreement with Prime Minister Turgut Özal over Turkey’s involvement in the first U.S. occupation of Iraq in 1991. Özal wanted Turkey to participate in the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The military establishment and Foreign Affairs Ministry strongly opposed Özal’s plans (Heper and Cinar, 1996).

A tradition of military interventions in Turkey (1960, 1971 and 1980 respectively) and alleged human rights violations during military government periods caused a rift in relations with the E.U. The U.S. administration, on the other hand, preferred to overlook the human rights and civil rights problems as a result of Turkey’s continuing usefulness to American interests in the region (Wood and Quassier, 2005).
Turkey–U.S. Relations after 1980

Turkey and the U.S. signed the ‘Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement’ (DECA) in 1980. With this agreement, Turkey guaranteed continued U.S. support of its economy. In addition, the U.S. administration assisted with efforts to modernize Turkish military forces. In return, Turkey allowed the U.S. to use its airfields and intelligence facilities (Athanassopoulou, 2001; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Turkey also purchased fighter jets (F-16s) from the U.S. and co-produced F-16s with the U.S. based on the ‘Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement’ (Hale, 2000; Isyar, 2005; Athanassopoulou, 2001).

In the years that followed Turkey received the third largest share from U.S. military aid, after Israel and Egypt. U.S. military aid levels during this period were the highest ever, except for the Korean War era. Both economic and military aid from the U.S. started to decrease in 1984. The loans by Arab states to Turkey peaked to an all time high of $477 million ($17 million in 1979). The amount of loans from Arab states remained high throughout 1981 ($399 million) and 1982 ($229 million). After 1982, the level of loans never again reached such levels. On the European Union side, the loans were at peak levels during 1980 ($809 million) and 1981 ($1 billion). The level of loans by European Economic Community (EEC) states also never reached such levels after 1981.

Improved Turkish-U.S. cooperation and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan slowed Turkish–U.S.S.R. political and economic relations in the 1980s. Strained relations continued until Gorbachev became the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party. Under Gorbachev’s administration, Turkish–Soviet relations—both political and economic—improved significantly, especially in the second half of 1980s. In 1987–1990 trade volume between the two nations increased from $476 million to $1.8 billion (Hale, 2000). Natural gas gradually became an
important aspect of Turkish-Russian economic relations after the end of the communist regime in Russia.

In terms of Turkish–Greek relations, traditionally problematic areas, enforced with historical distrust, continued to be source of tension. Despite Turkey’s claims for the demilitarization of the Aegean islands (based on the Lausanne Treaty and Montreux Treaty), Greece continued to militarize the islands. Turkey took Greece’s efforts as a security threat and established the Aegean Army (also known as the fourth army) in 1975 for the defense of its Aegean shores. Tension in the Aegean resulted in an arms race between Turkey and Greece. Greece’s efforts increased Turkey’s security concerns, and Turkey felt obligated to reinforce its military power in the region. Turkey’s every attempt to increase its security created a security threat to Greece. Uncertainty and lack of genuine trust between two NATO allies only reinforced security concerns on both sides (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000).

Territorial waters were also another problematic area. Greece wished to expand its territorial waters from its current level at 6 miles to 12 miles which would have almost cut Turkish vessels off from the Aegean Sea without Greece’s permission, considering the number of Greek islands. Turkey declared that any Greek attempt to expand territorial waters to 12 miles as ‘casus belli’ (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000). Similarly, borders of the continental shelf and its usage also continued to create tension. Limitation of airspace posed another problem between Turkey and Greece. While Greece was claiming that its airspace extends 10 miles, Turkey continued to recognize only 6 miles, which is also the established practice of Turkish air force.

While these problems continued, Turkey lifted its veto on Greece’s participation to NATO’s military forces in 1980 under the military regime21 (Kalaitzaki, 2005). Bilateral and multilateral

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21 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/11/nato.simonjeffery
talks, for a solution on Cyprus, continued between Greek and Turkish sides, all of which failed. In 1983, Turkish Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In following years, different U.N. led plans proved to be ineffective. Another possibility of an open conflict appeared between the two NATO members in 1987, when conflict over the continental shelf reached its highest point.

Diplomatic talks averted the crisis, and tension in relations seemed to relax. Leaders from both sides tried to ease the tension by using personal friendship between Turkish and Greek prime ministers as a channel for diplomacy. However, these efforts failed to go beyond rhetoric. Despite short-lived improvements in governmental relations, by the end of 1980s conflict and tension prevailed in Turkish–Greek relations (Kalaitzaki, 2005; Hale, 2000).

An unexpected crisis erupted between Turkey and Bulgaria as early as 1984, when the Bulgarian government imposed a forced assimilation campaign upon its Turkish minorities. Bulgarian Turks were forced to abandon their religious practices and change their names. Government imposed a ban on Turkish language, music and any cultural activities. Domestic public reaction was severe, especially considering the large population of Bulgarian descendent Turks in Turkey. The Bulgarian government refused to open talks on the assimilation problem with Turkey, arguing that this was an internal matter (Bishku, 2003). While Turkey gained international support over this issue, it failed to exert significant pressure on the Bulgarian government. In 1989, the Zhivkov regime decided to expel Bulgarian Turks, resulting in over 300,000 thousand Bulgarian-Turks moving to Turkey by the end of August. The crisis was resolved after the collapse of the communist regime, and many refugees returned to Bulgaria. Restrictions on their political rights were lifted, ‘the Movement for Rights and Freedom’ (Haklar

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,944944,00.html
ve Övgürülker Partisi) became an advocate for Bulgarian Turks’ rights. This party later joined in coalition governments and proved to be a prominent political figure in democratization process of Bulgaria.

Turkey–Middle East Relations

Turkey shaped its relations with the Middle Eastern countries based on its Western alliances. Despite severe criticism from the Middle Eastern countries, Turkish governments continued with pro-U.S. policies in the region and started several initiatives, such as the Baghdad Pact, in order to help U.S. policies of U.S.S.R. containment in 1950s. Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 and diplomatic relations in 1950 sealed the perceived image of Turkey, among Arab states, as a pawn of Western interests. Turkey’s strict pro-U.S. policies proved to be costly when Turkey later sought Soviet support over the Cyprus issue. The 1963 Missile Crisis and the 1964 Johnson Letter encouraged Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy towards Arab states.

Turkey was the co-founder of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1962, partnering with Pakistan and Iran. Turkey also viewed the 1967 Arab–Israeli War as an opportunity to further develop its relations with Arab states. Turkey backed Arab states and voted in favor of a resolution for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from Arab territories. Turkey also refused to allow U.S. to use American bases in Turkey for sustaining the support of Israel, while permitting the Soviets to use Turkish airspace in order to help the Arabs (Bishku, 2006; Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Israeli, 2001; Aras and Bicakci, 2006).

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22Only Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, Pakistan and Albania voted in favor of Turkey while 26 Muslim countries abstained from the voting on U.N. resolution 2077, concerning Cyprus, on December 18th, 1965 (Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Jung, 2005).
The 1967 war with Israel diminished Egypt’s power in the Arab world. Nasserist, Socialist Baathist, and Pan-Arabist policies (with Egypt in the center) in the region shifted towards more pro-American policies (with Saudi Arabia in the center). A crippled Egypt was an advantage for Turkey, since Nasser’s Egypt displayed avid opposition to Turkey’s pro-American policies. Following the vote in the U.N. against Israel, tension between Turkey and the Arab states were significantly reduced (Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001).

Improved relations with the Arab states proved to be beneficial for Turkey during the 1970s. The oil crisis following the Arab–Israeli War in 1973, as well as the Cyprus crisis in 1974 accentuated the economic and political importance of good relations with the Arab states. Foreign oil dependency and the American arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus crisis further encouraged Turkey to improve economic ties with the Arab states. Despite the slow takeoff at the beginning, Turkey’s trade with Arab states significantly improved. Imports rose from $64 million in 1970 to $2.8 billion in 1985, and exports rose from $54 million to $3 billion (Hale, 2000). Between 1980 and 1982, loans made to Turkey by the Arab states exceeded those made by the U.S.

Turkey became a de facto member of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1975. Membership to OIC was in contradiction to the secular principles of Turkish constitution which prohibits membership to religion-based organizations. Faced with a dilemma, Turkish governments chose to emphasize the economic dimension of OIC rather than its religious structure (Bolukbasi, 1999).

In 1975, Turkey voted along with the Arab states in favor of a resolution that denounced ‘Zionism as form of Racism’. In 1976, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people. PLO opened a representative office in
Ankara; OIC granted Turkish Federated State of Cyprus observer status and announced a pro-Turkish resolution on Cyprus in 1979 (Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Bolukbasi, 1999).

The declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the Knesset in 1980 enforced Turkey to choose between the Arabs and the Jewish state. The Turkish government decided to close down the Turkish Consulate General in Jerusalem in August, 1980 (Piccoli, 1999; Yavuz and Khan, 1992). After the 1980 coup d’état, the military regime maintained good relations with the Arab states due to common economic interests. Kenan Evren, head of the military regime, became the first Turkish President who participated in the OIC’s meetings, and attended the fifth conference of OIC in 1987. During the 1980s, Turkey continued its support of Palestinian self-determination. However, the PLO continued to support Greek policies regarding Cyprus, the forced assimilation policy of Bulgarian Turks under the Zhivkov administration, and the terrorist organization PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Isci Partisi) (Bolukbasi, 1999).

Turkey–Iran Relations

Economic and political competition has been a critical factor in Turkish-Iranian relations since the Ottoman period. Sunni–Shiite tension also contributed to this competition, with predominantly Sunni population of Turkey and a mostly Shiite population of Iran. Both countries suffered disintegration and foreign occupation following WWI, but chose different paths for modernization and westernization after their independence (Republic in Turkey, Monarchy in Iran). After WWII, both Turkey and Iran regarded communism as a common threat to their security and allied themselves with the Western Bloc. They became founding members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. Close cooperation continued between Turkey and Iran until the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Both countries gained from the détente
process in the 1960s and improved their relations with the U.S.S.R. In 1962 they co-founded the Organization of Regional Cooperation Development (RCD), which aimed to develop close cultural and economic ties between its members.

The Shah tried to transform Iran into a regional power during the 1970s. Iran had profited greatly from the oil crisis in 1973, and expanded military spending as a result. Although Iran’s growing military power initially concerned Turkey, Iran’s main focus was the Persian Gulf. Thus, Iran’s regional ambitions did not slow down the cooperation between the two countries. They remained pro-American allies that did not threaten each other’s security (Calabrese, 1998). However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran shook the foundation of Turkish–Iranian relations. Turkey remained neutral during the Iraq-Iran War, and refused to participate in U.S-led sanctions on Iran. Turkey gained from its neutral stance in the Iran–Iraq War and improved its trade both with Iraq and Iran. Iran became the second biggest oil supplier to Turkey after Iraq (Aydin and Aras, 2005). During mid-1980s, Iran’s support for the PKK created tension in relations. Turkey accused Iran of allowing PKK to use its territory to launch attacks on Turkey. In the meantime, Iran accused Turkey of providing safe haven to the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran, which had tried to overthrow fundamentalist regime in Iran (Aydin and Aras, 2005; Calabrese, 2005).

In terms of relations with Syria, ‘Hatay’ (Alexandretta) and ‘water problem’ (Euphrates and Tigris Rivers) remained as a source of conflict. Conflict on Euphrates and Tigris Rivers stemmed from conflicting views of Syria and Iraq on one side and Turkey on the other. Syria and Iraq regarded the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as international waters, and they demanded an equal share. Turkey, on the other hand, considered itself as the sole sovereign of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, since both rivers originate in Anatolia. In 1980s the launch of the South Anatolia
Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi - GAP) in Turkey exacerbated the problem. Although Turkey signed a protocol guaranteeing a flow of 500 cubic meters per second to Syria, tensions remained unresolved. Syria’s support of PKK also damaged Turkish–Syrian relations. Despite several bilateral security treaties with Turkey, Syria continued its support for the PKK as a bargaining chip in its water problem with Turkey (Aras and Koni, 2002; Hale 1992; Hale 2000; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Aydin and Aras, 2005; Olson, 1997; Altunisik, 2000).

Turkey – Israel Relations

Israeli (2001) describes the relationship between Turkey and Israel as the “odd couple”. Turkey, a predominantly a Muslim country, and Israel, an unwelcome neighbor in the region since its founding, somehow achieved a close relationship throughout the Cold War period. Turkish–Israeli relations proved to be a mutually beneficial, long term relationship, despite criticism of Turkey by many Muslim countries in the Middle East and several crises, such as the status of Jerusalem and Palestine–Israeli conflict.

However, this was a pragmatic relationship shaped by the security concerns of the Cold War era. Turkey’s own security concerns and its Western alliance encouraged the formation of close ties with Israel, which received unconditional U.S. support. Turkey’s secular establishment, with its exclusion of Muslim identity, also facilitated the development of Turkish–Israeli relationship. For Israel, close relations with a Muslim nation in a hostile environment was essential. Mutualties with the U.S. further encouraged close relations between Turkey and Israel (Lesser, 2000).

Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 caused a severe reaction from Muslim countries. Turkey disregarded these protests, since maintaining close relations with U.S. and Europe was much more essential for its security at the time than good relations with the Arab states (Bishku, 2006; Yavuz and Khan, 1992). With diplomatic channels, relations between Israel and Turkey
rapidly grew in economic, social, and cultural areas. Despite growing cooperation with Israel, Turkey still participated in regional organizations, such as the Baghdad Pact, as long as these organizations enhanced its alliances with the West (Bolukbasi, 1999; Bishku, 2006). Yavuz and Khan (1992) argue that Turkey’s efforts to develop relations with Israel and with the Arab states at the same time was a result of its geopolitical and cultural duality. In this sense, Turkish–Israeli relations are defined as “the most controversial aspect of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Cold War era” (Bacik, 2003).

The 1956 Suez Crisis is considered as an example of the dual character of Turkey’s relations with Israel and the Arab states. When the Suez Crisis erupted, Egypt intensified its criticism against Iraq for their participation to the Baghdad Pact. Egypt’s criticism evidently induced Iraq to put pressure on Turkey. Under growing pressure, Turkey called back its charge d’affairs from Israel in November 1956. Turkey was genuinely concerned about communist expansion, encouraged by Nasser’s anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet stance (Bishku, 2006; Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Hale, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999). Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad pact as a result of a 1958 coup d’état, and the pact was effectively dissolved. However, a new intelligence initiative, known as Trident, was initiated between Israel, Iran and Turkey (Bishkuk, 2006).

Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and the resulting U.S. arms embargo also had a negative impact on Turkish–Israeli relations. After the U.S. embargo, Turkey backed every anti-Israel resolution in the U.N. along with the Arabs, including resolution #3379, declaring ‘Zionism’ as a form of racism. Israel’s Jerusalem Law in 1980 put further strain on the relations. Despite several setbacks, Turkey eventually achieved a balance in its relations with both the Arab states and Israel. Turkey’s dependency on foreign oil and its need for support in the
international system prevented Turkey from following anti-Arab policies. Meanwhile, Turkey needed good relations with Israel for its alliance with the West.

Starting in the mid-1980s, the balance tilted in Israel’s favor due to three main reasons: 1) the Arab states continued with their support for Greek case on Cyprus; 2) the PLO maintained its close relations with Cypriot Greeks and the terrorist organization PKK, and continued to support Zhivkov’s forced assimilation against Bulgarian Turks; and 3) Syria provided the PKK with logistic support in its occupied territories in Lebanon. In 1986, economic and political relations between Turkey and Israel flourished (Bishku, 2006; Yavuz and Khan, 1992; Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Israeli, 2001; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Piccoli, 1999). The trade volume between Turkey and Israel increased from $45 million in 1985 to $110 million in 1990.

In 1986, Turkey sent Ekrem Güvendiren as charge d’affairs to Israel. Strained Turkish-Arab relations and the developing peace process in Palestine contributed to Turkish–Israeli relations. However, the first ‘intifada’ in 1987 put an early stop to recuperating Turkish–Israeli relations. Israel was criticized by many members of international community for its harsh tactics against civilians. In spite of this setback, economic and military cooperation continued growing in this period (Bishku, 2006; Bolukbasi, 1999; Altunisik, 2000).

Turkey – Europe Relations

Turkish and European identities have been shaped by mutual antagonism resulting from a centuries-old struggle between European states and the Ottoman Empire. Turks have been considered as the ‘other’ that had to be stopped by Europeans since Ottoman times (Aydin, 2003; Eralp, 2004). The Ottoman Empire expanded its territories and influence by conquering European soil. The siege of Vienna by the Ottomans in 1529, and again in 1683 created perpetual images on both sides. Eralp (2004) suggests that Ottomans constituted the opposite of
‘Europeanness’ from its start. Centuries long conflicts resulted in opposite identifications on both sides.

Leaders of the new Turkish state, most notably Atatürk, considered the Western values of democracy and secularism as essential tools to transform and modernize the Turkish society. Ottoman heritage, with its Muslim identity, was viewed as the main reason of the backwardness of Turkish society. The new Turkish state created a new Turkish identity based upon Western values. In light of Ottoman efforts to become a part of Europe since Tanzimat Fermanı (1839), Atatürk’s desire for Westernization may not seem to be a novel idea. Upon closer inspection, Ottomans used Westernization to build strategic alliances with Western powers in order to pit them against each other; Atatürk and his colleagues considered Westernization as synonymous with modernization (Hale, 2000). Therefore, their desire to transform the nation and the state was genuine. Accordingly, they started a series of reforms, starting with the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923.

Turkey kept its distance from Europe in the period between the two World Wars. The struggle to create a nation with a viable economy and society was the focal point of the governments between 1923 and 1939. Turkey followed an independent and well-balanced foreign policy in the period between the two wars. After the end of WWII, Turkey joined the Western alliance against communist expansion and accordingly improved its relations with Europe.

The European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957. Following Greece, Turkey applied to the EEC in 1959. The Ankara Agreement was signed with the EEC in 1963. From the Turkish perspective, the Ankara Agreement was the ‘recognition of Turkey as a part of Europe at last’. On the European side, however, Turkey’s European identity was quite
questionable, but security concerns of the Cold War overcame Europe’s reluctance (Wood and Quassier, 2005; Hale, 2000; Eralp, 2004). It was a relationship shaped by security concerns against a common threat. Both sides chose to downplay cultural, political and social differences in order to create a mutual defense system.

1963’s Ankara Agreement was an economic agreement which laid out the principles for Turkish accession to the EEC. The agreement set timetables for Turkey’s accession to the EEC in three steps: preliminary stage from 1964 to 1973, transition stage from 1973 to 1980 (earliest) or 1995 (latest) and the final (possible accession) stage, once Turkey met the conditions of the Ankara Agreement (Cicekli, 1997; Hale, 2000). In spite of economic nature of the Ankara Agreement, political arguments shaped Turkish–European relations in the decades that followed.

Despite its initial economic character, the EEC evolved into a political entity throughout the years. Turkey’s domestic issues and political developments increasingly affected the EEC’s approach towards Turkey. During the same period, U.S. administrations preferred to overlook Turkey’s domestic problems of democracy and human rights for the sake of its role in the struggle against the U.S.S.R. Military interventions met severe EEC criticism in this respect; the Council of Europe suspended Turkey’s membership after the 1980 coup d’état. Following Turkey’s return to civilian governments, an application was made for EEC membership but was declined. Greece was permitted to join the EEC immediately after its civilian government replaced the military junta in 1981. Since its accession, Greece used its veto power in the EEC to corner Turkey in problematic areas such as the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. Meanwhile, the EEC also set the resolution of bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece as preconditions for Turkey’s membership (Hale, 2000; Eralp, 2004).
Another issue in Turkish–European relations has been the status of Turkish workers in European countries. Following the labor shortage after the WWII, a bilateral agreement was signed between Turkey and Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 for Turkish guest workers. Initially, this was planned as a short term solution for the labor shortage. However, many worker families chose to stay in Europe. Turkey signed similar agreements with other European countries: Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Sweden (Wets, 2006). By the mid-1970s, the number of Turkish workers reached approximately 600,000, and their remittances to Turkey were calculated to be approximately $1 billion per year (Hale, 2000).

In 1970, an additional protocol, which regulated the transition stage of Turkey to full membership, was signed between the EEC and Turkey. This protocol also aimed to formalize the free movement of Turkish workers. Meanwhile, unemployment numbers climbed in European countries as a result of 1970 energy crisis. The free movement of Turkish workers threatened to usurp opportunities from the domestic work force. When the due date of the protocol arrived in 1976, EEC states opted for limited improvements for Turkish workers (who were already working in EEC countries) (Barnard, 2004; Cicekli, 1997; Hale, 2000). EEC also imposed limitations upon the free movement of Turkish workers. In 1978, the Ecevit government suspended Turkey’s responsibilities according to Additional Protocol. Under Demirel’s premiership, Turkey resumed its responsibilities in 1979. Turkish–European relations witnessed a swift deterioration following the 1980 coup d’état (Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2004).

Turkey, under military rule, called back its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Diplomatic relations were normalized after 1983, when democratic elections were held and civilian governments returned in Turkey. The fourth financial protocol was signed in 1981 between Turkey and the EEC. Economic aid was frozen after the 1980 coup
d'état, and the EEC conditioned the release of funds upon Turkey’s return to democracy. Democratic elections resumed in 1983; however, funds were never released due to repeated Greek veto. Under Özal’s premiership, Turkey made its application for full membership to the EEC in 1987. The EEC turned down Turkey’s application in 1989, emphasizing the economic gap between Turkey and the EEC problems with Cyprus and Greece, human rights problems and the quality of democracy in Turkey.
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

One of many graffiti statements on the Berlin Wall, ‘Eventually every wall falls’ proved to be right when a crowd of hopeful and enthusiastic East Berliners outnumbered guardians at Berlin Wall’s gates and started to enter into the West on November 9th, 1989. Spurred by this symbolic event, the end of the Cold War came in August, 1990, when the U.S.S.R. backed U.N. resolutions against the invasion of Kuwait by one of its satellite states, Iraq (Piccoli, 1999). The end of the Cold War not only changed the map of Europe, but also resulted in substantial changes in the international system.

Threats from the Soviets fundamentally shaped Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War years. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet threat to Turkey’s security. Under these new circumstances, Turkey lost its strategic importance to the U.S., since the communist threat had effectively ceased to exist (Sezer, 1992; Sayari, 1992; Evriviades, 1998; Muftuler-Bac, 1998). Turkey’s membership to the Western defense mechanism was a result of strategic concerns from Western perspective. Turkey, with its reduced strategic importance, would likely become a liability rather than an asset to the Western security due to its internal (human rights, PKK, etc.) and external (tensions with Syria and Greece) problems in the post-Cold War environment (Piccoli, 1999; Evriviades, 1998). In contrast, other scholars suggest that Turkey gained the freedom to follow more active policy, especially within its region, since the communist threat was gone (Hale, 2000; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Calleya, 2006). As a result, two opinions came forward concerning Turkey’s future: 1) Turkey as a ‘pivotal state’ (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Calleya, 2006); and 2) Turkey on the verge of a collapse (Evriviades, 1998).

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23 Irgendwann fällt jede Mauer
Most importantly, domestic factors started to have the potential for a predominant role in Turkish foreign policy. After two electoral victories of the central-right wing Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) in 1983 and 1987, Turkey reverted back to the period of coalitions. Shaky coalitions were the essential cause of political instability before 1980 coup d’état. The revival of political instability encouraged economic crises. Islamists came forward with rhetoric about justice for the underprivileged, and blamed the economic problems on coalition governments which they considered ‘pawns of the West’. Hale (2000) notes that in the post-Cold War environment, elements of civil society, such as business associations, universities and workers’ unions became more involved in the domestic politics of Turkey.

Problems concerning the rights of the Kurdish population in Turkey also gained momentum in the post-Cold War period. Pro-Kurdish political parties were established, and eventually they obtained enough electoral support to secure seats in the Turkish parliament. Their sharp rhetoric combined with PKK terrorism created a strong political backlash. 1999 general elections witnessed the revival of nationalist parties in Turkey.

**Relations with the U.S.**

Interestingly, Turkey seemed to maintain its importance for U.S. even after the end of the Cold War. It is argued that continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and U.S. dependency on foreign oil kept U.S. interest fresh in the region. U.S. considered Turkey as useful in the implementation of its policies of ‘spreading democracy and market economy’ in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Hale, 2000; Isyar, 2005; Athanassopoulou, 2001).

The Gulf Crisis erupted in August 1990 when Iraq invaded oil-rich Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council voted in favor of the implementation of an economic embargo on Iraq (Security Council resolution 661). Accordingly, Turkey shut down the Kirkuk–Yumurtalik oil
pipeline and suspended its trade with Iraq (which amounted to approximately $2 billion a year). Despite the Turkish government’s wish to participate in the U.S.-led military coalition against Iraq, the resistance of opposition parties in the parliament and public dissent prevented such decision. The predominance of domestic politics on foreign policy became evident with this lack of U.S. support. Turkey’s participation remained limited to allowing U.S. and coalition forces to use Turkish military airbases for the operation in Iraq (Athanassopoulou, 2001; Hale, 1992).

Meanwhile, Turkey wanted to secure NATO support in case of an Iraqi attack on Turkey. Following NATO’s decision to provide immediate support, 40 outdated aircrafts were sent by Germany, Belgium and Italy to assist in Turkey’s defense (Hale, 2000; Athanassopoulou, 2001). Turkey also relocated 120,000 military personnel and equipment to its southern border with Iraq in order to fortify its security. This maneuver forced Saddam Hussein to move eight divisions of Iraqi army to the Turkish border.

Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad initiated a military campaign against its Kurdish population in Northern Iraq in 1991. Turkey had to accommodate large number of Kurdish refugees who fled from Northern Iraq as a result of this military campaign. On April 5, 1991 an international force was set up (U.N. Security Council resolution 688) for the protection of Iraqi Kurds (Operation Provide Comfort). A no-fly zone was imposed north of the 36th parallel in Iraq which encouraged Kurds, free from Saddam regime’s oppression, to work toward an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. This caused the Turkish government to be concerned about possible effects on the sentiments of its own Kurdish population (Hale, 2000; Athanassopoulou, 2001). Saddam Hussein remained in power despite military intervention by U.S.-led coalition forces and a U.N. embargo. The only substantial outcome was the creation of a safe haven for Kurds in their pursuit of an independent Kurdish state.
During the 1990s, the U.S. administration continued its support of Turkey’s membership to the E.U. U.S. support was critical in the E.U.’s decision regarding Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate at the Helsinki Summit, in contrast with the E.U.’s 1997 decision to exclude Turkey from further enlargement plans at the Luxembourg summit (Aybet, 2006; Hale, 2000; Athanassopoulou, 2001).

Turkey’s improving relations with Israel in 1990s had a positive impact on Turkish–U.S. relations. Turkey and Israel signed the Military Cooperation and Training Agreement in 1996. Neighboring countries opposed Turkey’s cooperation with Israel, while the U.S. administration backed it. The U.S. participated in Turkish–Israeli joint naval exercises in 1998 and 1999, which were executed as part of a 1996 agreement (Athanassopoulou, 2001; Bishku, 2006; Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Israeli, 2001; Aras and Bicakci, 2006).

In line with the E.U. policies, human rights, the Kurdish issue and Cyprus problem started to draw increased criticism from the U.S. administration. The U.S. began to condition its economic and military aid upon these issues as a result of Greek and Armenian lobbies in the U.S. senate. It was suggested by Senator D’Amato (D-New York) that American aid should be frozen ‘unless Turkey stopped its fight with Kurds, recognized their rights and withdrew its forces from northern Cyprus’ in 1995. The Pentagon rejected the sale of Black Hawk helicopters to Turkey in 1994 (Athanassopoulou, 2001).

During the Cold War era, Turkey was one of the biggest beneficiaries of U.S. economic and military aid. From 1946 to 1985, Turkey was the fourth largest recipient of U.S. military assistance, in total of more than $7.8 billion, ranking right after Israel, South Vietnam and South Korea. From 1984 to the end of the Cold War, Turkey was the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid, ranking after Israel and Egypt. It should be noted that this number does not involve
aid coming to Turkey from other members of the Western bloc. Sources of aid dried up rapidly after the Cold War. In 1997, American aid to Turkey was reduced to a $175 million loan and a cash grant of $22 million. In 1998, this number was further reduced even further. The reduction in the U.S. economic aid came as a result of the increasing importance of human rights, the PKK and Cyprus issues to Turkish–U.S. relations (Evriviades, 1998; Athanassopoulou, 2001). In the post-Cold war environment, it was necessary for Turkey to build a self-sufficient defense industry; U.S. aid was critical for the implementation of these plans.

In the 21st century, the title of ‘strategic partnership’ has emerged as the defining term for the Turkish–American relationship. It is argued that this term signifies a relationship that is beneficial to both countries’ interests in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in the Caucasus (Isyar, 2005; Athanassopoulou, 2001).

**Relations with the European Union**

After the rejection of Turkey’s application for membership to the EEC in 1989, relations experienced a cooling period. The Customs Union came into effect in 1996 which was viewed as a positive indication by the Turkish government. However, with the accession of former communist states to the E.U., and no signs for Turkey, it became evident that Turkey would not be a part of any enlargement plans in the foreseeable future.

The EEC’s southern enlargement was completed with the accession of Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986). Accession to the EEC helped these countries to consolidate their struggling democracies after long periods of military rule. The EEC gradually put more emphasis on ‘political’ factors over economic conditions for candidate states after its southern enlargement. Consequently, the EEC gradually transformed into a more political entity with special emphasis on democracy, human rights and the Christian-Judeo values shared by its
members (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000; Onis, 2002). Even so, Turkish governments continue to pursue full membership.

The EEC proposed the Matutes package to Turkey after its rejection in June 1990. It was a plan to increase efforts to achieve a Customs union between Turkey and the EEC. Efforts on both sides intensified following the EEC’s Lisbon summit in 1992. The E.U.’s emphasis on political factors bore fruit at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 with the adoption of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. According to Copenhagen criteria, candidate states should meet political as well as economic conditions for full membership. Consolidation of democratic institutions, rule of law, protection of human rights and a consolidated market economy were declared as the core of Copenhagen criteria. Despite the promising economy, with its poor political performance, Turkey ranked at the bottom of the candidate list (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000; Muftuler-Bac, 1998).

In March 1996, a Customs Union agreement was signed between Turkey and the E.U. The Customs Union agreement was approved by the European Parliament only after heated debates concerning Turkey’s improvements (or lack thereof) on political issues such as Cyprus and the Kurds. Turkey lost $2.6 to $3 billion per year on taxes after the implementation of the Customs Union. For compensation of these losses, the E.U. offered monetary support. Planned budgetary assistance worth €375 million, as a major component of European support, could not be released due to the Greek veto. In the meantime, the E.U. has lifted quotas on the import of textiles from Turkey as a condition of the Customs Union.

Domestic developments further eroded Turkey’s political performance. After its victory in mayoral elections in 1995, the religious conservative, right wing Welfare Party–WP (Refah Partisi–RP) formed a coalition government with the centrist right wing True Path Party–TPT
(Dogru Yol Partisi–DYP) as a result of the 1996 general elections. The Customs Union agreement was signed during the RP–DYP coalition government, even though RP has a tradition of opposing to the E.U. based on cultural and religious incompatibility. Turkey was officially excluded from Europe’s enlargement plan based on its weak human rights and democracy record at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 (Hale, 2000; Muftuler-Bac, 1998; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Islamists increased their share of public support after the E.U.’s decision. “The E.U. is a Christian club”, a remark made by RP’s leader Necmeddin Erbakan, became a political banner for Islamists for upcoming elections (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).

Hale (2003) argues that the Turkish government adopted a policy of disengagement which included a two-step program; remain inactive in pursuit of full membership while remaining loyal to its responsibilities to the E.U. European leaders tried to come up with a proposition to normalize its relations with Turkey at Cardiff Summit in 1998. However, they failed to produce a viable plan.

Another crisis further damaged relations in 1998 when Germany, Italy and Greece refused to cooperate with Turkish officials about the extradition of Abdullah Öcalan, the head of terrorist organization PKK. Record high anti-Kurdish, anti-E.U. and anti-U.S. sentiments among public were evident in 1999 general elections. Nationalist left wing Democratic Left Party–DLP (Demokratik Sol Parti - DSP) and Nationalist right wing National Action Party-NAP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP) formed yet another coalition government as a result of elections following the Öcalan Crisis with Europe.

Another attempt to nominate Turkey was vetoed by Greece and Sweden at Cologne Summit in June 1999 (Hale, 2000). Finally, Turkey became a candidate for full membership as a result of the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, under the condition of meeting the Copenhagen Criteria.
and resolving problems with Greece on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea (Aybet, 2006; Onis, 2002; Hale, 2000; Muftuler-Bac, 1998; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).

The Accession Partnership Document was accepted as a road map for Turkey by the E.U. Council at the Nice Summit in December, 2000 (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Several topics were listed for Turkey to improve before its accession to the E.U. The same agreement created mechanisms to assess Turkey’s progress. National Program for the ‘Adoption of the Acquis’ was prepared by Turkish Government and presented to the E.U. in March 2001. The Turkish government declared that its policies fulfilled its obligations for full membership (Onis, 2002; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Accordingly, Turkey started a series of political reforms including increased civilian control over police forces, the abolition of the death penalty, education in ethnic languages and lifting restrictions on freedom of expression.

In the Progress report of the E.U. commission, E.U. officials acknowledged Turkey’s progress and encouraged further reforms in December 2002. It was also stated that there was still a long road ahead of Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Aybet, 2006). In December 2004, the Progress Report of the E.U. Commission announced that Turkey had met the Copenhagen Criteria, and set the date as December 3rd, 2005 for openings of accession talks (Aybet, 2006).

With the ongoing Cyprus problem, domestic tension between secular and Islamist structures, strained relations with Greece, growing economic problems (in the 2007 second quarter, foreign debt was nearly $168 billion\textsuperscript{24}), the Kurdish issue, and mutually negative sentiments both in Turkey and in the E.U. countries, one can only imagine what is next for Turkish–E.U. relations (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Aybet, 2006; Muftuler-Bac, 1998; Eralp, 2004; Desai, 2005).

\textsuperscript{24} http://www.hazine.gov.tr/stat/turkiyenet_disborestok.htm
Relations with Russia and Caucasus

After the Cold War, Turkey no longer neighbored Russia for the first time in history (including Ottoman era). Turkey’s biggest security concern disappeared. These developments signified a new era for Turkish–Russian relations. Meanwhile, a new opportunity emerged for Turkey to develop relations with its distant cousins – the Turkic republics of Central Asia and Caucasus (Moustakis and Ackerman, 2002). This new beginning was not without complications, however. Even after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Turkey still had concerns about Russian activities in the region. Still the biggest military supplier of Syria, Russia also developed close relations with Iran. An attempted deal for the sale of S-300 missiles to Greek Cypriots further increased Turkish doubts (Uslu, 2003; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000).

There are many areas that have the potential to produce either close cooperation or severe conflict in Turkish–Russian relations. Russia refused to reduce the number of troops on its southern flank according to the agreement of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). During the Bosnian War (1992–1995), Russia supported the Serbs and Turkey sided with the Bosnians. On the other hand, cooperation on natural gas and increasing trade after the Cold War has contributed significantly to improving relations between Russia and Turkey (Bazoglu Sezer, 2000).

After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., a crisis erupted in Chechnya in 1990, and subsequent events influenced the transformation of Russia into the post-Cold War era (Falkowski, 2001). Because of the 5 million Caucasians living in Anatolia, and the common Islamic faith with the Chechens, Turkey stayed neutral in this conflict. Turkish governments followed a non-involvement policy, and emphasized that Chechnya was Russia’s internal problem. Turkey’s own struggle with the PKK was the logic behind its Chechnya policy. Turkey’s involvement in Chechnya conflict would have encouraged Russia to provide even more substantial support to
the PKK. Russia used its support of the PKK as a strategic tool to restrain Turkish reaction to its domestic problems in Caucasia. Thus, both Turkey and Russia adopted similar neutral policies concerning each other’s domestic conflict, apart from occasional political rhetoric (Uslu, 2003; Bazoglu Sezer, 2000).

The 1990s witnessed increasing cooperation in Turkish–Russian relations. After its rejection by the E.U., Turkey sought to improve its relations with Russia and former Soviet republics. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel visited Moscow in 1992. Treaty on the Principles of Neighborly Relations was signed between Turkey and Russia to encourage further cooperation (Warhola and Mitchell, 2006; Bazoglu Sezer, 2000). In 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project was initiated at a meeting in Istanbul with Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Albania. The BSEC projected mutual efforts from signatory states to remove trade obstacles (Hale, 2000). In 1985, the trade volume between Turkey and Russia was $410 million, which increased to $4 billion in 1997. The trade volume with Caucasian states was at $1 billion in 1991 and it stayed at about the same level for several years.

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Ankara in April 1997. The ‘Blue Stream’ gas pipeline agreement was signed during this visit. This agreement projected that upon its completion in 2010, Russia would provide 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey annually (Warhola and Mitchell, 2006; Hale, 2000). Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s visit to Moscow in 1999 coincided with the second Russian military operation in Chechnya. Despite the public reaction, the Turkish delegation remained focused on the economic aspect of the visit, namely the Blue Stream project.
After the independence of the Turkic republics of Central Asia, Turkey volunteered to play the ‘big brother’, providing guidance to these republics during their transformation to a market economy and democracy. Religious, ethnic, cultural and historical ties were considered to encourage a close cooperation. This idealistic approach was resounded by official statements from both sides between 1989 and 1992.

Despite the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Russia had plans to re-emerge as a superpower and to pursue its interests in former Soviet republics. Meanwhile, Turkey’s limited economic capability was a disadvantage. Furthermore, Turkey’s democratic institutions did not appeal to the autocratic leaders of the Turkic republics. More importantly, the last thing that the Turkic republics needed was another ‘big brother’ after 70 years of Moscow tutelage. Thus, Turkey’s big brother bid had a cooling affect on the relations (Hunter, 2001; Aydin, 2004; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Warhola and Mitchell, 2006; Bazoglu Sezer, 2000).

Turkey developed cooperative relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, although initial projections failed. Turkey signed an agreement of military assistance and cooperation with Georgia in 1999 and announced its intention for ‘deepening strategic cooperation’ with Azerbaijan in 1997. Turkey provided Georgia and Azerbaijan with assistance for the modernization of military forces. The pro-Western attitudes of governments in Georgia and Azerbaijan contributed to the cooperative nature of their relations with Turkey. Georgia and Azerbaijan signed agreements of Partnership for Peace (PFP) with NATO. Developing cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan was concluded with the Agreement of Turkish–Georgian–Azerbaijani trilateral security cooperation, signed in January 2002 (Hunter, 2001; Bazoglu Sezer, 2001; Uslu, 2003; Aydin, 2004; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).
Close cooperation continued in economic relations. A series of agreements were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey concerning Azerbaijan’s gas supply to Turkey in March 2001. It was projected that Azerbaijan’s gas supply of 2 billion cubic meters to Turkey would reach 6.6 billion cubic meters by 2007. Meanwhile, Turkey became one of the largest trade partners of Georgia. In 2005, Georgia’s imports came from Russia (14.2 percent of total), Turkey (11 percent), and United States (10 percent). For exports in 2005 major export partners were U.S. (16.1 percent of the total), Turkey (15.8 percent), and Turkmenistan (11.8 percent).25

Energy resources in the Caspian Basin drew increasing attention after the Cold War. Russia wished to exert influence over energy resources in the region. Accordingly, the Russian government suggested that the port of Novorossiysk (in Russia) should be considered a gate to world markets for Southern Caspian oil. Turkey offered a route from Baku (Azerbaijan), through Tbilisi in Georgia, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan as an alternative. The U.S, Georgia and Azerbaijan backed Turkey’s proposal. Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement in Istanbul for construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in November 1999. Despite the financial troubles, security concerns and political pressure from Russia, construction of the pipeline started in 2002 and it was completed in 2005. The first oil was pumped from Baku on May 10, 2005 and it reached Ceyhan (Turkey) on May 28, 200626 (Hale, 2000; Aydin, 2004; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Uslu, 2003).

Rich gas deposits were discovered at the Shah Deniz (Azerbaijan) in 1999. For the transportation of this gas, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) project was also initiated by an agreement between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2001. Construction of the pipeline started

25 http://www.export.gov/articles/Georgia_MoM2.asp
26 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm
in 2003, and the transfer of gas started in 2006. For the expansion of the gas pipeline to Europe, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement in 2003 (Aydin, 2004; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. was a double-edged sword for Turkey. On one hand, the most serious threat against its security since WWII had come to an end. On the other, the resulting power vacuum created new threats and security concerns for Turkey. Nonetheless, Turkey got an opportunity to pursue more assertive foreign policy in its region. Accordingly, Turkey tried to improve close economic, political and strategic relations with former Soviet republics. Turkey improved its relations with Russia in spite of potentially conflicting issues, such as Chechnya, the PKK, and the Bosnian War. Trade levels between Russia and Turkey reached $6-10 billion (including shuttle trade), which is higher than the trade volume between the U.S. and Turkey. Natural gas became an important aspect of economic and political relations. At present, Russia supplies almost 80 percent of the domestic need for natural gas in Turkey. Construction, arms sales and tourism sectors also witnessed a boom. Russia’s increasing military presence and its close relations with Iran, continue to concern Turkey. In the foreseeable future, however, good relations will presumably prevail between Turkey and Russia (Aydin, 2004; Bazoglu Sezer, 2000; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).

**Relations with Greece and Cyprus**

Conflicts continued to remain unresolved in the post-Cold War era. Greece had announced an expansion of its territorial waters to 12 miles according to the Law of Sea Convention (1982). Turkey did not sign the convention, and refused to accept 12 miles since such acceptance could limit its access to the international waters of the Aegean Sea. Turkey declared that any attempt by Greece would be considered ‘casus belli’. The Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution in 1995 authorizing the Turkish government accordingly. Conflicting interpretations of the rules
of Flight Information Regions (FIR) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by Turkish and Greek governments also created constant tension in the Aegean airspace, and continue to do so even today. Greece continues with its claims for 10 mile airspace over the Aegean Sea while Turkey acknowledges only 6 mile air space. Reports of dogfights between military aircrafts of two countries exemplify the continuing conflict in Turkish–Greek relations (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Similarly, Turkey claims that the militarization of the Aegean islands is a violation of the Treaty of Paris signed in 1947. Meanwhile, Greece views the militarization of the islands as a response to the Fourth Aegean Army of Turkey, which was established after the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Greek and Turkish governments failed to agree on talks for the resolution of these issues. Turkey insists on bilateral talks while Greece keeps pressuring for a trial before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague.

Conflict over the Aegean Sea brought the two countries head-to-head in 1996 over a tiny islet, Imia/Kardak (Lesser, 2000). In the last days of 1995, a Turkish fishing boat ran on the rocks of Imia/Kardak. Greece claimed that the accident was in international waters. Turkish government claimed sovereignty over the islet. Rising tension mounted to a point of an open conflict. Crisis was averted through U.S. mediation. However, this example shows the extent of conflict between Turkey and Greece. Despite ongoing conflicts, catastrophic earthquakes created a brief period of relaxation in bilateral relations in 1999. Both countries were quick in humanitarian responses. It is argued that politicians on both sides should use the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ to make a fresh start in relations (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Gundogdu, 2001; Hale, 2000, Lesser, 2000). However, mutual distrust prevails in relations. With the recognition of Turkey as a candidate state, the E.U. strongly encouraged both parties to solve bilateral problems
through intense diplomatic talks. Greece and Turkey opened negotiations over the problems in the Aegean Sea in 2002.

Meanwhile, UN-led diplomatic talks for the future of Cyprus failed in 1991 and 1992. Different arguments concerning the structure of united Cyprus deadlocked diplomatic talks. Cypriot Greeks offered a plan for a ‘bi-communal federation’, whereas Turkish Cypriots negotiated for a ‘confederation with two independent states’ (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000). The U.N. General Secretary attempted to bring parties to table by offering confidence-building measures. However, disagreements between the parties continued. In 1994, the European Court of Justice banned exports from the Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus to the E.U.

While Greek and Turkish governments declared their commitment to peaceful relations in a NATO meeting in Madrid (July, 1997), the Greek Cypriot government announced the purchase of S-300 missiles from Russia. Turkey opposed this deal, claiming that the missile system would pose a threat to its security. The Turkish government tightened controls on the ships passing through its straits. The U.S. administration warned that parties should avoid actions that would escalate the tension. As a result of Turkish opposition, backed by U.S. and British administrations, Greek and Cypriot Greek governments decided to install the missile system on the Greek island of Crete in August, 1998 instead of on Cyprus (Hale, 2000).

Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments signed an agreement of ‘Joint defense concept’ that proposed an economic union in July 1997. The E.U.’s decision for the exclusion of Turkey from enlargement plans as a result of Luxembourg summit discouraged Turkish and Greek governments to advance diplomatic talks over Cyprus. Negotiations resumed following the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000). On May 1st, 2004, Cyprus
became a full member of the E.U. Efforts to bring two communities under a united Cyprus have been continuing since then. The E.U. strongly urges all parties to come up with a viable solution for the unification of Cyprus.

**Relations with the Balkans**

The post-Cold War environment has lifted longstanding barriers to regional cooperation. Cultural, religious, and ethnic ties existed between several groups in the Balkans and Turkey. Refraining from any special emphasis on these ties, Turkey gradually assumed more assertive policies in the region. Turkey strongly supported a diplomatic solution for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. During the war, Turkey participated in NATO operations and later in the U.N. peace-keeping efforts (Hale, 2000; Calis, 2001; Lasser and Larrabee, 2003).

Turkey and Albania signed an agreement for the modernization and the training of Albanian armed forces in 1992. Turkey also provided Macedonia with assistance for the modernization of the Macedonian army. Turkey and Macedonia signed a military cooperation agreement in 1995. Turkish–Bulgarian relations also improved after the resolution of forced assimilation on Bulgarian Turks. Turkey and Bulgaria signed a Treaty of Friendship, Neighborly Relations and Security in 1992 (Hale, 2000; Lasser and Larrabee, 2003). It is argued that cautious Turkish policies have paid off in terms of preventing Bulgaria and Macedonia from participating in a Slavic alliance, led by Greece, against Muslim populations in the region (Hale, 2000).

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Turkey recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina following the U.S. and the EEC in 1992. When Serbian atrocities started against Bosnians, Turkey was faced with a challenging situation. Along with ethnic and religious ties, there were 4 million Turkish citizens of Bosnian descent in Turkey. Considering its alliance with NATO and despite public pressure, Turkish government
announced that Turkey could not engage in a unilateral military intervention. When the anticipated intervention against Serbs from the U.N. and NATO failed to occur between 1992 and 1995, Turkey called for support from Muslim countries.

A Balkan Conference convened in Istanbul, in November 1992. Participants called for an immediate U.N. intervention in the region. Although Turkey failed to trigger Muslim support for Bosnians, the Turkish government continued with its own diplomatic efforts. Russia and Greece, in alliance with the Serbs, prevented Turkey from sending troops to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) after its initial step up. However, Turkey was invited to send troops to the region as a part of UNPROFOR in March, 1994 as a result of diplomatic talks (Hale, 2000; Cakir, 2001). Turkey contributed to negotiations between Croats and Bosnians to establish a Bosnian-Croatian Federation in 1994. In the summer of 1995, NATO launched air strikes against Serbs (Operation Deliberate Force). A peace agreement was signed between the Bosnians and the Serbs on November 21st, 1995, and conflicts officially ended.

Turkey tried to avoid any involvement at the beginning of the Kosovo crisis in 1998. The Turkish government preferred to consider the situation in Kosovo an internal problem of Serbia, worrying any attempts could provoke reciprocal support for Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey (Hale, 2000; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). However, increasing Serbian animosity and pressure from Kosovo Muslims enforced Turkish government to review the situation. Turkish government decided to participate in NATO air strikes. After the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo, Turkey sent one thousand troops to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) (Hale, 2000; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).
Relations with the Middle East

Turkey and Israel

There were several developments that contributed to the improvement of cooperation between Turkey and Israel. The Madrid conference convened in November, 1991 for peace talks between Israel and the Arab states, including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. It was a positive indication for a lasting peace between the Arabs and the Israelis. At the same time, the PLO’s support for the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq was criticized by neighboring countries, weakening any possible Arab reaction against Turkish–Israeli cooperation in the region since many of the Arab countries, including Egypt and Syria, supported U.S. intervention in Iraq (Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Inbar, 2005; Piccoli, 1999; Bishku, 2006).

Conflict over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates was still unresolved between Turkey and Syria when the peace talks opened between Israel and Syria. Turkey realized that peace between Syria and Israel could create a disadvantageous situation where Israel may back Syrian claims against Turkey. Thus, Turkey decided to move forward quickly for a closer cooperation with Israel (Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Inbar, 2005; Piccoli, 1999; Bishku, 2006).

Turkish–Arab relations failed to follow the rapid take-off at the beginning of 1980s. Turkey wasn’t able to sustain the Arab support for important issues such as Cyprus and PKK. In the meantime, decline of oil prices led to the cutback of Arab imports from Turkey. Turkey’s export numbers to Arab countries dropped from 45 percent in mid-1980s to 12 percent in early 1990s. This development further encouraged stronger economic relations with Israel. Trade volume between Turkey and Israel improved 156 percent from 1992 to 1994 (Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Inbar, 2005; Piccoli, 1999; Bishku, 2006).

Turkey upgraded its diplomatic relations to an ambassadorial level with the PLO and Israel in December 1991. Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in 1994 and President Süleyman Demirel in
1995 visited Israel. These visits signified the highest level in relations since 1948. During President Demirel’s visit, four agreements were signed with Israel on economic cooperation, free trade, promotion of bilateral investment and prevention of double taxation (Kirisci, 1997; Jung, 2005; Hale, 2000; Altunisik, 2000; Bishku, 2006).

Turkey and Israel signed the Military Training and Cooperation on February, 1996. It is argued that this agreement was a part of the U.S.–Israel defense pact, signed in 1995, which projected a web of regional alliances in the Middle East (Hale, 2000). Turkey and Israel agreed to hold joint training sessions for air forces, mutual naval visits and training programs for military personnel. Turkey also allowed Israel to use Turkish air space for training of the Israeli air force. In August 1996, the Cooperation in Defense Industry agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel and established a base for intelligence transfer and military know-how. In 1996, a third agreement was signed by which Israel undertook the upgrade of Turkish F-4 fighter jets and Turkey purchased the Israeli Popeye-I and Popeye II air-to-surface missiles (Altunisik, 2000; Bolukbasi, 1999; Hale, 2000; Bishku, 2006; Kirisci, 1997; Piccoli, 1999; Jung, 2005).

Growing Turkish–Israeli military cooperation evoked Arab criticism. A Lebanese newspaper called it ‘an alliance against all Arabs’ (Jung, 2005). Egyptian president Mubarak expressed Egypt’s doubts about the nature of the Turkish–Israeli alliance (Bolukbasi, 1999). Similar statements from Iraqi, Iranian and Lebanese officials confirmed Arab concurrence with Mubarak’s comments. The Turkish–Israeli alliance was considered to be ‘beneficial to Israeli interests’ and ‘a serious threat against Iraq and Syria’ by Arab countries (Kirisci, 1997; Bolukbasi, 1999; Hale, 2000; Jung, 2005). In fact, Israel and Turkey entered into an alliance, since both countries viewed Iran’s and Syria’s missile capabilities as a common threat to their
securities. The possibility that Iran may expand its arsenal to include nuclear weapons also created concerns in both countries (Piccoli, 1999; Altunisik, 2000).

Turkey, Israel and U.S. naval and air forces executed a joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean in January 1998. Jordan also participated as an observer. Egypt and Syria described it as ‘a conspiracy against Arab and Islamic countries’. The Iraqi foreign minister called it ‘a provocative act against Arab nations’ (Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Altunisik, 2000; Piccoli, 1999; Bolukbasi, 1999). Mutual agreement between Turkey and Israel, for a second naval exercise, was announced during Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s visit to Israel in July 1998.

In the 2002 general elections, the Justice and Development Party–JDP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) won the majority in the Turkish National Assembly. A cooling period was expected with Israel since JDP, with its Islamist roots, announced their intentions for developing relations with Muslim countries. In contrast to these expectations, strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel continued. Israeli president Moshe Katsav visited Turkey in 2003. Military exercises were executed as planned. In 2004, the JDP government also signed an agreement with the Israeli government for the sale of 50 million cubic meters of water to Israel annually. An agreement concerning the training of the Turkish police force by the Israeli police force was signed during Israeli Public Security Minister Tsahi Hanegbi’s visit to Turkey in 2003. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül also visited Israel in January 2005 (Inbar, 2005).

Turkey and Syria

Along with the continuing water problem, Syrian support27 of the PKK continued during the 1990s. An agreement of joint effort against terrorism was signed between Turkey and Syria in

27 i.e. allowing PKK to use Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley as a training base.
1992. Accordingly, Syria declared the PKK as a terrorist organization. In the meantime, Turkey conditioned further agreements on the water issue upon Syrian denouncement of the PKK. However, the Syrian government continued to use their support of PKK as a bargaining chip in negotiations over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Sayari, 1990; Aras and Koni, 2002; Hale 2000; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Hale, 1992; Jung, 2005; Olson, 1997; Altunisik, 2000). Syrian support of the PKK escalated tensions to the point of military conflict in 1998. Egypt acted as a mediator during Turkish–Syrian negotiations. Consequently, the Syrian government agreed to withdraw its support of the PKK, and the Adana Accord was signed between Syria and Turkey in October 1998 (Sayari, 1990; Aras and Koni, 2002; Hale 2000; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; Hale, 1992; Jung, 2005; Olson, 1997; Altunisik, 2000). Israel also contributed to the peaceful resolution of the crisis through their own diplomatic efforts (Altunisik, 2000; Minasian, 2003; Aydin, 2000; Aras and Koni, 2002; Bengio and Ozcan, 2001).

The Adana Accord paved the way for economic and political cooperation between Turkey and Syria. Turkish and Syrian delegations came together in 1999 to discuss possible plans to improve cooperation in trade and transportation (Hale, 2000). During this meeting, delegations agreed to reactivate the Joint Economic Commission, which had suspended its activities in 1988. Relations were further improved following Bashar Assad’s rise to power after his father’s death (Hafez Assad) in 2000. Trade volume went up from $ 539.2 million in 1999 to $ 724.7 million in 2000. Turkey became the fourth largest trading partner of Syria. Turkey and Syria agreed to transport the Egyptian natural gas through Jordan to European markets in 2001. The Military Training and Cooperation agreement, which proposed the training of Syrian officers at Turkish military institutions, was signed in 2002. For the first time in 17 years, Syrian Prime Minister

Turkey and Iran

Turkey and Iran relations remained firm despite several conflicting issues (particularly the PKK and the Turkish–Israel alliance) on the agenda. Turkey and Iran signed a security agreement in 1993. Accordingly, both countries agreed to cooperate against terrorist organizations posing threats to their security. Iran captured and handed over a group of PKK terrorists to Turkish officials. According to a second agreement between the countries, the Iranian government declared their intention to prevent the PKK from using Iranian territory for transit passage. Turkish president Süleyman Demirel visited Tehran in 1994. This was the first Turkish presidential visit to Iran since the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. Even so, in 1995 Turkish military forces launched an incursion into Northern Iraq in pursuit of the PKK, and Iran protested Turkey’s decision.

In August, 1996, Turkish Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan visited Tehran. An agreement concerning the construction of a gas pipeline to transport Iranian natural gas to Turkey was signed. The agreement projected the sale of 228 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas, worth $23 billion, to Turkey over a period of 25 years. In the meantime, the U.S. administration announced the imposition of Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ILSA), and the U.S. administration opposed the Turkish–Iranian gas agreement, arguing that it would violate ILSA. The Turkish government refused to withdraw from the agreement, arguing that the gas agreement was outside of the ILSA’s jurisdiction (Aydin and Aras, 2005; Hale, 2000).

Relations became tense when Turkish fighter jets bombed PKK camps on Iraqi territory, adjacent to the Iraq–Iran border. The Iranian government claimed that Turkish jets bombed two
Iranian villages. The Turkish government accused Iranian government of supporting the PKK. A security agreement was signed between Turkey and Iran in August 1999 which resolved the crisis. The security agreement permitted the launch of simultaneous attacks on terrorist camps on both sides of the Turkish–Iranian border (Hale, 2000).

Economic ties, strengthened during Iraq–Iran War, continued to grow. The gas pipeline agreement, in 1996, bolstered economic relations. Upon completion of the gas pipeline, the pumping of Iranian gas to Turkey started in December, 2001. In May, 2000, Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade Kürşad Tüzmen visited to participate in negotiations for the establishment of a Turkish–Iranian Business Committee and the prevention of the illegal fuel trade. The Committee of Turkish–Iranian Business Cooperation was established on November, 2001. The Committee held its first meeting during Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s Tehran visit in 2002. A second trade agreement was signed between Turkey and Iran in October, 2003, concerning the reduction of customs and tax barriers on trade and the establishment of border trade centers (Aydin and Aras, 2005).

Despite differences in their policies regarding issues such as the PKK and the Islamist-secular conflict, Turkish–Iranian relations were able to endure turbulent times of the post-Cold War period. Some serious challenges will most likely test the strength of this relationship in the near future, however. Uncertainties in the region following the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 continue to exacerbate the Kurdish issue on both sides, and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons will stay at the top of the agenda for the foreseeable future.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

A thorough examination of the events of Turkish foreign policy in its historical depth shows a pattern of consistency since Ottoman times. This is generally defined as “responsiveness to structural attributes” (Okman, 2004). Structures of the international system should be evaluated as one of the determinants of Turkish foreign policy. Geopolitics has played an important part in the determination of Turkish foreign policy as a response to the external environment. The Ottomans used flexible alliances and exploitation of the balance of power in order to survive after the 17th century.

Balancing external threats with the help of alliances continued to be a determinant factor of Turkish foreign policy after 1923. The new Turkish state mainly shaped its foreign policy to balance two simultaneous efforts during the first decades after its establishment: 1) transformation of the society and the state based on the Western values, as stated by Kemalist ideology; and 2) solving certain problems, remnants of Ottoman heritage, with its neighbors through peaceful means and establishing itself as a respectable member of international society. Ideological coherence of ruling elites facilitated the implementation of this agenda. Turkish foreign policy with its neutral stance, non-interference and non-involvement as two basic components, helped Turkish governments to focus on domestic issues in between the two World Wars. The traditionally predominant position of external factors in Turkish foreign policy for the first time allowed for consideration of domestic factors as well.

World War II changed the balance of power in the international system, and forced Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy. Faced with the Soviet threat to its security, Turkey abandoned its neutral stance and sought permanent alliances to balance Soviet threats. As a result of its proximity to the U.S.S.R., Turkey was considered an asset for U.S. in its struggle with
communism. Until the transition to multi-party democracy in 1960, Turkish foreign policy was carefully handled by an elite group, with no eye to domestic policy. The structural characteristics of the international system were of the utmost importance in the determination of Turkish foreign policy between 1945 and 1960. After the Jupiter Missile Crisis in 1963 and Cyprus Crisis in 1964, Turkish governments realized the necessity of a more diversified foreign policy agenda. Accordingly, ‘multi-faceted foreign policy’ was adopted as a strategy to bring diversity to Turkish foreign policy. The dissolution of U.S.S.R., and the consequent end of Cold War, caused structural shifts in international system.

The bipolar balance of power, based on U.S.–U.S.S.R. competition, collapsed. In the power vacuum which followed the end of Cold war, religious and ethnic divisions came back full force in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood as well as previously frozen areas: the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. These developments had a dramatic impact on Turkey, creating both new security challenges and opportunities. Meanwhile, Turkey’s relative importance to the West, in Cold war structure was greatly reduced. While new threats emerged from the East, Western support for its security and survival declined. The post-Cold war era also provided Turkey with new opportunities, as well. It is argued that a serious shift could be observed in Turkish foreign policy from ‘active defensive posture’ to a more ‘assertive foreign policy’. This shift included Turkey’s more active involvement in regional issues and taking the lead in starting initiatives.

Domestic factors have gradually gained importance in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy since 1960. The military structure has been a power to reckon with in Turkish politics from the start. In line with Kemalist tradition, the military has always been considered ‘the guardian of secular and democratic Turkey’. The military seized the power and ousted
democratically elected governments three times when civilian governments were thought to have failed. However, the military did not seek to establish a permanent military rule, and after every intervention, they returned to their barracks. Nonetheless, military interventions had a great impact on domestic politics, and subsequently on foreign policy.

The 1961 Constitution, following the 1960 coup d’état, introduced the institutions of plural society and broad representation of different political groups to domestic politics. Conversely, the 1982 Constitution, following 1980 coup d’état, virtually destroyed the institutions of civil society, emasculated political parties and encouraged the revival of Islam in domestic politics. The most damaging effects of military interventions were felt in political establishments. While different political groups were enabled to participate in politics as a result of 1961 constitution, this development also led to ideological polarization and shaky coalition governments in the 1970s. The 1971 military intervention, without ousting civilian government, further damaged already polarized and fragmented political structure. The result was another coup d’état in 1980, which had long lasting damaging effects. Consequently, “Turkish foreign policy became a prisoner of chronic domestic instability and economic crisis, making effective planning very hard to achieve or implement” (Hale, 2000).

Ethnic and religious identities also became determining factors of foreign policy through their effects on domestic politics. The Kurdish issue became a very problematic subject in Turkey’s relations with its immediate neighbors, as well as with the E.U. In addition, increasing Islamist politics had an impact on domestic as well as foreign policy. Since their consecutive election victories in 2002 and 2007, the Islamist JDP (Justice and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) has been trying to reformulate both domestic and foreign policy principles that
have prevailed since the foundation of the Turkish republic. The net result of JDP policies is yet to be determined.

Turkey’s foreign and domestic politics will be shaped in the coming decades based on the resolution of several problematic areas: 1) the political system - corrupt politicians, the lack of stable political parties with broad electoral support, and the weight of military establishment in domestic politics are major problems in domestic scene. Despite hopeful promises, Islamist JDP has already started to be shaken by various corruption allegations and scandals. They deeply polarized the society around religious issues. JDP policies disappointed those who had hoped that JDP could follow the path of Christian Democrat parties in Europe. A political party that will appeal to the electorate and work towards the solution of Turkey’s long standing problems is yet to be seen. 2) Turkish economy - unsuccessful economic policies and resulting high unemployment rates, wide income inequalities, and high levels of foreign debt made IMF and World Bank constant features in economic scene. The solution of economic problems is highly dependent upon political problems. Considering the highly unstable political environment, Turkey is unlikely to find solutions for economic problems in near future. 3) Ethnic and religious politics - Turkey has been dealing with the increasing prevalence of religious (Islamists) and ethnic (Kurdish) politics since 1990s. PKK terrorism has caused great economic and human costs since 1984. It has also intensified tension between ethnic groups. Organic ties between Kurdish politicians and the PKK reduced the chances of pro-Kurdish political parties to contribute to a solution to the Kurdish issue. Islamists have enjoyed ever-increasing electoral support since 1990s. Unlike the first generation of Islamists, the JDP appeared to be in favor of pro-E.U. and pro-American policies, and with their strong populist rhetoric, they sustained broad electoral support. However, recent developments in Turkey implicates that despite their rhetoric of
‘politics without corruption’ the JDP is prone to corruption and nepotism as much as any other political tradition.

Along with domestic issues, Turkey faces several challenges in the region. Russia, with its resurging powers and ambitions, has once again emerged as a power to be reckoned with in the region. Iran, with its nuclear ambitions, could become a serious threat to the security of the region. Meanwhile, U.S. occupation of Iraq has enabled Iran to expand its influence in neighboring states while destroying already tenuous stability in the region. Turkey has developed strong economic ties, especially in energy-related areas, with both Russia and Iran since 1990s. In a global world, it is unlikely for countries to be able to separate economic relations from political issues. Turkey has to walk a thin line in order to maintain balance in its relations with these countries.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has participated only to NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and refused to support the U.S. occupation of Iraq. While the stabilization of Iraq is vital to Turkey’s security, it is unlikely that Turkey would support a divided Iraq, especially a separate, independent Kurdish state within Iraq. U.S. support for an independent Kurdish state will most likely create tension in Turkish–American relations in the coming decades.

Despite continuous efforts to unite, Cyprus remains a de facto divided state. The E.U. conditioned Turkey’s membership upon the solution of the Cyprus problem. Since Cyprus and Greece are unconditionally backed by the E.U., they have no motivation to hammer out a solution to benefit all parties, including the Turkish population of Cyprus and Turkey.

Turkey experienced the importance of domestic politics in its foreign policy most significantly during the Cyprus crisis (1964) and the Cyprus War (1974). Turkey also learned
from its past experience with the Western alliance, especially after the Cold War. With the increased level of democracy and domestic factors becoming the predominant force in Turkish foreign policy making, Turkey started to evaluate its long-established alliances in favor of possible alternatives, especially with its neighbors. The religious and ethnic ties in the region create significant influence in domestic politics. As explained in previous sections, relations with Russia, Turkic Republics, Iran and the Arab states offer opportunities, and Turkey, with its diverse political system, is forming new alliances. While the Western alliance may still be at the center of Turkish foreign policy, refusal of U.S. demands to provide support in both Gulf Wars, refusal to give in to E.U. conditions for membership, refusal to back down from energy deals with Iran and Russia, refusal to provide further military assistance in Afghanistan, refusal to give in to E.U. demands about Cyprus, refusal to open borders with Armenia, and continued cooperation with Iran in the war against terrorism in Turkey (PKK and PJAK\textsuperscript{28}) may be due to concerns about domestic politics. According to the Chief of Staff (2002) Full General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, many European nations provide safe havens and support for members of terrorist organizations\textsuperscript{29}. Increasing terrorist activity in Turkey, lack of international support, and continued regional cooperation contributes to changes in Turkish domestic perception about long-established foreign policies. Careful analysis of current political events, in light of existing relationships as explained in the previous sections will reveal that the change in Turkish foreign policy making from predominant domestic factors to predominant external factors may not be possible anymore. As such, international support for moderate Islam may prove to be a sufficient impetus to push Turkey away from Western alliances and their values toward Eastern alliances and their values.

\textsuperscript{28} Extension of PKK in Iran.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/03/08/p04.html}
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