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DURING WORLD WAR I, 1917-1919

VOLUME I

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

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My greatest debt is owed my parents who provided encouragement and love throughout.
PREFACE

The significance of this study lies in the importance of the times, the institution, and the historiographical issues involved. The times are the years of American participation in the cataclysm of World War I. The institution is the House of Representatives, the 65th session of which along with the Senate, voted for war and then sought legislation to win and end the conflict. The historiographical issues evolve out of some fifty years of work by historians on the war years and on the "Progressive Era" in general. The combination of the three elements—of time, institution, and historiography—present a number of issues for study. These can be summarized as follows: the institutional character of the 65th House, the response of the House to war mobilization, the attitudes of the House toward aliens and dissenters, the actions of the House on such important measures as Prohibition, and the relations between the President and the House.

In studying members of the House to determine their ideas on issues and their actions as a body, I have relied on traditional non-quantitative sources, such as personal papers of individual Congressmen and the Congressional Record. At the same time, I have combined these sources with quantitative data obtained from computer analysis in order to identify groups within the House.

As a preliminary to such analysis, my first chapter deals with the historiography and methodology that provide the foundation for my
discussion of House membership and the House as an institution. I then analyze the three sessions of the 65th House, covering the basic issues dealt with by each session. I conclude the dissertation with a summary of the more cogent findings.
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ABSTRACT

In this study the technique of roll call analysis has been combined with traditional non-quantitative sources in order to determine and analyze the response of the 65th House of Representatives to a broad range of issues. Particularly at question is the response of representatives to intervention in World War I; their attitude toward internationalism, mobilization of the economy and aliens and dissenters; their alignment and ideas on issues of a progressive nature; and their actions on such important measures as prohibition and women's suffrage. Secondarily, an effort has been made to investigate the party system, the organization of the House, and the prosopography of its membership. Voting records of the House were analyzed through use of the OSIRIS III package of computer programs, which was employed to correlate roll calls and to construct Guttman scales.

When judged by their response on recorded roll-call votes and by their expression of views on issues, representatives responded to the war crisis in a variety of ways. The victory of House Democrats in 1916 on the issues of peace and progressivism placed them in an ambiguous position once Wilson asked for war and they shelved reform for the war's duration. Structural weaknesses also existed in the leadership and party systems of the House, a fact which helps account for its inability to forge an effective war or postwar program.
Instead, President Wilson had to step in to direct the House into war, and, once in the war, to outline the basic war program. The fact of Presidential leadership often did not please the Republican members. As a result, the bi-partisan prowar coalition, which supported the war mainly because of the havoc wrought by the German U-boat but also because of economic, regional, and security factors, soon melted away. It failed to form a consistent voting bloc that supported war measures during the conflict and internationalism after the war. In a similar fashion, progressive issues, such as taxation, railroads, prohibition, women's suffrage, and water power, created only a series of single issue coalitions. Progressivism was a definite force in the 65th House, but it had no general ideology and its influence was limited. Moreover, there was no postwar flowering of progressive initiatives or ideas as some historians have indicated. Progressivism's relation to parties was ambiguous with the Democrats at times adopting the progressive stance and on other occasions the Republicans so doing. Yet, contrary to the usual thought, the Republicans more often supported the progressive position than the Democrats. Overall, regional and party factors were more important than progressivism in shaping House deliberations and House roll calls. These factors had significant roles in determining roll calls on the Revenue Bill, the Water Power Bill, prohibition, women's suffrage, and farm measures. Party and regional interests, attitudes toward Presidential leadership, and orientations toward internationalism and progressivism all helped mold the House's reaction to war mobilization and reconstruction plans. The House never appreciated
the rationalization and centralization affected by war mobilization. As a result, when peace returned, representatives only desired to aid economic stability and to restore prewar patterns rather than enact new schemes of government planning and regulation. Directly related to the House's desire for the restoration of normal conditions was its attitude against aliens and dissenters. Republican apprehensions during the first few months of the war had moderated some administration proposals on aliens and dissenters, but by the end of the war the Alien Deportation Bill and the Sedition Act were enacted with little opposition. The House played no small part in the ironic tragedy of the war for democracy that led initially to the Red Scare and eventually to "normalcy."
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Summoned by President Woodrow Wilson to hear his address on grave questions of peace and war, members of the House of Representatives gathered in their chamber on the night of April 2, 1917. They awaited the President's speech with expectancy, for Congressmen knew neither what Wilson would demand of them nor what course of action the nation should pursue. Wilson had shared these uncertainties, but as he now appeared before Congress, he read his decision with determination and strength. Declaring that the United States had no other course than to wage war with all power and force possible, he first spoke of the causes that compelled this action. He named as reasons German espionage in the United States, the Zimmerman intrigue, and, above all else, the submarine warfare against American commerce.
and lives. These hostilities against the United States, he maintained, were not simply a violation of American rights but also were a vio-
lation of all law and justice. It was a "warfare against all nations," in which neutrality no longer afforded isolation and where the ways of peace had to give way to the demands of war. To prepare for war, he pointed out, would require a number of measures, some of which would need the approval of Congress. He proposed a much larger army and navy, a selective service system, huge appropriations for military armaments, loan credits for both the United States and her new allies, and taxes heavy enough to finance the war "by this present generation."

Then, he abruptly turned to a discussion of the issues and objectives for which the nation would fight. Chief among them was the destruc-
tion of "selfish and autocratic power," which threatened liberty and all future peace. In what became the most famous sentence of the speech, he stated, "The world must be made safe for democracy." The United States had no desire, Wilson added, for conquest, dominion or indemnities for itself and did not fight against the German people, but against their rulers. As to the German people in the United States, he professed his belief that they were most loyal but warned that disloyalty would be treated "with a firm hand of stern repres-
sion...." Wilson drew his message to a close with a ringing perora-
tion:

It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But, the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried near-
est our hearts--for democracy, for the rights of liberties
of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as
shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a
 task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we
have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend
her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which
she has treasured. God helping her, she can do
no other.  

The Wilsonian ideals, as expressed in the conclusion of his
war message, removed the lingering doubts of many congressmen and gave
them hope for the future. Yet, the members of the House knew that
past conditions would combine with the myriad problems of warfare to
form a new test of their convictions and abilities. The prewar
vacillation might have been removed for many by Wilson's message, but
other urgent problems, which Wilson had suggested in his April 2
speech, now required decisive action.

Representatives immediately faced the task of voting for or
against Wilson's call for war upon the German Empire. Their decision
either to support or to oppose the war resolution raised three questions
for consideration. Firstly, what motivations, reasons, or arguments
did representatives offer for either sustaining or rejecting the
resolution for war? Secondly, what kind of groups supported either

Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 118-20, for Wilson's
speech.

5. LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 137-40. LaGuardia main-
tains that many Representatives were undecided as to the course that
the United States should pursue. The President's message helped them
reach a decision. Blum, Woodrow Wilson, 129-30, stresses the in-
spirational quality of Wilson's speech, noting how it overcame
the doubts of many Americans and gave them a belief that, after
their tribulations, there would be a new freedom.
position? Thirdly, what implications did congressmen see for American foreign policy because of involvement in the European war? Previous historical studies of American entrance into the war offer little, if any, information on these questions, since virtually all such studies have focused on the background to Wilson's war message and have ignored the House after April 2, 1917. Given this limitation of past analyses, it appears in order to categorize the various interpretations of American entry into war in relation to the three questions raised above.

Directly after the end of the First World War, historians split into two schools of interpretation on the causes of American intervention. One argued that German plots against American liberty caused the United States to enter the war. The other school asserted that munition manufacturers, holders of European bonds, and their allies in the press pushed the country into a war to protect their economic interests. To these schools, the war represented a struggle to secure either world liberty or American prosperity. A third set of historians in the 1930's suggested that the ruthless German submarine warfare against the United States forced American intervention. After World War II, a fourth group of historians advanced the view that intervention came only when Wilson realized the danger to American security from domination of Europe.6

As to the second question—which relates to the groups favoring or opposing intervention—several historians have delineated conflicting elements. John Milton Cooper, in a monograph on the pre-war preparedness controversy, sees the existence of two main positions on American involvement before April 1917, with both positions including two sub-groups. One main group he labels isolationists, while the other he calls internationalists. Each group consisted of two sub-groups, with isolationists and internationalists falling into both idealist and ultranationalists camps. He does not argue for an exact and neat dichotomy, because these prewar groups overlapped. The tendency of individuals, he maintains, was to fall into groups opposing involvement in world affairs or advocating a larger role in world affairs for reasons either having to do with American ideals or American self-interest.

Besides naming isolationist and internationalist groups, historians have also investigated the activities and positions of progressive elements. In an article, William E. Leuchtenburg, who bases his view on a study of non-Congressional progressives, argues that

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8Ibid., 86-99, 132, 195-99. Cooper names a number of Congressmen who served in the 65th Congress. Their activities as to U. S. entry into the war and as to American policy toward Europe will be traced in the body of the dissertation. Lloyd Ambrosius, "Wilson, the Republicans and French Security After World War I," Journal of American History, LIX (September, 1972), 341-52, rejects the implication of Cooper's thesis that Republicans began to coalesce around an isolationist position in opposition to Wilson's internationalism.
most progressives were imperialists. The reason he gives for this conclusion is that progressives held a nationalistic belief in the American mission. A few years after the appearance of the Leuchtenburg article, Arthur Link offered the contesting thesis that instead of being interventionists, the progressives were isolationists. In his book *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, he wrote of the progressive belief that since America had a special mission to purify herself and offer herself as an example, the United States should remain aloof from a decadent Europe. Also pulling them toward isolationism, he writes, was their assumption that munition makers, bankers, and special economic interest groups started wars.⁹

The wide divergence between Link and Leuchtenburg can be traced to the fact that they studied different progressives—Leuchtenburg non-congressional figures and Link mostly congressmen. Historians who have written since Link and Leuchtenburg's work appeared, bear out this distinction between the attitudes of progressives inside and outside Congress. Thus, J. A. Thompson, on the one hand, finds most progressive publicists of the war era coming to support intervention as a means of furthering reform.¹⁰ On the other hand, several


historians agree that congressional progressives maintained a non-interventionist orientation. To these writers—who include Walton Sutton, Howard Allen, Barton J. Bernstein, Franklin A. Leib, and John M. Cooper—most congressional progressives thought that preparedness and intervention were as likely to insulate reform as to stimulate it. With their convictions stronger for reform than for preparedness, congressional progressives reached a consensus opposing preparedness and American entry into war. \(^{11}\)

On the third question (about congressmen's thoughts on America's long-term foreign relations), historians have not offered many comments. Congressmen could not escape considering the question, however, for a war originating in Europe and requiring American troops in Europe raised completely novel problems to most congressmen. Either they realized this when they voted on the war resolution, or they increasingly anachronistic to talk about the progressives and World War I. See also, Charles Hirschfield, "Nationalist Progressivism and World War I," *Mid-America*, XLV (July, 1963), 139-56. Allen F. Davis, *Spearheads for Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 219-20, studied the social welfare side of progressivism, adds the interesting note that many social workers came to wholehearted support of the war once it began, even though they had originally opposed American involvement. Cf. J. A. Thompson, "An Imperialist and the First World War: The Case of Albert B. Beveridge," *Journal of American Studies*, V (August, 1971), 133-50.

became aware as the war ground toward a conclusion.\footnote{It is difficult to measure the exact distinction congressmen made between American entry into war and aims of the war. One Congressman, C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa), in a personal letter did make this distinction when he noted in April, 1917, that Wilson has set the war on a high plane for democracy and for the democratization of autocratic Germany. C. William Ramseyer to personal (no name), April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers, Archives, Iowa State University Library. In the House debates, usually causes and aims are not often clearly distinguished. Of course, as the war drew to a close, all Congressmen became aware of Wilson's goals.}{12} Even if the congressmen understood how the decision for war would affect American foreign policy, the question becomes one of whether or not they agreed with the Wilsonian vision of the future. Publicists at the time and historians since have doubted that most congressmen agreed with Wilson's goals. It is, however, a question which has not been studied in relation to the House.\footnote{Charles Merz, "At the Capital," \textit{New Republic}, XII (August 4, 1917), 21, reported that very few Congressmen either understood Wilson's war aims or supported them. The historiographical debate over Wilson's aims, particularly for the League of Nations, and the response of Congress to his plans has centered on the Senate. Little has been written on the House. See Ralph Stone, \textit{The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations} (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970) for one study concentrating on the Senate. For historiography on the League of Nations controversy, see ibid., 189-195.}{13}

The historiographical literature on the entrance into the war, although it does not often touch directly on the war House, is a definite aid for this study. By making use of this literature as a background, this study will delineate the thought and the groupings of the House on the issues of war and peace. First, quantitative techniques and non-quantitative sources can be used to locate individual and group opinion on questions of war and foreign policy. Second, groups will be studied for regional, partisan, and ideological
characteristics. Once these are defined, the thought and behavior of each group can be characterized and compared.

Besides raising the issue of involvement in war and the future course of American foreign policy, Wilson's war message had implications for progressive reform at home. On one level, Wilson in his message called for the subordination of all the nation's energies to the over­riding purpose of winning the war. At the same time, Wilson also fashioned progressive ideals to the service of the war and internationalism. This ambivalence—his shelving of domestic reform for the duration of the war, while at the same time proclaiming the aims of the conflict in the language of progressivism—has troubled his­torians, since they can find evidence that the war ended progressive reform at home but also that it extended the reform mentality to the world—at least to Europe.¹⁴ Whether reform gained strength, suffered an irreversible set-back, or changed into "liberalism" are some of the questions they have forwarded. However, they have not studied these questions in relation to the 65th House.

Historians are sharply divided over the war's impact on reform. In a review article, Hebert Margulies notes that some historians, among them Eric Goldman and Richard Hofstadter, see both an in­tellectual and political decline even before the start of the war.

¹⁴This ambivalence is one of the most basic issues for the entire war. It took several different forms and cut across issues in varying ways. Thus, the war could be for democracy, yet there could be re­pression at home. Or war measures were not advocated for their own sake but for the necessity of war; yet they would also be promoted as progressive. Or the nation would go all out to win the war, yet long to return to "normal" conditions. Groups in Congress became supporters of measures they would not normally support, and opponents of measures they normally supported. The resulting tension did not help clarify the House's response to the post-war world.
By linking the war to Progressive values, Hofstadter argues, Wilson insured not only a decline, which was already occurring, but also disillusionment and reaction. Taking an opposing view is Stanley Shapiro, who argues that the war stimulated a period of positive intellectual growth for the movement. Many citizens realized, as they never had before, the deepness and complexity of many social ills. Charles Hirschfeld adds the thought that the war experience also gave the ones having this new awareness a sense of the method by which government action and planning could handle the problems. He and Shapiro conclude that the ground work for a new "liberalism," which would fully develop in the 1930's, was thus laid. Robert Wiebe, the author of the important interpretation, The Search for Order, agrees that the period was one of development for the movement. But since he has a different interpretation of Progressivism, he does not see the war as launching new reform plans. Rather, the progressive movement seized the war in order to discipline American society to the


16Stanley Shapiro, "The Twilight of Reform: Advanced Progressives After the Armistice," Historian, XXXIII (May, 1971), 347-64. In another article Shapiro develops the argument of a brief flowering of reform in terms of a particular group and condition, namely labor and labor relations. See Stanley Shapiro, "The Great War and Reform: Liberalism and Labor, 1917-1919," Labor History, XII (Summer, 1971), 323-44. There are others who take this line; for example, see Allen Davis, Spearheads for Reform, 219-22; also Charles Hirschfeld, "National Progressivism and World War I," Mid-America, XLV (July, 1963), 154.
emerging bureaucratic order. Similarly, but from different perspectives, James Weinstein and Gabriel Koklo speak of the war as offering the progressive movement new opportunities, either as a "full scale testing ground" for the new corporate liberalism, or as "the triumph of business in the most emphatic manner possible." Finally, some historians see the war and the period shortly thereafter as a time in which the progressive Wilsonian coalition split into disconnected and ineffective splinters.

All of these viewpoints, in one manner or another, suggest this problem: were the measures decided, the roll calls voted, the ideals phrased, and the post-war reconstruction plans formulated in the context of an ongoing progressivism or in the context of a reaction against progressive reform? Once such a question is raised for consideration, a more basic one inevitably demands attention: did varieties of pre-war Progressivism exist, and, if so, did they find spokesmen in the war-time House? All writers recognize diversity in the Progressive Movement; all those who argue for a central nature also concede the coexistence of groups separate from the main

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A recent article, however, so emphasizes the theme of diversity that the very reality of an entity called "the Progressive Movement" is called into doubt. In a provocative article, Peter Filene cogently argues that great confusion exists in the historiographical literature as to various ideals and supporters of the movement. Since he thinks the snarl cannot be disentangled, it is, he concludes, time to write an obituary for the movement.\(^2^1\)

For this study's purpose, it is premature to recite a eulogy. Instead, it is more fruitful to pursue the lines suggested by three other recent writers, John Buenker, Howard Allen, and Jerome Clubb. Like Filene, they agree that the diversity of progressivism poses methodological problems for the historian, but the solution, Buenker states, is not to dismiss progressivism as non-existent. Preferably, historians should delineate the divergent reform groups, carefully defining the characteristics of the different groups. Since none of these groups formed a majority by itself, the next job of the

\(^{20}\)An example of a book which notes the diversity but still finds a basic commonality is Otis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 4-5, 14.

\(^{21}\)Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for the Progressive Movement," American Quarterly, XII (Spring, 1970), 20-34. Filene argues that the whole problem of historiography on the Progressive Era is that historians are trying to define something which never existed. Historians, he maintains, in support of this view, have failed to understand what is meant by the word "movement," which he says is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change and which has a program, values, membership, and supporters. In these terms, he concludes that historians have never been able to find any common denominators for the progressives. The trouble with Filene's view, even though it correctly points out the great variety within progressivism, is that it only establishes another definition for progressivism—a methodological definition rather than a substantive one. Such an approach fails to deal with the period.
In one sense, they argue that Congress itself constituted a special group within the Progressive movement. This was because congressional progressives viewed reform in light of their constituents' interests. Since most House progressives' constituents were largely non-urban, representatives did not often favor the proposals of urban progressives. In a second sense, Allen and Clubb note that congressional progressivism was also split between parties. Although this division created problems for reform, Republican and Democrat progressives did at times overcome the dictates of partisan concerns and joined together to pass reform legislation.

Buenker, Allen, and Clubb suggest that the job of the historian of the Progressive Movement is to carefully define groups within the movement. It is, however, necessary to go beyond this and show the connection between the groups. For example, the connection between the major parties and progressive groups is of primary importance.

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It has been already noted that progressives were split between parties, but Allen and Clubb also point out that most progressives were in the Democratic party. Also, if progressivism had its adherents in the House, conservatism had its supporters, too. What separated progressives from conservatives? Finally, progressivism showed certain geographical divisions. In particular, writers have emphasized that the South often acted as a distinct group in opposition to other regions. They are less sure, however, of the extent of progressive leanings among Southern congressmen. In many respects, therefore, progressivism cannot be treated in isolation from other possible House groupings.

24 The following listing is not meant to be exhaustive either in terms of possible divisions (groups) in the House or of possible sources. Many other divisions exist such as ethnic, agricultural, and urban groups, but this study will not be able to analyze them in any great detail. As to the studies to be named in this footnote, all particularly emphasize certain groups.

As evidenced by this review, recent historiography on progressivism has focused on the many overlapping and divergent reform groups. This emphasis on the variegated nature of progressivism suggests the difficulties in defining progressivism's overall nature and even in naming its individual components. One approach to this problem is to locate progressive issues and progressive groups supporting the issues. If this method (which includes the use of the computer to analyze voting records) uncovers progressive elements, then the effects of the war on progressivism and the characteristics of progressivism can be discussed.

Wilson suggested in his war message a basic subject for the House's attention, namely, the legislation necessary for the mobilization of the populace and the economy against the German enemy. Historians are unsure of the role of the House in the formulation of the war program. Many see the House as simply an obstacle in the way of the Administration's proposals, or as of little importance in the creation of the war program. Such views not only overlook the fact that Wilson had to seek Congressional authority for most war measures, but they also ignore the substantial service the House rendered in the evolution of the war program.²⁵

One phase of the war program involved the outlining of general plans for the mobilization of the economy. Robert Cuff, in a book on the War Industries Board, implies that the House only grudgingly

supported the Administration's war industry policy. Although the Administration sought a centralized and integrated war economy, elements in Congress, which Cuff identifies as progressive and Bryanite groups, remained hostile to giant economic management. He concludes that these elements obstructed plans of the war agencies, resisted certain Administration bills in Congress, and in general balked at the whole idea of close government and business interaction.²⁶

Other historians hold a much different viewpoint of congressional reaction to war planning. James Weinstein writes that a basic principle of war-time mobilization was the replacement of obsolete competition between companies in favor of cooperation between them. He indicates that the House expressed its approval of the shift by passing such measures as the Webb-Pomerene Commerce Act, which permitted corporation combinations in foreign trade.²⁷ In separate books, Wiebe and Kolko support Weinstein's argument, concluding that the war encouraged Congress to accept centralization of the economy and large-scale cooperation between government and business.²⁸

Another phase of the war program involved the enactment into law by the House of many particular war measures. The demands of the war

²⁶Robert Cuff, The War Industries Board (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 3, 104-07, 243-44. Cuff's book only occasionally looks at the reactions of Congress to war planning. This can be said also of the other books that are cited on this topic. They often have decided viewpoints, but the evidence for the position is very thin.

²⁷Weinstein, The Liberal Ideal, 218.

on the economy created varied and often novel proposals for House consideration. For example, the fundamental requirement of adequate war finances resulted in the passage of two revenue acts by the House. In another area of war management, Representatives passed acts to build housing in order that industries might care for war workers.\(^{29}\)

A third phase of the war program involved issues which had antecedents long before the war. One such measure was for the harnessing of water power, now needed for national war industries.\(^{30}\) A more important matter of long standing was the women's suffrage amendment. Its advocates promoted the amendment by claiming that it would spur the patriotism of women and fulfill the democratic ideals of the war.\(^{31}\) Similarly, the debate on the Prohibition amendment, which of course had its origins long before the war, transpired in the context of the advantages or disadvantages for the war program. For both of these amendments, the war affected the debates on them


\(^{30}\) On water power, see J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV (June, 1957), 29-57; and Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-4, 261-75. Both of these works on conservation direct some comments to the 65th Congress. The significant thing, however, is their opposing viewpoints: Bates argues that supporters of conservation were battlers against special interests and business control in the interest of democracy, while Hays maintains that conservationists were concerned with science and efficiency, not democracy, and often had the support of large business groups.

\(^{31}\) Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. pt. 1, 769. Opponents also used the war as a reason to oppose the amendment. There are few direct studies on the passage of the women's amendment; in particular, there are no vote analysis studies.
and probably influenced the choices of those voting for and against them.  

In his war message, Wilson also directed the vigilance of the House toward the problem of disloyalty and dissent during wartime. Implying that war required a new sense of devotion to the United States, Wilson both praised the fealty of the German population in America and also warned them against any lapses from loyalty. He concluded that "a hand of stern repression" would be promptly lifted against any who would impede the war effort by word or action.

Shortly after the President's speech, Administration supporters introduced the Espionage bill, which provided for the punishment of spies and dissenters. Historians have studied this bill both for its

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32 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 120.
impact on the violation of civil liberties and for its reflection of
the attitudes of various groups in American society toward aliens
and dissenters. William Preston traces the wartime loyalty laws
passed by the House to a longstanding conflict between two traditions,
one favoring openness, mobility, diversity, heterogeneity, and variety
of opinions, the other demanding unity, conformity, and homogeneity.
The second tradition won an increasing number of victories from the
1890's on, culminating with its triumph in World War I as intolerance
of aliens and political radicals surged over all moderating restraints.34

Agreeing with Preston on the triumph of the repressive tradition
during the war, H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite as joint authors of
Opponents to War divide Preston's group into several components. These
included Rooseveltian nationalists who wanted a role for the United
States in world affairs, moral fundamentalists who saw the struggle
as between God and the devil, superpatriots who placed the war above
any moral considerations, and self-interested patriots who wanted
repression for economic reasons. By the end of the war, the combi­
nation of these groups passed the Espionage and Sedition laws plus
restrictive alien and immigration acts through the House.35

Even the armistice, many historians maintain, did not bring
an end to the intolerance. Instead it persisted, helping to propagate
many of the cultural aberrations common during the 1920's. Into the
Twenties by Burl Noggle sees the war generating long-term impulses

34 William Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppres­
sion of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1963), 6-8.

35 H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918
against radicals, so-called subversives, and conscientious objectors. Only a few scattered congressmen, he writes, evidenced any concern for the fate of the dissenters. An article by Paul Murphy also points to the emotions fanned by the war as one of the basic sources for the proliferation of bigoted and repressive organizations during the 1920's. It was not, he writes, that the war created intolerant attitudes, for they had long existed. Instead, the war, by demanding extreme national unity and by failing to meet expectations, created a climate in which antipathies toward minorities could flourish.\(^{36}\) The role of the House in the evolution of this emotional atmosphere will be a prime consideration.

\(^{36}\) Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties; The United States from Armistice to Normalcy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 84-85, 95. Paul Murphy, "Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920's," The Journal of American History, LI (June, 1964), 60-76. A review article on the subject of liberty and repression during and after World War I is John Braeman, "World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty," American Quarterly, XVI (Spring, 1969), 104-112. The war also raised questions as to the position of another important minority group, the Negroes. See Jane Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black America," Labor History, X (Summer, 1968), 433-458. This article gives some attention to Congress and their reaction toward Blacks in wartime; for example, it notes racist fears as one reason for opposition to conscription. Other sources, which focus on persons and institutions other than the 65th House, suggest some lines for inquiry. Richard Sherman, "Republicans and Negroes: The Lessons of Normalcy," Phylon, XXVII (Spring, 1966), 63-79; and Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black America from McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1973) 118, 132-35, suggest, by implication, that a study of the House ought to include a look at Republican party attitudes toward the Negro. Many studies suggest that Progressives ought to be studied for their racial attitudes. See, for example, Howard Allen, Aage R. Clausen, Jerome M. Clubb, "Political Reform and Negro Rights in the Senate, 1909-1915," Journal of Southern History, XXXVII (May, 1971), 191-212; Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "The Progressive Movement and the Negro, 1898-1918," South Atlantic Quarterly, LIV (October, 1953), 461-477. This study will include some consideration of the Negro and attitudes of the 65th House toward him.
In his war message and later statements, Wilson attempted to control one of the normal House sentiments when he appealed for an end to partisanship. After the speech, both Republican and Democratic national party leaders echoed the call for the tabling of partisan animus. In the House, Champ Clark, after his election to the Speakership, declared that in this crisis "politics finds no place in this House." When the first session of the war House was drawing to a close, Clark claimed that, in fact, partisanship had "been temporarily banished from this House."37

Despite remarks such as Clark's, historians have widely disagreed over whether, in truth, the usual Republican and Democratic partisanship vanished in a great swell of patriotic ardor. On one side of the issue, Malcolm Moos maintains that partisan opposition to war measures was practically unknown during most of the war. As evidence for this burial of partisanship, Moos argues that Republicans gave at least as much support to Administration war measures as did Democrats. Partisanship only revived, he continues, in October, 1918, when Wilson called for the election of a Democratic Congress.38 Selig Adler agrees with Moos that partisanship abated for awhile, but he thinks its revival came before October, 1918. In fact, it appeared

37Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 108; ibid., pt. 8, 7918. Other Congressmen voiced similar hopes. Speaking for the Republicans, Thomas S. Williams (Ill.) claimed that his party had loyally supported the Administration's war measures. Another Republican in a private letter also said "there has not been and will not be any partisanship in this House." C. William Ramseyer to (no name), May 5, 1917, University of Iowa Library, Ramseyer Collection.

some time before Wilson again pleaded in May, 1919, for another adjournment of political infighting.³⁹

Seward Livermore, in his book on the War Congress, rejects the contention of these authors that partisan politics ever adjourned at any time. Making the question of partisanship the very center of his study, Livermore argues that although the war did restrain undue factionalism in rhetoric for awhile, partisanship was only camouflaged. Wilson never enjoyed harmonious bi-partisan cooperation; instead, Republicans continously assaulted him with "instrumentalities" for curtailing his war powers.⁴⁰

Adler and Livermore have established the importance of partisanship and its relation to the battle for control of the war program and to the struggle for political supremacy. Still, they have failed to ask the further question of how divisive partisanship was for roll-call votes on issues of war and peace and domestic policy. In other words, past research on the War House has failed to discuss the degree of partisanship that existed on individual measures and on a set of similar roll calls.⁴¹


⁴⁰Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1-5, 15-16, 48. Livermore's book is a very well-written account of partisan politics. However, his concern is both broader and narrower than this study's. He traces Congressional campaigns which this study will not cover. He also covers most of the major issues in Congress, looking at their implications for partisanship. He does not, however, ask if the voting on an issue and on all issues together reflects partisan voting patterns. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, Chapters 2-8.

⁴¹There has been some statistical calculation of roll calls in the House. See Moos, The Republicans, 306. Here Moos states that on
When the issue of partisanship is viewed in this manner, several studies on previous Congresses suggest possible results. Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb argue that Congresses during the Progressive era displayed high partisan voting on roll calls. They further add that the partisan voting reflected meaningful differences on issues. However, Allen and Clubb's contention must be checked very carefully as to the existence of differences between parties on issues. This is because the parties, although they might oppose each other, may not support a consistent policy on the issue but, rather, may swing back and forth for purposes of partisan advantage. Finally, studies on partisanship suggest that parties are the most significant group in explaining voting patterns of the House. David Brady concludes from his study of the McKinley Houses that political parties better explain divisions on roll call votes than do geographical divisions, urban-rural splits, and ethnic conflicts.

fifty-one roll calls between April, 1917 and May, 1918, Republicans supported seventy-two percent of the roll calls on war measures, while Democrats supported the same roll calls sixty-seven percent of the time.

42 Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years: The Senate, 1909-1915," Journal of Politics, XXIX (August, 1967), 567-84. Clubb and Allen, "Progressive Reform and the Political System," ibid., 132-33, repeats the same point on the level of partisanship. Their articles, plus the work of their students, have covered the voting records of many of the Congresses during the Progressive Era, but none of the studies include the 65th Congress.


44 David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era, A Study of the McKinley House and a Comparison to the Modern House (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1973), 5-9, Ch.
Given conditions in past Congresses and the evidence from historians on the 65th House, it is likely that Wilson's call for political unity was not heeded. Undoubtedly, partisanship greatly influenced the atmosphere of the wartime Congress and also the votes on House roll calls. Thus, this study will focus on partisan divisions as one of the main groups influencing the actions of the House.

Wilson in his address stated that he would take the liberty from time to time to present war measures for congressional consideration. Noting that Congress would have a role in the war effort, he emphasized the need for it to evaluate closely the proposals of the Executive departments. In effect, he advocated Executive leadership of the war, with Congress assuming the function of advising and consenting to Executive proposals.45

To note Wilson's belief in Presidential leadership of Congress is to raise the specific question of Wilson's influence over the legislation of the war House and of Executive-House relations in general. Congressmen in April, 1917, feared that they would have little part in the framing of the war program. They insisted that

II. Brady statistically studied several groups besides parties as to their importance in roll call voting. This study will be able to include only one such group, geographical divisions.

45 Several articles discuss Wilson's conception of Executive leadership and of party leadership in relation to Congress: See Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson and The Democratic Party," The Review of Politics, XVIII (April, 1956), 146-56; A. W. MacMahan, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," American Political Science Review, L (September, 1956), 641-75; and Dimock, "Wilson as Legislative Leader," 3-19. All these articles describe Wilson as having a strong conception of the President's role. They, moreover, maintain that he was highly successful in both controlling his own party and in gaining passage of legislation.
they would not simply dissolve and go home; instead, they maintained that the Administration must draw them into its confidence.46

Historians, however, have tended to think that the House in the end failed to do much in the shaping of war measures. M. E. Dimock, recognizing that the legislative process requires compromise by both the President and the Congress, nonetheless stresses Wilsonian leadership in directing war plans. Even stronger in his stress on Wilson's role, Henry Turner argues that Wilson dominated the War House. He concludes that all major legislation of the war years originated in the Executive Branch and that Congress passed the laws substantially as the White House desired.47

From what has been written, it appears that Congress, rather than shaping or offering war proposals of its own, simply endorsed Wilson's. If this is true—and the position requires further study—Executive ascendancy has implications for another important aspect of Presidential-House relations, namely the degree of friendliness or animosity in the relations between the President and the House. This issue is the very thrust of Livermore's Wilson and the War Congress and its emphasis on partisanship. Undoubtedly, if partisanship were both as extreme and as bitter as he suggests, it would explain much of the catastrophe of Versailles and after.48

46 Throughout the 65th House comments were made on the House's role in the war program. For some early examples, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 496-99.


48 Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, 245-47.
While historians have studied the basic features of Wilson's address—as it relates to war and peace, Progressivism, civil liberties and dissenters, Prohibition, partisanship, and Presidential-House relations—in studies of other Congresses they have largely ignored the wartime House of Representatives in their analyses. Richard Hofstadter and George Mowry have assumed that many of the issues with which they were concerned lapsed before the war commenced or shortly afterwards. Other historians, lacking specific studies to attack, have overlooked the 65th House. But the 65th House, the link between the Progressive years and the disillusioned twenties, has received little scholarly attention. 49

The 65th House is deserving of attention, not only to test the validity of a number of historiographical theses, but also to examine the composition of the House and the manner in which it operated. Many issues have been suggested and investigated in studies of other Congresses during the Progressive period. To overlook the wartime House would be failing to test fully the issues suggested in these other works. Even if this were not so, the House is still worthy of research because of the importance of its institutional character and because it convened in times both chaotic and momentous for the nation.

49 Direct studies on the House are very few, apart from Seward Livermore's Woodrow Wilson and The War Congress, and I. A. Newby's article on "States Rights and Southern Congressmen." A few dissertations are either being written now or have been recently finished. A few studies touch on the House peripherally, such as Fite and Peterson, Opponents of War, and Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League. Most other studies go right up to the 65th Congress and either stop there or skip to the next Congress. As is obvious from this historiographical review, these studies, however, did raise basic questions, which, when reshaped to fit the 65th House and the requirements of this dissertation, have provided the basis for most of the issues for research.
In the present study several basic techniques have been used to
determine the behavior of 457 congressmen who served during the 65th
House. First, biographical material on social status, occupations, and
political experience has been collected on each member. This data has
been coded on computer cards and then correlated for the purpose of
describing the backgrounds of members and comparing Democratic and
Republican members. It will also allow some comments on the institu­
tional qualities of the House.

A second method used to study the House has been the scaling of
congressmen on certain issues. A statistical test called Guttman
scaling was used to rank members on an issue. The use of scaling re­
quires the existence of a closely-related group of roll calls. Such
roll calls can be ranked on an ordinal scale from easiest-to-accept
(the lowest scale position) to hardest-to-accept (the highest scale
position). The technique rests on the assumption that "each legislator
has a more or less fixed attitude on each issue and that he votes
against measures that are too strong for him to accept." If the
assumption is correct and a scale of roll calls can be properly
defined, then each legislator may be assigned a scale position, based
on his voting record on a particular set of issues.

Another method employed is a simple tabular presentation showing
the regional and party divisions occurring on selected roll calls.
Theoretically, it would be ideal if all roll calls could be placed in
a scale, but many roll calls will not correlate with other votes. In

50Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen, Historian's Guide to
Statistics: Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research (New York:
these cases, simple tables can be used, thereby allowing some analysis of the roll calls.51

Finally, non-quantifiable sources such as newspapers, manuscript collections, and government documents have been surveyed to evaluate the content and meaning of the members' actions on roll calls and non-roll call matters. These sources will not merely determine the meaning of roll calls but will also aid in the location of groups within the House membership. The purpose of utilizing this particular approach is that it facilitates delineation of groups regarding both voting records and thought processes.52

In the following chapters the results of the combination of quantitative data and non-quantitative sources are presented. The initial concern is to examine the Representatives as a body and as individuals. Chapter II is an institutional and biographical profile of the House and its members.

51 The biographical, scaling, and tabular methods will be explained in greater detail when they are first used. All the methods require the use of the computer.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND PROSOPOGRAPHY OF

THE 65TH HOUSE

The House of Representatives, when it convened in April, 1917, was subjected to severe institutional stresses. The 1916 election campaign had fomented division in the country over the issues of war and progressivism, though it also produced a winning coalition for Woodrow Wilson and his Democratic party. Since these issues carried over into the sessions of the 65th House, they helped to shape the ideologies and the structures that thereafter developed.

When the voters went to the polls, many cast their ballots on the issues of neutrality, American rights, and preparedness. Within Republican ranks, the former Rough Rider and Bull Mooser Teddy

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1 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 240; and George E. Mowry, The California Progressives, (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1951, 1963), 243-250. Link writes of the campaign in terms of progressivism and peace. Mowry stresses the progressive aspect on the state level in California. Josephson, Jeanette Rankin, 59, in a discussion of the first woman representative, shows the issues in a local Congressional district campaign: The progressive ones of protection of children, social justice, and, of course, women's suffrage. Josephson does not mention the peace issue though ironically Rankin would vote against American entry into the war. See, also, John C. Board, "The Lady From Montana," Montana, XIII (July, 1967), 4-5. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 5-6, emphasizes the preparedness issue. He also brings out a sectional issue that Republicans used very effectively in the North against the Democrats. Ibid., 9-10. The consensus of the historiography suggests that the basic issues were peace and progressivism.
Roosevelt spoke of a fierce defense of American rights against German violations, a position that attracted the support of pro-allied voters. However, the basic Republican platform and many individual GOP congressional candidates called for a "straight and honest" neutrality, a stance that appealed to some German and Irish Americans. Though initially uncertain of his stance, President Wilson allowed his re-election supporters to trumpet the slogan "he kept us out of war." By the end of the campaign Wilson and his party had adopted the peace theme to such an extent that it became the accent of their addresses. Many groups, such as hyphenated Americans and women voters, selected Wilson and Democratic congressional candidates because they more clearly favored peace than the Republicans.

Also influencing the electorate was the position of party and congressmen on progressivism. By the fall of 1916 Wilson and the Democrats could claim that they had enacted into law nearly all planks of the Progressive Party of 1912. As a result Wilson declared in his campaign speeches that the Democratic party stood for justice and the working people because progressivism had enacted such measures as the child-labor law and the eight-hour-day limitation for railroad workers. In the opposition camp, the issue of progressivism proved confusing and divisive. The Republican's presidential candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, never effectively fashioned a positive program and at best

2Ibid., 5-8. Link, Woodrow Wilson, 230.

3Ibid., 247, 241; Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 8.

offered fumbling criticism of Wilson's progressive leadership. To many voters, such as laborers, farmers, former Progressive party supporters, and a large minority of Socialists, the election finally became a contest between progressive and conservative ideals, necessitating a vote for Wilson and against Hughes. Only future events would tell if the Democratic victory in this campaign over peace and progressivism, which made the party accountable to the public for their stewardship of these issues, hid pitfalls for them. In the meantime, the confused and divided Republicans could only hope for developments that might unite them and weaken the Democrats.

Even in triumph the Wilsonian coalition showed signs of weakness, as the Democrats lost seats to the Republicans in the House elections. The result was that for the first time in history elections for the House ended in a dead heat between the two major parties. Each had 215 seats, and the balance of power lay in the hands of five minor-party members: a Socialist, an Independent, a Prohibitionist, and two Progressives. In the previous House the Democrats had a majority of twenty-three (228 to the Republicans' 205), but in 1916 the Democrats suffered significant losses in the Midwest, especially in Illinois.


Indiana, and Wisconsin. Adding to the Democratic setbacks were the one or two seats garnered by the Republicans in New Jersey, Maine, and Oklahoma. Democrats, nonetheless, retained strong hopes of organizing the next House when they offset these nearly disastrous losses with gains of several seats in Ohio and California and scattered individual seats across the country.\(^8\)

Clearly revealed by the House election results was the sectional nature of the Democratic coalition. Although the coalition consisted of various social, economic, and issue-oriented elements such as agrarians, urban workers, small businessmen, immigrants, women, and socialists, which cut across the country, its sectional basis was more notable than its national qualities. To Arthur Link, the Presidential electoral results demonstrate that the Wilsonian coalition represented a fight of the South and West against the industrial Northeast.\(^9\)

On the House level, this sectional support is also evident. Table 2-1 shows that the Democrats failed to penetrate appreciably into the industrial Northeast. Instead, forty-five percent of the Democratic House members elected in 1916 came from the states of the Old Confederacy. If the Border states are added to the sections total, Southern


### Table 2-1

**Geographical Distribution and Party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals for each region include all individuals seated by the House of Representatives including partial term replacements for members who died or resigned during their term and those who lost their seats during their term through a challenge of their seat. The House in 1917 had a limit of 435; special elections and appointments added twenty-two more members who sat sometime during the session. Several deaths occurred, but some notable members resigned such as Carter Glass to become Secretary of the Treasury, and Irvine Lenroot to become a senator from Wisconsin. The source of the table is the Osiris III package, available for use at the Louisiana State University Computer Center; it is designed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICPR), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The regional codes in this table and all subsequent tables are a modified version of the ICPR codes. NE (New England) includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. MA (Middle Atlanta) includes Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania. ENC (East North Central) includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; WNC (West North Central), includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota. SS (Solid South) includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. BS (Border States) includes Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia. MS (Mountain States) includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming. PS (Pacific States) included California, Oregon, Washington. The original source used by the ICPR for this information on a Congressman's region was Lawrence F. Kennedy (comp.), *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971* (Washington, 1971), hereinafter cited as *Biographical Directory*.  

33
Democrats constituted more than sixty percent of the party's House membership. City machines in certain areas, however, did give the Democrats some strength in the Midwest and North Atlantic regions. Of course, the table also shows that the Republicans almost completely failed to muster any electoral strength in the South; but they did have strength across the rest of the country. The electoral pattern was not insignificant to the 65th House, since the Republicans would use the uneven sectional support of the Democrats, particularly their reliance on the South, as an effective propaganda tool against the Democrats.  

To overcome the Republican appeal, the Democrats would have had to construct policies favorable to the Plains States, Midwest, and East. The 1916 election alignments fitted into the electoral patterns which emerged after the watershed election of 1896. On the national level this meant that the Wilsonian coalition, although showing some differences from the Bryanite alliance in that it contained more urban, labor, and liberal elements, continued the earlier reliance on the South and West. Similarly, the 1916 national Republican party evidenced few differences from the McKinley coalition. On the congressional level, the 1916 election returns followed a stable pattern relative to party competition within districts. In perhaps as many as thirty states no competition existed between parties. Only in the 

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Border states, a few Midwestern states, notably Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, and two Northeastern states, New Jersey and New York, did real competition continue.\textsuperscript{12} The basic alignments were firmly fixed in 1896, and the 1916 election results showed no significant deviation.

The decrease of competition meant that fewer new members entered the House. In fact only seventy-one new members were elected to the 65th House, the fewest in twenty years.\textsuperscript{13} For Congressmen who had served one or more terms, re-election in 1916 proved to be relatively easy. Table 2-2 presents a breakdown of an incumbent's likelihood of return.\textsuperscript{14} It demonstrates that members with one or two terms usually faced serious electoral opposition. As a congressman's tenure became longer, his re-election became progressively easier, although it is true that constituents at times could reject long-term incumbents. It should also be noted that not all of the forty-two defeated members were turned out of office by the opposition party. Rejection by the party at the nominating stage reduced to thirty-five the number of seats that actually changed hands between the two parties.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid. Charles O. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congressional Seats," \textit{Western Political Quarterly}, XVII (September, 1964), 461-75, discusses several different time periods, noting the number of changes in the House composition. Turnover has decreased even more since 1932.

\textsuperscript{13}Charles Merz, "At the Capital," \textit{New Republic}, X (March 31, 1917), 261-62. The number of seventy-one is at the time of election.

\textsuperscript{14}The table's breakdown on defeated members and their length of service at the time of defeat was compiled from the \textit{Biographical Directory}. See Randall B. Ripley, \textit{Congress: Process and Policy} (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975), 193-95, for a discussion on incumbent's re-election success over the years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Retired</th>
<th>Defeated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st - 2nd</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd - 4th</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th - 6th</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th - 8th</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th - 10th</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th - 12th</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th and more</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The election of 1916, though a heated contest, did not produce a significant turnover either of individuals or of parties.

Low electoral competition and high stability of tenure had several implications for the House. First, the knowledge of House operations, procedures, and mores was high among the membership since most had acquired House experience. Second, the membership was accustomed to the organized procedures of the House. New members, on the other hand, had less time to become disciplined to following the rules. Consequently, they would more likely act in an unpredictable manner, thereby disrupting House procedures. Longer tenure can, however, have destabilizing effects, as older members carve out their own fiefdoms on committees, holding at arm's length the party leaders. At the very least, their influence on policy matters increases. Thus, they might weaken the President's influence with Congress and might block his legislative program. In any event, the 1916 election results sent to the House a membership and leadership who had secure tenure and long experience.

In this House membership, a variety of backgrounds were encompassed. All members, of course, had formed their outlooks on politics and on issues from their social, educational, and political experiences. If these formative experiences had been highly diverse, instability in House operations could ensue. Diversity, however, could be moderated through the recruitment procedures of political

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16 Jones, "Inter-Party Competition," 476, evaluates the decline in competition as meaning increased institutional stability in terms of policy and leadership.
parties. The experience of members, as filtered through political parties, affected House stability.\textsuperscript{17}

Most of the 455 Congressmen left little substantial material regarding their personal and political backgrounds. Some leaders and even lesser figures have merited biographies. In a few cases, members wrote autobiographical accounts of their lives. For the vast majority the main source of information is the Biographical Directory of the American Congress. Several other sources do offer biographical information, but these were used mainly to check the Biographical Directory and to supplement missing evidence.\textsuperscript{18} These sources serve as the basis for the biographical remarks.

When representatives entered the House for their first term, a number could look back to subsistence environments that did not suggest future success or importance. Instead, their families were hardly able to provide for their own necessities, let alone furnish opportunities for their offspring to advance in life. There were no surplus funds to provide for an education, no personal friends to offer crucial

\textsuperscript{17}David J. Rothman, Politics and Power, The United States Senate, 1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 135-36, argues that Senators of the Guilded Age went through an apprenticeship in which they learned to accommodate to party leadership and institutional process. Much of his argument is based on the similarity in their backgrounds.

My own dissertation includes biographical data because I believe, as Rothman argues, that one source of unity or diversity derives from congressmen's backgrounds. Allen and Clubb, "Progressive Reform and the Political System," 137-39, includes a discussion of biographical characteristics of reformers and conservatives, though not of congressional ones.

aid, no family name to open opportunities. These future House members struggled by themselves (Table 2-3).

Congressmen from these subsistence families had similar experiences in growing-up. During one House debate, Otis Wingo (D-Ark) digressed from the normal proceedings in order to remind his colleagues of their common hardships as sons of farmers. He recalled that as a youth he awoke at daylight and went out barefooted to hoe sweet-potato hills all day long, "the meanest work a boy ever did, unless it be 'suckering' tobacco." Others could remember equally hard farm experiences, but some grew up in city and labor class backgrounds. Homer Snyder (R-N.Y.), who was to become a leading manufacturer of bicycles, had no help from laboring parents, and was compelled to leave school after a primary education to work in a factory. For these Congressmen their earlier experiences instilled a deep desire to acquire profitable skills enabling them to climb up into the ranks of the successful.

A somewhat larger percentage of members (forty-eight percent) were reared in more substantial settings. Whether rural or urban, skilled laborer or professional, the families of these members were able to assist their sons. Though incapable of providing luxury,

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20 Enrique Lopez-Mena, A Biography of Homer Snyder (New York: Van Rees Press, 1935), 2. James B. Aswell's (La.-D) parents were poor cotton farmers who gave this future state superintendent of education no aid toward an education. Sandra Stringer, "James B. Aswell: Education and Politician" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1970), 1-2. Naturally others had fathers who were subsistence laborers, such as Frank Greene (R-Vt.) and Kenneth Keating (D-Col.). Finding evidence on parents' occupation and status is difficult since the Biographical Directory provides no such information.
TABLE 2-3
HOUSE MEMBERS' SOCIAL ORIGINS
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subsistence</th>
<th>Substantial</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(355)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Appendix A
such families were prepared to supply funds for education. Some of the families earned a less tangible asset, good reputations, which would facilitate entry into occupations. Nevertheless success had to be earned.

Most members from substantial backgrounds had known a father who was hard working and who had often demanded industry from them at an early age. Their advantage over the members from subsistence families was not the avoidance of labor, but some assistance in their future careers. John Nance Garner's (D-Tex.) father was a relatively prosperous farmer who played a leading role in a small community. He also worked hard on farm activities, and he made John help him with the jobs.  

Similarly, many others from substantial farm backgrounds could recall long hours of doing farm chores. Towns and cities provided fewer domestic tasks, but this did not mean that jobs could not be found. In the case of Carter Glass (D-Va.), his father, who wrote and edited the local newspaper, was successful only to the extent that he could provide Carter with a primary education. After that, Carter had to go to work in his father's profession as a newspaper printer. Circumstances were eased and some doors were opened, but success was still largely the result of individual initiative.

The percentage (eighteen) from elite backgrounds is significantly smaller than from subsistence and substantial ones.  


23The percentage of members from elite backgrounds is perhaps inflated. Material as to social backgrounds was not readily available
Of course, eighteen percent represents a greater number of affluent families than in the total American population, which indicates that affluence eased the pathway to the House. Elite members had atypical social backgrounds: their birth into wealthy and notable families afforded them many opportunities denied to most Americans. The family wealth and status of August Peabody Gardner (R-Mass.) permitted him an education at Harvard where he studied law. He never practiced law, however; instead, he managed his estate. At the same time, he married the daughter of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, fought in the Spanish-American War, and entered politics. Although those from privileged families could not win respect from other members without a display of abilities, their affluence gave them freedom for political activities.

Educational backgrounds varied significantly among House members (Table 2-4). While two congressmen received little or no formal school training, eighty-five either went through the primary grades or through high school. For most, their experiences included at least some exposure to a college and a professional curriculum (368 members). In acquiring their educations, members attended a variety of educational institutions. On the lower grade levels, some went to the classic one-room school house or the "old field schools" of the

24Washington Post, January 15, 1918, 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No formal Education</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1st - 8th Grades</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High School</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>(81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High School Graduate and/or Reading Law</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. College with possible professional training</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>(138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. College Graduate and Professional training</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>(187)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Appendix A
South. One attended an Indian agency school, while others received their education from graded city schools or private academies. Those with more advanced education attended schools ranging from small rural colleges such as King College (Bristol, Tennessee) to prestigious institutions such as Yale and Harvard. During a period when there was no standard procedure for the education of lawyers, their training varied from reading law in an attorney’s office to studying in law schools.25

The most striking fact about the members’ education was the large percentage who at least attended college. A full seventy percent had enough desire to advance their training as far as college. In a period when few Americans went beyond the primary grades, such an interest reflected the ambition and the tenacity of the future congressmen. Included within this group of college students is a significant number from subsistence families (Table 2-5). Fully fifty percent of the group managed to find the resources necessary for a college education. One example was Fiorello LaGuardia (R-NY), whose musician father died before Fiorello could attend college. He entered the diplomatic corps after high school. Following a tour of duty in Europe from 1902 to 1906, he returned to New York where he translated Italian and other languages at Ellis Island in the day and attended New York University law school at night. He eventually was graduated at age twenty-eight.26 Future congressmen from substantial backgrounds found access to college is easier than did LaGuardia, with only

25Source of information on education experience was the Biographical Directory.

26Biographical Directory, 1255-56.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subsistence</th>
<th>Substantial</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No formal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1st - 8th Grades</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High School</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High School plus</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. College plus</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>(35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. College Graduate plus</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Appendix A
twenty-three percent deciding that college was not what they desired. That 100 percent of the members from elite families attended college indicates both the value that elite members placed on a college education and the ease with which they could acquire it. Ultimately, social origins for most members became less important than a common educational experience and a common achievement in accomplishing a task.

Once a suitable education was acquired, the future congressmen launched into their careers. A survey of members' vocations shows that the majority either engaged in the practice of law exclusively or in a combination of law and some other pursuit (Table 2-6). Sixty-one percent were so employed, while the next most popular activity, a combination of business, commerce, and agriculture, involved only twenty percent. Under this heading were members with a wide variety of activities. Franklin Mondell, an influential and conservative Republican member from Wyoming, engaged in mercantile pursuits, mining, railway construction, oil exploration, and town development. No doubt he was exceptional, but a number of members acquired versatile backgrounds before they came to the House. The other nineteen percent of the House membership earned their incomes in the professions such as medicine (1.1 percent), finance-banking (two percent), commerce and trade (7.3 percent), manufacturing (2.6 percent), industrial labor (four percent), and agriculture (0.7 percent). The last figure is surprisingly low, particularly when it is realized that roughly forty percent of the total population in 1916 still engaged in agriculture. The percentage does, in fact, underestimate the members involved in

27Ibid., 1424.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance-Banking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce-Trade</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Activities</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Appendix A
agriculture, since the proper figure is obscured by agriculture's integration into multiple occupations. When this is taken into account, the total number of agriculturalists increases to 5.6 percent. Even with the larger figure, it is quite clear that agriculturalists were underrepresented by the House membership. On the other hand, the legal profession was overrepresented in comparison to the total population. This high percent of lawyers increased uniformity of experiences and added respect for legal and organized procedures.

Before election to the House, most members had won election to city, county, or state positions. A number of House members, all of whom were lawyers, had been prosecuting attorneys (Tables 2-7 & 8). With numerous opportunities for capturing the public eye, the position of prosecuting attorney proved attractive to many ambitious lawyers. Lawyers continued to be influential in other political offices, but the other occupations now fully participated in the holding of political offices. Through election to local positions such as a city councilman and city mayor, businessmen, agriculturalists, and even laborers could find opportunities for political experience. If the door to Congress did not open after a stint in local government, the aspiring politician could seek office at the state level. In fact, many House members from all occupations had served in both local and state level political positions. A small number of lawyers (ten altogether) held positions of prosecuting attorney, county or city official, and state representative before moving on to Congress.28 More commonplace was the experience of real estate operator William F. James (R-Mich.), who entered city government in Detroit, became

28Ibid., 1859
### Table 2-7
**Political Experience** (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Position</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosecuting Attorney</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>(383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(138)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>(317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>(226)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>(451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Official</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>(238)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Appendix A

### Table 2-8
**Occupations and Political Experience** (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Prosecuting Attorney</th>
<th>Local Government</th>
<th>State Government</th>
<th>Party Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance-Banking</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce-Trade</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Activities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mayor, and then won election to the state senate.\textsuperscript{29} An honor won by very few, regardless of occupation, was election as governor of a state. Only four members of the 1916 House had served terms as governors before going to Washington. Many members from most occupations acquired training from tenure on a party committee or from election as a delegate to a national convention. An interesting occupational exception is the professions other than law, where four of the five professionals had acquired no party experience before their House election. The small number precludes definite remarks, but it is possible that the four professionals who failed to hold party positions viewed politics not as a career but as a means to enact various policies. Congressmen from the other occupations, as indicated by the large number (forty-seven percent), who served in party posts, considered politics a profession and election to the House as the apex of a career.

The degree of professionalism of the House membership is also reflected in the extent of their political experience (Table 2-9). Before election to the House, very few members (2.6 percent) had received extensive training in politics. They could not, as did Andrew Montague (D-Va.), claim election to the top state positions as governor and attorney general, appointment to diplomatic conferences, and selection to national party conventions. A greater number (28.8 percent) could claim an average amount of party experience at the state or local level. For example, Irvine Lenroot (R-Wis.) spent six years in the State House of Representatives, serving in four of those as speaker of the House.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., 1182.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Considerable</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Little or None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(131)</td>
<td>(207)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The majority of the 1916 group came to the House with a moderate amount of political experience (forty-five percent). Data from the Biographical Directory undoubtedly minimize the experience of a congressman. For example, Jeff McLemore (D-Tex.) published a newspaper and served in the State House of Representatives for four years while at the same time serving on the Austin city council. He also held the post of State Democratic Secretary for several years. Nonetheless, he was counted as having only moderate experience. Some representatives (twenty-three percent) did, in fact, come to Congress with little experience. A good example of such members is William Kettner (D-Cal.), who had won only a one-year term on the city council of Visulia before he ran successfully for a House seat in 1912.\textsuperscript{30} Most representatives, however, by the time they arrived in Washington had served relatively long apprenticeships in politics. Invariably, they came to the House not as amateurs or dilettantes but as professionals. Their experience had equipped them to succeed in a legislative system.

Diverse backgrounds need not cause disruption in Congress, especially when variety functions to increase skills necessary for tasks facing the institution. Other structural forces also operated to prevent institutional instability. The House membership revealed a clear demarcation between the representatives with status and the newer, less important members. Although such a situation would apparently foment disruptive rivalry, it instead generated deference toward seniors by juniors as the latter hoped to inherit the power of the former.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 1425-26; 1283; 1388; and 1230.
When freshmen Congressman--the first Congresswoman--Jeanette Rankin claimed her seat, she told the press that she did not intend soon to engage the attention of the House by long speeches or to participate in the give-and-take of debates. Rather, she deemed it advisable as a new member to begin slowly, allowing herself time to develop opinions and a grasp of House operations. Most other new members apparently followed this reasoning with the notable exception of Fiorello LaGuardia (R-N.Y.). This future mayor of New York City entered the House in 1917 after narrowly winning election in a normally safe Democratic district. In such a circumstance, he was forced to compile an impressive record quickly. Besides, as he wrote in his autobiography, he could see no reason why he should not participate in House debates. Soon taking part in debates, he also even offered amendments to bills. Republican party leaders might have been more accommodating to him because of his immigrant background and his close district. LaGuardia, in any event, was not a typical low status freshman representative.

With 435 members in the House, unrestricted debate on a given bill was impossible. For example, a special rule restricted debate on

31 Washington Post, April 2, 1917, 2.

32 LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 132, 133, 134; and Howard Zinn, LaGuardia in Congress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 13, 15. Leaders did seem to allow LaGuardia a great deal of leeway; at least he took advantage of any openings to become involved. The same is also true of Miss Rankin. She did not participate much in debate, but leaders gave her special recognition. For example, when the House established a special committee to hear bills on women's suffrage, Rankin campaigned for the Republican nomination for chairman. She lost only because a strong anti-suffragist and party leader in the Republican caucus, Joseph Walsh (Mass.) demanded that seniority be followed. See New York Times, December 13, 1917, 9.
the Women's Suffrage Amendment to an afternoon, preventing such a senior member as Henry Cooper (Wis.), the ranking Republican member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, from receiving time to speak.  

Congressmen often sought to circumvent the time restrictions by asking for unanimous consent to extend their remarks in the Record. However, leaders at times would prevent younger members from abusing this privilege by objecting to their extension of remarks. 

Some statistical evidence demonstrates that freshmen did not speak very often on the House floor as compared to the veteran member and party leaders (Table 2-10).  

The Congressional Record list all occasions on which a member spoke on the House floor. By counting the number of times a member addressed the House and then placing the number on a scale from the most (code 1) to the least (code 4), the speaking habits of a member can be compared with those of other members. Random selections of freshmen members, of party leaders and finally of all members irrespective of their positions were made. An average for each classification of legislator was computed, thereby

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33 Henry Allen Cooper to Miss Mattie French, October 22, 1918, Archives of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Cooper Papers.

34 Representative Joseph Walsh (R-Mass.) had a reputation as one who objected to extension of remarks. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 747.

35 The statistics for the table were compiled from the indexes of the Congressional Record. The method was to select every fifth freshman member and every fifth average member. Every party leader was included in the survey. Who the leaders are is explained on page 65a and 74. Moreover, only two of the three sessions were surveyed, the first and third. Of course, random selections are not as good as a complete survey, but time would not permit more than a sampling. The codes and the numbers under the code are arbitrary. They do appear to produce meaningful results, ones that allow comparison between members.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code 1</th>
<th>Code 2</th>
<th>Code 3</th>
<th>Code 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequent (100 or More)</td>
<td>Moderate (50 to 90)</td>
<td>Little (20 to 49)</td>
<td>Hardly at All (0 to 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Selection of Leaders</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Selection of all Members</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Selection of Freshmen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
allowing comparison between groups. The results indicate that freshmen were more seen than heard. Unfamiliarity with House rules and desire for more experience restrained the freshman's verbosity. On the other hand, figures show that the leaders spoke frequently, an average of 1.86 with 1 the most and 4 the least. The average for all the House membership was greater than the freshmen average, 3.10 as compared to 3.86. From the speaking patterns of the House, it can be seen that men of experience and position dominated debates, with the average freshman and even the average member only occasionally joining the discussion.

Besides maintaining a low profile in speaking, freshmen did not propose new pieces of legislation (Table 2-11). This may have been because they were not confident that their measures would gain a hearing. In any event, first term members introduced fewer bills and resolutions into the House and offered fewer motions during debates than other members. Apparently, the leaders did not spend their time introducing bills. Instead they concentrated on passing a few bills. The average member introduced more bills than did those in

---

36This conclusion must be taken with the qualification that since there were only a few leaders (thirty-seven), compared to ninety-two freshmen and 336 other members, floor debates saw much more of the average than is implied by the remarks. The point is made in terms of proportions. There is a significant difference between a member who speaks at least one hundred times and one who speaks less than twenty times.

37On the bills introduced and motions offered, the same basic techniques of selection were followed as on speaking practices. Military pension bills were not counted. Since Congressmen often introduced many such bills for individual veterans and their widows, it was not deemed a sign of activity on the part of a Congressman but only the expected thing to do. Pension legislation, therefore, was not counted in computing the averages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code 1</th>
<th>Code 2</th>
<th>Code 3</th>
<th>Code 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random Selection of Average Members</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Selection of Leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Selection of Freshmen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the other classifications, probably because he had developed legisla-
tive experience in the passage of bills. On the other hand, he had
not yet come into positions of authority which would direct his
attention toward floor debates and more significant pieces of legis-
lation. The data on the introduction of bills only indicates again
the significance of experience and tenure in House operations.

To understand the differences between members with varying
lengths of tenure and different levels of status, it is necessary to
examine also the committees on which members served. Here most clearly
the principle of seniority became manifest, since seniority in House
membership usually resulted in the better committee assignments. In
the eight most important committees of the House, only eight positions
were filled by first term members.38 No freshmen were appointed to
Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules, usually considered the three
most weighty assignments. As the importance of a committee decreased,
more freshmen would appear on the committee's roster. Thirty-five
found their way onto the second-rank committees,39 but freshmen, such
as Alvan Fuller (Prog.-Mass.), in most cases found themselves relegated

38 The eight most important committees were: Appropriations,
Banking and Currency, Rules, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs. The
selection is arbitrary, but it is based on the amount of business
they conducted on the House floor. The information was collected
from the Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 1919, p. 195-204;
At the same time the eight freshmen found their way to these prestigious
committees, fifty members with longer tenure were appointed. The im-
balance is another indication of importance of experience on assign-
ments.

39 The second rank committees were: Agriculture, District of
Columbia, Post Office, Rivers and Harbors, Immigration and Naturali-
zation, Indian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Labor.
to such third rank committees as Expenditures of the Interior Department. What made Fuller notable was not his lowly niche, but the fact that he protested his assignment. In his protest, Fuller wrote Speaker Clark a tart letter on the worthlessness of the committee. Fuller's revolt, instead of gaining him a better seat, caused several older members to dress him down on the House floor. His humiliation served as an abject lesson for others aspiring to advance more swiftly than the system would tolerate.

Seemingly, such a situation would result in conflict between the generations. No revolt arose, because freshmen accepted their insignificant role in House operations, believing that they had to secure a firm understanding in House ways first. Freshmen also saw the advantages of the different rankings: they envisioned that they would eventually gain some of its benefits. If they did not personally profit, the low status member could at least see possible benefits to his region and party from seniority. For these reasons low status members did not attempt to disrupt House activities. Their exclusion from leading roles on the floor and in the committee rooms functioned to increase the influence of experienced members.

The diverse background, experience, and status of House members flowed into the parties. A common populist image of the early twentieth century pictured the Republican party as the party of business


41 C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa) to Grimes, January 19, 1919, C. William Ramseyer Papers, University of Iowa Archives, was a second term congressman, who saw the Midwest as gaining much from seniority in the next Congress. See Randall B. Ripley, Congress in Process and Policy, 63-65, on seniority and apprenticeship.
and wealth. If this image is correct for the World War I period, the Republican ranks should include many members from elite back-
grounds. Furthermore, the party's membership should count among
its number more industrialists, businessmen, and financiers than
lawyers. Finally, the populist view would imply that these elite
members would have temporarily abandoned their enterprises for a
short tour in Congress in order to protect their profits. The
Democrats, on the other hand, ought to include more members from
modest, even deprived beginnings, more lawyers and agrarians, with
longer careers in politics than the average Republican. In short,
the membership of the two parties was supposedly drawn from contrasting
milieus, thereby reflecting the class conflicts in American society.

Actually, this popular image bears only a small resemblance to
the reality. The popular view of Republicans as business men would
argue two possibly contradictory theses. Either the Republican ought
to come from subsistence families (as in the tradition of Horatio
Alger) or from elite families. Though the sample is only partial,
statistics do not indicate either possibility (Table 2-12). Instead,
both parties recruited their cadres from all social classes on the same
percentage scale. In one sense the popular view does have some vali-
dity because the classifications do hide some family differences worth
noting. The Democratic elite members included at least three Vir-
ginians from families of the old Southern planter aristocracy: Claude
Kitchin, Andrew Montague, and Walter Watson. No Republican elite
member had similar planter connections. Likewise, Democratic and
Republican subsistence families probably varied, with more Democrats
from poor tenant farm families, and more Republicans from poor
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Unknown</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Unknown</td>
<td>(355)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
itinerant peddler parentage. Yet, the similar percentages do demonstrate that, as organizations seeking to win elections, political parties endeavored to recruit men who would perform well for the organization, not necessarily ones from certain class origins.

Educationally, more differences between the parties are to be found, but similarities still predominate (Table 2-13). The Republicans selected more of their members with only high school education (twenty-two percent against twelve percent of the Democrats). Fewer Republicans, consequently, attended college or pursued post-graduate professional training, but the variation is not as great as in the lower grades (thirty-seven percent of the Republicans and forty-five percent of the Democrats). As an explanation for the variance in education, the Democrats inclined more toward occupations that were more likely to require a college education (law) than Republicans, who displayed more preference for diversified activities (Table 2-14). To a degree, the divergence also comes from a geographical influence. In comparison to other regions, the Southern and Border States, which provided the Democrats with a large portion of their members, sent delegations consisting mostly of lawyers (Table 2-15). Though

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The data in Table 2-12 and in the following tables on party and member backgrounds was compiled from Biographical Directory. For information on the family backgrounds of Kitchen, Montague, and Watson, see Alex M. Arnett, *Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1937), 4; William E. Laren, *Montague of Virginia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965, 4-6; and Walter Watson, *Nine Notes on Southside Virginia* (Richmond: State Library, 1925), 264. The comments on subsistence families were not drawn from any particular source. Rather, they were based on the occupational characteristics of the North and South.

---

The Southern and Border states did send significantly more lawyers than some regions, though some others are relatively similar. Also, the Republican's and Democrat's variance on lawyers is not as noticeable in some regions, particularly in the East North Central Region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First - Eighth</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Plus</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Plus</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College - Graduate</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>(223)</td>
<td>(226)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance-Banking</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce-Trade</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-Other</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Activities</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>ENC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance-Banking</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce-Trade</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-Other</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance-Banking</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce-Trade</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Activities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
differences existed on education between the parties, more notable was the similarity.

Occupationally, the variance between parties becomes significant. The Democrats, who came more from the rural Southern states, sent to Congress a high percentage of small-town lawyers. The Republicans, coming more from the industrial areas, nominated more business-oriented elements. This is clearly seen in the category of multiple occupations (Table 2-14), with the Republicans having twice as many so engaged as the Democrats (twenty-eight percent of the Republicans to thirteen percent of the Democrats). The popular view of the parties contained an element of truth. Even so, more than fifty percent of the Republicans had law-related backgrounds. By 1917 the political parties were seeking out men with similar occupational attainments, probably because the parties agreed that a certain type of man was better disciplined to the organized practices of the parties and of the House.

Politically, the types of political experience and the extent of political experience again emphasizes the similarity between party member backgrounds. Interestingly enough, the higher percent of lawyers in the Democratic ranks did not result in proportionally a higher ratio for Democrats in comparison to Republicans as prosecuting attorneys (Table 2-16). There was a leveling of differences, because only fifty-eight percent of the Democratic lawyers became prosecuting attorneys when seventy-one percent would have equaled their proportion to all Democrats. A variation is found in the larger number of Democrats elected to local government positions, but experience in the state posts and in party positions again was similar. The Republicans
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Experience</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosecuting Attorney</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Official</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>(223)</td>
<td>(226)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
did tend to have fewer of their numbers in these positions, but the
difference is not significant.

The GOP encompassed a larger percentage with little or no
political experience (twenty-nine percent versus the sixteen percent
of the Democrats, Table 2-17). Offsetting this was a higher percent
of Democrats who had moderate prior exposure to politics in comparison
to Republicans (fifty-one percent of Democrats versus forty percent of
the Republicans). As a result both parties had nearly equal percen-
tages in the lower two categories, sixty-nine percent of the Republi-
cans in comparison to sixty-seven percent of the Democrats. The
popular view of Republicans as businessmen who took time out of a
career for politics may be true. However, an equal number of Democrats
did exactly the same thing. In the higher categories, approximately
equal numbers of both parties had received extensive tours in politics
(thirty-three percent of the Democrats and thirty percent of the
Republicans). As to prior political experience, the popular image has
little validity. Neither party had its ranks filled with political
novices, but sent to Congress cadres with at least moderate levels
of political training.

Statistics on the length of service in the House also showed
that both parties were equally determined to retain members for long
careers in the House (Table 2-18). In the early days of the Republic,
the esteem with which members held their positions was evidently low.
Rather than serving for long periods, they declined re-election or
they often simply resigned from the Congress to which they won election
in order to take up a state post.44 By the 65th House, attitudes

44This remark is not based on any statistical evidence but
### TABLE 2-17
**EXTENT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND PARTY**
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considerable</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or None</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2-18
**LENGTH OF SERVICE IN THE HOUSE AND PARTY**
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Service</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Term</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2—3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4—5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6—7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8—9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10—11</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12—13</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14—15</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
toward holding a seat had changed, and lengths of service had increased as more Democrats and Republicans saw the value of longer service. Those with the longest periods of tenure (eight to fourteen terms or longer) come almost equally from the two parties. In the range from four to eight terms, a difference between the parties becomes noticeable as the Democrats retained more members than did the Republicans. A possible explanation for this is that the Republicans' setback of 1912 cost many Republicans their seats, including such party stalwarts as Uncle Joe Cannon, William B. McKinley (Ill.) and Nicholas Longworth (Ohio). These men were able to regain their seats in 1914, but most who lost in 1912 found themselves permanently ousted from the House. In any event, the variation of tenure afforded neither party an advantage. Both parties were equally committed to developing well-trained members who were accustomed to the demands of House and party organization.

While the backgrounds of congressmen often transcended party lines, other structural features of the House revealed the influence of partisan divisions. Traditionally, the voting behavior of the House has been studied along party lines with the implication that political affiliation is the chief determinant of voting patterns. The utilization of quantitative methods has not altered this emphasis on the party. Robert P. Swierenga, in a review of the quantitative literature on legislative voting behavior, concludes that political parties are the main influence on voting behavior.45 Explaining the

simply from a perusal of the Biographical Directory.

institutional behavior of the House exclusively in terms of political
party has limitations. Yet, the role of party in the roll call voting
of the House cannot be denied.

In assessing party voting in the 65th House, I have used several
basic devices. Although these devices do not involve complex statis-
tical computations, some explanation of them is desirable. The first
statistical device seeks to determine the frequency with which one
party voted against the other. This is done by arbitrarily estab-
lishing some percentage level for what is called a "partisan vote."
Such a vote occurs when at least a majority of a party votes yes and
at least a majority of the second party votes no. Over the years,
researchers have set different criteria regarding what constitutes
the proper percentage for a partisan roll call vote in a particular
Congress. In order to compare the 65th House with the findings on
these other Congresses, the percentage level for calculating a par-
tisan vote has been established at two different ranks, ninety versus
ninety percent, and fifty versus fifty percent. All the roll call
votes of the 65th House were reviewed to determine the degree of par-
tisanship in the vote. Once this was found, the percentage of roll
calls that fell into each category was determined.46

46Lawrence Lowell was the first political scientist to estab-
lish a percentage for partisan opposition. He set the percentage
at ninety versus ninety percent. Most writers believe this is too
rigorous for American parties and, instead, use the much lower
fifty percent versus fifty percent as the definition for party
voting. Unless otherwise noted, when this study refers to a party
vote, it is referring to the fifty percent versus fifty percent
convention. See W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Con-
gressional Voting, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968), 3-5, 10-11.
A second device utilized to assess party voting patterns finds party cohesion within individual parties on House roll calls. The particular cohesion device here employed was originally developed by Stuart Rice, and it simply shows the difference in percentage terms between the number of members of a party who voted "yea" on a particular vote and those in the party who voted "nay." When interpreting the Rice Index, the score of the two parties should not be inferred as implying that the two parties voted against each other. In fact, it is possible that both parties voted together since the Index only measures unity within one party. Another statistical tool finds the percentage of party members voting with the party majority on a roll call. Once a percentage is found for all roll calls, an overall average percentage of votes with the party is calculated. The purpose of the device is the same as the Rice Index, to determine cohesion within a party. A fourth device used in assessing the voting of parties involves tabulation of the times that party leaders voted with the majority of their party. By this device, a cumulative "party loyalty score" was calculated for the party leaders of the 65th House.

In evaluating the results obtained from these devices, a certain factor must be considered. Since the war brought before the House a

47 See Anderson, et al., *Legislative Roll Call Analysis*, 32-35, for a discussion of the Rice Index. The Rice Score can vary from zero to one-hundred.

48 The last two measures of party unity were suggested by Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 567-69. The percentage was included because Clubb and Allen calculated it for several Congresses, not because it added anything to the finding of the Rice Index.
large number of war measures, the voting on a roll call was often unanimous or nearly so. All Houses have a certain number of votes that are unanimous, since some votes are simply procedural, or the issues are not very divisive. However, it seems that war measures increased the number of indivisive ballots. The truth of this point is evident when a comparison of the three sessions of the House, the first two in wartime, the last after the war, is made as to the numbers of unanimous roll calls (Table 2-19). The first and second sessions have similar percentages of about thirty but the last session drops to nineteen percent. Throughout the first two sessions the Administration presented measures as necessary for the war effort, and though Republicans may not have liked them, they voted for them nonetheless. With the return of peace, Republicans dropped their support of Administration proposals and unanimous voting declined. In short, war-induced patriotism increased the number of unanimous roll calls in the first two sessions. When peace returned, patriotism waned and unanimous voting fell significantly.

Obviously, these devices permit only limited analysis. Still, they do allow comparison with other Congresses that political scientists have already studied, thereby allowing classification of the 65th House as to the degree of its unity within parties and conflict between parties. From the classification of party leaders' loyalty, some comments on their role in unifying or disrupting the party can be made. Also, by making a classification of general legislative

49A unanimous vote is defined as occurring when less than one out of twelve voted against the majority. The ratio of twelve to one is a recognized statistical convention in determining unanimity.
**TABLE 2-19.**

UNANIMOUS ROLL CALLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Sess.</th>
<th>2nd Sess.</th>
<th>3rd Sess.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Unanimous Roll Calls</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Unanimous Roll Calls</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Roll Calls</td>
<td>48*</td>
<td>(146)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>(266)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number of roll calls includes all ballots after the organizing ballots. The first nine ballots of the first session were votes organizing the House and were, therefore, partisan votes. These "unrepresentative" organizing votes were deleted from the statistics. With them included the percentage of unanimous votes drops to twenty-four percent.*
issues and by ascertaining the Rice Index cohesion scores of parties, it will be possible to identify issues that tended to jeopardize party unity.

The first device—one measuring the number of times that a majority of Democrats voted in opposition to a majority of Republicans—shows the "party votes" in comparison to such votes in other Houses (Table 2-20). Given the general call for unity in wartime, the number of partisan votes should decline. On the fifty versus fifty level of party voting, the 65th House recorded fewer partisan votes (forty-seven percent) than any other Congress. Only the first Cleveland Congress (54th), when Congress experienced confusion from depression, free silver, and populism, and the first Kennedy Congress (87th), evidenced nearly as low an incidence of party votes. Most of the other Congresses were significantly higher in party voting, though the turmoil of the last Taft Congress (62nd) produced a vote more comparable to that of the 65th. On the level of the much more rigorous standard of ninety versus ninety, partisan voting in the 65th is still the lowest, with only ten percent of its roll calls dividing along party lines. Two Congresses, however, are very comparable with the 65th: the third Roosevelt Congress of 1937 (twelve percent) and the Roosevelt War House of 1943 (eleven percent). At the other end of the spectrum are the McKinley House (fifty-one percent) and the Harding House (twenty-nine percent) both of which show a significant variation from the Wilson House. By any standard of comparison, there was a severe decline in partisan voting in the War House of 1917-18.

One might view the low partisan vote by the war time House as a reflection of "discord" that a party was simply unable to agree
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Roll Calls Which</th>
<th>Congresses*</th>
<th>1st Session</th>
<th>2nd Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are Party Votes</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90 Percent of Democrats Versus 90 Percent of Republicans

| 10.9 | 51 | 29 | 12 | 11 |

50 Percent of Democrats Versus 50 Percent of Republicans

| 47    | 53 | 76 | 79 | 60 | 75 | 70 | 52 |

*Congress includes the Senate. All the percentages of the fifty versus fifty level except the 65th come from Senate voting records. The results do not exactly compare, though there is no reason to suppose a great variation in the House in relation to the Senate. This level does not refer to the combined House and Senate, but to the House alone for the 65th Congress and the Senate alone for the other Congresses. The ninety versus ninety percentages are all on the House and do not include the Senate. The computations at the ninety and fifty percent levels for the 65th House were compiled for this study. The statistics at the ninety percent level were drawn from W. Wayne Shannon, *Party, Constituency, and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative Behavior in the United States House of Representatives* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 5-10. The other figures at the fifty percent level were drawn from Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 571.
on a position and, hence, rarely voted as a united bloc. This appears to be a sound interpretation of the last Cleveland Congress (1895-1897) and the last Taft Congress (1911-1913),\textsuperscript{50} but its application to the 65th House is inaccurate. Partisanship declined due to greater unity of the parties, as both agreed in large measure to the war program. They were not voting against each other but with each other. Evidence for this fact is found in the high percentage of unanimous voting and also in the high cohesion rate for each party as recorded by the Rice Cohesion index and by the high average percentage of votes within each party. Despite the partisan voting that did occur, and whatever the degree of partisanship carried on covertly, the House during the war period was not rent by partisan conflict over roll calls.

Comparison with the voting records of other Congresses indicates the high internal party cohesion in the 65th House (Table 2-21). During the first McKinley Congress and the first Harding Congress Republicans showed higher cohesion. For the other Congresses they were less united, particularly during the other Congresses of the Progressive Era. In comparison to the Republicans, the Democrats were slightly more unified in the 65th House. Compared with Democrats of other Congresses, they were very cohesive. Only during the first Taft Congress, when the Democrats were diligently striving to capitalize on Republican disunity, had they evidenced higher unity. The degree of Democratic cohesion is impressive particularly in comparison to the last Cleveland Congress (54th) and the first Kennedy Congress. (87th)

\textsuperscript{50}Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years, 571-73."
TABLE 2-21

AVERAGE PARTY UNITY SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Congresses*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Cohesion Score</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Percentage of Votes With Party</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Cohesion Score</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Percentage of Votes With Party</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Table consists of the 65th House with all the other statistics based on Senate roll call voting. The cohesion figures for the 65th House were compiled for this study. All the other statistics were compiled by Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 571. The interpretation of the statistics for those Congresses comes from Clubb and Allen.
Seemingly, the spirit of wartime helped to increase Republican unity and to maintain the high unity of the Democrats, while at the same time it tempered normal party differences. In the face of war, the House became as one, more than it ever had before. The Democrats were more successful than were Republicans in organizing party cohesion in the face of the war emergency, but this was to be expected. After all, the Administration was in the hands of the Democrats, and the natural tendency would be for the Democrats to support their Administration. In contrast, the Republicans faced conflicting pressures. In normal times, the dictates of partisanship and the desire to regain control of the government would have helped unite the Republicans against the Democrats. However, since the times were in no sense usual, the Republicans could not afford to oppose the Administration's war measures. If all Republicans had turned to support of the Administration's war measures, their cohesion average would have undoubtedly been higher. On various roll calls, however, some Republicans could not endorse all measures suggested by the Administration. On other roll calls, some Republicans found it impossible to support a partisan Republican vote on a war measure because they reasoned that the measure truly was needed for the war effort. In either event, Republicans' cohesion was lowered in comparison to the Democrats'.

Besides determining the average cohesion score on all roll calls, this study also computed an average cohesion score on individual issues. In order to ascertain this score, roll calls were arranged into sixteen categories in terms of the general issues to which they were relevant (Table 2-22). Then, the cohesion score was calculated
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Republican Average Cohesion Score</th>
<th>Republican Average Percentage of Votes With Party</th>
<th>Democrat Average Cohesion Score</th>
<th>Democrat Average Percentage of Votes With Party</th>
<th>Number of Roll Calls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Contracts</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Services</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Suffrage</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers and Harbors</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Votes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Relief</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Determining which roll calls go into each issue category was done through evaluation of debates on the roll calls. Some roll calls may be misplaced, but the margin of error is probably small. The Rice Cohesion Index and percentage voting with the party in this table must be read differently from the table on average party unity scores. The statistics in this table will show lower unity on most
issues than the average on all roll calls for two reasons: first, many of the unanimous votes which are included in Table 2-21 are not included in this table, because they were on procedural votes or were on trivial issues; second, the unanimous votes on the sixteen issues were excluded in this table, but not in Table 2-21.

Each issue was defined so as to logically include similar roll calls. Some roll calls fell into two or more of the issue categories. After a definition was decided for each issue, all the 266 roll calls of the 65th House were studied, usually by reading the debates in the Congressional Record before the roll call. Thus, the roll call could be determined as to which issue category it belonged. The definition of issues and examples of roll calls that went into an issue category are as follows: war contract were a set of roll calls over a bill to give relief to contractors who had entered into verbal contracts during the war. Postal service includes the Burleson-Creel censorship and several roll calls on bills dealing with the postal service. Revenue was defined as all roll calls on the 1917 Revenue Act. Railroad included three roll calls over the bill for the operation of the railroads under government control. Conservation was defined as all measures effecting the proper use of resources or wild life or water. Draft votes were defined as roll calls on the original conscription law and later roll calls which modified the original bill. Labor was defined as bills effecting the hours, wages, and conditions of government workers or of all workers. Farm included all agricultural appropriation roll calls and other votes effecting the production of food. Progressive includes a number of different issues but the criteria for inclusion was whether or not historians have labeled an issue progressive. Some examples of the roll calls included under progressive are: prohibition, women's suffrage, revenue, labor, the declaration of war, conservation, aliens, draft, water power, and civil liberties. War was defined as any roll call which would not have occurred if there had not been the war. This includes many issues, from direct military bills, to revenue, to farm measures. Economic was defined as bills which involved increased government expenditures. All war measures were excluded, and it included mostly unimportant bills on House operations along with military pension bills. European relief was a bill to provide food relief for Europe after the war.
on each issue, which thereby made it possible to find the issues that unified on divided parties. Both parties had high cohesion on the postal service and war legislation, and moderately high unity on the war contract, labor, progressive, draft, farm, and economic issues. On the first two issues the parties demonstrated nearly as high a cohesion as on all roll calls (See note on Table 2-22). On the latter six issues, the unity of the parties was nearly fifty or above, which shows a general agreement within the parties on the issues. In the case of the prohibition, railroads, and veteran issues, the parties, though united on the issues, were separated by ten or more points. On the revenue, women's suffrage, conservation, rivers and harbors, and European relief issues, one or the other of the parties evidenced high disunity. The Republicans found unity elusive on revenue, conservation, rivers and harbors, and European relief measures. Democrats found it similarly difficult to maintain any semblance of unity on the Women's Suffrage Amendment, and, in fact, recorded the lowest score for either party on an issue. But this was clearly the exception to the general Democratic tendency toward higher party solidarity than the Republicans.

In their study of the Congresses during the Progressive Era, Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb conclude that divisive issues, while decreasing unity within parties from the high unity of the McKinley years, did not conspicuously affect party cohesion on roll calls.51 In the case of the 65th House, voting on roll calls transpired in times demanding unity, while simultaneously placing a premium on partisan

51 Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 570-75.
activity as each party jockeyed to benefit from the war. As a first result, partisan voting on roll calls declined from earlier Wilson Congresses, though it continued as a factor in nearly half the roll calls. As a second consequence, intra-party cohesion increased as cross-party division declined. In peace time, a party seeks high internal unity in opposition to the other party, but this was not the case during the 65th House. Instead, the high degree of unity flowed not from opposition but from agreement. Yet, this did not mean a real agreement on policy, since in wartime, when almost all measures of the first two sessions were billed as war measures, even greater unity might be expected. Partisanship in voting continued, but in more subtle forms.

The Republicans and Democrats organized their party activities through similar structures, consisting of a campaign committee, a steering committee, a party caucus, party whips, and party leaders. If political parties are nothing else, they are at least machines for the election of their members. To this end, each party organized congressional campaign committees, staffed by a chairman and several workers.

For the Republicans, Frank Woods (Iowa) served as chairman until the summer of 1918 when he was pressured out of his position. Woods had voted against the war resolution, which naturally rendered him a questionable leader of a party that hoped to attack the Wilson Administration for lax prosecution of the war. Adding to his deficiency was his lame-duck status after his failure to gain re-nomination in the Iowa primary of August, 1918. Simeon
Fess replaced him, a man whose war record could not be ques-
tioned.52

On the Democratic side, Scott Ferris (Okla.) replaced Frank
Doremus (Mich.) in March, 1918, because of Doremus' poor management
of the last two congressional elections. In their positions, Fess
and Ferris worked to raise campaign funds, develop campaign issues,
and place campaign influence in the districts where it would most
count.53

For the House, campaign chairmen and election campaigns had
their influence. The chairmen themselves gained a measure of party
status and a higher rank in the House. During the tenure of Woods
and Doremus, the chairmen, however, were sources of embarrassment for
the parties, decreasing their ability to develop effective campaign
issues. This weakness was overcome with the appointments of Ferris

52 See the following on the removal of Woods: New York Times,
July 3, 1918, 8; July 7, 1918, 22; August 24, 1918, 5; August 28,
1918, 13; September 2, 1918, 5. Woods had no desire to retire, but
resigned only after being charged as pro-German by a Republican
member, and shortly before the rest of the campaign committee demanded
his resignation. See, James Robertson, "Progressives Elect Will H.
Hays Republican National Chairman, 1918," Indian Magazine of History,
LXVI (September, 1968), 185-90, for a discussion of not only the Old
Guard-Progressive split in the Republican party but also of the plans
of Hays to harmonize the party behind a strong war program and to
attack the Administration for its war program. By the time the actual
fall campaign had rolled into full form, this issue had shifted from
the war program to the Wilson peace program. Fess fitted party needs
well here also since he was a strong opponent of Wilson's League of
Nations. See John Lewis Nethers, "Simeon D. Fess: Educator and Poli-
tician" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1964),
232-33, 235-40, for a discussion of Fess as campaign chairman and of
his view on the League.

53 See Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 112, 191,
206, 218, for a discussion of Ferris's elevation to chairman and
of the activities of the party chairman.
and Fess, both of whom became assets to their respective parties. In the case of Fess, the Republican triumph in the 1918 congressional elections caused a short boom for him as Speaker among the newly-elected Republican freshmen.  

The whole process of winning elections also colored the atmosphere of the House, with the parties periodically taking time out of debates on House bills to extol their own virtues and castigate their opponent's.  

Elections were never far distant from the considerations of members, but other structures of the parties entered more directly into House operations than did the campaign committees.

Each party had a mechanism by which it assigned members to committee posts. The Republicans made appointments through a Committee on Committees, chaired by Minority Leader James Mann (Ill.). Apparently, the Committee also had party-housekeeping and policy-suggestion responsibilities. These latter activities, however, were insignificant, at least as far as can be determined from the sources.  

Operating under a different arrangement from the Republicans, the Democrats appointed committees through the Democratic members of the Committee on Ways and Means. Because of the doubling of function, Ways and Means was the most important of House committee assignments for the Democrats, and its chairman Claude Kitchin (N.C.) served also as majority leader.  

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55 See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 9, 9601-06, 9656, 9856-62, for some examples of partisan speech making.

Placing party members on committees was a difficult job for party leaders. It nonetheless proved a useful means by which to punish or placate the recalcitrant members, as the case demanded, and to reward the faithful. It was also a means by which party leaders could adjust geographical imbalances if they so desired.\textsuperscript{58} In the case of the Democrats, leaders had to balance the power between states by downgrading the committee assignments of the South and Border states. Table 2-23 demonstrates that Democratic party leaders considered geography in making committee assignments. Only two committees, Judiciary and Foreign Affairs, favored the South and the Border states, and the Judiciary imbalance can be explained by the greater percentage of lawyers coming from these areas as compared to other regions. For the most important committees of Ways and Means, Rules, and Appropriations, the South and Border states were unrepresented. Obviously, the Democratic leadership was aware of the geographical imbalance, with the consequence that they adopted a conscious policy of minimizing the Southern predominance. Republican geographical strategy reveals less design. In making assignments, the members of the Committee on Committees tended to over represent the Middle Atlantic and

\begin{footnotesize}
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TABLE 2-23  
GEOGRAPHICAL BALANCE OF COMMITTEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Percentage of Members</th>
<th>Committees* (Percent)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
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<td>WNC</td>
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<td>11 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
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<td>BS</td>
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<td>MS</td>
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<td>PS</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Percentage of Members</th>
<th>Committees* (Percent)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>NE</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Committees: 1 = Agriculture; 2 = Appropriations; 3 = Banking and Currency; 4 = Post Office; 5 = Rivers and Harbors; 6 = Rules; 7 = Military Affairs; 8 = Naval; 9 = Judiciary; 10 = Foreign Affairs; 11 = Interstate and Foreign Commerce; 12 = Ways and Means. Source of the information is Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., Sess. 3, 195-204.
East North Central states, but the imbalance was not noticeable, except perhaps on the Rules and the Banking and Currency committees. Both parties faced difficulty in assigning seats to the Mountain States and Pacific States, probably because of the low percentage of members from these regions. These two regions could feel a justifiable slight by the assigning committees of both parties. Any electoral advantages a party won by geographical appeals would have to be based on factors other than the geographical distribution of seats.

The nucleus of the two parties' organization was the caucus. Before 1917, its exact function and significance for each party as a unifier had varied greatly, but by 1917 the dissimilarities between the parties' caucuses had decreased. After the overthrow of Speaker Cannon's system in 1910 and 1911, the Republicans tried several new methods. From 1912 to 1917, the party held open-public sessions instead of closed caucuses. These seldom met, because little unanimity on policy existed between the Progressive and Old Guard factions. By early 1917, attitudes were changing, as conservatives pushed for a return to closed meetings and progressives demanded a stronger caucus to adopt a party platform. Closed sessions were revived, but no party platform resulted from their return.59

For Democrats, the caucus had entailed much more than merely a means of selecting leaders, which was more the case for the Republicans.

59Bolling, Power in the House, 99-100; Washington Post, January 12, 1917, 6; and January 25, 1917, 2. The Post stated that since the overthrow of Cannonism, the Republicans had not been able to harmonize differences, which prevented them from presenting an elective counter program to the Democrats. The caucus as a result became unimportant. But in 1917, A. J. Gardner (Mass.), a Progressive, and J. H. Moore (Penn.), a Conservative, attempted to revive the caucus as a means of creating policy.
When the Democrats had combined successfully with insurgent Republicans to overthrow Cannon, they superseded his power with the authority of the caucus. Speaker Champ Clark (Mo.) and Majority Leader Oscar W. Underwood (Ala.) devised the binding caucus in 1913 as a new means to formulate party policy and to hold the Democratic rank-in-file to it. The system operated successfully, but when Underwood moved over to the Senate and Kitchin replaced him in 1915 as majority leader, the caucus declined as a means of mobilizing Democratic majorities. The reasons for this are not absolutely certain, but it appears that first of all Kitchin declined to utilize the binding caucus because he opposed the Administration on preparedness measures; and, second, President Wilson took a more personal role in directing House Democrats. Therefore, in 1917, the caucus, though diminishing in significance for the Democrats and gaining in importance for the Republicans, did not fully serve either party as a tool to mobilize party majorities or to develop party policy.

Also ineffectively used by both parties to activate members was the position of party whip. Speaker Clark spoke of the whips as the right hands of the minority and majority leaders, with their main function being to ensure attendance of members when the party needed

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Randal Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 61-62. Caucus rules stated that when two-thirds of the party voted in favor of a measure, all members had to vote for it on the floor. Also Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," The Progressive Era, 103.

The Democrats held caucuses on policy matters, but these did not appear too effective. For example, they met early in the war and agreed to pass only war measures during the special war session. But when they got down to a specific "hot potato," in this case the Rivers and Harbors appropriation bill, they could not make a decision that they could enforce. See New York Times, April 20, 1917, 6.
it. Yet, curiously enough, during the 65th House the Democrats had no member formally designated as whip. From investigation of floor debates, it appears that Democrats utilized the chairman reporting the particular bill under discussion as a whip. The Republicans did have a whip, Charles M. Hamilton (N.Y.), but he was not very active in carrying out the responsibilities of the position, probably because the Republicans were in a minority and did not have much need for a whip.

Similar to the whips were individuals who performed different liaison functions and who closely watched debates. For the Democrats, the most notable person of this type was John Nance Garner (Tex.). Because of Kitchin's poor White House relations, Garner served as contact man for the Administration in the House. Besides holding conferences with Wilson regularly, he also funneled information between departments and the House and informed House Democrats of the Administration position.

For the Republicans, two members, J. Hampton Moore (Penn.) and Martin Madden (Ill.), performed actively on the House floor. Moore was a member of the prestigious Ways and Means Committee and was also one of the five members of the Republican steering panel of the Committee on Committees. Madden was a leading Republican member of the Postal Committee who had wide influence on many policy matters. With a combination of self-assurance and partisanship, Moore and Madden


addressed themselves to a wide variety of topics. In fact, they spoke to such a degree that only Minority Leader Mann equalled in quantity their speaking habits. 64

Another leader very visible in the party system and in floor debates was the chairman of a committee. A common thesis is that since the overthrow of Cannon, the independent power of chairmen had increased. The corollary to this view argues that the decreased control of the Speaker over chairmen weakened party discipline over the voting behavior of members. 64 That there had been some decrease in party voting since 1910 cannot be doubted, but it is questionable if the expansion of the chairman's power was responsible. 65 A method for determining the chairmen's possible negative influence is available by computing their party loyalty score. If their own voting records were less cohesive than the average member's, it would indicate that their independence was disruptive of party solidarity. However, if the opposite is true, some other factors must be sought for the decrease in party voting (Table 2-24).

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64 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 499. For an instance of Moore's partisanship, see his remarks about civil service appointments to the diplomatic service: That such appointments meant that only Democrats need apply. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 2, 1883-85. For Madden's attempt to discomfit the Administration over its exemption of draft-age employees, see Washington Post, June 22, 1918, 6.

65 Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 572, note the decrease party voting since 1910 and particularly since 1945. There was a decline in the Progressive years in party loyalty from the McKinley years, but more recent times show an even greater decline.
TABLE 2-24
COMMITTEE LEADERS' LOYALTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPUBLICAN</th>
<th>DEMOCRAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Loyalty</td>
<td>Leaders Loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not all committee chairmen were computed, only the more important ones. The selection of whom to include as important committee chairmen was necessarily an arbitrary process. The House had many committees which met rarely and conducted few hearings, such as the expenditure committees on executive departments. Others may have held hearings, but their subject area was not of national or House importance—such as the ones on pensions. The important committees were: Agriculture, Appropriations, Naval, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Ways and Means, Merchant Marine, Military Affairs, Public Lands, Rules and Rivers and Harbors. Democratic chairmen were: Asbury F. Lever, J. Swagar Sherley, Thetus W. Sims, Daniel E. Garrett, Edwin Y. Webb, Joshua W. Alexander, S. Herbert Dent, Jr., Lemuel P. Padgett, Scott Ferris, John H. Small, Edward W. Pou, and Claude Kitchin. Republican leading members were: Gilbert N. Haugen, Frederick H. Gillett, Everis Hayes, Henry A. Cooper, Frank P. Woods, Philip P. Campbell, Andrew J. Volstead, Julius Kahn, Joseph W. Fordney, and John J. Esch. In determining the party leaders' loyalty score, a random selection of roll calls was made. On this selection, the Rice Cohesion Index score was computed. The same procedure was followed for the average member's score. The chairmen and ranking members headed committees during the 3rd Session of the 65th. Several chairmen had resigned by then. They are included on the general cohesion index of party leaders.
Committee chairmen were partisans, but to a lesser degree than the average party member. Even so, there is very little difference between the chairmen and the other members within the Democratic party (eighty-five for average members and eighty-four for committee leaders). In the Republicans' case, the difference is somewhat greater (eighty for chairmen, eighty-five for the average member). The Democratic chairmen, then, were more loyal to the party, while Republican chairmen showed more independence. Possibly, the average Republican member, when he occasionally voted against his party, could feel justified because he could point to the votes of ranking committee members against the party. However, probably no disruption flowed from the slightly lower party cohesion of committee leaders. Nonetheless, their occasional independence did not increase party loyalty.

The majority and minority leaders also vitally affected the cohesion and direction of their parties. The average member, who tended to identify the leaders with the party position, looked upon the leaders' actions as the signals for party policy and voting. Part of the reason for this was that the majority and minority leaders possessed formidable power, consisting of the right to make committee assignments, to call a party caucus, and to direct floor debates. As in the case of Majority Leader Kitchin, who was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, the leader might augment his power by important committee positions.66 Nonetheless, Kitchin, though liked by Democratic

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66As an example of a freshman Congressman looking to the main party leaders, see the remarks of Louisiana Representative Aswell in Sandra Stringer, "James B. Aswell," 63-64. Minority Leader Mann did not have any committee assignments, probably because he wished to direct all his attention to floor debates. See Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., January 1919, 216. Minority and majority leaders
members and a man of great financial acumen and debating brilliance, confined his power to limited areas. Since he voted against the war declaration and opposed the conscription law, his relations with the White House were strained. At those times when he followed an independent course, he turned the direction of the party over to another member in sympathy with the Administration. Kitchin also failed to use the binding caucus. A further restriction of his influence resulted because Kitchin limited his important floor activities to advancing only those bills which came from his committee. By so doing, he considerably decreased his presence on the House floor and hampered his direction of a general party program.

made committee assignments with the aid of other important members and also with guidelines established by seniority, geography, and abilities. See G. Goodwin, The Little Legislatures, 70-71. Congressman James A Frear of Wisconsin wrote to James Mann asking for a change in committee assignment, arguing that he was qualified to serve on the Rules Committee because of experience, devotion to his work, and the support of the Wisconsin delegation. Frear to Mann, January 6, 1919, Frear Papers, Archives State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Madison).

Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Mac-Millian Co., 1948), p. 93; Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 339; and James Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper, 1958), 33. Byrnes and Hull write that Kitchin was one of the finest characters they ever knew, as well as a dangerous debater. Byrnes also relates a story of Kitchin's unfriendly relations with Garner and Postmaster-general Albert S. Burleson. This resulted because Garner and Burleson were able to push a man onto the Appropriations Committee whom Kitchin opposed. Such a personal conflict also limited a leader's effectiveness. Kitchin's biographer praises his abilities. See Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 26, 84-85.

After his vote against the war resolution, some newspaper reports said that there was a move afoot to replace him. This never got off the ground if, in fact, there ever was such a movement. Kitchin did, however, limit his standing with the White House by voting against war. See Washington Post, April 11, 1917, 1; New York Times, April 9, 12; and Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 236-37.

Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 103.
Radically different from Kitchin's style was that of Minority Leader Mann, who actively participated in debates on a wide variety of topics. Another difference between Mann and Kitchin was the type of emotion they evoked in fellow party members. Unlike Kitchin, Mann was not loved, mainly because he could display a harsh demeanor and showed no tolerance for mistakes or laziness. He, nonetheless, commanded the respect of his contemporaries of both parties. They wrote that Mann was an extremely diligent and precise student of legislative matters who paid great attention to issues and to parliamentary procedure. In his autobiography, LaGuardia described Mann as the greatest parliamentarian of his or any other period.

Notwithstanding these abilities, his success as a party leader had its definite limitations. During the prewar period he had taken a moderate non-interventionist position which had aroused the hostility of the Roosevelt interventionist faction of the Republican membership. When the war started, many thought his past record disqualified him for leadership in wartime. He also incurred the displeasure of some members by pursuing a generally conservative policy and by keeping most

70 Mann did allow the ranking Republican minority member of the committee reporting the bill to lead the debate, but he did not sit on the side lines without commenting as Kitchin usually did. As a result some members thought he robbed them of opportunities that were theirs on the House floor. Washington Post, January 15, 1917, 1; and February 26, 1917, 2.

71 Hull, Memoirs, 55, writes that Mann spoke in his "usual perverse tone and demeanor." For an example of his harshness toward a fellow member, see Cong. Rec., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 111.

72 LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 135; Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics, 342. For the examples of Mann's skills as a parliamentarian, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 2, 2077; and Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 644-45.
policy decisions in his own hands. More progressive Republicans pressed for an innovative program and greater participation in policy-making, but no changes were forthcoming. Most important in limiting his leadership was a serious illness he suffered in July, 1917. Since he remained in Johns Hopkins hospital for the rest of the session and most of the next, the Republicans had to improvise leadership. What finally emerged consisted of co-minority leaders, Frederick G. Gillett (Mass.) and Irvine L. Lenroot (Wis.). Certain individuals, such as Uncle Joe Cannon (Ill.) and leading committee members, played major supporting roles as directors of individual bills. These men were not without skill, particularly Lenroot and Ex-Speaker Cannon, but the absence of Mann caused uncertainties in the direction of the party.

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73 "Republican Chairman," Nation, CVI (February 21, 1918), 200-01. This article refers to Mann as a Republican liability because of his moderate position on intervention and his conservatism. Such stances raised the ire of "Gussie" Gardner (R.-Mass.) along with other less clearly identified members. See also Washington Post, January 12, 1917, 6; and February 26, 1917, 2, for activities of Gardner to push a party program. Mann had been associated with Cannon when Cannon was Speaker. See Blair Bolles, Tyrant From Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power (New York: Norton, 1950), 55, 57.

74 The failure of the Republicans to develop a party program probably reflected the difficulty of developing a program out of the divisions within the party. But just as likely was the Republican realization that as they allowed war events to take their course, they would be able to use events against the Democrats. In short, the Republicans simply had to stay up with developments and let the Democrats make mistakes. For evidence of the Republican approach of using the war against the Democrats, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 8, 7857.

75 New York Times, November 24, 1917, 6; November 26, 1917, 8; Washington Post, November 25, 1917, 11. According to one Republican member, Mann was "forty times" more skilled than Gillett, who eventually took the main job of leadership when Lenroot went to the Senate in April, 1918. William Ramseyer to Grimes, February 19, 1919, Ramseyer Papers, University of Iowa Archives. LaGuardia, in his autobiography, wrote that Cannon was still extremely able though he was in his 80's. LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 135.
In the end, the divisiveness caused by Mann's pre-war positions and anti-reform sentiments, plus his long-term absence, undermined his effectiveness in unifying the party. He failed to win renomination as party leader in 1919.

The most important House leader, at least in theory, was Champ Clark, the Speaker, who had held the office since 1911. After the close election of 1916 both parties claimed that they could elect the Speaker and organize the House. In fact, neither party was sure of the outcome because five independents held the balance of power. The independents—Thomas D. Schall (Minn.), Alvan T. Fuller (Mass.), Charles H. Randall (Cal.), Whitmell P. Martin (La.), and Meyer London (N.Y.)—conferred several times during February and March, 1917, attempting to map out a course which would gain them leverage with the major parties on issues that they supported and for committee assignments that they desired. In the end they agreed to no common strategy, though four of the five cast their ballots for Clark rather than Mann. Also increasing the doubt of both the Democrats and Republicans as to the outcome of the race was the possible defection of members of their own party to the opposition. In the Democratic ranks, dissatisfaction, which foreshadowed the cultural tensions in the Democratic party of the 1920's, existed among representatives from the big Eastern urban machines, particularly from Massachusetts and Tammany Hall. They were distressed over their committee assignments and over the prohibition tendencies of the party. Although several boycotted the Democratic

76 Washington Post, January 31, 1917, 2; February 18, 1917, 2; March 11, 1917, 3; March 10, 1917, 2; March 13, 1917, 2; New York Times, March 5, 1917, 1; March 8, 1917, 10; and Washington Post, April 3, 1917, 2. The fifth, Fuller, voted for Rep. Irvine Lenroot (R.-Wis.).
caucus on March 31, they voted for Clark on April 2, apparently because the leadership agreed to give them better committee positions.\footnote{Washington Post, March 26, 1917, 2; New York Times, March 30, 1917, 1; New York Times, March 31, 1917, 4; Washington Post, March 31, 1917, 1. Eastern representatives did receive some good committee assignments in the 65th House: James A. Gallivan (Mass.) to Appropriations, Thomas F. Smith (N.Y.) to Banking and Currency; Joseph V. Flynn (N.Y.) to Judiciary; Daniel J. Riordan (N.Y.) to Rules; and John Carew (N.Y.) to Ways and Means. Whether or not this was a result of the pre-speakership trading is difficult to tell. For source on committee assignments, see Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., January, 1919, 183-92.}

On the Republican side, a number of progressives and interventionists were unhappy over Mann's failure to develop a party program and over his prewar non-interventionist position. There had been talk of a bipartisan organization of the House by certain Republicans, but members of this faction—who included Gardner (Mass.), Edward Gary (N.J.), Frederick Dallinger (Mass.), Reuben Haskell (N.Y.), and Frank James (Mich.)—were inspired in their opposition by Mann's policies, not by desires to offer a bipartisan gesture. When it came to the voting, although the Republican caucus did make some concessions, these five voted for other Republicans.\footnote{Washington Post, January 15, 1917, 1; March 7, 1917, 1; New York Times, March 11, 1917, 1; Washington Post, March 22, 1917, 2; March 24, 1917, 2; March 26, 1917, 2; March 28, 1917, 2; April 1, 1917, 1; New York Times, April 1, 1917, 6. Two other Republicans did make a bipartisan gesture and voted for Clark.} By the time of the roll call, a combination of Democratic unity and independent support, plus Republican dissension, handily gave Clark the Speakership for the fourth time.\footnote{Washington Post, April 3, 1917, 2; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 105-16.}

Clark retained a post that had been much diminished in status and power since the overthrow of Cannon. Clark did not retain the
powers to appoint standing committees and to control the House Rules Committee that Cannon had earlier employed. He, nonetheless, retained considerable power, since he still held the right to assign bills to committees, to decide questions on rules during floor debates, to appoint special and joint committees, and to select the presiding officers of the House.\(^8^0\) Whether these powers gave the Speaker sufficient ability to direct a legislative program is debatable. In actual practice Clark exercised his power in the limited fashion of the chief presiding officer, leaving others to direct the legislative program.\(^8^1\)

The leadership structures of the House did not augur well for a unified party or a coherent party program. The voting behavior of leaders did not help unify their parties (Table 2-25). Leaders of both parties continued to display lower loyalty than other party members. At times, the disloyal votes of leaders, such as Speaker Clark's on the conscription bill, were disruptive for their parties, besides difficult to explain to the public. Further, party instability was increased by the disjointed fashion with which the leadership structures fitted together. Neither party had formally operating

\(^{80}\text{Bolling, Power in the House, 50-63; Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, 52. For an example of some of the Speaker's powers in the operations of the House, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 4, 3390.}\)

\(^{81}\text{Bolling, Power in the House, 93-4, writes that when Underwood was Majority Leader, he, rather than Clark, was the real leader. I found no comments contrasting Kitchin to Clark. However, one Congress­man in a letter, probably reflecting the way Clark ran the speakership rather than its inherent potentialities, maintained that the speaker acted simply as a moderator. William Ramseyer to Grimes, February 19, 1919, Ramseyer Papers. A general study of leadership in Congress does maintain that the majority leader was now more important. See Ripley, Majority Party Leadership, 52.}\)
TABLE 2-25

PARTY LEADERS' LOYALTY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPUBLICAN</th>
<th>DEMOCRATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Loyalty</td>
<td>Leaders' Loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For the names of the leaders who were chairmen or leaders of committees, see Table 2-24. The ones not named in the previous table but included in this one are: Democrats—William C. Adamson, James F. Byrnes, Joseph W. Byrns, Champ Clark, John J. Fitzgerald, John N. Garner, Carter Glass, Cordell Hull and Henry T. Rainey; Republicans—Joseph G. Cannon, Simeon D. Fess, Irvine L. Lenroot, Nichols Longworth, James R. Mann, Frank W. Mondell, and J. Hampton Moore. The same random selection method was used in selecting roll calls as in the committee leaders' loyalty table.
whips, party caucuses met but failed to formulate policy, and com-
mittee chairmen operated in their own narrow domains. The top leader-
ship, who suffered from personal and policy deficiencies, unintentional-
ly limited their direction of party members to a restricted number of
policy areas. These structural limitations could be overcome,
either by groups with clear ideological positions or by presidential
intervention in House activities. The war and its aftermath would
test the institutional qualities of the House as never before, deter-
mining its ability to handle issues of a national crisis.

82Democratic leadership was also weakened by the resignation of
several key leaders: John J. Fitzgerald, chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, William Adamson, Chairman of Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, and Carter Glass, Chairman of the Banking and Currency
Committee. The exact results of the resignations would be difficult
to determine, but all were party loyalists, particularly Glass who
strongly defended the Administration.
President Wilson's call to arms before a joint session of Congress on April 2, 1917, provoked a dramatic House debate. Although opponents of war fought courageously, they could not block the declaration of hostilities. Once the war resolution passed, the Administration and the House hastily developed a war program. On one level, the war program required the forging of a military machine by raising an army and funding armaments. Similarly, mobilization involved the censorship of press and speech, the suppression of radicals, the organization of industry and agriculture for war purposes, and the adoption of policies for financing the war. On another level, the war program created fundamental ideological, partisan, geographical, and institutional conflicts. These divisions within the House influenced much of the legislation that was enacted, but they remained largely hidden from public view behind a bi-partisan facade of unity. Though the war induced an ostensible agreement in favor of the war programs, complex partisan, regional, and ideological forces undermined the apparent harmony.

Resolution For War

Immediately after the organization of the House on April 2, representatives took up Wilson's proposal for intervention, a subject
upon which many members had often demonstrated definite tendencies toward non-intervention. Not more than a year before, during an earlier German-American crisis in 1916, many congressmen rallied behind a resolution introduced by Jeff McLemore, a Texas Democrat, which forbade American travel on armed merchant ships in submarine-infested waters. Before the roll call a majority of Democrats probably favored it. However, strong pressure from the chief Executive forced all but a handful of recalcitrant Democrats to vote against the resolution. When it came to a vote, three out of four of the 142 representatives who voted for the resolution were Republicans.\(^1\) Even after the break in diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, House isolationists, commanded by Henry A. Cooper (R-Wis.), sought to restrict administration action. They proposed an amendment which provided that American ships, which an administration bill intended to arm, could not carry munitions to the Entente Powers if armed. Denounced by the Administration as another McLemore resolution, the Cooper amendment rallied only token support and went down to defeat, 293 to 125.\(^2\) Given past House actions, it was not surprising that when the Foreign Affairs Committee introduced the war resolution to the floor two of the Committee's members rejected the majority report in favor of war, one of whom was Cooper, the leading Republican member of the committee.\(^3\) As the House undertook the task of deciding


\(^{2}\)Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 13.

\(^{3}\)New York Times, April 5, 1917, 1.
for or against war, non-interventionists stood prepared to withstand the clamor for war.

In the opening debate on April 5, which took place before a full House and jammed galleries, Henry Flood (D-Va.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, phrased the necessity for war as a challenge..."thrown at our feet by the arrogant autocracy of Germany." The thrust of his argument for war, often repeated in the long hours of debate ahead, rested on an enumeration of German violations of American independence. Specifically, Flood charged that Germany had spied on the government and people of the United States, had disregarded its pledges to restrict submarine warfare, and had murdered "innocent women and children." His argument and similar ones also included a listing of ships sunk by Germany. At this point, opponents injected that England had similarly violated American rights. Floor countered by maintaining that British violations were of a different nature altogether, since no American lives were taken by her violations. His conclusion, endorsed by later speakers who followed his reasoning, was that America must stand up and defend herself against a power which was already waging war against American rights and citizens.4

Added to pro-war arguments was a technique that appealed to the emotions of patriotism and belligerent chauvinism. A mild form of this sentiment maintained that in a crisis the Congress had to stand

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4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 1, 307-09. For similar arguments see ibid., 970, 344-48; C. William Ramseyer to Frank Shane, February 26, 1917; and Ramseyer to personal (no name), April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Don Stephens to Matt S. Hartman, April 6, 1917, Box 26, Folder 199, Stephens Papers, Archives of the Historical Society of Nebraska.
by the President. In a more robust form, William Good (D-Ark.) declared that German actions ought to make the blood of American patriots boil for a fight. He also insinuated that the patriotism of the anti-war members left much to be desired. Pat Harrison (D-Miss.) unleashed an abusive diatribe against opponents, declaring that a preceding anti-war speech would have been more appropriate if delivered in the German Reichstag. Similarly, Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.) charged that non-interventionist speeches undoubtedly pleased Count von Bernstorff, the former German Ambassador to the United States. Both diatribes reflected a virulent nationalism which asserted that the United States could not tolerate mistreatment from Germany. As Harrison stated, the German "outrages" could not be accepted by a great nation which had "not forgotten the teachings of our fathers." Harrison and Heflin's patriotism combined an implied distrust of the loyalty of war opponents with a direct threat of intimidation of all opponents, American and German alike.

A much different appeal for war came from members who envisioned the conflict as a great clash between ideals of government. That advocates of war, particularly Wilson, demanded American entry because of idealistic values has largely been discounted by such historians as Arthur Link. According to Link's view, Wilson did not reach his

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5 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 375-76.

6 Ibid., 331.

7 Ibid., 315-16, 348. Another remark by Heflin indicates the connection of patriotism to a sense of manhood. He said that "we were drawn into war, and no nation with any self-respect, no nation with an ounce of courage, no nation with a particle of national honor, would have endured longer the insults of the murderous Kaiser."
decision for war because he wanted to protect democracy, but only later
cloaked the rationale for war in idealistic terms.\footnote{Link, \textit{Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement}, 277-79, 281. Link modified this thesis in a later book when he noted a strong
desire by Wilson to influence the peace settlement after the war in
the direction of a world community. See, \textit{Link, Woodrow Wilson:
Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace}, 410-415.} Even if Wilson
came to an idealistic position after reaching his decision for war,
it does not follow that all idealistic advocates evolved their position
in a similar fashion. In any event, a few congressmen did phrase their
support in idealistic terms.

The idealistic argument included two facets—one conservative,
the other revolutionary. Augustus Gardner (R-Mass.) argued that though
the German submarine warfare directly pushed the United States into war,
the real spark came from another source: the American people realized
that a life and death struggle was occurring in which democracy's
survival hung in the balance. If the United States did not respond
to the challenge, it would become impossible, Gardner argued, to
preserve American ideals and democratic government in Europe.\footnote{\textit{Cong. Rec.}, 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 668-69.}
But for George O'Shaunessy (D-R.I.) the war offered the opportunity
for the revolutionary overthrow of tyrannical governments rather than
the mere maintenance of democratic government. In his pro-war speech
he called for the removal of all kings, starting with the German
Kaiser but not exempting even the King of England, and for the forward
march of the masses.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 391.} In a less provocative fashion, Charles Linthicum (D-Mo.) also advocated the uprooting of autocracies and the
establishment of free republics. Both O'Shaunessy and Linthicum reflected the feelings of oppressed European ethnic groups who hoped to harness American democracy to the cause of national self-determination.

Rising in opposition to the crusade, a determined minority resolutely denied that war was justified. Claude Kitchin, majority leader of the Democrats and the most prominent opponent of war, elaborated what has been called the "un-neutrality thesis." Holding that Wilsonian policies were un-neutral from the start, Kitchin insisted that they consequently drew the United States into the maelstrom. Moreover, there was no justification for American involvement since it was strictly a war for European dominion. Additionally, both sides had equally violated American rights, but the Administration had scarcely offered an audible protest to Entente violations. As a corollary to this argument, Kitchin insisted that the un-neutrality of administration policy permitted profiteers to wax rich, thereby enmeshing the country more deeply in the conflict. American traders, his argument continued, were given a free reign without proper controls. As a consequence, Germany took retaliatory action via the only weapon at her disposal, the submarine. Kitchin implored the House not to send American boys to die in order to protect American trade and profiteers. In sum, the un-neutrality thesis, as stated by Kitchin and others, stressed administration favoritism, British high-handness, and American trade entanglements.

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11 Ibid., 324, 319.

12 Ibid., 332-33, 314, 345, 376, 327. See Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 47-48, for a discussion of Kitchen's view on the war crisis.
The anti-war sentiment, which flowed from a sense of the proper role of America in world affairs, expressed itself in two differing lines of thought: a nationalist and idealist. Like the pro-war nationalists, the anti-war nationalists argued that the United States should defend its rights against German aggression. But the sphere of defense should be confined to the oceans, with the United States acting independently. To join an European alliance would, Frank Rearis (R-Nebr.) maintained, cut America from her traditional isolationists' moorings and violate the warning of Washington's Farewell Address on the dangers of entangling alliances. To these isolationists, a defense of American rights involved unilateral action against Germany on the high seas, without encumbering European ties.

From the nationalistic perspective of isolationism, the emphasis in the argument shifted to the upholding of high ideals. Seeing war as the "greatest crime against the human race," these isolationists supported their viewpoint with various ethical ideals. Edward King (R-Ill.) cited the teachings of Jesus, while William LaFollette (R-Wash.) appealed to the liberal ideals of human civilization. These war opponents also portrayed America as an example that ought to uphold democracy and humanity without the shedding of blood. Meyer London (N.Y.), the lone Socialist in Congress, argued that involvement not only would harm America's liberty but would also adversely affect the development of German democracy. He believed in the liberation of


14 Ibid., 318, 363-64, 353. The discussion and terminology on isolationism is partly influenced by Cooper's, The Vanity of Power, 2-4, 88, 99. Opponents of war can, to a degree, be placed in his classifications of idealist and ultranationalist orientations.
oppressed peoples as did O'Shaunessy, but to him war did not advance the masses because they were the real sufferers in any conflict.\textsuperscript{15} London's interpretation of idealism stood in direct contrast to the international idealism of Wilson, who advocated an aggressive advancement of democracy throughout the world.

That the debates influenced the votes of members cannot be denied. Equally true, many cast their ballots for reasons other than those revealed in the debates. Marvin Jones (D-Tex.) wrote later that more representatives objected to war in the cloak room than on the floor and that many only voted reluctantly for war.\textsuperscript{16} There were several reasons for this conduct, but the most important of these was the emotionally charged atmosphere in which congressmen reached their decision. From the vantage point of C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa), the war atmosphere had set in motion processes of fate or history which all but dictated the choice for war. Never enthusiastic to enter the war, because he believed that it meant entangling alliances and protection of munition makers' profits, Ramseyer nonetheless felt that "destiny" demanded war.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, Edward W. Saunders (D-Va.) stated during the debates that an "inexorable compulsion" created circumstances that House members must simply follow.\textsuperscript{18} In a less

\textsuperscript{15}Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 335, 341, 371, 329; and Pt. 2, 1149.

\textsuperscript{16}Marvin Jones, Marvin Jones Memoirs, 33, voted for war, so his comment is not a critical remark by an opponent of war. Kitchin's biographer makes a similar point; see Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 236.

\textsuperscript{17} Ramseyer to P. T. Grimes, January 6, 1917; to Homer A. Roth, February 10, 1917; and to Robert Lumsdon, March 10, 1917, Ramseyer Papers.

\textsuperscript{18}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 345.
fatalistic tone, Dan V. Stephens (D-Neb.), a Bryanite in sympathies, believed that the President dictated the path the country would follow. To stand in his way meant that one would "be branded a traitor."\textsuperscript{19}

Part of this pressure that Stephens detected operated upon Jeannette Rankin (R-Mont.), who nonetheless still voted against war. Her brother argued the justice of the war and warned that a negative vote would end her political career. Women's suffrage leaders gravely conferred with her regarding the harm that a nay vote would have on the movement. She held her ground, however, for her dread of sending American boys to death was greater than her fear of political defeat.\textsuperscript{20} But in most instances, congressmen followed Philip Campbell's (R-Kans.) course. He knew that the war resolution would pass. A nay vote then would do no good, but in the circumstances might be construed as comforting the enemy. He voted yea.\textsuperscript{21} Of course, many pro-war advocates were firmly convinced that American honor, rights, and ideals demanded war. For a minority, however, support was the result of political and historical conditions that they could not oppose.

Factors shaping a member's vote on the war resolution can also be approached by quantitative analysis. Such an analysis suggests dimensions of pro-war and anti-war groups which would otherwise be obscure. The starting point is to correlate the war roll call with

\textsuperscript{19} Dan Stephens to Frank Fowler, February 16, 1917, Box 25, Folder 193, Stephens Papers.

\textsuperscript{20} Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 73-77.

\textsuperscript{21} Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 410. See Louis C. Crampton to Earl G. Fitz, April 11, 1917, File L, Folder 10d, Louis C. Crampton Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, for an expression of a viewpoint similar to Campbell's.
all other relevant roll calls. By doing this a better definition of the issues that pro-war and anti-war legislators supported may be revealed. However, correlating the war vote with other war-connected roll calls may show that it related to few other roll calls. In fact, this is the case, because the war vote associated at a level of statistical significance with only eight out of 120 roll calls, which as a group did not all associate among themselves (Table 3-1 and note on page 113). Two of the roll calls dealt with prohibiting strikes during wartime, while another two granted a $50 million appropriation to purchase seed grain for farmers during wartime. The four others included a draft vote, a vote on permitting associations in trade, and one to establish a commission on unemployment insurance. The final vote dealt with charges of treason against two members who opposed the war.

Although the war roll call correlates with these eight votes, an analysis of this relationship must be restrained. First, the votes do not correlate with each other at a level of statistical significance (See note on page 113). Second, since the war groups purposely came together only eight votes out of 120 votes, it indicates that they did not consistently work together in future votes. Given these qualifications, the opponents of war were members who rejected placing restraints on the rights of workers to strike and who favored providing seed for farmers. They further endorsed a volunteer rather than a conscripted army, desired an investigation of unemployment insurance, voted against trade associations, and protested charges of disloyalty because of their vote on the war resolution. In contrast most supporters of the war resolution took counter positions on these issues. In terms of attitudes and group orientations, opponents of
TABLE 3-la

**BILLS AND MOTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROLL CALL ON THE WAR RESOLUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Motion</th>
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<tr>
<td>±.750</td>
<td>To agree to the amendment to H. R. 3545, (May 18, 1917), authorizing the President to increase temporarily the United States military establishment, which amendment eliminates the clause authorizing the President to call for 500,000 volunteers, so as to permit the increase to be made by a selective draft rather than through volunteers. <em>Cong. Rec.</em>, 65 Cong. Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1555.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>±.763</td>
<td>To expunge certain remarks from the record regarding Bill H. R. 4961, (40 STAT-217, August 10, 1917, providing further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel, by eliminating certain words referring to two representatives as being traitors and in treason with anarchists and charging them with stirring up enmity to the draft law. <em>Ibid.</em>, Pt. 6, 5757.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>±.716</td>
<td>To strike out the Enacting Clause in H. R. Res. 189, providing for a commission to inquire into the advisability of establishing national insurance against unemployment, invalidity, and sickness. <em>Ibid.</em>, Pt. 1, 906.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>±.642</td>
<td>To amend S. 383, (40 STAT-533, April 20, 1918), punishing the destruction or injuring of war material and war transportation facilities by fire, explosives or other violent means and forbidding the hostile use of property during time of war, by including persons with intent to injure, interfere with or obstruct the U. S. or any associate nation in carrying on the war, and who conspire to prevent the erection or production of war premises, war material or war utility. <em>Ibid.</em>, Pt. 3, 3124A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>±.725</td>
<td>To amend S. 383, by making it lawful under the act for employees to agree together to stop work with a bona fide purpose of securing better wages or conditions of employment. <em>Ibid.</em>, Pt. 3, 3126A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
±.694 To amend H. R. 7795, which appropriates $50,000,000 for the purchase of seed grain and feed for live stock, to be supplied to farmers and stockmen and to create boards in the respective states to assist in carrying out provisions of this act, by amending Section 4 thereof, so as to provide that the Secretary of Agriculture, at the next session of Congress, make a detailed report regarding all proceedings under the act. Ibid., Pt. 5, 4296.

The procedure followed in correlating the war resolution roll call and all subsequent roll calls is as follows: The OSIRIS social science computer package offers a program called Correl which allows a researcher to correlate up to sixty roll calls at one time. I first selected a number of roll calls which had some practical or logical relation to the war resolution. Not all votes would have any relation to each other and were not correlated. The ones that did appear to have a possible relation were coded into the Correl program for statistical analysis with the war vote. The Correl program printed out both a matrix of the correlations (Yule's Q) and a card matrix. I then did two things: first, I ran a second Osiris program called Cluster which placed in groups all similar-correlating roll calls; second, I traced by sight the war vote with all other roll calls in the printed Correl program. Both methods are designed to find high correlations between roll calls. After correlating with over a 120 roll calls, only eight other votes were found that correlate with the war vote at a level of statistical significance. Significance is defined as a Yule's Q ranging from .700 to 1000 but it is permissible to drop to .600. Four of the votes correlate with the war vote at the .600 level, indicating a relation but not a great one. It must be emphasized that while the war vote correlates with the eight, the votes do not all correlate with each other. This procedure was followed on other roll calls. Many votes did not correlate with other roll calls or with only a few votes. In particular few votes fitted into a group of roll calls in which all simultaneously correlated or clustered with each other. The ones that did not correlate could at least be placed into party and regional tables, as was done with the war resolution vote. For those that correlated they could be further evaluated by the Gscore program. This program will be explained later.
war favored labor and farmers, resisted militarism in the organization of the army and monopolism in the conduct of the export trade. It can be concluded that the anti-war element, at least when it voted together, indicated progressive tendencies.

An evaluation of the war roll call in relation to party and region yields more precise results (Table 3-2). Since the resolution passed by a wide majority of 373 to fifty, both parties overwhelmingly favored American entry into the war. A variation between parties nonetheless existed, in that twice as many Republicans (thirty-two) as Democrats (sixteen) voted against war. An explanation of the greater Republican opposition demonstrates the importance of leadership in the reaching of House decisions. None of the top Republican leadership opposed the war, but Democratic Majority Leader Claude Kitchin resolutely fought American entry into the conflict. However, his influence with fellow Democrats was offset by President Wilson, the national leader of the party. A vote against Wilson by significant numbers of Democrats would have immobilized Wilson and his party. Democrats, who in their personal convictions abhorred war, feared more the political repercussions of a negative ballot. Similar restraints operated on the Republicans, but since their party did not occupy the White House, more ventured to vote as their conscience dictated.

Greater variation exists regionally than politically. On the one hand, the New England and the Middle Atlantic regions united in a common support of the war. On the other hand, the Midwestern states (ENC and WNC) harbored nearly all the Republican opponents of war. The Western states (MS and PS regions) for both parties expressed higher than average opposition. In short, the isolationist and the
### TABLE 3-2

**VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION OF S. J. RES. 1: DECLARATION OF WAR***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE</th>
<th>Region and Party (Numbers)</th>
<th>Region and Party (Percent)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nay</td>
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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., 412.*
rural-oriented Midwest furnished the greatest number of opponents. The Western states, which were geographically far removed from the European conflict, were hesitant to support the war. On the other hand, the South and Border states were second only to the industrial North-east in their emphatic support of the war.

Raising Men and Money

Passage of the war resolution dictated the future direction of the first session and the legislative action of the House membership. The opponents of war would now have to shelve their anti-war convictions if they were to avoid being branded traitors. Since none wanted such a label, they agreed with Kitchin that the war required opponents to enter into the task of creating a war program even if their misgivings continued.22 The supporters of the resolution more readily tackled the job of forging a war program. Still they realized that war measures would often violate their peacetime convictions. In the case of either war supporters or opponents, many occasions would arise whereby wartime proposals would provoke disenchantment.23

Immediately after disposal of the war resolution, the House quickly adopted a multi-billion dollar loan for the American and Allied war efforts.24 But the foremost question crowding the House for a quick decision involved the raising of an army. The regular army


23That both sides agreed to support the war program is seen in these articles: Washington Post, April 8, 1917, 1; April 9, 1917, 1; April 11, 1917, 2; April 20, 1917, 1. Much less agreement existed over the specifics, such as how the army was to be raised or who was to be taxed.

24Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 630, 650, 690.
and militia were grossly undermanned for waging a world war. The Administration hoped to correct this dangerous situation by recruiting an army of two million via conscription. Although it violated American tradition, War Department advisors justified this departure on the grounds that not enough men would forsake the lure of good jobs and high wages without compulsion. Many House members rejected the military's viewpoint and looked upon conscription with a jaundiced eye. In 1916, the House membership had firmly defeated a War Department proposal for a Continental Army which hinted at the draft concept. Influential members such as Edward Pou (D-N.C.), Chairman of the House Rules Committee, advised Wilson of present House sentiment, warning him that conscription could not pass without first a trial of the volunteer system. Wilson, agreeing with his War Department advisors, could not be deterred and had the conscription bill introduced.

The bill first went to the House Military Affairs Committee, a caldron seething with opposition. The Administration tried to counter the opposition by sending Secretary of War Newton D. Baker before the Committee. He argued for the efficiency of the draft, but he found determined opposition from two types of volunteer advocates. One element resisted the whole concept of a drafted army. Such committeemen listened sympathetically to anti-conscription advocates, among them Grant Hamilton of the American Federation of Labor and Jane

25 New York Times, April 6, 1917, 1; April 7, 1917, 3.
26 Link, Woodrow Wilson and Progressive Movement, 184.
27 Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 6, 16-17; Washington Post, April 12, 1917, 1.
Addams, a leader of humanitarian causes. The second group did not so much oppose the draft as support the establishment of a special volunteer division for former Rough Rider Teddy Roosevelt. Representative Daniel R. Anthony (R-Kans.), who had charge of the Colonel's interests in the Committee, pictured the Roosevelt division as a quick means to place American troops in the European trenches by fall. 28

In the face of the impending revolt, Wilson held several conferences with Hubert S. Dent (D-Ala.), head of the Military Affairs Committee, along with other leaders. Also active was the Administration's chief lobbyist Albert Burleson, the Postmaster General. Nevertheless, these administration efforts in the end proved ineffective when the Military Affairs Committee reported, thirteen to eight, a bill that provided for use of the volunteer principle first. If this failed, only then could the draft be implemented by the President. 29

With the defeat of the Administration in the Committee, the House debates opened in an environment of confusion and tension, with the outcome in doubt. Reflecting the unusual conditions, the ranking Republican of the Committee, Julius Kahn (Cal.), directed the forces for the Administration's position. In the opposing camp, Chairman Dent, along with the two chief Democratic leaders Kitchin and Clark, who had also deserted the President, led the forces in favor of the volunteer


29 New York Times, April 10, 1917, 1; April 12, 1917, 1; April 17, 1917, 1; April 18, 1917, 1; April 17, 1917, 1; and April 20, 1917, 1.
principle. Dent and his like-minded colleagues argued repeatedly that the volunteer system represented the historical tradition of the United States which at least ought to be given an opportunity to prove itself. Representatives in agreement with this viewpoint cited the "history of the Anglo-Saxon race," and the experience of the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.

According to this traditionalist argument, the fighting abilities of volunteers were superior because they fought as men who had freely consecrated their lives to their country. As former Civil War officer Issac Sherwood (D-Ohio) stressed, very few draftees during the Civil War ever made good soldiers. The strength of the army, the traditionalist argument continued, would also be boosted as localities volunteered together to form regiments in which neighbors drew courage from fellow neighbors. Finally, the traditionalist viewpoint believed that the volunteer system drew vitality from the patriotism of the men. The draft system, according to Speaker Clark, was a reflection against American youth, saying that they could not be trusted to volunteer. The truth, Clark added, was that American men wished a free means through which to express their patriotic sentiment. Without idealism, without patriotism, the American army, the proponents of the volunteer system argued, would lack the fervor necessary to win the war.


31 See ibid., 1376, 1378, 1120-21, 1104 for examples of the traditionalist's argument.

32 Ibid., 1201-03, 1205.

33 Ibid., Pt. 1, 973, 962-63, 1029, 1037, 977; Pt. 2, 1119, 1099, 1147; and New York Times, April 25, 1917, 1.
Linked with the traditionalist and patriotic argument was the fact that voluntary advocates had a strong distrust of the military in American life. This view first of all encompassed a desire to prevent an impersonal military bureaucracy from taking away a person's choice. If men were not to become mere tools of the military, the argument ran, they must be allowed freedom of selection. Secondly, the argument questioned how a democratic country could employ autocratic methods to wage war. Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) summarized this feature of the anti-militarist viewpoint when he stated, "Let us not pay Prussian militarism, which we are seeking to destroy, the compliment of adopting the most hateful and most baneful of its institutions." Finally, the anti-militarists played upon the fears of congressmen by insisting that the draft was part of the military's long-term plan. Several volunteerists maintained that the "militarists" did not want the draft just for war, but also for peace.

In the debates on the draft, two conflicting conceptions of American society battled for mastery. On one hand, the opponents of the draft drew on the ideals of anti-militarism and on visions of a voluntaristic and agrarian American society. On the other hand, supporters of the draft founded their argument on an organized and industrial American democracy. This argument, which can be labeled the modernist position, maintained first of all that American society had irreconcilably changed from the past. To them the volunteer system never functioned as well as the misty memories of Civil War

34 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 1, 1052; and Pt. 2, 1377, 1106-07.

35 Ibid., 1091-92; and Pt. 1, 1028.
veterans recalled, but now more than ever it would not work. Modern war required a wide variety of skills more complex than simple military ones. Secondly, in the modern system, according to conscription proponents, each member of society served as part of the military machine. It was not a system run by sentiment or spirit, but one run on scientific and technical principles. Manpower had to be carefully placed in the right positions, particularly in certain key industries. Correspondingly, only the draft could allot men where they best served the war effort. The machine could not allow some to escape obligations while others served. At this point, the modernist argument branched off into a consideration of the "slacker" and of democracy, which it phrased as a question of equality. Captain Percy Reginald of the British army, before the Military Affairs Committee, maintained that the draft was the democratic method because all were obligated by the system. Congressmen picked up the point. As William Bankhead (D-Ala.) stated it, the country formed one fabric indivisible and homogeneous, which functioned as a unit with rights and obligations for all. Citizens would equally serve the nation, with slackers forced to do their part.36

Finally, the modernist argument claimed that the draft also operated in the most efficient manner. The proponents, having a greater faith in experts and military specialists than the opponents, insisted that the voluntary system had not functioned well in past wars. It had not proved efficient in England either, since the best

of her citizens volunteered and then went to their death. England eventually replaced the system, and America, they concluded, should not heed the call of sentiment or tradition. Instead, draft supporters insisted that American democracy could organize scientifically as a modern industrial and nationalistic state and must do so immediately.37

When the draft debates commenced, the supporters of the voluntary system believed that they commanded a majority in the House.38 By the time the roll call was taken, however, the volunteer principle suffered an overwhelming non-partisan defeat, 313 to 109. To a degree the turnabout reflected the persuasiveness of the arguments of the draft supporters; but other factors also operated against the advocates of volunteerism. First, they were divided among themselves. Some were advocates of volunteerism only because they wished to secure room for Roosevelt's outfit. Other advocates of the volunteer system rejected the whole idea of the Roosevelt division. In the Committee of the Whole House, the Roosevelt plan suffered an easy defeat. After this loss some Roosevelt advocates switched from the voluntary plan to the draft position. Anti-conscriptionists also suffered from advocating an argument that could only be weakened by time. At first it did not appear that the United States would need to send troops to Europe, and many representatives thought that the volunteer plan ought to be given at least a trial. Progressively they became conscious of the implications of modern warfare and the need for American troops

37Ibid., 974-77, 979, 983, 985, 969, 1066; and Pt. 2, 1368, 1200, 1213-15, 1229.

38Ibid., Pt. 2, 1376; and Stephens to C. D. Marr, April 28, 1917, Box 27, Folder 213, Stephens Papers.
As a result, momentum for greater mobilization increasingly pushed aside half-way measures.

Another factor that originally influenced congressmen's attitudes was the South's opposition to conscription of the Negro. The Administration quieted their anxieties as the debate progressed. Furthermore, draft opponents could not effectively counter the charge that they were "living in the cobwebs of the past." Not only were they going against the military experts and the President, they were also setting up an agrarian, nineteenth-century view of American society against a vigorous and disciplined industrial twentieth-century view.

Finally, the draft opponents' appeal to traditional American democratic ideals was countered by the draft supporters. Postulating a democratic and equalitarian ideal that better meshed with a modern industrial society, the conscriptionists won an easy victory over the volunteerists.

Espionage and Censorship

Following passage of the Conscription Act, the House immediately took up another highly controversial measure, The Espionage Bill. Late in the last session of the 64th Congress, the Administration had introduced similar legislation, which provided penalties for spies and

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40 Fears of the effect of the draft on white supremacy caused some congressmen to vote against the draft. See, Ibid.; 294-95; and Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 31.

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41 Stephens to C. D. Marr, April 28, 1917, Box 27, Folder 213, Stephen Papers, expressed his views of the draft opponents in these terms. That considerations of following the President affected votes can be seen in Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 987, 554.
individuals supplying war information to the enemy. It would have passed if it had not become enmeshed in the last-minute legislative tangle. Consequently, administration supporters reintroduced the bill, now modified by two amendments. The first new section established newspaper censorship and granted the President wide latitude in the detection and the punishment of violators. According to the Justice Department, which wrote the original draft of the bill, newspaper censorship was designed to suppress information worthwhile to the enemy. The second amendment provided that every letter, circular, postal card, pamphlet, or book in violation of the act or treasonable or "anarchistic" could be banned from the public mails. While the original espionage provisions stirred few misgivings with congressmen, the newspaper and mail sections sparked lively apprehensions for the safety of American rights.

Before the bill reached the House floor, the Justice Committee held a short public hearing on it. A number of witnesses voiced alarm over the censorship provisions. Jane Addams, the famous social worker, wondered if this bill would restrict advocacy of a postwar, international body for peace. In this case, the chairman of the Committee, Edwin Y. Webb (D-N.C.), reassured Miss Addams that the bill did not restrict support for that cause. Since other aspects the bill's application was less clear, many witnesses, along with newspapers of the country, demanded changes in the bill's wording. The Committee made a slight concession to the opponents when it added a

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provision that required the President to issue a proclamation which would list prohibited subjects. 43

House debates on the revised bill revealed a variation in the ideas and motives of the censorship supporters. On one hand, they mistrusted the self-restraint of the press in the publication of information. In essence, the argument maintained that the press would publish any information that it could so long as it sold newspapers. As evidence, Thaddeus Caraway (D-Ark.) cited newspaper stories during the Civil War that had irresponsibly revealed military secrets. 44 On the other hand, they expressed a profound respect for the President. Chairman Webb, who argued that since wartime created special restraints on liberty, somebody simply had to be trusted to do the right thing. He added that he placed his faith in the President rather than the press. 45

All supporters of censorship necessarily argued that the rights of the press were not unlimited. In the case of some, their emphasis centered on the limitations of free speech and press. As a premise, they reasoned that the press did not stand above the law or have special rights above the people. Given this, they contended that since citizens could not harm the nation, neither could the press. In wartime the danger to the nation was particularly acute, thereby necessitating


44 Ibid., 1770, 1754, 1605, 1601, 1695.

the imposition of strong restraints. Though never directly stated, proponents of this restrictive thesis of press rights implied that more than spies and indiscreet editors should be arrested. With censorship broadly defined, radicals and pacifists might well also find themselves entangled in the bill's restrictions.46

The House conducted the Espionage debates in a charged atmosphere, which surged with partisan infighting. To the Democrats the press was a Republican bastion which sought every opportunity to embarrass the Administration. If Congress could enact press controls, a major source of divisive criticism could be silenced. For the Republicans, the situation was reversed because they believed that an unfettered press could more easily attack the Democrat's management of the war. Consequently, Republican opponents of censorship insisted that criticism prevented corruption, exposed incompetency, and stopped abuses of power. However, not all objection to the censorship provisions as a restriction on the revelation of corruption came from partisan motives. Fiorello LaGuardia objected strenuously because he wanted to prevent corruption of the type which allowed contractors during the Spanish-American War to sell the army the contaminated meat that killed his father.47

46Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1710, 1809. Debates left unclear congressional intentions, but the following sources offer some inclination of attitudes: Stephens to Otto Ulrich, August 22, 1917, Box 29, Folder 231, Stephens Papers; and U. S. Congress, House, Espionage and Interference With Neutrality, Hearings, 19-20, 26, 8. The debates and hearings, however, do indicate a good deal of confusion in the minds of supporters of censorship as to what the bill would include. For a general discussion on civil liberties and congressional attitudes in war-time, see Peterson and Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918, particularly pages 4-7, 12-13, 51, 61.

47Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1719, 1601,
A more general argument rested on a constitutional foundation. Harold Knuston (R-Miss.) argued that the censorship section violated constitutional guarantees and meant nothing less than the stifling of American liberty. In a more moderate form, this argument said that the Constitution, though permitting wartime restrictions, required that restrictions be carefully and fully defined. In either case, the argument found its substance in a fear of unlimited power. Minority Leader Mann, in commenting on the postal provisions, thought that they conferred autocratic powers on the Postmaster General. LaGuardia, who had a vivid appreciation of the abuse of power, suspected that even Wilson who would not resist becoming a despot if given the opportunity.48

After four days of debate and amendment, the House started the final votes on the bill. Efforts to amend the mail provisions failed in committee, and no member attempted to overturn the decision by a formal roll call. Free access to the mails rallied only a few congressmen, mainly because no major interest group felt its privileges at stake, while opposition to the censorship provisions came from the nation's press outside of Congress and the Republican party within. The Republicans demanded a roll call, on which a few Democrats, moved by constitutional scruples, voted with the Republicans. The combination proved adequate to defeat the provision, 221 to 167 (Table 3-3:A). Democratic floor leaders reacted quickly by offering the Gard

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1699, 1700. At least one Democrat did agree with the Republicans on this point. See ibid., 1764. Mann, LaGuardia, The Fighter, 80.

TABLE 3-3: A, B, C, AND D

VOTE BY PARTY ON H. R. 291: ESPIONAGE ACT

A. Remove Censorship Provision

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<th>Vote</th>
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B. Agree to Gard Amendment

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C. Pass Espionage Bill

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<td>47 (86)</td>
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D. Remove Censorship Provision

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<td>22 (39)</td>
<td>94 (155)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>78 (147)</td>
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*The numbers in the tables will not exactly match the statistics given in the body. This is the result of two factors: first, the table statistics include only Republican and Democrats while the ones in the body include minor party members; and second, the tables include party members who did not vote but who indicated they would have voted either yea or nay if present.

a Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 1816, 1819, 1841; and Pt. 3, 3144.
Amendment as a compromise. Since the amendment specifically stated that censored information must relate to national security, it mollified several Democratic opponents. With their support, the compromise won a narrow victory, 191 to 185 (Table 3-3:B). A few Republicans joined the Democrats, but most Republicans (eighty-seven percent) could not distinguish a difference between the Gard amendment and the original provision. A final roll call adopted the bill 260 to 107 (Table 3-3:C). The greatly reduced opposition came almost exclusively from the Republicans.49

The bill sped on to the Senate where the original censorship provision was reattached. In the conference committee, the House and Senate conferees agreed to a compromise. When the bill returned to the House, Webb claimed that the conference's provision better protected freedom of the press than the Gard Amendment. The Republicans rejected his contention as spurious, held a caucus, and reached a non-binding decision to oppose censorship. In what was shaping up as the first major partisan contest of the legislative session, President Wilson conferred with Democratic leaders, refused compromise amendments, and insisted that Democrats vote for the conferees' amendment. A party caucus followed, which concluded a non-binding

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49On the original censorship provision, fifty-three Democrats voted with the Republicans, which represented twenty-seven percent of all Democrats voting. Twenty-eight Republicans voted with the Democrats. See ibid., 1816. Voting on the Gard Amendment saw only twenty Democrats voting with the Republicans, while twenty-four Republicans voted with the Democrats. See, ibid., 1819. On the final vote only nine Democrats voted with the Republicans, while eighty-six, or forty-seven percent, of the Republicans voted with the Democrats. See ibid., 1841; and New York Times, May 5, 1917, 1.
decision to support the President. Nonetheless, thirty-six Demo-
crats, including the author of the Gard Amendment, doubted the wisdom
of the provision. The combination of dissentient Democrats and Re-
publicans defeated the amendment, 144 to 184 (Table 3-3:D). Ten
Republicans, who stated that they distrusted the press' ability to
practice self-restraint, voted with the main body of Democrats. The
newspaper censorship provision suffered a well-publicized defeat, but
the restrictive mail provisions quietly entered the law books.

Conscription and Volunteerism Again

Shortly after the passage of the original Espionage Bill, a
conference report on the conscription law created more partisan con-

clict. After the draft law left the House in April, the Senate added
provisions for raising the Roosevelt division that friends of the old
Rough Rider had envisioned. Going next to the conference, the bill
provoked a protracted wrangle as the House conferees opposed the Senate
on the volunteer division. In May, one of the Senate conferees
eventually retreated, allowing the bill to return to the House with
the Roosevelt provision deleted. During the original House debate,
the Roosevelt division had lost easily on a non-roll call vote, with

50 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3131, 3140,
3144; New York Times, May 23, 1917, 1; May 26, 1917, 1; May 31,
1917, 5; Washington Post, May 23, 1917, 6; May 23, 1917, 2; May 26,
1917, 2; and May 28, 1917, 2. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the
War Congress, 34, states that the Republicans reached a binding
caucus decision. He quotes the New York Times, but the Times for
May 31, page 1, states they reached a non-binding decision.

51 New York Times, June 1, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3133, 3144, 3136-38. Some congressmen continued
to express concern about the mail provisions, but not enough to force
a roll call. See ibid., 3132.
such important Republican leaders as Mann opposed. Since then the Republicans had united, while significant numbers of Democrats, who had voted for the voluntary system but not the Roosevelt division, saw the colonel's army as the last hope for volunteerism. Also promoting some changes from the first vote was the knowledge that the British and French looked with favor on the Roosevelt plan. So when the House voted to approve the conference report, the Roosevelt supporters formed a partisan and ideological coalition large enough to carry the division against administration opposition, 215 to 178. The vote proved, however, of no avail, as the second conference committee, under the strong pressure of the White House, made the voluntary division a matter of discretion with the President. Since Wilson had no intention of placing a political rival over a special outfit of troops, he frustrated Colonel Roosevelt's and the House's desires by never establishing the division. The whole affair ended with Roosevelt admirers charging Wilson with pettiness and Wilsonians accusing Republicans of partisan spite.\footnote{Washington Post, April 18, 1917, 1; May 8, 1917, 2; May 12, 1917, 2; New York Times, April 28, 1917, 1; May 10, 1917, 1; May 11, 1917, 1; May 13, 1917, 1; May 15, 1917, 8; May 16, 1917, 1; May 19, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1380; Pt. 3, 2200-05, 2215; Ramseyer to Personal (no name), April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; to Don McGriffin, May 31, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 20-21, 26-30.} The roll calls on the draft mirrored the shifting currents between the debates in April and the conference report in May. On the first vote, which rejected the volunteer principle, non-partisan factors determined the breakdown of the ballot. Both parties with near equality supported and opposed the bill, though slightly more...
Democrats as compared to Republicans voted against the draft (Table 3-4). One of the non-partisan influences came from sectional divisions. In the Northeast (the NE and MA regions), the parties solidly favored the draft. A fourth to a third in the Midwest (MEC and NWC regions) and in the Southern and Border states voted against conscription. The greatest opposition to selective service surfaced in the Mountain and Pacific states. Another non-partisan force shaping the ballot was a congressman's attitude toward the war. The draft roll call was correlated to a number of war measures, in particular to other draft votes. No important correlation was discovered, even with the Roosevelt division roll call, except with the roll call on the war resolution. Abhorrence of sending American boys to war resulted in opposition to drafting them to fight the war. It is tempting to speculate that an anti-war coalition, though a minority and unable to prevent passage of war measures, was forming. Such is not the case, however, since the same configuration never joined again in opposition to war measures. Opposition to the war and the draft engendered similarly compelling obligations for displays of conviction. In the months to follow, the onward thrust of the war program neither created nor permitted similar demonstrations again.

Far different from the draft vote, the vote on the Roosevelt division largely followed partisan rather than geographical lines (Table 3-5). Eighty-five percent of the Republicans supported their former standard bearer while seventy-seven percent of the Democrats opposed him. Regionally, Republicans and Democrats who voted contrary to the party opposition fell into no overall significant pattern. A variation from the party norms for the Democrats is found in the
TABLE 3-4

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3545: AN ACT TO INCREASE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT*

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<tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>8</td>
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Region and Party (Percent)

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<td>D</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
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### TABLE 3-5

**VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3646:**

**ROOSEVELT VOLUNTEER DIVISION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE</th>
<th>Region and Party (Numbers)</th>
<th>Region and Party (Percent)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2215.*
East North Central states and the Pacific States. Similarly, the
Mountain, Border, Southern, and West North Central regions provide
more wholehearted support for the Republican position. No conclusion
is possible except that the Far West, an old Roosevelt stronghold,
accorded him more support than other areas. Correlation with other
similar roll calls revealed no important connections. The Roosevelt
vote united a temporary coalition of the dissatisfied: Democrats
determined to support the volunteer principle, Republicans resolved
to satisfy the ambitions of their most popular national leader, and
Westerners remembering the Spanish-American War. 53

Financing the War

Interspersed with the controversial measures were the more
conventional military appropriation bills. Though involving vast
expenditures of money and effecting tremendous reorganization of in­
dustry, they provoked less divisiveness in House business. Such
measures as the appropriation bills for 1918 and the new military and
naval supply bills received unanimous support in record-breaking
time. 54 The measures did, however, force changes in House practices
and foment controversy at times. For example, the unprecedented
demand for fast action resulted in the consolidation of the appropria­
tion procedures of the House. No longer did several committees, par­
particularly the military and naval committees, consider appropriation

53 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3031-20; Wash­
ington Post, February 16, 1917, 4; May 1, 1917, 2; New York Times,
April 16, 1917, 1; May 1, 1917, 3; and Link, Woodrow Wilson and the
Progressive Movement, 273.

54 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 120-21, 165,
285, 299.
bills. Instead, the Appropriations Committee took over their functions. Both parties agreed to the step, but some discontent on the by-passed committees accrued. The Administration's desire to lump-sum appropriations also created a hostile reaction in the House. Since representatives considered the Congress as the constitutional body for appropriating funds, they felt that such a method would threaten their integrity as an institution. In particular, Minority Leader Mann protested Wilson's request for $100 million secret fund. Mann thought that it ignored the powers of Congress; but Congressional leaders, including most Republicans, agreed with John Fitzgerald (D-N.Y.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who argued that secret service operations required it.

At times the military appropriation process also sparked divisive voting on roll calls. In one incident, critics demanded that the government hire the new employees provided for by the appropriation through the civil service. This quickly became a partisan matter, as ninety-one percent of the Democrats opposed eighty-nine percent of


56 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 5105-06; 5130, 3189, 1693, 3279, 496-99. In committee hearings, members displayed a concern for exactly what was being funded and how it was to be spent. See U. S. Congress, House, Urgent Deficiency Appropriation on Account of War Expenses, Hearings, on HR 3971, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 224-26, 182, 327, 722-23, 353. Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, X (April 21, 1917), 352-53, maintains that the criticism of lump-sum appropriations came from the congressmen's desires to force the military to spend some of the money in their own local districts. Some members did introduce bills requiring expenditures in their areas, but probably few really thought in such narrow terms.

57 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 496, 730; and Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7905.
the Republicans—the most partisan vote of the first session (Table 3-6). More than mere partisanship had a role, however, as civil service reformers such as LaGuardia dreaded the war's impact on administrative practices. In a second incident, opposition developed to the Navy's purchase of land along the James River in Virginia. Republican critics of the proposal charged that only landowners and not the Navy would benefit. The majority agreed with the critics, and though the voting divided on partisan lines, thirty-eight percent of the Democrats sided with the Republican position (Table 3-7).

Wartime appropriations generated institutional and partisan tensions, while the actual financing of the appropriations fomented questions of good public policy and social justice. The House divided on both questions, the first of which involved the proper ratio between the money to be raised by taxes and the sum to be borrowed by bonds. In normal times, both parties stood squarely for the balanced budget. In wartime, however, they realized that a balanced budget represented an impossible goal. To what degree the balanced budget should be abandoned became the question. Linked closely with the first question, the issue of social justice involved the problem of who should pay the taxes. In 1913 progressive groups triumphed over reactionary elements with the adoption of the income tax.

58 Ibid., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3063, 3087-88, 3123.

59 Ibid., 3284, 3287, 3293, 3296, 3539. The Navy Department had first asked for the appropriation for the land; later Wilson wrote Chairman Padgett of the Naval Committee that he supported the purchase. That many Democrats still sided with the Republicans showed the apprehension as to the soundness of the appropriation.
TABLE 3-6

VOTE BY PARTY ON H. R. 3932:
CIVIL SERVICE*

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<td>11 (16)</td>
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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3123.
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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3296.*
tax amendment to the Constitution. To progressives, the income
tax represented a social equalizing tool which placed the tax burden
on those capable of bearing it. Increasingly the revenue bills
after 1913 reflected this philosophy. Thus, the February 1917 Revenue
Act placed stiff levies on wealthy individuals. A new feature in
the 1917 law was an excess profits tax on ballooning corporation in-
come. Advocates of graduated taxes controlled past policy and the
momentum of war demands favored their continued domination.

In the Ways and Means Committee, which received guidelines from
the Administration and wrote the specifics of the bill, several mem-
ers, led by Republican ranking member Joseph W. Fordney (Mich.),
were less than pleased by past policy. Their distress was increased
when Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo announced the Adminis-
tration's plan for raising $1.8 billion more by new corporation and
income taxes. In place of this proposal they advocated a scheme which
would raise more by bonds. Their argument, which conservatives
repeated frequently during the debates, stressed the baneful inhibition
that high taxes would produce on business initiative. Since they
dominated the subcommittee that drafted the original bill, they pro-
vided only $1 billion more in taxes. This figure would require that
at least three-fourths of the war cost be financed by bonds. In the
Committee as a whole the thinking contrasted sharply with that of the
subcommittee. Chairman Kitchin and leading Democratic members such

60 New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; and Link, Woodrow Wilson:

61 New York Times, January 17, 1917, 8; March 2, 1917, 7;
Washington Post, January 20, 1917, 1; March 2, 1917, 4; and Link,
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 194-95.
as Cordell Hull (Tenn.) pressed for a plan in which the government financed at least fifty percent of the war by taxes. The other Democratic and Republican members, though less sure of the exact percentage, nonetheless, desired to raise the full $1.8 billion as recommended by McAdoo. The committee threw away the subcommittee's draft, rewrote the bill, and increased excess profit, inheritance, and income taxes so as to provide the required funds. At the same time, the Committee agreed to an across the board ten percent hike in the tariff, a move which mollified the extreme protectionist sentiments of Fordney. Other proposals such as a tax on cotton sparked acrimonious discussion, but the committee eventually resolved all differences. For the first time in fifty years, the revenue bill emerged with the unanimous approval of the committee.

Debates on the House floor revealed a determined advocacy for the bill along with a resentment that the taxes were needed in the first place. The consensus was that never in peacetime would supporters vote for taxes such as those contained in the bill. Nonetheless, the proponents of the bill maintained that, as demanded by justice, the war had to be financed by progressive taxes and by the present generation to do otherwise; argued two Iowa Republicans, William Green and William Ramseyer, would condemn the Congress in the eyes of future generations. It would also place the burden on the members of the


63 *New York Times*, May 2, 1917, 6; May 2, 1917, 1; May 6, 1917, 13; May 8, 1917, 2; May 9, 1917, 1; and *Washington Post*, May 16, 1917, 2.

64 *New York Times*, May 12, 1917, 1; Ramseyer to D. W. Matheny,
community least able to pay taxes. In the meantime, the war manufacturers and speculators would reap huge profits from the blood of American boys. Arguments for justice became spiced with anger directed toward those profiteers thought to have caused the war. Claude Kitchin, who voted against the war resolution, was the chief proponent of this contention for high taxes. He and other former anti-war opponents made it abundantly clear that munitions manufacturers should pay for the war. But even strong supporters of war could agree with Kitchin since ostensibly America waged the war for democracy and not selfish profit. Opponents were unable to mount an effective counter argument, although they insisted that taxes ought to be added on cotton, trade, and poorer income groups.65

After the general debate on the bill, the House started the complicated process of amendment. Insurgents contested the income provisions because they failed to tax the income of the rich sufficiently. Edward Keating (D-Col.), demanding that wealth ought to be conscripted as well as men, offered an amendment to impose a 100% duty on all income over $150,000. Though it attracted a few adherents, few congressmen could agree with its radicalism.66 More realistic and also more successful was the amendment offered by Irvine Lenroot to increase income rates twenty-five percent on incomes over $40,000. At first

May 2, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2225-26, 2124, 2806.


Kitchin, who acted as floor manager of the bill, opposed all income boosts as an underhanded trick to later remove taxes on special interest. During the debate on the amendment, Kitchin received a call from Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo. Informed by McAdoo that the Revenue Bill needed to raise more than $1.8 billion, Kitchin dropped his opposition to the increase, though not his dislike of it. In the roll call that followed, the hike in taxes on large incomes passed easily, 345 to sixty.67

Both parties supported the income provision, but fifty of the sixty opponents came from Republican ranks who voted against their fellow party member's amendment (Table 3-8). Besides this partisan variation, geographical differences are noticeable as all but seven of the fifty Republicans represented the northeastern regions (NE, MA, and ENC). That Democrats of the same regions did not join the Republicans probably indicates that partisan influences held them in line. It may also relate to different types of local constituencies. Less explicable is the fact that eight of the ten Democrats in opposition came from the South. A possible reason is that Kitchin, who did not want a trade-off between higher income tax supporters and lower postal rate advocates, voted against the amendment. His action likely influenced several fellow southerners to side with him. In general, the voting pattern marshaled northeastern Republicans, who thought the other regions were stealing their wealth, against the tax. On the other hand, both parties in the rest of the country favored a more graduated income tax.

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2815.*
The amendment process next took up the tax schedules on corporations. Martin Madden opposed the whole section, arguing that its basic source of revenue, the excess profits tax, imposed unjust rates. Most other opponents of the section thought that adjustments, such as choosing a different base year on which to rest capital investment, would erase the defects. A majority of the House did not agree with Madden or even with the more moderate critics. They easily defeated all amendments in the Committee of the Whole House. When the Committee resolved back into the House, opponents made a final effort to change the corporation section. They forced a roll call on an amendment that delayed collection of the basic five percent corporation tax until a corporation earned an eight-percent profit. It lost on the relatively close vote of 173 to 235. Seventy-one percent of the Republicans supported the amendment. At the same time, eighty-six percent of the Democrats opposed it (Table 3-9). From a geographical perspective, the roll call demonstrated that Democrats of the Northeastern regions (NE, MA, and ENC) tended toward supporting the Republican position. In the rest of the regions except the Pacific states the Democrats aligned close to the party average. Republicans who broke party ranks came more from the New England States and the West North Central region. Generally, the Northeast areas and the Pacific states desired lower taxes, while the West North Central, South, and Border states fought to retain stringent taxes on business profits.

The final amendment vote came over a hotly contested provision on postal rates. The provision affected the newspaper, magazine,

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88 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2278, 2130, 2545-51, 2816.
TABLE 3-9

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280:
MANUFACTURERS TAX*

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and mail order industries by both establishing zone rates and by increasing overall rates. Support for it manifested itself among two types of members. The economy-minded favored the amendment, because higher rates would decrease the postal service's ninety million dollars a year loss on publications. Support also drew substance from members, mostly Democrats, who disliked the great publishing houses of the East for their unfair criticism of the Administration. The opponents of the zone system adopted as their main counter thrust a nationalist argument: a free, vigorous national press would foster a non-regional market place for the exchange of ideas. The division over the amendment split the House closely, with the result that in the Committee of the Whole House opponents eliminated the objectional provision. However, on final passage, Kitchin forced a roll call where the zone system now won, 256 to 150.

As in the case of the corporation tax roll call, the postal vote followed partisan lines (Table 3-10). The Democratic position triumphed because of greater unity in their ranks, for ninety percent, as compared to sixty-five percent of the Republicans, voted with the party majority. Democrats also succeeded because a larger percentage of their members voted in comparison to the Republicans. Geographically, the postal zone system carried because most regions opposed the domination of the Eastern (NE and MA) publishing houses. Republicans who


71 Ibid., 2817.
### TABLE 3-10

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280: RATES AND ZONE SYSTEM FOR SECOND CLASS MAIL*

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2817A.
broke with the party tended to come from the Midwest (ENC and WNC). Democrats who parted from their party's majority represented New England and Middle Atlantic states. In sum, the voting pattern divided along party lines, with variations from partisanship coming from the high support given the publishing interests by members of both parties of the Northeast.

The final two roll calls on the Revenue Bill consisted of efforts either to recommit the bill or to defeat it. The first roll call combined nearly all elements which desired revisions in the law. If the bill had been returned to the Ways and Means Committee, undoubtedly income, corporation, and postal revisions would have resulted, thereby gratifying desires for changes in the bill. From another viewpoint, the roll call can be seen as a Republican effort to change the bill, since almost all House members voting for the motion were Republicans. The breakdown on this roll call, where seventy-seven percent of the Republicans voted for the motion and ninety-eight percent of the Democrats opposed it, indicated the high partisanship (Table 3-11). The twenty-two percent of the Republicans siding with the Democrats followed no clear-cut regional pattern. There was a tendency among the East and West North Central Republicans to oppose the motion, but the variation was not significant. Specifically, twelve of the dissident Republicans were members of the Ways and Means Committee which wrote the bill. Documentary sources provide no clear evidence for their dissent from the party majority, which also appeared on the other roll calls. However, an explanation perhaps can be found in the compromises reached in Committee. There trading occurred, especially over the tariff, tobacco, and sugar provisions, which
TABLE 3-11

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280:
MOTION TO RECOMMEND*

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2817B.
perhaps mollified Republicans.\textsuperscript{72} At least several Republican opponents of the bill charged that the secret sessions held by the Committee had allowed them to conclude several underhanded trade-offs. Another possibility is that Fordney, who always said that he disliked the bill, yet supported it, wanted the Republicans to gain some credit if the measure proved popular. In the case it did not, Minority Leader Mann, who directed Republican opposition, could then claim honor for his party.\textsuperscript{73} In any event, the alignment on the recommitment motion indicates abnormal voting by the Republican Ways and Means members.

The last roll call on the Revenue Act was largely a formality, demanded by Mann. The bill passed the House by a wide margin of 329 to 76, as all opposition came from the Republicans. Of five roll calls on the Revenue bill, the last four form a scalogram (Table 3-12 and note on page 153). Measured by the scale is the readiness of representatives to accept higher taxes and to accept the Revenue bill. Sixteen percent (sixty-four members) opposed all tax provisions, twenty-four percent (ninety-five members) accepted one or two, and sixty percent supported three or four of the tax votes. Of the sixty-four congressmen unable to agree on acceptance of higher taxes, all were Republicans. The greatest number of these Republicans represented the Northeastern regions outside of New England (MA and ENC), though the highest percentage of opponents came from the Border states. At the medium rank of support, eighty-six came from the Republican party,

\textsuperscript{72}New York Times. May 12, 1917, 1; May 20, 1917, 1; May 21, 1917, 1; Washington Post, May 11, 1917, 1; May 7, 1917, 6; May 8, 1917, 2; and May 9, 1917, 1.

\textsuperscript{73}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2124; and Pt. 3, 2806.
TABLE 3-12:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE
REVENUE BILL: H. R. 4280

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Party (Numbers)</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCALE POSITION</strong></td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9  86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>195 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5  10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCALE POSITION</strong></td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td>D R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The order of the roll calls is 37, 35, 36, 34
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 16, 8, 12, 48
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .952
TABLE 3-12:B
SCALEOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Position</th>
<th>Motion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAR 35</td>
<td>To amend in the nature of a substitute for section 1201, H. R. 4280, by reducing the rates for second class mail and applying to that class the zone system now in use for parcel post. 256-150; + = yea. Ibid., 2817A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR 36</td>
<td>To recommit H. R. 4280 to the committee on Ways and Means. 161-247; + = nay. Ibid., 2817B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR 34</td>
<td>To amend H. R. 4280, by prohibiting the collection of five percent tax until the manufacturers enumerated shall have earned a profit of eight percent upon the actual capital invested. 173-235; + = nay. Ibid., 2816.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A NOTE ON SCALE CONSTRUCTION

The roll-call votes used for scale construction in this study were taken from the roll-call data sets for each House compiled by the ICPR. The computer programs used for scale construction were those in the ICPR's Osiris II package. By examining the content description of each roll call in the ICPR data set and the Congressional Record, all roll calls relating to similar issues in each House were listed to form a "preliminary universe of content." From this universe, a series of subsets relating to specific issues (e.g., the war, civil liberties, taxation) were selected. The universe was then recorded by subset and the roll-calls were recoded and subjected to a program to compute Yule's Q correlation coefficient for each pair of roll-calls in the universe. Yule's Q (which ranges from -1 to +1) is the generally accepted measure of the scalability of a pair of roll calls. A high value of Q between a pair of roll calls indicates that they scale—that is, few (if any) members will be found who reject an easier-to-support item and then accept a harder-to-support item. Every roll-call in a given subset was required to have a Q value of above +.7 with every other measure in that subset to be considered scalable. The Q limit was lowered to ± .6 on several occasions in order to include certain desired items within a scalable subset, but in all cases the mean Q for each subset exceeded .7 and in most cases it exceeded .85. The computer-generated matrix of Q coefficients for the universe was then examined to determine which measures scaled within each subset and
within the whole universe. To double-check the manual "clustering" of scalable roll-calls the matrix was subjected to a computer program to produce clusters of scalable votes on a particular issue. Those roll-calls in each cluster with negative $Q$ values were "reflected"—the yeas and nays reversed to produce the correct response category indicating the positive position.

Each cluster of roll-call votes was then subjected to a scaling program which ordered the items in the cluster in a rank from largest passing set to smallest passing set and assigned a scale position to each member. In most cases, members who were absent for more than thirty percent of the votes in a scale were excluded from that scale. Similarly, those with more than one inconsistent vote (e.g., voting for a harder-to-accept proposition after rejecting an easier-to-accept proposition) were usually excluded from the scale except when the scale size could legitimately accommodate more than one inconsistent vote (referred to as an "error"). Careful use of the $Q$ Coefficient and proper controls on errors and absences consistently yield valid scales. A further customary check on the adequacy of each scale is its coefficient of reproducibility which measures the percentage of responses on scale items that could be correctly predicted from a member's position on the scale. Scales with a coefficient of reproducibility above .9 are generally considered to be satisfactory.


The explanation on scale construction has been adapted from Terry Seip, "An Economic Analysis of Southern Representatives During Reconstruction," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1974), 143-44. The format used to present the scale results has been adapted from Seip, "An Economic Analysis." The initial table (A) in each act gives the distribution of scale scores by region and party the coefficient of reproducibility, the order of roll calls, and the percentage of each point on the scale. The second table (B) in each set identifies the items in each scale position, the vote, the positive position, and the citation to the Congressional Record.
while only nine wore the Democratic label. Regionally, these Republicans fell into a noticeable pattern, since they come from New England, East North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States. At the final rank of support, forty-four Republicans voted in favor of higher taxes. The West North Central (forty-two percent) followed by the East North Central (twenty-five percent) voted in this category. The contrast between Republicans and Democrats on the bill reveals itself best at this level, as all but nine of the Democrats supported the graduation taxation. In summary, advocacy of the Revenue Bill created no tension for almost all Democrats as they overwhelmingly backed a progressive tax policy. Though the majority of Republicans only moderately supported the bill, a number did break ranks, particularly from the Midwest (ENC and WNC regions). By so breaking ranks, these Midwesterners indicated an ideological position in favor of a high tax to bond ratio and in support of stiff taxes on corporations and individuals. On the other hand, a number of Republicans, mostly from the Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and Border regions, showed decided conservative tendencies.

A singular combination of motives and ideas operated in the writing and passage of the Revenue Act. Narrow and often petty sectional, partisan, and special interest considerations swayed the debates and amendment process. However, the popular portrayal of the bill as one written by the agrarian South so as to place taxes on the industrial wealth of the Northeast is only in a limited sense true. No doubt the South favored the bill, but other regions advocated it also,  

74 Ibid., 2298-98, 2661, 2467, 2609, 2611; and Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 261.
most notably the Midwest. Moreover, such a criticism of the bill ignored the motivations of many of its proponents. For one thing, considerations of justice and public policy underlined the debates and in fact governed the outcome. Otherwise, a coalition of Democrats and insurgent Republicans could never have formed. These elements, though not wholly satisfied, believed that much had been accomplished in creating a judicious system. As one Congressman wrote, the war had acted as an instrument which prodded members toward progressive, even socialistic, positions.75 For a second reason, the bill fulfilled the requirements for proper war financing as established by the Treasury Department. Many observers did not agree that it served good public policy, claiming that it would stir up immense amounts of class and sectional animosity. Workers and farmers were unconvinced that wealth was taxed enough, and business resented being made to carry much of the burden. In the House, several members believed the measure crude and even "monstrous," and hoped that the Senate would rewrite the bill. Still, no congressmen advanced better proposals, and the revenue bill eventually played an important part in the securement of a firm financial structure for war.76

Besides raising taxes, the House sought to mobilize the financial resources of the Federal Reserve System. Carter Glass (D-Va.), chairman of the Banking Committee, with the cooperation of the Treasury

75 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2272-74, 2294; and Stephens to Frank Dolegal, May 15, 1917, Box 24, Folder 189, Stephens Papers.

Department, wrote a bill. Originally Glass introduced it in the 64th House, but it failed to pass. The Treasury Department during the 65th House demanded action on it as necessary war emergency legislation. Its provisions contained features to expand the financial capabilities of the Federal Reserve System and the nation's banks. First, it changed the required reserve of country banks (i.e., banks not in the major banking cities) from twelve percent to seven percent, all of which now had to be carried in Federal Reserve banks. Further, the first provision also reduced the required reserves of banks in central reserve cities from eighteen percent to fifteen percent. The law's purpose on this provision was to increase funds for lending. The second main section provided for the liberalization of entry rules into the Federal Reserve System. These two features made up the bill as written by Glass, but a third provision not authored by Glass became the center of controversy during House debates.

Criticism of the bill came from advocates of the country banks. Ebenezer Hill (R-Conn.), member of the Banking Committee, argued that Glass designed the liberalization rules so as to drive state banks into the Federal Reserve System. He also saw a danger to country banks due to the removal of the reserve requirements. Few representatives agreed with Hill, but many other country bank supporters criticized the bill because Glass failed to include a check exchange provision. Sponsored by Kitchin, this amendment allowed country banks


78 Ibid., 1874.
to charge an exchange fee on checks not to exceed ten cents per hundred dollars. The virtues of the amendment, according to a bipartisan coalition, sprang from its aid to country banks. Joseph Cannon and Louis McFadden (R-Pa.), both with personal financial interests in country banks, argued that without the check charge the banks would be forced into bankruptcy. 79 Glass bitterly opposed the intrusion of this provision into his bill. Proponents of the Kitchin amendment, nonetheless, persisted in advocating it and thereby transformed a war measure into a battle between special interest groups.

Glass, with the aid of such Republicans as Nicholas Longworth (R-Ohio), maintained that an exchange fee lodged an excessive and unjust charge on industry. William Howard (D-Ga.) voiced similar conclusions from a farm-oriented perspective when he remarked that country banks made enough profit—out of farmers—already. At the first stage of the legislative process, Glass succeeded in having the Kitchin Amendment thrown out on a point of order. The bill then passed without a roll call. 80

In the Senate, Senator Hardwick secured the adoption of his check exchange amendment. In this form, the Senate passed the revised Glass bill and sent it to the conference committee. Before the House appointed its conferees, supporters of the Hardwick amendment demanded that the House instruct the conferees on the amendment. They forced a roll call and won an easy victory over Glass and his adherents, 240 to 117. Glass, who remained unalterably opposed to the amendment,

79Ibid., Pt. 4, 3522, 3526, 3604.

80Ibid., 3526, 3533, 3543, 3614; and Pt. 2, 1584-85.
headed the House conferees. Not surprisingly, given Glass's hostility, the conference changed the Hardwick amendment substantially. In its new form, the amendment vested the Federal Reserve Board with the power of deciding if member banks could charge check exchange fees.

A new phase of the row erupted when the conference report returned. Frank Mondell (R-Wyo.) charged Glass with "flagrantly and contemptuously" disregarding the instructions of the House. Glass, who obviously played a subtle game throughout, denied the charges and told the House that he had only tried to perfect a crude amendment. New instructions to rewrite the conference report followed, but this time Glass defeated the country bank advocates, 170 to 159. One factor in the shift in voting may have come from the knowledge that Glass favored the President's vetoing the bill if the Hardwick amendment was made mandatory. Fear that Glass's influence would prompt Wilson in fact to veto the bill caused some representatives, who reasoned that "half a loaf" was better than nothing at all, to accept the revised Hardwick amendment. Another pressure came from a Glass-inspired lobbying campaign by commercial and industrial elements.

81 Ibid., Pt. 2, 2078; Glass to William McAdoo, no date but probably late May, 1917; Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment, Glass Papers and to W. P. G. Harding, February 1, 1917, Box 99, Folder 1, Glass Papers.


84 Glass to William McAdoo, no date but late May 1917 likely date, Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment; to George McRay, May 8, 1917, Box 99, Folder Kitchin Amendment; to Thomas A. Fernley, April 20, 1917, Box 99, Folder 1; to George G. McRay, May 8, 1917, Box 99, Folder Kitchin Amendment; to Scott Ferris, May 19, 1919, Box 102, Folder Hardwick
Analysis of the three roll calls by a scalogram demonstrates that the House closely divided over the check exchange provision (Table 3-13). Thirty-one percent of the House found it impossible to support the Hardwick amendment in any fashion. These strong opponents came from both parties in about equal numbers, with fifty-eight Democrats following the leadership of Glass and forty-eight Republicans joining. A geographical breakdown indicates that the highest percentage of opponents were located in the Northeast area (NE, MA, and ENC). Twenty percent found it possible to vote once in favor of the Kitchin Amendment, but then turned against the Senate's Hardwick amendment on subsequent votes. As the crucial swing group, they voted to sustain Glass's action in the conference. They came equally from both parties, thirty-five apiece, which again indicates the bipartisan nature of the voting. The Hardwick amendment gathered its least enthusiastic support in the Middle Atlantic region. Here, most of the members completely opposed the amendment or veered into the opposition camp after an initial favorable vote. High percentages within the Border and Pacific states were also in this swing group. The final forty-nine percent, who represented both parties in nearly equal numbers, voted in support of the check exchange fee. Geographically, the Far West (Ms and PS), the South, and West North Central provided

Amendment; and E. S. Underhill, May 19, 1917, Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment, Glass Papers. The last three letters demonstrate Glass' hostility to the amendment, though he stated that he abided by the original House roll call in the conference. They actually reveal he intended to "work things out" in the conference. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3620.

85Ibid., 3621.
### TABLE 3-13:A

**SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON KITCHIN AND HARDWICK AMENDMENTS: H. R. 3673**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Position</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Scale Position</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>176</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
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The order of the roll calls is 30, 48, 49
Percent at each point on the scale 31, 20, 12, 37
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .985
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Position</th>
<th>Motion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> VAR 30</td>
<td>To instruct the managers of the conference committee on H. R. 3673, (40 STAT-232, June 21, 1917), amending an act approved December 23, 1913, known as the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, to have the House agree in conference to the Senate amendment, authorizing any Federal Reserve Bank to receive checks or drafts on Non-Member Banks or Trust Companies, providing these Non-Member Banks maintain sufficient balance with the Federal Reserve to offset the items in transit held for its account by Federal Reserve Bank. 240-117; + = Nay. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2078.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> VAR 48</td>
<td>To recommit H. R. 3673, (40 STAT-232, June 21, 1917), amending the Federal Reserve Act, to the committee on conference with instructions to report relative to Non-Member Banks and trust companies and their accounts with Federal Reserve Banks. 159-170; + = Nay. Ibid., Pt. 4, 3620.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> VAR 49</td>
<td>To agree to the conference report on a bill, H. R. 3673. 188-130; + = Yea. Ibid., 3621.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
average or above average support for the Hardwick amendment. Carter Glass, in a letter to a fellow representative, stated that "many banks in the South and West are insisting upon having" the "petty graft" which they would acquire by charging for exchange of checks.\textsuperscript{86} He correctly identified the South and West as basic building blocks of the Hardwick coalition, while overlooking the Republicans of the West North Central region who should also be named as strong advocates of the amendment.

\textbf{Food For War}

At the end of May, 1917, the House turned from financing the war to providing for the food supplies of both the United States and her allies. Originally the Administration introduced an omnibus food bill, but the House Agriculture Committee divided it into two bills. The first measure empowered the Agriculture Department to carry out a food survey and seed distribution program. The second and more important piece guaranteed the price of wheat and regulated food prices, liquor production, flour production, and food transportation. With food supplies running low, prices sky-rocketing, and with the allies suffering grave food shortages, many believed that the food situation confronted the nation with its most immediate crisis.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{86}Glass to Augustine Lonergan, May 19, 1917, Box 182, Folder 1917-Hardwick Amendment, Glass Papers.

\textsuperscript{87}U. S. Congress, House, \textit{Food Production, Conservation, and Distribution, Hearings on H. R. 4188, H. R. 4125, H. R. 4630}, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 1917, 1; \textit{Washington Post}, April 21, 1917, 1; April 22, 1917, 10; May 1, 1917, 1; May 2, 1917, 2; \textit{New York Times}, May 4, 1917, 8; and Ramseyer to R. R. Ramsell, April 14, 1917, Ramseyer Papers.
During the hearings on the food survey bill, Administration spokesmen and farm experts argued that the survey's necessity arose from war-induced conditions. On the other hand, critics of the bill denied its ability to improve conditions. The divergent viewpoints came from different assumptions. For those in favor, a survey would determine the quantity of American supplies and disclose the supplies of speculators. The seed distribution by farm agents would increase production by aiding needy farmers and by supplying production information. To the bill's critics, the requisite efficiency for the survey would never materialize, with the result that money would be lost. Gilbert Haugen (Iowa), ranking Republican member and chief critic of the bill, also showed a rural hostility toward the farm experts of the Agriculture Department. He pictured the Department as hiring "experts" who knew little of farming and who would go "joy riding" in cars at the taxpayers expense.\textsuperscript{88} In one sense, the survey bill divided Agriculture Department supporters and skeptics of the Department because of attitudes about the efficiency and the economy of the measure and the value of experts.

Floor debates and the roll call revealed other dimensions of the survey issues. Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) objected to the extensive entry and subpoena powers granted the Secretary of Agriculture. In this instance, Agriculture Committee Chairman Asbury F. Lever (D-S.C.), who acted as floor manager for the bill, agreed to an amendment restricting the Secretary of Agriculture's power. The criticisms from the hearings were heard again and opponents offered amendments

\textsuperscript{88}U. S. Congress, House, Food Production, Hearings, 41, 92, 95, 80-81, 55, 39, 116.
incorporating the objections. As true in the Committee, the opposition continued to have little success in changing the bill. When the motion to recommit was taken, the bill's supporters easily turned aside the opposition, 221 to eighty-one.\(^{89}\) Though majorities of both parties voted in favor of the bill, the opposition came almost exclusively from the Republicans (Table 3-15). Only fifteen Democrats agreed with sixty-six Republicans that the bill needed revision. Geographically, no discernible pattern of support for recommitment emerged, except that the Republicans of the West North Central region provided slightly higher advocacy than average for the motion. Haugen, the leader for revision, came from this region and Midwestern Republicans may have been supporting his leadership. More likely, as a farm region they may have agreed with his rural skepticism.\(^{90}\) In short, a number of Republicans rejected the measure as ineffective, an imposition on storage dealers, and a costly increase of the Agriculture Department's payrolls.

The food regulatory bill was presented by Secretary of Agriculture David Houston to the Agriculture Committee in April. Two main features of the bill granted the President power to control prices and to establish a food administration. James Young (D-Tex.) strongly opposed the price section, arguing that at just the moment farmers started to reap "magnificent" profits, the government proposed

\(^{89}\)Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2903, 2886-87, 2891, 3008, 3011, 3012; and Pt. 4, 4100.

\(^{90}\)The two roll calls with which the food survey bill correlates are on increased funding of agriculture research. These votes, along with the food survey, raise questions of economy as much as agriculture. See ibid., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1600-01.
TABLE 3-14
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4188:
FOOD SURVEY BILL

Region and Party (Numbers)

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<th>VOTE</th>
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<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nay</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Region and Party (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
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<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
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<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>83</td>
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</table>

to rob them of their gain. Other critics, notably Haugen, charged that Secretary Houston favored city interests over farm interests. If farmers must submit to this burden, he maintained that, city elements ought to agree to price controls on the products that they sold to farmers.\textsuperscript{91}

The bill's provision on the food administration drew a different volley of criticism. In the Committee, Young charged that the bill granted dangerous and arbitrary powers to the food administration. Others on the Committee disagreed, because they thought that the food administration required dictatorial powers in order to prevent hoarding and speculation. In fact, Chairman Lever and Sidney Anderson (Minn.), a leading Republican, favored granting virtual arbitrary powers to the food administration. As a consequence, Lever, the Agriculture Department, and the proposed Food Administrator, Hebert Hoover, found the original bill deficient and drafted a new and more centralized measure. Lever introduced it May 23, 1917.\textsuperscript{92}

Since the Agriculture Committee did not report the rewritten bill to the floor until June 18, President Wilson's wrath was aroused by the slow progress of the bill. The massive inflation of over ninety percent in less than a year, the crying needs of the Allies, and the general dislocation of the economy created a popular demand for action.


Employing this for purposes of speeding Congress, the President held conferences repeatedly with Lever and Haugen, seeking to overcome the bottlenecks in the legislative process.\textsuperscript{93} Meanwhile, in early April, 1917, Wilson appointed Hoover to head the food section of the National Council of Defense. Late in May, Wilson issued a plan on the use of food, vesting Hoover with control in this area. Wilson's action was indirect criticism of Congress. Shortly before the House took up the bill, Wilson, even without formal legislation, told Hoover to begin the food saving campaign and ordered an embargo on food to neutral countries. As a final gesture, he wrote Representative William Borland (D-Mo.) that congressional delay was aiding food speculators. Even though the Administration as well as Congress was responsible for the leisurely pace, Wilson used it to mobilize tremendous pressure for the bill.\textsuperscript{94}

The House disliked Wilson's tactics but Wilson had created too much momentum for the development of organized opposition. The Republicans called a party caucus, heard critics of the bill such as Haugen, but decided not to make the bill a partisan issue.\textsuperscript{95} Nonetheless, some individuals still attempted to modify the bill by amendment during House debates. Haugen continued to claim the real aim of the bill was to lower food prices, not to stimulate food

\textsuperscript{93}New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; June 7, 1917, 1; June 17, 1917, 1; and Washington Post, May 11, 1917, 2; and June 16, 1917, 2.

\textsuperscript{94}New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; May 20, 1917, 1; June 17, 1917, 1; June 19, 1917, 1; June 20, 1917, 1; Washington Post, June 16, 1917, 2; and June 17, 1917, 1.

\textsuperscript{95}Washington Post, June 18, 1917, 4; and June 22, 1917, 2.

production. Like-minded colleagues argued the virtues of a free market system and pointed to the evils of price controls. Other critics of the price-control provision voiced a city instead of rural viewpoint. J. Hampton Moore, a Philadelphia Republican, argued that laborers received no guaranteed wages such as those which the bill proposed to give farmers. Similarly, city spokesmen reminded rural supporters that prices were already too high. All efforts to change the price section, however, in favor of either rural or city elements failed. Supporters of the price section stifled dissent because they claimed that it would stimulate farm production and still protect the urbanite.96

As in the Committee, the provisions on the food administration drew fire. Irvine Lenroot attacked the section licensing food companies, claiming that it unconstitutionally delegated powers to the President.97 Supporters retorted that during wartime the Constitution allowed the granting of increased powers to the Chief Executive. To Speaker Clark, who maintained that the President could—and should—summarily arrest food speculators, the security of the nation came first.98 Lever rejected an amendment that Lenroot offered to limit the Executive's powers, but a similar provision offered by fellow Democrat Andrew Montague (Va.) won Lever's and Lenroot's approval. It provided that the section's powers were delegated, not granted, and that they would only operate during the war period. Since supporters

97 Ibid., 3802, 4075-79, 4091, 4096, 4147, 4152, 3896, 3937.
98 Ibid., 3821, 3901, 3832, 3848, 3816-17; and Pt. 3, 2842.
believed that the Food Administrator required dictatorial powers for his job, they refused to accept other amendments restricting this delegation of authority.\textsuperscript{99} Another provision, heretofore not discussed, raised the highly volatile subject of prohibition. Inevitably the bill, since it contained food conservation provisions, raised the liquor question. Opening their drive toward a national amendment,\textsuperscript{100} prohibitionists or "drys" claimed that prohibition would save the country one hundred million bushels of grain a year. The Agriculture Committee wrote into the food bill a restriction on future manufacture of liquor, but not all prohibitionists were pleased. William Howard (D-Ga.) wanted not only the manufacture but also the sale of liquor with over three percent alcoholic content banned. The chair ruled an amendment he offered to strengthen the prohibition section out of order.\textsuperscript{101} Not surprisingly, anti-prohibitionists or "wets" vigorously opposed the section.\textsuperscript{102} A heated debate flared-up between antagonists. In the frenzy, two members, Jacob Meeker (R-Mo.) and Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.), exchanged personal insults which had to be struck from the Record. A vote followed and an amendment to strike out the prohibition section

\textsuperscript{99}Ibid., Pt. 4, 4077-79.

\textsuperscript{100}A leading prohibitionist, Charles Randall (Prohibitionist-Cal.) had earlier attempted to add an amendment to the Espionage bill to prohibit the manufacture of liquor during the war. He went so far as to force a roll call, but only twenty members voted for it while 336 voted against it. Evidently, most prohibitionists did not see the Espionage Bill as the appropriate bill to attach a rider to. See, Pt. 2, 1840.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., Pt. 4, 4153, 4161.

\textsuperscript{102}One wet, Leonidas C. Dyer (R-Mo.), favored the section because it would lessen pressure for the national amendment. See ibid., 3880.
failed, 152 to 136. "Wets" did not force a formal roll call, probably fearing that a prohibition victory would accelerate the movement for a national constitutional amendment.\footnote{Ibid., 4164, 4182; and Washington Post, June 24, 1917, 1.}

Opponents never effectively mounted an attack on the bill, with the result that when it came to a roll call vote, it passed 365 to five. Few could afford to oppose this essential war measure, but the bill's success also extended to the defeat of most amendments.\footnote{Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 4190.} An explanation for this comes first from the weakness of the opposition and second from the vitality of the supporters. The basic means of opposing a bill, partisanship, failed to materialize as Republicans declined the role of opponents. Critics like Haugen were left without a starting base, and they were further weakened by internal divisions. For example, they had no common plan for perfecting the price control section, as some opposed the section altogether while others wanted to add manufactured products to the section. The bill's supporters, on the other hand, had a concrete proposal advocated by the President and by the chairman, who both adamantly pushed the measure.\footnote{Ibid., 3793.} The bill also drew strength from wartime conditions. Even if a congressman rejected the measure, he could not deny that conditions were abnormal. In particular, most congressmen were up-in-arms over the sinister dealings of food speculators and hoarders. Finally, though the bill was strictly a war measure, the hoarding and speculation provisions drew added support because a number of members saw them as establishing
a precedent for peacetime. Unknown at the time, however, the bill's price-control provisions spelled future danger for Wilson and his party.

**Transportation and Communication**

War mobilization also required the organization of the nation's internal and foreign transportation systems. The fast shipment of goods had become a problem even before the war started, and after April 6, all signs indicated that matters would grow worse. Eastern railways and ports, the designated points for the shipment of supplies and of troops to Europe, were threatened by labor strikes, which their jammed conditions could not tolerate. Moreover, the transportation problem included the simple proposition that without the construction of more ships neither supplies nor men would be able to reach the battlefield. In this context the House took up a series of measures for transportation regulation during the first session.

The first controls on shipping were included in the Espionage Bill. One section provided that the President could declare a national shipping emergency wherein he could formulate rules regulating the movement of all ships. Another provision granted to the President power over the movement of a neutral nation's ships if he thought that the ship might travel to a belligerent country. During the

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106 Ibid., 3794, 3816, 4035, 4055, 3808; and Zinn, LaGuardia in Congress, 23–25.


Espionage debates these sections received little attention as most interest focused on the censorship and mail provisions.  

Another bill, written by the Justice Department, covered trade with the enemy and indirect shipments to Germany, plus other subjects relating to Germany such as German patent rights, alien enemy-owned property, and censorship of mail and telegraph services from the United States to foreign countries. A final provision added by the Senate required that German language papers in the United States print English translations of war criticism. The bill's basic purpose, as presented to the Interstate Commerce Committee by Secretary of State Robert Lansing, was to control exports. In particular, it sought to prevent exports from an American company to a German company in a neutral country. Moreover, other purposes aimed to secure the profits and property that Germans held in the United States and to stop the flow of any profits to an enemy in Germany. To accomplish these latter intentions, an Alien Property Office was established. Little opposition surfaced in the Committee, but what did centered around the constitutionality of the bill. Several committeemen conjectured that it granted unconstitutional powers for peacetime. When other members argued that war conditions required different standards of constitutionality, they quickly conceded that the bill was constitutional.


111 U. S. Congress, House, Direction of Exports in Time of War, Hearings on H. R. 3349, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3-4, 8-10; and ibid., Trading with the Enemy, Hearings on H. R. 4704, 65 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Criticism became more intense on the House floor as several provisions drew energetic objection. Minority Leader Mann questioned the definition and classification of an "enemy alien," wondering if it did not include German citizens in the United States. LaGuardia, who thought the definition encompassed even naturalized citizens, called it "vicious." In like manner, the definition of "enemy trading" raised questions in the mind of a third Republican, Irvine Lenroot. He thought that it was overly broad and in fact violated international law. The center of criticism, however, focused on the mail and telegraph censorship provisions. Mann emphasized the dictatorial nature of the powers granted. He also asserted that the Administration saw a "spy behind every doorstep." In general the opposition reflected a particular concern for legal processes and personal rights. Supporters of the bill either denied any dangers or maintained that the President ought to control aliens in order to prevent harm to the war effort. Apparently, the critics presented valid objections since the House agreed to several clarifying amendments and completely struck out the mail and telegraph section. The bill then passed without a roll call.

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112 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4865, 4916, 4846-47.


114 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4912, 4915, 4976, 4989; and New York Times, July 13, 1917, 13. The mail and telegraph regulations were written back in by the Senate. The House agreed to the Senate's action without dissent. Mann was ill by then—September 20, 1917. See Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7420; and New York Times, September 21, 1917, 1.
Two other shipping measures were passed during the first session, the first to increase ship tonnage and the second to foster the competitive trade position of American companies. A shipping act in 1916 established the Shipping Board with a capital of fifty million dollars. Its purpose was to build ships for the American merchant marine.\textsuperscript{115} Shortly after April 6, 1917, Joshua Alexander (D-Mo.) chairman of the Merchant Marine Committee, conferred with Shipping Board officials on ship construction for war purposes. In May, President Wilson announced a proposal for a vast ship construction bill with an appropriation of $500 million, which was later raised to $750 million. He conferred with a number of Senators and Representatives and little criticism surfaced. Once it reached the House, action on the bill moved quickly, the only objections coming in the form of disbelief at the sums of money involved. Some members also expressed doubts as to the Shipping Board's ability to implement the program. The bill passed as part of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation in late May.\textsuperscript{116}

The second measure, which became known as the Webb-Pomerene Export Bill, legalized cooperative selling associations among American exporters. Originally introduced in the 64th Congress and passed by the House, but not the Senate, it was not a war measure in the strict sense.\textsuperscript{117} Chairman Webb of the Judiciary Committee, nonetheless,

\textsuperscript{115}Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 192.

\textsuperscript{116}New York Times, April 9, 1917, 1; May 10, 1917, 10; May 26, 1917; May 29, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2931.

\textsuperscript{117}New York Times, January 6, 1917, 11.
maintained that the bill was required more than ever. His argument stated that trade conditions would be vigorously competitive after the war. American firms must be in a position to handle the competition and this bill would help toward that objective. Promoters of the bill added that it would aid smaller companies, who were the intended beneficiaries, develop foreign trade. Singularity, small corporations could not compete against larger American companies and foreign cartels except by banding together into associations.¹¹⁸

During the 64th Congress the bill provoked criticism from anti-monopoly elements. They objected that it did not bar companies from acting together inside the United States. Responding to the objections, the Judiciary Committee wrote a prohibition into the bill for the 65th House. Several critics were mollified but others remained in opposition to the bill.¹¹⁹ Andrew Volstead (R-Minn.), concerned about possible grain monopolies by export millers, warned that the bill "practically nullifies the Sherman Act." Dick Morgan (D-Okla.), in agreement with Volstead, proposed an amendment which would have vested the Federal Trade Commission with supervisory powers over the trade associations. It failed on a non-roll call vote, and the bill itself passed easily, 241 to twenty-nine.¹²⁰

Historian James Weinstein has argued that the Webb-Pomerene Bill benefitted large corporate interests by enabling them to organize trade associations. Moreover, the bill symbolized the growing acceptance

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 3565-67.
¹²⁰ Ibid., 3681-85.
by Congress of large corporate entities. Antimonopoly sentiments were declining, while advocacy of a liberal corporate state grew. In particular, the shift in orientation occurred within the Progressive Movement. Weinstein contended that the movement sought not to destroy corporations but, on the contrary, to rationalize American society along corporate lines. The export bill consequently meshed with the corporate ideals of the Progressive Movement.¹²¹

Roll call analysis of the Export Bill can shed light on the Weinstein thesis. The nearly unanimous vote on the bill supports his argument that there was a developing consensus which supported the formation of a corporate state. The opposition which existed indicates a slight partisan coloring (Table 3-15). Only four Democrats opposed the bill while the rest of the opposition (twenty-four) came from the Republican ranks. Of course the vast majority of Republicans voted for the bill (eighty percent). All that can be stated is that a faction of the Republican party opposed the bill. Geographically, twenty of the twenty-four Republican opponents came from the Midwest (ENC and WNC regions). Correlation of the roll call with other votes explains why they came from the Midwest: the export vote relates to several farm measures. Volstead and other Midwestern agriculturalists rejected the bill because they foresaw the organization of price-fixing grain export monopolies. In sum, the opponents were mostly rural-oriented Republicans concerned with monopoly.

But to argue the corollary, as does Weinstein, that supporters were advocates of a corporate state appears unjustified by the debates.

### TABLE 3-15
THE WEBB-POMERENE EXPORT BILL

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Supporters expressed two main interests: to promote American trade and to promote the activities of moderate size companies in foreign trade. No member promoted the bill as furthering the trade of large corporations. Particularly, no congressman either directly or indirectly viewed the bill as part of plans for a corporate state. The main goal of the bill, as its proponents saw it, was to place American trade in the forefront of the world, not to establish a liberal corporate state based on capitalism.\textsuperscript{122}

Another transportation bill, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation, affected the external and internal water transportation of the country. During the last minute rush of the 64th Congress, the Appropriation Bill for fiscal 1918 died in committee. Since the bill had the unsavory reputation as the granddaddy of all "pork" legislation, the Democratic caucus voted that Congress should not consider it during a national emergency.\textsuperscript{123} Chairman John Small (D-N.C.) of the Rivers and Harbors Committee rejected the caucus decision and behind the scenes promoted the bill as necessary to maintain projects already in existence. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels boosted Small's efforts when he recommended for naval reasons, an appropriation to deepen the Hell Gate entrance to New York harbor. Through the Secretary's assistance, Small won time on the floor for the bill.\textsuperscript{124}

A spirited debate ensued, as determined opposition surfaced among elements of the Republicans. James Frear (R-Wis.), who was

\textsuperscript{122}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3570.

\textsuperscript{123}New York Times, April 20, 1917, 6.

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., May 19, 1917, 10; and May 20, 1917, 2.
joined by Mann and a majority of the Republicans rank-in-file, directed opposition. Their motivations included both real concern over the economy and desires for political gain. Several Republican stalwarts such as J. Hampton Moore, however, deserted the party because they represented export interests. The divisions in the Republican ranks deepened the controversy present in the debates. Charges of "pork," "provincialism," "self-interest," "waste," and "partisanship" flew back and forth. Personal abuse and the depreciation of the opposition's motivation, rather than a reasonable discussion of the issues, often became the focus of the arguments.

Reflecting the hostility of the debates, the House squared off in the most protracted voting duel of the session. Six roll calls were ordered, which thereby allows for a close definition of the partisan and regional elements behind the balloting. A number of members (thirty-four percent) either could not support the bill in any manner or could do so only once (Table 3-16). The greatest number of these were Republicans, ninety-one Republicans as compared to only twenty-four Democrats. Regions giving above average support to the majority

125 Ibid., June 9, 1917, 13; June 27, 1917, 3; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3717, 3732.


127 New York Times, August 1, 1917, 7; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong. Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3454, 3733. In one particular, the debates involved more than immediate questions, and that issue was a proposal to establish a waterway commission. Advocated for years by Senator Newlands, the commission was to advance multiple-purpose river development. Newlands won inclusion of the commission in the Senate bill and the House agreed to it one on one of the six roll calls. President Wilson, however, never appointed commissioners and the 1920 Witer Power Act repealed the Commission. See Hays, The Gospel of Efficiency: The Conservation Movement, 238-40.
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The order of the roll calls is 55, 56, 44, 52, 57, 51
Percent at each point on the scale 27, 7, 4, 2, 5, 12, 43
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .946
## TABLE 3-16:B

**RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BILL**

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<td>1</td>
<td>VAR 55</td>
<td>To move the previous question on H. R. 126, providing that H. R. 4285, making appropriations for the construction, repair and preservation of certain public works on rivers and harbors, be taken from the speakers' table, that the Senate amendments be disagreed, and that a conference committee on the same be appointed. 198-93; + = yea. Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5628.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>VAR 56</td>
<td>To adopt H. Res. 126, authorizing the House to take up H. R. 4285 from the speaker's table, and that Senate amendments be disagreed to and a conference committee on same be appointed. 188-103; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5633.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>VAR 44</td>
<td>To consider H. R. 4285, making appropriations for the construction, repair and preservation of certain public works on rivers and harbors. 189-119; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 4, 3359.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>VAR 52</td>
<td>To pass H. R. 4285, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Bill. 203-133; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 5, 4357.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>VAR 57</td>
<td>To recommit H. R. 4285 to the Committee on Conference with instructions that House conferees disagree to Amendment 41, which creates a 7 member Waterways Commission to prepare a plan for the improvement of waterways, and appropriates $100,000 to defray expenses. 142-207; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5732.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VAR 51</td>
<td>To recommit H. R. 4285, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Bill, to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors with instructions to report back the bill with amendment, providing no money be expended for maintenance until the President has certified it is necessary for the commercial needs of the country or any new project unless for the successful prosecution of the war, expenditure to be approved by the President. 141-189; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 5, 4356.</td>
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</table>
Republican position were New England, the Midwest (ENC and WNC), and the Mountain states. Democrats going against the dominant Democratic position were from the New England, the West North Central, and the Mountain states. The medium place on the scale includes two motions to hear the bill, plus the roll call on passage of the appropriation. Only eleven percent of the members clustered in the swing position, and they divided about equally between the parties. The high category included two votes to recommit; or in other words, to vote against these motions required the greatest level of support for the bill. At this level seventy percent of the Democrats supported the bill. Thirty-four percent of the Republicans were also able to support moneys for rivers and harbors. Regionally, the greatest advocates from both parties came from the Middle Atlantic, Southern, Border and Pacific states. Unsurprisingly, these are the regions of the country with the great seaports and rivers. The six votes had definite partisan qualities since party majorities located on either end of the scale. However, the pattern demonstrates strong regional tendencies. In fact, they were so decided that the balloting might be evaluated as more regional than partisan. Both parties in the New England, Midwest, and Mountain regions either strongly opposed the bill or gave it only conditional support. The reverse is the case for the Middle Atlantic, Southern, Border, and Pacific states. Undoubtedly, some Republicans hoped to embarrass the Democrats by opposing the bill, but in most cases regional interests overrode party advantages.

The railroads, as the main connecting link between the factories and the seaports, received the attention of the Administration and the
House. The thinking of the Administration in the Spring was to regulate and control the railroads, while still allowing them to remain under private ownership. However, desiring to be prepared for all eventualities, administration supporters introduced a bill that permitted the takeover of the railroads by the Executive. It also included provisions for the regulation of railroad car usage. At the same time, House members introduced an administration-backed bill for increasing the membership of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The first proposal provoked adverse remarks by some members because they saw it as another grant of broad and arbitrary power to the President. Critics, who feared possible government ownership of railroads, also claimed that the power was unnecessary since the railroads functioned adequately under their private managers. Meanwhile, the Senate modified the bill into a railroad car priorities measure. After the revision House opposition melted away and the bill passed without a roll call.

The second railroad bill engendered more formal controversy, particularly after the Senate added a new provision. In its first form, the bill divided the ICC into three subdivisions and increased the membership from seven to nine. By these administrative changes, the proponents of the bill hoped to improve the efficiency of the ICC. No objection was made against these provisions, but this was not the

128 Washington Post, April 14, 1917, 2; New York Times, April 13, 1917, 1; May 22, 1917, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3585.

case with the new provision. It required that whenever a protest was filed against railroad rate increases, the commission had to suspend the rates until a full investigation. Thetus Sims (D-Tenn.), chief advocate of the provision, explained that it aimed to block a pending fifteen percent hike in rates desired by the railroads. The provision itself raised the question of whether or not the ICC would retain its discretionary power on suspending rates.130

Critics of the provision maintained that it would tie up the ICC with cases, slow the decision process indefinitely, and severely limit the ICC's discretion. A second opposition view expressed distress for the railroads. According to George Graham (R-Pa.), the railroads were not prospering and the amendment would further injure their profit-making capacities. As part of the debate that had raged in the House for many years over the control of the railroads, arguments were shaped on the one hand by a hostility to higher railroad rates and on the other by a concern for railroad profits. The bill became less a matter of railroad regulation when the members expressed a concern over the discretionary rights of the ICC.131

Consequently, the combination of ICC and railroad advocates controlled the vote, defeating the Sims provision, 156 to seventy-six.132 Partisan divisions did not operate, as fifty-nine percent of the Democrats and seventy-six percent of the Republicans voted against the amendment (Table 3-17). Twice as many Democrats (fifty) cast an

130 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3585; Pt. 5, 4369-4371.
131 Ibid., 4385.
132 Ibid., 4491.
### TABLE 3-17
INTERSTATE COMMERCE BILL

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<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
affirmative vote as compared to the Republicans (twenty-four), which may indicate somewhat greater favor among Democrats for restrictions on railroads. A more noticeable trend reveals itself geographically. Here the Northeastern regions, particularly New England and the Middle Atlantic, opposed the rate amendment at an above average percentage in comparison to the other regions. In contrast, the West North Central, the South, and Mountain states provided high support for the amendment. In sum, both parties opposed restricting the discretion of the ICC, though more Republicans did than Democrats. Regionally, the industrial Northeast evidenced greater opposition to the restriction. The more agrarian states of the Midwest, South, andMountain regions tended to favor it.

Implementing and Critizing the War Program

With completion of the ICC bill in late June, the House had virtually nailed down the major points of the war program. During the ensuing legislative lull, attention shifted from the creation of a war program to the evaluation of its implications and operations. When congressmen voted for war, few fathomed all that was involved in terms of men, money, mobilization, and transfer of power. In fact, the war vote would have been closer if they had known that they would be conscripting a vast army and sending it to Europe. Instead, congressmen believed that the American role would consist of providing the Allies with funds, ammunition, and other supplies, with fighting restricted to naval warfare.\textsuperscript{133} They progressively discovered the

\textsuperscript{133}\textit{Ibid.}, Pt. 2, 1646; LaGuardia, \textit{The Making of an Insurgent}, 140; and Ramseyer to Harry M. Neas, July 25, 1917, Ramseyer Papers. Some
true situation, first with the draft controversy and then when allied deficiencies became apparent.

When they had fully adjusted to full-scale war, they were better able to clarify their thought on the aims of the war. First of all, representatives came to a general agreement that German attacks on American shipping provoked America's entry into the war. Nonetheless, a noticeable split developed over their interpretation of the meaning and implications of American involvement. For a number of House members, the talk of world democracy, humanity, and brotherhood made little sense. They believed that nations fought only to gain something for themselves or to defend themselves. For others, such a definition overlooked the nature of the adversary, which to them embodied a thorough-going autocracy bent on destroying democracy. As one representative wrote, "Germany knows no limits to her ambitions of world empire. It is a fight to defend our ideals." The destruction of autocratic power and the substitution of democracy in its place became a logical goal of the war for such representatives. The division over this most fundamental of all war questions did not find formal outlet in roll calls, but it did foster an atmosphere of tension and confusion in the House.

members also learned to their dismay that the draft did not work out as they had expected. See Stephens (D-Neb.) who wrote Woodrow Wilson, September 25, 1917, Box 30, Folder 236, Stephens Papers, that the draft as means to exempt farm laborers was not working properly.

134 Ibid., to Don McGiffin, May 31, 1917, Ramseyer Papers, and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5898.

135 Stephens to Theodore Bests, June 16, 1917, Box 24, Folder 183, Stephens Papers; to Fred A. Marsh, August 13, 1917, Box 28, Folder 215, Stephens Papers; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4539; Pt. 6, 5568; and Pt. 7, 7165, 7286, 7293-94, 7316.
That the war and the creation of the war program engendered deep apprehensions can be best seen in the controversy over establishing the Committee on the Conduct of the War. The increasing demands that the Executive placed on Congress for new grants of power served as background to this controversy. As authority flowed to the President, doubts mounted as to the place of the Congress in the war effort. Perhaps most members recognized that modern war was a matter of administration, which consequently left Congress largely out of the process. Still, they believed that they could advance the war program, particularly since they knew that the Administration was running into snags in the implementation of programs. The Shipping Board's affairs had become so disorganized that a public scandal erupted in the middle of July. Before all was lost, many congressmen believed that it was time for Congress to assert its prerogatives and take over the management of the war effort.

The Senate in July started the row as Republicans and dissendent Democrats added the Weeks Amendment as a rider to the food bill. When the bill passed the Senate and went to the conference, the House conferees adamantly refused agreement on the rider. Bolstering them in their opposition, Wilson wrote Lever that he would veto the bill with the rider since it would completely undermine his running of the war. He compared the present scheme to the joint committee established


during the Civil War, which he maintained had seriously impaired Lincoln's management of the war. Lever, a vigorous Administration supporter, fully appreciated Wilson's sentiments. With the aid of his fellow House conferees and of Senator Francis Warren (R-Wy.), he defeated the proposal in the conference.

Lever and the conferees had earlier won instruction from the House against the amendment. At that time, House Republicans were divided. Kahn, the leading Republican of the Military Affairs Committee, opposed the war committee but Mann and Longworth strongly advocated it. Cannon and Gillett also favored it, though they were unwilling to wage a protracted campaign for it. Their arguments rested on the contention that the committee had no evil design. Its purpose was simply to establish a means by which the House could monitor war expenditures so as to prevent graft, not to hamstring the Administration. Not all House Democrats were happy with the Administration but they lined up against the amendment, defeating it 169 to 101. On this non-roll call vote, thirty-one Republicans broke ranks and voted with the Democrats.

The Weeks Amendment was defeated on July 26, but the debate over it signaled the start of a running battle over the conduct of the war.

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138 New York Times, July 22, 1917, 1; July 23, 1917, 1; July 24, 1917, 1; and Washington Post, July 24, 1917, 1. Representative Martin Madden (R-Ill.) had earlier—only days after the Declaration of War—introduced a similar proposal. No action was taken on his plan. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess., 1, Pt. 1, 497, 626, 630, 683.


140 Ibid., July 26, 1917, 1; August 4, 1917, 3; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5527, 5739.

141 Ibid., 5527; and New York Times, July 26, 1917, 1.
One phase of the conflict came over Republican efforts to attach amendments similar to the Week's proposal. Gillett and Joseph Fordney scored Wilson for insulting the Republicans of the Civil War era who served on the joint War Committee of that period. They tried to add the Committee as an amendment to the second bond bill, but Speaker Clark ruled the hostile amendment ungermane to the bill and therefore out of order.\textsuperscript{142} More commonly, the Republicans and some Democrats criticized individual aspects of war management. A long-standing complaint was the method of letting war contracts on a cost-plus basis rather than by competitive bidding. Chairman John Fitzgerald of the Appropriation Committee at various times objected to the method, but the Army replied that it offered the fastest means for the production of war supplies.\textsuperscript{143} Other criticisms, mostly of a partisan nature, rained down on the Administration over the employment of dollar-a-year businessmen in war agencies, the production of small arms ammunition, and the inflation of food and non-perishable goods. While the opprobrium directed against the Administration remained within bounds, such criticism after July, 1917, always underlined House discussions.\textsuperscript{144}

The resulting tense atmosphere served to ignite the most dramatic confrontation of the first session. Some members, particularly

\textsuperscript{142}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 6635-36; and New York Times, September 1, 1917, 1.

\textsuperscript{143}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3185; Pt. 7, 7218; and New York Times, September 12, 1917, 7.

\textsuperscript{144}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 8, 7783; Pt. 7, 6808; New York Times, September 26, 1917, 9; September 5, 1917, 14; Washington Post, August 7, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 5071.
Democrats, thought that the motivation for the criticism sprang from partisan bias. Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.), went farther by claiming that an element in Congress censured the President's program for treasonable interests. Throughout the first session, Heflin had indulged in verbal blasts at unpatriotic elements, but during the debate over the Weeks amendment he unleashed bitter remarks against two members of the House. He charged that Fred A. Britten (R-Ill.) and William E. Mason (R-Ill.) purposely stirred up opposition to the war and the selective service. Both members came from districts with large German populations, and each had in fact introduced a bill on the draft, Mason's to exempt draftees from going to Europe and Britten's to allow German aliens exemption from the draft. Heflin alluded to these particulars, connected Britten and Mason with anarchists and traitors, and further referred to these representatives by name, which went contrary to House rules. His remarks were stricken from the Record by a roll call, 190 to 122. Most members simply wrote the incident off as a typical Heflin performance.

A much less easily ignored speech by Heflin came after State Department disclosures in September that the former German Ambassador to the United States, Count Von Bernstorff, had employed a $50,000 fund for influencing Congress. Most observers interpreted the fund's use as for propaganda, but Heflin concluded that the Germans employed the money as a slush fund for bribing congressmen. On the basis of

145 Stephens to F. B. Knaps, July 16, 1917, Box 27, Folder 206, Stephens Papers.

146 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2937-38; Pt. 6, 5756-57; New York Times, June 26, 1917, 7; and August 4, 1917, 1.
this erroneous premise, Heflin delivered a House speech, claiming in it that he could identify "thirteen or fourteen" congressmen who had received money from the fund. At this point he only linked Mason and Britten to the funds. William Howard (D-Ga.) supported Heflin, when he claimed that he could also name members who had taken the money.\(^\text{147}\)

Unleasing an uproar in the House, Heflin met with few supporters and much denunciation even from fellow Democrats. The House Rules Committee launched an investigation into the charges, while other members demanded the expulsion of Heflin. In the end, the incident fizzled out. No members pushed matters to a climax, and the Rules Committee dismissed Heflin's charges as without substance.\(^\text{148}\)

**Retrospect**

Although the Heflin incident indicated a growing alarm over criticisms of the war program, the first session generally maintained a sense of proportion in dealing with possible discontented elements and with dissenters. They had twice rejected the restrictive censorship provision of the Espionage law but accepted another one and overlooked totally the other restrictive features of the bill. A number advocated the easy exchange of newspapers and magazines, and a majority voted to strike Heflin's attack from the House proceedings. In total, the House went on record six times on civil liberties and dissent issues. These provide a basis for analyzing the groups

\(^{147}\) New York Times, September 27, 1917, 1; September 23, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7305-06, 7360-61.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 7361, 7461, 7369, 7463; Pt. 8, 7711-15, 7786; New York Times, September 24, 1917, 1; September 25, 1917, 8; September 27, 1917, 4; September 28, 1917, 1; September 29, 1917, 1; October 7, 1917, 3; and U. S. Congress, House, Alleged German Corruption Fund, Hearings on H. Res. 148, 149, 151, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 14-18.
supporting or opposing repressive tendencies. Since all six of these votes scaled together, a scalogram pinpoints the members having the easiest time supporting repressive measures and those having the hardest time supporting them. (Table 3-18:A). Thirty-eight percent of the congressmen either could not vote for any repressive measures or found that they could vote for the passage of Espionage Bill but no restrictive positions. Of this first group, a mere ten out of the 147 congressmen were Democrats while the rest carried the Republican label. Clearly some partisan factors were at work in the votes. In terms of geography, no pattern is noticeable except that New England Democrats lined up with the Republicans more than normally, and New England and East North Central Republicans gave slightly below average support to their party position. In the moderate category eighteen percent of the membership swung from support of repressive measures to opposition. The partisan breakdown levels out as a number of Republicans (thirty-five), who had found it possible to vote for a measure or two, moved into opposition against other restrictive measures. At the same time, an equal contingent of Democrats (thirty-nine) found that they also could not agree to such confining policy positions. These Democrats resided in all sections, but greater numbers came from the East North Central and the Pacific states. The third category includes the supporters of the most repressive measures; they favored the original censorship provisions of the Espionage Bill and they opposed removing Heflin's inflammatory remarks. Partisan divisions returned as 145 Democrats supported the President's and Heflin's positions. Only seventeen Republicans so voted. These 162 members came from all sections though the South supported the measures more
### TABLE 3-18: A

#### CIVIL LIBERTIES

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<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>92</td>
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<th>Region and Party (Percent)</th>
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<td>55</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>75</td>
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The order of the roll calls is 29, 35, 27, 41, 26, 58
Percent at each point on the scale 19, 20, 9, 6, 4, 20, 22
Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.937
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<th>Scale</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Motion</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>VAR 35</td>
<td>To amend in the nature of a substitute for section 1201, H. R. 4280, by reducing the rates for second class mail and applying to that class the zone system now in use for parcel post. 256-150; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 3, 2817A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>VAR 27</td>
<td>To amend H. R. 291, by prohibiting the wilful publishing of any information relating to national defense that may be useful to the enemy during any national emergency resulting from a war, and authorizing the President to declare a national emergency excepting that nothing in this section be construed to limit or policies of the government or the publication of same. 191-186; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1819.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>VAR 41</td>
<td>To recommit H. R. 291, (40 STAT-217, June 15, 1917), Espionage and Neutrality Bill, to the Committee of Conference with instructions, to agree to eliminate from the Bill Section 4, Title One, which describes specifically the character of information useful to the enemy. 184-144; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3144.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>VAR 26</td>
<td>To amend H. R. 291 (40 STAT, June 15, 1917), punishing acts of interference in the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States and strengthening the criminal laws of the United States, by eliminating Section 4, authorizing the President to declare, by proclamation, the existence of a national emergency and to prohibit the publishing and communication of information relating to national defense which might be useful to the enemy, and also eliminating the provision that nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict any discussion, comment or criticism of the acts or policies of the government or its representatives or the publication of the same. 221-167; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1816.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To expunge certain remarks from the record regarding Bill H. R. 4961, (40 STAT-217, August 10, 1917), Providing further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel, by eliminating certain words referring to two representatives as being traitors and in treason with anarchists and charging them with stirring up enmity to the draft law. 190-122; + = Nay. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5757.
strongly than the other regions. In summarizing the votes, partisanship clearly influenced the balloting as most Democrats favored the repressive position while most Republicans were in opposition. The members who broke party ranks expressed either a libertarian or authoritarian ideological, rather than a strictly partisan, position. Of course, the positions of the two parties also reflect ideological orientations, but more notable is the simple partisanship of their stances.

The partisan voting on the civil liberties issues was unusual for the first session because extreme partisan voting nearly disappeared as the House recorded only two percent of its roll calls at the ninety percent level of partisanship (Table 3-19:A). When compared to the eleven percent of extreme partisan votes for all sessions, the two percent for the first session indicates that the parties checked their partisan tendencies. Part of the reason for this is that partisanship on a number of issues either did not influence the vote or operated only in a minor fashion. In this category are such vital war measures as the draft and food bills. Open partisanship did not completely vanish, however, as the first session recorded thirty-nine percent of its roll calls at the fifty percent versus fifty percent level. In this category are the Espionage Act, the Roosevelt division, some of the ballots of the Revenue Act, and the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation. On still other roll calls partisanship was noticeable, even though it falls below the statistical convention. On such votes, what opposition did exist came from a minority of one party. For example, all opposition to the final passage of the Revenue Act came from a minority of Republican party members. Then partisanship made
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Second Session</th>
<th>Third Session</th>
<th>Overall</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ninety Percent</td>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<td>versus</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifty Percent</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>versus</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
itself known through floor debates, criticism of the Administration, and attempts to wrestle control of the war program from Wilson. Although thirty-nine percent was a relatively low percentage of partisan voting, which compared favorably with the overall percentage of forty-seven for all sessions, the Republicans added a dimension of conflict to roll calls that otherwise would have been missing.

At the same time that roll calls recorded few partisan votes, they also indicated a high cohesion within parties (Table 3-19:B). Normally, high cohesion within parties is interpreted as a result of high partisan voting, as both parties internally unite against the other. The corollary to this thesis is that low cohesion within parties reflects low partisan voting. However, the thesis is largely incorrect for the first session of the 65th House, because the high cohesion within parties actually represented a high agreement between parties on policy. Interestingly, however, the Rice Cohesion Index records a relatively small difference between the three sessions of the 65th House. Democrats recorded during the first session a cohesion score of seventy-four on all votes, which represented an increase of one over the average score for all sessions. The Republicans actually dropped one point from sixty-seven to sixty-six. A possible explanation is that while the parties united behind the war program, elements of both parties at times found it impossible to support the party position. In this way the war program created internal party disunity, though the war program usually engendered surprisingly high unity within parties.

149Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive Years," 570-77.
TABLE 3-19:B
COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES BY PARTIES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEMOCRAT</th>
<th></th>
<th>REPUBLICAN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Session</td>
<td>All Sessions</td>
<td>First Session</td>
<td>All Sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average Cohesion</td>
<td>Average Cohesion</td>
<td>Average Cohesion</td>
<td>Average Cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Overall</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Revenue</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Progressive</td>
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<td>51</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. War Legislation</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>5. Economic</td>
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<td>52</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*This table was constructed in a manner similar to Table 22 of Chapter two.
The high cohesion was reflected in high unity on several issues of the first session (Table 3-19:B). The Democrats maintained significantly high unity on revenue, progressive, and war measures. Where the Democrats were able to unite on these issues, Republicans achieved little unity on revenue legislation and only average unity on progressive and war legislation. On roll calls dealing with economy in government, the Republicans achieved a higher unity, but their score of fifty-two against the Democrats fifty cannot be construed as significantly greater. The degree of unity on all issues except one was not greater than the average for all sessions. In the context of the fewer partisan votes, the lower cohesion scores indicate that such issues, when they caused divisions at all, divided parties internally. Overall, the parties agreed to the war program, which resulted in high cohesion on issues.

Policy differences between Republicans and Democrats existed, but to characterize their positions as progressive or conservative is more difficult. The draft vote moved in the realm of liberalism. Since both sides claimed to speak for democracy and the parties did not divide, the progressive stance becomes impossible to pinpoint. However, the Revenue Act and the civil liberties votes suggest more recognizable liberal positions. On the Revenue Act, Republicans staunchly stood for conservativism as they opposed higher business taxes and favored revision of the bill. They reversed their alignment on civil liberties and voted for the liberal position. The Democrats

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150 The cohesion scores on the issues will often be lower than the overall cohesion average. As an explanation, it should be noted that all unanimous votes were removed from the votes on issues, while the overall average, as the term implies, included all votes.
followed a similar inconsistent pattern, since they adopted the opposite stance on these two issues. Therefore, partisanship is probably more significant than ideology on the revenue and civil liberties issues, but elements of both parties broke ranks to express ideological orientations. Those who did so may be described as progressives or conservatives.

If partisanship and ideology influenced the final decisions of the House, the war program gave substance and weight to all that transpired. The House, though often directed by the Executive, formed a war program for troop recruitment, espionage, finances, food, and equipment of the army and navy. More than once the President and the press criticized the congressional pace, but if not immediately, at least eventually, the required programs were forthcoming. Throughout, the House insisted on its share in the war program. They in fact stamped their image on the draft, the Espionage Act, the Revenue Bill, and the Lever Food Act. They failed, however, to develop a program of their own and, rather, accepted an administration plan from which to work. Most of all, they failed to share in the implementation of the war program. As a result, many in the House, mainly Republicans but also some Democrats, uneasily accepted this lack of participation. The session closed in October, 1917, on a note of cordiality, but an undercurrent of frustration and tension flowed beneath the surface.
THE HOUSE AT WAR: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DURING WORLD WAR I, 1917-1919

VOLUME II

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

Richard Kenneth Homer
B.A., Abilene Christian University, 1967
M.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1968
May, 1977
When congressmen assembled for the second session on December 2, 1917, they were in a critical and suspicious frame of mind. Rumors of war mismanagement by the Wilson Administration filled the Capital, creating a tense atmosphere. Representatives vocally demanded information from the Administration of military preparations and of the status of American relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But tension arose not only from concern over the war program but also from the legislative difficulties that confronted the new session.

Much of the legislation passed during the first session required revision because it had left out important war needs or had not provided enough money, men, and material to effectively fight the war. Also, the war spirit was generating pressures for two long time reforms, women's suffrage and prohibition. It was again clear that complex partisan, regional, and ideological forces would be active during the session as in the first session.

Adding to the tension and flux was the change in party leadership and in the balance between the parties. Minority Leader Mann had

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been absent since July, 1917, suffering from a nervous breakdown. Although he would periodically make an appearance during the second session, the Republicans had to find new leadership. At first they selected a two-man team, Frederick H. Gillett and Irvine L. Lenroot; Republicans also directed that several other party stalwarts, among them Joseph Cannon, assist Lenroot and Gillett. Shortly after his selection, Gillett took over sole direction of the party when Lenroot won a seat in the Upper House in April, 1918. In contrast to Mann, Gillett chose to work in concert with several other party leaders.  

On the Democratic side, old leaders also had to be replaced. Two important committee chairmen resigned in December, John J. Fitzgerald, head of Appropriations, and William C. Adamson, head of Interstate Commerce. J. Swagar Sherley replaced Fitzgerald, and Thetus Sims took over the Interstate Commerce post. Though both men had long experience in the House, they lacked the floor training which Fitzgerald and Adamson had acquired.  

Meanwhile the control of House machinery could have passed to the Republicans if they had so chosen after the death of Ellsworth Bathrich (D-Ohio) and the resignation of four Tammany Hall Democrats, who preferred to reap the spoils of the Tigers' recent mayoralty victory rather than stay in the House. With the Democrats' ranks thus depleted, Republicans technically became the majority party. Although they decided that the Democrats ought to bear alone the responsibility for


the conduct of the war, roll calls would now be more bitterly contested than during the first session.4

Resolution For War

The actual legislative session started calmly enough when the House heard President Wilson deliver the State of the Union Address on December 3, 1917. He declared that the goals of the war were just because America waged war for the vindication of principle and of right. Only a complete defeat of German autocracy and complete freedom for European people would achieve this purpose. In pursuit of this goal, Wilson explained, America's war had to be expanded to include combat against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He suggested that the Hapsburgs were vassals of Germany and hinted that war against them would help to liberate the Empire's nationalities. On domestic matters, he very cursorily sketched legislation that the Executive would require from Congress during the session. As Wilson concluded his address, he had resolved the tensions over the ambivalent status of American relations with Austria-Hungary, but he had failed to resolve all doubts over American war aims.5

Immediately taking up the declaration after Wilson's speech, the House membership quickly demonstrated that few followed Wilson's

4New York Times, December 25, 1917, 3. Eventually, the Democrats were replaced. Since the replacements were other Democrats, control reverted to them. See ibid., March 7, 1917, 5; and Washington Post, March 15, 1917, 2.

reasoning or sympathized with his aims except for three members, J. Charles Linthicum (D-Md.), Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.), and Frederick Gillett. Phrasing the imperative for war in the terms of Wilsonian idealism, they also spoke of the war as one to lift humanity, establish international law, liberate subjugated nationalities, and achieve permanent peace.6 The majority who finally opted for war on Austria supported the resolution because they believed that it would be an effective means of destroying German power. American might, they thought, should be directed against Germany's allies because they furthered her war-making potential.7 Such a narrow definition of the war's purpose could not encompass the idealism of Wilson.

A third group of congressmen diverged even more significantly from Wilson's view. According to Pat Harrison (D-Miss.), war against Austria grew out of the need to maintain American economic rights. In effect advancing an economic motivation for the war, Harrison and like-minded colleagues connected the wartime prosperity of the country to American's resistance toward the Central Powers.8 Finally, members who had voted against the declaration of war on Germany often implied that they still disagreed with the war's purposes. Caleb Powers (R-Ky.), though he supported the Austrian War resolution, strongly objected to Wilson's claim that his view of war aims represented the only possible stance. Similarly, Jeannettee Rankin (R-Mont.) backhandedly alleged that commercial interests

7 Ibid., 51, 86, 91, 94, 96; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XIII (December 22, 1917), 218.
controlled the direction of the war machine. She, nonetheless, voted for the Austrian war resolution because she supported all measures that carried out the original war declaration. The only member to vote against the declaration agreed with Miss Rankin's economic thesis: Meyer London, claiming that he stated the Socialist position, sympathized with Wilson's internationalism; he declared, however, that selfish economic interests only turned Wilson's idealism to their own advantage in war. Debates demonstrated the cleavages within the House over the war issue, either because members did not agree with Wilsonian doctrine or because they did not understand its goals.

Prohibition and Women's Suffrage

After the settlement of the Austrian war issue, the legislative business of December and January consisted mostly of appropriating and raising money for the war. Several highly charged issues, however, disrupted the normal proceedings, the first of which was the national prohibition amendment. Since 1913 prohibition forces, directed by the Anti-Saloon League, had been demanding that Congress bar the manufacture and sale of liquor by the adoption of a constitutional amendment. In 1914, the drys made their first attempt to pass the amendment in the House, losing 196 to 190. Still short of the constitutional two-thirds requirement, prohibitionists redoubled their activity and waged a vigorous election campaign in 1916 that defeated several anti-prohibition congressmen in Indiana and elsewhere. By 1917 they had augmented their already formidable ranks, and the

9Ibid., 94, 98-99, 90.
onset of the war only mobilized the drys all the more for an offensive.\(^\text{10}\)

Prohibitionists believed that the war presented their cause with a solid argument in their favor. They cited the insistence of the Secretary of the Navy on laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to soldiers and sailors. Though they failed to add a bone-dry provision to the Lever Food bill, prohibitionists could claim that the bill's provision barring the manufacture of most liquor products would conserve grain for food.\(^\text{11}\) In a similar vein, John G. Cooper (R-Ohio) maintained in a speech full of bathos that the American government had no right to remove a boy from the purity of his mother's home and return him spoiled by alcohol. Edwin Webb, floor leader for the Democratic prohibitionists, connected liquor with the decline of the Roman Empire. When the country was to face the challenge of the new "Vandals," America could not afford any weaknesses that alcohol would generate.\(^\text{12}\) Wets tried to counter with a war thesis of their own, namely that prohibition would foster discontent at home. In particular, wets claimed that it would make the laboring people of the country unhappy, since they would feel they were denied relaxation and liberty.\(^\text{13}\) However, the wets' rebuttal of the prohibitionists' war argument failed mainly because the drys more effectively dramatized of the issue.

\(^{10}\)Odegard, Pressure Politics, the Story of the Anti-Saloon League, 98, 151, 166-174; and Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, 180-199.


\(^{12}\)Ibid., 430, 468.

\(^{13}\)Ibid., 428, 430, 446.
During the debates, one side would advance an argument which the other would then seize and reject. A favorite wet argument ridiculed the whole proposition because laws could never force the people to stop drinking.\textsuperscript{14} Discounting the likelihood of extreme violation of prohibition laws, Edward Keating sarcastically suggested that wets organize a movement to repeal all laws on theft. Laws, he maintained, were frequently violated, but that was not the question; rather, the issue was whether or not the law would help prevent some damage to the community.\textsuperscript{15} Taking another approach, the wets advanced constitutional objections: a national amendment would violate states rights, would place a sumptuary law in a fundamental document, and would restrict the workings of democracy.\textsuperscript{16} Prohibitionists countered by arguing that the states rights thesis had never been consistently upheld by its proponents: wets now employed it only as a scare tactic. Further, prohibitionists argued that sumptuary law or not, the problem came from the existence of wet states next to dry states, which made dry state enforcement of prohibition laws impossible. Only national action could ensure the integrity of dry states. Finally, Webb discounted the issue of limitation of individual rights because the amendment followed the constitutional procedures. Besides, as Frank Mondell (R-Wyo.) maintained, the people wanted prohibition and they had the right to determine such laws as they desired.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 453, 463, 436.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 453.
  \item \textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 428, 457, 439, 432-33, 462.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 431, 435, 426, 453.
\end{itemize}
Better organized and more determined, the prohibitionist, consistently dominated the debates.\(^\text{18}\)

Many congressmen during the debates implied that arguments would not influence their votes but rather that political considerations would determine them. Many political units across the country had held prohibition elections within recent years. Thus, the political power of prohibition was graphically evident to many congressmen. Joseph Cannon, not noted for his abstentious from strong drink, declared that he would vote to submit the amendment to the states. By so doing, he said that he fulfilled the expressed sentiments of his constituents.\(^\text{19}\) On the other side, Thomas Heflin, after arguing that prohibition would weaken the states' police powers, concluded that, since his district rejected a state constitutional amendment in 1909, he could not vote against his constituents' desires.\(^\text{20}\) Never unmindful of constituent desires, many congressmen, on this issue with its deep public passions, voted frequently not as conviction dictated but as political expediency required.

Despite the influence of politics on many representatives' stances, there were a number of strong prohibition advocates. Among them several attitudes, often overlapping, manifested themselves. Historians have attempted to classify prohibitionists into assimilative


\(^{19}\) Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3204. In private correspondence several members candidly expressed the necessity to vote dry because of constituent pressure. See Stephens to P. M. Barrett, February 28, 1917, Stephens Papers; Ramseyer to Harry M. Neas, July 25, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Stringer, "Aswell, Educator and Politician," 66, 68.

or coercive reformers, true social reformers, efficiency proponents, and so forth. Such efforts are essentially futile because a congressman often combined several attitudes. Yet, in one sense a common denominator can be found that encompasses many of their attitudes. Running through their discussions was a characterization of liquor as "evil." The word "evil" itself was repetitiously mouthed by drys, while at the same time they drew sinister images of the "liquor traffic" and the "saloon." In their psychology this evil existed, not simply as an abstraction, but as a real and potent force that threatened to destroy much that they valued. A clearcut morality of right and wrong underlined many drys' beliefs, which fastened on "liquor" and the "saloon" as the source for many of the problems in the country.

Since liquor was the source of untold graft, moral degradation, and social destruction, its abolition became a reform of the highest order. According to Congressman Keating, efforts to regulate the "liquor traffic" repeatedly failed because of the selfish interests of the liquor manufacturers. Reform in this case, he continued, required prohibition. Developing the reform concept, Patrick Norton (R-N.Dak.)


23Ibid., 453; and Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado, 391.
spoke of prohibition as preventing the blight of "woeful wrecks of humanity" now found where the "evil" saloon existed. In broad terms, prohibitionists spoke of a rebirth of the best moral senses of mankind. Since liquor dulled moral sensitivity, weakened physical strength, and spawned criminality, its abolition would further the regeneration of man. The prohibitionist as reformer confidently looked toward a better day.

Besides retarding the reform of mankind, liquor also damaged the health and diminished the efficiency of workers. According to Webb, alcohol weakened infants of alcoholic mothers, undermined the intelligence of people, and deprived a person of his physical strength. Alben Barkley added that liquor robbed the nation of billions of dollars of industrial production by lowering workers' efficiency. The growth of "scientific management" advanced the prohibition cause by demonstrating that industrial efficiency required sober workers. Not unmindful of the value that most Americans accorded science, prohibitionists gladly claimed that science had given prohibition its imprimatur of approval.

Prohibitionists also believed that alcohol threatened the existence of traditional values and the social fabric of the community. The prohibition movement, according to Webb and other spokesmen, sprang from the beliefs of Christian, God-fearing people who were trying to defend Americanism, motherhood, womanhood, homelife, moral purity, and "old time religion." In opposition to these fundamental

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25Ibid., 426, 459-60, 442.
values and institutions of the American people were alien and sinister forces which sought to undermine them. Usually, prohibitionists did not define the forces that attacked the community except in the general condemnation of liquor. John Tillman (D-Ark.), however, identified social groups that, if given liquor, became particularly insidious forces in American society. Although not denying the danger of whites "crazed" by alcohol, he singled out the Negro who, he insisted, could not resist the lures of drink. His intemperance, Tillman elaborated, "decreased the Negro's economic efficiency and increased the menace of his presence." Attributing the growth of prohibition sentiment in the South in large measure to the danger of the Negro, Tillman stressed that the South would do all it could to prevent the crime which it "regards as the blackest of all crimes." He completed the picture of sinister forces by linking "foreign names" to the control of the liquor industry. To some convinced prohibitionists, the suppression of liquor meant the protection of traditional values through the disciplining of alien and evil elements.

The strong moral fervor of the prohibitionists encompassed a variety of reform, traditional, and authoritarian attitudes. The congressmen who expressed the attitudes of the dry as well as the wets can be partially identified through quantitative analysis. First, this can be accomplished by correlating the prohibition roll calls, five altogether, in order to find if they cluster with each other. Since they do, the second step is to correlate the prohibition votes with

26Ibid., 468, 438, 430, 442.

27Ibid., 449.
issues that historians have named as overlapping with prohibition. These issues include women's suffrage, progressivism, and labor reform, all of which have received computer analysis in relation to prohibition. All tests proved ineffective in uncovering significant links between prohibition and supporters and opponents of other issues. On the women's suffrage movement, three of the six suffrage votes relate to one of the five prohibition roll calls. Since the other votes do not cluster, only a slight connection is indicated between the advocates and opponents of the two movements. As for progressive issues, James H. Timberlake makes a strong case for ties between the Progressive and the Prohibition Movements. His study reevaluates and defines the ideas of the Prohibition Movement in relation to Progressivism; he did not, however, analyze congressional voting blocs. Though Timberlake could be correct about the association of ideas, the inference that this would necessarily mean there were connections between supporters of prohibition and progressivism might be wrong. In fact, this is the case, since tests between progressive and prohibition issues revealed no correlations. Prohibitionists as a group did not function as a unit on progressive roll calls. In short, prohibition transcended the interests and ideals of progressivism and women's suffrage and became a force of its own.

Nuala Drescher describes proponents of unionism as usually opposing prohibition. However, correlation tests with issues in


29Nuala Drescher, "Organized Labor and the Eighteenth Amendment." Labor History, VIII (Fall, 1967), 280-283. Her study does not include an analysis of the 65th House.
which organized labor had taken a position reveal no connection between labor and prohibition. During their debate both drys and wets claimed that they spoke for the laboring people of the country. One opponent of prohibition in fact waved before the House a letter from Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in opposition to the amendment. As a rejoinder, John Cooper (R-Ohio), a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, cited the support of his union, among others, for prohibition. It would seem that despite the Engineers support, labor would tend to oppose the abolition of the saloon because of economic, social, and class reasons, but no quantitative information sustains Drescher's position. No organized voting groups formed which consistently expressed antiprohibition and pro-labor positions.

Although no correlations exist with these other groups there appears to be some relationship between prohibition and farm issues. A number of roll calls involved questions of farm policy and consequently divided members supporting or opposing farm proposals. Since most farm votes do not cluster with each other, it could not be expected that prohibition roll calls would correlate with many farm votes. Yet, three farm votes, two on a measure to stimulate farm production and one to raise the guaranteed price of wheat, did correlate with the prohibition votes. This inconclusive relationship at least indicates that agrarian advocates tended toward prohibitionist sentiments while farm opponents showed an orientation in favor of liquor. The farm and rural connection with prohibition has been the most constant theme in historiographical literature.30

30Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 429, 432. See
These correlations partially verify that thesis.

Partisan and geographical groupings also operated during the prohibition roll calls, though their significance varied widely. The prohibition scalogram ranks members into opponents, moderates, and supporters of the amendment. The low position on the scale pinpoints those members who refused to support any prohibition measures (Table 4-1:A). Since these representatives even continued to oppose prohibition bills after the passage of constitutional amendment, the low category pinpoints those who refused to concede victory to the prohibitionists and consequently were the most inflexible opponents of prohibition. Predominantly from the Northeastern states, twenty-nine opponents were Democrats and sixteen were Republicans.

In the middle scale bracket, the party breakdown again shows that Democrats predominated over Republicans. In the regional breakdown, members at this scale level, who switched from opposition to support after the ballot on the constitutional amendment, came from the Pacific wine-growing states, and the Border, New England, and East North Central States. At the highest level of support, prohibitionists carried the label of both parties, which indicates the non-partisan nature of the prohibition coalition. By regions, the West North Central, the South, the Border, and Mountain states supported the amendment more strongly than the rest of the country.

Overall, the most noticeable voting pattern revealed within the Democratic party was a geographical split. Although the Republicans had no significant geographical divisions, Democratic opposition to Chapter I for historiography on prohibition and the farm.
TABLE 4-1A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON PROHIBITION

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SCALE POSITION</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>

The order of the roll calls is 161, 160, 174, 71, 177
Percent at each point on the scale 9, 5, 3, 9, 21, 53
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .970
## TABLE 4-1:B
### SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON PROHIBITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Position</th>
<th>Motion</th>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1   VAR 161</td>
<td>To pass Bill S. 3935 prohibiting the sale, manufacture, and importation of intoxicating liquors in the Territory of Hawaii during the period of the war, except as herein after provided. 237-30; + = yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 6741.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2   VAR 160</td>
<td>To refer Bill S. 3935, (40 STAT-560, May 23, 1918), prohibiting the sale, manufacture, and importation of intoxicating liquors in the Territory of Hawaii during the period of war, except as hereinafter provided, to the committee on Territories with instructions to report back with amendment removing the two year limitation regarding appeal. 40-239; + = nay. Ibid., 6739.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3   VAR 174</td>
<td>To discharge the Committee on Agriculture from further consideration of H. RES. 394, a resolution requesting the President to report to the H. of Rep. whether any order has been issued by the U. S. Fuel Administration restricting the supply of coal to persons engaged in manufacture of intoxicating liquors. 205 - 47; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 8, 8137.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4   VAR 71</td>
<td>To agree to S. J. RES. 17, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors. 282-128; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 1, 469.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5   VAR 177</td>
<td>To table H. RES. 399, requesting the President to report to the H. of Rep. whether any order has been issued restricting the supply and transportation of materials and machinery for use in manufacture of intoxicating liquors or the transportation of such liquors. 142-159; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 8, 8358.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
prohibition clustered more nearly in the three Northeastern regions. These Democrats, representing city and Catholic ethnic constituencies, registered their protest against the party's dominant position. In 1918, signs of the growing regional strife, which would divide the Democracy in the 1920's, were already appearing.

In January, 1918, the House took-up another constitutional amendment, this time on women's suffrage. The movement for the amendment had been gathering momentum for several years, but during 1917, its forward progress accelerated. In January, 1917, suffragettes started continuous picketing of the White House. Hoping to dramatize their cause, they also desired to push Wilson toward more aggressive support of the amendment. Some congressmen, particularly anti-suffragists, fumed against the tactic as an insult to the President. The pickets continued, nonetheless, since they spotlighted demands of the movement. Meanwhile in Congress, suffrage leaders such as John Raker (D-Cal.) and Jeannette Rankin organized their cohorts. In September, 1917, they proposed creation of a special House committee on suffrage. The Judiciary Committee, which usually heard constitutional amendments, was chaired by Edwin Webb, the leading opponent of the amendment. Since he had long refused to permit a favorable report of the amendment, suffragists hoped to bypass his committee with a new Women Suffrage Committee. They succeeded when the House agreed on a roll call, 181 to 107, to establish the new committee.32


32Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 94; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7384.
With this lopsided vote indicating the suffragists' strength, President Wilson increasingly moved toward open avowal of the movement. His previous stance had been that the Presidency had no constitutional role in the amendment process, since Congress exclusively initiated the amendment process. Moreover, Wilson, as he tried to side-step the issue, maintained that his party had not taken a position in favor of a national amendment. His statements, however, became progressively more positive. In October he told a group of suffragists that he favored the amendment, because the war brought to the fore fundamental issues and women's suffrage was one of the most essential. He still believed, nonetheless, that the states should settle the matter. In January, 1918, the President finally reversed course, and though he did not start to actively pressure Congress for passage until later, he now squarely supported the amendment. Many of his Democratic party members, particularly Southern ones, were not pleased, but they could not stop the well-organized movement, now aided by war ideals and by the advocacy of the President.

The new Committee on Women's Suffrage held hearings on the Susan B. Anthony Amendment, starting January 3, 1918. The opposition witnesses were led by Mrs. James Wadsworth. They argued that women found their dignity only in the home, and that in New York, where a suffrage amendment had recently won, Socialists, pacifists and German sympathizers had given it the margin necessary to pass. Pro-suffragist witnesses rejected out of hand anti-suffragist claims, arguing instead that the German-Socialist vote in New York affected

33Washington Post, January 10, 1917, 1; New York Times, October 24, 1917, 1; November 10, 1917, 1; and January 10, 1918, 1.
the outcome hardly at all. Turning to the attack, suffragists main-
tained that anti-feminist simply did not realize the great changes
occurring in the world. As Carrie C. Catte, President of the National
Women's Suffrage Association stated, female security no longer de-
pended on the reverence of the male, but on her rights before the law.
Women, suffragists elaborated, had broken out of the home, and now
demanded their inherent rights as protection against abuse by employers.
The suffragist witnesses also maintained that their aim harmonized
with the democratic ideals of the war and would help contribute to
the war effort by boosting the morale of women.34

Backed by a favorable report from the Women's Suffrage Committee,
general debate on the House floor commenced January 10, 1918. On one
plane, the debate focused on the immediate implications of a favorable
vote. On another plane, the debate probed into the fundamental
attitudes for support or opposition. Supporters of the amendment
argued that the war was being fought for the uplift of humanity and
the advancement of democracy. Miss Rankin closed her speech with the
rhetorical question, "How shall we explain to them (the peoples of the
world) the meaning of democracy if the same Congress that voted for
war to make the world safe for democracy refuses to give this small
measure of democracy to the women of our country?"35 The suffragist
opposition also appealed to the war for vindication of their position.
Willfred Lufkin (R-Mass.) claimed that conditions were too unsettled

34Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 96; and U. S. Congress, House
Extending the Right to Suffrage to Women, Hearings, on H. J. Res.
200, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 120, 57, 320, 245, 29.
for deciding grave constitutional questions. Developing this theme, James Parker (R-N.J.) added that the House must avoid divisive issues in favor of proposals that unified the people and cemented the war machine together. Overall, the suffragists gained the advantage because the war ideals, as phrased by Wilson, placed the opponents of the amendment on the defensive.

On the second plane, both political calculation and social and moral ideals shaped a representative's vote. John Moon (D-Tenn.) explained that he opposed the amendment because the overwhelming majority of his constituents opposed it. J. Hampton Moore (R-Pa.), too, reduced the issue to a simple determination of his constituents' wishes. Questions of right or wrong aside, he declared that his voters' opinions determined his vote against the amendment. On the suffragist side, James Cantrill (D-KY), who had just conferred with Wilson on the amendment, counseled his Democratic brethren to vote for the amendment to ensure future party success at the polls. He explained his contention by pointing out that, in the 1916 election, Wilson carried the West because of the female vote. Particularly alarmed by the possible negative vote of Southerners, he reminded them of their grave responsibility as the dominant element in the party during a time when democracy demanded positive support.

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36Ibid., 790, 763-64.
37Ibid., 765, 778.
38Ibid., 764; and Stringer, "Aswell, Educator and Politician," 86-87. At least one congressman voted against his constituents' expressed positions. John Esch in January, 1917, stated that he could not support women suffrage because his district had registered its disapproval in several recent ballots. Nonetheless, in January, 1918, he voted yea. See John Esch to Alfred L. Deves, January 13, 1917,
Significantly, Cantrill's advice and his reference to his con-
ference with Wilson brought prolonged laughter and jeers from fellow
Democrats and Republicans alike. The House's response indicated that
a congressman's attitudes and ideals were more fundamental than
political considerations. Placing the whole movement in the context
of democratic evolution, Miss Rankin linked the amendment to the basic
democratic desires of the American people. She went on to say that
the suffrage movement sought the realization of justice which would
allow equal opportunity and equal freedom for both male and female.
Similarly, Clyde Kelly (R-PA) pictured women's suffrage as fitting
the new "epoch" that the war commenced because both asserted the
ideals of equality and liberty. But he also talked, as did other
suffragists, of the uplifting influence that women's suffrage would
have on public morality. Women had already demonstrated their redemp-
tive quality in social work; their beneficial influence should spread
to politics, also.39

At this point anti-suffragists showed a traditional and mascu-
line bias in their rebuttals to the suffragists' viewpoint. To critics
women belonged not in public life but in the home; otherwise, the
family unit would be destroyed. The female in their view lacked the
strength, intelligence, and above all the firmness and hardness of
the male. The world in their mind was divided between security and
purity of the home and the battlefield of the business, political, and
military worlds. Frank Clark of Florida cited Herbert Spencer as an

39Ibid., 771, 769.
authority on women's abilities. To Spencer women were emotionally and mentally incapable of carrying the burdens of government. If women left the home, the result would not only be the destruction of a sacred haven but also the weakening of the competitive and hardfisted world of men.40

It seemed to the suffragists that their opponents completely ignored the numerous new roles that women played in American society. Ira Hersey (R-Maine) noted that in the war women were serving in all branches of industry and on the battlefield as nurses. Having become more than either the slave or the little angel of men, women, Edward Little (R-Kans.) declared, were capable people who were helping to win the war. Although most proponents limited the woman's new role to war activities, several, who were often ardent prohibitionists, stressed the woman's moral role in the general advancement of mankind. They rejected the opponents' view of the world as necessarily evil. Besides, even if this were true, women should not retreat to the hearth but should, these suffragists argued, exercise their spiritual vitality and sympathy to help transform the world.41 While this argument was designed to attract the advocates of other reforms, suffragists at the same time believed that women had in truth developed a finer moral sense than males.42

40Ibid., 777, 763-64, 783-84.
41Ibid., 778, 791, 793, 796, 780-81, 771, 774, 798; and Nethers, "Simeon Fess," 320-21.
The suffragist debates were complicated by the concealment of anti-suffragists' real opinion behind a states-rights argument. Briefly, the states-rights thesis ran that the Constitution placed electoral matters in the hands of the states. The women's suffrage amendment was a "lawless invasion" of state privilege, which would jeopardize the integrity of the states. Proponents countered by pointing out that the anti-suffragists had often voted for restrictions on states rights, for example, in the case of prohibition. Since most Southern representatives had voted for prohibition, they were forced to explain the apparent inconsistency. They did so by insisting that a difference existed between the two amendments, namely, that the prohibition amendment dealt with police powers while the suffrage amendment involved voting powers.43

Though the South's states-rights argument accounted for the inconsistency, it nonetheless concealed a basic reason for their opposition to the amendment, which was their fear over the effect of women voting on race relations. To Southerners, prohibition would have beneficial effects on the Negro race since it would increase the black's economic potential while it also would help subdue and discipline his passions. In effect, prohibition would only increase the South's police power by strengthening its control over the Negro.44

The situation reversed itself in the case of women's suffrage. Carter Glass wrote a constituent that there is "danger of permitting the federal authority to have anything whatever to do with the franchise


44 Ibid., 772, 789, 797-98, 805-06.
The only time there was ever federal intervention it took the extreme form of perpetrating the crime of Negro enfranchisement."45 It is true that Southern opposition revealed a deep strain of anti-feminist and traditionist sentiment which would oppose women's suffrage even by state amendment. Still, Southerner's fears were heightened by the specter of federal marshals at the polling places and Negro women in the voting booths.

After the conclusion of House debates, three roll calls occurred over the suffrage amendment. Since three other votes were taken during the session over other suffrage questions, the House recorded altogether six ballots. One roll call established the Women's Suffrage Committee and two others referred bills to the new Committee. Of the constitutional amendment roll calls, two represented attempts by opponents to undermine the amendment by inserting limiting clauses into it. The first required state conventions rather than state legislatures to approve the amendment, and the second limited the ratification period to seven years. Anti-suffragists supported these motions as a means to defeat the amendment on the state level. Suffragists, who saw through the intentions of the anti-suffragists, opposed and defeated the two motions.46 The final ballot involved passage of the constitutional amendment itself, which won, just barely, the necessary two-thirds support of the House (Table 4-2:B).

These six votes were subjected to the usual quantitative tests. As in the case of the prohibition amendment, the women's amendment

45Glass to Mrs. S. J. Hartsook, January 16, 1918, Box 107, Folder 1918, Glass Papers.

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<th>Position</th>
<th>Motion</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>VAR 109</td>
<td>To table motion discharging the committee on territories from further consideration of H. R. 4665, granting to the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii additional powers relative to elections and qualifications of electors and refering the same to the Committee on Woman Suffrage. 64-268; + = nay. <em>Cong. Rec.</em>, 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3491.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>VAR 72</td>
<td>To refer the two Bills, H. R. 242 and H. R. 3371, protecting the rights of women citizens of the United States to register and vote for Senators of the U. S. and members of the House of Representatives by transferring same from the committee on election of President, Vice President, and Representatives in Congress, to the Committee on Woman's Suffrage. 234-107; + = yea. <em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 515.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>VAR 63</td>
<td>To adopt H. RES. 12, amending the rules of the House of Rep. as follows: Amending rule X by adding a subdivision to be numbered 51A as follows: 51A on Woman Suffrage, to consist of 13 members; To amend rule XI by adding a subdivision as follows, &quot;51A all proposed action touching the subject of Woman Suffrage, to the Committee on Woman Suffrage.&quot; 181-107; + = yea. <em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7384.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VAR 78</td>
<td>To amend H. J. RES. 200, by making inoperative this article unless ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures within 7 years from the date of submission to the states. 158-247; + = nay. <em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 809.</td>
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</table>
called into existence a discrete and single-issue voting coalition since its votes related with few other ballots. Women's suffrage has long been accorded status as a progressive measure by historians who generally describe progressivism as having at least a phase devoted to the spread of democratic forms. In terms of constitutional changes, this meant that progressivism sought the direct election of senators and the recall and the referendum, along with women's suffrage. Since the 65th Congress considered only the women's suffrage amendment, it would be logical to assume that no similar voting blocs would exist. Such was the case particularly since other progressive issues, such as taxation, generated a totally different set of ideas and sentiments and consequently a separate set of voting blocs. Further, other roll calls that included farm and war issues indicated no consistent relationships either. Women's suffrage mobilized a new, but not insignificant, voting alignment.

Because the votes correlated, a scalogram was computed, thereby indicating the degree of support for the amendment (Table 4-2:A). A quarter of the House membership rejected all votes that advanced the women's cause or agreed to only one ballot--this vote on a referral motion after the victory of the amendment. The anti-suffragists disproportionally represented the Democratic party: eighty-seven, compared to sixteen Republicans. The overwhelming majority of these Democrats, sixty-nine, hailed from the Southern states, while seven more came from the Border states. The rest represented the

47 The Women's votes did correlate with two farm roll calls. Perhaps a small regional influence is thereby detected by this fact, since the particular farm votes won strong support from the West as did the women's amendment.
### TABLE 4-2:A

SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

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<th>R</th>
<th>BS D</th>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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The order of the roll calls is 109, 72, 77, 79, 63, 78
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 10, 5, 3, 4, 12, 50
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .948
Northeast, the region from which fifteen of the sixteen Republican opponents were also elected. At the medium level of support, a small swing group of twelve percent is to be found. A close evaluation of the roll call scale order reveals an interesting point on the swing group: the roll calls at this medium level include the constitutional amendment votes, while those at the high level consist of two suffrage motions that came before that roll call. Given this order, the swing group first tried to oppose the amendment but once finding that they could not defeat it, they voted for it. Otherwise, the swing group reveals no important party or geographical characteristics. Supporting the women's suffrage movement most consistently were the Republicans, who rallied seventy-nine percent of their members in support. Since forty-six percent of the Democrats similarly voted as did these Republicans, women's suffrage, in a strict sense, created a non-partisan coalition. Yet, the Democratic divisions and the greater Republican solidarity clearly demonstrate which party more avidly backed women's suffrage. Regionally, the Western states (MS and PS) gave emphatic and total approval while the West North Central states also firmly sustained the women's cause.

In some respects the suffrage coalition showed a connection with the advocates of prohibition. Both prohibitionists and suffragists came from the Mountain and West North Central regions in disproportional numbers, while the East North Central, Pacific, and Border states gave roughly average support. The greatest difference between the coalitions existed in the South, which voted for prohibition and against women's suffrage. In sum, women's suffrage mobilized a coalition with a larger number of Republicans than Democrats who represented
in greater percentages the Western and West North Central regions. The opposition consisted mainly of Southern Democrats, who were concerned over the effect of women's suffrage on traditional values, states rights, and race relations. Opponents also included some Northeastern Democratic and Republican congressmen who represented conservative-minded old stock Yankees and recent immigrants.

Conduct of the War

The House, at the same time that it considered the democratic implications of the war, increasingly became embroiled in controversy over the conduct of the war. The vast appropriations for military mobilization, the decline of Allied fortunes in Europe during the fall of 1917, and the leisurely pace of the War Department fostered growing alarm among congressmen. In response to these apprehensions, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, on December 12, started a probe of the Ordnance office to determine if shortages of guns and artillery existed. General William Croizer, head of Ordnance, and other officers evaded the Senators' questions, denied failures, or shifted responsibility—either toward Congress or in the direction of Secretary of War Baker. The testimony of Surgeon General William Gorges, however, revealed alarming medical conditions in several army camps.48 On the House side, criticism also surfaced, though on a more muted note. The Naval Affairs Committee started hearings on conditions in the Navy Department, not because of any specific charges but as a parallel to

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48 Washington Post, September 4, 1917; New York Times, December 2, 1917, Section VII, 2; December 12, 1917, 1; December 19, 1917, 1; and Lindsay Rogers, "Cooperation Between Congress and the Executive," Nation, CV (December 27, 1917), 714-16.
the Senate's investigation of the Army. An interim report in early January, instead of criticizing the Navy Department, praised it. Meanwhile several House Republicans, who had recently returned from France, issued a gloomy report on conditions overseas. According to Medill McCormick (R-Ill.) and George H. Tinkham (R-Mass.), American forces suffered from shortages of guns and ammunition. Fed by such charges, plus the finding of the Senate investigation, Administration antagonists prepared for a fullscale attack on the war program.

Congressional critics launched their assault by charging Secretary Baker with incompetence and by demanding the reorganization of the war machine. Senator George E. Chamberlain (D-Oreg.), chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, drafted a proposal for a minister of supply with cabinet status and requested that Baker appear before his Committee. Simultaneously, Horace M. Towner (R-Iowa) and William P. Borland (D-Mo.) introduced into the House bills similar to Chamberlain's, both of which would establish cabinet-level military ordnance departments. Coming before the Senate Committee on January 10, 1918, Baker rejected the ministry proposal as overlapping with a new war council recently set up by the army. When the Committee questioned Baker on the alleged ammunition shortages and camp deficiencies, he categorically denied any problems out of the ordinary. From

49 New York Times, December 20, 1917, 1; January 14, 1; and U. S. Congress, House, Conduct and Administration of Naval Affairs, Investigation, Hearings before the Naval Affairs Committee, 65 Cong., 2 Sess.


the Senators' perspective, Baker's manner, which had been rather casual and offhanded, was irritating. They also thought that he withheld full information on military conditions. Criticism only intensified.52

On January 17, Fuel Administrator Harry Garfield gave Administra
tion critics more ammunition when he issued an order closing North­eastern coal-burning factories (except munition plants) for five days and on Mondays for the next several weeks. Ostensibly, the order was designed to clear railroad coal car congestion and move coal to the points experiencing the most critical shortages, the cities and seaports.53 In the House, Republicans reaction was hostile: co­leader Gillett introduced a resolution which would suspend the Garfield edict. In what developed as the first full-scale House debate on the war's conduct, Madden and Lenroot charged "absolute incompetency," and Gillett bewailed the repercussions of Garfield's order on war pro­duction and on workers' wages. Democratic spokesmen, who largely stayed out of the debate, confessed that they did not know the exact reasons for the order, although Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) lamely added that "it must be needed." Criticism of the order continued for the next several days.54

With the political atmosphere highly charged, the opposition to the Administration started to coalesce around Chamberlain's proposal

52Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 80-89; New York Times, January 11, 1918, 1; January 13, 1917, 1; and January 16, 1918, 1.

53Ibid., January 17, 1918, 1.

54Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 974, 973, 984, 990, 983, 993, 1038-44; Washington Post, January 18, 1918, 1; January 19, 1918, 2; New York Times, January 18, 1918, 1; and January 19, 1918, 1.
to reorganize the cabinet. Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.),
leading Republican member of the Military Affairs Committee, told
the National Security League that the War Department had collapsed.
Kahn also gave his endorsement to the Chamberlain proposal. While
a few Democrats joined in the criticisms, Republicans met in caucus
over whether or not to support the Chamberlain plan. Since they
failed to reach an agreement, ex-president Teddy Roosevelt, who had
long been predicting disaster, rushed to Washington. Conferring with
leading Republicans at the home of his son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth
(R-Ohio), Roosevelt argued for more "constructive criticism" of the
Administration. House Republicans again caucused and this time agreed
to support the establishment of a "director" of munitions, a suggestion
that the President strongly opposed. However, they hesitated to take
immediate action on their proposal and decided instead to allow the
Senate to act first.  

Up to January 20, President Wilson and House Democrats had not
mobilized a counter-attack. Under the increasing pressure, they
organized a series of blows that threw critics into disarray. Wilson
initiated the offensive when, in a blunt letter to Chamberlain, he
claimed that the Senator was guilty of "astonishing and absolutely
unjustified distortions of the truth." Wilson also rejected the
cabinet plan.  

55 Ibid., January 20, 1918, 1; January 16, 1918, 3; and Beaver,
Newton D. Baker, 97.

56 Washington Post, January 24, 1918, 1; and New York Times,
January 24, 1918, 1.

57 Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 93. See
chapter five and six for a general discussion of the War Department
leaders, Baker requested another session before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Shedding his former evasive manner, Baker masterfully cited a ream of statistics which demonstrated that the War Department had not in fact collapsed. Shortly before his defense he had appointed Edward Stettinus, a widely respected financial leader, as Surveyor General of Army Purchase and had also reorganized some of army bureaus.\textsuperscript{58} Congressional response to Baker improved as a result of his new candor and more decisive action, and as the opposition started to break-up Wilson initiated the final counterstroke. On February 6, Wilson called in Democratic Senators and gave them a bill that entrusted the President with power to organize the government in order to improve war coordination. Robbing the critics of their own plan while maintaining Presidential authority, Wilson's plan completed the regrouping of the Democrats behind the President and the rout of his opponents.\textsuperscript{59}

From then on criticism subsided: the Chamberlain plan passed into oblivion, while the President's bill sped toward enactment.

Carter Glass defended the Administration in an extended House speech on February 7. Noted for not mincing his words, Glass accused Chamberlain of "theatricism," called the criticism "foolish," and declared the war program a success.\textsuperscript{60} No appropriate rejoinder by the critics

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{58} Bever, Newton D. Baker, 97-100; New York Times, January 26, 1918, 1; January 27, 1918, 1; January 30, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, January 26, 1918, 4.

\textsuperscript{59} New York Times, February 7, 1918, 1; February 11, 1918, 1; February 14, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, February 7, 1918, 1.

\textsuperscript{60} New York Times, February 8, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
followed, though a few more anti-administration speeches were heard in the House. Representative Fess, on the same day as Glass' speech, meekly suggested that the Administration required an infusion of new ideas. A few days later Gillett, offering a disquisition on congressional grants of power to the Executive, deplored Administration failures but was unable to suggest any alternative. On February 18, the final shot of the winter crisis was fired by Horace Towner, who insisted that his plan for a munitions department offered the best solution. No one listened, and soon the House, in a fit of near absent-mindedness, passed the President's proposal instead.  

No direct roll call was demanded on the President's reorganization plan, but one did come over an effort to curtail the bill's power. In particular, opponents attempted to grant immunity to the Interstate Commerce Commission from the effects of the President's reorganizing power. Although the Commission enjoyed high prestige among members of both parties, the amendment vote, which enlisted the support of eighty-three Republicans but only eleven Democrats, clearly demonstrated that partisan considerations outweighed solicitude for the ICC (Table 4-3). Republicans in Southern, Border, and Western (MS and PS) states voted below that party's average support; however, the variation fails to signify significant discordant voting. More importantly, the Republican majority did not mobilize fully forty-two  


61Ibid., 1831-32, 2170-71; Pt. 3, 2290; New York Times, May 8, 1918, 9; May 14, 1918, 12; and May 15, 1918, 1. Towner's speech consisted of only a few remarks on the House floor, which he then extended in the Record. A few more speeches were made but they were proforma performances. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2546, 2548.
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percent of their membership. Throughout the winter attack on the Administration some Republicans adopted a moderate or neutral stance; consequently, the two Republican caucuses that assembled during this period failed to attract large numbers of the Republicans. Only ninety-five out of a possible 210 attended the first meeting, and it adjourned without reaching any decision on policy. The second caucus, which attracted a slightly larger attendance of 125, could agree only to a watered-down compromise bill instead of the Chamberlain bill. Apparently, a sizable number of moderate Republicans feared charges by the press of partisan politics. In any event, the Democratic rout of the Administration's adversaries, as reflected in the roll call, was aided by disunity in Republican ranks.

Also enabling the Administration to finally triumph was the fact that House Democrats never broke into splinter groups, although such dissatisfaction existed over administration muzzling of military information and over autocratic direction of the war program that Representative Borland even introduced a war cabinet proposal. House Democrats also showed their displeasure by not defending the Administration during Republican attacks. Yet, the Democrats knew that the Wilson Administration was their administration, and their success rested in Wilson's victory. In the end the Democrats rallied behind

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62 New York Times, January 16, 1918, 3; and January 24, 1918, 1.

63 Washington Post, January 26, 1918, 4; and New York Times, January 12, 1918, 3.

64 A few Democrats spoke up for the Administration during the Garfield order uproar. However, they usually allowed the Republicans to blow off steam without interruption. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 973-93, 1038-44, for Democratic defenses of the Garfield order.
Wilson, though their doing so came at the high price of granting the President additional powers.

While the major crisis of the war receded into the background, a mini-explosion flamed up in April. George Creel and his Committee on Public Information had long drawn the fire of congressmen because he acted as a propagandist not only for the war but also for the Administration. He also inflamed passions by his obvious doctoring of news stories, by his egotism, and by his impulsiveness. Criticisms had, however, been sporadic before April, but he solidified opponents when he stated, "I will be proud to my dying day that my country was inadequately prepared when it entered the conflict." Congressmen pounced on this pacifist-like remark. Creel then increased his difficulties when he denied charges by Representative Allen Treadway (R-Mass.) that the Committee on Public Information sent propaganda materials to soldiers in France. He declared the accusation to be "totally baseless" and added that Treadway should have checked his sources before flinging charges.65

The House, particularly the Republican side, hotly criticized Creel for his remarks. Longworth demanded Creel's resignation and other Republicans moved to censor him. Democrats rebutted a claim by Republicans that they always supported the Administration and pointed out that they actually attacked the Administration at every opportunity. The vote on motions to reject the report in which Creel made his reply to Treadway reflected the high partisanship behind the debate. Only

65 New York Times, July 11, 1917, 8; July 15, 1917, 1; December 15, 1917, 2; Washington Post, April 10, 1918, 3; April 12, 1918, 3; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4973-77; and Gruber, Mars and Minerva, 139.
one or two members from either party broke ranks as ninety-nine percent of each party opposed the other. Since the Republicans had more members on the floor, they won the rejection of the report. Further confrontations ensued after Creel attempted to have the last word; he told reporters that he would not "inquire into the heart of Congress" because he "did not like to go slumming." After this insulting remark, the House Rules Committee demanded an apology; Creel retracted the remark, but the House membership was not through with him. They delivered the final blow when they cut his Committee's appropriation from $2 million to $1.25 million.

Aliens and Dissenters

During the winter of 1918, a less than amicable atmosphere also prevailed in the House over a number of other issues, one of which was the status of alien "slackers." The issue arose because American treaty arrangements with Allied and neutral countries prohibited the conscription into the U.S. military of their nationals who resided in America. When many aliens refused induction based on their treaty rights, many American citizens demanded that these aliens, who received the nation's benefits, should also shoulder its duties. Adding to the public's discontent was the fact that the draft based its quotas on the total population of a district without regard to its alien population. Thus, areas of immigrant concentration were forced

66Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4975, 4977-78, 4980; and Washington Post, April 21, 1918, 10.

67Ibid., May 17, 1918, 17, 2; May 18, 1918, 2; June 18, 1918, 2; New York Times, June 14, 1918, 8; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7915.
to draft a higher percentage of citizens than in regions of low
alien population. Given these conditions, considerable demand
arose outside of Congress and in Congress for harsher treatment of
the alien "slacker." 68

In September, 1917, Representatives John Burnett (D-Ala.) and
John Rogers (R-Mass.) introduced a slacker bill that required
the alien either to enter the military or face deportation. 69
The bill was assigned to the Military Affairs Committee which first
heard Secretary of State Robert Lansing and later the bill's sponsors.
The Secretary acknowledged the inequalities in current conditions,
but in extenuation he pointed to treaty obligations of the government.
These, Lansing continued, would not permit a law requiring military
service from aliens. To change current draft laws, he added, would
adversely affect relations with neutral nations, drive out of the
country skilled labor, and disrupt commercial activities. He con­
cluded by saying, however, that the Department was initiating discus­
sions with the treaty countries in order to revise the draft status of
aliens. During Lansing's statement Military Affairs committee members had
interjected that the public was demanding action on alien slackers.
Moreover, Frank L. Greene (R-Vt.) insisted to Lansing that the drafted
native soldier risked his life while the alien remained at home in
safety. John Q. Tilson (R-Conn.) added that the current draft law
unjustly discriminated against districts with many aliens. The
Committee implied to Lansing that the State Department must speed

68 Washington Post, September 20, 1917, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65
Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7384-85.

action on the treaties, or else the House would take matters into its own hands.  

After Lansing left the committee room, sponsor Rogers presented several proposals to the committee which he had designed to meet some of the Secretary's objections. He agreed with Lansing that the sections on neutral and enemy aliens ought to be removed, but he insisted that those on co-belligerent aliens should remain. With the bill's application thus narrowed, he next advocated that aliens ought not be drafted; however, the bill should continue to provide for the deportation of all aliens who refused to be drafted. Earlier Greene had asked Lansing about such a proposal. Diplomatically phrasing his reply, the Secretary had answered that it would be most "unfortunate" to deport aliens. Rogers acknowledged Lansing's position but rejected it because he disliked the granting of special privileges to aliens. Though some committee members agreed with Roger's nationalism, the Committee decided that they would wait and see if Lansing actually revised the alien status treaties.

When the State Department proved too dilatory, Burnett, Rogers, and others in January, 1918, revived the alien slacker bill. This time the legislation came under the auspices of the Naturalization and Immigration Committee, which Burnett headed. The Committee quickly agreed to the bill and won time on the floor for it in February, 1918.

Henry Flood. (D-Va.), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, opposed

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71 Ibid., 16, 20-22, 30, 34, 8; Washington Post, September 27, 1917, 7; and September 28, 1917, 6.
it as unnecessary. The State Department, he explained, was conducting its negotiations as rapidly as possible. He added that the bill's principle was defective even if the Department was not conducting negotiations because it established a precedent that could be used against Americans residing in foreign countries. Disregarding these international ramifications, Burnett characterized the alien "slacker" as a "sinister parasite" feeding on the American nation. The concern for "justice" that had earlier been voiced in the Military Affairs Committee largely disappeared. In its place appeared a stark nationalism that demanded the deportation of aliens regardless of the violation of treaty rights. Burnett even read into the Record a letter from the alien-baiting Patriotic Order of Sons praising the bill.

Not all opponents of aliens, however, lined up in support of the bill. For example, Albert Johnson (R-Wash.), a strong restrictionist, opposed the bill as rendering American treaties "mere scraps of paper." The majority, however, agreed with Burnett's aggressive nationalism, which permitted them to vent their rage not only against aliens but also upon the State Department. The bill won 234 to 130 on the key roll call.72

In the end the majority's anger turned to frustration as the State Department successfully sabotaged the bill in the Senate. Before the upper House could act on the alien bill, Lansing introduced the treaties. The Senate then stopped proceedings on the Burnett alien bill. After this happened, Lansing withdrew the treaties. With

the alien law thus sidetracked, Rogers vehemently protested Lansing's duplicity and the House attempted no further action.\footnote{Ibid., Pt. 8, 7389-85.}

Similarly, two proposals on alien voting came to naught. In one case, Representative Flood introduced a bill which barred from voting aliens who had not taken out their first naturalization papers. Representative Montague introduced a constitutional amendment that removed all voting rights of aliens irrespective of the commencement of naturalization procedures. In both cases the proposals struck at the practices of ten states, including New York, which did not prohibit alien voting. Only the Montague scheme came to a hearing before the Judiciary Committee. Presenting the amendment as a protection device, Montague argued before the Committee that foreign elements could control or influence elections in eight or nine of the ten states. This threatening condition, he postulated, must not be "acquiesced in" because the "preservation of our nation" hung in the balance.

Foreign countries, Montague continued, would purposely colonize America in order to control elections and to undermine American independence. Returning to more solid ground, he concluded that America had moved too rapidly in allowing immigrants into the country. Apparently the Judiciary subcommittee did not agree with Montague's combination of apocalyptic fantasies and restrictionist sentiments. At least, they failed to report the amendment out of the Committee.\footnote{New York Times, March 12, 1918; and U. S. Congress, House, Limiting the Right to Vote to Citizens of the United States, Hearings on H. J. Res. 270, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-8.}

Behind Montague's apprehensions lurked the fear that aliens and "sinister" forces were nearly one and the same. In particular
the alien and the "dangerous" anarchist had long been firmly linked together in popular thought. Laws as of 1918 provided that alien anarchists who had been in the United States less than five years could be deported. The Department of Labor and the Justice Department found the five-year law too restrictive. In its place, the Departments wanted a bill that provided an unlimited period of time for deporta-
tion. They also suggested that the bill contain a new and broader definition of anarchist, to include all those who believed in the violent overthrow of the American government. The Naturalization and Immigration Committee, which had jurisdiction on this proposal, agreed readily and reported the bill under the floor direction of Albert Johnson. In his analysis the bill supported one more "step on the part of the United States toward cleaning up its citizenship." Not unexpectantly, he pictured anarchists as "rats gnawing at the very foundations of our government." From his vantage point and also that of Jacob Meeker (R-Mo.), the war both roused Americans to the danger and offered the opportunity to rid the country of such freeloading and dangerous riffraff. John M. C. Smith (R-Mich.) rounded off the Americanism theme by asserting that the proposed law would further the development of a good, loyal, and "flag-waving" citizenry. If any representatives disagreed with his colleagues' prejudices, he elected not to express his opinions. The bill passed without a division.75

75Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 8109-8127. Congressman Smith was also advocating the adoption of a bill to punish "insults" to the flag. See Ibid., Pt. 6, 6176. The Alien Law of 1918 served as the basis for deportation of radical aliens after the war. See Robert K. Murray, Red Scare, A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 14, 196, 247, 213-17, and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 182-83, 193, 207, 218, for a discussion on the law's application.
Notwithstanding such attitudes as those voiced on the Alien Deportation bill, the House did not always follow a repressive course on aliens. As the war progressed, particularly when Congress declared war against Austria-Hungary, problems arose over the status of "enemy aliens." First, the naturalization of all enemy aliens had ceased after April 6, 1917. Since this inadvertently blocked the completion of naturalization by enemy aliens who had taken first papers, the House received protests from aliens so affected. John Raker (D-Cal.) responded to their demands and steered a bill through the House that rectified the situation. A second bill passed the House, without debate, concerning certain aliens from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Many in Congress did not believe that non-German nationalities of that Empire should be defined as enemy aliens. The bill, consequently, excluded them from classification as enemy aliens if they were serving in the American military.

However, when Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.) introduced another bill favorable to aliens, it stirred up many congressmen's prejudice about the racial "purity" of the American stock. His measure provided that certain Czecho-Slovak and Polish troops could receive American citizenship. Now fighting in the Allied armies, these soldiers had in the past resided in the United States. Sabath's bill allowed these former residents, if they wished, to become naturalized citizens while still in Europe. Assigned to the Naturalization Committee, this seemingly simple proposal unleashed a torrent of nationalistic bigotry.

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77 Ibid., Pt. 3, 3010.
Everis Hayes (R-Col.) conjured-up horrid images of the Czechs and Poles marrying "undesirables" and returning to the United States with them. To both Hayes and Albert Johnson, if such happened, the purging and cleansing of the American citizenry, which they named as the war's chief goal, would be undermined since these unions would propagate an ignorant and degenerated race of children that would subvert American institutions. Apparently, the whole Committee suffered from similar phobias about the contamination of American blood. At least, the Sabath bill did not win their endorsement.

Intolerance toward aliens fed upon itself and spread to attack other parts of the population. It grew not so much because of the breast-beating of the superpatriots, though they had their role, but because of long-term attitudes and wartime pressures for conformity. When the war started, members could still counsel caution in the speed with which the House enacted restrictive measures. The House even dared in face of demands for full-scale war to turn aside newspaper censorship provisions, foreign wire censorship, and a broadly worded sabotage bill. Increasingly, the war climate swept away all restraints as the country realized that all its resources and, above all, its men, would be required to crush the enemy. The "badgering of Baker" in part flowed from a real patriotic emotion that demanded the utmost


^79^See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 186, 199-203; and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 85-87, for a discussion of prewar nativist and repressive tendencies. Both authors stress that immediately before the war deep and broad-based phobias had developed against aliens and radicals.
dispatch and mobilization for war. Groups or individuals who appeared
to block the war or who refused to pledge one hundred percent support
became un-American. In the early days of the war the patriots sought
to entrap spies, but by the second session they wished to ferret out
"traitorous" speech and groups. As a result, when Socialist Meyer
London (N.Y.) called for greater freedom in expressing opinions, he
became an object of attack by several members, as the Socialist party
became suspect. Similarly, Clarence Miller (R-Minn.) singled out the
Non-Partisan League of the Northern Plains states as anti-war group
which ought to be suppressed. Others talked of "coward objections,"
"anarchists," "saboteurs" and related sinister forces supposedly at
work in America which must be either suppressed, deported, or pun­
ished. If any members were predisposed to oppose the trend, the
fear of attack from fellow members and blasts from the press restrained
their libertarian sympathies.

The Sedition Act was the congressional answer to the problem of
disloyalty. Written by Attorney General Thomas Gregory and advisers in
the Justice Department, the bill defined sedition as any means to
excite discontent against the government or to disturb the public
tranquility through inflammatory language. States had already passed
similar laws, with the result that Congress had grown used to the idea

80 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 855, 862; Pt. 2, 1572,
1872; Pt. 3, 2576; Pt. 4, 4214, 4242, 4281; Pt. 5, 4990, 5095; and
Pt. 8, 7542, 8108, 8112, 8162. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 112-13,
116-18, and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 181-199 for a general
discussion of wartime and postwar attitudes.

81 That congressmen feared attacks from press and fellow members
can be seen in the following citations: Cong. Rec., 65th Cong., Vol.
5, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 7320; Pt. 8, 8701; and Pt. 10, 10217, 10532.
of extreme measures.82 Thus when Representative Webb in January, 1918, introduced the bill, the House passed it after a short and uncontested debate. What discussion occurred made it abundantly clear that the House wanted legislation to silence hostile opinion and to curb radical groups such as the I.W.W.83 Sent to the Senate, the bill was expanded and then returned to the House. This time the House gave it slightly more attention, but the emphasis remained the same, the suppression of "loose" and "dangerous" speech. Meyer London attempted to describe the deleterious consequences of the bill, arguing that it would turn "people into cowards, hypocrites, and spies." But the House's nationalists rejected his libertarian argument and, instead, preferred to rout out, as Green of Iowa called them, the "pernicious vermin" who dared to attack the government. Behind the repressive attitude of the House was the war frenzy, which insisted, as Thaddeus Caraway (D-Ark.) said, that the country could not allow its young men to die in France while soap-box orators vilified the government. When the House voted on the conference report, London alone opposed the growing war intolerance, as the bill passed 293 to one.84

In general the House's majority had developed a harsh attitude toward aliens and dissenters by the late spring of 1918.85 From roll


84Ibid., Pt. 6, 6179-87; Washington Post, April 6, 1918, 2; May 7, 1918, 6; New York Times, April 25, 1918, 12; and May 5, 1918, 7.

85The House adopted other narrow-minded measures, and individual
call analysis of two ballots on the "alien slacker" law, some description of this majority can be given. The first vote on the bill, which sought to postpone debated on it, united a non-partisan coalition of sixty-seven percent of the Democrats and seventy-two percent of the Republicans in opposition to the motion (Table 4-4). The second ballot, which attempted to lessen the bills' severity by amendment, united a slightly lower percentage of both parties. Sixty-three percent of the Democrats and sixty-five percent of the Republicans refused to water down the bill (Table 4-5). This bi-partisan agreement is notable because House Democrats went against the Administration position on the bill. However, since at least the 64th Congress when many had voted to override Wilson's veto of the immigrant literacy bill, House Democrats had followed their own course on such matters.

The voting pattern revealed that the Far West (MS and PS regions), which likely transferred its phobia against the Japanese to all aliens, most strongly supported the anti-alien measure. Along with the South, which was the next strongest advocate of the measure, the Far West had the fewest number of immigrants. Regions with the larger numbers of aliens, the Northeast and Midwest, usually either provided average support or below average support for the bill. It is most likely that representatives from districts with large alien populations congressmen introduced confining legislation. See New York Times, June 2, 1918, section IV, 12; and Washington Post, July 14, 1918, 4.

\[86\text{Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1766; and Pt. 3, 2766.}\]

### TABLE 4-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H.R. 5667: ALIEN "SLACKER" DEPORTATION BILL*

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adopted a cautious position on the bill. On the one hand, they wanted
to appease the voters who were citizens; and on the other, they did
not wish to alienate foreign residents who either could vote or might
shortly be able to vote. Such district tensions operated most strongly
on Democrats of the Northeast, particularly the East North Central
states. In sum, Republicans evidenced little tension on the bill since
there were only small regional variations in their voting. Basically,
the same is true for the Democrats, though a greater tendency toward
division existed. This variation, as was true of prohibition also,
foreshadowed the cultural splits of the 1920's within the Democratic
party since Northeasterners opposed the other regions. By the spring
of 1918 a broadly based coalition supported restrictive measures.

Labor Policy

The wartime suspicion of divisive groups almost spread to include
organized labor. A number of congressmen thought that the government's
policy toward labor was too generous.88 Forthcoming during the
session as a result were a number of proposals to change the
government's labor policy. These proposals encompassed such areas as
conscription of labor, farm labor, convict labor, and speed of work.
Not all suggestions rested on anti-labor attitudes, nor did opponents
of labor win all the battles. In fact, the anti-labor attitudes of
some House members was offset by the progressive orientation of other
members. As a consequence, no coherent theme or labor policy emerged
from House actions.

88 Washington Post, April 14, 1918, 4; and April 16, 1918, 6.
In July, 1917, a threatened strike had come precariously close to occurring in the critical shipbuilding industry, and rumors of other strikes periodically recurred thereafter. When the Executive, however, did not suggest anti-strike legislation, several congressmen sought an opportunity to act on their own. In March, 1918, a bill came before the House which was designed to control and regulate the sale and use of explosives. Since the bill's purpose was to prevent the destruction of war industries.\(^8\)\(^9\) Joseph Cannon thought that "conspiracies" to prevent work were similar to schemes to "destroy" factories. Winning recognition on the floor, he offered an amendment to bar conspiracies, claiming that labor conditions were upset by "conspiratorial" organizations such as the Industrial Workers of the World. He conjectured that his amendment would not affect loyal groups such as the American Federation of Labor. Nonetheless, he conceded that his amendment really stopped strikes by any group. Several members protested. In their minds, Cannon's proposal not only was too drastic, but it also questioned the patriotism of labor.\(^9\)\(^0\)

The Cannon amendment came to a roll call and won overwhelmingly, 257 to fifty-nine. Immediately, George Y. Lunn (D-N.Y.), an ex-Socialist, offered a "clarifying" amendment which permitted "bona-fide" strikes for increased wages or improved conditions. Though this amendment, in effect, gutted the Cannon amendment, the House reversed its position and voted illogically for the Lunn Amendment, 273 to thirty-eight. Both were now included in one bill, which passed

\(^8\) U. S. Congress, House, Regulation of the Use of Explosives, Hearings, on H. R. 3633, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3-7.

and went to the Senate.  There the provision on explosives won acceptance, although those on strikes did not. A conference committee attempted to adjust the differences between the Senate and House bills but concluded that no harmony existed between the bills or between the Cannon and Lunn Amendments. The conferees pared the amendments and sent the bill back to the House. Returned to its original pristine status as a bill on explosives, it won acceptance from the House. Cannon closed the debates on the strike amendments by simply noting his confusion as to the House's conduct.

Analysis of the strike amendment roll calls yields only a few conclusions, one of which suggests a pro-labor position by some members (Tables 4-6 and 7). When Cannon and Lunn votes are correlated with roll calls that affected labor, it is found that opponents of the Cannon amendment voted in favor of a commission to study unemployment, which indicates their solicitude for labor. Secondly, since the House reversed itself from the initial vote, it is clear that many members did not really understand the Cannon proposal. However, an element did grasp the issue at stake. These members responded in a consistent manner either by voting for the Cannon proposal and against the Lunn amendment or by adopting the pro-labor positions on those amendments. The numbers in the two groups were small, fifty-six pro-labor members and thirty-eight Cannon supporters. Thirdly, no party or regional pattern emerges except among Northeastern Democrats who voted more

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91 Ibid., 3124-26; and New York Times, March 5, 1918, 15.
92 Ibid., April 6, 1918, 8; April 14, 1918, 12; Washington Post, April 14, 1918, 4; April 16, 1918, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5093.
### Table 4-6

**VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 383:**

**CANNON CONSPIRACY AMENDMENT***

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TABLE 4-7
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 383:
LUNN AMENDMENT*

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<th>BS</th>
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<td>84</td>
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</table>

frequently than other Democrats with Lunn. In short, the strike question cut across parties and all regions except the Northeast, revealing a trepidation to either support conspiracies or oppose "bona-fide" strikes.

On a second front, labor adherents battled to retain the seven-hour day. Since the 64th Congress, William P. Borland (D-Mo.) had been carrying on a one-man crusade to increase the legal workday for Washington, D.C., government clerks from seven hours to eight hours. During the first session he had offered amendments to several appropriation bills, but opponents easily turned these aside. By the second session, he had gained adherents to his position because of increasing pressure for greater war production. In the words of a new supporter, the "war demands...more work." Bred also by the war was a certain antagonism toward anyone who supposedly worked less than the norm. Borland characterized his proposal as requiring an "honest day's" work and as giving a "square deal" to the American taxpayer. Similarly, during floor debates on the Borland amendment, Clarence B. Miller (R-Minn.) claimed that the government "coddled" its workers, while John A. Sterling (R-Ill.) added that all should do the same amount of toil.

The defenders of government employees rejected the emotionalism of the Borland advocates and turned the House's attention toward actual working conditions. Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) pointed out that clerks already could be required to labor more than seven hours a day without overtime compensation. In fact, throughout the entire war period

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93 Ibid., Pt. 1, 308, 310.
94 Ibid., 308; and Pt. 4, 3563-64, 3558-59.
they had continuously worked over the limit. Another labor advocate, Edward Keating (D-Col.), added that government clerks would demand overtime pay if the amendment passed, whereas before they did without it. In any event, the opponent's factual case proved ineffective, even with the all-out backing of the American Federation of Labor. Borland succeeded in having his amendment attached to the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary Appropriation bill, and then defeated efforts to have it removed. The Senate concurred with the Borland amendment; President Wilson, however, refused to sign the bill and returned it to the House. In an attempt to override the Wilson veto, Borland forced a final roll call on his proposal. His motion lost, 246 to fifty, as not many members chose to directly confront the Chief Executive.

In the end winning the seven-hour day fight, labor proponents proved equally successful in securing a wage increase for government employees. Since the tremendous inflation during the war period had eaten into the fixed incomes of government workers, Edward Keating introduced a bill that responded to their plight. Gathering the support of the American Federation of Labor, the bill also received the endorsement of the Appropriations Committee. Committee members apparently concurred with William Wood (R-Ind.) that justice required the wage increase because of skyrocketing prices. In any event, once on the

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95Ibid., 3577; Pt. 8, 8313-14; and Washington Post, February 7, 1918, 5.

96Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3563-64; Pt. 7, 6439; Pt. 8, 8314; and Pt. 9, 8577, 8515.

floor, the proposal won the support of the House without extensive
debate and without recourse to a formal roll call.  

Since postal workers came under a separate government employee
classification and did not benefit from the wage hike, certain House
members pushed a special pay raise for them. Seventy or more repre-
sentatives, along with the legislative representative of the American
Federation of Labor, appeared before the Postal Committee to endorse
the pay boost. With this backing, the bill secured time on the
House floor in March, 1918. Debates clarified the need for the pay
increase: the decrease in value of postal workers' salaries from
inflation, the drain of employees to wartime industries with their
better salaries, and the importance of postal workers as representa-
tives of the government. However, a conflict in the proponent's ranks
appeared over whether or not the pay raises ought to be permanent or
temporary. Martin Madden offered an amendment to retain the higher
wages even in peacetime. Opposing this motion was John Moon, (D-Tenn.),
chairman of the Postal Committee, who described times as abnormal and
argued that with the return of peace, their old salary of $1,200 a
year would be sufficient. Henry Rainey agreed and added that Madden
had organized the Republicans, with sufficient numbers of Democrats,
for a "great salary grab." Cries of economy, however, did not deter
the coalition, and they carried Madden's amendment on a roll call.
Opponents quickly offered a motion to pare the Madden Amendment's

98Washington Post, January 3, 1918, 5; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3501.

99U. S. Congress, House, Salaries of Postal Employees, Hearings,
increases, but the postal bloc remained intact and defeated it, 311 to fifty-one.¹⁰⁰

Later in the session another bill aided the lowest paid government workers by establishing a minimum wage of three dollars a day.¹⁰¹ Overall, on the wage front, the House responded to the mounting inflation, though with increases less than the surge in prices. In the area of labor conditions, the House agreed with one position taken by labor backers and rejected another. The Senate had attached an amendment to the Naval Appropriation bill which granted bonuses to government shipyard workers for faster work. Seemingly, a benign measure to boost production in an all important war industry, it actually raised fundamental questions about labor conditions. Before the war, shipyard workers had won the establishment of maximum production levels beyond which they could not work. Advocates of the Senate provision portrayed the rules as restricting the productive capabilities of a laborer. With the bonus as an incentive, the shipyard worker, advocates maintained, would be motivated to greater efficiency and in the process earn extra money for his effort. An opponent, John Nolan (R-Cal.), connected the bonus to the Frederick W. Taylor "stop watch" method of production. Though Taylor's method might speed work, it was, Nolan asserted, completely unsympathetic to workers; moreover, its introduction would exacerbate the already tense worker-employer relations of the shipbuilding industry. The majority agreed with Nolan that war time was not the proper occasion for the introduction

¹⁰⁰ Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3847, 3868, 3907-08, 3927, 4026, 4105, 4107.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Pt. 11, 10731.
of innovations and turned down, on two separate roll calls, the speed-up proposal.\textsuperscript{102}

The second measure on the status of labor entailed the establishment of a cotton factory at the Atlanta Federal penitentiary. In hearings before the Justice Committee, a government witness presented the proposal as a means to rehabilitate prisoners by employing them in productive work. Since the AFL opposed the bill, committee member Thaddeus Caraway (D-Ark.) suggested that prisoners should be employed in farm work rather than textile production in order to prevent their competing with textile workers. A government witness agreed, but he also pointed out that no farm land was located close by the prison. Andrew Volstead, in support of the government witness, interjected that labor unions should not be distressed because the bill protected free labor by requiring the sale of prisoner-made goods at market prices. Volstead added that, the prison-produced cotton goods would go only to the government.\textsuperscript{103} After a favorable report by the Justice Committee, the bill went to the House floor. Labor supporter Leonidas Dyer (D-Was.) attempted to organize opposition against the measure on the grounds that convict labor would ultimately compete with free labor. The majority, however, agreed with the Justice Committee and passed the cotton factory bill on a roll call, 181 to seventy-four.

Analysis of the roll calls on labor questions was simplified because several of the measures scaled together. Usually scalograms

\textsuperscript{102}\textit{Ibid.}, Pt. 8, 8016-8023, 8382.

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{U. S. Government, House, To Equip the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary for the Manufacturing of Certain Government Supplies, Hearings on H. R. 8938, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-9, 25-26.}
are constructed on roll calls that encompass only one bill; in the case of the labor issues, two votes on wages, ballots on the Borland eight hour amendment, and three ballots on the Atlanta prison bill met the criteria for construction of a scale. By so doing, it indicates that not only a pro-labor bloc and an anti-labor group existed in the House but that they also operated together on several discrete measures.

Seventy-four House members indicated an anti-labor position by their low scale position on the several roll calls (Table 4-8:A). They either rejected all pro-labor positions or they adopted only one such vote, the roll call recommitting the postal workers' pay raise. Politically, the Democrats showed a distinct anti-labor bias, since seventy-two Democrats and only two Republicans were found at this scale level. These Democrats came predominantly from the South and Border states. In the medium category, party support equalizes. Still, the Democrats were more likely to provide only lukewarm support, since seventy-two of them in comparison to thirty-nine Republicans were found in this category. In the high category, thirty-two percent of the House membership voted for all or in some instances six of the seven labor positions. These strong labor advocates were usually aligned with the Republican party, particularly the Northeastern contingent.

The high Republican support for labor positions does not fit their historic image. An explanation might come from the fact that all the roll calls involved labor policy of the government. Their old nationalistic outlook might have disposed them to favor a government employee's policy of higher pay, shorter hours, and no prison labor competition against free labor, while they would have opposed such a policy in private industry. Another possible explanation is
### TABLE 4-8:A

**SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON LABOR ROLL CALLS**

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<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>149 265</td>
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The order of the roll calls is 116, 115, 233, 153, 155, 150, 154
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 11, 11, 9, 7, 14, 9, 23
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .950
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<td>VAR 116</td>
<td>To recommit to the Committee on Post Offices H. R. 9414, with instructions and report back with amendment that during the balance of fiscal year 1918, and during fiscal year 1919, the increased allowance for Postal Employees in addition to the compensation now received by them shall be changed in several ways. 51-311; + = nay. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4107A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>VAR 115</td>
<td>To amend H. R. 9414, by setting compensation for various grades in the Postal Service. 262-97; + = yea. Ibid., 4105.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>VAR 233</td>
<td>To amend H. R. 14078, (40 STAT-1213, Mar. 1, 1919), by increasing the annual compensation of all civilian employees of the government of the United States who now receive a total annual compensation of $2,500 or less. 202-79; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1698.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>VAR 153</td>
<td>To recommit Bill H. R. 8938, to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the Bill back with an amendment that the rules and regulations governing the prisoners engaged in such work shall not give them any advantage over free labor, either for the government or independent manufacturers. 117-142; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 6395.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>VAR 155</td>
<td>To recede from the amendment to Bill H. R. 10358, making appropriations for the legislative, executive and judicial expenses of the government for fiscal year 1919, by fixing a minimum number of hours of work per day for government employees. 131-159; + = yea. Ibid., 6439.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VAR 150</td>
<td>To adopt Bill H. RES. 335, providing for 1 hour debate on Bill H. RES. 8938, (40 STAT-896, July 10, 1918), relating to the manufacture of government supplies at Atlanta Ga. Penitentiary, and for the compensation to prisoners for their labor. 191-132; + = yea; + = nay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale Position</td>
<td>Motion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7   VAR 154</td>
<td>To pass bill H. R. 8938. 181-74; + = nay.</td>
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<td>Ibid., 6396.</td>
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that the Republicans saw some partisan advantage in the positions they adopted. Though no partisan benefit would arise from opposing to the Atlanta cotton factory bill, the other measures with their pay hikes and seven-hour day would win the approval of government workers. On the other hand, the Democrats voted against positions espoused by the AFL and, on the Borland amendment, by the Administration. An explanation for the Democratic pattern is not readily determinable though it is true that at least on the Atlanta prison bill they were adhering to an Administration position. The other two positions that they adopted on the wage and hour proposals may have reflected a rural economic fundamentalism, particularly since the South and Border states gave the greatest support to these positions. In any event, House members followed no consistent labor policy, since they reversed themselves on the Cannon conspiracy amendment and voted against labor on the Atlanta prison measure and the seven-hour limit. Yet, the House voted for labor by adopting pay hikes for government employees and by rejecting bonuses for shipyard workers. Overall, the House's attitude toward labor, as reflected in roll calls and debates, expressed an ambiguity that called for the conscription of labor but also recognized that positive labor relations were essential to the American war effort. Meanwhile, the Administration created the truly significant features of wartime labor policy.104

Farm Policy

During the first session, the House had enacted the fundamental features on a farm program: legislation to authorize a survey of existing food-stuffs, a food administration to conserve and regulate food products, and a guaranteed price of wheat. In the second session the House would add several particulars to the farm program. Namely, they would agree to increase credit sources for farmers, augment the normal agricultural appropriation bill, regulate conservation of food in greater detail, distribute seed grain to farmers, and raise the price guarantee for wheat. No consistent voting alignments formed on these proposals, but the basic issue remained constant: how much the government would help the farmer as compared to the urban resident.

The drain of banking resources into liberty bonds put the fledgling Farm Loan Board out of business. Several congressmen also charged that Eastern speculators had attempted to corner the agency's bonds, thus driving the bonds below par. In either case, the Farm Loan Board, which had been created in 1916 to extend loans at reasonable rates to farmers, found itself without funds to loan. To rectify the situation, the Board proposed a bill which would authorize the Treasury to buy $100 million worth of bonds from the Board.¹⁰⁵

Sponsored by Carter Glass, the bill drew opposition from a portion of the Republican membership, who forced two roll calls over it. On the first roll call, which was a motion to postpone hearing the bill, sixty-seven percent of the Republicans, joined by just six percent

of the Democrats, subscribed to the motion (Table 4-9). The Eastern
wing of the party, led by Gillett who claimed that the Banking Com-
mittee should study the bill in greater detail, more strongly backed
the motion than did the rest of the party.\textsuperscript{106} When Glass offered an
amendment strengthening the bill, Republicans again attempted to
defeat it. In their view the Board had already mismanaged its
affairs by over loaning. Also, the whole proposition, some Repub-
licans claimed, was political because only Democrats served as direc-
tors of the Board. In rebuttal Glass argued that the bill was neces-
sary to meet abnormal war conditions. Otherwise, he stated that he
would oppose the bill as "vicious" class legislation.\textsuperscript{107} In this final
roll call, the same configuration of Eastern Republicans opposed the
bill (Table 4-10). Most other Republicans and ninety-seven percent
of the Democrats secured the amendment's\textsuperscript{108} victory, 217 to 69. The
bill then passed without a roll call in early January, 1918.

In February the House considered the annual agriculture appro-
priation bill. Generally uncontroversial, the bill for fiscal 1919,
however, generated divisions over two particulars. The first involved
an expenditure close to the heart of many representatives, namely con-
gressional distribution of "valuable seeds" to constituents. Ezekiel
Candler (D-Miss.) set the waters churning when he proposed an amendment
which would add to the seed appropriation by fifty percent. The
necessity, he stated, grew out of greater constituent demand for seeds.

\textsuperscript{106}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 537, 615.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 592, 595, 597, 589.
\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 615.
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TABLE 4-10

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 3235:
FARM LOAN BROAD BILL*

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In rebuttal, Meyer London (Socialist-N.Y.) asked if congressional distribution of seeds was the proper activity for legislators. Agreeing with London, Joseph Walsh rejected the whole seed appropriation as a drain on the Treasury in a time of high costs from the war. 109 Though not agreeing with the extreme view of London and Walsh, a majority of the House voted "nay" to Candler's proposed increase (Table 4-11). Seventy-two percent of the Democrats voted "yea" and eighty-four percent of the Republicans responded "nay." 110 Southern Democrats and Western Republicans, both largely from rural areas, supported the seed proposition by a higher percentage than did the rest of their parties. On the other hand, Eastern and Midwest Democrats, often from the cities, split with their party. Clearly, rural and partisan factors shaped this ballot.

The eradication of tuberculosis in stock cattle, particularly milk cows, attracted the active support of most Republican members. As reported to the House floor by the Agriculture Committee, the bill appropriated a $250,000 sum to combat this disease, but William J. Graham (R-Ill.) maintained that too many cows and hogs had the affliction for this small amount to be effective. When he offered an amendment to double the appropriation, Agriculture Committee spokesman James Young (D-Tex.) asserted that the Agriculture Department could not properly spend more than $250,000. One of the few Republicans to vote against the proposition was Gilbert Haugen, who agreed with committee colleague Young on the Department's inability to use the

109 Ibid., Pt. 2, 1255, 1368-70.
110 Ibid., 1600.
TABLE 4-11
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054:
DISTRIBUTION OF VALUABLE SEEDS*

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extra funds. In the roll call that resulted from the division of opinion, the House parted along strict party lines, as ninety-six percent of the Republicans opposed ninety-four percent of the Democrats (Table 4-12). Why Republicans lined up behind this proposal is unclear from the sources, but it may reflect the greater concentration of Republicans in milk-producing regions in comparison to the Democrats. The amendment lost by the close margin of 142 to 139.\footnote{111}

A severe drought in the Great Plains states and the resulting plight of poor farmers brought the next farm bill before the House.\footnote{112} Sponsored by John Baer (D-N.Dak.), the bill proposed to aid farmers by extending fifty million dollars in credit to them to purchase seed for crops and feed for stock. A second provision allotted $2.5 million for the recruitment of farm labor. With many of the nation's farmers drafted into the military, a major farm problem developed from the resulting acute shortage of farm labor. Congressmen had proposed solutions to the problem, including the conscription of "city idlers" and the transfer of soldiers to the farms during harvest time. Prior to the Baer bill, no proposal had reached the House floor.\footnote{113} Defenders of the bill acknowledged that during peacetime they would never consider it. They added, however, that the times prompted radical action, and though the bill's intention was paternalistic, even "socialistic," the Congress had been similarly paternalistic to industry. The situation, as Gilbert Haugen argued, simply overrode

\footnote{111}{\textit{Ibid.}, 1259, 1262, 1269, 1342, 1601.} 
\footnote{112}{U.S. Congress, House, Seed Grain and Feed for Farmers and Stockmen, Hearings, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 78-82.} 
\footnote{113}{\textit{Cong. Rec.}, 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4152-53.}
TABLE 4-12

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054: ERADICATION OF TUBERCULOSIS IN LIVE STOCK*

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prenwar considerations, since the winter wheat regions were starved for seed and money. Objections to the bill reflected anti-paternalistic sentiments. According to Joseph Cannon, the original American pioneer farmer never would have asked for government handouts. Young of Texas in addition appealed to regional interests when he claimed that the measure would mainly benefit the farmers of the Northern spring wheat belt but no others. 114

Moved by Cannon's and Young's argument, opponents forced six roll calls over the bill. Since four of these votes scaled together, a scalogram was devised that defined the shifting pattern from support to opposition (Table 4-13:A). Exactly fifty percent of the House defended the bill against the critics' assaults on all roll calls. Seventy-four percent of all Republicans and twenty-nine percent of the Democrats lined up solidly for the bill. Regionally, two extremes existed, as only one Republican from the New England states voted for the bill, while one-hundred percent of both parties from the Mountain states united behind the bill. Given the bill's contents, these two regions stood to gain either the least or the most from the bill. Thus, the supporters, though showing partisan differences, indicated regional orientations as well. In the medium category, twenty-seven percent of House members moved to eliminate the enabling clause, and then switched sides and voted for final passage. This swing group, who were almost instrumental in defeating the bill, was composed of fifty-five Democrats and thirteen Republicans. While these Democrats resided in all regions, they represented the Northeast (NE and MA

114 Ibid., 4147, 4153-55, 4173-74.
### TABLE 4-13:A

SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 7795: FARM RELIEF BILL

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<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>29 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>40 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>31 14</td>
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The order of the roll calls is 120, 121, 123, 119
Percent at each point on the scale 50, 8, 19, 15, 8
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .983
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<tr>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Motion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>VAR 120</td>
<td>To order the previous question on the amendment requiring the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture to report H. R. 7795 back eliminating the enacting clause. 120–123; + = yea. <em>Cong. Rec.</em>, 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4178.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>VAR 119</td>
<td>To adopt H. RES. 281 for the immediate consideration of a Bill reported from the Committee on Agriculture as a substitute for H. R. 7795, providing for National Security and Defense and an adequate supply of food, by authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to contract with farmers in certain areas for the production of grain through advances and loans and otherwise, and by providing for the voluntary mobilization of farm labor, which substitute Bill appropriates $50,000,000 for the purchase of seed grain for live stock, the same to be supplied to farmers and stock men and also created boards in the several states to carry out the provisions of the act. 278–40; + = nay. <em>Ibid.</em>, 4151.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
regions), Southern (SS and BS), and Pacific sections in greater numbers. In the high category, the strongest opponents of the bill mostly represented the Democratic party. The only noticeable regional pattern was the greater concentration of opponents in the New England and Southern states. In sum, the Republicans generally supported the bill, while two-thirds of the Democrats opposed the bill. The Republicans and Democrats of the New England states provided the greatest opposition to the bill, as did the Democrats of the Middle Atlantic and Southern states. Over ninety percent of Midwestern Republicans upheld the bill, while Midwestern Democrats tended to break party ranks and to vote with the Republicans. Finally, both parties of the drought-stricken Mountain states voted unanimously for relief.

Although the wheat farmers benefitted from the seed bill, the price of wheat was more important to them. The Lever Food Bill of 1917 authorized the President to set a price for wheat, which Wilson eventually pegged at $2.20 a bushel. Since the prosperity of three million farmers was affected by the price, the President's action unleashed a growing problem for the Democrats. Wheat farmers complained that the rising costs of farm production cut deeply into their profits. When they compared their situation to Southern cotton farmers, whose prices remained unregulated, they became convinced that they were treated unfairly by the Administration. Thus, wheat producers rained down demands on the President and Congress either for higher wheat prices or for fixed prices on all products.115

Response by the Administration and the House took separate courses. In his December message and later in a bill, Wilson requested a proposal to control profiteering and to fix prices on the necessities of life. Coming during the winter military crisis and the Garfield order, such a proposal stood no chance of acceptance as Congress was in no mood to grant additional power to the President. Representative Lever, Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, immediately buried the bill in his committee, knowing that its broad grant of power would cause its certain defeat. 116 Since no action came on the industrial price front, Congress started to move in the direction of higher wheat prices. The Administration, however, strongly opposed higher prices because they would bestow windfall profits on grain dealers who were storing wheat. Moreover, the Administration maintained that higher prices would adversely affect both the American consumer and the country's allies. Given these economic and political ideas, President Wilson on February 23 reset the minimum price for wheat at $2.20 a bushel. In no mood to listen, the Senate attached a rider to the Agriculture Appropriation bill that added thirty cents to the President's price support. 117

When the House received the bill from the Senate, urbanites charged that the proposal imposed "outrageous" burdens upon industrial workers. Homer Synder (R-N.Y.) claimed that only U. S. Steel had


117 Washington Post, February 21, 1915, 2; New York Times, February 24, 1918, 1; and April 19, 1918, 6.
reaped such huge profits as had the farmers. In the farmers defense, William A. Ayres (D-Kans.) pointed out that only wheat growers had been subjected to price controls. Additionally, William E. Cox (D-Ind.) told the House, the increase represented a mere "bagatelle" which would hardly hurt anyone but, on the other hand, would greatly spur wheat production. After further heated debate, a vote on the Senate provision was called. At this point, enough Democrats stayed with the Administration for the House to vote down $2.50 a bushel wheat, 180 to 127.119

When the Senate conferees insisted upon $2.50 wheat, a long-term deadlock ensued, lasting from May to July. During this prolonged stalemate, political pressures from wheat-producing areas intensified as Democratic congressmen increasingly believed that their political survival in the upcoming 1918 congressional elections depended on a high wheat price. As a result, the House conferees eventually acceded to a compromise price of $2.40 a bushel. The House readily passed what they thought a suitable solution to the impose by a roll call vote, 150 to 106.120 Placed on the President's desk, the bill provoked a Wilson veto because he was concerned about consumer and Allied distress from the hike. A number of wheat congressmen, greatly agitated over their political self-preservation, demanded a roll call to override the veto. They failed by the wide margin of 172 to seventy-two.121

119 Ibid., 5272, 5274, 5319; and New York Times, April 19, 1918, 6.
120 Ibid., May 4, 1918, 6; July 2, 1918, 9; July 6, 1918, 8; Washington Post, July 13, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8796.
121 Ibid., 9105.
Since the three wheat votes scale, it is possible to indicate shifting patterns of support (Table 4-14:A). Thirty-nine percent of the House voted against all efforts to increase the price of wheat. Eighty of these representatives came from the Democratic party, while twenty-eight Republicans voted with them. Members in the low category more likely hailed from the Northeast (NE and MA) in both parties, and from the South among the Democrats. In the medium category, again more Democrats (forty-four) are found than Republicans (twenty-one). This swing group, who voted for $2.50 wheat and $2.40 wheat, but who could not go along with overriding the President’s veto, showed no significant regional concentration. The strongest advocates of higher wheat prices mostly represented the Republican party, eighty members as opposed to thirty-two Democrats. Since fifty-one percent of the Democrats voted three times against benefits to beleagured wheat farmers while sixty-two percent of the Republicans voted for all three, the balloting indicated a partisan difference of opinion on wheat prices. To a degree, Wilson’s firm stand against higher wheat prices had made the voting partisan. However, regional patterns were still very significant, because members of both parties from the North­east had no fondness for higher bread prices for their urban constituents. On the opposite side, both parties of the West North Central states, which included some of the leading wheat growing states, gladly sup­ported higher prices. The Mountain states followed a similar pattern, while the other regions divided along a voting pattern that reflected partisan differences. Politically, the most potent issue to emerge from the voting came from the low support that Southern Democrats gave to the wheat increases. To Northern wheat growers, fair play
### TABLE 4-14:A

SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054: WHEAT PRICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Position</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scale Position</th>
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<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>5</td>
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The order of the roll calls is 189, 138, 192
Percent at each point on the scale 39, 22, 17, 22
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .971
<table>
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<th>Motion</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 VAR 189</td>
<td>To have the House recede from its disagreeing vote on the amendment to H. R. 9054, making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919. 150-106; + = yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8796.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 VAR 138</td>
<td>To concur in the Senate amendment to H. R. 9054, making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for fiscal year 1919, which amendment provides that the President in an emergency fix the price of wheat products in the U. S. guaranteeing a certain profit to the producers thereof; that guaranteed price of 1918 wheat shall not be less than its equivalent of #2 northern spring wheat at $2.50 per bushel, the same to be binding until Dec. 1, 1919. 127-180; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 5, 5319.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 VAR 192</td>
<td>To pass, over the President's veto, H. R. 9054, making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for fiscal year 1919, the President's objections to the Bill being that Legislative price provisions should not be administered in a way advantageous to producers or consumers. 72-172; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 9, 9105.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
demanded that Southerners vote for the increase because their cotton
farmers enjoyed unregulated cotton prices. Their failure to do so,
gave the Republicans an excellent campaign issue. Democratic farm
policy failed to satisfy wheat farmers.  

Wartime Social Policy

At times during the session the House directed its attention
toward the social welfare needs of war workers and others. Industrial
centers, particularly Eastern cities, became jammed with laborers
from all parts of the country. Houses became overcrowded and rents
shot skyward. The shortage of housing caused family separations, low
morale, and high job turnover among war workers. Conditions were most
acute in the shipbuilding industry and certain other war industries,
which led concerned government officials and congressmen to propose
solutions. For shipyard workers, the Shipping Board advocated a
fifty million dollar appropriation to build either dormitories for
single men or small homes for families. The government also suggested
a similar appropriation for munition workers. Witnesses before House
committees supported both proposals because of the industries inability
to retain workers who were unable to find proper housing. They also
elaborated on the failure of private enterprise to fill the gap. In
short, the witnesses' theme stressed the necessity for government
action because of wartime conditions.  

122 Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 174-76.

123 Washington Post, February 8, 1918, 1; April 13, 1918, 7; U. S.
Congress, House, Housing for Employees of Shipyards Building Ships for
the U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, Hearings on S
3389, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-8, 24, 47-49; and U. S. Congress, House,
Public Buildings and Grounds, Hearings on H. R. 9642, H. R. 10265,
On the House floor, defenders presented the proposal as a straightforward war measure. In an effort to defuse any possible criticism, they denied any "socialistic" intentions, though they acknowledged that the structures ought to be well built and useful after the war. Critics voiced more concern over possible graft and waste of money than over government giveaways to workers. Representative J. Hampton Moore, playing his normal role as Republican partisan, implied that the money would go to contractors who were friends of the Administration. From another angle John W. Langley (R-Ky.) found distressing the ease with which Congress dispensed the fifty million dollars. Probably reflecting the astonishment of some other colleagues, Langley noted how Congress spent billions as casually as it had formerly appropriated millions. Ultimately, however, these critics realized that the measure was vital for war production, and they dropped their opposition. Passing without recourse to a roll call, both measures met war conditions and only indirectly represented efforts at solving long-term social distress.124

Meanwhile, the rental situation aroused Ben Johnson (D-Ky.), who became inflamed over exhorbitant increases in house rentals. Washington, which became a boom town because of the war, reported a series of evictions and rent gouging cases. Examining the situation, Johnson's

65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-10, 18.

124 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4463, 4395; and Pt. 2, 1953. See Allen F. Davis, "Welfare, Reform and World War I," American Quarterly, XIX (Fall, 1967), 517-20, for a general discussion of the aims of wartime housing. Davis notes the influence of housing experts, such as Lawrence Veiller, on the construction of the houses. Davis does not comment on congressional attitudes. The House realized that the homes ought to be well-built, but they definitely rejected long-term goals in so building them.
House Committee on the District of Columbia called a number of witnesses. Captain Julius Peyser of the Army housing division cited cases of the proverbial sick and old widow evicted by the heartless landlord, while others testified to similar distressing cases. In order to correct the situation, Chairman Johnson authored a bill that taxed excess wartime profits from rental property in the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{125}

By the time the Johnson bill came to the House floor in February, 1918, most members readily agreed that legislative action was demanded. Several congressmen, nonetheless, withstood the prevailing sentiments and voiced doubts about the effectiveness of the bill's technical features. Allen Treadway (R-Mass.) also claimed that the rental problem came from customers bidding up prices, not just landlords arbitrarily raising prices. Angry blasts from Johnson against rent profiteers, however, checked any tendency among members to vote for the landlords. The bill passed on a roll call, 221 to 101.\textsuperscript{126}

Less directly tied to war conditions, another social welfare measure proposed a minimum wage board for Washington's working women. Before a House committee, Edward Keating, who sponsored the bill,

\textsuperscript{125}U. S. Congress, House, Housing in the District of Columbia Hearings, on S. J. Res. 152 and H. R. 9248, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-11, 16; and New York Times, March 17, 1918, Section V, 1.

\textsuperscript{126}Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 2110, 2118; Pt. 4, 3333, 3390. The rent bill never became law. Since the Senate passed a much different bill, the conferees had a difficult time working out differences. Representative Johnson charged that the Senators were really in league with the landlords and did not want to help the "humble" citizen. His denunciation of the Senators became so strong that the Senate passed a motion refusing to confer further with the House if Johnson remained on the Conference Committee. Eventually, Johnson resigned but still no action was taken. See ibid., Pt. 8, 7808, 8359-60; Washington Post, June 23, 1918, 2; June 25, 1918, 3; and November 19, 1918, 1.
described the proposal as a social protection measure. Since women usually were unable to organize unions, the board, Keating elaborated, would ensure an irreducible minimum living wage which their present disheartening living conditions indicated they did not receive. Taking the highest plane possible, Keating added that American democracy must fulfill its promises for all of its citizens. Keating and legal expert Felix Frankfurter told the committee that the bill followed the lines of an Oregon law which the Supreme Court had declared constitutional in 1908. Safe from attack on that ground, the bill also gained security by the surprising support of Washington's commercial interests. A spokesman for the Merchant's Association, who justified the bill on grounds other than Keating's social democratic ideals, told the committee that his group endorsed Keating's plan as a means to improve employer-employee relations. 127

With this backing, the bill gained a hearing on the House floor. Socialist Meyer London spoke in favor of the bill, something that did not recommend it in the minds of some members. Ex-Speaker Cannon opposed the bill because wage levels should increase only from bargaining between employee and employer. He further argued that the bill would be difficult to implement and would also violate the fundamental principle that all individuals must care for themselves. Most members apparently did not concur since the House passed the bill without a formal roll call. At least for the District of Columbia, congressmen were inclined to violate the workings of the free market system. 128

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128Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8871, 8886, Pt. 10, 9537; Washington Post, July 9, 1918, 6; and August 27, 1918, 6.
Because the country experienced a tremendous wartime boom, some congressmen were frightened over a possible postwar economic recession. In order to prevent this possibility several suggestions were presented, only one of which reached the stage of a final House roll call. Introduced by Meyer London, this proposal created a commission made up of congressmen and experts who would study the feasibility of unemployment insurance. In committee Samuel Gompers strongly objected to the bill as inimical to labor unions. Most of the committee disagreed with Gompers and sent it to the House floor. During the ensuing House debate, Medill McCormick (R-Ill.) argued that conditions might shortly require Congress to have information on unemployment. Showing little ability to look beyond immediate conditions, many House members agreed with Henry Rainey's question that "in abnormal times why make investigations for normal times?" Similarly, J. Hampton Moore claimed that sufficient information already existed on the subject. Moore also brought to light another inhibition working against the bill, namely a belief that a commission would foster tensions between capital and labor. The House was not already to listen to advanced social ideas, and consequently representatives voted down the bill, 199 to 133.  

Partisanship did not operate on the balloting (Table 4-15). Sixty-two percent of the Republicans joined by fifty-nine percent of the Democrats opposed a study of unemployment insurance. At least in this instance neither party demonstrated any greater tendency than

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129 Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado, 365-66; Charles Merz, "At the Capital," The New Republic, XIII (January 26, 1918), 381; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 903-907. Moore may have been thinking about the Commission on Industrial Relations. See Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal, 190-91, for its impact on public opinion. Conservatives may have bulked at the idea of any other similar commissions.
TABLE 4-15

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. RES. 189:
UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE</th>
<th>NE</th>
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<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yea</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nay</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
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Region and Party (Percent)

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<th>VOTE</th>
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<th>WNC</th>
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<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yea</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nay</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the other toward support of social welfare schemes. Regionally, a
definite pattern emerged. Republican support of the commission was
abnormally high in the Midwest (ENC and WNC) and the Far West (MS and
PS). Greater than average opposition among Republicans surfaced in
New England and the Border states, both light industrial areas that
seemingly would want protection for their workers. On the Democratic
side, all regions voted for the proposal except the Southern states,
whose predominance in the party swung them into opposition against the
measure. Democrats from other regions often strongly favored the
measure, such as the over eighty percent advocacy by New England,
Middle Atlantic, and Pacific state delegations. In any event, the
Southern Democrats, probably because of their strong rural and anti-
labor bias, contributed significantly to the proposals defeat. In
general, social welfare proposals received a measure of support from
the House. War conditions provoked a potentially far-reaching housing
program and experimental rental plan. Further, local District of
Columbia wage rates warranted action, and national unemployment condi-
tions, in the minds of many, were at least worthy of study. Some hint
of future social measures could be detected, but in the main House
action was shaped more by war conditions than by an ideology favorable
to a social welfare state.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{130} Clarke A. Chambers, Seedtime of Reform: American Social
Service and Social Action, 1918-1933 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1961), 20-22, records evidences for a confidence
among social workers that social welfare goals would be advanced by
the war. At least during the second session, little evidence of
a positive attitude toward social welfare can be found among Con-
gressmen.
Industrial Policy

The Wilson Administration progressively evolved a wartime program for the organization of industry. During the first session of Congress, the Administration usually acted on its own initiative, though it did seek authorization from Congress in a few limited areas. In the second session, a war-induced industrial crisis would force the Administration to seek legislation from Congress in several important spheres of economic activity. From the summer of 1917 to the winter of 1918, war demands increasingly pressured vital components of the economy as railroad transportation slowed, mineral prices continued skyward, and credit sources for corporations dried up. Adding to the war-related dislocations was the severest winter in years, which hit the manufacturing Northeast the hardest. The railroad industry became the first to collapse from the combined war and weather pressures. President Wilson responded when he ordered a government takeover of the railroads late in December, 1917. Placing them under the control of a railroad administration, he conferred dictatorial power to run the roads upon his son-in-law, Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo. At the same time, the President announced his intention to address Congress on the railroad crisis after it reconvened from the holiday recess. 131

When Wilson addressed Congress on January 4, 1918, he listed several specific results that would accrue from government administration

First, all properties could be used without injuriously discriminating against any particular railroad companies. Second, the government would have unrestricted use of all railroad properties. Third, the government would be better able to finance railroad improvements. Half-way measures, such as private control with a head traffic director, would fail to infuse the necessary coordination and efficiency into the railroad system. Government interference, then, was due not only to wartime confusion but also to railroad decentralization. Wilson concluded his message with an outline of a bill that Congress eventually passed. The Railroad Act of 1918 provided that the government establish a fund for improvements and that it also compensate railroad owners during the period of the take-over.¹³²

Setting the pattern for the House, the Interstate Commerce Committee argued over the necessity and implications of government control. ICC Commissioner George W. Anderson pointed out to the Committee that tremendous increases in operational expenses, partly as a result of duplication of services under private control, was one reason for the take over. He also covered the bill's provisions which established the principle of "just compensation" and set the rates for reimbursement on the base years of 1914-1916. Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.), showing concern for the railroad corporations, asked Anderson why railroads should not be allowed boom profits such as other industries then received. Railroad executives who came before the

Committee also wanted a high return. In particular, they asserted that the government's date for deciding compensation worked against their profits. As one executive told the Committee, the railroads had made low profits during 1914-16; if the House allowed the increased profits of 1917, the railroads would be justly compensated.  

Throughout the hearings railroad officials displayed greater distress about the possibilities of government ownership after the war than over "unjust" compensation. Since some congressmen had decided predilections in favor of government control or outright nationalization, railroad executives and their congressional allies pressed for a clause limiting the takeover to one year after the war's end. On the other hand Director General William G. McAdoo, who probably favored government ownership, told the Committee that he opposed any fixed date for the return of the railroads to private control. To set a date, he maintained, would make an orderly and rational determination of compensation difficult. He also intimated that detailed legislation should be passed after the war that would replace the old system of railroad competition with a rationalized and centralized railroad administration. Committee members viewed McAdoo's suggestions as the symbolic battle point on the disposition of the railroads after the war. When they consequently decided fifteen to six to set a two-year postwar limitation on government control, it represented a partial victory for the corporations.


135 Ibid., February 2, 1918, 1; and New York Times,
As soon as the bill reached the House floor, supporters of greater government control attempted to reverse the Interstate Commerce Committee's decision. Thetus Sims, who was chairman of that Committee, directed this campaign. He argued that the railroads' transfer from private to government control was necessary because of the inefficiency and decentralization of the railroads. If these deficiencies were to be corrected, the House, he maintained, had to formulate bold and new legislation when the war ended. The two-year limitation on government management would impede the adoption of such legislation. However, these and similar arguments failed to convince the House membership. As a result, when Sims and like-minded colleagues endeavored to pass an amendment which removed the limitation, they were easily defeated. Sims did not force a formal roll call over his amendment.\(^\text{136}\)

After the defeat of the Sims Amendment, the more corporate-minded representatives attempted to modify the bill. They rallied behind John Esch (R-Wis.), who wanted two changes in the bill. First, he opposed allowing the President power to fix railroad rates, preferring instead that the ICC maintain control over rates. He supported the ICC's control because of that body's long-term experience in establishing rates. Perhaps a more basic reason for his position was that he objected to a further extension of Presidential power. Second because of his preference for private control, he argued that the two-year return provision gave the government too much time and that Congress could enact the needed legislation in one

February 3, 1918, 2.

year. Although other issues—such as the fate of the short-line railroads—also engendered the lively interest of some congressmen,\(^\text{137}\) the two issues as defined by Esch became the storm centers over which the House fought its roll call duels.

Barton E. Sweet, an Iowa Republican, forced a roll call over the Esch proposal to delegate the rate-setting power to the ICC. His motion lost 210 to 165 as seventy-three percent of the Republicans voted for the transfer while eighty-five percent of the Democrats voted to retain Presidential control over rates (Table 4-16). Middle Atlantic Republicans split off from the party position. Since most Republicans expected the President to increase railroad rates if granted the power to do so, the deviation of Middle Atlantic Republicans apparently resulted because they believed that such a power would benefit their region's railroads.\(^\text{138}\) On Esch's proposal for the early return of the railroads to private control, eighty-seven percent of the Republicans voted for it (Table 4-17). But the Democrats, who refused to decrease the possibilities for congressional legislative action after the war, demonstrated even higher cohesion and defeated the Esch Amendment, 205 to 164. No significant geographical pattern emerged among either the Democrats or Republicans. In general, the two roll calls evidenced a clear partisan division, with only Middle Atlantic Republicans indicating any significant geographical alignment on the two votes. The Republicans stood squarely for the retention for as

\(^{137}\)Ibid., 2465-70, 2564-65, 2569, 2358.

\(^{138}\)New York Times, February 2, 1918, 1; February 6, 1918, 9; and February 9, 1918, 9. House conferees agreed to a Senate provision granting the ICC review power over government rate increases. See Ibid., March 8, 1918, 1; and March 15, 1918, 4.
TABLE 4-16
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9685: ICC RATE CONTROL AMENDMENT OF THE RAILROAD BILL*

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, Pt. 3, 2834.
## Table 4.17

**Vote by Party and Region on H. R. 9685: Time Limit Amendment of the Railroad Bill**

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much of the old system as possible, either in rate matters or in the immediate return of the railroads to private hands after the war. Striking a more progressive stance, the Democrats advocated greater centralization and rationalization of the railroad industry. Both parties were drawing the battle lines over the postwar disposition of the railroads.

At the same time that the Administration struggled to reorganize the overburdened railroads, a shortage of credit started to plague corporations, particularly railroads. For nine months the government had staged liberty loan campaigns in order to finance its war programs. By the winter of 1918, normal bank funds had been largely diverted to the government and the bond market had gone to pieces. While this was happening, ever larger capital outlays were required because of wartime plant expansion. Not able to borrow the money from the banks or securities market, corporate leaders turned to the government for aid. In response William McAdoo, the financial wizard of the Administration, devised a scheme whereby a War Finance Corporation (WFC) would lend money to war industries.

As McAdoo explained the plan, the Corporation would have a capital of $500 million. Based upon this sum, the Corporation could furnish up to four billion dollars in loans to bankers. From the bankers, the money would find its way to the credit starved war industries. Designed strictly to aid wartime industrial expansion, the WFC proposal stood above partisan cavil. The specifics of the

plan, however, particularly its broad concession of powers to Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, threw the Banking and Finance Committee into a frenzy. Stepping in to expedite its passage, Majority Leader Kitchin placed the bill under his Ways and Means Committee rather than under the disaffected Banking Committee.  

In hearings before Kitchin's Committee, the bill still continued to draw fire over its particulars. Paul Warburg, Vice-Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, admitted that the bill smacked of an undesirable paternalism but was a necessary wartime expedient. John Garner (D-Tex.) interpolated that Congress had unfortunately had to pass many undesirable bills. When Secretary McAdoo appeared, Congressman Hampton Moore grilled him over the "tremendous grant of power" the bill gave McAdoo. Other congressmen described McAdoo's positions, that of Treasury head and Railroad Director, as being already beyond the capacity of one man. Wishing to lessen McAdoo's burden's, Martin Madden (R-Ill.) suggested a board of managers to supervise the WFC. Since the Senate in fact had substituted a board appointed by McAdoo for one appointed by the President and the Senate, the Committee agreed to this cutback in McAdoo's powers. They also reduced from four to two billion dollars the amount that the WFC could lend. The bill won the unanimous approval of the Committee loans.

Pleased by the Ways and Means Committee's courage in revising an administration bill, Republican Nicholas Longworth pronounced the

140 New York Times, February 5, 1918, 1; February 9, 1918, 14; and Washington Post, February 5, 1918, 2.

141 House, War Finance Corporation, Hearings on H. R. 9499, 39-41, 61, 92-95, 104; Washington Post, February 22, 1918, 2; March 10, 1918, 2; New York Times, February 19, 15; and March 9, 1918, 5.
bill as much improved by the Committee's handiwork. Still, some
House members were struck by the hitherto undreamed of actions that
they were taking in wartime. To these and like-minded colleagues the
bill required more revision, such as prohibiting loans to individuals,
allowing the Federal Reserve Board to increase its loan power, and
placing more checks on Secretary McAdoo's power. Republican leader
Frederick Gillett (Mass.) continued his long standing lament over
congressional grants of power to the Executive. Paraphrasing Lord
Acton, Gillett said that the possession of power in truth did corrupt
those who possessed it. Gillet did not, however, propose any revisions,
preferring instead his role as "constructive critic" to actual creator
of legislation.\footnote{Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3619-20, 3718,
3716, 3786, 3661, 3793, 3727.} Joseph Fordney, leading Republican member of Ways
and Means, agreed with Gillett that powers had flowed to the Executive; he nonetheless argued that this unfortunately must continue
because American corporate institutions required financial assistance.
Apparently, the House agreed with Fordney's viewpoint. After a few
futile efforts at amendment, the bill passed the House as written by
the Ways and Means Committee, 370 to two.\footnote{Ibid., 3613-17, 3609, 3793, 3807, 3843. New York Times,
March 19, 1918, 10; and March 20, 1918, 12.}

Another important economic proposition arose out of the war's
massive demands on the mineral resources of the country. The United
States suffered from critical shortages of certain minerals. These
included managanese, pyrite, and chrome, of which the U. S. did not
produce enough for its own needs. These minerals, because of their
scarcity, had spiraled in price. In order to deal with this problem, the Administration introduced in March a bill that encouraged mineral production and controlled prices. The goal, as Bernard Baruch told the House Mining Committee, was the economic self-sufficiency of the nation in war and in peace. 144

Since the provisions on production favorably appealed to the sentiments of economic nationalism, they easily secured the approval of most members when the bill was presented to the House in late April. The price-fixing sections, on the other hand, distressed the already frayed sensitivities of congressmen. Concerned about the fate of private enterprise, members turned to the injunctions of the classical economists against price-fixing. As a result, many House members argued that the market system, though under severe strain, would yield not only the right prices but also increase production. If the government, however, intervened and set prices, the bill's production provisions would be contradicted. The critics also rejected the new (and what they considered dictatorial) powers that the bill granted to the President. 145

When the House voted on the bill's price section, a combination of Republican partisanship, opposition to further delegations of power to the President, and southern cotton advocacy defeated its inclusion in the bill, 156 to 150. 146 Eighty-three percent of the Republicans


145 Ibid., 95, 99, 149; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5794.

146 Ibid., 5844; and New York Times, May 1, 1918, 24.
massed in opposition to the price control provisions (Table 4-18). They were joined by twenty-two percent of the Democrats, while the rest of the party adhered to the Administration's position. Although it was a decided partisan ballot, there were regional variations of significance. Almost all the Democrats who broke from their party's stance hailed from the Southern states (thirty of the thirty-four came from the South). Apparently, a number of Southern Democrats were apprehensive that the bill's principle would be applied to unregulated cotton prices, which were then experiencing wartime inflation. Members of both parties in the Mountain states supported price controls on minerals, probably because they believed that the Administration would increase prices for their minerals. Overall, the Republicans continued their opposition toward the Administration, while the Southern Democrats' action signaled to the Administration that they bitterly opposed any price control which might even remotely be construed as a reason to regulate cotton prices.\footnote{Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 173-76, portrays the Southerners as stoutly resisting any measures that smacked of price controls on cotton.}

The spread of governmental regulation seemed checked by the late spring of 1918. Upsetting this more congenial trend was a threatened strike among Western Union employees because that corporation denied its employees the right to join the Commercial Telegraphers' Union. In response to this crisis, Representative George R. Lunn (D-N.Y.) proposed a bill establishing government control of all telegraph and telephone companies. He told the press that this was necessary in wartime and that he believed it wise in peacetime. As an argument...
### TABLE 4-18
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 11259: MINERAL PRICE CONTROL AMENDMENT*

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5844.
for this proposal, Lunn pointed out that no European country allowed private control of wire services. When the strike danger continued, Wilson, on July 1, conferred with his cabinet and decided on an extension of government control to the wire services. Simultaneously, administration supporters introduced a resolution, which was sent to the Interstate Commerce Committee for hearings.

First, attempting to determine the reasons for the take over, committeemen questioned Secretaries Baker and Daniels and Postmaster General Albert Burleson. These witnesses cited the strike threat as the proximate cause for action, but Daniels stressed a second reason. There was, he argued, a real danger of "spying" on government communications with the wire services under private control. The legislators turned the questioning in a second direction when they asked the witnesses about government ownership after the war. Daniels and Burleson replied that they favored postwar government ownership for two reasons: that the wires were a public utility and that sedition could be more efficiently suppressed by government control. Committee members, though voicing no desire to protect free speech and communication, did not want further intrusions by the government into the private economic sector. The government witnesses and the Committee agreed to restrict the resolution exclusively to war-induced conditions.

The Committee directed the resolution to the House floor, where a number of congressmen protested its possible danger to private

148 *New York Times*, June 5, 1918, 17; and July 3, 1918, 1.

ownership after the war and to free exchange of communications during the war. They won a voice vote which would have sidetracked the bill except that supporters of the resolution demanded a roll call of the House and won, 197 to 107. The voting on the motion indicates that partisan factors had only nominal influence, since sixty-eight percent of the Democrats and fifty-eight percent of the Republicans supported the motion (Table 4-19). Only the Middle Atlantic and East North Central regions manifested a tendency to vote above their parties' average percentage against the resolution. These regions contained the great wire service companies that might have been adversely affected by the resolution. Otherwise, the divisions over it indicate no distinguishable pattern. Throughout the House's consideration of economic measures, the membership nervously viewed the postwar implications of their actions. If their conduct indicated any clear preference, it was to return the country to "normal" conditions as fast as possible after the war without additional government regulation.

Military Policy

During the first wartime session, Congress had passed most of the vital military measures. A portion of this work, however, had been done in such an incomplete fashion that it generated a number of problems that would require House attention. A modification of the draft law was necessary in order to correct oversights and to obtain enough men to fill the ranks of the Army. Then there were other matters stemming from the aircraft and the machine-gun program.

Normal and extraordinary appropriations for the army and navy would

TABLE 4-19

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. J. RES. 309:
WIRE SERVICE BILL*

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Region and Party (Percent)

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8651.
also require the close attention of the House committees involved. A lengthy list of appropriation bills poured into the Appropriation, Naval, and Military Committees.

Even though the frenzy of the first days of the war had declined, House committees still processed billions of dollars of appropriation requests in a matter of days, and the full House scrutinized matters less closely. Still, the committees did often subject witnesses and bills to hostile scrutiny. Thus during the attack on Baker in the winter of 1917-18, Representative Kahn lashed out at the military's failure to transport troops to France faster. He, along with William Gordon (D-Ohio), also criticized camp conditions and conjectured that the whole problem came from the Administration's anti-preparedness stance before the war. When major political crises were not occurring, witnesses received more deference and more straight-forward technical questions. Even then they did not escape unscratched, since the committees were adamant that the government secure the best buy possible for its money. Specific contracts, on such supplies as woolens, tents, guns, and clothes, were reviewed in order to ensure that private contractors were not gathering windfall profits from the government. At times congressmen also displayed apprehensions that some of their local manufacturers were mistreated by the War Department's purchasing system. On occasion the committees also criticized the method of making contracts. Richard Olney (D-Mass.) thought that the National Council of Defense hampered contract-making since councilmen were dollar-a-year businessmen who, he claimed, sought to protect the interests of big business. Additionally, committee members
frequently inveighed against the cost-plus system that the military
used for determining costs and profits on contracts. 151

At times, the detection of government failure led to full-scale
investigations. In May, the inadequacy of army machine-gun production
came to light which resulted in close investigation by Julius Kahn (R-
Cal.). 152 More far-reaching in its repercussions was the failure of
the aircraft program. Secretary of War Baker had initiated an air
program shortly after American entry into the war and then placed it
under the Council of National Defense. The Council originally envisioned
a modest program of 5,000 planes, but this soon multiplied into 20,000
planes and a $600 million cost. Congress, fascinated by a vision of
American air power, voted to appropriate the money after a short
debate. 153 Planning proved much easier than actual implementation,
and the whole program rapidly ran into numerous problems. When Gutzon
Borglum, a famous sculptor and also an aircraft enthusiast, revealed
the distressing conditions to the Senate, Republican senators and
Senator Chamberlain (D-Oreg.) pounced on the War Department and
started an investigation. Meanwhile, the House, as it often did when
such investigations of the Administration arose, sat on the side lines
and commended its sister body for its discovery of fraud and mis-
management in the war program. Senator Chamberlain revived the old

151 U. S. Congress, House, Army Appropriation Bill, 1919, Hearings,
on H. R. 12281, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 51, 204-05, 429, 609, 685, 1368,
679, 155, 898, 681-85; U. S. Congress, House, Council of National
Defense, Hearings on H. R. 3971, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 9, 16-17, 95; and
U. S. Congress, House, First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Hearings
before the Appropriations Committee, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 98-102.


153 Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 57-58.
Weeks Resolution and called for a general investigation of the War
Department. Wilson moved deftly to head off the proposed Senate
inquisition of the war program when he appointed a Justice Department
investigation under the former Republican standard-bearer, Charles
Evans Hughes. The Senate, completely out-maneuvered, still authorized
a lesser investigation, while the House refused to become involved
at all. 154

In addition to preventing military waste, the House on occasion
became a component of the military policy-making process. 155 The
defects of the original draft law engaged the House's attention at
several points during the session. First, the Administration requested
that the House enact legislation to remove "inequalities" in the selec­
tive service system. The bill redefined the classification system,
thereby allowing exemptions of persons with dependents or with critical
occupations. It also corrected the basis for determining draft-age
populations in a district by removing foreign aliens as part of those
counted for the draft. Overall, the supporters hoped that it would
more efficiently use manpower and that it would prevent the drafting
of married men with dependents. It also greatly enhanced the mili­
tary's power since it allowed classification of civilians by the
draft boards. 156

154 New York Times, April 11, 18, 1; April 12, 1918, 13; May 3
1918, 3; May 5, 1918, 6; May 8, 1918, 1; May 16, 1918, 1; May 23,
1918, 1; May 30, 1918, 9; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War
Congress, 119, 133-34.

155 New York Times, February 15, 1918, 4; and March 15, 1918,
4.

156 Ibid., March 14, 1918, 1; March 15, 1918, 5; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4981, 5036-38.
Because some representatives saw the measure as a step toward universal military training and military control, it stirred up the still controversial issues from the previous year's draft debates. Again Representative Hubert Dent (D-Tenn.), head of the Military Affairs Committee, deserted the President and supported instead a plan that Ashton C. Shallenberger (D-Neb.) had drawn up. Consisting of two amendments, Shallenberger's plan first provided that draft quotas should be based on the total registered population of military age and that Congress, rather than draft boards, would classify the draft-age population. The second amendment gave districts credit for volunteers. Advocates of the Shallenberger proposals commended such measures on the grounds that they would prevent non-industrial states from having to make up quotas for states granted deferments because of a large labor force in war industries. This agrarian state argument was coupled with an attack on the military. The Administration's plan, asserted Samuel Nicholls (D-S.C.), allowed the army to set quotas and classes; thereby, it delegated the military immense power over individual citizens. Only Congress, he maintained, should make such decisions regarding the exemption and non-exemption of different citizens.157

Although this draft bill was complicated by several other provisions,158 the three basic roll calls on it came over the Shallenberger

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157 Ibid., 4984-86, 5028-29, 4989-90; New York Times, April 13, 1918, 11; April 14, 1918, 6; and Washington Post, April 11, 1918, 4.

158 A draft exemption for divinity students caused divisions. Eventually, the House insisted on their continued exemption. Also, a provision on placing twenty-one year olds at the bottom of Class one created difficulties. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5625; New York Times, May 9, 1918, 9; and May 10, 1918, 10.
proposals. The first vote can be defined as a partisan vote because fifty-seven percent of the Democrats opposed ninety-two percent of the Republicans (Table 4-20). More significantly, the majority position of the Democrats represented a revolt against the Administration's stance while the Republican majority voted for the War Department's proposal. Such a division lent credence to Republican charges that Democratic obstructionists blocked the war program since the Shallenberger amendment was defeated only by Republican aid. Most of the Democratic rebels came from the West North Central, the South, and the Mountain areas. As was true during the first session, the industrial Northeast gave nearly unanimous support to the draft. In general, the voting pattern reflected the appeal made by the Shallenberger forces for the quota and classification amendment: rural-oriented areas tended to support it, while industrial regions opposed it.

The second Shallenberger roll call, which was demanded on the proposal granting to the states credit for volunteers, followed a non-partisan pattern as it carried by a vote of 293 to sixty-six. Nonetheless, fifty-five of the opponents came from one party, the Republican, while only eleven Democrats joined them (Table 4-21). A geographical relationship was also evident in this ballot since most of the fifty-five Republicans, who upheld the strongest pro-draft stance, represented

159 Two of the three votes scale together, the third does not. It appears that after the first two votes, which came in April, 1918, and the third, which came in May, Wilson's change on the credit proposals caused a realignment. Wilson always opposed the quota amendment. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5058-59; and Pt. 6, 6291.

TABLE 4-20

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123:
SHALLENBERGER AMENDMENT TO DRAFT BILL

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Region and Party (Percent)

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The third roll call, again on the credit principle, came a month later and showed the influence of changed conditions (Table 4-22). Prior to the first ballot on the volunteer credit provision, the President had maintained a neutral position; however, between the first and second ballot pressure from his military advisors forced Wilson to adopt a definite position against it. When a conference report on the draft bill returned to the House, most Democrats agreed with the President's new stance and now voted against the amendment.\textsuperscript{161} Less mindful of Presidential alterations in policy, forty-one percent of the Republicans still voted for the Shallenberger credit proposal. Overall, the three ballots, even though they do not correlate with each other, indicated a strong preference by the Northeast, particularly the Republicans of that region, for the military's position on the draft. Southern and Western Democrats usually reacted negatively to the military's plans. In any event, significant elements of both parties demonstrated that they stood ready to adopt an independent course on draft questions.

Later in the second session a second draft controversy arose when the Administration sought authorization for a larger army. Various Republicans, including Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, General Leonard Wood, and Congressman Julius Kahn, started a campaign in the spring of 1918 for an army of five million. Their plan would augment the then current size of the army by two million, an increase which they believed absolutely necessary for an Allied victory.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{161}Ibid., Pt. 6, 6289-91.

\textsuperscript{162}New York Times, June 14, 1918, 4; Washington Post, March 28, 1918, 3 and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, 177-78.
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Administration reacted slowly to the clamor, but after Secretary Baker returned from a European fact-finding trip, the Administration asked Congress to remove any legislative limitation on the size of the army. Rumors that the Executive would soon ask for much larger military appropriations and a change in draft ages mounted during the summer months. On August first, the War Department finally announced plans for a five million man army and at the same time requested an extension of age limits for the draft to include all males between eighteen and forty-five.

Response from Capital Hill demonstrated a continued mixed attitude toward military draft planning. Representative Kahn, who saw the age proposal as a step toward universal training, supported it as a result, but Chairman Dent again opposed the War Department. He and like-minded colleagues rallied behind a compromise counter-proposal that John C. McKenzie (R-Ill.) had drawn up. His plan provided that the eighteen-year old age group would be called only after the nineteen to forty-five category. Secretary of War Baker, however, rejected the McKenzie compromise plan.164

After Baker's refusal to compromise, a controversy erupted over deference to the military's position. Representative Kahn and his cohorts advocated following the military in technical matters. To representatives such as Dent, the whole idea violated their belief in the civilian creation of military policy for the public.165 In

163 Washington Post, May 2, 1918, 6; and May 3, 1918, 1.

164 New York Times, June 27, 1918, 1; August 2, 1918, 1; August 4, 1918, 1; August 6, 1918, 1; August 21, 1918, 11; and Washington Post

165 New York Times, August 23, 1918, 11; August 24, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9363-65, 905-06.
this case the anti-militarist bloc, however, represented a minority, as they lost the critical motion, one to recommit, 194 to 147. Again partisan differences were manifested on a draft vote (Table 4-23). Fifty-three percent of the Democrats voted with Dent, while sixty-six percent of the Republicans agreed with an Administration position. Nonetheless, the low cohesion indicates that neither party achieved a coherent party line. Proponents of the military position more likely resided in the Northeast (NE, MA, and ENC) and the Pacific states. Opponents hailed from the other regions. While this vote does not correlate with other draft roll calls of the second session, on a regional level it did display a consistency, particularly for the Northeast with its strong conscription advocacy. Overall, the balloting on draft legislation demonstrates that in the only area in which Congress participated directly in the formulation of military policy, significant numbers of representatives stood opposed to military and Administration directives. When this fact is related to the often aggressive and critical questioning of the House hearings, the military clearly did not win the approval of many congressmen. Although a majority supported the military’s plans, many of these did so with ill-temper, and a significant proportion refused all support. The House was permeated by a strong anti-military bias, which alerted its members to any possible abuses of power by the military.

Revenue and Water Power

By late May, the House could look forward to an end of their labors. With the primary elections in the offing, the solons were anxious to leave Washington for the hustings. However, these plans were in danger of being disrupted by the necessity for additional
TABLE 4-23

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 12731:
AGE CLASSIFICATION ON DRAFT BILL*

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9506.
revenue. With war costs mounting, the old revenue bill became more inadequate in maintaining the desired high ratio of taxes to bonds. As a result Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo met in early May with Democratic leaders Kitchin and J. Swagar Sherley, telling them that new taxes were imperative in the light of financial conditions. They and other congressional leaders vociferously objected and insisted that new taxes were not required until 1919, and that bonds could properly finance the war. But behind their distress was the apprehension that all the maneuvering necessary to pass the bill would wreck their party's chances in the November elections.¹⁶⁶

Notwithstanding these objections, McAdoo maintained his position, and in the ensuing deadlock Wilson was forced to step-in to break the impasse. Meeting with Republican and Democratic leaders in several conferences, he devised various compromise plans, such as for a special session to start November 11. House Ways and Means leaders Kitchin and Fordney accepted one proposal, but the Senate Republicans rejected it.¹⁶⁷ Now completely deadlocked, the House was startled by Wilson's request to address a joint session of Congress on May 27.

With a clarion call to duty that thrilled the public and that compelled the Congress to fall into line with his wishes, Wilson pressed home the necessity for new taxes. He also outlined the taxes he had in mind: a higher excess profits tax, a new war profits tax, and a more stringent tax on luxuries. In the midst of his speech,

¹⁶⁶New York Times, May 11, 1918, 1; May 14, 1918, 12; May 21, 1918, 11; Washington Post, May 11, 1918, 2; and May 22, 1918, 2.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., May 24, 1918, 1; May 25, 1918, 6; May 26, 1918, 1; New York Times, May 25, 1918, 1; May 26, 1918, 1; and May 27, 1918, 4.
he interjected what became its most memorable phrase, namely that "politics is adjourned." Meant not as a literal statement but as relating only to the framing of the revenue bill, Wilson's remark was misinterpreted by the press as a plea for a general truce in political infighting. Though incorrectly understood, it served the immediate purpose of forcing congressmen to give up their desires for campaigning. Many did so, however, with much ill-grace and deep resentment toward McAdoo.

The day after Wilson's speech, Kitchin, unhappy at the prospects of writing a tax bill, accused Secretary McAdoo of falling under the influence of the powerful publisher's lobby who wished to keep Congress in session until the rates on second-class mail had been repealed. Kitchin also "breathed fire" against the monied interests supposedly favored by McAdoo and threatened higher taxes on their ill-gotten war gains. Slightly better feelings returned when Kitchin and the White House agreed to brief summer vacations while Congress remained technically in session. Nonetheless, hearings on the tax bill got underway in an atmosphere of resentment.

The Ways and Means Committee's original plan was suggested by Secretary McAdoo. Its basic premise rested on the theory that good public financing required a bond to tax ratio of three to one or a tax bill of eight billion dollars. Since this figure represented about a four-billion dollar increase over the old revenue bill, McAdoo

168 Ibid., May 28, 1918, 1; Washington Post, May 28, 1918, 1; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 136-37.

proposed to raise the difference by a new eighty percent war profit tax to be superimposed on the existing excess profit taxes. He also suggested that normal income taxes should be increased from six to twelve percent and that additional heavy taxes should be placed on luxuries. The clear intention of the taxes, McAdoo implied, was to reduce the huge profits that contractors had garnered from war production. Although Republicans mostly concurred with the proposals, Fordney wanted more consumption taxes and a higher tariff. Past tax measures, along with McAdoo and Fordney's recommendations, provided the basis for the proposed bill and for remarks by witnesses before the Ways and Means Committee.

During the hearings Chairman Kitchin and John N. Garner (D-Tex.) told R. C. Leffingwell, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, that they disliked McAdoo's new tax plan. They suggested, instead, a dual plan by which the excess profit tax would be raised to the same eighty-percent level as the war profit tax. Their scheme proposed that whichever of the two taxes yielded the most revenue from a company, so long as it was not more than seventy percent of the net income, would be the tax used. Kitchin desired this formula because it would tax as much as the market would bear, thereby preventing business from escaping taxation. Rejecting their suggestion, Leffingwell argued that the war tax would accomplish the task alone. This tax also had the advantage, he maintained, of permitting the government to make contracts with manufacturers that would allow room for mistakes. Thus,

170 Ibid., June 1, 1918, 1; June 7, 1918, 1; New York Times, June 3, 1918, 1; June 4, 1918, 9; June 7, 1918, 1. U. S. Congress, House Proposed Revenue Act of 1919, Hearings on H. R. 12863, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 9-11.
on the one hand, a war contract would not bankrupt a company and, on the other hand, the tax would not permit huge profits from it. He concluded with a theme repeated throughout the hearings: the war tax was the most patriotic tax because it prevented war profiteering.\footnote{171}

Spokesmen from such diverse businesses as oil exploration and apple-growing paraded before the Ways and Means Committee. Although they all affirmed their patriotic desire to pay taxes, they also claimed that the proposed taxes would work unfairly against their own company but not their competition. They then proceeded to list a number of defects in the excess profit tax, some of which included a failure to differentiate between normal prewar profits and war profits and between capital expenditures and costs and an improper taxation of the "high risk" coal and oil industries, both of which their spokesmen asserted, deserved a depletion allowance. Other witnesses, some of whom represented farm groups, demanded confiscation of incomes over $100,000. When Garner asked one farmer spokesman if such high taxes might not kill the "golden goose," he replied that Garner’s implication was that the country’s men of great wealth were unpatriotic. A host of other special interest groups claimed that proposed taxes on cars, firearms, candy, and movies threatened the welfare of the American people as well as their industry. The most insistent special interest group was the second-class mail lobby, Kitchin’s antagonists. To them, the added postal taxes restricted information, burdened them with difficult administrative procedures, and violated the expressed opinions of

\footnote{171}{Claude Kitchin, "Who Will Pay the New Taxes?", Forum, LX (August, 1918), 149-154; and U. S. Congress, House, Proposed Revenue Act, 55, 65, 75.}
Presidents Washington and Lincoln in favor of low cost mail.\textsuperscript{172} By the time the Ways and Means committeemen closed public sessions, they were fully informed that any taxes they levied would offend many while pleasing few.

Writing the bill in secret, the Committee proceeded in an unusual fashion. Normally, the majority party wrote the bill by itself, then let the minority make its futile suggestions for change after the bill was written. This time, the parties joined together and drafted the bill in a non-partisan fashion. Though a few disliked this additional step, the committeemen also designated Kitchin as the only authorized spokesmen for the Committee.\textsuperscript{173} Working in this manner, the Committee first rejected a number of the luxury taxes suggested by the Treasury Department as unsuitable for heavy taxation. When the Committee next turned to the corporation provisions, more radical members attempted to regain the losses on luxury taxes with an increase from sixteen to twenty percent in the corporation tax. The Committee members turned this recommendation down, but they did agree to an eighteen percent tax. J. Hampton Moore, who insisted that the 1917 Revenue Act treated the rich too liberally, pressed for higher income tax assessments on larger incomes.\textsuperscript{174}

The main proposal under discussion by the Committee was Kitchin's plan to remove the war profits tax and to insert a higher excess

\textsuperscript{172}Ibid., 203, 208, 231, 437, 542, 544, 611, 629, 730, 775, 154-57, 955, 988, 1037, 1089, 1127, 1711, 1758, 1869, 1956, 2003, 2101-02, 2242.

\textsuperscript{173}Washington Post, July 15, 1918, 2; New York Times, July 21, 1918, 15; and July 23, 1918, 19.

\textsuperscript{174}Ibid., July 18, 1918, 8; August 5, 1918, 11; July 24, 1918, 17; July 26, 1918, 1; August 6, 1918, 14; and August 7, 1918, 15.
profits tax in its place. At one point the Committee adopted Kitchin's tax plan, but then the Administration mounted a campaign for the war tax. McAdoo told the press that a war profit tax would heavily assess all profiteers and also would have the added advantage of raising more money. Buttressing McAdoo's stance, Wilson issued a strong statement against profiteers in which he also supported his son-in-law's proposals. Kitchin, however, refused to retreat from his position altogether. Instead, he and other members insisted on a compromise system of excess and war profit taxes. In their plan, war profit taxes would apply if a company escaped from the first tax. Since Kitchin and not McAdoo dominated the Committee, McAdoo had to give way. The bill also differed from the Secretary's desires over the flat eighteen percent corporation tax and its failure to distinguish between earned and unearned income.  

Unanimously reported in early September by the Ways and Means Committee, the bill was explained by Kitchin for two days, the longest speech in House history. Little criticism surfaced during his discussion or in subsequent debates from Republicans. GOP leader Fordney told the House that he disliked particulars of the bill, such as parts of the excess tax provisions, and wished for the inclusion of a protective tariff. Yet, he quickly added that he was pleased by the bill and that any defects could be worked out by the Senate. The only partisan controversy during the debates arose over

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175Ibid., August 7, 1918, 18; August 13, 1918, 8; August 20, 1918, 6; August 27, 1918, 1; August 31, 1918, 9; September 3, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, August 5, 1918, 3.

a maneuver by Moore. In his latest foray against the Democrats, he offered the old Weeks resolution, under yet another of its manifold guises, as an amendment to establish a congressional commission which would investigate the expenditure of money raised under the Revenue Bill. Though the chair quickly ruled the amendment not to be germane, Moore scored another partisan point for the Republicans.  

On the Democratic side, a few members complained that the bill unfairly taxed the country, but they offered no counterplans. Party opposition to the bill disappeared, and though neither party was pleased with levying huge taxes days before the fall elections, they had to console themselves with the thought that the government required the money. An element of the House members, mainly progressives, liked those provisions which taxed the wealth of the country in an egalitarian fashion. These and the less sanguine Democratic and Republican members, joined together and voted unanimously for the bill 349 to 0.  

The Administration seized the time allowed by the prolonged session to advocate several other measures, the most important of which was an emergency power bill. For several years hydroelectric interests and public groups had been pushing for legislation to allow development of electrical power plants on navigable rivers.  

177 Washington Post, September 7, 1918, 2; September 21, 1918, 1; New York Times, September 7, 1918, 6; September 10, 1918, 5; September 21, 1918, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 10089 10339, 10547.  

178 Ibid.; and "The Revenue Bill," New Republic, XVI (September 14, 1918), 183-185. The Senate did not complete the tax bill until the third session. The bill's story will be taken up in the next chapter.  

179 See Samuel P. Hayes, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency;
President Wilson brought this question again before the House in his December, 1917, address when he advocated the development of resources on the principles of conservation. In January, he and House leaders organized a special committee on water power. At this time he also voiced his objections to the Senate's Shields water power bill because it did not protect the public's rights in conservation. Having already passed the Senate, the Shields bill provided for private development of electrical power and state control of rates. Its specific provisions established a difficult procedure for government "recapture" of water sites from companies and required a high rate of reimbursement to the companies by use of the formula of "just compensation." Behind the specific provisions of the Shields bill was a controversy over the proper use of America's natural resources. Congressmen such as Scott Ferris (D-Okla.) advocated a government managerial policy: the government should use public property for undertakings designed to be of the widest application to the public. Another group, as represented by the Shields bill, pushed natural resource development through private means, though they would accept a few government restrictions. Coloring the whole issue was the attitude of congressmen toward government regulation, corporate power, scientific management, and rational planning.181

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The new Water Power Committee started its hearings with testimony from O. C. Merrill, an employee of the Forestry Bureau, who had helped prepare the Shields bill. He presented the bill as one which fully protected the public interest and the natural resources of the country. Nonetheless, the emphasis of his statement stressed private rights more than public ones, a fact that caused Ferris to question Merrill closely about the "recapture" clause. According to Ferris, this provision, which granted licenses for fifty years and easy renewal terms at the end of that period, tied the hands of the government. Other members expressed to Merrill a skepticism about such provisions as the rate controls which were to be administered by the states, and the determination of the real costs of the power plant investment. Merrill took a corporation view on these matters, arguing that capital required moderate terms to encourage its investment.\textsuperscript{182}

The parade of corporation witnesses who followed Merrill agreed with the Shields bill or suggested even easier terms for power companies. When one company spokesman advocated the strengthening of the renewal rights at the end of fifty years, a lively discussion ensued. Frank Doremus (D-Mich.) doubted if any city would grant

fifty-year licenses to street car companies, while Miss Rankin ques-
tioned the spokesman's concept of "just compensation" at the end of the
fifty-year period. William LaFollette (R-Wash.) interjected that the
corporations' proposal would only enmesh the government in protracted
litigation over what was just. Chairman Thetus Sims closed the ex-
change with the observation that the public's position must be con-
sidered, particularly since the government was granting the companies
an opportunity to make money that it need not permit at all. The
Committee opposed liberalizing the bill in favor of the companies;
yet, the "just" compensation section remained too favorable to cor-
porations for the tastes of some members, most notably Chairman
Sims. 183

Since all sides agreed to the necessity of power development,
discussion on the House floor continued to revolve around the balance
between public and private interests. Sims, the bill's floor director,
argued that the House had improved the Shields bill by providing for
rate charges on the use of water sites and by clarifying the fifty-
year provision. This latter provision now read "not to exceed" fifty
years, whereas before it had provided for a flat "fifty years." Sims
added that the bill, in his opinion, still required more modification,
particularly on the recapture and compensation sectors. President

183Ibid., 160, 167, 175, 199-207, 247, 427, 457. The bill's basic provisions as reported out of committee included the following points. Federal jurisdiction of hydroelectric power was established on navigable waters. Leases were not to exceed fifty years. State and local political units were given preference over private companies on selection of power sites. A federal power commission was set up consisting of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. Recap-ture by the government of the lease was permitted under certain restric-tions. The federal government on recommendation of the commission was allowed to develop water power sites on its own initiative.
Wilson concurred with Sims, who likewise objected to the recapture principle of "net investment," and instead favored a provision based on the principle of "fair value not exceeding cost." Ferris summed up the argument by claiming that the net investment principle meant that the government would have to "pay back every penny" put into the power site. On the other hand, fair value would never exceed actual cost and would best serve the public interest. Supporters of the net investment section, as reported by the Committee, maintained that the provision was much different from that described by the opponents since various items under the "net value" concept would be deducted from total costs. Representative Esch also pointed out to the House that "net" investment was a clearly defined term in the courts. In contrast, the "fair value" concept was a poorly defined legal term.

The debate became highly technical but behind the details stood two varying interpretations of development and conservation: the supporters of the fair value principle pictured the public as suffering too long because of give-aways by the government; and the advocates of the net investment section wanted to see rapid development of hydroelectric power and failed to find danger in generous concessions to corporations.185

When balloting began on the recapture section, House Democrats rallied behind the Administration, and the Republicans united in favor of the corporations. The roll call, which would have permitted the substitution of the fair value principle for the net investment

184 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9037-38, 9042; Pt. 10, 9657-58, 9799; and New York Times, August 30, 1918, 10.

concept, found the Republicans victorious, 133 to 128.\textsuperscript{186} Handicapped by the greater unity of the Republicans, who organized ninety-two percent of their party in comparison to the eighty-seven percent of the Democrats', the Administration lost this close ballot (Table 4-24). When the roll call is analyzed from the geographical perspective, no evidence of party disloyalty can be found that indicated the influence of regional considerations. By 1918, the controversy over water power found both parties united on most details of water power legislation, but the decided partisan division over the compensation clause indicates differences over the role of the private and the public sectors in water power development. The Democrats urged greater public control, and the Republicans advocated increased incentives for private enterprise.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{Retrospect}

When the second session ended in November, 1918, the House, during a period of over eleven months, had considered a succession of fundamental issues that often caused heated debate. Whenever these

\textsuperscript{186}Ibid., 9971, 1052.

\textsuperscript{187}Of the different historiographical perspectives on the conservation movement, James Penick's viewpoint appears to best explain the division over the compensation clause. Briefly, Penick rejects the old view of conservation as a battle between one group favoring conservation and the other opposing it. Rather, conservation issues generated conflict between groups with different perspectives on conservation, one with a scientific and regulatory viewpoint, the other with a development and individualistic one. The Water Power Bill of the 65th House did not spark one group opposing it and another in favor of it. The division came from differing perspectives, one favoring greater government control and the other advocating more private control. Both sides agreed to government involvement on the one hand and corporate development on the other. The division came over the balance between private and public sectors. See Penick, Progressive Politics, 185-88.
TABLE 4-24
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 1419:
WATER POWER BILL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yea</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE</th>
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<th>MA</th>
<th>ENC</th>
<th>WNC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yea</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nay</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

questions came to a roll call, the resulting voting bloc frequently operated only on that issue. Nonetheless, these individual coalitions often expressed decided regional influences. Neither prohibition nor women's suffrage, two of the primary reforms of the Progressive Era, enlisted coalitions that also operated on other measures. In their case, the most notable pattern was found among Southern Democrats, who evidently were knitted together in support for prohibition and against women's suffrage in part because of the race question. Similarly, voting on farm, draft, and alien legislation created discrete blocs which often eclipsed partisan divisions: special regional interests, plus a decided element of partisanship, organized several diverse voting blocs on the farm proposals of the session; the new draft directives of the Administration aroused the opposition of ideologically committed members along with some members made unhappy over the mechanics of the draft system; and alien deportation legislation galvanized nativists into support and Northeastern Democrats, who represented immigrant constituencies, into opposition.

Besides regional influences, partisan factors frequently operated on roll calls. At the level of fifty percent versus fifty percent, a majority of Republicans rejected Democratic positions on forty percent of all roll calls (Table 4-25). At the highest level of partisanship (ninety percent versus ninety percent), the second session displayed what appeared to be a highly amicable state of affairs because only three percent of the votes were recorded at that level. In comparison to other sessions, partisan voting increased slightly over the first, but was markedly lower than in the third session. In comparison to other Congresses of the Progressive Period, the forty percent of
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Level of Partisanship</th>
<th>First Session</th>
<th>Second Session</th>
<th>Third Session</th>
<th>Average for All Sessions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 v 50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 v 90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
partisan voting at the fifty percent versus the fifty percent level was much below the normal average of sixty percent. 188

The obvious interpretation of this data would be that the general wartime unity caused a decline in partisanship. The second session recorded thirty-one percent of its roll calls as unanimous, a very high percentage. The first session voted unanimously twenty-four percent of the time, and the third session did so nineteen percent of the time. The large percentage of unanimous votes in the second included roll calls of both procedural motions of small consequence and votes over fundamental war measures. In this latter category, the War Finance Corporation and the Revenue Bill were agreed to by the House without division. The unanimous votes, then, would further collaborate the interpretation that partisanship declined.

However, this thesis is only partially correct because it overlooks a fundamental fact about the roll calls. When the unanimous votes are removed, the data suggests that many measures of a non-war character or even war nature did spark partisan voting. Fully forty percent of the remaining sixty-nine percent of the roll calls divided along partisan lines. In short, partisanship remained, but the high level of unanimous votes effectively hid it from view.

Another analytical tool for the study of roll calls measures the degree of unity within parties. First, by use of the Rice Index, the average score can be determined for the session. Democrats recorded a score of seventy-one while the Republicans posted a score

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188 See Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive Era," 571-76; and see, also, Chapter two, table twenty-one for more information on other Congresses.
of sixty-eight (Table 4-26). In comparison to the average cohesion score for all sessions, the Democrats displayed less and the Republicans more. Though in both cases the difference from the average was slight, it indicated that issues tended to separate the Democrats internally, even given the large number of unanimous roll calls on war measures which should raise the cohesion average score. For the Republicans this pattern was not as evident. However, when some individual issues are calculated for the Rice Index Score, Republicans at times showed marked disunity. Policy on aliens and wheat prices considerably disrupted Republican cohesion, while railroad measures and to a lesser degree economic and postal policy issues moderately fragmented them. In the case of the Democrats, divisive issues were women's suffrage, alien policy, and wheat prices. When the cohesion of the two parties is compared, the Republicans showed higher cohesion than the Democrats on women's suffrage and prohibition, while the Democrats displayed greater internal unity than the Republicans on wheat and railroad policy. Of course, despite these variations, it should be remembered that both parties showed high levels of cohesion, as seen in the table. As in the first session, both parties were comparatively united overall and on most issues, a fact that helps to account for much of the House voting behavior during the second session.

Finally, a number of measures raised questions of progressivism. In the case of labor issues with progressive implications, voting patterns tended to show the Republicans more favorably inclined toward labor than were the Democrats. On the most important labor votes, those on the Cannon amendment to bar labor "conspiracies," the House evidenced near total confusion as it first voted against
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Democrat Second Session</th>
<th>Democrat All Sessions</th>
<th>Republican Second Session</th>
<th>Republican All Sessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>War Legislation</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
labor and then for labor. A more clear-cut pattern emerged on the railroad bill, wherein the Democrats favored the progressive position while most Republicans opposed it. Again on price controls of minerals and on greater public control of water power development, the Democrats struck the more progressive stance. But since most of the progressive votes expressed a strong partisan or regional influence, the ideological significance of the parties' stance can be questioned. Overall, the House formulated its roll call decisions in the context of partisanship, moderated by the extenuation of war circumstances, the demands of regional interests, and the ideological requirements of particular measures.

Apart from these influences shaping roll calls, House deliberations were also directed by a pattern of attitudes and emotions. When the House reconvened in December, 1917, patriotic concern for the war program initiated investigations and several proposals for a partnership between the President and Congress. While the Republicans directed these thrusts, Democrats indicated their alarm in more subtle fashions. The Administration resolved the winter crisis, which it also did when beset by several smaller ones later in the session; but the patriotic and partisan attitudes behind them were never successfully channeled by the Administration into more productive directions. As a result representatives fixed their attention only on military victory and never turned to a fruitful discussion on the postwar world. Notably absent from House debates were clear and forward looking speeches on a better national and international future.  

Many congressmen made war speeches of one type or another,
Because of this failure to express generous sentiments, war emotions more often found outlet in rancor and intolerance toward minorities and dissenters. Aliens, in particular "alien slackers," along with political radicals, received their share of verbal abuse. More importantly, the House, with hardly a word of objection, nailed down the final features of the repressive war program when it passed the Anarchist Deportation Bill and the Sedition Act. In such an atmosphere, congressmen ceased being concerned with civil liberties and, instead, became afraid that their own records might be criticized by the press or by fellow members as insufficiently patriotic. Nonetheless, partisanship continued to play the dominant role even in the midst of emotions of intolerance. In fact, the desire to defeat the opposition party often turned patriotism and intolerance to its own uses. Criticism of the Administration, though based on real conditions, ebbed and flowed more on the impulses of partisan advantage than on a clear-cut analysis of the situation.

Too much was at stake in the war for either side to allow the other to reap the accolades of the public. As the session dragged toward the fall elections and adjournment, the dominant accent became not war, patriotism, intolerance, or ideology but the partisan campaign appeals. 190

190 For some evidences of partisan speech making late in the session see ibid., Pt. 8, 7689, 8204, 8207; Pt. 10, 9601, 9606, 9615, 10125, 10257, 10572; Pt. 11, 10709, 11291, 11324, 1332.
CHAPTER V

THIRD SESSION OF THE 65TH HOUSE

In the final session the House confronted the new and demanding problems of postwar reconstruction, which was similar in importance to the war mobilization issue of the first session. Several measures were only partially completed when peace was suddenly declared. Congress was forced to deal not only with these carry-over issues but also with the complex questions of postwar reconstruction. The departure of President Wilson shortly after the beginning of the third session for the Paris Peace Conference removed the main guiding force for the development of reconstruction measures. Cut adrift from leadership but compelled by circumstances to confront the problems of reconstruction, the House lost its direction and became entangled in a web of partisan, ideological, and regional confusion.

Defeat of the Reconstruction Commission

Although peace had returned, members' tempers were clearly on edge as the session opened. Republicans, who were the victors in the November, 1918, congressional elections, viewed Wilson with suspicion because of his October 25, 1918, press release. In this statement Wilson had called for a Democratic Congress, had declared the Republicans, though pro-war, anti-administration, and had charged them with designing to gain control of the Executive. Republicans,
besides turning the statement to their own partisan advantage, angrily denied the validity of the statement.¹

When the President failed to include Senators or important Republicans in the delegation to the Parish Peace Conference, he deepened congressional hostility toward himself and his program. As a consequence, Representative William A. Rodenberg (R-Ill.) introduced a resolution which declared the Presidency vacated if Wilson, as was rumored, decided to attend the Conference himself. Although Minority Leader Mann opposed such malevolent steps, congressmen were not in a receptive mood when Wilson appeared before them on December 2, 1918, to deliver the State of the Union Address.²

After citing the military accomplishments of the nation, the President in his speech praised the organizational abilities and the spiritual qualities of the soldiers and the people during the war. Wilson then discussed his ambitions for the future, which he defined as "justice and fair dealing." As a first step toward the achievement of these goals, he officially announced his decision to attend the Peace Conference. Since the Allies and the Central Empires accepted his Fourteen Points as the basis for the conference's negotiations, the President stated that his presence was essential to the proper interpretation of the points. Wilson was determined to influence

¹New York Times, October 26, 1918, 1; October 27, 1918, 10; October 28, 1918, 1. See Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 220ff for an extensive discussion of the October appeal and its implications.

²Washington Post, December 1, 1918, 1; December 3, 1918, 6; and December 4, 1918, 6.
personally the peace negotiations, and, for him this transcended all other interests.  

Although Wilson took little interest in the home front, he did note some problems stemming from postwar economic and industrial readjustment. He rejected "any general scheme of reconstruction" because business and labor would never be pliant enough to accept direction. He, instead, proposed several pieces of legislation that would aid the transition process. One such bill would fund a public works program for veterans. Entirely recommended by Secretary of the Interior Frank Lane, this bill called for the employment of veterans in the development of arid, swamp, and cut-over lands. Wilson claimed that this proposal was necessary because business would not be able to provide immediate employment for all returning veterans. He then turned to industrial reconstruction. The government, he pointed out, was already removing most controls over industry, but the shipping and railroad industries still required government direction and reorganization. The war demonstrated that the railroads were not capable of handling the immense transportation demands placed on them. Blaming this failure on the legally compelled competition between railroads, he suggested both an extension of government management and an appropriation for improvements. He also implied that he favored long-termed plans which would increase government regulation while decreasing "wasteful" competition. Finally, he advocated that the Senate pass the House-approved tax bill, though in a revised form. With the war's end, the need for revenue decreased; he

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recommended that the Senate slash the House's tax proposals from eight billion to six billion.  

Wilson's leadership of the third session largely ended with his speech. While he became enmeshed in the details of international reconstruction, the House was left to develop its own legislation for domestic reconstruction. During the second session Representative Barton L. French (R-Idaho) had introduced a reconstruction proposal that paralleled reconversion plans of some foreign countries. Its provisions established a minister of reconstruction in the President's cabinet and a commission composed of congressmen to propose legislation. Other congressmen made similar suggestions, and in the Senate, John Weeks (R-Mass.) submitted a proposal for a special congressional committee on reconstruction. Since its sponsor was known as a bitter anti-Administration Republican, Week's plan became a highly charged partisan issue, particularly when a conference of Senate Republicans endorsed it. Seeing the design as one more Republican effort to wrestle the direction of the government from Wilson's hands, Senator Overman (D-N.C.) introduced a bill to provide for executive predominance on a reconstruction commission.

4Ibid.

5See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 48-52, for a discussion as to the reasons why Wilson failed to provide leadership for domestic reconstruction.


7New York Times, September 28, 1918, 11; October 2, 1918, 12; October 4, 1918, 12; and November 14, 1918, 1.
After the November election victory of their party, Senate Republicans again agreed to work for the establishment of a reconstruction commission. They now proposed one strictly under the control of their party. When Wilson in his State of the Union address failed to break the deadlock over proposals, reconstruction plans became hopelessly tangled in partisan controversy and never emerged from congressional committees. The House was left without a central committee for reconstruction planning. 8

"Benefits for the Doughboys"

The start of the House's piecemeal consideration of reconstruction programs was prompted by the return of veterans from France. Congressmen advanced plans for securing the veteran's financial security. During the first session, the Congress had authorized a Bureau of War Risk Insurance. Through the services of this agency a soldier could gain protection in three different ways. First, he was required, if an enlisted man, to have half his pay deducted. If the enlistee had dependents, the Bureau then multiplied the soldier's deduction by the number of his dependents. This sum, along with the original deduction, was sent by the Bureau to the enlistee's family. If the enlistee had no dependents, the Bureau deducted half of his pay for forced savings. The allotment system ended at the close of

8Ibid., November 20, 1918, 1. Plans for reconstruction were common after the war, but the failure to create a reconstruction commission and Wilson's decision to remove himself to Paris never permitted them to get off the ground. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), 152, 304-05; and Noggle, Into the Twenties, 31-34, 46-49. The House could have filled the gap, but in large measure they failed to do so.
the war. Second, a government insurance program paid premium to a soldier's dependent's in case of his death, or, in the case of injury, provided for the complete cost of his rehabilitation. Third, the soldier could increase his insurance by taking out a life-insurance policy worth up to $10,000. The policy's attraction came from its greatly lower premiums in relation to those of private companies. If a veteran wished to continue the insurance after the war he could pay premiums to a government-operated insurance corporation.9

The House praised the bravery of the troops and made plans to implement the rehabilitation provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act. The House's concern for the care of the injured and sick did not, however, extend to a bill which would establish a tuberculosis sanitarium at Dawson Springs, Kentucky. Sponsored by a Kentucky Democrat, David H. Kincheloe, and supported by the Democratic leadership, the bill was rejected by the Republicans because they wanted a comprehensive bill on hospital care for veterans. They also complained that it was a scheme pushed by a representative for his constituents, which would benefit them much more than the veterans. Democrats countered that the Dawson Springs proposal was sanctioned by the Public Health Service. Further, they noted that the government would save money because at least 1000 acres had been donated to the government by the

Dawson Springs community for the hospital. The bill barely passed, as the House divided along strict partisan lines, ninety-nine percent of the Democrats opposing ninety-five percent of the Republicans.\(^\text{10}\)

Because Republicans opposed a piecemeal approach to rehabilitation, the House recorded a similar partisan division over a bill transferring a sanitorium from the Public Service to the War Department.\(^\text{11}\) The developing partisan split over rehabilitation policy, however, ended when the Democrats formulated and brought to the House floor comprehensive hospital legislation for discharged veterans. But agreement on a general hospital plan did not preclude controversy over other aspects of rehabilitation policy. For example, some representatives advocated buying hotels and using old army camps and converting them into hospitals, while others suggested that the government ought to build new facilities. In the case of the actual rehabilitation programs for the disabled, several representatives pushed training not only for manual labor but also for professional education, a plan that Congress did not accept until after World War II. The final legislation incorporated provisions for a rehabilitation program that called for building new hospitals, utilizing camp hospitals, and providing vocational training.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{10}\)Ibid., Pt. 1, 45-46, 48-49, 159. The bill did not pass the Senate. See Ibid., Index 254, on H. R. 12917.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., Pt. 2, 1786.

Representatives also aided the return of the veteran to peacetime activities by granting him a discharge bonus. The original plan involved a bonus equal to one month's pay, which for enlisted men would have been thirty dollars. George Huddleston (D-Ala.) protested the "gross inadequacy" of the sum, and its "unfairness" to the enlisted men in comparison to the officers, who received a much larger monthly salary. Insisting that officers rendered no more service to the nation than enlisted men, he proposed instead that all receive six consecutive monthly payments of thirty dollars each. He defended his plan by claiming that it would help prevent revolution and the spread of Bolshevism, a possible danger that increasingly loomed in the minds of some congressmen. That Huddleston himself was actually haunted by the spectre of revolution can be doubted, but the sudden cancellation of war contracts and the return of four million veterans to the employment market had caused some congressmen to predict widespread unemployment and unrest. Adding to their unease was the Communist Revolution in Russia which some conservatives saw as a possible forerunner of revolution in the States. Huddleston seized upon these anxieties and used them to support his claims that the bonus would stimulate the veteran's gratitude toward the government and render the work of the agitator more difficult. Apparently, not many congressmen agreed with Huddleston's "safety-valve" thesis; instead, they believed that the Treasury could not afford the drain of money. On a non-roll call vote his amendment, a precursor of the famous bonus schemes of the 1920's, failed to be adopted. Later in
the session the House, in a more generous mood, did raise the bonus to sixty dollars.13

Another plan for helping unemployed veterans involved the simple expedient of giving qualified veterans preference over other equally qualified applicants for government positions. The preference plan passed without opposition,14 but the session's other major employment scheme failed to pass. Proposed by Secretary of the Interior Frank K. Lane and recommended by President Wilson, the plan sought to establish veterans in organized farming communities. Under this scheme the government would grant veterans acreage in swamp, cut-over, or arid regions which the soldiers would improve through the assistance of government loans and advice. Cost for the program was tagged at $100 million by Lane during hearings on the proposal. He told the Public Lands Committee that it not only would decrease postwar unemployment but it also could help solve the problems of vice, poverty, crowded cities, and unused lands. Warming to his subject, the Secretary also argued that land grants for veterans would increase the numbers of property owners and would proportionately decrease the number of tenant farmers. In an appeal to the Jeffersonian tradition, Lane concluded that farm-owning veterans would be better citizens.15

Several members of Congress offered similar proposals such as the one advocated by Dick Morgan (D-Okla.). His plan eliminated the

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13 Ibid., Pt. 1, 955-57; and Pt. 3, 3010.
14 Ibid., 2326-28; and New York Times, January 30, 1919, 3.
communal features of the Lane proposal and established a corporation to loan money for individual plots of land. All such proposals aroused the hostility of congressmen who opposed large scale reconversion schemes. To these representatives Lane's plan seemed a "cooddling" operation wherein the government would destroy the initiative of young Americans by giving them handouts and telling them what to do. To some other members the plan was easily susceptible to speculative purposes, for they feared it would benefit special interests groups much more than the intended beneficiaries. The critics' anxieties were based on the fact that Southern marsh land owners, land-owning railroads, the owners of cut-over lands were conducting a well-organized lobby campaign for the measure. Perhaps the critics' main objection stemmed from a skepticism as to the soundness of the venture. Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.) voiced this viewpoint during hearings on the bill when he told Lane that he doubted the ability of veterans with no prior experience to make a success out of marginal lands. Although the plan appealed to nostalgic sentiments for a passing agrarian America, the Public Lands Committee still refused to report the Lane proposal to the House floor. Congressmen, wearied by the increase in executive power, remained unaffected by the postwar enthusiasm for government programs.  

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16 Ibid., 7-8, 11, 14. For a discussion of the land proposal and for the reasons of its failure see, Bill G. Reid "Proposals for Soldiers Settlement During World War I," Mid-America, XLVI (July, 1964), 172-186; and ibid., "Agrarian Opposition to Franklin K. Lane's Proposal For Soldier Settlement, 1918-1921," Agrarian History, XLVI (April, 1967), 167-179. Reid in the latter article stresses the role of Midwestern and Northeastern farm organization, fearful of over-production, in bottling up the measure. He, however, overlooks the bill's relation to reconstruction and congressmen's adversion to government schemes.
Military Policy

Although neither comprehensive legislation nor consistent voting blocs emerged on veteran issues, the House's obvious solicitude for the "doughboy" pointed toward its policy during the 1920's. Similarly, the House's action on military matters indicated congressional policy for the twenties. Foremost in the minds of many congressmen was the desire for rapid demobilization of the army. In part, their attitude reflected the longings of parents and relatives and soldiers themselves to return to civilian pursuits.\(^\text{17}\) Getting the "boys" home also encompassed a deep strain of hostility toward the War Department and its military leadership. Though battlefield victories had brought some praise to the military organization, the attacks of the earlier sessions on inefficiency, waste, corruption, and general incompetency continued unabated, and new charges in fact were added to the old ones. The military justice system was censured by Royal Johnson (R-N.D.), a member who had served in the army as a private. In his condemnation of military justice, Johnson even dared to attack General John Pershing for "partial, lawless, and harsh" military sentences.\(^\text{18}\) The system of military promotion also received a severe indictment from James A. Gallivan (D-Mass.). He charged that regular army officers were systematically excluding National Guard officers from

\(^{17}\)Washington Post, January 3, 1919, 6; January 23, 1919, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 962; Pt. 4, 3229, 3560-61.

\(^{18}\)New York Times, February 28, 1919, 5; January 3, 1919, 14; March 4, 1919, 10; March 5, 1919, 11; Washington Post, January 16, 1919, 6; February 16, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1927-28; Pt. 3, 2247, 2303; Pt. 4, 3478-79, 5032; and Pt. 5, 4502.
the higher ranks and advancements. Gallivan and other like-minded congressmen believed that regular army officers formed a military clique which utilized its power to abuse the rights of both the National Guardsman and the enlisted man.  

Two roll calls pointed out the strength and the sources of criticism toward the military. The first roll call came over a faux pas by Major General B. B. Buck, commander of the Houston military post. His office had issued orders that officers were not to attend social functions to which enlisted men were also invited. If officers, the order added, did inadvertently attend such a social function, they were to leave immediately. When this order came to the attention of Representative Huddleston, he soundly denounced it on the House floor. Such an order would undermine, he maintained, the very democracy that Americans had just secured, since it would create an un-American caste system. Although General Buck quickly rescinded the order, Huddleston and like-minded colleagues wanted to prevent similar orders in the future. They demanded inclusion of an amendment in the Military Appropriation Bill which would prohibit payment of salaries to officers who issued discriminatory orders. They forced a roll call on the proposal, which won, 191 to 71.

The vote mobilized an interesting coalition in support of the amendment (Table 5-1). Although it won bi-partisan support, a greater

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19 *New York Times*, February 2, 1919, 17; February 4, 1919, 2; February 14, 1919, 8; February 16, 1919, 10; *Washington Post*, February 2, 1919, 6; *Cong. Rec.*, 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 1408, 1409, 1410; Pt. 3, 2304, 2543; and Pt. 4, 3198, 3294-95, 3299.

20 Ibid., Pt. 3, 2248; and Pt. 4, 3300, 3301.

21 Ibid., 3735-36.
### TABLE 5-1

**VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE HUDDLESTON AMENDMENT**

#### Region and Party (Numbers)

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#### Region and Party (Percent)

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3736.*
percentage of Democrats than Republicans cast their ballots for Huddleston's amendment. Eighty-six percent of the Democrats voted in favor of the amendment while only fifty-eight percent of the Republicans supported it. Northeastern representatives (NE, MA) went against the majority position, particularly the Republicans of that region. Except for Pacific state Republicans, members of both parties in the other regions lined up solidly for the Huddleston amendment.

The second roll call resulted from Representative Albert Johnson's (R-Wash.) efforts to launch an investigation into the army's treatment of Colonel E. L. Rice. According to Johnson, Rice, who had saved the army money by uncovering and reporting the misuse of army supplies, had not been given just reward by the army. Instead, the military high command, Johnson told the House, had "outrageously" abused Rice by assigning him to an isolated post and by ignoring his findings. A resolution had earlier been introduced to investigate Rice's treatment, but the Military Affairs Committee had bottled it up. Johnson, in order to force action, proposed that the resolution be withdrawn from the Military Affairs Committee and requested that the War Department furnish records of the Rice case directly to the House. This maneuver in the form of a resolution won, 167 to 152 (Table 5-2). The voting breakdown differed radically from the Huddleston vote since the roll call divided along strictly partisan lines. One hundred percent of the Republicans voted for the resolution while ninety-eight percent of the Democrats opposed the motion.²² An explanation for the variation in the party voting over the Huddleston

²²Ibid., Pt. 5, 4348-50.
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Region and Party (Percent)

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and Johnson motions is readily apparent: the first vote involved a rebuke to officers for their status pretensions; the second vote involved not only an attack on officers but also a slap at the operations of the War Department.

Together the two votes clearly delineate the House's attitude toward the military and the War Department and the voting groups behind the attitudes. During the war the Republicans had repeatedly attacked the military management of the war by the Administration while the Democrats attempted to counter the GOP's assaults. Both stances were largely dictated by partisan considerations. However, segments of the Republican party, mainly from the Northeast, believed that military failures came from a shackling of the military by the Administration. These Republicans upheld the military tradition and opposed Huddleston's reprimand. A number of other Republicans rejected their colleagues' reverence for the military. Although these Republicans usually supported attacks on the Administration's war management, they also gladly joined the Democrats in checking the pretensions of the officer class. Democrats supported the Administration not because of any endearment for military officers but because their party held the reins of power. Given a discreet opportunity to attack, they unanimously voted against the military. They and many Republicans agreed with Dan V. Stephens' (D-Nebr.) comments to a constituent that "the military the world over, not just the German military, was a threat to freedom."

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23 Stephens to Frank Dolezal, May 5, 1917, Box 27, Folder 189, StephensPapers.
In this frame of mind the House started the task of dismantling the military machine. Before the Armistice the House had been appropriating vast sums for the army and navy. The military's insatiable demands were driving expected expenditures for fiscal 1919 upward to twenty-four billion dollars; however, the cessation of hostilities put a brake on the upward thrust of appropriations. Representative Sherley, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, demanded that all departments cut their future appropriation requests to the bone. He also wanted departments to stop the spending of money already appropriated but not yet committed. At the same time, Representative Simon Fess for the Republicans advocated that the House should adopt a resolution to block the expenditure of the unspent funds.\textsuperscript{25}

Immediate savings were instituted by departments, but, according to military witnesses appearing before Sherley's Appropriation Committee, several factors slowed down a complete cut back to peacetime levels. The most important one was that the army and navy could not be demobilized all at one time. These officials told Sherley's Committee that it would take months to transport the two million soldiers in France back to the United States. Committee members interjected during the witnesses' testimony that they wanted prompt demobilization, but added that they realized it would take time. Another factor, according to Secretary of War Baker, involved the technical qualities of a military contract with a company. If the production of the goods

\textsuperscript{24}New York Times, September 17, 1918, 17; September 20, 1918, 1; October 5, 1918, 17; October 17, 1918, 1; and December 3, 1918, 15.

\textsuperscript{25}Washington Post, November 24, 1918, 2; and November 27, 1918, 2.
was nearly complete, the military favored honoring the contract rather than cancelling it. Sherley agreed with Baker's principle, but the Committee often thought the military should have cut contracts on specific items sooner. Finally, Baker suggested that a judicious cutback in government expenditures would help prevent economic depression and high unemployment. The country, he pointed out, was passing through a transition period and the government had a responsibility not to unsettle conditions any more than absolutely necessary. Sherley again concurred with Baker's idea but added that a quick return to peacetime conditions would not engender massive disruption in the economy. Expressing an attitude frequently repeated in the months ahead, Sherley stated that business could take care of itself during the transition period.26

The push for economy27 and the desire for normal peacetime conditions shaped House debates on the naval appropriation bill. During the war Secretary of the Navy Daniels had proposed a naval building program costing $600 million. It duplicated the 1916 program that built ten superdreadnoughts and six cruisers. Similar to the earlier program it was to be completed in a three-year period. After the signing of the Armistice Daniels continued to advocate the three-


27 See Washington Post, February 16, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, Sess. 3, Pt. 1, 3198-3204, for discussions on military and House cut backs in expenditures. The military appropriation bill for fiscal 1920 was lowered from the astronomical sum of $19 billion to $1.1 by combined action of the military and the House.
year program and even requested that appropriations remain at the wartime level of over $2.4 billion.\textsuperscript{28}

The House Naval Affairs Committee reacted in disbelief that naval plans were still the same in spite of peace. Daniels argued before the Committee that the United States required a navy second to none. A navy of that size, he elaborated, would enforce, with England, the proposed League of Nations treaty provisions on the freedom of the seas. The Committee, however, rejected the Navy's plans for expending $2.6 billion, and even reduced a revised Navy Department budget of $903 million to $746 million. Opposition to the battleship phase of the naval program came mainly from Republicans Thomas S. Butler and William Browning. Nonetheless, when Wilson sent an urgent and secret appeal from Paris requesting passage of the three-year program because it was necessary to strengthen his hand in disarmament negotiations, even these Republicans swung into agreement. Consequently, the Committee reported the bill to the House floor with greatly diminished funding but retaining the three-year program.\textsuperscript{29}

Proponents of a small navy, who noted the incongruity between Wilson working for disarmament in Paris while simultaneously demanding more warships at home, sharply criticized the bill. These members, particularly the Republican element, were angered by Wilson's intervention into the debate. Adding to their sense of outrage was the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28}New York Times, October 23, 1918, 1; November 20, 1918, 4; and November 21, 1918, 13.
\item \textsuperscript{29}Ibid., December 13, 1918, 1; December 31, 1919, 1; January 26, 1919, 11; January 28, 1919, 1; January 31, 1919, 1; February 1, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 2674, 2680, 2682, 2685.
\end{itemize}
fact that Wilson sent his appeal as a secret cablegram only to the Naval Committee, and members of that Committee refused to divulge the message's details. From an anti-militarist viewpoint, Congressman Huddleston could not understand the reasoning behind the program, since America had entered the World War to end armament races. While he also called it imperialistic and militaristic, James A. Frear (R-Wis.) described the bill as a drain on the Treasury. The House would not only have to appropriate $740 million for fiscal 1920, but the program would, he stated, commit the government to spending $415 million more in the next two years. Martin Dies, Sr., (D-Tx.) ended the small navy argument with the contention that a large navy violated the American tradition of isolationism.  

Countering the arguments of the opponents, navy supporters, voiced a desire to back up President Wilson at the Paris Conference. Henry I. Emerson (R-Ohio) declared that he would vote for the naval program because the President asked for it at a critical juncture in the peace negotiations. He noted that he did not want the responsibility for defeating it when Wilson agreed to accept all the blame for any negative results. Other supporters of the President's position added that the bill carried a provision for cancellation of the program if the peace conference reached a disarmament pact. But some Naval proponents advocated a large navy on its own merits, without reference to the President. Patrick H. Kelley (R-Mich.) drew a completely different lesson from the war than the anti-militarists, namely that America had to arm herself fully for her own protection.

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30 Ibid., 2682-85, 2691, 2771, 2908-09, 2844, 3149, 3151, 3159; and New York Times, February 7, 1919, 14; February 11, 1919, 1.
Kelley's nationalism received support from Percy E. Quin (D-Miss.), who argued that the United States should never again be unprepared. He also added that a navy second to none was necessary to prevent Great Britain or any other nation from "bullying" the United States in the future.31

The varying interpretations of the work of the peace conference and America's naval role in the postwar world resulted in three roll calls, all of which scale together (Table 5-3). At the low scale position eight percent of the Democrats and thirty-four percent of the Republicans opposed all motions that favored the three-year naval program. Regionally, the only noticeable pattern of opposition that developed was among Republicans from the interior states who showed more signs of dissatisfaction with large naval expenditures than their colleagues from coastal regions. In the middle scale position representatives demonstrated only lukewarm support by voting for passage of the bill after opposing the critical ballot on the three year building program. Again the Republicans predominated as the moderate supporters of the bill. Regional factors had no discernable influence on the voting pattern of this level. At the highest level of support for the naval bill, eighty-four percent of the Democrats joined together and acceded to Wilson's appeal. They were supported by twenty-seven percent of the Republicans, who since they voted against their party's majority, can be labeled big naval supporters. No evident regional voting blocs existed at this level. The Navy's

## Table 5-3: A

### Scalogram by Party and Region on the Naval Bill: H. R. 15539

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The order of the roll calls is 254, 252, 253

Percent at each point on the scale 17, 24, 4, 55

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .995
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<td>To adopt bill H.R. 566, being a privileged resolution from Comm. on Rules for the consideration of H.R. 15539 and providing that after adoption of the rule it is in order to consider new legislation in the bill notwithstanding the general rules of the House. 205-148; + = nay. Ibid., 3152.</td>
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<td>253</td>
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<td>To amend bill H.R. 15339, by providing that &quot;enrolled men so transferred shall be entitled to receive the same pay, rights, privileges and allowances in all respects as now provided by law for men regularly discharged and reenlisted immediately upon expiration of their full four years enlistment in the regular navy or marine corps.&quot; 194-142; + = nay. Ibid., 3171.</td>
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</table>
support showed definite weaknesses because most Republicans opposed
the naval program and significant elements of the Democrats undoubtedly
only voted in favor of the three-year program because of the appeal
from Wilson.\textsuperscript{32}

While the Wilson Administration secured passage of the naval
bill, it failed to win House approval of the Army Appropriation Bill
for fiscal 1920. In his explanation of the bill to the House, Chair­
man Dent of the Military Affairs Committee noted that Secretary of
War Baker had told his committee of the military's need for a peace­
time army of 537,000 men, raised by voluntary enlistment. Baker had,
Dent related, justified this force size, which greatly exceeded the
prewar army of 175,000, as necessary to carry out the peace treaty as
well as regular military duties. Although Baker had described the
537,000-man army as a transitional force, most Military Affairs
committeemen feared that once sanctioned by law it would remain at
that level. They inserted, Dent explained further, a clause which
stated their intention to restrict the 537,000-man force to one year,
after which the army would return to the prewar level.\textsuperscript{33}

Dent had no fondness for the bill, and it soon became evident
that many congressmen wanted to establish immediately the size of the
peacetime army at a lower number. The military's proposal, Democratic

\textsuperscript{32}See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 29, for a discussion on
reduction of the Navy by future Congresses.

\textsuperscript{33}U. S. Congress, House, Army Reorganization, Hearings on H. R.
14560, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 13, 18-21, 64; Washington Post, February 16,
1919, 1; New York Times, January 17, 1919, 7; January 28, 1919, 1;
February 11, 1919, 2; February 13, 1919, 8; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3198-3205. For a discussion of Congress and
postwar military policy see Noggle, Into the Twenties, 27.
critics argued, cost too much money. Moreover, they disliked the whole idea of a large peacetime army because they saw it as a threat to liberty, and instead favored a small regular army which would be supported by a strong National Guard. A general assault on the bill developed, and in a startling roll call vote ninety-six percent of the Democrats voted against the War Department, thereby defeating the proposal for a 537,000 man army (Table 5-4). In its place they substituted the prewar limit of 175,000 men. Interestingly enough, ninety-two percent of the Republicans found themselves in the peculiar position of supporting the War Department. Republicans voted this way not out of a desire to support the Administration or necessarily because they believed in a larger army. Rather their stance, as explained by Minority Leader Mann to the House, was dictated by a desire to bring the troops home from Europe in the fastest way possible. Mann did acknowledge that some soldiers would necessarily remain in Europe for some time after the war, but volunteers should be substituted for draftees. This changeover was now impossible because the Democratic action, mann stated, cut the army's size so severely that there were not enough troops for European and regular army activities at the same time. Since the reduction did not affect the wartime army, the Administration, which Republicans distrusted, would use this as an excuse not to bring the "boys" home. Mann's explanation clarified the fact that the Republican majority had no desire to maintain a 537,000-man army. Thus when the Democrats, who

34 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3287, 3296, 3711-14, 3716-18, 3720, 3724; Washington Post, February 19, 1919, 1; February 24, 1919, 6; New York Times, February 19, 1919, 11; and February 26, 1919, 2.
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Region and Party (Percent)

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3718.*
did not share the GOP's distrust of the Administration, voted for the reduction, they were registering the long-range goal of the over­whelming majority of the House. A direct appeal from President Wilson on the naval bill did secure the assent of the House to a position many did not in fact favor. When no such appeal was made on behalf of the Army bill, even the Democrats could revolt against the War Department in their eagerness to check the power of the military.\footnote{35}

**International Affairs**

President Wilson, who had allowed the reduction of the military phase of the Great Crusade, actively attempted to guide the House from isolationism to internationalism. He first pointed out that the House should respond to the plight of the European masses. The aftermath of the war in Europe left millions destitute, and the likelihood of mass starvation, particularly in Russia, confronted the war-torn European countries. Revolution and civil war had also broken out in Russia and appeared imminent in many other European countries as well. With Europe on the verge of collapse and anarchy, Wilson cabled from Paris that Congress should enact a bill appropriating $100 million toward the purchase of grain for European food relief.\footnote{36}

\footnote{35}The Army Appropriation Bill was among the many bills that failed to make its way through the Congress. A Senate filibuster blocked its passage. The 66th Congress thus would have to deal with the subject. See ibid., March 9, 1919, 1; and Noggle, *Into the Twenties*, 27-29.

Representative Sherley immediately introduced a bill and brought it to the House floor on January 7, 1919. Republicans blocked action on it that same day, but Sherley soon secured a special rule from the House Rules Committee which returned it to the floor. He and fellow supporters presented the bill as a humanitarian response to the plight of the European people. Christian charity, James C. Cantrill (D-Ky.) told the House, demanded that the United States not be stingy with its money in this crisis.

On a more pragmatic level, Sherley pointed out the benefit that the bill would have on the price of wheat and other grains. With prices on the verge of collapse, the bill would, he argued, bolster the grain market. Some Democrats also perceived the measure as upholding the President while he negotiated the peace treaty. They claimed that opposition to the measure wanted to discredit Wilson and his proposed League of Nations. Several Republican supporters of the measure responded to the Democrats' implication of partisan rivalry. These Republicans maintained that their party never wished to embarrass the President; however, they did not like his high-handed methods of cabling for action without supplying specific information. Other Republican supporters, among them Minority Leader Mann and ex-Speaker Cannon, who had often refused to join in the partisan thrusts of some party members, argued that America had a moral responsibility to feed the Europeans. People were starving, said Mann, and action was

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37 *New York Times*, January 8, 1919, 3; January 10, 1919, 1; and January 12, 1919, 7.
needed to relieve suffering. Cannon also emphasized that "hungry stomachs" caused riots and fostered the spread of bolshevism.\footnote{Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1339-43, 1345, 1349, 1358-59, and 1369.}

J. Hampton Moore (R-Pa.) rejected such arguments, saying it was time "to put a stop to this universal altruism." Other opponents, who were almost exclusively Republicans, insisted that the bill opened up an entirely new area of public expenditures. The United States, Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.) argued, had already contracted a huge public debt. The taxpayers, he added, could not stand the extra burden of feeding Europe. But the Republican critics' main objection stemmed from a basic dislike of Wilson and of his League of Nations. James N. Good (R-Iowa) bitterly attacked Wilson for "usurpation" of powers and claimed that since the bill contained no restriction on how the President would spend the money, Congress was unfortunately permitting the continued expansion of his authority. The incoming Speaker of the House, Frederick Gillett (R-Mass.), stressed that the House needed to start acting the part of a legislative body and not that of a rubber stamp. Congress had no obligation, the Republican leader implied, to enhance Wilson's standing at the Peace Conference.\footnote{Ibid., 1340-43, 1351-52, 1359.}

Republican opponents forced two roll calls on the relief measure. In an effort to restrict the bill, they moved to give the American Red Cross rather than the President the control of the relief fund. They failed to carry their motion by the margin of 202 to 117. Seventy-six percent of the Republicans voted for Red Cross supervision while the Democrats voted unanimously against it (Table 5-5).
TABLE 5-5

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON EUROPEAN RELIEF:  H. R. 13708

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1373A.*
The twenty-four percent of the Republicans who aligned themselves with the Democrats did not form any noticeable regional bloc. Republican opponents also forced a roll call over passage of the bill, which they lost, 242 to seventy-three.\textsuperscript{40} A majority of Republicans (fifty-eight percent) voted with ninety-four percent of the Democrats, which indicated that many Republicans did not oppose the principle of the bill (Table 5-6). The Republican opposition tended to represent the West North Central and Border states in greater numbers than other regions. Because Democrats solidly supported their President and significant numbers of Republicans recognized humanitarian and political benefits in the bill, internationalism won over isolationism.

President Wilson, who was much less able to direct the House on other phases of his European policy, provoked angry and bewildered remarks from several congressmen by his dispatch of American troops to Russia in the summer of 1918. Ernest Lundeen (R-Minn.) charged the Wilson with hypocrisy because he violated his own doctrine of self-determination by attempting to dictate the type of government for Russia. According to William E. Mason (R-Ill.), the Bolshevik menace was no worse than the Czar. Even if the Bolsheviks were establishing an undemocratic regime, the United States held no mandate to overthrow them. He concluded that Congress must reclaim its rightful powers, and he introduced a resolution that called for the withdrawal of the troops. Although the resolution never reached the House floor,

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 1373A and 1373B.
### TABLE 5-6

**VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON EUROPEAN RELIEF: H. R. 13708**

#### Region and Party (Numbers)

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#### Region and Party (Percent)

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*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1373B.*
no members defended the Wilson Administration's Russian policy.  

In apparent contradiction to House sentiment that opposed intervention in Russian internal affairs, Representative Thomas Gallagher (D-Ill.) won approval of a resolution that instructed the American peace commissioners to work for Irish freedom. Supporters of the Gallagher resolution, however, saw no contradiction, claiming instead that the Irish fitted perfectly the principle of self-determination. They were, James A. Gallivan (D-Mass.) told the Foreign Affairs Committee, an oppressed minority whose condition was very similar to that of the Czech people. Gallagher presented the Committee a massive petition of 600,000 names in support of Irish freedom, which clearly demonstrated the political implications of the resolution. Opponents, who most likely had only a small Irish-American electorate to confront, thought the resolution meddled in the affairs of an ally. Though critics could not defeat the resolution, they did secure a revision of it by the Committee. As reported by the Committee and eventually passed by the House, the resolution simply requested that the peace conference "favorably consider the claims of Ireland." It passed without a roll call, 216 to forty-five.  

41 Ibid., Pt. 4, 4066; Pt. 3, 2639, 2543. Criticism of Wilson's Russian policy was bi-partisan since leading Democrats, among them Edward Pou (N.C.), Chairman of the Rules Committee, called for the troops' removal. See ibid., Pt. 2, 1876-80; Pt. 3, 2543, 2630, 3242. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 142-48, for a general discussion on postwar American-Russian relations.  

Although the House never took a roll call on the League of Nations, Wilson's chief design for international relations was the subject of several speeches. Maintaining that a temporary alliance of the victors would enforce peace better than the League, Richard W. Parker (R-N.J.) compared it to the Articles of Confederation government. Each, he asserted, lacked any real mechanism to enforce its decisions. The League, consequently, would prove powerless to make Germany pay an indemnity or prevent German and Russian Bolshevik designs for conquest and revolution. America, he concluded, had a role in world affairs that a temporary alliance system, such as the one suggested by ex-President William Howard Taft, could fulfill better than the League. Similarly, Representative Mason believed that while the United States should become more involved in world affairs, he rejected the League as the proper forum for American participation. Instead, he favored American membership in a world court which would render impartial decisions for humanity. 43

Another group of critics found the League objectionable because of a belief that it restricted American sovereignty. To these nationalist congressmen the League threatened American freedom of action because a majority of nations could out-vote the United States and make binding decisions. Simon Fess, Republican Congressional Campaign Chairman, claimed that as a consequence the United States might lose control over her own immigration policy and merchant marine. Other Republicans, among them J. Hampton Moore, singled out the League's possible danger to the protective tariff, believing that the Democrats

43Ibid., Pt. 1, 209; and Pt. 2, 1416.
were using the League to advance free trade. But to many critics, such as Charles H. Sloan (R-Neb.), the League simply violated America's customary foreign policy. As in many such traditionalist speeches, Sloan quoted Washington's Farewell Address on the liabilities of "entangling alliances." In general the League's antagonists, because of their nationalist, protectionist, or traditionalist sentiment, demanded that the peace treaty in no fashion impair American sovereignty.44

To the supporters of the League, the opponents' viewpoint ignored the course of recent history. Hatton W. Summers (D-Tex.) portrayed the war as drawing America out of its past isolationism into world affairs. He further emphasized that President Wilson had not, as some claimed, manipulated the country into joining the maelstrom of international politics; instead, the tide of human history had forced a new direction. Accordingly, Earl H. Beshlin (D-Pa.) maintained that America should seize the league as a tool to bring together the world's nations. The League would, he claimed, extend to the world the Monroe Doctrine's principle of the self-determination of nations. The League also offered the opportunity, Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.) said, of breaking down trade barriers and the economic rivalries behind them. Since such a development, Hull conjectured, would bring world prosperity, it thereby would help to promote world peace. Other League proponents spoke in similarly idealistic terms, advocating proposals such as a people's referendum on all declarations of war.45

44ibid., Pt. 4, 3801, 2845; Pt. 1, 221, 454; Pt. 4, 4942, 4948; Nethers, "Simeon Fess: Educator and Politician," 232-33; and New York Times, February 20, 1919, 3.

45Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1824-25, 1839-
Although the exact position of House members found no formal expression, it was clear that many Republicans and some Democrats opposed the League of Nations. The isolationist attitudes of most congressmen did not easily facilitate agreement with the promptings of Wilsonian liberalism.

Civil Liberties, Aliens, and Un-Americanism

That the House's attitude was restrictive was starkly revealed on questions concerning civil liberties, aliens, and patriotism. Up to the end of the session, when pressing business prevented off-the-subject remarks, representatives frequently referred to the Bolshevist and the radical menace. In the mind of at least some members, radicalism confronted the nation with a real crisis and imperiled its security. William R. Green (R-Iowa), however, criticized his fellow members for distorting the danger. He implied that the word "Bolshevism" had become devoid of meaning and little more than a scare word. Congressman Meyer London, the Socialist member, also dismissed the Bolshevist danger. The real threat, he argued, lay in the attempt to repress supposed radicals by unconstitutional means. But more members apparently agreed with Percy E. Quin (D-Miss.) that radicals existed in abundance and were seeking to stir up discontent. He advocated their suppression even now that the war had ended. 46

40; Pt. 4, 3955-60, 3972; and Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 100-01. Other actions of the House showed its general isolationist and hostile attitude toward Europe. For example, even though Secretaries McAdoo and Glass requested half a billion more for loans to the allies, the Ways and Means Committee refused to grant it. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 4273.

46 New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3202-7, 3230-03; Pt. 2, 1667-68; Pt. 1, 761,
Two bills that went far toward meeting Quin's desires reached the House floor via the Unanimous Consent Calendar. The first bill, recommended by the State Department, amended the Espionage Act. It provided for the punishment of persons who "knowingly lied" to the State Department. J. Hampton Moore, who was not a noted defender of civil liberties but who was always ready to stop the flow of powers to the Executive, argued that the country already had too many restrictive laws. The bill's broad definition of falsehood, he added, could readily be utilized by the government to jail those committing innocent mistakes of memory. The second bill, much wider in scope than the first, declared unlawful those associations which proposed by the means of physical force, violence, or injury to bring about any governmental, social, or economic change in the United States. Supporters pointed out that several states had recently found it necessary to adopt similar antisyndicalist laws. Since both bills required unanimous consent to pass, they were easily blocked by members who had retained a sense of respect for minority views.47

Aliens were also the targets of several bills. One bill, introduced by the Justice Department, provided for the deportation of aliens, usually enemy aliens, who had been detained during the war for their supposed dangerous attitudes toward the United States. Defenders of the bill claimed that the aliens had no political rights under the Constitution; however, Harold Knutson (R-Minn.), during

961; Pt. 3, 2718, 2756; and Joseph W. Fordney to William B. Mershon, April 23, 1918, Box 12, William B. Mershon, Michigan Historical Collection. These references are not intended to be exhaustive. Other topics will also note the influence of the Red Scare in congressional action.

47 Ibid., Pt. 2, 1125.
hearings before the Immigration Committee, showed a marked hostility toward the internment policy, closely questioning the Justice Department's witness regarding the numbers and legal rights of interned aliens. John E. Raker (D-Cal.), who did not oppose the bill, wanted the writ of habeas corpus included in it. A second bill, also heard by the Immigration Committee, pointed toward the restrictive immigration laws of the 1920's. It provided that immigrants, except in a few cases, could not enter the country for four years. Part of the reasoning behind the bill flowed from the common fear that unemployment was engulfing the country. However, Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.) described the belief in an oversupply of labor as false propaganda disseminated by corporations in order to justify a cut in wages. On the other hand, the American Federation of Labor lobbyist Frank Morrison believed that the boom conditions and the demobilization of the troops foretold the arrival of depression and consequently an over-supply of labor. Several committee members agreed with Morrison, but Benjamin F. Welty (D-Ohio) disrupted this seemingly mundane discussion and insisted that the real reason for the bill did not arise out of the labor problem. Rather, he stated, "we have taken up this bill because we are afraid of the spirit of bolshevism...We do not want to be the recipient of that element here." Later in the hearings Albert Johnson's (R-Wash.) outburst against immigrants who would "swamp" America with inferior blood indicated another phobia of the Committee. In fact, committee members were beset by a number

of nightmares. They envisioned an American society not only overrun by radicals and degenerated by racial intermarriage, but also crowded into polyglot cities and depressed economically by an oversupply of labor.49

Political developments contributed to the House's repressive attitude toward civil liberties. During the 1918 congressional campaign the National Security League, a militant pro-preparedness and pro-war organization, had drawn up a list of eight "acid test" roll calls, including several of the major war issues. The League then compared the voting records of congressmen with what they defined as the proper position on the roll calls. Those members failing to meet the League's standards were labeled as pacifist or pro-German. Since only forty-seven congressmen had spotless records and many of both parties had poor records, the House did not appreciate the League's impugning of its loyalty. Congressmen claimed that only two of the acid test votes were straight issue votes, while the other six were complicated parliamentary maneuvers that did not accurately reflect a congressman's final position on a subject. Nonetheless, the League's computations, which were published across the nation, apparently influenced voters, thereby causing the defeat of several incumbents to close elections. The victims of the "acid test" returned to Washington in a sour mood and poured out their woe to a sympathetic House, On October

4, 1918, the House ordered an investigation of the League but postponed the start of the inquiry until the third session.50

Conducted by a special House Committee, the investigation offered a possible opportunity to explore the true meaning of loyalty and patriotism. It, however, soon diverted into attacks on Wall Street, quests for the economic interests of League contributors, and occasions for the venting of anger toward the League. Pat Harrison (D-Miss.) questioned the League's President, Charles E. Lydecker, if he represented as a lawyer any steel companies or munition makers. The committee also questioned the proper interpretation of the eight acid test votes. Their questioning brought out the League spokesmen's unfamiliarity and confusion over the parliamentary situation behind the individual roll calls. Consequently, C. Frank Reavis (R-Nebr.) reprimanded League witnesses and told them that the manner in which an issue came to a vote made a tremendous difference in interpretation. The acid test issues, Edward W. Sanders (D-Va.) added, simply did not reflect preparedness and war issues. Frequently, the committee turned the questioning to the League's financial backers. They found that the Carnegie Corporation, J. P. Morgan and Company, munition makers, and large corporations had contributed to the League. Because the League had these financial supporters, it was not surprising that S. Stanwood Menken, the League's ex-President, deplored criticism of large corporations. With these discoveries the committee's

questioning assumed a populist tone, which implied that the rich had financed the League and had used the people's patriotism to promote selfish interests.\(^{51}\)

The committee's real concern, however, was neither the list of acid test votes nor the names of financial contributors but the charge of un-Americanism that the League leveled against Congressmen. Committeemen heard League spokesmen charge that a congressman was pacifistic, disloyal, and provincial if he failed to vote as the League dictated. A few congressmen responded to such charges by trying to determine the League's definition of loyalty. Sanders asked a League witness whether a congressman who studied an issue, consulted his conscience, and still voted wrong on an acid test measure would be disloyal? For most congressmen loyalty as a matter of conscience was not as important as was the charge of disloyalty, which they viewed as a personal insult and a threat to their political careers. Joseph Walsh (R-Mass.) expressed outrage at the League's defamation of character when he argued that their criticisms of congressmen actually helped to undermine the government. In particular, Reavis pointed to a League publication which attacked the House for "pork barrel" politics as the type of material that the Bolsheviks would print. When several congressmen, who were defeated in the 1918 election partly because of League propaganda, testified, committee members commiserated with their distressed colleagues and joined them in condemning the pernicious political influence of the League.

Their attitude cannot be construed as unusual because Edward W. Pou (D-N.C.) had set a precedent for the hearings when he introduced the resolution for the investigation. To the applause of the House he had said at that time, "I spit in the face of any man who impugns my patriotism," and had added that "our patriotism has been attacked." Although the hearings discredited a superpatriotic organization, congressmen nonetheless failed to use the investigation as a means to educate the public to a better understanding of what constituted loyalty. In fact, the members' anxious defense of their loyalty, along with other attitudes and actions, created an atmosphere in which others would also have to defend their Americanism.

Economic and Social Reconstruction

The House, besides proving itself unequal to the task of fostering a healthy postwar political climate, showed itself unable to enact a balanced economic and social reconstruction program. That economic conditions were unsettled and uncertain congressmen did not doubt. They knew that during the war the government had extended wide controls over the economy, and businessmen now wondered if the regulation would continue in peace. The House had to determine which parts of the wartime

52 Ibid., 82, 885, 1189-94, 378, 435, 775, 1753-54, 991, 1763, 1766, 1847; and Cong. Rec., 765 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 259-60; and Pt. 5, 5035.

53 Historians have studied the origins of the Red Scare from several different perspectives and, consequently, have suggested a number of reasons for it. The role of Congress has been overlooked by these studies, a failure which misses the importance of leadership in creating mass psychological reactions. Congress' inability to forge a constructive reconstruction policy and its negative attitudes toward civil liberties had to operate as one of the early catalyst to the panic. For a review of literature on the Red Scare see Noggle, Into the Twenties, 160-64, 218-19.
programs should be dismantled, what modified, and what left intact. Above all, the House had to decide what was the proper role of the government in the economic system. In whatever direction the House chose to go on these issues, they also had to consider the problem of wartime inflation and the likelihood of postwar deflation, depression, and unemployment. However, the House's ability to respond adequately to these difficulties was hindered from the first by lack of planning and leadership and by the shortness of the legislative session.  

Economically, the House started to "mop-up" war operations by approving a bill on war contracts. Shortly after the end of the war the Comptroller of the Treasury had declared illegal all contracts which the military had not formally completed with contractors. Since the Comptroller's action had stopped payment of the incompleted or "verbal" contracts, contractors without agreements were often placed in a precarious financial position. They demanded special relief legislation from Congress on the grounds that the military had requested them to start the projects without contracts.  

Congressional apologists for the bill stressed that there was nothing illegal about the contracts in a criminal sense. The military, in an attempt to cut red tape, had simply asked that contractors start projects before written agreements had been completed. Fair play, they concluded, demanded that the contractors, who were often on the

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54 New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1; and January 5, 1919, II, 1.

Crisis of the relief proposal saw the contractors not as innocent and honest businessmen but as highwaymen presenting the government with trumped-up claims. Underlying this attitude was a belief that the war had allowed munition makers huge profits. But the critics' attitude also expressed a doubt as to the ability of the War Department to pass fairly on the appeals because of the overly friendly ties between the contractors and the military. At this point, some of the opposition veered into partisan politics. Republican J. Hampton Moore, still up to his usual partisan antics, suggested that a congressional board hear the contractors' appeals for relief. He thought that such a board would often discover criminal conduct on the part of contractors and negligence on the part of the War Department. Even Minority Leader Mann opposed Moore's latest assault, and when his proposal came to a vote as an amendment, it was easily defeated on a non-roll call vote. 57

Once the contractor's relief bill passed the House, the Senate added an amendment to the bill, which resulted in further opposition. The Senate amendment provided for payment of mining operations begun under the Rare Mineral Act of 1918. The House conferees had rejected the amendment because they believed that it allowed claims with no real government obligation behind them. Led by Chairman Dent of the Military Affairs Committee, the conferees and likeminded congressmen

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expressed a deep distrust of private capitalists and government bureau-
crats. They first won a roll call to support the conferees' opposition
to the amendment; however, when the Senate insisted on it, some of the
original House opponents accepted a compromise that tightened up
procedures for deciding the mineral claims. In this modified form
the amendment survived the two roll calls that the uncompromising
opponents demanded.58

In a scale of the three roll calls, the strongest supporters of
the amendment represented the two parties in nearly equal percentages,
though a slightly higher percent of Democrats supported the miners'
claim than the Republicans (Table 5-7:A). Much more significant was
the regional alignment displayed among the strongest supporters. Since
the bill favored Western mining interests, congressmen from the Pacific
and Mountain states supported the amendment. The moderate supporters,
who voted against the amendment before it was altered and then switched
positions after its revision, represented the Republican party in a
slightly higher percentage than the Democrats. The bipartisan pattern
of the voting continued among congressmen who refused to vote for the
amendment. These strong opponents tended to represent the East and
West North Central states and the Democratic South more than the other
regions. Although the opponents succeeded only in modifying the bill
rather than defeating it, they, nonetheless, expressed one of the
strongest motivations behind reconstruction, namely that the close ties
between business interests and government could spawn corruption and
therefore must be ended.

58Ibid., Pt. 3, 2760, 2770; Pt. 4, 3355-62; and Pt. 5, 4258,
4266.
### TABLE 5-7:A

SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WAR CONTRACTS: H. R. 13274

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The order of the roll calls is 248, 255, 262
Percent at each point on the scale 22, 17, 30, 31
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .986
## TABLE 5-7:B

SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WAR CONTRACTS: H. R. 13274

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>248</td>
<td></td>
<td>To have the House instruct the conferees to agree to the section of the Senate amendment to Bill H.R. 13274 providing relief when formal contracts have not been made in the manner required by law, which section relates to contracts for war supplies prior to Nov. 12, 1918, but if agreement does not comply with statutory requirements, the Secretary of War is authorized to waive such non-compliance. 71-226; + = yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 2770.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>255</td>
<td></td>
<td>To recommit the conference report on Bill H.R. 13274, validating certain war contracts and providing relief where formal contracts have not been made in the manner required by law, to the committee with instructions not to agree to the section of the Senate amendment relating to contracts for war supplies prior to Nov. 12, 1918, and creating a War Contracts Appeals Amendment. 214-117; + = nay. Ibid., 3361.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>262</td>
<td></td>
<td>To amend a motion to instruct the managers on the part of the House to concur in the Senate amendment to Bill H.R. 13274, providing relief in cases of contracts connected with the prosecution of the war and for other purposes, which amendment instructs managers not to agree to the section of the Senate amendment relating to contracts for war supplies prior to November 12, 1918. 118-215; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 5, 4266.</td>
</tr>
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When the Revenue Bill passed the House in September, 1918, it provided for eight billion dollars in taxes, levied mostly on personal income and on excess and war profits of corporations. With the Senate still debating the bill when the Armistice was declared, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo told the Congress that the return of peace reduced government expenditures and the urgency for revenue. Accordingly, he suggested that the Senate cut taxes from eight to six billion dollars for fiscal 1919; he further recommended that the bill apply also for fiscal 1920, at which time taxes ought to be cut to four billion by eliminating the excess profit tax. In December, 1918, the Senate revised the bill, agreeing with McAdoo's recommendation for fiscal 1919 but rejecting his suggestion for fiscal 1920. In addition, the Senate adopted other changes, the most important of which was a tax on goods produced by child labor for interstate commerce. After the Senate completed its revisions, the bill went to the conference committee, where the Senate and House conferees eventually reconciled all differences.59

When Majority Leader Kitchin presented the final bill to the House, he described it as progressive legislation designed to halt the growth of the national debt and to capture the excess gain of war profiteers. If congressmen voted against the bill, he claimed, be protecting the swollen profits of big corporations rather

59 New York Times, November 14, 1918, 3; November 15, 1918, 1; November 16, 1918, 1; November 19, 1918, 1; November 30, 1918, 1; December 4, 1918, 10; December 7, 1918, 1; December 19, 1918, 17; January 14, 1919, 4; January 28, 1919, 1; and February 7, 1919, 1. The House conferees had to bring the bill back twice in order to receive House support against some Senate amendments. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 927; and Pt. 3, 2452-63.
than helping individuals. If the bill, he added, had shortcomings, it came from its leniency toward business. Kitchin then described the tax on products produced by child labor as following the majority viewpoint of the House, although some controversy existed over it. Joseph Fordney, ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, next defended the bill as improved over the original measure passed in September. With Republicans and Democrats in agreement, the conference report passed 312 to eleven. The token opposition consisted of four Republicans, along with seven Southern Democrats who were unhappy over the child labor tax. 60 Decisive leadership by McAdoo, Kitchin, and Fordney helped to formulate the unanimity, but more fundamental was the fact that public opinion and both parties had reached a temporary truce in favor of graduated taxation. 61

Railroads legislation also did not generate significant divisions on roll calls. The reason, however, was not because of mutual accord on policy but because of a decision by the House to postpone final action until the 66th Congress. In his December, 1918, address President Wilson told the House that he had no plans for the railroads. He did, however broadly sketch the main alternatives from which Congress could choose, namely government ownership, increased government control, or return to prewar conditions. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, who was also Director General of the Railroads, held more definite ideas regarding the immediate future of the railroads.

60 Ibid., 3003-12, 3035; and New York Times, February 9, 1919, 1.

61 See Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 53-54, for a discussion of tax policy during the 1920's—which was much different from the war years.
Writing to Thetus Sims, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, he advocated that the government retain control of railroads until 1924. During this five-year period Congress would have the opportunity to evolve new legislation which would incorporate the lessons learned from the war. In conclusion, he told Sims that although the short third session of the 65th Congress prohibited general legislation, the House would have time to pass the five-year extension along with a $750 million appropriation for the operation of the railroads.\textsuperscript{62}

The House Appropriation Committee agreed with McAdoo's recommendation to consider only the appropriation and extension aspects of the railroad question. However, this decision did not stop congressmen from viewing McAdoo's recommendations in terms of their implications on government control.\textsuperscript{63} Consequently, in hearings on the bill, Chairman Sherley argued that the $750 million appropriation implied a failure on the part of the railroad corporations because their profits were not large enough to finance improvements. According to Sherley, the long-term solution to capital investment problems was to be found in consolidation, though not in government ownership. Several committee members, who feared that the five-year extension would lead to government ownership, defended the railroads and reoriented Sherley's thesis. Gillett's questioning of witnesses suggested that the request for money showed that the government had

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{New York Times}, December 3, 1918, 1; December 12, 1918, 1; \textit{Washington Post}, December 12, 1918, 1; and \textit{Cong. Rec.}, 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1.

\textsuperscript{63}See \textit{New York Times}, November 23, 1918, 1; December 6, 1918, 14; January 5, 1919, II, 16; January 8, 1919, 1; January 12, 1919, 18; February 7, 1919, 1; and \textit{Cong. Rec.}, 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1423-28 for various plans on the reorganization of the railroads.
mismanaged the railroads. Siding with Gillett's position on the extension, the Committee rejected Sherley's, refused to revise the twenty-one month provision already in the Railroad Act of 1918, and agreed to the $750 million appropriation.\(^6^4\)

Since the appropriation for the railroads was never in doubt, House floor debates focused on government control. Republican opponents seized the debates as another opportunity to attack the Administration. Accordingly, William J. Graham (R-Ill.) asserted that the Administration had managed the railroads poorly during the war; they would have operated better had they remained under private control. Led by Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.), Democratic opponents joined the Republican critics and proposed an amendment which stipulated that the railroads would be returned to private control by December 31, 1919. The split within the parties over the issue became apparent when Democratic proponents of strong government regulation countered by proposing a compromise amendment for a three-year extension. Increasing the confusion were Republican advocates of regulation. They advanced a third amendment which prohibited the President from relinquishing control until July 1, 1920. With the House divided into contending factions, the result was the predictable defeat of all three amendments on non-roll call votes.\(^6^5\) At this point after the war, the House displayed marked confusion on future railroad policy. A desire for a modification of railroad laws was evident, but whether this meant greater government

\(^{6^4}\)U. S. Congress, House, Appropriation for Federal Control of Transportation Systems, Hearings on H. R. 16020, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 72, 132, 146, 3-6, and 129.

\(^{6^5}\)Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3890, 3895-96, 3900.
regulation was still unclear. In the meantime, the railroads would continue to operate under the Railroad Act of 1918.

In the quest for the restoration of peacetime economic conditions, the House reached a definite policy on wheat prices. Before the Armistice, President Wilson had issued a proclamation guaranteeing the price of wheat at $2.28 a bushel and calling on the nation's farmers to plant more wheat. In response, farmers sowed more wheat in expectation of high prices, but when the Armistice was declared, doubts were raised regarding government wheat policy. As a consequence, many congressmen demanded that the government support wheat prices, predicted a severe break in prices otherwise, and introduced bills to protect the farmer.66

During Agriculture Committee hearings on the guarantee, Representative Gilbert Haugen (R-Iowa) pointed out that only farmers had been governed by price controls. As a result they were entitled, he insisted, to good prices because laborers and munition makers and even grain dealers had received handsome compensation during the war. Haugen implied that the farmer had been unfairly treated, but some witnesses rejected the idea of a guaranteed wheat price because they favored lower bread prices for consumers and restoration of the free market system. A majority of Committee members, however, agreed with Haugen, since they believed that the government had pledged its word to the farmer. Questions concerning methods by which the government would guarantee the price, still protect the consumer, and

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66 New York Times, January 1, 1919, 12; January 20, 1919, 4; February 4, 1919, 4; and February 6, 1919, 14.
stabilize farm markets remained unresolved when the hearings closed.\textsuperscript{67}

The bill as finally reported by the Committee appropriated one billion dollars to make up for any difference between the guaranteed price and the market price. It also conferred wide powers on the Food Administration Grain Corporation to control markets, establish corporations, and license grain dealers. In this form the bill gave the consumer the benefit of the market price if it happened to be lower than the guarantee. Chairman Lever of the Agriculture Committee justified the two-price system on the grounds that many poor people could not afford high wheat prices. He also argued that the government should accept the burden in order to prevent civil disorder—a thesis often heard during House debates. His final observation was that the government probably would not expend much of the one billion dollars because world demand for wheat would remain strong through 1919. Congressman George Huddleston, one of the few critics of the bill, continued to voice populist sentiments when he rejected Lever's arguments and charged that the bill utterly failed to protect poor people from high prices. It was much more likely he asserted that the poor would actually suffer because the Grain Corporation would manipulate market prices in order to avoid paying the farmers the guaranteed price. Since the consensus in favor of giving the farmer a "fair share" of the economic pie overrode such criticism, the bill passed on a roll call vote, 278 to fourteen.\textsuperscript{68}


\textsuperscript{68}New York Times, February 7, 1919, 4; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Congressmen, who saw the wheat bill as a necessary obligation, found that a number of wartime-initiated social measures entailed no responsibility but instead impeded the return to peacetime conditions. On one hand, the House rejected the perpetuation of non-statutory wartime programs in job placement, housing, and employment of women in industry. Even though they received a number of requests, particularly in relation to the government-run Employment Service, for their continuance, members believed that postwar conditions demanded retrenchment. Further, Chairman Sherely of the Appropriations Committee argued that House rules did not permit the consideration of appropriations that had no general or enabling legislation behind them. Edward Keating (D-Col.) tried to protest this narrow interpretation of House rules and attempted to prompt a more humanitarian reconstruction. However, the House more readily agreed with the conservative position of Minority Leader Mann, who maintained that the House would establish a dangerous precedent if it passed appropriations without statutory backing. The Sundry Appropriation Bill, consequently, passed without money for these wartime social programs.69

Similarly, the House failed to initiate new programs in the areas of adult illiteracy, maternity hygiene, infancy care, rehabilitation of victims of industrial accidents, and rehabilitation of the deaf and

dumb. Congressmen advocated the literacy bill because immigrants and others would learn to read English and thus become better citizens. Jeannette Rankin (R-Mont.) advanced a humanitarian argument for the maternity bill when she told a House committee that justice demanded action to decrease the high infancy mortality rate among lower income families. But the most persistent theme which congressmen expressed during the hearings was a utilitarian concern that human resources should be properly developed. Although the war had likely created an increased awareness of wasteful uses of resources, the committees failed to report the bills addressing the problem to the House floor. Although the war had likely created an increased awareness of wasteful uses of resources, the committees failed to report the bills addressing the problem to the House floor.70 House rules, the shortness of the session, and the general attitude which opposed innovation blocked action.

To many congressmen the war had disrupted commerce with foreign countries and had increased competition between nations. If America was to restore prosperous and advantageous trade conditions, Congress needed first to enact a bill appropriating three million dollars for the construction of consulates. Advocated also by the Chamber of Commerce and other business interests, the bill aimed to promote the penetration of American goods into foreign lands. However, the bill

sparked an adverse reaction among economy-minded House members. More concerned with retrenchment than expansion of trade, they mobilized a voting bloc large enough to defeat the proposal, 173 to 106.  

Since sixty percent of the Democrats and sixty-five percent of the Republicans voted against the bill, partisan influences did not shape the House's opposition to the construction of consulates (Table 5-8). Some regional influences can be detected because coastal state representatives, particularly among the Democrats, voted in favor of the bill. Undoubtedly, attitudes toward economy in government coupled with calculations of regional benefit determined the voting pattern on the consulate bill.

Another trade proposal was sent to the House by Secretary McAdoo, who suggested that Congress extend the life of the War Finance Corporation for six months, during which time the WFC would channel up to one billion dollars of its funds into loans for the disrupted export business. Although favorably reported by the Ways and Means Committee, the bill was assailed by Joseph Fordney, ranking Republican on that Committee. Another billion dollars used for exporting goods would, Fordney maintained, increase the money supply by that much, thereby adding to the already high rate of inflation. Even though the measure involved no restrictions on business, Fordney also objected because it furthered direct cooperation between government and business. Gaining the endorsement of several other Republicans, Fordney instead desired to end these close ties and to restore the old separation. His opposition may also have been influenced by his support of the

TABLE 5-8

VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. RES. 504

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protective tariff and, consequently, by a hostile attitude toward any
measure that might promote, even indirectly, free trade. J. Hampton
Moore moved to strike the WFC provision from the bill, but in this
case the advocates of an aggressive export policy won, 240 to 111.\textsuperscript{72}

Many congressmen saw the war-initiated ship building program as
another means to foster American trade. Although the shortness of the
session prevented any comprehensive action, the House did have oppor­
tunity to consider an appropriation of $660 million for the Shipping
Board. This fund was to be used to complete contracts on partially-
built ships and to convert troop carriers into ships suitable for
peacetime trade. Not wishing to lose the initial investment on the
partly built ships, representatives also hoped to use the ships to
create a merchant marine capable of competing in world commerce. As
a result, it passed without a roll call as part of the Sundry Approp­
riation Bill.\textsuperscript{73}

Although the House had not followed a consistent trade policy,
the tendency pointed toward a more aggressive role for the government
in the export trade. Similarly, the House moved toward greater activity
for the government in the field of highway construction. Secretary of
Labor Wilson advocated to Congress "buffer legislation, in particular
a $200 million highway program, to prevent postwar unemployment and

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., Pt. 5, 4273-78, 4283, 4288, 4342. All but two oppon­
ents came from the Republican ranks, which indicates that anti-
Administration and anti-free trade sentiments probably operated on
the ballot. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 57, for a discussion
on the postwar evaluation of the WFC.

\textsuperscript{73}New York Times, January 5, 1919, II, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65
Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 4058-61.
the spread of radical ideas. Senators agreed with this reasoning, attached an appropriation amendment to the postal bill, and gained the concurrence of the House conferees to the amendment. When the conference report reached the House, economy-minded members, led by "Uncle" Joe Cannon, opposed it. Arguing that it was time, after a period of huge government expenditures, to retrench, Cannon demanded a roll call on the amendment, but his motion lost, 267 to seventy.

Among the economic reconstruction measures were two proposals for government ownership. During the War, Secretary of the Navy Daniels had seized control of radio communications and had purchased ship to shore wireless stations. When peace returned, Daniels recommended government ownership of wireless communication, mainly because of a desire to develop radio for military and corporate uses. In pursuit of this goal, Daniels proposed a bill before the House Merchant Marine Committee which established a government monopoly of radio. His basic contention was that radio wave lengths could be interferred with and thus a central agency had to monitor use of the waves. Minority leader Mann took a dim view of Daniel's actions, particularly his employment of the Navy's uncommitted fund to buy the ship to shore stations. In a blistering House speech, Mann called for Daniels' impeachment, whereupon the House deleted the radio purchase money from a naval appropriation bill. A few months later

75 Ibid., February 18, 1919, 6; February 20, 1919, 19; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3780-89. Most of the opponents, fifty-six, represented the Republican party, indicating that Cannon was able to influence a number of his colleagues.
Daniel's last pleas for his plan fell on the unsympathetic ears of the House. 76

The second plan for government ownership originated with another cabinet officer, Postmaster General Burleson. During the war, Congress had approved the control of the telephone, telegraph, and cable systems by the government. After the Armistice Burleson suggested that the communication systems remain under government control for two more years and then be returned to private ownership. However, Burleson actually wanted more, namely permanent government ownership of the wires. In a letter to Representative John Moon, Chairman of the Postal Committee, he argued that the Constitution necessarily allowed government ownership under the defense and postal powers. He also condemned private ownership for mismanagement and high rates, claimed greater efficiency from government ownership, and denied any danger of government invasion of privacy. Although critics immediately denounced the plan, Burleson had a sympathetic supporter in Representative Moon. As a result, his proposals for a two-year extension and for the takeover went to Moon's committee for a hearing. 77

William H. Lamar, solicitor for the Post Office, presented the bill to the Committee, first noting that the two proposals were


77New York Times, December 10, 1918, 1; December 15, 1918, 7; January 15, 1919, 10; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
separate. He, however, closely connected the two ideas, since he argued that the extension of government control would permit time for the consolidation of the wire companies. Under the present competitive economic conditions, the public received bad service while the companies also were unable to turn a fair profit. Lamar added that a period of government control, though not ownership, was even approved by most of the wire companies. At this point in Lamar's testimony, Martin B. Madden (R-Ill.) brought up the chief objection to continue government management, namely that it was to the companies' interests since the federal government granted their demands for increased rates. Rapid restoration of competitive conditions would, according to Madden, lower rates as well as eliminate a number of people from the government payroll. The majority of the Committee agreed with Madden, but since the companies and Burleson requested some time to adjust affairs, the Postal Committee set the date for relinquishment eleven months hence, on December 31, 1919. As true in other similar cases, congressional insistence on the restoration of prewar competitive conditions overrode desires for centralization, either through government regulation or ownership.  

In February, 1917, Congress had approved an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission into the meat packing industry. The purpose was to discover the reasons for the high cost of meat and to determine

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if the five leading meat packers controlled prices and markets in violation of the anti-trust laws. Directed by Francis J. Heney, a colorful California progressive, the investigation lasted for over a year, during which time it amassed a large quantity of evidence against the packers. At its conclusion, the FTC decided Heney's findings warranted legislative action and prevailed upon Thetus Sims, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, to introduce a bill. Though the measure did not propose to nationalize the slaughterhouses, it did aim to break the control of the packers by taking over their rolling stock and cold storage plants. Since these capital assets served as the means to monopolize the packing industry, government ownership would break the monopoly and restore competition. Chairman Sims called hearings, which started in January, 1917.79

The hearings revealed that the five major companies controlled the industry, set the prices, and divided up the purchase of cattle. Also uncovered were further abuses, among them the employment of marketing pools and the control of bank credit. William B. Colver, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, told the Committee that the upshot of their practices was higher food prices for consumers. In response, Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) indicated that he did not doubt the findings, but he characterized the proposals as "drastic" and the "very last thing to do" to remedy the situation. What was implied by many of the committee members' remarks, especially those of John S. Snook (D-Ohio), was a fear that the "public may get carried away and apply it (government ownership) to all industries." Since the hearings

79 Washington Post, February 25, 1919, 4; New York Times, December 21, 1917, 1; April 1, 1918, 1; and December 11, 1918, 17.
dragged on to the middle of February, it became impossible to pass a bill during the third session. However, the attitude of the Committee, though it pointed away from government ownership, suggested that the FTC findings were valid and that some type of action should be taken against the packers. 80

In contrast to the House's reluctance to adopt proposals for government control and ownership, it did, at times, accept schemes which permitted private development of natural resources. 81 In one case, the possible existence of large deposits of metalliferous minerals on Indian lands caused Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) to introduce legislation which would allow prospectors to lease land from the Indians. Arguing that it would aid mineral development, Hayden also claimed that Indians favored the proposition because they would receive a five percent royalty on any finds. Several members viewed Hayden's bill as outrageous, maintaining that it would enable the Anaconda Copper Corporation to grab all the land. Other Congressmen, such as Minority Leader Mann, contended that the House should also consider how resources ought to be expended. In the future, "our grandchildren,"

80 Ibid., January 23, 1919, 5; June 24, 1919, 1; and U. S. Congress, House, Government Control of Meat Packing Industry, Hearings on H. R. 13324, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 4-8, 14-28, 79, 35-45, 776, 834, 874, 975-81, 1028, 2058. In the 1920's, the Packers and Stockyards Act passed Congress which gave the Department of Agriculture substantial powers over the meat packing industry. See John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 55.

81 Some other bills, at least in the minds of individual legislators, raised questions of government ownership. For example, a bill to establish a plant for the testing of lignite coal drew charges from William H. Stafford (R-Wis.) that plans for government ownership had "gone wild". Other legislators did not agree and approved the bill. But Stafford's anxieties were widely shared on more clearcut cases of government ownership. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1114-19.
Mann pointed out, "would also need some resources." In reply to Hayden's argument that the Indians would benefit, Mann insisted that the bill, in fact, would adversely affect the Indians since they would lose control over the leased lands. Mann added that the five percent net royalty was "sheer robbery" of the Indian by the "greedy" white man. Since the bill operated under a special House rule, it required a two-thirds majority to pass. Consequently, Mann and other representatives concerned about Indian rights were able to mobilize enough members against the Hayden bill, defeating it on a roll call vote.82

A much more controversial resource development bill sought to encourage the exploration for coal, oil, gas, phosphate, and sodium resources. In particular, the bill provided, as explained by Scott Ferris (D-Okla.), for the replacement of the old system of patenting lands with government supervision and royalties. Under the new system, land would be leased to individuals or companies for different time periods, depending upon the resource. The bill also covered the claims that resulted from President Taft's 1909 order stopping all private oil exploration on the oil reserve lands of the navy. Opposed by Secretary of the Navy Daniels, this provision would allow oil men who had lost oil claims because of the order to take out new leases, for which they would pay the government royalties. Ferris claimed three advantages to the bill: it would change the old give away system for one that granted the government some rights; it encouraged the development of resources; and it cleared up the dispute over Taft's order.83

82Ibid., Pt. 3, 2634-38.
83Ibid., Pt. 4, 3698-3700; and Pt. 5, 4316.
In agreement with conservation groups outside of Congress, William Stafford (R-Wis.) described the bill as the "triumph...of the exploiters of the public domain." For him and other critics, Ferris' contention that the government increased its rights by the bill ignored its real results, which were to alienate large sections of the public domain, allow sale of land to companies, and permit payment of royalties on net profits after the deduction of production costs. James Frear (R-Wis.) closed this phase of the argument by citing the opposition of Gifford Pinchot to the bill because it allowed the plundering of the public. In another phase of the critics' argument, John M. Baer (D-N.D.), who rejected Ferris' contention that development of resources was immediately required, insisted that the bill would lead to the rapid depletion of the country's resources, thereby robbing future generations of its potential for economic well-being. Winning some modifications in the bill by amendment, the proponents of public rights and conservation were still unsatisfied with its provisions. They attempted to defeat it but could not, as two roll calls on conference reports passes, 232 to 109, and 221 to seventy-seven.  

Just days before the close of the session, the House considered another resource bill, this one on water power. Passed by the House during the second session, the bill, Thetus Sims told the House, had

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been changed in two significant ways by the Senate and House conferees. First, a "fair value" recapture clause had been added, thereby modifying the original "net value" provision. Second, the bill more clearly defined "navigable waters," one of the types of water areas covered by the legislation. The first alteration recast the bill in the direction of President Wilson's desires and thus silenced some critics of it. The second substitution, however, drew the objection of Minority Leader Mann because the conferees had defined navigable waters too narrowly. Otherwise, little criticism surfaced, and only the action of die-hard opponents forced a roll call on the conference report. It passed easily, 263 to sixty-five.86

None of the resource measures, it should be noted, were direct responses to post war conditions since they had antecedents before the war. However, the resource bills in a real sense, reflected postwar attitudes because they emphasized a return to normal profit-making pursuits with only minimum government restraints. That the House had such viewpoints can be seen in their reaction to government-directed measures. Bills of this nature, among them the wire services proposition, rarely emerged from committee or, if they did, they usually failed on the House floor. Yet, to say that this atmosphere reflected absolute opposition to government direction would be a distortion. The supporters of development, even though they opposed extensive government roles in resource development, did recognize the right of government supervision of development. They also undoubtedly wished

to conserve some resources for future generations. With these qualiﬁcations, it was clear that the rapidly evolving House consensus opposed centralized direction by the government and favored restoration of more traditional and competitive patterns of resource use.87

Since the four resource roll calls associate, it was possible to scale congressmen as to their attitude toward the bills. While ﬁfty percent of the Republicans supported efforts to defeat or to amend the resource measures, only four percent of the Democrats voted against them (Table 5:9). East North and West North Central Republicans voted in above average numbers for greater government control. The moderate members, who agreed to three of the four motions in support of the bills, represented both parties in nearly equal numbers. No discernible geographical pattern developed except among Middle Atlantic Republicans. The strongest supporters of private development were the Democrats, since seventy-four percent voted for the measures while only seventeen percent of the Republicans adhered to the same stance. Both parties of the Western states supported the measures, indicating that the Westerners saw advantages to private development. Regional factors helped to shape the ballot, but more surprising was the support of the Republicans for greater government supervision of resource development. Normally, Republicans are pictured as advocates

87 The question of centralization and competition is one to which the recent historiographical literature has given considerable attention. The more general works, such as Wiebe's The Search for Order, tend to argue that government was promoting greater concentration. Several articles, among them Robert F. Himmelberg, "The War Industries Board and the Antitrust Question in November 1918," Journal of American History, LII (June, 1965), 59-74, take a different stance, claiming that after the war government agencies moved away from the permanent adoption of controls. See also Noggle, Into the Twenties, 57-65.
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The order of the roll calls is 268, 236, 256, 245
Percent at each point on the scale 13, 14, 4, 23, 46
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .957
TABLE 5-9:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON RESOURCE LEGISLATION

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<td>1</td>
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<td>To agree to the conference report on the disagreeing votes of the two houses on the amendment of the House to Bill S. 1419, amending an act entitled &quot;an act to regulate the construction of dams across navigable rivers,&quot; the report recommending that a commission be created to be known as the Federal Power Commission. 263-65; + = yea. Cong Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 4640.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>236</td>
<td></td>
<td>To amend H.R. 14746, making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for fulfilling treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes for fiscal year 1920, by eliminating the words part of the appropriation shall be expended for uncontested &quot;excluding oil and gas leases&quot; from the provision that no leases to the Secretary of the Interior for approval, because the inspectors of the Indian Department make investigations of such leases and it is not necessary to include them in the prohibition. 198-68; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 2032.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
<td>To agree to the conference report on S. 2812, encouraging the mining of coal, phosphate, gas, and sodium on the public domain. 232-109; + = yea. Ibid., 3710.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
<td>To pass Bill S. 385, authorizing mining on the unallotted lands in Indian reservations. 168-90; + = yea. Ibid., 2638.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of private initiative, but, at least in this case, Democrats played that role.

Retrospect

Although the House had enacted no overall or bold reconstruction program during the third session, a clear theme can be discerned from its actions. Undoubtedly aware of the veterans' potential electoral power, congressmen adopted several measures beneficial to them—although they, at the same time, refused to consider Secretary Lane's comprehensive plan for employment of veterans. When representatives turned to military policy, they rejected the Army's plans and would have similarly blocked the Navy's program except for a timely appeal from Wilson. Forced to consider, albeit only indirectly, matters of international affairs, the House was divided as to America's role in restoring peace; nonetheless, it was clear that many congressmen distrusted Wilson's peacemaking plans. Economically, the House readily agreed to the revised Revenue Bill and to several proposals which were designed to increase American trade. But the House preferred to postpone railroad legislation and rejected implementation of plans that involved government intervention in the economy and close business and government relations. When representatives did agree to active economic programs, as they did on several resource development proposals, the bills largely envisioned a program of economic development directed not by the government but by competitive capitalists seeking personal welfare under minimum government regulation. Above all, the House spurned the social implication of the war, rejecting appropriations for housing, employment, and rehabilitation projects.
In general, congressional attitudes favored retrenchment and restoration rather than reconstruction.

To find the sources for the House's attitude it is necessary, first of all, to note the failure of partisan leadership and the revival of partisanship. When Wilson left for Paris, leadership devolved directly to House Democrats Kitchin and Clark who had no desire to develop a program. Undoubtedly, they also thought that by assuming the President's role for the party they would be exceeding their authority. Though Republicans did not suffer from absentee leadership, the factional infighting for the speakership seat likely diverted attention from reconstruction. In any event, party leadership did not function for the creation of comprehensive programs; yet, the parties were able to mobilize their cadres for a number of highly partisan roll call votes.

Such a development could have indicated the push for a reconstruction program by one of the parties and the ensuing battle over it. Clearly, this was not the situation, since both parties battled for partisan advantage over often trivial measures, such as the bill on the Dawson Springs sanitorium for veterans. On more fundamental matters, the parties' internal cohesion often broke apart, proving them incapable of sustaining the strain of complex questions. On the significant issues of progressivism and internationalism, the Republicans recorded their lowest cohesion scores.88 Democrats were more unified, but they were divided over government policy for

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88 Allen and Clubb found Republican unity lower "on more issues that were clearly relevant to Progressive reform" than the Democrats during the Progressive years. See Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive Years," 574-75.
railroads and nationalization of the wire services. Given the negativism of the partisanship, the failure of the House to draft bold departures in policy was not surprising.

"Party Voting," defined as fifty percent or more of one party in opposition to fifty percent or more of another party, significantly increased from thirty-nine percent of the first session and from forty percent of the second session to fifty-six percent (Table 5-10).

Similarly, party voting at the level of ninety percent in opposition to ninety percent shot up. In the first and second sessions extreme partisan voting nearly disappeared as only two percent and three percent respectively were recorded at that level. In contrast, the third session recorded twenty-two percent of its votes at this high level. As a result of the increased party voting the third session's voting record returned to patterns more in line with those of the first Wilson Congress, which registered seventy-four percent of its votes at the fifty versus fifty level.89

Internal cohesion of parties remained high, even with a greatly reduced number of unanimous votes. During the first and second sessions, approximately thirty percent of all roll calls received the complete support of both parties. In the third session, the percentage of unanimous votes declined to nineteen percent. This lower percentage of unanimous votes should have removed a basis for high internal unity within the parties, since a roll call of this type gave a party a high cohesion score. Yet, the Democrats' cohesion score went up from seventy-four and seventy-one in the first two sessions

89 Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive Years," 571.
### TABLE 5-10
PERCENTAGE OF PARTY VOTES AND AVERAGE PARTY
UNITY SCORES BY SESSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage &quot;Party Votes&quot;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 v. 50</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 v. 90</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Cohesion Score</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The score does not include the House organizing votes; with them included, the percentage was sixteen.*
to seventy-six in the third. The Republican's cohesion score did
decline from sixty-six and sixty-eight to sixty-four.

Cohesion on selected individual issues varied significantly
between the Republicans and Democrats (Table 5-11). The Democrats
recorded Rice Index scores of sixty or above on war contracts,
veterans, progressivism, war, and European relief. Only economy
issues divided the Democrats, as they registered a score of forty-
six. In contrast, the Republicans achieved high unity only on war
issues and average unity on war contracts, veterans, and economy
issues. Two issues, European relief and progressivism, divided them
sharply, as their cohesion score fell below forty. Clearly, the
Democrats during the third session maintained higher levels of unity,
both overall and on most individual issues: their cohesion score
was more than ten points higher than that of the Republicans on all
issues except war contracts and economy.

In the first two sessions the high cohesion partly resulted
from wartime-induced unity, as witnessed by the high percentage of
unanimous votes. Although war related measures continued to influence
the high cohesion of the third session, cohesion was usually a function
of partisan voting. That this is true is seen from the increase of
partisan voting, which jumped from forty to forty-six percent. With
the return of peace, competitive desires of one party to defeat the
other resulted in high internal cohesion.90

90Ibid., 571-76. Allen and Clubb discuss high cohesion as a
function of strong party competition. The first and second sessions
followed to a degree an unusual pattern while the third returned to
a more normal course.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. War Contracts</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Veterans</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Progressive</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. War</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. European Relief</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A second factor hindering the creation of a positive reconstruction program was the absence of any ideological group supporting a reconstruction program. Cohesive voting groups that operated on more than one bill rarely developed, particularly if they were not essentially a partisan grouping. As such, a group that mobilized in support of a progressive position, for example on taxation, did not perceive a community of interests on other issues. Underlying this failure were the vague ideas that representatives possessed on the rationalization of industry and economic planning. At times, congressmen told their colleagues of the virtues of efficiency and social welfare, but only in the area of railroad legislation did advocacy for centralization find wide currency. Questions involving railroads had antecedents long before the war, and few if any congressmen were ready to extend principles of railroad regulation to new areas of social and economic activities. As Joseph Fordney told the House, the country could take care of itself without centralized action and close business and government relations.\textsuperscript{91} In the absence of a coherent liberalism, the tendency of the House was to replace government control for the old competitive order.

Finally, the emergence of anti-radicalism, which would eventually lead to the famous Red Scare, foretold the defeat of reconstruction proposals.\textsuperscript{92} In a counter productive fashion, advocates of reconstruction proposals attempted to suggest that radicalism could be blunted by their schemes. Such an appeal, however, only deepened

\begin{footnotes}
91\footcite{Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 3015.}
92\footcite{Ibid., Pt. 3, 2718, 2756, 3230 for examples of the House's attitude toward communist radicalism.}
apprehensions which were relieved more easily by rejecting change than in responding positively to the supposed danger of Bolshevism. Of course, an atmosphere of tension and anxiety was not favorable to the passage of bills protecting the rights of dissenters and radicals, and few representatives, in fact, did show any interest in the fate of such extremists.\footnote{William E. Mason (R-Ill.) defended conscientious objectors and decried the way the military treated them, but most congressmen remained silent or spoke against un-American elements. For Mason's speech and others, see \textit{ibid.}, (Appendix) 229-30, 131-34, 291.} As the press of legislative business in the last days of the session crowded upon the House, congressmen neglected both the dangers of radicalism and the problems of reconstruction as they attempted to complete the appropriation bills on the legislative calendar. Their failure to do so, along with the generally unimpressive record on reconstruction, left the country frustrated and unhappy with the third session's performance.\footnote{The House closed on a note of surface harmony as Uncle Joe Cannon led the House in "God be with you till we meet again." Below the surface tempers were not so placid. See \textit{ibid.}, Pt. 5, 4913, 4672, 4022-23; and \textit{New York Times}, March 5, 1919, 1. Many critical comments were voiced by the press against the third session. See February 28, 1919, 12; March 5, 1919, 1; March 9, 1919, III, 5-8; \textit{Washington Post}, March 3, 1919, 1; March 5, 1919, 1; Lindsay Rogers, "Short Session of Congress," \textit{American Political Science Review}, XIII (May, 1919), 251-63; "Deeds and Misdeeds of Congress," \textit{Literary Digest}, LX (March 15, 1919), 16-17; and "Editorial—Close of Congress," \textit{New Republic}, XIII (March 8, 1919), 162.}
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To summarize the history of the 65th House presents many difficulties because the war spawned much confusion and many tensions. Yet, due to this very tension, it is possible to describe the House by the word "paradox." While institutional arrangements such as long tenure and seniority increased stability, they also created independence and conflict among powerholders. The party system, the bedrock of House decisions, united large numbers of representatives and yet pitted groups of members against each other. On some issues parties voted together as evidenced by high cohesion scores and by low "party voting." But on other paramount issues, parties either split internally or fought each other bitterly. On taxation and reconstruction, the House followed a consistent position. Yet, on other issues, no coalition stayed together for more than one or two bills, and the parties struck no uniform conservative or progressive stance. Having entered the war under the guidance of President Wilson, the House rejected his leadership immediately after the war. Present at all times in the 65th House was an undercurrent of emotion and anxiety that flowed from the war and the postwar situation. Bound together by the feelings of patriotism and idealism, as well as fear and bigotry, the House adopted bold war programs, then later rejected progressive reconstruction plans.
In light of these paradoxes, how can the interpretations of historians on this period be evaluated? It is evident from the complexity of House attitudes that the schools of interpretation on American intervention have over-emphasized their particular theses: German intrigue against American liberty, munitions makers' profits, German submarine warfare, or German plots against world security. Individually, these explorations fail to account for the complexity of representatives' motivations, but together they help to explain why the House voted to enter the war. Any history of American intervention written exclusively within the framework of defense of liberty overestimates the idealism of congressmen and underrates their pragmatic orientations. The munitions makers thesis as a general approach captures the interest and economic motivation of some congressmen but fails to consider properly the emotional and political climate in which they reached their decisions. The submarine theory is best, partly because it recognizes the German threat to American rights and to American prosperity created by the U-boat warfare. But it is also valid because it emphasizes the historical context for House actions. Given the sinking of American ships, the mounting frenzy, and the ringing appeal for war by President Wilson, representatives had to vote "yea" on the war resolution. And finally, all these theses overlook a significant factor shaping the vote for war. Albert Johnson (R-Wash.) told his House colleagues that America entered the conflict to prevent "the pollution of American blood." Other congressmen spoke as though the war should purge American society of aliens, radicals, and dissenters. From the very beginning, motivations were confused
and tarnished, even though Wilson tried to establish a noble purpose for American involvement.

Since representatives supported intervention because of a variety of motives, pro-war coalition soon broke apart. Some evidence of the coalition can be found on the vote for the draftee army, but throughout the rest of the sessions congressmen formed only single issue voting blocs on war legislation. For example, the coalition of Republicans and Democrats which formed to pass the postwar European food relief bill had no ties with the prewar interventionists and non-interventionists. Likewise, the blocs that voted to demobilize the army and reduce the navy represented different interests. It is true that a partisan influence can be found in these postwar decisions since some Republicans supported isolationist and nationalist positions by opposing food relief and favoring a larger navy and army. Yet, it is equally a fact that a consistent isolationist bloc can not be delineated because different Republicans voted against European relief and for larger armies. The evidence demonstrates that a coherent voting group did not operate on questions of intervention and internationalism.

A corollary to this thesis is that voting between international and domestic ballots followed no consistent pattern, a fact that has definite implications for the historiography on the Progressive Movement. Since William E. Leuchtenburg's pioneer article in 1952, historians have conducted a lively debate over the stance of progressives toward intervention and non-intervention and postwar internationalism. In light of this study's quantitative evidence, a question that historian William Trattner has asked is highly relevant: is it
not anachronistic to speak of progressivism and its relation to foreign affairs? Although this study agrees with his implication, it nonetheless must be qualified because the non-interventionists later voted for the progressive position on several non-foreign policy issues. Moreover, to expect consistency among progressive congressmen on both international and domestic questions fails to recognize the complexity of each issue, the often discrete events and ideas behind it, and the different political and regional interests affected by such issues. As a result, progressivism could have been a real influence on his roll calls and House attitudes on foreign policy, but other factors overshadowed its influence. Yet, to make these latter comments only emphasizes the failure to find links between progressivism and international policy. Even though the evidence is incomplete —largely due to the paucity of roll calls directly on foreign affairs —it still must be concluded that Trattner has correctly questioned the soundness of the historiographic debate on foreign affairs and domestic progressivism.

Since no consistent voting bloc existed on foreign affairs, it might be supposed that no definite ideological positions were articulated by congressmen. John Milton Cooper, however, has cogently argued that debates took place within the structures of very definite ideological presuppositions. He breaks these down into two main positions, isolationism and internationalism. Each has two subdivisions—idealism and nationalism. Congressmen such as Simon Fess (R-Ohio), who favored American intervention and then opposed the League of Nations, can be labeled, in Cooper's terms, international nationalists. Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.) pursued an idealistic
internationalist course that led him from support of intervention to vigorous advocacy of the League of Nations. Cooper presumes that most congressmen followed consistent courses similar to Fess and Hull, and, as a result, ideological positions were held by distinct groups of representatives. But, as discovered by the roll call analysis, many did not vote consistently, and instead changed their positions much as did William Mason (R-Ill.). Voting first against the war, Mason later came to favor American membership on a world court, but not the League of Nations. This phase of Cooper's thesis also ignores the bundle of conflicting, partisan, economic, and regional interests behind debates on wartime policy, postwar army and naval policy, and European relief. Consequently, the flux of events and proposals rendered the expression of an ideological position by groups of congressmen nearly impossible.

To note these points is not to deny Cooper's thesis altogether, but, on the contrary, to emphasize the usefulness of his categories. On the level of ideological expression he has brilliantly delineated the viewpoints within which House debates revolved. Throughout the three sessions, foreign policy and its complement, naval and army planning, were discussed within the context either of American ideals or American self-interest. From his description of conflicting ideologies, a paradox develops that highlights the House's inability to forge a postwar policy: ideological consistency could exist on the level of expression, but on the level of decision-making the complexity of events caused the formulation of separate voting combinations for each issue.¹

¹The apparent inconsistency of House voting patterns could
Equally paradoxical was the fate of domestic and progressive reform. Until Arthur Link's article in 1959, historical literature had assumed that progressivism disappeared before or during the war. More recently, a series of articles has sketched a vibrant and creative phase among laborers, social workers, and intellectuals, at least in planning if not in actually achieving concrete goals. Charles Hirschfeld, in one of these articles, has pointed out that the war experience generated a new awareness of the importance of planning. This heralded the arrival of a new "liberalism." That the Hirschfeld thesis is correct in the sense that progressivism continued into the 65th House cannot be doubted. Without this assumption, House debates on taxation, natural resources and conservation, and government-business cooperation become largely unintelligible. In another sense, evidence, however, does not support the thesis that a flowering of progressive thought and plans occurred during the war or after.

During the first session the war forced the House into a new and bold direction. For some representatives the Revenue Act of 1917, which Democrats and Midwest Republicans passed against the
stubborn opposition of Northeastern Republicans, was the harbinger of future reforms. On the other hand, House Democrats adopted the repressive Espionage Bill. Overall, congressmen of both parties agreed to the regimentation of the country as they enacted measures to organize the food supply, the transportation network, the financial system, and the industry and the labor of the nation for war. Planning and centralization slackened during the second session, but the House now approved progressive issues when it passed the prohibition and women's suffrage amendments. Advocates of both measures claimed that the war had set in motion forces which would improve the nation and held that prohibition and women's suffrage represented the ideals of the war. However, representatives, who also capped the loyalty program begun by the first session with the Sedition Act, suggested no new plans to achieve the democratic objectives of the war. During the third session the possibilities for progressive reform were again present. The House considered legislation for a reconstruction commission, veteran benefits, railroads, natural resource development, communications, and government social aid in housing and employment. A few congressmen apparently had a new awareness of the government's potential for action, believing that economic and human resources ought to be better managed than they were before the war. Moreover, congressmen did not object to government help for foreign trade or natural resource development, but their position on these issues was neither progressive nor was it part of a design to stabilize and rationalize capitalism (as Gabriel Kolko argues). Rather the House favored government intervention because it aided economic recovery and restored prewar competition. To the House membership the goal
of reconstruction was not enacting new programs but dismantling war-
time restrictions.

This study not only investigated postwar progressivism, but
also the very nature of progressivism. Historians have gone in two
distinct and separate paths on this subject, some arguing the exis-
tence of a unified movement and others claiming that the movement was
highly variegated with at best only a central desire for reform. To
the first, the movement represented the struggle between the corpora-
tions and the people, the revolt of the middle class, the design of
businessmen for a bureaucratic order, or the establishment of corporate
capitalism. To the latter, progressivism was made up of politicians
seeking the votes of the disgruntled, high-minded social reformers
attempting to abolish poverty, and businessmen and laborers desiring
benefits for their particular interest groups. This research does
nothing to lessen the emphasis on the many-sided complexion of
progressivism, arguing that no consistent ideological bloc formed.
Instead, groups supported only one progressive issue at a time and
then melted away.

On one level this thesis must apparently be qualified because
partisan groups tended to follow a consistent position on progressi-
vism. Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb note for earlier Wilsonian
Congresses that progressives tended to be split between parties. Occa-
sionally, reformers were able to overcome this division and pass legis-
lation. Although this thesis is valid for voting on some progressive
issues (a case in point is the Revenue Bill of 1917), Allen's and Clubb's
further contention that most progressives were in the Democratic
party is wrong for at least the 65th House. It is true that many
Republicans opposed the 1917 Revenue Bill, but they adopted the progressive side on the second tax bill. The progressive issues of prohibition and women's suffrage found the Republicans more unified in support than the Democrats. While the GOP objected to several features of the espionage laws and loyalty program, Democrats supported greater restrictions. Similarly, Republicans tended toward progressivism on labor and conservation with Democrats opposing them. Allen and Clubb's thesis does not reflect the reversal of party positions on progressivism during the war years.

On another level, the parties' positions did not reflect a consistent ideological stance since statistical roll call analysis found no uniform correlations over a number of separate issues. Rather, the parties' voting behavior demonstrated the pull of discrete stances, events, and proposals. Consequently, Republican support of progressive positions cannot be construed as reflecting an ideological position, but the result of seeking partisan advantage on a series of individual issues.

Contrary to the arguments of some historians, such as Dewey Grantham, regional groups displayed weak progressive tendencies. Occasionally, progressive ideals had some influence on the votes of a region's representatives, but more normally economic and social interests shaped their ballots. As a case in point, Midwestern Republicans broke from their party and voted with the Democrats on the 1917 Revenue Act, not so much because of the influence of progressive ideals as because of the distribution of the tax burden—which fell more on the industrial Northeast than the agrarian regions. In another instance, Northeastern Republicans struck a progressive
pose on some conservation measures, mainly because the West stood to gain from government payments to mining interests while their region would not. In truth, one of the weaknesses of progressivism was that it was often dependent upon regional interests for its strength. Only when other interests merged with progressivism, which occurred on a few individual issues, did it become a viable factor on roll calls. Allen and Clubb noted the role of constituent influence on progressivism, but in their efforts to find indications of progressivism they failed to pursue the ramifications of the thesis.

Another reason for progressivism's inability to forge a coherent bloc was that many congressmen found much of the organization for war reprehensible. Historians (among them Allen Davis, Gabriel Kolko, James Weinstein, and Robert Wiebe), who make much ado about the consummation or the resurgence of progressivism, completely misjudged the House's reaction to the war experience. Since congressmen wrote the laws, their attitudes were more important than those of social reformers or businessmen. Doubtless, the forces of rationalization and centralization inherent in capitalism and war accelerated rapidly in the crisis. But, for many representatives the new regimentation contrasted too sharply with the prewar role of government in economic and social spheres. Robert Cuff, writing about the War Industries Board, has pointed out that traditional methods continued to have a strong influence in shaping attitudes against the bureaucratic state. Additionally, the House had other reasons for rejecting planning and social programs. They disliked the shift of power from Congress to the Executive Branch, the overly rapid implementation of government-business cooperation in less than two years, and the
apparent radicalism of the plans. In short, a progressive and conservative stance is impossible to define because representatives overwhelmingly favored the end of wartime economic management and social programs. Ironically, progressivism did not surge into a dynamic phase of development during the war for progressive ideals.

The first and second sessions witnessed a sharp decline in partisan voting from other Congresses of the Progressive Era, and, at the same time, parties achieved near-record internal cohesion. Some historians interpret such a trend as indicating the burial of partisan animus. However, Seward Livermore in *Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress* has correctly described the bi-partisan voting as a camouflage of the protracted struggle between the parties. In the first session Republicans began maneuvering against the determined opposition of the Democrats to establish a congressional committee on the conduct of the war. This conflict increased in the second session. At the same time, parties battled each other over a number of individual issues, although it is true that the voting divisions were not as sharp as during earlier Wilsonian Congresses. In the third session partisanship dropped its covert characteristics. With all pretense gone, parties clashed over control of reconstruction and party voting returned to higher prewar levels.

Historians and political scientists agree that parties are the paramount influence on roll calls and in the creation of policy. In some ways, this magnifies the significance of parties during the 65th House because partisanship often focused on trivial economic and procedural measures. With more substantial issues the parties frequently failed to pursue a clear policy. For instance, on the water
power bill, Democrats in the second session supported greater federal control while the Republicans opposed it. But during the third session the parties reversed stances on federal regulation. Even on the war program, the parties usually followed the leadership of Woodrow Wilson who directed the House on what measures to consider. When the war came to a halt, parties did not so much create reconstruction policy as follow the general mood of the House, for almost all members, irrespective of party, favored scrapping wartime innovations.

Yet, the truth is that the role of parties cannot be completely dismissed. For one thing, partisanship, even if regional and ideological forces were combined, was the most important factor shaping divisions on roll calls. More significantly, partisanship embittered House-Presidential relations and caused, for instance, much of the hostile criticism of the War Department. Also, during the third session, partisan rivalry had much to do with the defeat of the reconstruction commission and the blockage of individual progressive proposals for the postwar world. Again paradox can be noted: while the war and the President overshadowed and shaped the parties' actions, parties nonetheless frustrated the creation of postwar policy.

Viewing the 65th House from the perspective of paradox allows an unusually fine opportunity to explore the evolution of the most tragic of the wartime tensions, President Wilson's call for the victory of democracy and his demand for the enactment of repressive measures. At first, the House—particularly Republicans who feared that the laws would be used against their newspapers—hesitated to adopt all the features of the espionage and loyalty program. By the second session, the mounting war hysteria overrode all opposition,
and the Sedition Act and Alien Deportation Act passed with hardly a word of opposition. By the third session, the war-induced distrust of aliens and dissenters had grown to include radicals. The House did not enact new and bold legislation, partly because of its anxiety about subversive elements.

Historical research offers several reasons for the growth of intolerance and each one is useful in understanding House acceptance of restrictive measures. A long tradition that demanded conformity and objected to the presence of radicals, dissenters, and aliens in American life is described by William Preston in *Aliens and Dissenters*. Preston argued that these traditional forces of bigotry, combined with the ever-increasing war tensions, overcame the few forces impeding the advance of repression. When the war drew to a close, congressmen's attention shifted from pacifists and pro-Germans to political radicals. H. C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite in *Opponents of War* pictured how the government decided to mobilize the people for war by combining repression with education. And finally, wartime anxieties and tensions and the failure of executive leadership induced a postwar reaction, a theme which Burl Noggle developed for the reconstruction period.

While it is clear that all these generalizations are useful to account for postwar intolerance, it would be highly unsatisfactory to let the matter rest there. It is necessary to say a word about the importance of congressmen in generating this anti-radicalism. Attitudes favoring moderation in the House always had a weak base since they often rested on Republican fears. Once Republicans saw that suppression held little danger to their interests, they also joined the attack against radicals, thereby augmenting the already large
forces working for restrictions. The House, which was constantly learning about the requirements of modern warfare, came to realize that the war would utilize not only material but also human resources. Correspondingly, demands increased that no individual or group in any fashion block the full equipment of the troops—a thesis that congressmen sold to the nation. But most significant was their advocacy of suppression and their defeat of a bold and generous reconstruction program immediately after the war. By so doing, the House added to the nation's postwar confusion of purpose and direction. This helped to generate the anxieties and tensions necessary for mass hysteria. Historians should not only dramatize Wilson's role in the debacle of progressive plans for the postwar world, but they should also emphasize the House's part in the postwar reaction.

When Congressmen heard President Wilson's war address on that solemn night of April 2, 1917, they little realized all the tensions which the acceptance of war would generate. At the same time that members fell to the task of mobilizing the nation for war, they also longed to return to "normal" conditions. Representatives became supporters of measures that in peace time they would vehemently oppose, and opponents of measures they normally advocated. All the while disliking the necessity of doing so, representatives voted for centralization and planning and even social aid, but given the first opportunity when peace returned, they promptly sought to reestablish economic competition. Congressmen employed progressive ideals for the aims of the war, and supported repression in the name of democracy. While the nation's history has been filled with paradoxical events, there have been few times when generous values and repressive measures
have combined so forcibly to unleash hysteria and disillusionment. The House fully shared in the tragedy of the war for democracy that led initially to the Red Scare and eventually to "normalcy."
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EXPLANATION OF THE BIOGRAPHICAL AND CAREER TABLES
OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES

The Table of Social Origins

The ranking of this table and most of the other tables is adapted from David Rothman's *Politics and Power*.\(^1\) The key to defining the social status of a person was the extent of aid the family could provide for the success of their children. The "elite" designation was reserved for those whose fathers had wealth and position, whose status made it likely that their children would some day enjoy leadership and power. The "substantial" category includes fathers who earned comfortable livings and who could provide advantages for their children. Still, success was chiefly up to the child. Lastly, the "subsistence" family was defined as one unable to provide social or economic advantages for their children. It should be noted that these are not exact categories, nor are they indicative of "class". The interest centered on aid that fathers could provide to their offspring.

Table of Educational Experience

Classifying educational experience proved difficult, mainly because lawyers need not have gone to college or even completed high school. The scheme devised takes this into consideration. Those placed in the lowest category had no formal education, either by tutor or schools. Those ranked second had a primary education (grades ranging from first to eighth). In the third level are those who

attended high school, but need not have graduated. The fourth level includes members who graduated from a high school or similar institution and then went on to read law in a law office. In the fifth level are the congressmen who attended college, perhaps graduating. If they did not graduate but went on to study law, they were counted on this level. The final level includes men who graduated and then went on to graduate training and professional training. If they studied law, either by reading in a law office or through training in a law school, they were counted at this level.

Table of Occupation

This is a straight-forward scale, though deciding how to classify individuals did pose some problems. Representatives in ranks one through seven were considered to have one predominant occupation. In this category individuals could have some other activity, but it would be minor. Categories eight and nine include individuals with two or more main activities. Lawyers with multiple occupations deserved a special category (category eight). The final category included a variety of individuals, some with two main activities, while others had multiple interests.

The Table of Extent of Political Experience

House members who served in key political offices for over six years before coming to the chamber were designated as having considerable experience. Those who spent three to six years in key offices, or over six years in secondary posts--state legislature, state cabinet, or state supreme court—or over a decade in less significant positions, such as prosecuting attorney, were considered to have average
experience. Members with moderate experience served less than three years in important posts or less than six in secondary posts. Men designated as having little or no experience had held office only briefly or not at all. Congressmen who were elected before March 4, 1905, were given a one-level advancement over whatever their prior experience would have otherwise entitled them to. By 1917, the members elected before 1905 had acquired great experience in the ways of the House and of parties.
VITA

Richard Kenneth Homer was born in Wichita, Kansas on January 31, 1945. He received his elementary and secondary education in the public schools of Wichita Kansas and graduated from Southeast High School in 1963. He entered Abilene Christian University in 1963 and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in History in August 1967. In September 1967 he began graduate study in the Department of History in the University of Texas at Austin and received the Master of Arts degree in August, 1968. From September 1968 to July 1972 he was an instructor of History and Political Science at Abilene Christian University. In September 1972 he began graduate study for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History at Louisiana State University. He is candidate for that degree in May, 1977.