1976

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Wilbur J. Scott

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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IN THE EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL ACTION:
THE CASE OF NEW ORLEANS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by

Wilbur J. Scott
B.A., St. John's University, 1967
M.A., University of Texas at El Paso, 1972
December, 1976
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Successful completion of a graduate career is an event long in the making that inevitably incurs a considerable debt to others. I am, of course, deeply indebted to the members of my doctoral committee--Perry H. Howard, Michael D. Grimes, Alvin L. Bertrand, Quentin A.L. Jenkins, Prentiss E. Schilling (Experimental Statistics), and Paul E. Grosser (Political Science)--for their suggestions, encouragement, and, ultimately, their approval. I owe a special note of thanks to my director, Dr. Howard, for sticking by me through "thick and thin" in the course of my doctoral studies. I also wish to publically thank George S. Tracy for his advice and support as a member of my committee for all but the final moments. Finally, David A. Whitney, my colleague at the University of Oklahoma, deserves special mention for his many substantive and stylistic critiques provided during the preparation of the final draft.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation contains an examination and test of the conditions under which aggregates of individuals sharing class and racial characteristics are found to exhibit distinctive patterns of political participation. The argument is made that these objective characteristics lead to distinctive political activity chiefly through the presence of an intervening variable, namely, an organizational factor. In short, it is argued that the hierarchy of organizations found in a community represent a prime agent of that community's salient features of social differentiation, especially those of class and race.

An ecological perspective is employed in developing the operationalization of these basic concepts. Eleven selected elections from the 1972, 1973, and 1974 Democratic primaries in New Orleans are analyzed. Measures of the class, race, and political participation variables are derived from census materials and precinct data. The class and racial characteristics of areal units are refined into a combined race/class index consisting of black, lower white, and upper white dimensions. Election data examined here include voter registration, voter turn out, and votes cast for various candidates. There is no corresponding data repository for the organizational variable. Thus, a large part of the dissertation is devoted to establishing
the hierarchy of political organizations in New Orleans. Interview data is presented for nineteen political organizations found to be active in the recent New Orleans elections. Organizational leaders and candidates for office were asked to rate these political organizations in terms of their effectiveness in the elections. Composite ratings derived from this procedure are used to apply the reputed effectiveness labels of the organizations themselves to their corresponding areas of operation, thus converting organizational effectiveness into an ecological variable as well.

Descriptive summaries of the structural and compositional characteristics of the nineteen political organizations are presented. Contrary to expectations, there is much more formal political organizational activity and a higher reputation for organizational effectiveness among black than white areas and among lower white than upper white neighborhoods. Cast within a typology of political organizations, upper white organizations were said to exhibit normative compliance structures, while black and lower white organizations were characterized as utilitarian compliance organizations. Examination of registration levels by the race/class designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of areal units generally indicates a positive relationship between race/class and registration levels and
the absence of any relationship between organizational effectiveness and registration levels. Likewise, voter turn out is highest in upper white areas in two of the years considered and shows no significant difference by organizational effectiveness levels. However, in 1973, turn out in black and lower white areas matches that found in the upper white neighborhoods. Analysis of votes cast in the elections offers some strong support for the organizational thesis. Voting cohesiveness (the tendency to "bloc vote") is found to be greatest in black neighborhoods and to be fairly pronounced in upper white areas as well. Such cohesiveness is much more negligible in lower white areas. Voting cohesiveness is greater in higher rated organizational effectiveness areas than in lower rated neighborhoods only occasionally—mainly, it seems, when the candidates involved are politically identifiable in either class or racial terminology.

A factor analysis of the basic variables confirms these contentions. Voter registration, voter turn out, and candidate choice are shown to be independent indicators of political participation. Black and upper white organizations emerge as distinct factors comprising both their respective ecological characteristics and candidate choices. No independent factor is shown for the lower white areas.
CHAPTER I
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS
OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction
In the minds of many professionals and laymen alike, the study of political organizations and voting behavior belongs in the realm of political science. Dating back in the contemporary era to Rice's (1928) *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, the investigation of electoral dynamics and trends has, in fact, been a mainstay of political science research. However, since Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's (1944) classic study of the impact of a presidential campaign upon candidate choice in Erie County, a goodly number of sociological works have dealt with the social aspects of the electoral process. It is now commonly acknowledged that sociologists have made a contribution to the understanding of electoral behavior, although the extent of that contribution is often a matter of lively debate.¹

Nevertheless, as if subliminally aware of to whom the study of elections "really belongs," sociologists have shied away in their analyses from factors too obviously political in content. While some of this bias may be
defensible on theoretical grounds, this informal division of labor clouds the fact that many overtly political factors have dimensions of legitimate theoretical interest to sociologists as well as political scientists. To illustrate, the composition, structure, and operation of political organizations, an undeniable factor of some sort in most elections, has often fallen into the "obviously political" category. However, analyses of such organizations would seem to include questions of the following variety: under what domain and specific conditions do different types of organizations emerge? How are they formally organized? What informal variations arise in day-to-day operations? How do they attract and retain membership? What consequences, intended or otherwise, do they entail? These are the sorts of questions a sociologist would ask instinctively about any group. It is suggested that answers to these and similar questions about the nature of political organizations merit extended sociological investigation.

The Sociological Context of Political Organizations

Sociological studies abound in the analysis of various social characteristics of the voter in relation to his party identification and candidate choice. It has been well established that party and candidate preferences tend to vary in a number of settings by social class, race, religious affiliation, ethnicity, and other distinguishable social characteristics. For example, in summarizing recurrent themes reported in voting studies, Lipset (1963: 234)
offers the following generalization:

... the most impressive single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right.

Studies of socially mobile individuals further confirm this contention. The remarks of Parkin (1971: 49-51) are representative:

As a rough general estimate, between about a quarter and a third of those born into the manual working class in modern Western countries will move to the ranks of the middle class. . . . There is little doubt that the overall tendency is for the upwardly mobile to shift their political allegiances from parties of the Left to parties of the Right.

Likewise, in an assessment of the persistence of racial, ethnic, and religious bloc voting, Wolfinger (1965: 897) concludes:

Ethnic politics constitute one of those features of American life that are always said to be on the point of disappearing, but that somehow endure. . . . From the stump. . . politicians righteously deplore any suggestion that their red-blooded American constituents might be influenced by bloc-voting patterns; off the stump they find it hard to discuss strategy in any other terms.

These findings reiterate the basic premise of a sociological approach to the study of electoral behavior, namely, that the electorate may be correctly viewed as a collection of social categories, groups, and organizations, rather than simply a composite of individuals. Carried a step further, an entire corpus of sociological literature has developed over the years concerning the role of "groups" in disseminating, legitimating, and interpreting information for its members and sympathizers. Many a politician has
learned from campaign experience that, while it is impossi-ble to approach and persuade each voter individually, a personal touch can be indirectly effected through the medi-ating capacity of groups. Therein lies the practical and sociological wisdom of the candidate seen eating gumbo, blintzes, kielbasa, pizza, and the like.

Given this bit of insight, one may be moved to pon-der the question of how such collectives of individuals come to act in varying degrees of unison. If, for a moment, a social category may be defined as an aggregate of persons sharing some characteristics, and groups and organizations are thought of as social categories in which recurrent in-teraction is increasingly structured, it can be easily shown that concerted, unified action is by no means auto-matic. Dealing first with social categories, it is quite evident that not all characteristics shared with a number of other persons result in joint behavioral effort. The lack of a "left-handed bloc vote" is a trivial yet true example. It is also true that, of characteristics which are somehow deemed important, not all lead to identical action. The Italian, working class vote in the eastern seaboard cities, is solidly Democratic—except in New Haven, where it is staunchly Republican. Such variation may be found among organizations as well. Since 1952, Democratic presidential candidates have rarely won a plurality in Deep South states despite Democratic party registration levels there exceeding ninety percent of the electorate.
These examples are by no means uncommon, and the fact that one can conjure some explanation for these variations does not negate the basic point. Thus, the central concern of this dissertation is to investigate the electoral role of political organizations in a metropolitan setting and, in doing so, to advance and test some explanation of collective political action. Without being very systematic about it at this point, it is speculated that political organizations play a key role in effecting: (1) the specification of which social characteristics come to be considered a matter of political importance, and (2) the conversion of otherwise dormant categories of individuals sharing these characteristics into persons acting to a significant degree in unison.

This dissertation, therefore, purports to test propositions regarding the organizational factor in defining salient cleavages, especially along class and racial lines, and in mobilizing these portions of the electorate into political action. The activity of political organizations during recent local elections in the city of New Orleans will be used as a relevant case in point. With some modifications to be specified as the argument unfolds, the investigation essentially entails: (1) elaborating the distribution of salient features of social differentiation in New Orleans, namely, those of class and race, (2) specifying the political organizational framework of the city vis-a-vis these features of differentiation, and (3)
ascertaining the role of this political organizational structure in inducing collective action along these lines of differentiation in the electoral process.

The Electoral Context of Political Organizations

Rationales for the treatment of political organizations within an electoral context are both theoretical and practical. A prominent characteristic of democratic and quasi-democratic systems is that a large number of key governmental and judicial figures are selected by popular ballot. Since such selection is subject to periodic renewal, again by ballot, elections may be viewed as controlled, legitimized struggles for access to the apparatus of government (Lipset, 1963: 230-233). The formation and persistence of political organizations has typically been an integral part of this process. The question of types of political organizations aside, it has been generally observed that no candidate or ideology has ever made much headway in this system without some organizational base (Barnes, 1966: 522). The diminished chances of success commonly ascribed to those candidates and platforms bucking established political organization are further evidence of this theme.

Therefore, success in the electoral sphere is a commonplace if not primary goal of political organizations. The potential theoretical importance of this item lies in the fact that many social scientists have followed the lead of Weber and Michels in analyzing organizational
functions in terms of organizational goals. This trend has received further impetus and sanction in the Parsonian scheme in which "goal orientation" is a central defining characteristic of organizations (Parsons, 1956: 64-67). As shall be shown in the next chapter, there are some problems with equating functions with goals. Nonetheless, at least one good reason for studying political organizations within an electoral context is that these organizations generally consider electoral activity and success to be their raison d'etre.

The electoral context of organizations is important in other respects as well. Discussion of the role of political organizations in a metropolitan setting is predicated initially upon an assessment of the nature of political parties in the American political system. In this regard, American political parties are seldom "organized" in the European political sense of the word. To begin with, being a Democrat or a Republican in the United States is largely a matter of self-definition, party membership requiring only a minimum of active support and participation. The structure of both parties, therefore, consists of full-time politicians, professional staff, a small number of party activists, and an immense pool of formally inert party identifiers (Dye and Zeigler, 1972: 199-200). This description is likewise appropriate in the one-party South where factional politics prevails. Here, the party structure tends to consist of emergent factions, usually
temporary coalitions of professionals, activists, and formally inactive identifiers hinging upon the personality and force of individual political leaders (Key, 1949: 302-305).

This situation implies that the influence and sphere of operation of political organizations extend far beyond their formal and immediate membership. The best test of the operating domains of such organizations would, therefore, be found in an actual election, or preferably, a series of elections. Consequently, eleven recent elections in New Orleans have been selected to provide a test of the relationship between political organizations and patterns of political action.

Footnotes

1 For an illustration of the debate, see Key and Munger (1959) and Sartori (1969). Key and Munger argue that most sociological studies of the vote exhibit a form of "social determinism" which essentially takes the politics out of the study of political behavior. Sartori is in agreement with this point and, of particular relevance here, suggests party organization as an intervening variable in the relationship between social class and political as a theoretical remedy.

2 Pertinent examples include Festinger (1959), Homans (1951, 1961), Sherif and Sherif (1953), Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Blau (1964), and Laumann (1973).

3 Deep South states are here defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North and South Carolina.
CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate some of the thoughts and efforts of others who have considered issues related to the context and operation of political organizations. This is considered essential for the usual reasons. First, a goodly number of capable scholars have previously tackled the basic or similar problems and have advanced a wide range of theoretical observations and empirical findings. Their insights can be of assistance in choosing those approaches and perspectives with greater potential utility, weeding out by experience those most likely to prove untenable or irrelevant. Secondly, such review aids in delimiting the focus of the study by identifying a coherent series of propositions to be investigated.

In this spirit, there are several topic areas which receive close inspection in this chapter. These topics suggest a central theme of the dissertation, namely, that the organizational structure of a community may be thought of as a prime agent of the community's salient lines of social differentiation, especially those of class and race.
Social Differentiation, Political Action, and the Organizational Factor

Social Class and Political Action. If any one independent variable has become associated with the sociological perspective, it is probably that of social class. One can scarcely find any research done recently within the discipline, or indeed within the social sciences or the polling industry, which does not routinely include social class in an associative, predictive, or explanatory role. Apparently, many social scientists and laymen alike think that some relevant class-type phenomenon does in fact exist.

The historical and intellectual impetus for this interest may be traced to the works of Karl Marx, whose efforts roughly a century ago mark sociology's first comprehensive treatment of class. It is not totally an exaggeration to assert, as does Zeitlin (1968), that the principal lines of investigation in the general area of social stratification since that time constitute an "ongoing debate with Marx's ghost." Nevertheless, Marx would explicitly reject as relevant to class analysis much of what modern sociologists do in the name of social stratification. For Marx, class constitutes a dynamic concept rooted in a dialectical materialistic theory of social change. In this scheme, classes are depicted as the potential vehicles of conflict capable of inducing real change. Marx did not assume that a group identity was required for the existence of classes (Klasse an sich).
However, a class was not conscious of itself (Klasse für sich) until there was organization for the purpose of political, that is, class, action.

It is apparent from this that few American sociologists are truly Marxists in their approach to social class. Class is now most often treated as a static concept in a theory of social stratification. The referents in this scheme are categories of individuals differentiated by varying income, educational, or occupational levels and their corresponding life-styles. Consider as a plausible illustration the tone of the following comments by Berger (1963: 80-81):

A sociologist worth his salt, if given two basic indices of class such as income and occupation, can make a long list of predictions about an individual . . . [the sociologist] will be able to make intelligent guesses about the part of town in which the individual lives . . . give a general description of the interior decorating . . . predict the voluntary associations [he] has joined, guess [his] political affiliation . . . predict the number of children sired and also [predict] whether the individual has sexual relations with the lights turned on or off.¹

The sheer bulk of empirical data linking social class with behavioral correlates seems to have lulled many sociologists and social scientists into accepting the position that class characteristics sui generis lead to class action. In the absence of a further rationale, the position is untenable for two simple reasons. One, not all class conditions lead to political action. Secondly, identical class conditions do not necessarily lead to identical political actions. These two factors strongly suggest that
objective class conditions, by themselves, lack the mechanisms conducive to political action. In short, class conditions do not constitute a sufficient condition for the emergence of class action.

The focal point of this section then is this: in the absence of dialectical materialistic themes, how may one account for the class consciousness component of social class and, by extension, class action. The suggestion is not that Marx holds the only answer to this question. Rather, it is being argued that if the class terminology is to be theoretically useful, Marx's explanatory mechanisms must be replaced when his basic tenets are set aside.2

Of course, class consciousness and political organization, essential properties of Marx's concept of class, have received attention from contemporary sociologists. For instance, the interest of political sociologists in political action corresponds quite closely to that of Marx. However, the manner in which class has typically been used as an independent variable in this regard is more congruent with the stratification than with the change approach of class. Likewise, the extensive attention devoted to the study of the organizational factor has taken place mainly under the guise of organizational analysis rather than within the rubric of class analysis.

Some sociologists have preferred to rephrase the issue of social class and class consciousness in terms of the concepts of social status and status self-perception.3
Though some have used the terms of social class and social status synonymously, the connotations are clearly not identical. By way of definition, social status indicates the acknowledgement of a stratification hierarchy comprising a gradient of prestige ranks. Status self-perception (or status awareness), then, refers to the capacity or inclination of the individual to locate himself within that hierarchy. This is quite a different matter than that of social class and class consciousness. As has been shown, social class connotes the existence or imminent emergence of a conscious class ideology. Through class consciousness, perception of the stratification system is reduced to the simple dichotomy of "we," one's class, versus "they," the class enemies (Sartori, 1969). Marx dispels any notion that he might consider the two approaches synonymous in observing that only the "vulgar mind" treats "differences in the size of purses" as class differences (Dahrendorf, 1959: 11).

If one is properly convinced that status self-perception and class consciousness refer indeed to empirically independent phenomena, questions arise concerning the significance this situation holds for a theory of class action. It can be shown that indices used to measure objective class conditions, such as levels of occupation and income or variations in life-styles, correlate highly with indicators of status self-perception. Thus, the transition from objective class conditions to some form of status
self-perception does not appear to be problematic. Rather, the theoretical crunch hinges instead upon the transition from status self-perception to some form of political action. While one can see quite easily how class consciousness may lead to political action, it is by no means clear that status self-perception is capable of inducing such action as well.

In dealing with this latter problem, it has been a fairly common practice among sociologists to assume that primary relationships among individuals sharing objective class characteristics, rather than the objective class conditions themselves, lead to political action. The use of the primary interaction variable here does have some advantage. Simply stated, it stipulates that personal interaction networks accrue high degrees of conformity and solidarity among their respective members. To the extent that these sorts of relationships can be shown to appear among those sharing given objective class characteristics, this strategy stands as a theoretically plausible alternative.

However, this formulation falls somewhat short of expectations on two counts. First, the strategy would still be insufficient in explaining why identical class conditions often lead to different kinds of action. In this respect, the strategy shows little improvement in correcting problems incurred by simply assuring that class characteristics in and of themselves lead to political action. Secondly,
FIGURE 1

DIAGRAM OF SOCIAL CLASS AS A CONCEPT IN A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
AND AS A CONCEPT IN A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Legend: → theory-consistent line of development
--------→ theory-inconsistent line of development
primary interaction networks are, by implication if not definition, relatively small in size and limited to individuals who are well known to each other. Since many of the types of political action in which sociologists are interested involve large categories of individuals, many of whom are unknown to each other, one may realistically wonder about the adequacy of informal, personal networks as the key intervening variable.

The distinctions between social status and social class developed in this section are depicted in figure 1. Much of the current confusion regarding the concept of class stems from the fact that it has become what Rosenberg (1965: 17) has termed a "global concept," that is, the concept as commonly used by sociologists has more than one referent. Put within the context of the introductory remarks, the term **social status** refers more nearly to what is intended by the stratification approach to class, while the term **social class** intimates the change approach to class. Furthermore, while the sharing of similar lifestyles and status self-perceptions may lead to primary interaction networks, this development is not theoretically useful in accounting for the occurrence of political action. Rather, the study of political action requires the study of class organizations as a device for generating and mobilizing class consciousness.

**Race and Political Action.** The discussion in this section has thus far dealt with social class as the dimension
of social differentiation. This concentration has not been totally unintentional. As suggested earlier, the concept of social class has been accorded exhaustive, quasi-systematic attention in sociological thought. Of course, numerous other features of social differentiation have received extensive consideration as well. Dominant among them is the analytical concern focused upon race.

If it can be said that empirical instances of class consciousness, that is, the polarization of individuals into the "we" vs. "they" dichotomy, occur in rather weakened dosages in this country, such is certainly not the case with the racial variable. Perceptions of racial differences and the ensuing constraints placed upon interactional patterns have figured prominently in the history and culture of the U.S. The tone and tenor of these patterns may be gleaned from sociological writings earlier this century which characterized the system of black-white relationships as being "if not a caste, at least castelike," to use Warner's (1936: 234) phrase. A similar characterization was advanced by Myrdal (1944: 674-675). Key (1949: 5) was likewise led to assert in the introduction to his classic work that "whatever phase of Southern politics one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro" and his place in society.¹

Interest in the relationship between race and stratification, or more specifically, race as a dimension of stratification, has been extended since the early
statements of Warner and Myrdal through the "debate" between Cox and Berreman concerning the applicability of the term caste to stratification in contemporary America. Cox (1945: 362-368) has argued that the American system of stratification varies significantly from the caste prototype in a number of basic respects. Two factors are primary among these differences. First, the concept of caste has generally implied the existence of heredity groups constituting a hierarchy of occupational specialties. Further, the systematized inequality engendered by distinctions among castes has been portrayed as normatively acceptable and legitimated by religious authority and tradition.

In contrast, blacks in the U.S. have theoretically been expected to embrace the work/achievement ethic as are whites, although structural barriers may in fact have prohibited them from fulfilling this expectation. Of equal or even greater importance, the constitutionality and legitimacy of blatantly discriminatory aspects of the system have been shown to stand in serious question. In fact, it is this discrepancy between the ideal and interactional norms which Cox identifies as the distinguishing feature of the American stratification system on the criterion of race.

Berreman (1960: 120-127) disagrees. According to Berreman, it is highly unlikely that persons near the bottom of any stratification system fully accept the "rationales" intended to justify their comparatively meager
lots. Conversely, those occupying favored positions can be expected to employ and perpetuate an elaborate series of values and sanctions conducive to the maintenance of their advantage. Given these considerations and the relative rigidity of the ascribed racial proscriptions, the American "class" system is argued to vary little from the Indian "caste" system in several important respects.

Whichever viewpoint is more valid, the racial issue clearly continues to register highly upon any list of attributes by which individuals in this country are likely to be differentiated. Further, the mere suggestion of the term caste arouses considerable interest given the developing context of this study. The term projects the image of a stratification system containing an independent racial dimension in addition to the one based upon class characteristics. Likewise, the usage serves as a heuristic device leading one to entertain the notion that many of the same sorts of mechanisms operating in the conversion of objective class characteristics to class action may be indigenous to the social reification of racial attributes as well.

**Political Action and the Organizational Factor.**

From the preceding discussion, it seems clear that some respecification is necessary in order to meaningfully express the relationship between objective characteristics of social differentiation and ensuing political action. Sartori (1969: 84-86) has argued strongly for the consideration of an organizational factor in just such a
respecification. In a critical assessment of Alford's (1963: 289-290) conclusion that England represents a relatively "pure" case of class voting, Sartori notes that almost one-half of the Conservative Party electoral support has traditionally come from the working class. This support constitutes the deviation of fully one-third of the working class vote. Other national studies show further apparently bewildering variations in the class vote. However, consistency of sorts is to be found by the introduction and interpretation of an intervening organizational variable. For example, class voting in the English case is correlated with union membership; that is, union members vote overwhelmingly for the Labour Party, while nonunion members split their vote almost evenly between the Conservative and Labour parties. Further comparative data strongly suggest that the direction of the vote is often a product of the relationship between the organizational variable (for example, labor union membership) and the larger socio-political context (such as local governmental form). Thus, through their organizational identifications and ties, members in one specific setting may vote to the "left," while their associational counterparts in another setting may vote to the "right."

Summarizing these data, Sartori (1969: 84) asserts:

To put it bluntly, it is not the "objective" class [class conditions] that creates the party, but the party that creates the "subjective" class [class consciousness]. . . . The party is not the consequence of the class. Rather, and before, it is the class that receives its identity from the party.
Hence class behavior presupposes a party that not only feeds, incessantly, the "class image," but also a party that provides the structural cement of "class reality."

The model implicit in this discussion is that certain sources of social differentiation may be said to receive salience and direction through an organizational factor, leading in turn to forms of political activity. In any population, there are obviously a wide range of objective features which could be used to identify and classify individuals into socially meaningful categories. It is being argued here that this definition process occurs in the organizational structure of the community. This formulation seems to hold promise in treating many of the questions left unanswered by other of the theoretical strategies raised thus far in this chapter.

Organizational Dimensions of the Urban Community

Organizations as a Prime Feature of Urban Life.
The term "mass society" is frequently heard in both public and professional circles. The referent of this term appears most often to be modern, or more specifically, urban society. This usage is apparently intended to emphasize certain commonly assumed characteristics of contemporary urban social structure, primarily its size, complexity, and heterogeneity. Much of the sociological literature applicable to the urban scene bears this theme. The classic formulations of Toennies (1940) and Simmel (1940) almost a century ago and the more recent statements of Wirth (1938)
and others tend to emphasize urban structure as heterogeneous, impersonal, fragmentary, and, hence, destructive of enduring social relations. Concerning this point, the words of Wirth (1938: 12-13) are particularly instructive:

The contacts in the city may indeed be face-to-face, but they are nonetheless impersonal, superficial, transitory, and segmental. Whereas the individual gains, on the one hand, a certain degree of emancipation or freedom from the personal and emotional controls of intimate groups, he loses, on the other hand, the spontaneous self-expression, the morale, the sense of participation that comes with living in a integrated society. This constitutes the state of anomie. . .

However, research concerning the interactional patterns of urban dwellers in recent years indicates that life in the city may not be as isolated and purely contractual as some of these latter theorists seem to imply. The efforts of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), Whyte (1955), Wilensky and LeBeaux (1965), Babchuck (1965), and Laumann (1973), as well as the recent work of urban anthropologists (Barnes, 1969), go a long way in establishing the identity and persistence of primary networks in urban settings. Objectively, the city-dweller may indeed live in a complex, heterogeneous structure of considerable size. However, from his perspective, day-to-day interaction on the job and at home tends to be restricted to a microcosm of peers and relatives.

Nor are all secondary contacts with the larger social context inevitably fragmentary, segmented, and destructive of integrative social bonds. On the contrary,
Tocqueville's (1963: 71) pronouncement almost one hundred fifty years ago concerning the busy participation of substantial portions of Americans in relatively stable organizational structures indicates just the opposite to be true:

In no country in the world has the principle of associations been more successfully used. . . than in America. Besides the permanent associations which are established by law. . . a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private citizens. . . . If a stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare. . . the neighbors immediately form themselves into a deliberative body; . . . if some public pleasure is concerned, an association is formed. . . . Societies are formed to resist evils (and) to diminish vice(s). In the United States, associations are established to promote the public safety, commerce, industry, morality, and religion. There is no end which the human will desairs of attaining through the combined power of individuals. . .

Empirical evidence accumulated in the last few decades favors de Tocqueville's early assessment. In their widely acclaimed study of "Middletown," for instance, Lynd and Lynd (1929: 528) report that ninety-five percent of the "business class" and forty-six percent of the "working class" in their sample were members of one or more voluntary associations. Axelrod (1956: 13-18) found strikingly similar proportions in a more recent case study, and a national sample placed the number of adults participating in at least one voluntary association at sixty-one percent (Wright and Hyman, 1958: 286). Likewise, cross-national comparisons with other industrialized countries have revealed participation levels of forty-seven percent and
forty-four percent of adults sampled in Great Britain and Germany respectively (Almond and Verba, 1965: 249).

Organizational Structure as a Reflection of Social Differentiation. Hollingshead's (1952: 685-687) appraisal of New Haven, Connecticut, provides apt illustration of the presumed relationship between social differentials and organizational structure. The intent of the study was to identify class distinctions, in part through the examination of the associational patterns of a sample of respondents. Interestingly, Hollingshead reports finding vertical social divisions based upon racial, ethnic, and religious differences in addition to the expected horizontal cleavages due to social class criteria. An important conclusion of the study is that these vertical and horizontal divisions create highly compartmentalized subsystems of interaction vividly reflected in the composition of voluntary associations in the New Haven community. In short, these organizations demarcate imaginary social grids within which interaction among socially, ethnically, and religiously compatible individuals routinely takes place.

It does not appear that Hollingshead has stumbled across an isolated phenomenon. Warner and Srole (1945) earlier documented such an occurrence in a study appropriately entitled, The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. Similar findings are reported by Greer (1962), Gans (1962) and Wolfinger (1965). Nor has the emergence of
suburbia as a dominating feature of the urban scene necessarily altered the basic picture. After analyzing ten metropolitan areas, Lieberson (1962: 681) is led to conclude that the same groups which are the most highly segregated from "native" whites in the central city are also the most residentially concentrated in the suburbs. This finding, he suggests is an indication that interactional patterns thought endemic to the central city persist to a large extent in suburbia as well.

Parenti's (1967: 717-720; 1969: 173-180) comments regarding observed patterns of acculturation and assimilation provide a helpful perspective for assessing this situation. Specifically, a cultural system refers to an ideational or belief set, while a social system denotes a behavioral or interactional set. If one can assume that there is "no inevitable one-to-one relationship between the various processes" in the two systems and that "imperatives in one system are not wholly dependent upon the other" (Parenti, 1967: 718), then it is theoretically defensible to expect that groups which are segregated socially, that is, in terms of their interactional patterns, may nonetheless exhibit a high degree of integration culturally, that is, in terms of shared values and beliefs. Hence, individuals may be culturally assimilated yet also "segregated" as evidenced, among other things, by participation in socially, ethnically, racially, or religiously homogeneous organizations. To the extent that these observations
are valid, the organizational structure of the community may be viewed as an expression of its salient features of social differentiation, including class and racial differences.

The Mediating Capacity of Organizations. A further set of implications contained in the organizational structure of the urban environment lies in the mediating capacity of organizations. Durkheim (1964: 27-32) has stressed the view that organizations in the modern setting have the unique capacity to stand as a counterbalance between the isolated individual and the larger social context. To Durkheim, this mediating capacity is of importance in two basic respects. On the one hand, organizations provide the social mechanism for integrating scattered individuals into a common stream of values, beliefs, and sentiments in settings otherwise often conducive to anomie. On the other hand, this mediating capacity helps insure individual emancipation and freedom from the domination of the state.

This interpretation by Durkheim attributes a stabilizing function to the mediating capacity of organizations. For those who do not share his optimistic appraisal of organizations, it is generally not the mediating capacity or the internal integrative potentials which are objects of contention. The dissensus involves the probable role with which these characteristics are said to be most amenable. As the tone of this disagreement implies, the dispute may
be characterized as falling within a pluralist-elitist clash of perspective.

In the spirit of Durkheim's critique of organizations, pluralists are apt to emphasize several positive aspects of the mediating potential of organizations (Truman, 1951; Almond and Verba, 1965; Smith, 1966). Pluralists, for example, are more likely than elitists to assert that membership and participation in organizations is fairly widespread. Thus, if organizations are indeed selective in terms of who is represented, the wide range of social origins from which participants are drawn nevertheless equalizes the effect. The statements of Rose (1967: 244) in this respect are typical:

. . . a significant portion of the lower classes is organized into labor unions, an increasing proportion of the middle class is assuming leadership in the social-influence associations, the ethnic minorities have organized their own social-influence groups, and all of these are taking stronger interest in politics. Thus power has become more widely distributed through greater participation in voluntary associations.

Pluralists likewise resist the notion that organizations are an inherently conservative force. They note that organizations potentially may be utilized either to induce change or to defend the status quo. Whichever the case, what is of importance they claim, is that organizations do provide an effective and powerful medium for gaining access to the political process.

Shifting the focus to this political process, pluralists further contend that the interests represented by any
number of competing organizations merit consideration apart from potential power differentials, such as organizational size, force, or resources. Incumbent with but not restricted to this position is the belief that the exercise of power resides for the most part in the formal machinery of government. In a critique of various strategies in measuring power, Bonjean and Grimes (1974: 378) summarize this contention as follows:

... the question, "Who Governs?" (and, by implication, who has power?) was answered very much in the same manner by social scientists and the lay public. Those persons occupying important offices ... were assumed to be those making key community decisions and thus exercising power.

Broad access to these positions of power is further purported to be well insured by a public electoral system, by a widespread acceptance of a core of "democratic" values, and by open competition among polycentric, socially diverse organizations (Rose, 1967: 55-58; Truman, 1968: 134). Obviously not all organizations are equally effective in gaining access to these positions of power. However, given the alleged democratic spirit of the organizational competition, pluralists argue that organizational participation has positive consequences in and of itself. Independent of the "success" of the organization, organizational identification and participation is thought to provide a sense of political efficacy and a satisfaction with democratic processes among its latent and active members. Elitists, on the other hand, are more likely to dote upon the question of who tends to benefit most from
the mediating capacity of organizations. Turning first to the question of "who participates" in organizations, elitists admit that participation is indeed fairly widespread. But, they add, participation also tends to be consistently and positively correlated with social class. The empirical findings quoted earlier concerning organizational participation support this interpretation (Lynd and Lynd, 1929; Axelrod, 1956; Wright and Hyman, 1958; Almond and Verba, 1965). To summarize, the studies show relatively substantial levels of participation in organizations, proportions ranging from forty to sixty percent of samples including representation from all classes. However, the distribution is clearly skewed by class, indicating greater participation among upper status individuals. Lipset (1963: 201), for example, notes that the higher participation level "of the more privileged" in organizational activities has been documented in virtually every comparison between those of higher and lower status. Therefore, if the political system is in fact responsive to the operation of organizations, and if persons participating in various organizations can reasonably be assumed to pursue their own interests, the mediating role of political and parapolitical organizations may indeed operate in favor of the higher classes by virtue of differential participation.

Elitists are apt to delineate other discriminating aspects of organizational life as well. The classic treatise
of the Italian sociologist Michels (1959) over fifty years ago has alerted subsequent social scientists to the oligarchic proclivity of organizations. Michels avered that organizational control is inevitably reduced to the hands of a few, even in democratically contrived organizations. This oligarchic tendency is said to be rooted in a number of factors, most notably man's "inherent" craving for power, the apathy of rank-and-file members, and the natural desire of the leadership to strengthen and buttress its position of authority. Thus, the very principle of organization itself contains elitist trends. A number of contemporary sociologists and political scientists, therefore, contend that organizations are not truly capable either of bringing about change or of defending the status quo. Rather, they assert that organizations which persist and wield political clout are mostly conservative in their orientation to the status quo (Schattschneider, 1960; Edelman, 1964; Parenti, 1970). According to Dye and Zeigler (1972: 234-235):

Organizations perform a conservative, stabilizing function for the society. . . . Of course, the goals of organizations vary, some being more radical than others. But in general, organizations that survive, even if they began as radical, become more moderate as organizational perpetuation and maintenance of bureaucracy displace the original goals. . . . Pressure for substantial social change [thus] comes from forces outside the associational structure.

Finally, elitists are in basic agreement with the pluralist contention that participation may instill feelings of political efficacy among organizational members even when
personal and political returns are substantially negligible or purely symbolic (Edelman, 1964). However, given their perspective of organizational life, it is not surprising that many elitists state additionally that such intangible rewards constitute a delusionary enterprise, diverting attention of rank-and-file members and nonparticipants alike from the basic issue: the perpetuation of the status quo by vested interests.

In summarizing the conflicting contentions reflected in these two viewpoints, the following observations seem most appropriate. First, it does not appear that the mediating potential of organizations is a matter in question. A wide range of literature, theoretical speculation, and empirical evidence are in basic agreement about this point. Secondly, it seems fair to say that while relatively large numbers of individuals participate in organizations, this number is not proportionately representative of several important groups within the population. For example, it is clear that the organizational variable is positively correlated with social class, thereby raising the question of whether organizations tend to represent specialized interests, in this case those of the higher classes. Finally, the matter of whether organizations reinforce the status quo or provide an effective medium for social change appears largely a matter of perspective and thus a contention to be verified. The tendency here will be to lean toward the elitist position and seek substantiating and refutory evidence accordingly.
Organizations and Politics

Strategies in the Analysis of Organizations. It has almost been an unstated assumption in the history of organizational analyses that organizations should be conceptualized and evaluated in terms of their respective goals. As indicated in the introductory chapter, this procedure is embedded in the organizational perspectives advanced by Weber (1957) and Michels (1962) earlier this century and, subsequently, a goodly number of efforts have been patterned after their lead. There are sound reasons for employing this approach. Organizations may be characterized as formal groups in which the relationships are rationally defined in terms of positions and concomitant linkages. This rationalization of relationships serves as a means of legitimizing social relationships in the absence of traditional or personal bonds and, as emphasized by this perspective, provides a regimen for the efficient pursuance of desired goals.

However, several problems seem to persistently accompany this approach. For instance, there has often been confusion concerning exactly "who" defines the goals of an organization. Cartwright and Zander (Mohr, 1973: 470-471) have noted that one may conceivably distinguish at a minimum (1) the goals an organizational member may hold for his own ends, (2) the goals an organizational member may hope the organization will pursue or achieve, (3) the goals of organizational members as a group, and finally (4) the formally
stated organizational goals. The first two of these distinctions comprise goals which are held individually while the latter two identify collective orientations. Further, only the second two distinctions refer to goals which may be collectively attained. Validly enumerating organizational goals is of particular importance when such specification is meant to provide the rationale and criteria for the ensuing analysis.

The difficulties encountered in this matter of specifying goals raise the more general problem of adequately and formally accounting for the distinction between "intent" or "motive" and "function." It is clear that the structure of social arrangements may indeed engender a series of consequences beyond those intended, serve some purposes yet also constitute disruptions for others, or in other ways vary from its subjectively perceived or designated design.\(^9\)

Etzioni (1960; 1975) and others (Gouldner, 1959; Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967) have articulated further criticisms from this base of dissatisfaction with the goal model of organizations. By now it almost goes without saying in organizational research that organizations will most often be judged as inefficient; that is, they will be found to fall short of stated goals and to be pursuing objectives other than formalized goals. An alternative strategy is found in the writings of Etzioni (1960) and Gouldner (1959) who assert that organizations may be more meaningfully viewed
as miniature social systems in which goal attainment is but one of a number of important functions. Perhaps the most obvious yet most frequently overlooked of these important functions is that organizations "seek" to survive; that is, the behavior of individuals occupying key organizational roles is principally, though not exclusively, guided by considerations pertaining to organizational maintenance and enhancement (Wilson, 1973: 13).

Of course, the systems model is not without its critics either. If the goal model has been tagged as containing an inherent rationalist bias, the system model is most often accused of harboring a functionalist bias. This latter accusation stems from the maxim "what exists, is functional," which is often erroneously identified as summarizing the core of the functionalist position. More accurately, "what exists, exists." Existant social arrangements which persist over time presumably meet some basic minimum of survival requirements, for instance, attracting and holding members. Obviously, no members, no organization. However, such arrangements may be functional, dysfunctional, or even afunctional in any number of ways, including perpetuating deleterious consequences upon those who gladly embrace them.

The conceptualization of organizations within the context of the systems model is not meant to exclude the Weberian notion that organizations are rationally formed for the stated purpose of attaining certain goals. Rather,
it is presented here to attune the inquiry to other functions or consequences which the organizational structure of the community might entail. For example, political organizations as a rule represent calculated attempts to gain access to the formal machinery of government, most often in this country through influencing the outcome of elections. Thus, any analysis of political organizations would do well to at least tangentially consider such stated purpose. However, a political organization may wittingly or unwittingly be "doing" other things as well, one of which might well be the pacification of its members through providing only a guise of meaningful access to the presumed positions of power. Or, in keeping with the considerations presented earlier in this chapter, political organizations may purposely or inadvertently solidify potential lines of social differentiation, thereby functioning to support endogamous subsystems of interaction within the community setting.

Organizations as Reference Groups. In an earlier section of this chapter, the mediating capacity of organizations was presented and analyzed from a structural perspective. Briefly, it was argued that organizations constitute interactional subsystems which stand between the "isolated" individual and the larger socio-political structure, thereby providing a medium through which individuals may be integrated into a cultural stream, gain access to the decision-making apparatus, and so forth. The substance of these claims, as well as the nature of the influence
exerted by organizations, can receive further explication by momentarily viewing the problem from another perspective.

One of the more central themes in sociology is that individuals gain standards or perspectives with which to view and evaluate the world from groups of which they are members. Merton (1968: 339-340) has posited the following conditions as prerequisites for group membership:

First of all. . . the concept of a group refers to a number of people who interact with one another in accord with established patterns. . . . A second criterion of a group. . . is that interacting persons define themselves as members, i.e., that they have patterned expectations of forms of interaction which are morally binding on them and on other members. . . . The correlative and third criterion is that the persons in interaction be defined by others as "belonging to the group". . . .

The problem is only slightly modified if the concern is focused upon organizations. As formally constituted groups, the (varying) criteria for memberships are ostensibly a matter of technical qualifications, for example, paying dues, attending meetings, and so forth. From an analytical standpoint, however, the basic criteria for membership is the same as that specified for groups in general, that is, members can be recognized by the fact that their association with the organization has affected their behavior. This being the case, the influence of organizations upon the activities of members is well grounded in theoretical expectations.

The applicability of the influence exercised by groups and organizations, however, is not necessarily
limited to their immediate memberships. The concept of reference groups\textsuperscript{10} has been developed to account for this apparent tie often found between groups, their members, and some nonmembers as well. The basic assumption underlying the reference group concept is that individuals may internalize group perspectives through psychological identification even in the absence of formal group membership and participation. In these instances, the affinity which exists between nonmember and group may establish the group as an occasional or even consistent focal point for gaining information about the world in which one lives. This factor is of particular importance to the discussion of organizations, for it permits the handling of organizational influence far beyond formal organizational boundaries.

Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955: 31-34) have documented and attempted to account for one aspect of this phenomenon in a "two-step flow of influence" paradigm. Lazarsfeld and his associates had earlier studied the effects of mass media advertising upon the purchasing patterns of consumers and of mass media campaigning upon candidate preferences of voters. In each case, a rational model of choice was posited, that is, individuals were assumed to glean information from media sources in a diligent manner and to make prudent decisions about products and candidates after carefully weighing the evidence. However, the data gathered in these studies suggested quite a different process. Individuals were found to derive information about the world in
a systematic but nonrational manner, typically by relying upon and accepting uncritically the interpretations of media messages. "Opinion leaders," usually respected members of groups in which individuals participated, were found to supply these interpretations by attaching meanings and connotations to "objective" information. It has been shown in previous discussion, however, that the role of opinion leader is not restricted to group co-members. Rather, this function may be also fulfilled by groups in which the individual is not a formal member (reference groups) and by individuals not personally known to the individual (reference persons).

The Structure of Political Organizations. Up to this point, organizations have been simply characterized as structures in which interaction is highly formalized and is formally goal oriented. Though adequate for many purposes, this preliminary definition does not completely depict the referent usually intended by the use of the term organization. By way of clarification, the term social group, is commonly used to denote structures in which recurrent, direct relationships exist among all members. Social groups, therefore, are theoretically limited in size by the requirement of direct relationships. By contrast, organizations are multi-group structures (Bertrand, 1972: 132-135; Bates and Harvey, 1975: 142-144). Thus, individuals in an organization are critically linked to one another by sets of indirect as well as direct relationships.
This distinction points to further key characteristics of organizations. Organizations typically reflect a well-developed division of labor, with the various sections devoted to the performance of specific tasks. Direct relationships among section leaders and other "staff" personnel provide co-ordination and indirect links to individual section members. Direct links join individuals within sections. The formalization of proceedings also translates the normatively specified interaction within the organization into relationships between positions and ranks rather than between individuals. For example, the relationship between a supervisor and a foreman or between a foreman and a worker in a given plant should be identical, irrespective of the individual supervisors, foremen, or workmen there encountered. Thus, as is the case with social systems in general, it is exactly because the behavior of these individuals is predictable by virtue of the positions they occupy that social organization can be said to exist (Bertrand, 1972: 3).

Applied to the problem at hand, political organizations are expected to be multi-group structures oriented most generally to the acquisition of power or the formal positions of power (Etzioni, 1975: 107). As indicated earlier, these organizations most often consist of political professionals, activists, and occasional workers in the various leadership, staff, and line (general membership) positions, and larger numbers of formally inert psychological identifiers. Central to this dissertation is the
notion that organizational participation and identification leads to types of political action, that is, there is something about the nature of the organizational variable which prompts certain kinds of political activity.

Burstein (1972) has argued that social networks in general may be ranked on a "voluntariness" continuum. This characteristic implies that membership in certain kinds of social networks tends to reflect varying degrees of voluntary action by those involved. Some networks, for example, are purely ascribed and are, therefore, completely involuntary. Thus, associations based upon one's age, sex, race, ethnicity, and so forth, involve statuses which are a matter of birth. Other networks are quasi-voluntary. These refer to the interplay between ascribed and achieved statuses, such as the type of education one obtains or the sets of relations one encounters. A third set refers more nearly to voluntary attributes, or the formal roles one plays, such as one's occupation, marital status, or participation in organizations. Finally, voluntary behaviors constitute the fourth category of choosing, to the extent possible, the circumstances of interaction.

According to this scheme, organizational participation is viewed as a voluntary type of action. There is at least one other consideration as well, namely, that some types of networks are more closely tied into--are more central to--the concentration of societal resources. Thus, from a structural point of view, one's degree of political
access is expected to be affected by two factors: (1) one's participation (or nonparticipation) in political organizational networks, and (2) assuming participation, the centrality of the political organization in which one is a member to key societal resources (Burstein, 1972: 1092-1095; Bierstedt, 1975: 237-240). As has been shown in this chapter, participation is likely to be correlated with social class and race. To the extent that the line of reasoning presented here is correct, the organizational factor stands as a critical variable in the emergence of kinds of political action.

Types of Political Organizations. Another useful strategy in explicating the structure of political organizations involves identifying political organizations within a spectrum, or typology, of organizations. The major purpose here is to focus upon the way in which political organizations may be viewed vis-a-vis other organizations and the way in which different varieties of political organizations themselves may be distinguished. A number of influential organizational theorists have advanced typologies potentially useful for these purposes.

Blau and Scott (1962: 43-57), for example, have suggested classifying organizations in terms of their primary beneficiaries. They have distinguished mutual benefit organizations (members are prime beneficiaries), business organizations (owners or directors are prime beneficiaries), service organizations (definite clientele is major beneficiary),
and commonwealth organizations (public at large is primary beneficiary). While interesting and useful in dealing with a wide range of organizations, this typology does not seem especially sensitive in distinguishing political organizations in which the interest here is focused.

A more useful conceptualization—the compliance thesis—has been advanced by Etzioni (1975). This typology begins with the notion that compliance with organizational directives is reducible to the relation in which one actor acquiesces to expectations of a superordinate actor. This relation is composed of: (1) the ability of the superordinate actor to elicit conformity to directives (power), and (2) the orientation of the subordinate actor to the power of the organization (involvement). This being the case, the nature of compliance may be plotted along these two dimensions.

Etzioni (1975: 3-19) argues that there are three basic kinds of power which might be employed in the organizational context. These power options reflect the types of sanctions which might be utilized in exercising social control over organizational participants. Coercive power rests in the application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions—food, creature comforts, beatings, or even death. Remunerative power is based upon control of material resources. Salaries, fringe benefits, fines, or termination of employment are appropriate illustrations of material sanctions. Finally, normative power refers to the manipulation
of symbolic resources, especially those of acceptance, prestige, and rejection. An organization may, and typically does, employ more than one type of power option. However, the organization usually relies most heavily upon one type of option at the expense of the other two. As Etzioni (1975: 6-8) has pointed out, it is difficult to simultaneously and effectively emphasize more than one power option since this tends to neutralize their respective effects.

Just as there are three modes of power, so also there are three main types of involvement, that is, the intensity and direction of the orientation of the subordinate actor to the organization. Alienative involvement refers to an intense, negative orientation, calculative involvement to a mild positive or negative orientation, and moral involvement to a highly positive orientation to the organization. Taken together—the power applied by the organization and the orientation of the actors to the organization—there are three major types of compliance modes. Generally, organizations with coercive power tend to have actors with alienative involvement (coercive compliance). Remunerative power is most often combined with calculative involvement (utilitarian compliance). Finally, normative power is most often found with moral involvement (normative compliance.)

Locating political organizations within this typology proves to be a worthwhile endeavor. To begin with, political organizations potentially may fall within any one of the three major compliance modes outlined above, depending upon
their style of organization and their goals. Etzioni (1975: 107-108) argues that the goals of the organization often give some clear indications of the compliance structure. Thus, a political organization which seeks to control or reallocate the means of coercion can be viewed as focusing upon problems of order. Revolutionary groups often stand as empirical examples. Here the compliance mode is most frequently coercive. On the other hand, economic goals, as sought by unions, local political "machines," and other political organizations, deal with the reallocation of goods and services and are most compatible with the utilitarian compliance structure. Finally, normative organizations usually pursue cultural goals. Examples include political organizations touting "good government" themes or advancing the cause of any one of a number of "-isms" as a central concern.

In this dissertation, the utilitarian and normative compliance modes are expected to be most useful in the analysis of political organizations in New Orleans. This distinction between the normative and utilitarian compliance structures is closely related to the "public- vs. private-regardingness" dichotomy of Wilson and Banfield (1964: 876-877). They use the term public-regardingness to refer to a value complex based in some conception of the "public interest" or the "common good," whereas the term private-regardingness taps the value complex centered in self-interest. Wilson and Banfield have found that certain
categories of individuals, as reflected in voting patterns by class and ethnicity, seem more predisposed toward one value complex over the other. Of critical importance here is their conclusion that the observed relationship holds only for those in a subculture clearly definable in ethnic or income terms (Wilson and Banfield, 1964: 884-885). The central argument in this chapter has focused upon the role of organizations in just such a circumstance.

A Proposed Model of Political Action

Political participation is the type of political action which is of greatest interest in this study. One may object that this category of political action implicates activity taking place solely within the normative confines of the existant socio-political system. More precisely, the concentration upon political participation appears to preclude consideration of revolutionary actions, resort to terrorist tactics, and the like. However, it is for this exact reason that the emphasis upon political participation is preferred. Simply stated, participation in the system is argued to be the modal category of political activity.

Specification of Theoretical Perspective. Previous discussion of the objective conditions of social differentiation and their subsequent conversion into categories of political action may suggest to some an interactional thesis focusing upon individuals' cognitive assessments of socio-political situations. In point of fact, a complete explanation of this conversion process may not be possible without
considerable attention directed towards this interactional dimension. For purposes of this study, however, the focus of the analysis is placed squarely upon distributions of characteristics and patterns of behavior without regard for the subjective definitions and perceptions of the individuals involved. This precondition is not meant to denigrate the importance of subjective dynamics intrinsic to all human behavior. However, such dynamics are neither here defined nor treated— they are simply accepted as "given" and are assumed to be operating.

The ecological approach is consistent with this strategy. This approach is based upon the premise that certain distinctive facets of areal units may provide major clues in accounting for particular patterns of observable behavior. This type of analysis permits the researcher to establish the likelihood that certain types of behavior will take place under a specified set of contextual circumstances. One might even argue that the range of viable behavioral and structural options available within any areal unit is distinctively interrelated with and delimited by its salient ecological (contextual) characteristics.

Heberle (1951: 210) has elaborated the logic of this approach in applying the perspective to the study of political behavior:

The sociologist. . . merely reverses the process of thinking which every politician uses in calculating his chances of winning an election. The political candidate knows approximately which social groups are his best potential supporters. . . in (each) area
of his election district; knowing this, (he) will attempt to predict in which of these areas he is likely to have a safe majority. . . . On the other hand, the social scientist knows the returns in an election precinct by precinct. . . . By taking the percentage of the total vote case in each area for each candidate and comparing it with the relative size of certain significant groups in each area, the sociologist can infer which groups gave the main support for the candidate or party.

An error often associated with this approach has been the designation of individual motives and individual behaviors on the basis of the observed aggregate characteristics (Robinson, 1950). As is clear from the debate stirred by Robinson's article, this point poses a problem mainly to the extent that one erroneously insists upon generalizing beyond the group data to individual activities. Proper use of the ecological approach on the other hand can provide a valuable perspective for investigating the problem under study, namely, determining the sets of objective class and racial characteristics and the organizational conditions in which certain types of political participation are likely to occur.

Specification of the Theoretical Model. The model developed in this discussion states that certain sources of social differentiation, in this case those of class and race, are said to receive salience and direction through an organizational factor, leading in turn to forms of political action. In any population, there are obviously a wide range of objective features which could conceivably be used to identify socially meaningful categories of
individuals. One could, for example, distinguish between individuals on the basis of parentage, shoe size, region of residence, height, occupation, or any other discernible factor. It is being argued here that the specification of which differences are worth noting occurs in the organizational structure of the community.

This model is depicted in figure 2. At the most general level (Level I), it stipulates that the potential features of social differentiation within a community provide aggregates of individuals to which emergent or existent organizations may orient themselves. These aggregates represent potential members and organizational identifiers who may be attracted through a collective appeal couched in terminology and issues relevant to the conditions of differentiation. Attempts by organizations to generate support through defining and publicizing such issues subsequently lead to the emergence of distinctive patterns of action by the various categories of differentiated individuals.

Translating these assertions into the more specific analytical categories of class and race (Level II), it is claimed that class and racial characteristics form the prime objective features of social differentiation. These class and racial characteristics, therefore, are expected to provide the themes and substance of the organizational structure found in the modern community. Insofar as the organizations are active and are guided by the special
FIGURE 2
PROPOSED MODEL OF POLITICAL ACTION

LEVEL I: General Categories

Potential Characteristics of Social Differentiation

Orientation of Community Organizations

Organizational Activity

Patterns of Action by Differentiated Categories

LEVEL II: Specific Categories

Distribution of Objective Class and Racial Characteristics

Class & Racially Based Community Organizations

Class & Racially Defined Organizational Activity

Patterns of Political Action by Class and Race Groups
interests of their respective population bases, distinctive forms of political action by class and race will be found to exist.

The model is not meant to imply that the objective distributions of class and race "cause" or in some other way induce the emergence of the organizational structure. No specific statements have been made in this chapter defining the etiology of such structures. The model simply assumes that, however an organization emerges or is structured, an important aspect of organizational maintenance is that of extending influence to appropriate categories of sympathetic nonmembers and of retaining the interest of current members. The proposal suggests, at this point, that aggregates of those sharing objective class or racial characteristics provide an especially convenient and potentially responsive target population for these tasks.

It should also be noted that the class or racial appeal of an organization may occur independently of any formally stated goals. It is by now well known that any social arrangement may engender a series of consequences beyond those intended, or in other ways vary from its subjectively perceived or designated design (Merton, 1968: 115). In other words, organizations may be wittingly and unwittingly doing a number of things, including purposely or inadvertently solidifying potential lines of social differentiation. Whatever the intention, an organizational factor is deemed necessary for the emergence of distinctive
patterns of political action.

This latter observation stands at the core of the model, namely, that objective categories of social differentiation here class and racial characteristics, do not in and of themselves lead to distinctive patterns of activity. From a social psychological point of view, such action is contingent upon the attachment of meaning to otherwise inert characteristics. From a structural perspective, forms of action emerge only in the presence of the organizational factor as an intervening variable in the transition from aggregates to conscious groups. Either by accident or by design, organizations stand between isolated, undifferentiated individuals and the larger socio-political context and, thereby, function as reference groups for both active members and psychological identifiers alike. In this process, the organizational structure of the community contains the appropriate mediating capacity to convert aggregates of individuals into politically active categories of individuals.

Footnotes

1 It should be noted that this passage employs "income" and "occupation" as empirical indicators of social class. This usage is worth noting because it represents a widely accepted procedure both in terms of how class is commonly perceived by American sociologists and in terms of how they have often attempted to measure it. The convention stems originally from the efforts of Lynd and Lynd (1929) to analyze "Middletown" within the framework of a two-class system composed of a business class and a working class. The attempted linkage with Marx's concept of class is obvious.
Dahrendorf's (1959) *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* represents the most definitive reformulation of Marx's theory of social class developed within the context of the dialectic.

Nisbet (1966: 180), for example, states, "The major controversy in the study of stratification... (is) the subtler and theoretically more fundamental one of social class versus social status: of a view of the new society resting upon the assumption of the erosion of class and its replacement by fluctuant, mobile, status groups and by status-seeking individuals.

Kahl (1953: 9) is among those sociologists who are not plagued by such doubts. For example, he states, "The degree to which people at a given stratification level... are explicitly aware of themselves as a distinctive social grouping is called their degree of class consciousness (Sartori, 1969: 98).

Although the patterns described in these early works have clearly undergone change, the extent and significance of that change are too many a matter of debate. Handlin, for example, summarizes the progress of blacks in the 1960's towards equality with the words "... Negroes have advanced far more in these ten years than any other comparable group in the past," while Clark counters with the following assessment (Davidson, 1972: 4):

> The homicide rate and delinquency rate in Negro ghettos... have not decreased... Negroes are still restricted to ghettos by income and white resistance... Unemployment and underemployment are high... The welfare system continues to reinforce family instability... The educational system of the ghetto has decayed even further...

The two terms--mass society and urban society--are not, however, completely interchangeable. Kornhauser (1959: 13-17), for example, has advanced the thesis that the state of mass society, an anomie conducive to numerous horrors, is not necessarily identical with nor limited to urban industrial society.

These assertions call into question the often espoused notion of the American "melting pot." This popular bit of folklore suggests that the American way represents a single, uniformly accepted culture comprising the blended contributions of any number of its constituent groups. In this spirit, former president Woodrow Wilson once observed: "America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of
himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American" (Handlin, 1963: 121).

8 Durkheim (1964: 28) argues, "A nation can be maintained only if, between the state and the individual, there is interrelated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life."

9 Merton (1968: 115) has admonishingly observed:

... scrutiny of current vocabularies of functional analysis (shows) how easily, and how unfortunately, the sociologist may identify motives with functions. It (is) further indicated that the motive and the function vary independently and that failure to register this fact in an established terminology has contributed to the unwitting tendency among sociologists to confuse the subjective categories of motivation and the objective categories of function.

10 The term was introduced by Hyman (1942) in analyzing the influence of certain groups upon a sample of students and their perceptions of their own status.

11 Dahrendorf (1959) provides an excellent analysis of the conditions conducive to the emergence of such structures.
CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Introduction

It has been theorized in the previous chapter that certain objective features of social differentiation are converted into modes of political action through an intervening organizational variable. In this chapter, the intent is to specify the considerations and procedures relevant to the testing of this basic proposition. As with much sociological research, the problem under investigation here does not lend itself to direct manipulation. For example, one cannot select subjects and randomly assign them to treatment groups to be exposed, in turn, to varying levels of class conditions or to increments of racial characteristics. This situation is hardly unique. Independent variables in which sociologists are typically interested are rarely amenable to true experimental manipulation, usually because it is either physically impossible or morally objectionable to do so.

This might not necessarily be regarded as a problem. However, there is a rather persistent theme in the methodological literature which suggests that true experimentation is the most desirable of research strategies.

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The implication is that other modes of analysis are to be only grudgingly employed. The main advantage attributed to the experimental method is the degree of control introduced in isolating the anticipated effects of independent variables upon the dependent variable. The randomization procedure itself serves to nullify the presence of some extraneous variables and the experimental manipulation of variables lends credence to the inference that observed effects are indeed attributable to specified variables.

These assertions are accepted here as essentially correct. It is also clear, however, that some procedure other than the experimental method must be used. The proposition under consideration may be subjected to an appropriate form of empirical testing through a strategy of comparative analysis. This strategy involves the comparison of the independent and dependent variables in a series of naturally occurring situations in order to assess the presence, consistency, and strength of the hypothesized relationships. An advantage of this strategy is that it provides a framework having some control features for pitting expectations against empirical evidence given the limitations of nonexperimental variables. It does, however, lack the precise control capabilities of the experimental method, chiefly because the effects of the independent variables take place prior to the study and, hence, are outside the realm of the direct control of the researcher. Thus, one can never really be certain that observed "effects"
are in fact the result of independent variables specified in the study. However, lack of complete confidence that a relationship is real should not preclude attempts at control and empirical testing. As Rosenberg (1965: 38) has correctly pointed out, science is built upon "degrees of confidence rather than certainty."

As specified in the previous chapter, the ecological perspective shall be used to direct the course of the proposed comparative analysis. Census publications constitute the most comprehensive and systematic compilations of data covering a variety of areal units from census tracts to entire states. Likewise, a good deal of aggregate information is available which taps the political activity patterns of areal units. These data have been recorded from the precinct to the state level in special reports of election returns and in the rolls of voter registration offices. These sources, especially when supplemented with survey data, contain a wealth of information appropriate for the comparisons of areal units intended in this study.

**Operationalization of Terms**

**Objective Class and Racial Characteristics.** The distributions of objective class and racial characteristics within selected areal units comprise the initial independent variables of interest. Objective class characteristics are measured in an index consisting of the following four indicators (Murray and Vedlitz, 1975: 4): (1)
percentage of adults in an areal unit who are high school graduates, (2) median family income per areal unit, (3) percentage of adults in the labor force who are employed in nonmanual occupations\(^2\) per areal unit, and (4) percentage of families in an areal unit who are classified as being above the poverty level.\(^3\) Possible score values for this index range in size from 0 to 100, with each indicator contributing a maximum of twenty-five points to the overall score (see section 1 of figure 3). The percentage measures are awarded one point for every four percentage units and one point is assigned for each one thousand dollars of family income up to a maximum of twenty-five points. The racial characteristics of an areal area are operationally defined as the percentage of residents who are nonwhite (see section 2 of figure 3).

These two main indicators—the class index and the percentage of residents who are nonwhite—may also be combined to form a single three dimensional measure of social differentiation. Howard, Long, and Zdrazil (1971: 45-47) have noted that in recent urban elections in the South, the black vote has been relatively consistent across class lines while the direction and variation of the white vote has fluctuated by class. On the basis of this observation, Howard and his associates suggest the use of a race/class variable consisting of black, lower white, and upper white dimensions. This can be accomplished by considering as black all areal units whose population exceeds fifty percent
### SUMMARY OF VARIABLES UNDER STUDY AND THEIR RESPECTIVE INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Empirical Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (1) Objective class characteristics | Objective class index, 100 possible points, with maximum of 25 points for each of the following:  
   (a) percentage of adults in areals unit who are high school graduates  
   (b) median family income for areal unit  
   (c) percentage of adults in areal unit who are employed in nonmanual occupations  
   (d) percentage of families in areal unit above poverty level |
| (2) Objective racial characteristics | Percentage of residents in areal unit who are nonwhite.                                                                                               |
| (3) Race/class                   | Race/class index, 3 point scale:  
   (a) black: areas in which more than 50% of residents are nonwhite  
   (b) lower white: areas in which less than 50% of residents are nonwhite and in which objective class index score is less than 59  
   (c) upper white: areas in which less than 50% of residents are nonwhite and in which objective class index is more than 59 |
| (4) Organizational composition   | Race/class designation, three classifications:  
   (a) black: majority of reported membership are blacks  
   (b) Lower white: majority of reported membership are whites and working class constituency is claimed  
   (c) upper white: majority of reported membership are white and middle or upper class constituency is claimed |
| (5) Organizational effectiveness | Organizational Effectiveness Indices based upon:  
   (a) ranking of organizations by organizational leaders |
FIGURE 3 - Continued

(b) ranking of organizations by
candidates for office
(c) composite ranking derived from
(a) and (b)

(6) Political
participation

Measured as three separate dimensions:

(a) registration: percentage of eligibles who are registered to vote
(b) turn out: percentage of those registered who vote
(c) candidate choice: percentage who vote for each candidate

nonwhite, and by classifying the remaining units as upper white if falling in the top one-third of the class index distribution, lower white if in the bottom two-thirds of this distribution (see section 3 of figure 3).

A main advantage of this typology is that it is sensitive to important shifts and trends in the composition of a community's political coalitions. For example, one can easily identify and trace four logical coalition outcomes: (1) blacks and lower whites versus upper whites (populist coalition), (2) blacks and upper whites versus lower whites (moderation-paternalism coalition), (3) upper and lower whites versus blacks (segregation-white supremacy coalition), and (4) no pattern, instances in which the three groups split their support for three different candidates or issues (Howard, Long and Zdrazil, 1971: 52). All three indicators, namely, the class index, the
percentage of residents who are nonwhite, and the three-dimensional race/class index, will be employed in subsequent analysis.

**Political Organizational Structure of the Community.**

The initial question to be confronted here is that of specifying how a community's political organizations can be adequately identified. The hierarchy of organizations for the purposes of this study is defined as comprising those which can be shown to have been active in the elections under consideration. Activity is said to have taken place if (1) it can be shown that the political organization solicited electoral support either for itself or a political candidate by contacting potential voters, by producing campaign propaganda, or by financing or otherwise backing such efforts, or (2) it is known to a reference person, candidate for office, or leader of a "rival" organization that electoral involvement took place. Two basic dimensions of a community's political organizational structure are argued to be of special significance, namely, organizational composition and organizational effectiveness. The first deals with the composition of organizational membership and nonmember constituencies, and the second with perceived organizational effectiveness.

Organizational composition is indicated by the proportions of members by race and class as claimed by organizational leaders. The nonmember constituencies are assessed by noting the target populations claimed by
organizational leaders (see section 4 of figure 3). It is admitted that such claims are no guarantee that actual ties exist between organization and nonmember. However, the claim would seem at least to indicate categories of nonmembers to which the organization consciously directs its appeals. Finally, the organizational leaders are asked to specify the areal units of residence from which these members and nonmembers are drawn. At first glance, this may seem to constitute an unrealistic request. However, it is assumed at this point that organizational leaders are able to specify quite readily within which precincts or areas organizational strengths lie.

The effectiveness of political organizations is ascertained from ratings supplied by two independent sources. First, the leaders of the organizations themselves are asked to rank the community's political organizations in terms of their perceived ability to exert an influence upon the outcome of elections. Secondly, candidates for office in selected elections are asked to perform the same task. Both are requested to indicate the areal units in which the organizations are thought to be effective. The two rankings are then used to compile a composite rating or organizational effectiveness (see section 5 of figure 3).

Political Participation. Participation in the established political system may include a variety of acts reflecting degrees of involvement in or commitment to the system. Milbrath (1965: 18-22), for example, has
distinguished four major categories of activity ranging from gladitorial activities (being an active party member, soliciting campaign funds, being a candidate for office, etc.), to transitional activities (making monetary contributions, attending political events, etc.), to spectator activities (exposing oneself to political stimuli, voting, engaging in political discussions, etc.). Apathetics comprise the fourth category. From this perspective, voting represents a minimal amount of engagement in the political process. However, from another point of view, voting stands as the modal type of participation in which the bulk of the populace has actually partaken. The percentage of those who turn out to vote in this country is small when contrasted with the pool of those eligible to vote, but not when compared with the proportions involved in the higher levels of political participation specified by Milbrath.

The operationalization of political participation is centered around aspects of voting. Three empirical indicators are employed: (1) the percentage of eligible individuals within a given areal unit who are registered to vote, (2) the percentage of those registered per areal unit who voted in specific elections, and (3) the percentages of votes cast per areal unit for various candidates (see section 6 of figure 3). What is being argued in this case is that voting as a form of political participation begins with formally qualifying oneself by complying with registration requirements and procedures. Areas where
larger proportions of individuals take this step are regarded as exhibiting higher degrees of political participation than those with lower levels of registration. The relative size of the voter turn out is the second level of this participation process for areal units, with actual candidate choice constituting an indication of the apparent purpose intended by given categories of individuals.

Statement of Hypotheses

The basic propositions to be tested in this dissertation may be stated in question form as follows:

(1) do levels of voter registration, voter turn out, and candidate choice increase in areal units with higher objective class indices and larger proportions of white residents?

(2) are the varieties of organizational composition related to areal class index and racial composition?

(3) does organizational effectiveness vary by areal class index and racial composition?

(4) are levels of political participation consistent across varieties of organizational composition and degrees of organizational effectiveness in these areal units?

The anticipated answer to the first three of these questions is "yes." The fourth is expected to be answered negatively.

Turning to the first question, a wide range of research has established the relationship of class and racial characteristics with levels of political participation. The average voter has been shown to be "unyoung, unblack, middle income, middle educated, and middle class" (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1972: 45-58). Cast in terms of rates of participation, those with higher incomes, higher educational
levels, and employment in managerial, professional or other white collar occupations have been found to be more involved politically than those ranking lower on these scales. Further, it has been shown that whites have been much more likely to participate politically than have blacks (Lipset, 1963: 185-189). The hypotheses suggested by these data and previous discussion are:

(1) Areal units with higher objective class indices will have higher percentages of individuals registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity in candidate choice than areal units with lower class index scores.

(2) Areal units with larger proportions of nonwhite residents will have lower percentages of individuals registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity in candidate choice than areal units with smaller proportions of nonwhites.

Previous research likewise illustrates the close relationship of class and race with organizational participation. The national surveys of Wright and Hyman (1958) as well as the cross-national studies summarized by Almond and Verba (1965) indicate the persistent tendency among those of higher objective class rank to become more actively engaged in the organizational structure. In a similar vein, whites have been found to participate more actively in organizational life than have blacks (Wright and Hyman, 1958; Lipset, 1963: 185), although there is some evidence that the relative level of organizational participation of blacks vis-a-vis whites has been slightly underestimated (Babchuck and Thompson, 1962: 647-649). Therefore, it is expected that organizational composition
shall be primarily a reflection of the distribution of class and racial characteristics in various areas. Formally stated:

(3) Areas with higher proportions of whites and higher class index scores will have greater representation in the political organizational structure than areas with lower proportions and scores respectively.

Participation in organizations is only one aspect of the interest here in the organizational dimension. Of great concern also is the effectiveness of the various organizations in exerting influence upon the course of political events in the community. As stated earlier, the pluralistic conception of the organizational structure has been that organizations represent a wide range of special interests and that each works to advance its own interests within the constraints of a spirit of democratic competition (Rose, 1967: 55-58; Truman, 1968: 134). Elitists, however, emphasize that the influence of organizations is closely allied with power bases, an important one of which is the class structure itself (Schattschneider, 1960: 35-42; Parenti, 1970: 259-263). They suggest that the resources which organizations might bring to bear in conducting day-to-day affairs vary considerably. Although there are a number of ways in which organizational resources might be enhanced, organizations of higher class composition are argued to have greater access to structural controls naturally appropriate to such increases. The theoretical bias in the dissertation for the elitist position has already been expressed.
One of the ways in which a political organization might be considered as influential is in terms of the electoral support it is able to marshall. This could ostensibly cover a wide range of activities including raising funds, establishing ready pools of volunteer workers, staging political rallies, formulating campaign propaganda and strategy, supplying poll watchers, and so forth. In this study, organizational effectiveness as alleged by rival organizational leaders and candidates for office will be assessed by the levels of political participation found within the areal limits of organizational activity. Insofar as an organization is able to perform effectively as a mediator and reference group for its corresponding target population of members and identifying nonmembers, it is expected to increase political participation within recognizable areal units.

These relationships involving organizational effectiveness are stated as follows:

(4) Areal units with higher objective class indices and larger proportions of white residents will have higher organizational effectiveness ratings than areal units with lower class indices and smaller proportions of whites.

(5) Areal units with higher organizational effectiveness ratings will have higher percentages of individuals registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity in candidate choice than areal units with lower organizational effectiveness ratings.

Figure 4 contains a summarization of the basic relationships contained within the five formalized hypotheses. Areal units which are classified as upper white are expected
FIGURE 4

SUMMARY OF EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS AS EXPRESSED IN THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

I. Race/Class Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Effectiveness</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Lower White</th>
<th>Upper White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A(^a)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expectation: \(C > B > A\)

II. Race/Class Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Effectiveness</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Lower White</th>
<th>Upper White</th>
<th>Organizational Effectiveness - Row Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High(^b)</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>DEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class Index-Column Effects</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>CF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expectations:  
1. \(CF > BE > AD\)  
2. \(ABC > DEF\)  
3. \(A > D, B > E, and C > F\)

\(^a\) All cell entries represent anticipated level of organizational effectiveness.

\(^b\) Organizational effectiveness variable dichotomized into "High" and "Low" for this presentation.

\(^c\) All cell entries represent anticipated levels of political participation.
to have the highest levels of organizational effectiveness, while lower rates are expected in lower white and in black areas. Further, it is anticipated that observed levels of political participation will increase as one moves across the race/class index as applied to areal units. Specifically, the highest rates of political participation are expected in areal units predominated by upper whites, while successively lower rates of participation are anticipated among lower white and black areas respectively. Should the distribution of race/class characteristics fail to be a factor in affecting levels of organizational effectiveness or political participation, there will be no differences among the column effects indicated in section I and II of the table.

However, the anticipated effect of race/class upon political participation is not thought to be consistent across levels of organizational effectiveness. Areas where organizational effectiveness is said to be high are expected to exhibit higher levels of political participation than areal units where organizational effectiveness is low, regardless of whether the area be black, lower white, or upper white. What is being argued is that organizational effectiveness stands as an intervening variable between distributions of objective race/class features and categories of political action by race and class. Should organizational effectiveness exert no significant influence upon political participation levels across race/class categories, there will
be no difference between the row effects indicated in section II of the table.

Sources of Data

The Setting. Partly by design and partly by circumstance, the study involves an analysis of recent local elections in Orleans Parish. There are, first of all, good theoretical reasons for dealing with local politics using Orleans Parish as a case study. As stipulated in the introductory chapter, the American political system is highly decentralized (Dye and Zeigler, 1972: 199-200). Consequently, attempts to define its structure and analyze its processes require full and thorough treatment at the local level (Riker, 1959: 11-12). Furthermore, it has been suggested that political decisions most immediately affecting everyday life take place locally. Hence, local issues are often hotly contested in a manner which gives flesh to potential cleavages otherwise dormant in state and national elections. On the other hand, Orleans Parish, comprising essentially the city of New Orleans, happens to be a readily accessible area containing features suitable for examining the problem under study. The city's cultural and historical heritage marks the confluence of French and Spanish traditions with those of the Old and New South producing, it is argued, a basic politics of class and race.

The most current and comprehensive sources of data relevant to the present study may be found in the following items:
(1) selected 1970 publications released by the United States Bureau of the Census (1972),

(2) the registration rolls of the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters,

(3) voting returns compiled by the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee (1973) and the Office of the Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana (1972, 1974).

These materials contain detailed information concerning the city's social, racial, economic, and political characteristics commensurate with the purposes of this study. Of equal importance, these data are presented in forms amenable to the analysis of New Orleans by specific areal units.

The census data, for example, are available by census tracts. Such tracts constitute the units into which metropolitan areas have been divided for statistical purposes by the Bureau of the Census in co-operation with local committees. As a rule of thumb, tracts generally contain an average of approximately 4,000 residents and are drawn in such a way to comprise relatively homogeneous units. Data enumerated by tracts which are of particular relevance here include population size by age and race, income characteristics for individuals and families, schooling and educational attainment levels for adults, and detailed occupation and employment classifications.

The political divisions within New Orleans are defined in terms of the city's seventeen wards and their respective subdivisions, the precincts. Vital political information available for these political units include
voter registration figures, voter turn out levels, and the compilations of the vote for each candidate in selected elections. Fortunately, comparison of wards, precincts, and census tracts is possible in the case of New Orleans since the boundaries of each of these divisions, while not perfectly coterminous, do nonetheless permit matching without gross distortions. Therefore, although wards are much larger in size than any given census tract, a number of tracts may be combined to indicate significant ward characteristics indirectly through census materials. Likewise, precincts are generally smaller than census tracts but can be combined in order to supply the political data for any given tract. The rationale behind the matching of census tracts with political divisions, therefore, is the hope of producing areal units which are well-defined in terms of both ecological and political characteristics. A map containing the matching of census tract and political ward boundaries is presented in appendix 1.

However, the matching of tracts and precincts seems to be the more desirable of the two strategies. Such a grouping will yield fairly small and relatively homogeneous units. This would not be the case with the larger, more compositionally diverse wards. With this purpose in mind then, one hundred and sixty-three census tracts and four hundred twenty-three precincts were subjected to initial examination. Several highly irregular tracts comprising warehouse districts and industrial zones were eliminated
from consideration. Further, several emergent tracts with extremely small populations were combined with appropriate adjacent tracts of the more usual size. Finally, in a small number of instances, two or three tracts were combined into single areal units in order to achieve a more harmonious fit of precinct and tract boundaries. A final tally of four hundred nineteen precincts were combined with one hundred thirty-one census tract units. A listing of these matched tracts and precincts is presented in appendix 2. It is these matched tracts and precincts which constitute the areal units of New Orleans for the purposes of this study.

The Elections. Earlier in this chapter, political participation was said to comprise voter registration, voter turn out, and candidate choice in specified areal units. These indicators may be concretely measured only within the framework of specific elections. Two basic considerations are invoked in choosing these elections, namely, the time frame of the election and, two, the visibility of the election. Concerning the issue of when selected elections took place, "recent" elections are preferred since interviews with organizational leaders and candidates for office are planned as a supplement to census materials and precinct returns. Asking respondents to recall details concerning organizational activity and effectiveness from elections too distant in the past runs greater
risk of inaccurate or incomplete responses due to understandable lapses of memory.

On the other hand, the time element must be balanced with considerations for the number and qualities of local elections available for such analysis over recent time spans. Elections included in the study should involve races for a variety of vital local offices and comprise broad based interests found engaging by organizations from a cross-section of the community. This strategy is not meant as a systematic sample of available elections but rather concentrates upon selecting out types of elections which relevant forms of organizational activity are expected, and, hopefully, cleavages among organizations are exposed. In this vein, special attention is directed towards those elections which forced run-offs and, hence, organizational realignments for the second election. Further, contests featuring black and white candidates for office or candidates having clearly defined class ties are given greater consideration.

Following these guidelines, eleven elections have been selected for consideration in this study. A summary of these elections is presented in figure 5. The first two elections are the First (August 19, 1972) and Second (September 30, 1972) Democratic Primaries for the position of Supreme Court Justice, First District, State of Louisiana. This election was somewhat unusual since it featured races for two associate justice positions which had become available simultaneously through retirements
## FIGURE 5

**SUMMARY OF ELEVEN RECENT NEW ORLEANS ELECTIONS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position Contested</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>(1) Supreme Court Justice, First District, a State of Louisiana, First Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Revius O. Ortique, Jr. William V. Redmann Leon Sarpy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Supreme Court Justice, Second Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Leon Sarpy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>(3) District Attorney, Orleans Parish, First Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Harry Connick Jim Garrison George W. Reese Ross T. Scaccia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) District Attorney, Second Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Harry Connick Jim Garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Civil Sheriff, Orleans Parish, First Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Johnny Jackson, Sr. Alvin J. Sargent Milton A. Stire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Clerk of Criminal Court, Orleans Parish, First Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Herman J. Bustemente Daniel B. Haggerty Edwin A. Lombard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7) Clerk of Criminal Court, Second Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Daniel B. Haggerty Edwin A. Lombard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9) Supreme Court Justice, Second Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Alwynn J. Cronvich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10) Judge, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, First Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Peter H. Beer Joseph R. Bossetta Dominic C. Grieshaber George W. Reese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11) Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Democratic Primary</td>
<td>Peter H. Beer Joseph H. Bossetta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*First District is comprised of Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes.*
prior to their scheduled expiration dates. One seat carried a term expiring December 31, 1980, and the second seat was due to expire on December 31, 1974. The race for the latter position is included in the study for three reasons. One, the 1974 expiration date allows for a comparison two years hence of an election involving an extremely important judgeship position. Two, the candidates for that position, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Revius O. Ortique, Jr., William V. Redmann, and Leon Sarpy, are individuals whose origins and categories of potential support cover the range of class distinctions in New Orleans. Calogero and Redmann, for example, both claim ties with the working class and organized labor while Sarpy's memberships in the Krewe of Rex and the Boston Club attest to his upper class status. The racial issue is also a factor in this election. Ortique is one of the city's better known black lawyers. Two, the failure of any of the four candidates to carry a majority of the votes in the first primary forced a run-off election between Calogero and Sarpy, thereby presenting an interesting situation for analyzing votes in these two elections by class and race.

A total of five elections are selected for analysis from the 1973 First and Second Democratic Primaries held on the tenth of November and the fifteenth of December respectively. The race for Orleans Parish District Attorney pitted challengers Harry Connick, George W. Reese, and Ross T. Scaccia against controversial incumbent Jim Garrison.
The highly visible campaign marked Connick's second attempt to unseat Garrison and the race was further intensified by the complex of "law and order" issues with its attached racial overtones. The second primary featured a run-off between Connick and Garrison.

The Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race was also drawn from the 1973 Democratic primaries. This contest found long-time incumbent and old-style politician Milton A. Stire faced by two black candidates, Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr., a well known pastor and community leader, and the lesser known Alvin J. Sargent. Stire won the election without a run-off. The election is of interest here in terms of the distribution of both Stire's support and those of the respective black candidates. The final two elections from 1973 involve the race for the position of Clerk of Criminal Court (Orleans Parish). Daniel B. Haggerty, like Stire an incumbent of long standing and a politician of the old school, was challenged by Edwin A. Lombard and Herman J. Bustemente. It was generally felt within the city's political circles that Lombard, a respected and articulate lawyer, had a good chance of becoming the first black to win a city-wide elective office since Reconstruction. Bustemente was not regarded as a serious candidate. This speculation proved to be essentially correct. Bustemente polled less than six percent of the vote in the first primary and a second primary was necessary to settle the issue between Haggerty and Lombard.
The 1974 Democratic primaries were held on August seventeenth and September twenty-eighth. The first two elections of interest involved the second run in two years for the Supreme Court Justice seated vacated by retirement. Pascal Calogero, who had successfully sought the position in 1972, now faced challenges from Jim Garrison, recovering from his defeat by Connick in the 1973 District Attorney's race, and Alwynn J. Cronvich, Criminal Sheriff of Jefferson Parish and self-styled "law and order" candidate. This race obviously invites comparisons with the same election of 1972. It also proved to be one of the more heated and less dignified campaigns in recent years. A second primary was necessary to decide this election as well.

The final two elections are drawn from the race for Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a position also made available by retirement and carrying an expiration date of December 31, 1983. The four contestants were City Councilman Peter H. Beer, Municipal Judge Joseph R. Bossetta, Civil Court Judge Dominic C. Grieshaber, and lawyer George W. Reese, also a candidate in the 1973 District Attorney race. Beer, who was viewed as representing "uptown New Orleans" on the City Council, promised an open campaign in which no money would be paid by him for organizational endorsements and support. On the other hand, Bossetta, a George Wallace elector in 1968 who reportedly "softened" since that time, actively sought the
involvement and support of political organizations. The appropriate role of the city's political organizations thus became somewhat of an open campaign issue through both the first and second primaries of this race.

With the selection of these elections, it is now possible to apply the operationalization instructions to the indicators of political participation. Turning first to the problem of voter registration levels, it is noted that the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters Office compiles the numbers of those registered to vote by precinct and by ward on a monthly basis. State regulations concerning voter eligibility require that an individual be registered at least thirty days prior to an election before being allowed to participate. Conversations with personnel at the Registrar of Voters Office reveal that the number of persons registering between first and second primaries in any given year is negligible. Therefore, the decision was made to determine registration levels on the basis of the rolls as established one month prior to the first primary of each of the elections involved, that is, July of 1972, October of 1973, and July of 1974, respectively.

The registration rolls for these months provide the absolute numbers of those registered to vote. In raw form, these numbers are not useful due to variations in the sizes of the base populations by area and year of all those eligible to register. Further, no estimates of the percentages registered from the pool of all those eligible to
register are attempted by the Registrar of Voters Office. These percentages, however, may be crudely estimated from census data associated with the previously defined areal units. As the minimum age for registration is eighteen years and the most recent census data available are for the year 1970, the pool of those eligible to vote per areal unit is defined as the absolute number of individuals sixteen years of age and older per areal unit for the 1972 estimate, fifteen years of age and older for the 1973 estimate, and fourteen years of age and older for the 1974 estimate.6 The level of voter registration for each areal unit then is computed by dividing the actual number registered in an area by the estimate of the total number eligible to register. A summary of these procedures is presented in figure 6.

The registration information also provides some basis for standardizing the measurement of voter turn out in the various elections. The compilation of the ballots cast in each precinct and ward are available through the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee for all elections except those dealing with the Supreme Court Justice seat. Data for the 1972 and 1974 versions of this race are, however, obtainable through the Louisiana Secretary of State's office. The basic procedure involves combining these voting returns by precinct to match the appropriate tracts. Voter turn out per areal unit is computed by dividing the total number of votes cast in an area
FIGURE 6
MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicator of Participation</th>
<th>Operational Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent registered per areal unit, 1972</td>
<td>Total number of persons per areal unit registered in July 1972 divided by total number of persons 16 years of age and older enumerated in census per areal unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Registra-</td>
<td>Percent registered per areal unit, 1973</td>
<td>Total number of persons per areal unit registered in October 1973 divided by total number of persons 15 years of age and older per areal unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent registered per areal unit, 1974</td>
<td>Total number of persons per areal unit registered in July 1974 divided by total number of persons 14 years of age and older per areal unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Turn out</td>
<td>Percent turn out (computed for each election)</td>
<td>Total number of votes cast per areal unit divided by the total number of persons registered per areal unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Candidate Choice</td>
<td>Percentage of votes cast for candidate (computed for each candidate)</td>
<td>Total number of votes cast for a candidate per areal unit divided by the total number of votes cast for all candidates per areal unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by the corresponding number of individuals registered to vote. Measures of candidate support are assessed by dividing the number of votes cast for each candidate per areal unit by the total number of votes for that area. These latter procedures are likewise specified in figure 6.

The Organizations. The identification of relevant political organizations and the subsequent collection of pertinent data are more problematic here than was the gathering of information for areal units discussed in the previous section. Preestablished lists of such organizations and compilations of their characteristics relevant to the purposes of this study do not exist. Therefore, some systematic procedure must be instituted: (1) to identify the population of political organizations operating in New Orleans during specified elections, and (2) to formulate an appropriate questionnaire and schedule of interviews by which their activities and influences can be assessed.

A preliminary review of New Orleans's major newspapers was conducted as a means of generating a list of the city's active political organizations. The newspapers consulted include the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the daily morning newspaper and the paper with the city's largest circulation, the New Orleans States-Item, the daily evening newspaper, The Louisiana Weekly, a weekly newspaper expressly oriented toward the black community, and finally two weekly newspapers of popular local readership, Courier and Figaro.
This effort yielded a list of organizations indicated as active in news articles or shown to be active by the publication of advertisements or endorsements in these newspapers. The basic list was expanded and further annotated through initial interviews with several reference persons. These two steps produced a list of fifty-two organizations (see appendix 3).

The initial interviews pointed to the operation of a rather interesting phenomenon. It was indicated that literally hundreds of political organizations tend to emerge during (recent) elections in New Orleans. Some of these organizations appear to be formed to represent special issue or neighborhood interests, either by attracting candidate attention or by actively supporting a favored candidate. Many, however, seem to be simply instituted by individuals offering to "work" selected areas in behalf of given candidates if supplied with sufficient funds to cover campaign expenses. This suggests that elections constitute a highly competitive and serious "game," that is, they comprise instances of organizational struggles for various social, political, and/or economic rewards. Many of these political organizations defined as active "close shop" and cease to exist between elections. A further number do not survive more than one or so elections. The basic point is that the population of active political organizations varies depending upon how one wishes to specify limitations in terms of size, purpose, and duration.
The decision was made at this point to stay with the original guideline in constructing the population of organizations, that is, a list of those political organizations known to be active during the time frame under study are included regardless of size, purpose, and so forth. Realistically, however, resource limitations preclude the study of all known active political organizations in New Orleans. The more salient question, therefore, involves how these organizations to be studied shall be selected. The preference here is to single out for analysis the "major" organizations rather than drawing a probability sample of organizations for study. The justification is perhaps too simple: if organizations are indeed mediators as predicted, then the capacity is expected present at the very least among the major political organizations. Given this purpose, the list is thought certainly to contain the major political organizations operating in New Orleans during the elections being considered.

The basic list of political organizations with which interviews are attempted is presented in figure 7. These political organizations are those judged most active and/or influential on the basis of newspaper reviews and initial reference interviews. They represent a wide range of interests in the community, including, hopefully, those of class and race. By and large, they are organizations which seem to maintain at least a modicum of formal operations between elections and are those which have survived the elections under study.
FIGURE 7

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS
SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Organization Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alliance for Good Government (AGG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Association of Independent Democrats (AID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Criminal Courts Bar Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Independent Women's Organization (IWO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>League of Women Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mid-City Democrats (MCD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>New Orleans Bar Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>New Orleans Coalition (NOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>New Orleans Young Democrats (NOYD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD)</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Uptown Democratic Association (UDA)</td>
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A second set of problems involves the procedure for obtaining the desired organizational data. The interviewing of a designated leader from each of the organizations was selected as the most feasible strategy for obtaining this information. This strategy is not without its shortcomings, principally that the revelation of each organization's characteristics by an actual member is entrusted to a single interview. The problem here is not so much that one suspects the falsification of information but it is the potential variability among organizational members' perceptions of what an organization actually does and/or seeks to do which is worrisome. On the other hand, a ranking leader within an organization may be more readily aware of a wide range of organizational characteristics and be more directly involved in the sorts of considerations and happenings which guide organizational activity. Further, this strategy restricts the number of resultant interviews to a limit within the logistics of a single interviewer.

The candidates seeking office in the specified elections constitute another important source of information concerning organizations. Unlike the data derived from interviews with organizational leaders, this information is more likely to be "reputational" in nature. However, if the hypotheses guiding the research are correct, these candidates for office are in a position to divulge unique observations about local organizational activity. Not only are such individuals expected to be intimately
acquainted with the New Orleans political scene, but also many of them will have been directly affected by such activity. By interviewing both successful and defeated candidates alike, it may be possible to construct some balanced assessments of the organizations and their activities from this perspective. The views of the candidates may likewise serve to counter some excesses reported by organizational leaders. The intention here, therefore, is to interview at least the major candidates in all eleven elections.

The questionnaire designed for interviewing organizational leaders is presented in appendix 4. An earlier version of the questionnaire was pretested in interviews with three organizationally affiliated individuals. Alterations and improvements suggested by the pretest are incorporated into the present questionnaire. As it now stands, the questionnaire takes from forty to forty-five minutes to administer, although it can easily run to an hour if the respondent is encouraged to give more extensive elaborations. Specified clusters of items within the questionnaire are intended to ascertain the following information:

1. the basic structure of the organization (items 1 - 7, 18 - 21)
2. the organizational affiliations and occupational ties of organizational leaders (items 23 - 32)
3. the composition of organizational membership (items 5 - 15)
(4) specification of organizational membership by areal units (items 8 - 10)

(5) target groups of non-members to which organization orients itself (items 16, 52, 53)

(6) specification of target groups by areal units (items 17, 56)

(7) the process by which candidates were endorsed in elections under consideration (items 33 - 51, 54)

(8) types of campaign activities performed (items 55, 58)

(9) sources of organizational revenue (items 59, 60)

(10) ratings of the city's political organizations (items 61 - 64)

(11) specification of organizational influence by areal units (item 61a)

A second questionnaire was prepared for the interviewing of candidates who sought office in the elections under consideration. The solicitation of information from the candidates is necessarily oriented toward the types of observations and evaluations made as candidates. This questionnaire addresses the following issues:

(1) motivation for seeking office (item 1)

(2) conception of the "average" voter in New Orleans (items 2, 3)

(3) assessment of the role of political organizations in the election(s) in which the candidate participated (items 4, 5)

(4) specification of organizational influence in candidate's election(s) by areal unit (item 6)

(5) ratings of the city's political organizations (items 6 - 9)

(6) specification of organizational influence by areal unit (item 6a)
The brevity of this questionnaire results from a conscious effort to limit its length. Simply, it was felt that obtaining appointments with the candidates might be facilitated if the amount of time requested for an interview were reduced in this case to twenty to twenty-five minutes.

Footnotes

1The rationale for the comparative approach is well expressed by Durkheim (1966: 125): "We have only one way to demonstrate that a given phenomenon is the cause of another, viz., to compare the cases in which they are simultaneously present or absent, to see if the variations they present in these different combinations indicate that one depends on the other. When they can be artificially produced at the will of the observer, the method is that of [the] experiment. . . When, on the contrary, the production of facts is not within our control and we can only bring them together in the way that they have been spontaneously produced, the method employed is that of indirect experiment, or the comparative method."

2Nonmanual is here defined as including those employed in the following occupational categories: (a) professional, technical, and kindred workers, (b) managers and administrators (except farm), and (c) nonretail sales workers (retail sales workers specifically excluded).

3Families classified as falling below the poverty level are those earning less than $4,000 per year.

4A reference person is defined as an individual considered by the researcher to possess particular knowledge about the New Orleans political scene. Where utilized, such persons will be identified in footnotes.

5The comparison of areal units in this study involves an entire population as derived from census and precinct data. Descriptive techniques, including those of correlation and regression, shall be used in evaluating these data. Analysis of variance, an inferential statistic, shall also be used. In this case, the statistic indicates more correctly the probability that differences of the observed magnitude would occur by chance alone given a hypothetical set of like circumstances. Technically, the parameters are observed rather than estimated.
This procedure admittedly involves undetermined amounts of error. For example, the procedure tacitly assumes that death and migration rates by areal unit are relatively constant—an improbable assumption. However, in the absence of further alternatives, this strategy is argued acceptable for generating at least crude estimates needed for the comparisons indicated.

Mr. James Chubbuck, Institute of Politics, Loyola University, New Orleans; Mr. Joe Walker, Walker Associates (a local polling research firm); and Mr. Freddie Warren, prominent black lawyer and former assistant district attorney.
CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

Chapters four and five contain a presentation and analysis of ecological/survey data collected in accordance with the design of the study. As indicated in the previous chapter, an assessment of the organizational factor is complicated by a variety of problems, including the ex post facto character of the study, the indirect nature of the "influence" variable, resource limitations, and so forth. Nonetheless, it is felt that a considerable amount of interesting and usable evidence has been generated which allows for an appropriate testing of the research problem.

According to the plan specified in the previous chapter, interviews were attempted with the leaders of twenty-five local political organizations. Organizational leaders were questioned about both their own and other political organizations. Additionally, candidates for office in selected elections were interviewed about the operation of political organizations for the elections in which they participated.
Four organizations—the League of Women Voters, the Criminal Courts Bar Association, the New Orleans Bar Association, and the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee—were found to depart somewhat from the criteria established for inclusion in the study. For example, by-laws of the League prohibit that organization from endorsing candidates or dispensing partisan campaign information. The two bar associations were found to be "politically active" only in the sense that the preferences of the membership, as indicated by a straw vote, are made public in judicial races. Their charters likewise forbid further action or formal dissemination of information during campaigns. Finally, the Orleans Parish Executive Committee was found to be solely an administrative body instituted primarily to referee electoral proceedings and to oversee the proper and accurate recording, tallying, and publication of voting returns.

A brief synopsis of the remaining twenty-one organizations, and the outcome of a contact with each is summarized below. There are two purposes in presenting these initial summaries. First, they provide a working, descriptive account of the political organizational structure of New Orleans. Such information is plainly of historical interest and can be appreciated solely at the descriptive level. It further stands as a basis for comparison with other works dealing with the New Orleans political scene. Secondly, the summaries allow for a brief
but systematic format to acquaint the reader with the empirical evidence upon which later generalizations and characterizations of the organizations are based. In keeping with the promise of confidentiality, information is reported in grouped or anonymous form. Appendix 5 contains a list of those persons with whom interviews were conducted.

### Descriptive Summaries

**Alliance for Good Government (AGG).** The Alliance was founded in 1967 as an organization officially devoted to "the principles of good government" and "the elimination of corruption." It was expressly meant to be a politically-oriented organization which would openly endorse and support candidates "committed to reform." In addition, it intended "to encourage high ethical standards of conduct" among politicians by instituting an annual award for the legislator from the New Orleans area who best exemplified such standards. Literature published by the Alliance stresses the independence of the organization from vested political ties and emphasizes the personal qualities of their preferred candidates, especially those of "honesty and integrity."

The membership of the Alliance is reported to be composed primarily of white, well-educated, young professionals and businessmen. The handful of blacks who have joined the group are likewise described as well-heeled.
Membership strengths and organizational influence are said to be concentrated in the "middle and upper-middle class" sections of Uptown, Gentilly, and New Orleans East. This particular composition is most likely attributable to the organization's preoccupation with the "good government" theme, rather than the result of any restrictions delimiting membership. This view is expressed in the words of a leader from a rival organization: "Political reform is a middle class luxury."

The endorsements made by the Alliance reflect its reformist concerns. The group has on occasion supported black candidates over white opponents, the most recent example being their choice of Edwin Lombard over Daniel Haggerty in their 1973 race (considered in this study.) A nonpartisan orientation towards reform is claimed by virtue of their endorsement of Republican David Treen over Democrat Charles Grisbaum in the 1974 Congressional election.

The Alliance does accept money from candidates to help pay the costs of advertising endorsements. Their efforts to keep these transactions open and above suspicion may be further evidence of the reformist impulse. Several candidates, for example, revealed that the Alliance provided them with itemized tabs indicating how campaign money was spent and, in at least one instance, they returned money left over from the campaign to the candidate. Apparently, such bookkeeping and scruples are rare, according to the reimbursed candidate.
The Alliance is generally well-regarded by other organizational leaders and candidates alike. It is typically described by them as "honest" and "forthright." However, the matter of the organization's influence is another question. The consensus is that its endorsements and support are "nice to have," but that their actual impact in any given election is slight. The candidates as a group do rate the organization more highly than do the other organizational leaders.

Association of Independent Democrats (AID). AID is also a "good government" group, but is known to a far lesser extent among the candidates and organizational leaders than is the Alliance. The organization was chartered in 1970 under the leadership of now-City Councilman Joseph DiRosa with the expressed purpose of instituting "real change in government." The basic promotion made by the group encourages the citizen to "be independent, vote the person, not the party!"

AID claims a biracial, multi-class membership concentrated primarily in the fifth and ninth wards. The headquarters for the group is located on Bourbon Street in the French Quarter, and their political rallies are said to draw "quite well" among Quarterites. The appeal of the group in their designated area among blacks is probably slight. As shall be shown, several black organizations of high regard operate in these two wards. Further, the group did not endorse any of the four black
candidates (Ortique in the 1972 Supreme Court race, Lombard in the Clerk of Court race, and Jackson or Sargent in the Civil Sheriff election) entered in the recent elections under consideration here.

Like many organizations, AID does invite candidates to speak to their rallies. This format is generally regarded by the candidates as a "useful tactic" for making personal contact with potential supporters. However, the impact of AID, that is, the group's ability to reach, convince, and activate potential voters, is thought to be minimal in any particular election. Neither the candidates nor the organizational leaders considered AID to be an influential organization, although several expressed their personal and professional respect for its current chairperson.

Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD). BOLD came into being following the 1969 mayor's race, an election in which the racial issue was a central question. For the founders of BOLD, the issue boiled down to a single question: "will blacks have a voice in local politics?" The organization is thus viewed by its leaders as a mode of political expression for the black neighborhoods of the Uptown area. It is also conceived as having a wider "service function." In addition to on-going registration drives, and political education classes, it sponsors a job-placement program, a Christmas toys program for neglected and needy Uptown children, and a counselling program.
The high educational attainment and the professional occupational status of several BOLD leaders stand in contrast to that of the bulk of their target group. BOLD considers its area of operation to be the black neighborhoods of the first, second, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and seventeenth wards. The area contains both medium and low income black neighborhoods, including several housing projects. Historically, Uptown black neighborhoods have been politically fragmented. White political candidates have for years approached ministers and a myriad of other neighborhood leaders and influentials on an individual basis in an attempt to sway a black precinct here and there. The organization hopes to consolidate the Uptown black communities into a solid bloc.

BOLD has admittedly been modeled somewhat after other successful black organizations, namely, the Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP) of the seventh ward and the Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL) of the ninth ward. It has, however, experienced much less success than these latter two organizations. It is rated by both the candidates and other organizational leaders alike as being influential only on occasion, and then at a relatively low level. Candidates endorsed and supported by the organization have often shown poorly in Uptown black precincts, including the one in which BOLD is headquartered. Critics of the group state that its leaders are often sidetracked by ideological issues irrelevant to the immediate
concerns of the blacks who make up their constituency. In BOLD's defense, it has been argued that decision-making should be guided by certain issues as a matter of principle rather than by baldly pragmatic concerns.

An illustration of this apparent controversy may be drawn from the 1972 Supreme Court race. BOLD endorsed Ortique because (a) he was regarded as a qualified black, and (b) it was thought that a black should fill that slot. However, Calogero, a white liberal, was endorsed by several other black organizations under the argument, at least in part, that (a) Ortique could not possibly win, and (b) a solid black vote for Ortique, while gratifying, might insure the election of a white conservative. Of course, however real this issue, BOLD's problem of ineffectiveness may or may not be reducible to this question of strategy.

Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP). As in the case of BOLD, the emergence of COUP (pronounced "coo") upon the New Orleans political scene is closely tied to the 1969 mayor's race. The middle 1960's marked a period of growing black voter registration and eventually candidacy for office. It seems natural then that a political organization should emerge in the seventh ward where, in addition to the poorer black neighborhoods found throughout the city, the black well-to-do and middle status residential areas are located. Following the 1968 defeat of black candidate Charles Elloye for the seventh ward's state legislative post, COUP was formed to organize the
black voters of the Ward into a "politically effective" group. Although the organization is primarily political in orientation, it does attempt to attend to the wider social and economic needs of the area. Indeed, its leaders regard the political arena as the locus for dealing with these larger problems. One COUP member put it this way: "If you're not there when the pie is sliced, you don't get any!"

In 1969, the organization backed Maurice "Moon" Landrieu, the eventual victor in the mayor's race, on his promise of bringing a black voice into city government with his administration. Since this election, COUP has come to be regarded by the candidates and organizational leaders as one of the most influential and successful political organizations in New Orleans. There is, for example, general agreement among them that COUP endorsements have had a strong impact in recent election upon the strength and direction of the seventh ward's black vote. Among several of those interviewed, COUP has the reputation of being able to "deliver the vote," a phrase historically assigned to the prototype urban machine.

COUP sources do not disclaim the solid image of the group. They do, however, describe the relationship between the organization and the black voter as one of "trust." As one leader elaborates this point:

The voters will rely upon the endorsements of organizations whom they trust for guidance. . . . In this matter of trust, actions speak louder
than words. Good organizational leaders don't have unlisted (telephone) numbers. They're there when you need them. They're there at two in the morning when you need bail or whatever. They live in the community, they're visible. . . (An organizational leader) can't drive in from New Orleans East into the neighborhood and say, "I'm here, I've come to save you from all this!"

COUP expects endorsed candidates to provide money for campaign expenses. It also conducts fund-raising drives, particularly to help black candidates. Unlike a number of other organizations examined here, COUP does not "merely advertize" its endorsement. Its success in persuading the black voter is attributed to extensive door-to-door campaigning--"the personal touch"--as well as telephone canvassing. Both types of activity, particularly when carried out on a large scale, involve mounting expenses for sample ballots, telephone banks, paid workers, and so forth. 9

COUP's reputation may be measured in other ways as well. Local (and state) governmental positions are now dotted with COUP members and affiliates. Examples include Criminal Magistrate Robert Collins, Mayor's Aide Robert Tucker, city Finance Committee member Henry Simon, Aviation Board member Nolan Marshall, Sewage and Water Board member James Beverly, Policy Planning Committee member Emmon Mouton, Magistrate Clerk Emilo Dupre, and State Senator Sidney Barthelemy. Concerning the group's relative success, one COUP member stated: "When (Victor) Schiro was mayor (1962-1969), the only blacks to be seen in City Hall were standing behind brooms. We've helped change all that."
The sheer number of educated and professional status blacks associated with COUP and its area of operation appears to have extended the organization's sphere of influence independent of its actual clout. Several black organizations have been able to exert some political pressure upon candidates through the ballot box. However, none have had the supply of members with the education and experience to take advantage of the opening positions as has COUP.

COUP's reputed rise has not been without difficulty or dissension. For example, their endorsement of Calogero over Ortique in the 1972 Supreme Court race raised the issue of a sell out in the minds of some blacks. It is likely that a number of factors were considered by the COUP leadership, not the least of which being the fact that Calogero and Mayor Landrieu are close friends and former law partners. One leader summed the "practical politics" issue this way:

Sometimes you have to bite the bullet. You can't only wear black, red, and green, and run around with a clinched fist. You can accomplish much more with a little give-and-take, with establishing yourself as a principled known quantity.

Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA). CCDA was founded in 1946 by deLesseps S. "Chep" Morrison following his stunning upset victory in the mayor's race over incumbent Robert Maestri. Prior to the election, Maestri was considered unbeatable. He had not been an unpopular mayor. Further, he was the undisputed leader of the Regular Democratic Organization (RDO, discussed later), a reputedly
well-oiled and powerful city-wide organization which had dominated local politics almost uninterruptedly since 1896.  

On the other hand, Morrison had been urged into the race at the last minute by a desperate and disorganized committee of business and professional men opposed to Maestri. So reluctant was anyone to run against Maestri that the committee actually rummaged through the telephone directory at one point in search of potential challengers (Parker, 1974: 64). Committee member Jacob Morrison eventually suggested that his younger brother, a colonel about to be discharged from the Army and a returning war-hero, might be interested.

Morrison ran on a platform of political reform. He assailed the incumbent's organization as an entrenched, corrupt, and unresponsive political machine. Though a slow in city services was probably attributable to the war years and war effort as much as anything else, Morrison placed the blame squarely upon the complacent "machine." His charges apparently struck a responsive chord. Housewives took to the streets armed with brooms, symbolic of their desire to "clean up" New Orleans (Parker, 1974: 67-69). Maestri's campaign effort also fueled the charge of complacency. His organization worked without apparent urgency, and he himself delivered only one radio broadcast during the campaign. Morrison won by over 4,000 votes.

Though elected as a reform candidate, Morrison moved quickly after his election to build an effective
organization of his own. CCDA was a city-wide organization comprising a number of seemingly incompatible groups, ranging from professional politicians (including some RDO defectors), middle class housewives (enrolled in the Independent Women's Organization, IWO, discussed later), businessmen (the Cold Water Committee),\(^ {11}\) and blacks\(^ {12}\) (Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League, OPPVL, discussed later). Like RDO, however, the main structure of the organization consisted of representatives and their staffs from each of the city's seventeen wards (Parker, 1974:63).

Morrison was elected mayor of New Orleans for four consecutive terms. In 1955 and again in 1959, he unsuccessfully ran for governor of the State of Louisiana. The second defeat, experienced at the hands of segregationist Jimmie Davis,\(^ {13}\) ended all gubernatorial aspirations. Further, the rejection of a referendum by New Orleans voters which would have allowed Morrison to run for a fifth term as mayor terminated further local options. Nine months before his fourth term as mayor expired, Morrison accepted an appointment to the Organization of American States from the Kennedy administration. According to the city charter, an interim successor could be chosen only from two city councilmen elected at-large. Victor Schiro of the CCDA was selected by a close margin as interim mayor.

Morrison's departure and the ensuing organizational chaos, which intensified with the 1961 mayor's race, was viewed by many as evidence that (a) CCDA had been slipping
badly during Morrison's fourth term, and (b) Morrison was CCDA. In his absence, the diverse factions which made up the organization polarized over issues, procedures, and, of course, Morrison's successor. Unable to unite behind a single candidate for the mayoralty election, CCDA eventually fielded two candidates (Schiro and Adrian Duplantier) in the primary against RDO representative James A. Comiskey. In a bizarre turn of events, it was reported that Morrison briefly advocated Comiskey's candidacy before the Cold Water Committee. Comiskey was, however, eliminated in the first primary, and Schiro defeated Duplantier in the run-off, chiefly by capitalizing upon segregationist sentiment stirred by court-ordered school desegregation in New Orleans.

The current structure of CCDA only vaguely resembles that of the organization at its peak under Morrison. IWO and OPPVL are now completely separated from CCDA. Although the caucus still retains representatives from each of the seventeen wards, present leadership claims some strength among whites in only the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and fifteenth wards. The decline of the organization may be further evidenced by the observation that CCDA has "not held regular meetings in over a year." The group is, however, planning to meet and work in upcoming city council and gubernatorial elections.

Several factors are cited for the decline of CCDA and other "old-line organizations in general." The prime
reason given for the drop in organizational importance is the changing role of the news media in campaigning over the years. Says one CCDA leader:

The role of the news media, especially television, is much stronger now than before. People are more personally oriented toward the candidate. They want to see him on TV and hear his pitch. They want to see for themselves.

Perhaps related to this is the overall decline in organizational importance, as distinguished from the decline of the organization. One leader observed: "Civil service took away a lot of our patronage." Implied here is a loss in the organization's unique ability to provide opportunity and service to those loyal to it. Whereas the organization was previously capable of providing the link between the individual and the larger political structure, bureaucratization of the relationship is said to relegate the organization to secondary importance.

A final factor thought to have affected the status of CCDA is the rise in the registration of black voters, coupled with the movement of large numbers of white ones to the suburbs. The combined effect is that "all neighborhoods in the city now have large percentages of black voters, and, of course, in some they hold a majority."

Successful organizations are said to be closely attuned to the neighborhoods making up the wards. CCDA has not been able to tie into these networks in black areas, largely because of their reluctance to alter long-standing traditions dividing blacks and whites in the city. The strategy
utilized by Morrison during the 1950's of incorporating blacks, albeit in a secondary status, within the organization has been totally ineffective since that time. Indeed, what was once progressive is now regarded by blacks as part of the problem.

Candidates and other organizational leaders generally agree that CCDA is in a serious state of decline. One candidate remarked: "They still distribute sample ballots, but it's an organization on paper only. They just don't have the horses any more." The organization is not regarded by the candidates and organizational leaders as having had a significant impact in any of the elections under consideration. Organizational leaders, however, do hold a more favorable opinion of CCDA than do the candidates for office.

**Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL).** One of the city's oldest black organizations, CCIVL is the political arm of General Longshore Workers Local #1419. According to AFL-CIO by-laws, a union may formally support only those candidates selected by a representative council of all local unions. Since whites have dominated the council, the black longshore local was prevented political expression as an organization, at least to the extent that it sought changes in the interest of the black community. Black longshore leaders, originally working in the Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL), formed CCIVL in 1951 to enable the utilization of union resources in behalf
of candidates favorable "both to labor and the betterment of the black community."

The most pressing task facing CCIVL at the time of its inception was that of increasing voter registration among black voters. Both the "grandfather clause" and the "understanding clause" had been effectively employed over the years to delimit black registration. A further restriction used occasionally permitted blacks to register only as Republicans, thus precluding their meaningful participation in local and state elections. Two CCIVL leaders, the late Clarence "Chink" Henry and current president Walfred Daliet, were reportedly among the first blacks to register as Democrats in the ninth ward. The organization stressed registration among union and nonunion blacks alike, and participated in state-wide registration drives as well. One dollar from the annual dues of each CCIVL member was funnelled to the NAACP to further the registration cause.

Although CCIVL attempted a city-wide organization in the past, it presently claims active membership in only the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and seventeenth wards. The organization holds regular political meetings only during elections. However, since the leadership of CCIVL and the Longshore Local are identical, it would be misleading to assert that the organization is totally inactive in the black community between campaigns. In addition to sponsoring political rallies, CCIVL makes its endorsements
known through advertisements in the *Louisiana Weekly* and the publication of sample ballots.

The candidates and organizational leaders do not rate CCIVL as having been influential in recent local elections. This is not to say that they hold no respect for the organization. On the contrary, several expressed admiration of CCIVL leadership, particularly for its efforts over the years. It was also suggested that the impact of the organization is difficult to assess. Although it is quite a sizable group (more than 1500 paid members), its members reside in black neighborhoods throughout the city. However, the ratings may not be totally incorrect either. Like CCDA, CCIVL may be starting to show its age. Many older blacks doubtlessly remember the organization and its history. However, the young black, whether he be poor or upwardly mobile, seems more likely to associate the group and its tactics with past wars.

*Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN).* DAWN was founded in 1971 by two well-known and respected black leaders, the Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr. and his son, State Representative Johnny Jackson, Jr. The younger Jackson had previously been associated with the Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL), but left to form his own organization in his bid for the state legislature after a dispute over SOUL endorsements. Formally, DAWN is a civic rather than a political organization, and hence qualifies for funds under a number of neighborhood
improvement projects. The organization is centered in the one hundred and first legislative district, comprising eighteen precincts from the eighth and ninth wards, including the notorious Desire Housing Project. Organizational activities revolve around those of the Jacksons, who are involved in a number of efforts to deal with the problems of Desire and the surrounding area.

Statistically, portions of the one hundred and first district are among the poorest in the city. Median family income for 1969 in Desire was $2315 as compared with a median of $9536 for the city (United States Bureau of the Census, 1972: 58,66). It is estimated that approximately twenty-five percent of able adults are unemployed. Problems of crime and drug abuse are said to be acute, making it a highly patrolled area with frequent confrontations with police and concomitant racial animosities. By virtue of his positions held with the Desire Community Housing Corporation (funded under Model Cities), Desire Area Council, Osei (which operates three day-care centers), and the Urban Squad Advisorty Board, rather than DAWN per se, Rev. Jackson is often viewed by many residents and by officials as a link between the area and the authority structure.

Ratings of DAWN as an organization tend to reflect this situation. While the Jacksons are generally well-known to the candidates and organizational leaders, DAWN itself is not well-known among them. Several who have
dealt with the organization consider it to be "fairly effective" in its own area. An overall impression is that the organization itself is minimally developed, and that its impact resides mainly with the personal qualities of its leaders.

Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO. In terms of sheer numbers alone, the AFL-CIO constitutes a strong potential force in any election. The city's central employers are the port and the tourist trade. Most occupational fields are organized, including service workers, and the council claims over 85,000 union members in Greater New Orleans, an area comprising Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes. In New Orleans, approximately fifty-five percent of union members are black. However, overall membership for the Greater New Orleans area is predominately white.

AFL-CIO endorsements for city elections are made by a vote of a council representing all union locals. By-laws prohibit any local from making counter-endorsements. Generally, the AFL-CIO itself does not actively endorse or support candidates. Rather, such activities are left to the union locals. Occasionally, the council will make financial contributions to candidates for office, the candidates often promote AFL-CIO endorsements themselves. The council and its recent log of decisions and endorsements are generally regarded by black leaders as "unresponsive" to the black community, despite the growing black membership
among the union rank-and-file. The council claims to preoccupy itself with "labor" issues.

The impact of the AFL-CIO in recent elections is difficult to access. Although a given candidate is endorsed by the council, the endorsement typically receives varying degrees of support from the locals. Further, blacks apparently often participate in campaigns in their own political organizations rather than through unions. Finally, the membership is residentially diverse. Although one might be able to locate "working class" neighborhoods, membership in and exposure to the organization is likely to be uneven. This problem is commonly shared in the ecological data collected here for many of the organizations, but is particularly acute for those organizations not oriented to specific neighborhoods.

Candidates for office and organizational leaders consider the AFL-CIO to have been influential in recent elections. A negative endorsement, that is, the claim by the organization that a candidate is "anti-labor," is seen as having particular consequences. In the words of one candidate:

An AFL-CIO endorsement is certainly helpful. It establishes your acceptability for a lot of people. If they like what else they see and hear, or even if all other things are equal, they'll vote for you over the other guy. . . . But (the AFL-CIO) is most effective when they are out to defeat a particular candidate.

Independent Women's Organization (IWO). IWO emerged in 1946 as a formal organization from the "broom brigades,"
groups of women who signified their desire to "clean up city hall" by parading on Canal Street armed with brooms in support of Morrison. Following his election, the group formed a close alliance with CCDA. IWO itself was not structured along ward lines, but rather was concentrated in "white middle and upper middle class" residential areas. At times, it numbered upwards of one thousand members and constituted a highly motivated and available volunteer force.

IWO proved to be a fairly effective political force. In 1952, Mrs. Logan Brown of the organization was elected to the state House of Representatives. Morrison himself may have underestimated their strength on occasion. In 1956, he ignored their suggestions in a school board race. IWO worked vigorously against his choices and defeated them at the polls. The organization is presently much smaller than in past years, but retains its higher status membership composition. It has actively sought to recruit black members and the small number of black women who have joined come basically from "old-line, wealthy black families." The area of operation is restricted to the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, and sixteenth wards.

The organization has, however, undergone some recent changes. While the older members tend to be "leisured women of the upper middle class," newer members tend to be employed, often in career-oriented rather than terminal positions. IWO has also become more "issue conscious"
beyond the rather diffuse "improve government" goal of years past. It has actively worked for "basic women's rights," including for the passage of ERA, and campaigned for a wide range of specific social and environmental items as well.

IWO's campaign strategy consists of providing volunteer workers for endorsed candidates, concentrating upon staffing campaign offices and canvassing neighborhoods, rather than advertising endorsements. On balance, IWO nets a "moderately effective" rating from the candidates and organizational leaders. Several of those interviewed, however, appeared to be somewhat hostile to the organization. Rationales involved basically the "liberal" ideology of the group and the close "association of the group with the mayor." Others seemed to imply that a women's group could not really be a political organization.

Mid-City Democrats (MCD). MCD is truly an organization from the old school of politics. Each Wednesday evening, MCD chairman (and municipal tax assessor) Lawrence Comiskey, Jr., holds an open session at the organization's headquarters on South Jeff Davis Drive. People, mostly from the first municipal district (wards one, two, and three), come one-by-one to relate their problem to Comiskey—a traffic ticket, a cancelled building permit, needed bail for a relative, or whatever. Comiskey listens intently, asks some questions to verify the situation, and then reaches a course of action—a telephone call here, a
promised check by his lawyer in the morning there. Mostly, his patrons go away grateful and smiling. All Comiskey asks in return is that they vote the MCD ticket in the next election.

MCD was founded in 1962 by the late James A. Comiskey (Lawrence's uncle) following his unsuccessful bid for mayor as the Regular Democratic Organization (RDO) candidate. In the course of that election, RDO and CCDA tried to form a coalition, designated the Crescent Regular Democrats (CRD). The effort sought to unite the best of the two once powerful, but now floundering, organizations. The coalition, however, reportedly reached an impasse on the question of whom to endorse for governor that year—Gillis Long or John McKeithen—and it dissolved while still in the formative stage. The elder Comiskey then left both CRD and RDO to institute his own organization.

Originally, MCD was situated in wards one through six. Now, however, it is confined to the first three wards. The organization is predominately white, although it does now have "a couple" of black precinct captains from the district's black neighborhoods. Composition of the district is said to be "basically working class." The stated purpose of the organization is simply put: "to help the people in the area, and to promote the Democratic Party." The organization holds campaign rallies and distributes sample ballots exhorting the voter to "stamp the rooster," "support MCD endorsements," and "be a loyal Democrat."
MCD is the only of the city's old-line organizations to support McGovern in the 1972 presidential election. Comiskey explains that unpopular decision as follows:

He was the Democratic nominee, and we follow the party line. That's old-style politics. It's a matter of party loyalty--it's as simple as that.

MCD is rated by the candidates and organizational leaders as being "moderately effective." Generally, the vote of the district is said to follow MCD recommendations, especially in the white precincts. Referring to his weekly "help sessions," Comiskey says: "The voters here have fifty-two reasons to back our endorsements."
The lowered rating of the organization is most often attributed to the small number of votes at stake in the first district, especially in comparison with the numbers of votes involved in other of the city's wards. In 1974, for example, wards one, two, and three combined had only 12,648 registered voters. By comparison, ward seven alone had 28,703 and city's largest ward, ward nine, had 47,224.

New Orleans Coalition (NOC). The Coalition began at Loyola and Tulane Universities quite informally in 1968 as a "club" devoted to the discussion of political issues. Interest sparked by the 1969 mayor's race led to the crystallization and formalization of proceedings. Originally, the organization served as a clearing house for various liberal groups in the city. It published a newsletter synthesizing the activities of local liberal groups, and most of NOC participants were also frequenters of these groups as well.
The basic purpose of the organization was "to raise the level of political awareness and participation." It is described as having been very idealistic and greatly concerned about issues such as education, integration, and the "Great Society" programs. The spirit of those days is captured in incidents such as Coalition members taking "great delight" in integrating Uptown bars. The political tone of the group is more sobered these days. The organization continues its political discussion format, more formalized now by the presence of guest speakers at virtually every meeting. Also, money has been allocated to conduct "Nader-type" research. Finally, NOC seems to deal in electoral activity more seriously and one or two of its leaders are contemplating future bids for office.

NOC is still peopled predominately by "white, college educated, upper middle class" individuals. Black members are reportedly "academic types" who commonly are also active in black organizations as well. NOC claims to represent the "academic, preservationist, ecological, liberal bag"—an impulse which in New Orleans delimits its appeal to a rather small constituency. The organization does endorse candidates and supports these selections primarily by advertisements in Figaro and The Courier, newspapers with a young adult readership. It also does some canvassing, particularly in Uptown precincts near the universities. NOC is generally rated by candidates and organizational leaders as having been minimally effective in recent elections.
**New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA).** NOVA was established in 1967 under the tutelage of now State Senator Nat Kiefer. The organization is centered in Kiefer's home district comprising portions of the eighth and ninth wards, including the rapidly expanding and developing New Orleans East. It is formally dedicated to electing officials to local and state government who are "responsive to the people." NOVA claims to draw its membership primarily from the older, more established white areas of the two wards and the newer, more suburban (and primarily white) neighborhoods of New Orleans East. This constituency may be characterized as containing both "working and middle class" voters.

NOVA appears basically to be the personal organization of Senator Kiefer. The group endorses candidates in all elections, however, and supports its endorsements primarily through canvassing neighborhoods and shopping centers. The name recognition of the group is fairly low among candidates and organizational leaders, perhaps accounting for its rather low rating. Several of those interviewed, upon being informed of the organization's identity, offered stronger evaluations on the basis of their acquaintance with the group as "Kiefer's organization."

**New Orleans Young Democrats (NOYD).** Several attempts were made to set up an interview with the leader of this organization. The president had no office or home telephone and had to be dealt with through an intermediary. Apparently the leader declined the interview, either directly or
unintentionally by failure to respond. Organizational leaders and candidates for office rate this organization as having had no significant impact in recent elections.

**Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL).** The NWCVL was originally organized in 1958 as the "political section" of the Ninth Ward Civic League, a group which sought to confront and improve conditions in black neighborhoods of the ninth ward. However, it quickly became apparent that "a true political organization was needed if anything was to be accomplished." The political section thus expanded and NWCVL became a separate entity in 1960. The stated purpose of the organization is "to promote political involvement" among ninth ward residents through political education. NWCVL regularly conducts registration drives and classes. Further, much of each monthly meeting is devoted to speakers, projects, and seminars dealing with neighborhood problems.

The group claims an interest in all black neighborhoods of the ninth ward, but is concentrated in "Lower Nine," the residential areas south of the Industrial Canal. Neighborhoods there range from "poor to working and lower middle class." Membership of the organization reflects this composition, with the "lower middle class" predominant among regular attenders. Leadership of the group is composed primarily of those in nonprofessional middle class occupations, and there appears to be a pervading sense in the group of working hard and biding one's time. In this
respect, the group seems to combine much more idealism with its political pragmatism than do most of the other black organizations under study here. This may reflect the political mood of the seemingly large proportion of older individuals and retirees in the group. For them, enough change may have taken place in recent years for the system to appear accessible. Such does not seem to be the perception of many younger blacks in the area.

NWCVL is rated by the candidates and organizational leaders as being at least moderately effective in recent elections, particularly in Lower Nine. On occasion, it is said to have had an impact in other areas of the ward, even when opposed by such reputedly powerful organizations as Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL). Examples of such organizational confrontations, and subsequent good showings by NWCVL endorsed candidates, include Harry Connick's 1970 run for District Attorney (against Jim Garrison), Bennett Johnston's 1972 gubernatorial bid (against Edwin Edwards), and Peter Beer's 1974 Fourth Circuit Court race (against Joseph Bossetta). One candidate stated of the organization:

You can't help but be impressed with NWCVL. They have a straightforward, earnest demeanor. . . . In my opinion, too, their (organizational) effectiveness is often overshadowed by the brassy image of other organizations such as SOUL.

At least part of NWCVL's reputed level of success may lie in its low-key presentation of self, which apparently many white candidates and organizational leaders find assuring.
Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL). OPPVL was founded in 1948 by now-City Councilman Rev. Abraham Lincoln Davis. At that time, only about thirteen percent of black adults in the city were registered to vote, as compared with sixty-six percent of white New Orleanians. The organization was formed to mobilize black registration and introduce blacks ("Negroes in those days") into the mainstream of the political process. Like CCDA with which it became affiliated for some time, OPPVL was structured along ward lines and sought to mobilize black registration efforts and voter turn out for the entire city. The association which developed between Mayor Morrison and Rev. Davis led then Governor Earl Long to grump, "Morrison's got himself a Baptist preacher who don't preach nothin' but Morrison!" 20

The most common strategy in those days among white politicians was to deal solely with black leaders rather than ever confronting the black electorate directly, a practice which has often carried over to the present day. While Morrison privately encouraged Davis to develop the organization and strive for continued black involvement, it became clear to many black leaders that white sponsorship itself was capable and willing of only the most modest of advances. Thus, despite some initial improvements, a general move emerged to more directly challenge the segregationist stance of traditional social and political relations.
Paramount among these was the formation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957 at a meeting in Rev. Davis' New Zion Baptist Church and the election of Rev. Martin Luther King as its first president (Davis was elected second vice-president). Rev. Davis himself was a regular spokesman for the black community as the drive toward integration got underway in New Orleans and he was on one occasion jailed for such activities. However, Davis' assimilationist goals and his willingness to work with existing powers have led some more impatient blacks over the years to brand him an "Uncle Tom." Counters Davis: "If sponsoring radical ideas of eliminating racial segregation and saving a city is Uncle Tom-ing, then so be it."

OPPVL served as Davis' organizational base throughout these years. Rev. Davis' own notoriety and the many historic changes which were taking place in those years coupled to make the organization a fairly unified political force. However, it is acknowledged that OPPVL is not as strong in all parts of the city as it once was, and that other black organizations now challenge its leadership role in several wards. Nonetheless, the black voter entering the polling place with a Rev. Davis sample ballot in hand is said to still be a fairly common occurrence.

Candidates and organizational leaders rate OPPVL as having been a moderately effective organization in recent elections. They are skeptical of any claim of current city-wide influence, but concede particular organizational
strength in portions of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and seventeenth wards. They do suspect at least some latent appeal remaining among many older black voters. Davis' recent appointment to the city council may further enkindle some of those feelings. On the other hand, there is some evidence that time may have eclipsed OPPVL. Many of the newer black organizations seem to regard OPPVL endorsements and modus operandi with some disdain. In the words of one leader, "We're all indebted to Davis for his long service to the community, but the organization is a little too conservative... the style smacks too much of the old days."

Regular Democratic Organization (RDO). RDO claims to be the second oldest of the big city political "machines" which emerged in the U.S. during the nineteenth century. The organization evolved in 1876 from the Crescent City White League, a white supremacist group formed two years earlier to combat Reconstructionist rule. In 1879, RDO was able to gain control of the city following the election of several of its members to key governmental positions. However, a number of RDO candidates were defeated by reform candidates in ensuring elections amid charges of corruption and, by 1896, the Regulars had been dislodged from power. A year later, RDO began a serious rebuilding program for establishing its return to power with the founding of the Choctaw Club, an extensive grassroots political organization instituted expressly "to recapture city hall and to
disenfranchise the Negro" (Reynolds, 1936: 32). It is difficult to exaggerate the success of RDO in achieving these goals. RDO thoroughly dominated city politics at every level almost without interruption from the turn of the century until Morrison's upset victory in 1946. Further, they invoked a dramatic ninety-five percent reduction in the number of blacks registered to vote in New Orleans between the years 1896 and 1900 (Howard, 1971: 190).

RDO's organization during these years of rule may be described as the prototype urban political machine. The caucus consisted of leaders from each of the city's wards. Precinct captains generally were carried on the city payroll, thus allowing them to devote full-time to political chores. Principal among these chores was the task of cultivating voter loyalty to the organization by providing services for precinct residents. Affiliation with the organization afforded jobs, preferential treatment in city services, and the necessary connections to cut red-tape in what could otherwise be an impersonal, bureaucratized city government.

In 1927, RDO made the mistake of opposing the candidacy of Huey Long in his successful gubernatorial bid. Long brought the organization to its knees by cutting off access to state patronage and state funds. However, Long had no desire to eradicate the machine—he merely wished to make it responsive to himself. He therefore elevated to
the highest ranks those individuals who expressed their loyalty to him, among them Robert Maestri. Maestri's eventual term as mayor marked almost a half-century of RDO rule. While the arrangement has been described as "beneficial and effective" for both organization and loyal voter alike, it also remembered as often being greedy, complacent, and ineffective.

RDO appears to have never fully recovered from its 1946 setback at the hands of Morrison. However, the group still does claim a city-wide organization. More realistically, its strengths are said to be concentrated in the "white working class" areas of the third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh wards. The organization has no black members, although it claims to have supported black candidates on occasion. Unlike CCDA, it conducts regular monthly meetings of both the full membership (the Choctaw Club) and the executive committee. RDO typically distributes sample ballots and holds rallies in support of its endorsed candidates.

RDO is rated by organizational leaders and candidates as having been moderately effective in recent elections. This assessment is in keeping with the self-evaluation of one RDO leader: "Quite frankly, we're not what we used to be, but we still win more than we lose." The evaluation is by no means unanimous. One candidate stressed the decline of the oldline organizations in general by stating emphatically, "RDO and CCDA endorsements are worth about thirty-
five votes apiece." On balance, the overall assessment by the leaders and candidates seems more nearly the correct description. A surprising number of RDO members and affiliates may be found in state and local governmental positions. Further, RDO retains some measure of its appeal in certain areas of the city, as the solid attendance at many of its rallies attests.

**Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL).** SOUL is commonly regarded by the organizational leaders and candidates for office as the "longest and strongest" political organization in New Orleans. It is also known among them as being "extremely pragmatic." Such pragmatism apparently prompted SOUL leader Nils Douglas to refuse participation in this study with the words, "There's nothing in it for SOUL." Therefore, information concerning the organization was gathered from other written sources and reference persons.

SOUL, like COUP, emerged in the mid-1960's from an unsuccessful bid for the state legislature, in this case, by Douglas. Following his defeat, Douglas established the organization in the populous ninth ward. According to one interviewee:

The older black organizations were in a real stall in those days. Progress with them depended too heavily upon white co-operation... (which) ceased administratively when Schiro became mayor. SOUL hit at a time when blacks were frustrated and black consciousness was rising. The timing was right.

The 1969 mayor's rate proved to be critical in establishing SOUL's reputation. Jimmy Fitzmorris entered the race with
the solid endorsement of the old-line white organizations. Landrieu, however, won by drawing overwhelming support from black and upper white precincts. SOUL precincts showed impressive support for Landrieu, some reporting ninety percent of the votes cast in his favor.

SOUL's reputation for pragmatic politics is long established as well. Several candidates and organizational leaders have suggested that, for several years, the organization's support has gone "to the highest bidder." The label stems mainly from two factors. One, as SOUL's reputation has grown, so apparently has the price of its support. Gov. Edwin Edwards reported spending $60,000 for their support in the 1972 gubernatorial election (James, 1975). Figures quoted more often are $30,000 in elections dealing with major local offices, and $10,000 to $15,000 for lesser offices. One candidate remarked somewhat sourly, "Thirty thousand is a lot of money to turn over to an organization for just one stinking ward." Secondly, SOUL has occasionally supported candidates whose ideologies and stands on the issues seemingly would have precluded their support in the black community. A prominent example, from several which might be mentioned, is SOUL's endorsement in 1971 of Jamar Adcock, a wealthy north Louisiana segregationist, for lieutenant governor (Murray and Vedlitz, 1974: 34).

Several observations have been offered in explanation of SOUL's strategy. It should be noted, for example,
that SOUL did not invent this brand of politics. The
habit of paying black leaders rather than dealing with the
black electorate directly originated with white politi-
cians, most notably, Morrison. More to the point, however,
is the observation that the strategy is only a slight mod-
ification of the politics employed for years by white
organizations. At the simplest level, the leaders of SOUL
wish to back candidates from whom they can extract tangi-
ble rewards, presumably both for themselves and for their
constituency. The argument is well taken that money is a
medium of exchange not likely to net direct benefit for
the constituency. Unlike the situation where policy and
patronage considerations are delivered after the election,
the commitment of the candidate tends to end with the
monetary exchange. However, one interviewee observed:

... building an effective organization requires
revenue. SOUL has gotten a rather bad reputation
from the press as a money-grabbing operation. But
if a candidate wants the full stroke—canvassing,
mail-out, ads and posters, transportation of voters
to the polls, etc.—let's face it, that costs some
money. So to begin with, SOUL has built a real
organization, not a paper one like so many others
around... for what? Let's be cynical for a moment.
For most [white] candidates, the political reality
is that the interests of the black community are
intrinsically opposed to those of the white commun-
ity. In that case, what's a campaign promise worth?

This line of thought thus places the emphasis upon
building an organizational weapon. In this respect, SOUL
differs little from successful organizations of the past.
Control of the organization is thought to reside in the
hands of three individuals, Douglas, Sherman Copelin, and
Don Hubbard. Much of the revenue generated by the organization is clearly devoted to election activities. SOUL, for example, is said to possess the most extensive telephone banks of any organization in the city. Further, SOUL is known to have financed the campaigns of several black candidates for office. However, the recent indictments for gross misuse of funds handed down against Copelin and Hubbard in connection with their respective jobs with Model Cities and the Family Health Foundation—both federal poverty programs—have done little to quell the image of "money grabbing" at the ultimate expense of the black community.

SOUL has extended its area of operation in recent elections, most notably into the fifteenth ward. It's actual level of effectiveness, as opposed to its reputation, is a matter of some debate. Analyses conducted by the Institute of Politics at Loyola University show that candidates endorsed by SOUL between 1969 and 1973 received a mean of 72.6 percent of the votes cast in black neighborhoods of the ninth ward (Murray and Vedlich, 1974: 35). Although this figure is extremely impressive, its glitter falls off somewhat when one realizes that several of these candidates carried all black neighborhoods of the city by wide margins. One candidate for office summarized it this way:

It depends. Given a candidate who is basically acceptable to the black community anyway, a SOUL endorsement might produce 80-90 percent support.
On the other hand, given an unknown or a candidate with a bad racial stance, getting 40-50 percent with their support might be a real accomplishment. Of course, who knows that you couldn't achieve similar results if you just spent $40,000 in that ward on your own.

**Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT).**

TILT endorsements appeared in *Figaro* in 1973 and gained some notoriety due mainly to the strange composition of their preferred ticket. The slate of endorsed candidates comprised a mixed bag of blacks, ultra-conservative whites, and little known candidates, all topped off by an endorsement of local eccentric and perennial candidate, Rodney Fertel, for mayor. Attempts to locate the group revealed TILT to be a good-natured hoax perpetrated by a local newspaper editor. Alert readers no doubt suspected as much following claims of organizational strength in "the area of the Canal Street and Metarie cemeteries." 26 TILT's name was left on the list of organizations presented for evaluation to organizational leaders and candidates as a validity check. They rated the organization as ineffective in recent elections.

**Treme Improvement Political Society (TIPS).** TIPS was founded in 1971 to support the candidacy of Louis Charbonnet, the son of a black, well-to-do funeral parlor operator, for the state legislature from the ninety-sixth district. The district comprises higher status whites living in the French Quarter and lower Esplanade area, "working class blacks" located in Treme and adjacent
neighborhoods, and "working class whites" in the Faubourg-Marigny and City Park areas. The stated purpose of this organization is to "improve the conditions of the districts unique neighborhoods." The needs of the neighborhoods vary and while Charbonnet himself deals with the wider concerns of the district, TIPS is devoted to the black neighborhoods. One critical problem facing the city is revenue and, of course, ways of generating more of it. In a recent session of the legislature, Charbonnet introduced a controversial bill to convert the old U.S. Mint located at Decatur and Esplanade into a gambling casino for revenue purposes.

TIPS does not hold regularly scheduled meetings between elections, although it does on occasion sponsor activities and the board of directors is "on call" for any problem. As with DAWN, the organization and its activities seem closely tied to a dominant, publically known person, in this case, Charbonnet. Organizational leaders and candidates rate TIPS as having been only minimally effective in recent elections. It appears that Charbonnet himself was elected with the support of blacks and upper whites. The latter group, however, does not figure in the organization nor is responsive to it. Thus, the strength of the vote which elected Charbonnet coalesces again only occasionally, and then outside the control and influence of TIPS itself.

University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD). The current chapter of UNO-YD was re-established in 1970
following the demise of the original group at the University of New Orleans campus during the middle-1960s. The group is affiliated with the national Democratic party, but carries no formal ties with either state or local Democratic organizations. Membership is not restricted solely to UNO students, but is limited to those less than 35 years of age. The organization claims to represent what has been generally termed "the youth vote." Active campaign work is conducted on campus and in surrounding areas where students are likely to live.

The size of the organization varies greatly, depending mainly upon the interest generated by any particular election. Between elections, active membership may drop off to as low as a dozen or so. The organization operates upon a rather severe budget, thus delimiting options which it can exercise in behalf of endorsed candidates. Its main asset in this regard may be that it is able to sponsor speeches and debates on campus as an organization officially registered with the university. Such activities typically draw quite well, particularly in the more heated of elections. The organization also contributes money to candidates, albeit on a small scale. The group, for example, contributed ten dollars in support of Baton Rouge newscaster Jeff LaCaze's bid to unseat Congressman John Rarick. Organization leaders and candidates for office rate the YD's as having had no impact in recent elections in New Orleans.
Uptown Democratic Association (UDA). UDA is located in the tenth and eleventh wards and operates from a locally popular seafood restaurant and bar. Its area of concentration appears to be the white, working class neighborhoods of the Irish Channel in and around lower Magazine Street. The group advertizes its endorsements in a storefront on Magazine Street and, of course, in the bar. An interview with the leader of the organization was precluded by illness in his family. Organizational leaders and candidates for office rated the organization as ineffective in recent elections. Due to this and the lack of other information, the organization was dropped from the study. The elimination of UDA and NOYD from the modified list of twenty-one organizations left nineteen organizations for further analysis.

Composite Organizational Ratings

As indicated in previous sections, organizational leaders and candidates for office were asked to rate each political organization in terms of its impact upon selected elections. As the questionnaire had been originally prepared, each respondent was to indicate which organizations were most effective. However, once interviewing began, each respondent was instead asked to comment upon the effectiveness of each organization on the list rather than only the most effective ones. From these individual evaluations of each organization, three overall rating scales were generated—one for the organizational leaders, one for the candidates,
and, finally, a composite ranking based upon these first two ratings.

A summary of these ratings is presented in Table 1. The rankings for each scale have been divided into four basic categories on the basis of the individual evaluations: very effective, moderately effective, minimally effective, and not effective. The order in which the organizations are listed within the first three of these categories indicates further ranking of the organizations. Thus, the first organization in the moderately effective category was ranked higher than the organization entered in the second slot of that category. However, within the fourth category, that is, those rated not effective, the organizations are merely listed in alphabetical order. Further differentiation within this category on the basis of the evaluations rendered would have been extremely arbitrary.

The first column of the table contains the ratings of the organizational leaders. SOUL and COUP, the well-organized black groups of the ninth and seventh wards respectively, were said by them to be the most effective in recent elections. Rated as moderately effective are the old-line organizations of New Orleans—in order, AFL-CIO, OPPVL, MCD, RDO, IWO, and CCDA. The only other organizations founded prior to 1960, NWCVL and CCIVL, were classified as minimally effective and ineffective respectively. Other organizations reputed by the leaders to be minimally effective are BOLD, NOC, NOVA, and TIPS, all groups of fairly recent origins.
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<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Ratings by Organizational Leaders</th>
<th>Ratings by Candidates for Office</th>
<th>Composite Ratings</th>
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</table>
AGG, AID, DAWN, TILT, and UNO-YD were said by the organizational leaders to have been ineffective in recent elections.

Ratings by the candidates for office are similar to those of the organizational leaders, with a few important exceptions. Most dramatically, the candidates pronounced AGG as a moderately effective organization as opposed to an ineffective classification by organizational leaders, and CCDA as an ineffective rather than a moderately effective organization. Likewise, the candidates advanced a higher rating of NWCVL and assigned slightly lower ratings to AFL-CIO, MCD, and NOC than did the organizational leaders. A fairly strong correlation of .66 (Spearman rho) was found between the ratings of the organizational leaders and those of the candidates.

A composite ranking derived from the previous ratings further reflects their basic similarities. In the composite ranking, most organizations are listed in the same effectiveness category as earlier specified by the two sets of respondents. As indicated earlier, serious disagreement between the organizational leaders and the candidates exists only in their evaluations of AGG and CCDA. The overall effect is that these two organizations are both classified in the composite scale as minimally effective organizations by default rather than by consensus.

The disagreement over these two organizations is perhaps purely coincidental. However, the discrepancy may be symptomatic of the differing vantage points of the two sets
AGG is not structured in the same manner as other typical organizations regarded by organizational leaders as effective. Rather, it is seen more as a businessmen's club. By contrast, CCDA, at least in previous years, has had the expected organizational form. The candidates, on the other hand, are attuned to the consequences of an endorsement by a group such as AGG, particularly among higher status voters. This factor is illustrated by the memberships held in AGG by several candidates prior to seeking elections. Simply, the "good government" image of the group is considered a desirable social and political asset in grooming one's credentials for office. It also certifies one's politics as acceptably mainstream. In comparison, CCDA lacks such transitivity now that it is viewed as lacking the organizational muscle to literally turn out the vote, a major source of its strength in the past.

Organizational Composition and Organizational Effectiveness

These latter comments raise the question of the varying composition of organizational memberships and its relevance to the problem at hand. One strategy in arriving at some answer to this situation is to classify the organizations on the basis of their own identity claims. Given the current array of organizations, the most obvious criteria of differentiation is that of race. While none of the organizations interviewed openly forbid membership to persons on the basis of skin color, most memberships are, nonetheless, racially
restricted. Several organizations further proclaim to present or advance the interests of a racially defined group. RDO, for example, was originally a white supremacist organization. BOLD's very name, Black Organization for Leadership Development, indicates a black target population, and so forth. However, all of this seems a bit cautious. The city has a long history of racial segregation and, unsurprisingly, interaction to the present day continues to be confined to racially homogeneous groups, as the previous organizational descriptions illustrate.

Class distinctions are likewise evident in the organizational descriptions advanced by the organizational leaders themselves. Target populations are commonly defined as "the working class" of a given ward or an "upper middle class" neighborhood. On the basis of these observations, it is argued that the organizations may be categorized as "black," "lower white," and "upper white" in keeping with organizational claims. Table 2 contains a summary of New Orleans' major political organizations categorized along race/class and organizational effectiveness dimensions. Each listed organization readily fits the assigned race/class designation, with the exception of NOVA whose area of operation reportedly includes both "lower" and "upper" white neighborhoods of the eighth and ninth wards.

Two basic hypotheses were advanced in the previous chapter concerning the expected composition of this table. It was anticipated that: (a) levels of the race/class
### TABLE 2

RATINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS, BY RACE/CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite Rating</th>
<th>Race/Class Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very effective</td>
<td>SOUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderately effective</td>
<td>OPPVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minimally effective</td>
<td>BOLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not effective</td>
<td>CCIVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TIPS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aExcluded from this listing are TILT, the fictional organization, and UNO-YD, whose campus orientation makes it technically unclassifiable according to this scheme.*
dimension would reflect varying degrees of political organization, and (b) levels of the race/class dimension would exhibit varying degrees of political effectiveness. Specifically, upper white areas were expected to show the greatest evidence of organization and effectiveness, while decreasingly lower levels of these characteristics were anticipated in lower white and black areas respectively. Initial inspection of the table indicates that neither of these hypothesized relationships is substantiated by the data. Rather, the data show that upper white organizations are conspicuously few in number and sport rather tame reputations. Lower white organizations, while more numerous and more highly regarded, are considered as a group to be in a general state of decline. Finally, black organizations have been appearing recently in greater numbers and, in many cases, are regarded as having organized quite effectively.

These trends indicated in the table are not thought to be distorted by the nonrandom nature of the sample under study. Each organizational leader and candidate was asked during the interview to identify further political and nonpolitical organizations considered influential in recent elections. All agreed that the major political organizations of the city were included in the list under study. While several additional organizations were mentioned, the name of only one was volunteered more than once (two times, actually)—the Black Youth for Progress (BYP), a small, black, quasi-radical group centered in the St. Bernard Housing Project. It
is doubtful that any of these suggested organizations, including BYP, would have received high effectiveness ratings. Nor is it likely the proportions of upper white, lower white, and black organizations are grossly distorted. The interviewees expressed basic agreement with the ratio of organizations contained in the race/class categories. Thus, despite the lack of a random sample, the enumeration of further organizations known to exist would most likely only increase in rough proportion the number of organizations listed in the minimally effective and ineffective categories.

The scarcity of upper white organizations, of whatever effectiveness status, deserves further mention. As indicated in chapter two, a substantial amount of research has detailed a positive correlation between socio-economic status and organizational participation. The data show here that, in New Orleans during the early 1970's at least, participation in formal political organizations does not follow this pattern. However, the positive correlation between status and participation may indeed hold within the broader organizational structure of the community, that is, when the scope of inquiry is extended beyond the range of purely political organizations. There is some evidence suggesting this trend. Parker (1974: 68), for example, notes that the higher status groups of New Orleans have traditionally left the operation of the city's politics to the political organizations and their lower status constituents. Chai (1971: 2-11) has further exemplified this theme by claiming widespread, rapid
participation of higher status Orleanians in the city's social organizations, most notably Mardi Gras krewes, at the expense of political participation.

Organizational Effectiveness as an Attribute of Areal Units

In order to facilitate further analysis of the organizational variable, a procedure was derived for measuring organizational effectiveness as a characteristic of the areal units under study. Attempts were made to identify as clearly as possible the areas of operation claimed by each of the organizations to be analyzed. Areal units which fell within territories claimed by organizations with high or moderate composite effectiveness ratings were classified as areas of high organizational efficiency. A medium organizational effectiveness classification was assigned to areas claimed by minimally effective organizations and, finally, areas occupied by ineffective organizations or otherwise devoid of claimed organizational activity were categorized as low organizational effectiveness areas. In cases where an areal unit was claimed by more than one organization, the efficiency rating of the stronger organization was used in determining the areal rating.

A number of problems were encountered in applying the organizational variable to areal units. To begin with, the orientation of some organizations was not easily translatable into geographic terms. UNO-YD, for example, claimed to seek the "youth vote"—a characteristic almost impossible to
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isolate with any degree of accuracy utilizing census materials. A similar situation results when the area of operation is only vaguely defined by the organizational leader, either because he himself does not know or wishes to keep the information secret. In essence, the problem of defining the organizational characteristics of areal units is simple and straightforward only when the organizational claims specific precincts and these precincts match a set of defined areal units reasonably well.

Secondly, individual exposure to organizational activity is surely highly variable from area to area. One might argue that this variability is primarily a function of differences in organizational effectiveness. However, the researcher has no firsthand evidence of (a) individual exposure to organizational activity, leading to (b) individual behavior commensurate with organizational exhortations, leading to (c) the organization's reputation for effectiveness. Thus, the study deals primarily with the reputation for organizational effectiveness since the areal units are being ranked on the basis of claims by organizational leaders and candidates for office.

These problems, no doubt, introduce some systematic error into the procedure. The overall effect of the first problem is most likely that of inducing underestimations of the organizational factor. The second problem can be kept within control by restricting generalizations to the reputation for effectiveness as opposed to actual effectiveness.
With these restrictions in mind, the nature of the organizational effectiveness variable as an ecological attribute in relation to the race/class dimension of areal units is shown in table 3. Previous discussion has made clear the expectation that varying levels of race/class characteristics were anticipated to lead to varying levels of organizational effectiveness. The data in table 3 confirm the observations made in the previous section, to wit, the race/class and organizational effectiveness variables are indeed related, but not in the previously hypothesized direction.

Black areas are claimed to have political organizations which are, on the average, considered more effective than those found in either lower white or upper white areas. On a scale of one to three (low, medium, and high effectiveness ratings respectively), black areas show an average organizational effectiveness score of 2.15 as compared to mean values of 1.70 and 1.52 for lower white and upper white areas respectively. Asterisks next to the race/class mean square indicate that its corresponding F-value, derived by dividing the race/class mean square by the mean square for error, is statistically significant. Thus, there is a true overall difference among the organizational effectiveness means across categories of the race/class variable. Further, contrasts between treatment means show that the difference between the organizational effectiveness average for black areas and the weighted average for all white areas is statistically significant as well ($t = 4.02, p<.01$). However,
TABLE 3
DATA SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS OF 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Summary:</th>
<th>Race/Class</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Lower White</td>
<td>Upper White</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Organizational Effectiveness Score</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Areal Units</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation:</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>Contrast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>4.45**&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>4.02**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White vs. Upper White</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td>.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Column entries associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares. Mean squares are interpreted in terms of the corresponding F-value resulting from the ratio of mean square for treatments with mean square for error.

<sup>b</sup>Column entries associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics. The t-test is composed of the difference between weighted contrast means divided by the standard error of the difference between means.

<sup>c</sup>Level of significance is indicated by asterisks: no asterick, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
the size of the difference in organizational effectiveness means between lower white and upper white areas was not significant ($t = 1.03, p > .05$).

The race/class and organizational effectiveness dimensions of areal units can be further explicated by examining a correlation matrix of pertinent ecological characteristics. This matrix includes the additional ecological variables of percent residents who are nonwhite, median school years completed, percent adults who are high school graduates, median family income, and percent adults employed in nonmanual occupations. The matrix of variables is presented in table 4.

As expected, the race/class dimension shows a strong inverse relation ($-0.87$) with the nonwhite variable. The remaining variables indicate that upper white areas contain higher schooling, income and occupational advantages, while decreasing levels of these attributes are found as one moves to lower white and then to black areas. Organizational effectiveness, on the other hand, is positively related to the nonwhite variable ($0.35$), that is, black areas tend to show a higher reputation for organizational effectiveness. Correspondingly, then, areas of high organizational effectiveness tend to be characterized by lower educational, income, and occupational levels. The relationship between race/class and organizational effectiveness is moderate and inverse ($-0.33$). These issues shall receive further amplification with the analysis of elections in the next chapter.
TABLE 4
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE RACE/CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS DIMENSIONS WITH OTHER ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS, NEW ORLEANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MSCH&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>PHSG</th>
<th>MFIN</th>
<th>PNML</th>
<th>ORGEF</th>
<th>RACLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONW</td>
<td>-.63&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCH</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHSG</td>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNML</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Abbreviations refer to ecological characteristics as follows:
- NONW - percent residents of areal unit who are non-white
- MSCH - median school years completed for adults over 25 years of age
- PHSG - percent adults of areal unit who are high school graduates
- MFIN - median family income for areal unit
- PNML - percent adult residents of areal unit employed in nonmanual occupations
- ORGEF - organizational effectiveness rating of areal unit
- RACLS - race/class classification of areal unit

<sup>b</sup>Correlations are computed for 131 areal units. All correlations in the table are statistically significant, that is, the probability that the true relationship between any two of the variables is really zero is less than .05.
Utilitarian vs. Normative Compliance
Characteristics

It was argued in chapter two that compliance with organizational directives comprises at least two dimensions (Etzioni, 1975: 3-19): (1) the type of power available to the organization to enforce its directives, and (2) the orientation of the members to the authority of the organization. Briefly, three types of power—coercive (the use of physical sanctions), remunerative (the use of material sanctions), and normative (the use of symbolic sanctions)—and three types of orientation—alienative (intensely negative), calculative (mild positive or negative), and moral (intensely positive)—were discussed. It was noted that three major types of organizations are likely to be found, namely, coercive (coercive power, alienative involvement), utilitarian (remunerative power, calculative involvement), and normative (normative power, moral involvement) organizations. Applied to political organizations, it was shown that a political organization may potentially fall in any one of the three classification types. However, empirical reviews suggest that they most often meet the credentials of the latter two compliance modes. The old-line political machine, for example, most closely resembles the utilitarian criteria, while the national or state political party structure most often exhibits traits of the normative type.

An attempt shall be made to tentatively apply the typology to the political organizations discussed here. This
procedure shall rest largely upon a subjective evaluation of the primary emphasis detected in the organizations. Organizations typically reflect the characteristics of more than one compliance mode. Further, the organizations may reflect differing compliance modes in varying contexts. For example, it may reflect a normative compliance pattern when operating in the public sphere, and a utilitarian mode in its day-to-day operation. As has been shown, however, one compliance pattern tends to predominate.

With these qualifications in mind, it seems allowable to state impressionistically that the upper white organizations discussed here tend to resemble most closely the normative mode, while black and lower white organizations, with the possible exception of NWCVL, AID, and NOVA, appear to reflect the utilitarian mode. Thus, the "good government" and "elect candidates of integrity" themes—regardless of their intrinsic truthfulness in contrast to the strategies of other organizations—are reflections of an appeal to the realm of political ideals for guiding activities. By contrast, the recurrent references among black and lower white organizations to campaign funds, considerations for political positions, and performance of service considerations suggest the salience for them of the practical and material benefits at stake in these elections. This by no means is meant to imply that upper white organizations have little interest in such "mundane" considerations or that they do not benefit materially from electoral activity. On the contrary, they may
simply be more clever in disguising their "true" intentions. It is also possible that the material rewards for the upper white category are realized in more subtle form. Or they may indeed be more "public-regarding," to use Wilson and Banfield's (1964) term. These themes shall receive further treatment in the next chapter.

Footnotes

1 Note, however, that much information about the organizations is public in nature. For example, the organizations themselves advertize their endorsements.

2 Unless otherwise specified or clear by context, quotation marks in this section entitled "Descriptive Summaries" refer to words used by an interviewee.

3 It is not illegal, apparently, for such funds to exchange hands in Louisiana. For a discussion of the election laws in the state, see James' (1975) analysis of Gov. Edwin Edwards' re-election campaign.

4 This candidate remarked: "Believe me, it was the first time I'd seen that happen in my thirty years in politics!"

5 The term influential could be possibly interpreted in more than one sense. For example, an organization could be extremely "influential" in a limited area of operation without having an impact upon the overall election. Respondents were encouraged to evaluate the organizations in terms of their perceived areas of operation.


7 One such neighborhood leader is well-known local political figure, Edna Mae Tickles. For a discussion of the political fragmentation of the Uptown area, see Synder (1975).

8 In 1944, for example, 63% of white adults were registered to vote, compared to approximately 1% of black adults. By 1948, the percentage of registered blacks increased to 13%, to 26% by 1956, 27% in 1964, 47% in 1968, and 55% in 1974. White registration levels for the same time frames stand at approximately 70%. For a discussion of registration levels by race in five Southern cities (including New Orleans), see Murray and Vedlitz (1975: 7-12).
It is apparently also quite common for money secured for campaign expenses to be utilized in support of more general organizational activities. This practice is by no means restricted to COUP.

With the exception of one term (1920 - 1925), a member of RDO has occupied the mayor's seat for every term from 1896 to 1946 (Parker, 1974: 69).

The Cold Water Committee was composed of a group of wealthy businessmen who helped finance activities of CCDA. Its name was derived from their attempt to dissuade Morrison from running for governor - figuratively, throwing "cold water" upon his plans (Parker, 1974: 81).

For a more detailed discussion of the special relationship between CCDA and the black community see Parker (1974: 86-88).

While Jimmie Davis himself did not run on an openly segregationist platform in the first primary, third place finisher, Willie Rainach, did so in the crudest of terms. In the second primary against Morrison, Davis made race an issue and successfully gathered much of Rainach's support. For a discussion of this election, see Havard, Heberle, and Howard (1963).

Morrison is generally regarded to have handled the initial period of desegregation in the city quite poorly. Morrison's general strategy seems to have been to ignore the issue as much as possible—a seemingly unwise decision while disorder reigned in the streets. The agonizing controversy, perhaps accentuated by the absence of strong leadership, appears to have contributed to CCDA's growing reputation for ineffectiveness (Parker, 1974: 118).

Iris Kelso, political reporter for the New Orleans States-Item, offered this analysis (Parker, 1974: 126):

The main reason for the confusion is that for almost sixteen years now Chep Morrison was New Orleans politics. It was all quite simple. Either you were for or against the former mayor. Members of the Crescent City Democratic Association were the good guys. Members of the Regular Democratic Organization were the bad guys... If you were a Regular, you... waited patiently for the day he would be gone. Now suddenly that day has come and nobody knows what to do.
The grandfather clause stipulated that only those whose grandfathers were registered voters could now themselves register to vote. Since the grandfathers of most blacks would have been slaves, and, hence, not registered to vote, the rule had the effect of disenfranchising blacks. Of course, it technically also eliminated a number of whites from eligibility as well. The understanding clause required the potential registrant to demonstrate knowledge of the U.S. constitution to the satisfaction of the registrar of voters. The level of knowledge required to "satisfy" the registrar typically varied, depending upon who was attempting to register.

New Orleans is the second largest port in the United States.

The group was, in fact, a strong supporter of the mayor in the 1969 election. Further, Phyllis Landrieu, the mayor's wife, is a member of the organization.

The "rooster" is the symbol of the Democratic Party in Louisiana.

A quote of this nature is found in both Parker (1974) and Fredrichs (1967).

Rev. Davis was appointed to the post by Mayor Moon Landrieu. Elections for positions on the city council have been temporarily suspended until a redistricting plan for the city is completed.

Only Tammany Hall is said to be older.

The system is obviously not beneficial to those who are excluded from access to the organization.

RDO claims to have endorsed Juvenile Court Judge Israel Augustine in his bid for that post. They also invited the Rev. A.L. Davis to be one of the honored guests at the centennial celebration of the organization (Katz, 1975).

Douglas' reputed pragmatism has by now reached legendary proportions. He reportedly told a national organizer from the McGovern 1972 presidential campaign who solicited his support (Davis, 1973: 40): "Let's get one thing straight: I'm a political whore... what's in it for me?"

Sources here include Murray and Vedlitz (1974), Davis (1973), Bourg (1973), and selected reference persons.
CHAPTER V

THE ELECTIONS

Introduction

This chapter contains an analysis of eleven New Orleans elections which were held between 1972 and 1974. The rationale for selecting the particular elections under study and the basic descriptions of the contestants and issues involved in these elections are presented in chapter three. As further detailed in the operationalization of terms section of that chapter, local elections are considered to be of particular relevance in studying a community's political organizational structure. Such elections typically involve issues which most directly confront the individual citizen. Consequently, they are often hotly contested and serve as a forum in which potential cleavages within the population may become actualized. Of course, a major concern here is to assess the role of political organizations in this process.

Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and Voter Registration

Granted the assumption that political organizations attempt to influence the way in which individuals cast their votes, it seems clear that they likewise concern themselves with qualifying potential supporters for action at the polls. Indeed, the promotion of voter registration appears on the
agenda of virtually every New Orleans political organization described in the previous chapter. However, interest in the registration variable stems from other motives as well. According to evidence presented in the chapter dealing with theoretical considerations, voter turn out in many locales is often correlated with a number of characteristics, including race, sex, class, participation in voluntary associations, and so forth (Lipset, 1963: 75). Not surprisingly, these patterns generally hold as well for those who register to begin with. It is reasonable to expect that organizations prey upon this factor, seeking either to accentuate or reverse these reported trends in their favor.

Table 5A contains a summary of registration figures in New Orleans for the years 1972 through 1974. Cell entries for each of these years contain the average percent registered to vote of the estimated total number of individuals eighteen years and older for the 131 areal units comprising New Orleans. The registration means are cross-tabulated by both the race/class designation and the organizational effectiveness rating of the areal units. These means represent actual registration levels as determined from voter registration rolls, that is, they are not adjusted for the effects of the race/class and organizational effectiveness variables.

The race/class designations of the areal units are identical to those used in chapters three and four. However, for purposes of the analysis contained in this chapter, the list of areal units has been dichotomized into high and low
TABLE 5A

VOTER REGISTRATION IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT ADULTS REGISTERED, UNADJUSTED MEANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>Race/Class</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Lower White</th>
<th>Upper White</th>
<th>Row Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the registration rolls of the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters.*
organizational effectiveness categories rather than the three levels—high, medium, and low—of the previous chapters. This procedure is necessary since the cross-tabulation of three levels of race/class and three levels of the organizational variable would generate a table with at least one empty cell and several low frequency cells. High effectiveness areas are defined as those claimed by organizations themselves rated as highly or moderately effective by organizational leaders and candidates for office. The low effectiveness label is attached to areas claimed by organizations said to be minimally effective or ineffective, or to areas without organizational activity.

A two-factor analysis of variance is presented in table 5B for assessing the registration figures. This procedure is particularly appropriate for testing the relationship between nominally scaled independent variables and a dependent variable which is intervally scaled. It allows for the determination of the isolated effect of each independent variable upon the dependent variable and, additionally, a test for an interaction effect. Since cells of the two-way classification table used here do not have equal frequencies,2 a modification of the standard analysis of variance is contained in this procedure. Basically, each effect—in turn, race/class, organizational effectiveness, and interaction—is partitioned by adjusting for all other effects. Thus, the component sums of squares will not be orthogonal, that is, the estimates of the main effects will
TABLE 5B

VOTER REGISTRATION IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT ADULTS REGISTERED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Black vs. White</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.34**</td>
<td>118.16**</td>
<td>97.12**</td>
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<td>Lower White vs. Upper White</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Effectiveness</td>
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<td>15.64</td>
<td>26.93</td>
<td>31.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
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<td>25.52</td>
<td>30.62</td>
<td>45.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vs. Upper White, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td></td>
<td>19.13</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>15.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>c</sup>Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
not be independent of each other and the estimate of the interaction effect will not be independent of the main effects. This situation reflects a characteristic of the estimation procedure for unequal cell frequencies rather than any particular defect in the analysis. Estimates of the various effects are reported in the analysis of variance table as mean squares. The standard F-test is computed by dividing the mean square associated with any treatment effect by the corresponding mean square for error.

A further tool available in the analysis of variance repertoire is the computation of independent contrasts among treatment means. Such comparisons essentially involve a further partitioning of the variation associated with the independent variables. The number of comparisons permitted with any one independent variable is equal to the number of levels of that variable minus one. Thus, two comparisons—black versus white and lower white versus upper white, for example—are contained in the race/class variable. Since only one comparison—low versus high effectiveness—is allowed with the organizational variable, the indicated F-value stands as the test of this comparison. With these two independent variables, two further contrasts are possible, namely, one for each of the two degrees of freedom associated with the interaction component. The t-statistic for testing the difference between means is used to determine the level of significance incurred with each contrast.
Turning to the actual registration data entered in the table, it is first noted that an estimated 58.8 percent of eligible Orleanians were registered to vote in 1972, while 51.9 percent and 46.9 percent were so registered in 1973 and 1974 respectively. The eleven percent reduction in the proportion of those registered to vote is almost perfectly consistent across both race/class and organizational effectiveness levels. Examination of the raw figures constituting the percentages indicate that the reduction is due both to decrease in the numerator and to increases in the denominator. Specifically, the absolute numbers of registered voters actually declined between 1972 and 1974 and the pools of eligibles in these years likewise increased in size. In 1972, for example, 252,788 of the estimated 437,349 individuals 18 years of age and older in New Orleans registered to vote. Corresponding figures for 1973 are 234,567 of 451,960, and 217,278 of 465,264 for 1974.

Several possible explanations may be advanced to account for this pattern, although none can be clearly substantiated by the data. An employee of the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters suggested that the decline is not a long term one. Rather, registration increases occurred in the late 1960's and early 1970's, probably due to growing black registration and heightened interest in the 1969 mayor's race. Periodic checks of the registration cards are conducted in order to verify continued residence in the precinct of registration among those who have not voted in the past.
three years. Those who have moved to addresses outside the city boundaries or who cannot be located are eliminated from the rosters. Apparently, registration levels in 1973 and 1974 did not offset such losses.

Another possible explanation involves some basic error in the estimation of the total number of those eligible to vote. Since these estimates are based upon census materials, no adjustment is included for differences in mortality rates and migratory patterns among areal units. However, this factor would appear much more plausible if the differences from year to year, or from one level of the independent variables to another, were wildly divergent or reflected inconsistently biased trends. This is decidedly not the case. The observed patterns of decline are relatively uniform. Thus, the assumption that mortality and migratory differences among areal units will cancel each other out still seem acceptable.

Whatever the reasons for the decline, registration levels are clearly correlated with the race/class dimension of areal units. Upper whites are in each instance registered in greater proportion than are either lower whites or blacks. In fact, the mean difference in registration levels in upper white areas is approximately 12 percentage points higher than in lower white areas and 20 percentage points higher than in black areas. The statistics associated with the isolated effect of the race/class variable on voter registration levels confirm these observations. The magnitude of the race/class
mean square shows the differences to be highly significant, that is, to reflect a significance level indicating that differences of this magnitude occur by chance alone less than one time out of one hundred in identical situations. The orthogonahal contrasts indicate that differences between black and white areas and differences between lower white and upper white areas are both statistically significant aspects of the race/class differences.

However, the same patterns do not hold for the organizational variable. Examination of row totals suggest that there is only a negligible difference in registration levels between areas designated as containing highly effective organizational ratings and those having the low effectiveness ratings. Consequently, the mean square associated with these observed differences in registration across levels of organizational effectiveness is even smaller than the mean square for error. An orthogonal comparison, therefore, is not warranted. Further, since the observed patterns are fairly consistent within treatment dimensions, the interaction component is also well within chance expectations.

These findings are only partially consistent with hypothesized expectations. Positive relationships were expected between race/class and registration and also between organizational effectiveness and registration. The data support only the former expectation. However, there is a further complication. The race/class and organizational effectiveness attributes of areal units were also originally
expected to follow a positive relationship pattern. Instead, as the data of the previous chapter show, an inverse pattern prevails there. Thus, from the standpoint of its composition, the high organizational category is made up primarily of black areas, followed in number by lower white and upper white areal units. Specifically, the high organizational effectiveness category contains thirty-nine black, twenty-seven lower white, and fourteen upper white areal units. The low organizational effectiveness group consists of fifteen black, twenty-three lower whites, and thirteen upper white areas.

The central feature being tested in this dissertation is the mediating capacity of the organizational variable. Therefore, if the relationship between the race/class designation and the organizational effectiveness characteristics of areal units is inverse, the following two conditions must hold for the mediation role to be substantiated:

1) an inverse relationship must exist between the race/class characteristic and the participation variable (registration or voter turn out), and

2) a positive relationship must exist between the organizational effectiveness rating and the participation variable.

As detailed earlier in this section, neither of these conditions holds in comparisons of the registration figures across levels of the race/class and organizational attributes of areal units. To summarize, upper whites exhibit the highest levels of registration. However, the high effectiveness category of the organizational variable contains primarily
black, not upper white, areal units. Upper white areal units rated as highly effective are therefore expected to exhibit higher registration figures than upper white units rated as low effective areas, but lower registration figures than either lower white or black neighborhoods. Thus, the superior registration proportions of the upper white areas are apparently obtained in the relative absence of effective political organization as measured here. This situation accounts to some extent for the poor showing of the organizational factor vis-a-vis the registration data.

Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and Voter Turn Out

One can expect that organizational activity will be reflected in varying degrees of voter turn out. Table 6A contains a summary of voter turn out levels classified by race/class and organizational effectiveness characteristics for the years 1972 through 1974. Analysis of these data is presented in table 6B. As stipulated in chapter three, the voter turn out percentages were computed by dividing the total number of votes cast per areal unit by the total number of persons registered to vote for each unit.

Looking first at the 1972 figures, average voter turn out in the first primary stands at 41.6% and at 45.4% for the secondary primary. However, levels of voter turn out are not uniform across levels of the race/class variable. Upper white areas show the highest average turn out levels, exceeding in both elections those levels found in lower white areas
### TABLE 6A

VOTER TURNOUT IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT TURNOUT, UNADJUSTED MEANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td>Race/Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Lower White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff b</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>High</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1972, 1974a, 1974b), the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee (1973a, 1973b, 1973c), and the United States Bureau of the Census (1972: 1-18).*

*bThe abbreviation "OrgEff" refers to the organizational effectiveness variable.*
### TABLE 6B

**VOTER TURN OUT IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, and 1974, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT TURN OUT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.55&lt;sup&gt;C&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>18.43&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.14&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>20.34&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.22&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.73&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.31&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.03&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White vs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.45&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>2.16&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.98&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper White</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.64&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>17.13&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>20.93&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>18.43&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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<td>Black vs. White,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.15&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.28&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.16&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, Low OrgEff</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vs. Upper</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.86&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3.37&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.08&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, High, Low</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td>3.31</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>5.78</td>
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</table>

<sup>a</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>c</sup>Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
by about four percentage points and those of black neighborhoods by approximately twelve percentage points. The mean squares associated with the main effects of the race/class variable indicate statistical significance at the .05 level.

Turn out figures in 1972 are quite consistent across organizational effectiveness levels. The variation in mean voter turn out in high versus low organizational effectiveness areas is only about one percentage point. The extremely small mean squares for the organizational variable confirm the absence of significant differences in turn out levels. However, F-values associated with the interaction component of race/class and organizational effectiveness do indicate significant variation. Inspection of the turn out averages listed in the respective cells of the table quickly reveals the locus of the interaction. Turn out figures for black and lower white areas are almost identical, regardless of the level of organizational effectiveness considered. By comparison, upper white areas show voter turn out to be almost ten full percentage points higher in the high than in the low organizational effectiveness areas. Further comments concerning this matter shall be presented after considering the voter turn out data for 1973 and 1974. A check of the orthogonal contrasts reveals that the observed differences in turn out are significant for the black versus white, lower versus upper white, and, with one exception, for the interaction comparisons.
In 1973, voter turn out levels for New Orleans rose dramatically by an overall average of approximately eleven percent. The average turn out in the first primary stands at 56.2% and at 57.0% for the second election of that year. The major portion of this increase is contributed by the black and lower white neighborhoods. The mean turn out among upper whites is approximately seven percentage points higher in 1973 than in 1972. However, turn out in the lower white areas is about eleven percentage points higher than in 1972, and, in black neighborhoods, the average turn out increased by nearly seventeen percentage points. The overall effect is that turn out in the three race/class areas approaches parity, with the lower white and black areas actually showing a higher turn out than upper whites by two or so points in the first primary. The F-values indicate that the sizes of the differences in turn out means by the race/class variable are not statistically significant. Likewise, the small differences in turn out figures across levels of organizational effectiveness are below significance thresholds and no interaction effect is noted. Under these circumstances, no orthogonal comparisons are warranted.

Voter turn out levels in 1974 returned to magnitudes comparable with the 1972 data. In the first election of 1974, 45.2% of those eligible voted in the first primary and 44.3% participated in the second. Upper white neighborhoods again had the highest turn outs in both primaries, exceeding turn outs in lower white and black areas by about three and
ten percentage points respectively. The F-ratios indicated by these overall differences are statistically significant. However, the orthogonal contrasts indicate that the average difference in turn out between lower and upper whites is not significant in the first primary. Turn out differences associated with the organizational variable are again negligible. In both elections, however, an interaction effect is detected among levels of the independent variables. As in the 1972 data, this effect is centered in the turn out of figures of upper whites, high organizational effectiveness areas which show nearly seven percentage points beyond that listed for low organizational effectiveness, upper white areas.

The turn out data thus reflect two basic trends. One, voter turn out figures are, in general, positively correlated with the race/class dimension of areal units. This finding is contrary to the expectations revised on the basis of the observed inverse relationship between race/class and organizational effectiveness. If organizational effectiveness were the mediating variable, black areas would be expected to show the highest turn out percentages, followed then in participation by lower white and upper white neighborhoods. This pattern is approached only in the 1973 elections, a year in which black and lower white turn out levels significantly exceed those of the other two election years examined here. These and other data suggest that the 1973 pattern is the exception rather than the rule.
The second trend contained within the data concerns the interaction effect observed in the 1972 and 1974 figures. The second corollary of the mediation hypothesis is that voter turn out will be highest in areas rated as organizationally effective. Generally, this is not supported by the data, except in upper white areas. Turn out in lower white and black neighborhoods is shown to be roughly identical in both high and low organizationally effective units. The upper white pattern may be a reflection of the composition of highly rated upper white areas, located primarily in Uptown New Orleans and the Lakefront, as opposed to that of lower rated upper white areas, situated mostly in the newer suburban neighborhoods of New Orleans East and the West Bank—in short, a distinction between status areas of older versus newer vintage.

Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and Votes Cast in Selected Elections

Perhaps the ultimate test of organizational effectiveness lies in the relation between the array of organizational endorsements and the distribution of votes cast for endorsed candidates. As has been shown in the organizational descriptions of the previous chapter, such campaign activity forms the nucleus of what New Orleans' political organizations typically consider themselves to be all about. Further, candidates and organizational leaders alike considered local political organizations to play an important role in recent elections and were able to talk readily about the organizations
in terms of their reputed impact upon elections. Indeed, the concept of "organizational effectiveness" as adopted for the study is drawn from the definition commonly held among these respondents. In short, the organizations operate primarily within the electoral context.

The assessment of the mediating role of organizations follows the expectations specified earlier in this chapter, with one modification. This refinement is necessitated by the fact that organizations do not always endorse the same candidate. Thus, the expected direction of the relationship between the race/class dimension and the distribution of votes cast is defined in each election by the particular pattern of organizational endorsements. Likewise, the direction of the relationship expected between organizational effectiveness ratings and the distribution of votes cast is subject to this endorsement pattern.

1972 Louisiana State Supreme Court Race. The 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court election featured four candidates seeking to fill a two year unexpired, associate justice term. The election district for this seat actually extends beyond Orleans Parish to include Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes. Analysis is restricted here to Orleans Parish to maintain continuity and comparability with other electoral data presented in the study.

Preliminary descriptions of the candidates—Pascal Calogero, Revius Ortique, William Redmann, and Leon Sarpy—and the conditions surrounding the election were presented
in chapter three. The election is of particular interest because of its racial and class overtones. Both Calogero and Redmann, for example, emphasized their "working class" ties. Ortique reminded audiences that he would be the first black justice elected to the court. Sarpy, a Tulane law professor, Boston Club member, and former King of Rex, was cast as the Uptown, silk-stocking candidate.

Calogero, a close friend and former law partner of Mayor Landrieu, actively sought the support of the city's political organizations. Landrieu himself had won the 1969 mayor's race with strong black and upper white organizational support, and many of the same apparently saw virtue in backing a candidate of a similar mold. Calogero's own working class origins in the city's eighth ward, graduation at the top of his class at the Tulane Law School, and work as an attorney and Democratic office holder combined to project a "local boy makes good!" image attractive to many organizations. The Landrieu connection was likewise said to be very persuasive.

Ortique, on the other hand, encountered considerable difficulty marshalling the support of even black organizations. Several black organizations had recently experienced a measure of electoral success and its spoils in the 1969 election. The wisdom of backing a winner was apparent and fresh in mind. Further, Ortique's upper status background and existence, seemingly removed from that of the average black, were mentioned as obstacles in generating enthusiasm for his
candidacy. The issue of black solidarity, however, took precedence in the considerations of some organizations.

Sarpy's campaign strategy concentrated upon the media approach. He tended to view the judicial race and his own campaign as standing above the political fray incumbent to the typical New Orleans election. The tone of his television commercials, filmed in the well-appointed living room—chandeliers, for example, hung conspicuously overhead—of his Uptown home, seemed particularly to impart an air of aloofness. He addressed a number of rallies sponsored by political organizations, but seldom asked directly for organizational support and universally refused to provide funds for organizational endorsements.

The final candidate, Redmann, sought some organizational support, but received little—most likely because he was given little chance of winning the election, given the nature of his opposition. The AFL-CIO did rate him as very friendly to and compatible with labor.

Endorsements of the city's political organizations are summarized in table 7. In the first primary, the black organizations split their endorsements, with the more highly rated organizations of this group favoring Calogero and those rated as less effective, excepting CCIVL, siding with Ortique. Calogero drew the support of all lower white and upper white organizations. With the elimination of Ortique and Redmann from the race, all organizational support was lined up behind the candidacy of Calogero in the second
### TABLE 7

ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1972 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calogero</td>
<td>Ortique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Class Designation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPVVL</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>TIPS</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
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</tr>
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<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>NOVA</td>
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<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper White:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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</tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
primary. On the basis of these endorsements, expectations consistent with the mediating hypothesis indicate that Calogero should carry the areas of high organizational ratings over those areas rated as less effective, and that the distribution of votes cast for Calogero should be inversely related to the race/class designation of areal units. Further, the levels of support found among the other candidates should be equally distributed over both race/class and organizational effectiveness categories.

Presentation and analysis of the votes cast in the 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court race are given in tables 8A and 8B. In the first primary, Sarpy received 33.7% of the votes, only a fraction more than the 33.3% collected by Calogero. Ortique managed to get 24.1% and Redmann finished a distant fourth at 9.2%. Turning to the race/class variable, Sarpy, without organized political support as defined here, received the largest share of votes within any of the race/class areas—55.7% of the upper white vote. With only the claimed support of the lower rated black organizations, Ortique gained 45.8% of the black vote. Thirty-two percent of the remaining vote in black areas was cast for Calogero and 17.6% was given to Sarpy. Calogero managed 39.4% of the lower white vote, only one tenth of one percentage point more than the 39.3% of that vote cast for Sarpy.

The F-ratios associated with the race/class variable indicate that the average number of votes cast in each of the race/class levels are significantly different in all cases.
TABLE 8A

VOTES CAST IN 1972 LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate:</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Race/Class</td>
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<td>Lower White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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</table>

*Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1972).
TABLE 8B

VOTES CAST IN 1972 LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Calogero</th>
<th>Ortique</th>
<th>Redmann</th>
<th>Sarpy</th>
<th>Calogero</th>
<th>Sarpy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Race/Class</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>-14.60**</td>
<td>10.07**</td>
<td>14.67**</td>
<td>-13.27**</td>
<td>13.23**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower White vs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-2.07*</td>
<td>4.71*</td>
<td>6.58**</td>
<td>-6.04**</td>
<td>5.83**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper White</td>
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<td>Organizational</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td>17.42</td>
<td>104.29**</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>18.27</td>
<td>33.91</td>
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<td>.58</td>
<td>93.39**</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
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<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.08*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vs. Upper</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>White, High, Low</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.97**</td>
<td>4.00**</td>
<td>2.23*</td>
<td>2.50*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>10.00</td>
<td>16.04</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>10.54</td>
<td>11.21</td>
<td>11.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>c</sup>Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
except that of Calogero. Orthogonal contrasts indicate that these discrepancies across race/class levels are significant for both black-white and lower white-upper white differences. A strong interaction effect is also noted in both the Calogero and Sarpy distributions, symptomatic mainly of the heavy support for Sarpy in the high effectiveness, upper white areas and the corresponding low support for Calogero in these same areas.

The distribution of votes cast shows a statistically significant difference across levels of the organizational effectiveness variable only in the case of Ortique. Here, a difference between high and low effectiveness areas stands at eleven percentage points in favor of Ortique. Since, however, he was not endorsed by one of the eight organizations in the high effectiveness category, and the bulk of the vote in his direction occurred in black neighborhoods, it is difficult to construe this as evidence supportive of the organizational variable.

The major issue in the second election revolved around the question of to whom Ortique's bloc of votes would shift. Black organizations previously backing Ortique now endorsed Calogero. The Landrieu connection was reaffirmed. Sarpy, meanwhile, continued his policy of working independently of organizational support. Political wags fully expected Calogero to take the bulk of the departed candidates' support.

Returns from the second primary suggest quite clearly to whom Ortique's share of the black vote went. Calogero
received 58.4% of all votes cast in Orleans Parish, enough to offset his losses in neighboring parishes, and 73.5% of the black vote. This represented an increase of 41% in his support among blacks over the first primary. He also increased his share of the lower white vote to 53.3%, and carried 37.7% the upper white vote. The analysis shows that the differences in the vote by race/class categories is statistically significant for both candidates. There also is an interaction effect, again centered in the ten percentage point gap in candidate choice in upper white neighborhoods between high and low organizational effectiveness areas. Votes in black and lower white areas vary no more than five percentage points across organizational effectiveness levels. Differences in overall mean votes per candidate across the organizational variable are not significant.

In sum, the data for this election do not tend to support the mediating hypothesis. The organizational effectiveness variable shows a significant difference only in the case of the vote for Ortique--an instance which must be discounted since the high effectiveness organizations endorsed his opponent. One might argue, however, that the effect of an endorsement is relative, that is, Calogero did well by the organizations in the first election in drawing almost one-third of the black vote against a black opponent. On the other hand, in the absence of a black opponent in the second primary, he still received 70.7% of the vote in low effectiveness black neighborhoods--only four percentage points
less than in high organization black areas. In short, the endorsed candidate won, but it is difficult to point to solid evidence of organizational mediation.

1973 Orleans Parish District Attorney Race. The District Attorney's race in 1973 featured a rematch of the 1969 election in which Harry Connick challenged incumbent Jim Garrison. These two were joined in the 1973 election by attorney George Reese and former Garrison aide Ross T. Scaccia. Connick's campaign emphasized a tough "law-and-order" stance which included a promise to prosecute black-on-black crime, a claimed weakness of the Garrison regime. As otherwise used, law-and-order is generally a codeword for cracking down upon black-on-white crime. Connick sought to soften the hard image that law-and-order thus carries in the black community by personally and openly courting the support of the black organizations. Upper white organizations favored Connick over Garrison. Connick was well-known among them through his work as a successful attorney in criminal law and through his participation in AGG prior to seeking office. As indicated in table 9, Connick was successful in gaining the support of the higher ranking black organizations, with the exception of OPPVL, and of all the upper white organizations. Among the lower white organizations, he was able to secure the endorsement only of MCD.

Garrison was seeking his fifth term as district attorney and, whether he himself actually contributed to the problem or not, was a natural target for the frustration over
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>1st Primary</th>
<th>2nd Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connick</td>
<td>Garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWCVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPS</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
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<td>NOVA</td>
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<td>AID</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper White:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
rising crime rates in New Orleans. Generally regarded as a charismatic individual, Garrison maintained extensive support in lower white areas over the years and, despite occasional recriminations, was personally popular among blacks as well. However, his involvement in the Kennedy assassination case, considered by some as a wasteful and foolish divergence, seemed to have cost him some measure of support in upper white areas. Garrison drew endorsements from two old-guard black organizations (OPPVL and CCIVL) and all the lower white organizations except MCD. The leaders of DAWN, somewhat leery of all the law-and-order talk being generated, decided to stay with Garrison.

Reese, the third candidate, was able to attract only the endorsement of BOLD, although several organizations expressed their basic satisfaction with his credentials. His efforts in aligning organizational support appeared hampered chiefly by the belief that Connick had the best chance of unseating Garrison. A handsome and charismatic sort, he concentrated upon personal appearances and media advertising.

The basic pattern of the endorsements varies in this election significantly from that of the previous one. In this race, upper white and black organizations are found leaning toward the same candidate, who is actively opposed by the lower white organizations. In this scheme, the higher organizational effectiveness category is initially somewhat diluted. In keeping with hypothesized relations, support for Connick is expected to be least elevated in the
organizationally effective areas of lower white neighborhoods. The reverse pattern, that is, low support in black and upper white areas and high support in lower white neighborhoods, should hold for the distribution of the Garrison vote. The Reese support should be randomly distributed across levels of the race/class and organizational effectiveness variables.

These expectations, therefore, anticipate quadratic trends within the distribution of the Connick and Garrison votes. Such trends may be specifically assessed by utilizing the two orthogonal contrasts associated with the race/class variable to test for linear and quadratic trends rather than the black-white and lower white-upper white comparisons employed in analyzing the previous election. In this instance, the former set of contrasts is clearly preferable.

Tables 10A and 10B contain the distribution and analysis of votes cast in the district attorney's race. Garrison carried 40.4% of the vote in the first primary, compared with Connick's 34.4%. Reese was eliminated with his third place finish of 23.9%. The largest single bloc of votes within any race/class category is the 49.2% of the black vote given to Garrison—despite the endorsement of Connick by the bulk of the strongest black organizations. Connick followed in black neighborhoods with thirty-six percent of the votes. Lower whites favored Garrison, giving him 40.3% of the vote, and split their remaining votes almost equally between Connick and Reese (29.8% and 28.2%,
## TABLE 10A

VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS

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<th>Candidate:</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Black</td>
<td>Lower White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connick</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Column Mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garrison</td>
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</tr>
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<td>OrgEff</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Column Mean</td>
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<tr>
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a Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee (1973a).

b The abbreviation "OrgEff" refers to the organizational effectiveness variable.
**TABLE 10B**

VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df(^a)</th>
<th>df(^b)</th>
<th>Connick</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
<th>Reese</th>
<th>Connick</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>-4.12**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>4.48</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>7.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are **mean squares**.

\(^b\)Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are **t-statistics**.

\(^c\)Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05, *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
respectively). Connick and Reese were the clear choices of the upper white neighborhoods, drawing 39.8% and 35.8% of those votes. Garrison finished a poor third there with only 23.1%.

The F-ratios associated with the race/class designation indicate that the mean differences among the categories are indeed statistically significant. Further, a clear quadratic trend is present in the distribution of Connick votes. The expected quadratic trend in the Garrison vote is overshadowed by the strong linear trend induced by the unexpected high support for Garrison in black areas. Reese's support is likewise obviously linear, but in the opposite direction from Garrison's distribution. Differences among levels of organizational effectiveness are not statistically significant.

The distribution of the vote in the first primary suggested that Garrison faced an uphill battle in the run-off. Reese's votes seemed most likely to swing in Connick's direction. Votes cast for Reese shared an important characteristic with those for Connick, namely, both were votes against the incumbent. To Connick's advantage also, Reese was the clear favorite over Garrison in upper white areas. Finally, several of the black organizations backing Connick seemed slightly embarrassed by the strong black support for Garrison in the first primary. Atonement could be made in the second election. A breakdown of the votes cast in the second primary generally confirmed these projections, with the exception of Garrison's black support diminishing. Garrison carried 56.8% of the
black vote, an increase of about seven percent over the first primary. However, Connick managed to win the election by a narrow margin, 50.9% to 49.0%. He did so by carrying two-thirds of the votes from upper white areas—an increase of nearly thirty percent—and drawing 46.6% and 43.0% from lower white and black areas respectively.

The differences among the race/class categories are shown to be statistically significant in the analyses of variance. A strong positive relationship between the race/class variable and the Connick support and the concommitant inverse relationship between race/class and the Garrison support are indicated. These linear trends overshadow the predicted quadratic trends. The interaction effect is noted again, resulting from the magnitude of the differences in support between high and low organizational effectiveness areas of the upper white category, compared with the similarities found in black and lower white areas across organizational effectiveness ratings.

In this election, there are some factors which conform with expectations. The quadratic distribution of the Connick vote in the first primary and the higher vote totals for Connick in high organization upper white areas are examples. However, the organizational variable again shows poorly and most of the expectations associated with it are, in fact, not substantiated by the evidence. In addition, one may note the 61.9% support gained by Connick in low organizational effectiveness upper white areas or the 55.5% for Garrison in
high organizational effectiveness black areas. Such discrepancies must be balanced against the confirmed expectations.

1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff Race. Political observers indicated prior to this 1973 election that long time incumbent, Milton Stire, again appeared unbeatable. Stire was reputed among the organizational leaders and candidates to run and clean and tight office. Further, he had proved over the years to be an active and shrewd politician. Formally, he eschewed personal affiliation with any one political organization. He did, however, maintain open and public ties with a number of organizations, especially the city's lower white groups. As illustrated in table 11, Stire acquired the backing of these organizations for the election and also secured the endorsement of AGG. For Stire, the issue of the campaign was simple: "Re-elect me, I've done a good job."

Stire was opposed by two black candidates--Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr. of DAWN, and Alvin Sargent. Jackson voiced no specific complaints about Stire's performance in office other than the incumbent's rather conservative racial stance. Given the extent to which matters of this office affected the black community, Jackson primarily claimed to seek greater black participation and input. The entry of Sargent into the race touched off some controversy in the black community. It was charged by some that Sargent's candidacy was inspired by the Stire camp to put a crack in
TABLE 11
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>First Primarya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Jackson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Class Designation</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUL</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUP</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPVL</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWCVL</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIVL</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower White:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td></td>
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<td>CCDA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper White:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aStire won re-election without a run-off (second primary).*
the solid black vote needed by Jackson to pull an upset. Jackson gained the unified endorsement of all the major black organizations, and drew the support of IWO and NOC as well, who agreed "it was time for a change."

The pattern of endorsements in this election closely resembles that of the district attorney race (which, incidentally, was conducted concurrently). Quite simply, black and upper white organizations are found to favor the same candidate, Jackson, in opposition to the choice of the lower white organizations, Stire. According to the hypothesized relationships, therefore, quadratic trends are expected in the distributions of Stire and Jackson support across levels of the race/class designation. Thus, the greatest support for Jackson is expected in high organizational effectiveness portions of black and upper white areas, while comparatively fewer votes should be found for him in high organizational effectiveness areas of lower white neighborhoods. Stire's support should be concentrated in the lower white categories, especially in the high organizational effectiveness classification. These patterns are again tested directly in the set of orthogonal comparisons.

The results of the first primary for this office are presented in table 12A. The political forecasts were in this instance affirmed. Stire won easily without necessitating a run-off by cornering 56.4% of the vote. Jackson followed with 34.1% and Sargent claimed the remaining 9.1%. The largest single bloc of votes within categories of the race/class
### TABLE 12A

VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Race/Class</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Lower White</th>
<th>Upper White</th>
<th>Row Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jackson</strong></td>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sargent</strong></td>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stire</strong></td>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee (1973b).
designation is found among the high organizational effectiveness upper white neighborhoods where Stire gained 81.5% of the vote. Overall, Stire collected 79.4% of the votes cast in upper white neighborhoods. Jackson and Sargent split the remaining twenty-one percent almost evenly, 11.5% to 9.4% respectively. Stire likewise carried lower white neighborhoods by a wide margin, 71.4%, with only one tenth of one percent difference showing between high and low organizational effectiveness areas. Jackson managed to get 60.1% of the black vote, carrying high organization areas of these neighborhoods by about eleven more percentage points than in low organizational effectiveness areas. However, Stire did receive almost one-third of the black vote despite solid organizational opposition in black areas. The nine percent won by Sargent would apparently not have altered the outcome of the election, even if it had been unanimously co-opted by Jackson.

The analyses of variance, presented in table 12B, indicates that the differences in support for Stire and Jackson are statistically significant across race/class categories. The distribution of votes for Sargent by this variable is well within chance expectations. The expected quadratic trends are not pronounced due to the low support accorded Jackson, or conversely, the strong support for Stire, in upper white neighborhoods. However, linear trends are pure and prominent. The Jackson vote is clearly related inversely to the race/class dimension and the Stire support
TABLE 12B

VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Jackson</th>
<th>Sargent</th>
<th>Stire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>701.09**&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>675.79**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Trend</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-14.97**</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.40**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic Trend</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-6.30**</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.16**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Effectiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>123.96**</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>107.23**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41.85</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>49.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Trend, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic Trend, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>c</sup>Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
subsequently shows a strong positive relation with the race/class variable.

The organizational factor likewise shows significant variation here in the distribution of votes for both major candidates. The significant variation in the vote between high and low organizational effectiveness areas is largely attributable to the differences in support among black neighborhoods. Differences in candidate choice among white neighborhoods of the low and high effectiveness rating are quite small by comparison. Generally, these data are quite supportive of the hypothesized relationships, with the notable exception of the potent support given Stire in upper white areas.

1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court Race. The Clerk of Court election bears much resemblance to the race for Civil Sheriff. A long term white incumbent, Daniel Haggerty, faced opposition from a promising black candidate, Edwin Lombard, and a third minor candidate, Herman Bustemente. Haggerty was considered to be more vulnerable than Stire. Dissatisfaction had surfaced concerning Haggerty's performance in office, particularly during the most recent term. The situation posed a dilemma in the minds of some people. Disposing of Haggerty was one thing. Replacing him with a black man was another. However, by almost any standard, Lombard was an attractive candidate. He was well and locally--Loyola University School of Law--educated. He had worked for Mayor Landrieu in recent elections and was considered to
be a stable, known quantity. He was an effective and articulate speaker, especially in comparison to Haggerty. Bustemente sought to gain entry and consideration into the race, but was largely ignored as major organizations and figures chose sides between Haggerty and Lombard.

Organizational endorsements for the election are presented in table 13. Lombard received unanimous support from the city's black and upper white organizations. His candidacy was even endorsed by the conservative morning daily, The New Orleans Times-Picayune. He was likewise endorsed by The New Orleans State-Item, the editorially more liberal evening newspaper. For the black organizations, Lombard's candidacy became a cause célèbre. The specifics of the election indicated that Lombard had a good chance of becoming the first black to win a city-wide elective post since Reconstruction. On the other hand, if he failed, it was difficult to envision a situation in which a black candidate might succeed in the near future. Haggerty drew the unified support of the lower white organizations. Thus, the election, like the previous two, shows black and upper white organizations siding in their endorsements against those of the lower white organizations. The expectation, then, is that the distributions of support for Haggerty and Lombard will follow linear and quadratic trends.

Tables 14A and 14B contain the distribution and analysis of the votes cast in the two primaries for this office. In the first primary, Haggerty barely missed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>1st Primary</th>
<th>2nd Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bustemente</td>
<td>Haggerty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Class Designation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWCVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower White:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper White:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate:</td>
<td>First Primary</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Lower White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haggerty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff High</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff Low</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff High</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff Low</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aRaw data used in generating this table derived from Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee (1973c).
TABLE 14B

VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Haggerty</td>
<td>Lombard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>359.43**&lt;sup&gt;C&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>450.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>579.62**</td>
<td>578.59**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Trend</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.74**</td>
<td>-11.87**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.06**</td>
<td>-10.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic Trend</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>-7.21**</td>
<td>7.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.58**</td>
<td>8.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Effectiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>208.40**</td>
<td>220.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>214.31**</td>
<td>221.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>76.57**</td>
<td>76.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56.73</td>
<td>60.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.44*</td>
<td>-2.41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>16.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.94</td>
<td>20.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup> Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>C</sup> Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
collecting a majority of the votes, receiving 48.5% of those cast. Lombard finished a scant two and one half percentage points behind with 46.0%. Thus, Bustemente forced a run-off though getting only 5.1% of the vote. The largest bloc of votes in any race/class category is the 73.3% support for Lombard found in high organizational effectiveness black neighborhoods. Overall, Lombard received 69.3% of the black vote, while drawing 30.2% and 28.5% from lower white and upper white areas respectively. Surprisingly, upper white areas gave Haggerty his largest proportion of support. He received 63.3% of that vote and 62.8% of the vote in lower white areas.

Analysis of these figures shows that the average voting levels recorded for the two candidates vary significantly across both levels of the race/class dimension and levels of the organizational effectiveness variable. Tests for linear trends indicate the Lombard vote to be strongly and inversely related to the race/class designation and positively related to the organizational effectiveness rating of areal units. These relationships are present in the Haggerty vote as well, but run in the opposite direction. That is, Haggerty support tends to increase across levels of the race/class variable and decrease across organizational effectiveness levels. The quadratic trend is less pronounced due to the unexpected level of support received by Haggerty in upper white neighborhoods. An interaction effect is present in the data, attributable mainly to the large
difference in support between high and low organizational effectiveness areas in black neighborhoods. The differences average almost fourteen percentage points in black areas, as compared with fluctuations of only one or two percentage points in white areas.

With both sides realistically sensing victory, the campaigns between the primaries intensified considerably. Both organizational efforts and media advertising increased noticeably. Special efforts were made to further inform voters residing in upper white areas of Lombard's educational and political credentials. Perhaps of even greater significance, his name was subtly linked with that of Connick (the district attorney candidate) and Charles Foti (the challenger in the criminal sheriff race) as the reform "ticket." This strategy would presumably help Lombard in white areas, and work to the advantage of Connick and Foti in black neighborhoods.

The second primary was not as close a contest as had been expected. Lombard won with 54.4% of the vote. He drew 79.5% of the black vote, an increase of almost ten percentage points over the first primary. He also received 40.5% of the upper white vote, a shift of twelve percentage points over the first primary, and drew over one-third of the vote in lower white neighborhoods. Thus, Haggerty recorded 65.0% of the lower white vote, but fared more poorly in both black and upper white areas than in the first primary.
Differences in the average votes cast per candidate vary significantly across both race/class and organizational effectiveness categories. Lombard's support is inversely related to race/class and positively related to organizational effectiveness. Haggerty's support appears as the mirror image. The quadratic trends across race/class levels are clearly evident, with Lombard's support in black and in upper white areas being larger than that recorded in lower white neighborhoods. For Haggerty, the reverse is true. No interaction effect is noted. In short, the results of this election conform in every way to the hypothesized expectations.

**1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court Race.** The 1974 race for the Louisiana State Supreme Court involved the same associate justice seat contested in the 1972 election treated earlier. This time, however, the victor could expect to serve a full ten-year term before facing re-election. Justice Calogero was challenged by Jefferson Parish Criminal Sheriff, Alwynn Cronvich, and the former Orleans Parish District Attorney, Jim Garrison.

Cronvich attacked Calogero's record on the court, claiming that Calogero served as the liberal swing vote that allowed rapists and murderers to run free. He vowed to bring a tough law-and-order stance and a lawman's point of view to the court. Calogero defended the legal and moral integrity of his court decisions. He further emphasized his private role of parent, implying that the concerned
father of eight children would not turn loose murderers and rapists into the streets. Garrison's candidacy seemed doomed to failure from the start. Having just been defeated in the district attorney's race in the midst of law-and-order talk, he had no unique stand left between Calogero and Cronvich. Further, his major strengths during the district attorney years—lower whites and blacks—were major sources of Calogero's constituency in the 1972 race. The tough-talking sheriff, meanwhile, seemed to hold a decided edge among the suburban whites of Jefferson Parish and the rural whites of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes that might otherwise be predisposed to Garrison.

Calogero's strategy in 1974 was similar to that used two years earlier—to win by a large enough margin in New Orleans to off-set expected losses to Cronvich in the other three parishes of the district. Table 15 contains a summary of the endorsements of New Orleans political organizations for this election. Calogero secured the endorsements of all seventeen organizations. The organizations worked the campaign with some sense of urgency. Few were willing to risk losing the campaign to Cronvich. Some were concerned about Cronvich's ideology. For others, it was simply a matter of retaining the seat for a New Orleanian rather than giving it up to someone in Jefferson Parish.

The pattern of endorsements in this election leads to the standard set of expectations used in the analysis of the 1972 race. The distribution of the Calogero vote is
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>1st Primary</th>
<th>2nd Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calogero</td>
<td>Cronvich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWCVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL-CIO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper White:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
expected to be inversely related to the race/class variable. Black areas are anticipated to support Calogero in a greater proportion than are lower white or upper white areas. Lower white support for Calogero should exceed that found for him in upper white areas. Finally, the vote should be significantly larger in Calogero's behalf among high than low organizational effectiveness areas. Distributions of support for Cronvich and Garrison should follow a random pattern across levels of the race/class and organizational effectiveness variables. These trends are specifically tested in the set of orthogonal comparisons.

Tables 16A and 16B contain the results and analysis of the two primaries. In the first primary, Calogero just missed a majority in Orleans Parish, carrying 49.7% of the vote. Garrison was second in the parish with 28.8% and Cronvich finished third here with 21.5% of the New Orleans vote. However, by virtue of his stronger showing in the other three parishes of the district, Cronvich outdistanced Garrison for the run-off slot against Calogero.

Returning to the New Orleans vote, black neighborhoods gave Calogero the largest single bloc of votes (59.5%) of any of the race/class areas. He also carried the largest percentage of the votes cast in white areas, taking 43.1% of the lower white and 41.9% of the upper white votes. Garrison did almost equally well in lower white and black areas, polling 31.8% and 30.1% of the votes, but fared poorly in upper white neighborhoods. Cronvich received a
TABLE 16A

VOTES CAST IN 1974 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS

| Candidate: | First Primary | Race/Class |               | Race/Class |               |
|           |               | Black      | Lower        | Upper      | Mean        | Black      | Lower        | Upper      | Mean        |
| Calogero  |               |            |              |            |             |            |              |            |             |
| OrgEff    | High          | 61.4       | 43.3         | 40.6       | 51.9        | 81.2       | 56.4         | 43.7       | 66.2        |
|           | Low           | 54.7       | 42.3         | 43.4       | 46.2        | 76.7       | 52.8         | 51.0       | 59.6        |
|           | Column Mean   | 59.5       | 43.1         | 41.9       | 49.7        | 79.8       | 54.8         | 47.2       | 63.6        |
| Cronvich  |               |            |              |            |             |            |              |            |             |
| OrgEff    | High          | 10.0       | 23.3         | 41.2       | 20.0        | 18.8       | 43.4         | 56.1       | 33.6        |
|           | Low           | 11.3       | 26.5         | 33.4       | 23.8        | 23.3       | 47.1         | 48.7       | 40.5        |
|           | Column Mean   | 10.5       | 24.8         | 37.5       | 21.5        | 20.0       | 45.1         | 52.5       | 36.3        |
| Garrison  |               |            |              |            |             |            |              |            |             |
| OrgEff    | High          | 28.6       | 32.5         | 18.2       | 28.1        |            |              |            |             |
|           | Low           | 33.9       | 31.0         | 23.0       | 29.9        |            |              |            |             |
|           | Column Mean   | 30.1       | 31.8         | 20.5       | 28.8        |            |              |            |             |

\(^a\)Raw data used in generating this table derived from the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1974a).
TABLE 16B

VOTES CAST IN 1974 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df^a</th>
<th>df^b</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Calogero</td>
<td>Cronvich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.35**C</td>
<td>185.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-9.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-9.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.58**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, Low, OrgEff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vs. Upper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, High, Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>3.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

^bColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

^cAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.

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meager 10.5% of the black vote and 24.8% of the votes in lower white neighborhoods. Upper whites gave him 37.5% of their votes.

Differences in votes cast across the race/class designation of areal units are statistically significant in all cases, and the discrepancies between lower and upper white levels of support vary significantly in the cases of Cronvich and Garrison. An interaction effect is noted as well for the distribution of support for each candidate. This effect is located in the difference between high and low organizational effectiveness levels of support in black versus white areas for the Calogero vote and in lower versus upper white areas for both the Garrison and Calogero votes. The organizational variable shows significant differences as expected only in distribution of the Calogero vote.

Projections indicated that Calogero would fare even better in Orleans Parish in the second primary. Calogero seemed sure to pick up the bulk of Garrison's substantial black and lower white support. Further, if trends in the first primary carried into the run-off, Calogero and Cronvich stood to split Garrison's small upper white following almost evenly. A look at the results for the second primary generally confirm the accuracy of these predictions. Calogero carried 63.6% of the votes cast in Orleans Parish, with an increase of twenty percentage points over the first primary from blacks (to 79.8%), an eleven percent increase from lower whites (to 54.8%), and an additional six percent in
upper white areas (to 47.2%). These differences, as well as those contained in the Cronvich vote, are statistically significant across race/class categories. Orthogonal contrasts show the differences to be significant for both black versus white and lower white versus upper white variations. The interaction effect is also significant in the comparison of lower and upper white patterns across levels of the organizational variable. Variation in the vote by levels of organizational effectiveness ratings are likewise significant.

These data are only partially supportive of the hypothesized trends. The Calogero vote is indeed inversely related to race/class and, especially in the second primary, the organizational variable does register a significant effect. However, as indicated by the persistent presence of the interaction effect, these trends are not entirely consistent across all levels of the independent variables. In short, variations in the dependent variable, votes cast, occasionally carry a unique effect at certain levels of the independent variables. Here, the loci have generally been the high and low effectiveness categories of the black or upper white area designations. At this juncture, therefore, the organizational variable seems to assume the hypothesized mediation role only under certain circumstances. Even then, it deviates at times from expectations.

1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Race. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals race is of particular interest for two reasons. One, the organizational endorsement procedure
became a campaign issue in this election. City Councilman and Uptown resident, Peter Beer, declared that he would not "pay" for organizational support. Other of the candidates resented at least one implication of the pronouncement, namely, the charge that only they were buying votes. Several organizational leaders were rankled by the remarks as well. If candidates were being impugned for buying votes, the organizations were also being accused of selling them. Secondly, this election shows a third pattern of organizational endorsements—that of black and lower white organizations siding against the choice of the white organizations.

The question of organizational endorsements had been a campaign issue on previous occasions. For example, Sarpy had disdained the practice during the 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court election. However, the issue was highlighted in the Fourth Circuit Court election, probably because of the endorsement of Municipal Judge Joseph Bossetta by several black organizations, including SOUL. SOUL's pragmatism, or more baldly, its reputation for requiring money in exchange for an endorsement, had received considerable media attention. Black endorsement of Bossetta, a Wallace elector in the 1968 presidential race, constituted for some substantiating evidence of such practices—although Bossetta had in fact established a more moderate reputation among several black leaders since 1968 and could reasonably have been supported by them on these grounds.
Table 17 contains a summary of the organizational endorsements for this election. Of the strongest black organizations, SOUL and OPPVL endorsed Bossetta, while COUP and NWCVL supported George Reese. Bossetta also obtained the endorsements of all but one of the remaining black organizations and all of the lower white groups. One black leader commented:

We would have been quite comfortable politically with Beer. He had a pretty good record while on the (city) council. But when we met the candidates, here he was standing there spouting off about money and endorsements and generally being offensive to us. Bossetta . . . was making an effort to relate to us and, by contrast, seemed the more friendly candidate. . . . Of course, his background did, nonetheless, make him hard to peddle in our precincts.

Beer drew the solid endorsements of the upper white organizations. However, securing endorsements was a difficult matter for the two remaining candidates, Civil Court Judge Dom Grieshaber and Reese, the former district attorney candidate. Grieshaber won the support only of BOLD. As indicated earlier, at least one important consideration entertained by the organizations in making endorsements is the candidate's probability of winning. As such, much of the natural constituency which Grieshaber and Reese could expect to attract was preempted by the two other candidates.

The basic pattern of endorsements contained here—black and lower white versus upper white—generates the following set of expectations. Support for Bossetta is anticipated to be greatest in the high organizational effectiveness areas of black and lower white neighborhoods.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations:</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class Designation</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>Bossetta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUP</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWCVL</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIVL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDA</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper White:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further, there should be an inverse relationship between the race/class variable and support for Bossetta. Beer, on the other hand, is expected to carry upper white neighborhoods, with special strength in the high organizational effectiveness areas. The series of orthogonal contrasts are fitted to test the particular black-lower white versus white dichotomy found here.

Results and analyses of the two primaries are presented in tables 18A and 18B. The returns of the first primary indicate a fairly close election, with the top three candidates finishing within eight percentage points of each other. Beer and Bossetta qualified for the run-off with 31.5% and 29.7% of the votes respectively. Grieshaber was a close third with 23.6% and Reese finished last with the remaining 15.2%. The largest blocs of votes found in any of the cross-classifications by race/class and organizational effectiveness are the 52.0% and 44.6% of the votes cast in upper white high and low organizational effectiveness areas respectively. The remaining portion of the upper white vote slightly favored Grieshaber (20.7%), with Bossetta (17.4%) and Reese (13.4%) close behind. The largest percentage of the black vote was gained by Bossetta (37.7%), followed by decreasing levels of support for Grieshaber (23.3%), Beer (21.3%), and Reese (17.8%). Lower white preferences were even more closely contested among the top three candidates. In lower white areas, Beer received 33.3% of the votes, while Bossetta and Grieshaber finished with 27.8% and 25.5%
TABLE 18A
VOTES CAST IN 1974 FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate:</th>
<th>First Primary</th>
<th>Race/Class</th>
<th>Second Primary</th>
<th>Race/Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td>Lower White</td>
<td>Upper White</td>
<td>Row Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bossetta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grieshaber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reese</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgEff</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Column Mean</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Raw data used in generating this table derived from the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1974b).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Beer</th>
<th>Bossetta</th>
<th>Grieshaber</th>
<th>Reese</th>
<th>Beer</th>
<th>Bossetta</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
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<td>184.18**&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>66.35**</td>
<td>39.69**</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>97.11**</td>
<td>102.87**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, Lower White</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. Lower White</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>7.02**</td>
<td>-4.92**</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>3.26**</td>
<td>-3.44**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Organizational</td>
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<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
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<td>16.63</td>
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<td>8.03</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
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<td>20.38*</td>
<td>32.20*</td>
<td>21.87*</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>19.52</td>
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<td>Black, Lower vs.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2.42*</td>
<td>-2.92*</td>
<td>2.58**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>White, High, Low</td>
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<td>OrgEff</td>
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<td>Error</td>
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<td>8.02</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup> Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>c</sup> Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
respectively. As in the other areas, Reese was the last choice with only 13.3%.

Differences in the distributions of votes cast across categories of the race/class variable are statistically significant in the cases of Beer, Bossetta, and Grieshaber. Beer was clearly favored by the upper whites and the overall distribution of his support is positively correlated with race/class. Bossetta and Grieshaber were supported primarily by votes from black and lower white neighborhoods. Orthogonal contrasts reveal a consistent inverse relationship between the Bossetta vote and the race/class variable. F-ratios for the organizational effectiveness variable are not statistically significant. However, this effect is diluted somewhat by the particular pattern of endorsements in this election. Thus, it is important to note that the patterns of support found in the Bossetta and Beer votes match expectations associated with the organizational variable.

The second primary gave every indication of being an even closer election. Beer seemed likely to pick up the greater share of the lower white and upper white support previously accorded Grieshaber and Reese, and Bossetta stood to gain most of their black support if trends established in the first primary persisted. However, lower white organizations, which had shown poorly in the first primary with Beer actually carrying their combined area of operation, intensified efforts in Bossetta's behalf. Also, Beer
quietly moved to smooth over the ruffled feathers of several black organizations in an effort to secure crucial support in these areas. Thus, although the endorsements and the voting patterns in the first primary were known, the exact levels of support in the second level were difficult to precisely predict.

An unusual incident further muddied the picture. A few days prior to the election, a letter, supposedly endorsed by the captains of several Mardi Gras krewes, was made public denouncing Beer as an "enemy of Mardi Gras." The letter noted that Beer, while a city councilman, had questioned the amount of money budgeting for sanitation and other services provided by the city during the Carnival season. It further implied that Beer was not a full participant or enthusiastic supporter of Mardi Gras. The letter elicited a negative public reaction. First, it was viewed as containing the hint of an unpleasant attack upon Beer as a member of the Jewish community. Jews have been traditionally excluded from most Mardi Gras krewes, and thus many of them are not "full participants" or "enthusiastic supporters." Secondly, Beer's full record on the council hardly warranted the attack. The letter was therefore commonly viewed as a last ditch effort to smear the Beer candidacy.

Bossetta campaign personnel denied any connection with or knowledge of the drafting of the letter. The effect of the letter incident upon the election is difficult to gauge. If it had any effect at all, it was thought to have
been more detrimental to Bossetta than to Beer, and since Bossetta lost in an extremely close election, the question has generated much speculation.

Beer carried 50.8% of the votes cast in the second election, drawing his major support from upper white neighborhoods where he received 62.0% support. Lower white and black areas offered decreasingly lower levels of support for him with 48.8% and 43.2% of the votes cast respectively. Bossetta's support follows the opposite pattern. Differences in the votes cast vary significantly across levels of the race/class variable. These differences are of significant magnitude for both black, lower white versus white comparisons and black versus lower white comparisons. This indicates a positive relationship between the support for Beer and the race/class variable, and a consistent inverse relationship between the distribution of Bossetta votes and the race/class variable. Differences across organizational effectiveness levels are not statistically significant, nor is an interaction effect noted. However, the distribution of the votes do conform closely with the expectations associated with the organizational variable.

Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and the Index of Cohesion

Interpretation of the race/class and organizational effectiveness variables can be aided by the computation and analysis of an index of cohesion variable. As stated in chapter three, the index of cohesion is an indication of the
extent to which the vote in any given area is unanimous or, conversely, fragmented. It is computed by subtracting the proportion of votes cast in an areal unit for the less favored candidate from the percentage of votes cast in that unit for the favored candidate. The greater the percentage of votes cast for the favored candidate, the more unanimous the vote, and the higher the index of cohesion score. Conversely, the closer the contest in an areal unit, the more divided the vote, and the lower the index of cohesion score.

The computational procedure of the index of cohesion restricts its effective use to elections in which there are only two candidates. Thus, the analysis here is restricted to those five elections which featured second primaries: the 1972 and 1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court races, the 1973 Clerk of Criminal Court race, the 1973 District Attorney race, and the 1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals race. If the mediating hypothesis is correct, that is, if organizational effectiveness as an attribute of areal units is a key intervening variable in the expression of levels of political action in varying race/class areas, then the following two expectations are warranted. One, the race/class variable will be inversely related to the index of cohesion scores of areal units. Specifically, black neighborhoods are anticipated to have the highest levels of cohesiveness, with decreasing levels expected in the lower white and upper white areas respectively. Second, high organizational effectiveness areas should exhibit higher
index of cohesion scores than areas of low organizational effectiveness.

Table 19A contains a presentation and analysis of index of cohesion scores. The 1973 Clerk of Court race shows the presence of the highest index of cohesion score. In that election, votes for the favored candidate of an areal unit exceeded the proportion of votes given his opponent by an average of 44.0%. In order, decreasingly lower scores are found in the 1974 and 1972 Supreme Court races (32.7% and 30.5%), the District Attorney race (20.3%), and the Fourth Circuit Court race (18.3%). Overall, the index of cohesion scores are highest among black neighborhoods with an average score of 41.2%. Upper white areas have the next highest average cohesion score with 23.4%, and lower white areas show the least cohesion with an average of 19.2 percentage points separating their favored from their less favored candidates. High organizational effectiveness areas show a mean cohesiveness score of 28.4%, while a mean score of 21.8% is found for low organizational effectiveness neighborhoods.

Analysis of the index scores presented in table 19B show that the degree of cohesiveness varies significantly across levels of the race/class variable in all five of the elections. Further, differences in cohesiveness scores vary significantly in high and low organizational effectiveness areas in three of the five elections—the 1972 and 1974 Supreme Court races, and the Clerk of Court race. Interaction
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election:</th>
<th>Race/Class</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Lower White</td>
<td>Upper White</td>
<td>Row Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Louisiana Supreme Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 District Attorney</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 Clerk of Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 19B

INDICES OF COHESION FOR 131 AREAL UNITS IN SELECTED NEW ORLEANS ELECTIONS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING:
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN INDEX SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Variation:</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Supreme Court(72)</th>
<th>District Attorney</th>
<th>Criminal Court</th>
<th>Supreme Court(74)</th>
<th>Fourth Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-6.89**&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>-6.13**&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-12.57**&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower White vs. Upper White</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2.11*</td>
<td>5.01**</td>
<td>-2.51*</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>4.41**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Effectiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>47.51</td>
<td>47.51</td>
<td>202.19*</td>
<td>45.25</td>
<td>63.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. White, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.83**</td>
<td>2.05*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vs. Upper White, High, Low OrgEff</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.25*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.10</td>
<td>16.14</td>
<td>48.89</td>
<td>30.91</td>
<td>16.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.

<sup>b</sup>Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.

<sup>c</sup>Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
effects are noted in the Clerk of Court and Fourth Circuit Court elections. The interaction effect for the 1973 race is located in the high organizational effectiveness black areas and, in the 1974 election, in the high organizational effectiveness upper white areas. Orthogonal contrasts confirm greater cohesiveness among black than white areas in the 1972 and 1974 Supreme Court races and the Clerk of Court election, and greater voter cohesiveness among upper white than lower white areas in all but the Clerk of Court race and the 1974 Supreme Court race.

These data are generally quite supportive of the specified hypothesis. Black areas do indeed show significantly higher cohesion scores than white neighborhoods. In three of the elections, the organizational variable likewise is shown to exhibit significant variation in the predicted direction. The major flaw in the match of hypotheses and the data here lies in the cohesion scores of upper whites, which are slightly higher than predicted.

Discussion

A number of issues have now been raised and given extended treatment. The most basic question under study involves the mediating potential of organizations, specifically in this case, the role of political organizations in affecting patterns of political participation. In this dissertation, an attempt has been made to treat the organizational variable as an attribute of areal units. Such
strategy is consistent with the theoretical tradition of political ecology and has the further advantage of tapping a wide range of data already enumerated and available as characteristics of areal units.

However, as has been noted on occasion in the previous pages, the measurement of organizational effectiveness as an ecological characteristic is not without certain problems. In this study, the organizational effectiveness rating of an area has been obtained by (a) asking each organizational leader to specify the area of operation claimed by his organization, (b) asking organizational leaders and candidates for office to rate the organizations in terms of their judged effectiveness, and (c) applying the effectiveness rating attached to organizations to their respective areas of operation. Thus, the nature of the characteristic is somewhat different than other ecological attributes employed in the study. If census materials or precinct returns indicate something about the racial composition of a census tract or the number of votes cast for a given candidate, one can feel fairly certain that such traits do indeed reside in the geographical unit under study. Such certainty is much weaker in the case of the organizational variable measured here.

To begin with, while most organizations operate in terms of geographical areas, there are some whose geographical orientations are either quite loose or even incidental. In such cases, defining the organization geographically
or, conversely, defining the characteristic of an area on the basis of that organization's activity becomes problematic. Further, even if the operation of the organization is clearly specified in geographical terms, the actual or physical presence of the organization is, nonetheless, indeterminate. Namely, it is still not known that the residents of the areal unit are aware of the organization and its activity—or even more to the point, that they consult it for guidance in political matters. In large part, the problem resides in the measurement of organizational effectiveness through a reputational approach. However, given the logistics of the study, there was little other choice.

Thus, it should be kept in mind that the measurement of the organizational variable contains an unknown amount of error. It is possible, though unlikely, that the organizations exert little or no influence and, consequently, that their effectiveness is vastly overrated by the reputational approach. Such would require a collective effort on the part of the organizational leaders and candidates for office similar to that found in the tale of the king's "invisible clothes." It seems more likely that, if anything, the actual effect and operation of the organizations will be somewhat underestimated—mainly because the areal units comprised of census tracts almost certainly overextends or slightly misrepresents the target areas in which organizations operate. Thus, even if one had individual level
measurements covering the connection between organizations and areal residents, additional error is always present in assigning the organizational rating to the entire areal unit.

An important facet in the test of the organizational variable is the race/class dimension and its correlates. The data show that the basic relationship between the race/class and organizational attributes of areal units is inverse, that is, the highest organizational rankings are concentrated in black areas. This finding modified the set of hypotheses advanced earlier in the dissertation. However, the race/class variable is strongly and consistently related to the measures of political participation—voter registration, voter turn out, and votes for candidates. In virtually every election and comparison, the distribution of the political participation measure is found to be distributed non-randomly across levels of the race/class designation. The essential question then involves the identification of the mechanism whereby these categories of political action emerge. Of course, the organizational variable is tested here as the potential mechanism.

The evidence concerning the mediation role of the organizational variable is decidedly mixed. No real organizational effect could be noted in the registration data, although these data are clearly correlated with the race/class dimension. Evidence of organizational activity is likewise scarce in reviewing the turn out data, although 1973 constitutes a year in which turn out levels best
indicate the organizational effect. However, no statistically significant differences are found for that year since the higher turn out among black and lower white areas simply brought their percentages to parity with the usually higher upper white turn out figures. Finally, in turning to the election returns, solid evidence for the organizational variable is found only in the 1973 Clerk of Court and the 1973 Civil Sheriff races. Lower levels of support can be gleaned from certain aspects of the other elections, especially the 1972 and 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court races.

With this maze of sometimes conflicting evidence, how can one answer the question, "what is the effect of the organizational variable?" The best answer seems to be that the organizational variable does indeed have an impact upon political activity, both in terms of candidate support and, to a lesser extent, voter turn out. However, the effect of the organizational variable seems to be primarily situational. Given a setting in which issues can be clearly defined in racial or class terminology, organizations bearing and playing upon these identifications appear to be able to act persuasively.

These statements require some clarification. One, the actual effect of an organizational endorsement or of organizational activity calls for a relative judgment. In situations where organizations have endorsed candidates already popular and acceptable to the residents of their area, a high vote in support of that candidate may only appear to
constitute an organizational effect. On the other hand, a comparatively lower showing in that area by a less attractive candidate endorsed by the organization may actually constitute a strong organizational impact.

Secondly, modern organizations do not seem to hold the extensive control over their patrons apparently available to the traditional machine. They can no longer expect to be an exclusive information source, mobility vehicle, or political godparent. One consequence of this is that few organizations can expect to generate the same sort of loyalty often rendered the traditional machine. One further consequence is that, while the influence of the organization is more fragmented, it is often more diffuse as well. The implication of this factor is that the reference group attribute of the organization may be quite extensive. Finally, it appears that the organizational structure relevant to the generation of categories of political action extends beyond the narrowly defined set of political organizations used here. This would seem to be especially true of activity patterns in upper white neighborhoods, where overall levels of participation in political organizations are quite small yet particular patterns of political participation were quite well defined.

These basic trends within the data can be further illustrated as statistically defined dimensions by the factor analysis technique. Table 20 contains a presentation of these dimensions. The first dimension, entitled "The Black
TABLE 20
FACTOR ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS OF ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 1—The Black Vote</th>
<th>Factor 2—The Upper White Vote</th>
<th>Factor 3—Voter Registration</th>
<th>Factor 4—Voter Turn Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Lombard 1 .95</td>
<td>% Connick 2 .90</td>
<td>% Registered .86 1973</td>
<td>% Turn out .79 2 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ortique 1 .95</td>
<td>Median School .86</td>
<td>% Registered .84 1972</td>
<td>% Turn out .78 1 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Lombard 2 .94</td>
<td>% Garrison 1 -.84</td>
<td>% Registered .84 1974</td>
<td>% Turn out .74 2 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Jackson 1 .93</td>
<td>% Nonmanual .81</td>
<td></td>
<td>% Turn out .72 1 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Haggerty -.93 1</td>
<td>SES Index .79</td>
<td></td>
<td>% Turn out .69 1 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Stire -.93</td>
<td>% High School .76</td>
<td></td>
<td>% Turn out .67 2 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Haggerty -.92 2</td>
<td>% Connick 1 .68</td>
<td></td>
<td>% Turn out .67 2 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Calogero .88 1 74</td>
<td>% Beer 2 .68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Calogero .88 2 74</td>
<td>Race/Class .47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Nonwhite .88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sarpy 1 -.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Calogero .72 1 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Class -.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness .40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = First Primary
2 = Second Primary
72 = 1972
73 = 1973
74 = 1974
Vote," contains support for candidates Lombard, Jackson, Ortique, and Calogero, lack of support for Haggerty, Stire, and Cronvich, and the ecological characteristics of a high percentage of nonwhite residents, a "black" race/class designation, and high organizational effectiveness rating. The second factor, labeled "The Upper White Vote," indicates a dimension detailing support for Connick and Beer, lack of support for Garrison, and high scores on schooling, educational, income, occupational, and race/class attributes. No factor is noted for the lower white group. Finally, factors three and four represent "Voter Registration" and "Voter Turn out" as dimensions separate from candidate choice.

These findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations expressed in chapters two and four and drawn from Etzioni's (1975) typology of organizations. It was argued in these chapters that upper white organizations typically exhibit normative compliance structures. Such structures are characterized by the exercise of "normative" power, that is, the use of symbolic sanctions to enact organizational control, and by the presence of "moral" involvement patterns, that is, members tend to be positively oriented toward organizational power and participate as committed believers.

By comparison, black and lower white organizations were argued to be structured primarily along utilitarian lines. This type of structure is based upon the allocation
of material sanctions—remunerative power—and upon a calculative orientation of its members to organizational power. Thus, the emphasis here is upon the practical consequences and spoils at stake in elections. Simply stated, supporting winning candidates affords access to the formal positions of power, either directly through the placing of organizational personnel in these positions or indirectly through the development personal/professional ties with non-member candidates and the accumulation of political credits.

The data suggest with a fair degree of clarity that black and upper white organizations are regarded as relatively effective forces in the elections considered. The strongest black organizations are clearly utilitarian. They enjoy reputations of being effective organizations in influencing the vote and of being able to command a high price or promise for patronage in exchange for services rendered. The dominant upper white organizations are known as being idealistic groups whose endorsements help "legitimize" candidates, that is, attest to the mainstream acceptability of candidates' credentials. However, these organizations are also regarded as relatively unimportant in actually delivering the vote. They likewise are not known to entertain openly material concerns in contemplating endorsements. These several differences between black and upper white organizations reflect clearly the key distinctions between utilitarian and normative organizations.
Turning to the low ratings and apparently weak performances of the lower white organizations, it may be said that their utilitarian posture has been undermined by increasing problems in effectively allocating material sanctions. In prior times, lower white organizations tended to the politics of New Orleans while upper whites tended to the business affairs. Blacks, largely disenfranchised, were not a formal factor. However, with increasing black registration, white migration patterns, and increasing concern for political reform, the operational bases of lower white organizations appears to have become increasingly eroded. On occasion, these organizations are still able to muster effective power and participation. For the most part, however, their effectiveness seems pre-empted directly by competing black organizations and indirectly by reform oriented upper white organizations.

Footnotes

1Figures are for the month prior to the first primary in the years 1972, 1973, and 1974.

2Cell frequencies are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Lower White</th>
<th>Upper White</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational High</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Low</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3Computer programs employed in the analyses are drawn from Nie et al. (1975).
An interaction effect indicates that the effects associated with one variable are not consistent across levels of another variable. In such instances, prime consideration needs to be devoted to the interaction effects rather than the main effects.

Mayor Landrieu placed a personal advertisement in the New Orleans States-Item, entitled, "So That Mr. Sarpy Will Understand." The ad contained pointed references to Sarpy's social status, asking at one point if the ex-King of Rex expected to ascend to the Supreme Court by virtue of the "divine right of kings." It defended Calogero as the realization of the American dream—by contrast to Sarpy, a "poor boy makes good" story (Glassman and Davis, 1972).

Scaccia, who received less than 3% of the vote, is excluded from the analysis.

Recent revelations concerning the CIA seem to redeem Garrison's preoccupation somewhat. A recent cover story in New Orleans magazine carries the blurb, "What with the recent revelations about the CIA, the former D.A.'s theories seem a lot saner. Listen to them again" (Manguno, 1976).

Bustemente, who received under 5% of the vote, is excluded from the analysis.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This dissertation has been addressed at the most general level to one basic question: how is it that certain clusters of individuals come to act "collectively," that is, to share some behavioral pattern in common. After all, it is quite evident that a large number of characteristics shared with others typically result in no such collective action. For example, group consciousness among those who wear glasses is ordinarily quite low, and there have been few uprisings among those who write with the left hand. However, various forms of collective sentiment and action are, under certain circumstances, found among those with the same skin color or those who live in the same neighborhood. It is assumed that almost any discernible characteristic might be used to distinguish meaningful categories of individuals. It is also thought that these characteristics tend to remain inert in the absence of socially attached meanings.

At the more specific level, the study deals with conditions relating to the emergence of certain forms of political action, namely, stages of political participation.
ranging from registering to vote to casting the ballot. Here, too, it is expected that some characteristics by which individuals might be classified will be practically useless in generating adequate predictions and explanations of political activity. Candidate choice is not anticipated to very significantly between those with glasses and those with perfect eyesight. However, certain characteristics are expected to show a relationship with patterns of political participation. It is further anticipated that these characteristics receive salience through the presence of some definitional agent.

The major factors thought to be related to the political participation variable are social class and race. However, individuals sharing given levels of income or a given skin pigment are not expected to automatically show similar participation patterns. Rather, it is argued that objective characteristics of class and race come to be defined as socially meaningful and, hence, serve as a political rallying point chiefly through the presence of an organizational variable. That is, organizations found in a community setting are said to play a major role in specifying which differences among individuals are worth noting.

Simply stated, then, the electorate may be correctly viewed as a series of aggregates, groups, and organizations rather than as a composite of individuals. A wide range of sociological literature has been shown to intimate the role of "groups" in disseminating, legitimating, and interpreting
information for their members and sympathizers. The problem is only slightly modified if the concern is focused upon organizations. The model offered here assumes that, however an organization emerges or is structured, an important aspect of organizational maintenance is that of extending influence to appropriate categories of sympathetic nonmembers and of retaining the interest of current members. Aggregates of those sharing objective class and racial characteristics are merely said to provide an especially convenient and potentially responsive target population for these tasks. Insofar as organizations are effective in defining and publicizing such themes, distinctive forms of political participation are expected to emerge along class and racial lines.

The ecological perspective was employed in developing the operationalization of these basic concepts. This approach is based upon the premise that certain distinctive facets of areal units constitute contextual circumstances which influence the types of behavior likely to occur. Applied to the problem at hand, it assumes that the distributions of objective class and racial characteristics in specified areas will, in the presence of an appropriate organizational factor, lead to distinctive patterns of political participation by class and race.

Operationalization of the class, race, and political participation variables was achieved in a relatively straightforward manner utilizing census materials and precinct data. Census tract and precinct boundaries proved to be coterminous
enough to permit matching into usable areal units. The class and racial characteristics of areal units were further refined into a race/class index consisting of three dimensions—black, lower white, and upper white neighborhoods. Precinct based data, including registration figures, turnout levels, and votes cast for candidates in selected elections from 1972 to 1974 in New Orleans, were compiled as indicators of the political participation variable.

Operationalization of the organizational variable as an attribute of areal units was more problematic. There is no corresponding data repository for this variable indicating the organizational characteristics of the community. Thus, a large part of the dissertation is devoted to establishing this information through field interviews. Consideration of the organizational factor was restricted to political organizations. Interview data was collected from nineteen political organizations active in recent New Orleans elections. Further, organizational leaders and candidates for office in these elections were asked to rate the political organizations in terms of their impact and effectiveness in the elections. Composite ratings derived from this procedure were then used to apply the reputed effectiveness labels of the organizations themselves to their corresponding areas of operation, thus converting organizational effectiveness into an ecological as well as organizational characteristic.
Descriptions of the basic structural and compositional characteristics of the nineteen organizations are detailed in chapter four. Basically, the organizations lend themselves to categorization on the basis of both organizational effectiveness ratings and their respective class and racial compositions. Contrary to expectations, the number and overall reputed effectiveness of political organizations in New Orleans is inversely related to the race/class dimension. That is, there is apparently much more formal political organizational activity and a higher reputation for organizational effectiveness among black than white areas and among lower white than upper white neighborhoods. The exact explanation for this is not totally clear from the data. It was suggested that organizational participation levels among upper whites may indeed be greater than among lower whites and black areas if the term were broadened to include activity in nonpolitical organizations. Further, the relative absence of upper whites in formal political organizations may well belie a great deal of parapolitical organizational activity, that is, the operation of technically nonpolitical networks which, nonetheless, serve political ends.

Political organizations in New Orleans were identified within a typology of organizations based upon the compliance thesis. This thesis proposes that compliance with organizational directives is grounded in power options available to the organization (coercive, remunerative, and normative power options) and orientations of participants to the power
of the organization (alienative, calculative, and moral involvement types). Three basic types of organizations, therefore, emerge: coercive organizations (coercive power, alienative involvement), utilitarian organizations (remunerative power, calculative involvement), and normative organizations (normative power, moral involvement).

Although political organizations may fall into any one of the three classifications depending upon the styles and goals employed by them, no empirical examples of coercive political organizations were identified in New Orleans. However, black and lower white organizations were generally said to have utilitarian compliance structures, while upper white organizations were more likely to exhibit normative compliance structures. This is not meant to imply that upper white organizations do not benefit materially from electoral activity. They may simply be more clever in disguising their "true" intentions. It is also possible that the material rewards for the upper white category are realized in more subtle form. Finally, they may indeed be more "public-regarding." The utilitarian-normative distinction, however, reflects the difference between the recurrent references in black and lower white organizations to monetary and patronage considerations and the typical "good government" themes of the upper white organizations.

Analyses of election related data allow further insight into these issues. It was anticipated that areas supporting high organizational effectiveness ratings would
show higher levels of voter registration and voter turn out for selected elections than would the lesser rated areas. Also, the distribution of votes cast in high organizational effectiveness neighborhoods was expected to match more exactly the pattern of endorsements advanced by highly rated organizations, while the distribution of votes in areas with low effectiveness ratings were expected to exhibit greater departure from the pattern recommended by lower rated organizations. On the basis of the previous discussion of the relationship between organizational composition and reputed organizational effectiveness, it was anticipated that registration, turn out, and candidate support levels would be inversely related to the race/class dimension, specifically, that these levels would be highest in black neighborhoods and lowest in upper white areas. To the extent that this is not found to be the case, the organizational thesis is called into question.

Examination of registration levels by the race/class designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of areal units generally indicated a positive relationship between race/class and registration levels and the absence of any relationship between organizational effectiveness and registration levels. Basically, overall registration levels declined from 1972 to 1974 rather uniformly across both race/class and reputed organizational effectiveness characteristics of areal units. The decline is thought to be mainly attributable to the peaking of a registration trend associated with
the 1972 presidential campaign. This factor aside, however, registration was highest in upper white areas and lowest in black neighborhoods, while differences between high and low organizational effectiveness areas were minimal. Thus, the variation in registration levels is not accountable within the confines of the organizational variable, at least in terms of the manner in which it is defined here.

Levels of voter turn out, analyzed by the race/class designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of areal units, showed a slightly different pattern. Overall, voter turn out was highest in two of the years considered in upper white areas. However, in 1973, turn out in black and lower white areas matched that found in upper white neighborhoods and, in one primary, actually exceeded the upper white figure. Later analysis of votes cast indicated 1973 to be a year of exceptionally high electoral interest in the black community.

Analyses of the distributions of votes cast in the selected elections across levels of race/class and organizational effectiveness variables contain some rather interesting trends. First, the pattern of endorsements by the organizations in these elections indicate the presence of three basic "coalitions." It was noted that in five of the eleven elections, black and upper white organizations sided against the candidate choice of lower white organizations. However, in two of the elections, black and lower white organizations found themselves basically supporting the same
candidate in opposition to the choice of the upper white organizations. Finally, in the remaining four elections, the same candidate was endorsed by practically all of the organizations. These patterns reinforce the earlier findings of a number of studies dealing with electoral trends in the New South, particularly those of Howard, Long, and Zdrazil (1971).

A second feature noted in the analysis of these elections concerns the distributions of the votes themselves. Voting cohesiveness, that is, the tendency to "bloc vote," was found to be greatest in black neighborhoods and also to be fairly pronounced in upper white areas as well. Such cohesiveness is negligible in lower white areas. However, voting cohesiveness is greater in higher rated organizational effectiveness areas than in lower rated neighborhoods only occasionally. To begin with, a fair amount of unanimity in candidate preference was noted in all neighborhoods, irrespective of organizational effectiveness. Nonetheless, areas with a reputation for organizational effectiveness do show a significantly greater level of cohesiveness in candidate choice—especially, it seems, when the candidate involved is politically identified in either racial or class terminology beyond mere physical identification.

A factor analysis of the basic variables involved confirms these contentions. It clearly indicates that the voter registration, voter turn out, and candidate choice indicators of political participation merit consideration as
independent dimensions, at least as far as analysis within the context of the race/class and organizational effectiveness variables are concerned. Further, black and upper white neighborhoods emerge as distinct factors comprising both their respective ecological characteristics and candidate choices. The pattern is more pronounced in the black areas than in the upper white. No independent factor was shown for the lower white areas.

Limitations of the Study

The major limitations incurred in the execution of this study involve the treatment of the organizational effectiveness variable as a characteristic of areal units. This circumstance is not entirely incidental. The strategy of applying the organizational variable in this way is consistent with the theoretical tradition of political ecology. It has the further advantage of tapping a wide range of data already enumerated and available as characteristics of areal units. However, these positive attributes likewise spell some disadvantage.

The first limitation stems from the nature of the theoretical assumptions accompanying the ecological approach itself. The focus of an ecological analysis is placed squarely upon the characteristics and patterns of behavior found in areal units without regard for the subjective definitions, perceptions, and interactional content of the individuals involved. Such dynamics are simply assumed to be operating and are accepted as "givens." Thus, despite
the interest expressed here in the organizational factor, the researcher, nonetheless, has no firsthand evidence of (1) individual exposure to organizational activity leading to (2) individual behavior commensurate with organizational exhortations leading to (3) the organization's reputation for effectiveness. The study allows only statements of this order: it is highly unlikely that one would uncover a series of incidences in which pattern A is found rather consistently under conditions B and C by chance alone. Thus, insofar as pattern A is observed under predictable circumstances, one's theoretical statements in which A, B, and C are integrated receive further credence. However, these items A, B, and C must, in discussion, be kept at the level of contextual variables rather than individual level ones (a, b, and c).

A second limitation revolves around the practical problems of defining organizational effectiveness as an attribute of areal units. Simply put, the organizational variable is not intrinsically an ecological characteristic in the sense that are population characteristics. Thus, an organization's target population may not be strictly definable in areal terms. The political organization studied here, UNO-YD and its orientation toward the "youth vote," is an apt illustration. Further, the influence of the organization is not necessarily restricted to specified areal units. For example, a political organization may indeed operate exclusively and effectively in a given ward.
However, the organization's sphere of influence may, nevertheless, exceed the boundaries of that ward as manifested by positive and negative identifiers in other areas who orient their behavior accordingly.

The overall effect of these limitations may be summed as follows. In the instance of the first limitation, actual organization impact, while assessed indirectly, is nevertheless directly unknown. Thus, conclusions can be legitimately expressed only in the terms of ecological or contextual circumstances. The second limitation, on the other hand, is likely to result in an underestimation of the organizational effect. Thus, the registered organizational effect, as an ecological characteristic, is probably stronger than indicated in this study.

Recommendations for Future Study

Ensuing research dealing with the substantive sorts of problems treated here is likely to be fruitful if oriented in two basic directions. One, further analyses of political organizations qua organizations are essential. Many descriptive studies of organizations have been formulated by sociologists and political scientists. However, what is noticeably lacking are studies designed to test propositions about political organizations drawn from the wider organizational literature in sociology. Further, attempts can be made here to establish the sphere of influence of political organizations using organizations as a base of social networks.
Secondly, sociometric types of analysis focusing upon the individual are needed as well. This strategy seeks to establish the community's vital social networks by establishing and tracing the relationships of separate individuals to their usual clusters of primary and secondary acquaintances. Both of these types of analysis constitute efforts to establish the effect of the organizational variable on the basis of firsthand and direct evidence.

**Conclusions**

The major conclusions of the study may be stated as follows:

1. The relative numbers and strengths of political organizations in New Orleans were hypothesized to be positively related with the race/class dimension. Specifically, upper white areas were expected to show the greatest evidence of organization and effectiveness, while decreasingly lower levels of these characteristics were anticipated in lower white and black areas. Neither of these hypotheses were substantiated by the data. Rather, upper white organizations were few in number and were not generally regarded as being every effective. Lower white organizations, while more numerous than upper white organizations, were considered as a group to be in a state of decline. Black organizations were found in the greatest numbers and, in some instances, were regarded as having organized quite effectively.
(2) Cast within a typology of organizations, upper white organizations were said to exhibit normative compliance structures, while black and lower white organizations were characterized as utilitarian compliance organizations. Thus, upper white organizations tend to operate in terms of normative adherence to political ideals and quasi-ideological standards, especially those involving "reform" and "good government." Participants in these organizations are more likely to be idealistically motivated in their participation. Black and lower white organizations, on the other hand, tend to operate on the basis of the material benefits at stake. These benefits are typically allocated in a systematic fashion in order to maintain organizational operations. Participation in these organizations by members is more likely to be calculative, that is, to be motivated in terms of the acquisition or loss of these rewards.

(3) Commensurate with expectations, voter registration, voter turnout, and candidate choice were found to be consistently and positively correlated with the race/class variable.

(a) It was found that upper whites were more likely to register and turn out to vote than were lower whites and blacks. With some exceptions, levels of voter registration and voter turn out did not vary significantly across levels of the organizational variable. The noteworthy exception occurred in three elections in which race and class became very explicit issues. In these elections,
voter turn out in black and lower white areas approximated that found in upper white neighborhoods.

(b) In every election, the distribution of votes for the candidates considered was found to vary distinctively by race/class. However, only in elections in which candidates became politically identifiable in race or class terms did the distributions of the vote across levels of the race/class variable correspond to the pattern of organizational endorsements.

(c) These factors suggest that political organizations in New Orleans are able to mobilize sentiment mainly under a specialized set of conditions. Apparently, where the focus of the campaign can be cast in terms other than those of race or class, the organizations are less effective.

(4) All logical combinations of bloc votes among the black, lower white, and upper white areas occurred in the elections under study. In primary elections with more than one candidate, each bloc often voted independently of each other. In run-offs (and some first primaries), populist (black, lower white vs. upper white), white supremacy (black vs. lower white, upper white), and moderation-paternalism (black, upper white vs. lower white) coalitions were observed. These were not necessarily formal coalitions—in fact, they most often were not. However, these patterns do indicate the practical air to the politics of New Orleans.
(5) Upper white and black bloc votes emerge as independent dimensions in a factor analysis of all the characteristics under study. An independent lower white dimension was not detected. Upper white organizations tend to be normatively structured, a stance apparently commensurate with the mood of the upper white areas. Black and lower white organizations tend to fall into the utilitarian compliance mode. However, the ability of lower white organizations to operate effectively in this mode seems to have become seriously eroded. Both white migration patterns and the enfranchisement of the black voter have coupled to weaken the organizational base of the lower white organizations in their traditional areas of operation. Further, the rise of black organizations has sharply increased competition for the spoils. Thus, the utilitarian posture of the lower white organizations is now only occasionally effective.
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APPENDIX 1

JUXTAPOSITION OF WARD AND CENSUS TRACT
BOUNDARIES, NEW ORLEANS, 1970
The seventeen political wards are demarcated by heavy solid lines where coterminous with tract boundaries. Map excerpted from the United States Bureau of the Census (1972). Ward boundary information derived from maps provided by the Department of Streets for the City of New Orleans.
APPENDIX 2

MATCHED TRACTS/PRECINCTS FOR ORLEANS PARISH
Match Tracts/Precincts for Orleans Parish

WARD 1

1) Tract (Tr) 77 - Ward (Wd) 1: Precinct (Pct) 1; Wd 2: Pct 1.
2) Tr 78 - Wd 1: Pcts 2, 5.
3) Tr 79, Tr 80 - Wd 1: Pcts 6, 7.

WARD 2

4) Tr 67 - Wd 2: Pcts 2, 3.
6) Tr 69 - Wd 2: Pcts 6, 6A.
7) Tr 70 - Wd 2: Pct 7.

WARD 3

10) Tr 63 - Wd 3: Pcts 7, 9, 10.
11) Tr 64 - Wd 3: Pcts 13, 14, 16.
12) Tr 65 - Wd 3: Pcts 17, 18, 19, 20.
13) Tr 71 - Wd 3: Pcts 8, 12, 15

WARD 4

16) Tr 50, Tr 54 - Wd 4: Pcts 5, 6, 7, 8.
17) Tr 55 - Wd 4: Pcts 9, 10, 10A, 11, 12.
18) Tr 56.01 - Wd 4: Pcts 19, 20, 20A, 21, 21A.
19) Tr 56.02 - Wd 4: Pcts 17, 17A, 18, 18A.
20) Tr 56.03 - Wd 4: Pcts 15, 16, 16A.
21) Tr 56.04 - Wd 4: Pcts 13, 13A, 14, 14A.
22) Tr 133.01 - Wd 4: Pcts 22, 23; Wd 5: Pcts 17, 18, 19.

WARD 5

23) Tr 42 - Wd 5: Pct 1, 2, 3.
25) Tr 44 - Wd 5: Pcts 5, 6, 7, 8.
26) Tr 45 - Wd 5: Pcts 9, 10, 11.
27) Tr 46 - Wd 5: Pcts 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

WARD 6

28) Tr 38 - Wd 6: Pcts 1, 2.
30) Tr 40 - Wd 6: Pct 5, 6, 7.
31) Tr 41 - Wd 6: Pct 8, 9.
WARD 7

32) Tr 26 - Wd 7: Pcts 1, 2.
33) Tr 27, Tr 29 - Wd 7: Pcts 4, 4A, 5, 7.
35) Tr 30, Tr 31 - Wd 7: Pcts 8, 9, 9A, 20A.
36) Tr 33.01 - Wd 7: Pcts 32, 33A, 39, 40.
38) Tr 33.03, Tr 133.02, Tr 25.01 - Wd 7: Pcts 37, 38, 38A, 41, 42; Wd 8: Pcts 26, 27, 28, 29.
39) Tr 33.04 - Wd 7: Pcts 34, 35, 36, 36A.
40) Tr 33.05, Tr 33.06 - Wd 7: Pcts 27, 27A, 27B, 28.
42) Tr 33.08 - Wd 7: Pcts 23, 24, 25.
44) Tr 35, 36 - Wd 7: Pcts 11, 12, 13, 14.
45) Tr 37.01 - Wd 7: Pcts 18, 19.

WARD 8

47) Tr 18 - Wd 8: Pcts 1, 2.
48) Tr 19 - Wd 8: Pcts 4, 5, 6.
49) Tr 20 - Wd 8: Pcts 7, 8.
50) Tr 21 - Wd 8: Pcts 9, 11.
51) Tr 22 - Wd 8: Pcts 10, 12.
52) Tr 23 - Wd 8: Pcts 13, 14; Wd 7, Pcts 22, 26.
53) Tr 24.01, Tr 24.02 - Wd 8: Pcts 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
55) Tr 25.03, Tr 25.04 - Wd 8: Pcts 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 25A.

WARD 9

56) Tr 7.01 - Wd 9: Pcts 8, 8A.
57) Tr 7.02, Tr 8 - Wd 9: Pcts 1, 1A, 2, 4, 7.
58) Tr 9.01 - Wd 9: Pcts 3, 3A, 3B.
59) Tr 9.02, Tr 9.03 - Wd 9: Pcts 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D.
60) Tr 9.04 - Wd w: Pcts 5, 5A.
61) Tr 11 - Wd 9: Pcts 9, 10, 11.
64) Tr 13.02 - Wd 9: Pcts 16, 17, 18.
68) Tr 16 - Wd 9: Pct 27.
69) Tr 17.01 - Wd 9: Pcts 31B, 31C, 31D, 31E.
70) Tr 17.02 - Wd 9: Pcts 29A, 30, 30A, 31, 31A.
72) Tr 17.07 - Wd 9: Pcts 33, 33A, 42, 42A, 42B.
73) Tr 17.08 - Wd 9: Pcts 34, 35, 36, 36A, 36B.
74) Tr 17.09 - Wd 9: Pcts 37, 37A, 38, 38A, 39, 39A.
WARD 9, Continued

75) Tr 17.10 - Wd 9: Pcts 39B, 40, 40A, 40B.
76) Tr 17.11 - Wd 9: Pcts 42C, 43, 43A, 43B, 43C, 44, 44A.
77) Tr 17.12 - Wd 9: Pcts 41, 41A.

WARD 10

80) Tr 82, Tr 83 - Wd 10: Pcts 6, 7, 8, 9.
81) Tr 84 - Wd 10: Pcts 10, 11.
82) Tr 85, Tr 86 - Wd 10: Pcts 12, 13, 14.

WARD 11

83) Tr 87 - Wd 11: Pct 1.
84) Tr 88 - Wd 11: Pcts 2, 4, 7.
86) Tr 90 - Wd 11: Pcts 6, 8, 9.
87) Tr 91 - Wd 11: Pcts 10, 11.
89) Tr 93 - Wd 11: Pcts 14, 15, 16.
90) Tr 94 - Wd 11: Pcts 17, 18, 19.

WARD 12

91) Tr 96 - Wd 12: Pcts 1, 2.
93) Tr 99 - Wd 12: Pcts 5, 6, 7, 8.
94) Tr 100 - Wd 12: Pcts 9, 11, 13.
95) Tr 101 - Wd 12: Pcts 10, 12.
96) Tr 102 - Wd 12: Pcts 14, 15, 16.
97) Tr 103 - Wd 12: Pcts 17, 18, 19, 20.

WARD 13

98) Tr 105 - Wd 13: Pcts 1, 3.
102) Tr 111 - Wd 13: Pcts 13, 14, 14A.
103) Tr 112 - Wd 13: Pcts 15, 16.

WARD 14

104) Tr 114 - Wd 14: Pcts 1, 2.
105) Tr 115 - Wd 14: Pcts 3, 4, 8.
107) Tr 117 - Wd 14: Pcts 7, 9, 14, 15.
WARD 14, Continued

109) Tr 120 - Wd 14: Pcts 10, 11.
110) Tr 121.01 - Wd 14: Pcts 18, 18A, 19.
111) Tr 121.02 - Wd 14: Pcts 12, 13 (+13A in 1973, 1974).

WARD 15

115) Tr 1 - Wd 15: Pcts 1, 2, 3, 4.
117) Tr 2, Tr 3, Tr 4, Tr 6.01 - Wd 15: Pcts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 11A.
120) Tr 6.05, Tr 6.06 - Wd 15: Pcts 14A, 14B, 15, 15A.
121) Tr 6.07 - Wd 15: Pcts 16, 17, 17A, 17B.
122) Tr 6.09 - Wd 15: Pcts 19, 19A.

WARD 16

123) Tr 125 - Wd 16: Pcts 1, 1A.
124) Tr 126 - Wd 15: Pcts 2, 3.
126) Tr 128 - Wd 16: Pcts 7, 8.

WARD 17

127) Tr 75.01, Tr 75.02 - Wd 17: Pcts 9, 11, 13, 13A.
129) Tr 72.02 - Wd 17: Pcts 15, 16, 17.
130) Tr 129, Tr 130, Tr 131 - Wd 17: Pcts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
131) Tr 132 - Wd 17: Pcts 7, 8, 10.

*Maps used in generating these areal units derived from the United States Bureau of the Census (1972) and the Department of Streets for the City of New Orleans.*
APPENDIX 3

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS FOUND TO BE ACTIVE IN RECENT LOCAL ELECTIONS IN NEW ORLEANS
Political Organizations Found to Be Active in Recent Local Elections in New Orleans

1 - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
2 - American's Changing Society Democratic Association
3 - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
4 - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
5 - Blacks United for Leadership League (BULL)
6 - Black Women's Caucus
7 - Black Youth for Progress (BYP)
8 - Brothers Improvement Association
9 - Central City Coalition for Urban Politics
10 - Civic Independent Association
11 - Community Organization of League (COOL)
12 - Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP)
13 - Consolidated Independent Democrats of New Orleans
14 - Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
15 - Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
16 - Daneel Street Democrats
17 - Democratic Alliance of Louisiana
18 - Democratic Beavers of America, Inc.
19 - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)
20 - Eighth Ward Political Group
21 - Faith Beneficial Association
22 - Ghetto Democrats
23 - Greater Algiers Voters Education League (GAVEL)
24 - Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO
25 - Handicap Voters League
26 - Independent Women's Association (IWO)
27 - Louisiana Advancement Association
28 - Louisiana Concerned Citizens Council (LCCC)
29 - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
30 - New Breed Civic Association
31 - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
32 - New Orleans Public Housing Tenants Association
33 - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
34 - New Orleans Voters League (NOVL)
35 - New Orleans Young Democrats
36 - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
37 - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
38 - Political Workers of America, Inc.
39 - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
40 - Seventh Ward Democratic Voters League
41 - Southern Democratic Association
42 - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
43 - Suburban Political and Social Club
44 - State-Wide Voters League
45 - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
46 - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
47 - United Black Brotherhood
48 - United Brothers League
49 - University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD)
50 - Uptown Democratic Association (UDA)

51 - Voters Improvement Through Progress
52 - West New Orleans Democratic Civic Association
APPENDIX 4

BASIC QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
Questionnaire for Organizational Leaders:

Q1 Let me begin with some general questions about your organization. How did the name of organization come into being?

INTERVIEWER: PROBE DATE, POL SETTING/SOC ISSUES

Q2 What is the stated purpose of your organization?

Q3 What regularly scheduled meetings or events does your organization have?

Q4 Does the organization have any other programs or ongoing activities?

Q5 I realize that the size of an organization often fluctuates during and between elections. On the average, approximately how many active members has your organization had during any given election in the past year or two?

Q7 Approximately how many members have been active in your organization's meetings or activities in the last two or three months?

Q8 Do the members of your organization tend to live in any particular area of the city?

IF YES, GO TO Q11
IF NO, GO TO Q10

Q9 Could you pin down these areas for me, say in terms of neighborhoods or precincts?

IF NO, GO TO Q11

Q10 So your membership tends to reside fairly evenly throughout the city?

IF YES, GO TO Q11
IF NO, RETURN TO Q10

Q11 Is your membership predominantly "white" or "black"?

IF WHITE, GO TO Q12
IF BLACK, GO TO Q13
Q12  Approximately what percentage is white?
    GO TO Q14

Q13  Approximately what percentage is black?

Q14  Would you say that the average member of your organization has "completed grade school," "completed some high school," "completed high school," or "attended college"?

Q15  Would you say that the average member of your organization is "upper class," "upper middle class," "middle class," "working class," or "lower class," as these terms are commonly used in New Orleans?

Q16  Do you see your organization as representing the interests of any particular segment of the New Orleans population?
    IF YES, ASK Q17
    IF NO, GO TO Q18

Q17  Can you identify this segment for me in terms of neighborhoods or even precincts?

Q18  Could you briefly describe for me the staff positions of your organization?

Q19  Of your staff positions, approximately what percentage are salaried?
    IF SOME ARE SALARIED, ASK Q20
    IF NONE ARE SALARIED, GO TO Q21

Q20  Do any of the persons in these positions also hold jobs with local or state government? Of these paid positions, approximately what percentage are considered full-time?

Q21  What is the affiliation of your organization with the national Democratic party?

Q22  Were any members of your organization delegates to the national Democratic convention in either 1968 or 1972?

Q23  What is your current position in the organization?

Q24  How did you come to hold this position?
    PROBE:  HOW LONG POSITION HELD: APPOINTIVE VS. ELECTIVE
Q25 What other occupational, professional, and/or advisory positions do you hold?

Q26 What would you say is the prime factor prompting your involvement in the organization?

Q27 Do any other factors prompting your involvement come to mind?

Q28 What is your current age?

Q29 What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?

Q30 To which kinds of these clubs or organizations are you a member?

ASK FOR NAME OF EACH ORGANIZATION IN WHICH PARTICIPATION IS INDICATED; IF NONE, GO TO Q33

Q31 Do you hold an office or leadership position in any of these organizations?

Q32 Concerning your participation in ____________, how often have you participated in its meetings or functions in the last three months?

REPEAT FOR EACH ORGANIZATION IN WHICH PARTICIPATION IS INDICATED; RETRIEVE CARD A

Let's turn to some recent elections in New Orleans. In these elections, many organizations such as yours endorsed and actively supported selected candidates.

Q33 Has your organization endorsed candidates in recent local elections?

IF YES, ASK Q34
IF NO, GO TO Q52

Q34 What procedure has customarily been used to decide which candidate the organization endorsed?

GIVE RESPONDENT CARD B. Here is a summary list of candidates for office in selected recent, local elections.

Q35 In the 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice first primary, did your organization endorse Calogero, Ortique, Redmann, or Sarpy?

Q36 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Calogero or Sarpy?
Q37 What were the key considerations in the decision to endorse ________________?

REPEAT IF ENDORSEMENT CHANGED FROM PRIMARY TO RUN-OFF

Q38 In the 1973 Orleans Parish District Attorney first primary, did your organization endorse Connick, Garrison, Reese, or Scaccia?

Q39 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Connick or Garrison?

Q40 What were the key considerations in the decision to endorse ________________?

REPEAT IF NECESSARY

Q41 In the 1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race, did your organization endorse Jackson, Sargent, or Stire?

Q42 What were the key considerations in the decision to endorse ________________?

Q43 In the 1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court first primary, did your organization endorse Bustamente, Haggerty, or Lombard?

Q44 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Haggerty or Lombard?

Q45 What were the key considerations in the decision to endorse ________________?

REPEAT IF NECESSARY

Q46 In the 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice first primary, did your organization endorse Calogero, Cronvich, or Garrison?

Q47 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Calogero or Cronvich?

Q48 What were the key considerations in the decision to endorse ________________?

REPEAT IF NECESSARY

Q49 In the 1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first primary, did your organization endorse Beer, Bossetta, Grieshaber, or Reese?
Q50 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Beer or Bossetta?

Q51 What were the key considerations in the decision to endorse ____________________?

REPEAT IF NECESSARY: RETRIEVE CARD C FROM RESPONDENT

Q52 In your estimation, how does the average voter decide:
  a) whether to vote, and b) for whom to vote?

  a)

  b)

Q53 What role does an organization such as yours play in influencing whom the voters support?

IF ORGANIZATION DOES NOT ENDORSE, GO TO Q59

Q54 Why does your organization endorse candidates, i.e., what's in it for you?

GIVE RESPONDENT CARD C. Here is a list of campaign activities often performed by organizations such as yours in behalf of candidates they have endorsed. These activities have been grouped into three categories.

Q55 What two or three activities best represent the primary efforts of your organization in behalf of candidates if endorsed?

IF A THRU G IS CITED, ASK Q56
IF H OR I IS CITED, AS Q57
IF NONE, GO TO Q58

Q56 Can you specify for me who was the target population of these campaign activities—in terms of segments of the electorate, neighborhoods, or even precincts?

Q57 What effect upon election outcomes do you feel that these campaign activities by your organization had in these areas of the city?

RETRIEVE CARD C FROM RESPONDENT
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD D. Campaign activities and day-to-day operations require some source of revenue. Here is a list of potential sources of revenue available to organizations such as yours.

Q58 Were there other organizations with whom you were in contact or worked?
Q59 Which of these possible sources of income has your organization used to raise money in the last year or so?

Q60 Which of these sources would you say is your organization's primary source of revenue?

RETRIEVE CARD D. I am interested in learning more about which organizations you feel exert the most influence in affecting the vote in New Orleans. Here is a list of organizations which have made endorsements in recent elections.

GIVE RESPONDENT CARD E

Q61 Which three or four groups are, in your opinion, the most influential in affecting the vote in New Orleans?

Q61A In which specific area, i.e., neighborhoods and precincts, are these organizations influential?

Q62 In what ways would you say that they are influential?

Q63 Is there any political organization whom you regard as influential whose name is not on the list?

IF YES, SPECIFY

Q64 Are there any social, civic, religious, business or other technically non-political organizations which you feel have in some way played a politically significant role in recent New Orleans elections?

IF YES, SPECIFY AND EXPLAIN

Q65 What would you say are the two or three most pressing issues facing the community which your organization is trying to do something about?
CARD A

Here is a list of the types of clubs and organizations found in the New Orleans community:

A - church connected groups (Knights of Columbus, Brothers Zion, Knights of Peter Claver, etc.)

B - labor unions

C - veteran's associations (American Legion, VFW, etc.)

D - service organizations (Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, etc.)

E - business or civic groups (YMBC, Chamber of Commerce, JC's, etc.)

F - civil rights organizations (NAACP, Urban League, SCLC, etc.)

G - PTA's

H - clubs for people of same nationality or race

I - sports clubs or recreational groups

J - country clubs

K - youth groups (Scouts, Big Brothers Program, etc.)

L - professional or occupational groups (AMA, Louisiana Bar Association, etc.)

M - political clubs or organizations

N - social clubs or groups, including Carnival krewes

O - charity, health, or welfare organizations (Heart Fund, Sickle Cell Anemia Foundation, March of Dimes, Christian Relief Fund, etc.)

P - neighborhood improvement associations (Gentilly Neighborhood Association, Lower Ninth Ward Civic Association, Audubon Civic Association, etc.)

Q - other (please specify)
CARD B

Candidates for local office in selected recent elections.

1972 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice (1st District) race:

**first primary**  
Pascal Calogero  
Revius Ortique  
William Redmann  
Leon Sarpy  

**second primary**  
Pascal Calogero  
Leon Sarpy

1973 Orleans Parish District Attyory race:

**first primary**  
Harry Connick  
Jim Garrison  
George Reese  
Ross T. Scaccia

**second primary**  
Harry Connick  
Jim Garrison

1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race:

**first primary**  
Johnny Jackson, Sr.  
Alvin J. Sargent  
Milton A. Stire

**second primary**

1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court race:

**first primary**  
Herman Bustamente  
Daniel Haggerty  
Edwin Lombard

**second primary**  
Daniel Haggerty  
Edwin Lombard

1974 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice (1st District) race:

**first primary**  
Pascal Calogero  
Alwynn Cronvich  
Jim Garrison

**second primary**  
Pascal Calogero  
Alwynn Cronvich

1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship race:

**first primary**  
Peter Beer  
Joseph Bossetta  
Dominic Grieshaber  
George Reese

**second primary**  
Peter Beer  
Joseph Bossetta
Here is a list of campaign activities often performed by organizations such as yours in behalf of endorsed candidates.

A - hold or sponsor campaign rallies, picnics, or other get-togethers in behalf of endorsed candidates

B - place ads in newsletters or local newspapers endorsing selected candidates

C - place or distribute campaign posters

D - distribute sample ballots endorsing selected candidates

E - conduct house-to-house or telephone canvassing

F - place ads on radio or TV endorsing selected candidates

G - provide transportation to polls for voters

H - contact leaders of other political, social, civic, or religious groups in behalf of endorsed candidates

I - work through other political, social, civic, or religious groups in behalf of endorsed candidates

J - contribute money to the campaign funds of selected candidates

K - other (please specify)
Here is a list of potential sources of revenue often relied upon by organizations such as yours:

A - membership dues
B - fund-raising events (dinners, fairs, picnics, dances, and other events sponsored by organization)
C - contributions from candidates for office
D - revenue generating property owned by organization
E - contributions from individuals
F - contributions from groups and businesses
G - other (please specify)
Here is a list of organizations that have endorsed candidates in recent New Orleans elections:

A - AFL-CIO
B - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
C - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
D - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
E - Community Organization for Unified Leadership (COUP)
F - Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
G - Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
H - Criminal Courts Bar Association
I - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)
J - Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
K - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
L - New Orleans Bar Association
M - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
N - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
O - New Orleans Young Democrats
P - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
Q - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
R - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
S - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
T - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
U - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
V - University of New Orleans Young Democrats
X - Uptown Democratic Association
Questionnaire for Candidates from Selected Elections:

The following questions are in reference to your bid for office in the _______ race.

Q1 What considerations prompted you to run for this office?

Q2 In your estimation, how does the average individual decide
   a) whether to vote, and b) for whom to vote?
   a)  
   b)  

Q3 What has been the role of political organizations in influencing which candidates the voters have supported in recent local elections?

Q4 From which political organizations did you or your staff actively seek support?

Q5 Which portions of the New Orleans electorate would you say provided you with the strongest support? INTERVIEWER: PROBE AREAS OF SUPPORT.

Q5A In what way, if any, do you feel that political organizations were a factor in the outcome of the _______ race? INTERVIEWER: PROBE AREAS OF OPERATION.

Q6 Card A contains a list of political organizations which have endorsed candidates in recent elections. Of the organizations on the list, which three or four would you say are the most influential politically?

Q6A In what areas of the city are these (top 3 or 4) organizations influential?

Q7 In what way are these organizations influential?

Q8 Is there any political organization whom you regard as influential whose name is not on the list? If so, please indicate its name and specify its importance.

Q9 What "non-political" organizations, i.e., social, civic, religious, business, etc., organizations, do you feel played a political significant role in the _______ race? Please explain your answer.
CARD A

Here is a list of organizations that have endorsed candidates in recent New Orleans elections:

A - AFL-CIO
B - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
C - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
D - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
E - Community Organization for Unified Leadership (COUP)
F - Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
G - Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
H - Criminal Courts Bar Association
I - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)
J - Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
K - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
L - New Orleans Bar Association
M - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
N - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
O - New Orleans Young Democrats
P - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
Q - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
R - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
S - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
T - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
U - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
V - University of New Orleans Young Democrats
X - Uptown Democratic Association
APPENDIX 5

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY

Candidates for Office:

Peter H. Beer, candidate, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice, 1972 and 1974
Harry Connick, candidate, Orleans Parish District Attorney
Dominic C. Grieshaber, candidate, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Daniel B. Haggerty, incumbent, Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court
Johnny Jackson, Sr., candidate, Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff
Edwin Lombard, candidate, Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court
Revisus O. Ortique, Jr., candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice, 1972
George W. Reese, candidate, Orleans Parish District Attorney and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Leon Sarpy, candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice, 1972
Milton A. Stire, incumbent, Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff

Organizational Leaders:

Sandra Anderson, secretary to Lindsey Williams, president of Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO
Richard Boseman, vice-president of Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
John Cassreino, president of Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
Lawrence A. Comiskey, Jr., president of Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
Joseph Cangemelli, president of Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
Walfred Daliet, president of Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
Rev. A.L. Davis, president of Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
Bobby Dupont, president of New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
Emilo Dupre, president of Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP)
Gale Gagliano, president of Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
Donald A. Hoffman, president of Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr., president of Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)
Darleen Jacobs, president of Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
Sen. Nat Kiefer, president of New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
Susan Magee, president of New Orleans League of Women Voters
David Quidd, president of University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD)
Norman Smith, vice-president of Treme Improvement Political Society (TIPS)
Paul Valteau, president of Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)

Reference Persons:

James Chubbuck, director, Institute of Politics, Loyola University of New Orleans
James K. Glassman, editor, Figaro, New Orleans
Rosemary James, political analyst, WWL TV, New Orleans
Marcel Trudeau, director, New Orleans Chapter of the Urban League
Joe Walker, research specialist, Walker Associates, New Orleans
Freddie Warren, attorney and past assistant district attorney, New Orleans
VITA

Wilbur J. Scott was born in Clinton, Missouri, on March 10, 1946. The son of a career army officer, he was graduated from Heidelberg American High School, Heidelberg, Germany, in May of 1963 after attending several elementary and high schools. In September of 1963, he enrolled at St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota, and was graduated with highest honors four years later. After two years of military service, he entered the graduate program in sociology at the University of Texas at El Paso, receiving the Master of Arts degree in May, 1972. In the fall of that year, he began his doctoral program in sociology at Louisiana State University, with outside concentrations in experimental statistics and political science. He has been employed as an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Oklahoma since August, 1975.
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Wilbur J. Scott

Major Field: Sociology

Title of Thesis: An Ecological Analysis of the Organizational Factor in the Expression of Political Action: The Case of New Orleans

Date of Examination: July 26, 1976

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

July 26, 1976