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iii
This study evaluates recent speech-act theory, particularly as formulated by J. L. Austin and John Searle, as an instrument for the teaching of the reading and writing of the formal essay in college freshman English classes. The study assumes that the formal essay can be regarded as the performance of a series of speech acts of the various kinds distinguished by Austin and Searle and that the reader's and writer's knowledge of these distinctions will result in greater effectiveness in the use of language.

The study opens with several chapters in which speech-act theory is examined to discover elements that might be relevant for the study of the formal essay. The following four points are explored thoroughly: (1) virtually every utterance in a meaningful speech situation is a performance of a locutionary or propositional act, an illocutionary act, and usually a perlocutionary act; (2) propositional acts and illocutionary acts are rule-governed and conventional whereas perlocutionary acts (effects on an audience) are not; (3) conventional force indicators convey the illocutionary intent of the speaker; and (4) the rules, conventions, and indicating devices are accessible, at least intuitively, to most native speakers of the language.
In the next few sections of the study four essays by professional writers are analyzed as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts. The locutionary and perlocutionary acts performed in these essays are mentioned only briefly. The lengthiest treatment is given to Howard Mumford Jones's "The Iron String." In this essay are discovered the illocutionary acts of stating, opining, arguing, exemplifying, accounting for, comparing, deprecating, commending, evaluating, and urging. Each of these acts is defined by the conventional rules which constitute it, and some attempt is made to discover the indicating devices that signal the act. Then three other essays found in traditional anthologies used in freshman English classes are analyzed: Joseph Wood Krutch's "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Sylvia Angus's "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?", and Irving Kristol's "Censorship and Pornography." The analysis of these essays shows that the method developed in the study of "The Iron String" works in the study of other essays; the analysis also adds to the list of illocutionary acts isolated and the rules formulated, and it contributes to the understanding of the force indicators which authors use in addressing different audiences. Some attempt is also made to determine the felicity of the illocutionary acts isolated in the essays. "Felicity" is Austin's term for success in the performance of an illocutionary act. As Austin points out, the felicity of
an illocutionary act depends in large part on the extent to which the reader can interpret the author's indicators, the willingness of the author to use indicators to signal force, and the authority of the author who performs a particular act.

Finally, five student essays are analyzed as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts. Four of these fail to some degree because they do not perform the act required by the assignment, perform it in a garbled manner, or do not signal their acts in a clear way. The students are successful only when they understand the extent to which they obligate themselves in performing certain acts and therefore perform only acts which they can felicitously perform.

This study indicates that this approach to the teaching of the formal essay is a promising one which deserves to be tested with further classroom experimentation in which students are taught to read essays as the performance of illocutionary acts and to write with the conscious intent to perform certain acts.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When J. L. Austin delivered the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955 (published in 1962 as How to Do Things with Words), he introduced a new set of concepts and terms which have now been adopted by some literary critics, rhetoricians, and linguists. In these lectures, Austin examined the meaning, the force, and the effect of utterances in the everyday speech of ordinary men. He concluded that a speech act, or the utterance of a series of vocables by a human speaker who consciously intends to express a certain meaning with a certain force in order to produce a certain effect, may be analyzed into two and sometimes three separate acts. He called one act, which carries the meaning, the locutionary act; another, which conveys force, the illocutionary act; and the third, which is the effect of the preceding two acts, the perlocutionary act. In other words, Austin proposed that when a speaker says, "Please close the door," he expresses the idea that a person is to close a door and performs a locutionary act, he conveys the force of requesting and performs an illocutionary act, and he may persuade and perform a perlocutionary act.
Since Austin's death in 1960, his speech-act theory has been modified and expanded by others, particularly John Searle. In articles and in his book on the philosophy of language, *Speech Acts*, Searle has built on Austin's definition of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. He has modified Austin's ideas in some respects, and he has provided concrete examples and detailed explanations of the concepts on which the speech-act theory rests. As an explication of Austin's ideas, Searle's work is valuable in any study which attempts to explore the use of the concepts developed by Austin.

Austin's speech-act theory, originally interesting only in philosophers' circles, is now beginning to be appreciated by scholars in other fields. Some literary critics have defined various literary genres in terms of their illocutionary force, and they have shown that a theory intended originally to explain one-sentence utterances can be used in the explication of written discourse many paragraphs in length. Students interested in oral and written composition have also looked to Austin's speech-act theory for new ways to view their disciplines. Though the full implications of speech-act theory have not yet been explored, significant beginnings have been made in a number of fields.

In the study described in this dissertation, I have considered the implications of Austin's speech-act theory
for the teaching of the formal essay. My thesis is that an effective essay by a professional writer should reflect the successful performance of the appropriate speech acts, that students can be taught to analyze these acts in the professional writer's essay, and that they can, in turn, profit from viewing their own writing as the performance of speech acts. I have, therefore, read essays by professional writers as the performance of successful speech acts. Then, I have evaluated the success of student essays using as a criterion the extent to which they perform successful speech acts. Finally, I have formulated guidelines for teaching the reading and writing of the formal essay using speech-act concepts. The results of this investigation constitute the main divisions of this dissertation.

In the rest of my introduction I shall take a general preliminary view of the theory and summarize what use has already been made of it in the study and teaching of literature and composition.

I

To understand Austin's work, one must see it in the context of twentieth-century philosophy. According to Anthony Quinton, writing for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The latest phase of British philosophy can be said, with more precision than is usual in the history of thought, to have begun in the year 1903. It was the year of the first
major work of Bertrand Russell (born 1872), his *Principles of Mathematics*, and of the two most influential writings of G. E. Moore (1873-1958), his *Principia Ethica* and his essay "Refutation of Idealism." The period ushered in by these works is characterized by its emphasis on the study of language as the chief work of the philosopher. In the first decades of this period, philosophers such as Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) attempted to construct a philosophical language as precise as the mathematical language of calculus. Then, in the next two decades, the logical positivists such as A. J. Ayer reduced the statements interesting to philosophers to the "verifiable" proposition. According to Ayer, as well as the other positivists, verifiable propositions are either "analytic" or "synthetic." Ayer defined the two types as follows: "A proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience." Any utterance which does not fall in one of these two groups is either nonsense or simply an expression of an emotion. In either case, the utterance is unimportant in serious philosophical discussion. These philosophers believed that the language of the everyday world is in many ways deficient and that the business of the philosopher is to develop an artificial language that will be a more nearly adequate vehicle for his ideas.
In the 1950's Cambridge philosophers under the leadership of Wittgenstein and an Oxford group led by Austin and Gilbert Ryle continued the emphasis on language which Quinton notes as a characteristic of this period, but they repudiated the previous generation's attitude toward ordinary language. Wittgenstein, who, in the *Tractatus*, had advocated a mathematical language for philosophy, decided, according to V. C. Chappell, "that 'ordinary language is all right,' and that philosophical difficulties, which are indeed linguistic in origin, arise not because our language is faulty but because philosophers misdescribe and misconstrue it." Ryle's landmark essay, "Ordinary Language," first published in 1953 in *The Philosophical Review*, called for a consideration of the vernacular as a corrective measure which the philosopher's jargon requires. As Ryle expressed it, "'Back to ordinary language' can be (but often is not) the slogan of those who have awoken from the formaliser's dream. This slogan, so used, should be repudiated only by those who hope to replace philosophising by reckoning." The Oxford and the Cambridge philosophers who agreed with Ryle came to be known as the ordinary language philosophers.

Among twentieth-century philosophers, Austin is, first of all, an ordinary language philosopher. In his early essays and lectures, he turns again and again to the way an expression is used in ordinary English for his basic
information on the expression. For example, in "Truth," an essay published in 1950, he begins with the question, "What is it that we say is true or is false? Or, how does the phrase 'is true' occur in English sentences?" In Sense and Sensibilia, lecture notes published in 1962, Austin's chief attack on Ayer's "two languages" grows from Ayer's failure to regard ordinary language with respect. In the first chapter he affirms, "The fact is, as I shall try to make clear, that our ordinary words are much subtler in their uses, and mark many more distinctions, than philosophers have realized." In the essay, "A Plea for Excuses," Austin sums up his attitude toward ordinary language: "Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word."

Austin's other characteristic which is important in this study because it led to the theory of the illocutionary act is his concern for the dimensions of language which the language philosophers of the first half of the century considered irrelevant in the study of philosophy. In a 1956 B. B. C. broadcast, a transcript of which was later printed in Philosophical Papers as "Performative Utterances," Austin describes the philosophical milieu in which he developed his theory. He says,

We have not got to go very far back in the history of philosophy to find philosophers assuming more or less
as a matter of course that the sole business, the sole interesting business, of any utterance—that is, of anything we say—is to be true or at least false. Of course they had always known that there are other kinds of things which we say—things like imperatives, the expressions of wishes, and exclamations—some of which had even been classified by grammarians, though it wasn't perhaps too easy to tell always which was which. But still philosophers have assumed that the only things that they are interested in are utterances which report facts or which describe situations truly or falsely.

Austin cites two periods in the development of this approach. In the first period, "people began to say: 'Well, if these things are true or false it ought to be possible to decide which they are, and if we can't decide which they are they aren't any good but are, in short, nonsense.'"

In the second period, philosophers began to question whether or not the statements classified as nonsense had been intended as statements at all. For example, as a philosopher beginning his work in this period, Austin asks, "Mightn't they [the statements classified as nonsense] perhaps be intended not to report facts but to influence people in this way or that, or to let off steam in this way or that? Or perhaps at any rate some elements in these utterances performed such functions, or, for example, drew attention in some way (without actually reporting it) to some important feature of the circumstances in which the utterance was being made."

Working with ordinary language, Austin set out to
explore this dimension of utterances which cannot be accounted for by their factual content. Significantly, he worked with the utterance of the sentence or proposition, not with the sentence or proposition itself, and then with the "total speech act," as he calls it. Summing up his conclusions in Lecture XII in *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin makes the following point first: "The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating." In considering the "total speech act," not the sentence or proposition, Austin moved from a distinction between two kinds of utterances—the performative and the constative—to the notion that every utterance will be a locutionary and an illocutionary act and may also be a perlocutionary act. Then he established the nucleus of a theory of rules and conventions which govern the illocutionary act.

Austin's discussion of the performative in the first seven chapters or lectures in *How to Do Things with Words* begins with a consideration of certain utterances which seem to have meaning but which do not seem to be true or false. The most obvious of these is a ceremonial utterance such as "I do" in the wedding ceremony or "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" in christening a ship. The grammatical form of these utterances is the simplest form of the logical positivist's verifiable proposition, but the
utterance is not intended to make a statement and is not subject to the need for verification. Instead, such an utterance as "I do" "performs" an action. The actual uttering of the words is a vital part of the marriage ceremony or the christening of the ship. Hence, Austin calls this type of utterance a "performative." The "constative," on the other hand, is the utterance which makes a statement and is subject to the need for verification. Its chief function is not to perform an action but to report or describe. A constative with the same form as the performatives which Austin uses for examples is the following: "I see the dog." In this utterance, the speaker describes his own action, but, by his utterance, Austin concludes at this point, he does not perform an action since he does not perform the act of "seeing" by stating that he is seeing.

In these first lectures Austin explores the idea that the performative is capable of being happy or unhappy and the constative of being true or false. The "doctrine of the Infelicities" defines the conditions under which an utterance is happy. These conditions, which will be discussed fully in Chapter III, are the circumstances surrounding the utterance, the intention of the speaker, and the commitment of the speaker to carry out or stand behind the commitment which he makes in the performative utterance. The constative, on the other hand, Austin tries to show, can only be judged by the extent to which it can be verified.
By Lecture VIII, however, Austin has abandoned the distinction between performative and constative as a helpful way of dividing utterances into two completely separate classes. After experimenting with various grammatical tests, he concludes that none of them will be consistently useful in his attempt to distinguish constatives from performatives. More important, he realizes that every utterance is an action. The simplest verifiable proposition—for example, "The rose is red"—becomes an act of stating when it is uttered by a speaker. As such, it is subject to the conditions which must be satisfied if a performative is to be happy. On the other hand, Austin discovers that performative utterances not only have a happiness-unhappiness dimension but also are capable of being true or false. In fact, the happiness of a performative depends in part on its being true. For example, a performative such as "I apologize" is only happy when it is true that the speaker is apologizing. Austin concedes that "considerations of the happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)."

In other words, when Austin considers the "total speech act," he cannot divide utterances into two discrete classes, one consisting of performatives and the other of constatives.

Austin, therefore, replaces the attempt to separate utterances into two groups with the attempt to distinguish
different acts within the "total speech act." Most signifi-
cant utterances, he decides, involve two acts: a locu-
tionary act and an illocutionary act. Some utterances also
perform a third act—the perlocutionary act. The locution-
ary act is the direct descendant of the constative. It is
simply "uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense
and reference." Austin's favorite example of a sentence
which can be used in performing a locutionary act is "The
cat is on the mat." Uttering it, the speaker refers to
"the cat" and tells something about the particular cat.
The illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts go back to
the performative. The illocutionary act is the component
of the utterance which determines its force, or the type of
action which the speaker is performing in uttering the sen-
tence. The speaker may be ordering, warning, or advocating,
or he may be stating. Austin can find no clear examples of
utterances in which he is not doing some action such as
these when he is uttering a meaningful sentence and intend-
ing to communicate with an audience. If a speaker says to
his listener, "The cat is on the mat," unless the circum-
stances are completely outside the limits which define human
communication, he is performing an illocutionary act of
stating or asking or even warning. The perlocutionary act
is "what we bring about or achieve by saying something such
as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, sur-
prising or misleading." Every speech act will have its
locutionary and illocutionary components, but, since the perlocutionary act is the effect on the listener, some speech acts may not include a perlocutionary component. One may warn of a danger, for example, without convincing or deterring. To sum up the character of the three acts, Austin says, "Thus we distinguished the locutionary act . . . which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain effects by saying something."

Virtually all utterances are locutionary and illocutionary acts: in the act of performing the locutionary act, the speaker must employ a certain force and therefore perform an illocutionary act. Any act may also have a perlocutionary effect: it may cause the hearer to change an attitude, escape a danger, or rob a bank. Whether this effect is achieved is outside the full control of the speaker. In fact, the effect which he achieves may not even be an effect which the speaker has intended to bring about by his speech act. To Austin, the most interesting of the three acts is, then, the illocutionary. The locutionary aspect of utterances he feels has been overemphasized by the logical positivists. The perlocutionary act is too subjective, too dependent on the hearer's emotional response, to provide material for the kind of objective study in which he is interested. Ignored by the previous generation of philos-
ophers, yet possessing the built-in characteristics necessary for an objective study, the illocutionary act is Austin's chief concern.

Austin's work with the theory of the illocutionary act was not, however, complete at the time of his death in 1960. Of his three major works, only Philosophical Papers contains essays published during his lifetime and therefore prepared for publication by Austin himself. After Austin's death, C. J. Warnock edited some of his notes for publication as Sense and Sensibilia. J. O. Urmson, assisted by Warnock, prepared the manuscript of How to Do Things with Words from Austin's William James Lectures notes. Because his work was not considered finished, his fellow scholars have found it possible to amend and supplement it without assuming an adversary role in relation to Austin. The most important, John Searle, in Speech Acts and in articles based on his dissertation, has expanded the Austinian framework into the beginnings of a full philosophy of language. Austin's three books supplemented by the relevant portions of Searle's works will provide the understanding of the illocutionary act which is the basis of this study.

II

In the last ten years, encouraged, it appears, by the publication of How to Do Things with Words in 1962 and Speech Acts in 1969, some literary critics and rhetoricians
have attempted to show that Austin's theory has significant implications for the formulation of literary theories and new methods of teaching oral and written composition. In a recent article in *New Literary History*, "Cumulation, Revolution, and Progress," Martin Steinmann describes Austin's speech-act theory as revolutionary and predicts the emergence of a new school of criticism based on "the Literature-as-Imitation-Speech-Act Theory" which may overthrow the New Critics' "Literature-as-Special-Language Theory."

The effect of the use of the theory on the teaching of oral and written composition as well as linguistic studies seems likely to be equally revolutionary.

Richard Ohmann, editor of *College English* and a leading proponent of the usefulness of speech-act theory in literary criticism, called for a study of its usefulness as early as 1971. In that year he begins the final section of his essay, "Speech, Action, and Style," with the following statement: "A discourse is a set of grammatical structures with meanings. It is also an attempt to influence the reader. I am suggesting that these facts about the ontology of discourse have been well recognized in theories of style, but that a third—that a discourse is a series of illocutionary acts—has not, and ought to be." In the same year in another essay, "Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature," Ohmann proposes this definition: "A literary work is a discourse whose sentences lack the illocution-
ary forces which would normally attach to them. Its illo-

cutionary force is mimetic." Considering this defini-
tion, Ohmann observes:

If the work of literature is mimetic of speech acts, then it is in a sense exhibiting both quasi-speech-acts and the sentences that purportedly help bring about those acts. To exhibit them is to direct attention to them, and, among other things, to their intricacy of meaning and their formal regularity. Similarly, since the quasi-speech-acts of literature are not carrying on the world's business—describing, urging, contracting, etc.—the reader may well attend to them in a non-pragmatic way, and thus allow them to realize their emotive potential. In other words, the suspension of normal illocutionary forces tends to shift a reader's attention to the locutionary acts themselves and to their perlocutionary effects.

Ohmann studies the connection between style and the illocutionary act in "Speech, Action, and Style"—a connection based on his view of literature as "a series of hypothetical acts, grounded in the conventions for verbal action that we have all thoroughly learned." In "Speech, Literature, and the Space Between," written in 1972, Ohmann applies his understanding of the illocutionary force of utterances to an exploration of discourses ranging from newspaper articles to television commercials.

In the essay, "Literature as Act," printed in Seymour Chatman's Approaches to Poetics, 1973, Ohmann expands ideas for which he has laid the foundations in the earlier articles. For one thing, he defines irony in speech-act terminology as the result of an illocutionary act's infelicity. The desperate irony of a play like Beckett's Endgame he
shows to be a result of the author's manipulation of "quasi-speech-acts" in a milieu in which felicitous speech acts are impossible since the understandings necessary for their successful performance are no longer shared by speaker and hearer. Ohmann demonstrates that the irony of Undershaft's speeches in Act II of Major Barbara results from their infelicity and that Barbara's understanding of the truths which they convey results from her knowledge of their infelicity. In addition, Ohmann makes an important point concerning the speech act in fiction which applies to the act in any written discourse: "A written literary work preserves in its words a record of purported speech acts. They are frozen in its text, to be brought alive whenever a reader reenacts them as a participant." Both of these ideas are important as speech-act theory is expanded to explain other forms of literature.

Monroe C. Beardsley, co-author with W. K. Wimsatt of "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy," defines the lyric poem in The Possibility of Criticism, published in 1970, as "the complex imitation of a compound illocutionary act." Beardsley calls the imitation "complex" for the following reason: "What makes a discourse a literary work (roughly speaking) is its exploitation to a high degree of the illocutionary-act potential of its verbal ingredients—or, in more usual terminology, its richness and complexity of meaning. And what makes a literary work a
poem is the degree to which it condenses that complexity of meaning into compact, intense utterance."

Defining it as "compound," he considers that the poem relies heavily for its complexity on primary and secondary illocutionary acts. To explain these Beardsley compares "Bring me my slippers" to "Bring me my favorite slippers, which are such a comfort to me." He calls both of these examples of ordering, but the second he holds to be also an example of praising. Beardsley sums up the difference between the two utterances: "The second case is a compound illocutionary act, though the syntax makes the ordering primary, the praising secondary."

In a later essay, "The Concept of Literature," Beardsley is less confident of his definition of the lyric poem as "the complex imitation of a compound illocutionary act," but he is not willing to abandon it completely. He concludes, "What I wish to suggest, by way of conclusion, although without anything like an adequate defense, is that there is indeed an underlying relationship between (1) being an imitation illocutionary act and (2) being distinctly above the norm in ratio of implicit to explicit meaning."

Since the relationship of implicit to explicit meaning is basic to Beardsley's other theories, he is expressing a crucial idea when he connects implicit and explicit meanings to the illocutionary act.

In recent years at least four other critics have used Austin's terminology, and Searle himself has smoothed the
way for a consideration of the illocutionary act in fiction. Marcia Eaton, in articles based on her 1968 dissertation, Stanford University, adds the term "translocutionary act" to Austin's three terms for speech acts. Richard Gale in the essay, "The Fictive Use of Language," which he describes as "a paper on the ontology of fiction," considers fiction from a philosophical viewpoint using the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary distinction. In the essay, "Three Kinds of Intention," printed in Modern Language Notes in 1972, Michael Hancher distinguishes three kinds of intention which may be discovered in a literary work: "(1) the author's intention to make something or other; (2) the author's intention to be (understood as) acting in some way or other; (3) the author's intention to cause something or other to happen." Hancher shows the problem discussed by Wimsatt and Beardsley as the "intentional fallacy" to result from confusing these three kinds of intention, which he feels correspond roughly to the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary acts. Using speech-act theory, Robert L. Brown, Jr., in "Intention and the Contexts of Poetry," published in 1974 in Centrum, attacks the idea that interest in the author's intention is a "fallacy" and discusses two kinds of intention--the intention of the speaker in the poem or work of fiction and the intention of the author of the work. In a recent article, "The Logical status of Fictional Discourse," Searle shows the way in which
he believes the author of a work of fiction uses illocutionary acts and the status of these acts in the work of fiction.

In the field of speech several works have explored ordinary language philosophy as a possible source of insight. Karl R. Wallace, author of Understanding Discourse: The Speech Act and Rhetorical Action, uses Austin's ideas to support his "notion of purpose" as well as the "notion of material foundations of utterance and the form and substance of utterance." John Stewart's dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970, is entitled "Rhetoricians on Language and Meaning: An Ordinary Language Philosophy Critique." Stewart, in a recent article based on this study, summarizes a number of treatments of language and meaning in recent speech communication literature and the approach to these subjects of the ordinary language philosophers, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, P. F. Strawson, and William P. Alston. In this article, printed in The Quarterly Journal of Speech, he proposes a study of ordinary language philosophy by both the rhetorician and the speech communication specialist. Paul Newell Campbell, on the other hand, tries to show in "A Rhetorical View of Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts" that ordinary language philosophy can have little importance in the field of speech.

A few attempts have been made to incorporate the
conclusions of speech-act theory into programs for teaching writing. For example, Ohmann has collaborated with Harold C. Martin and James Wheatley in a textbook for a composition course, The Logic and Rhetoric of Exposition (third edition), in which the authors consider exposition as the illocutionary act of stating or asserting and attempt to list the rules and obligations of the writer of statements or assertions. In addition, they explain persuasion as a perlocutionary act and strategies of persuasion as the means of bringing about a change in an audience. This book makes a valuable contribution to the study of speech acts and composition, but it does not fully exploit the possibilities of the Austinian theory. It limits serious expository writing to the illocutionary act of asserting, it does not explore the relationship between style and illocutionary-force potential, and it does not attempt the analysis of whole works.

In addition to the Martin-Ohmann-Wheatley textbook, three dissertations have contributed to the attempt to relate ordinary language philosophy to the study of language and composition. One of these, "Illocutionary Acts and Transformational Grammar," by Steven Davis, University of Illinois, 1968, is concerned with the teaching of composition only to the extent that generative grammar is considered to be a tool for improving composition. In it, Stevens explores the relationship between generative grammar and
speech-act theory and concludes that a "universal grammar" will have an "illocutionary act component" which will account for questions and assertions. In other words, he concludes that the question and the assertion are present in every language because the human mind works in a certain way. Jack Reitzes in "J. L. Austin's Theory of Speech Acts: Its Theoretical and Heuristic Potential for the Study of Language," Harvard, 1968, finds that "Austin's theory can be construed as a valuable heuristic device both for theorists involved in the study of language, linguistic performance and perception and for those who are in the process of learning their language as well." Reitzes' study is directed not to the teaching of composition but to the teaching of language, and it remains on the level of a theoretical philosophical study. Alan Lemke's "Philosophy of Language and the Teaching of Writing," University of Illinois, 1972, is the only dissertation at this time which offers practical suggestions for teaching composition. Lemke looks for an approach to the teaching of writing in the works of Wittgenstein, Austin, Alston, Kenneth Burke, and Brand Blanchard. Drawing upon the work of these men, Lemke advocates teaching writing as "a way of knowing," utilizing "a process in which the student moves from a state of relative incoherence toward the end of his knowing impulse." Lemke's chief contribution to techniques for teaching writing is his suggestion concerning pre-writing activities. He
feels that the student should be led through a dialectic process to accept as his own the question or problem which he is to consider. Good writing will result from the student's serious consideration of the problem. Lemke deals with problems of style or arrangement only as they arise and are solved as the student searches for a coherent answer.

One point emerges from a consideration of these uses of the illocutionary-act theory. A growing number of scholars feel that this theory, developed in terms of the simple one-sentence utterance, can be applied to discourse of more than one sentence in length and even to written discourse. In addition, two definitions which apply the idea of the illocutionary act to written discourse of some length have appeared: Beardsley's definition of the lyric poem as "the complex imitation of a compound illocutionary act" and Ohmann's definition of any discourse as "a series of illocutionary acts." In prose nonfiction the discourse is not an imitation of an illocutionary act: the author performs the act in his own right when he speaks in his own person. Usually in nonfiction the author is speaking for himself. A long discourse will be "a series of illocutionary acts," and it will be a complex performance of illocutionary acts. Its separate sentences will usually perform a compound illocutionary act. In fact, the discourse as a whole may be analyzed as a compound illocutionary act. For example, an
article for a periodical may be, first of all, an act of asserting and, second, an act of advocating. Then it may have within it a series of acts, most of them compound, all of them contributing to the complexity of the performance of illocutionary acts in the essay. In this study, the formal essay will be considered as a performance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts all of which contribute to the total illocutionary force, which in turn may be compound.

III

When one applies to the formal essay the idea that any discourse is the performance of a series of illocutionary acts, he is broadening a theory based originally on single utterances in speech situations to fit a discourse that may run to thousands of words. This application is possible if one accepts the extended application of the term supplied by Beardsley and Ohmann. It becomes even more plausible applied to the formal essay as I define it in this study.

I define the formal essay by pulling from the historical definition of the essay those elements which seem to make it in its more formal instances a suitable label for the type of writing which a student should master before he enters a particular field with its particular writing demands. In other words, this definition of the formal essay
should apply to the "theme" which is the goal of freshman English instruction. James Kinneavy in *A Theory of Discourse* comments on the ambiguous uses of the term *essay* which, he feels, "make it presently unacceptable in any precise context." Certainly the term has been a catch-all term, used in fact to apply to any short prose non-fiction. In its evolution, however, the term has kept some elements which make it meaningful in spite of its broadness. The English word *essay* is derived from the French *essai* used by Montaigne in the sixteenth century to refer to his "attempts" to explore subjects of interest to him in short prose works. Samuel Johnson turned the definition in a pejorative direction in his eighteenth-century definition: "A loose sally of the mind; an irregular indigested piece; not a regular and orderly composition."

OED lists its definition of the literary essay under the second division of its definition of the word *essay*. All the definitions in this division are "a trying to do something." When this definition is limited to written discourse, OED picks up parts of Johnson's definition: "A composition of moderate length on any particular subject, or branch of a subject; originally implying want of finish, 'an irregular undigested piece' (J), but now said of a composition more or less elaborate in style, though limited in range." The thread tying all these together is knotted at Montaigne's first use of "attempts" to describe his short
meditative sketches. It is the key, in fact, to modern definitions such as the one in the 1971 unabridged edition of *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language* and in Barnet, Berman, and Burto's *A Dictionary of Literary, Dramatic, and Cinematic Terms*. The first defines the essay as "a short literary composition on a particular theme or subject, usually in prose and generally analytic, speculative, or interpretative." The second defines it as "a composition having no pretensions to completeness or thoroughness of treatment." This last definition keeps most clearly the idea of the essay as an "attempt" or a "loose sally of the mind," but even the Random House definition continues to suggest that the work is not one in which the writer merely reports but one in which he analyzes, speculates, and interprets in an "attempt" to produce a viable analysis, speculation, or interpretation. The OED adds the idea of a "more or less elaborate style," rejecting Johnson's idea that the essay must be "an irregular indigested piece."

In this study, the essay is defined first of all as an attempt to explore a subject. As such it will make no claim to exhaustive treatment of the subject. In the second place, it will be speculative, interpretative, and analytic. Finally, its style will be as elaborate as the subject and the audience demand. Since the type of essay studied here is to be limited to the formal essay, its style will never be "loose" or "irregular."
The type of essay to be considered is then the formal essay. According to Steinmann and Willen in the introduction to *Literature for Writing*, the goal in writing in freshman English and most college courses is a paper which is "rather formal, impersonal, and objective; essentially serious." They give the name formal essay to this type of writing to distinguish it from the familiar or informal essay. No one can claim that the dividing line between the formal and the familiar essay is so clear that essays can be separated into two groups which will satisfy everyone. Essays can only be arranged on a continuum from the most formal to the completely personal and subjective. In this study, the essays to be considered will group themselves far enough in the direction of the formal as to arouse no real argument. They will appear to be impersonal, objective, and serious because they will be written in formal English, will usually employ the third person, and will be essentially serious. Like any essay, they will be, in reality, somewhat personal, since each will be an "attempt" by its author to develop a point which he has chosen to make. The style will often be appropriate for what Kinnear calls "reference discourse," especially the "reference discourse" which he classes as "exploratory," but the emphasis on the author's opinion rather than the world which he is describing will keep the work an essay.

Since the essay is closely tied to its author's
attempt to convey an idea to an audience, even when it is its most formal, it is especially amenable to analysis as the performance of speech acts which result in a "complex" series of illocutionary acts made up of "compound" acts. The essay has, however, one characteristic which distinguishes it from the spoken act. The illocutionary acts in written discourse are usually prepared with an audience in mind, but the audience is not present during the writing or speaking process. The acts therefore become merely sentences when they leave the writer, and the sentences must be re-incorporated into speech acts by the reader. Thus, each act cannot be considered successful or unsuccessful until the sentence is read. Since the writer will not get the kind of help with each utterance that the speaker gets from his audience, he must work harder than the speaker to indicate the force of his utterances in his sentences which the reader will transform into speech acts as he reads. In other words, the illocutionary acts in an essay should be indicated in more obvious ways than the same acts in spoken discourse, or, at least, in ways more closely tied to the sentence.

The next chapter of this dissertation will be devoted to a discussion of the theory of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Chapter III will explore the conditions and rules which "constitute" illocutionary acts and make them successful. Then Chapter IV will record
my first attempt to analyze an essay as the performance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts. The essay chosen for this analysis is Howard Mumford Jones's "The Iron String," which was originally prepared to be presented as a speech to a group of Harvard students. Any editing which the original speech would need in order to be intelligible to an audience of readers, one can assume has been done, so the speech printed here should have the explicitness in its use of terms and force indicators which written discourse requires. At the same time, as an essay, it retains the value of having originally been a complicated speech act of the kind which Austin and Searle specifically discuss. In this chapter, Jones's essay will be analyzed as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts which are indicated in conventional ways and constituted by certain rules and conditions. The total illocutionary force of the essay should become apparent as well as its locutionary or propositional (Searle's term) content and the complex of illocutionary forces within the essay. In addition, the function of force indicators will be elucidated, and the list drawn from the work of Austin and Searle will be amended. Finally, the rules and conditions for the acts performed will be formulated. Through a consideration of this essay, close to Austin's original theory since it was prepared to be delivered as a speech and to the personal essay because of its occasional use of first
person, the usefulness of the theory for the analysis of essays further removed from the speech situation and placed closer to the formal end of the essay continuum should become apparent.

In the fifth chapter, therefore, the points in the theory which still appear to be pertinent will be applied to the analysis of the following essays: "We Were Not Skeptical Enough" by Joseph Wood Krutch, "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus, and "Pornography and Censorship" by Irving Kristol.

In the sixth chapter, the practice in analyzing successful professional essays will supply the method for analyzing student essays, some of which "misfired," to use Austin's term. Such an analysis will be shown to result in a clearer insight into the student writer's problems. More important, it will provide a way to explain the student's difficulties and suggest the way to correct them.

The study will end with the suggestions for using the speech act theory in the composition class which seem valid after it has been applied in these different ways.
CHAPTER II

LOCUTIONARY, ILLOCUTIONARY, AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

J. L. Austin formulated his speech-act theory in order to call attention to the dimensions of the total speech act which philosophers in the decades before him had not considered relevant in the study of philosophy. In the William James Lectures presented at Harvard in 1955 and printed in 1962 as How to Do Things with Words, he maintains that most utterances by a speaker who is addressing an audience convey a meaning together with a certain force and sometimes a certain effect or, in other words, may be analyzed into a locutionary, an illocutionary, and sometimes a perlocutionary act. He devotes most of his attention in How to Do Things with Words to the illocutionary act and its relationship to the locutionary act. Because the illocutionary act is, unlike the perlocutionary act, dependent for its successful performance on language conventions which the speaker and the hearer must know, Austin maintains that he or any other third person can listen to a conversation and determine what illocutionary as well as what locutionary acts the speakers are performing and what language conventions they are using to perform these acts.
John Searle, in *Speech Acts* and a number of articles published before *Speech Acts*, amends Austin's ideas and applies the theory to specific acts. He shares, moreover, without reservation Austin's view of the conventional nature of illocutionary acts. He agrees with the view stated by Austin: "A judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved."

From the works of these two men, then, comes the theory of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts which I shall use as the basis for my analysis of the formal essay. According to this theory, a speaker in a certain situation signals by conventional indicators that he is performing a total speech act which has a certain content and force. Because of their conventional nature these indicators can be interpreted by a third person or Austin's "judge."

I

After J. L. Austin in the William James Lectures had abandoned his earlier constative-performative distinction between utterances in favor of the distinction between meaning and force in a single utterance, he turned to the analysis of two acts which he believed could be found in any meaningful utterance, the locutionary and the illocu-
tionary acts, and a third act, the perlocutionary act, which he believed to occur in many speech acts. He devoted most of his interest to the illocutionary act. Because of their conventional nature, he believed that it is possible to study speech acts and ascertain their illocutionary force with more precision than is possible in the study of most human activities and to discover conventional force indicators which signal force changes. The most reliable of these indicators Austin concluded is the "explicit performative formula" which he used to make a tentative listing of illocutionary acts into five categories, "verdicitives," "exercitives," "commissives," "behabitives," and "expositives." These categories are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated, Austin discovered, but with the explicit formula and other force indicators they are helpful in studying the illocutionary force of utterances.

The locutionary act is, to Austin, the carrier of meaning defined as "correspondence with the facts" of a linguistic form. The locutionary act, in other words, is the direct descendant of the constative. In Lecture XI Austin explains,

With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary: moreover, we use an oversimplified notion of correspondence with the facts--oversimplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. We aim at the ideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c. 2

When Austin considers the locutionary act, he says that he
is abstracting from the total speech act "what would be right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience." For example, the sentence "The cat is on the mat" should convey to any audience of English speaking people the "fact" that the cat is on the mat. Of course, uttered by a speaker to a certain audience, it will never convey only this fact, but Austin is willing to consider the product of this abstracting, though it is "oversimplified," because of the need he feels for isolating a facet of the speech act which conveys a "correspondence with the facts." Austin, in effect, recommends here a definition of meaning in which the performance of a locutionary act is "roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense." This act will convey the same meaning in every speaking situation as long as the "sense" and "reference" are the same. These in turn equal "correspondence with the facts."

To explain his use of "sense" and "reference," in Lecture VIII Austin breaks the locutionary act into three other acts: the phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic. Austin is not interested in the phonetic act, which is "merely the act of uttering certain noises," though it is, of course, a basic condition of all speech acts. The phatic act is "the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging
to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar." In other words, the vocables uttered in the phonetic act are organized into words and grammatical phrases in the phatic act. The phatic act has no meaning, however; it may even result in nonsense. For example, "The green grass is growing" used to perform a phatic act and a phonetic act is a successful performance of both acts because it uses the vocabulary, the grammar, and the sound system of English. "The boing boing is boing" is a phonetic act but not a phatic act since it does not use the vocabulary of English. "The green grass is growing" has no meaning until the speaker refers to certain grass and describes it as growing. The utterance can even be nonsense if the only grass to which reference is made is artificial. It is in the rhetic act that sounds organized by a particular vocabulary and grammar in the phonetic and phatic acts become meaningful utterances or, in Austin's words, acquire "a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference." Austin illustrates the difference between the phatic and the rhetic acts with the same series of vocables. The utterance, "He said, 'The cat is on the mat,'" reports a phatic act. On the other hand, this utterance also reports a rhetic act: "He said that the cat is on the mat." Employing essentially the same "vocables" and the same vocabulary and grammar, the second construction has "a certain more-or-less definite sense and
reference": a native speaker understands the second utter­ance as an attempt by a speaker to refer to the world of facts or to secure a "correspondence with the facts." The first sentence, on the other hand, merely reports a sen­tence using the grammar and vocabulary of English. It may be a sentence uttered by a parrot or a robot in imitation of human speech.

A more precise understanding of "sense" and "refer­ence" eludes even the reader who studies Austin's discus­sion in the essay, "How to Talk." There Austin explores what he calls "Speech-situation $S_o$," in which there is only one utterance pattern, "I is a T." "I" is the symbol for the "I-word," which refers or corresponds to a single en­tity, a sample of an "item-type." Austin uses the example "1227 is a rhombus." "1227" refers to one figure or item, identified as "1227." Reference is made when "1227" is linked with this figure or item. The "T-word," on the other hand, is linked to the "sense" or "pattern." "Rhombus" gives the "sense" of the item-type "1227." Thus it seems to identify it, describe it, or limit it. The way this distinction would work even in a simple utterance such as "The cat is on the mat" is not completely clear. One assumes that "the cat" refers and that "on the mat" carries the sense of "the cat" in this context. However, an at­tempt to extend this analysis further quickly becomes orig­inal work tied to Austin's thinking by conjecture only. On
the basis of Austin's work, one can conclude only that some element in each speech act refers to the nonlinguistic world and that another element gives the sense of that reference—added information about it.

The phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts, the last characterized by "a more-or-less definite sense and reference," make up the locutionary act. This act is the uttering of sounds using a particular vocabulary and grammar to convey a certain sense and reference. When one questions the purpose of the utterance produced in this way, he is moving from a consideration of the utterance as a locutionary act to a study of it as an illocutionary act, the carrier of "force" in the utterance.

Acknowledging that the distinction is arbitrary, Austin continues to separate meaning and force in discussing the locutionary and illocutionary acts. He says in Lecture VIII, "Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force—'He meant it as an order', &c. But I want to distinguish force and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning." Considering an utterance as a locutionary act, Austin focuses on it as a phonetic act, a phatic act, and a rhetic act or the sum of these—an utterance with sense and reference. Considering the same act as an illocutionary act, he examines it for its force in the context
where it occurs. Its force depends on the intention of the speaker performing the speech act. For example, the utterance of the series of vocables, "He ran ten miles," is a locutionary act if it has sense and reference. In every case which Austin can discover, it is also an illocutionary act with the force of a statement, an exclamation, or a question. In other words, the speaker who utters the series of vocables with sense and reference in the locutionary act will utter them in order to perform an additional act, the illocutionary act. This additional act is the force of the utterance.

To succeed in performing this act, the speaker must secure from his audience only an intellectual response called "uptake." His utterance may be one which "takes effect" as in the christening of a ship, or it may require a response as in asking, but Austin is most interested in the response he calls "uptake." For this response to be complete, the hearer must understand the meaning of the locution and the illocutionary intent of the speaker. Discussing the appropriate responses to the illocutionary act in Lecture IX, Austin uses the example of the "uptake" following a warning. For a warning to be a successful locutionary and illocutionary act, the hearer must understand what he is being warned about and that the speaker intends to warn him. He does not need to act on the warning.

Though Austin is not interested in the perlocutionary
act, which is too closely tied to audience attitude to be studied objectively, he realizes that any speech act with its locutionary and illocutionary aspects may have, if not "a perlocutionary object," at least "a perlocutionary sequel." The perlocutionary act differs from the illocutionary act in the effect which it produces. For a perlocutionary act to be successful, the hearer must respond in an appropriate way. When the act of persuading is successful, for example, the hearer is persuaded. However, as Austin expresses it, "any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a straightforward constative utterance (if there is such an animal)." Then the perlocutionary act may occur as a result of a speech act which appears to be intended to perform only the locutionary and the illocutionary acts. The "perlocutionary sequel" may, therefore, be a sequel which the speaker did not expect or even desire. A simple warning may result in the speaker's offending his hearer. The hearer may experience the appropriate "uptake," but because of his personal emotional and mental state also experience the same effect that he would experience if the speaker desired to offend him. For example, a warning that his car is in the path of another vehicle may arouse anger if the hearer is a driver who is accustomed to being laughed at.
for his driving errors. An observer has no way, however, to predict this anger, and nothing in the utterance demands it.

Austin maintains that "a judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved." The judge should have this ability to distinguish locutionary and illocutionary acts because he is a proficient speaker of the language which is being used and therefore understands its conventions. Since the illocutionary act is basically conventional, it depends on signals which the speaker and his audience as well as the judge can understand. Austin never reaches the point at which he can define these conventions precisely and fully, and his very use of the term conventional is not always clear. What is clear is his total commitment to the conventional nature of language in general and the illocutionary act in particular.

Any speech act is to Austin largely dependent on conventions for its usefulness as a conveyor of meaning. Austin expresses his commitment to this idea in the essay "Truth":

If there is to be communication of the sort that we achieve by language at all, there must be a stock of symbols of some kind which a communicator ('the speaker') can produce 'at will' and which a communicatee ('the audience') can observe: these may be called the 'words', though, of course, they need not be anything very like what we should normally call words--they might be signal flags, &c. There must also be something other than the
words, which the words are to be used to communicate about: this may be called the 'world'.

Austin believes that many of the problems of the philosopher arise when he fails to understand the arbitrary nature of words. Language symbols have no natural connection or correspondence with the world about which they are used to describe. Philosophers tend to forget this characteristic of language symbols, especially as they examine the meaning of words such as fact. In this essay Austin avoids the use of the phrase "the fact that" because, he says, in philosophy it is often used loosely "with advantage in ordinary life, though seldom in philosophy—above all in discussing truth, where it is precisely our business to prise the words off the world and keep them off it." To "prise the words off the world," Austin emphasizes the conventional nature of words. He says, concerning the use of "corresponds," "The only essential point is this: that the correlation between the words (=sentences) and the type of situation, event, &c., which is to be such that when a statement in those words is made with reference to an historic situation of that type the statement is then true, is absolutely and purely conventional." One can say, then, that the locutionary act, the act which embodies "correspondence with the facts," employs the first level of language conventions, since this discussion in "Truth" involves the conventions of locution.

In "How to Talk," Austin shows how the conventions
used in the locutionary act function in "Speech-situation $S_o$." Two sets of "semantic conventions" operate in the sentence of form $S$, "I is a T." These are "I-conventions, or conventions of reference," and "T-conventions, or conventions of sense." These conventions make possible the relationship between the "I-word" and the "T-word" in the sentence "I is a T," and they make it possible for such a sentence to convey meaning to a hearer. As a result of an arbitrary decision, any "I-word" refers to an item. In the example which Austin uses, "1227 is a rhombus," as in all sentences in "Speech-situation $S_o$," the "I-word" is a number so that no two items can be identified by the same word. The "T-word" is more difficult to explain. Austin says, "Every word in our language $S_o$ (except for 'is' and 'a') has either a reference fixed by I-conventions or a sense fixed by T-conventions, but not both, and is accordingly either an I-word or a T-word." "T-conventions" involve two linguistic procedures: "name-giving" and "sense-giving." "Name-giving," "allotting a certain vocable to a certain item-type as its 'name'," and "sense-giving," "allotting a certain item-type to a certain vocable as its 'sense'," produce this result: "when either has been gone through, the item-type, attached by nature to certain items, is attached by convention to a certain vocable, now a T-word and (as we shall call it) its 'name', as the 'sense' of that word." As one sees in Chapter II, "Speech-situation $S_o$."
limited to only one sentence pattern, provides little help in the analysis of more complicated utterances. The point here is that to Austin, even on the locutionary level, the meaning of the utterance depends on conventions which speaker and hearer know how to use and recognize.

In this essay, Austin also describes one convention related to illocutionary force. He calls "is a" the "assertive link." Since asserting is an illocutionary act, the use of "is a" to link the "I-word" and the "T-word" as the "assertive link" must show the force of the utterance. In English, as in "Speech-situation $S_0$," the presence of a part of the verb be used as the predicate will sometimes signal assertions, since the pattern of the one sentence in "Speech-situation $S_0$" is a common pattern in English.

By the end of these essays, Austin has made two points which indicate the way in which he understands the word conventional and the conventions of a language. First, language is conventional and language conventions operate because of arbitrary agreements that certain words will convey certain meanings. There is no natural connection between words and the "real" world. Second, the locutionary act, when he discusses it, will be as dependent on conventions as the illocutionary act. As a judge, Austin or any other person who knows these conventions can distinguish locutionary and illocutionary acts.

The suggestions which Austin gives concerning illo-
cutionary act conventional indicators in *How to Do Things with Words* are helpful only if one realizes the limitations of these suggestions. At the end of his listing of types of indicators in Lecture VI, Austin stresses that usually one indicator is not adequate to show force and that several will be needed together if the force is to be clear. Austin says, "No doubt a combination of some or all the devices mentioned above (and very likely there are others) will usually, if not in the end, suffice." Only the explicit performative, either already supplied in the utterance or added to test the force, is a sure indicator to Austin, who stresses the "vagueness of meaning and uncertainty of sure reception" of the others.

The most important of the conventional devices which Austin uses, the "explicit performative formula," he first discovers when he is working with the performative and finally fastens on after testing and discarding two other formulas for distinguishing illocutionary from perlocutionary acts. The formulas which he tests and discards are the following:

'In saying $x$ I was doing $y$' or 'I did $y$',

'By saying $x$ I did $y$' or 'I was doing $y$'.

When meaningful lexical items are substituted for $x$ and $y$, these formulas result in the following sentences:

'In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him'.

'By saying I would shoot him I alarmed him'.

In Lecture X Austin concludes that "these formulas are at
best very slippery tests for deciding whether an expression is an illocution as distinct from a perlocution or nei-
22 ther." In some cases, for example, the formulas can be used to identify locutionary acts; and, in some cases, the formulas, when words are substituted, result in the identification of the opposite act. In other words, the "by" formula produces the illocutionary act. More important, Austin finds the formulas to be no help in his study of distinctions among illocutionary acts. The significant aspect of the formulas is their emphasis on the verb as the key word in the perlocutionary and the illocutionary acts. From the start of Austin's work with the performative, the verb had this importance. It is, of course, the key to the explicit performative formula, which consists of the addition of "I" and a first person singular present indicative active verb to the beginning of an utterance in order to make it "explicit" as a performative. The illocutionary force, Austin discovers, can be made "explicit" in the same way. Thus, in studying an utterance such as "He has told the truth," Austin adds "I hold that," "I promise that," or "I believe that" to the utterance. If one of these works in the context of the original utterance, then it makes "explicit" the illocutionary act performed in the speech act. The verb, then, names the illocutionary act, and, in turn, a list of verbs which will work in the explicit formula becomes a list of illocutionary acts.
In Lecture XII Austin applies the first person singular present indicative active test in order to set up five categories of verbs naming illocutionary acts. He begins the procedure by listing all the verbs in a concise dictionary which seem to work in the explicit formula. His list, he jokingly says, is "of the order of the third power of 10" or consists of more than one thousand verbs. These he classifies as "verdictives," "exercitives," "commissives," "behabitives," and "expositives." Acts in the first group give verdicts or a finding "which is for different reasons hard to be certain about." Examples of verbs which name these acts are "characterize," "reckon," and "estimate." (See Appendix I for Austin's examples in all five categories.) The exercitive involves "the exercising of powers, rights, or influences" or "the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it," as in appointing, dismissing, or pardoning. Commissives "commit you to doing something, but include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not promises, and also rather vague things which we may call espousals, as for example, siding with." Examples are "vowing," "undertaking," and "engaging." Behabitives "have to do with attitudes and social behaviour" as apologizing, thanking, and complimenting. Expositives, the fifth group, "make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation." Examples are "affirming," "remarking," and "informing."
These lists of verbs which name illocutionary forces and the headings themselves are not as helpful in identifying the various illocutionary acts as they appear to be when one first studies them. In the first place, Austin's verbs will not all work in the explicit formula. Then, the lists are not exhaustive. One cannot even be sure that Austin would have retained these five categories if he had been able to continue his study. In Lecture XII, in discussing expositives, Austin admits that one can often dispute his placing of various verbs in the categories. Then he mentions the way an act tends to differ in particular cases from another as a matter of degree, not kind. Discussing intention, for example, he says, "At the one extreme I may just state that I have an intention, but I may also declare or express or announce my intention or determination."

In other words, Austin acknowledges the difficulty in deciding even in cases where the explicit form is used which act is being performed. The formula, found in the utterance or added to test the utterance in context, is, however, the most useful indicator.

In his discussion of the performative, Austin lists other indicators which, though vague and uncertain, will work as illocutionary force indicators, especially if they are used in combinations to support each other. These are the mood of the verb, adverbs and adverbial phrases, connecting particles, the circumstances of the utterance, tone
of voice, cadence, and gestures. The imperative mood clearly points to such acts as ordering, requesting, and begging, if it is used in its customary sense. The subjunctive mood also expresses a kind or degree of force which distinguishes it from the indicative, which is used in too many dissimilar situations to be a clear signal. About adverbs and adverbial phrases, Austin says, "Thus we can qualify the force of 'I shall' by adding 'probably' or—in an opposite sense—by adding 'without fail'; we can give emphasis (to a reminder or whatever it may be) by writing 'You would do well never to forget that..." Austin cautions that these words often signal intentions which he considers to be questionable as to force such as intimating and insinuating, so care must be taken not to interpret all adverbial qualifiers as simple force indicators. When they do signal force, they change the force to some degree from that expressed in the verb or they simply make the force expressed in the verb clearer by making it more emphatic.

By connecting particles, Austin means transition words such as "still," "therefore," "hereby," and "moreover" as well as subordinate conjunctions such as "although" and "whereas" and presumably coordinate conjunctions like "and" and "but." He gives as examples of the way the connecting particles convey force the use of "'still' with the force of 'I insist that,'" "'therefore' with the force of 'I conclude that,'" and "'although' with the force of 'I concede
Austin does not mention the coordinate conjunctions, but they operate to indicate force very much as either the subordinate conjunctions or the transition words. For example, "and," used to connect independent clauses, usually indicates that the force of the first part of the utterance continues in the second part. "But," on the other hand, indicates a change in propositional act and sometimes in force. When one of these occurs as the first word in a sentence, it ties the utterance which it introduces to the one before it in a way that usually indicates whether or not the force of the previous utterance is repeated. The ways in which all the connecting particles indicate force will become clearer as I discuss their use in "The Iron String" in Chapter IV.

When Austin speaks of the circumstances of the utterance, he discusses one of the most important indicators in conversation and also in the essay. One must see its use in conversation in order to see its relevance to the interpretation of written discourse. In a conversation, the first speaker often needs no explicit word indicators to interpret correctly the illocutionary act of the person who responds to his utterance. For example, the first speaker asks, "When did you last see John?" The person addressed answers, "I saw him last week." The second speaker is stating and also answering. Out of context, the utterance could be the performance of a number of acts. In this context, the
speaker will seldom fail to secure the "uptake" which he intends, even though the words in the sentence are neutral as to force.

Austin mentions titles several times in his discussion of performatives and illocutionary acts, thus indicating that the title of any discourse may play a part in indicating its illocutionary force. In Lecture VI he mentions that performative verbs may occur in titles and seems to indicate that they keep their performative characteristics in titles. Then, after pointing to the significance of words like "whereas," "hereby," and "moreover," Austin says, "A very similar purpose is served by the use of titles such as Manifesto, Act, Proclamation, or the subheading 'A Novel. . . .'" One can see that these announce something about the nature of the act. On occasion, the title may even connect the chapter to follow with the one before it in a way which indicates illocutionary force. In this study, the title will usually be considered as part of the context of the discourse or the circumstances of the utterance, since it usually prepares the reader for what is to come.

In his discussion of speech acts and conventional indicators, Austin leaves many problems unsolved. One such problem which will be important in this study is the status of utterances by an actor on a stage or a persona in a poem. Austin says in Lecture II, concerning such utterances:

a performative utterance will, for example, be in a
peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance—a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use—ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language.34

Then, in Lecture VIII, Austin discusses certain nonillocutionary and nonperlocutionary uses of language, for example, "'the use of language' for something, e. g. for joking." Here he means the utterance of a sentence which seems, on the surface, to perform a legitimate illocutionary act but actually is used "for something" else. For example, the sentence "She is a beanpole," when uttered by a speaker, may appear to be a statement. Its locutionary meaning is, however, in question, and, if the person in question weighs three hundred pounds, its force as a statement is questionable. It seems to be a sentence used for joking, rather than for the sake of its illocutionary force.

Austin cites the use of language in poetry as the same use "for something," and he explains the problem in the following way:

These references to 'use of language' have nothing to do with the illocutionary act. For example, if I say 'Go and catch a falling star', it may be quite clear what both the meaning and the force of my utterance is, but still wholly unresolved which of these other kinds of things I may be doing. There are parasitic uses of language, which are 'not serious', not the 'full normal use'. The normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary act, no attempt to make you do anything, as Walt Whitman does not seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar.36
In addition to the examples of the use of language "for something," Austin cannot fit into his categories those utterances "which do not seem to fall, intuitively at least, exactly into any of these roughly defined classes, or else seem to fall vaguely into more than one." For example, the act of insinuating, "seems" to involve the use of conventions of the kind typical of the illocutionary act, but Austin is troubled by the fact that a native speaker of English would never use the explicit performative formula, "I insinuate that. . .," and the feeling that insinuating "seems like implying to be a clever effect rather than a mere act." Using language to evince emotion is another speech act which does not seem to fit Austin's application of the performative formula: "We may evince emotion in or by issuing an utterance, as when we swear; but once again we have no use here for performative formulas and the other devices of illocutionary acts." Since Austin's work is unfinished and he admits that these problems are unsolved, one can suggest tentative solutions which do not seriously contradict the rest of the theory. Therefore, these do not interfere with the usefulness of the theory as a tool for analyzing the formal essay.

As one begins a study of the essay as a compound illocutionary act based on a series of locutionary acts, one has, then, several reasonably clear formulations from the work of Austin to use as guidelines. In the first place,
though sense and reference are never completely explained, one feels able to separate the elements which merely represent "correspondence with the facts," or the locutionary acts, if only by reducing each utterance to a constative. In the second place, it is possible to classify some illocutionary acts in the essays to be considered by choosing the appropriate verb from Austin's list or using the performative formula. In the third place, one knows to look for subjects and verbs in the first person singular present indicative active in the essays as an explicit indication of the act which is being performed. Finally, one has a list of indicators of or clues to illocutionary force. On the other hand, the essays exemplify some of Austin's acts which seem "like implying to be a clever effect rather than a mere act." For example, in "The Iron String," Howard Mumford Jones "understates." Does this fact vitiate the force of the essay as an illocutionary act. Before answering this question, however, one needs to see what light the work of John Searle can throw on the whole problem of distinguishing locutionary and illocutionary acts.

II

By the end of How to Do Things with Words, Austin has described a theory which he hopes will account for most serious utterances. While attempting to base a "philosophy of language" on Austin's work, John Searle in Speech Acts...
suggests another way to distinguish among illocutionary acts. In the process of expounding his philosophy, he absorbs Austin's distinction between meaning and force in his understanding of the relationship between the sentence and the speech act, and he redefines the locutionary act as the propositional acts of reference and predication, only a slightly more useful formulation than Austin's.

Like Austin, Searle is committed to the study of language as a speech act, the most interesting component of which is the illocutionary act. Searle defines the term speech act in the essay, "What Is a Speech Act?": "It is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol or word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication." In Speech Acts Searle amends this definition in a significant way. He says, "More precisely, the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions is a speech act, and speech acts (of certain kinds to be explained later) are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication." The "certain kinds" which are "minimal units of linguistic communication" are illocutionary acts. The performance of these is the result of the "issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions." The existence of the "certain conditions" give the speech
act its significance. In fact, they determine its illocutionary force.

Like Austin again, Searle uses the method and the material of the ordinary language philosophers. He says in *Speech Acts*, "My knowledge of how to speak the language involves a mastery of a system of rules which renders my use of the elements of that language regular and systematic. By reflecting on my use of the elements of the language I can come to know the facts recorded in linguistic characterizations." When Searle wants to state rules or list illocutionary acts, he relies on his intuitive grasp of a language which he has mastered without the necessity for consciously learning rules or ways to perform illocutionary acts. This language is his native language. Using it, Searle does not need to gather information from a sampling of informants. Nor does he need to trouble himself because he cannot give satisfactory definitions of terms as long as he can use these terms. His problem is merely "converting knowing how into knowing that." Searle sums up his method: "I am a native speaker of a language. I wish to offer certain characterizations and explanations of my use of elements of that language. The hypothesis on which I am proceeding is that my use of linguistic elements is underlain by certain rules. I shall therefore offer linguistic characterizations and then explain the data in those characterizations by formulating the underlying rules." This method
Searle follows in his entire study of the illocutionary act. Finally, like Austin, Searle is chiefly interested in illocutionary acts. Katherine Hammer in "Searle's Conditions and the Determination of Illocutionary Force" points out that basic to the conditions for the illocutionary act is the intent of the speaker to perform a perlocutionary act. She adds, however, "This is not to collapse the distinction between illocutionary act and perlocutionary act, for the successful performance of some illocutionary act does not necessarily result in the successful performance of the intended perlocutionary act; e. g., one can successfully warn someone without persuading him to behave appropriately." At the end of his discussion of promising, Searle himself acknowledges the close tie between the illocution and the perlocution, but he insists that the distinction is vital to his theory. Reducing the illocution to the perlocution results, he feels, in a "stimulus-response account of meaning." His rules are tied, instead, to "institutional theories of communication." It is this characteristic which makes his theories seem valuable in a study of language where any degree of certainty will depend on the acceptance of the idea that there is a body of language data which is the common property of the student and his society and is not dependent on individual reactions. Whatever its perlocutionary intent, therefore, the utterance is interesting in this study as a speech act which secures "uptake,"
and this result is not dependent on the hearer's subjective response.

Searle devotes no space to a formal definition of the illocutionary act. In the first place, Austin's work provides the basic definition, since Searle uses the term essentially as Austin uses it. In the second place, as with the terms which Searle discusses in Chapter I of *Speech Acts* as those which give philosophers unnecessary difficulty when they try to define them, the illocutionary act, to Searle, is understood when one knows how to use it. In *Speech Acts*, Searle equates "performing illocutionary acts" with "stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc." If a speaker understands the nature of stating, questioning, or promising to the extent that he can use these terms, he understands the terms whether he can give a formal definition or not. If he knows when to use the term illocutionary act to mean stating, questioning, or promising, then he understands what an illocutionary act is.

Austin's recommendation to speak of illocutionary force rather than illocutionary meaning is absorbed without a real attack on the idea in *Speech Acts*. Searle's statement of the "principle of expressibility" is the first step in this process. The principle is that "for every possible speech act there is a possible sentence or set of sentences the literal utterance of which in a particular context would constitute a performance of that speech act." Or, to
state it another way, "whatever can be meant can be said." Searle never deviates from the idea that every meaningful utterance is primarily an illocutionary act. The literal utterance of the sentence must supply the ingredients for the illocutionary act as part of the total speech act. Then in the second chapter of *Speech Acts* Searle asks, "But what is it for one to mean something by what one says, and what is it for something to have a meaning?" The first question is tied to the speaker's intention; the second refers to the sentence used in the utterance. Searle insists that intention and literal sentence meaning go together. He finally states the relationship between the two in the following way:

> In our analysis of illocutionary acts, we must capture both the intentional and the conventional aspects and especially the relationship between them. In the performance of an illocutionary act in the literal utterance of a sentence, the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect; and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters associate the expression with the production of that effect.

Since it is possible for the speaker to convey that which he intends to convey by "using words literally," it becomes inconsequential to separate what he intends to convey into force and meaning. Austin's concept of force is nebulous and difficult to discuss, and when it disappears in the total meaning of the utterance, its disappearance is not even deserving of a comment from Searle. One needs to
remember, however, that when Searle examines the locutionary act, he is not looking at it as the carrier of meaning.

This fact is the basis for the frontal attack on Austin's locutionary act which Searle launches in the article, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts." Discussing Austin's distinction between the locutionary act and the illocutionary act, Searle observes that Austin uses the same form for demonstrating rhetic and illocutionary acts. In Lecture VIII Austin shows the phatic and the rhetic acts with these sentences:

'He said "I shall be there"', 'He said he would be there';
'He said "Get out"', 'He told me to get out';
'He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?"', 'He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge'.

In the same chapter Austin uses sentences such as these to illustrate the illocutionary act: "He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her" and "He protested against my doing it." Changing from phatic to rhetic act, Austin changes from a direct to an indirect quotation. When he changes a sentence from a locution to an illocution in form, he changes from a direct to an indirect quotation. In addition, the verbs which he uses in demonstrating the rhetic act — said, told, and asked — are verbs which he uses in his formula for testing illocutionary force, and they also appear in his lists of verbs naming illocutionary acts. If one cannot report a rhetic act without employing a verb with illocutionary force and if the rhetic act is the necessary ingredient of the locutionary act, then an attempt to
separate meaning and force in the locutionary act and the illocutionary act is doomed to failure. The need for the concept of the locutionary act seems to have disappeared.

Searle is not actually making such a dramatic departure from Austin's divisions of the speech act. He still feels that he must distinguish two elements which he finds in the total speech act, and he bases his method of making this distinction on Austin's correlation of the constative and the locutionary act and the performative and the illocutionary act. Searle quotes from Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*, "With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary... With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts." Since the constative represents the verifiable proposition so dear to the hearts of earlier twentieth-century philosophers and the locution with its sense and reference is the pure constative, Searle concludes that Austin is separating content from force rather than meaning from force when he defines the locution and the illocution. Relying on the constative's relationship to the proposition, Searle calls the speech acts with which he replaces the locutionary act "propositional acts." He represents the utterances which he examines as "F(p)" with "F" standing for force and "(p)"
for content or proposition. By the end of the article, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," Searle has, then, replaced Austin's five acts with four acts—phonetic, phatic, propositional, and illocutionary.

In Chapter 2 of *Speech Acts* Searle describes the relationship of the three acts which he finally substitutes for Austin's five. He lists these and explains each:

(a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing *utterance acts.*
(b) Referring and predicating = performing *propositional acts.*
(c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing *illocutionary acts.*

In this list, phonetic and phatic acts are combined as "utterance acts." Searle then explains the way utterance acts operate in a full speech act. Utterance acts are not means to propositional and illocutionary acts; "rather, utterance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts in the way in which, e.g., making an 'x' on a ballot paper stands to voting." Utterance acts do not cause propositional acts and illocutionary acts, nor do propositional acts cause illocutionary acts. Instead, each is a part of a process in the way that the "x" and the ballot are part of voting. The voter, using the "x" and the ballot and intending to vote, votes. The speaker, uttering words, referring and predicating, and intending to ask a question or give a command, actually does ask a question or give a command.
Only the propositional acts of referring and predi-
cating receive any detailed explanation from Searle, who is
satisfied that the reader will understand the other two if
he understands the normal use of the explanatory terms. In
order to illustrate propositional acts, Searle lists four
sentences, each of which is used to perform a different
illocutionary act:

1. Sam smokes habitually.
2. Does Sam smoke habitually?
3. Sam, smoke habitually!
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually.

From each of these the same propositional acts can be ab-
stracted: "Sam" and "smokes habitually." The utterance of
"Sam" is the reference act, and the utterance of "smokes
habitually" is predication. Obviously, Searle's use of the
term reference corresponds closely to Austin's use of the
same term, but his use of the term predication is nearer the
use of the noun predicate and the verb predicate by an
earlier generation of grammarians and philosophers.

To explicate his notion of reference, Searle deals
only with one kind, "single definite reference." Tokens
used in performing this act may be proper names, noun
phrases beginning with the definite article or a possessive
pronoun or noun followed by a singular noun, and pronouns.
Other types of referring expressions or tokens are indefi-
nite referring expressions, expressions referring to uni-
versals, and plural definite referring expressions. Obvi-
ously, these last expressions are used to perform acts which
are far more complicated than single definite reference, but, at the same time, all reference acts share essential features which enable Searle to group them as reference acts. The first of these features is Austin's "correspondence with the facts" or correspondence with a nonlinguistic element, something outside the speech act itself. The second is the result of this first characteristic: the reference act, Searle insists, is a speech act in itself. Though Searle indicates that the only reference which he is interested in occurs in the total speech act, still, in referring the speaker performs an act which has a degree of autonomy. This autonomy is best understood in a comparison of the reference act to the act of predication. Dropping into the terms of an older grammar, Searle says, "The subject serves to identify an object, the predicate, if the total illocutionary act is one of describing or characterizing, serves to describe or characterize the object which has been identified." Reference then is tied to elements outside the utterance; predication turns inward as it acts on the referring expression. In addition, the referring expression may occur within the predicate, or so it seems though Searle never discusses this occurrence. These expressions, in other words, seem "to identify an object" and become part of a reference act wherever they occur. The third feature which reference acts share is that they are always neutral as to illocutionary force.
Predication, on the other hand, is never a speech act and is always "a slice from the total illocutionary act." Rather than referring to an entity outside the context of the speech act, the expressions which make up the predicate act on the referring expressions in a way which is very similar to the way the predicate relates to the subject in traditional grammar. In addition, predication acts are never neutral as to illocutionary force. Like Austin, Searle sees in the verb, the key word in predication acts, the carrier of illocutionary force. The following examples illustrate this characteristic: "'You are going to leave', 'Leave!', 'Will you leave?', 'I suggest that you leave.'" Each has the same subject for "leave"—the single definite referring expression "you." The predication in each changes, however, and with it, the illocutionary force changes from stating to commanding, requesting, and suggesting.

When Searle tries to list verbs which stand for illocutionary acts, he drops Austin's five classes for the notion that there are "several different continua of 'illocutionary force'." He lists six types of illocutionary acts or six "different continua" in Chapter 3, "The Structure of Illocutionary Acts." The description of these six types is not so helpful in the process of identifying illocutionary acts as the "principles of distinction" which Searle uses in order to arrive at the types. These principles follow a discussion of the rules for promising, and they are related
to these rules. For this reason, most of them only become meaningful after the discussion of rules in Chapter III. Two of them are, however, useful as tests of the illocutionary force of an utterance even without the rules. The first is "the point or purpose of the act (the difference, for example, between a statement and a question)," and the seventh is "the different ways in which an utterance relates to the rest of the conversation (the difference between simply replying to what someone has said and objecting to what he has said)." The purpose of an utterance is usually clear whether one can list the rules for the utterance or not. The seventh condition reenforces Austin's view that the circumstances of the utterance are very important as an indicator of the force of the act.

Since, to Searle, speech rules are universal and conventions are found only in particular languages, he devotes only an occasional sentence in his "philosophy of language" to listing conventional force indicators in English. Searle is, however, dedicated to the idea that "for every possible speech act there is a possible sentence or set of sentences the literal utterance of which in a particular context would constitute a performance of that speech act." Here he is emphasizing two points in his understanding of indicators. In the first place, the "particular context" is all-important. In the second place, in the sentence itself, it is possible to indicate every meaning
which the speaker intends to convey. These two points would alone be an adequate guide to the person working within the framework of Searle's theory and wishing to discover force indicators in the sentences of English or any other language.

When Searle lists specific indicators, he lists them primarily for spoken English, but he, like Austin, includes some which can be found in written discourse. Searle's list includes the mood of the verb, the performative verbs, cadence, intonation contour, stress, word order, and punctuation. It is interesting that Searle mentions two times the use of the verb as a force indicator. The verb in any sentence is so closely tied to the act of predication that one can practically pick out the words which are used in this act by the old subject-verb distinction. Now, Searle says that the act of referring "always comes neutrally as to its illocutionary force." Predication, on the other hand, "is a slice from the total illocutionary act." In the words which are used to perform the act of predication, one can expect to discover important clues to illocutionary force.

One can say, then, that Searle's work has clarified and added to Austin's theory in several areas which are important to this study of the formal essay. First, Searle has removed the need to consider force as separate from meaning. Second, by his understanding of the relationship of the propositional acts and content and his explanation
of the propositional acts of reference and predication in terms which fit traditional ideas of these, he has provided a way of examining the sentence for the speech act which conveys content. Third, he has formulated two distinctions between illocutionary acts which are helpful in determining which acts have been performed. Finally, he has added to Austin's view of indicators. Like Austin, Searle has left groups of utterances such as joking outside his classes of serious speech acts.

III

At the end of a study of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts as they are defined by Austin and Searle, one has an understanding of these acts as part of the total speech act. Conventional in nature, locutionary and illocutionary acts should be clear to a third party to a conversation or to the reader of an essay. They should be clear because the speaker or writer has signalled his meaning with convenient force indicators.

At the end of a study of the work of Austin and Searle, one has the following possibilities for consideration as force indicators:

1. Verbs—mood, performatives.
2. Vocabulary—connecting particles, adverbs.
3. Intonation and stress.
4. Word order.
5. Punctuation.
7. Tone of voice.
8. The circumstances of the utterance or context.
The importance of several of these will obviously change as one turns from the spoken utterance to the essay. Intonation and stress, gestures, and tone of voice will play no part in one's reading of the essay. On the other hand, punctuation can be a subtle tool in the hands of the essayist, a tool by which he conveys some of the meanings which he would convey orally or visibly if he were speaking. The circumstances of the utterance change to the total context of the essay—the purpose for which it was written, its original place of publication, whether in a book or a periodical, its title, each paragraph and each sentence as each creates a context for the next. Each sentence in an essay should set up expectations in the minds of a reader to be satisfied in the next sentence just as one utterance in a dialogue provokes the utterance which follows it. The list amended to exclude intonation, stress, gestures, and tone of voice and to include a new understanding of the circumstances of the utterance provides the necessary framework for beginning the search for indicators in essays studied here. Before studying the essays, however, one must understand the cornerstone of the theory of Austin and Searle—the notion of the conditions and rules for the successful performance of the illocutionary act. These conditions and rules actually set up the framework for illocutionary acts. Their existence makes the act conventional. The next chapter will, then, be devoted to these.
CHAPTER III

THE CONSTITUTIVE RULES

As J. L. Austin and John Searle studied the illocutionary act and classified various acts, they both concluded that the successful illocutionary act depends on its satisfying certain conditions. To Austin, the conditions equaled the rules for performing an illocutionary act. After a study of the act of promising, Searle first formulated nine conditions which must be satisfied if the speaker "sincerely and non-defectively promises." Then he extracted from these conditions five rules for the use of "the illocutionary force indicator for promising." Austin's conditions will provide the basic guide in the formulation of conditions and rules for the illocutionary acts discovered in the formal essays analyzed in this study, but the work of Searle will be used for its three important additions to Austin's theory. His first contribution is his application of Austin's idea of rules and conditions to a specific illocutionary act--the act of promising. His second contribution is a list of suggested rules for a number of speech acts which he does not analyze completely. Probably his most important contribution is his discussion of what speech rules do—that they "constitute" a speech act.
Before one attempts to formulate rules for the illocutionary acts performed in the essays analyzed in this study, it is necessary, therefore, to understand the nature of the rules and conditions of Austin and Searle—how they are discovered, how they are instituted, and how they function to constitute speech acts.

I

Austin's most detailed discussion of the conditions or rules governing speech acts occurs in his early attempt to distinguish performative from constative utterances, but all the points which he makes apply to his discussion of illocutionary acts. The constative, Austin postulates, may be examined for its "truth" and "falsity." The performative, on the other hand, is capable of being "happy" or "unhappy," "felicitous" or "infelicitous." When Austin abandons the constative/performative distinction for the notion that every utterance in a meaningful speech act has both a constative and a performative dimension, he carries over to the locutionary act the idea of truth and falsity and to the illocutionary act the idea of felicity and infelicity. The locutionary act is defined by its "more-or-less definite sense and reference" or its rhetic component. Truth, for Austin as for language philosophers such as Ayer, is a product of successful reference; so the locutionary act like the constative is judged for its truth. The illocutionary
act rests in most cases on a successful locutionary act, but the added dimension of illocutionary force is subject to the test of happiness or felicity. This test is the extent to which any act satisfies the conditions, and the conditions for the successful performative are the conditions for the successful illocutionary act.

In Lecture II, Austin considers the performative as an utterance which can be happy or felicitous or can go wrong in various ways. He uses the performative "I bet" as an example, and he points out, "To bet is not . . . merely to utter the words 'I bet, &c.'; someone might do that all right, and yet we might still not agree that he had in fact, or at least entirely, succeeded in betting." He might say "I bet" when the only appropriate linguistic procedure for betting is to say "I wager." He might be without money or any other goods to bet, and he might say "I bet" to someone not prepared to take bets. He might even say "I bet" when he had no intention of betting. Any act such as christening, marrying, or apologizing can go wrong, Austin concludes, for the same kinds of reasons, and he calls this notion of the things that can make a performative unhappy, the "doctrine of the Infelicities." On the other side of the coin is the idea of the things which must go right if the act is to be happy. Austin lists these as the conditions or rules to be satisfied if the performative is to function happily.

The rules which Austin formulates for the happiness
of the performative are general rules for all performatives. Applied to the study of the illocutionary act, they become general rules for all illocutionary acts. The rules or conditions as Austin states them follow:

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely.

(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.5

The first two rules specify the setting in which the speech act occurs. They also define the conventional nature of the act. The conventional procedure must "exist" before the speaker can use it. It must be "accepted" in the repertoire of the speaker and the audience. In addition, the first two rules define the proper relationship between speaker and hearer: "the particular persons" invoking a "particular procedure" must be persons who are capable of invoking that procedure whether the procedure is designed for use in christening a ship, performing a marriage ceremony, or apologizing. The next two rules describe the correct observance of the conventions in the act itself.
Finally, the last two connect meaning with intention in terms of the speaker's sincerity.

Applied to any one of Austin's performatives, the rules work in a simple way which makes it possible to generate rules for any speech act. For example, a man utters, "I apologize." His utterance is happy or felicitous if the utterance of "I apologize" is the correct procedure for the person uttering it to use and he is uttering it to a person whom he has wronged in some way, if the speaker utters the words with the correct intonation and is not interrupted in the process, and if the person actually intends to apologize because he is sorry for his actions. The apology may be unhappy or a "misfire" if the speaker intends to act but does not proceed correctly. The act may be an "abuse" if the speaker is not sincere when he performs the act. "I apologize" uttered with the wrong intonation may become a "misfire." Uttered when the speaker is not sorry, it becomes an "abuse."

In Lecture XI, Austin, discussing statements, concludes that the illocutionary act is also subject to infelicities and is therefore covered by the conditions and rules for performatives. The statement is, of course, tested for truth, but, in addition, the judge hearing the statement uttered in a conversation may ask whether the speaker is the appropriate person to make such a statement: to apologize, one must have done something wrong, and to state one must be
in a position to know what he states. He must not, for example, give population figures for China unless he can show or his hearer knows that he has the information on population in China. He can state successfully, in other words, only if he satisfies the same type of general rules that he must satisfy in apologizing or betting. If stating, the nearest to the pure constative of any speech act, is governed by the performative rules and conditions, then certainly acts such as ordering, begging, urging, and warning, where the illocutionary force is more important, have rules which can be derived from the general rules for the performative. An illocutionary act, like a performative, is infelicitous or unhappy if any one of the six rules or conditions is not satisfied.

Austin uses the terms conditions and rules interchangeably. From allusions to games in How to Do Things with Words, the reader concludes that Austin's rules are game-type rules, but when Austin discusses them, his purpose is, first, to discover the ways in which a performative utterance is different from a constative, not to discuss the nature of the rules or even to discriminate between conditions and rules, and finally to show that even statements must satisfy the rules. Searle attempts to make such a distinction, but his attempt is not his most important contribution to Austin's theory. More important is his explanation of the nature of the rules which "constitute" a speech
More helpful as a guide to formulating rules for the acts in the essays is his analysis of the act of promising.

II

John Searle proceeds from Austin's list of the conditions for the success of a performative utterance to an explanation of the type of rule which "constitutes" a speech act and a detailed explanation of the conditions and rules for promising. In addition, he shows that predicating and referring, propositional acts, are rule-governed. His work offers, then, the most specific guide to formulating the conditions and rules for the illocutionary acts in the formal essay. In some respects this attempt at a precise analysis of the act of promising is very helpful in the preparation of such an analysis of other illocutionary acts. In other respects, it is not helpful. The distinction between conditions and rules, for example, seems an unnecessary one in this study; and since the rules as he states them have aroused a number of attacks on Searle and his work, here the conditions and rules for promising will be used to show how Austin's conditions can be applied to a particular act without any attempt being made to extract rules from conditions. Indeed, such an attempt seems more and more a mere exercise in the manipulation of words as one considers the nature of the rules and Searle's purpose in formulating them.

In the 1965 essay, "What Is a Speech Act?", Searle
introduces the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules on which his definition of speech rules rests. About rules, he says, "Some regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour; for example, the rules of etiquette regulate interpersonal relationships, but these relationships exist independently of the rules of etiquette. Some rules on the other hand do not merely regulate but create or define new forms of behaviour." The second type of rule is the type which constitutes games, as, for example, football or chess. These games and even the individual plays and moves in them do not exist before a set of rules defines them. For example, it takes the understanding that a player crossing the goal line without committing any of the infractions of the rules possible at that point in the game and without being tackled by a player on the other team who is also performing the actions permitted him by the rules of the game constitutes a touchdown to set up the scoring procedure for football. In chess, even the pieces are defined by the rules of the game: a pawn is a pawn because it is constituted a pawn by the rules which define its movements. Translated into another language, the term pawn will be different, but it will still name the pieces that perform certain moves as constituted by the rules of chess.

This understanding of rules is found in John Rawls' "Two Concepts of Rules," which Joseph Ransdell considers to be the ancestor of Searle's conception. Rawls distin-
guishes between what he calls the "summary" approach and the "practice" approach to understanding law. In the summary approach, "rules are pictured as summaries of past decisions arrived at by the direct application of the utilitarian principle to particular cases." The "particular cases" must exist before the rules can be formulated. In the practice approach, the rules define the action. They are "logically prior to particular cases." Of these rules, Rawls says, "To engage in a practice, to perform those actions specified by a practice, means to follow the appropriate rules." In other words, "if a person is engaged in a practice, and if he is asked why he does what he does, or if he is asked to defend what he does, then his explanation, or defense, lies in referring the questioner to the practice." This type of rule and this type of practice, Searle believes, define the speech act.

In *Speech Acts*, Searle substitutes for the distinction between "summary" rules and "practice" rules the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. He expresses the difference: "Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules." Regulative rules, for example, do not make it possible for a human being to consume food, but they may exist as commands to eat a certain
way. Such commands may become constitutive rules for the consumption of a formal dinner, the procedure for the formal dinner only existing after it is defined by the constitutive rules. Constitutive rules will often be definitions rather than commands. For example, in football or chess, each playing position and each chess piece exists because it has been defined in a certain way. Rules which constitute an activity, unlike regulative rules, can change without changing the nature of the activity only if the rules are not basic to the nature of the activity. Searle cites "degrees of centrality in any system of constitutive rules."

"Peripheral" rules can be changed without a change in the nature of the game. In football, the substitution rules are changed periodically without the game becoming another type of ball. On the other hand, the introduction of a rule that six points are scored only if a player can hold the ball for sixty seconds on the fifty-yard line would result in a different game altogether. Searle sums up the difference between the two types of rules: "Regulative rules characteristically have the form or can be comfortably paraphrased in the form 'Do X' or 'If Y do X'. Within systems of constitutive rules, some will have this form, but some will have the form 'X counts as', or 'X counts as Y in context C'."

Actually, all constitutive rules, it can be shown, have this "counts as" quality, and Searle involves himself in unnecessary controversy by insisting on separating some rules from
others on the basis of this difference. The very nature of a constitutive rule is that it causes a particular "X" to "count as" something. In his discussion of the difference between constitutive and regulative rules, however, Searle has explained the nature of the rules to be formulated in this study.

Searle gives some insight into the way these rules operate in his discussion of "brute" and "institutional" facts in Chapter 2 of Speech Acts. "Brute" facts are mental or physical entities. "Institutional" facts depend on the existence of human institutions. According to Searle, "These 'institutions' are systems of constitutive rules." Each "fact" in such a system is undergirded by one or more rules of the form "X counts as Y," Searle says. For example, the fifth rule which he gives for the proper use of any illocutionary force indicating device for promising (Pr) is of this kind: "The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A [some future act of the speaker]." If one considers the act of promising as a human "institution," then all the "facts" that make up the promising act are dependent on this rule. Whether one accepts the "counts as" form as essential or not, the idea which Searle is explaining is basic to an understanding of rule-governed speech acts. Communication in the language "game" is possible because of the existence of a network of constitutive rules, and the "facts" in the repertoire of the players are "institutional" facts.
Since speech seems logically prior to other human institutions, the process by which its constitutive rules were established is puzzling. Certainly, Searle is not suggesting that a prehistoric committee on language set up certain rules and thus constituted speech acts. He may be suggesting, as Steven Davis tries to prove in his dissertation, "Illocutionary Acts and Transformational Grammar," University of Illinois, 1968, that the rules for such acts can be traced to a source deep within the mind of all human beings. Davis considers promising and questioning, for example, to be accounted for in an "illocutionary act component" of a "universal grammar." The fact that Searle considers his study to deal with a "philosophy of language" rather than the working of a certain language seems to support this view. Without adopting such a comprehensive explanation or even attempting to explain how speech rules were set up, the reader can find two significant ways in which speech-act rules meet the requirements for constitutive rules. In the first place, they possess the arbitrary force that one associates with the rules set up by the maker of a new game: one does not question these rules if he wants to play the game constituted by them, and one does not question the necessity of the speech-act rules when he wants to perform a certain act. The second way in which speech-act rules meet the requirements for constitutive rules is merely the other half of the first way. It is not
only the speaker who follows the rules but also the hearer who follows them in interpreting the speech. The rules, whatever their source, make the meaning of an utterance accessible to the hearer, just as the rules which constitute a game make it possible for the second player to understand what his next move should be after he sees the move of the player ahead of him.

For the rules basically deal with the manipulation of words and terms in the way that the player of games manipulates men or chess pieces, in other words, with the formation of the sentence. Searle calls them rules for "the use of the illocutionary force indicating device," and he uses an analogy to the game of chess in describing them. In his analogy the speaker's and the hearer's repertoire of illocutionary force indicating devices corresponds to the chessmen. The rules describe the way the devices may be manipulated.

Though the rules deal with the manipulation of devices in sentences, Searle stresses the fact that they are "semantic" and not "syntactic." His use of the term semantic is intended to remind the reader that, if he wishes to consider the rules in the framework of transformational grammar—a method of study which Searle does not himself pursue but believes to be productive, these rules belong to the semantic component, not the syntactic component, of the deep structure of the sentence. It is also intended to
emphasize the idea that the rules and meaning are two sides of the same coin. Searle ties the sentence, the rules, and meaning together in the following summary:

1. Understanding a sentence is knowing its meaning.
2. The meaning of a sentence is determined by rules, and those rules specify both conditions of utterance of the sentence and also what the utterance counts as.
3. Uttering a sentence and meaning it is a matter of (a) intending (i-1) to get the hearer to know (recognize, be aware of) that certain states of affairs specified by certain of the rules obtain, (b) intending to get the hearer to know (recognize, be aware of) these things by means of getting him to recognize i-1 and (c) intending to get him to recognize i-1 in virtue of his knowledge of the rules for the sentence uttered.
4. The sentence then provides a conventional means of achieving the intention to produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer.\textsuperscript{19}

To understand an utterance and the commitments which the speaker is making in the utterance, the hearer must have internalized the rules which apply and must be able to assume that the speaker is using the rules properly. If he can assume that the utterance which he is hearing follows the rules, the sentence used in the utterance will convey the act with its full effect.

When Searle studies the rules for the use of the illocutionary force indicating device in performing specific acts, he has, then, two sources of information. The first of these is the sentence used in the utterance. Since it "provides a conventional means of achieving the intention to produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer," Searle can study it without the fear of delving into the mind of the speaker or the hearer. According to the
"principle of expressibility," whatever the speaker intended to express, he should have been able to express in the grammar and vocabulary of his language. Anyone studying his utterance should be able to discover his intentions as well as the contents of the utterance by studying the sentence. The second source of information is his own intuition as a native speaker of the language. For information on the rules governing speech acts, as a good ordinary language philosopher, Searle relies on his intuitive grasp of the way these acts work. Relying on the sentence and his understanding of the language which he speaks, Searle can formulate semantic rules for predicating and referring as well as the rules for illocutionary acts.

Before he attempts to formulate rules, however, Searle, like the observer of the chess game who tries to understand the game without having it explained to him, attempts to describe the conditions under which the illocutionary act which he is studying is performed. In Chapter 3 of *Speech Acts* as in the earlier article, "What Is a Speech Act?", Searle lists nine conditions which must be satisfied in a successful act of promising. These nine conditions, which should be compared with Austin's rules discussed on pp. 70-72 above, must be satisfied if the act of promising is happy or felicitous, or, in other words, if the act is a promise at all. The following list summarizes these conditions:
1. Normal input and output conditions obtain.

2. $S$ [speaker] expresses the proposition that $p$ in the utterance of $T$ (sentence).

3. In expressing that $p$, $S$ predicates a future act $A$ of $S$.

4. $H$ [hearer] would prefer $S$'s doing $A$ to his not doing $A$, and $S$ believes $H$ would prefer his doing $A$ to his not doing $A$.

5. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $S$ will do $A$ in the normal course of events.

6. $S$ intends to do $A$.

7. $S$ intends that the utterance of $T$ will place him under an obligation to do $A$.

8. $S$ intends (i-1) to produce in $H$ the knowledge ($K$) that the utterance of $T$ is to count as placing $S$ under an obligation to do $A$. $S$ intends to produce $K$ by means of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) $H$'s knowledge of the meaning of $T$.

9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by $S$ and $H$ are such that $T$ is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain.

"Normal input and output conditions" are present when, for example, the speaker and hearer know the language being used, the speaker does not have an impediment which makes his speech unclear, and the hearer is not deaf. In Searle's words, "'Output' covers the conditions for intelligible speaking and 'input' covers the conditions of understanding." Searle calls conditions 2 and 3 the "propositional content conditions." Four and five are termed "preparatory conditions"; six, the "sincerity condition"; and seven, the "essential condition." Though the hearer is necessary in the satisfying of these conditions, they do not rely on his response. Rather the burden is on the speaker, who must assess the situation which includes the expectations of the hearer and must perform the act of promising using a sentence which contains the signs necessary for determining the
These conditions for promising are closely related to Austin's general conditions for the performance of a successful performativa or illocution. Condition 1 is not included in Austin's list, though everything which Austin says about language implies that the successful performance of speech acts depends on the existence of "normal input and output conditions." Condition 8 specifies the appropriate "uptake" for the act. Condition 9 corresponds in some respects to Austin's condition A.1. Searle says, in explaining it, "This condition is intended to make clear that the sentence uttered is one which, by the semantical rules of the language, is used to make a promise." Here one finds the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the utterance tied together again. Searle points out that the conditions 1, 8, and 9 apply to all illocutionary acts. Searle's conditions 2-5 correspond to Austin's A.2, B.1, and B.2, though Searle does not make explicit the importance of the appropriate person's performing the act. Condition 6, the "sincerity condition," corresponds to \( \backslash .1 \) and \( \backslash .2 \). Together, Austin and Searle indicate four basic components for the conditions of promising:

1. Speaker and hearer must share a common language, and no speaking or hearing problem must interfere with their use of it.
2. The speaker, the appropriate person to perform such an act, must intend to perform an act which he knows the hearer wishes him to perform but does not know that he intends to perform.
3. By the speech act, the speaker intends to place himself
under obligation to perform the act described in the sentence.

4. The existing linguistic formula is followed.

Conditions of the same type may be formulated for any illocutionary act. These conditions are complete if they specify (1) the speaker's intentions, (2) his assessment of the hearer's knowledge and desires, (3) the position of the speaker as the proper person to perform the act, and (4) the extent to which the speaker obligates himself.

From his nine conditions, Searle "extracts" five rules for "the use of the illocutionary force indicating device" to be used in promising. These rules correspond to conditions 2-7. Since conditions 1, 8, and 9 are applicable to illocutionary acts generally, rules for the use of specific act indicators need not include these. By his use of the term extract, Searle shows how closely he thinks the rules follow the conditions. By his calling them rules for "the use of the illocutionary force indicating device," he means that these rules are intended as a precise shorthand statement of the constitutive rules that a native speaker of any language will employ, automatically for the most part, in choosing from his repertoire of conventional devices the appropriate ones to convey the force which he intends his utterance to have. Searle calls number one the "propositional content rule": "Pr [any illocutionary force indicating device for promising] is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse)
T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S." Rules two and three are "preparatory rules": "Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A," and "Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events." Four is the "sincerity rule": "Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A." Five is the "essential rule": "The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A."

Whereas rules 1-4 are quasi-imperatives, rule five has the form, Searle says, of a constitutive rule. For that reason, to Searle, this rule is "essential" in "constituting" the speech act an act of promising.

The relationship between conditions and rules in Searle's discussion is so close that one can profitably continue with Austin to equate rules and conditions. Certainly, the two categories are never more than two views of the same set of phenomena--the constitutive rules which establish each speech act as a human "institution." Conditions are formulated when one views the speech act as it occurs and describes what is happening as the speaker utters a meaningful sentence with a certain force. Rules are a statement of the restrictions which the speaker must observe as he chooses force indicators in order to perform the act which he intends. Or, at least, this seems a fair
assessment of Searle's distinction between the two. Conditions are discovered in the observable act by Austin's impartial judge. Rules are a level away from conditions: theoretically, they explain why the conditions can be observed. When the two are essentially the same, then, one finds it difficult to justify considering rules and conditions separately. Indeed, when Searle turns to other illocutionary acts after his analysis of promising, he erases the distinction between rules and conditions. The chart on pp. 66-67 of Speech Acts, reproduced in my Appendix II, reflects the simplified set of distinctions which, he feels, are all that are necessary for most purposes.

Searle has retained in this summary the key terms that he used in formulating his conditions and rules for promising. The "propositional content" is given, not in a sentence, but in a noun phrase, which makes it clear that the important element is "something"--the content of the propositional act. The "counts as" terminology of the "essential" rule points to Searle's original discussion of constitutive rules in Chapter 2. It should be pointed out that this rule is controversial. For example, Barry Richards, in "Searle on Meaning and Speech Acts," objects to the fact that only one of the five rules for promising is a "counts as" rule, the others following the pattern "________is to be uttered only if. . . ." However, without one rule of this form, even though the rule applies
only if rules two and three also apply, Searle would not recognize the act of promising as instituted by a set of constitutive rules; thus the "essential" rule expresses the basic arbitrariness of the rules and the conditions. This summary, because it contains the key ingredients of the conditions and rules for all illocutionary acts, will form the basis for formulating the rules and conditions of the illocutionary acts to be studied in my next chapter.

Having explicated the rules and conditions for promising and summarized the conditions for other acts in Chapter 3, in Chapters 4 and 5 Searle sets up the semantic rules for the two parts of the propositional act--referring and predicating. Since it will not be necessary to discuss fully the propositional acts in the formal essay analyzed here, it seems unnecessary to describe these rules fully. However, one point which Searle makes in his analysis of the conditions for successful predicating will, however, be useful in studying illocutionary force indicating devices. The conditions and rules for predicating support the idea that predication "is a slice from the total illocutionary act." For example, condition 7 reads: "S intends to produce in H the knowledge that the utterance of P raises the question of the truth or falsity of P of X (in a certain illocutionary mode), by means of H's recognition of this intention; and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means of H's knowledge of the meaning of P." Since the
"meaning of P" is conveyed by the sentence and the part of the sentence concerned with predicating is the grammatical predicate, this condition supports the suspicion that illocutionary force indicating devices will be found in the predicate or will in some way relate to the grammatical predicate. One recalls, too, Austin's explicit formula and classification of illocutionary acts by a listing of verbs.

In his study of speech acts, Searle has, then, made Austin's study of rules and conditions concrete. Following his lead, any other sophisticated introspective user of the language should be able to arrive at the rules for any illocutionary act. He needs only to ask himself concerning any act what relationship exists between the speaker and his audience, what commitments the speaker must make in performing the act, and what the correct procedure is for performing the act. Assisted by Searle's analysis of promising and his chart of other acts but not bound to follow slavishly his terminology, the reader of the essays can act as Austin's judge to decide which acts have been performed and then delve into his own experience in order to codify the rules for the illocutionary acts found in them.
CHAPTER IV

"THE IRON STRING" AND SPEECH-ACT THEORY

If a reader attempts to use the theories of Austin and Searle in the analysis of a complete formal essay as the performance of a series of illocutionary acts, he will get little help from critics and rhetoricians. They have taken only a few steps from the analysis of single-sentence utterances to the analysis of longer discourse. A few critics have studied lyric poems as the performance of illocutionary acts, they have theorized on the place of fictional sentences in speech-act theory, and they have suggested that the theory can apply to discursive prose of more than one sentence. No one, however, has reported an attempt to analyze a formal essay as the performance of illocutionary acts. In this chapter I shall present the results of such an attempt. It is an attempt which reveals a number of problems, some of which can be solved only tentatively at this time.

One of these problems is that the analyst, as a reader, stands in a relationship to the essay different from the relationship of the impartial judge overhearing a conversation and deciding what locutionary and illocutionary acts are being performed. The difference is the result of
the fact that he must transform the written word into speech acts. Ohmann, in the passage quoted in Chapter I, comments on the position of the reader as the audience which brings alive the speech acts "frozen" in the text of the printed work. Now, the speech acts in the formal essay are closer to ordinary speech acts than the utterances in many other types of works. Barbara Herrnstein Smith in her essay "Poetry as Fiction" insists that "to the extent that the writer's act of composing and inscribing is an historically specific and unique verbal event, it is analagous [sic] to the speaker's act of emitting the sounds that comprise spoken discourse." She maintains further that "a printed work may . . . be a natural utterance itself in written form, exactly like a personal letter." The utterances in an essay in which the author speaks primarily in his own voice are very similar to the utterances in a personal letter. One difference is that the audience is not usually known to the writer, and, therefore, he does not know the extent to which he and his audience may share speech conventions. As with the letter, however, the writer must rely only on the conventions which he can incorporate in print.

Another problem that the analyst of the formal essay encounters immediately is the problem of handling the single-sentence utterance which is not simple in terms of propositional acts or illocutionary forces or both. Few sentences in an essay by a mature writer record simple
propositional and illocutionary acts like the sentences analyzed by Austin and Searle; most of these sentences consist of complicated arrangements of words, phrases, and clauses. In other words, they are the product of transformations and embedding, to use the terminology of transformational grammar, which I will employ in other sections of this chapter. As I showed in Chapter I, Monroe Beardsley is one philosopher who has discussed sentences that incorporate within their structures two or more illocutionary acts, one of which may be primary and the others secondary. Such sentences Beardsley concludes are used in the utterance of "compound" illocutionary acts. In this study, I shall develop this suggestion of Beardsley. I shall analyze some sentences by reducing them to kernel form to show that these kernels correspond to the tokens of propositional acts, and I shall examine many sentences as reflecting compound illocutionary force.

The biggest problem for the analyst of the essay is, however, the act which does not appear to be completed with the utterance of a single sentence. Austin and Searle work with simple single-sentence utterances, though they do not rule out the possibility of longer utterances in which a number of acts are part of the same act. In an essay, one sentence is often so closely tied to the ones which follow it that it seems impossible to speak of its performing an illocutionary act alone, and sometimes the act does not seem
complete at the end of the sentence. For these reasons, I found the analysis of single sentences did not always produce meaningful results.

Fortunately, N. G. Fotion in two essays—"Master Speech Acts" and "Indicating Devices?"—makes some suggestions on how this problem might be handled. In the first article Fotion contends that utterances should be analyzed in units longer than the sentence and the individual speech act. A follower of Austin and Searle, he contends, is almost forced to regard utterances as separate entities, which, when they are put together, are characterized "much like the way a child characterizes the marble collection which he keeps in a bag." The child may group his marbles according to type, but they remain separate marbles. Fotion contends that, in most utterances, the relationship among the sentences is more organized than is the relationship of marbles in a bag and that this organic connection is frequently signaled by an author's use of a sentence like the following: "First of all, let us be clear about (i.e., state what) the facts (are)" or "Let us pray." Such sentences, Fotion claims, control the linguistic behavior of the sentences which immediately follow them. The first makes it necessary that the speaker state facts, and the second guides him to pray. Fotion calls such sentences "master speech acts" or "speech acts which control other speech acts." He says that these sentences may control at
least the following four aspects of the use of language:

1. Mode of expression (e.g., talking rather than writing; this code rather than that one).
2. Manner of speaking or writing (e.g., loudly rather than softly; slowly rather than rapidly; prosaically rather than poetically).
3. Topic (e.g., topic A rather than B; this aspect of A rather than that one).
4. Nature of speech act (e.g., commanding rather than promising; describing rather than evaluating).  

Each master speech act may control more than one of these four aspects of the acts which follow, its function being mainly to aid the hearer in identification of the act and assessment of the acts which follow. Fotion cites as an example of a master speech act which controls more than one aspect, "When you write, please tell me (i.e., describe) what happened to June." Here the act controls mode—writing; topic—what happened to June; the illocutionary force of the act—describing. In this way the master speech act guides the reader's expectations as to what is to follow. The aspects of language use which Fotion is concerned with in this paper and certainly the ones which I am particularly interested in are the third and the fourth. The third is the aspect expressed in the locutionary or propositional act, and the fourth is the aspect expressed in the illocutionary act.

Fotion analyzes master speech acts into two basic parts. These parts he refers to as the "formula" and the "content" parts. By the "formula" he means either the explicit performative verb already supplied in the sentence
or the part of the sentence which shows what explicit verb could be added to the content portion to determine force. For example, in the sentence, "First of all, let us be clear about the facts," "let us" is a formula for requesting. It indicates that the utterance of this one sentence is a request. The rest of the sentence indicates the force of the sentences to follow. The speaker is going to state facts. The utterance has two forces then--requesting and stating. Because the content part controls the utterances which follow, the entire utterance is called a "master speech act," and it is actually part of the utterances which it controls.

In "Indicating Devices?" Fotion focuses on speech activities rather than individual speech acts. He finds that speech activities like a conversation or an essay or a book frequently use "detached" indicating devices which are similar in form and purpose to master speech acts. Philosophers, Fotion believes, have "focused too much attention upon locating these devices within the framework of the individual speech act, rather than in the relationships between acts." He first examines the "detached" indicating device as it is added to an utterance to prevent ambiguity or failure to secure "uptake." For example, he cites the following dialogue:

Speaker 1: "You had better get a move-on."
Speaker 2: "Are you threatening me?"
Speaker 1: "Yes."
The first speaker's response, "Yes," is a detached device signaling or confirming that his first utterance was intended as a threat. But Fotion feels that the more interesting indicating devices are those which occur "prior to the 'original' speech act" and whose purpose is not remedial but "preventive or lubricative." His examples are "Let us pray," "Here are your orders for the week," and "Here is a list of things I want for Christmas." These usually indicate the force or content or both of the sentences which follow. Others are what Fotion calls "referring-indicating" devices, an example being "This is a true story." Even the title of a book or a chapter in a book may be used to indicate force and content. This last indicates that the linguistic activity discussed may be as long as a chapter or even a book. A "detached" indicator, functioning in the above manner, is part of the speech acts which it serves since the acts are not complete without the indicator.

If this function of the master speech act or the "detached" speech indicator is allowed, then necessarily some speech acts must consist of more than one-sentence utterances. A clear example of such utterances is the argument. On a very general level, most illocutionary acts performed in exposition can be classified into two groups: (1) those that are claims, conclusions, assertions, etc., and (2) those that provide the justification for group 1 acts, such as proving, making good, justifying, inferring,
backing up, defending, supporting, etc. Usually the pattern is that a claim or assertion is made and then justification for that claim or assertion is provided. Together they constitute an argument which frequently may be introduced and organized by a master speech act. For example, a master speech act such as the following might begin a paragraph of arguing: "I claim that the following reasons will demonstrate that under no circumstances should the United States intervene in Angola." Here the force of claiming is carried by the formula. The content shows that an argument supporting this claim is to follow. The act of arguing seems to consist of the master speech act, the stated conclusion, and the sentences which supply the reasons and the evidence. As we shall see, the illocutionary acts of exemplifying and accounting for work somewhat the same way.

I

I chose to analyze "The Iron String" as the first test of the usefulness of speech-act theory in teaching the reading and writing of the formal essay because, though my position as Austin's "judge" is still shaky in this situation, the essay itself surely is what Smith calls a "natural utterance." It was originally a speech made to a group of students at Harvard, where Jones was a professor of American literature. It was printed in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, April 8, 1950. I read it as it appears in Steinmann and
Willen's *Literature for Writing*, an anthology for freshman English classes. (It is reproduced in Appendix III as it appears in *Literature for Writing*.) Reading it, I must, as Ohmann says, bring alive the speech acts "frozen" in the text. Though I find my role as the judge hampered by my participation in the speech act which I must bring alive, I will at least be analyzing a "natural utterance."

The title of the essay comes from the following quotation from Emerson's essay "Self-Reliance": "Trust thyself --every heart vibrates to that iron string." Emerson's ideas of self-reliance are the basis of a view of education, the advocacy of which is Jones's main intention in the essay. Jones begins the essay with a list of the things for which Emerson has been criticized: his transcendentalism, his optimism, his liberalism, and his failure to understand human weakness. To Jones, it is contradictory for an American to criticize Emerson for these positions: instead Emerson should be considered as a leading proponent of "the custom of dissent," and "the custom of dissent" is necessary for the maintenance of this country's institutions. The "drive for conformity" is strong in this country in politics and in education, according to Jones. The present need in education is to reverse this drive, to educate men, not train them, and finally to produce "man thinking" (Emerson's term again). Jones says, "The educational problem is not conformity to any pattern, however lofty in intent; it is
how to remove obstacles from the lonely path by which edu-
cation sometimes results in man thinking." In this process,
according to Jones, Emerson is "the most excellent catalyst
we have in a democracy."

It is obvious that Jones's intention was to convince
or persuade his audience to accept this view of education,
but the securing of conviction or persuasion is a perlocu-
tionary act and will not be studied in detail here, though
the direction such an analysis would take seems clear. As
Austin and Searle both point out, illocutionary acts may be
and usually are performed with a perlocutionary intent.
Certainly the essay can be analyzed (and probably usually
is in the classroom) as persuasive discourse with ethical,
pathetic, and logical appeals, in the full Aristotelian
sense, which, as Kinneavy reminds us, are the same set of
appeals used by rhetoricians and propagandists of all
times. Thus, the reader (the analyst of "The Iron
String") can see ethical proof in the way the author por-
trays himself as a person who possesses a tremendous amount
of knowledge of his subject, who is willing, on the surface,
to see both sides of the subject, and who has only the in-
terests of his country at heart. Examples of his pathetic
or emotive appeals appear in the irony of his pose: "All
these fine scholars see it as a weakness that Emerson lacks
'a vision of evil,' but I, a plain man who cannot under-
stand their devious and subtly intricate explanations, am
so naive that I see only that he has a 'vision of good.'"

Finally, an analysis of Jones's logical argument would show how he "stacks the cards" and throws in "glittering generalities" such as honor and love of country in order to achieve his persuasive effects. It is possible then to analyze the speech as persuasive discourse, but Austin's judge does not want to examine or evaluate this aspect of it. His main job is with the illocutionary forces incorporated in the speech acts that constitute this essay. The reaction of the audience is involved only to the extent that "uptake" must occur if these acts are to be felicitous.

When I began to study "The Iron String" as a series of speech acts, I did not have a clear view of the steps that I should take in such an analysis. Following the suggestion of Searle, I decided to begin with the attempt to isolate propositional acts, since this part of the analysis seemed simple compared to the discovery of illocutionary acts and since it appeared that this might be a necessary first step in the discovery of illocutionary acts. When this process was explored and found to be unnecessary to the discovery of illocutionary acts, I decided to begin identifying illocutionary acts by using the two most obvious indicators which Austin discusses—the circumstances or context of the utterance and the explicit formula. I felt that I could use the circumstances or the context of each utterance at least as effectively as all of us use them to
interpret the utterances of another speaker and that Austin's faith in the explicit formula justified working with it. It should be pointed out at once, however, that neither of these indicators, as yet, can be used with complete assurance; the theory of each is incomplete and unsettled. For example, no complete list of explicit formulas is available; there is disagreement as to whether certain verbs can be used in the formula or not; no sharp differentiation has been made between the meaning of verbs that name closely related illocutionary acts; and, except for the very tentative treatment by Austin, no classification of illocutionary acts is available. There are also problems in the use of the context or circumstances of an utterance as an indicating device. The problems of defining and particularizing the context remain unsolved. Perhaps a rough distinction can be made between the "internal" and "external" context of an utterance, but the specific aspects of the kinds of contexts which are relevant for determining illocutionary force, particularly in written discourse, remain to be fully worked out. Fotion's notion of the master speech act and the detached indicating device I assumed would be helpful in my use of context or the circumstances of the utterance.

The indicators other than context and formula verbs which Austin and Searle mention I found to be as vague and uncertain as Austin says they are. Thus my procedure was to use the explicit formula and the circumstances of the
utterance with some consideration of master speech acts to
determine roughly what acts are being performed. It soon
became apparent that an analysis which is aimed at isolat­ing
every secondary component of every compound speech act
is impractical: such an analysis would extend for too many
pages and be far too complicated to have any practical ap­
lication. At the same time that I was determining which
acts are being performed, I was formulating the constitutive
rules for each of the major acts performed in the essay.
Neither Austin nor Searle has worked out rules for most of
these acts. My formulation of these rules is summarized in
Appendix II, but the chief characteristics of each are dis­
cussed as I discover the act in the essay. Finally, I ex­
amin the essay for the other indicators which Austin and
Searle mention with the idea that the function of these will
become more meaningful when they appear in context and that,
since I had a hypothesis about what acts are being per­
formed, I could tell how each indicator works to signal
these acts. The following is a list of indicators mentioned
by Austin and Searle which apply to written discourse:

1. Circumstances of the utterance
2. Verbs—performative, mood
3. Vocabulary—connecting particles, adverbs
4. Word order
5. Punctuation

By the end of the analysis, I was aware that indicators
which neither author discussed had signalled some acts to
me. Thus, in addition to studying the five indicators above
for their potential to convey force, I had added certain others.

So, from a start with context and the performative formula to a listing of acts to a study of the rules for the acts and the indicators in context, the study proceeded, as this chapter will show. By the end of the chapter, I hope to show that it is not unreasonable to say that "The Iron String" represents the successful performance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts. Almost all the individual acts in the essay can be classified as stating, one kind of explaining, arguing, deprecating, commending, evaluating, and advocating. However, analysis will support Beardsley's contention that many sentences are compound illocutionary acts. For example, many sentences are used to state and deprecate, or to state and commend, or to state, commend, evaluate, and advocate. Further, my analysis will show complex interrelationships among individual speech acts. For example, a series of statements may come together to constitute a speech act of a higher order, such as an argument or an explanation. Indeed, the stated master illocutionary act for the entire essay may be considered as the advocacy of a certain view which Jones has evaluated and concluded to be good. Jones's advocacy of this view seems to control a complex intertwining of various kinds of Austin's verdictives, exercitives, behabitives, and expositives.
II

If speech-act theory is relevant in the analysis of the formal essay, in "The Iron String," Howard Mumford Jones is first of all uttering words and performing the propositional acts of referring and predicating. It will become immediately apparent that it would be tedious and unnecessary to follow propositional acts through the entire essay, but it seems important to see the way in which this part of the theory works. I have, therefore, analyzed the first paragraph for propositional content as an example of a possible procedure to follow in determining propositional acts. The paragraph follows:

I have lately been reading a Harvard author who is just now out of favor here. He has been unpopular before. He once made a speech\(^1\) at this college, a speech so disliked that he was persona non grata\(^2\) in Cambridge for thirty years. However, the alumni and the Faculty finally decided he was a solid citizen—this was after the Civil War—and so they made him an Overseer, they gave him an honorary degree, and they asked him to deliver a course of lectures. In view of this history I take some pleasure in remembering that the title of these lectures was: "The Natural History of the Intellect." Another thirty years or so drifted by, and they erected a building in his honor. On any class day in winter you can enter it and see Frank Duveneck's statue of him buried under the coats and hats. Somehow, this symbolizes what has happened to Emerson.

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\(^1\)speech: Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882; American poet, essayist, and philosopher), "The Divinity School Address," July 15, 1838.

\(^2\)persona non grata: unacceptable person.

This paragraph is printed here as it appears in Literature for Writing complete with footnotes provided by the editors.
These notes are a reminder that here one is considering the speech as an essay and that full reference may not be completed successfully by the wider audience of recent college undergraduates which the book will reach without these explanations of allusions which the original audience of Harvard students was expected to understand. The only semantic problem is the need to understand these allusions.

To provide an analysis of the sequence of propositional acts that appear in a discourse consisting of a series of sentences, almost all of which are, grammatically, compound or complex, is an extremely difficult matter. Neither Austin nor Searle, in their concentration on single-sentence utterances, is of much help. Discussing propositional acts in Searle's work, one concludes that the tokens of the reference act will correspond to the grammatical subject and the tokens of the predication act will correspond to the grammatical predicate, but when one attempts to separate these tokens in a complex sentence, the result is far removed from Searle's division of acts in his typical four- or five-word sentences. The sentences which Searle works with are the simplest possible forms. In fact, they contain simply the ingredients of the kernel sentences of transformational grammar.

When one realizes that the sentences which can be divided into reference and predication act tokens with ease and certainty are the same as the kernel sentences of
transformational grammar, he sees almost immediately a direction to take in analyzing complex-sentence utterances for propositional acts. Now, this direction is not new and unheard of among speech act theorists. Indeed, in the introduction to *The Philosophy of Language*, Searle himself affirms his belief that a theory which combines the insights of ordinary language theory and generative grammar is the most promising approach in modern philosophy. Repeatedly, in *Speech Acts*, Searle describes aspects of his theory in the terms of generative or transformational grammar. In Chapter 4, for example, discussing reference, he says that "generative syntax" can be used to explain expressions such as "his sake" and "the lurch." Searle is chiefly interested in deep structure and the semantic component, but he obviously makes a connection on the syntactic surface level. Steven Davis, whose dissertation "Illocutionary Acts and Transformational Grammar" is also directed primarily at deep structure relationships, suggests in Chapter VII four hypotheses which he feels account for illocutionary act potential. They are the study of the forms underlying the surface structure of an utterance, the study of these forms using Austin's explicit formula, a semantic study, and finally a study of illocutionary act features which do not seem to be included in the other three. The first hypothesis, which he feels works in some instances, would call for the discovery of the structure embedded in
the completed utterance or an analysis of the kernel sen-
tences. In the second hypothesis, there lies the possibil-
ity that this analysis should take place in some utterances
before one uses the explicit formula.

Just as speech-act theorists have incorporated
transformational grammar in their studies, so linguists have
begun to use speech act theory and transformational grammar
together in interesting ways. For example, Chungmin Lee
describes "suggest" in "May I suggest that you run for the
presidency this time" as an "embedded performative."

Julian Boyd and J. P. Thorne in "The Semantics of Modal
Verbs" propose an explanation of modal verbs which begins
with a discussion of their differences with Katz and Postal,
leaders in the generative grammar movement, and they use
generative grammar terminology as tools in their speech-act
explanation of modal verbs. Certainly, the use that has
been made of transformational grammar by speech-act theo-
rists and speech-act theory by grammarians prepares one to
recognize kernel sentences in Searle's propositional act
tokens.

Paul Roberts' definition of kernel sentences in
Modern Grammar seems to support the relationship between
propositional act tokens and kernel sentences. Roberts de-
fines a kernel sentence as one "to which no optional trans-
formation rules have been applied" and adds, "It is made up
of two main parts--a noun phrase that functions as the
subject, and a verb phrase that functions as the predi-
cate." The propositional act, consisting of a reference
act and a predication act, certainly seems to be represented
in its simplest form by a kernel sentence. In most of the
sentences in a formal essay, then, one may expect to find
the tokens of more than one propositional act, and each act
may be analyzed as a kernel sentence. In addition, if Davis
is correct in his first hypothesis, then illocutionary force
may be made clearer by this analysis.

Using Roberts' definition of the kernel sentence but
simplifying it to allow such "kernels" as "Thirty years or
so drifted by," I have broken the sentences in the first
paragraph into these basic structures. Sentence 1 yields:

I have been reading books lately.
The author is from Harvard.
He is out of favor just now.

Sentence 2 is the only kernel sentence in the paragraph:

"He has been unpopular before." Sentence 3 yields:

He made a speech at Harvard once.
The audience disliked the speech.
He was persona non grata in Cambridge for thirty
years.

Sentence 4 becomes:

The alumni decided [it].
The faculty decided [it].
He was a solid citizen.
It was after the Civil War.
They made him an Overseer.
They gave him a degree.
The degree was honorary.
They asked him to deliver a course of lectures.

Sentence 5 breaks into:
I remember the title of the lectures.
I take some pleasure in the title.
The title was "The Natural History of the Intellect."

Sentence 6 can be analyzed thus:

Thirty years or so drifted by.
They erected a building.
The building honors Emerson.

Sentence 7 becomes:

You can enter the building any class day in winter.
You can see Frank Duveneck's statue of Emerson.
It is buried under coats and hats.

In sentence 8, "this" is substituted for the statement in sentence 7 that the statue is buried under coats and hats.

Analyzed into kernel sentences, sentence 8 becomes:

This symbolizes it somehow.
It has happened to Emerson.

This analysis clears up several problems in applying Searle's definitions of successful reference and predication acts. Searle does not give an example of reference which occurs within the predication act, yet the reader feels that reference according to his definition takes place in the utterances in this essay in other positions than in the subject position cited by Searle. Many of these become the tokens of reference in the subject positions in the kernel sentences. In addition, the complexity of the act of predication in the surface structure of the final utterances is a result of the embedding of kernel sentences.

Such an analysis is the necessary first step in determining the compound illocutionary force of most of the
sentences in a typical essay. The sophisticated reader makes such an analysis intuitively. It must become a conscious process only when a question of content arises or when he wants to pare away indicators. In addition, in some cases, a separation of a transformation into its constituents will make the illocutionary force of each of the constituents more readily apparent and, as Davis suggests, provide the structure for the use of the explicit formula. Thus, the usefulness of a combination of speech-act theory with transformational grammar is increasingly recognized in philosophical and linguistic circles.

III

In this section of Chapter IV, I shall show my tentative attempts to identify illocutionary acts in "The Iron String." My method will be chiefly a reliance on the instinctive "uptake" provided by a careful reading of the essay supplemented by a study of the context of the essay and a search for the guidelines which Jones provides by his selection of a title for the essay and his use of Austin's explicit performative formula at strategic points within the essay. The results of this method will be tested by the Austinian procedure of introducing each sentence with an explicit formula in order to make the implicit force of an utterance explicit. I shall end the section with an outline of the illocutionary acts which, one must remember, will
suffer from all the weaknesses inherent in the process in which the judge is also the audience. How successful a summary it is will be clearer when the other indicators are examined later in the chapter.

In "The Iron String" the internal context of each separate sentence as well as the context of the whole discourse plays a part in indicating illocutionary force. In fact, as with many single-sentence utterances, the context is the most important single indicator. The context of this utterance must include its original setting—the Harvard lecture room in which Howard Mumford Jones addressed students. Studied here, the essay appears in _Literature for Writing_, already identified as an anthology for undergraduate students. In both cases, the author stands in a relation to his audience which enables him to state and recommend felicitously. Fotion says that the title of a selection may be a detached indicator and therefore an important part of the context of the remainder of the work. Actually, the title of this essay has minimal indicative use. It does not indicate the illocutionary act or acts that will appear in the essay. To a reader who does not know where the expression "the iron string" comes from, the title will not indicate even the content of the essay. However, a reader who does recognize the title as a quotation from Emerson will expect that the essay will be dealing in some manner or other with Emerson's advice, "Trust thyself."
All readers, moreover, will recognize the metaphoric nature of the phrase, "the iron string." The idea of an "iron string" provokes a number of questions: What is one used for? Does the use of the word iron suggest rigidity or merely strength? The reader wants an explanation of the title's significance, and he expects the writer to supply it.

In paragraph 7, Jones uses a master speech act to indicate that he intends to advocate a certain position which he has evaluated and found to be good. He begins the paragraph, "By now you have rightly inferred that I find something important in Emerson. I am speaking of Emerson à propos of our time in order to revalidate an old Harvard custom--the custom of dissent." The reader who recognizes the phrase used as the title knows at this point, if he has not suspected it before, that Emerson's "iron string" and advice, "Trust thyself," will not be disparaged in the essay. In these two sentences, Jones clearly indicates that he evaluates Emerson's position as good, that his position favors dissent, and that Jones is prepared to advocate--"revalidate"--that position. The future of American institutions, he is prepared to argue, depends upon the fostering of the inclination to dissent. One is not surprised then when Jones advocates education which will produce "man thinking," since, to him, "man thinking" will be man dissenting when dissent is needed. Other master speech acts occur in
the essay, but they are more profitably discussed in a discussion of the acts which they control than in a discussion of the indicators which signal Jones's overall intent. Advocating and evaluating will be discussed at the very end of the discussion of the acts as the two acts which together control or organize the others.

Proceeding from this very general consideration of these matters of external and internal context to the determination of the illocutionary force of smaller units of utterance within the essay, I turn to an examination of the essay for verbs that can be used in Austin's explicit performative formula. Some which have the form, first person singular present indicative active, on examination do not function as part of the explicit formula. These are "I take," paragraph 10, and "I come," paragraph 19. They are mentioned because the reader, seeing the forms which do not work, will better understand the ones which do work. These name and report acts, but they do not name speech acts. Nor do they indicate that the speaker is performing a speech act. One group which Austin does not mention is included here because it seems to fit. The groups includes verb-adjective and verb-noun combinations which are synonymous with certain formula verbs. The examples are "I take pleasure," "I am afraid," and "I am ashamed." The first seems synonymous with "I rejoice." The second translates "I fear." "Fear" seems like the doubtful cases which Austin lists under expositives, such as "doubt," "know," and "believe." The third
seems a synonym for the behabitive "deprecate."

A certain pattern appears even on a cursory examination of the explicit formula verbs. In addition to the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are at least ten true expositives and six such as "I think" that seem to be covered by Austin's doubtful cases such as "believe" and "doubt." "I find" in paragraph 7 is one of these. They are expositives in the sense in which Austin explains the term: "Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and references." Expositives are "I suggest, "I wonder" (conjecture), "I mean," "I cite," "I suppose," "I submit," "I detect," "I repeat," and "I quote." Each of these indicates the "expounding of views" or the "conducting of arguments." They show that various acts such as stating, arguing, and opining will take place. Some that contain more than two words can have expositives from Austin's list substituted for them as "I can only point" and "I take my third example"—"I illustrate." Most of the expositives signal acts which are statements or show relationships between statements. Two formula verbs, "honor" and "am ashamed," are behabitives and indicate that Jones is expressing his feelings for the ideas which he discusses.

Identifying the explicit formula verbs in the essay does not exhaust the possibilities for the use of the formula. The formula was used by Austin to make "explicit" or
clear and unequivocal the force which he believed an utterance to have "implicit" in it. From the context and from conventional indicators which he grasps only half consciously, the reader or the listener may suspect that a certain illocutionary act is being performed. To test the utterance, he adds the appropriate explicit formula verb to the utterance. If the utterance still works in the context, he has made explicit what he knew implicitly from the context and other indicators. He will have demonstrated what he knew intuitively without demonstration. This is the process to be applied in summarizing the illocutionary acts in "The Iron String." After using context consciously and other indicators only half consciously at this point, the reader will then test utterances with the explicit formula. It will not be necessary to record every test here, since the process becomes too monotonous, but enough tests will be given to demonstrate the method.

Applying the formula-indicating device in this double fashion, I found that a large number of the propositional acts in the essay are asserted or stated. A full clarification of stating and the other illocutionary acts that occur in the essay appears in Appendix II, where I present a formulation of the rules, either taken from Searle or developed by myself, that govern the happy performance of each of the acts. However, a general notion of these acts is indispensable as I trace their appearance in the essay. Thus, a
statement, as defined by Austin and Searle, asserts the truth of the propositional act which is its content. This is similar to what I. A. Richards and others call the referential use of language in which a sentence is to be taken as referring to some state of affairs in the real world with the implication that the speaker of the sentence believes that what he says is true and that he can support the truth of the statement with hard evidence. Now, in Lecture XI of How to Do Things with Words, after attempting to set stating apart as an act distinct from such acts as warning, arguing, judging, and blaming, Austin concludes that this "hard evidence" is not always so firm a means of distinguishing statements as he would like it to be. He examines such statements as "France is hexagonal" and "Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma." He calls the first "rough" and the second "exaggerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others." The first would satisfy the requirements for a statement if uttered by virtually anyone except a geographer; the second works in an elementary textbook where the point is that Raglan was the commander of the winning forces, not an analysis of the factors involved in his army's victory. Austin concludes that, "in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as much as in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance and its context are important; what is judged true in a school book may not be so judged in a work of
historical research." In other words, Austin seems to be saying that there is a range of degrees of fidelity to the truth into which an utterance may fall and still remain a statement. In "The Iron String," one finds sentences such as this one: "His life was threatened by tuberculosis, he abandoned his pulpit, his first wife died young, his brothers were sick men, and his son perished. . . ." Each clause seems to represent a statement, but not a statement with the kind of verifiability that it would have if it specified time, place, and degree. Again, Jones concludes the first paragraph, "Somehow, this symbolizes what has happened to Emerson." Austin might describe this utterance as "exaggerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others," but it seems to fall within the statement range. Most statements in an essay of this type, one begins to feel, will not be precise, though they may refer, as these do, to historical events. To be felicitous, they must only satisfy an audience which respects the ability of the speaker to supply precise information and can assume some responsibility on its own for assessing the statements.

Now, there are similar utterances which seem even less susceptible to verification. In paragraph 2, one finds this sentence, "He was a transcendentalist, and any beginner in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with transcendentalism." The first clause is a verifiable statement, though again it does not specify when Emerson was a transcendental-
list and therefore seems vague. The second, however, gives an opinion. It is an opinion tainted with irony, as I shall show later, but one would find it difficult to prove that "any beginner in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with transcendentalism." Or one finds a statement such as this one made concerning Harvard: "I sometimes think dissent may have no other place to go if the drives for conformity continue." The use of "I think," a doubtful performative in Austin's list, indicates that Jones is expressing an idea which is personal to him. He is performing an act similar to stating but distinguished by the speaker's understanding that he cannot demonstrate the point conclusively by supplying additional information and by his hope that the audience will be willing to accept the point tentatively as his personal opinion. This act I shall distinguish in this study from stating and call "opining." Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms groups "opinion" with "view, belief, conviction, persuasion, sentiment" and sees them as "comparable when they mean a more or less clearly formulated idea or judgment which one holds as true or valid." The term opinion it distinguishes by "a personal element in the judgment, the possibility of its being in error, and the strong probability that it will be disputed." Now, opinions like statements cover a wide range of utterances, some of them hardly distinguishable from statements. For example, Jones's view of Harvard as the home of dissent remains an opinion in this
study even though it is not completely personal, being shared by many people. Stating and opining, distinguished in this way, become valuable labels for the acts in this essay. They are distinguished by the degree of certainty of the speaker in his utterance, the type of evidence which he can supply, and the nature of the "uptake" which the audience gives to the intention of the speaker.

Going back to the use of the explicit formula, one finds in the introductory paragraph of this essay the pervasiveness of stating or asserting. In the first paragraph, only one explicit performative verb is used, "I take some pleasure." Thus it is necessary to preface the other utterances with the appropriate explicit formula. Now, I have already extracted kernel sentences from the sentences in this paragraph; so in an attempt to discover all the illocutionary acts conveyed in the utterance of these sentences, I shall use the explicit formula on these. When this process is completed, one has the following:

- I state that I have been reading books lately.
- I state that the author is from Harvard.
- I state that he is out of favor just now.
- I state that he made a speech at Harvard once.
- I state that the audience disliked the speech.
- I state that he was persona non grata in Cambridge for thirty years.
- I state that the alumni decided it.
- I state that the faculty decided it.
- I state that he was a solid citizen.
- I state that it was after the Civil War.
- I state that they made him an Overseer.
- I state that they gave him a degree.
- I state that the degree was honorary.
- I state that they asked him to deliver a course of lectures.
I state that I remember the title of the lectures.
I rejoice that the title was what it was.
I state that the title was "The Natural History of the Intellect."
I state that thirty years or so drifted by.
I state that they erected a building.
I state that the building honors Emerson.
I state that you can enter the building any class day in winter.
I state that you can see Frank Duveneck's statue of Emerson.
I state that it is buried under coats and hats.
I state that this symbolizes it somehow.
I state that it has happened to Emerson.

This consideration of the first paragraph indicates that the illocutionary act of stating will appear frequently in the kind of discourse usually called "expository." The act will appear either as an end in itself as in the first sentences in paragraph 1 or as a part of a higher order act, such as explaining, arguing, or evaluating.

A more refined analysis of the first paragraph will show that other illocutionary acts are also being performed. There are touches of explanation, deprecation, and commendation. For example, in sentence 5, the formula-like expression, "I take some pleasure," is an explicit indication that the speaker is approving, applauding, or favoring. These acts will be discussed more fully as more clear-cut examples are discovered later in the essay.

After the introductory paragraph, the next major block of the essay consists of paragraphs 2-6. This section is introduced by a master speech act: "The reasons for Emerson's current lack of favor are understandable." Jones, following this utterance, proceeds to discuss four reasons
for Emerson's "current lack of favor": his being a transcendentalist, his having no vision of evil, his being a liberal, and his having no understanding of human nature. The master speech act indicates that, by discussing these, Jones intends to explain. Now, "explanation" is not a simple term. Austin lists the verb explain under expositives, but the act performed in explaining is far more complicated than the act performed by most of the other expositives. Abraham Kaplan in The Conduct of Inquiry speaks of the end of explaining being to secure understanding, and he says of scientific explanation, "It does its work, not by invoking something beyond what might be described, but by putting one fact or law into relation with others." When one explains, as when he describes, Kaplan is saying, he is not merely reporting facts which can be grasped and used. In explanation, however, the relationship between the parts is of even more importance than it is in a description. Though there are, of course, one-sentence explanations, the act of explaining which is intended to secure understanding will usually consist of more than one sentence, and each sentence will be carefully related to the others in the explanation. For this reason, the explicit formula, "I explain that," does not work in the neat way that "I state that" or "I warn that" will work.

The word explain, probably because of the vagueness of the word understanding, has several different meanings
which apply to radically different uses of the word. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms divides the definitions of "explain" into two groups. In one group, it places "explain, expound, explicate, elucidate, interpret, construe," and in another, "explain, account, justify, rationalize." Kaplan says of explanations, "We use the verb 'to explain' in connection with very many different things. We may be said to explain ourselves, a dream, or a text; explain how to do something or other; explain why a particular event occurred or a certain law obtains; or explain for what reason a person or group acted as they did." Though he acknowledges that all explanations seem to be intended to secure understanding, Kaplan finds that the type of understanding and the appropriate response by the hearer differ to such an extent that he must separate explanations into several types, two of the most prominent being what he calls semantic and scientific explanations. Semantic explanations make clear a meaning. Scientific explanations supply other kinds of understanding, mostly "reasons why." The explanations which Jones is undertaking in this essay probably have characteristics of both kinds of explanations. Kaplan would then call them "interpretations," but in this study it is important to distinguish the two types.

The reason why the distinction must be made is that, according to Kaplan's discussion of the two types of explanation, semantic explanation is a perlocutionary act, and
scientific explanation is an illocutionary act. Since a study of the explaining acts in the essay support the idea that illocutionary and perlocutionary explaining take place and since this study is devoted to illocutionary acts, then the two must be kept separate. Kaplan shows the difference when he says that semantic explanation must be clear, but scientific explanation must only be true. In other words, semantic explanation must produce the perlocutionary effect of clarification, but scientific explanation can be successful whether or not it succeeds in clarifying an idea for an audience. As Kaplan says, "There is a difference between having an explanation and seeing it." One need only "have" a scientific explanation. Converted into speech-act terminology, this distinction means that the semantic explanation is a perlocutionary act, and the scientific explanation is an illocutionary act. In Jones's essay, then, most of the explanations seem intended to "clarify" or perform a perlocutionary act. Both Austin and Searle point out that many illocutionary acts are characterized by the perlocutionary intent. An illocutionary act with the intent to clarify is illustrating or exemplifying. For the acts seemingly intended to clarify, I shall use the terms exemplify and define. Other acts of explanation where Jones seems to be engaged in a kind of scientific explanation I shall call "accounting for."

Now, the act of exemplifying seems to be felicitous
when the audience understands that the speaker is supplying information intended to clarify a generalization. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "exemplify" and "illustrate" are "comparable when they mean to use in speaking or writing concrete instances or cases to make clear something which is difficult, abstract, general, or remote from experience or to serve as an instance, case, or demonstration of a point or matter under examination." "Exemplify," it adds, "implies the use of examples for clarification of a general or abstract statement or as an aid in revealing the truth of a proposition or assertion." The audience may not find that the act produces clarification, but it must understand the speaker's intent. In accounting for, on the other hand, the audience recognized the speaker's intent to supply reasons and his belief that he can supply valid reasons. Both of these acts are usually performed in more than one sentence, the act consisting of the generalization or the statement of the phenomenon and then the concrete detail or specific reasons. In other words, exemplifying commits the speaker to supplying examples intended to secure the perlocutionary effect of clarification, whereas accounting for commits him to supplying reasons or causes for the existence of something.

In paragraph 2, then, the first sentence, a master speech act, commits Jones to accounting for Emerson's lack of popularity, but far more is going on than the simplest
understanding of the master speech act would indicate. In the first place, Jones is stating and opining, acts which seem to underlie most explaining. In the second place, he is commending and deprecating. Now, the acts of commending and deprecating have certain characteristics common to all members of Austin's class of behabitives. Austin says, "Behabitives include the notion of reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct." He adds, "There are obvious connexions with both stating or describing what our feelings are and expressing, in the sense of venting our feelings, though behabitives are distinct from both of these." Austin seems to mean that behabitives will not be mere exclamations, but he also seems to imply that the propositional content will be limited in a way which will distinguish the behabitive from other speech acts. He gives as examples words like "thank," "apologize," and "welcome." In the essay, however, the behabitive act will seldom be as simple as the acts which Austin describes. Instead, it will usually be the secondary act in a compound act.

Taking commending for an example, one has the sentence in the first paragraph: "I take some pleasure in remembering that the title of these lectures was: 'The Natural History of the Intellect.'" Here, as I demonstrated already using the explicit formula, one has a statement plus
the force of praising or commending. *Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms* defines "commend" as a synonym of "recommend," "applaud," and "compliment," saying that they "are comparable when they mean to voice or otherwise manifest to others one's warm approval." This source adds that commend "usually implies judicious or restrained praise, but it suggests as its motive a desire to call attention to the merits of a person or a thing." Obviously, as Austin points out about all behabitives, the sincerity condition is especially important. The audience must believe that the speaker is sincere if it accepts his intent to call attention to the merits of the thing commended.

On the other hand, "deprecate" means, like its synonym "disapprove," "to feel or to express an objection to or condemnation of a person or thing." It "stresses the implication of regret, frequently profound, occasionally diffident or apologetic." In paragraph 8, one finds this sentence: "There is with us a set of persons called Democrats, some of them in office, and another set of persons calling themselves Republicans, not so many of whom are in office, but neither you nor I nor more competent observers can define the philosophic difference between these sets of persons in terms that will really make sense." In the context of the paragraph, this sentence is used to express Jones's objection to a two-party system where no differences separate the parties and to express his regret at this state
of affairs. The sentence is used in a compound act, consisting actually of three acts—stating, comparing (to be discussed later), and deprecating. In performing this last act, the speaker is obviously committing himself to a sincere objection to the absence of a real difference of political principles separating Republicans from Democrats.

In paragraph 2 and then in paragraph 3, the thrust of commending and deprecating is conveyed in interesting ways. The last sentence in paragraph 2 follows: "All it [transcendentalism] has is imagination and insight." This is the sentence which turns the force of the paragraph to commendation of Emerson's views and deprecation of those who criticize him. His views possess the merits of imagination and insight; his critics do not understand that possessing imagination and insight will atone for other weaknesses. One's understanding of this sentence depends on one's understanding of understatement as well as on one's understanding that enough imagination and insight will compensate for any other weakness. In paragraph 3, one finds understatement and an apparent paradox. The paradox is that in a society with a certain vision of good as its ideal the only person with that vision of good is condemned. The discussion of understatement and paradox is deferred to the fourth section of this chapter, where devices such as these will be discussed as conventional force indicators. Here it is sufficient to see that Jones regrets that a view as close to the
American ideal as Emerson's should be criticized in America and by reverse implication commends this view.

Paragraph 4, in addition to being a part of the unit of speech acts controlled by the master act in paragraph 2, is a fine example of the complexity which makes exhaustive analysis virtually impossible. The paragraph begins with a master speech act which operates within the framework of the act in paragraph 2, it contains its quota of statements and opinions, it defines, it exemplifies, and it commends and deprecates. The paragraph follows:

A third reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he was a liberal. A liberal, says the Oxford Dictionary, is favorable to changes and reforms tending in the direction of democracy. Emerson favored these changes. However, liberalism is dead. It is not merely dead, it was mistaken. Mr. Wallace's failure to create a liberal party in this country is proof. The latest British election, which again buried the liberal party, is proof. The liberal point of view in economics is wrong. The liberal point of view in history, or rather the point of view of liberal historians, is wrong. These historians denounced Talleyrand, but Talleyrand was a force for stability. They attacked Metternich, but Metternich was a force for order. I am afraid Emerson was a liberal; that is, he assumed that man might amount to something by and by if he would but consult his better self, and that men, taken individually, might improve themselves, so to speak, into a democratic state. This is the American dream which, through the Voice of America, we are broadcasting round the world, particularly into darkest Russia. I am not a politician, merely a literary man, and I cannot explain this contradiction.

6Talleyrand: Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince de Bénévent (1754-1838; French statesman).
7Metternich: Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich (1773-1859; Austrian statesman).
The sentence following the master speech act which begins the act of accounting for defines. Jones feels the necessity to tell what a liberal is, since one reason for Emerson's lack of popularity is that he is a liberal. The phrase, "says the Oxford Dictionary," shows that this utterance is intended to define. Now, Austin lists "define" as an expositive, and like exemplifying, it is a type of explaining intended to clarify. The word "define," The Random House Dictionary of the English Language says, means "to state or set forth the meaning of" and "to explain the nature or essential qualities of; describe." The second of these definitions seems the one which most exactly corresponds to the act being performed in the utterance of the second sentence. Jones is giving the "essential qualities" of the liberal, as they are given in the Oxford Dictionary. He is also, however, quoting, the original speech act of defining having been performed by the editors of the dictionary. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "quote" with "cite" and "repeat." They share the meaning, "to speak or write again something already said or written by another." According to this source, "Quote usually implies a use of another's words, commonly with faithful exactness or an attempt at it." Here the purpose is to give a generally accepted definition of the word "liberal." Quoting does not commit Jones to accepting this definition. Indeed, in sentence 11, Jones propounds his own definition.
It does not contradict the first one, but it turns the term "liberal" into an expression of strong commendation, and in the next sentence he shows that the liberal is actually only a man committed to the American dream. Here, Jones is not quoting but attempting to set forth the "essential qualities of."

Going back to the intent in the master speech act, one needs then to see that the entire paragraph is an act of accounting for, but that accounting for proceeds by a complex of acts. After defining comes arguing. One finds the statement, "It [liberalism] is not merely dead, it was mistaken." In the next two sentences, Jones gives "proof." Now, the "proof" works to some extent as an indication that liberalism may be dead: Wallace's defeat and the defeat of the liberal party in Britain do indicate that the state of the party is not healthy, though they do not necessarily indicate that it is dead. If these are supposed to show that the party is "mistaken," the problem is even more complicated. Does defeat at the polls prove a party's platform to be wrong? However, the real thrust of the argument comes when Jones says that the liberal historians were wrong because they criticized Metternich and Talleyrand. Few students of history give unqualified approval to either of these men, and certainly a person committed like Jones to the beliefs of Emerson could not be genuinely praising two of the most reactionary figures in nineteenth-
century Europe. With the definition of "liberal" and its association with the American dream, Jones shows that he has indeed been arguing, but he has been arguing the opposite side from the literal expression in sentence 4. Through the entire paragraph, Jones is commending and deprecating, and the act that begins as a simple explanation controlled by a master speech act has been compounded and complicated to give it a richness that Austin's and Searle's one-sentence utterances do not even approach.

Arguing, one of the acts discovered in paragraph 4, is another expositive, already mentioned as an act requiring more than a one-sentence utterance. "Argue" is grouped with "discuss," "debate," "dispute," "agitate" in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, and it shares with them the meaning "to discourse about something in order to arrive at the truth or to convince others." The very word "discourse" suggests a longer than one-sentence utterance. "Argue," in this source, "usually implies conviction and the adducing of evidence or reasons in support of one's cause or position." The abridged Merriam-Webster adds to the meaning "often heated adducing of reasons and evidence in support of one's position." In arguing, then, the speaker commits himself to a conviction of the truth of the side which he argues for, and he must be prepared to offer evidence or reasons for this conviction. In paragraph 4, Jones is convinced that liberalism expresses the American
dream, and he argues for this conviction by attempting to make the other side look absurd by giving reasons why the idea that liberalism is dead and mistaken are foolish. In paragraph 8, he argues the idea expressed in this statement: "No such issue [Tory vs. Socialist] divides the Republican state from the Democratic state." He uses performatives like "I cite"—paragraph 10, saying, "I cite these familiar facts only that you measure from what Massachusetts permitted in 1850 what California demands in 1950." "Cite," listed with "quote," according to Webster's "is likely to stress the idea of mentioning for a particular reason (as proof of a thesis or substantiation of a position taken)." In paragraph 10, then, devoted by the first sentence to exemplifying, one has also the stated intent to give reasons to back up a thesis.

Arguing proceeds from a variety of other speech acts, acts which, by the way, become part of the act of arguing. For example, Jones begins paragraph 12 with an evaluation: "I suppose the greatest president Harvard had in the nineteenth century was Charles W. Eliot." In the paragraph he then proceeds to argue for his evaluation of Eliot. He also argues to show that he is right in condemning the political and educational systems of the country: in them, he detects "a failure of nerve." He argues for the thing which he advocates when he quotes Mrs. Roosevelt in paragraph 27. Arguing, then, winds through the essay, but,
because of the obvious intent to persuade, it is subtly intertwined with other acts.

Before discussing advocating and evaluating and analyzing one of the later paragraphs in the essay, it seems important here to mention an act which forms part of exemplifying and arguing in many instances. The act is comparing. Webster's New Encyclopedia of Synonyms places "comparing" with "contrasting" and "collating" and defines the three verbs as "to set two or more things side by side in order to show likenesses and differences." Of "compare," it says, "Compare implies as an aim the showing of relative values or excellences or a bringing out of characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent; contrast implies as the aim an attempt to emphasize their differences; thus, one may compare the movement of the Odyssey with that of the Aeneid to arrive at their distinctive qualities; one may thereupon contrast the buoyancy and rapidity of the one with the stateliness and dignity of the other." Now, comparing is an act that can occur without speech, but in the essay it involves the "relating" of "characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent." It takes place, like other expositives, "in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of references." For comparing to take place there must be the intent on the part of the speaker to place relative values
or characteristics side by side and show their likenesses or differences. This action would seldom be performed as an end in itself, however, in an essay. It would be performed in arguing or in some kind of explaining or in advocating, or at least this is the case in "The Iron String." For example, paragraph 8 is controlled by the master speech act which ends paragraph 7: "Let me briefly discuss four examples of the drive for conformity--two from politics, two from education." The first two sentences seem to indicate that simple exemplifying will take place:

The British election shows what a genuine two-party system is--a system in which there is a fundamental philosophic difference. In Great Britain that issue lies between the Socialist state and the Tory state. However, the next sentence begins a comparison of the British system with the American system which still seems to have as its primary aim to exemplify but with the added aim to argue. The intent to compare appears in this one sentence: "No such issue divides the Republican state from the Democratic state." Here Jones is comparing the American system to the British system, but he is also heading for a comparison of the two parties in America. He concludes his comparison, "Almost nothing could be more comic, if it were not so tragic, than to watch the Republicans hunting for somebody who will tell them what to do--a party in search of a platform. The only thing just as comic and just as tragic is the Democrats hunting for somebody who
will tell them what they have done—a platform in search of a party." Here, comparing has been used in exemplifying and in arguing. In paragraph 9 Jones compares the political fates of Wallace and McMahon in order to advance his argument and to exemplify. In paragraphs 12 and 13 he compares President Eliot of Harvard with President Hutchins of Chicago in order to show that his evaluation will lead to advocacy of a certain educational system. In paragraph 9, he "cites" "familiar facts" from the life of Thoreau as part of his argument against the loyalty oath demanded of California professors. Obviously, comparing has been performed in order to satisfy the conditions for felicity of other acts—in order to provide reasons for, examples of, or assessments of. In the essay, it is then a peculiarly semi-dependent act.

In this essay, advocating or urging—to use the term which Austin uses in his list of expositives—seems closely tied to evaluating. Jones urges a course of action which he has evaluated and concluded to be worthwhile. The relationship between the two is supported by Austin's classification of the two acts. As a "verdictive," evaluating is "the giving of a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire." Urging, on the other hand, as an exercitive is "the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it." For the verdictive, according to Austin, the decisions
"need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate, a reckoning, or appraisal." The verdictive "is essentially giving a finding as to something—fact, or value—which is for different reasons hard to be certain about."

In uttering the exercitive, the speaker is taking the verdictive and acting on it: "Its [the exercitive's] consequences may be that others are 'compelled' or 'allowed' or 'not allowed' to do certain acts." The acts which the speaker is compelling others to perform in uttering an exercitive is an act appraised as good and expressed in a verdictive. Now, it is not necessary to the act of urging or to any exercitive that the speaker choose to back it because he evaluates it as superior to other acts. He may advocate an act purely out of self-interest. The act which he advocates or urges may be chosen through his appraisal of the worth of the action, however, and this is the relationship which one finds in "The Iron String."

Evaluating is an act performed in a number of places in the essay. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms places "evaluate" with "estimate," "appraise," "value," "rate," and "assess," and it defines them as "to judge a thing with respect to its worth." It continues, "Evaluate...suggests an intent to arrive at a mathematically correct judgment" but seldom one given in monetary terms. In other words, when he evaluates, a speaker commits himself to a verdict concerning the worth of something. His
utterance "counts as" his assessment of its worth. He is not committed to a demonstration of the reasons for his evaluation: he must merely show "intent to determine" its worth. Evaluating and opining have then a certain similarity. Neither is verifiable in the sense that a statement is verifiable. Evaluating is not verifiable, however, because it is practiced in an area where certainty is never more than what value judgments are capable of. Opining is performed in areas where truth and falsity are theoretically possible: the speaker is willing to rely on his personal decision concerning truth or falsity, either because verifiable statements are difficult to arrive at or because he feels that they are unnecessary. In addition, evaluating has similarities to deprecating and commending. Austin recognizes that the behabitive can come close to giving a verdict. I have defined deprecating and commending by limiting them to "expressing" approval or disapproval. In evaluating, on the other hand, the speaker is "judging." One finds in this essay, then, utterances with some evaluative force like this one in paragraph 5: "That somewhat frightened conservative, Matthew Arnold, came here in the eighties to lecture us about culture." The primary force of this utterance is stating, but the phrase "somewhat frightened conservative" gives a value judgment of Arnold. In paragraph 9, Jones says, "I wonder what Emerson would tell us here about a foolish consistency, that
hobgoblin of little minds." Here, by quoting Emerson, Jones gives his evaluation of the conformity in government policies in his own day. In paragraphs 12 and 13, he evaluates Eliot and Hutchins. In paragraph 14, he evaluates the Great Books Program. Paragraph 17 is largely evaluative, the argument showing how the judgment is weighed and arrived at. The paragraph begins, "In each case, of course, there is something to be said for conformity." Evaluating conformity, Jones gives his verdict: the conformity necessary for a coalition government to survive is good, but the conformity that makes the government a "Papa knows best" institution is not good.

Paragraph 18 is an interesting example of defining and evaluating, both of these secondary acts to stating.

The paragraph follows:

Honor is not manufactured by printed forms to be taken before a notary public; it is a function of manly self-respect—and it is a mark of the time that I feel almost apologetic for using so old-fashioned a phrase. The notion of standardized wisdom—so many parts of Plato, so many parts of Newton, so many parts of Milton; do not shake before taking—is a product of this same loss of nerve. It reveals hurry and distrust—hurry, because when you have invented the formula, you can push the product through to its shaping, faster; distrust, because when you substitute uniformity of pattern for equality of individuals, you transfer your belief from the individuals to the pattern. A belated Emersonian, I am still, in things of the spirit, for the individual. Robert Frost reminds us that a one-man revolution is the only revolution that is coming.

27Plato: (c. 427-347 B.C.; Greek philosopher).
28Newton: Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727; English physicist and mathematician).
The first sentence is used to state and to define. The first part of the sentence tells what honor is not and the second part gives one attribute. The third part of the sentence deprecates a prevailing attitude in which an apology for holding this definition is necessary. The third sentence is used partly to define "standardized wisdom." It is also an evaluation: "Standardized wisdom" itself must be bad since it results from "loss of nerve." The next sentence is used to argue for the idea that the trust in "standardized wisdom" reveals loss of nerve. Finally, Jones gives his verdict: he is not for "standardized wisdom," but for the individual. In the last sentence, when he quotes Robert Frost, he is evaluating any movement based on standardization and finding it wanting.

As I indicated earlier, evaluating and urging go together in this essay. In paragraph 7, Jones shows this relationship, and finally in paragraph 27, he clinches it. He quotes Mrs. Roosevelt: "Have we really reached the point where we must fear to join any group because at some time or other a person of Communist leanings, or supposed Communist leanings, might also join it? That is a terrible thing and we should be ashamed of it." Jones shares this evaluation, and he adds, "I do not think it is too late in the history of the republic, whether in education or in
politics, to believe that Emerson is still the most excellent spiritual catalyst we have in a democracy." Now, a catalyst is an agent effecting change of which it is not itself a part. Jones is then not only evaluating and deprecating. He is attempting to "revalidate an old Harvard custom—the custom of dissent." In doing that he is urging or advocating.

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms defines "urge" along with "egg, exhort, goad, spur, prod, prick, sic" to mean "to press or impel to action, effort, or speed."

"Urge," it says, "implies the exertion of influence or pressure either from something or someone external or from something within (as the conscience or the heart); specifically it suggests an inciting or stimulating to or toward a definite end (as greater speed or a prescribed course or objective) often against the inclinations or habits of the one urged." Urging seems to come close to Searle's use of "advise." There is no necessity, however, for the thing advocated to be in the best interest of the person who is urged. The speaker must merely favor the desired change or action, and his utterance must count as the exertion of influence to cause the hearer to change or act. The speaker's statement of intent need be no more explicit than Jones's in paragraph 7: he is attempting to "revalidate" an idea and a custom which have all but disappeared. Probably, in the essay written for the type of audience
which Jones was interested in addressing, the urging would usually be this subtle.

Up to this point in this essay, I have, then, discovered a complex of illocutionary forces conveyed in a variety of ways. Jones, I have concluded, has stated, opined, argued, accounted for, exemplified, defined, compared, and defined, thus performing acts classed as expositives; deprecated and commended, performing acts classified as behabitives; evaluated, performing an act classed as a verdictive; and urged, performing an exercitive. Further analysis might disclose more acts, as some utterances yield not one or two but as many as three or four acts piled on each other. Such analysis seems unnecessary to demonstrate that this essay is indeed a complex utterance of a series of compound illocutionary acts. Certainly, in teaching the essay, the analysis would have to stop at this point or even sooner if the freshman student is not to become hopelessly lost in the maze of interrelated acts. The question which remains, before I proceed to further enumeration of force indicators, is not, then, how many more acts can be discovered but whether these acts are felicitously performed.

In Chapter III I concluded that the conditions for the felicitous performance of an act must specify the speaker's intentions, his assessment of the hearer's knowledge and desires, the position of the speaker as the
proper person to perform the act, and the extent to which the speaker obligates himself. The conditions summarized in Appendix II specify these elements, all of which must be satisfied if these acts are to be felicitous. Now, the first real test is the extent to which the audience accords "uptake" to the speaker. By the fact that I have been able to isolate these acts, one can conclude tentatively that they are felicitously performed. If I have recognized the speaker's intent, the extent to which he has obligated himself in each act, and his position as the proper person to perform the act, then the acts appear to be felicitous. For example, I have distinguished between the commitment of the author when he states and when he opines, when he evaluates and when he commends, when he argues and when he accounts for. However, I may have read his signals wrong, and his intent in some cases may have been different. One conclusion is definite: Jones stands in the proper position to perform the acts which he is performing. Again, one assumes that a man of his reputation would only perform these acts sincerely, that Austin's dictum that a man's word is his bond would apply. Certainly, we rarely read a serious nonfiction work unless we have some reason to trust the author as a person capable of committing himself in the proper way in the acts which he performs. Further testing of the extent to which I have interpreted the acts correctly or given the proper "uptake" will come
in the next section, when I turn again to force indicators.

IV

Having tentatively identified the illocutionary acts performed in the essay by using the explicit formula and my intuitive grasp of the nature of these acts, I next tried to study in more detail the other indicators. This part of the study, I felt, would reinforce or correct my assumption concerning the acts performed and, at the same time, explore the nature of these indicators. The indicators which were not discussed in Part III are verb forms besides the explicit performative formula, connecting particles, adverbs, word order, and punctuation. In addition, rhetorical devices function in conventional ways, and occasionally the author simply states his intention to perform a certain act.

The verb in the independent clause is the one which must be examined for illocutionary force, since it comes directly from the speaker and carries his full intent. Verbs in dependent clauses may carry the force of an utterance which the speaker is quoting, but the verb in the main clause, or, in transformational terminology, in the matrix, is the key to the speaker's primary intent. In Part III the verbs occurring in the explicit performative form have already been used as the first indication of the basic force of the essay. The mood of the verbs supplies another
indication. The use of indicative mood supports the idea that stating and asserting are basic acts, but since almost any force can be expressed with the indicative mood, this indicator alone is ambiguous and uncertain. In three places the mood becomes imperative with the form "let me." Again, in paragraph 19, the following sentence contains the imperative mood: "If all you want to do is to train the young, establish your pattern—Great Books, General Education, call it what you will—and the training may be admirable." In the following paragraph, the imperative occurs twice: "Ask any Harvard graduate" and "ask him who taught him." When one examines these three instances of the use of the imperative, one sees that this mood by itself as an indicator is little more help than the indicative mood. As force indicators, the "let me" constructions have no real request intent. Here, the best explanation for the utterances in which they occur is that they are master speech acts in the sense in which Fotion uses the term. In paragraph 7, one finds "Let us briefly discuss..."; in paragraph 11, "Let us turn..." (meaning "let us discuss"); and "let me briefly contrast..." According to Fotion, the "let me/us" would become the formula governing the speech act in the single-sentence utterance and the rest of the sentence the content governing the sentences which follow. An explanation by Chungmin Lee in a recent article, "Embedded Performatives," contains a similar explanation,
one which perhaps accounts better for the "let us" portion of the utterance. Lee shows that in a construction using "let" and a performative verb, as in "Let me briefly discuss. . ." the "let me," may function as a "sign of deference." The "let me," according to Lee, has no illocutionary force. With either explanation, the act functions as a detached indicator. Considering the sentence in paragraph 19 out of context, one would conclude that the force is advising: the "if" clause suggests that one try the performative formula, "I advise that. . ." and it works. In context, the sentence becomes merely a summing up of the basic difference which Jones wants to show between training and educating, and it secures the "uptake" of an opinion. In the "ask" constructions, the requesting force disappears as one sees that the use is merely another way of expressing condition: "if you ask any Harvard graduate" is actually what Jones is saying. The whole sentence becomes again an expression of an opinion, and the mood of the verb is seen as an indicator which needs help from others if it is to function clearly.

Certain verbs in themselves carry considerable force even when they are not used in the explicit formula or would not fit in the formula. An example is the verb seem. In paragraph 3, the following sentence occurs: "It seems that Herman Melville had a vision of evil in Moby Dick, that Nathaniel Hawthorne had a vision of evil in The
Scarlet Letter, and that Henry James had a vision of evil in The Turn of the Screw." The sentence is used to state and to account for. By the very word seem itself, however, Jones is indicating that he is not stating a belief that he is committed to but one that others hold. By using the impersonal "it" as subject, he reenforces this idea and suggests that those who hold the belief may not be willing to support their opinions with their names. The attempt to interpret the verb seem shows again that one must constantly remember that vagueness and uncertainty inflict all indicators unless they are used in a context where the context and other indicators support them.

The connecting particles make an interesting list. One might argue that every conjunction has a part in conveying the force of the utterance. The words which connect independent clauses and provide transitions between sentences are probably the most important because of their contribution to the effect of context on each utterance. In this list, therefore, connecting particles are limited to conjunctions connecting independent clauses, subordinate conjunctions connecting dependent clauses to independent clauses, and transition words between sentences and paragraphs. Subordinate conjunctions which introduce noun clauses and ones which occur in adverb clauses which are embedded in peculiar ways in other clauses will not be marked because the importance of these as force indicators
is not clear.

Looking at these as a list of words out of context one sees that, alone, each one is ambiguous and uncertain. Put into a context, the most neutral of them gains explicitness. For example, in paragraph 1, "however" emphasizes the change from one level of popularity to another, thus contributing to the overall force of the paragraph utterance. The use of "and" in the second sentence of paragraph 2 is significant. This conjunction is the kind of neutral term which stating and most kinds of explaining demand. Two ideas are combined using "and" with no indication that one is more important than the other. Through the entire paragraph, there is only one subordinate clause, since "as we owlishly say" functions as an interrupter and will be listed here as an adverbial phrase. The use of short simple sentences and compound sentences with the clauses joined by "and" indicates that the author is merely piling one detail on another, and it makes the final sentence, which at first seems only to add another idea, hit with double force when the reader sees that it has more to do than to state and account for. The use of the word now in paragraph 9 shows the uncertainty which afflicts the word indicator with no help from the other indicators. The first one--"Now I do not care. . ."--emphasizes the statement force of the utterance. The second--"Now that the situation has worsened"--is an indication of time sequence.
Both are valuable connective words in explanations, but they do not function in the same way. On the other hand, a cursory reading of the list indicates that the kind of words needed to make the relationships between statements and utterances in an explanation clear is present. When Jones argues in paragraphs 16-20, he begins to use "but" and "if" with considerable frequency. Both indicate that opposing sides will be given.

Several adverbs are used in an interesting way. One of these is "merely." This word occurs six times in the essay. When it occurs, Jones is deprecating his own ability and his own views. Now, deprecating may be an illocutionary act itself, but here it is an act used "for something." The "for something" is the establishing of the persona in order to praise and condemn. This use will be discussed below under rhetorical devices. "Only" is used nine times, three times as an adjective and six times as an adverb. The adjectival use adds emphasis to the force of utterances in some contexts: paragraph 8--the "only thing"; paragraph 14--"only great readers of books"; paragraph 22--"only opportunity." Austin, one recalls, mentions that some indicators do not change the force but merely give emphasis to it. When "only" is used as an adverb, it means "merely" in this essay, and again Jones is deprecating his own actions and views. Then "all" is used in the second and third paragraphs, not as an adverb but with the
sense in the context of "only" or "merely." Here again the effect is deprecatory.

Unusual word order seems to convey force in several ways. In some sentences, the indirect quotation is handled with an interrupter such as "he said." This word order emphasizes that Jones is quoting Emerson. In paragraph 7, one finds a sentence such as "Long may it be so." Paraphrased this becomes, "I hope that it may be so for a long time." The hope is almost a prayer, but the illocutionary force is still commending. In paragraph 9, one finds this sentence: "Mr. Wallace is on the political left and must therefore be intrinsically wrong; Senator McMahon is an administration Democrat, and must therefore be intrinsically right." The repetition of the pattern in the two clauses makes nonsense of the conclusions, thus adding to the praise and blame force of the utterance. Paragraph 14 is largely composed of rhetorical questions: "But why a library?" "Why is bookishness a virtue?" "What is a great book?" The reader answers for himself as Jones wants him to answer. Most important, he realizes that Jones is arguing against the Great Books Program and condemning those who would pour in knowledge and expect to turn out an educated man.

The use of the rhetorical question leads into the whole question of the use of traditional rhetorical devices or the linguistic techniques of persuasive discourse as
illocutionary force indicators. Searle gives as the preparatory condition for a genuine act of questioning that the speaker must not know the answer which he is asking for. Since, in this essay, Jones obviously knows the answers to the questions which he asks, the questions are rhetorical and the sort of utterance that Austin labels "for something." Such questions along with similes, understatement, antithesis, apostrophe, hyperbole, and (in some lists) as many as a hundred and fifty others are traditional rhetorical devices. Austin would consider all of these to be usages "for something" besides the performance of the act which each seems to perform. An example of understatement or litotes, for example, will appear to state but actually perform another act, often an act of praising. Now, most rhetorical devices have been considered as persuasive devices and therefore tied to the perlocutionary act, if one tries to fit them into speech-act theory. They are, however, conventional in one sense and on one level, and they certainly can be used to indicate illocutionary force. Turning first to the conventional nature of these devices, one sees that they originally are used, in most cases, in unique ways, but to the sophisticated user of the language many of them are just as conventional as the customary word order of the language. To the less sophisticated, rhetorical devices will remain literal expressions. The thesis here is that even the most
subtle rhetorical device becomes conventional if it is in the repertoire of the speaker and the audience.

Certainly, these uses of language "for something" in "The Iron String" help to indicate the force of the utterances. A critical sentence is this one from paragraph 1: "In view of this history I take some pleasure in remembering that the title of these lectures was: 'The Natural History of the Intellect.'" Jones's pleasure here results from his use of this title in an ironical way to describe the history of Emerson's reputation. One has the manipulation of utterances to produce irony, or the use of language "for something": Jones takes pleasure in order to make an ironic assessment of the fickleness of people. This understanding rests on the ability of the audience to pick up certain conventional clues. The clues are the word some and the position of the sentence in relation to others in the essay. The word some understates in a subtle way which directs attention to the title. The position of the sentence demands that the reader think about the reasons why the title gives pleasure to the speaker: nothing in the previous sentence has prepared the reader to anticipate that this title will give pleasure to the speaker. Instead, the previous sentences have been flat statements of fact. Taking the speaker seriously when he says he takes pleasure, the reader then must look for his reason. It can only lie in an ironical twisting of the meaning of the
The final sentence of paragraph 2 and sentence 6 in paragraph 3 use understatement as a conventional device for conveying the author's approval of Emerson. The final sentence in paragraph 2 can be rephrased as follows: "It has only imagination and insight." Sentence 6, rephrased, reads "He has only a vision of good." Obviously, the reader will feel that "imagination and insight" and "a vision of good" are not small and unimportant attributes. Understated, they loom larger than ever. Again, it is necessary for the audience to understand this use of "all" and the reason for understatement. If the audience does have this understanding, then the use functions as an illocutionary force indicating device to enable the speaker to praise.

In paragraph 3, the repetition of "vision of evil" seven times and the apparent paradox signal to the audience that Jones is condemning those who praise a writer for having a vision of evil to the point where he makes them ridiculous. To the reader who is so unsophisticated that he sees nothing strange about the use of this phrase in the same construction seven times in one paragraph, this repetition will convey no idea except that each of the writers
mentioned had a "vision of evil." The discovery that Americans condemn Emerson for holding the view that is supposedly the cornerstone of their system is only an apparent paradox. It conveys to the reader the ridiculousness of the criticism of Emerson. Here one has, then, conventional uses which are conventional only to users of the language of a certain sophistication. They seem, however, to be fully as conventional as the use of the "assertive link."

All speakers of the language would be expected to recognize the function of "is," but only one large group would recognize the use of repetition as Jones has used it in "The Iron String."

Another device which Jones uses in these first paragraphs is his adoption of a persona. He becomes ingenuous, unassuming, modest. He is "merely a literary historian," "merely a literary man," and "not a theologian." Again, the sophisticated reader is assisted in detecting the force which Jones wishes to convey. He is not "merely" anything in this essay; he is the authority giving his opinion to students. In other words, he is employing the "Plain Folks" technique, a technique for performing perlocutionary acts, in order to show the real thrust of his support for Emerson's ideas.

These uses with their rhetorical appeal definitely have perlocutionary effect. They are all useful in persuading. This fact does not seem to destroy them as
illocutionary devices. The reader who does not understand these uses will miss both perlocutionary and illocutionary reactions. In other words, a native speaker may grasp conventions on two levels. On the lowest level, he will merely understand illocutionary acts performed simply with no hint of the use of language "for" something." On the highest level, he will have in his language repertoire a set of conventions which convey illocutionary force at the same time that they aim to secure a perlocutionary effect, and he will see in language used "for something" a complicated way of bringing about the "uptake" of the illocution. One is reminded of Ohmann's discussion of irony in "Literature as Act." In the sentences discussed in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and in the repetition of "vision of evil" in paragraph 3, the irony does result from the author's performance of an infelicitous illocutionary act. To a reader who knows the conventions of the use of the infelicitous act, however, the infelicitous act is used to perform a felicitous one.

A device which is so simple that it almost escapes notice is the author's simple statement of intent, which corresponds to Fotion's master speech acts or "detached" indicators. Such a statement occurs in paragraphs 2-5. Jones states that he is going to supply reasons for Emerson's unpopularity. In so doing, he is committing himself to accounting for the act which he is performing. Jones
has not hesitated to tell his reader what he intends.

Punctuation is important as an indicator in several striking instances. The period, comma, and semicolon are indicators chiefly in the sense that they do not call attention to any one force but direct the reader to other signs. The dash, on the other hand, seems to exist to call attention to a force. In eight places, the dash is used instead of the comma to set off appositives. These appositives are in every case ones which add extra dimensions to the words they explain, and thus they emphasize. For example, in paragraph 19, one finds the following: "If all you want to do is to train the young, establish your pattern—Great Books, General Education, call it what you will—and the training may be admirable." Here Jones is condemning Great Books, General Education, etc., as "patterns" for training. Placing these in apposition to "pattern" and setting them off in dashes emphasize the pattern quality which results in training, not education. In three places, the dashes signal interruptors, each of which is a significant key to the author's attitude. For example, in paragraph 3, Jones sets off in dashes two lines from Emerson's poem describing his son. These lines occur in Jones's listing of all the bad things which happened to Emerson, and they emphasize that the death of his son, at least, must have seemed to Emerson an evil. Finally, the dashes signal expressions, even clauses, which the author
wishes to call attention to as being subtly worded ("a party in search of a platform" and "a platform in search of a party") or as expressing an idea which he feels has been ignored in paragraph 18. Exclamation marks are used for sentences with the word order and structure of exclamatory sentences in paragraph 21. The utterances have the force of statements, however.

After looking at these indicators, the reader is struck more and more by several points. In the first place, an exhaustive list of force indicators in each category is not possible. Almost any word can be used to convey force in a given context, and few words consistently convey the same force. Instead of a list of indicators, one has suggestions concerning the positions and the functions of the indicators. The suggestions of Austin and Searle concerning the verb, connecting particles, adverbs, word order, and punctuation (useful here only as an indicator of the rhetorical question) are consistently helpful. In addition, conventional rhetorical devices and direct statements of intentions, or master speech acts, sometimes direct the reader to the intended force. Certainly, the context of every utterance provides the first important sign.

In the second place, the relationship between style and illocutionary force seems apparent, though nebulous. Beardsley, Ohmann, and even I. A. Richards, a critic who has not used speech-act terminology, support the idea of
a relationship between style and illocutionary force. Is illocutionary force to propositional content as style is to content? Or, in other words, is style merely the manipulation of illocutionary force indicating devices? If one sets out to study style apart from content, how does the process which he uses differ from the process used in separating illocutionary force indicating devices from the basic indicators of propositional content? It appears now that the study of illocutionary force indicating devices will not be as comprehensive as a study of style. In addition, a speaker or writer has considerable choice among devices to convey the same force. Until the extent to which each word in a particular context conveys force is known, or it can be shown that no two arrangements of words or phrases can convey the same force, then one cannot equate style and the way the author conveys force. One can, however, say that the way the author conveys illocutionary force is one aspect of his style. Since he seems, at the present time, to have a variety of ways to convey the same force, this discovery will not prove a single answer to the question of ways to distinguish between styles. A study of this relationship therefore is a subject for further consideration.

In this chapter, I set out to describe my analysis
of "The Iron String" as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts in Beardsley's sense of the word complex, assuming that, in this essay, Jones has exploited "to a high degree the illocutionary act potential of its verbal ingredients." Stating, opining, accounting for, exemplifying, defining, quoting, arguing, comparing, commending, deprecating, evaluating, and urging assume various degrees of importance in the essay as the "verbal ingredients" from the simplest indicators to sophisticated rhetorical devices convey force. On the whole, evaluating and advocating seem to control the other acts: Jones is continually evaluating one view of politics and one view of education—in both cases views that discourage dissent—as he urges that another view—one which encourages dissent—be adopted. Most of the utterances in the essay are compound. If one considers, for example, as simple a sentence as "There is a country called Russia" in paragraph 9, he finds two acts being performed and the sentence forming part of a third act. Part of the speaker's understanding comes from the context: Jones is discussing "the drive for conformity" as it is demonstrated in people's various views toward Russia. The sentence is used first to state: "Russia is a country." The word arrangement of the original shows another act—the deprecating of people who hold certain views of Russia. In other words, "I deprecate for holding these views people who are so simplistic that they
need to be told that there is a country called Russia."
The views of such people change as the man advocating them
changes, and the changes are the result of the ignorance
of the people. The utterance is also part of an "exemplify­
ing" act. These compound acts are signalled by various
indicators, and each is constituted by rules.

Or, at least, this interpretation seems possible as
one analyzes "The Iron String" in terms of speech-act the­
ory. Certainly, it is still merely a possible interpreta­
tion. The reader-judge cannot be certain of attaining the
objectivity which illocutionary act analysis promises. He
cannot even be certain that the acts which he has isolated
are the only way to name the acts in the essay. Using
speech-act theory to discover locutionary and illocutionary
acts, he hoped for certainty of the kind which should re­
sult from knowing the rules of the language game. This
certainty has not resulted, and this analysis of "The Iron
String" is no more than a beginning.

If it has been successful at all, however, the anal­
ysis of "The Iron String" as a series of illocutionary acts
should make it easier to analyze other essays in the same
way, and the analysis of these should proceed more expedi­
tiously. In addition, analysis of other essays might show
a kind of pattern in the illocutionary acts performed in
the formal essay, if such a pattern exists. In this essay,
I contend that Jones states, accounts for, opines, exemp­
lifies, defines, argues, compares, commends, praises, and deprecates in order to urge the adoption of a position which he has evaluated and found satisfactory. Probably Jones hopes to convince and persuade. In addition, he may perform other perlocutionary acts such as clarifying. The three essays discussed in the next chapter will be explored, then, as a further test of the usefulness of this theory in the study of the formal essay. I will try to see the illocutionary acts which are performed, the indicators which signal these acts, and the pattern which the complex arrangement of acts forms.
CHAPTER V

THE FORMAL ESSAY AND AUSTIN'S JUDGE

If Austin is correct, a judge, a disinterested third person, should be able to observe a speech act being performed by a speaker in the presence of a hearer and conclude that certain locutionary and illocutionary acts have been performed. Searle, too, says that a sentence can contain all the indicators necessary to reveal the speech acts performed by an utterance. Since the writer of the essay cannot rely on gestures, intonation, and stress as indicators, he can or should be expected to place in each sentence tangible clues to the force which he intends each sentence to carry in the context of the essay. Up to this point in the study of the essay as a complex series of compound illocutionary acts, I have begun the analysis of an essay with an attempt to grasp intuitively the nature of the acts performed, the only really helpful criterion being the explicit formula. Now I can use with greater certainty the indicators which Searle and Austin discuss because I have found them in "The Iron String," and, in addition, I have discovered indicators which they do not list. If the impartial judge can indeed tell what illocutionary acts are being performed by hearing them performed, then I should be
able to follow the writer's indicators to the same kind of conclusion. With each essay analyzed, I should become more adept at interpreting indicators, and I should gain new insight into the way the individual illocutionary acts which the author has performed relate to each other.

To continue this investigation, I have chosen three essays: "We Were Not Skeptical Enough" by Joseph Wood Krutch; "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus; and "Pornography and Censorship" by Irving Kristol. I chose these, first of all, because they are all found in recent anthologies of essays used in freshman English classes; thus they should be typical of the essays used in such classes to explain expository techniques with the help of traditional terminology. Next, I considered the audience for which each was first written. By choosing an essay treating a philosophical subject for a lay audience, another written for a literary publication like The Saturday Review of Literature, and a third written for a newspaper magazine like The New York Times Magazine, I felt that I could insure that I had essays which employed a variety of conventional indicators in order to reach a variety of readers. Finally, I considered the extent to which each essay remained close to Barbara Smith's "natural utterance" such as a personal letter, which I discussed in Chapter IV. Krutch's essay is written in the first person almost entirely, employing "I" or "we" as the subject of the main
clause in all but seven sentences. The other two essays use the first person only a few times. I hoped to move in easy stages from an essay like "The Iron String," which was originally a speech act in the truest sense, to an essay in which the explicit performative formula would still be found and finally to essays which used the first person very seldom. These last, I believe, remain "natural utterances," but their nature is not so obvious as the nature of those essays which employ the first person extensively.

My discussion of these three essays, then, represents further experimentation with the instruments of analysis that I had applied to "The Iron String." I hoped to refine these instruments and develop them further. My report of my experimentation with these essays will, therefore, confirm what I had already learned from the analysis of "The Iron String"; but I will stress the new things that I learned from the application of speech-act analysis to essays which, as I worked with them, I realized were in certain ways very different from "The Iron String." These differences which I had grasped intuitively before I began my analysis actually constitute a fourth reason for my choice of these essays for my next application of speech-act analysis. I was increasingly aware of illocutionary acts which are not found in Jones's essay and indicating devices that Jones did not have occasion to use. For example, in interpreting Krutch's essay, the reader is faced
with the crucial problem of understanding the illocutionary force or forces behind sentences explicitly referring to the writer's "beliefs." Similarly, in Angus's essay, even the title indicates that a crucial illocutionary act will be that of defining, an act which I touched on only very briefly in my treatment of "The Iron String." Kristol's essay has been published in two versions. A comparison of the two versions provided me with an opportunity to study how some of the changes that Kristol made influence the ease with which the reader is able to make out the illocutionary forces operating in the essay. Also, Angus's and Kristol's essays are interesting because of their rich use of verbs, adverbs, and punctuation as indicating devices. Finally, in examining these essays, I raised with more seriousness a question which I only touched on in examining "The Iron String": How well can Austin's impartial judge see not only what illocutionary acts are being performed but also whether they are being performed felicitously? In talking about these three essays, I will attempt a brief answer to this question.

The process of analysis to be tested in this chapter is basically the attempt to answer three questions: (1) What illocutionary acts are performed in each essay? (2) Are these acts successfully or felicitously performed? (3) What is the relationship of these acts to each other? Because the writers of these particular essays are successful
professional writers, the assumption will be that the acts are, in the main, felicitously performed. Thus, the emphasis in answering the second question will not be on finding them unsuccessful for some obscure reason but on discovering the ways each satisfies the most important conditions for success. The first question will be answered by the search for illocutionary force indicating devices in each essay. The ordinary reader of such an essay, if his reading completes a successful illocutionary act, will rely on these indicators usually in a mechanical, unself-conscious way as he interprets the sentences in the essay. Here I will consciously study the essay for the devices which signal certain acts. From a study of the indicators, I should know what acts are performed and then be prepared to test their felicity by the rules which constitute each as a certain type of speech act.

The following devices, discussed in my preceding chapter, will also be useful in the study of the three essays analyzed here:

1. The context, including the circumstances of publication, the relationship of each sentence to the others, and the relationship between paragraphs.
2. Master speech acts including detached indicating devices such as titles.
3. Verbs—mood, tense, performatives.
4. Vocabulary—connecting particles, adverbs.
5. Punctuation.
6. Word order.
7. Rhetorical devices such as irony and understatement.

In the reading of each essay, any other indicators which appear can be added to this list.
I

In the short essay, "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Joseph Wood Krutch addresses an audience as wide as the intended circulation of the anthology, This I Believe, in which his essay first appeared. The anthology, which is no longer readily available, is described by the editors of Patterns of Exposition, the college text in which Krutch's essay is reprinted, as "a collection of philosophic observations from famous people." (The essay from Patterns of Exposition is reproduced in Appendix IV.) In the essay, "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Krutch states that, though young people of his generation thought that they were extremely skeptical, in reality they "believed very firmly in a number of things which are not really so." Basically, their mistake, according to Krutch, was that they accepted the idea that man is merely an animal, that man and his society can be studied in the same manner in which one studies the animal world, and that man has no power to influence the direction of his individual life or his society. Krutch, on the other hand, has concluded that man "can will, and choose and prefer," that he can make society what he wishes it to be, and that the belief that man is an autonomous creature is important in building a free society.

The title of this anthology and the title of the
the essay are the first indicators of force and content and are perfect examples of Fotion's "detached" indicators. Examining the title of the collection, I was immediately struck by the presence of a construction which Austin classifies as a doubtful expositive, "I believe." The Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms places "believe" with "know" and "think" and defines them as "to hold something in one's mind as true or as being what it purports to be." For "believe," Merriam-Webster adds that it "stresses assurance but implies trust and faith (as in a higher power) rather than evidence as its basis." Obviously, then, "believe," as here defined, is not the name of a speech act in the fullest sense, yet as Austin indicates, its use shows something about the nature of the act being performed.

What does a speaker seem to be doing when he says, "I believe"? Mats Furberg in Saying and Meaning distinguishes two senses in which "I believe" is used, and this distinction seems more helpful in working with the title, This I Believe, than the definition given above. The first Furberg terms the "degree-showing employment." In this sense the expression indicates that the speaker is not certain; or, as Furberg says, "'I believe' is, roughly speaking, replaceable by 'probably.'" The second or the "psychological" employment Furberg explains using as an example the "delusional employment." The mental patient
tells the psychiatrist, "I believe that pink elephants are running after me." Here the term "I believe" expresses the fact that the utterance is "a piece of information about the speaker's state of mind." The psychological use by the normal person is similarly a report on the speaker's state of mind, though the "state of mind" may be the result of rational processes and bring about rational actions by the person holding the belief. Furberg sums up the difference between the two uses of "I believe": "Whilst the degree-showing employment simply serves to warn the listener that the utterance has less than its normal [assertive] strength, the psychological one serves to tell us something about the subject's state of mind—viz. that he is ready to claim certain things and/or prepared to act in certain ways."

Now, the use of "I believe" in the title of this anthology indicates that the essays in the anthology are to be taken primarily as reports on the psychological state of the writer of each piece. The quotation from Patterns of Exposition shows that the volume is intended to deal not with the degree of credence with which the writers hold certain beliefs or necessarily with their reasons for holding these beliefs but with their beliefs as states of mind or "philosophical observations." Now, considering the title and the description of the essays, I concluded that the use of "I believe," though certainly intended to signal
a report of a psychological state, also signals an act which is different in some respects from the simple report of a psychological state. The title of the book seems to use "believe" in one sense of "affirm," thus taking it out of the group of doubtful expositives and making it a legitimate speech act. Now, in his summary of rules, Searle equates stating, asserting, and affirming. The title of this book uses "believe" in a way that seems synonymous with a meaning of "affirm," which is not an exact equivalent of stating and asserting. It uses "I believe" in the sense in which one uses it in saying a creed in church, in an organization, or at a patriotic program. The person saying the creed, "I believe in . . .," is reporting a psychological state, and, as such a report, his utterance cannot be challenged as an assertion of his belief. In addition, however, he is affirming in the sense in which Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms defines "affirm" as synonymous with such words as "assert" and "declare" and differentiates it in the following way: "Affirm implies conviction of truth and willingness to stand by one's statement because it is supported by evidence or one's experience or faith." Supposedly, the men writing for this anthology have formed certain beliefs on the basis of experience or faith. The utterance of "I believe" in this sense is close to Austin's original performative: in saying "I believe" the author is affirming, performing the
act of confirming his belief. The utterance of "I believe..." also has its constative element, however, and it is this element which the hearer can challenge for truth or falsity. Though I think that it is possible to consider "I believe" here as merely the report of a psychological state, I shall consider "believe" as a true speech act meaning "affirm." As such I shall find the act felicitously performed if the hearer understands that the speaker is uttering a proposition which he obligates himself to support with evidence from his own experience or with a statement that his faith supports the statement.

When one substitutes the title of Krutch's essay for "this" in the title of the book of essays, one has the assertion, "I believe that we were not skeptical enough." The author has made a value judgment at some time in the past. This judgment constitutes his state of mind, and he is affirming that his state of mind is such. He does not appear to be merely reporting personal psychological states: he seems to want to be taken seriously as a critic of the "we" of which he was a part. Again, one can question the truth of the belief which he reports or any evidence which he offers, but one cannot question his assertion that he believes. The titles of the two works, the book of essays and the individual essay, prepare the reader for the speaker to report his beliefs, first of all. In addition, one expects the speaker to affirm beliefs which
he can support with evidence or faith. Finally, the title of the essay indicates that deprecating will take place: the author is regretting that in the past a group (we) to which he belonged was not skeptical enough. One expects in this essay, then, to find asserting or opining, believing defined as affirming, evaluating, and, perhaps, some form of explaining and justifying.

Each paragraph from the first sentence to the last provides a further context for every other paragraph and for every sentence. Following the title, the reader expects the author to report beliefs and to deprecate certain beliefs. He expects the beliefs which he deprecates to be ones held in the past, since the verb in the title is in the past tense. Paragraphs 1-6 obviously deal with beliefs from the author's past. Paragraphs 1-2 state: the author was born in "An Age of Unbelief" and he came to realize that this title was not accurate. Paragraphs 3-4 primarily exemplify with statements. Krutch probably wants to clarify his assertions in paragraph 2. The last sentence in paragraph 4 evaluates: "The trouble was not that we were not skeptical but that we were not skeptical enough." In the context, because of the expectations aroused by the four statements used to exemplify, the reader would know that one of the possibilities for this sentence in paragraph 4 is a statement of a conclusion based on the preceding sentences. The sentence does conclude or sum up the
author's belief exemplified in the preceding sentences that his generation was not really skeptical, but, in addition, it evaluates this condition: "We were not skeptic enough."

A certain degree of skepticism is, then, desirable, and Krutch's generation, he believes, did not attain this degree. Paragraphs 5-6 exemplify the last utterance in paragraph 4. In these paragraphs, the use of the past tense indicates that the beliefs asserted were those held in the past. The evaluation in paragraph 4 shows that Krutch is also deprecating in paragraphs 5-6: his generation believed that man was "not a cause but an effect," a belief which shows that its members "were not skeptical enough."

Paragraph 7 turns to beliefs which Krutch holds as he writes the essay: the world is in a "parlous" state and man has lost faith in himself as an agent capable of improving it as well as in a God who can save him. Paragraphs 8-9 report the author's beliefs at the present time, exemplify these, and, by implication, advocate them. The reporting of beliefs in chronological order as they change strengthens the force of deprecating and commending and adds this implied advocating. Man, Krutch now believes, is a free agent with power to shape his world, and a democratic society demands that its members operate on the basis of this belief. The final paragraph asserts: "we cannot set the world free until we believe that the individual himself is free." Again, an idea is commended
and, by implication, advocated.

In paragraphs 8 and 9, Krutch introduces what appears to be an act not encountered before in this essay or in "The Iron String." The act is the one indicated by his use of the verb mean. He begins paragraph 8, "What I believe in most firmly is man himself." He continues, "And by that I mean something quite specific." I shall call the act performed here "interpreting." By interpreting, I shall not mean the act described by Abraham Kaplan and discussed in Chapter IV of this study. Kaplan views interpretation as an explanation having both semantic and scientific components. I shall use instead the definition in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, which lists "interpret" with "explain" but differentiates it in the following way: "Interpret implies the making clear to oneself or to another the meaning of something (as a poem, a dream, an abstraction, or a work in a foreign language) which presents more than intellectual difficulties and requires special knowledge, imagination, or sympathy in the person who would understand it or make it understood." One finds in this definition the same perlocutionary intent, clarification, that one finds in exemplifying, but the act is different from exemplifying in that it does not involve the giving of examples. When he interprets, the speaker believes that he has imaginative or sympathetic insight or special knowledge, and he obligates himself to provide that
insight or special knowledge to explain a concept "that presents more than purely logical difficulty" for his audience. His interpretation need not be a formulation which he can defend with facts or logic. About interpretations, there can be considerable difference of opinion, yet each interpretation can be felicitous because the speaker is relying on private knowledge, his possession of which cannot be disputed, and he indicates to his reader that he is relying on this kind of knowledge. Here, Krutch is interpreting a belief and the logical consequences of one's holding that belief. When he says that he believes in man, he means "that he descended from the animals but that he has powers which animals share but little, if at all." He means "that he is something in himself," "that he can will, and choose and prefer." Krutch is using imaginative insight based on his experiences to formulate his belief in man. Next, he extends this interpretation to society, and he interprets the society of men understood as he understands men as one in which men can be free to think and choose and live in a truly democratic society. Perhaps the attempt to separate interpreting in this way is a futile attempt to distinguish too finely between acts, but the desire to set up an act called "interpreting" rests on the premise that there is an act of explaining similar to defining but going past defining because the meaning to be elucidated cannot be supplied without special insight,
knowledge, or sympathy.

In the process of understanding these acts, the reader has repeatedly used a set of indicators which seem inextricably tangled with everything which he learns from the context. These are the connecting particles and certain adverbs which function as connecting particles. In the first paragraph, "then" and "and" indicate an order according to time sequence and the absence of contrasting ideas. In paragraph 2, the reader finds the adverbial connecting particle, "Only very slowly," signaling an orderly progression of time and the contrast between "really" and "not really" preparing for the examples to be used to exemplify—all of these showing what was "really characteristic" of the age or "not really so." In paragraph 3, "for example" indicates that exemplifying will be undertaken. In paragraph 4, "as I still do" shows that the author is reporting what he, like his contemporaries, believed and still believes. "And then" in paragraph 5 shows a time connection between ideas in the two sentences: the speaker is still reporting beliefs, this time a belief he holds as a consequence of the ones he has just discussed. In paragraph 6, "to take the most familiar example" signals that the author is exemplifying; "What is even more important" indicates an evaluation of the relative importance of the ideas; and "we tended to believe" reenforces the idea that he is asserting a belief. "Seldom before" and "not often
before" in sentence 1, paragraph 7, indicate the assertive nature of the utterance. "Yet," sentence 2, shows that the ideas will conflict, but the utterance still expresses the author's belief. The second sentence in paragraph 8 begins "And by that," thus tying the exemplifying in sentences 3-5 to the first sentence in the paragraph. Then, in paragraph 9, one has "for example" to indicate exemplifying, "not" and "not merely" to tie these ideas to the evaluation of earlier mistaken beliefs, and "therefore" to signal present beliefs. These particles, by indicating the relationship between sentences and paragraphs and sometimes by naming the nature of the speech act, show either that a certain force is to continue from one sentence to the next, that the force is to change, or that the force is to be of a certain kind. They make explicit the effect of context on the utterances in the essay.

A peculiar use of quotation marks is also a clue to the author's beliefs and his attitude toward his beliefs. These phrases are placed in quotation marks: "An Age of Unbelief," "that science proves," "science proved," and "nothing but." Not one of these groups of words is so definitely a quotation from another writer's work that it would have to be placed in quotation marks. The marks, therefore, call attention to the fact that the author is questioning the ideas expressed by the portions of the utterances enclosed as quotations: he wants his reader to
know that these ideas are not his but someone else's. By showing that he questions these beliefs, the author is showing at least a mild condemnation of them. The use of quotation marks plus the change in tense of the verb as the author's ideas change with time point clearly to such an attitude.

The verbs in the essay become, then, the most important single indicator, since they convey the force of asserting and interpreting as well as deprecating and commending. Through paragraph 6, the verbs in the individual sentences are past tense indicative mood. In paragraph 2 "did come" signals the point toward which the author's beliefs were moving in the past. The past tense in paragraphs 3-6 shows beliefs, most of which the author has discarded. This use is made clear in paragraph 4 by the already mentioned "as I still do." The sentence in which this clause occurs is used to report a belief which the author still holds, and because it is an exception, it must be pointed out. The change in paragraph 7 to present perfect and present brings the reader to the beliefs which the author holds at the present time. In paragraph 8, the verbs with their subjects are the following: "What I believe in most firmly is," "I mean," "I believe," "I believe," and "I believe." In paragraph 9, they are "This means," "It means," "I believe," and "The difference is." In the final one-sentence paragraph, the verb with its
subject is "I believe." The author is reporting his beliefs, and with "I mean," he is signaling that he is interpreting his beliefs. By the change in tense which occurs in paragraph 7, the author clearly signals a change from deprecating to commending in addition to asserting, exemplifying, and interpreting. For this essay, then, it is possible to make an outline of speech acts simply by using the verbs in the main clauses.

In this essay, the reader concludes, the indicators show that Krutch asserts, exemplifies, deprecates, commends, evaluates, and interprets. One feels that he also advocates, since he so obviously believes that his ideas are good that he presumably wants his reader to adopt them. However, unlike Jones's "The Iron String," this essay seems to secure adequate "uptake" if the reader merely accepts it as an assertion of Krutch's beliefs. In "The Iron String," Jones argues for his beliefs, and the overall thrust is his urging the acceptance of a view of education and government which he does not believe that people in America hold at the time when he makes the speech. Krutch, on the other hand, is exploring a psychological state, and the nearest he comes to urging that others adopt this state is his equating of his view with a democratic society and the opposite view with totalitarianism. Believing defined as the affirming of something more than a psychological state is supported through the essay as the author shows his
experience with beliefs through the years. As with a re-
port of a psychological state, believing as affirming can
be felicitous without the reader accepting the belief him-
self: he needs merely to know that the author intends to
affirm his belief.

The next question is then whether or not these acts
are felicitous. It is in the process of reading the essay
that the sentences on the page again become utterances and
speech acts, so the first consideration in testing the
felicity of this essay as the performance of a complex
series of compound illocutionary acts is a study of the
reader for whom it can be felicitous. The reader must be
capable of reading the language, and he must know something
about modern scientific thought in order to grasp the prop-
ositional content as well as the force of the utterances in
the essay. The first requirement obviously follows from
the conditions of Austin and Searle. The second becomes
obvious as one considers the allusions to evolution and
various behavioral sciences which the reader must under-
stand if Krutch's examples "illustrate" anything to him.
The whole notion of "normal input and output conditions"
(see pp. 83-84 above) must be expanded to include the
writer's assessment of the body of knowledge which he can
expect his audience to have. A successful speech act can
be performed only when the hearer knows the language which
the speaker is using. If the speaker alludes to a body of
knowledge which the hearer does not have, he will fail to secure "uptake" as surely as he will if he speaks in a language the hearer does not know. When Krutch wrote the essay, he intended it for the sort of people who would be attracted to "a collection of philosophical observations from famous people." In Patterns of Exposition, the essay is intended for college undergraduates. Neither audience is completely homogeneous and neither shares the same body of knowledge. In either audience, only the reader with the necessary background knowledge will understand the content or the force of the essay. The writer will, however, stand in a perfect position to perform the intended acts for the readers who can comprehend them. A professor of literature at Columbia University for many years, Krutch could be expected to speak as an authority on some subjects to some audiences. Here, however, he is not speaking as an authority in a field, though his position earned him the invitation to write for the anthology. Rather, he is asserting his beliefs as a young man and his present ones. He stands in a perfect position to make these assertions, since the propositional content of the acts which he performs is his own beliefs and the beliefs of people whom he knows. When he evaluates, because he shows his wide range of experience, the reader may be able to listen, but again his evaluations, also his beliefs, do not have to be in any way convincing to stand as assertions of his beliefs.
The question of the speaker's sincerity, certainly a big factor when one examines assertions of beliefs, is a more difficult one to deal with. As Furberg points out, the question of sincerity when a person says, "I believe" is always a big one. How does one evaluate the sincerity of an author affirming beliefs? Probably, the best test again is the reputation of the author. The reader who chooses to read this essay must be convinced that the writer is a man who would not affirm beliefs which he does not hold. He will be willing to accept the author's sincerity, too, if he does not see the author to be furthering his own self-interest as he asserts his beliefs. This essay by Krutch, a man of integrity in the academic world with no selfish interest to further by expressing these beliefs, seems felicitous as judged by the sincerity condition to the extent to which one can judge its sincerity.

Again the question of the perlocutionary effect of the essay which is a series of illocutionary acts must be considered. The intent to clarify seems present wherever an author exemplifies and interprets. An older man showing the way his ideas changed as he matured can be expected to desire to persuade his audience to adopt his later views. The way in which Krutch aligns his view with democracy and its opposite with communism certainly seems to show that he hopes to persuade, but the judge cannot decide whether or not the reader is persuaded without his direct testimony.
Certainly, a description of a change in ideas from youth to maturity would sway some to adopt the ideas of the older person. On the other hand, there are those who arbitrarily decide with youth. In other words, the perlocutionary act remains hidden in the minds of writer and reader, inaccessible to Austin's judge.

Examining this essay, then, I have discovered a complex series of compound illocutionary acts performed in a very different manner with a different intent from those performed in "The Iron String." Both seem "natural utterances," to use Barbara Smith's term again, but one is an oration to a stage full of people and the other is a soliloquy, a man's musings on his personal beliefs. The oration, "The Iron String," employs elaborate devices and a tremendous complexity of texture. "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," the soliloquy, is simple and straightforward.

II

The essay "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus is a far more complicated series of illocutionary acts than Krutch's essay, even though the audience for it is more clearly defined and restricted. This essay was originally printed in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, the readers of which are not only literate users of the language but also usually people who are interested in and knowledgeable about art, literature, and current affairs.
The content can be summarized in the following way: Art lovers have become unwilling to criticize experiments in the arts to the extent that they accept whatever is experimental, even the "random," as art. This attitude conflicts with the "critical faculty," which demands the willingness to criticize the product of the artist and is dependent on this idea: "Art is not what we experience; it is the controlled product of the artist's experience." Angus finally defines art as "the controlled structuring of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of experience," thus providing a basis to criticize "random" art.

The reader of "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" finds the context and the title as helpful in indicating the illocutionary force of the essay as did the reader of "We Were Not Skeptical Enough." The article did not appear in the art section of the Saturday Review but in the first section which is devoted to articles of general interest. In Design, it is printed in a section called "The Arts." (The essay from Design is reproduced here in Appendix V.) The title, a "detached" indicator of content and force, is more important as an indicator than either position in which the article was printed. The title gives an evaluation and asks a question: "It's pretty, but is it art?" This title indicates that the utterances in the essay will be concerned with defining art, since the question poses
the problem of whether "it" fits the definition of art. As an illocutionary act, questioning is not indicated so much as arguing in order to define. The title is not asking a question to be answered so much as it is proposing an argument about a definition. It leads the reader, moreover, to expect statements and explanations. To what does "it" refer, the reader wants to know.

The first two sentences are acts of opining. They read: "In art, this is not the age of anxiety, the pill, or the bomb. It is the age of 'willingness.'" In the next paragraph, Angus begins to argue. Art lovers are supposed to find experiments in art "interesting," but, unfortunately, many of them are "not interesting." Angus devotes paragraphs 3-5 to arguing for her conclusions or her evaluation of this art as "not interesting." In these paragraphs she exemplifies in order to argue her point. She uses as her example a touring group called "Contemporary Voices in the Arts." She points out that the performances of this group, which espouses "random" art, are boring and confusing. On the other hand, the talks defending their performances are lucid and persuasive. In other words, the members of the group define art with the clarity and precision which they condemn in the art itself. With her example, Angus has demonstrated that the logical and ordered are more interesting than the "random."

In paragraph 6, Angus proposes a possible relation-
ship between modern science and "random" art. She asks, supposedly for the proponents of "random" art, "If randomness is a fundamental truth of science, why is it not also applicable to art?" Then, in paragraph 7, she presents five problems with "random" art which make a telling argument against it. In paragraph 8, she evaluates and opines concerning "random" art, preparing for paragraphs 9-15 in which she argues against the "random" in art. In paragraph 12, she attacks those who would relate scientific relativity to art: "The atomic particle may be indeterminate, but man is not. The random, the formless, is basically impossible and uninteresting to man, who is, willy-nilly, a pattern-making animal." Paragraph 16 opines as Angus sums up what is needed at the time in art. The last two paragraphs, the point toward which the argument in the essay has moved, offer a definition of art, a definition which Angus believes to be needed as a result of the argument through which she has led her readers to this point.

Now, in "The Iron String," I discovered an incidental act of defining. This essay, unlike "The Iron String," indicates by its title and the master speech act in the last two paragraphs that its main purpose is the act of defining. Monroe Beardsley in Thinking Straight calls definition "the most important kind of verbal elucidation." He points out that a definition "consists of two parts, the term whose meaning is in question or in doubt and is to
elucidated (this is the term to be defined), and the term that is offered as synonymous with the first term and is assumed to be more familiar or more explicit (this is the defining term)." In this essay, "art" is the "term to be defined," and the "defining term" is "the controlled structuring of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of experience." According to Beardsley, there are two types of "defining terms": "definition reports" and "definition proposals." Both of these are found in paragraph 4 of "The Iron String" in which Jones first reports the Oxford Dictionary's definition of a "liberal," a definition which to the lexicographer seems to be sanctioned by common usage, and then proposes his own definition which deepens and enlarges the dictionary definition though it does not contradict it.

In the last two paragraphs of "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?", Angus presents a "definition proposal." She does not merely quote a definition of art. Instead, what she gives is what Beardsley calls "a decision to use a word one way rather than another for certain purposes in certain contexts." Angus uses a master speech act to signal that she is making a proposal: "With more bravery than good sense, I will climb well out on a limb and define it [art] as follows." It is the act which results in the "definition proposal" which I shall arbitrarily call "defining" in
this study. When the speaker merely quotes a definition from a dictionary, he is not actually performing the act of defining, but the act of stating or reporting. The editors of dictionaries who report definitions discovered in common usage and phrase these definitions for their publications are performing an act of defining, but for convenience's sake I shall use the term only when the speaker obligates himself to provide a "defining term" which involves a "decision to use a word one way rather than another for certain purposes in certain contexts."

Probably, this is the only act of defining usually found in the essay, the chief source of "definition reports" being the dictionary. As Beardsley points out, the speaker performing this act does not obligate himself to verify a statement: not being a statement, Beardsley says, a "definition proposal" "can't be refuted, and it can't be proved," though it is not "immune to criticism." To be successful, the definition must, moreover, "be more familiar or explicit" than the "term to be defined." On the other hand, it need not clarify. The "uptake" desired is the reader's understanding that defining is intended. The defining of "art" is, then, the point toward which the argument in this essay leads. Angus argues and exemplifies, opines and states, deprecates and commends, and finally arrives at her definition of art.

Now, the question is, "What role does defining
The title has indicated that a definition is to be tested or that a product is to be measured by a definition. Throughout the essay, Angus is deprecating and arguing against "random" art. By her definition, she excludes the "random" from the class of things defined as art, answering her question, "Is it art?", and completing her argument against it as art. The perlocutionary intent—to convince the reader that this is not art by defining art to exclude the "random"—seems obvious. The use of the definition as part of her whole argument against "random" art seems equally obvious. The reader is impressed again, at this point, by the complexity of the series of illocutionary acts which a writer like Sylvia Angus is able to perform in order to convey the overall force which she hopes to convey. By the end of this essay, the reader may not be convinced, but he certainly should realize that the author is arguing against the "random" in art.

Again, connecting particles play a tremendous role in making the context a clear indicator. An especially interesting pattern occurs in paragraphs 12-15. In these paragraphs, the author is arguing, and the particles which recur are "if" and "but." The way these work is apparent in the last sentence of paragraph 12: "Man is a sensing animal all right, but he is also a thinking reed..." Here the fact that each clause represents one side of the
argument is emphasized and made clear by the conjunction.

The fact that basic acts through the essay are stating and opining is supported by the use of the verb to be in the present tense fifty-six times in the essay's eighteen paragraphs. (As in the study of "The Iron String," only verbs in the main clauses are considered.) "Is a" is called the "assertive link" in Austin's early essays, and it often signals the predication of a truth about a subject. Opining also has the form of the statement. The first two sentences of the essay illustrate the use of "is" in opining. Since the utterances do not contain a verifiable proposition, the act is opining.

The force of the simple present tense "be" works in an interesting way with certain conditional verbs to convey the force of arguing. The following conditional verbs can be found in the main clauses: paragraph 9—"can be," "can turn," "can stimulate and entertain," "can provoke"; paragraph 10—"can be had"; paragraph 12—"may be," "may seem"; paragraph 13—"may be"; paragraph 14—"may be"; paragraph 15—"may produce," "can [produce]"; paragraph 16—"can be defined"; and paragraph 18—"can go." In a number of cases, the conditional verb sets up one side of the argument which is then demolished by an utterance containing an assertive use of "be." An example of this use is found in the following sentence in paragraph 10: "Experience can be had, and is had, at any time of the day and night." This
sentence occurs in a paragraph of assertions, but the two verbs stage an argument over possibility and actuality. Here the "be" verbs are technically auxiliaries, but the effect is the same as if they were main verbs. Then in paragraph 14, one finds the following sentence: "If we select the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress, the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the merchant a couturier?" Again, "may be" is not positive, and the positive "do call" is used to emphasize the assertion, since the question is clearly rhetorical.

Adverbs also play an important part in the felicitous performance of the illocutionary acts in this essay. It seems more profitable to consider the ones which have not been included under connecting particles chiefly in the context of interesting sentences and phrases, but a few, considered alone, point to the author's intent to argue against "random" art. Examples are "unfortunately," "never," "conversely," "not always." Some such as "equally" and "clearly" are tied to stating, commending, and deprecating. In paragraph 16 where the definition of art begins with the concluding argument against "random" art, "not" occurs six times.

Angus has chosen to use italics and quotation marks as force indicators. Beginning in paragraph 4, twenty-three words are italicized. They are "say," "show," "after," "is," "can be," "any," "as art," "poor," "duty,"
"art," "we," "we," "not," "not," "includes," "not," "does," "is," "we experience," and "controlled." In each case the force of the utterance is intensified by the use of italics. Angus uses quotation marks, on the other hand, for the same purpose for which Krutch used them—to show that she questions something about the use of the words. Eighteen words and phrases are placed in quotation marks for this reason. One example is "a happening." The author questions this term concerning its meaning and its suitability as a term to describe art. Her use of quotation marks becomes especially clear as she changes her placing of quotation marks. In paragraph 4, she speaks of "the 'random' arts." Here she is bothered by the word random. In paragraph 7, she talks of "random 'art.'" In this case, she is questioning whether or not it is suitable to call that which is random, art. Finally, in her definition of art in paragraphs 16 and 17, she drops the quotation marks around the word art. Obviously, her use of these marks is tied to commending and deprecating. One notes too that in the last paragraph Angus uses quotation marks in the most conventional way when she encloses "controlled structuring" to indicate that she is quoting her own words from the preceding paragraph.

Angus also uses exclamation marks in an interesting way. She does not use them following utterances with the form of an exclamation but following utterances having the
form of statements. They are used to show surprise at the idea and in turn to place weight on one side of the argument. The first comes at the end of paragraph 5 where the long example explaining random art ends. The other one comes in paragraph 10, again in the last sentence, where again an argument is to be driven home: "If all of these can also be called 'art,' then clearly what we are doing is simply melting our language down into one blob in which differentiations can no longer be made--anti-intellectualism with a vengeance!"

Angus employs certain words, phrases, and clauses to direct the reader to the force of her utterance. These are not included in the lists of conventional indicators prepared by Searle and Austin, nor can they be taken out of this essay and placed on such a list. These expressions will not function the same way in any two situations, but their effectiveness still depends on the speaker and the hearer sharing a repertoire of conventional meanings and usages and they therefore deserve attention as force indicators. For example, in paragraph 1, the author shows the ridiculousness of the classicists' embarrassment when they are confronted with "random" art when she says that "they sneak home for a bit of Haydn on the hi-fi." She speaks of the way "willingness has completely overborne" the critical ability of the listener. By personifying "willingness" she makes it ridiculous. She calls the
"critical faculty" "that philistine thing." Now, according to *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, "philistine" means "lacking in or hostile to culture." No educated reader could fail to see in the application of "philistine" to "critical faculty" anything but irony. Certainly the average reader of *The Saturday Review of Literature* does not regard the critical faculty as the enemy of culture. In paragraph 2, Angus refers to the "bland, slightly nervous acquiescence" of those who favor continued interest in the new art. In paragraph 4, Angus contrasts the artists' success in saying "(which was not their main intention)" with their lack of success in showing "(which was)" in order to show that "curiously enough" the arts were more successful in the first instance than in the second. She uses expressions from time to time like "as it may seem to some" and "What I am against." These uses can all be interpreted for their rhetorical effect and therefore their contribution to the perlocutionary effect of the essay, but they also have the more objective function of signaling the steps in the argument.

Then, certain complete sentences are interesting as indicators of the force intent for whole paragraphs and indeed the whole essay. These show the author's case against "random" art: more important, in speech-act terminology, they show that the author is deprecating and arguing against it. In paragraph 4, one finds the follow-
ing sentence: "Films flickered simultaneously on screens, walls, and ceilings; shrill and unrelated noises attacked the eardrums in long, continuous squeals; artists wandered about, coyly lighting matches when lights failed; a so-called panel discussion on the arts resolved itself into several people making desultory remarks and joshing each other like small boys; artists ambled about the stage like actors on the first day of a rehearsal when they do not yet know their lines or even their roles." The underlined words and phrases show the slant of the author. They are intended perhaps to persuade but certainly to hold up one side of the argument. One notices the personification of "panel discussion," the use of similes, and the very real force of the verbs.

In paragraph 5, three sentences which are rhetorically effective argue against "random" art. In each sentence, the terms which especially point to the conflicting sides of the argument are underlined. The sentences follow:

Cogently, lucidly, in logical, sequential prose, they explained that art should be a total, sensory experience which should be allowed to flow over and through one; that it should not be examined for logic, lucidity, or sequence. Clearly, rationally, they made the reasonable point that art has too long concentrated on intellectual perceptions, and that this, the age of exploding mass media and new technology, should be a time to seek sense experience in whatever random arrangement of sight, smell, or sound might present itself at any given moment. With admirable intellectual coherence, they made a most persuasive case for the nonintellec-
tual, random art with which the audience had been bored the evening before!
These three sentences move from a beginning with an adverb-adverb-prepositional phrase pattern to an adverb-adverb pattern to a prepositional phrase beginning. In each sentence, the opening words and phrases describe the good aspects of the lectures. The underlined words which follow in each sentence point to the fact that the art does not regard these characteristics as good.

In paragraph 6 and paragraph 14, rhetorical questions are used to suggest the force which Angus intends. In paragraph 6, she asks, "If randomness is a fundamental truth of science, why is it not also applicable to art?" The question is rhetorical because rather than requiring an answer it is merely another way of asserting this relationship between science and art. In fact, in the next sentence its assertive nature is pointed out: "In a seeming attempt to assert the unity of science and art, we have now gone far along the path of asserting that the random is or can be art." In paragraph 14, Angus asks, "If we select the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress, the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the merchant a couturier? Is his randomly heaped assortment of materials 'art'?" Angus obviously does not expect an answer from her reader. She expects to call attention in a persuasive way to her side of the argument.

Paragraph 9 begins with the very peculiar sentence, "Which brings me, of course, to the positive, if heretical,
point I am making: that totally random or accidental art is not art at all." Here the broad reference of the pronoun *which* with which the sentence begins and the fact that the group of words defies all attempts to make it a grammatically complete sentence at all, that it remains a rather elaborate adjective clause, call attention to the point that the author is making and to the force of the utterances which precede this one. These utterances take "random" art out of the definition of art. In paragraph 10, one finds the succinctly effective, "Experience can be had, and *is* had, at any time of the day or night." In paragraph 12, Angus uses the same structures in two sentences in order to emphasize her argument against "random" art: "Given a blank wall, man will form its cracks into a design. Set down in chaos, man will separate the whirling from the stationary, for chaos and meaninglessness, as the existentialists have discovered, are the hardest of all things for man to endure." The past participles "given" and "set," each modifying the subject of its sentence "man" which, in turn, has in both cases a future tense verb, show man's pattern-making propensity. Finally, in the second sentence of paragraph 13, one finds this attempt to reduce "random" art to absurdity: "Today we are being asked to watch our artists doodle in public and to cull from their doodles whatever appeals to us."

Three paragraphs begin with master speech acts or
"detached" indicators. Paragraph 2 begins, "Unfortunately, a great deal of current experiment in the arts is not interesting." This is the kind of claim which an author usually intends to argue, and it controls the next sentences. Paragraph 7 begins with this sentence, almost the wording of a model master speech act: "If we allow, for the moment, that the artists in the experiment above have a rational theory for asserting that the random can produce art, we are faced with a number of criticisms of random 'art' based on their own demonstrative performances, which suffered from at least the following five problems, any one of which is capable of destroying any art." Obviously, the writer is preparing to argue against random art by giving problems which beset it. The third example occurs in paragraph 17, the sentence already quoted: "With more bravery than good sense, I will climb well out on a limb and define it [art] as follows." This sentence utterance prepares for the act of defining.

Sylvia Angus did not speak as an expert to readers who would accept her authority if she merely praised and condemned. Her points could only be made by leading her readers through a reasoning process to her definition. A definition, as Beardsley points out, is not a verifiable statement, and the person proposing one would probably have a perlocutionary intent—to convince—that could best be furthered by arguing for the definition. Hoping to
persuade, Angus could not speak *ex cathedra*. Instead, she must speak to equals and argue in a reasonable way. Again, however, one does not need to worry about the perlocutions performed. The choice of illocutionary acts can be justified by the simple desire of the writer to argue the question of the proper role of art and finally to define art. She need not care at all whether anyone is persuaded by her acts. She need only know that the proper "uptake" will be secured if the reader knows that she intends to present rational arguments defending her definition and if her definition is understood, in turn, as part of her argument.

III

Irving Kristol in "Pornography and Censorship" is again performing a complex series of compound illocutionary acts. Again the context is the first clue to the nature of these acts. Then Kristol's use of the wide range of indicators studied in the other essays confirms the original impression resulting from the context.

Kristol originally wrote the essay for *The New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1971. The title of the essay in this publication was "Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship." This title clearly indicates that Kristol planned to argue for censorship. The title which Kristol has given to the essay in *Design*, which he rewrote for this anthology, is not so clear an indicator of the
illocutionary act intent of the author. (The essay from Design is reproduced in Appendix VI.) It does, however, provide some guidance to the author's attitude. If the author intended to argue against censorship, he would probably not have paired censorship with pornography in the title. Almost no one ever argues for that which he calls "pornography." Defined in The Random House Dictionary, pornography is "obscene literature, art, or photography, esp. that having little or no artistic merit." One might argue for freedom as opposed to censorship, the freedom of art or literature, but the material that one argues should be allowed in circulation will not be called "pornography," since this word never carries a good meaning. The reader knows, then, that Kristol's attitude is probably favorable to censorship of pornography, but whether he is presenting the case for censorship or merely explaining relationships between censorship and pornography, the reader does not know simply on the evidence of the title.

The reader soon learns, however, that the article is a defense of censorship. Kristol points out that those who through the years have opposed all censorship are at the present time almost completely victorious but that they are finding that the relaxation of censorship has resulted not only in a world in which the reading and viewing of works of better quality can take place but also, as he expresses it, in "a world in which homosexual rape takes place on the
stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hour to witness varieties of professional fornication." According to Kristol if one believes that books can improve a person, one must also believe that they can corrupt him. If cigarette advertising can be banned because cigarettes are believed to harm the body, then it is logical to censor the books which will harm the mind. Censorship will, on occasion, Kristol believes, cause a book of real value to be restricted in its distribution. It is necessary, however, if the minds of the public are not to be swamped with pornography.

The first paragraph should leave the reader with the understanding that the essay is making a case against pornography. The first sentence opines: "Being frustrated is disagreeable, but the real disasters in life begin when you get what you want." The next sentences exemplify in order to clarify: someone got what he wanted—a relaxation of censorship laws which the first sentence has already labeled a "disaster." Paragraphs 3-4 exemplify in statements and opinions the reasons why the advocates of complete freedom of the media are unhappy. Then paragraph 5 asks questions which Kristol answers in paragraphs 6-8. In paragraphs 9-10, Kristol picks up terms used in paragraph 8, and by exemplifying his use of these he argues against the relaxing of all censorship, showing that, in addition, he is advocating censorship. Paragraphs 11-13 continue the
argument by explaining the harm to society that may result from pornography. Kristol defines the terms pornography and censorship in paragraphs 14-16.

Then in paragraphs 17-18, Kristol breaks the thought of the previous paragraphs to speculate on the changes to be expected in the mores of Western society and make predictions, or opine about the future. Paragraphs 19-24 argue the importance of the question of wide use of pornography to the future of civilization. Paragraphs 25-28 state Kristol's beliefs concerning the relationship between the defense against pornography and the defense of the civilization. In paragraph 29, Kristol opines that the question is one which involves the future of this country's democratic government. Paragraphs 30-33 exemplify his opinion. In paragraphs 34-40, Kristol states, opines, and argues for his own view of censorship. Finally in the last four paragraphs, Kristol states his view, which he clearly advocates.

The original paragraph divisions of the essay are probably better indicators of illocutionary force than the present ones. In fact, it is difficult to see why the paragraphing was changed when the essay was printed in this collection. The fact that it was changed, however, gives an opportunity for the reader to see the importance of paragraph organization as an indicator of illocutionary intent. In every well-organized work, the organization of
the individual paragraphs will show one or both of two things: the subject, including the author's intent in handling the subject, and the continuation of the same act or complementary acts for the course of the paragraph. When the original paragraphs in this essay are chopped into pieces, they lose the power to show either thing. In the appendix, the original paragraphs are marked as are the places where sentences, phrases, and paragraphs are deleted. The deletions are obviously justified by the space requirements of the anthology, but the paragraph changes actually make the essay longer because of the additional space needed for paragraphing.

A study of paragraphs 3-4 in Design or paragraph 2 in The New York Times Magazine illustrates this importance of paragraph divisions. The paragraphs follow, divided as they are in Design:

Is there a sense of triumphant exhilaration in the land? Hardly. There is, on the contrary, a rapidly growing unease and disquiet. Somehow, things have not worked out as they were supposed to, and many notable civil libertarians have gone on record as saying this was not what they meant at all.

They wanted a world in which "Desire Under the Elms" could be produced, or "Ulysses" published, without interference by philistine busybodies holding public office. They have got that, of course; but they have also got a world in which homosexual rape takes place on the stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hours to witness varieties of professional fornication.

In the last sentence of the second paragraph, this clause was omitted from the essay in Design: "in which Times Square has become little more than a hideous market for the
sale and distribution of printed filth that panders to all known (and some fanciful) sexual perversions." This deletion makes the reading of the essay by a person not familiar with New York more meaningful in addition to shortening the essay, but no such justification exists for the paragraph division. The first four sentences (including "Hardly.") report the author's opinion of the present mood of those who have favored the removal of all censorship restrictions. The rhetorical question followed by "hardly" becomes a master speech act indicating that the author intends to give his opinion on this mood of the winning side. The next two sentences exemplify this mood. Since exemplifying requires the showing of relationships, when the examples are placed in a paragraph apart from the master speech act and the statement of the concept to be exemplified, a heavy burden is placed on the other indicators to show this relationship. Again, because Kristol is exemplifying opinions which are part of an argument, making these paragraphs also part of the act of arguing, relationships between sentences are extremely important, and the connecting particles must function with no help from the paragraph divisions. It is interesting to note that five of these particles which were originally used to connect sentences within paragraphs now must connect paragraphs which have been divided.

Adverbs and adverbial phrases support the idea of
the illocutionary force of arguing. They are "on the contrary" (3); "oddly enough," "incredibly enough" and "in all sincerity" (6); "nevertheless," "merely" (8); "in this crazy world of ours" (10); "to put it bluntly" (21); "merely" (27); "rarely" (30); "as bluntly as possible" (34); and "obviously" (41). Even out of context, these words suggest the giving of reasons and opposite reasons.

The verbs convey force in very much the same way that they do in the other essays. Thirty-four main verbs are present-tense forms of the verb be and suggest stating and opining. Seven are conditional: "Might (not) be," "might have added," "might find," "can be," "may be," "can see," "might point out," "can be," and "may be." In the last three paragraphs, the subject-verb arrangement suggests the explicit formula: "I subscribe" (43); "I think," "I believe," "I think" (44). All of these support the opinion force of the last three paragraphs. Adding "I opine that" to any one of these, the reader has a meaningful utterance and has identified the act which he is performing.

Punctuation is more interesting than it is in the other essays. Dashes are used to separate clauses and set off phrases twenty-four times. The first use is illustrated in paragraph 22: "In other words, infantile sexuality is not only a permanent temptation for the adolescent or even the adult--it can quite easily become a
permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis." By using the dash Kristol calls attention to the second clause which is the stronger of the two points in supporting his argument. The dash is, then, a tool in arguing as it is used here. In paragraph 1, the reader finds the second use: "For almost a century now, a great many intelligent, well-meaning and articulate people—of a kind generally called liberal or intellectual, or both—have argued eloquently against any kind of censorship of art and/or entertainment." Or, in paragraph 19, he reads, "But when sex is public, the viewer does not see—cannot see—the sentiments and the ideals." In the first of these two sentences, the author with the use of dashes calls attention to the type of people whom he is discussing and, in a subtle way, suggests that people bearing the labels "liberal" and "intellectual" are somehow suspect. In the second sentence, Kristol makes his reader take notice of the "cannot see" verb, thus emphasizing this portion of his argument.

Colons and parentheses point to advocating, stating, and exemplifying. A typical use is found in paragraph 34: "And lest there be any misunderstanding as to what I am saying, I'll put it as bluntly as possible: If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship." For "I'll put it," one can substitute "I advocate that." The second part of the sentence is then used for advocating. Parentheses are used
to enclose short explanatory phrases. For example, in paragraph 18, one finds, "It is, however, highly improbable (to put it mildly) that..." and, in paragraph 36, one finds, "We have no problem in contrasting repressive laws governing alcohol and drugs and tobacco with laws regulating (i.e., discouraging the sale of) alcohol and drugs and tobacco." These short phrases add to the meaning of the phrases which they follow, and they, also, emphasize points in the argument.

The use of the question mark seven times in this essay raises the problem of the rhetorical question. Searle gives as the preparatory condition for a genuine act of questioning that the speaker must not know the answer which he is asking for. In this essay, the speaker obviously knows the answer which the question demands, and the reader is conscious that here is a use of the form of a speech act "for something," a use which bothers Austin tremendously. The use here is "for" the purpose of calling attention to the speaker's statements and opinions, especially the opinions which he advocates. As such a signal it becomes another rhetorical device used as a conventional indicator of the illocutionary act. No reader of the sophistication demanded by this essay will mistake these questions for sincere requests for information. He will immediately know that they signal statements and opinions which are to be advocated and argued for.
This point leads to an assessment of the overall effect of these four punctuation usages. What they do is secure for the author the kind of immediacy which the spoken act has. They do more to supply the stress and intonation patterns of stating and asserting than any other device. In addition, they seem to work almost like the explicit formula: they make clear the force which the other indicators suggest.

As the Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values at New York University and a coeditor of *Public Interest*, Irving Kristol stands in relation to his audience in such a way that he can opine, state, explain, and argue concerning the effects of pornography on the public in order to advocate censorship. Because of his position, he can be expected to have thought more deeply on the subject than the average reader of *The New York Times Magazine* or of the undergraduate anthology *Design*. Because he is speaking on a subject which most people feel to some extent qualified to speak on, he must, however, "argue that" in some instances rather than stating dogmatically. From the beginning of the essay, Kristol acknowledges that many people in his position will not agree with him, at least before they read the essay. For them, he must "argue that" in order to advocate. His essay then is a successful performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts because Kristol understands the controversial nature of the subject of his article,
possesses the authority to speak on this subject, and employs the illocutionary forces which will secure the only effective "uptake" which he can expect--the "uptake" from opining and arguing in order to advocate. Kristol also states, deprecates, and commends successfully, but the chief acts are these others which the nature of the subject--one on which agreement is difficult to reach--demands. The perlocutionary effect of persuasion which Kristol obviously intends also seems furthered by these uses.

IV

At this stage in the study, I have completed the attempt to analyze four essays by professional writers as the performance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts. In these essays, the authors appear to perform successfully a variety of acts. In all the essays, the authors attempt to perform perlocutionary acts: they all attempt to clarify and in three cases they obviously want to persuade. The interesting results from this analysis are to be found, however, not in the area of perlocutionary acts, but in the area of illocutionary acts.

The illocutionary acts show certain characteristics of such acts in successful essays. First, the reputation of the author determines the type of act which he can perform successfully, and, at the same time, he will only be successful when he performs the acts which he can clearly
obligate himself to perform successfully. For example, he must not appear to state when he could not have the information to verify his statement, he must not ask his audience to believe him to be sincere in a statement of beliefs if he is a known liar, and he must not assert dogmatically points which are susceptible to argument. Second, the acts in the successful essay will be complex in most cases. The simplest utterances in these essays occur in Krutch's essay. Their simplicity fits the tone of his essay which is thoughtful, meditative, not designed to be dramatically persuasive. In an essay like the last one, however, each section contains more than one act intertwined with each other. For example, in the paragraph already quoted, Kristol opines, exemplifies, and argues, at the same time that he is deprecating and commending.

In the next chapter, I shall report on the attempt to analyze student essays as attempts to perform a complex series of illocutionary acts.
CHAPTER VI

THE STUDENT ESSAY AND AUSTIN'S JUDGE

When an essay is regarded as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts, the twin problems for Austin's judge are to determine what acts are performed in the essay and to evaluate them as successful or unsuccessful. In handling these problems, the procedure of the judge is to ask how well each discernible act satisfies the rules which constitute it. As we have seen, these rules, as formulated in general terms by Austin and Searle, specify (1) the speaker's illocutionary intention, (2) his assessment of the hearer's knowledge and desires, (3) the position of the speaker as the proper person to perform the act, and (4) the extent to which the speaker obligates himself.

In the two preceding chapters I have studied the work of four professional writers. I have assumed that these authors deserve their reputation as skillful writers of expository prose and that an important aspect of this skill is their ability to perform illocutionary acts felicitously. Thus my investigation was guided by the Austin-Searle rules and served as a test of their validity. On the assumption that the illocutionary intentions of the
effective writer of the professional essay can be ascertained with considerable precision, I devoted most of my analysis to a search for the linguistic indicators of illocutionary force by means of which these intentions are made evident to the reader. In addition, I assumed that the other components of the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts—the authority with which the writer speaks on the subject of his essay, his understanding of the limits of his knowledge, and his reluctance to obligate himself in areas in which he does not feel that he can fulfill his obligation—should also be evident in the work of the skillful professional. Thus, a secondary purpose of my analysis was to raise the question of the means by which the authors of these essays hoped to insure that their illocutionary acts would be felicitous. This part of my analysis was necessarily much more sketchy and tentative than the first part, though it did result in a greater particularization of the Austin-Searle general rules for each of the illocutionary acts discovered. The results of this latter part of my investigation are summarized in the charts in Appendix III.

Thus, my examination of the professional essays gave me some confidence in the validity of the speech-act theory as a guide in the analysis of the essay and aided me in the development of a set of admittedly very rough instruments to be used in further investigation. I felt that these
instruments were sufficiently refined to use in evaluating a group of student papers as the successful or unsuccessful use of language for the performance of certain assigned illocutionary acts. My assumption was that good student writing, like good professional writing, will reflect the principles found in speech-act theory for the performance of the successful speech act and that a piece of student writing can be shown to be "poor" because it departs from these principles.

It was easier to make a full evaluation of the felicity of student writing because, for the student essays, I made the assignment which specified the major intent which the student was to pursue and I could examine each essay to see to what extent that intent was carried out. Then, I knew the audience of the essay, I knew on what subjects the students were able to obligate themselves to acts such as stating, and I knew the acts which they could felicitously perform in a way which I could not possibly know for the professional writer. Thus, knowing what acts were supposed to be performed, I sought to determine why some acts succeeded and others failed.

I concluded that the student essays examined here fail when the writers do not fulfill the requirements for the performance of successful illocutionary acts which professional writers have satisfied. The student writers do not always employ appropriate devices or any devices to
signal the act to be performed. The reader may speculate that the writer intended to perform a certain act asked for in the assignment, but unless the writer signals his intentions, the reader cannot be sure that he is performing the act. The failure to indicate the act in an appropriate manner is, however, only the surface problem. In addition to a scanty use of indicating devices, the writers of these essays fail, it seems to me, for three other reasons:

1. The writer does not perform the act required in the assignment.
2. The writer slips back and forth between acts without preparing his reader for changes or perhaps without being aware of the changes himself.
3. The writer performs acts which he cannot properly perform because of his relationship to the audience for which he writes.

In other words, the acts are "unhappy" or "infelicitous" because they are not performed according to the rules which constitute successful speech acts.

The student essays to be studied were written at Louisiana State University to satisfy the first two requirements in English 1002 in the spring semester of 1975. Each was an assignment to be completed by the end of the fifty-minute class period. They contain grammatical and mechanical errors which I have retained in my transcription, some of them even those once designated "gross" errors by the freshman English committee at the University. My contention is that the main reason the first papers are poor, indeed practically meaningless, is the failure in
communication which is a consequence of the authors' failure to perform illocutionary acts successfully. The successful paper is successful, on the other hand, primarily because the act which the writer was asked to perform is clearly signaled and adhered to throughout the paper.

I

The first essay analyzed here was written on the second day of class and is therefore Theme 1 or the diagnostic theme for the second semester of the 1974-75 school term. The writer has some problems with grammar and mechanics, but the paper fails because the writer does not explain, as he is asked to do, but instead chooses to instruct and exhort.

On this particular day, the students were given two theme topics, each based upon a quotation from an essay of the type studied in English 1001, a course which most of them had completed the semester before. I did not assume that the students had read the essays, so I chose quotations which I believed they could understand out of context with only a few remarks from me before they began to write. On the second day of the semester, however, it is almost impossible to know what assignments will make sense to students, and the teacher is testing the breath of background knowledge of the class as much as the writing ability of each member. The two assignments, typed copies of which
were given to each student, follow:

1. In the essay, "Farewell, My Lovely," E. B. White summed up his generation's affection for the Model T Ford in the following way: "My own generation identifies it with youth, with its gaudy, irretrievable excitements." What does your generation identify with youth? Explain your answer in your essay.

2. Harold Taylor in the essay, "The Development of an Identity," says, "The particular purpose of a college education is to enable the young to establish a personal identity from the materials of experience and knowledge which lie at hand." Explain the ways in which your first semester at college has helped you "to establish a personal identity."

After handing out the assignment sheets, I briefly discussed the possible problem spots of the assignment: the meaning of "personal identity," "identifies," and the "Model T Ford." I asked for questions from any student who did not understand the assignment, and I talked to several individually as they began to write. I reminded the students that adequate development is one criterion for the good paper in freshman English classes and that usually their papers should be three hundred to five hundred words in length, but I did not emphasize length because I did not want to encourage random padding.

The first assignment, the subject of the essay analyzed in this section, specifies the propositional content for the essay and the chief illocutionary acts which the student is expected to perform. He is to opine when he tells what his generation identifies with youth. If he were given this assignment by an advertising firm, for
example, which desired statistically correct assessments of those activities and products with which today's young people identify, he would be expected to assert or state. Since he will not be able to verify in any conceivable way during the fifty-minute writing period that a majority of his generation will agree with his choice, he cannot be expected to state his answer to this question. He is asked, moreover, to spend most of his writing time performing the act of explaining. Now, in Chapter IV, I have shown that "explaining" is an ambiguous term which encompasses several different acts and that each of these acts is usually performed in a multiple-sentence speech act. Explaining may be accounting for, and it may be exemplifying or even defining, according to the definitions in this study. The assignment does not specify which act of explaining the student is to perform; so he might be expected to give reasons for his choice or to exemplify his choice with the intent to clarify. The writer will have a perlocutionary intent in most cases: he will want to convince his reader that his choice is valid or reasonable. He may, in addition, perform other acts, but they must stay subordinate to the intent to opine and explain. My reason for wording the assignment so that I asked only for these acts is the result of my experience with student papers. This experience indicates that students are more inclined to argue and attempt to persuade than they are to provide good exempli-
ification or good reasons. I wanted them to focus completely on explaining before they were asked to perform acts which may require reexplaining as a "sub-act." In explaining here, the student's authority must rest on firsthand knowledge of youth which he has as an eighteen-year-old at the present time or in years past, if he should happen to be very much older than the usual college freshman. He must supply his information in order to explain his opinion.

The essay follows:

I would say that my generation identifies smoking cigarettes with today's youth. It seems as though every year I see a younger child with a cigarette in his hand. Lately, I have seen children as young as twelve years old smoking cigarettes. They think it makes them look older and grown-up.

The fact that so many youngsters are smoking at this early age is a bad situation. They are going to get into habits of smoking and not be able to quit later on. This can cause problems with their lungs at an earlier age than the previous lung diseases of smokers since they are starting at least seven or eight years earlier than the adult smokers.

This generation should do something to show these children that this can cause difficulties or even death of them later on in their life. Programs should be started in grammar schools showing these youngsters how much cigarette smoking can harm them. This would discourage a lot of this early beginning of smokers. Show films of what smoking has done to previous smoker's lungs and tell of the bad effects that smoking can give a person. Stress the fact that starting to smoke so young will become a habit and that they will be smoking two or three packs a day later in their life. The coughing and agony that cigarette smoking causes after several years will be a good point to bring up.

You can look outside and see this problem face to face with the youngsters because nothing is being done about it. No one is saying anything to them about why it is wrong. There should be an effort put forth to
show these children the mistake they are making by starting to smoke so young, but the city officials and school board members are not doing much about it. We know that it is wrong; we know that they are doing it; but nothing is being done to prevent it. When a child sees his parents smoking, he must figure it cannot be too bad for himself. Mom and Dad do it. This is what the children are faced with, and they cannot very likely be told that it is wrong when the person speaking is smoking.

This is a big problem with today's youth, but nothing seems to be getting done about it. If programs were started to prevent this, a lot of lives might be saved. With a little effort from this generation they might be helped; but without it what do they have to look forward to?

It is apparent in paragraph 1 that the writer probably will not be content merely to opine and explain. The first sentence opines in order to answer the question—to convey the basic propositional content of the essay. When the student tells his reader that his generation identifies with smoking, his reader must decide how he will explain: will he account for or exemplify? Accounting for seems the most obvious act, though he might exemplify with the telling of experiences with the people of his generation in which cigarettes are the single constant element, thus "explaining" his opinion and probably trying to prove that it is more than an opinion—in fact, a fairly accurate assessment of the habits of his friends and acquaintances. The next three sentences do indeed exemplify and account for the author's opinion that cigarette smoking is characteristic of today's youth, but the writer also manages to raise himself out of the class of youth to a vantage point
from which he is observing "smoking youth." This process begins in sentence 2, and it is completed in sentence 4 where the writer says, "They think," not "we think."

Subtly, perhaps unconsciously, the writer shows that he is preparing to condemn others rather than illustrate or account for something of which he is a part. Now, condemning can legitimately occur as an author explains: any or all of his acts may be compound, and he has not been instructed to praise the thing which he associates with youth. Condemning or deprecating is not, however, to be the chief emphasis of the paper. Since two sentences in the first paragraph exemplify and the last sentence accounts for, the writer still has a chance to keep explaining as his major act until he launches a full-scale attack on smoking in paragraph 2. At this point he gives up all pretense of explaining in favor of a discussion of the horrors of smoking and ways to discourage it.

In paragraph 2, the writer shows in his first sentence that he is prepared to deprecate or condemn. Then, in paragraph 3, he signals with his verbs that he will advise and exhort. The repetition of the modal "should" indicates the nature of the act being performed. Then the change to imperative mood reenforces the idea that the writer is giving instructions. In paragraph 4, the writer might be said to be accounting for the widespread practice of cigarette-smoking among children, but then in his con-
clusion one sees that his real interest is still in advising and exhorting, even warning.

The writer, failing to perform the act that the assignment requires, has instead unsuccessfully performed acts which he lacks the authority to perform successfully, cannot perform in a three-hundred-word paper written in fifty minutes, and would need reference material to substantiate. In paragraph 2, one questions his authority to state in sentences 2 and 3. In paragraph 3, one wonders how the writer can know that these measures will help. The problem runs through paragraph 4. How much does the writer know about campaigns to stop children from smoking, the reader asks himself. He would accept statements based on the writer's own experience as a child or the experience of his friends. In the last paragraph, however, the writer is omniscient in his pronouncements. His reader will, therefore, accord him the muddled "uptake" which his muddled performance deserves.

Now, this paper was one of the poorer papers written in response to the assignment, but the problem of directing attention to the appropriate illocutionary act was apparent in enough papers to tell me something about the assignment and the class. The quotations seemed clear enough to most of the students, but the acts which they were asked to perform did not seem clear. The term explain, I assumed, caused them as much trouble as it has caused really serious
students of expository writing. If I were to continue to use the term, I knew that I had to limit its meaning for the class.

II

The second assignment of the semester elicited a paper from a student with far more potential as a writer but with the same inability to perform the two acts requested in the assignment. Because the student, after a conference with the instructor, rewrote the paper, this paper provides an interesting example, not only of the ways the writer goes wrong in performing the required acts, but also of the ways a writer can succeed. The errors of various kinds are, again, distracting, but not so distracting as the fact that the reader is never completely sure that he knows which illocutionary act the writer is performing at a given moment.

In the class meetings before the second assignment, I worked on the senses in which I would use the term **explain** in their assignments. We looked at examples of accounting for, of exemplifying, and even of defining as we discussed Al Capp's "Young Van Schuyler's Greatest Romance" and Erik Erikson's "Adolescence," both found in the anthology *Design*, a supplementary text in the class. In Erikson's essay, actually a section from his book, *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, defining, accounting for, and
exemplifying take place as Erikson discusses adolescence in modern society. Al Capp's story defines terms such as "Normies" and "Others," and we used it as a fictional example of the "out-grouper," Erikson's term which we discussed in class extensively. I emphasized the necessity for the student to read the assignment carefully and to show in the first paragraph which acts he intended to perform in his own essay. I used traditional terminology reminding the students as they had been taught in English 1001 to use an introduction with a thesis statement and reviewing the writing of introductions.

The assignment question which the girl who wrote the next two papers as well as the students who wrote the last two chose to write on follows:

Erik Erikson says, "Young people can become remarkably clannish, intolerant, and cruel in their exclusion of others who are 'different,' in skin color or cultural background, in tastes and gifts, and often in entirely petty aspects of dress and gesture arbitrarily selected as the signs of an in-grouper or out-grouper." To what extent is Erikson accurate in calling young people in an "in-group" "clannish," "intolerant," and "cruel"? Explain your answer using your own experience as an "in-grouper," an "out-grouper," or an observer of both to illustrate your ideas.

In this assignment the writer is explicitly told to illustrate or exemplify his opinion. Thus, he is, first, to give his opinion of the accuracy of Erikson's view. The writer is not asked to argue that another group is more clannish or intolerant than adolescents, though he could use comparison with another group to illustrate his view of
adolescents, and arguing may figure in the complex series of acts if it is not allowed to take over as the chief act. Moreover, the writer may have a perlocutionary intent—in this case, probably to convince or persuade. However, he has been guided to his best authority for his acts—his own experience, and he has been instructed that his chief responsibility is to opine and explain with illustrations.

The essay to be analyzed, this time the work of a girl, follows:

The time in one's life roughly between twelve and twenty is a very different time. Very important things happen, patterns are set up to affect the rest of your life, a career is set up for launch, and a majority of the most important lessons are learned. This time in your life is different mostly in that it is so much more intense. Even the smallest of matters can be upsetting and take on terrible importance. Erikson brought out that the opinions of one's peers is one of the terribly important factors that affect decisions. He is right.

It is rather obvious that youth is "clannish." I felt Erikson was being very condemning in his article concerning the way youth form cliques. That is the way he came across to me. In the fact that youth are often cruel to and intolerant of those who are not in the "group," I guess he has a right to condemn. However, I should like to disagree with attributing this to being young. This trait is not a trait of adolescents, but one of humanity. Most of the things he brought out about that period of life are more readily recognized only because they are more intense. It is apparent in circles of older people all over the world.

It is true that the young strive to please their peers, and it often becomes an obsession. We pick certain friends who are like us and surround ourselves with them. I can't speak for the youths that Erikson observed to make these statements but the extent of cruelty and intolerance of cliques is not as great as he has made it out to be. . . .
Since the assignment requires that the student opine and illustrate, she is in trouble when she makes "disagreeing" the major act in paragraph 2, but her trouble began in paragraph 1, and by the end of paragraph 3, her paper has become incoherent to such a degree that analysis of the next paragraph seems pointless.

In the first paragraph, the writer shows that the complex series of compound illocutionary acts which she has been asked to perform are not likely to be performed in a clear way. The writer who intends to opine and illustrate in this essay needs to begin by showing the extent to which he accepts Erikson's view of the adolescent as "clannish, intolerant, and cruel." In the first paragraph he must indicate his own belief and show the direction his essay will take in an attempt to clarify it. In this essay, the statement of the student's belief comes in the final sentence of the paragraph. She begins the paragraph by asserting, a proper act with which to lead up to the act of opining or giving her belief. The problem with her assertion is its propositional content. Her assertion is little more than a truism: this different time of one's life is a very different time. The reader expects the next sentence to rescue the sentence in some miraculous way from the state of uselessness which the truism in most situations succumbs to, and, for a time, it appears that it has succeeded by illustrating the ways it is different.
Sentence 2 states, however, in a way that shows that the second sentence does not illustrate the first. Sentence 3 defines "different" in sentence 1 in such a way as to make the illustrations in sentence 2 irrelevant. Sentence 4 does illustrate sentence 3, but then sentence 5 is dropped into the reader's lap. Various relationships between the intensity of one's experiences and the effect of peers on one's decisions may be obvious to the reader because of his own experience, but what relationship the writer intends to show, the reader has no way of knowing. Then comes the utterance of the writer's belief: "He is right." The reader will probably assume that the writer means that "he is right" in calling the young people of an "in-group" "clannish, intolerant, and cruel," but actually the reader only assumes that this is the point because he has the question before him. In this first paragraph, the writer has made a series of assertions and opinings, some of them seemingly intended to clarify others, and the reader has no way of deciding how the writer intends them to relate to each other. The author has used no master speech acts. Therefore, the reader is confused concerning what illocutionary acts are to be performed and what the propositional content will be of an essay introduced in this inadequate way.

Now, sentence 1, paragraph 2, seems to be a master speech act indicating that the writer is prepared to
illustrate the last sentence of paragraph 1. However, sentence 2, paragraph 2, shows that the writer does not really agree with Erikson at all, since "condemning" seems to function as a value word denoting an attitude which the author does not like. Sentence 3 adds to the idea that "condemning" is used in this way, though the sentence adds too little else to justify its inclusion in the essay. In the fourth sentence, the writer moves into an act which has nothing to do with the assignment but a lot to do with the use of "condemning." The writer disagrees and argues with Erikson's attributing clannishness, intolerance, and cruelty to adolescents and not to adults. She is only asked to decide on the extent to which adolescents are "clannish, intolerant, and cruel" and illustrate her position from her observations of "in-groupers" and "out-groupers" among her own acquaintances. Then, in sentence 5, the writer makes an assertion to support a point which she was not asked to make with assertions which she cannot make successfully. A college freshman will always trouble his reader when he makes assertions about people "all over the world." In addition, the word intense in sentence 6 becomes more apparently a problem than it was in the first paragraph where the reader worried about a "time in your life" which is intense. The word means "existing or occurring in a high degree" or "acute, strong, or vehement, as sensations, feelings, or emotions," according to The Random House
Dictionary of the English Language. If this word is used accurately at all in the second paragraph, it confuses further the point the writer is making about the extent to which she feels that "in-groupers" are "clannish" or "cruel." Acting intensely, young people in "in-groups" would be tremendously crueler than people at other ages.

In the third paragraph, the writer proceeds to make one assertion after another until the paper fades off into an incoherent jumble. By this time, the reader knows that the paper does not opine and illustrate but makes assertions that are not successful as components in an act of illustrating because they are not tied together in a meaningful way. Many of them are not successful assertions if they appear as single-sentence acts since they contradict each other and express views which the reader will not be willing to accept from an eighteen-year-old student.

When the student rewrote the paper following a conference in my office, she indulged her love of jargon and big words, but she controlled to a remarkable degree her tendency to make infelicitous assertions and her desire to perform a variety of acts instead of the ones called for in the assignment. In our conference, I discussed the assignment with her, and then I read over her paper with her sentence by sentence in order to point out inconsistencies and contradictions as well as the ways in which she had failed to satisfy the assignment. I did not use speech-act
terminology such as illocutionary act because we had not used it in the class. Instead, I asked her in rewriting the paper to answer the question as directly as she could with her opinion of Erikson's view and then to illustrate her view with examples from her own experience.

The essay follows:

To the young person the fixation of an accepted identity and the clarification of one's ideas, ideals, and behavior is very important. Clarification is sought in surrounding oneself with peers who either accept your initial identity or allow you to copy theirs. According to Erikson, clarification can also be sought by destructive means. He states that young people can become remarkably cruel and clannish in the exclusion of others selected as "out-groupers." I feel the measure of their cruelty is only to the extent that the out-grouper allows it to disturb him.

One of the problems of identity formation is that when a young person enters high school, which I shall use as an influential adolescent environment, she has the choice of accepting one of the already stamped out identities or forming her own and taking the chance of it being accepted by those whom she wishes to accept her. The mistake of far too many youths is that they feel the first choice is their only one. Rather than molding their own identity by experience or carefully weighing advice from trustworthy sources, the student sees as practically her only choice the acceptance of the preformed identity of a prominent clique.

A young person's second choice is what Erikson prefers to call the Democratic doctrine--to play one's own role. To be able to form an identity acceptable to me was far more important than whether it was accepted by others. I would not always have a group of peers to stand on or behind me. If I were the one that tested my ideas, ideals, and behavior and they passed as acceptable, I would find that knowledge more comforting than knowing I had the identity of someone else and had to depend on their acceptance. If I approached those who were cruelly intolerant of my own role, I would pass them off and not be bothered. If I had let their exclusion bother me, then the extent of their cruelty would be greater. I measure the intolerance and cruelty
by the way it affects the student.

I had enough faith in humanity to believe that somewhere a group of people would accept me and were the type meant to be my friends. Cliques who believed they did not want me or need me or would shut me out because they considered me "out" were blown off. I found a minority of people who accepted whether they approved personally of the role I had chosen or not. I did not find the intolerance of other cliques very cruel, and their approval was no longer important. I was happy that I myself was satisfied with my adolescent identity.

In conclusion, not only do I find young people less cruel and intolerant than Erikson portrays, but also I still believe they are inclined to be more open-minded than in post-adolescence.

Only in the last paragraph does the writer give in to the desire to argue against Erikson's thesis by stating her belief that adults are more cruel than adolescents. In this last sentence, the change in act is bothersome, but in the preceding paragraphs the acts introduced in the first paragraph have been at least partly performed.

The first paragraph of the essay still shows some problems which the writer is having in refining the performance of the assigned speech act. Grammatical and diction problems are obvious difficulties, but the still-present difficulty in executing certain illocutionary acts is the most serious one. The first sentence asserts, as signalled by the assertive link "is," as well as by the nature of the content. The second sentence asserts and illustrates the method of "clarification." One problem at this point is the authority for the writer's assertions. The third sentence introduces another problem. The word also signals
that this sentence is used to assert another means of clarification besides the one described in sentence 2.

However, it is actually only an aspect of the first method as the writer could show by a clearer use of indicators to signal the relationship between sentences in a multiple-sentence utterance. Sentences 3, 4, and 5 could be changed to read in this way:

According to Erikson, however, the search for clarification which aids some adolescents in fixing an identity results in harm to others. In their association with peers who share or accept the same identity traits, adolescents form "in-groups" which often become remarkably cruel and intolerant toward others. I feel, nevertheless, that these groups are only cruel to the extent that the "out-grouper" allows them to disturb him.

In the revised paragraph, in illustrating "clarification," the writer prepares for the point which she wishes to make: "out-groupers" are harmed only to the extent to which they allow themselves to be, so they determine the extent to which "in-groups" are "clannish, intolerant, and cruel."

If the reader accepts the signal given by the use of the word also as a true indication of meaning, this revision will not work; but the revision spares the reader the difficulty of reconciling "surrounding oneself with peers who either accept your initial identity or allow you to copy theirs" and considering this practice as completely outside the "in-group" system.

The next paragraphs fail in that they do not contain illustrations which show the author's experiences but assert
generalities, but the paragraphs do try to illustrate the author's view of the cruelty of "in-groups." The use of the pronoun she in paragraph 2 confuses the reader concerning the identity of the speaker and "her" relationship to the assertions which she is making. If the reader knows that the writer is a girl, he does not know it because of any assistance from the writer. In addition, the reader misses the assistance from transition words which successful exemplifying requires. The reader must discover for himself the relationship between the "out-grouper's" suffering and the choices. The third paragraph is tied in by the allusion to the paragraph before it. By the end of paragraph 4, however, the reader has difficulty remembering the point of the paper. The writer is asserting and opinioning, but the content is now her own strong character, not the extent to which adolescents can be called "clannish, intolerant, and cruel."

This paper I consider to be a definite improvement over the other paper. It has problems such as those discovered in the first paragraph. On the other hand, the writer does give her opinion of the extent to which adolescents are cruel in their treatment of "out-groupers" in the first paragraph, and in paragraphs 3 and 4 she gives as examples of her opinion her own experiences as an "out-grouper" by choice. I would prefer her examples to be more concrete than they are, but, after this revision, I could
see that the young woman would probably finally display the intelligence and background which had earned her ACT scores that allowed her to skip most first-semester freshman subjects.

III

The second writer of a paper on the assignment described above shows a different type of confusion of acts. The writer seems to know what he is expected to do but to be incapable of performing the acts in a straightforward manner that will secure the proper "uptake" from his reader. Finally, the writer changes from one act to another for no apparent reason, and the reader is left with a decision concerning the nature of the proper "uptake."

The essay begins with the title, "The Adolescent Journey," which is provocative but not a clear indicator of the act to be performed. One expects from the title some allusion in the essay to the journey mentioned in the title, perhaps an extended metaphor which will be used in explaining the writer's view of Erikson's assessment of the adolescent's "in-group" behavior. Actually, the expectations set up in the title are never satisfied as one sees in the essay which follows:

The Adolescent Journey

People experiencing adolescence should prepare themselves for some good fortune and some disappointments based on what groups they are classified in. Being
classified in groups is an adjustment that is premedi­
tated by the group and is not decided by the person
involved. The fact is, the person who is being put in
a group must accept what he is until he reaches a stage
that will allow him to change or be independent.

Members of groups have characteristics that warn of
their disapproval of letting outsiders into their group.
One example is the "clannish" effect they can give to
the outsider. The group does this by classifying the
outsider with another group and telling him that he
should "get lost." This frequently occurs when a young­
er boy wants to associate with an older group of boys.
I experienced this in my early group. I wanted to give
my friends my own age the impression that I was at a
higher level of maturity than they could ever reach and
that they had to look up to me. This was a cruel thing
to do to my friends when I look back on it, even though
it seemed very appropriate at the time. In this case
people who were "different" were excluded from the
group.

Some of these groups were formed for the accomplish­
ment of a common purpose. The common purpose usually
was to eliminate people from our association who were
unable to fulfill the characteristic we wanted a member
to have. These groups are called cliques. I have been
in a clique in my adolescence. For example, I have been
in cliques in which the outsider was excluded just for
the sake of argument. This type of nonsense is typical
of the adolescent stages, especially in the early and
middle stages of adolescence.

The exclusion of others is not always an easy task.
If an outsider is persistent enough, he can adjust him­
sel so that he fits in with the image of the group.
For example, if I was ambitious enough to want to fight
in any way possible to join a group, I would concentrate
on perfecting ways to fit into it. With a great desire,
I may eventually become an "in-grouper."

Being an "in-grouper" or "out-grouper" is based on
what type of person one is. I mean whether you are a
"normie, a "poor kid," or an "other."

A normie is a normal kid. Being normal is one step
toward being an "in-grouper." Normality may be based
on race, culture, or belief. Race is the most difficult
obstacle to overcome because there is no way to overcome
it. Culture can sometimes be an obstacle because of
differences in languages and educational background.
Belief is probably the easiest obstacle for one to overcome. A "poor kid" has distinguishing features that cannot be overcome. For example, a racial difference. In my case this is true and I am distinguishable. These distinguishing features are not always reasons for exclusions. Sadly enough, in many cases they are. Other features are handicaps such as wooden legs or short arms.

"Others" are the most unfortunate group. They are unwelcome outcasts. In a sense, they have no way to redeem themselves or truthfully prove that they are worthy of respect and acceptance.

The "Out-grouper" should be optimistic and realize that he is in a group himself, that group being the outsiders.

In paragraphs 1-4, the writer, with no help from the title, attempts to illustrate his answer, the propositional content of which is not clear. Then, in paragraph 5, he begins to classify and define. In paragraph 7, he concludes his essay by advising.

The reader senses in paragraph 1 that the writer is agreeing with Erikson that adolescent "in-groups" can be cruel. The writer confuses his reader, however, by his indirect way of expressing his belief. "People experiencing adolescence" might be parents, teachers, policemen, or any other group working with young adults, though the reader, partly because he knows the assignment, assumes that the phrase refers to adolescents themselves. In the first sentence, the writer leads his reader to expect that he is going to discuss good and bad aspects of the "in-group" relationship. The reader is led to a blank wall, however, in the next sentence by the assertion that "being classified" equals "an adjustment" and that the "adjustment" is
"premeditated" by the "in-group." The last sentence where the reader is expecting the writer's stand on Erikson's ideas is again frustrating. Obviously, the writer has not enjoyed the effect of "in-groups," but he cannot bring himself to execute a clear expression of this opinion that they are bad. One speculates that he does not understand how to signal his acts directly and that a large portion of this student's problem is his ignorance of the significance of illocutionary force indicators.

Paragraphs 2-4 attempt to illustrate the writer's experiences as an "in-grouper" in order to show that "in-groupers" can be cruel. The broad reference in paragraph 2 makes the propositional content unclear: is the writer a younger boy wanting membership in an older boys' "in-group" or is he a younger boy who made it into an older boys' "in-group"? Finally, the reader concludes that he is the younger boy who was accepted by the older boys, but the writer has not signaled that this is the direction which he is taking. The act of illustrating in these paragraphs would be more effective if the writer had used statements of specific happenings rather than general statements. For example, in paragraph 4, the reader, by describing one way in which he fought, could make his illustration far clearer to his reader. Illustrating, to be successful, requires that the writer supply relationships between the illustration and the thing to be illustrated, and, for a reader who
is not familiar with the way this young man has fought to secure his place, these relationships must be made very clear. They would be far clearer if the writer described specific happenings.

In paragraph 8, the writer abruptly changes acts. Paragraphs 8-10 are devoted to classifying and defining "normie," "poor kid," and "other." These terms were introduced in the Capp story mentioned above, and they could be used effectively in this assignment as the writer explains "out-groups" and "in-groups." In the context of the assignment, the writer would not even have to define the terms, since his reader already knows the way in which he is using them. Here, they are stuck in without master speech acts to show their relationship to the chief illocutionary intent of the paper. The propositional acts of these paragraphs are confused, but the reader can hardly worry about that point when he sees no reason for the act of defining at all or the use of these terms unless they are introduced earlier and used more effectively. The final paragraph of advice is equally confusing but welcome as the end to a paper which ran out of material several paragraphs earlier. In fact, one wonders whether the writer did not worry excessively about length and add these paragraphs to stretch his work.
IV

The successful essay or complex series of compound illocutionary acts performed by a third student demonstrates the extent to which these other essays did fail. The writer, a young woman, tells her reader immediately in the first paragraph that she agrees with Erikson and that she can illustrate her understanding of Erikson's ideas with her own experiences. For me, at least, her illustrations succeed in clarifying.

The reader notices immediately that the writer is not prone to make statements and assertions which she cannot be responsible for. The essay follows:

Adolescence is a wonderful and difficult period in growing up, and that period of development between the beginning of puberty and maturity holds cherished as well as harrowing experiences for almost everyone who has been through it. For, as Erik Erikson stated in his essay on adolescence, "Young people can become remarkably clannish, intolerant, and cruel." This cruelty is common in the world of the young adult, and coping with situations like prejudice and ridicule sometimes strengthens and sometimes weakens the tormented individual. I have experienced the anguish of being an "out-grouper" as well as the "pleasure" of being an "in-grouper," and it is because of this direct participation in both events that I can comment on the absurdity of the two. For I was the same person before I encountered wealth, and here is where the absurdity lies. With the same face and ideals and a few greenbacks in my wallet, I experienced a sudden transformation that, at first, I was not aware of.

Being an "out-grouper," as I remember it, was a trying and awkward experience. I was one of those kids who still wore white socks and loafers when all the other girls had flamboyant, colorful fishnet stockings and tiny-heeled pumps that none of them could walk in. I also had a mop of auburn hair, that embarrassing
color between red and brown that looks so awkward in the midst of girls with blond hair. But, worst of all, I was poor. That was the great burden in my life that would surely make me eligible for sainthood after death. It was poverty, I felt, that kept me from achieving the fame that was rightfully mine. My classmates would laugh at my ancient clothes and medieval loafers, and, at parties, new teenagers would mistake me for the maid and throw their fur-collared coats at me for safekeeping. It was humiliating, and I waited for the day when I would be famous and plastered on billboards throughout the country. And then my dream was fulfilled!

My widowed mother met and married a brilliant and charming widower who just happened to have a small fortune and an older daughter with a flair for fashion. Slowly I became chic and fashionable. Lime-green fishnet stockings made me the center of attraction. My built-in swimming pool also helped. New friends flocked around me, encircling me in the very groups that had once cast me out. At first, it was exciting and fun. Then the hypocrisy of these "friends" finally shouted at me. These "in-groupers" wanted me to ridicule and shun the members of the "out-group" that I was once a member of. I had that same, funny auburn hair and still wore loafers when nobody was around. (They were comfortable.) So why was I different suddenly? The whole thing was absurd, and I will never forget how unrealistic and foolish it was of me to be an "in-grouper." I had been an "in-grouper" all along with the "out-groupers" who were like me.

Adolescence is a wonderful and difficult period of growing up, and this stage of growth can be painful as well as joyful. Young people can be prejudiced and harsh in their encounters with others, and this harshness can sometimes weaken or strengthen an individual. But it is a period of growth that everyone experiences, and, luckily, most survive. And this survival brings new insights to us about human behavior and life.

The reader soon notices phrases such as "almost everyone," "common," and "sometimes strengthens and sometimes weakens" all of which show that the writer will not overgeneralize or, in speech-act terminology, make assertions which she cannot sincerely obligate herself to provide evidence to
support. The content of the last two statements in paragraph 3 is not completely clear though the reader suspects that he knows the point that is being made, but at the end of the essay, as the reader, I definitely knew the writer's opinion of Erikson's view of adolescence and understood, not only that the writer had intended to illustrate, but also what the writer "means" by her answer, to the extent to which that is possible. In addition, the writer has performed acts which were not required by the assignment without destroying the focus of her paper.

In the first paragraph, the writer begins with an assertion on adolescence that is also an evaluation of it. In the second sentence, she quotes in order to opine. The connecting particle "for" in sentence 2 shows that the writer is more concerned with the "difficult" and "harrowing" aspects of adolescence than with the "wonderful" and "cherished" side: in other words, the writer believes with Erikson that adolescents can be "clannish, intolerant, and cruel." The next sentence opines further concerning the view expressed in sentence 2 and adds dimension to the paper's position on adolescent cruelty by opining concerning its effect on the adolescent. In the next sentence, the writer shows her source of information—her own experience. The sentence which begins "I have experienced" functions as a master speech act to indicate exemplifying. Throughout the paragraph, the writer is deprecating and
commending. By the end of the complex series of compound illocutionary acts which is the first paragraph of this essay, the writer has answered the question in the assignment, showed her understanding of the effect of the "in-group" on the individual, and suggested the direction the essay will take as she illustrates the statement, "This cruelty is common in the world of the young adult, and coping with situations like prejudice and ridicule sometimes strengthens and sometimes weakens the tormented individual." The phrase "situations like prejudice and ridicule" is inaccurately formulated, but the reader knows the young woman's opinion and also knows that she intends to add the idea of the good effect of the "in-group/out-group" situation to the total idea in the paper.

This essay can be analyzed for its use of illocutionary force indicators just as the professional essay can be. The expectations in the mind of the reader who knows the assignment provide the first context indicators. In paragraph 2, "as I remember it" and "I felt" function like the explicit formula by signaling that the writer is exemplifying in terms of her own experience and that she is opining. Connecting particles such as "also," "worst of all," and "and" assist in the performance of the illustrating acts. The third paragraph could be divided in order to show the changes from the statements and opinions about her mother's marriage and her new life to the opinions
and statements that explain her reaction to the new life. In paragraph 3, quotation marks, "friends," signal deprecating.

This essay exhibits the complexity of the professional essay, to the extent that the author can handle complex acts successfully. She deprecates her own attempt to be stylish in order to deprecate the "in-group" mystique. She fulfills the assignment, agreeing with Erikson that "in-groups" can be cruel, but she shows throughout the paper that the effect of the cruelty has been to strengthen at least one adolescent—herself. In other words, this student essay is judged successful because it displays the same characteristics displayed by the professional essays. It, like them, is a complex series of compound illocutionary acts, each of these acts signalled by indicators known to the writer and to any reader who finds the essay fully intelligible.

V

The student essay viewed by Austin's judge is, then, successful for the same reasons that a professional writer's essay will be successful. The writer in composing the essay performs a complex series of compound illocutionary acts, and he performs them in the manner specified by the rules which constitute the individual acts, correctly using the force indicators in his repertoire. One realizes
very soon that the acts which are successfully performed in the student essays are never as complex as those found in the professional essays. One is reminded of Beardsley's conclusion, "What makes a discourse a literary work (roughly speaking) is its exploitation to a high degree of the illocutionary-act potential of its verbal ingredients." The successful student essay contains more compound acts and manages to work in more acts with opining and exemplifying without destroying the unity of intent in the paper, but even this paper lacks the "richness and complexity of meaning" which Beardsley finds in the great work. The second essay studied fails at least partly because the writer tries for complexity and loses unity because she cannot handle compound acts well.

The importance of the assignment becomes increasingly apparent. The student writer uses as his first indicator the assignment for which he writes the essay, this assignment functioning as the context of his utterance as the collection of essays or a periodical functions for the professional writer. The terms used in the assignment must be ones which the writer knows, and he must be asked to perform acts which are possible. The term explain will probably always give difficulty. It seems necessary, however, when the instructor is trying to limit the acts which the student performs to accounting for or exemplifying in order to make sure that the student can perform these acts
which are an integral part of more complicated acts such as arguing.

It seems logical to conclude, therefore, that a study of the essay as a complex series of compound illocutionary acts should give a student insight into the nature of the composing process which results in an essay, the restrictions on him when he intends to perform a certain act, and the signals which he must use if he wants his reader to understand his intent.

If the study of the formal essay as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts has the possibilities for teaching composition which I believe it to have, then one should be able to outline a program for teaching the essay based on the conclusions to be drawn from this study. In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, after summarizing my conclusions, I shall propose such an outline.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

I began this study to test the hypothesis that a formal essay can be analyzed as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts and that the insights gained from such an analysis can be applied to the teaching of the reading and the writing of the formal essay. My study proceeded from a study of the works of J. L. Austin and John Searle to an analysis of professional and student essays using speech-act theory. From this study I have concluded that such an approach may provide a valuable fresh approach to teaching composition as well as the careful reading of expository prose.

In the second and third chapters of this study, I discussed the parts of the speech-act theory of Austin and Searle which are relevant in the study of the essay. The relevant ideas from their theories are the following: (1) virtually every utterance in a meaningful speech situation consists of a locutionary or a propositional act, an illocutionary act, and sometimes a perlocutionary act; (2) the propositional and illocutionary acts are rule-governed and conventional; (3) conventional force indicators convey the illocutionary intent of the speaker; and (4) the rules,
conventions, and indicating devices are accessible to the native speaker of the language as a result of his knowledge as a native speaker.

In Chapter IV, I analyzed "The Iron String" by Howard Mumford Jones as the performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary acts. In the process I discovered that the author performed acts of stating, opining, arguing, exemplifying, accounting for, comparing, quoting, evaluating, urging, deprecating, and commending, and I formulated the rules for these, which I have listed in Appendix II. I concluded that some of these—exemplifying, arguing, and accounting for—are seldom performed using a one-sentence utterance and that they usually consist of a statement or opinion to be argued for or exemplified plus the evidence to be used in arguing or exemplifying. I discovered indicating devices which Austin and Searle did not discuss, and I concluded that in certain contexts almost any word may function to indicate force and that the author's use of indicating devices may finally be tied to his style, thus providing a new approach to the study of the relationship of form and content.

In Chapter V, I studied three additional essays--Joseph Wood Krutch's "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Sylvia Angus's "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?", and Irving Kristol's "Censorship and Pornography." In analyzing these I found it necessary to discuss three additional acts--believing,
defining, and interpreting—and to formulate the rules for these, which are also listed in Appendix II. I found more and more evidence to support the idea that the illocutionary acts in most essays by professional writers are distinguished by their complexity and that the ways to indicate force are as numerous as the verbal resources of the writer and his audience. I concluded, too, that these essays were felicitous performances of illocutionary acts because the authors possessed the necessary authority to perform the acts in them and understood the obligations which they undertook in performing them. Finally, in Chapter VI, I analyzed five student essays, four unsuccessful ones and one successful one, for their felicity as illocutionary acts. I must now consider to what extent I have proved the hypothesis with which the study began to be a correct one. Is it valid, in other words, to regard the formal essay as a performance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts? Can this theory be used in the composition class?

The first question elicits a somewhat hesitant affirmation of the first part of the hypothesis. Given the theory of the illocutionary act and given certain professional essays, I have been able to manipulate the elements in the essays to fit the elements of the theory. And, I might add, they fit rather neatly. On the other hand, I suspect that "manipulate" may be a more apt term to
describe the process which I have used than I had hoped it would be--that, in other words, I have merely superimposed one more pattern on the structure of the essay instead of discovering relationships inherent in its structure in a good ordinary language philosopher way. Rather than new insights which will make the intrinsic structure of the essay clearer, I may have simply put old wine into new bottles which add nothing to the flavor of the wine though they embellish its appearance on the shelves. For example, does an examination of connecting particles as force indicators make their use clearer than the examination of the same words as transition devices? Is it more helpful to consider organization in terms of the focus on the desired illocutionary acts and the importance of their relationship to each other? I believe that speech-act theory does offer a constructive new approach to the analysis of the formal essay because I believe that the theory is an accurate description of speech acts. I do not believe that it has passed the theory stage, however; and the final study, if such a study is possible, is probably some years away.

One direction for study at this time is an examination of the second part of the hypothesis, which I have explored only in evaluating the five student essays. Actual use of the theory in composition classes should show more about the intrinsic value of the theory as a description of the essay as well as its value as a teaching aid.
Basing my ideas on the analysis in Chapters IV, V, and VI, I believe that the following procedures will work.

In the first place, the student must be introduced to spoken English as the performance of speech acts. In this introduction, the age of the student and his maturity in the use of English should dictate the instructor's use of terminology to explain speech acts. The term *illocutionary*, for example, has no intrinsic value, but it is a convenient term once the student has mastered his language to the extent that the word will not hide the concept. The rules which constitute each act are far more important in the study than the ability to use the word *illocutionary* in an appropriate slot. These rules should not be taught but discovered. Until a student can consider a certain speech act which he can perform with ease and formulate the rules for it, he is unlikely to use the act successfully in an essay. As his knowledge of speech acts grows, then the acts for which he can verbalize rules should grow. Indicators, on the other hand, can be taught more directly.

The writing of the professional can be used in three ways as the student moves from the spoken to the written act. In the first place, the student should be able to see in the essay a series of *illocutionary* acts constituted by the same rules which constitute these acts in a conversation. Especially important is that he sees the commitments which the writer makes to his audience--the sort of know-
ledge he claims to have, the future actions which he expects to perform, and the beliefs which he is expressing. In order to make these commitments, he must know his audience or, at least, know that his audience is too vague to know well. In the second place, the student studying the professional essay should increase his ability to perform additional illocutionary acts by seeing them performed in the writing of the professional. Assuming that this ability to perform speech acts can be taught, the instructor can hope to increase the student's ability to perform these acts by showing him the acts as they are performed in the essay. In the third place, the student can see the way professional writers use indicators. Memorizing a list of indicators is of dubious value, partly because one must learn them in context. Discovering them in the sentences of an essay should be far more helpful.

Next the student should be taught that, before he writes, he must analyze the illocutionary acts which he intends to perform. He must know his audience, and he must know what acts are required by the assignment. And he must know the importance of truly intending to perform a certain act, the act demanded by the assignment. One suspects, especially after seeing the ending which she wrote on the assignment, that the writer of the second and third essays analyzed in Chapter VI did not intend to explain, that she still intended to argue and finally prove Erikson wrong
about adolescents but right if he applied his theory to adults.

Finally, the student can be taught to criticize his completed paper as a complex series of compound illocutionary acts. Conscious of the rules which govern his acts and of the importance of his use of indicators, he should be able to check his writing in two ways. First, he should be able to decide whether he has felicitously performed the acts which he intended to perform by judging whether the acts which he has performed were duly constituted by the rules. He should discover statements which he cannot successfully make to his particular audience, attempted acts of explaining which fail to show relationships, violations of his commitment in the act. Second, he should discover indicators which signal the wrong act and sentences which need indicators if they are to signal any act. Once the essay has been completed, it becomes a speech act as separate from the writer as the spoken act is from Austin's judge and as accessible to his methods of analysis. A student should be able to analyze his own essay from a position near that of Austin's judge.

In other words, studying the essay as the performance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts may replace steps in teaching composition which are time-honored but dubiously successful. The teaching of organization may be swallowed up in the emphasis on the
focus on the appropriate illocutionary acts. Problems with clarity may be absorbed in the separation of the problem into problems of content and problems of force, and the last kind of problem may disappear as the student considers his acts as rule-governed. Force indicators may become far more meaningful terms to students than the traditional terms. Finally, as I suggested earlier, the old problem of style may be partially solved or even completely solved as the illocutionary force potential of each word and word arrangement becomes clearer. In other words, ancient rhetoric's arrangement, invention, and style may be well on their way to expression in a new vocabulary and support by a new rationale.

As a result of my study, I believe that this theory has this kind of practical application.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


8. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 185.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 234.


13. Ibid., p. 55.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 120.


20 Ibid., 17.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p. 56.


33 Karl R. Wallace, Understanding Discourse


CHAPTER II

1 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 121.
2 Ibid., pp. 144-145
3 Ibid., p. 108.
4 Ibid., p. 95.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 135.
8 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 100.
9 Ibid., p. 116.
10 Ibid., p. 117.
11 Ibid., p. 109.
12 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 121.
13 Ibid., p. 124.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
16 Ibid., p. 137.
17 Ibid., p. 136.
18 Ibid., p. 138.
19 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 77.
20 Ibid., p. 76.
21 Ibid., p. 121
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., pp. 130-131.
24 Ibid., p. 149.
25 Ibid., p. 150.
26 Ibid., p. 154.
27 Ibid., pp. 150-151.
28 Ibid., p. 151.
29 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 75.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 22.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 105.
39 Ibid.


41 Searle, Speech Acts, p. 16.
42 Ibid., p. 13.
44 Ibid., p. 15.


47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 24.
49 Ibid., p. 19.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 43.
52 Ibid., p. 45.

53 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 95.
54 Ibid., pp. 101-102.


56 Ibid., pp. 420-421.
58 Ibid., p. 24.
CHAPTER III

1 Searle, Speech Acts, p. 57.
2 Ibid., p. 62.
3 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 13-14.
9 Ibid., 25.
10 Ibid., 26.
11 Ibid., 27.
12 Searle, Speech Acts, p. 34.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
15 Ibid., p. 51.
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16Ibid., p. 63.


18Searle, Speech Acts, p. 64.

19Ibid., p. 48.

20Ibid., pp. 57-61.

21Ibid., p. 57.

22Ibid., p. 61.

23Ibid., p. 63.

24Ibid.

25Ibid.

26Ibid.


CHAPTER IV


2Ibid.


4Ibid., 234.

5Ibid., 234-235.

6N. G. Fotion, "Indicating Devices?", Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (1975), 230.

7Ibid., 231.

8Ibid.
9 See quotation from "Poetry as Fiction," p. 98 above.


12 Searle, Speech Acts, p. 73.


16 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 143.

17 Ibid., p. 142.


19 Ibid., p. 327.

20 Ibid., p. 330.

21 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 159.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 150.

24 Ibid., p. 154.

25 Ibid., p. 150.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 154.


CHAPTER V

3 Ibid., p. 233.
5 Ibid., p. 233.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 240.
9 Ibid., p. 238.
10 Ibid., p. 252.
11 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 24.

CHAPTER VI

2Ibid., pp. 273-277.

LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED


Fotion, N. G. "Indicating Devices?" Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (1975), 230-237.


APPENDIX I

AUSTIN'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCES
OF UTTERANCES WITH HIS EXAMPLES OF EACH OF THE MAIN TYPES

1. Verdictives

Austin says that verdictives "are typified by the giving of a verdict... by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. It is essentially a finding as to something--fact, or value--which is for different reasons hard to be certain about" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 150).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquitted</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
<th>Find (as a matter of fact)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquit</td>
<td>Convict</td>
<td>Find (as a matter of fact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold (as a matter of law)</td>
<td>Interpret as</td>
<td>Understand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read it as</td>
<td>Rule</td>
<td>Calculate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reckon</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Locate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put it at</td>
<td>Make it</td>
<td>Take it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Describe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterize</td>
<td>Diagnose</td>
<td>Analyse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Exercitives

Austin defines an exercitive as "the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so; it is an award as opposed to an assessment" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 154).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appoint</th>
<th>Degrade</th>
<th>Demote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dismiss</td>
<td>Excommunicate</td>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levy</td>
<td>Vote for</td>
<td>Nominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choose</td>
<td>Claim</td>
<td>Give</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bequeath</td>
<td>Pardon</td>
<td>Resign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warn</td>
<td>Advise</td>
<td>Plead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pray</td>
<td>Entreat</td>
<td>Beg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urge</td>
<td>Press</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Commissives

Austin says of commissives that they "are typified by promising or otherwise undertaking; they commit you to doing something, but include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not promises, and also rather vague things which we may call espousals, as for example, siding with" (How to Do Things with Words, pp. 150-151).

4. Behabitives

Austin says of this group, "behabitives include the notion of reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct. There are obvious connexions with both stating or describing what our feelings are and expressing, in the sense of venting our feel­ings, though behabitives are distinct from both of these" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 159).

1. For apologies we have 'apologize'.
2. For thanks we have 'thank'.
3. For sympathy we have 'deplore', 'commiserate', 'compliment', 'condole', 'congratulate', 'felicitate', 'sympathize'.
4. For attitudes we have 'resent', 'don't mind', 'pay tribute', 'criticize', 'grumble about', 'complain of', 'applaud', 'overlook', 'commend', 'deprecate', and the non-exercitive uses of 'blame', 'approve', and 'favour'.
5. For greetings we have 'welcome', 'bid you farewell'.
6. For wishes we have 'bless', 'curse', 'toast', 'drink to', and 'wish' (in its strict performative use).
7. For challenges we have 'dare', 'defy', 'protest', 'challenge'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>proclaim</th>
<th>announce</th>
<th>quash</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>countermand</td>
<td>annul</td>
<td>repeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enact</td>
<td>reprieve</td>
<td>veto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dedicate</td>
<td>declare closed</td>
<td>declare open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Expositives

About this class, Austin says, "Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the classifying of usages and of references" ([How to Do Things with Words], p. 160). Austin presents expositives grouped into the following subclasses:

| 1. affirm deny state describe class identify |
| 2. remark mention ?interpose |
| 3. inform apprise tell answer rejoin |
| 3a. ask |
| 4. testify report swear conjecture ?doubt ?know ?believe |
| 5. accept concede withdraw agree demur to object to adhere to recognize repudiate |
| 5a. correct revise |
| 6. postulate deduce argue neglect ?emphasize |
| 7. begin by turn to conclude by |
| 7a. interpret distinguish analyse define |
| 7b. illustrate explain formulate |
| 7c. mean refer call understand regard as |
APPENDIX II

THE CONSTITUTIVE RULES FOR SPEECH ACTS

This appendix is divided into two parts. The first part is simply a reproduction of the constitutive rules that Searle provides for the illocutionary acts of requesting, stating, questioning, thanking, advising, warning, greeting, and congratulating. These are reproduced as they are found on pp. 66-67 of Speech Acts. The second part of the appendix provides my own formulation of the rules for thirteen additional acts discovered in the four professional essays. Stating is a basic act in the four essays, but, since the rules for it are included in Searle's summary, I will not include any discussion of it in my summary except as a reminder that it is closely related to several other acts but differs in important respects from them.

To understand Searle's summary, one must understand the abbreviations which he uses. These abbreviations are used in the summary: "A"—act; "H"—hearer; "S"—Speaker; "p"—proposition; and "E"—an event, state, etc. I have used the same abbreviations in my rule summaries.

The thirteen acts whose constitutive rules are presented in the second part are arranged in accordance with Austin's classification of illocutionary acts. The definition of each of these major types is found in Appendix I. In the essays, no examples were found of the type of act which Austin calls the "commissive," so the numbering of these
groups of rules will skip the number "3" in order to retain the numbering of Austin's classifications. My formulation of the rules for each of these acts follows the pattern used by Searle in *Speech Acts*.

My formulations are usually preceded by citations from the synonymies found in Merriam-Webster dictionaries. These citations provide only a preliminary characterization of each act, which is then amplified by the rules themselves. The citation chosen is the one which fits the act as it is performed in these essays. The choice of meaning will seem arbitrary in some cases where the term has a number of other meanings. For example, "interpret" and "define" are names for two or more acts which are not clearly distinguished in the Merriam-Webster synonymies. "Explain," as shown in Chapter IV, is discussed here as several acts—accounting for, exemplifying, and defining. These rules with the discussion in the appropriate sections of Chapters IV and V should make clear the sense in which each term is being used to describe an act.
### Types of Ilocutionary Acts

**Report\(^1\)**  
Propositional content: Future act \(A\) of \(H\).  
Preparatory:  
1. \(H\) is able to do \(A\). \(S\) believes \(H\) is able to do \(A\).  
2. It is not obvious to both \(S\) and \(H\) that \(H\) will do \(A\) in the normal course of events of his own accord.

**Assert, state (that), affirm\(^1\)**  
Propositional content: Any proposition \(p\).  
Preparatory:  
1. \(S\) has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of \(p\).  
2. It is not obvious to both \(S\) and \(H\) that \(H\) knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) \(p\).

**Question\(^1\)**  
Propositional content: Any proposition or propositional function.  
Preparatory:  
1. \(S\) does not know the answer, i.e., does not know if the proposition is true, or, in the case of the propositional function, does not know the information needed to complete the proposition truly (but see comments below).  
2. It is not obvious to both \(S\) and \(H\) that \(H\) will provide the information at that time without being asked.

**Types of Rule**

#### Sincerity
- \(S\) wants \(H\) to do \(A\).

#### Essential
- Counts as an attempt to get \(H\) to do \(A\).

**Comment:** Order and command have the additional preparatory rule that \(S\) must be in a position of authority over \(H\). Command probably does not have the 'pragmatic' condition requiring non-obviousness. Furthermore in both, the authority relationship infects the essential condition because the utterance counts as an attempt to get \(H\) to do \(A\) in virtue of the authority of \(S\) over \(H\).

**Thank (for)**

**Propositional content**
- Past act \(A\) done by \(H\).

**Preparatory**
- \(A\) benefits \(S\) and \(S\) believes \(A\) benefits \(S\).

**Comment:** Sincerity and essential rules overlap. Thanking is just expressing gratitude in a way that, e.g., promising is not just expressing an intention.

#### Admit

**Propositional content**
- Future act \(A\) of \(H\).

**Preparatory**
- \(S\) has some reason to believe \(A\) will benefit \(H\).  
2. It is not obvious to both \(S\) and \(H\) that \(H\) will do \(A\) in the normal course of events.

**Comment:** Unlike argue these do not seem to be essentially tied to attempting to convince. Thus "I am simply stating that \(p\) and not attempting to convince you" is acceptable, but: "I am arguing that \(p\) and not attempting to convince you" sounds inconsistent.

#### Warn

**Propositional content**
- Future event or state, etc., \(E\).

**Preparatory**
- \(H\) has reason to believe \(E\) will occur and is not in \(H\)'s interest.  
2. It is not obvious to both \(S\) and \(H\) that \(E\) will occur.

**Comment:** There are two kinds of questions, (a) real questions, (b) exam questions. In real questions \(S\) wants to know (find out) the answer; in exam questions, \(S\) wants to know if \(H\) knows.

---

\(^1\) In the sense of "ask a question" not in the sense of "doubt".
Part 2

1. Verdictives

**Evaluate**

*Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms* lists "evaluate" with "estimate," "appraise," "value," "rate," "assess," and "assay." According to Webster's, they "are comparable when meaning to judge a thing with respect to its worth." "Evaluate" differs in that it "suggests an intent to arrive at a mathematically correct judgment; it seldom suggests, however, an attempt to determine a thing's monetary worth, but rather to find its equivalent in other and more familiar terms."

*The Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms* says of evaluate, "Evaluate suggests an intent to determine either the relative or intrinsic worth of something in terms other than monetary."

Rules:

- **Propositional content**
  - Any thing, event, idea, etc.

- **Preparatory**
  - S has a view of the relative or intrinsic worth of a thing, event, idea, etc., based on his judgment and capable of translation into terms that are not monetary.
  - H does not know S's view.

- **Sincerity**
  - S believes his view of the thing to be justified.

- **Essential**
  - The utterance counts as an undertaking to indicate the worth of the thing, event, idea, etc.
2. Exercitives

Urge

*Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms* says, "Urge, egg, exhort, goad, spur, prod, prick, sic mean to press or impel to action, effort, or speed. Urge implies the exertion of influence or pressure either from something or someone external or from something within (as the conscience or the heart); specifically it suggests an inciting or stimulating to or toward a definite end (as greater speed or a prescribed course or objective) often against the inclinations or habits of the one urged."

Rules:

- **Propositional content**: Future act A of H.
- **Preparatory**: S wishes A to be carried out and knows that it is possible for H to do A.
  - It is not obvious that H will do A or that H wants to do A.
- **Sincerity**: S desires H to do A.
- **Essential**: The utterance counts as an undertaking to cause H to do A.

(The action urged may be merely a change of viewpoint. Urge seems close to Searle's advise, but it is stronger in its attempt and has no implication that H will benefit from A. "Advocating" is used interchangeably with "urging" in this study.)
a. **Commend**

*Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms* says, "Commend, commend, applaud, compliment are comparable when they mean to voice or otherwise manifest to others one's warm approval. Commend usually implies judicious or restrained praise, but it suggests as its motive a desire to call attention to the merits of a person or a thing."

**Rules:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional content</th>
<th>Some action, person, thing, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>A sees the merits of the action, person, thing, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S does not have reason to believe that H already admires the person, place, or thing, admires it in the same way S does, or knows that S admires it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity</td>
<td>S believes that the person, place, thing, etc. has certain merits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential</td>
<td>The utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that S admires the action, person, thing, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. **Deprecate**

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "disapprove" and "deprecate" mean "to feel or to express an objection to or condemnation of a person or thing. . . . Deprecate stresses the implication of regret, frequently profound, occasionally diffident or apologetic."

**Rules:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional content</th>
<th>Some event, action, thing, etc., E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>S objects to E and regrets its occurrence, existence, or condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is not obvious that H holds the same view, holds it as strongly, or knows that S holds this view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity</td>
<td>S believes the event, action, thing, etc., to deserve condemnation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential</td>
<td>The utterance counts as the undertaking by S to show his objection to or condemnation of E.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Expositives

a. Opine

According to Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, "Opinion, view, belief, conviction, persuasion, sentiment are comparable when they mean a more or less clearly formulated idea or judgment which one holds as true or valid." Speaking of "opinion," Webster's adds that "the term more consistently suggests a personal element in the judgment, the possibility of its being in error, and the strong probability that it will be disputed."

Rules:

Propositional content  Any proposition \( p \)

Preparatory  S does not have hard evidence for the truth of \( p \), recognizes that his formulation of \( p \) is based on a personal judgment, and realizes that its truth may be disputed.

It is not obvious to S that H believes \( p \) or knows that S believes \( p \).

Sincerity  S believes \( p \).

Essential  The utterance of \( p \) counts as the undertaking to the effect that S believes that \( p \) represents an actual state of affairs, but S does not and cannot provide hard facts to support \( p \).

(Opining differs from stating and asserting in the degree of verifiability of the proposition. When the speaker opines, he does not expect his hearer to require evidence for the truth of his opinion but to accept it as his personal judgment.)
b. Argue

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "argue" with "discuss," "debate," "dispute," and "agit­ate" and gives their shared meaning as "to discourse about something in order to arrive at the truth or to convince others." Webster's adds, "Argue usually implies conviction and the adducing of evidence or reasons in support of one's cause or position."

Rules:

Propositional content Any proposition (or series of propositions) \( p \)

Preparatory S can supply \( p \) or any series of propositions as part of a reasoning process which will support an idea held up in discussion in opposition to another idea.

It is not obvious either that H accepts the idea or that H knows the reasoning process being used to support it.

Sincerity S believes in the idea and the validity of his argument.

Essential The utterance counts as an undertaking by S to demonstrate to H the superiority of the view which S holds.

(Implicit in the definition is the idea that the act of arguing will seldom be performed in single-sentence utterances. One sentence will express the idea, and the remaining sentences are used to present the reasons in support of it.)
c. Account for

This term is not defined in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms. I am using it as a term to name Kaplan's "scientific explanation" discussed in Chapter IV.

Rules:

Propositional content: Any proposition (or series of propositions) $p$

Preparatory $S$ knows for what reasons a phenomenon exists or occurred.

It is not obvious that $H$ knows the same reasons.

Sincerity $S$ believes that he can supply the reasons for the phenomenon.

Essential The utterance of $p$ counts as the undertaking by $S$ to tell why or for what reasons the phenomenon exists or occurred.
d. Exemplify

Another form of explaining, "exemplify" is placed with "illustrate" in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, which says they "are comparable when they mean to use in speaking or writing concrete instances or cases to make clear something which is difficult, abstract, general, or remote from experience or to serve as an instance, case, or demonstration of a point or matter under examination." Webster's adds, "Exemplify implies the use of examples for clarification of a general or abstract statement or as aid in revealing the truth of a proposition or assertion."

Rules:

Propositional content An action, instance, case, etc., usually expressed in more than one sentence.

Preparatory S sees a relationship between an action, instance, case, etc., and a difficult, abstract, or general statement.

It is not obvious that H sees this relationship.

Sincerity S believes that the relationship which he is proposing exists.

Essential The utterance counts as an undertaking to provide examples to illustrate a difficult, abstract, or general statement.

(Note that the very nature of the act calls for a perlocutionary intent on the part of the speaker--to clarify.)
e. Define

Another kind of explaining, defining is analyzed here without the help of Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, since the definitions which I have used in defining this act come from Monroe Beardsley's Thinking Straight. I have arbitrarily restricted the term to the kind of defining which Beardsley says produces the "definition proposal."

Rules:

Propositional content  A term to be defined and a defining term

Preparatory  
  S possesses a defining term which is a more familiar expression for a term which S wishes to be understood in a particular way.
  It is not obvious that H already believes or accepts this definition.

Sincerity  
  S believes that the defining term which he offers is a valid one in the context.

Essential  
  The utterance counts as the undertaking to provide a more familiar term which represents a decision to use a word one way rather than another.
f. Interpret

Another variation of explaining, "interpret" is listed in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms with "explain," "expound," "explicate," "elucidate," and "construe." They "are comparable when they mean to make oneself or another understand the meaning of something." In addition, interpret "implies the making clear to oneself or to another the meaning of something (as a poem, a dream, an abstraction, or a work in a foreign language) which presents more than intellectual difficulties and requires special knowledge, imagination, or sympathy in the person who would understand it or make it understood."

Rules:

Propositional content
Any term and explanation of the term

Preparatory
S has knowledge or insight which he uses to formulate a sentence intended to help H to understand the term.

It is not obvious that H understands the term.

Sincerity
S believes that he has special knowledge or insight needed to understand the term.

Essential
The utterance of the sentence counts as the undertaking to provide S's understanding of the term.
g. Compare

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms groups "compare," "contrast," and "collate" when they "mean to set two or more things side by side in order to show likenesses and differences." Webster's says of "compare," "Compare implies as an aim the showing of relative values or excellences or a bringing out of characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent."

Rules:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional content</th>
<th>Two or more events, objects, people, ideas, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>S sees likeness and/or differences between two or more things, often ones which show relative values or excellences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is not obvious that H sees these likenesses and/or differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity</td>
<td>S believes that the likenesses and differences exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential</td>
<td>The utterance counts as an undertaking to show likenesses and/or differences of two or more events, objects, people, ideas, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "quote, cite, repeat are not close synonyms, though all mean to speak or write again something already said or written by another." Webster's adds, "Quote usually implies a use of another's words, commonly with faithful exactness or an attempt at it, for some special effect like adornment, illustration, close examination."

Rules:

Propositional content

Any sentence or series of sentences, any word or phrase

Preparatory

S is capable of reading or recalling the exact words of a portion of spoken or written discourse, usually discourse not composed of his own original utterances, in all cases not uttered for the first time on the occasion of the quoting.

It is not obvious that H is familiar with the quotation or does not need to be reminded of it.

Sincerity

S believes that he is quoting exactly.

Essential

The utterance counts as an undertaking by S to repeat the exact words of another speaker or his own exact words uttered originally on another occasion.
i. Believe

After defining "believe" with "know" and "think," Merriam-Webster's Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms says that "believe... stresses assurance but implies trust and faith (as in a higher power) rather than evidence as its basis." In addition, here the word is used in the way "affirm" is used in church ritual when members are asked to affirm their faith. "Affirm" here means not "state" or "assert" as in Searle's summary, but "implies conviction of truth and willingness to stand by one's statement because it is supported by evidence or one's experience or faith."

Rules:

Propositional content

Any proposition $p$

Preparatory

$S$ possesses experience, knowledge, or faith to support the truth of $p$.

It is not obvious that $H$ believes $p$, or $H$ needs to be reminded that $S$ believes $p$.

Sincerity

$S$ believes $p$.

Essential

The utterance of $p$ counts as the undertaking to affirm the belief of $S$ that $p$. 
[1] I have lately been reading a Harvard author who is just now out of favor here. He has been unpopular before. He once made a speech at this college, a speech so disliked that he was persona non grata in Cambridge for thirty years. However, the alumni and the Faculty finally decided he was a solid citizen—this was after the Civil War—and so they made him an Overseer, they gave him an honorary degree, and they asked him to deliver a course of lectures. In view of this history I take some pleasure in remembering that the title of these lectures was: "The Natural History of the Intellect." Another thirty years or so drifted by, and they erected a building in his honor. On any class day in winter you can enter it and see Frank Duveneck's statue of him buried under the coats and hats. Somehow, this symbolizes what has happened to Emerson.

[2] The reasons for Emerson's current lack of favor are understandable. He was a transcendentalist, and any beginner in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with transcendentalism. As a philosophy it is inconsistent, illogical, and indefensible. Its epistemology is contrary to fact, its ethical system is unscientific, its language is confused, and its frame of reference is romantic America. It is not, as we owlishly say, for our time. All it has is imagination and insight.

[3] Another reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he did not have a vision of evil. To count in criticism nowadays you must have a vision of evil. It seems that Herman Melville had a vision of evil in Moby Dick, that Nathaniel Hawthorne had a vision of evil in The Scarlet Letter, and that Henry James had a vision of evil in The Turn of the Screw. Precisely what the evil was in each case is in dispute, but it is there. Emerson had no vision of evil. His life was threatened by tuberculosis, he abandoned his pulpit, his first wife died young, his brothers were sick men, and his son perished—

That hyacinthine boy, for whom
Morn well might break and April bloom

he was ostracized by the conservative, he took the unpopular side in politics, he was accused of advocating atheism, he was said to be a radical, but he had no vision of evil. All he had was a vision of good.


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Good, he said, is something so tough, resilient, and timeless, it is indestructible. Our culture is supposed to have this vision of good as its ideal, yet Emerson is unpopular. I am not a philosopher, but merely a literary historian, and I do not pretend to explain the contradiction.

A third reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he was a liberal. A liberal, says the Oxford Dictionary, is favorable to changes and reforms tending in the direction of democracy. Emerson favored these changes. However, liberalism is dead. It is not merely dead, it was mistaken. Mr. Wallace's failure to create a liberal party in this country is proof. The latest British election, which again buried the liberal party, is proof. The liberal point of view in economics is wrong. The liberal point of view in history, or rather the point of view of liberal historians, is wrong. These historians denounced Talleyrand, but Talleyrand was a force for stability. They attacked Metternich, but Metternich was a force for order. I am afraid Emerson was a liberal; that is, he assumed that man might amount to something by and by if he would but consult his better self, and that men, taken individually, might improve themselves, so to speak, into a democratic state. This is the American dream which, through the Voice of America, we are broadcasting round the world, particularly into darkest Russia. I am not a politician, merely a literary man, and I cannot explain this contradiction.

That somewhat frightened conservative, Matthew Arnold, came here in the eighties to lecture us about culture. He began the habit of depreciating Emerson. His lecture brings me to the fourth reason for Emerson's unpopularity. Arnold hinted that Emerson did not quite understand human weakness. Ours is the aspirin age, and we understand human weakness. Mr. T. S. Eliot has told us a number of times that man is full of sin. Mr. Reinhold Niebuhr has told us that man is full of sin. Monsignor Sheen has told us that man is full of sin. The bright faith in man characteristic of the eighteenth century, the bright trust in spiritual development characteristic of much of the nineteenth century, were fallacies.

Arnold allowed Emerson a single virtue. Emerson, he said, is the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit. But we are informed that our profoundest failure, individual and political, is a failure of the spirit. For example, we are not truly successful in democratizing Germany because there is lacking a spiritual content to our democracy. Through the Marshall Plan and through military aid to Western Europe, there must glow, we are told, a radiancy of the spirit, or Communism will rush in. I do not understand how, if all men are weak, if all men are sinful, we can hope to maintain, much less improve, democratic society, I do not see how universal wickedness can be restrained except by an authoritarian church and state, I do not see how free men can be held together by mere unanimity of evil hearts. Nothing, of course, is more flattering than to think of one's self as a great sinner, irreparably lost. Byron is a case in point. A new Byronism
now appears in poetry and theology, but I still suggest that some tincture of virtue is necessary for citizens of a republic. However, I am not a theologian.

[7] By now you have rightly inferred that I find something important in Emerson. I am speaking of Emerson à propos of our time in order to revalidate an old Harvard custom—the custom of dissent. The protection of dissent is old at Harvard. Emerson's Divinity School Address was delivered, whatever happened afterwards—an early example. President Lowell's refusal to discharge Münsterberg and Harold Laski, when mob feeling demanded it, is a second example. The refusal of the President and Fellows to silence Harlow Shapley at the demand of an influential alumnus is a third. If Oxford's proudest products are its rebels, the proudest tradition of Harvard is the protection of dissent. Long may it be so. I sometimes think dissent may have no other place to go if the drives for conformity continue. For a slow, irresistible drive against dissent does go forward. That is why Emerson is important. Let me briefly discuss four examples of the drive for conformity—two from politics, two from education.

[8] The British election shows what a genuine two-party system is—a system in which there is a fundamental philosophic issue. In Great Britain that issue lies between the Socialist state and the Tory state. No such issue divides the Republican state from the Democratic state. There is with us a set of persons called Democrats, some of them in office, and another set of persons calling themselves Republicans, not so many of whom are in office, but neither you nor I nor more competent observers can define the philosophic difference between these sets of persons in terms that will really make sense. Almost nothing could be more comic, if it were not so tragic, than to watch the Republicans hunting for somebody who will tell them what to do—a party in search of a platform. The only thing just as comic and just as tragic is the Democrats hunting for somebody who will tell them what they have done—a platform in search of a party. We are afraid of political dissent. We are so afraid of it that we use every means we can to prevent the creation or continuation of a dissenting party, Communist, Progressive, or what have you. I wonder what Emerson would say to this spectacle— he who interested himself in man rather than in mass.

[9] This example of our distrust of dissent is from the national scene. My next example is from the international scene. There is a country called Russia. There is something called the cold war. There is something called the atom bomb, and there may be something called the hydrogen bomb. Now I do not care whether you think Mr. Wallace is politically naive or whether you think Mr. Wallace is an instrument of Satan, but I find nothing more characteristic of the pressure of conformity upon opinion than to compare what happened to Mr. Wallace and what happened to Senator McMahon. A few years ago Mr. Wallace was roundly smeared for urging that on the whole it would be more sensible patiently to continue to seek some accommodation with the Kremlin than to continue to slide down the terrifying spiral along which we are descending. Now that the
situation has worsened, Senator McMahon--I mean no disrespect when I say he is safely ensconced in office--was a few weeks ago roundly applauded for saying very much the same thing. Mr. Wallace is on the political left and must therefore be intrinsically wrong; Senator McMahon is an administration Democrat, and must therefore be intrinsically right. We applaud the Christian sentiment of the one and denounce the identical Christian sentiment of the other. It is now, of course, clear that sensible persons were right in saying that no important military weapon and no important scientific discovery can be long kept secret, but as our emotions of conformity are always predictable when this question comes up, the Russians must be very pleased. It makes me think of what General Lee said when he learned that General McClellan had been called back to command the Army of the Potomac. "I am very happy that General McClellan is again opposed to me," he remarked, "because I always know what he is going to do." I wonder what Emerson would tell us here about a foolish consistency, that hobgoblin of little minds.

I take my third example from the world of learning. I received a week or two ago an airmail letter asking me to protest against the action of twelve regents of the University of California who, in the teeth of faculty opinion, of administrative opinion, of gubernatorial opinion, of the opinion of six members of the board, and of the opinion of many outside the university, are determined to require a new oath from a faculty which has already taken an oath, and which has declined to take the new oath by a vote of 900 to 0. It is apparently supposed not only that some member of the faculty may be a Communist, but that members of the faculty may, or might, or could, or would belong to mysterious organizations not named, mysteriously threatening the peace and dignity of California. The exact language of the proposed oath is: "That I am not a member of the Communist party, or under any oath, or a party to any agreement, or under any commitment that is in conflict with my obligation under this oath." No one knows what this language means except that it is insulting. It is not proved that any member of the California faculty has perjured himself or committed treason or acted as a spy. It is provable that the faculty of no university served the country more patriotically during the war. Now a majority of the regents has discovered that this same faculty are potential liars. They infer that the faculty might take oaths only to violate the oaths they take. They therefore set up this second oath, although if the oath-taker is not bound by oath number one, he is not going to be any more bound by oath number two. The effect is simply to penalize dissent. On the other hand, a friend of Emerson's preached active disloyalty to this government, an aunt of Emerson's helped that friend to violate the laws, and when this friend eulogized a rebel named John Brown, Emerson applauded him. Now, as we quaintly say, we "teach" Thoreau's *Essay on Civil Disobedience*, even in California. I cite these familiar facts only that you measure from what Massachusetts permitted in 1850 what California demands in 1950.

Let me turn to my last example. Passing over such obvious dangers to higher education as the military control of research, the extra-
ordinary oath proposed to be attached to the National Science Foundation, the stool-pigeon clause demanded by the Navy Department of officers in training and happily modified because of student dissent, let me briefly contrast two patterns of collegiate training.

[12] I suppose the greatest president Harvard had in the nineteenth century was Charles W. Eliot. Like Emerson he is now undervalued. He believed in the individual. His great work was to break up the cake of custom which then bound this college. He argued that if a man was old enough to go to college, he was old enough to know what he was going to college for. Mr. Eliot therefore instituted the elective system. He restored dignity both to learning and to the scholar. He knew very well that many men would not profit under his system, and that many men would abuse his system, but he also knew very well that for men worth educating, this was education worthy of men. He had got tired of educating boys. He guessed that the social gains would outweigh the social losses, and the brilliant roll call of distinguished Harvard men graduating in Mr. Eliot's time proves that he was right.

[13] I suppose the greatest president of the University of Chicago in the twentieth century is Mr. Hutchins. I honor Mr. Hutchins. He speaks his mind. He is a remarkable individual. But I am always puzzled to know why Mr. Hutchins, who speaks his mind, infers that single-mindedness is therefore the principal virtue in liberal education. Mr. Hutchins has abandoned the pattern of Mr. Eliot and gone back to the pattern of Aquinas. I do not fully understand the Chicago system, but the part I do understand is the dogma that a selected list of great books is sufficient for, or synonymous with, a liberal education. These the teacher is to expound. The student is there to be taught. He may argue, he may debate, but he is there to master this library.

[14] But why a library? The people who wrote these books had no such library, for the most part. As Emerson said, librarians are not wiser than other men. Why is bookishness a virtue? What is a great book? Who determines when it is great enough to get in, or, what is more important, small enough to be left out? Some books in some moments for some people have great beauty, and some books for some people at some moments have great wisdom, but I submit that one gains as much pleasure and wisdom and instruction from little books as one does from big ones. Are there great books, indeed? May not one truly say there are only great readers of books, and that the great reader seldom confines himself to any restricted list? Yet it is seriously maintained at Chicago that only by bookish authority can democracy be maintained and culture be enriched.

[15] It is regrettable that Abraham Lincoln's library was meager. He never read Aquinas. He merely wrote the Gettysburg Address, which is shorter than Pericles' and just as good. Meek young men, said Emerson, grow up in libraries believing it their duty to accept the views which Cicero, which Locke, which Bacon have given, forgetful that Cicero, Locke, and Bacon were only young men in libraries when they wrote these
books. It is true that Mr. Eliot put together the Harvard classics, but he did not do it to end a library; he merely thought it might be an economical way to begin one.

[16] I do not remember who first made popular the phrase: "failure of nerve." But in these several instances of a drive to conformity, I detect a failure of nerve, a failure of belief in the individual.

[17] In each case, of course, there is something to be said for conformity. There is always something to be said for conformity. I think, for example, something is to be said for the theory that whether the party in power is Democratic or Republican, we have in fact a coalition government; but a coalition government so insecure that it treats dissent as unpatriotic is not a government which Emerson, at any rate, could approve. The doctrine that "Papa knows best" troubles the presidency and the office of the secretary of state, but it is not the doctrine of Emerson. The demand for patriotic oaths contrasts with the sentiment of a president in Emerson's time who once said of a rival that he would gladly hold General McClellan's stirrup, if by so doing he could get the country through its danger.

[18] Honor is not manufactured by printed forms to be taken before a notary public; it is a function of manly self-respect—and it is a mark of the time that I feel almost apologetic for using so old-fashioned a phrase. The notion of standardized wisdom—so many parts of Plato, so many parts of Newton, so many parts of Milton; do not shake before taking—is a product of this same loss of nerve. It reveals hurry and distrust—hurry, because, when you have invented the formula, you can push the product through to its shaping, faster; distrust, because when you substitute uniformity of pattern for equality of individuals, you transfer your belief from the individuals to the pattern. A belated Emersonian, I am still, in things of the spirit, for the individual. Robert Frost reminds us that a one-man revolution is the only revolution that is coming.

[19] By this circuitous route I come back to Emerson and education. We have found out in two wars that if all we want to do is to train the young, we can do it cleverly. If all you want to do is to train the young, establish your pattern—Great Books, General Education, call it what you will—and the training may be admirable. But it will be only training. We set up these teaching patterns and then look around for somebody to make them operate instead of assuring ourselves that we first have men to teach.

[20] Like everybody else I have tinkered with the curriculum, but beyond rudimentary common sense and the baser parts of diplomacy, it does not matter what the pattern is, provided you have good scholars and students who really want to learn. The pattern seems wonderful only for a time. Ask any Harvard graduate ten years out what the catalogue outlined as proper education when he was a junior, and you will probably draw a blank; ask him who taught him, and he will instantly recur in memory to this or that powerful personality.
[21] Education is a private affair. It is as private as falling in love. There is no such thing as general education, there are only specific individual educations. How often in the biographies of Harvard men do you find the phrase: "He studied with Agassiz, or Kittredge, or Royce, or Shaler!" How seldom does the curriculum appear except in a negative and crippling connotation!

[22] Education, I repeat, is a private affair. It is essentially a lonely business, which neither deans nor advisers nor proctors nor tutors nor professors can substitute for. Like religion and marriage, it is personal, the result of the impact of character upon character. My objection to some things we are trying to do here is that we have strayed away from the spirit of Emerson.

[23] When Emerson uttered his famous phrase: "Trust thyself--every heart vibrates to that iron string," he makes, if I may say so, the whole iron curtain vibrate. He did not speak to the sentimental, the lazy, the superficial men, the men who are content to get by with the aid of a tutor and skilful appeals to the dean's office. What he had in mind is the stark truth that we brought nothing into this world and it is certain we can carry nothing out, and that therefore between these poles of time lies our only opportunity to develop character. And when he said that books are for the scholar's idle time, he did not mean that nobody should enter the Lamont Library.

[24] In a democracy we count by ones and not by masses, though there are those who would define democracy by another pattern--the hatred of those who count by masses. Hate, however, is neither salvation nor statesmanship. The great contribution of Emerson is not only that he agreed to count by ones, but he also believed that one--anyone--had infinity behind him. I cannot defend this belief logically, though it looks suspiciously like Christianity, and is no more absurd than existentialism. But in education, as in the national life, how are we to fortify the individual unless we rally infinity behind him? This will, I know, be incomprehensible to many and impractical to some, and I can only point to the historic truth that this doctrine, incomprehensible and impractical, is the child of Harvard--of the great, traditional Harvard, the Harvard that I, who am merely Harvard by adoption, think we must not lose. When Lowell recited his ode for the Harvard dead in 1865, he did not celebrate the curriculum:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Those love her best who to themselves are true,} \\
&\text{And what they dare to dream of, dare to do;} \\
&\text{They followed her and found her} \\
&\text{Where all may hope to find,} \\
&\text{Not in the ashes of the burnt-out mind,} \\
&\text{But beautiful with danger's sweetness round her.}
\end{align*}
\]

[25] Perhaps if we looked more often, both faculty and students, upon the face of the statue in Emerson Hall, we might detect a smiling irony about its lips. Perhaps, if we looked at it oftener, a noble doubt, as Emerson would say, might suggest itself about our faith in advice, in pattern, in crutches, in conformity.
[26] Emerson's faith was not in machinery but in man thinking, whereas we today are proud of machines that think, and suspicious of any man who tries to. I see no reason for being as apologetic as we are about the protest of protestantism and the dissidence of dissent in a college which was founded by dissenters; and difficult though it is to make my point, I for one dissent from current notions in college and country that democracy will survive only after you have imposed a pattern and made as many persons as possible conform to it.

[27] The educational problem is not conformity to any pattern, however lofty in intent; it is how to remove obstacles from the lonely path by which education sometimes results in man thinking. As for public life, I quote Mrs. Roosevelt: "Have we really reached the point where we must fear to join any group because at some time or other a person of Communist leanings, or supposed Communist leanings, might also join it? That is a terrible thing and we should be ashamed of it." I, too, am ashamed of this pressure of conformity. I do not think it is too late in the history of the republic, whether in education or in politics, to believe that Emerson is still the most excellent spiritual catalyst we have in a democracy. It is in that spirit I have tried to speak.

NOTES

1 speech: Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882; American poet, essayist, and philosopher), "The Divinity School Address," July 15, 1838.

2 persona non grata: unacceptable person.

3 transcendentalism: philosophy that there is a spiritual reality (usually apprehensible by intuition, not reason) that transcends, is superior to, or is a priori to experience, to the material or empirical.

4 That...bloom: Emerson, "Threnody," 16-17.


6 Talleyrand: Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince de Bénévent (1754-1838; French statesman).

7 Metternich: Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich (1773-1859; Austrian statesman).

8 Matthew Arnold: (1822-1888; English poet and critic).

10 Reinhold Niebuhr: (1892- ; American Protestant theologian).

11 Monsignor Sheen: Monsignor (now Bishop) Fulton John Sheen (1895- ; American Roman Catholic cleric and apologist).

12 Byronism: affected or romantic consciousness of being irrevocably given to mysterious or unspeakable sins—after George Gordon, sixth Baron Byron (1788-1824; English poet).


14 Münsterberg: Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916; German psychologist who taught at Harvard).


16 Harlow Shapley: (1885- ; Paine Professor of Astronomy at Harvard, vocal advocate of liberal causes).

17 a foolish...minds: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines" (Emerson, "Self-Reliance," Essays: First Series, 1841).

18 Subsequent votes on related issues should not be confused with this one as reported in the newspapers. At the time of going to press, the author's summary of the situation was believed to be reasonably correct [Jones's note].


20 Hutchins: Robert Maynard Hutchins (1899- ; president of the University of Chicago, 1929-1945).

21 Aquinas: Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274; Italian theologian and philosopher).

22 Pericles': (c. 495-429 B.C.; Athenian statesman).

23 Cicero: Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.; Roman statesman, orator, rhetorician, philosopher, and poet).

24 Locke: John Locke (1632-1704; English philosopher).

25 Bacon: Francis Bacon, first Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Albans (1561-1626; English philosopher, essayist, and jurist).

26 Lincoln.

27 Plato: (c. 427-347 B.C.; Greek philosopher).
26 Newton: Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727; English physicist and mathematician).

29 Milton: John Milton (1608-1674; English poet).

30 Robert Frost: (1874-1963; American poet).

31 Agassiz...Shaler: all teachers at Harvard: Jean Louis Rodolphe Agassiz (1807-1873; Swiss naturalist); George Lyman Kittredge (1860-1941; American philologist); Josiah Royce (1855-1916; American philosopher); Nathaniel Southgate Shaler (1841-1906; American geologist).

32 "Trust...iron string": opening sentence of Emerson's "Self-Reliance" (see note 17).

33 Lowell: James Russell Lowell (1819-1891; American poet, essayist, and diplomat).

34 protest...dissent: "the Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion" is a famous phrase from Matthew Arnold (see note 8), Culture and Anarchy (1869).
APPENDIX IV

We Were Not Skeptical Enough

"We Were Not Skeptical Enough" was written for This I Believe, a collection of philosophic observations from famous people. This necessarily short essay is a convenient beginning illustration of the use of examples as a basic pattern of exposition.

I was born in what was called "An Age of Unbelief." When I was young I took that description seriously, and I thought that I was an intellectual because of the number of things I did not believe.

Only very slowly did I come to realize that what was really characteristic of myself and my age was not that we did not believe anything but that we believed very firmly in a number of things which are not really so.

We believed, for example, in the exclusive importance of the material, the measurable, and the controllable. We had no doubts about "what science proves" and we took it for granted that whatever science did not prove was certainly false.

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When, for example, "science proved" that man had risen from the lower animals, we believed, as I still do, that this is a fact. But when science found it difficult to define, or measure, or deal with the ways in which a man's mind, and character and motives differ from those of the lower animals, we believed that there was no important difference between them. The trouble was not that we were skeptical but that we were not skeptical enough.

We studied man by the methods which had proved fruitful for the study of animals and machines. We learned a great deal about his reflexes, animal drives, the ways in which he could be conditioned to behave. And then, because our methods did not permit us to learn anything else about him, we came to the conclusion that there was nothing else to be learned.

We came to believe, to take the most familiar example, that love was "nothing but" the biological impulses connected with sex. What is even more important, we came also to believe that his thinking was "nothing but" his power of rationalization and that his ideals and values were "nothing but" the results of his early conditioning. We began to assume that what he believed to be his free choices were not really anything of the sort; that he was not the captain of his soul but only what the dialectic of society or perhaps his infantile fixations had made him. He was, we tended to believe, not a cause but an effect.

Seldom before in the history of civilization has the world been in so parlous a state and not often before have men seemed to believe less in a God who would save them. Yet it is at this moment that we have lost faith in man himself as a prime mover of events.

What I believe in most firmly is man himself. And by that I mean something quite specific. I believe that he descended from the animals but that he has powers which animals share but little, if at all. I believe that he is something in himself. I believe that he can will, and choose and prefer.

That means, for example, that society is what he makes it, not that he is what society makes him. It means that he can be permitted to think, not merely conditioned by good or bad propaganda. I believe, therefore, that he can be freed, and that means a good deal more than given the vote or permitted civil liberties. The difference between a totalitarian and a democratic society is the difference between those who believe the individual man
capable of being the captain of his soul and those who believe that he is merely the creature of the society in which he lives.

I believe that we cannot set the world free until we believe that the individual himself is free.
APPENDIX V

"It's Pretty, but Is It Art?"

Sylvia Angus

(1) In art, this is not the age of anxiety, the pill, or the bomb. It is the age of "willingness." Even the most conservative classicists feel, as they sneak home for a bit of Haydn on the hi-fi, that they should give the avant-garde "a chance." To those genuinely interested in the great variety of artistic experiment now going on, curiosity has reached a fever pitch in which willingness has completely overborne that philistine thing, the critical faculty. Everything is grist for the mill; everything is, at the very least, "interesting."

(2) Unfortunately, a great deal of current experiment in the arts is not interesting. Art has always been experimental, but never before

has the audience for art been called upon to find all the trials and errors "interesting," and it does art a disservice to accept everything offered with the same bland, slightly nervous acquiescence.

(3) There is, for example, the recent case of the touring group called "Contemporary Voices in the Arts," sponsored by the New York Council on the Arts, which visited a number of college campuses all over the state. The idea was interesting. The artists were well-known, avant-garde people with a significant body of work behind them in film, sculpture, painting, music, poetry, and dance. One could expect that an artistic galaxy which included Merce Cunningham, Jack Tworkov, John Cage, Len Lye, Robert Creeley, Stanley Vanderbeek, and Billy Klucver would have something significant to say and to show about the arts they are engaged in.

(4) Curiously enough, their largely student and faculty audiences found that they had a great deal of value to say (which was not their main intention) and very little to show (which was). Audiences were treated to a kind of traveling circus, but a circus manqué, a tedious circus. Films flickered simultaneously on screens, walls, and ceilings; shrill and unrelated noises attacked the eardrums in long, continuous squeals; artists wandered about, coyly lighting matches when lights failed; a so called panel discussion on the arts resolved itself into several people making desultory remarks and joshing each other like small boys; artists ambled about the stage like actors on the first day of a rehearsal when they do not yet know their lines or even their roles. It was a "happening," and, for most of the audiences, a bore. The point of all this is that the performance was not billed as a "happening" but purported to be an experience in the new art forms, the "random" arts.

(5) The most curious and significant thing about this performance, and one of the most telling criticisms of current experiments in "the random" as an art technique, came on the day after the performance, when the artists in small groupings spoke to students about the purposes and methods of their arts. Cogently, lucidly, in logical, sequential prose, they explained that art should be a total, sensory experience which should be allowed to flow over and through one; that it should not be examined for logic, lucidity, or sequence. Clearly, rationally, they made the reasonable point that art has too long concentrated on intellectual perceptions, and that this, the age of exploding mass media and new technology, should be a time to seek sense experience in whatever random arrangement of sight, smell, or sound might present itself at any given moment. With admirable intellectual coherence, they made a most persuasive case for the nonintellectual, random art with which the audience had been bored the evening before!
Art today, like science, is in the grip of the uncertainty principle. Einstein began it with relativity, and now Heisenberg has shown that the smallest particles of matter are indeterminate in their motion. The sense of this relativity and indeterminateness has filtered into all our consciousnesses. If randomness is a fundamental truth of science, why is it not also applicable to art? In a seeming attempt to assert the unity of science and art, we have now gone far along the path of asserting that the random is or can be art.

If we allow, for the moment, that the artists in the experiment above have a rational theory for asserting that the random can produce art, we are faced with a number of criticisms of random "art" based on their own demonstrative performances, which suffered from at least the following five problems, any one of which is capable of destroying any art:

1. **Overkill**—the expenditure of too much effort or attention for insufficient sensory or emotional reward.

2. **Pretentiousness**—the declaration of significance when the significance offered is minor or cliché.

3. **Inarticulateness**—the inadequate communication which comes from lack of understanding by the artist of what might happen during his experiments.

4. **Lack of Direction**—not quite the same as lack of goal. There need not be a final goal in sight, but the lack of any sense of direction produces circular art, and circular art ceases to be interesting after two or three revolutions.

5. **Tedium**—the open-ended tiresomeness of material so shapeless and unstructured that it doesn't know when to stop.

The above criticisms are criticisms of random art as art. If it is art, then it is too often poor art, and it is the audience's duty to point this out and not to generalize feebly that all of it is interesting. There is no more justification for uncritical acceptance of any and all assaults upon the senses in the name of art than there is justification for accepting passively the drilling of experimental dentists. Experiment is always valuable, but experiment is only "art" when it succeeds. Robert Frost once remarked that he did not require that a potato be covered with earth for him to accept it as a potato. It is perhaps equally unnecessary that we be willingly on deck for an artist's trials and errors. These trial runs are best confined to the artist's studio until he works the bugs out of what he is doing.

Which brings me, of course, to the positive, if heretical, point I am making: that totally random or accidental art is not art at all. It is "a happening," and "a happening" is a form of social interaction, a
kind of group dynamics. Happenings can be great fun; they can turn one on; they can stimulate and entertain; they can even provoke spiritual or sensory awakenings. That, however, doesn’t make them art any more than a motorcycle trip, or a trip to a supermarket, or a fall down a well is art, though any one of them may also stimulate, entertain, or awaken us. If any and all experience can be labeled art and demand our attention as art, then clearly the word has lost all meaning and turned into mush.

(10) This is not, as it may seem to some, a mere semantic quibble. It is an attempt to gain some perspective in an area where perspective itself has become suspect. There is a not-so-underground effort being made these days to turn the word “experience” into an all-purpose shrine before which we must keep an eternal flame burning. We are supposed to seek experience at all costs, and, what is more, we are being conned into dignifying all experience with the title of “art.” But all experience is not art, which has always been a rather special area of experience. Experience can be bad, and is had, at any time of the day or night. To ride the New York subway on an August day is an experience. It is equally an experience to hoe a row of carrots, to swim across a lake, to go to the toilet, to spank one’s child, or to be converted to Mohammedanism. If all of these can also be called “art,” then clearly what we are doing is simply melting our language down into one blob in which differentiations can no longer be made—anti-intellectualism with a vengeance!

(11) “Experience” is the most important “in” word we have at the moment; everyone from Timothy Leary to Marshall McLuhan, the Fugs, and 3,000,000 students are for it. So am I. What I am against is being told to recognize as art any random group of chance and often tiresome irrelevancies which may give me a reaction, an “experience,” no matter of what kind of quality. For if there is one thing about which I am perfectly clear, it is that art implies control. It is the precise opposite of randomness.

(12) Here, precisely, is where scientific truth and artistic truth part company. The atomic particle may be indeterminate, but man is not. The random, the formless, is basically impossible and uninteresting to man, who is, willy-nilly, a pattern-making animal. Given a blank wall, man will form its cracks into a design. Set down in chaos, man will separate the whirling from the stationary, for chaos and meaninglessness, as the existentialists have discovered, are the hardest of all things for man to endure. To expect that he can, without drugs, turn off his brain and float on a sensory sea is as illogical as to expect, conversely, that he can react on a purely intellectual plane, untainted by the perceptions of his senses. That the over-intellectualizing of art has caused this violent pendulum swing in the opposite direction is a reason, but not an excuse, for the excesses of the present position. The idea of a random “art” may
seem a corrective to rigidified, overformalized art forms, but it is a fundamentally useless correction. Man is a sensing animal all right, but he is also a thinking reed, and it is futile to attempt to limit his art to the narrow compass of his senses.

(13) In the long artistic past of humanity an accidental, random stroke has often produced significant art, but it took the artist's eye to recognize what the random stroke had done. Today we are being asked to watch our artists doodle in public and to cull from their doodles whatever appeals to us. This may be fun, but it gives the performers no cachet to be known as artists, since we are asked to do our own discriminating and make our own selections on purely subjective grounds. The artists who do this are rapidly putting themselves out of work, since the end point to this method must be "every man his own artist."

(14) The artist who tosses a pot of paint at a wall, or hangs a wrecked car from the ceiling, or holds the microphone up to record his gargling and then tells us to look and to "experience" is doing no more than the merchant who displays before us an assortment of textiles, thread, buttons, and braid, and suggests we choose what we like and make ourselves a dress. If we select the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress, the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the merchant a couturier? Is his randomly heaped assortment of materials "art?"

(15) My criticism of these experiments in the random, then, is not that they may not produce interesting, beautiful, or moving things, but that they are simply not art. They may produce excitement, gaiety, tedium, or a headache, but so can a day on the beach. If there is no focusing, organizing intelligence behind it, there is no art in any meaningful sense of the word.

(16) What is needed, it seems, is to redefine yet again, and for a new generation, what we mean by art—a hazardous but a perennially necessary job. To start with the easier end, let us clarify what art is not. It is not, as the current definition would have us believe, the communication of experience, not even of moving or emotional experience—though it includes this function. Too many moving and emotionally communicated experiences occur every day which are not art—for example, a man telling us how his dog was run over, or a girl describing her hatred of her mother. Art is not any accidental pattern of color, shape, or sound which delights us. Nature is full of such delightful accidents, but nature is not art. Art, in short, cannot be defined by what it does to us, because we can be moved, stimulated, angered, made ecstatic by a vast number of personal experiences which are not artistic in nature.

(17) What is left, then, if we cannot define art by what it does, is to define it by what it is. With more bravery than good sense, I
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will climb well out on a limb and define it as follows: Art is the controlled structuring of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of experience. This definition, be it noted, allows for weak art or for great art, depending on the skill or stature of the artist. It does not allow any place for the random or totally unstructured. The key words are "controlled structuring." Experience, emotion, communication are all ingredients, but all are insufficient without the controlling mind, which, alone, is capable of producing art. Art is not what we experience; it is the controlled product of the artist's experience. Our reaction to it is our own affair, but art comes from the artist—purposefully. If we give back to the word art a rational meaning, we can then go happily on to enjoy or to abominate random happenings without destroying the intellectual basis for language, which is the power to make distinctions.
APPENDIX VI

Pornography and Censorship

Irving Kristol

(1) Being frustrated is disagreeable, but the real disasters in life begin when you get what you want. For almost a century now, a

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great many intelligent, well-meaning and articulate people—of a kind generally called liberal or intellectual, or both—have argued eloquently against any kind of censorship of art and/or entertainment.

(2) And within the past 10 years, the courts and the legislatures of most Western nations have found these arguments persuasive—so persuasive that hardly a man is now alive who clearly remembers what the answers to these arguments were. Today, in the United States and other democracies, censorship has to all intents and purposes ceased to exist.

(3) Is there a sense of triumphant exhilaration in the land? Hardly. There is, on the contrary, a rapidly growing unease and disquiet. Somehow, things have not worked out as they were supposed to, and many notable civil libertarians have gone on record as saying this was not what they meant at all.

(4) They wanted a world in which “Desire Under the Elms” could be produced, or “Ulysses” published, without interference by philistine busybodies holding public office. They have got that, of course; but they have also got a world in which homosexual rape takes place on the stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hours to witness varieties of professional fornication.

(5) But disagreeable as this may be, does it really matter? Might not our unease and disquiet be merely a cultural hangover—a “hangup,” as they say? What reason is there to think that anyone was ever corrupted by a book?

(6) This last question, oddly enough, is asked by the very same people who seem convinced that advertisements in magazines or displays of violence on television do indeed have the power to corrupt. It is also asked, incredibly enough and in all sincerity, by people—e.g., university professors and school teachers—whose very lives provide all the answers one could want.

(7) After all, if you believe that no one was ever corrupted by a book, you have also to believe that no one was ever improved by a book (or a play or a movie). You have to believe, in other words, that all art is morally trivial and that, consequently, all education is morally irrelevant. No one, not even a university professor, really believes that.

(8) To be sure, it is extremely difficult, as social scientists tell us, to trace the effects of any single book (or play or movie) on an individual reader or any class of readers. But we all know, and social scientists know it too, that the ways in which we use our minds and imaginations shape our characters and help define us as persons. That those who certainly know this are nevertheless moved to deny it merely indicates how a dogmatic resistance to the idea of censorship can—like most dogmatism—result in a mindless insistence on the absurd.
I have used these harsh terms—"dogmatism" and "mindless"—advisedly. I might also have added "hypocritical." For the plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the "self expression" of an individual or a group, even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults.

A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on the stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that—any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist.

The basic point that emerges is one that Walter Berns has powerfully argued in his superb essay, "Pornography vs. Democracy": No society can be utterly indifferent to the ways its citizens publicly entertain themselves.

Bearbaiting and cockfighting are prohibited only in part out of compassion for the suffering animals; the main reason they were abolished was that it was felt they debased and brutalized the citizenry who flocked to witness such spectacles. And the question we face with regard to pornography and obscenity is whether, now that they have such strong legal protection from the Supreme Court, they can or will brutalize and debase our citizenry.

We are, after all, not dealing with one passing incident—one book, or one play, or one movie. We are dealing with a general tendency that is suffusing our entire culture.

I say pornography and obscenity because, though they have different dictionary definitions and are frequently distinguishable as "artistic" genres, they are nevertheless in the end identical in effect. Pornography is not objectionable simply because it arouses sexual desire or lust or prurience in the mind of the reader or spectator; this is a silly Victorian notion.

A great many nonpornographic words—including some parts of the Bible—excite sexual desire very successfully. What is distinctive about pornography is that, in the words of D. H. Lawrence, it attempts "to do dirt on (sex) . . . (It is an) insult to a vital human relationship."

In other words, pornography differs from erotic art in that its whole purpose is to treat human beings obscenely, to deprive human beings of their specifically human dimension. That is what obscenity is all about. It is light years removed from any kind of carefree sensuality—there is no continuum between Fielding's "Tom Jones" and the Marquis de Sade's "Justine."
It may well be that Western society, in the latter half of the 20th century, is experiencing a drastic change in sexual mores and sexual relationships. We have had many such "sexual revolutions" in the past—and the bourgeois family and bourgeois ideas of sexual propriety were themselves established in the course of a revolution against 18th century "licentiousness"—and we shall doubtless have others in the future.

It is, however, highly improbable (to put it mildly) that what we are witnessing is the final revolution which will make sexual relations utterly unproblematic, permit us to dispense with any kind of ordered relationships between the sexes, and allow us freely to redefine the human condition. And so long as humanity has not reached that utopia, obscenity will remain a problem.

Sex—like death—is an activity that is both animal and human. There are human sentiments and human ideals involved in this animal activity. But when sex is public, the viewer does not see—cannot see—the sentiments and the ideals. He can only see the animal coupling.

And that is why, when men and women make love, as we say, they prefer to be alone—because it is only when you are alone that you can make love, as distinct from merely copulating in an animal and casual way. And that, too, is why those who are voyeurs, if they are not irredeemably sick, also feel ashamed at what they are witnessing. When sex is a public spectacle, a human relationship has been debased into a mere animal connection.

The basic psychological fact about pornography and obscenity is that it appeals to and provokes a kind of sexual regression. The sexual pleasure one gets from pornography and obscenity is autoerotic and infantile; to put it bluntly, it is a masturbatory exercise of the imagination, when it is not masturbation pure and simple. Now, people who masturbate do not get bored with masturbation, just as sadists don't get bored with sadism, and voyeurs don't get bored with voyeurism.

In other words, infantile sexuality is not only a permanent temptation for the adolescent or even the adult—it can quite easily become a permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis.

What is at stake is civilization and humanity, nothing less. The idea that "everything is permitted," as Nietzsche put it, rests on the premise of nihilism and his nihilistic implications. I will not pretend that the case against nihilism and for civilization is an easy one to make. We are here confronting the most fundamental of philosophical questions, on the deepest levels.

But that is precisely my point—that the matter of pornography and obscenity is not a trivial one, and that only superficial minds can take a bland and untroubled view of it.

In this connection, I might also point out that those who
are primarily against censorship on liberal grounds tell us not to take pornography or obscenity seriously, while those who are for pornography and obscenity on radical grounds, take it very seriously indeed.

I believe the radicals—writers like Susan Sontag, Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, and even Jerry Rubin—are right, and the liberals are wrong. I also believe that those young radicals at Berkeley, some five years ago, who provoked a major confrontation over the public use of obscene words, showed a brilliant political instinct.

Once the faculty and administration had capitulated on this issue saying: "Oh, for God's sake, let's be adult: What difference does it make anyway?"—once they said that, they were bound to lose on every other issue. And once Mark Rudd could publicly ascribe to the president of Columbia a notoriously obscene relationship to his mother, without provoking any kind of reaction, the SDS had already won the day. The occupation of Columbia's buildings merely ratified their victory.

Men who show themselves unwilling to defend civilization against nihilism are not going to be either resolute or effective in defending the university against anything.

I am already touching upon a political aspect of pornography when I suggest that it is inherently and purposefully subversive of civilization and its institutions. But there is another and more specifically political aspect, which has to do with the relationship of pornography and/or obscenity to democracy, and especially to the quality of public life on which democratic government ultimately rests.

Though the phrase, "the quality of life," trips easily from so many lips these days it tends to be one of those clichés with many trivial meanings and no large, serious one. Rarely does it have anything to do with the way the citizen in a democracy views himself—his obligations, his intentions, his ultimate self-definition.

There is an old idea of democracy—one which was fairly common until about the beginning of this century—for which the conception of the quality of public life is absolutely crucial. This idea starts from the proposition that democracy is a form of self-government, and that if you want it to be a meritorious polity, you have to care about what kind of people govern it. Indeed, it puts the matter more strongly and declares that, if you want self-government, you are only entitled to it if that "self" is worthy of governing.

And because the desirability of self-government depends on the character of the people who govern, the older idea of democracy was very solicitous of the condition of this character. It was solicitous of that collective self which we call public opinion and which, in a democracy, governs us collectively.

And because it cared, this older idea of democracy had
no problem in principle with pornography and/or obscenity. It censored them—and it did so with a perfect clarity of mind and a perfectly clear conscience. It was not about to permit people capriciously to corrupt themselves.

* (34) I have, it may be noticed, uttered that dreadful word, “censorship.” And I am not about to back away from it. If you think pornography and/or obscenity is a serious problem, you have to be for censorship. I'll go even further and say that if you want to prevent pornography and/or obscenity from becoming a problem, you have to be for censorship. And lest there be any misunderstanding as to what I am saying, I'll put it as bluntly as possible: If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship.

* (35) But can a liberal be for censorship? Unless one assumes that being a liberal must mean being indifferent to the quality of American life, then the answer has to be: yes, a liberal can be for censorship—but he ought to favor a liberal form of censorship.

(36) Is that a contradiction in terms? I don't think so. We have no problem in contrasting repressive laws governing alcohol and drugs and tobacco with laws regulating (i.e., discouraging the sale of) alcohol and drugs and tobacco. Laws encouraging temperance are not the same thing as laws that have as their goal prohibition or abolition.

(37) We have not made the smoking of cigarettes a criminal offense. We have, however, and with good liberal conscience, prohibited cigarette advertising on television, and may yet, again with good liberal conscience, prohibit it in newspapers and magazines. The idea of restricting individual freedom, in a liberal way, is not at all unfamiliar to us.

* (38) I therefore see no reason why we should not be able to distinguish repressive censorship from liberal censorship of the written and spoken word.

(39) This possibility, of course, occasions much distress among artists and academics. It is a fact, one that cannot and should not be denied, that any system of censorship is bound, upon occasion, to treat unjustly a particular work of art—to find pornography where there is only gentle eroticism, to find obscenity where none really exists, or to find both where its existence ought to be tolerated because it serves a larger moral purpose.

* (40) It is such works of art that are likely to suffer at the hands of the censor. That is the price one has to be prepared to pay for censorship—even liberal censorship.

(41) But just how high is this price? If you believe, as so many artists seem to believe today, that art is the only sacred activity in our profane and vulgar world—that any man who designates himself an artist thereby acquires a sacred office—then obviously censorship is an intoler-
able form of sacrilege. But for those of us who do not subscribe to this religion of art, the costs of censorship do not seem so high at all.

(42) But I must repeat and emphasize: What kind of laws we pass governing pornography and obscenity, what kind of censorship or —since we are still a federal nation—what kinds of censorship we institute in our various localities may indeed be difficult matters to cope with; nevertheless the real issue is one of principle.

(43) I myself subscribe to a liberal view of the enforcement problem: I think that pornography should be illegal and available to anyone who wants it so badly as to make a pretty strenuous effort to get it. We have lived with under-the-counter pornography for centuries now in a fairly comfortable way. But the issue of principle, of whether it should be over or under the counter, has to be settled before we can reflect on the advantages of alternative modes of censorship.

(44) I think the settlement we are living under now, in which obscenity and democracy are regarded as equals, is wrong; I believe it is inherently unstable: I think it will, in the long run, be incompatible with any authentic concern for the quality of life in our democracy.
VITA

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