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Testing democracy: the case of the 17th amendment and constituency representation

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TESTING DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF THE 17TH AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATION

A Thesis

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By
Rhonda Wrzenski
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines a unique aspect of Congressional history centering on the passage of the 17th amendment in 1913, which shifted the power of U.S. Senate elections from the state legislature to state electorates. This paper examines how the passage of the amendment affected the relationship between characteristics of the state electorate and the roll call behavior of U.S. Senators. Due to the historical nature of the time period, I use Presidential election results by state, party control of the governorship and upper and lower chambers of the state legislature, as well as a number of demographic variables, to estimate each state’s mass ideology. Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE scores are also used to determine the liberal-conservative positions of Senators during this time period. Regression and pooled cross-sectional time-series models are utilized to test the hypotheses. I find that legislators, after the passage of the 17th amendment, become more apt to take the policy views of their constituents into account when voting. I also find evidence that Senators are more conservative in states where conservative elites are strongly agitating for the amendment.
INTRODUCTION

The linkage between constituents and representatives has been a major scholarly focus of political scientists for decades (Weissberg, 1979; Wright, 1989 and Hill and Hurley, 1999 provide just a few examples). Throughout this time period, political scientists have grappled extensively with measurement challenges and the difficulties posed by competing theories in the literature (Stone, 1979; Ardoin and Garand, 2003; LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997; Kuklinski, 1977; Miller and Stokes, 1963 and Erickson 1978). Though this relationship has been studied in many different ways, few scholars have studied representation from a historical standpoint. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the passage of the 17th Amendment affected legislative roll-call responsiveness to state constituencies. I explore how the movement from an indirect to a direct method of election affects the level of representation in the Senate. In order to do this, I collect data on each state’s mass ideology (using presidential election returns, governor and state legislature party control estimates and census data) and each Senator’s ideological position (using Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE scores). I estimate a series of regression and pooled cross-sectional time-series models to take advantage of this natural experiment in the Senate across the time period from the 51st Congress (1889-1891) to the 76th Congress (1939-1941). My goal is to explore whether senators become more attentive to their constituencies over time and particularly after the passage of the 17th amendment in 1913. I expect some level of senatorial responsiveness prior to the ratification of the 17th amendment given that the state legislatures were appointing these officeholders and this institution was a popularly elected body. Given this, I assume that the public had an indirect effect on the outcome of these senate appointments and could
vote out incumbent legislators who appointed senators that did not meet with the public’s approval.

**Historical Background**

The framers designed the Constitution with the implicit intent to control minority and majority factions as much as possible (Edwards, Wattenberg and Lineberry, 2002). This was accomplished through a system of checks and balances, a separation of powers and by limiting majority control. Over time, the Constitution has become increasingly democratized as amendments have expanded the eligible voting population while providing opportunities for the public to vote for more officials than was originally intended. The 17th amendment was just one of these democratizing elements.

The appeal of an amendment mandating popular election of U.S. senators grew as the public became increasingly dissatisfied with the way their legislators were being selected. The prevailing appointment process was centered in the state legislatures where several problems occurred, including: decision deadlocks resulting in long vacancies, interference with legislative business and policymaking, bribery and corruption during the selection process, and the accusation that some appointees were neglecting their constituency obligations and misrepresenting the state’s partisan interests (Haynes, 1938).

This compilation of problems sparked a movement among state legislatures, the U.S. House, and the public to reform the electoral process by creating a system of popular election of senators. By 1905 32 state legislatures had taken some form of formal action by advocating the amendment to Congress (Haynes, 1906). In addition, California, Nevada and Illinois all conducted successful referenda on the popular election of
Senators (Haynes, 1906). Some states also created constitutional amendments or new laws that allowed for the popular election of senators via direct party primaries. However, it was not until the amendment’s ratification that official mandatory reform occurred uniformly across the United States. Starting in 1913, state legislatures no longer had the power to appoint representatives, as this authority was bestowed upon the public. From that point forward, all Senate vacancies were filled through direct popular elections. This change brought an end to the 18-year battle within the United States House to reform the system for selecting Senators (Crook and Hibbing, 1997).

This historical change created a flurry of conjectures from journalists and incumbent Senators regarding what the ensuing period would bring for the institutional body and the democratic process. Not surprisingly, many Senators were against the amendment’s passage and voiced their hostility openly (Crook and Hibbing, 1997). Such a major change could spell political ruin for Senators who were used to being appointed and not elected. Nevertheless, others supported the amendment, believing it could revamp the political system as it stood and bring about the sort of reforms that some equate to modern day term limits.

So, which outlook was more accurate? Did the 17th amendment turn out to be a bane or a boon for representation? The answer to this question has remained largely a mystery as little systematic or empirical analysis has been conducted for this time period. This paper sets out to rectify that shortcoming by examining the representative-constituent linkage after the passage of the 17th amendment through regression and pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis.
LITERATURE REVIEW

At the heart of the discussion on the representative-constituency linkage is the assumption of responsiveness. Responsiveness has taken on different interpretations throughout the literature but perhaps the most basic notion is that of “a meaningful connection between constituency policy preferences or demands and the representative’s official behavior (Eulau and Karps, 1977).” As can be seen by the context of this characterization, this relationship is usually defined within the realm of policy production. However, this responsiveness can take on a number of forms. Representatives can serve informational, distributional, policy oriented and symbolic roles for their individual constituencies, as well as for their respective districts.

Officeholders are visible, powerful connectors between their constituents and the sometimes-uncharitable waters of government bureaucracy. This type of responsiveness can range from routine service, such as, responding to constituency mail and arranging tours to complex casework that might involve handling delays, job placement or program facilitation (Eulau and Karps, 1977). Once elected, many officeholders feel this type of service-oriented responsiveness is part of their Congressional responsibility.

Representatives are also engaged in pork-barrel politics throughout their tenure in office. Stein and Bickers (1995) discuss the electoral connection between particularized and distributive benefits and votes. This presumed connection has led officeholders to engage in logrolling and credit claiming in an effort to maintain or secure greater electoral marginality and reelection probability. It has also meant bankable projects, grants and various infrastructures for the members of the district to use and enjoy.
Perhaps least noted are the representative’s efforts to maintain a good image or level of trust with the public by using certain symbolic gestures or actions. In *Home Style*, Fenno (1978) documents the behavior of Congressmen in their home districts. This is just one example of the connection representatives seek to create between themselves and the voters. In establishing an aura of public responsiveness and good will throughout their terms in office members may hope to increase their chances of reelection via their finely and carefully crafted image.

Finally, officeholders work to create public policy that will provide a name for them both nationally and locally. But, some scholarly literature has called into question just how closely the member should, and does, follow the viewpoints of those he/she represents when crafting the legislation.

Often, responsiveness is examined over the duration of an officeholder’s career (Luttbeg, 1992 and Stratmann, 2000) or in terms of a specific policy arena (Mishler and Campbell, 1978 and Weber and Shaffner, 1972). Other studies postulate that responsiveness is a result of something specific such as ballot initiatives (Lascher, Hagen and Rochlin, 1996), term limits (Carey, Niemi and Powell, 1998) or redistricting (Glazer and Robbins, 1985 and Gelman and King, 1994). What all of these studies have in common is a contemporary outlook on the question of representation. Unfortunately, to date, the literature on representation has largely failed to account for historical dynamics or events that might affect the relationship between an officeholder and its constituency.

One of the most documented theories on legislative responsiveness is found in the work of Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson (1962). These authors examine the various roles that officeholders play using data from four state legislatures. Of these
roles, the most familiar are that of delegate and trustee. The delegate theory of representation argues that a member is a representative of the people and, as such, he/she should represent the ideas and wishes of the district in their creation of public policy. On the other side of the debate, is the trustee theory of representation which argues that public officials have the trust of those who put them into office and, as a result, they are given the authority to make decisions and policy that they feel is best for the district, even if the constituents feel differently (Eulau and Karps, 1977; see also Erikson, 1978).

Miller and Stokes (1963) take this notion of policy control a step further by adding conditions of constituency influence into the framework. The first means of influence comes when a district elects a representative who holds the same policy views as the constituency. Here, a member of Congress is seen as following the will of the public not because they have influenced the officeholder’s decision-making process but because the officeholder’s views are so much a feature of his/her districts that they can’t help but follow the will of their constituents a majority of the time. The second means of influence is more direct. Here, legislators may deviate from their explicit will, at least some of the time, in order to please the voters and have a better chance at reelection.

Legislators provide varying degrees of responsiveness to their constituencies. Some legislators are seen as particularly attentive to the policy views of those in their district while others seem to have more leeway in their behavior. An abundance of literature has been produced in an effort to describe why this is so. Explanations have included electoral proximity (Thomas, 1985), electoral marginality (Kuklinski, 1977) redistricting effects (Glazer and Robbins, 1985), clarity of policy signaling (Ardoin and
Garand, 2003), political engagement (education) of constituency (Ardoin and Garand, 2003), and characteristics of the electorate (Wright, 1989), among others.

Besides these variables, variation in representative’s response levels can be partially explained by the degree to which various actors have some level of influence over a Congressman’s decision-making process. Outside of a representative’s individual policy beliefs and those of his/her constituency, their fellow Congressmen, interest groups, staff members, party leaders and the President, can influence a representative (Kingdon, 1989). If a bill is particularly controversial, salient or complex, a member may rely heavily on some of these forces to the exclusion of others in an effort to make the most appropriate decision.

As one can see, a great body of scholarly research has been produced on the linkage between representatives and constituents in general. However, there has been very little investigation into what effects, if any, the 17th Amendment had on that linkage. Given that elections provide an incentive for legislators to be responsive to their constituents I would expect the amendment to have a significant effect on representation levels. Further, there has been very little research produced on this topic prior to the 1950’s. Thus, it’s important to analyze whether more modern day methodological approaches for measuring constituency ideology will remain adequate proxies during the early 1900’s.
THEORY

In this paper, I argue that the relationship between state constituent ideology and senate roll-call behavior will strengthen after the passage of the 17th amendment and direct popular election. Introducing an election condition and making it a stable political attribute is crucial to assumptions of representation and responsiveness because it holds officeholders accountable to the public. Regular elections give the voters a voice and a chance to elect a challenger to office they feel will better represent their interests. At the same time, once an election condition is established officeholders are confronted with strong electoral incentives to respond to the needs of their constituents. When officeholders must weigh the potential electoral costs of apathy against the benefits of attentiveness they are likely to choose the latter in the hopes of being elected or reelected. No longer are these officeholders beholden to the whims of the legislative elite. Now, they must concern themselves with appealing to the masses.

In each state, the level of agitation for the amendment varied among citizens, Congressmen and state legislatures. Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that senators who hail from states who were active in the fight for the amendment’s passage would be more concerned with representation then those who come from states where agitation is at dismal levels. Senators who are surrounded with a climate of activism and change may see the amendment as an impending phenomenon and make an effort to adjust their behavior before its passage in order to survive in the future.

There are a number of theories to support the notion that officeholders will be attentive to their constituents, especially under certain circumstances. Few scholars would disagree that legislators are concerned with reelection. This concern has borne
two prominent explanations in the political science literature to account for why legislators would willingly choose to be responsive to their electorate. The most prominent explanations are electoral proximity and electoral marginality.

The theory of electoral proximity argues that Senators will tend to modify their voting behavior prior to an election. Officeholders shift ideologically because they believe their more recent votes are the most likely to be remembered by the voters and that the voters will be more attentive to what they are doing when an election is near (Thomas, 1985). But which direct are officeholders likely to shift? Elling (1982) argues that Senators will shift towards “the mean ideological position of all Senators” while Thomas contends that Senators are more likely to move in the direction of whomever the constituency perceives as their electoral opponents (Thomas, 1985, pp. 109).

In a related vein, the theory of electoral marginality argues that officeholders will be more representative when they hail from competitive districts and face stiff electoral competition on a regular basis (Kuklinski, 1977). It has been argued, that an officeholder who maintains a large margin of victory in their most recent election will be more apt to exhibit party loyalty over constituency concerns. On the other hand, if an officeholder is not electorally secure they are more likely to pay attention to the desires of their constituency and vote accordingly.

For the purposes of this research paper, I offer the following research question and hypotheses:

RQ: How did the 17th Amendment affect legislative roll-call responsiveness to state constituencies?
The hypotheses are that, in the United States Senate:

**Primary Hypothesis**

H_1: Legislative responsiveness will increase as a result of Senators moving from a no-election condition (prior to the passage of the 17th amendment) to an election condition (after the passage of the 17th amendment). This will allow for a more positive relationship to develop between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting behavior, measured on a liberal/conservative dimension after the ratification of the 17th amendment.

**Secondary Hypothesis**

H_2: The relationship between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting behavior will be stronger and more positive among the states that agitated for the popular election of senators prior to the amendment’s ratification.
PRIOR APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES TO MEASURING CONSTITUENT IDEOLOGY

In order to analyze the relationship between constituency policy preferences and roll call behavior on the part of the legislators it is necessary to have measures of both concepts. Roll call data are assessable for both the state and federal legislative bodies. Perhaps best known in these studies, is Poole and Rosenthal’s extensive database of roll call votes and member ideology scores spanning the entire history of Congress. Public access to this database has made measuring the dependent variable in these types of studies much less challenging then finding adequate independent variables to measure constituency preferences. A lack of resources, both monetary and otherwise, has made it exceedingly difficult to obtain efficient and unbiased estimators of district ideology.

In the face of this, researchers have created a number of surrogates. These include demographic indicators (Ardoin and Garand, 2003; Froman, 1963), presidential election results (LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997; Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1986), referenda votes (Kuklinski, 1977; McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979), aggregated survey data (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Wright, Erickson and McIver, 1987; Wright, 1989) and simulations of opinion (Erickson 1978; Sullivan and Minns, 1976)

Demographic Variables

Political scientists often rely on demographic indicators to measure the ideology of constituencies and to tease out district level policy preferences. These indicators are often obtained from U.S. Census data and may include such variables as education, race, population density, home ownership, age and income.

In an effort to provide evidence that differences in Democratic and Republican voting behavior are not solely based on party or ideology, Froman (1963), uses a number
of demographic variables to establish that inter-party differences are partially the result of differing constituencies. Likewise, Ardoin and Garand (2003) use demographic variables to help create measures of state ideology, which were then used to generate ideology scores for each House district throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Though many prominent research articles and books have used demographic variables in their models, it’s important to remember that in order to do so the authors had to make some implicit assumptions about their connection to actual policy preferences. Some of these assumptions are risky and may not be well supported by quantitative evidence.

“In particular, one assumes that (1) individuals’ demographic characteristics are related systematically to their policy preferences, (2) legislators are aware of the demographic composition of their districts and take those characteristics (or at least how they interpret those characteristics) into account when making roll call decisions, and (3) such a relationship holds when one moves across levels of analysis (i.e. from the individual level to the aggregate level).”

-Ardoin and Garand, 2003

Though demographic variables, such as those listed above, can be helpful in explaining some variation they are not without their flaws. No demographic characteristic will be perfectly correlated with district-level policy preferences. Just as legislators rely on cues outside of the makeup of their district, so should a researcher, when possible, work to improve the predictive power of their model by adding other estimators in along with their demographic indicators.

**Presidential Elections**

Presidential election results are often used independently or along with demographic characteristics as a way of defining the ideology or policy preferences of
constituencies. These types of studies were particularly popular in the 1980s as a wealth of literature came out using presidential election results as a proxy for constituency ideology. The underling idea behind its usage is that voters employ their ideological viewpoints as a tool in the process of determining which candidate to support with their vote on Election Day. Thus, by aggregating election results in each state, one can gain a depiction of district ideology. Unfortunately, presidential election results may not mirror the atmosphere of state or local politics where ideological returns may be much closer and diverse. Further, outside environmental factors and forces, such as the state of the economy or a war, may have an affect on election results that would not occur if these causes were not present. Finally, as Ardoin and Garand (2003) point out, presidential elections are not all created equal. Some elections are much more ideologically focused then others (see also, Rabinowitz, Gurian and MacDonald, 1984.)

Just as with demographic characteristics, referenda results also contain implicit assumptions. “In particular, one assumes, “(a) that short-term factors determining the vote have a fairly uniform effect across sub-national constituencies and (2) that constituency ideology is the only significant long-term factor affecting the vote (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1986).”

In Rabinowitz, Gurian and MacDonald (1984) the authors estimate a spatial model of state presidential election results from 1944-1980. They find that party and ideology are the principal structural elements in elections. This finding provides support for the argument that elections may be an adequate means of examining state or district ideology.
LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997), use principal component analysis to examine whether partisanship and ideology will remain as underlying forces in state presidential elections results over the 1960-1992 period. Their results mirror those of Rabinowitz, Gurian and MacDonald. However, they find that highly ideological elections tend to provide better proxies of constituency ideology and recommend examining election results over a number of elections in order to create more reliable estimates.

Referenda Voting

In lieu of these drawbacks, some scholars have resorted to referenda votes as a way of getting at district preferences and ideology. Unfortunately, few states have referenda elections and this makes creating a measure to represent constituency opinion across every state utterly impossible.

Kuklinski (1977) uses voting returns in California to analyze district competitiveness across three policy dimensions: contemporary liberalism, taxation and government administration. In the former study Kuklinski finds varied support for the effect of competitive districts and party position on the relationship between district opinion and roll call behavior. In the later article, McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) find that district opinion can be a powerful determinant of roll call behavior if the representative feels he is a delegate, if the policy issue has saliency and if the constituency provides clear policy cues.

Aggregated Survey Data

For a period in the 1980’s, a number of articles came out which used aggregated public opinion surveys to capture ideology at the state level. Prior to this, Miller and Stokes (1963) used small sample surveys as a way to gain proxy measures of ideology.
They interviewed a sample of constituents in each congressional district, as well as, the Congressmen themselves and then examined three policy domains. They found that House members tend to vote along with their perceptions of constituency views, as well as, with their own individual views in these three domain areas.

Wright, Erickson and McIver (1987) aggregate CNS News/New York Times national opinion surveys to construct a measure of public opinion and ideological positions within the states. They find that state opinion plays a major factor in helping to determine state policy and that these preferences play a greater role than either social or economic factors.

Finally Wright (1989), using these same aggregated surveys, makes an effort to examine what types of group or constituencies Senators represent. They find that Senators listen most to the policy views of party elites and Independents. Further, their results show that partisan ideology has little to no effect on senatorial decision-making. In short, each individual constituency may have a unique influence on a member that is divorced from the type of effect another constituency might have on the same member.

Unfortunately, using survey results such as these, or more commonly, American National Election Studies to get at district level public opinion is impossible given that no surveys were conducted around the turn of the century. Even today, survey usage is problematic due to small sample sizes, language barriers and difficulties with measuring concepts and wording questions.

**Simulations of Opinion**

Computer simulation techniques have also been developed in several research pieces to test the linkage between constituency policy preferences and voting behavior.
These techniques are typically refereed to as “top down” or “bottom up” simulation approaches. A “top down” approach occurs when data is taken from a higher level of aggregation to simulate opinion at a lower level. A “bottom up” approach is used when data is taken from a lower level of aggregation to simulate opinion at a higher level of aggregation (Ardoin and Garand, 2003). Here, a “top down” model may approximate constituent ideology from the state-level to the district-level while a “bottom up” model may approximate ideology from the individual-level to the district or state-level.

Sullivan and Minns (1976) use simulation to create measures for ideological opinion in 32 states. They find that party preference, rather than issue preference, affects a candidate’s ideological positioning in an election and, in turn, voter behavior.

Like Sullivan and Minns, Erikson (1978) uses simulation to measure constituency opinion. His concludes that partisan candidates tend to have a higher probability of electoral success if their views are in-line with their constituents. Comparing his results with those of Miller and Stokes, he finds higher correlations between constituency opinion and congressional behavior.

Like the aforementioned approaches, these methods have not escaped without some degree of criticism. Higher levels of random error may plague “bottom up” approaches because individual-level data is more likely to suffer from measurement error than that at the aggregate level (Ardoin and Garand, 2003). On the other hand, “top down” approaches can inflate the importance of key figures or hierarchical control while undervaluing the actions taken by individuals (Ringquist, 1993).
DATA AND METHODS

Few question the difficulty associated with measuring constituency ideology. It seems that regardless of the method used, there are numerous drawbacks or incentives associated with it. Unfortunately, a number of the aforementioned methods can’t be utilized effectively for the time period under study here.

The 17th Amendment was passed in 1912 and the ratification process was completed on April 8, 1913. In order to encompass the time period prior to and after the amendment’s passage I select a time series from the 51st Congress (1889-1891) to the 76th Congress (1939-1941). This time period allows me to examine representation under two distinct partisan eras: Republican from 1889-1924 and Democratic from 1932-1941 (Edwards, Wattenberg and Lineberry, 2002).

The dependent variable in the model is the liberal-conservative ideology scores of Senators as created by Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE program. Eliminating non-conflict votes, they establish an 85% predictive accuracy across all roll call votes. The authors have found that Senator ideology scores have remained very stable over the first dimensional structure of roll call voting which makes them an ideal measure for this type of historical analysis.

Some states are excluded in the Poole and Rosenthal database during parts of this time period because of their date of entry into statehood. These include Arizona (which gained statehood in 1912), New Mexico (which gained statehood in 1912) and Oklahoma (which gained statehood in 1907). Estimates for Alaska and Hawaii (which both earned statehood in 1959) were excluded from Poole and Rosenthal’s dataset for the entire time
period under focus here. In addition, some states lack full representation due to legislative deadlocks, which generate periodic vacancies in the dataset.

Several independent variables are also included in the model to estimate the ideology of the 48 states. These variables have been cited in several scholarly works as possible surrogates for mass state ideology. One component of constituent ideology can be examined using census estimates. In my model I use the following variables to estimate ideology at the state level: population density, percent of the population that is black, percent homeownership rate, and percent metropolitan. (For a complete and detailed list of the variables used in my dataset see Appendix 1).

The data for these variables are supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau and are obtained from a special report on demographic trends in the 20th century compiled by Hobbs and Stoops, which was issued in 2002. The data span from 1900-1940. Unfortunately, due to data availability issues (a fire occurred in 1921 which destroyed or damaged a significant portion of the census records for 1890) I am unable to obtain compatible measures for several variables within the dataset from 1900-1940 (Blake, 1996). As a result, I exclude the 1890 census estimates from my analysis. In addition, data was only available for the percent metropolitan variable from 1910-1940 and population density is used as a surrogate for the first decade under analysis.

In accordance with these variables, I hypothesize that homeownership and the size of the black population should be positively related to state conservatism (except in the South where blacks were largely disenfranchised and whites voted overwhelmingly Democratic) while the percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas should be negatively related to state conservatism. It has been noted that prior to the black
realignment in the 1930’s, Northern blacks voted Republican in greater numbers (Bolce, Maio, Muzzio, 1992). Thus, only in the last five to ten years of my dataset do I expect to see the Democratic Party becoming increasingly synonymous with the black vote. Next, from the mid to late 19\textsuperscript{th} century through the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, urban political machines frequently ran politics in the big cities and these machines were often seen as instruments for immigrants and the poor (Stone, 1996). Though these machines were sustained more through patronage than ideology, many were tied to the Democratic Party. Finally, throughout history the Democratic Party has been associated with blue-collar workers while the Republican Party has been considered a champion of the well to do. Using home ownership as a surrogate for income I assume that states with a high rate of home ownership may exhibit more conservative attributes then those with lower levels of ownership.

In order to create a more precise measure of state ideology and to obtain more data reference points throughout this time period, presidential election results for each state are included in the analysis from 1892-1936. By combining these estimates of liberalism-conservatism with other state demographic characteristics one can gain a more accurate picture of true constituency preferences and raise the predictive power of the model. The data for this variable was obtained from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

I follow the standard measure of the Republican presidential vote. This variable is computed as the, “average percentage of the vote for Republican candidates” in a given election. I hypothesize that representatives who have a very high or very low average percentage of the vote going to Republicans will send more clear policy cues to their
representative. In turn, these representative’s ideology scores will more closely reflect those of their constituency. Further, I expect to find that this variable has a positive relationship to state ideology. I reason that states with high Republican support scores will be less apt to deviate from the conservative position (except in the South).

In an effort to further define the ideology of the states under consideration I examine the party composition of popularly elected government institutions in the states, these being the governorship and the upper and lower houses of the state legislature. In so doing, I aim to gain a better understanding of the partisan climate within each state. The governorship data was obtained from a variety of websites (see Appendix 2) and Dr. Brian Gaines at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign graciously provided the data for the state legislatures. This data spans from the 51st to the 76th Congress and throughout this time period a serious effort is made to match up the session lengths of these institutions and officeholders with each session of Congress. For the governorship data, each session of Congress is coded according to which party held the governor’s seat. When two different parties controlled the governorship during a given Congress the party who held the office the longest was designated for that session. Only when the governorship was split equally between one session of Congress was the session coded to denote the power sharing that took place. For the state legislative data, each session of Congress is coded according to the average of the partisan split within the upper and lower chambers of each state.

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1 I collect data on gubernatorial party control because governors can exert a great deal of influence over the legislature and its agenda. In addition, occasionally the governor appointed senators when a state legislature was unable to come to a consensus, although, in these instances the governor’s appointment power was typically overturned by the courts or rejected by the senate (Hall, 1936).
Given this, my model, which is constructed to estimate state ideology scores for all the states included in Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE dataset is constructed as follows:

\[ \text{D-NOMINATE} = a + b_1 \text{ (average Republican Presidential vote)} + b_2 \text{ (% black)} + b_3 \text{ (% home ownership)} + b_4 \text{ (% metropolitan population)} + b_5 \text{ (party control of the governorship + party control of the upper and lower house in the state legislature)} \]

In addition, a unique quasi-experiment is conducted by comparing states that were active in the movement for popular elections prior to the amendment’s ratification against those that were largely dormant. This level of activity is comprised by combining information on each state’s involvement, where applicable, with direct primary legislation, referenda, congressional joint resolutions, memorials from state legislatures and petitions from organized and unorganized citizens (see Hall, 1936; Merriam and Overacker, 1928; Merriam, 1908; Haynes, 1906 and 1938). By selecting these measures I represent the activity level across the three key dimensions in each state: Congress, state legislatures and the public. The activity level on each of these dimensions is accounted for from the 1800’s to the early 1900’s and then totaled. The states are then broken up into three classification groups based on their total number of activities. A state is classified as low if they conducted eight or fewer activities, mid if they conducted between nine and 19 activities and high if they conducted 20 or more. Each state’s classification division can be found in Appendix 3.
I reason that states which were more active in agitating for the amendment and had some level of participation by the public in senate elections prior to the ratification will be more apt to exhibit a positive trend in representative-constituent ideological congruence than states without this degree of activity.
ANALYSIS

The data analysis in this paper covers a time series from 1889-1941 with the intervention point set in 1913 (the year the 17th amendment was ratified). The selection of this time frame was designed so that enough time is allotted for Senators from both the Republican and the Democratic parties to have transitioned from a condition of no electoral threat to one of constant electoral risk.

In order to fully capture the variation in the independent variables over the 52-year time span the analysis was broken down into sections. To begin, I estimate regression models for each presidential election year using the senator’s DWNOMINATE score as the dependent variable and the Republican presidential vote and state party control (Republican control of the governorship and state legislature) as the independent variables.

Table 1: Regression estimates for models of senator ideology by presidential election year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constant b</th>
<th>Constant t</th>
<th>GOP Presidential Vote b</th>
<th>GOP Presidential Vote t</th>
<th>State Party Control b</th>
<th>State Party Control t</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>-2.62***</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>9.72***</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>9.21***</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
<td>-3.16***</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>3.35***</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>10.68***</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>1.45*</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>11.16***</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
<td>-2.39***</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>2.96***</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>7.77***</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-4.09***</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>4.45***</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>8.47***</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>.436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
<td>-3.48***</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>3.49***</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>4.86***</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>-2.89***</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td>3.43***</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>3.10***</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>-0.584</td>
<td>-6.34***</td>
<td>1.364</td>
<td>6.77***</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>1.57*</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>-0.232</td>
<td>-1.95**</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>2.42***</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>7.64***</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>-3.59***</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>4.42***</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>4.72***</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-2.47***</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>1.38*</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>5.19***</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** prob < .01  
**  prob < .05  
*  prob < .10

Although the pattern is not perfect, over time we can see some support for my primary hypothesis. Beginning with the Republican presidential vote one can see that prior to 1900 this variable was not significant and only weakly related to the conservativeness of senators. This is not surprising given that the first eight years saw only building state agitation for the amendment and most Senators were not presented with an incentive to be responsive. Between 1908 and 1912 states were increasingly adopting the Oregon Plan or had some form of direct election in place spurring senators to become more attentive to their newly voting publics. This is reflected in the high levels of significance for this variable. In 1916 the first elections for Senators are held and the relationship between the Republican presidential vote and the conservatism of senators remains very significant until 1936. Next, looking at the state party control variable we see much the same effect in reverse. Here, the relationship between Republican control at the state level and the conservatism of senators is very strong prior
to the first senate elections in 1916. Although, this relationship retains is significance level following these elections the coefficients only reach the level experienced prior to 1916 once (in 1928).

These results demonstrate that after the ratification of the 17th amendment, Senators are listening more to the voters and less to the elites. This provides support for my primary hypothesis, which stated that legislative responsiveness would increase as a result of Senators moving from a no-election condition to an election condition.

In order to visualize the trend in table one across time I generate a figure that plots the regression coefficients for both the presidential vote and state party control variables by presidential election year.

Figure 1: Coefficients for presidential vote and party control
Here we can see that the general trend in the presidential vote variable is upward while the party control variable is moving slightly downward. Furthermore, we can see that the coefficients for the presidential vote are much larger than those for party control; demonstrating the heightened importance of the public in determining the conservativeness of senators.

Before moving on to estimating panel models I tested the level of variance for each state. To do this, I generated graphs plotting the state party control variable by presidential election year for each state. I also ran a regression model for presidential election year against my state party control variable for each state. The following states showed no movement along the x-axis and returned no regression statistics and were subsequently dropped from the rest of the analysis, as these states proved unable to respond to my leverage variables: Vermont, Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Oklahoma.

After examining the relationship between senator and constituent ideology for each presidential election year I estimate a pooled cross-sectional time-series (panel) model to capture the effect. For this model constituent ideology is represented by the Republican presidential vote, state party control and three census variables (percent metropolitan, percent black and percent home ownership). The South is excluded from this model, as is Vermont, which exhibited no variance over time.
### Table 2: Panel estimates for senator ideology for the non south excluding non varying states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Presidential Vote (+)</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Control (+)</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Metropolitan (-)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black (+)</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Home Ownership (+)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                            | 336     |
| Psuedo R²                    | .257    |

***prob<.01  
** prob<.05  
* prob<.10

Here, we can see that the Republican presidential vote is significantly related to the conservativeness of senators, providing further support for my primary hypothesis. The state party control variable does not exhibit any degree of significance, which demonstrates that the elites do not have the same amount of influence on the conservativeness of senators as the public does. Only the percent homeownership variable is correctly signed but does not reach any level of significance.

Next, I estimate a panel model to examine how the relationship between senator and constituent ideology changes after the ratification of the 17th amendment. Once
again, the model is ran excluding the South and Vermont, which exhibited no variance in earlier tests.

**Table 3: Panel estimates for senator ideology in the pre-post ratification periods for the non south excluding non varying states**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prior to Ratification</th>
<th>After Ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Presidential Vote (+)</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Control (+)</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>5.92***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Metropolitan (-)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-1.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black (+)</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Home Ownership (+)</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-1.83**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psuedo R²</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.720</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***prob<.01  
**  prob<.05  
*    prob<.10

This table provides strong support for my primary hypothesis. Here, the Republican presidential vote goes from a point prior to the amendment where the more conservative voters where the less conservative senators were to a point after the ratification where senate and constituent conservativeness is strongly aligned and highly significant. The state party control variable shows that prior to the amendment the conservativeness of the elites in the state were strongly tied to the conservativeness of
senators. After the ratification of the 17th amendment this effect reduces substantially and the variable does not retain its significance. After the ratification of the 17th amendment, the presence of a metropolitan area has less of an effect on the conservativeness of senators. The percent black variable is signed incorrectly and follows more traditional understandings of the tie between African Americans and conservatism. The percent home ownership variable does move in the correct direction after ratification of the 17th amendment but does not achieve statistical significance.

Finally, I ran a panel model to test my secondary hypothesis that the relationship between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting behavior will be stronger and more positive among the states that agitated for the popular election of senators prior to the amendment’s ratification. This model was run with all non-varying states excluded. Here, constituent ideology is a factor of two variables, the Republican presidential vote and state party control.

Table 4: Panel estimates for senator ideology by agitation level excluding non varying states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Agitation</th>
<th>Medium Agitation</th>
<th>Low Agitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Pres. Vote (+)</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Control (+)</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>3.06***</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>599</th>
<th>547</th>
<th>642</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psuedo R</td>
<td>.299</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***prob<.01
** prob<.05
* prob<.10
The results provide partial support for my hypothesis. It’s important to note before examining these results that prior to this moment my hypothesis suggested that state party control should go down in importance and the presidential vote should go up as a function of the elites having less control over the appointment process of senators and the public having more. In short, Senators are becoming more responsive to the people and less to the state elites. Here, the same reasoning holds for the presidential vote but not for the state party control variable. Since agitation is a function of the activity in Congress, in the state legislatures and among the public both of these variables should play a stronger role in states where agitation is high. In short, Senators are likely to be more conservative in states where both a conservative public and a conservative group of elites are pushing for the amendment.

To begin, while the Republican presidential vote has the greatest effect on the conservativeness of senators in states that were actively agitating for the amendment it has its next biggest effect in states whose level of activism was largely dismal. Moreover, in none of these agitation levels does the presidential vote reach significance. However, looking at state party control we see that the degree of Republicanism among the state elites played a much stronger role in the states that agitated for the amendment, as hypothesized.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In conclusion, I found some support for both my primary and secondary hypotheses. My primary hypothesis stated that a positive relationship should develop between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting behavior after the ratification of the 17th amendment. As evidence of this, between the 51st and the 76th Congress, the conservatism of the voters is shown to have a significant effect on the conservatism of senators while the conservatism of the elites does not demonstrate any significant effect. Furthermore, following the ratification of the amendment in 1913, the relationship between the voters and the senators is very pronounced while the relationship between the state elites and the senators becomes insignificant. Both of these findings provide evidence that legislative responsiveness has increased as a result of senators moving from a no-election condition to a state of constant electoral threat. As hypothesized, Senators are paying more attention to the ideology of the voters then to that of the governor and the upper and lower chambers of the state legislature.

I found only partial support for my secondary hypothesis, which argued that the relationship between characteristics of the state electorate and the roll call behavior of U.S. Senators would become stronger and more positive among the states that voiced their desire for the amendment the loudest prior to the amendment’s ratification. I found that voter ideology was not significantly related to senate ideology at any of the agitation levels. However, the degree of Republicanism among the state elites played a much stronger role in the states that agitated for the amendment, as hypothesized.

It’s important to note here that measuring constituent ideology is an imperfect process. Researchers have used a number of surrogates to try to get at ideology, and
although they have been accepted as reasonable approximates in the literature they are not flawless. Given the historical time period under consideration I was unable to fall back on contemporary measures of ideology, such as public opinion polls or aggregated survey data. Therefore, this paper makes the best use of the data available given the constraints and methodological challenges presented.

These aforementioned results are important because they establish a link between representatives and their constituents and demonstrate that representatives do not exist in a vacuum and that, even though other internal and external forces may put pressures on members, a representative’s constituency does play an important factor in their voting decisions.

As the next step in this project, I plan to add in a seniority variable with the data I have collected on each Senator’s term length from the 51st to the 76th Congress. In this manner I hope to examine whether incumbency has an effect on senatorial responsiveness. I also plan to examine turnover levels across this time period to see whether the 17th amendment had a stabilizing effect on this phenomenon.
REFERENCES


## APPENDIX A
### VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Session of Congress – Ranging from 51 to 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>The year each presidential election was held – Ranging from 1888 to 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Post Amendment</td>
<td>0 = prior to ratification of the 17th amendment 1 = after ratification of the 17th amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification</td>
<td>0 = before ratification of the 17th amendment 1 = after ratification of the 17th amendment 3 = amendment never ratified 4 = amendment rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Agitation</td>
<td>Variable was estimated for each state by summing the number of congressional joint resolutions proposed on the direction election of senators from 1820-1910, the list of memorials from state legislatures from 1870-1910 and the citizen petitions for popular elections from 1880-1910. 1 = high agitation 2 = medium agitation 3 = low agitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWNOMINATE Dimension 1</td>
<td>Approximates a Senator’s ideology through roll call votes – Ranges from −1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>Calculated by dividing the total population by land area (people per square mile or square kilometer of land area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>Calculated by dividing the total black population from the total population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Home Ownership Rate</td>
<td>According to the U.S. Census Bureau, “The proportion of households that are owner occupied. It is computed by dividing the number of owner-occupied housing units by the total number of occupied housing units, times 100.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Metro</td>
<td>According to the U.S. Census Bureau, a metropolitan district can be defined as, “A statistical area comprising a central city and adjacent incorporated places, densely settled Minor Civil Divisions (MCDs) and, in some cases, enumeration districts (EDs). It was used in the 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 decennial censuses (with changes in the underlying criteria).”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State Party Control  Ranges from –3 (Democratic control of the upper and lower chamber and governorship) to 3 (Republican control of the upper and lower chamber and governorship).

Republican Presidential Vote  Calculated as the Republican raw vote divided by the total vote per state.

Region$^2$  $1 = \text{North}  2 = \text{Midwest}  3 = \text{South}  4 = \text{West}$

No Variance  $0 = \text{state varies across presidential election years on the state party control dimension}  1 = \text{the state does not vary across presidential elections on the state party control dimension}$

---

$^2$ Northern states are designated as follows: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA, NJ, DE and MD. Midwestern states are designated as follows: OH, IN, IL, MI, WI, MN, IA, MO, KS, and NE. Southern states are designated as follows: OK, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, LA, AR, TX, TN and KY. Western states are designated as follows: CA, OR, NV, CO, ND< SD< MT, WA, ID, WY, UT, AZ and NM.
APPENDIX B
PARTY CONTROL DATA SOURCES

The party control data on the governor was collected from a variety of websites. The primary source for this information was the NNDB, which is “an intelligence aggregator” that tracks the activities of noteworthy individuals both alive and deceased. This source provided data for 38 states on each governor’s name, birth date, date of death, party affiliation and term length. In the case of ten states (UT, WY, WA, RI, VT, TN, WV, WI, SD and VA) data was not available from the NNDB. Thus, for these ten states, data on the aforementioned variables was collected from the following resources: The Rhode Island Office of the Secretary of State, The Official Website of the State of Tennessee, The West Virginia Division of Culture and History, The Official Website of the State of Utah, The South Dakota State Historical Society, The Official Commonwealth of Virginia Home Page, The Wyoming Secretary of State’s Website, Washington State Digital Library Resources, World Statesmen and The Knapp House. (See the reference section for detailed citations).
### APPENDIX C
### STATE AGITATION CLASSIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>States within these Agitation Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>AL, AZ, CT, DE, FL, GA, LA, ME, MD, MA, MS, NH, NJ, NM, ND, RI, SC, UT, VT, VA, WV, WY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>AR, CA, CO, ID, KY, MN, MT, NE, NC, OK, PA, SD, TX, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MO, NY, OH, OR, TN, WI, NV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA

Rhonda Wrzenski is a graduate student in the department of political science at Louisiana State University. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree at Hastings College in Hastings, Nebraska, in May of 2003, graduating cum laude. She will earn her Master of Arts degree in May of 2005.